Front Cover
 Half Title
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Concept and methodology
 The bureaucrat
 The bureaucracy
 The bureaucract in perspective
 Back Cover


The government executive of modern Peru
University Press of Florida ( Publisher )
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053781/00001
 Material Information
Title: The government executive of modern Peru
Series Title: Latin American monographs (Gainesville, Fla.)
Physical Description: ix, 141 p. : map. ; 23 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Hopkins, Jack W
Publisher: University of Florida Press
Place of Publication: Gainesville, FL
Publication Date: 1967
Subjects / Keywords: Government executives -- Peru   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Bibliography: Bibliography: p. 135-138.
Statement of Responsibility: by Jack W. Hopkins.
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Half Title
        Page i
        Page ii
    Title Page
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Table of Contents
        Page ix
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
    Concept and methodology
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
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        Page 83
    The bureaucrat
        Page 84
        Page 85
        Page 86
        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
        Page 91
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        Page 107
    The bureaucracy
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
    The bureaucract in perspective
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
        Page 121
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    Back Cover
        Page 144
Full Text

Second Series


The Government Executive

of Modern



The Government Executive
of Modern Peru


THE CONTEMPORARY Latin American gov-
ernment executive has been an enigmatic
individual whose identity has been lost in
the general and descriptive studies which
have been made of him. In this mono-
graph the author carefully examines and
defines him for the first time. Through an
empirical investigation of the origins and
family, education and attitudes, and back-
ground and mobility of the senior bureau-
crats of the government of Peru he presents
a factual and realistic analysis of the Latin
American bureaucrat and bureaucracy.
The country of Peru was chosen by the
author because of its transitional quality,
a characteristic which it shares with the
other republics of Latin America. Because
of this it provides "much potential for ap-
plication of some of the features" of Fred
W. Riggs' study of the prismatic society.
Also, Dr. Hopkins found that the "appear-
ance of the work of W. Lloyd Warner and
his colleagues on United States government
executives offered an excellent opportunity
for a comparative study in another system
of public administration."
Peru is slowly, often hesitatingly, ad-
vancing into the modern world. However,
its highly centralized governmental struc-
ture is essentially that imposed by the

The Government Executive of Modern Peru

The Government Executive
of Modern Peru





Committee on Publications

Professor of Political Science
Professor of Economics
Professor of Geography
Graduate Research Professor
of Agricultural Economics
Professor of Spanish

A University of Florida Press Publication



Who knows how far it was from


Dr. Gladys M. Kammerer, Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Public Administration Clearing
Service, University of Florida. At that time, the ap-
pearance of the work of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues,
The American Federal Executive, offered the stimulating
possibility of applying a similar conceptual framework and
research methodology to the Latin American environment.
The author was fortunate in obtaining a research consult-
antship with the Institute of Public Administration of New
York, under which the year 1964-65 was spent in a technical
assistance program and research in the bureaucracy of Peru.
Membership in the team effort of IPA, which was under con-
tract with the U. S. Agency for International Development
(AID), afforded an invaluable opportunity for the author to
work as a participant-observer in the Peruvian bureaucracy.
Our host organization, the Oficina Nacional de Racionaliza-
ci6n y Capacitaci6n de la Administraci6n Pdblica (ONRAP),
aided in access to the Peruvian government and members of
the bureaucracy which otherwise would have been most diffi-
cult to achieve.
Much is owed to many people for their assistance, cooper-
ation, and comfort during the period of the research. Dr.

Kammerer has been a thorough and helpful critic throughout.
To Daniel Kilty and John C. Honey, formerly of IPA, I express
my deep appreciation for both material aid and intellectual
stimulus in keeping the study properly oriented. James C.
Watson, formerly Chief of Mission of IPA/Peru, spent many
hours discussing methodological problems with me. Professor
Erwin C. Bard of Brooklyn College, formerly with IPA/Peru,
offered much helpful insight from his observations of Peru-
vian society. Professors W. Lloyd Warner of Michigan State
University and Paul P. Van Riper of Cornell University gave
their approval of the use of their questionnaire in the Peru-
vian study, and Dr. Van Riper offered suggestions on coding
problems. To Ernest DeProspo of Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, a colleague in IPA/Peru, my thanks for our many ses-
sions where mutual problems were talked over. I am deeply
in debt to Olga Janssen of Miraflores, Lima, for her help in
translation and for brightening the research environment in
general. To those in ONRAP, Lima, who made us welcome,
especially Harry Mufioz Carro and Roberto Chocano, my
deepest thanks. Much assistance was given also by the Presi-
dente Ejecutivo of ONRAP, Victor Miranda Nieto, by Javier
Medina del Rio, and by Ingeniero Eduardo Watson Cisneros
and Sr. Anselmi of the Convenio de Estadistica y Cartogra-
fia, Lima.
My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Harry Kantor of the
University of Florida, not only for his acute insight into Latin
American life and politics, but also for some fascinating joint
ramblings in Peru.
Finally, to Kat, Dave, Mark, and Susan, my apologies for the
many hours of neglect.
The present study was initiated in 1964 under the auspices
of the Institute of Public Administration of New York. Al-
though the empirical field investigation for the study was
performed in consultation with the Chief of Mission of the
IPA program in Peru, and although the project had the official
sponsorship of IPA and ONRAP, the interpretations and con-
clusions of the study are the responsibility only of the author.


Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia


Introduction / 1
Concept and Methodology / 10
Profiles / 36
Families / 69
The Bureaucrat / 84
The Bureaucracy / 108
The Bureaucrat in Perspective / 118
Appendices / 121
Bibliography / 135
Index / 139


T HE LATIN AMERICAN government executive is essen-
tially an unknown element. He has been discussed in
general terms, assigned to certain classes and groups,
and accused of a multitude of administrative mal-
practices largely on the basis of impressionistic evidence. Few,
indeed, and limited in scope are the studies which have at-
tempted to probe more deeply by means of detailed and sys-
tematic investigation of these factors. The result is that the
Latin American government official has remained obscured
behind the barriers of language, the "Latin mystique," and
impressionistic generalization. It is vaguely understood that
these executives differ from the general population of their
countries, that they appear to be the products of certain
geographic areas of their nations, that they are descended
from a group apart, educated in a kind of classical system
out-of-touch with reality, entering and holding their positions
and controlling entry of others through a network of ami-
guismo. Yet the feeling is nebulous and the evidence is nil;
the Latin American executive remains an enigma.
To attempt to formulate a more realistic and a more solidly
based interpretation of the Latin American government ex-

ecutive, the present study consists of an empirical investiga-
tion of the backgrounds, origins, mobility, and attitudes of a
group of senior executives of the government of Peru.
Several reasons converged to make Peru an appropriate
choice for such a study. Considered in terms of development,
Peru appeared to possess a number of the attributes of a
"transitional" country, in the sense used by Fred W. Riggs in
his work on the prismatic society.1 Thus the government of
Peru seemed to provide much potential for application of some
of the features of Riggs' model. In addition, the probable
transitional character of the country suggested that its bu-
reaucracy and the executives who run it might tend to fall
somewhere on the continuum between Riggs' prismatic bu-
reaucracy and the more fully developed institutions of a nation
such as the United States.2 Finally, the appearance of the
work of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues on United States
government executives3 offered an excellent opportunity for a
comparative study in another system of public administration.
The increasingly important role of government and its impact
on Peruvian society naturally focus attention upon the mem-
bers of the government of Peru who occupy positions of high
responsibility. The influence of national government officials
in Peru probably has increased during recent years despite
various attempts at decentralization of national government
power. Despite continued pressure for reform of the local
government structure of Peru, essentially the same arrange-
ments-characterized by a high degree of centralization-
have persisted from colonial times.
The centralized pattern set during Spain's rule of the Vice-
royalty of Peru was carried over to the post-independence
unitary system. This continuity of administrative centraliza-
tion stands in marked contrast to the social and geographic
dichotomies of Peru. Although sporadic attempts have been
made to achieve some measure of decentralization, until the

1. Especially in Administration in Developing Countries (complete in-
formation concerning works cited will be found in the Bibliography).
2. Almond and Coleman place Peru in the group of countries with a
"semi-competitive" political system. On the scale of political modernity,
they describe Peru as "mixed" (between modern and "traditional"),
along with Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. Almond and Coleman,
The Politics of the Developing Areas, p. 534.
3. Warner et al., The American Federal Executive.

Introduction 3

very recent past the results have been meager and many of
the various experiments at devolution proved to be short-
Various factors, such as the continued centralized govern-
mental system of Peru, the traditional dominance of Lima
over the national life of Peru, and the reputed important role
of a small elite group, combine to emphasize the importance
of understanding the leaders of the Peruvian government.
Almost any study of bureaucracy derives utility from basic
formulations concerning bureaucratic organizations as set
forth by Max Weber in his ideal model.4 In his model, organi-
zational tasks are set up through clear-cut division of labor
and high specialization, both designed to foster expertness.
Offices are arranged in a hierarchy. Formal rules and regula-
tions govern official decisions and actions. Officials are imper-
sonal, looking upon clients as cases, not people. Administration
is performed by full-time officials who are thoroughly and
expertly trained, and by general rules which are quite stable
and comprehensive.
A shift from traditional and utopian approaches in studying
public administration toward various approaches using em-
pirical research gradually led to a more realistic understand-
ing. As Selznick and others of the sociological school delved
further into large organizations,5 a much clearer light was
cast on the way that formal organizations work. The actors
in these organizations, the executives and the bureaucrats,
came to be recognized as elements far more humanly frail
chan Weber's model implies.
Management of the organizations studied by Selznick, for
example, proved to be much more complicated in terms of
motivation and unanticipated results, especially in relation to
delegation of authority. Thus bureaucracy becomes much
more than merely a device for using specialized skills. Taking
on virtually a life of its own, bureaucracy both impels and is
impelled by the people who comprise it, in ways not suggested
by Weber. In effect, as Blau points out, bureaucratic struc-
tures create conditions that modify those structures."

4. For example, Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, Essays in
5. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots.
6. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy.

Much more has come to be known about government execu-
tives as attention was focused on these active elements in the
bureaucratic process. As members of the bureaucracy came
to be considered more than building blocks of skills to be
fitted into an organizational structure, the importance of vari-
ous factors that influence these people received increased at-
tention. Thus in the study of Warner and his collaborators,
many of those factors-occupational, geographic, national
origins, influence of family, educational backgrounds, career
patterns, personalities, value orientations, self-images, and
role conflicts-were probed in detail.
Our understanding of government executives has broadened
and deepened considerably since the basic formulations of
bureaucratic types of Max Weber. The professional, highly
trained, impersonal official, who comprised Weber's ideal type
of bureaucrat and was rather far removed from the human
factors and complications of organization and quite insulated
from the ennobling or corrupting influences of family back-
ground, region of birth, and similar conditions, has come to
be recognized as somewhat atypical of government officials
even in the highly formalized, intricately organized bureauc-
racy of the United States. A growing store of knowledge
and understanding concerning large and small organizations,
the informal and other groups that comprise these organiza-
tions, and the factors which influence bureaucratic behavior
have brought about a more complicated and probably more
accurate description of government executives.
Whether Weber's ideal bureaucratic organization can
achieve the hoped-for ends, such as precision, speed, conti-
nuity, reduction of friction, and elimination of irrational ele-
ments, has been questioned by later students for a number of
reasons.7 But as a practical matter, how close the model ap-
proaches reality is not nearly so important as how useful the
model is as a conceptual tool and as a benchmark for research,
against which one's perception of reality may be measured.
Weber's analysis of types of authority, which includes au-
thority legitimatized by the sanctity of tradition, charismatic
authority, and legal authority, might serve as a useful model
for study of executive attitudes. Recognition of much prog-
7. For example, Presthus, The Organizational Society; Blau and Scott,
Formal Organizations.

Introduction 5

ress in the understanding of government executives should
not be interpreted as either completely denying the validity
and the usefulness of devices such as the Weberian model or
completely refuting the importance of Weber's formulation in
terms of its actual or attempted application in practice.
Models, or "constructed types," serve several useful pur-
poses. They are not intended to serve as a description, for
example, of a particular system of government. Rather, as
Riggs points out, they serve a "heuristic" purpose.8 Such
models are useful in providing a frame of reference and "cri-
teria of relevance." Assembly of data around the framework
of the constructed model can suggest relationships in material
which otherwise might appear quite undifferentiated.
In this sense, of course, Weber's model of bureaucracy
serves a useful purpose in facilitating the selection, ordering,
and relating of data. Where Riggs' "sala" model provides even
greater utility is in 'its ecological base. In attempting to relate
administrative behavior to ecological factors typical of tran-
sitional societies, Riggs offers an invaluable tool for compara-
tive analysis in a variety of bureaucratic situations.9 In the
following chapter, more detailed attention will be devoted to
Riggs' sala model and the uses to which it is put in this
Previous studies, to the limited extent that they have treat-
ed the Latin American government executive, have resorted
to much use of broad generalizations in description of bu-
reaucracy and the bureaucrat. The usual approach has been
descriptive rather than analytical, with apparently a gener-
ally limited empirical base. Only very rudimentary progress
has been made toward meaningful comparative studies.10 Two
reasons stand out: first, an acceptably realistic ecologically
based model was not available, and second, few students have
bothered to test empirically a set of hypotheses in the field
situation, or worse still, even to do empirical field research.

8. Riggs, "An Ecological Approach," p. 35.
9. Berger's attempt to apply the Weberian model of bureaucracy to Egypt
led him to conclude that Weber's formulation was inadequate for use in
such transitional societies. See Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society
in Modern Egypt. Berger's interview guide was useful to the author in the
present study.
10. Among broader studies, one should name Public Administration
Clearing House, Public Administration in Latin America.

A variety of interpretations and conclusions has resulted
from the limited attention devoted to government executives
in Latin America. For example, the typical bureaucracy has
been described as tending "to be rather tightly stratified along
traditional class lines and to be deficient in the scientific, tech-
nical, and middle management skills."' A tendency to central-
ize power has been attributed largely to insecurity of office
and the class pattern.12 One student commented that the spoils
system "is widely practiced; the struggle for power is
very much associated with the striving for livelihood in the
form of bureaucratic positions."13 Another commented on the
high rate of turnover of employees: "a major turnover and
shuffling of personnel, all up and down the hierarchy" occurs
whenever political leadership changes.'4 Other writers, how-
ever, conclude that leadership changes are typically accom-
panied by personnel turnover only at the higher levels, and
that the core of relatively stable personnel is affected only
slightly by top-level changes. Instability of tenure is a fre-
quently recurring theme in discussions of Latin American
governments, but I know of no studies which attempt to docu-
ment such alleged instability. Familistic connections and in-
fluence also receive considerable attention, but again with very
limited substantiation. Professor Hunsberger, for example,
believes that family and personal loyalties "in the Spanish
and Portuguese traditions are so strong as to make difficult the
development in Latin America of dependable large impersonal
organizations like corporations or governments."15 He sees a
strong tendency among officials of government and business
to seek relatives as subordinates. Therefore, "the level of
performance is often below what might be expected of a
trained and experienced career civil service."16
Naturally, because of the many variations in political sys-
tems of the Latin America area, different patterns of bureauc-
racy and administration should be anticipated. Although per-
sistent uniformities may become evident after study of vari-
ous types, such uniform characteristics likely will emerge only
11. Henry, "Public Administration and Civil Service," p. 482.
12. Ibid., p. 485.
13. Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America, pp. 82-83.
14. Henry, p. 483.
15. Hunsberger, "Latin America," pp. 180-181.
16. Ibid., p. 187.

Introduction 7
from detailed, empirical investigations based on systematic
research designs. The lamentable aspect is that most of the
earlier studies contain generalizations based not even on
straightforward idiographic work, much less on any concep-
tualization and testable propositions. If this shortcoming is
applicable to the study of government and politics, it applies
doubly to more specialized subjects such as bureaucracy and
the bureaucrat.
It is this void that the present investigation is designed to
fill. Focusing on a limited segment of the bureaucracy of the
government of Peru, the study consists of a fairly detailed
examination of the senior Peruvian bureaucrat.
The core of the present study, a body of data concerning
these executives, is built upon empirical observation in the
field situation. But equally important, these foundation data
were obtained through systematic use of hypotheses and a
controlled attempt to identify critical independent and depend-
ent variables respecting the background of Peruvian govern-
ment executives. After the detailed results of this investiga-
tion are synthesized to produce a composite of the senior
bureaucrat of Peru, an attempt is made to test certain pre-
liminary hypotheses and to generalize about bureaucracy in
the Peruvian government. Even then the generalizations of
the present study are set forth more in the sense of proposals
for further study than as final conclusions.
In general terms, the study is directed toward determina-
tion of the kinds of people who fill the higher positions of the
government of Peru, their backgrounds and those of their
families, as far as these can be determined, their attitudes,
their individual characteristics and origins, and the extent
to which this particular group of officials is representative of
the people of Peru.
Such data are important because the critical role of govern-
ment officials cannot be understood fully or considered in
terms of the future without knowledge of their social origin,
education, mobility, and similar factors. It has been shown by
numerous studies of administration since Weber's time that
members of organizations condition those organizations and
accommodate to them considerably on the basis of their own
backgrounds and values. Thus it is crucial to understand such
attributes of people in bureaucracies.

Such a thesis oriented the recent study of W. Lloyd Warner
and his colleagues of the federal government executives of the
United States." The present study, founded upon this thesis,
is an adaptation of the Warner framework and approach in
order to study the Peruvian public administration environ-
ment."8 It is an initial attempt to overcome the paucity of
information which exists on Latin American government ex-
Cross-cultural transference of a conceptual framework de-
signed for application to a modern industrialized, democratic
nation with wide variation in traditions and patterns of de-
velopment presents a difficult problem. Because of such differ-
ences in the administrative environment of the United States
and Peru, Warner's framework had to be employed judicious-
ly. Nevertheless, the general methodology followed in the
American study was adaptable, in the main, to Peruvian pub-
lic administration. Of course, variations in heritage and the
environmental conditioning of Peruvian society not only re-
quire interpretation of empirical data in terms of a different
set of beliefs, values, and ideology, but also demand certain
methodological revisions to elicit such data. Where the frame-
work of the Warner study did not appear adequate, particu-
larly for that part of the research requiring personal inter-
views, it was necessary to turn to a more ecologically related
model. For these purposes, Fred W. Riggs' sala model ap-
peared to approximate the Peruvian bureaucracy most closely
and thus appropriate features of the sala were selected for use
in the Peruvian research.19 These aspects are discussed in
greater detail in the following chapter, where the conceptual
framework, hypotheses, and methodological approach are con-
sidered at length.
The principal and immediate aims of the study are three:
first, to define, identify, and analyze the persons in that por-
tion of the Peruvian government service that may be con-
sidered as the policy-making segment; second, on the basis of
evidence and information gathered through the use of per-
17. Warner et al., p. 2.
18. I am grateful to Professor Warner for his encouragement of the
application of his questionnaire and conceptual scheme to Peru.
19. In this respect, heavy reliance is placed on Riggs' constructed model
of the "prismatic society" and the "sala." Riggs, Administration in Develop-
ing Countries.

Introduction 9

sonnel records, questionnaires, and interviews, to compare
executives of selected ministries of the government and man-
agement personnel of government corporations; and third,
to attempt, primarily through depth interviews and limited
role analysis of government officials, to draw tentative con-
clusions as to the extent of approximation of the Peruvian
bureaucracy to certain characteristics of Riggs' model of the
prismatic society.
Personnel of government corporations are included as sub-
jects because a significant portion of government operations
is conducted by various types of autonomous and semi-auton-
omous entities in the so-called Sub-Sector Pfblico Indepen-
diente. Usually assuming the form of corporations, these en-
tities function in a broad spectrum of activities ranging from
monopolies in salt and matches to operation of government
tourist hotels and regional industrial development. Because
of the importance of such entities in the overall governmental
process, a phase of research was devoted to the study of
their senior management personnel. Corporations in the In-
dependent Public Sub-Sector often have government ministers
or other government officials as ex officio members of their
boards of directors or other governing body. Because they are
relatively unrestricted by formal civil service requirements,
these corporations are able to attract personnel with higher
salaries and other benefits.
This greater latitude in personnel management for govern-
ment corporations suggested the likelihood that the type of
personnel attracted by the independent entities would differ
from regular ministry personnel. The existence of approxi-
mately 400 entities in this sector precluded complete coverage.
However, several of the most important organizations are
considered in the study. For this research, the same ques-
tionnaire as that used in the ministries was employed.

Concept and Methodology

toward understanding of the United States civil serv-
ant suggested the possibility of a similar study in
Latin America, where practically no detailed and
rigorous investigation of the top leaders of the governments
had been conducted. A basic purpose of The American Fed-
eral Executive was to draw broad generalizations about the
representative character of the American bureaucracy and
about occupational mobility and succession in American soci-
ety. The "representativeness" of bureaucracy is important
because of its close connection to the mobility process and its
institutional consequences. Although Warner did not imply
that the bureaucracy should copy the total society in this
respect, it was suggested that governmental elites would be
at least as representative as any elite group in the nation.
This conceptual framework was likewise found to fit the Peru-
vian situation. Obviously, then, a great debt is owed to the
work of Warner and his colleagues, especially in the realm of
methodology, for much of the main Peruvian questionnaire is
derived from The American Federal Executive. To the ex-
tent that their instrument appeared to be applicable to the

Concept and Methodology 11
Peruvian environment, their questions were adapted verbatim
for the Peruvian study. Naturally, such adaptation caused
numerous problems in translation; some of these will be
discussed below. Not only language, but in many instances a
substantially different understanding or interpretation on the
part of respondents, necessitated a careful analysis of re-
sponses to ascertain the meanings implied.

Administrative Ecology: The United States and Peru
Before considering the specific problems of methodology,
translation difficulties, and pretest procedures, it is desirable
to discuss cultural and environmental differences between the
United States and Peru as they affect the application of the
Warner research techniques. Difficulties arise, of course, be-
cause the study is an attempt to transfer cross-culturally a
conceptual framework and specific research techniques which
were designed especially for the American setting. The sub-
jects of the Warner study in the United States were condi-
tioned by a set of influences differing considerably from those
bearing upon government officials in the Peruvian milieu. Al-
though I make no pretense of ability to measure most of these
factors precisely, a certain value can be derived from recog-
nition of some of them.
For a statement of the fundamental distinguishing features
of the American system of public administration, to be used
as a point of reference for comparison with the Peruvian sys-
tem, the comprehensive and perceptive thoughts of Leonard
D. White are paraphrased below:
1. American public administration is based on law, and pub-
lic officials are responsible to ordinary courts for their in-
2. American public administration is dependent on repre-
sentative, elected legislative bodies, subordinated to demo-
cratic control and responsive to public opinion.
3. American public administration is democratic in spirit.
4. The conduct of American public administration depends
heavily upon the consent of the people.
5. American public administration since 1900 has tended
strongly toward professionalism.
6. American public administration is civil in structure, per-
sonnel, and point of view.

7. American public administration is "flexible and adaptive,
experimental, constructive, and unfettered by precedent."
8. The American system of administration is federal, with
distribution of power and functions being both constitutional
in nature and also the result of distance, variety, and public
9. American public administration is rooted deeply in local
10. American public administration operates on a huge
scale, both in numbers of personnel and in services per-

When the salient characteristics of Peruvian public admin-
istration are considered in the same manner, several signifi-
cant differences become apparent.
1. Peruvian public administration, though strongly legalistic
in origin and tone, also exhibits many elements of formalism.
2. Peruvian public administration, with some exceptions
stemming from constitutional restrictions, operates more in-
dependently of legislative bodies, which themselves are less
representative than American legislatures and less respon-
sive to public opinion.
3. Peruvian public administration reflects much of the hier-
archal rigidity characteristic of Spanish colonial administra-
tion, and exhibits a corresponding loss of democratic tone and
4. Peruvian public administration generally operates with
relatively little dependence upon the consent of the people.
5. The growth of professionalism in Peruvian public ad-
ministration dates from about 1950, with strong efforts not
commencing until 1963.
6. Peruvian public administration is affected by the military
influence, with defense ministries under strict military control,
and staffing of numerous positions by military officers.
7. Peruvian public administration tends to be inflexible, non-
innovative, reluctant to experiment, unimaginative, and gen-
erally strongly fettered by precedent.
8. Peruvian public administration is unitary in nature and
strongly centralized (in authority if not in control).
9. Peruvian public administration has relatively limited
roots in local communities except in the matter of staffing
provincial posts mainly with local citizens.
10. Peruvian public administration operates on a relatively
1. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, pp. 20-22.

Concept and Methodology 13
small scale, with the majority of the personnel functioning
in the capital.

Peruvian public administration functions in a unitary gov-
ernmental system wherein practically all responsibility lies in
the central government, and primarily in the president. Oper-
ating through a hierarchical arrangement from the capital,
authority flows downward through 24 departmental prefects
to sub-prefects and governors of 140 provinces and over 1300
districts. The capital is the point of initiation and decision
on most matters affecting all levels and regions of Peru.
Executive power is vested in the president, two vice-presi-
dents, and twelve ministers of state who form the cabinet.
Power tends to be concentrated in the presidency and is aug-
mented by special powers permitting him to make law by de-
cree and suspend certain constitutional guarantees in cases of
The twelve ministries of government operate principally in
the capital, having provincial jurisdictions for areas outside
Lima. But practically all decisions come from Lima, since the
provincial areas have little autonomy.
Deterministic explanations of the character of a people and
culture tend to fall short as analytical devices because certain
historical, geographic, cultural, or other factors are often
emphasized to the virtual exclusion of others. Thus, an over-
emphasis on the cultural conditioning of the Spanish colonial
era passes as an explanation for the continued centralization
of many Latin American governments. Likewise, the alleged
fatalism of the Andean Indians and their nonparticipation in
political life is said to stem from the stultifying effects of
coca, from the depressing effects of high altitudes of the
region, or from persistent psychological resistance growing
from maltreatment and exploitation during and after the
colonial period. Each explanation serves the purposes of its
exponent, and probably all are accurate to a degree. In a
similar fashion, the geographic barriers confronting many
countries of Latin America, undoubtedly significant in their
effects, can grow disproportionately as explanations of their
determinative influence on national characters. Because of the
many pitfalls of such deterministic explanations, a deliberate
attempt is made in the present study to avoid cause-and-

effect conclusions. Where the empirical data of the study
indicate a certain tendency or an apparent correlation, the
interpretation will be presented as a suggested explanation
but no more.
Most students, in approaching the study of various aspects
of Peruvian society, sooner or later confront the fact of a
country characterized by numerous dichotomies-social, geo-
graphic, economic, and political. Such divisions stand out in
the separation of much of the Indian population of Peru from
the mestizo and so-called white elements. They are also iden-
tifiable in the obvious geographical barriers of the country,
which set apart the costa, the sierra, and the selva, and in
the economy, which encompasses the most modern market
and credit system as well as persistent, primitive barter sys-
tems totally removed from the market economy. They can also
be discovered in the political system, moving unevenly toward
representative government but with the largest political party
still uncertain of its role and its acceptance in the governmen-
tal process.
Peru, with nearly a half million square miles of area, ranks
third largest of the countries of South America and in mid-
1964 had a population of 11,050,000. Its territory is divided
into three principal regions. The costa, covering less than 12
per cent of the area, contains about a third of the total
population and is the nucleus of export agriculture, industry,
and important economic activity in general. The sierra, com-
prising the Andean highlands and used mainly for domestic
agriculture, makes up 27 per cent of the national area but
contains 60 per cent of the country's population. The selva or
montania is a sparsely populated region extending from the
eastern slopes of the Andes over the lowlands of the Amazon
basin. Although 60 per cent of Peru's territory lies in the
selva, only about 10 per cent of its population is found there.
Peru's population is very unevenly distributed among the
three principal regions, and the largest cities stand in marked
contrast to a typically rural landscape. The urban population
is distributed among several cities and towns, all of which
are growing rapidly. Lima, the national capital, overshadows
all other urban areas of the country with a metropolitan
population of 1.7 million. The next largest city, Arequipa in
the south, has only one-tenth the population of Lima.

Concept and Methodology 15
Socially, the country is divided about evenly into two main
groupings: the mestizo and white population on one hand, and
the Indian population on the other. The indigenous population,
descendants of the Incas, lives mainly in the Andean moun-
tain range. Adhering strongly to collectivist and communal
patterns of living of the past, and largely illiterate, the Peru-
vian Indians have been bypassed to a great extent by changes
which have taken place elsewhere.2 This deep social dichotomy
makes the term "nation" inapt as a description of the coun-
try, and stands as one of Peru's most serious and potentially
dangerous problems. Peru, as Holmberg comments, remains a
relatively unintegrated nation, and unlike Mexico and Bolivia,
it has not experienced an abrupt break with the traditional
past through violent social revolution.3
When the observer faces these contrasts in the different
elements and sections of Peru-especially the stark contrast
of the capital, Lima, with most of the provincial areas-he
is confronted immediately with the problem of choosing any
kind of common denominator which will describe adequately
such a dichotomous, heterogeneous nation.

Uses of a Constructed Model
The purpose in this brief consideration of Peru as a society
is to attempt to employ as an analytical aid some features of
the theoretical model formulated by Fred W. Riggs in his
works on administration in developing countries.4 The investi-
gation of the senior government executive of modern Peru
can be made more meaningful if the bureaucrat is studied in
relation to his society, and more particularly according to
some of the criteria established by Riggs in his concept of
prismatic society.
Some of the attributes of Riggs' sala model, the typically
prismatic bureau, are examined in an attempt to apply its
appropriate features to the bureaucracy of Peru. It should be
emphasized at this point, however, that this application of
the sala model is limited to that section of the study dealing
2. Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund.
Fourth Annual Report 1964, pp. 439-445.
3. Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru,"
pp. 66-67.
4. Especially in Administration in Developing Countries.

with attitudinal aspects of the Peruvian bureaucrat. Even in
this restricted application of Riggs' model, valuable advan-
tages can be gained. This is true particularly in regard to
such features and problems of the bureaucracy as elite re-
cruitment and adaptative incorporation of administrative
In this study, no attempt is made to apply all the features
of the Riggs model of prismatic society. The concern is with
only that portion of the model dealing with the sala, the pris-
matic bureau, and more specifically, with characteristics of
sala administration that relate directly and can be applied to
the group of bureaucrats under study. The particular aim in
this limited application of the sala model is to gain some
insight relative to the approximation of Peruvian bureaucracy
to the Riggs scheme. The problem will be approached pri-
marily through depth interviews of senior civil servants and
subsequent analyses of their attitudes.
To make clear the pertinent features of Riggs' sala model
with which the study is concerned, there is offered below a
summary of the salient attributes of sala administration as
conceptualized by Riggs in his prismatic society. This sum-
mary will have the advantage not only of further defining
the boundaries of the employment of Riggs' model, but also
of facilitating uniform usage of his somewhat esoteric and
certainly singular terminology.
Initially, a distinction should be made between "transition-
al" societies and "prismatic" societies. Such differentiation is
important because although prismatic societies may be also
transitional societies, they are not necessarily so. Also some
of the basic hypotheses of this study are predicated on the
assumption that the various segments of the bureaucracy of
a society in transition will undergo this transition at different
rates and in different forms.
The sense in which "transitional" is employed here signifies
movement toward "modernity." Without attempting to de-
fine modernity precisely, the fact of Peru's movement toward
the type of industrialized and democratic society exemplified
by the United States can be substantiated in several areas.
Among these are its accelerating economic growth in recent
years and the adjustments this has forced in its economic
system. Peru's economy since 1960 has recovered from a

Concept and Methodology 17
previous lag and has showed steady growth. Gross national
product grew at a rate of nearly 6 per cent between 1960 and
1963, with a similar rate in 1964. Agricultural output, gener-
ating about 20 per cent of the GNP, has increased but at a
slower pace than the rest of the economy. The increase in
manufacturing output in 1963 amounted to 8 per cent, with
its share in the GNP approximating that of agriculture. The
spectacular growth of the fish meal industry placed Peru first
among the world's fishing nations in 1964. The country en-
joys the important advantage of well-diversified exports, in-
cluding fish meal, cotton, copper, sugar, and other mining and
agricultural commodities. Peru has maintained a favorable
balance of payments position since 1960.5
On the political side are broadened suffrage and mounting
evidence of a general willingness to try democratic political
procedures, i.e., the legalization of the Aprista party, free
municipal elections in December, 1963,6 acceptance of the re-
sults of the 1963 national elections by the military junta and
by all political parties, and a Congress controlled by the oppo-
sition and the executive's accepting such a situation. Increas-
ing reform efforts have been made in public administration,
the most notable being the programs stemming from joint
Peruvian-United States establishment of a national public ad-
ministration center. The Oficina Nacional de Racionalizaci6n
y Capacitaci6n de la Administraci6n Pfiblica (ONRAP) since
1963 has functioned as a training center for public servants,
a nucleus of expansion of 0 and M techniques, and a stimulus
for growing interest in administrative problems. Peruvian
universities gradually are recognizing their role in national
development, reflecting this increasingly by curriculum
changes to upgrade offerings in political science and institute
courses in public administration, including work in O and M
techniques and personnel administration. In addition, the gov-
ernment has begun to move more energetically and resolutely
to institute the agrarian reform program. Agrarian reform
represents a tardy but still crucial response to Peru's extreme
maldistribution of land. The program finally has been recog-
nized as a possible alternative to a violent solution to the

5. Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund.
Fourth Annual Report 1964, pp. 440-443.
6. No local elections had been held previously since 1919.

problem.7 These points are considered to be clear evidence of
Accepting the classification of Peru as a transitional country
in Riggs' sense, it is then useful to outline briefly the principal
attributes of the "sala model" and prismatic society, as they
apply to the analysis of Peruvian bureaucracy. The sala, first
of all, exhibits nepotism, in which "familistic considerations
dominate appointments, although the formal rules prescribe
non-ascriptive tests."8 Similarly, the law in this situation is
likely to be applied "generously to relatives, stringently
against strangers."9
The sala is typified also by poly-communalism and bureau-
cratic elects.10 Sala officials are likely to discriminate in favor
of their own community and against members of other com-
munities. Positions may be filled only with those recruits from
the dominant community. The sala is further likely to exhibit
effects of the "bazaar-canteen," the economic submodel of
prismatic society. Corruption is institutionalized; in-group
members get bargain prices, and prices are indeterminate.
When new norms and political formulas based on foreign
experience "are superimposed on a social order which contin-
ues to adhere, in large measure, to older traditional norms,
formulas, and myths," the result is dissensus, polynormati-
vism, and normlessness.11 Difficulty for the organization results
when officials, although publicly adhering to such norms, "may
secretly reject them as meaningless or not binding."
Many of the other features of Riggs' sala model probably
could be employed usefully in analysis of the Peruvian bu-
reaucracy. However, it was decided to concentrate chiefly on
aspects of elite recruitment and the extent to which adapta-
7. Many of Peru's land distribution problems, as Ford shows, stem from a
sheer lack of arable land. But concentration of land ownership compounds
the problem-concentration on the costa being a result of expansion of
capitalistic enterprise; that of the Sierra a survival of colonial latifundia.
Ford, Man and Land in Peru, pp. 67-69.
8. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, p. 273.
9. Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," p. 24.
10. Riggs refers here to "a branch, sector, or stratum of bureaucracy,
all of whose members are recruited from a given community or sub-
community, organized so as not only to carry out its formal duties but
also to safeguard communal interests, to bar admission to members of rival
communities, and, no doubt, to administer rules in a discriminatory fash-
ion." Administration in Developing Countries, p. 275.
11. Ibid., p. 277.

Concept and Methodology 19
tion of foreign norms and administrative formulas has caused
dissensus and poly-normativism in Peruvian administration.
The manner in which these features were used is discussed
in the following paragraphs.

It was anticipated during the preliminary phases of the
study that significant differences would exist among the offices
and ministries of the Peruvian government in terms of quali-
fications, educational attainments, and other characteristics of
officials. The different functions of the ministries of the cen-
tral government and the varying circumstances under which
these functions are conducted suggested the likelihood of such
differences. For the same reasons, variations in the degree of
stability of executives in different ministries were expected.
Likewise, because in this student's opinion Peru is a transi-
tional country, it appeared likely that younger civil servants
would exhibit a greater degree of social mobility, commensur-
ate with changes in Peruvian society.
To attempt to measure these factors more methodically and
rigorously, several working hypotheses were formulated.
Each of these hypotheses is examined in some detail before
consideration of other aspects of methodology.
Hypothesis H-1.-Significant differences exist among offices
and ministries of the Peruvian government in the qualifica-
tions and educational attainments of officials in the following
(a) Executives of ministries directly and significantly in-
volved in professional or exterior activities, i.e., the Ministry
of Public Health or the Ministry of Foreign Relations, or in
foreign cooperation programs will exhibit higher educational
attainments and qualifications than personnel of ministries
engaged predominantly in non-professional and domestic af-
fairs, i.e., Ministry of Government and Police.
(b) In terms of educational attainments and qualifications,
executives of corporations and other entities in the Independ-
ent Public Sub-Sector will surpass personnel of non-profes-
sionally oriented ministries but not personnel of professionally
oriented ministries.
In this respect the term "professionally oriented ministries"
will be employed to indicate ministries or agencies in the

Independent Public Sub-Sector which have as their primary
mission programs or functions principally professional or
"outward-directed" in nature, or whose functions necessitate
broad or intimate association with foreign or international
agencies. Examples of predominantly outward-directed func-
tions are foreign relations and national defense (especially
Navy and Air Force). The term "non-professionally oriented
ministries" will be used for those ministries or agencies which
have programs or functions principally nontechnical and do-
mestic in nature as their primary mission. Examples of pre-
dominantly nontechnical and domestic programs are govern-
ment and police, telecommunications and post office, justice
and religion, labor and Indian affairs, and agriculture.
Hypothesis H-1 and its sub-hypotheses are posited because
of the assumption that executives of ministries and offices
which are required as a regular routine to deal closely with
professional personnel or foreign executives will tend to de-
velop skills and attain educational levels closely approximat-
ing those of their contacts and counterparts. Such develop-
ment becomes almost a necessity in order for them to be
effective representatives of their profession and their country.
Hypothesis H-2.-Executive stability varies according to
the character and orientation of ministries.
(a) Executive stability will be higher in "professionally ori-
ented" ministries because of the necessity for development of
professional competence or the relative isolation of these
these ministries from domestic politics.
(b) Stability will be lowest in ministries and agencies en-
gaged in programs of high national priority or in programs of
a highly controversial nature, i.e., agrarian reform and agri-
culture, because of the probable effect on stability of pressure,
criticism, and opposition, especially legislative criticism.
Hypothesis H-3.-Executive stability varies in direct rela-
tion to ministerial stability.
The reasoning which suggested hypotheses H-2 and H-3
concerning executive stability involves both constitutional and
political factors. Constitutionally, Peruvian ministers of state
are subject to interpellation. Votes of censure may be moved
by a single deputy or senator. Censured ministers must resign
and the President is obliged to accept the resignation.12 In
12. Constitution of the Republic of Peru, Articles 169-173.

Concept and Methodology 21
addition, ministerial interpellations appear to have further-
reaching effects in some instances. Politically inspired inter-
pellations and censures seem likely to carry a "political back-
lash" which may threaten the career stability of executives in
the ministry involved.
In the detailed consideration of these hypotheses in the sec-
tion on career stability, patterns of stability will be examined
closely in an attempt to relate these to the history of executive
and ministerial careers in the ten-year period 1956-1965.
A useful model for analysis of stability is found in Alfred
Diamant's study of French public administration.13 Diamant
hypothesized that in the presence of a weak political consen-
sus a modern nation's administrative machinery will develop
its own rules and procedures. Various devices will enable it
to function without political direction. The particular point of
interest for the present study is the consideration of whether
Peruvian public administration has developed forms of inter-
nal controls which carry it through political instability and
various other vicissitudes.
Hypothesis H-4.-There is a direct correlation between age
and social mobility of executives in the Peruvian government.
Social mobility is highest in the lower age groups. This
hypothesis stems directly from the fundamental assumption
that Peru is a transitional country in the sense suggested by
Riggs.14 That is to say that, in addition to the aspects of a
prismatic society which Peru exhibits, the Peruvian society
as a whole shows also a transitional development toward mod-
ernization. Certain substantiating evidence of this process has
been offered. From this assumption, there is posited the hy-
pothesis that younger age groups will demonstrate a greater
social mobility, commensurate with an accelerated trend to-
ward modernity.
Hypothesis H-5.-Norms of elite recruitment vary directly
with the degree of professional orientation of the organization,
and range from nepotism in nonprofessionally oriented or-
ganizations to nonascriptive methods of selection in more
professionally oriented ones.
Continuing the basic hypothetical distinctions between for-
eign oriented and domestically oriented organizations and
13. Diamant, "The French Administrative System."
14. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries.


between professionally and nonprofessionally oriented organi-
zations, it is hypothesized that significant differences will exist
with varying degrees of professionalism. Of course, the use
of the sala attribute of nepotism in elite recruitment is ap-
parent in this respect.
Ample works support the assumption of the weight of
familistic considerations in recruitment, although there are
few which are based on empirical field research. The classi-
fication of Peru as a transitional country suggests not only
that administrative characteristics are undergoing basic modi-
fications, but also that the rate and intensity of change, as
illustrated by familistic considerations, will differ according to
professional orientation of various segments of the bureauc-
Hypothesis H-6.-Effects of adaptative incorporation of ad-
ministrative changes (exogenous or "exo-prismatic" changes),
especially poly-normativism, tend to be stronger in nonpro-
fessionally oriented organizations than in professionally ori-
ented organizations.
Peru's developmental pattern appears to correspond quite
closely to the exogenous form of changes described by Riggs.15
This adaptative, or in Riggs' terminology, exo-prismatic re-
sponse to the impact of modern industrialized societies, seems
to be typical of Peru where developmental stimuli have come
mainly from the outside. Without claiming the inevitability
of development toward the "modern," it has been concluded
that Peru is a transitional society. But the important concept
is that different segments of the society and different parts
of the bureaucracy undergo this transition at different rates
and in different forms. Some organizations of the bureaucracy
must of necessity take "giant-steps" to adapt to modern tech-
nological change; others, because the pressure to change is
less, can afford to lag behind. For example, it would be reason-
able to expect that the Ministry of Public Health would be
compelled to adapt itself more rapidly to handle advances in
modern medicine and public health practices. In the same way
the Ministry of Development and Public Works, intimately
involved in development work requiring international cooper-
ation and considerable expertise, would likely adapt more
rapidly. Taking the next logical step, it is hypothesized that
15. Ibid., p. 39.

Concept and Methodology 23
those organizations which are not compelled by technological,
political, or other pressures to change, will tend not to change.
When modifications do come about, especially those resulting
from outside stimuli, such organizations will be more likely to
resist change and to exhibit various effects such as dissensus,
poly-normativism, and normlessness. In this respect, patterns
of behavior characteristic of the sala will be apparent.
For the purpose of testing these hypotheses systematically,
the following classification of ministries will be employed:

Development and Public Government and Police
Works Justice and Worship
Public Health and Social Agriculture
Assistance Treasury and Commerce
Public Education Labor and Indigenous Affairs
Foreign Relations
It should be noted that, for the testing of hypotheses H-5
and H-6, the main reliance is placed on executive attitudes
concerning the matters of recruitment and administrative
change. The executives' own interpretations are assigned ma-
jor weight in the conclusions.

Methodological Approach
Major problems were encountered in the preparatory stages
of the project, both in identification of the segment of the
public service for study and in distribution of the study ques-
tionnaires. The essential nature of some of the basic research
involved may be appreciated from the fact that no directory
of government officials existed in Peru when the study was
initiated. Likewise, no dependable statistics were available
upon the total number of employees of the central govern-
ment. The most satisfactory count of the Peruvian civil serv-
ice appears to be that performed in ONRAP in 1965. For in-
formation and comparison, Table 1 shows approximate total
numbers of employees in permanent positions in each branch
of the central government and in each civilian ministry.
Several factors contributed to the final selection of the
population to be studied. First, it was desired that the execu-
tives chosen should be roughly comparable in level and po-


sition to those in Warner's American study. Included in that
study were 12,929 civilian and military executives in the
career civil service, the foreign service, political positions, and
in top levels of military command. These executives hold
civilian positions ranging from cabinet level to General Sched-
ule (GS) grade level 14 or equivalent and military grades




Presidential offices 580
Government 8,650
Foreign Relations 590
Justice 1,920
Labor 1,047
Education 67,848*
Treasury 8,715
Development 4,110
Public Health 18,509
Agriculture 2,344
Comptroller General 282
Total 114,595

TOTALS (excluding Legislative Branch)
Executive branch 114,595*
Judicial branch 2,092
Electoral branch 1,454
Total 118,141t

*Includes 53,306 permanent teachers of the Ministry of Public Education.
tNot including the armed forces, auxiliary forces, assimilated civil per-
sonnel in the military, hourly teaching personnel, contracted personnel, and
the Independent Public Sub-Sector.
Source: Peru, Oficina Nacional de Racionalizaci6n y Capacitaci6n de la
Administraci6n Pdblica (ONRAP).

from admirals and generals to captains in the Navy and colo-
nels in the other services.16 Thus it was decided early in the
preparatory stage that the group of government executives
studied should be persons at a high level of responsibility in
the Peruvian government. The principal criterion followed was
that the level chosen should reasonably justify an assumption
that such a group will exercise considerable influence on de-
16. Warner et al., p. 6.

Concept and Methodology 25
cisions, probably making a large portion of them, and to a
significant extent will determine the direction of policy formu-
lation and development. It was considered justifiable to assume
that government executives at the level of director and di-
rector-general and sub-director play an important role in the
governmental process in Peru. Their position alone, at a stra-
tegic level in the bureaucratic hierarchy, justifies an investi-
gation of their characteristics and professional qualifications.
However, the choice of this "policy-making segment" implies
no attempt to determine conclusively that the study group
actually dominates the policy-making process.
Preliminary study revealed that a high degree of standard-
ization exists in the central government of Peru in position
titles at the level chosen. All ministries fairly consistently
arrange their organizational structure by division into direc-
ciones at the level immediately below that of the minister.
Some ministries employ a director-general who functions de
facto as a vice-minister or as general administrative coordi-
nator for the ministry. This position may also be referred to
as coordinator-general or secretary-general in some ministries.
The principal executive official immediately below the direc-
tors is fairly consistently titled sub-director. The admittedly
arbitrary decision made was that the "policy-making seg-
ment" would be defined as the segment of the Peruvian cen-
tral government bureaucracy which consists of directors-
general, directors, and sub-directors, and their equivalents
where this standardization of titles does not exist.
The decision to include management personnel of the major
organizations in the Independent Public Sub-Sector recognizes
the importance of such entities in the overall governmental
process of Peru. A significant and increasing portion of gov-
ernment operations is conducted by various types of auton-
omous and semi-autonomous entities in the Independent Pub-
lic Sub-Sector. Defining the boundaries of the study of execu-
tives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector was more difficult
than the choice of regular government executives. This was
true for several reasons. Management personnel of the entities
in this sector are of two principal types: management func-
tionaries and boards of directors. The former category in-
cludes the managers, assistant managers, treasurers, direc-
tors of personnel, and similar operating personnel. The boards

of directors, in typical corporate form, usually consist of a
president and a vice-president plus a varying number of other
members. Selection and appointment methods differ consider-
ably, but as a rule the boards of directors are comprised of
representatives from several areas of national life. For ex-
ample, the directory board of the Banco Central de Reserva
consists of nine members: three named by the President of
the Republic, one elected by the state development banks,
one elected by the commercial banks of Lima, one elected by
the regional banks, one each from the Sociedad Nacional
Agraria and the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias, and finally,
one director representing both the Asociaci6n de Camaras de
Comercio of Lima and the Corporaci6n Nacional de Comer-
ciantes. According to the organic law creating the bank, the
directory then elects the president of the bank.
This pattern is followed, in general, by the majority of
organizations in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. The prob-
lem in definition of the study boundaries arose chiefly from
the fact that many boards of directors include representatives
from the central government ministries. In many cases, these
representatives were executives included in the study bound-
aries for the central government. For this reason, and be-
cause directory members are not full-time executives in the
sense of the study, it was decided to exclude directory per-
sonnel. Only senior functionaries, in a full-time operating
capacity, fall within the study boundaries.
Using these boundaries, it was judged that the two groups
of executives-senior executives of the central government
and senior management functionaries of the Independent Pub-
lic Sub-Sector-correspond adequately in terms of levels of
responsibility and executive functions discharged.
The next major problem, after deciding where the bound-
aries of the investigation should be set, was identification of
the executives. Mention was made above of the absence of any
form of a directory of government officials of Peru. Fortunate-
ly at this particular and vital stage of the study, ONRAP was
undertaking the preparation of a directory of senior executives
of the government of Peru. This directory project reached the
point where rough drafts of the listing of senior executives
were available to serve as the basis for distribution of the study
questionnaires. A second phase of the directory project, which

Concept and Methodology 27
would publish a directory of management personnel in the In-
dependent Public Sub-Sector, was only partially completed at
this time; listings of managers were used for questionnaire
distribution as they became available. During the distribution
it became necessary to obtain new listings directly from some
ministries as the original ones were outdated to an extent.
Another decision was necessary in the choice of entities to
be studied in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. The difficulty
of this decision becomes apparent when one considers the
broad range of activities, the geographical dispersion, and
the large variations in capital investments and number of
employees characteristic of the Independent Public Sub-Sec-
tor. Because of the great variety of entities in this sector, it
was decided that the use of a precise formula for choosing
organizations to be studied would not be feasible. For exam-
ple, selection of a random sample very conceivably could cause
the omission of the most important organizations in terms of
size, investment, number of employees, economic impact, ef-
fect on the social or administrative systems, or other signifi-
cant characteristics.
In the matter of choosing organizations, the simple avail-
ability or nonavailability of personnel listings was an
important factor. A regrettable characteristic of the Peruvian
bureauracy, nonresponse or slow response to requests for
information, plagued the production of the executive direc-
tory of the government. The Independent Public Sub-Sector
in particular responded slowly and incompletely to the request
of ONRAP for personnel listings. This lack of response was due
partly to the ill-defined relation of some entities in this sub-
sector to the central government.1 Another likely factor was
the undeveloped reputation of ONRAP, the sponsoring organi-
zation. Its requests to other government agencies probably
would be given less weight and receive less attention than if
they had been submitted by another agency. However, in

17. The Ministry of Treasury and Commerce experienced the same prob-
lem in preparation of the functional budget of Peru for 1964. In his
message of transmittal to Congress of the Budget for the Independent
Sub-Sector, the Minister observed that only 21.1 per cent of the 246 entities
in this sub-sector furnished their budget documents to the General Budget
Office-partly because of their unclear organizational relationships. Peru,
Presupuesto Funcional de la Repiblica para 1964; Vol. 11: Sub-Sector
Pblico Independiente, p. 11.

spite of this incomplete return of personnel listings, it is con-
sidered that the listings which were available encompassed
an acceptable portion of those entities deemed "important"
in the terms of the study.
An obvious and unfortunate gap remains in regard to the
defense ministries, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of the
Navy, and the Ministry of Aeronautics. The original research
scheme projected the use of data on military executives for
comparative purposes because the population of Warner's
American study encompassed the military. However, repeated
efforts to gain access to military officials of rank equivalent
to the senior civilian executives were not fruitful. Lists of
military officers similar to the registers published by each
armed force of the United States are not available; even or-
ganization charts of the war ministries are considered classi-
fied information. To illustrate the sensitivity of the defense
ministries in regard to outside requests for information, a
request from ONRAP for a simple organization chart and a list
of directors of each ministry, to be included in a directory
of the central government, was denied. Several informal re-
quests to high officials of each defense ministry for permis-
sion to solicit questionnaire data from senior military execu-
tives were unsuccessful. One official, a top-level air force offi-
cer, advised the author that his intelligence service had given
a negative report on the questionnaire. Another general felt
that the Peruvian armed forces simply were not ready for this
type of study: "perhaps in six or eight years they will be."
He candidly stressed the sensitivity of the armed forces, who
are defensive about their role because they realize they have
no military role in the way that United States armed forces
Finally, after failing to obtain the approval of the director
of the Peruvian host organization to solicit the defense min-
istries' cooperation officially, because he believed it "not pru-
dent, especially for a gringo," it was decided reluctantly to
proceed without data from the three defense ministries.
In terms of numbers and coverage of the population studied,
the total number of executives in the study group was 380.
Of these, 252 were directors, sub-directors, and equivalent
executives in the central government of Peru, including nine
ministries (all except the defense ministries) and various

Concept and Methodology 29
autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations which can be
described generally as "presidential offices." Another 68 were
senior management personnel of entities in the Independent
Public Sub-Sector. For comparative purposes, in addition, 60
middle management personnel of the government were ana-
lyzed. This group of functionaries is considered separately in
an attempt to discover variations in social mobility in a differ-
ent age group and at a lower level of seniority and responsi-
Various opinions were solicited from Peruvian government
officials and other persons who had the benefit of experience
in the Peruvian environment in regard to the most effective
method of distributing the study questionnaires. In addition,
several different methods of distribution were employed with
smaller groups before the main study began. Without excep-
tion, all advice received (and especially that from Peruvian
sources) emphasized the need for close control and follow-up
because of the Peruvian propensity for procrastination.
Two small-scale experiments early in the study used two
different methods of distribution. The first was a direct mail
solicitation to a group of 30 middle management government
officials. This group of employees had participated in an ac-
counting seminar in Puerto Rico under the auspices of ONRAP
and therefore had an established connection with ONRAP. Of
the group, 73.3 per cent responded. In another test, wherein
questionnaires were distributed and explained to a class of
government officials in ONRAP, and collected at a subsequent
meeting, 80 per cent of the group responded. Considering the
probable difficulty of bringing the senior executives together
in a group, the result of these experiments suggested that a
third method would be more feasible.
For distribution of questionnaires to the main study group
(the "policy-making segment"), it was decided that liaison
personnel in each ministry would be used wherever possible.
The persons who were requested to assist in the distribution
were members of the Advisory Committee of ONRAP and were
themselves part of the segment to be studied. All were at
least at the level of sub-director. The initial step was an
explanation of the study to this group of executives in a
meeting at ONRAP, where their cooperation was requested.
This briefing was followed by a series of personal visits with

each liaison official, at which time the questionnaires, accom-
panied by a letter of explanation and a self-addressed enve-
lope, were left for distribution to each executive. A direct
mail distribution was used for executives in the Independent
Public Sub-Sector, principally because of the widely scattered
locations of the various entities, many of them outside of
Three systems of follow-up were employed. After the lapse
of one month, a follow-up letter was sent to each executive
who had not responded. At that time, only 24.7 per cent of
the group solicited in the central government had replied;
only 17.1 per cent in the Independent Public Sub-Sector had
responded. Two weeks after the mail follow-up those who still
had not returned the questionnaire were called by telephone
and requested to complete the form. At the time of the tele-
phone contacts, 35.9 per cent of the executives had responded.
Two further follow-ups were made to a majority of the group.
When appointments for interviews were made with some offi-
cials who had not responded, they were requested at the time
of the interviews to fill out the questionnaires. Finally per-
sonal visits were made to persons in those ministries whose
percentage of returns was unacceptably low. Such personal
visits were quite successful in producing additional returns.
No further follow-ups were attempted after completion of the
interview phase. At that time 58.2 per cent of the group had
Some frustrating problems were encountered in what nor-
mally should be simple, mechanical processes. For example, a
follow-up letter, sent as a reminder to executives who had not
returned the questionnaire, caused a large response from
executives who stated they had never received the original
questionnaire. Replacement questionnaires were forwarded to
these officials, and analysis was delayed pending receipt of
the late mailings. It was not possible to isolate the causes
for this nonreceipt of the original questionnaires.
During the final follow-up phase, in which each executive
who had not responded was contacted personally, these fail-
ures in communication became even more apparent. Many
officials indicated that they had mailed the completed ques-
tionnaires, but these were not received, for unknown reasons,
by the author. In such cases, new questionnaires were left

Concept and Methodology 31
with these persons and collected personally at a later date.
The lack of adequate census data for Peru presented seri-
ous obstacles to complete analysis of the characteristics of
the group of executives on a comparative basis. Population
data, of course, were needed for use as standards against
which the characteristics of the executives could be com-
pared. Data on this group of executives could be analyzed more
meaningfully if they could be compared with corresponding
characteristics of the total population of Peru, particularly in
terms of nativity, age, sex, occupational distributions, and
educational levels.
It was determined that the average age of these senior
executives of the Peruvian Government was 48.2 years and
of the middle management group, 37.6 years. Thus, for an
appropriate standard for comparison, a census near the year
1920 was needed. In addition to the need for a population
census near the year 1920, further census data for about 1940
were desired for comparison of the occupations of the fathers
of the executives with those of the total population of Peru.
The year was determined by adding twenty years to the aver-
age birth year of the group of executives; the figure of twenty
years was arrived at by assuming that the average member
of the group commenced work at about that age.
Unfortunately, the only two useful population censuses
available for Peru are those of 1940 and 1961. Not until 1959
was regularity of censuses established legally by Peru, at
which time it was required by law'1 that censuses of popula-
tion and housing would be conducted every ten years and
economic censuses every five years.
It was decided against attempting any adjustments to the
census figures for 1940 or 1961. There were two principal
reasons for this decision. First, the varied rates of population
growth for different sections of the country would lead to
difficult, if not impossible, demographic estimates. The skewed
rates of population growth for the coastal industrial cities,
especially Lima, Callao, and Chimbote, would have compound-
ed the problem. Second, little confidence in any census before
1940 vas expressed by knowledgeable personnel in the Direc-
ci6n Nacional de Estadistica y Censos. Among the working

18. Ley No. 13248 of August 24, 1959.


hypotheses followed by the Direcci6n Nacional de Estadistica
y Censos in 1961 were two which assumed that there had
been no perceptible changes in the nativity pattern of Peru
between 1940 and 1961, and further that the censuses of
1940 and 1961 are comparable in quality and exactness of
To avoid adjustments of the available census data, which
would be likely to introduce further error into statistics al-
ready less than totally accurate, it was decided to base all
calculations which were necessary for comparative purposes
on the censuses of 1940 and 1961. To a large extent, the
1940 census yields data acceptably close to the year required.
Even in the instances where the 1940 census data are some
years removed from the exact date pertinent to the analysis,
it is considered that their use is preferable to attempting
demographic adjustments for another year.
Although many entries in the questionnaire distributed to
the executives were adapted verbatim from The American
Federal Executive, numerous problems of transferral arose
both from language interpretations and from the application
of the questionnaire to another environment. Ambiguities be-
came apparent when the questionnaire, translated initially by
the author, was revised to apply to the unitary governmental
system of Peru. Some difficulty arose in the attempt to make
a necessary distinction between officials of the national govern-
ment at the central level (in the capital) and at the depart-
mental, provincial, and district levels. The idea of a unitary
government reaching directly from the capital to the districts
was entrenched so firmly in the Peruvian officials' thinking
that it was difficult for them to accept the necessary concep-
tual distinction between central government functionaires in
the capital and central government officials in the provinces.
A question relating to occupational mobility raised the prob-
lem of applicability of some occupations to the senior gov-
ernment executive of Peru. A group of occupations which
would fall low on a prestige scale (guard, messenger, un-
skilled manual worker, etc.) was dropped at first from the
preliminary translation, for two principal reasons. First,
doubt was expressed by knowledgeable Peruvians that any of
19. Peru, Sexto Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n: Resultados Finales de
Primera Prioridad, p. 313.

Concept and Methodology 33
the subjects of the study group would have ever engaged in
such occupations, and second, such a question, in a status-and-
prestige-conscious society such as Peru's, conveivably could be
offensive to the respondents and as such could prejudice the
validity of answers to the remainder of the questionnaire.
Eventually, despite such advice, the final questionnaire in-
cluded the low-prestige jobs. It was important to secure data
in regard to social mobility from these jobs-at least to offer
respondents the opportunity to furnish such information-
despite the risk of injured sensitivities. The assumption that
responses relating to such jobs would be valid is as justifiable
as an assumption that certain occupations would be inappli-
It was found also that the Warner study categories of
farmers and agricultural workers in the occupational listing
were difficult to transfer to the Peruvian environment. Agri-
cultural terminology which is comprehended fairly uniformly
in the United States caused confusion when translated into
Spanish. The main difficulty arose not from language itself
but from the variety of meanings attached to the terms
which describe agricultural workers, for in Peru they vary
considerably in different regions of the country-costa, sierra,
and montafia. The problem was to select terms which would
convey a reasonably standard meaning in all parts of Peru.20
Questions relating to military service did not elicit the in-
tended response in protests because of differing interpreta-
tions of the meaning of "service." Some respondents con-
sidered that completion of a course in military history, or
gaining a reserve commission by virtue of university gradua-
tion, constituted military service. The difficulty seemed to be
solved satisfactorily by specifying and emphasizing that the
question pertained only to active military service.
It was found from preliminary response that answers to
the questions relating to education would require a consider-
able amount of study and interpretation. There were two
principal reasons for this. First, respondents interpreted
"post-graduate studies" to mean something other than studies
beyond a university bachelor's degree. Consequently a multi-
tude of responses was received indicating the completion of
20. Ford encountered similar difficulties in categorizing Peruvian agri-
cultural workers. See Ford, p. 75.

miscellaneous courses that were unrelated to university de-
gree work. Second, a "titulo" in the Peruvian environment is
likely to be interpreted as almost any form of degree, diploma,
or certificate of completion of a course. Likewise, a titulo
professional means almost any title indicating any specializa-
tion. Thus, a person who had specialized in the study of tour-
ism would consider himself to have a professional title as a
technician in tourism. For these reasons, codes were developed
for such responses as the questionnaires were analyzed, not
A question relating to income was included in the original
draft of the questionnaire. However, it was decided to omit
income queries completely (except for one question asking if
the official received any income from jobs other than his
government post) because it became apparent that such
questions probably would not elicit valid answers. To illus-
trate the difficulties inherent in financial queries, the census
of 1961, in answer to a question on monthly income of govern-
ment and private business employees, received in over 12 per
cent of the replies answers not specifying amounts. Nearly
half of those not answering were government employees.21
The obvious indication was that similar questions in the pres-
ent study likely would receive similar responses. A question
relating to previous occupations, which categorized companies
as small, medium, or large by financial criteria (approximate
annual sales), was retained. Even in this instance, the inclu-
sion of financial criteria raised doubts in the minds of several
persons who reviewed the questionnaire that suspicions in
regard to tax liability would be created.
Data received on the written questionnaires were coded on
ordinary 80-column EAM punch cards. Where required codes
had not been anticipated in preplanning, additional ones were
devised as data were analyzed. This was necessary, for ex-
ample, in the coding of specializations of college graduates
and degrees received. In the main a simple method of analysis
was used; none of the work really required a computer. For
example, no complicated types of factor analysis were consid-
ered necessary; all the tables were managed by relatively
simple matrices.

21. Sexto Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n, p. 254.

Concept and Methodology 35
Key punching, verification, and other data processing were
performed on conventional EAM machines at the data pro-
cessing center of the Convenio de Estadistica y Cartografia
of the Government of Peru in Lima. Supplementary runs were
made in the Rich Electronic Computer Center at the Georgia
Institute of Technology.


P ROFILES have been developed of the senior executives
of the Peruvian government from the research de-
scribed in the previous section. The profiles offer the
best means to present clusters of characteristics and,
if possible, typologies. The group with which the study is
concerned consisted of 176 senior executives at the level of
director and sub-director and 45 middle-management person-
nel. These officials, all but two of whom were men, were
distributed fairly evenly throughout the central government
of Peru and the Independent Public Sub-Sector. All min-
istries of the central government except the Ministries of
War, Aeronautics, and Navy were represented, along with a
number of entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector.
Organizations included in the survey are indicated in Table
2. Of the 176 senior executives who responded to the ques-
tionnaire, 96 were directors in the central government, 46
were sub-directors, and 34 were executives of equivalent grade
in the Independent Public Sub-Sector.
Table 3 indicates the distribution of mailings and returns
by ministry and sector. It was expected that a correlation
would be evident between percentage of returns and the


Ministry of Government and Police
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Ministry of Justice and Religion
Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs
Ministry of Public Education
Ministry of Treasury and Commerce
Ministry of Development and Public Works
Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance
Ministry of Agriculture
National Planning Institute
Comptroller General of the Republic
National Office of Public Administration Rationalization
and Training (ONRAP)
Housing Bank of Peru
Fund of Deposits and Consignations
Peruvian Steamship Corporation
Labor and Human Resources Service
Mining Bank of Peru
Bank of Agricultural Development of Peru
Central Reserve Bank of Peru
Port Authority of Callao
Employee Social Security Board
Peruvian Commercial Airports and Aviation Corporation
Electric Energy Corporation of the Mantaro
National Productivity Center
Promotion and Economic Development Corporation of Tacna



Government and Police 27 10 37.0
Foreign Relations 23 11 47.8
Justice and Religion 24 19 79.2
Labor and Indigenous Affairs 21 9 42.9
Public Education 26 12 46.2
Treasury and Commerce 31 19 61.2
Development and Public Works 26 15 57.7
Public Health and Social Assistance 18 12 66.6
Agriculture 38 25 65.7
Presidential Offices 18 10 55.5
Independent Public Sub-Sector 68 34 50.0
Middle Management 60 45 75.0
Total 380 221 58.2

"character" of agencies, and that returns would be lower in
those ministries which were considered less professionally
oriented. Although this was substantiated partially, as Table
3 shows, the pattern of return percentages was not such that
meaningful conclusions could be drawn. Too many extraneous
factors influenced the situation to attribute rates of return
solely to the "character" of the organizations.

Geographic Origins of Peruvian Executives
The extreme centralization of the economy and society in-
fluence the geographic origins of the group of executives.
As Whyte points out, although such concentration is a com-
mon pattern in Latin America, in Peru it is found in more
extreme form than in the majority of the countries of the
Of the population of Peru, approximately 10,420,357 in
19612 and estimated to be 11,649,600 in 1965, some 60.6 per
cent reside in rural regions and 39.4 per cent live in urban
localities.3 Of the total population, 16.4 per cent live in the key
area of Lima, the capital, and Callao, contiguous with Lima
and the major port of the country.4
Although such concentration of population, as well as of
economic activity, characterizes Peru, it should not be for-
gotten that the country has experienced strong effects from
regional and territorial differences. Just as Warner and Van
Riper noted in regard to the United States,, sentiments of
locality and region have been strong in Peru. Thus we find
that a native of Arequipa, for example, even though he has
lived in Lima for most of his life, persists in referring to
himself as an arequipefio. Such loyalties form the major
strength of the numerous social clubs of the capital, with

1. William F. Whyte, La Mano de Obra de Alto Nivel en el Perz, pp. 25-
2. Peru, Sexto Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n, p. 1; and Diagn6stico y
Programaci6n de los Recursos Humanos: Poblaci6n del Peri, p. 4.
3. "Urban" was defined broadly in the 1961 census to include population
of district capitals and of other communities with urban characteristics.
However, the percentages above are based on the number of inhabitants
residing in communities of 2,000 or more. Diagn6stico y Programaci6n de los
Recursos Humanos: Poblaci6n del PerA, pp. 24-25.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
5. Warner et al., p. 39.

Profiles 39
each comprised of migrants from various provincial cities or
The contribution of provincial areas stands out sharply
when the origin of Peru's presidents is studied. As Ernesto
Diez Canseco points out, the great majority of those who
have exercised the office of president ("por delegaci6n, por
usurpaci6n o por accidente) have been provincials.6 Of a total
of 173 mandatarios, Lima has given only 10 per cent; 14
were limeiios, the other 159 were provincials.
Neither the questionnaire nor personal interviews attempt-
ed to isolate effects of birthplace on the values and attitudes
of these officials. But consideration of place of origin can be
most revealing in understanding Peru. First, the concern was
simply with what regions produce the senior executives of the
Peruvian government. Through analysis of census data, the
distribution of executives by region of birth was related to
determine the productivity ratio for each region. Second, a
comparison of department of birth with department of pres-
ent residence indicated the extent and form of mobility of the
officials.7 Such analysis can provide the foundation for specu-
lation about the effects of population concentration on na-
tional life, and the potential advantages and disadvantages
imposed on regions by virtue of uneven distribution of popu-
Executives of the study group were asked to indicate
their place of birth by district, province, and department
(or foreign country) and the birthplaces of their spouse,
father, paternal grandfather, mother, and maternal grand-
father. In addition, they were asked for information on the
location of their first government job and their present post,
as well as the number of years they had served in various
parts of Peru and in foreign countries. Analysis of these data
provides a rather complete picture of regional representation
and mobility, in addition to valuable information on ancestry.
The findings relative to productivity ratios of the four re-
gions of Peru are presented in Table 4. For computation of

6. "El descentralismo hist6rico de la presidencia en el Peril," quoting
Ernesto Diez Canseco.
7. Peru's unitary system of government functions through 23 depart-
ments plus the constitutional province of Callao, each headed by a prefect
appointed by the President of the Republic.

productivity ratios, population figures for the census of 1940
were employed. The 1940 census was used to increase the
accuracy of the calculations by basing ratios on a period closer
to the year of birth of the executives.
Most of Peru's population, according to the census of 1940,
was distributed fairly evenly among the northern, central, and
southern regions, with only the region of the selva being out
of proportion since it had only 5.4 per cent of the total popu-
lation.8 But when considered in terms of productivity ratios,



Northern Peru 30.9 18.9 0.61
Central Peru 30.8 58.5 1.89
Southern Peru 32.9 17.5 0.53
Selva 5.4 5.2 0.96
Total 100.0 100.0

*Excludes foreign-born executives.
productivity atio Executives born in region (%)
fProductivity Ratio =
1940 Population (%)

the four regions show marked differences. First, an almost
exact correlation exists between population and productivity
ratio in the case of the Peruvian selva. Containing 5.4 per
cent of the 1940 population, the four departments of the selva,
Peru's jungle region, produced 5.2 per cent of the executives
of the study group. At the other extreme, the central region,
including the great Lima-Callao urban center as well as the
middle Andean departments, with 30.8 per cent of the popu-
lation, produced 58.5 per cent of the executives. Its productiv-
ity ratio, 1.89, places the central region far out of proportion
in terms of its contribution of leaders to the government of
8. For our purposes, the four regions of Peru comprise the following
departments: Northern Peru-Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Lambayeque,
La Libertad, Ancash; Central Peru-Hudnuco, Pasco, Junin, Ica, Huanca-
velica, Lima, Callao; Southern Peru-Ayacucho, Apurimac, Arequipa,
Puno, Moquegua, Tacna, Cuzco; Selva-Loreto, San Martin, Amazonas,
Madre de Dios.

Profiles 41

Source: U. S. Dept. of Labor, Labor in Peru.

Peru. We find that northern and southern Peru with 30.9 and
32.9 per cent of the population, respectively, produce only
18.9 and 17.5 per cent of the executives. Their ratios of
productivity thus amount to slightly more than half the ex-
pected rate.
Of course, such indications of productivity should not be
accepted as complete evidence of low productivity without
consideration of patterns of mobility of government leaders
and general internal migration. It is necessary to relate pro-
ductivity ratios of the various regions of Peru to patterns of
mobility and migration for a better picture of regional con-
tributions to government leadership. Because the study did
not encompass elements of the central government outside
of the capital, except to a limited degree for certain ministries
and autonomous agencies, the productivity ratios must be in-
terpreted with care. For example, it is conceivable that the
lower ratios of productivity of the northern and southern
regions of Peru could mean that executives born in those
regions were employed more outside Lima, and would be un-
der-represented in the study. The proximity of most of the
central region to the capital would lend some credence to this
possibility, but studies of internal migration lead rather to
the conclusion that the northern and southern regions simply
do contribute fewer leaders to the government.
These studies of migration9 within Peru reveal the principal
currents of internal migration to be as follows:
a. from the entire country toward the capital
b. from the sierra to the costa
c. along the costa
d. along the valleys, principally to the great Andean val-
leys such as Urubamba, Mantaro, and Callej6n de Huaylas
e. colonization movements to the selva.
The movement to the capital has been most drastic in impact.
Analysis of the composition of population in the Lima-Callao
area indicates that the central region contributes considerably
greater numbers of migrants than do the other three re-
gions.10 Thus it is likely that the productivity ratios derived
9. For example, Perui, Instituto Nacional de Planificaci6n, Andlisis de la
Realidad Socio-econ6mica del Peru as quoted in Diagnostico y Progra-
maci6n de los Recursos Humanos: Poblaci6n del Peru, pp. 21-23.
10. Peri, Diagn6stico y Programaci6n de los Recursos Humanos: Po-
blaci6n del Peru, Cuadros 10A and 10B, pp. 22-23.

Profiles 43
from the questionnaire data are a true reflection of the actual
migratory patterns which exist in Peru.
Table 5 shows mobility patterns for the government leaders.
Using four executive groups, a distribution is made of three
types of mobility. Intradepartmental mobility is indicated for
those whose department of birth and department of residence
are the same. Interdepartmental mobility means that the de-
partment of birth and department of residence are different
but within the same region. Inter-region mobility signifies
that the department of birth and department of residence
are different and in separate regions.
Employing these definitions, the data show that sub-direc-


All senior executives 47.2% 16.5% 32.4% 3.9%
Directors 44.8 19.8 30.2 5.2
Sub-Directors 52.2 13.1 32.6 2.1
Independent Sector
Executives 47.3 11.8 38.2 2.9
Middle Management 31.1 6.7 60.0 2.2
*"Other" includes international mobility and undetermined mobility.

tors are most likely to remain in their department of birth
while pursuing their careers. Over 52 per cent of sub-directors
were born and now live in the same department. Still, almost
one-third of this group has moved between regions of the
country. In general, all of the senior executives follow ap-
proximately the same patterns of mobility, though executives
of the Independent Public Sub-Sector show a higher interre-
gional mobility, over 38 per cent.
Standing apart from the senior executives is the middle
management group. Officials of this segment demonstrate
strongly the attractions of the capital, with 60 per cent having
moved from other regions of Peru to Lima and another 6.7
per cent having moved from other departments. Such a pat-
tern coincides with the steadily increasing, primarily one-
way migration from all parts of Peru to the Lima-Callao
metropolitan area. This younger, middle management group


is probably quite representative of the typical postwar mi-
grant of that class to the capital.
One must look as well to the racial situation for further
insight into the relative productivity of the four regions. The
region of lowest productivity, southern Peru, contains the
highest percentage of the Indian population of the country,
and therefore also has higher illiteracy, less education, and
other factors which would decrease opportunities for entry
into the civil service. Although the most productive central

Executive born in Peru 99.3% 96.9% 100.0% 97.1% 95.6%
Executive foreign born 0.7 3.1 2.9 4.4
Father and executive
born in Peru t 91.7 97.8 94.1 93.3
Paternal grandfather,
father, and executive
born in Peru t 74.0 82.6 88.2 80.0

*Source of 1961 population data: Peru, Instituto Nacional de Planifica-
ci6n, "Cuardro No. 5, Poblaci6n de la Rep6blica, por Lugar de Nacimiento."
June 14, 1965.
tData on nativity of ancestors are not included in the census.

region also contains a large percentage of Indians, the effect
on the productivity ratio is offset by the huge population of
In Table 6, the nativity of Peruvian senior executives and
middle management personnel is compared with the popula-
tion of Peru in 1961. Because of nonavailability of census
statistics relating to nativity of fathers and paternal grand-
fathers, the comparison does not extend to such ancestors,
but applies only to the executives themselves.
All categories of senior executives and middle management
officials show up as overwhelmingly native Peruvians. In the
case of sub-directors, 100 per cent were born in Peru. The
highest percentage of foreign-born officials is seen in the
middle management group, where 4.4 per cent were born out-
side Peru. In the group of directors, 3.1 per cent are foreign-

Profiles 45
born. Such differences might indicate increasing accessibility
of civil service jobs to sons of immigrants, but the evidence
is far from conclusive.
Comparing nativity of senior executives with the nativity of
the general population of Peru, it may be seen that the for-
eign born are overrepresented in the Peruvian bureaucracy.
The census of 1961 counted 66,723 foreign-born inhabitants,
or 0.67 per cent of the total population. Yet 2.3 per cent of
the senior executives were born in the exterior and 4.4 per
cent of middle management personnel were foreign born.
Percentages of native births drop somewhat when fathers
of executives are considered together with the executives. In
this regard, it may be noted that the director group exchanges
places with the middle management group as "least Peru-
vian." The obvious cause is a higher proportion of foreign-
born fathers in the case of directors. At the same time,
sub-directors exhibit greater "purity" of Peruvian ancestry
with 97.8 per cent of sub-directors plus fathers born in Peru.
But upon tracing ancestry to the third generation, and includ-
ing paternal grandfathers with fathers and the executives, a
further alteration of "Peruvianness" occurs. In this instance,
although the director group remains "least Peruvian," it is
discovered that independent sector executives are "most
Peruvian" when considered with fathers and paternal grand-
Evaluating the effect of foreign birth on the opportunities
for success in the bureaucracy, it must be concluded that
native birth is not advantageous when that factor is consid-
ered in isolation. Proportionately, more foreign-born persons
reach high levels in the Peruvian bureaucracy than do native
Peruvians. The data indicate that the executives who have
reached the highest level in the civil service are "least Peru-
vian" in terms of ancestry. Further substantiation of such
data through deeper studies could lead to some revision of
thinking about the "closed society" which frequently has been
considered characteristic of Peru.
Education of Peruvian Executives
The importance of education in the Peruvian scale of values
is clearly evident. No one who has observed the Peruvian gov-
ernment worker at close range can fail to be "impressed by

the high value placed on at least the exterior signs of educa-
tion, such as a university diploma, degree, or certificate of
course completion. The same spirit is evident in the eagerness
with which Peruvians seek to complete courses of many de-
scriptions. Formal education is looked upon as the key to
social and occupational mobility."
In this section comparisons will be made of educational
levels attained by the executives and the educational levels
attained by Peruvian adult males. Also analysis will be made
of differences in university education and other training re-
lated to ministry. In addition, the contributions of various
Peruvian and foreign universities to the education of the
executives will be considered as well as the areas of speciali-
zation of college graduates.
College and university training appears to be a virtually
essential stage in the careers of most Peruvian bureaucrats.
Ninety-one per cent of the senior executives had at least
some college training, and 74.6 per cent were college gradu-
ates. Over 36 per cent had undertaken some form of post-
graduate studies. There were minor differences in attained
levels of education among the four groups of executives, with
the sub-director group having the lowest proportion of per-
sons with college training.
No executive in any group had less than high school training
and only 15 per cent of the sub-director group failed to con-
tinue beyond the high school level.
Table 7 aids in appreciation of how distinctly education sets
Peruvian government executives apart from the rest of so-
ciety. A comparison of the proportions of executives at vari-
ous levels of education with proportions of adult males in the
Peruvian population at these levels makes obvious the high
over-representation of well-educated persons among govern-
ment executives. Although data for direct comparison exactly
in these terms were not available, much value lies in consid-
eration of similar breakdowns. In 1961, it was reported that
almost 40 per cent of the adult population of Peru (over 17

11. Mejia Valera points out how education particularly was used after the
economic crisis of 1929 as a path of social mobility. This intensified after
the Second World War, and in recent years a new type of student-from
the lower classes-has appeared on the scene. Jose Mejia Valera, "La
estratificaci6n social en el Peri."

Profiles 47

years old) was illiterate.12 Of those persons with some de-
gree of formal education, the overwhelming majority had
completed no more than the primary level. Only 4 per cent
of this literate group over six years old had gone beyond
secondary level."3
In terms of education, then, it is obvious that Peruvian
government executives stand apart as a highly elite group



Less than Ligh
High School 8.5% 5.2% 15.2% 8.8% 6.7%
Some college 16.5 11.5 19.6 26.5 24.4
College graduate 38.1 35.4 39.1 44.1 28.9
studies 36.4 46.9 26.1 20.6 35.6
No answer 0.6 1.0 4.4

in their society. They are hardly comparable to even the
average Peruvian in this respect, and they are worlds apart
from the great mass of illiterate Indians, completely without
formal education. It is interesting to speculate about the ways
in which such a drastic difference might foster an attitude
of paternalism among such executives.
A rather confusing pattern is apparent in the areas of
specialization chosen by the different groups in their univer-
sity training.14 Table 8 shows the proportions of executives in
each group according to specialization in college. It is obvious
12. Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund.
Fourth Annual Report 1964, p. 449.
13. Per6, Estadistica Educativa de 1961, Cuadro No. 1.
14. In consideration of specializations, the behavioral sciences are
defined as economics, economic development, social sciences, and arts and
sciences. Physical and biological sciences include physical sciences, zool-
ogy, science, chemistry, pharmacy, and geology. Engineering includes
architecture, civil, chemical, mechanical, electrical, and industrial engineer-
ing, mining, and metallurgy. Other applied fields include agronomy or
agriculture, education, public or business administration, "urbanism," city
planning, accounting, public relations, medicine, public health, dentistry,
and social work.


that many differences exist among the four executive groups
in terms of university preparation.
In The American Federal Executive, the choice of an
area of specialization in college was interpreted as the first
of a long series of moves which opened or closed certain career
perspectives. Such decisions were seen to be of crucial impor-
tance, influencing greatly the particular federal elite the men
entered. Although the present study offers comparable data
on educational specialization of Peruvian executives, the au-
thor is not convinced that the choice of specialization plays



sciences 16.0% 20.3% 3.3% 18.2% 13.8%
Physical and
biological sciences 3.1 0.3 9.1 6.9
Law 27.4 29.1 33.3 13.7 13.8
Engineering 17.5 12.6 20.0 31.8 10.3
Other applied
fields 21.3 25.3 23.3 4.5 51.7
Other 14.5 10.1 20.0 22.7 3.4

a role so strongly deterministic as the authors of the United
States study see for American executives.
However, what the data indicate for Peruvian executives
may be even more significant. It can be seen that the largest
proportion of executives in the director and sub-director
groups specialized in law during their university years. Such
specialization corresponds well with traditional notions of edu-
cation and government service in Peru. Yet the independent
sector executives and the middle management group chose
law less than half as frequently. At the same time, nearly
32 per cent of independent sector executives specialized in
engineering, and almost 52 per cent of the middle manage-
ment personnel followed other applied fields in their univer-
sity training.
This greater emphasis on engineering and other applied

Profiles 49
fields of specialization by independent sector executives and
middle management officials is believed to indicate significant
changes in Peruvian government and society. A traditional
education in the law no longer suffices for the developmental
needs of Peru. There is a burgeoning demand for persons
trained in a wide variety of new fields. These demands are
felt strongly in the government because much of the insti-
gation and impetus for development programs originates in
the Peruvian bureaucracy.
Another striking aspect of the data on areas of speciali-
zation of Peruvian executives is the indication of complete
absence of specialization in any of the humanities. The lack
of representation of graduates in the humanities" is some-
what surprising in view of the proportion of Peruvian uni-
versity students engaged in the study of "letters." Table 9
shows that nearly 17 per cent of all students majored in
letters in 1959. Apparently none of these has entered or
reached the level of the bureaucracy included in the research.
In terms of more direct preparation for a public service
career, such as specialization in public administration and re-
lated fields, it was found, as expected, that few executives
had chosen such a specialization.'6 Historically, Peruvian uni-
versities have demonstrated little or no interest in the area
of public administration and only recently have several uni-
versities in Peru begun to develop courses in administration.17
The Federico Villarreal National University in Lima presently
offers the strongest existing program and is directed specifi-
cally at training public administrators. Professor Bard's com-
ment in regard to the weakness of available programs bears

The central fact that accounts for sparse offerings in the field
of Public Administration, the superficiality of its study and
the lack of academic interest in things public may be found in
15. The humanities are defined to include languages and literature, the
fine arts and music, classical studies, philosophy, and history.
16. Most of those who had so specialized were middle management
personnel, mainly in accounting.
17. The author is grateful to Dr. Erwin W. Bard of Brooklyn College
for the use of his report, University Training for Public Administration
in Peru, prepared for the Institute of Public Administration of New York,
January, 1965. Many of these comments are based on Professor Bard's


the absence from the University curricula of Political Science
as an area of scientific objective study and teaching. The
Faculty organization of Peruvian higher education, cast in the
same mold as the universities of continental Europe, has left
no free ground in which Political Science could grow. Early
indications of an interest were lost as the related faculties
yielded to the narrowing pressure for professional training.18


SPECIALIZATION 1950 1959 IN 1950 IN 1959

Letters 1,648 4,551 10.35 16.96
Law 1,514 2,987 9.51 11.13
Sciences (preparatory) 2,318 3,847 14.56 14.33
Medicine 2,550 1,772 16.02 6.60
Obstetrics 607 261 3.81 .97
Odontology 574 904 3.61 3.37
Veterinary medicine 119 209 .75 .78
Pharmacy and Biochemistry 582 990 3.66 3.69
Biological sciences 131 197 .82 .73
Physical sciences and
mathematics 154 140 .97 .52
Geology 89 367 .56 1.37
Agronomy 534 819 3.35 3.05
Chemistry and chemical
engineering 920 461 5.78 1.72
Engineering 1,025 3,406 6.44 12.69
Economic and commercial
sciences 1,512 3,922 9.50 14.61
Education 1,212 1,779 7.61 6.63
Journalism 191 217 1.20 .81
Others 239 11 1.50 .04
Totals 15,919 26,840 100.00 100.00

Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, Programacion del Desarrollo,
Vol. 3, Cuadro 9, as quoted in Whyte, La Mano de Obra de Alto Nivel, p. 41.

Present developments in Peruvian higher education should
lead to much wider interest in political science and public
administration and probably to significant changes in the
areas of specialization of college graduates among Peruvian
executives. Recent technical assistance programs under the

18. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Profiles 51

Alliance for Progress have served to stimulate interest in
public administration not only in the Peruvian government
but in the academic sector as well.
There can be little doubt of the pervasive importance of
higher education in the careers of Peruvian government exec-
utives. It was shown above that 91 per cent of the senior



Universidad Nacional
Mayor de San Marcos
Pontificia Universidad
Cat6lica del Perui
Universidad Nacional
de Ingenieria
Universidad Nacional
Universidad Nacional
Federico Villarreal
Universidad Nacional
de La Libertad,
Universidad Nacional
San Agustin,
Other Peruvian Univer-
sities and schools
Foreign universities-
United States
Foreign universities-
Western Europe
Foreign universities-
Latin America
No answer

















8.7 2.9 4.4


1.1 1.0 2.2

executives had at least some college training and that nearly
75 per cent were college graduates, with 36 per cent under-
taking some post-graduate studies. Such data naturally draw
our attention to the universities that produce Peruvian exec-
utives. Table 10 offers such information.
In analyzing educational background, separate codes were
employed for each major institution reported in Peru and





other codes for universities located in different regions of the
It was found that Peruvian executives attended public in-
stitutions much more than private universities. Such findings
were not unexpected, considering the predominance of public
institutions in Peru. The Universidad Nacional Mayor de San
Marcos in Lima, one of America's oldest universities, stands
far above other universities in numbers of executives pro-
duced. Nearly 30 per cent of all senior executives and about
49 per cent of the middle management group attended San
Marcos. The Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica, Peru's second
largest university, provides the second largest representation
of executives in the Peruvian bureaucracy. Seventeen per cent
of all senior executives attended the Catholic University. This
university was attended by various executive groups, whose
proportions varied widely, ranging from 25 per cent of the
directors to 6.5 per cent of sub-directors and less than 9 per
cent of the other executive groups. The data suggest no ex-
planation for such variations. Accounting for the third largest
number of graduates among the executives in the Universidad
Nacional de Ingenieria, Peru's most important engineering
school. Over 11 per cent of the senior executives studied at
the National Engineering University. A much larger propor-
tion-20 per cent-of independent sector executives comes
from the Engineering University, perhaps reflecting stronger
interest in applied education by these executives. Only one
other institution, the Universidad Nacional Agraria, provides
numbers comparable to the three universities considered
above. The Agrarian University fills nearly 10 per cent of
the senior executive positions and over 4 per cent of the mid-
dle management jobs.
Table 10 shows the relatively minor role played by other
universities of Peru in preparing future government execu-
tives. Only the Universidad Nacional de La Libertad at Tru-
jillo supplies an even slightly comparable proportion, nearly
7 per cent of the middle management group. Clearly, as Table
11 indicates, the "big 4," San Marcos, Catholic University,
National Engineering University, and National Agrarian Uni-
versity, dominate in the role of producing Peruvian govern-
ment executives. All of these major universities are located
in the capital and are thus in a better position to attract

Profiles 53
larger numbers of students. But traditionally, San Marcos
and Catholic University are the schools to attend, and new-
comers such as the Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal,
despite their more advanced offerings in subjects such as pub-
lic administration, still lack the prestige of the traditional
Foreign universities account for nearly 7 per cent of the
senior executive groups, the largest numbers coming from
universities in other Latin American countries. Over 13 per
cent of the middle management group studied at universities



52 52 29.5 San Marcos
30 82 46.5 Catholic
20 102 57.9 National Engineering
17 119 67.6 National Agrarian
4 123 69.9 San Augustin, Arequipa

*Table includes only those schools which grant four degrees or more. The
total of four-year level degrees is 147.

in other parts of Latin America. United States universities
provided about 6 per cent of the executives in the Independ-
ent Public Sector.
Another aspect of the research was a determination of the
correlation, if any, between the type of ministry and the level
of education and qualifications of the executives. One of the
working hypotheses was that significant differences would ex-
ist among offices and ministries in the qualifications and edu-
cational attainments of officials. It was hypothesized that ex-
ecutives in professionally oriented or foreign oriented minis-
tries would exhibit higher attainments in this regard than
executives in nonprofessionally oriented ministries. Further-
more, executives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector were
expected to surpass, in these respects, those executives in the
nonprofessionally oriented ministries but not those in the pro-
fessionally oriented ministries.


Several factors were selected for use as measures of qual-
ifications and educational attainments. These were: level of
education, commercial training, other training, and linguistic
knowledge. Data relative to each factor are presented in
Tables 12 through 15.
Reference to Table 12 will show that in regard to level
of education, the hypotheses were sustained in part but must
be partially rejected. The professionally oriented ministries
do tend to be staffed by better educated executives, although
it was surprising to find that the Ministry of Foreign Relations


Foreign Relations 36.3 18.1 45.4
Development 6.7 53.3 40.0
Public Health 16.7 33.3 50.0
Education 8.5 8.5 33.3 50.0
Government 30.0 20.0 10.0 40.0
Justice 5.3 5.3 57.9 31.5
Treasury 26.3 21.1 36.8 15.7
Agriculture 8.0 44.0 48.0
Labor 11.1 22.2 44.4 22.2
Middle Management 4.4 6.6 24.4 28.8 35.5
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 8.8 26.5 44.1 20.6

was lowest among the professionally oriented ministries, hav-
ing 63.5 per cent of its executives with college degrees or
post-graduate work. The nonprofessionally oriented group, es-
pecially the Ministries of Government and Treasury, gener-
ally tended to show lower educational attainments, although
not in marked degree.
More significant, however, is the finding relating to exec-
utives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. These execu-
tives not only rank lower than most officials in the profes-
sionally oriented ministries (except Foreign Relations) but
also stand considerably below many executives in the non-
professionally oriented group. Of the latter group, only the
Ministries of Government and Treasury rank lower than the

Profiles 55

Independent Public Sub-Sector. This finding reveals a situa-
tion quite different from the type of executive expected to
be found in such semi-autonomous entities of Latin American
Turning to the second element used as a measure of attain-
ment, commercial training, it may be noted from Table 13 that
the findings are inconclusive. Several factors make the data
deficient. Substantial numbers of executives in most minis-
tries and offices either had no such training or failed to re-
spond to the question. Further, overemphasis on such an ele-



Foreign Relations 45.4%
Development 20.0% 26.6
Public Health 8.3
Education 16.6
Government 10.0 10.0
Justice 5.3 26.3
Treasury 21.1 36.9
Agriculture 20.0
Labor 44.4
Middle Management 8.9 55.6
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 20.6 26.4

ment as commercial training could do an injustice to areas
where executives might have less need for such training.
The data do not suggest clear conclusions. In regard to the
third measure, other training in administration or manage-
ment, essentially the same results are evident in Table 14.
The data do not permit adequate testing of the sub-hypoth-
esis in this respect.
One further measure of qualifications is the extent of knowl-
edge and command of languages. Questions relating to lin-
guistic knowledge were included in the questionnaire not only
to provide a measure of education but also to determine the
numbers of executives capable of communication in the in-
digenous languages of Peru. Because a very large proportion
of the Peruvian Indian population speaks only Quechua or


Aymara, it is important to know what barriers to direct com-
munication exist in the bureaucracy and among the bureau-
Table 15 indicates the proportion of executives who have
a reading or speaking command of various languages. It is
apparent that very few government executives at this level
have a command of Peru's indigenous languages, Quechua
and Aymara. Three ministries show no executives with such
ability, one being the strategic Ministry of Government. This


Foreign Relations 9.1% 36.3% 9.1%
Development 20.0 6.7% 13.3
Public Health 8.3 25.0 8.3
Education 8.3 16.6 8.3
Government 30.0 10.0
Justice 5.3 21.1 15.7
Treasury 31.5 5.3 15.7
Agriculture 12.0 12.0 4.0 8.0
Labor 22.2 11.1 33.3
Middle Management 31.1 40.0 6.6
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 29.4 23.5 2.9 15.9

same ministry also has the highest proportion of executives
(50 per cent) who speak only Spanish. In general, executives
of the professionally oriented or foreign oriented ministries
exhibit the most extensive language capability. This is not,
however, a strong tendency, and so many variations exist that
it is not feasible to assert that the hypothesis is sustained

Career Lines of Peruvian Executives
As part of the analysis, the main career routes of Peruvian
bureaucrats were considered in an effort to determine pat-
terns of movement in and out of occupations of different sta-
tus. Although an executive's forebears, his geographic origin,


SECTOR (1) (2)* (3) (4) (5) (6)t (7)

Foreign Relations 9.1% 81.8% (9.1)% 9.1%
Development 13.3% 6.7% 53.3 20.0
Public Health 16.7 (8.3) 25.0 8.3% 41.6 (8.3) 8.3
Education 8.3 (8.3) 33.3 8.3 50.0
Government 50.0 20.0 30.0
Justice 26.3 15.7(11.4) 36.8 15.7 21.1
Treasury 26.3 47.3 26.3
Agriculture 20.0(8.0) 28.0 8.0 52.0
Labor 33.3 (11.1) 44.4 11.1 11.1
Middle Management 28.8 11.1(8.8) 42.2 8.8 17.7
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 5.9 (11.7) 55.6 11.7 26.4

*Percentages in parentheses in this column are included in Column 4.
tPercentages in parentheses in this column are included in Column 7.

his education, and other factors are strongly determinative
of his career, much also depends on his performance after he
becomes self-supporting.
Almost exactly the same proportion of Peruvian senior ex-
ecutives that Warner found among American federal execu-
tives-three-fourths--began their careers in one of the pro-
fessions or in a white-collar job. But in Peru, quite different
from the United States, only 1.1 per cent started as laborers.
Just over 6 per cent began their careers in the armed forces.
When the professions are considered in detail, in Table 16,



Engineer 38.3% 32.9% 28.0% 29.7%
Medical doctor 6.2 7.3 11.0 10.9
Lawyer 24.7 22.0 20.7 17.2
Scientist 1.2 1.2 2.4 3.1
School teacher 11.1 11.0 9.8 9.4
Architect 1.2 1.2
Professor 1.2 2.4 4.9 3.1
Accountant 11.1 9.8 11.0 12.5
Other 6.2 12.2 11.0 14.1
Total persons 81 82 82 64

it can be seen that engineering and the law, with 38 per
cent and 25 per cent respectively, lead by far in the numbers
of executives who chose these professions. Sizable proportions
followed the professions of teaching and accounting, with 11.1
per cent of the executives beginning in both these fields. Med-
icine attracted 6.2 per cent of the officials as their first occu-
Proportions of executives in the professions, as may be
seen in Table 17, remained very stable for the first ten years
of their careers. Fifteen years later, however, the professions
exhibit a large decrease, from 46.6 per cent to 36.4 per cent.
The decrease may be explained by a corresponding increase
in the proportion of major executives during the same period,
from 9.1 per cent to 23.3 per cent. The questionnaire asked
the executives to indicate their principal occupation at four

Profiles 59

time periods, and apparently many considered their respon-
sibilities as major executives to outweigh their professional
In terms of movement in and out of occupations, there are
many indications of transitions. We find a steady decrease
in proportions of white-collar workers, from a high of 27.8
per cent in the first occupation to only 2.3 per cent fifteen
years later. There is an increase of minor executives at the
five and ten year stages, then a sharp decrease at fifteen
years. Movement of professional men consists principally of
decreases in engineers and lawyers over the fifteen year per-

Laborer 1.1%
White-collar worker 27.8 16.5% 7.4% 23%
Minor executive 6.3 12.5 16.5 8.0
Major executive 1.1 3.4 9.1 23.3
Business owner 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1
Professional man 46.0 46.6 46.6 36.4
Armed forces 6.3 5.1 5.7 4.5
Other 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.6
No answer 2.8 10.8 13.1 23.9

iod, most of these men apparently then considering them-
selves as major executives.
Considerable variation was revealed among different types
of executives in the number of organizations (government or
private) in which they served. As may be seen in Table 18,
sub-directors are least likely, though not strongly so, to move
between organizations. Almost 35 per cent of the sub-director
group has served in only one organization. Although 70 per
cent of all senior executives are likely to have served in three
or less organizations, the executives in the Independent Public
Sub-Sector show somewhat greater propensity toward inter-
organizational movement. Only 55.9 per cent have served in
three or less organizations. But almost 77 per cent of these
men have served in four or less, and relatively small num-
bers are inclined to move more often.
Comparison of inter-organizational mobility? in Warner's


United States study19 and the data on Peruvian executives
shows American federal executives much more inclined toward
movement. Furthermore, American executives are about as
likely to make four or five moves as one or two. Among
Peruvian executives, after the third organization there is a
marked drop in mobility. Peruvian government executives ap-



1 27.3% 29.2% 34.8% 11.8% 22.2%
2 22.2 21.9 19.6 26.5 15.6
3 20.5 19.8 23.9 17.6 13.3
4 9.1 7.3 4.3 20.6 2.2
5 7.4 6.3 10.9 5.9 11.1
6 4.5 5.2 2.2 5.9
7 1.1 1.0 2.9 1.1
8 1.7 2.1 2.9
More than 8 2.3 3.1 2.2 1.1
No answer or
indeterminate number 4.0 4.2 2.2 5.9 31.1

pear to be much more likely than their American counter-
parts to remain in one organization.

Stability of Peruvian Government Executives
Instability is virtually an automatic feature associated with
discussions of Latin American governments. A long record
of men-on-horseback, coups d'6tat, frequent revisions of con-
stitutions, and governmental turnovers naturally suggests
that public administration would be characterized by much
instability and job insecurity. As it was indicated in Chapter
I, many are the studies which assume such instability; few
if any, however, have offered substantiation of such assump-
For this reason, one of the principal areas of interest in
the Peruvian research was a study of stability in the upper
levels of the Peruvian bureaucracy. Two hypotheses were
formulated to focus part of the research upon the matter of
19. Warner, p. 170.

Profiles 61
stability. Hypothesis H-2 stated that personnel stability
varies according to the character and orientation of ministries.
Further, it was hypothesized that stability would be higher
in foreign oriented ministries and in professionally oriented
ministries, and lowest in ministries and agencies engaged in
programs of high national priority or in programs of a highly
controversial nature. Hypothesis H-3 stated that personnel
stability would vary in direct relation to ministerial stability.
To test each of these hypotheses in the research, the actual
record of personnel turnover of each ministry was studied.
The author was fortunate in being able to obtain quite com-
plete records of personnel changes for most ministries. In
others, the data are somewhat fragmentary.
Of especial interest in this phase of the research was the
idea that changes in government, particularly extra-constitu-
tional changes, bring about wholesale turnover of personnel.
Is this idea a myth? Various contradictory remarks offer hints
that it might be less than completely true. For example, one
Peruvian expressed the belief that every time the govern-
ment changes, the public service is swept clean. Yet, immed-
iately following that statement, he volunteered that his
cousin, who had served 30 years in a ministry, could be of
assistance in explaining ministerial organization.
Other fragments of the "folklore" were equally revealing.
For example, a "dicho," or saying, holds that "el puesto de
director es pan para hoy y nada para mafiana" (the job of
director is bread for today and nothing for tomorrow). The
dicho conveys a belief that the posts of directors and sub-
directors are ones of great insecurity, that they change with
changes in the government. Other posts subordinate to this
level do not seem to be affected so strongly (at least accord-
ing to the folklore) by this fear of insecurity.
The same person who used this expression also indicated
that the Belafinde government had not replaced officials in
the customary manner, but made replacements only in crit-
ical positions where the success of its program depended upon
the loyalty of party sympathizers.
Thus, from the more or less complete data on all civilian
ministries except the Ministries of Public Health and Public
Education, and limited data on those two ministries, executive
stability was analyzed. Because the data are considered to be

somewhat unique, they are presented in considerable detail
in Tables 19 and 20. The analysis covers the period extending
from the change of government in July, 1956, upon the in-
auguration of President Manuel Prado Ugarteche, through
the extra-constitutional government of the Military Junta
(1962-63), to the administration of President Fernando
Belainde Terry as of March, 1965 (for directors), and June,
1965 (for ministers).

MINISTRY 1956-1962 1962-1963 1963-AS OF JUNE, 1965t

Foreign Relations (4) **17.8 mos. (1) 12 mos. (1) 24.0 mos.
Government (4) 17.5 (2) 6 (3) 8.0
Justice (6) 11.7 (1) 12 (3) 7.3
Treasury (9) 8.0 (2) 6 (2) 11.0
Development (6) 12.7 (1) 12 (4) 5.8
Agriculture (5) 14.4 (2) 6 (3) 7.7
Education (5) 16.8 (1) 12 (2) 11.0
Public Health (6) 12.0 (1) 12 (1) 23.0
Labor (6) 11.7 (1) 12 (2) 11.5

*Overthrown by military coup d'6tat in July, 1962.
tData on Belainde's administration cover only the period from July 28,
1963, to June, 1965, the cut-off date of the study. The complete cabinet
change in September, 1965, is not reflected.
**Figures in parentheses indicate the number of incumbents represented.

Several factors should be kept in mind in interpretation
of the data in Tables 19 and 20. The government of Manuel
Prado was ousted by the coup d'6tat of July 18, 1962. How-
ever, because the "golpe" took place shortly before the nor-
mal time for completion of the term of office, there was no
radical alteration of ministerial tenure in the Prado admin-
istration. Terms of office during the one-year administration
of the military junta government reflect that short period.
Finally, data on the Beladnde administration are derived from
the period dating from the inauguration in July, 1963, through
June, 1965.
It should be recognized also that the period from 1956 to
1965, generally speaking, was one of constitutional govern-



Foreign Relations 8.7 24.0 30.4 8.7 4.3 2.2 10.8 10.8
Development$ 19.2 7.7 7.7 15.4 19.2 3.8 3.8 7.7 15.4
Public Health Detailed data not available
Education Detailed data not available
Government 45.2 3.2 27.6 13.8 6.4 8.1 1.6 1.6
Justice 4.8 48.0 14.3 14.3 4.8 9.5 4.8
Treasury 4.8 33.3 9.5 4.8 4.8 23.8 19.0
Agriculture 2.8 13.8 27.7 16.6 5.6 5.6 8.3 16.6 2.8
Labor 7.1 21.4 35.7 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1

*Columns headed "Past" include directors serving during the period 1956-1965 but not those in position as of March, 1965.
fColumns headed "Present" include directors in position as of March, 1965.
$In eight cases, length of service is at least that indicated. Records available indicated beginning of service as "before 1956."

ment except for the one-year rule of the military junta. Be-
cause of this, it is entirely possible that no fundamental
changes occurred during the period, changes such as might
be expected before 1945 or in the period 1945-1948. Never-
theless, substantiation of the absence of significant movement
in and out of the civil service from 1956 to 1965 would be
an important finding in itself. Such a finding could indicate a
tendency toward better job security in the public service and
greater stability in the government in general.
In Table 19, data on stability of ministers of the Peruvian
government during three administrations are presented. The
data are arranged according to ministry and time period. For
each ministry and time period, the average length of minister-
ial service was computed. In relating these findings to hypoth-
esis H-2, it will be recalled that on pages 19-20, four minis-
tries-Development, Public Health, Education, and Foreign
Relations-were classified as "professionally oriented." It can
be seen from Table 19 that hypothesis H-2 is sustained only
partially by the data. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was
found to possess the highest stability of ministers, with an
average length of service of ministers reaching 17.8 months
during the Prado administration, 12 months during the mili-
tary junta, and 24 months during the early period of the
Belaunde government. The Ministry of Public Education,
third highest in stability during Prado's term, dropped to 11
months in Belafinde's administration. Stability in the Prado
term for the other two ministries classified as professionally
oriented, Development (12.7 months) and Public Health (12
months), did not sustain the hypothesis. In the Belafnde gov-
ernment, the Ministry of Development exhibits the worst sta-
bility, with four ministers in less than two years and an aver-
age tenure of only 5.8 months.
For the five ministries which were considered to be non-
professionally oriented-Government, Justice, Agriculture,
Treasury, and Labor-it was hypothesized that stability
would be lower. A sub-hypothesis was founded on the assump-
tion that the lowest stability would occur in connection with
programs of a controversial nature. In the latter instance, the
main focus of interest was the Ministry of Agriculture, cen-
ter of activity in the sensitive agrarian reform program.
Again, the data relating to these five ministries are incon-

Profiles 65

elusive to the extent that no clear pattern of stability could
be inferred. The Ministry of Government, for example, ex-
pected to exhibit a very low stability, shows the second high-
est stability of 17.5 months during the Prado administration.
The Ministry of Agriculture, rather than being lowest, pos-
sessed the longer than average length of service of 14.4
months under Prado. Ranking lowest in stability during the
Prado government was the Ministry of Treasury with 8
months average service among ministers in that portfolio.
When stability of the nonprofessionally oriented ministries
during the Belafnde administration is considered, the hypoth-



Government 54.G 18.6
Foreign Relations 50.6 20.0
Justice 44.2 23.5
Labor 49.7 25.3
Education 45.1 23.3
Treasury 49.7 23.0
Development 52.2 27.2
Public Health 49.7 26.0
Agriculture 45.9 26.8
Presidential offices 39.5 25.4
Middle Management 37.6 23.2
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 49.9 26.1
Overall average 47.4 24.0

esized results are substantiated more clearly. In general, sta-
bility of these ministers under Beladnde is significantly lower
than that in the professionally oriented ministries, and even
lower than stability in the same ministries under Prado. The
fact that Belainde had not completed his term does not alter
the trend toward lower stability. Indeed, judged by the record
to the date of the study, it appears that the Belafnde admin-
istration may establish a very low overall stability rate.
However, in spite of the substantiation provided the hypoth-
esis in this instance, it must be concluded that the hypoth-
eses relating to stability of ministers are not, in general, fully


sustained. It cannot be stated firmly from the presently avail-
able evidence that the professional character of the minis-
tries necessarily determines ministerial stability.
Continuing the consideration of stability of other execu-
tives, it was hypothesized that stability of directors also
would vary according to the character of the ministry, and
furthermore that executive stability would vary in direct re-
lation to ministerial stability. In Table 20, data are presented
for directors in the civilian ministries except the Ministries
of Education and Public Health. Looking at the professionally
oriented ministries, it is apparent that length of service of
directors in the Ministry of Foreign Relations tends to be
short. Over 71 per cent of these executives had served for
less than one year. In the Ministry of Development, half the
executives had served more than three years in the same
position, and 23.1 per cent over seven years. The erratic pat-
tern of lengths of service makes it infeasible to generalize
extensively; however, the Ministry of Development does ex-
hibit fairly high stability.
Of the nonprofessionally oriented ministries, Government
and Police has the lowest stability. Nearly 90 per cent of
its directors had tours of less than three years. Almost 50
per cent served less than a year. The Ministries of Justice
and Labor had 67.1 and 64.2 per cent, respectively, of their
executives serving less than three years in position. In gen-
eral, these ministries show lower stability than the profes-
sionally oriented ministries. However, these differences do not
conclusively sustain the hypothesis.
One further perspective of executive stability in the Peru-
vian government bureaucracy is afforded by the data in Table
22. The respondents were asked to indicate the number of
times their careers had been interrupted. It is apparent from
Table 22 that a very low average rate of career breaks exists
in general. The average executive reported 0.6 career inter-
ruptions, the extremes ranging from 1.2 breaks in the Minis-
try of Labor to 0.2 breaks in the Ministry of Government
and among middle management officials. The data appear to
indicate a quite high degree of job stability among these ex-
ecutives. It should be noted, nevertheless, that there is not
necessarily a close correlation between length of total service
and length of service as a director. A rapid turnover at the

Profiles 67

high director level conceivably could coexist with relatively
lengthy overall service.
Turning to the other aspect of ministerial stability, hy-
pothesis H-3 predicted a direct relationship between executive
stability and stability of ministers. This hypothesis was not
sustained. One of the ministries least stable in regard to
ministers-Development-is among the more stable in re-
gard to executives. The Ministry of Treasury shows much
the same relationship. Indeed, all ministries except Govern-



Foreign Relations 0.5 per person 30.6 years 2.6 years
Development 1.0 25.0 8.4
Public Health 1.0 23.7 5.3
Education 0.3 21.8 2.1
Government 0.2 36.0 3.7
Justice 0.9 20.7 3.6
Treasury 0.4 26.7 4.8
Agriculture 0.6 19.1 3.1
Labor 1.2 24.4 3.9
Middle Management 0.2 14.4 3.5
Independent Public
Sub-Sector 0.6 23.8 4.6
Overall average 0.6 per person 24.2 years 4.1 years

*Computed from average age of executives and average ages at entry
into the public service. It does not reflect career interruptions. See
Table 21.
fComputed from ages at commencement of present job and present ages.
It, too, does not reflect career interruptions.

ment are seen to have fairly large proportions of their execu-
tives remaining in their positions for over three years. Thus,
a reasonably large stable corps of executives remains in most
ministries to serve as nuclei for continuity. One is reminded
of Diamant's study of the French administrative system
which continued to function even in the absence of political
consensus. Perhaps somewhat the same continuity is provided
by a core of administrators in the Peruvian governmental

system. There are, of course, instances of "house-cleaning"
for political purposes.20 In general, the data seem to indicate
that it is not entirely accurate to consider Peru's adminis-
trative system highly unstable. At best, however, results of
the research to date are not conclusive. Many unanswered
questions remain to be studied. One of the more basic ques-
tions is what constitutes the ideal stability. The effects of
normal rotation in posts, such as that occurring in the Minis-
try of Foreign Relations, need further research. More de-
tailed research, with rigorous control of pertinent variables,
might reveal much more about bureaucratic stability in the
Latin American environment.
The research has shown that the dominant central region
of Peru produces government executives out of proportion to
its population. Most of the executives appear quite likely to
remain in their area of birth in the course of their career.
The executive group is strongly native Peruvian, although the
foreign born are overrepresented in the government
Practically all the senior executives had at least some col-
lege training and nearly three-fourths are college graduates.
In terms of education, the Peruvian executive stands far
above most of the rest of society. There is a persistence of
traditional specialization in the law, but emphasis is increas-
ing in engineering and other applied fields. Personnel of the
professionally oriented ministries tend to show higher educa-
tional attainments, but not in marked degree.
Most of the executives began their careers in a profession
or in a white-collar job, with the emphases on the professions,
engineering, and the law.
Finally, the professional character of ministries does not
appear to determine stability of ministers and neither does
there appear to be a direct relationship between executive
stability and stability of ministers.
20. For example, censure of the Minister of Public Education, Francisco
Mir6 Quesada, in October, 1964, was accompanied by his firing of a large
number of officials, mostly of the opposition party, before his own fall.
La Prensa, Lima, October 6, 1964, p. 1.


'N THE preceding chapter, the executives were discussed in
terms of their own characteristics, such as geographic
origin, education, and career patterns. But for a deeper
understanding of the process of social change occurring
in Peru and of the potential effects of this on the government
bureaucracy, it is necessary to delve farther into the family
backgrounds of the executives.
In an unintegrated society such as the Peruvian, character-
ized by various cultural dichotomies, and generally described
as a fairly rigidly stratified social system,1 the question of
family influence assumes much importance. In considering the
socio-economic representativeness of the senior administra-
tive leaders of the Peruvian government, that is, the pro-
portions in which they are derived from fathers of various
occupational categories, it is crucial that we attempt to under-
stand the degree of "eliteness" which characterizes the group.
Are the upper levels of the bureaucracy monopolized by cer-
tain occupational strata of society and by sons of certain
types of elite families? What opportunities exist for sons of
1. For example, Holmberg, p. 65; Owens, Peru, pp. 72-73; and Schmitt
and Burks, Evolution or Chaos, pp. 88-92.

fathers in lower economic occupations? These are some of the
questions to which the following analysis is pointed.
The questionnaire by which data were obtained on occupa-
tional backgrounds of the executives and their families fol-
lowed fairly closely that of Warner's study of American fed-
eral executives. Some of the modifications which were neces-
sary to adapt the instrument to the Peruvian environment
were discussed on pages 10-16.
Fathers of Executives
For a broad picture of the paternal backgrounds of the
senior executives and the middle management group, Table
23 is presented according to a seven-fold division of major
occupations. These seven major categories are detailed in
twenty-four groups.
A significant difference emerges immediately when the
paternal occupational categories of Peruvian executives are
compared with those of American federal executives. Only
1.1 per cent of all senior executives are from the laborer
class; the highest percentage is found among sub-directors
with 4.3 per cent from this occupational background. The
middle management group includes 2.2 per cent descended
from laborers. All groups are markedly lower than the 21 per
cent of laborers' sons which Warner found among American
federal executives. Strong suggestions can be seen of less
upward movement of laborer classes in Peruvian society, for
the smallest proportion of Peruvian executives is from the
laborer classes.
Turning to the other extreme, the largest group of senior
executives descends from professional men (30.7 per cent).
Professionals are followed in order by farmers (14.8 per cent),
business owners, executives, "other occupations" (12.5 per
cent), of which the armed forces contribute 8.5 per cent, and
white-collar workers. The proportion of fathers in the profes-
sional category is roughly equal for all of the executive groups
(approximately 30 per cent) except for the middle manage-
ment group, where fathers in the professional grouping occur
among only 20 per cent of the group.
This substantial difference suggests a higher degree of so-
cial mobility among this younger, more junior group of gov-
ernment officials. As other occupational origins are compared,

Families 71

consideration shall be given to the extent to which hypo-
thesis H-4 is sustained. It is hypothesized on page 21 that
there is a direct correlation between age and social mobility
of executives in the Peruvian government, and that social
mobility is highest in lower age groups. The hypothesis was
based on the assumption that Peru is a transitional country,
with the implication that younger age groups (in this case the
middle management group) would demonstrate a greater
social mobility, commensurate with the accelerating trend
toward modernity.
The middle management group draws considerably more
(20 per cent) from the business owner family than do the
senior executives (only 13.1 per cent). Likewise, many more
middle management personnel are derived from fathers in
"other occupations" (20 per cent), while the armed forces
contributes some 9 per cent. Sons of government workers
make up 42.2 per cent of this segment.
One of the surprising aspects of family background for all
four executive groups is the very large proportion of those
executives with fathers who were employed in the public
service. These proportions range from 47.9 per cent of direc-
tors' fathers to 35.3 per cent of the fathers of independent
sector executives. In Table 23, the percentages of fathers
employed in the government service are shown in parentheses.
A comparison of these data with the background data for
American federal executives shows that a vastly larger pro-
portion of Peruvian government executives had fathers em-
ployed in the public service. There is a very strong propensity
for the sons of government personnel to follow their fathers'
footsteps and pursue a public career. As might be expected,
this tendency is most pronounced among sons of white-collar
workers, with about two-thirds of that group having fathers
in the public service. Roughly two-thirds of the fathers who
were professionals were also government workers.
A question which follows naturally concerns the extent of
nepotism in the Peruvian bureaucracy. If the bureaucracy
approximated Riggs' sala model in this respect, strong indi-
cations of nepotism would be present. To gain some apprecia-
tion of nepotistic tendencies the questionnaire asked the exec-
utives if their fathers worked in the same ministry as them-
2. Warner et al., pp. 28-29.



Laborer 1.1% 4.3% 2.2%
Unskilled 2.2
Skilled 1.1 4.3
White-collar worker 9.7 (6.8) 8.3 (6.3)% 10.8 (8.7) 11.8 (5.9)% 6.7 (4.4)
Clerk 0.6 2.9
Salesman 0.6 1.0 2.2 (2.2)
Office worker 8.5 (6.8) 7.2 (6.3) 10.8 (8.7) 8.8 (5.9) 4.4 (2.2)
Executive 12.5 (5.7) 11.4 (7.3) 13.0 (4.3) 14.7 (3.0) 13.3 (6.6)
Minor executive 7.4 (3.4) 6.2 (4.2) 8.7 (4.3) 8.8 11.1 (6.6)
Major executive 5.1 (2.3) 5.2 (3.1) 4.3 5.9 (3.0) 2.2
Business owner 13.1 14.6 8.7 14.7 20.0 (2.2)
Small business 9.1 8.3 8.7 11.8 15.6 (2.2)
Medium business 1.7 3.1 2.2
Large business 2.3 3.1 2.9 2.2

Professional 30.7 (19.3) 31.2 (19.8) 30.4 (17.3) 29.4 (20.7) 20.0 (13.2)
Engineer 5.7 (2.2) 6.2 (2.1) 6.5 (4.3) 2.9 2.2
Doctor/Dentist 5.1 (3.4) 4.2 (3.1) 10.8 (6.5)
Lawyer 11.9 (9.1) 13.5 (12.5) 10.8 (4.3) 8.8 (5.9) 2.2 (2.2)
Teacher 2.3 (1.8) 2.1 (2.1) 5.9 (3.0) 6.7 (6.7)
Architect 1.1 (1.1) 5.9 (5.9)
Accountant 4.0 (1.8) 4.2 2.2 (2.2) 5.9 (5.9) 4.4 (2.2)
Other 0.6 1.0 4.4 (2.2)
Farmer 14.8 (3.4) 12.5 (4.2) 21.7 (4.3) 11.8 13.3 (2.2)
Owner 12.5 (2.8) 9.4 (4.2) 19.6 (2.2) 11.8 11.1 (2.2)
Other 2.3 (0.6) 3.1 2.2 (2.2) 2.2
Other occupations 12.5 (9.1) 15.6 (12.5) 6.5 (4.3) 11.8 (5.9) 20.0 (13.3)
Armed forces 8.5 (8.5) 12.5 (12.5) 4.3 (4.3) 2.9 (2.9) 8.9 (8.9)
Other 4.0 (0.6) 3.1 2.2 8.8 (3.0) 11.1 (4.4)
No answer 5.7 6.2 4.3 5.9 4.4
Totals 100.0 (43.2) 100.0 (47.9) 100.0 (39.1) 100.0 (35.3) 100.0 (42.2)

*Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of fathers in the public service.


selves. The responses indicate strongly that few fathers and
sons have or have had employment with the same ministry.
Of those executives who answered the question precisely, over
85 per cent do not work in the ministry in which their fathers
are or were employed. However, regardless of any nepotism,
government service appears to reflect a sort of family tradi-
tion which is strongly determinative of the son's choice of a
Another substantial and important difference between
American and Peruvian societies is suggested by the relative
proportions of executives whose fathers were in the armed
forces. Warner found only 0.7 per cent of U. S. federal exec-
utives from military families. A much higher portion of sen-
ior Peruvian executives-8.5 per cent-comes from a military
background. This evidence tends to substantiate speculations,
such as Kling's, McAlister's, and others,4 that the military in
some parts of Latin America offers one of the few open
routes for upward social mobility in a relatively immobile
social environment. For the group of directors, the represen-
tation of the military is even greater, reaching 12.5 per cent.
The smallest number of executives from military families is
found among the independent sector group, where only 2.9
per cent have military fathers. The data here suggest, in part,
that perhaps a father's military career has opened new paths
of upward social mobility for the son.
One further important difference between American and
Peruvian executives concerns the representation of officials
coming from fathers in the professions. Whereas The Ameri-
can Federal Executive5 indicates that 19 per cent of American
executives come from families of professionals, it was found
that 31 per cent of the senior Peruvian executives come from
families in the professional class. Approximately the same
percentage occurs for directors, sub-directors, and indepen-
dent sector executives, although the middle management
group reaches only 20 per cent in this respect. Another in-

3. It will be seen on pages 86-87 below how the motivation of "classic
executives" corroborates this.
4. Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Instability in Latin America";
McAlister, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America"; Lieuwen, Arms
and Politics in Latin America, Ch. 5 and passim; and Alexander, "The
Army in Politics," pp. 153-54.
5. Warner et al., p. 29.

Families 75

stance of strong difference is seen in the representation of
legal backgrounds. Nearly 12 per cent of all senior executives
had lawyer fathers. Again, in the case of middle management,
the situation is different, for only 2.2 per cent of this group
has such antecedents. An intriguing question arises in view of
such differences. Have these middle management people
reached their upper limit of achievement in the bureaucracy
or do they herald significant changes in types of personnel
and patterns of mobility in the Peruvian government? At this
stage, the evidence does not offer an answer; however, a long-
term study might reveal important trends in mobility in the
Peruvian society.
Comparisons of these proportions with those of the general
population are difficult because available statistics from Peru
provide only broad estimates of employment by industry, and
occupation and census data reflect only the economically ac-
tive population in broad sectors, such as agriculture, mining,
service, etc. Such categories do not permit comparison with
the detailed occupational data presented in Table 23.
However, some clues or suggestions for comparison may be
obtained from consideration of the results of a 1962 survey of
occupational distribution in the Lima-Callao area, which cov-
ered 604 manufacturing establishments. The survey indicated
the distribution of occupations recorded in Table 24. It can be
seen that fathers of the executive group of the present study
differ radically in their occupational distribution from the
population considered in the report. Altogether, 76.9 per cent
of the 58,718 persons surveyed fell in the laborer class. Such
evidence suggests that the senior executives of the Peruvian
government, and the middle management group as well, are
far from being representative members of Peruvian society.
Such a finding was not unexpected. However, it assumes
greater significance when compared with Warner's findings in
this respect. The American study showed that a large portion
of the American executives came from laborers' families (21
per cent), as compared with 48 per cent of the United States
adult male population in 1930.6 Only 1.1 per cent of the Peru-
vian senior executives have laborer fathers, and as indicated
by the study which was quoted above, a very high percentage
of the whole population is of the laboring class. The disparity,
6. Warner et al., p. 30.


or "unrepresentativeness," of Peruvian government execu-
tives thus is markedly more apparent than that of American
federal executives.

The Third Generation
Thus far the consideration of family influence on govern-
ment executives has been concerned only with two genera-
tions. The executive groups have been analyzed by occupation-
al distributions of the fathers. As Warner points out,7 occu-
pational mobility may take longer than two generations, and



Administrators 2.2
Professionals, technicians, and
scientists 2.4
Office workers and workers in related
occupations 15.7
Foremen, supervisors, and personnel
in similar capacities 2.8
Skilled and semi-skilled workers 32.9
Unskilled workers 36.7
Apprentices 7.3

Source: Perd, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indigenas, Informe
Sobre la Participaci6n del Ministerio de Trabajo en el Desarrollo Econ6-
mico y Social del Peri (Lima: October, 1963), p. 5, as quoted in U. S.
Department of Labor, Labor in Peru, p. 27.

for this reason a more encompassing study is required to
determine family influence. If such slowness of occupational
mobility is apparent in the United States society, there is
every reason to expect less and slower mobility in Peruvian
society, where numerous factors operate against fluid move-
The purpose of Table 25 is to indicate the routes of occu-
pational mobility from the third generation to the second.
Much the same approach as that used by Warner in the
United States was used for the Peruvian executives. In order
to derive as much insight as possible from the data concerning
Peruvian military men, this category was added to the list of
7. Ibid., p. 71.




Unskilled laborer 4.4% 2.2% 2.2%
Skilled laborer 1.1% 1.1% 0.6%
Farmer 25.6 37.8 14.8 13.3 10.2 6.7
Clerk or salesman 1.2 1.2 2.2
White-collar worker 3.4 8.5 4.4 0.6
Minor executive 4.0 4.4 7.4 11.1 2.2
Major executive 4.0 5.1 2.2 2.3
Small/medium business 7.4 8.8 10.8 17.8 1.7 2.2
Large business owner 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.1
Professional man 21.6 20.0 30.7 20.0 14.2 4.4
Armed forces 7.4 8.8 8.5 8.9 1.1 2.2

Note: Columns do not add to 100 per cent because all occupations are not included.

grandfathers' occupations as used by Warner.8 Although all
the occupational categories used elsewhere are not included
in Table 25, it is apparent that there have been major overall
shifts in occupations between the two generations. Further-
more, occupational continuity within the same family shows
significant breaks.
To portray the latter point more clearly, a different ap-
proach from that in Warner's study was used. In the Ameri-
can study, ratios of continuity were calculated using the
proportion of fathers in each occupation and the proportion
of grandfathers in the same occupation.9 This approach is
considered deficient in that it fails to show changes within
families. Changes in occupations of a particular individual's
forebears could easily be concealed through the use of such
overall ratios. Therefore, in Table 25, the proportions shown
in the third major column represent the percentages of indi-
viduals whose fathers and grandfathers had the same occu-
The results were quite surprising. Conspicuous is the fact
that the major decline in fathers following the farming occu-
pations is matched by a corresponding increase of fathers in
the professions. Of the grandfathers of senior executives 25.6
per cent were farmers but only 14.8 per cent of their fathers
farmed. The change in forebears of middle management
officials is even sharper, declining from 37.8 per cent farmers
to 13.3 per cent over the two-generation period. Major shifts
were into the professional fields and into business.
When the occupational continuity of the forebears of indi-
viduals is considered, it becomes apparent that father and
grandfather were in the same occupation for very few of the
executives. The highest continuity is found among senior
executives' forebears who were professional men, where 14.2
per cent of fathers and grandfathers followed the same occu-
pation. The next highest continuity is among farmers. In all
cases, however, for both senior executives and middle man-
agement, the rate of occupational continuity is surprisingly
low. This low continuity appears to indicate a society tending
towards rather significant changes in family traditions, occu-
pational choices, and direction of development. The very low
8. Ibid., Table 8, p. 74.
9. Ibid., Table 10, p. 82.

Families 79
continuity in the occupations of the families of middle man-
agement is a further substantiation of the hypothesis concern-
ing higher social mobility among lower age groups in the
Mothers, Fathers, and Wives
Warner, in discussing the "kinship certainty and occupa-
tional ambiguity" of the mother's lineage, makes the point
that a system of endogamous marriages is characteristic of a
caste society.10 In such a situation, men and women (assuming
absolute controls) would marry only at the levels of their
occupational origin. Sons and daughters of business owners,
for example, would intermarry; there would be no "out-
The idea of endogamous marriages as an attribute of caste
society seemed to offer possibilities for better insight into
Peruvian society. If it were determined that this type of
marriage characterized the society of these bureaucratic
executives, would this mean that the possibility of mobility
by marriage was eliminated? The degree of stability in mar-
riages and the extent of exogamous marriages can aid in the
detection and understanding of trends toward greater mobility
in Peruvian society, or at least among Peruvian government
To arrive at this insight, a slightly different arrangement
of data was used. The three groups for analysis are directors
and sub-directors, independent sector executives, and middle
management. In Table 26, the principal question is: What
percentage of maternal and paternal grandfathers were in
each occupation? The comparison is between the mothers'
fathers and fathers' fathers in order to determine the extent
to which endogamous marriages are characteristic of the
executives' families.
In general, more significant differences appear between the
mothers' and fathers' lines in occupational background than
were evident in Warner's study. In all three executives
groups, there is a close correspondence of percentages of
families in maternal and paternal lines from the farming class
and from the laborer class. But in the white-collar category
for directors and sub-directors, the percentage of the mothers'
10. Ibid., pp. 85-86.




Laborer 1.4% 1.4% 4.4% 6.7%
Farmer 25.4 22.5 26.5% 26.5% 37.8 28.9
White-collar worker 3.5 7.0 8.8 5.9 6.7
Major executive 4.2 2.1 2.9
Minor executive 3.5 6.3 5.9 2.9 4.4 2.2
Business owner 9.2 11.3 11.8 14.7 8.9 17.8
Professional man 23.2 19.7 14.7 8.8 20.0 13.3
Armed forces 7.7 6.3 5.9 11.8 8.9 4.4
Other occupation 0.7 1.4 2.9 2.2 6.7
No answer 21.1 21.8 23.5 26.5 13.3 13.3

Families 81
fathers is double that of the fathers' fathers. No white-collar
workers appear among middle management fathers' fathers
but 6.7 per cent are found in the maternal line. Substantial
differences are found also in the armed forces category, where
maternal and paternal lines differ by a factor of two for the
independent sector and middle management. Other differences
are readily apparent in Table 26.
Results of this aspect of the study were somewhat surpris-
ing. It had been expected that the society from which these
Peruvian executives descended would be much more strongly
endogamous than that of the United States. But the frequency
of significant differences suggests a more fluid situation. These
results may be partly due to the relatively small numbers
involved in the study, thus causing small differences in abso-
lute numbers to be magnified when presented in relative form.
It is also noteworthy that a larger-than-usual number of
executives failed to respond to questions relating to family
background. The missing data from these nonresponders
could be another factor introducing differences into the pic-
ture. However, if the Peruvian executive's background is
judged on the basis of these data, it can be said that the two
lines of descent are not nearly so similar and constant as
Warner found in American federal executives. Relating data
on the middle management group to hypothesis H-4 on social
mobility, it can be seen that even more substantial differences
exist between the maternal and paternal lines for this group.
But these data also should be interpreted with recognition
of the small number of executives involved. In any case, while
the hypothesis relating to social mobility of middle manage-
ment personnel is sustained, the general results of this occu-
pational comparison are the opposite from those expected.
At the time of the research, 88.3 per cent of the Peruvian
executives were married. In the different groups, the per-
centage of those who were unmarried varied widely: from
2.9 per cent of the independent sector executives to 33.3 per
cent of middle management. Because the data about spouses
are overwhelmingly about wives-only two of the executives
are women-the spouse will be referred to as the wife.
Once again, as in the consideration of maternal and paternal
occupational lines, the main emphasis is on occupational suc-
cession and mobility. We are concerned with the social and


economic backgrounds of the women married by the execu-
tives, who their fathers were, and what were their fathers'
occupations. To what extent did these future leaders marry
wives from their own occupational levels?
Table 27 shows a drastic decrease in all three groups from
the percentages of mothers to wives who are farmers'
daughters-the same situation noted by Warner in the United
States. This drop is offset somewhat for independent sector
executives by the larger number of wives whose fathers were
in the professional class (29.4 per cent) than the mothers



Laborer 1.4% 0.7% 6.7% 4.4%
Farmer 22.5 11.3 26.5% 5.9% 28.9 6.7
White-collar worker 7.0 9.2 5.9 14.7 6.7 4.4
Major executive 2.1 3.5 2.2
Minor executive 6.3 7.7 2.9 8.8 2.2 4.4
Business owner 11.3 14.8 14.7 14.7 17.8 8.8
Professional man 19.7 20.4 8.8 29.4 13.3 22.2
Military 6.3 5.6 11.8 2.9 4.4 6.7
Other 1.4 1.4 2.9 5.9 6.7 2.2
No answer 21.8 18.3 26.5 14.7 13.3 4.4
Unmarried executive 7.0 2.9 33.3

originating from that class (8.8 per cent). The same situation
prevails, to a lesser extent, among the middle management
group. It can be seen in Table 27 that mothers and wives of
directors and sub-directors tend to have similar occupational
backgrounds to a much larger extent than do the other exec-
utives' mothers and wives. This higher occupational stability
would appear to provide further evidence indicating greater
social mobility in the younger age groups, as was hypothesized
above. But again such judgments must be tempered by taking
into account the limited size of the study group sample and
the large percentage of executives who did not answer ques-
tions relating to family background.

Families 83
In this chapter, the focus of interest has been upon the
families of the government executives and the degree of elite-
ness which characterizes the group.
It was learned that, in general, Peruvian government ex-
ecutives derive from a higher socio-economic level than Amer-
ican federal executives. Especially evident are the high rep-
resentation of fathers in the professions, the larger propor-
tion of public service backgrounds, and the very low number
from the laboring class. Further, a higher degree of social
mobility was suggested for the middle management group.
Considering the third generation background, it became
apparent that major shifts have occurred between the third
and second generations, and that occupational continuity with-
in families shows significant breaks. Study of maternal and
paternal occupational lines suggests a more fluid situation than
existed in the United States. The two lines of descent are
not nearly so similar and constant as expected. Further, a
comparison of mothers and wives of executives shows a large
decrease in the number of wives whose fathers were farmers
and a proportionate increase in the number of their fathers
in the professions.

The Bureaucrat

FROM THE analysis of data on the group of Peruvian
government executives, the student of Latin American
public administration can discover much about the ori-
gins, the preparation and education, and the career
paths of these strategically located officials. The foregoing
data have removed most of the veil behind which the gov-
ernment officials of this Latin American nation operate. The
main body of statistical data was derived from a cross-
section of the higher level of all civilian ministries of the
Peruvian central government and representative corporate
entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector.
But statistics derived from factual questionnaires such as
those employed in this study, even when analyzed against the
administrative and societal environment, cannot reveal ade-
quately how the bureaucrat perceives his role. To obtain this
insight into the world of the Peruvian government executives,
the personal interview was used. To complement the statisti-
cal data, 10 per cent of the study group was selected for
depth interviews. The purpose of these personal interviews
was to probe attitudes and role expectations of civil servants
and managers. Emphasis centered particularly on identifying

The Bureaucrat 85
the ideals and career ideas of the group, their image of
themselves, and their values and aspirations.
Included in the sample of executives interviewed were offi-
cials in all the civilian ministries and in four important entities
in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. About 60 per cent of
the persons interviewed were at the level of director; the rest
were sub-directors or equivalent grades. Interviews were
structured only to the extent necessary to cover in general
the particular interests of this study and to supplement the
specific data of the questionnaires. Each interview was de-
veloped and conducted as the situation seemed to demand. No
notes were taken during the interviews; rather, immediately
after completion, results of the discussion were transcribed.
No attempt was made to follow precisely an interview guide.
Every effort was made in each interview to achieve rapport
with the executives of the group so that the interviews could
proceed virtually as conversations. The use of open-end ques-
tions permitted much latitude in the development of the inter-
views. In Appendix C is the interview guide which was
followed generally.1
Analysis of the interview results is presented in the form
of a synthesis of attitudes and views which were revealed
during the conversations. This synthesis is arranged to offer
the prevalent ideas of the group in regard to various impor-
tant aspects of public administration and the civil service
career-motivation of the public servant, recruitment, career
satisfaction, and self-images.
It was discovered, as the interviews progressed, that senior
executives of the Peruvian government demonstrate certain
characteristics in a manner that suggests fairly clear-cut
types. But regardless of the relatively small number of exec-
utives who were interviewed, it became obvious that it is
difficult to generalize validly about the Latin American gov-
ernment executive. In particular, it was discovered that
significant variation exists in the matter of motivation. At the
same time, certain features indicate the existence of patterns
of motivation. As these traits began to repeat themselves with
a larger number of interviews, several types of motivation
1. A number of questions used in the Peruvian study were adapted from
Berger's Egyptian study.

At this stage a terminology was considered which would
facilitate the presentation of the findings and better illustrate
variations among officials. For example, Presthus' bureau-
cratic types-the "upward-mobiles," the "indifferents," and
"ambivalents"-offered one possibility. Presthus' major ob-
jective was to show how people accommodate themselves to
the "miniature societies" of big organizations, and accord-
ingly, his typology describes three types of accommodation.
The "upward-mobiles" represent those persons who react pos-
itively to the bureaucratic situation and succeed in it. "In-
differents" are the uncommitted majority who view their jobs
merely as means to obtain off-work satisfactions. The "am-
bivalents" are the undecided, disturbed minority who want
status and power but are not willing to play the disciplined
role necessary to achieve these rewards.
Such a classification, although it might serve in certain
respects to categorize the executives, does not capture the
differences in attitudes and motivation which are believed to
exist. Although Presthus' typology succeeds in describing pat-
terns of accommodation to bureaucracy, its further usefulness
is limited. Thus, to illustrate these variations a typology was
formulated and is used throughout this chapter to describe
three types of executives.
The three types are termed the classic executive, the
manager, and the career executive. While no attempt will be
made to define rigorously these three types of officials, the
typology will be maintained in the discussion of various as-
pects of the government career. In this manner, character-
istics appropriate to each type will emerge from the treat-
ment of each aspect.

Motivation of the Peruvian Public Servant
In terms of motivation, a number of senior executives were
found for whom the public service signifies virtually a calling.
For these men, who are called classic executives, the public
service is the natural thing to do. They look upon government
office as practically a duty deriving from their unique ante-
cedents, and would find it strange to follow any other career.
They are unashamedly proud to be civil servants, so that their
careers become a way of life rather than mere jobs. They

The Bureaucrat 87
respect the high calling of public service and feel completely
at home in the position.
One of these classic executives, who obviously practices his
office with gusto, follows the public service as a family tradi-
tion in which he takes much pride. Son of an ex-minister of
state who died in office while pioneering much of the trans-
portation network of Peru, he developed a great love for the
ministry for which he has worked some 37 years. It is his
first love-for sentimental reasons, for the challenge it pre-
sents, for his belief in the work it does. Carrying on a long
family tradition of government service, this classic executive
has followed the high standards set by his forebears in gov-
Another who was found to fit the type of classic executive
was the career diplomat who entered the public service on the
recommendation of friends and his family, which has a long
history of public service. His motivation was tested by the
necessity of working several months in the beginning of his
career por meritorios, without pay, and by working after
hours to compensate for time taken to study for a law degree.
Now, after 40 years of service, much of it abroad in the
Peruvian diplomatic service, he maintains his enthusiasm,
feels he has done his job well, and anticipates more years of
In the cases of all the officials classified as classic execu-
tives, a striking aspect was an obvious love of Peru, a deep
desire to serve, a strong sense of duty to the nation, and a
feeling of responsibility to represent the government and the
public service well.
Motivation of the executives which are called managers is
in a number of cases similar to that of the classic executives.
The term managers is used to describe officials who entered
the public service especially to perform a particular function
for which they were well fitted. In most cases, they embarked
on a public career with little or no experience in government,
and usually began that public career at a high level.
A dominant characteristic of this type of executive, the
manager, is his impatience to get the job done. Often coming
from another position where he experienced more freedom of
action to change and innovate, he finds the bureaucracy some-
what restrictive and unimaginative. Or because of zeal to

improve the situation, whether it be within the government
apparatus or in society as a whole, he experiences a certain
frustration. Whatever his reaction to the new environment of
government bureaucracy, the manager keeps foremost the
challenge presented by his responsibilities. He attempts to
take an imaginative approach to the everyday problems of
his position. In general, the frankness with which the man-
ager type expressed his opinions was most revealing.
Among the manager type, the emphasis is on change-the
need to bring innovation to the bureaucracy, to achieve uni-
versal education, to slash the red tape of government, to do.
Motivations range from a simple belief that one is capable of
doing the job better by means of improved methods and
administration to an almost missionary zeal to raise the quali-
ty of education in the nation. Yet little or none of such moti-
vation stems from utopian altruism. All of the Peruvian
executives called managers are realists, aware of the magni-
tude of their responsibilities and of the obstacles impeding
their fulfillment.
The group of senior executives named career executives
in the present typology seems to form the main body of the
policy-making segment of the Peruvian government. Motiva-
tion of the group of career executives ranges widely in in-
tensity, but considered as a whole, career executives look
upon their positions as perhaps more than livelihoods but less
than callings or ways of life. The classic executive sees his
job as practically a calling; the manager type approaches it
as a more or less temporary challenge which he is specially
equipped to meet; the career executive views his position as
a job which he is qualified to handle, to which he gives his
best efforts, and in which, as a rule, he is involved intimately.
Many career executives consider themselves specialists in
their particular field, as a result of many years' experience
in the area. Their motivation becomes a natural desire to
better themselves through regular promotions. But such moti-
vation is more than a materialistic ambition, as it is accom-
panied often by an intense involvement in the responsibilities
of the position.
It was found, as a rule, that the career executives began
their service in the Peruvian government for primary econom-
ic reasons. The public service in many cases offered the

The Bureaucrat 89
only decent opportunity in a country underdeveloped, with
scant opportunity for persons trained in technological fields.
Often these engineers, medical doctors, and similar profes-
sionals transferred to a government career after varied ex-
perience in private industry. In a number of cases, the pri-
mary reason for such changes was the lack of opportunity
for further advancement; this was true in several instances
where foreign-controlled industries staffed their higher posi-
tions with non-Peruvians. Many other career executives de-
cided on a government career because of the diverse attrac-
tions of the capital city, Lima. William F. Whyte describes
this magnetism of Lima well: "Also, Lima is the social and
cultural capital of the country. In spite of the fact that some
provincial cities have maintained a certain pride of identity
independently of Lima, and have adhered strongly to their
established upper class, there remains always the general
feeling that Lima is the place for all who have social and
professional ambitions."2
Thus many of the career executives, on reaching the limit
of promotion opportunity in private industry, or upon facing
the challenge of educating a family in the provincial areas,
chose government careers to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties of Lima. Social and professional ambitions, as well as
family needs, seem to be important factors in the motivation
of this group to follow public service careers. Availability of
employment in the public service or improvement in desirabil-
ity of government work influenced a number of the career
executives in their decision. For example, several members of
the diplomatic service of Peru decided to follow that career
after various protective laws improved the opportunity and
job security in the diplomatic service in the 1930's.3
Generalizing about the motivation of the career executives,
it may be said that this type undertook the public service
career much as he would any other job, as a means to an end.
But it would be unfair to attribute only a materialistic moti-
vation to these career executives. They are of the bureaucracy
perhaps more than the manager types, who are in the bu-

2. Whyte and Flores, pp. 25-26. Translation mine.
3. For example, Ley No. 6602 of April 1, 1929, regularized entrance and
promotion requirements for the diplomatic service, and Decreto-Ley No.
7372 of October 21, 1931, integrated the diplomatic and consular services.