• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Table of Contents
 List of acronyms
 Strategic plan in brief
 Country overview
 Strategic and special objectiv...
 Summary analysis of the assistance...
 Performance monitoring plan of...
 P.L. 480 title III program
 Bibliography
 FAA section 118 and 119 - tropical...
 Environmental compliance
 Participants in the elaboration...






Title: USAID strategic plan for Haiti, fiscal years 1999-2004
CITATION PDF VIEWER PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00017090/00001
 Material Information
Title: USAID strategic plan for Haiti, fiscal years 1999-2004
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: USAID
Publisher: USAID
Publication Date: 1999
 Subjects
Subject: Caribbean   ( lcsh )
Spatial Coverage: Haiti -- Caribbean
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00017090
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:

USAID plan ( PDF )


Table of Contents
    Table of Contents
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
    List of acronyms
        Page iv
    Strategic plan in brief
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
    Country overview
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
    Strategic and special objectives
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
        Page 70
        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
        Page 74
        Page 75
        Page 76
        Page 77
        Page 78
        Page 79
        Page 80
        Page 81
        Page 82
        Page 83
        Page 84
        Page 85
        Page 86
        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
        Page 91
        Page 92
        Page 93
        Page 94
        Page 95
        Page 96
        Page 97
        Page 98
        Page 99
        Page 100
        Page 101
        Page 102
        Page 103
        Page 104
        Page 105
        Page 106
        Page 107
    Summary analysis of the assistance environment and rationale for Haiti program
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
        Page 121
        Page 122
        Page 123
        Page 124
        Page 125
        Page 126
        Page 127
        Page 128
        Page 129
        Page 130
        Page 131
        Page 132
        Page 133
        Page 134
        Page 135
    Performance monitoring plan of the mission strategic plan
        Page 136
        Page 137
        Page 138
        Page 139
        Page 140
        Page 141
        Page 142
        Page 143
        Page 144
        Page 145
        Page 146
        Page 147
        Page 148
        Page 149
        Page 150
        Page 151
        Page 152
    P.L. 480 title III program
        Page 153
        Page 154
        Page 155
        Page 156
    Bibliography
        Page 157
        Page 158
        Page 159
    FAA section 118 and 119 - tropical forestry/biodiversity
        Page 160
        Page 161
        Page 162
        Page 163
    Environmental compliance
        Page 164
        Page 165
        Page 166
        Page 167
        Page 168
        Page 169
        Page 170
        Page 171
        Page 172
        Page 173
        Page 174
        Page 175
        Page 176
        Page 177
        Page 178
        Page 179
        Page 180
    Participants in the elaboration of the strategy
        Page 181
        Page 182
        Page 183
        Page 184
        Page 185
        Page 186
        Page 187
        Page 188
        Page 189
        Page 190
        Page 191
        Page 192
        Page 193
        Page 194
        Page 195
        Page 196
Full Text






SAID
STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR HAITI
Fiscal Years 1999 2004

Table of Content
Page

I. Strategic Plan In Brief ............................................ 1
A Introduction ... ... ... ... ..... ..... ... ... ... .. ... .. .... 1
B. The Strategy in Summary ................... ................ 2
C. Overview of Progress ................... .................. 7
D. Performance Monitoring Plan ................... ............. 10
E. Cross-Cutting Themes and Principles .......................... 11

I. Country Overview ................. .......... ...... .. 13
A. The Nature of Poverty in Haiti ............................... 13
B. Macroeconomic Environment ................................ 14
C. Socio-Political Environment ................................. 19
D. Gender Concerns .... .............. ............. .... ..... 22

mI. Strategic and Special Objectives .............................. 24
A. Sustainable Increased Income For The Poor ........................ 24
B. Environmental Degradation Slowed ............................. 42
C. Achieve Desired Family Size ................................ 56
D. Increased Human Capacity .................................. 68
E. More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained .............. 80
F. Streamlined Government ................................... 96
G. Police Better Protect and Serve Haitians ........................ 104

IV. Summary Analysis of the Assistance Environment and Rationale for
Haiti Program ............................................ 108
A. Linkages of Strategic and Special Objectives ...................... 108
1. Government of Haiti Goals and Objectives ..................... 108
2. U.S. Mission to Haiti Goals and Policies ...................... 108
3. Regional Priorities (Summit of Americas Objectives) ............... 109
4. Agency Goals ........................................ 110
B. Foreign Assistance History U.S. and Other Donors ................. 112
C. Positive Results ......................................... 118
D. Actual and Potential Sources of Conflict ........................ 128
1. Background ........................................ 128
2. Internal Sources of Conflict .............................. 129
3. Impact of the Strategy on Sources of Conflict ................... 130
E. Customer and Partner Involvement In the Strategic Planning
Process ............................................... 132









F. Transition from Relief to Development Programs ................... 134

V. Performance Monitoring Plan of the Mission Strategic Plan ............. 136


VI. Resource Requirements .........................
A. Program Funding Requirements ..................
B. Discussion of FY 1999 Programming Options ..........
1. Sustainable Increased Income for the Poor ..........
2. Environmental Degradation Slowed ...............
3. Achieved Desired Family Size (DFS) .............
4. Increased Human Capacity (IHC) ................
5. More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained
6. Streamlined Government .....................
C. Operating Expenses ..........................

Appendixes:
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Common Objectives
P.L. 480 Title III Program
R4 Cable

Annexes:
Selected Bibliography
Environmental Analysis
Participants in the Elaboration of the Strategy


..... 138
..... 138
..... 145
..... 145
..... 146
..... 147
..... 148
..... 148
..... 150
..... 152


USAJD/Haiti Strategic Plan FLY 1999-2004 Page ii


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page ii





F im mjUg3x797 pixels 7 4


2 Haiti
International boundary
Department boundary
i* National capital
Department capital
Railroad


Caribbean.
Sea


-14 4


'^.. ^ ..".. :"

: .. '.

..:'.: c a e- "
SMarie
ns d'Hainault
GRAN

:: .."Les Anglais




:' Port-Sa


-'B----------- ---


Gra
caye


Y NSE

.S U. D
SUD


Les Caye
fie
Ut


m


--.- Road

O 10 20 80 40 Kilometers
S a a I .


30 4


1 of 2 B8a 2? .E ..MO


S .7 -- 3


I


i


http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCLIMap collection/amencas/lHaiti,
..:.;. .. T"ortuga NORTH ATLANTIC
.:" .' OCEAN :
IFA ..'' *Port-de-Paix -. ::.:.- .
Male r- eMontecristi
ainN C3 4 .. rn
NO RD -O U ST T1~s 0R
Baire-de-Henne HLimbd Forc r
... du-No
:.:. ":ni' ".i; -. No _e lalab6n
% S: o N O R D-
nnery ap
Go.Golves E.ES T

doa/t TIBONIT
Gonave


Saint-Marc / Hinch s


I ae eMaontrouis R


Ps u~ O U"
S Canal du Sud .e DOMINICAN
,mite ...REPUBLIC
P t '-rou-de-Nippes

,-Miraga. ,ns SMae
S. ,.." ... ruin .... r'' .
Aquin SU -,,ST ,


a Vach For ." .

Caribbeari Sea


'
:O Milce ~i ~'










List of Acronyms


ADRA Adventist Development and
Relief Agency
ASSET Agriculturally Sustainable Sys-
tems and Environmental Trans-
formation
BRH French acronym for Central
Bank
CARP Center for Applied Research on
Poverty
CEP Provisional Electoral Council
CIDA Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency
CLED French acronym for Center for
Free Enterprise and Democracy
CMEP Modernization of Public Enter-
prise Council
CPR Contraceptive Prevalence Rates
CSD Civil Service Downsizing
CRS Catholic Relief Services
EDH French acronym for the Electric
Parastatal
EERP Emergency Economic Recovery
Program
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility
ESF Economic Support Funds
EU European Union
FADH French acronym for Haitian
Armed Forces
FAES French acronym for Economic
and Social Fund
FAO United Nations Organization for
Food and Agriculture
FENAMH Mayors Federation
FONHEP Haitian Foundation for Private
Education
FSN Field Service National
GOH Government of Haiti
HEF Haitian Environmental Founda-
tion
HPZ High Potential Zones
HNP Haitian National Police
ICITAP International Criminal Investiga-
tive Training Assistance Program
IDB Inter-American Development
Bank


IFES


International Foundation for
Electoral Systems
International Financial Institu-


tions
IIBE Improve Basic Education
ILD Institute for Liberty and Democ-
racy
IMF International Monetary Fund
INARA French acronym for Agrarian
National Reform Institute
IR Intermediate Result
IRI International Republican Institute
MDF Municipal Development Fund
MICIVIH French acronym for UN/OAS
Civil Mission to Haiti
MOE Ministry of Education
MOJ Ministry of Justice
MofAg Ministry of Agriculture
MPP Mission Program Plan
MSPP Ministry of Public Health and
Population
NDI National Democratic Institute
NEP National Education Plan
NEAP National Environmental Action
Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NXP Non-Expendable Property
OE Operating Expenses
PAU Parliament Analysis Unit
PFP Policy Framework Paper
PLUS Productive Land Use Systems
PURE Progamme d'Urgence de Relance
Economique
PVO Private Volunteer Organization
SO Strategic Objective
SOE State-Owned Enterprises
SSO Special Strategic Objective
UNDP United Nations Development
Program
WB IBRD
WHO World Health Organization


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page iv


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page iv










SAID
STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR HAITI
Fiscal Years 1999 2004

Vision: Sustainable Democracy With Equitable Economic Growth

I. Strategic Plan In Brief

A. Introduction

This document presents a six-year strategy for the USAID program in Haiti for the
1999-2004 period. It capitalizes on Haiti's unique development environment and USAID's
investments and experiences during the previous five years. The goal of the 1993-1997
strategy was to help establish the conditions for the majority of Haitians to improve the
quality of their lives. Our new strategy emphasizes poverty reduction in a democratic society
through activities which mitigate the effects of poverty, addresses poverty's underlying
causes -- high fertility, poor education and environmental degradation -- and creates
opportunities to increase income. This strategy supports economic growth not only by
enabling Haitians of all economic classes to be more productivebut also by addressing their
security, and governance concerns and their aspiration to participate more fully in the
development of the country.

The approach to implementing this strategy is as significant as its content. The
strategy envisions involving the Haitian population more profoundly in the nation building.
To do so, the central government must present a credible appearance of effectiveness,
legitimacy and transparency. USAID's first principal is to foster good government through
assistance in the justice sector and in downsizing the civil service and privatizing state-owned
enterprises. Good government requires popular participation, USAID's second guiding
principal. We stress community participation on all levels, from implementation of the
Government of Haiti (GOH) decentralization policy to grass roots, cross-sectoral endeavors
promoting citizen involvement and advocacy. The third guiding principle is the development
of Haitian institutions capable of researching the issues, defining the policies and advocating
for change. The third guiding principle is the development of Haitian institutions capable of
researching the issues, defining the policies and advocating for change. The fourth guideline
is "leading from behind"; USAID seeks Haitian initiatives and groups worth supporting
rather than imposing them on the country and its people.

USAID recognizes that the vision, "A Sustainable Democracy With Equitable
Economic Growth" will not be realized in a six year period. Our strategy builds the
foundation for a sustainable democracy in an equitable economy, a vision that will require at
least a generations to attain. It recognizes that the basis on which democracy and economic
growth are being institutionalize is low to non-existent. Even a well-organized, experienced


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 1








administration would have a difficult time meeting the enormous challenges found in Haiti
today: too many people live on too little land with too few economic opportunities. Even a
literate population with access to reliable information would have a difficult time voting their
choices when the candidates have little experience in political campaigns and presenting their
messages. And finally, even a more egalitarian culture with a history of power-sharing
institutions would have difficulties brokering compromises on issues generated by these prob-
lems.

B. The Strategy in Summary

Rationale: Poverty, Equity and Growth. USAID's Strategic Goal for 2004 is
Reduction of Poverty in a Democratic Society. As an initial matter, we would like to set
forth USAID's understanding of the relationships between poverty reduction, equity and
economic growth. These considerations will help to explain why poverty rather than growth
is the initial object of this strategy and why a democratic society is the best basis for
sustainable growth in the long run.

To achieve reduction of poverty in the near term, this strategy will focus not only on
income generation but also on alleviating the worst misery and on redressing the deep
inequity that is the legacy of misrule. An economic development program in Haiti that did
not contain poverty reduction activities would founder on the rocks of popular bitterness and
populist demagoguery. Moreover, a strategy that increased economic growth without
reducing population growth would be overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of Haiti's poor.
Consequently, the strategy will address the underlying causes of poverty while relieving some
of its worst effects. Our program will attack the population growth issue head on. Other
USAID activities will improve access to services, including education and health, to help put
Haiti's citizens -- especially the young -- on a better path to a secure future.

The strategy also defines government and democracy in a broader sense than has been
applied to date. We do not assume that the central government will be the sole active
participant and supplier of goods and services to the population. Instead USAID will help
better define and reinforce an active role for local government and civil society in bringing
Haitians together to provide goods and services as well as to solve their problems.

Several USAID supported activities will induce growth at the farm and
microenterprise levels, but the strategy will not, in itself, create major grouth. USAID's
work will be complimented by activities supported by other donors to achieve equitable
economic growth. In particular, the efforts of the IBRD and other donors are required to
rebuild Haiti's crumbling infrastructure and to inculcate policies, attitudes and institutions
that will attract investors, employers and export markets for Haiti. USAID's two special
objectives (SpO) described below contribute to this longer term vision. The 1999-2004
Strategic Objectives aim to give the poor majority opportunities for participation and
increased productivity so as to provide hope and stability for the long haul.

The Strategic Objectives


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 2









1. Sustainable Increase Income for the Poor


The Problem: Sixty-five percent of the population live in rural areas and more
than 80% of the rural population live below the poverty line. The majority attempt to eke
out a living from the severely eroded slopes of the steep hills that cover much of Haiti.
Farm holdings generally are neither large enough nor fertile enough for successful subsis-
tence farming, Limited access to credit and technology, a complicated legal system that
makes land titling difficult and deters land improvements, and the lack of public investment
and basic infrastructure in rural areas all contribute to low agricultural productivity.

The Solution: USAID can have its greatest impact on poverty by developing
replicable models for income generation in the informal sector, and for increased agricultural
productivity of hillside farmers. We will provide poor farmers and entrepreneurs with
financing, inputs, information and opportunities to enhance their profitability. USAID will
work with public and private groups, to improve the environment for economic growth and
increase real incomes. Since microenterprise is the best approach for increasing real incomes
of the poor, USAID will address two significant constraints, access to credit and information.
USAID will also strengthen Haiti's institutional capacities for reforming macro-economic
policies.

Subject to the availability of funds, USAID will initiate a secondary cities program
to assist local governments, business and civic groups to develop alternatives to Port-au-
Prince. Under this approach, selected cities will be developed to attract investment and
create jobs. While other donors develop public infrastructure in the selected cities, USAID
will strengthen public education and vocational training, as well as promote public-private
cooperation and competition among different suppliers of city services, such as electric
power or telephone service.

2. Environmental Degradation Slowed

The Problem: Haiti is increasingly losing its productive potential. Due to the
loss of its vegetative cover it is also beginning a process of decertification Only 1.5% of
Haiti's natural forest remains and 25 of its 30 watersheds are denuded. Deforestation of
Haiti's mountainous countryside has resulted in extensive soil erosion. An estimated 15,000
acres of top soil are washed away each year, with erosion also damaging other productive
infrastructure such as dams, irrigation systems, roads, and coastal marine ecosystems. The
growing gap between fuel-wood supply and demand is exacerbating environmental degra-
dation as peasants cut the few remaining trees to produce charcoal.

SThe Solution: The disastrous pace of environmental degradation in Haiti is
closely tied to the lack of viable economic alternatives. The rural poor must either farm
unsuitable land and deplete the natural resource base or move to urban slums. USAID's
strategy attempts to encourage local initiatives to improve management of natural resources,
promote better environmental policies, and support economically viable productive enter-
prises. USAID works with public and private institutions to promote conservation and


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 3








sustainable exploitation of natural resources. USAID also supports energy, agriculture and
microenterprise activities which offer the poor alternative sources of food, income and fuel
that are now acquired by depleting the natural resource base.

3. Achieve Desired Family Size

The Problem: There is strong evidence that most Haitians want fewer children,
yet the population continues to grow at the very high annual rate of 2.3%. At current
fertility rates, Haitian women will give birth to an average of 4.8 children during their
reproductive years and the current population, estimated at 8.0 million, will double by the
year 2027. This rapid population growth jeopardizes investments made for the economic and
social development of the country, depletes the already degraded natural environment, and
hinders efforts to respond to basic human needs.

Population pressure also contributes to poor health and woefully inadequate health
care. One in eight children born will not live to the age of five; this is the highest under-five
mortality rate in the Western Hemisphere. Maternal mortality is estimated as high as 1,000
per 100,000 live births. Yet, most Haitians have no access to reproductive health or child
survival services. The health system is dispersed among public, private and jointly adminis-
tered facilities. It is characterized by inequitable distribution of facilities and resources, poor
availability and management of essential drugs, and service providers with weak reproductive
health and child survival skills.

The Solution: Based on the recommendations of the "Cairo" Conference on
population, USAID will implement a comprehensive reproductive health services program
which addresses the inter-relationships between family planning, maternal health, child
survival, HIV/AIDS prevention, girls education, and women's income and position in
society.

4. Improve Human Capacity

The Problem: Education in Haiti remains the weakest in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The national adult literacy rate is below 35%, and fewer than 75% of school age
children are enrolled. The poor quality of education is the result of inadequate learning
materials, unqualified teachers, and the government's inability to provide resources to
improve the primary education system.

To compensate for deficiencies in public education, a system of private primary
school education -- supported primarily by religious, philanthropic and community
organizations has evolved in Haiti. The quality of instruction at the majority of these
schools is far from the minimal acceptable standards for the hemisphere. Two out of three
students drop out before finishing school, and more than half of those remaining will repeat
at least one grade before passing the sixth year exam. On average, it takes 16 pupil years
(rather than the intended 6 years) to produce one graduate.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 4









There is a particularly vicious nexus between lack of education, population and
health problems and the degraded condition of women in Haiti. Although experience shows
that a girl's level of education influences her knowledge and use of reproductive health and
child survival services, over one-third of Haitian women age 15-49 have no education. The
children of these women are 1.7 times more likely to die before reaching the age of five than
the children of mothers with a secondary education. More than one-third of adolescent girls
gives birth before the age of 20, with early childbearing prevalence higher among those with
no education (26%) than those with a secondary education (8%).

The Solution: USAID's strategy for assistance to the education sector is to
improve the quality of instruction and administrative efficiencyy in primary schools serving
rural and depressed urban areas and to help establish a sustainable primary education system
in Haiti. We will also support efforts to improve the quality and availability of technical
training that meets job market demands.

USAID's largest activity will continue to be improvement of both public and
private primary schools. We will support in-service training of teachers and school directors
in 485 core schools with the objective of sharing innovations with other schools in "quality
networks". In addition, the network schools will participate in the USAID school feeding
program to address nutritional deficit problems. These problems results in school absences
due to sickness and learning difficulties. By addressing these problems we can increase the
chances that children of the poorest families will attend school.

5. More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained

The Problem: According to a series of assessments and surveys funded by
USAID, most Haitians are disillusioned with the ability of democracy and democratic
processes to address problems of economic stagnation, unemployment, and poverty. They
believe that elected officials do not represent public views and interests. They also believe
that corruption and inequity are pervasive throughout the judicial system. Moreover, most
prospective foreign and local investors have expressed the need for a justice system which
protects property, promotes trade, and provides a stable legal environment for commercial
activities.

While there have been improvements during the last four years, the judicial
system remains weak in its ability to guarantee due process and to administer justice. For
example, it is estimated that 80% of prisoners are in pre-trial status; 20% of them have
already served terms longer than their sentences would have been had they had expeditious
trials.

The Solution: USAID will work with Haitian civil society and government, both
national and local, to increase demands from the people for justice, good governance and
respect of human rights. We will seizing targets of opportunity to strengthen the system's
capacity to respond. USAID's activities will promote the institutionalization of rule of law,
as well as effective advocacy and inclusive policies. We will also support Haitians as they


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 5









define the relative roles of national and local governments and establish approaches to
provide responsive services. Moreover, we will continue to encourage competitive processes
in which the will of the people guides the selection of government officials in elections that
reflect dramatic increases in participation rates. We will also promote both security and
justice -- in continued support for development of an accountable police system and a judicial
system which is perceived as transparent, accessible, based on the law, broadly perceived as
fair in a society that demands justice and respect for human rights.

The Special Objectives

6. Streamlined Government

In October 1996, the Haitian Government reached agreement on a three year,
$135 million Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) to revitalize the economy and
modernize public administration. The ESAF called for stringent fiscal measures to control
inflation and liberalize the exchange rate as well as privatize inefficient state owned-
enterprises and a reduced civil service. Despite progress in adhering to IMF fiscal targets
that have reduced government spending, increased revenues and slowed inflation
significantly, the political impasse has delayed privatization and the Preval Administration
has not yet downsized the civil service.

Should the GOH name a Prime Minister and concretely show commitment to
economic reform, USAID activities to assist the GOH to enhance its ability to access and
better manage financial resources would include: (a) the U.S. Treasury TA to the Ministry of
Finance to improve budget execution and better control of the wage bill; (b) the USAID
budget support to enable the GOH to access to IFI/donor-financed budget supports; (c) the
TA to CMEP for the GOH privatization program to eliminate subsidies to SOEs and, thus,
reduce the budgetary drain from parastatals; and, (d) the TA to BRH to improve bank
supervision. The ultimate common objective of the three activities just identified is to enable
the GOH to better control the wage bill and subsidy payment to SOEs to ensure that, in light
of IMF/IBRD/IDB efforts to raise tax revenues, relatively more public resources could
devoted to the provision of social services for the Haitian poor. The planned TA for BRH
should ensure better monitoring of commercial banks' activities.

7. Police Better Protect and Serve Haitians

The sense of personal security is not only a measure of social justice for the poor
but also critical to foreign investors' willingness to invest in Haiti. Under this Special Objec-
tive, USAID will continue to finance the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program's (ICITAP) Police Development Program to
provide the basis for a true civilian security system under the rule of law.

In the area of management, program activities will include assistance to improve
Haitian National Police (HNP) organizational capabilities to fulfill its law enforcement
mission with institutional and individual accountability and integrity. In addition, ICITAP


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 6









will expand its services beyond the current HNP to include organization of a new rural police
force.

ICITAP will continue to assist the HNP to strengthen operational capabilities.
Specialized assistance will include a full-time technical advisor to specialized units, training
for Judicial Police in forensics and investigative skills, and continued support to the Adminis-
trative Police to improve and expand capabilities in hostage negotiation, urban disorder
management, patrol supervision, and traffic management.

ICITAP also aims to institutionalize a sustainable training academy capable of
professionalizing the HNP. ICITAP will provide mentors for a new cadre of Haitian instruc-
tors, and continue support for curriculum development and field training.

C. Overview of Progress

In spite of the continuing challenges, progress has been achieved in recent years.
Constitutional democracy has been restored, the macroeconomic policy framework has been
created and security and social order has been maintained. In addition, in areas where
USAID has made significant investments, incomes have increased as has vegetative cover;
health and education levels have been improved; justice and governance have been
strengthened.

1. Economic Reform

The 1996 ESAF to revitalize the economy and modernize public administration
called for a five part program: fiscal and monetary reforms to promote investment and
reduce inflation; privatization of nine parastatals to reduce the drain on the public budget;
civil service reform to modernize government and reduce its size; tariff reform to promote
trade and safeguard local production; and restructuring of the national development bank.

Significant progress has been achieved in three of the five areas: 1) Stringent
fiscal measures to control inflation have worked: tax revenues were higher than anticipated;
government spending was lower than planned and the exchange rate has been liberalized. 2)
CMEP, the GOH privatization agency, has led the privatization program to successfully
conclude the flour mill transaction, bid award for the cement plant and preparations for
privatization of the airport, seaport and telephone company. 3)' Tariff Reform legislation to
reduce rate schedules and ceilings was submitted to the Parliament but has not yet been
enacted.

2. Economic Growth

USAID activities are making significant contributions to food security and
income generation for approximately 750,000 people in rural areas. These activities, based
on agricultural models for improving yields and income while protecting the environment,


USAlD/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 7









support adoption of improved crop varieties and soil and water conservation techniques. In
addition, they help develop export and domestic markets for agricultural products.

Improved coffee production and processing techniques, along with organization
of a farmer export federation, has enabled Haiti to find a niche market for gourmet coffee,
"Haitian Bleu". This has resulted in doubling and in some cases even tripling earnings for
20,000 coffee producers or 100,000 rural beneficiaries. About 25,000 mango growers, using
the same marketing strategy have increased their incomes 20 to 30%.

Loans to small and large business have also been successful. The Agricultural
Guarantee fund has made 15 loans totaling $2.1 million for mango exporting, sisal
processing, tomato processing and fertilizer imports which in turn created new jobs and in-
creased the poor's income. Over 3,000 loans were made through 42 village banks, most of
them to women, with almost 100% repayment rates. As a result of USAID guarantee
program, two commercial banks have opened microlending windows for the first time, one in
a secondary city. Two more bank branches are expected to be opened in secondary cities
over the next few months.

3. Environment

USAID is developing models of environmentally sustainable agriculture and
community cooperation. In our hillside programs, over 130,000 farmers and 20,000 coffee
farmers have planted multipurpose and coffee trees, and introduced sound agricultural
practices. These practices not only slow soil erosion and increase humidity retention, they
also foster community action. A $21.5 million IBRD project currently funds the replication
of USAID's model nationwide.

Urban environmental interventions also have produced replicable models. In
collaboration with local public utilities and a UNDP project, a water project was completed
in Cit6 Soleil. Clean water is now sold to 175,000 people through 76 community operated
fountains. The proceeds are used to pay for collection of solid waste which clogs canals and
leads to flooding of sanitary waste.

4. Health and Family Planning

The USAID health sector activities has built a public-private partnership of
service providers using community-based health care system throughout Haiti. USAID
supports activities in all nine departments and, despite challenges, grants to 22 NGOs have
succeeded in maintaining service delivery to 2.3 million beneficiaries nationwide.

Contraceptive prevalence rates in several USAID target areas are nearly double
the national rate. Social marketing activities, partially financed by USAID, sold 7.5 million
condoms in 1997 and expanded sales of oral and injectable contraceptives.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 8


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 8









Child survival and maternal health indicators in USAID target areas show
substantial impact. Immunization coverage rates of 59% in USAID target areas compare
favorably to the national rate of 40%. Two thirds of pregnant women in USAID target areas
have a provider-assisted delivery compared to the national averages of 46%, 61% of mothers
treat diarrhea with ORS which is double the national average of 31 %.

Title II food aid resources have been integrated with a full package of health
interventions at participating institutions, with a 30% decline in chronic malnutrition within
one Cooperating Sponsor's program.

5. Education

The Incentives to Improve Primary Education Project (IIBE) works primarily
through the Haitian Private Education Foundation to strengthen private educational
institutions. A project evaluation in June 1995 applauded IIBE's contribution of the best pre-
school curriculum in the Caribbean; it is still in use after six years. The project also
achieved a decrease in primary school repetition rates for children from 32% to 25%, and a
9% decrease in teacher turnover and absenteeism. With support from the USAID Office of
Transition Initiatives and U.S. Army Special Forces, the project also brought about the
rehabilitation of 364 schools and the opening of 264 new schools in under-served areas.

6. Building Democracy

a. Justice and Security

Major accomplishments in justice and security include the peaceful
demobilization and retraining of the Haitian Armed Forces, establishment of a 5,200 member
civilian Haitian National Police force, training for 360 judges and prosecutors in
Port-au-Prince and eight major cities, and basic training at the Ecole de la Magistrature for
over 430 judges and prosecutors.

From January 1996 to December 1997, about 15,000 poor Haitians
have received legal assistance sponsored by USAID.

USAID's assistance in development of a case-tracking system has
enabled cases to proceed more efficiently and fairly through the penal system, resulting in a
drop in the numbers in pre-trial detention beyond the time allowed by law.

To address human rights abuse, USAID re-established the Human
Rights Fund that existed during the defacto period. Under the new program, nearly 150
victims of human rights abuses have received medical and other direct victim assistance.

b. Elections


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 9


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 9








USAID has assisted all the elections since 1990. The Presidential
elections in December 1995 resulted in the first peaceful transition of power from one
democratically elected President to another. A local election observer unit has been formed
as a result of a business group initiative, with USAID-financed observer training.

c. Local Government

Mayors and other local officials are making progress in the
decentralizing of central government authority. USAID helped create the National
Federation of Haitian Mayors, which links 11 regional groups and advocates for
decentralization reforms. This group received a mandate from President Pr6val to develop
decentralization legislation, now pending before Parliament.

d. Civil Society

Civil society is increasingly active and vocal over public priorities and
concerns, and is putting increasing pressure on the government to respond. Following the
restoration of democracy, USAID worked with civic and local citizen groups to implement
2,250 community projects in 113 of the 133 communes.

Civil society is increasingly taking stands on key policy issues such as
decentralization. In response to the recent political stalemate, more than 90 civic groups
from across the country have spoken out in favor of resolving the impasse. USAID support
for two national dialogues and a public information campaign on decentralization and
participation brought together organizations with different views in a constructive,
policy-oriented debate.


D. Performance Monitoring Plan

To improve analysis of strategic objectives and the allocation of funds among
objectives and activities, USAID has established a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU)
within the Program Coordination and Policy Support Office (PCPS). The MEU is working
closely with Team Leaders to implement a planning, monitoring and evaluation system which
measure performance, meets the needs of results package managers, and complies with
Agency guidance. USAID will collect data on targets and assess progress for each level of
result on a quarterly basis, and develop sectoral monitoring systems based on established
protocols for data collection, storage and use. Although a number of grantees will continue
to have a budget and responsibility for evaluating their programs, the MEU will provide
assistance to ensure the quality, timeliness, and adequate distribution of reports. USAID will
also implement a system to document activities that lead to desired results as a resource to
improve performance, document how individual activities achieve results, and document
considerations and factors that may have contributed to success.


USA ID/Haiti Strategic Plan Fl' 1999-2(A94 Page 10


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 10










E. Cross-Cutting Themes and Principles


1. Integrated Role for Food Aid

P.L. 480 resources, both Titles II and III, will continue to represent a sizable
portion of total US government resources coming into Haiti and will play a key role in
helping alleviate the immediate consequences of poverty in the country. At the same time,
however, USAID and its development partners will build on efforts already under way to
fully integrate food aid resources into our sectoral development activities. As detailed above
in the respective Strategic Objective summaries, food aid resources will directly support and
be programmed with our education, health and economic growth activities to gain the
maximum development impact from our food aid programs.

2. Good Government

USAID recognizes that successful initiatives at the grass-roots and secondary cities
levels need to be sustained in order to have longer term impact. The case for grass-roots
activity is particularly compelling because, at this time, the central government remains weak
and lacks leadership and political will. In areas such as education, health and environment,
we will work in collaboration with the central government ministries and agencies, but not
depend solely upon them or provide significant funding to them. As the central government
expresses interest in working with USAID, the strategy will be adjusted to facilitate positive
government participation.

USAID's strategy places considerable emphasis on local government as a
development partner. USAID will also work closely with civil society groups at the local
level. The objective is not only to establish competent and honest leadership in the munici-
palities, but also to enable the Haitian electorate to recognize abuses of power or inefficiency
and to demand better governance.

3. Popular Participation

Popular participation is crucial to accountability of government officials.
Participation is also a stabilizing factor, giving the poor a stake in maintaining the democratic
order. For this dynamic to work, governments must be open to the participation of people
and the electorate must be motivated to participate and given the skills to do so effectively.
Training NGOs in advocacy and organizational skills forms part of the program under each
of our Strategic Objectives.

4. Institutional development

With weak political will for development in most sectors at the central government
level, the bulk of USAID's strategy will be implemented directly with community groups,
private organizations and local governments. USAID will also support new and existing
private organizations to serve as think tanks or development foundations in areas of interest


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 11









under this Strategy. As the central government or individual ministries show ability to break
through the present impasse, USAID retains the option under this Strategy to provide
technical assistance and other support for their institutional development.

5. Leading from behind

Our champions will come from Haiti. USAID will foster initiative by individuals,
NGOs, national coalitions and public/private partnerships in support of development objec-
tives. Equally important, USAID will not impose methods and values of our own but will
seek out the Haitian initiatives and leaders who show promise of effectively inculcating
values conducive to equitable development.


USAD/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 12


US"MD/aiti Stnutegic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 12










I. Country Overview


A. The Nature of Poverty in Haiti Poverty in Haiti is the worst in the Western
hemisphere by a wide margin. The primary statistics are almost too well-known: 70 percent
of Haiti's people live in the countryside and 80 percent of the rural population live below the
poverty line. Two-thirds of all rural Haitians live below the "absolute poverty line," that is,
their yearly income is less than $160 per capital and they cannot supply their families with the
basic caloric requirement for the strenuous lives they lead. The result is that hunger pre-
vails. One in three children suffers chronic malnutrition; one in eight will die before the age
of five. The World Food Program estimates that nearly half of all children under five have
been stunted by malnutrition.

Though impoverished, rural Haitians are generally land-owners. But their real estate
is frustratingly valueless. Land titling processes are so onerous and uncertain that banks will
not accept farm mortgages. Moreover, the average cultivated plot is tiny, half the size
needed for bare subsistence. Consequently, the rural Haitians must find other sources of
income and nourishment, spending roughly two-thirds of household income simply on food.
A primary source of non-agricultural income is the sale of charcoal for fuel. Turning trees
into fuel further impoverishes a countryside that has already lost 98.5 percent of its natural
forest. But the fact is that rural Haitians obtain more income from charcoal and wood sales
than from agriculture. Thus, their natural resources are not treated as a renewable reserve
but as a fixed asset to be strip-mined for urgent, immediate needs. Many rural Haitians also
turn to informal sector microenterprises but are stymied by lack of infrastructure, marketing
skills and financial resources. The measure of their isolation from the sources of wealth is
found in the formal sector's loan figures: less than 1 percent of bank loans in 1995 were
made to the poor informal sector.

The overall situation is slightly better Women -- As a poor woman living in rural Haiti,
in the cities where "only" 53 percent of the you are illiterae and powerless. You have given
population live below the poverty line. birth to 6 children although you would like to
have only 3. If you manage to send as many as
However, accelerating growth will soon 3 of your children to school, only one will finish
overwhelm the fragile urban infrastructure, the sixth grade. You may well have borne
Already, sanitation is at unacceptable levels, children in the hope of cementing a relationship
Only 30 percent of the urban population with thefather, but there is a 40% chance that
have access to toilets or latrines and 75 you are the head of your household ... and also
percent of infant deaths are, in part, a 40% chance that you have been raped or
abused during your life. You run your household
attributable to unsanitary conditions. In on a total yearly cash income of about US$ 591.
urban slums, water is purchased by the Your home has neither running water nor elec-
bucket and is likely to be bad. In Port-au- tricity. You probably don't even have access to
Prince, by far the major urban center, only a toilet or latrine. If you are a bit luckier, you
37 percent of the population have access to are a market woman. You cannot get credit;
potable water. Nor do they have jobs. your stock is small and your profits are tiny.
Following the military coup of 1991 and the
US embargo, both foreign and local firms


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 13








fled Haiti with the result that 70 percent of the population are unemployed or underem-
ployed.

Statistics are inadequate toconvey the quality of suffering. In particular, statistical
averages fail to reveal the inequity that sharpens the bite of poverty. Disagregated, the
numbers show the deeper misery of the uneducated country people, the reasons for their
flight to the cities and their struggle to educate their children: 80% of rural households live
below the poverty line as against 53% of urban households. While the urban fertility rate is
4.0 children per woman, the rural rate is 6.1. The birthrate for illiterate girls is three times
that of the educated. As with childbirth, so with death. Child mortality among the illiterate
is almost double the rate for children of educated mothers.

Isolation adds to the burden of poverty. Many rural homesteads are sunk in the
inaccessible hollows of steep hills. Even the farmers of the more fertile plains are afflicted
by abominable roads that separate them from inputs, markets and information. Only 24% of
rural households possess a radio. Thus, poor Haitians are cut off from knowledge and
assistance. Surveys and focus groups reveal their sense of desolation:

69% believe that public officials don't care about them
Only 19% believe that the judiciary protects human rights
73 % believe that the public services in their community are poor

Yet, the same surveys confirm that Haitians believe the sentiment expressed in their national
motto, "L'union fait la force." (In union there is strength.)

82% believe that by organizing into groups they can have a voice in how their
government operates
Over 81% are registered to vote
40% belong to religious groups; and 33 percent belong to more than one group

Their belief is the engine of USAID's strategy. We will seek to strengthen poor
Haitians' ability to participate in their communities and advocate their own values. If they
can break from the isolation of voiceless passivity, then poor farmers, market women and
slum-dwellers can benefit from new models to increase income and productivity and to gain
control over their lives.

B. Macroeconomic Environment

Haitian political leaders have attempted to liberalize the economy and institute strict
fiscal and monetary management in conformity with IMF led structural adjustment programs
to achieve high levels of economic growth. Despite these actions, the relative lack of securi-
ty, as well as political and economic uncertainty have hindered equitable economic growth.
There is a consensus that economic growth has been weaker than anticipated since FY 1995
in all economic sectors except construction.

USAID/Haiti~ ~ ~ ~~~ taegcPanF 99-04 ae1


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 14









FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97
Real GDP Growth -10.6 4.5 2.8 1.1
IMF Real GDP Growth Target N/A 4.5 4.5 4.5

The two potential sources of economic growth, public and private investments, have
not had the impact expected. First, public investments have not occurred at the rate
anticipated because, since FY 1995, the GOH operating and investment budgets have been
passed by Parliament only following several months delay. For example, the FY 1997
operating and investment budgets were delayed seven months until May 1997. Second,
private investments have not, contrary to expectations, significantly increased in response to
the decline in real interest rates.

"La vie chere" is the battle cry of Haiti's poor. Inflation, an insidious regressive form
of taxation, continues to threaten the welfare of the poor by eroding their limited purchasing
Power. It also deters private investment and economic growth, depriving the poor of
employment and income.

FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97
Actual Inflation Rate (%) 37.4 30.2 20.1 17.0
IMF Inflation Target (%) N/A 15.0 15.0 9.0

1. Progress on Economic Liberalization. Interest rate ceilings were abolished in
FY 1995 by Central Bank order. GOH-administered pricing of commodities, except for
pump-level gasoline and some donor-financed food items, was also eliminated in FY 1996.
By the same token, GOH-determined exchange rates were also abolished in FY 1995.

2. Revenue/Expenditures/Deficits. As shown in the table below, tax collection has
improved significantly due mainly to GOH efforts to: (a) strengthen the management and
administrative capabilities of key tax collecting institutions; (b) enlarge the tax base (the
TCA, which represents approximately 25 percent of all tax revenues, was set at 10 percent
and applied to all goods and services in FY 1997); and (c) eliminate tax exemptions. GOH
spending has been conservative. Increased tax collection combined with conservative GOH
spending has rendered the GOH less of a borrower in the capital market measured by either
total deficit or current account deficit.

FY94 FY95 FY96. FY97
Tax Revenue* 3.2 7.2 7.2 8.7
GOH Expenditures 7.4 12.0 9.7 9.4
Total Deficit (-) -4.2 -4.8 -3.3 -0.8
Current Account Deficit (-) -3.9 -4.4 -2.7 0.3
Surplus
figures expressed as percentages of GDP

As a consequence, the GOH has not been "crowding out" private borrowers to
whom more capital thus becomes potentially available. Private investment has, contrary to


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 15








expectations, not significantly increased because of insufficient structural reform, a
continuing poor investment climate and lack of security and political stability. Compounding
the insufficiency of private investments have been the serious delays in getting the 95 percent
donor-financed Public Investment Budgets through Parliament in FY 1997, for example, the
G 7.9 billion Public Investment was voted in May 1997, a seven month delay and their lax
execution.

3. Slow Pace of Privatization. Privatization has been the most contentious
economic issue in Haiti. The State Enterprises Democratization Unit (SEDU) was first
established in 1995 in the Office of the Prime Minister. SEDU yielded nothing of value
except a set of diagnostic studies of the first nine state-owned enterprises (SOEs) scheduled
for privatization. With the "modernization" bill signed into law on October 10, 1996, the
GOH named representatives of these nine enterprises to CMEP ("Conseil de Modernisation
des Enterprises Publiques" Modernization of Public Enterprise Council) in December 1996
replacing SEDU under whose auspices privatization had been stifled. The CMEP was staffed
up in earnest and in February 1997 President Pr6val introduced the CMEP plan to privatize
the first nine SOEs by March 1998. While this timetable has slipped, concrete privatization
transactions have occurred. The state-owned flour mill was sold by the GOH to the Conti-
nental Grain, Seabord Corporation and Unifinance consortium in June 1997. In December
92, CMEP announced the HolderBank-Colclinker-Compagnie Nationale de Ciment consor-
tium as winner of the bidding process for the cement plant. In addition, CMEP is in the
process of finalizing the selection of consortia of technical advisors to assist in the
privatization of the Port-au-Prince seaport, airport and T616co, the telecommunication
parastatal.

4. Incomplete Civil Service Reform. Following a one-year debate, the Parliament
passed the civil service downsizing (CSD) bill on April 9, 1997. The CSD bill was rapidly
approved by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and signed by President Pr6val on April 21,
1997. The CSD law has, however, not been published in the official gazette, Le Moniteur.
Without publication, the full scale implementation of the GOH downsizing program with a
projected 7,500 lay offs over nine months cannot begin. The validity of the CSD Law will
expire on September 30, 1998. There has been to date only a timid CSD effort carried out
in July-August 1996, before the CSD was passed, when some 1,500 ghost employees (i.e.
employees who did not exist but in whose names salary checks were issued) were identified
and, reportedly, removed from the government payrolls. However, President Pr6val has
recently reaffirmed publicly the GOH's interest in pursuing CSD. Donors, including
USAID, are mobilizing themselves to support this initiative.

5. Parliamentary Inaction on Tariff Reform. Tariff reform began in earnest in
April 1995 with planned adjustments in product valuation, product classification
nomenclature and duty schedules/rates with the ultimate objectives of liberalizing the Haitian
economy and reducing the discretionary power of customs officers in the application of the
existing tariff law. Since FY 1995: (a) dutiable imports have been assessed at Commodity,
Insurance & Freight (CIF) prices based on the prevailing market-determined exchange rate;
(b) classification of dutiable imports for the purpose of duty rate determination has been


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 16










progressively changing toward the international six-digit classification nomenclature; and (c)
rate schedules have been simplified and the rate ceiling has been lowered.

Customs Duties (% of CIF Prices)

Pre-FY96 FY96 To Present May 1996 Law
0-10% 0% 0-5%
15-20% 5% 5%
25-30% 10% 10%
35-50% 15% 10%
25% (for gasoline only)

However, as shown in the preceding table, much remains to be done with respect
to duty rate schedules and ceilings because the May 1996 draft Tariff Law, which proposes
to reduce rate schedules and ceilings, still awaits parliamentary action. Under this draft law,
the GOH proposes a normal rate of 5 percent of CIF price with two exceptions: (a) 0
percent for raw materials and basic food products (except for rice and refined sugar); and (b)
10 percent for all luxury items i.e. alcohol, cigarettes, cars, consumption products which
were taxed at 50 percent and gasoline which was taxed at 25 percent.

6. Decentralization: Several laws were enacted in FY 1996 to support the GOH's
constitutionally mandated decentralization initiative. The Communal Section Law and, Local
Government Fund define communal sections and identify local governments at the communal
section, communal and departmental levels as sole managers responsible for the use of Fund
resources. A September 2, 1996 law determines that a portion of certain tax revenues be
allocated to the Local Government Fund. The October 10, 1996 Modernization Framework
Law also provides for financing of the Local Government Fund (Article 34).

In spite of the passage of the referenced decentralization laws, important gaps
remain that hinder the effective implementation of decentralization. There have, however,
been some noteworthy developments. When Haiti's mayors were convoked at the Palace to
rubberstamp the Ministry of Interior's draft legislation on municipalities, they refused, stating
that they would prepare their own draft bill. With a mandate from President Pr6val, the
Mayors Federation (FENAMH) sought USAID technical assistance to prepare a policy paper
on decentralization and a new version of the law on municipalities. The two versions of the
Decentralization Framework Law drafted by the Ministry of Interior and the Mayors
Federation respectively, along with the version drafted by Parliament, were submitted to
Parliament in the first half of 1997 and still await parliamentary action. Almost one year and
a half after its creation, the Local Government Fund is less than fully operational due to
various bureaucratic delays. Thus, no adequate budget allocations to local communities have
been set up in most municipalities to ensure proper accountability of public resources. The
debate on decentralization continues, prompted by national and regional dialogues on the
subject with local officials and civic organizations suggested by USAID; however, decisive
actions by the central government and Parliament have yet to take place.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 17








7. Infrastructure. There is no doubt that the limited number of roads and their state
of repair increases transportation costs. The majority of microenterprises are commercial in
nature relying on reselling of goods. For both goods that are imported, and foodstuffs
produced in the countryside, transport is a major element of total costs. The poor state of
the national road system in Haiti has more than doubled the cost of moving goods in real
terms. As transporters have realized the losses they are incurring, their prices have risen,
causing lost sales opportunity to resellers, whose customers' purchasing power has not kept
pace. Some areas, particularly the South and Center Departments, rely completely on the
road infrastructure for the movement of goods and people (not having developed sea or air
transport) and are, consequently more severely constrained.

However, the Government of Haiti (GOH) has made great efforts to rehabilitate
the existing road network and to construct or rebuild new highways. The road leading to the
Central Plateau from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien through Hinche in the interior of the
country, National Route #3, is under construction. The rehabilitation of National route #2
are underway. The road between Pont Sond6 and Mirebalais is under construction. The
contract for the study of the road from Cap-Haitien to Ouanaminthe, on the border with the
Dominican Republic, is about to be awarded. Several road rehabilitation programs financed
either by the IBRD, IDB, EU, or USAID through the P.L. 480 Title I Program have
already been established for the repair of almost the entire road network. Except for the
Title III funded rehabilitation of agricultural secondary roads, progress in the above
mentioned road construction programs is contingent upon GOH compliance with donor
conditionalities.

The lack of reliable electric power remains one of the most serious infrastructure
constraints. The problem is not so much that the power is too expensive, but that it is
unavailable on a regular basis at a constant voltage during regular working hours. The
power company has been remunerated for only about 40 percent of the power it has produced
since 1991, most being lost to illegal connections, unpaid accounts, employee theft and
transmission inefficiencies. It has never been able to produce enough current to meet
demand. Urban areas, other than Port-au-Prince, are without power most of the time (some
small areas close to generation stations excepted). Rural electrification has not yet occurred
in Haiti.

8) Informal Sector. The majority of urban Haitians work in the informal sector in
some type of microentrepreneurial activity. Most microenterprises can be characterized by:
small size, easy entry, rudimentary technology, local resources and raw materials, high labor
content, simple products and services, low prices, clients with low revenues, localized and
accessible markets, simple distribution methods, intense and free competition, skills obtained
on the job and poor, if any, access to credit. Haiti does not have official statistics on the
actual size and characteristics of the informal sector. However, it is generally acknowledged
that the contributions of the informal sector to GDP and increased are major.

Apart from fishing and farming, the majority of microenterprises are urban or
peri-urban due to the deteriorated infrastructure and insufficient permanent market for good


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 18









and services in rural areas. Since microenterprises work outside of the regulated
environment and without the usual financial buffers of bank accounts, access to loans,
insurance and the like, they depend upon daily receipts to meet daily expenses, including
labor.

C. Socio-Political Environment

1. History of State And Public Institutions.
In 1986, the 30 year regime of the Duvaliers ended. A popular referendum in 1987 ratified
a progressive new Haitian Constitution ensuring civil rights, creating democratic forms of
government and adopting principles crucial to long-term development, promotion of gender
equality and decentralization. Under the new Constitution, the populist Jean-Bertrand Aristide
was elected in 1990 only to be ousted by a 1991 army coup, Thereafter, local democratic
initiative halted or went underground during a three-year period of severe repression. Since
the return of the constitutional government in 1994, Haitian administrations have
implemented policies redefining the traditional role of the state and decentralizing
government. In 1995, the Aristide administration dismantled the Haitian army and created a
national police force. In 1996, the reins of government passed successfully from one
democratically elected president to his successor, Ren6 Pr6val the first such transition in
recent Haitian history.

Over the past four years, Haitians have struggled, with limited success, to make
progress toward a pluralistic political system. The art of political compromise among compet-
ing political parties is still underdeveloped in Haiti. Insiders seek to dominate, and outsiders
stress partisanship over reasoned debate. Parliamentary proceedings tend toward intermina-
ble delay or virtual paralysis due to an inability to compromise and form working coalitions.
Political parties tend to have a limited base of support among common citizens, stress
personalities over ideological platforms, and focus inordinately on the office of president.
Due to a winner-take-all mentality that stifles debate, rival parties have been unable or
unwilling to remain actively engaged in the political process as a loyal opposition. A real
forum for public debate on national policy issues does not exist. Consequently, citizens tend
to be deeply skeptical of all political parties and the process of formal democratization in
general.

Traditionally, the primary function of the state apparatus has been to extract
wealth and extend patronage. Neither the citizenry nor office holders have ever viewed the
state as a disinterested provider of public services. In response to limited government
services, a growing number of international NGOs have provided a broad range of dispersed
public services in certain sectors. Since the 1970s, a great deal of public and private foreign
assistance has by- passed government channels entirely. This greatly strengthened the NGO
sector and fostered the emergence of local or national NGOs. The growing importance of
NGO services over time created a kind of shadow government for public services such as
agriculture, education, and public health.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 19


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 19








Post-1994 administrations have initiated reforms in public administration and
corrupt state monopolies; however, there is continuing evidence of corruption and abuse of
power as a common feature of officialdom. Employment at all levels of government is based
primarily on political patronage. Ministerial budgets continue to be dominated by salaries
with few or no program support funds. Most services in education, health, and agricultural
extension are still provided by NGO networks and the private sector.

2. Role of NGOs In Social Sector Service Delivery. International
and national NGOs have been providing relief, charity, and social sector services since the
1950s, but increasingly so since the 1970s. In periods of crisis, when the GOH has been
unable or unwilling to provide even a minimal range of social services NGOs have promptly
stepped in, with considerable donor and private philanthropic funding. Toward the end of
the second Duvalier regime, public-private partnership arrangements were made between
NGOs and the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), sharing staff and
infrastructure under the Health for All in 2000 program. The same was true in the education
sector. A number of these partnerships have survived the subsequent changes in govern-
ment, the coup d'tat, and the latest decentralization reforms.

During the 1992-1994 crisis period, NGOs were the only source of basic health
services in many remote areas, and are estimated as having provided at least 60 percent of
health services in the country as a whole. Today, they probably still provide about 50
percent of primary and curative health services. While coverage by NGOs and MSPP for
health and population has increased significantly, the picture for water supply and sanitation
is less reassuring. There is very little GOH capacity in these areas critical to health and to
the environment. Almost all interventions being made are funded through international
NGOs, who on-grant to local NGOs or other local organizations to create employment and
actually implement rehabilitation or construction projects.

For education, the proportion of services provided by the GOH has been even
lower. Traditionally, the GOH has never attempted to meet the demand for universal
primary or secondary education. Most members of the urban and rural elite and middle-class
were educated in private schools and most of the rural poor remain illiterate. Nearly 200
schools have been renovated or built in the last 18 months with the help of NGOs and direct
donor funding. Approximately 80 percent of all primary and secondary schools are either
run by religiously affiliated NGOs, or are private, for-profit institutions.

In agriculture, government funds for agricultural infrastructure or other
production-enhancing interventions are extremely limited. The Ministry of the Environment
can afford few direct interventions, while NGOs carry out a wide variety of programs in
environmental protection and natural resources management. The situation for women
oriented programs is even more critical in terms of the proportions of non-government
funding, and the Women's Affairs Ministry is likely to be closed for lack of budget funds.
Human rights activities are virtually dominated by NGOs.


USA iD/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 20


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 20










3. Education and Literacy. Poorer family household heads are likely to be
illiterate or have limited education. A 1994-1996 survey determined that some 58 percent of
rural household heads do not read or write, 34 percent have 6 years or less of schooling,
only 6 percent finished high school and 0.4 percent have a university degree. Today, only
63 percent of the 6-12 year old children are schooled. This proportion falls even lower in
rural areas where it is only 23 percent. In sharp contrast to most countries in the world, the
majority of school children are enrolled in private schools (75 percent and 82 percent at the
primary and secondary levels, respectively). The quality of education children receive is
directly related to where they live and to the level of tuition their families can afford to pay.
This means that education represents a heavy financial burden on many poor families,
especially in rural areas. As far as the quality of learning is concerned, it is widely
acknowledged that it is below international standards and the majority of students are
enrolled in facilities which do not provide a suitable learning environment.

4. Decline in Personal Security. By international standards, Haiti is not
particularly violent. However, the notable rise in crime rates in recent times has shaken the
collective sense of well being among all strata of society. Two aspects of this crime increase
are alarming to Haitians and outside observers: urban crime is increasingly violent and
unpredictable, and it increasingly involves children. Furthermore, robbery and violent crime
have become more common in wealthier neighborhoods that were previously well protected
from such incidents. In the past, property related crimes tended to be targeted and limited to
burglary. Today car-jacking, armed robbery, and murder are much more common.
Criminals increasingly use children to carry out crimes such as car theft, burglary as well as
movement and sale of drugs. Children increasingly perpetrate their own crimes. Guns are
easily accessible for rent or purchase. Childhood prostitution almost unheard of until
recently is now common in urban areas. The response to this rise in criminality has been
weak.

5. Weak Judiciary. Despite the initial progress made in the justice sector over
the last two years, the judicial system remains weak. Virtually all of the judicial structures
need to be revamped and strengthened. The judicial system is unable to process cases
efficiently, openly or credibly. The capabilities of judicial personnel are limited particularly
among judges, judicial police and prosecutors. Prisons are overcrowded and the backlog of
cases awaiting adjudication is moving at a snail's pace through the system. The Ministry of
Justice, which is responsible for ensuring a smooth functioning judicial system, lacks the
institutional capacity or political will to effect the needed changes.

The weakness of the justice system was confirmed by a recent assessment of the
judicial sector, which concluded that: (a) the political leadership for judicial reform in Haiti
is weak and fragmented; (b) legal system structures are not adequately in place; (c) the legal
system is inaccessible and inequitable; and (d) that the Haitian government does not have the
institutional capacity to deliver the justice that the people desire. These weaknesses were
also confirmed by USAID staff's informal field survey, in which the majority of Haitians
interviewed believed that justice in Haiti was for sale and that judicial personnel are corrupt
and not accountable.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 21








The Haitian National Police (HNP), created in 1995, while generally receiving
high marks in surveys, have been implicated in political violence and drug smuggling.
Human Rights Watch notes that there has been little progress in prosecuting police abuse
cases in the courts; however, it does not view police abuses as motivated by official policy.
In a notable breach with old patterns of impunity, the HNP has taken firm steps to discipline
members of its force for misconduct, including firing police agents and officers and detaining
them. The problem so far has been a disinclination of the judicial system to prosecute,
perhaps due to fear of retribution.


D. Gender Concerns

Haiti has recorded one of the highest rates of economically active women in
the LAC region', playing highly visible roles in production, rural marketing and family
subsistence. Yet there is a tendency to regard women's work as secondary and subordinate
to men's, as reflected in the fact that a significant proportion of women's work is unpaid.
Women's work also tends to be under-valued because of the subsistence nature of their
activities, the irregularity and informality of women's work and the proximity and integration
of women's work with their domestic duties.

Although it is likely that women's participation in agriculture has declined over
the decades due to economic stagnation in that sector, available information suggests that
women continue to play an important role in agriculture production and a predominant role in
rural marketing. The 1982 census reported that 50 percent of all working women were
engaged in agriculture and this figure, at the time, was considered to be an underestimation.
However, after the embargo period (1991-1994), although women remain very active,
agriculture ceased to be their primary source of income. Agricultural production, petty com-
merce and other non-agricultural activities represent 35, 20 and 31 percent respectively of
female-headed households total income vs 47, 13 and 23 percent for male-headed households.

Haitian women have proven to be key actors in sustaining their families during
conditions of economic decline and poverty. Information on the impact of poverty within the
household suggests that women have carried a greater burden than men in terms of family
maintenance. In part, this is due to the loss of jobs in the formal sector which has affected
men to a greater extent than women. But in addition, the structure of the family and the
prevalence of informal unions and polygamous relationships in Haitian society, has created a
situation in which men are not legally or otherwise bound to support their children and
partners.
Female-headed households are, by a wide margin, the more economically
vulnerable. They also suffer from high mortality and morbidity rates -- the highest, in fact,


'The Enau&te Mortalitd, Morbidite et Utilisation des Services (EMMUS II) reported for the period 1994-1995
a labor force participation rate of 38 percent of women in the 15-49 and 64 percent for men in the 15-59 age
group. A study of 12 poor urban neighborhoods in 1995 indicates that 42 percent of women and 82 percent of
men were in the labor force.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 22










in the Latin American region -- and low education. One third of Haitian women between the
ages of 15 and 49 have no formal education, yet 40 percent of Haitian households are headed
by women.

Although legislation guarantees women equal property rights, their perception
of personal rights remains weak. Forty percent of women have been subject to rape or
abuse, but two thirds of the cases are unreported due to the victims' fear of reprisal or lack
of confidence in the legal system. Womens' lack of a sense of personal power is evident in
the differences between male and female responses to the AIDS threat: while 43 percent of
men at risk have changed their behavior, only 23 percent of women report that they seek to
protect themselves.

Where Haitian women possess some power is in their role in Haiti's internal
marketing system. They perform significant low cost services in collecting, distribution and
breaking bulk for wholesalers. Most women are not full-time traders, but market small
quantities and sell irregularly to consumers or to market intermediaries. Women also market
a larger percentage of manufactured goods (both foreign and locally produced). In addition,
they offer credit and are an important source of informal financing for farmers. Women
traders, often called "Madam Saras," typically invest large amounts of labor and time and
use small amounts of capital, a situation that results in low profit margins. Low profits
prevent women from building up inventories, making them unable to benefit from economies
of scale in purchasing. Economic conditions force a large number of women to work under
these conditions, which in turn, makes the sector fragmented and only marginally profitable.











C-"..: II 7


4'


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan Fl' 1999-2004 Page 23


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 23








II. Strategic and Special Objectives


A. Sustainable Increased Income For The Poor

1. Statement of Strategic Objective

Long term, sustainable improvement of the status of Haiti's poor requires
major economic growth to overcome not only poverty itself, but also the attendant ills of
ecological degradation and excessive population growth.2

The Strategic Objective, Sustainable Increased Income for the Poor, targets the
majority of the population who fall beneath the poverty line and provides direct, targeted
assistance to increase their incomes. USAID has three customer bases: rural farmers, who
compose 22% of the rural population and contribute 14% to national household income; rural
and urban informal sector operators, who compose 80% of the population and contribute
75% to national household income, and the formal private sector, which composes 10% of
the work force, and who will be addressed through our institutional policy reforms.

Our customers in both rural and urban areas are caught in a vicious circle of
poverty and environmental degradation. Recent assessments have concluded that poverty
causes increased environmental degradation, which in turn causes even deeper poverty. The
nature of this cycle, therefore, dictates a very strong synergy between the customers of this
strategic objective and that for environmental activities.

In the near-term (1999-2001) of this Strategy, USAID proposes to target major
segments of the poor population; we will increase income available to hillside farmers and
the informal sector, and deliver immediate results to alleviate the worst deficits. Meeting
urgent needs will help to build hope among the poor so that their energy can be mobilized.
Creating replicable models of income generation -- including increased agricultural
productivity, informal sector credit plans and assistance to high potential urban zones outside
Port-au-Prince -- will build the foundation for long-term sustainable growth.

The Food Security Strategy has recommended the concentration of assistance
activities geographically to create sufficient impact to reduce food insecurity, primarily
through the creation of jobs. The concentration of economic power and population in Port-
au-Prince will be addressed and challenged through the creation of opportunities elsewhere in
Haiti. The High Potential Zone (HPZ) approach will seek to concentrate activities in specific
geographic zones, which have high economic potential and existing levels of public-private


2The causal linkages between poverty, population, migration, and environmental degradation have been
analyzed by the recently completed USAID Food Security Study, (1997); the 1997 Private Sector Assessment, the
report "Strengthening the Informal Sector in Haiti" (1993) and the IBRD's study on Haitian poverty (December,
1997). The solutions suggested have guided our discussions with partners and customers, and through these
surveys, influenced the proposed strategic approach.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 24









collaboration. HPZs are a significant element in the USAID strategy because they create
zones of economic opportunity to attract population from the surrounding countryside, and
provide models for replication elsewhere in Haiti. The HPZ approach is not an urban
development approach. Rather, it develops the economic potentials of both urban and rural
areas, and creates economic linkages between the two, significantly increasing the rate of
economic growth, investment and income generation for the region as a whole.

The initial years of this strategy will also mark the shift from a transitional
program to a sustainable development program. Conceptually, this can be categorized as the
shift from a strategy based on programming opportunities for successes, to a sustainable
development program which provides a clear framework for increasing'incomes and
enhancing economic growth. This framework also focuses on institution building,
development of linkages between sectors, and the development of public-private partnerships
to meet the demand for services and infrastructure. All of these elements are required to
shift to sustainable long-term development.

To increase income collaboration is required among Haitians and donors to
formulate a policy and institutional framework conducive to a competitive, market-driven
economy. An improved policy and institutional framework is perhaps the most important
element of this SO in terms of achieving long-term increases in income and economic
opportunity for Haitians. The weight of world-wide development experience shows that the
single most important determinant, by far, in alleviating poverty is the presence of an
economy open to investment and competition. Therefore, SO activities will lay the
foundation and nurture institutions to achieve this end.

USAID will systematically build on donor coordination and collaboration. We
will work with Parliament and civil society institutions to develop the constituencies
necessary to push for continuous reform. In the High Potential Zones we will develop
activity level success stories which will act as catalysts for an improved decentralized policy
and institutional matrix. Lastly, in the interests of sustainability, we will seek out Haitians
willing to take the lead in establishing organizations committed to an improved investment
climate that can attract funds and assure a continuing, vital policy debate.

The timeframe of reference for this strategy extends beyond the immediate period
of programming to year 2020. Although this falls outside of normal USAID programming
methodology, the USAID strategy in Haiti is focused on developing, a-base for long-term
development. Therefore, although activities will produce results within the timeframe of this
strategy, they are best understood and valued in the context of the goal of having sustainable
long-term economic growth in place by the year 2020. In short, the economic, institutional
and physical decapitalization of Haiti has reached the point where rapid economic growth can
only resume once a certain minimum momentum has been achieved. The objective of this
six year strategy is to reach that minimum momentum.

In the medium to long term (2002-2020), increases in income to the poor and
recent graduates from poverty will be critically sensitive to the success of other Mission SO


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 25








teams and other donors. For example, the Desired Family Size team's success in decreasing
fertility will, in the longer term, be essential to assure that Haiti's resources are not spread
so thin that growth becomes impossible. Similarly the Human Capacity team's work to
improve the skills of the work force is necessary to improve productivity. More generally,
the efforts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), IBRD and our own Streamlined
Government special objective are essential to establish conditions conducive for sustainable
economic growth. With the collaboration of such partners, we hope, by the year 2004, not
only to have stopped the fall in Haiti's real per capital income, but also to have reversed it.
By the year 2020, the country should have built, on the foundation developed during this
strategic period, a viable economy capable of attaining the equitable eight to ten percent
growth rates required to continuously reduce poverty.

2. Problem Analysis: A Legacy of National Mismanagement

The Target Populations. The primary statistics are almost too well-known: Seventy percent
of Haiti's people live in the countryside and 80% of that population lives below the poverty
line. The majority attempts to eke out a living from the deeply eroded slopes of the steep
hills that cover much of Haiti. Their land is not large enough nor fertile enough for
successful subsistence farming. Thus, food security cannot be achieved off the land. The
results of their land deficit are many: The World Food Program estimates that severe or
moderate stunting afflicts 46.8 percent of children under age 5. Farming is contributing less
and less to the national economy. By the end of the 1980s, agriculture accounted for only 35
percent of GDP and ten percent of exports, falling from, respectively, 47 percent and 75
percent in the 1970s. Farmers are turning to other, non-agricultural sources for income
with the result that agricultural and informal sectors together combine for over 85% of the
population's employment.

When all else fails, the rural poor migrate to the capital. But Port-au-Prince has
reached its growth limit in the near term. Absent interventions to limit or shift migration,
the city will require opportunities to increase incomes and infrastructure to absorb an
estimated 100,000 new labor entrants annually, resulting in growth of urban population from
2.2 million today to 9.4 million in 2020.

Constraints to Increasing Incomes. The 1997 Food Security study and Private Sector
Assessment identify several major constraints; to increasing incomes which affect the
development of other sectors:

i) limited natural resources: a fragile physical environment (70 % of currently cultivated
lands --one million hectares--are on hillsides, an equal amount can no longer support any
agricultural use), and a declining availability of water due to deforestation of watersheds.

ii) failing infrastructure: only fifteen to nineteen percent of the land is irrigable, but less than
half of that is actually irrigated --and the irrigated acreage is threatened by massive
sedimentation.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 26









iii) insufficient productive land: families need a minimum, on average, of 2.5 to three
hectares in order to make a living from farming, but seventy percent of farms are smaller
than 1.3 hectares.

iv) ill-adapted legal system: land titling is difficult and expensive. Procedures established by
law for land affairs are complicated and expensive, and the amount of land that is titled and
complies with legal requirements is extremely small.

v) inefficient financial markets: lack of access to financial services restricts farmers' access
to agricultural inputs, affects productivity and incomes, and limits technological options.
The absence of savings services forces short-term; and environmentally damaging, solutions
(tree cutting) to meet unexpected demands for liquidity. While agricultural and the informal
sectors constitute over eighty-five percent of Haiti population's employment, loans to these
sectors number in the mere thousands (less than .6 percent of formal credit was allocated to
agriculture). The inability of small and micro-enterprises to access credit or savings
services limits the impact this dynamic sector can have on job creation and increased
incomes. Existing grass root financial intermediaries, like Caisses Popularize, face
bankruptcy due to recent interest rate liberalization, an asset base eroded by past inflations
and by an inadequate application of prudential principles.

vi) low productivity: most farmers use 18th century technology (e.g., machetes and hoes),
no fertilization, and produce few high value crops. Post-harvest losses are estimated to be as
high as 20-30 percent for grains, and over 40 percent for perishable products.

vii) poor transportation infrastructure: non-existent roads isolate producers from markets and
contribute to higher food prices. High transportation cost are the major reason for the
reportedly high food prices in Haiti.

viii) weak and unresponsive institutions: the public sector fails to supply key public goods.
The agricultural sector faces a dearth of research and extension services. Burdensome taxes
and other fiscal policies, inefficient administrative practices designed to extract rents,
increase transactional costs, uncertainty and high risk, a lack of public investment in rural
areas and basic infrastructure have discouraged local and international investment in all
economic activities. Misguided policies and/or their administration reinforce socio-economic
divisions and unsustainable use of natural resources.

Program Accomplishments to Date

While economic growth may not yet be visible, economic development is taking
place. The GOH has implemented structural reform measures which have cost dearly in other
countries. Petroleum subsidies were eliminated (and nothing similar to the Caracas riots took
place); all public sector wage contracts signed with the de facto regime were cancelled; the
export surrender requirement and the remaining restrictions on imports were abolished;
import tariffs were reduced; and, ceilings on interest rates were eliminated. In addition,
inflation, which had reached 52% by early 1994, declined to 16-17 % last year. Remittances


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 27









continue to arrive, and some estimates place them as high as half a billion dollars in 1997
(including both financial and in kind). The privatization program has begun in earnest with
the sale and transfer of one agribusiness parastatal and the sale of a state-owned cement
company.

The existing USAID economic growth portfolio has benefited from the improved
policy framework. Only six months ago, USAID assisted the first commercial bank in
opening its doors to the informal sector; it has already made over 600 loans to small- and
micro-enterprises. Two other banks have since joined the program and will begin informal
sector lending activities in 1998.

Public-private partnerships were dangerous under the past repressive regimes. In
newly democratic Haiti, they are beginning to emerge. Public and private interest groups
formed a common agenda in Cap Haitian to bring cruise ships back after more than a
decade's absence. This joint effort produced a successful cruise visit which serves as a
reference point for future progress. The powerful cruise ship industry -- a major
development force in the Caribbean -- benefits the handicraft industry, improves city
revenues, and generates jobs and foreign exchange. Equally important was the development
of a model for public-private dialogue that brought about the success.

In 1997, a leading Haitian civil society group, CLED, launched an ambitious initiative
to formalize informal urban property. Combining its resources with the experience of
Hernando de Soto's ILD, this activity will provide thousands of Haiti's poor with clear title
to their land and an opportunity to use it as collateral for credit. This activity has already
determined that the value of informal property and homes in Port-au-Prince exceeds $1.5
billion.

On the Haitian hillsides, over 130,000 farmers are working with USAID partners to
plant multipurpose trees and use sound agricultural practices. These actions have slowed
down soil erosion, increased humidity retention, and farm productivity. It has also increased
farmers income by over 20 percent. The success of this program is attributable to the
ongoing involvement, over a six year period, of farmers in the redesign and deployment of
new methodologies to increase farm income.

The improved policy framework also enables USAID agricultural and agribusiness
marketing entities to facilitate increased competition and value addition through improved
post-harvest practices. 20,000 members of Native Coffee Growers Associations are selling
high quality coffee, Haitian Bleu, to specialty markets in the US for premium prices ($10+ a
pound retail), doubling their farm gate prices for the third consecutive year. The EU and the
IDB are replicating these favorable experiences in other regions. Haiti's President has chosen
the success of Haitian Bleu as a model of growth with equity, and the approach to follow
because it empowers small growers by allowing them to increase competition vis-a-vis
traditional trading houses.


USAID/Haiti Strolegic Plan Fl' 1999-2004 Page 28


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 28










Through assistance to the Presidential Commission, an improved economic framework
was developed and a comprehensive legal package of eight bills submitted to the President.
Although its passage has been delayed due to the absence of a Prime Minister, this
comprehensive package provides modern legislation for investments and streamlines
government procedures. With USAID support, the Presidential Commission has attracted
resources from other donors (e.g., IDB) for additional policy analysis, launched a pilot
vocational training center; and accelerated the liberalization of the financial sector (e.g.,
insurance and pension funds) with assistance from the government of Chile.

Credit is beginning to become available to the poor through a village banking system
with over 3000 loans (almost 100% to women) through 42 village banks in"three regions.
IICA, our partner in coffee-related activities, has also attracted non-USAID resources to fund
a program that provides jointly village banking and family planning services to women in
USAID-assisted coffee regions.

3. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships

The assumptions set forth below include both the classic assumptions concerning external
circumstances that the USAID program cannot regulate (e.g., political stability) and causal
assumptions intrinsic to the program. The latter represent development postulates based on
research and experience.

Other donors on-going programs continued and their funding maintained and dispersed
as projected over the 5 year period, support the accelerated expansion of light
manufacturing and assembly and complete planned infrastructure investments in
selected High Potential Zone regions.

Complementary activities in the USAID program are implemented as planned.

Property rights gradually become more secure.

Inflation remains below 20% and market-determined exchange rates continue.

External economic conditions (e.g., investment flows, commodity prices, tourism
trends) remain stable over the strategic period. New trade blocks do not discriminate
against Haiti.

Political conditions, public lack of confidence, and/or insecurity do not produce
disruptive events that severely effect our customers and partners.

No major massive act of God (i.e., hurricane, widespread, floods, fires) affects more
than 20% of our customers over the strategic period.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 29


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 29








4. Commitment and Capacity of Development Partners


Improving the environmental, agricultural, and private sectors are development
objectives of various multilateral, bilateral, and PVOs, (development partners) presently
active in Haiti. These organizations have been working closely together in collaboration with
the government to develop complementary strategies. In particular, multi-donor activity in
Jacmel provides a model for collaboration in development of High Potential Zones.

A multi-donor and GOH effort is underway to support revitalization of the Haitian
economy that includes assistance for privatization and an Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility, designed to facilitate the reform of the Government of Haiti (GOH) fiscal and
monetary policies. Policy reform efforts are also included in the programs of the IBRD, IDB,
IMF, and European UnionL(EU). This multi-donor effort is critical for reviving the Haitian
economy. USAID activities in the high potential zones are contingent upon other donor's
investments in road, port, and electricity infrastructure (IDB, World Bank (IBRD), European
Union (EU), France, and Germany). The IDB and EU also have major investments planned
in irrigation. P.L. 480 Title III local currency also supports irrigation interventions, second-
ary road rehabilitation, and credit for the informal sector.

In addition, increasing the income of the poor will also require close collaboration and
teamwork with donor partners operating in the policy area. USAID will complement the
activities of other donors supporting civil society advocacy of improvements in the
investment climate. USAID supports other activities to increase the level of economic
literacy in Haiti. The Center for Applied Research on Poverty and the Parliamentary
Analysis Unit,- will increase the level of informed debate in Haiti and reduce the time
necessary to develop support for and introduce new polices, regulations, administrative rules
and laws necessary to support an accelerated level of investment and economic growth.

In the agricultural sector, IBRD (additional $50 million) and IDB ($33 million
current-additional 40 million future project) will contribute to capacity building within the
GOH. The IDB supports GOH land reform activities. The EU supports agriculture in Haiti
with institution building of the Ministry of Agriculture ($30 million), irrigation ($45 million),
and propagating coffee practices established by farmers working with USAID's coffee
project. FAO is providing technical assistance for sectoral planning and distribution of
production inputs (seeds, fertilizer). It's recent analysis of Haiti's land tenure system
provides the Mission with a baseline document for this complex and challenging social issue.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 30


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 30









Table 1
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CONTRIBUTIONS (FY 97 to 98) ($ Millions)


Sectors IBRD IDB EU Canada UNDP
Agriculture 73 85 4.3
Hillside agriculture 13 5.2
Coffee 0.7 12
Irrigation 13 45
Institution Building 5 30
Land Reform 0.6 .38
Haiti/DR Cross border 10-25

Private Sector
General Economic Reform/ 70.3 52.9 108 15.1 15
Presidential Commission
Urban 20 148 3.22 18.9 3.3
Road 123.9
Port Dredging
Power generation 11.4
Miscellaneous Private 7.0 11.2 2.6
Sector

Decentralization/Local Govt. 25-30

FAES/Funds that include 50 23
agricultural investments Social FAES II
(these programs may support and 80 for
some of the other activities Econ. PURE I
previously listed) Fund for and II
poverty


Although donor commitments are not broken out by interventions in High Potential
Zones, most donors have expressed interest in and agreement with the methodology. In
addition, this interest has been backed with expressions of commitment to infrastructure
rehabilitation, beginning with the IDB (sewers); IBRD (roads), and France (urban
rehabilitation) in Jacmel, and the EU (roads) in Cap Haitian.


Sustainability

Program sustainability is driven by a focus on two underlying themes which unify
the strategy: institutional development and access creation. These themes will promote


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 31


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 31









change in Haiti in a systemic, rather than incremental, manner. The overarching
sustainability condition is simple: sustainable and accelerating economic growth.

Specifically, the program will achieve sustainability by:

emphasizing market-driven activities that both increase income and address the causes
environmental degradation;

selecting environmentally-benign technologies, economic activities and policies;

providing a framework to improve service delivery in the targeted sectors which
continues beyond USAID funding time-frame;

building capacity of individuals, community group, and institutions to support the
framework;

developing sustainable institutions (e.g. MDF, CARP, FINNET) capable of providing
services and acting as advocates for positive and productive change in the policy
framework so as to establish their own revenue base;

following a participatory approach which reinforces, at all levels, a functional
democratic process;

Developing public-private collaboration to improve services;

including and supporting community-based organizations;

6. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Approaches.

Achievement of four Intermediate Results (IRs) will lead to the Strategic Objective of
Sustainable Increased Incomes for the Poor.

IR 1: Increased Environmentally Sustainable Agricultural Productivity.

USAID will increase farm productivity in selected watersheds through improved access to
environmentally sound technologies and practices, agricultural inputs, financial services and
markets. Increased sustainable farm income will be the principal objective. Our assistance
will be tailored to protect the hillside while increasing farmers revenues from a wide range of
activities namely food processing, handicrafts, animal husbandry and other agricultural based
income generating activities. These opportunities to increase incomes will also be a driving
force for the rural poor to undertake sustainable agricultural sector interventions .

Illustrative Activities include:

- Expand production, processing, and marketing of coffee, cocoa, and other tree species


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 32









- Improve land use through soil conservation practices
- Introduce new, high-value perennial crops and bio-intensive gardens
- Improve storage and packing, value-added processing, and marketing
- Integrate forage production, animal husbandry, and water management in farming
systems

USAID will continue to use the Productive Land Use System and the Coffee (PLUS) project
approach. This approach will use appropriate farm technologies which reduce risk and
environmental degradation while increasing farmers income. During the next six years, the
program will expand into:

High potential zones in support of the new Mission focus
New productive watersheds, to complement the Ministry of Agriculture efforts in low
land areas and to support ASSET community-based environmental initiatives
New coffee growing areas in the North and North East to respond to GOH and farmers'
request to expand the coffee activities into new areas.

The USAID agricultural program will build on lessons learned from the PLUS marketing
activities to develop and expand the agricultural marketing and processing efforts. These
efforts will lead to the production and export marketing of environmentally friendly crops,
such as plantains, beans, cacao, mangoes and sour oranges.

IR 2: Small and Micro Entrepreneurs Economically Empowered

USAID will develop a high performing financial network that encompasses village banks,
NGO's, Caisses Populaires, and commercial banks, to encourage existing and potential
financial intermediaries to provide services to credit-worthy informal customers. At the same
time, market-driven integrated support systems will be supported to address non-financial
constraints such as availability of raw materials, quality control, and access to markets.
USAID will measure changes in the informal sector through annual surveys throughout the
strategy period.

Activities will increase the poor's access to financial services by widening and deepening the
reach of financial services through mitigating the risk financial institutions face and
increasing their capacity to provide services in rural areas. Given the difficulty in
developing new financial services institutions, USAID will, at every opportunity, build on
existing institutions willing to adopt sustainable practices.

Illustrative Activities include:

- Establish a Financial Network (FinNet) of institutions committed to lending to the
working poor
- Assist intermediate financial institutions to improve and expand services in rural areas
- Establish a permanent Loan Capital Fund that will provide loan funds, guarantees and
other risk management instruments to FinNet institutions


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 33








- Develop efficient low-transaction-cost savings services to assist the poor


USAID Activities will increase the productivity of microentrepreneurs by improving access
to competitive inputs, technology, better business practices, and local and international
markets. We will take a comprehensive approach to assisting micro-enterprises by
addressing constraints which range from the availability of raw materials, through quality
control and access to market information, to linkages to larger enterprises. For example,
there are 400,000 craftspeople in Haiti, and there is international demand for Haitian crafts;
many buyers even equate the Caribbean style with Haitian style. Handicrafts therefore is a
sector with significant potential.

Illustrative Activities include:

- establish an integrated support system for the small- and micro-entrepreneurs making
available a spectrum of services
provide technical assistance in product design, process improvement, appropriate
technology, product quality, marketing, accounting, cost analysis and production manage-
ment
improve business relations between larger businesses and small artisans (e.g., cost
sharing on-the-job training, cottage industry, sub-contracting, raw materials).
- provide technical assistance and training aimed at facilitating the creating of new jobs for
the under employed and the unemployed of the informal sector.

IR 3: Investment Climate Improved

The measures pursued under this IR will, in reciprocating fashion, build up the capacity of
the government to employ improved policies, and of private sector leaders to advocate
policy changes. The findings of the USAID Center for Economic Growth clearly indicate
that an economy open to international trade and competition will enable Haiti to attain the
level of economic growth necessary to decrease poverty. Private sector led trade and
investment can produce this level of economic growth.

By linking the Democracy Program's efforts to strengthen advocacy with the efforts of this
IR, a range of business groups will come together to form coalitions around common
agendas. For example, USAID currently works with the Center for Free Enterprise and
Development (CLED) on the formalization of informal property rights. CLED has also been
a leading advocate in the private sector for economic reform and liberalization, and has
begun its own, independent social marketing campaign to raise public awareness as to the
need for economic reform and increased governmental responsibility.

The Center for Applied Research on Poverty (CARP), a new effort, will support all other
policy reform efforts by researching and disseminating information on the blockages to
accelerating economic growth in Haiti, distortions which may prevent the benefits of that
growth from being equitably distributed, and the best means to apply the lessons of other
countries to the Haitian context. CARP will also inject relevant analysis into the policy


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 34










dialogue on the importance of different types of investment and their impact on poverty
reduction. In a similar fashion, the Parliament Analysis Unit (PAU) will enhance the ability
of that legislative body to be more responsive to the demands for an improved investment
climate and environmental protection..

Both CARP and PAU will provide Haiti with linkages to other countries which have gone
through similar transitions. Examples of such linkages include Chile for policy reform and
economic liberalization, Peru for its experience in the formalization of informal property
rights, and the Dominican Republic for its experience in developing the tourism and
assembly sectors. Brethren countries of the hemisphere have already taken a significant role
in helping Haiti. Argentina is the fifth largest bilateral donor (after Japan), Chile has already
provided assistance in investment promotion, and the Dominican Republic has been eager to
promote cross-border trade. CARP and PAU will work in close coordination with the efforts
of the IBRD and the IMF to improve the macroeconomic policy framework.

The Agricultural Information System will.act in a similar manner to the PAU, by providing
significantly improved information on agricultural production to GOH policy makers and
entrepreneurs.

Through a social marketing component, USAID will ensure the widespread discussion of
these policies before they are formally proposed to the pertinent bodies. In addition, this
social marketing activity will launch popular educational campaigns to promote a better
understanding of key issues affecting the economy, free enterprise and the informal sector.

There are three areas of focus which are seen as predominant to improving the policy
framework. First, the Government must eliminate the bottlenecks that slow or block
investment and economic development. Not only must laws, regulations, and policies be
appropriate to the promotion of investment, but also the operation of government must invite
investment. In other words, the GOH must shift from one which is at best indifferent to
investment and at worst antagonistic to it, to one which accepts both in word and action the
importance of both domestic and international investment to the future welfare of the
country. Second, the Government must improve the delivery of its services, whether that be
infrastructure or agricultural extension. Third, the Government must increase its level of
accountability through an increased level of transparency.

The analysis of the Private Sector Assessment states clearly that improvements in the policy
framework will not be a natural outgrowth of the continuation of the status quo, Policy
change must be actively supported by a broader spectrum of civil society in order to be
successful. For example, in our discussion with customers, privatization is always
acknowledged to be an important aspect of the reform of the policy framework. However,
our customers are much more interested in the liberalization of the economy, which will
allow local groups to work with international investors to address such needs as power
generation, road construction, and port rehabilitation or development.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan Fl' 1999-2004 Page 35


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 35








An improved policy environment will open the door to the development of sectors and
industries with value added, labor-intensive production. One sector which has great potential
for the creation of jobs and increased income for the poor, and is sensitive to a poor policy
environment, is light manufacturing. Based on monitoring and evaluation of the performance
and impact of this sector in the future, the Mission will review its decision not to be involved
in the sector.

USAID efforts to improve the policy framework will produce three long-term results; first,
to reduce the flow of capital out of Haiti; second, to attract back capital currently abroad or
belonging to the Haitian diaspora; and third, to attract international investors, who choose
Haiti because of opportunities for adequate returns.

Illustrative Activities include:

- Improving access to and security of urban land owned by the informal sector
- Launching a social marketing program promoting values and technologies which lead to a
better understanding of the interplay between the environment, free enterprise and
sustainable economic growth
- Supporting civil society to advocate for economic reforms
- Establishing a new institution, the Center for Applied Research on Poverty, developed
with support from the private sector, to analyze the informal sector, track the impact of
legislation and macroeconomic management on their economic welfare, and monitor their
performance
- Improving banking regulation and competition to increase the efficiency of the financial
system and the availability of resources for investment and finance
- Establishing institutional support to assist the Haitian Parliament in the analysis of both
economic growth and environmental issues
- Increasing the capacity of civil society groups to advocate for and demand, improved
services and institutions
- Establishing a reliable and viable agricultural information system

IR 4: Strengthened Zones of High Potential Economic Growth.

In response to the challenge of concentration of economic power in Port-au-Prince and the
resulting pauperization of the countryside, USAID will select High Potential Zones (HPZs)
whose development will attract investment and migration from the surrounding hinterlands.
The objective of focusing assistance geographically, as cited in the Food Security Strategy, is
to develop sufficient impact in a limited geographic region to increase the incomes of
currently food insecure people, primarily through the creation of jobs.

Port-au-Prince has reached its current limits of growth, infrastructure, and potential for
providing opportunities for newly arrived migrants to increase their incomes. Yet, the
Capital, more than twenty times larger than Haiti's second city, continues to receive more
than 60,000 migrants annually, due to the lack of opportunity in other geographic regions.
Increasing opportunities in rural areas to slow this migration is not an option since, as the


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 36









Food Security Strategy describes, rural areas must reduce, not maintain, population pressure,
particularly on fragile hillsides. The geographic distribution of economic growth across
several urban centers will reduce the population pressures on Port au Prince while developing
other centers of economic opportunity.

The HPZ approach will occur within the context of other activities, such as micro-credit,
watershed development, health and education retaining a national focus. The HPZ approach
will seek to leverage USAID activities, those of other donors, and those of the private sector
to produce a visible impact on economic growth in a limited geographic region. For
example, in the city of Jacmel, donors (including USAID) are already working with a
coalition of public and private sector actors to begin preparing the city as a functioning
tourism center within two years.

Within the HPZs, the primary objective of USAID assistance will be on activities that result
in sustainable and significant opportunities for poor rural and urban households to increase
their income generation prospects. Emphasis will be placed on working with the
stakeholders in the HPZs to identify activities that: 1) will achieve rapid results; 2) are
community based; 3) have synergetic relationships with the activities of other donors; 4)
expand the private sector; and 5) strengthen the economic linkages between the secondary
cities and their rural hinterlands.

These HPZs should show a quick economic and environmental turn-around through the right
policies, constructive private-public partnerships, and attractive investment opportunities. In
the near term there are already market opportunities through small-scale operations not
requiring major investments which could provide income opportunities directly for low-
income people. Key among these are: small-scale agriculture and agribusiness; handicrafts
and small-scale manufacturing; and certain segments of tourism such as the servicing of
cruise ship destinations and auberge tourism based on the Haitian diaspora.

A critical challenge in the development of HPZs is the poor level of infrastructure
development. The private provision of public infrastructure and services presents a solution
to this problem and is currently under discussion in several municipalities. The poor level
of institutional development in many municipalities makes the preparation of the necessary
terms of reference, much less the regulatory framework, completely out of reach. To
overcome this constraint, USAID will develop a new activity, the Municipal Development
Fund (MDF). The MDF will draw on regional and. sub-regional experiences to support local
infrastructure development, facilitate investments, and encourage private sector solutions to
public sector challenges. More importantly, the MDF will foster cooperation between the
public and private sectors in Haiti to reduce the current high level of mutual suspicion, and
change attitudes about the appropriate role of the private sector. The MDF will be
developed in concert with the Democracy Program's Local Government initiatives. With
regard to urban environmental issues, the HPZ element will support community-run up-
grading programs similar to that of Cite Soleil in Port-au-Prince that provide potable water
and sanitation services.


VSAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 37








The first two HPZs in which USAID will work are Jacmel and Cap-Haitian. There are
several reasons for selecting the two zones. First, both secondary cities have strong historic
linkages with their rural hinterlands and at one time served as important ports for the export
of locally produced agricultural commodities, in particular coffee. Moreover, as both zones
are highly suited for coffee production, USAID could continue its successful coffee
revitalization efforts in the rural areas of both zones.

A second important factor influencing the selection of these two HPZs, is that both towns
have port facilities that are being rehabilitated by other donors and will attract cruise liner
tourists. Visits by cruise liners are already planned for Jacmel, beginning in 1999-2000. As
both HPZs have a high potential for tourism, the re-introduction of cruise ship tourism would
be the first step in reviving this segment of the local economies and generating significant
additional income opportunities. Both HPZs also possess a significant handicraft industry
and many skilled artisans which, with technical assistance and credit, will greatly profit from
the revival of the tourist industry.

The significance of a High Potential Zone approach to development of the informal sector
lies in the opportunity to maximize the mutually reinforcing nature of the different activities.
For example, tourism and handicrafts are clearly mutually reinforcing. Agribusiness and
tourism also will be mutually beneficial, as backward linkages between the tourism and
agriculture sectors in the Dominican republic clearly illustrate. As has been demonstrated in
other countries (e.g. East Caribbean Islands), the tourism sector will be the stakeholder most
keenly aware of the costs incurred from a degrading environment.

Capacity building programs for the tourism sector in both HPZs will be a useful tool, both
for preparing the inhabitants for the arrival of tourists, and gaining community consensus for
larger issues. Much of community education and consensus building will be carried out in
cooperation with the civil society component of the Mission's democracy and governance
program.

A significant benefit of this approach will be to give practical content to a range of
decentralization initiatives, while providing local authorities access to foreign resources, thus
breaking the monopoly enjoyed by the central government on the latter. The initial HPZs
will serve as training grounds for future replication of economic and political decentralization
approach. They will be carried out jointly with local governments Full-scale implementation
of the HPZ approach will only be undertaken if the high budget option is secured.

Jacmel and Cap-Haitian both have a proven, local entrepreneurial class with strong
attachments to their region. Their entrepreneurial spirit will facilitate USAID's efforts to
expand the role of the private sector in the local community and to generate new
opportunities to increase incomes. Moreover, in both communities, there exists a good
dialogue between the public and private sectors which is based on a history of working
together to achieve mutually desired ends.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2(X)4 Page 38


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 38










Capacity building will be an important activity for the HPZ strategy. Skills or business
training are required to allow the population to secure opportunities to increase incomes. In
the rural areas, technology transfer of improved farming techniques, seeds and crop types
may also mandate skills training for the farmers as well as extension agents. The HPZ
element will directly support initiatives aimed at improving energy supplies and use.
Similarly, the Mission's democracy and governance program might be able to concentrate a
greater amount of effort on training local officials within the HPZ, both in terms of
improving the capacity of these officials to manage local services and to promoting public-
private partnerships and community participation in development activities.

The high potential zone approach is an agriculture and' rural development strategy. The low
level of demand from urban areas, poor linkages between urban and rural centers, and poor
infrastructure, contribute to the low productivity of adjacent rural economies. Cities like
Jacmel will once again be effective engines of growth for their regions through the increased
demand for agricultural products which are the inevitable results of increased economic
dynamism. Concurrently, robust economic growth in cities like Jacmel will provide the
capacity to absorb the inevitable and necessary migration from rural to urban areas.

Illustrative Activities include:

- Form Municipal Development Fund supporting market driven solutions to public sector
issues: energy, potable water, solid waste collection, and community management of
infrastructure
- Enhance investments in the rehabilitation of secondary roads linking secondary cities to
areas of great tourist and agricultural potential
- Support pilot efforts in decentralization of authorities and revenue-generation by local
governments
- Build on the work of other SO teams to develop community-based projects, civil society
capacities and public-private partnerships
- Form public-private partnerships for municipal development plans and other measures
critical to long-term development


7. Expected Results and Impact:

Sustainable Increased Income For The Poor: Strategic. Objective level Indicators and Targets
(end of year 2003)

- Percent change in private investment
2001- 7% 2002- 9% 2003- 10% 2004- 10%

- Percent increase income for customers
Target: 1999-10% 2000-10% 2001-10% 2002-10% 2003-10% 2004- 10%


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 39


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 39









IR 1: Increased Environmentally Sustainable Agricultural productivity (assumption PLUS
$6 million,coffee $2 million $1.5 million for animal/water program and $3 million
Title III)

- Percent Increase in Average Real Farm Income in Selected Areas:
Target: 1999- 5% 2000- 7% 2001- 10% 2002- 10% 2003- 10% 2004- 10%

- # of Customers Baseline: 1998-160 (thousands)
Target 1999- 175 2000- 180 2001- 190 2002- 210 2003- 225 2004- 2253

IR 2: Small and Micro Entrepreneurs Economically Empowered (assumption $7.5 mil-
lion/year and $3 million Title III)

- Percent increase in earnings4 of customers of the USAID small and microentrepreneur
program.
Women: 1999 25, 2000 25, 2001-25, 2002-25, 2003-25, 2004-25
Men: 1999 25, 2000 25, 2001-25, 2002-25, 2003-25, 2004-25

- Percent Increase in number of customers of USAID small and microentrepreneur program
(1998-5000 customers)
Women: 1999 25, 2000 25, 2001-25, 2002-25, 2003-25, 2004-25
Men: 1999 25, 2000 25, 2001-25, 2002-25, 2003-25, 2004-25

IR 3: Investment Climate Improved (assumption $3.5 million)

- Composite Index on Domestic and International Investment Climate
Target: TBD

IR 4: Strengthened zones of high potential economic growth (assumption $20 million/year)

- Number of customers Benefitting from New and Improved Municipal Services: Baseline
1999-0;
Target: 2000-10,000, 2001-20,000, 2002-40,000, 2003-80,000, 2004-160,000

- Number of community initiatives supported by Municipal Development Fund
Target: 2000-6, 2001-12, 2002-32, 2003-48, 2004-48





-The period 2003-2004 will be used to consolidate the use of technology introduced in prior years.

'Since income is a difficult statistic to ascertain among micro-entrepreneurs, earnings deduciblee from sales
volume) is used as a proxy. The underlying assumption is that micro-entrepreneurs will not continue to produce
at higher volumes if it results in reduced net income.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 40








SO: SUSTAINABLE INCREASED INCOME FOR THE POOR
Indicators for the SO:- Percent change in private investment.
Percent Increase Income for customers.


SUSTAINABLE INCREASED INCOME FOR THE POOR


INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
III~"' I


INTERMEDIATE RESULTS INDI


IR1: Increased Enviro
Sustanable Agricultur


R 2: Small and Micro
Entrepreneurs Econo
Empowered



iii


- % Increase In average real farm % Increase In earnings of custo
selected areas. USAID small and mlcro-ntrepren
program.
-No. of customers.
% Increase In number of custom
USAID small and micro-entrepren
program.


IR 3: Investment Climat IR 3: Strengthened Zon
Potential Economic Gr






- Composite Index on domestic an No. of customers benefiting from
International Investment climate. Improved municipal services.
-No. of community Initiatives sup
Municipal Development Fund (200


"u:-pcpspub\123data\sp-silp.wk4"


REDUCED POVERTY
IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


__ _


_


MISSION
GOAL







STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE









B. Environmental Degradation Slowed


1. The Strategic Objective: Environmental Degradation Slowed.

Our Strategic Objective is to slow the disastrous pace of environmental degrada-
tion in Haiti. Desperate poverty and lack of alternatives forces Haiti's rural poor to ravage
the land for their immediate survival needs; the result is a depleted natural resource base that
cannot, in fact, sustain the existing rural population. Many migrate to city slums.
Uneducated and malnourished, neither the rural nor the urban poor have the capacity to
improve their economic and political prospects, feed their children, or control the size of
their families. Thus, population explosion raises the specter of escalating pressure on the
exhausted land and ill-equipped cities. With 70 percent of the Haitian population relying
almost entirely on the natural resource base for income, direct and institutional measures are
needed to secure what remains of the country's environmental potential.

USAID's strategic approach will build on local initiatives and a new political
openness that permits community groups to solve their problems. USAID's environmental
team will: nurture community-based endeavors to sustainably manage natural resources,
nurture advocacy for improved policies, and undertake economically viable productive
enterprises. The proposed program will also foster improvement in the public policies and
institutions that could promote conservation and rational exploitation of natural resources.
Finally, USAID's agriculture, micro-enterprise (Sustainable Increased Income for the Poor
SO), and energy activities will offer alternative sources for the food, income and energy that
the poor currently acquire by continued unsustainable mining of their already depleted natural
resource base.

2. Problem Analysis

The Country

This tropical country is increasingly losing its production potential and beginning a
process of desertification. Only 1.5 percent of Haiti's natural forest remains and 25 of its 30
watersheds are denuded. This deforestation of Haiti's mountainous countryside has resulted
in extensive soil erosion washing away approximately 15,000 acres of top soil each year.
This imposes intolerable limits on the agricultural and economic possibilities for the 70
percent of Haiti's population for whom agriculture provides a major source of income.
Erosion also damages other productive infrastructure such as dams, irrigation systems and
roads and the coastal marine ecosystems.

Haiti has a rural population of 5.6 million people of whom almost 4.5 million live below
the poverty line (US $220 per capital income per year) and over three million live below the
indigence level of US$160 per capital per year (for 1995). Haiti is rural poor and small-scale
landowners, with farm size averaging between 1 to 1.5 hectares. However, in order to attain
food sufficiency, that same rural household would have to have 2.5 hectares under
cultivation. Traditional farming practices as they exist in Haiti today cannot sustain the


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 42









growing rural population, given the unavailability of additional agricultural land. In some of
the drier areas, charcoal production is the primary source of income for the farmers. A
survey performed by CARE, ADRA, and CRS, of their food aid recipients, indicated rural
households on average derive only about 14 percent of their income from agriculture. In
contrast, 36 percent of income came from non-agricultural wages and 16 percent, from
charcoal and wood sales. Although we would expect agriculture to account for a higher
percentage of income in more productive areas, these facts make it painfully clear that it is
not agriculture but the rapidly disappearing forest that is the primary source of rural income
in drier areas and among the poorest of the poor. Agriculture also does not provide food
security to those who live on the land. The same survey indicates, only 28 percent of a rural
household's food is self-produced and an enormous 67 percent of that household's
expenditures are for food.

The Cities

Haiti has the most pronounced urban primacy in the hemisphere, with Port-au-Prince
(with a population of two million) exceeding the size of the second largest city by almost
twenty times. Unable to support themselves on the land, the rural population migrates to the
urban areas. Port-au-Prince has reached its limit of growth in the near term. Already inade-
quate waste and sewage disposal threatens health, pollutes aquifers and destroys coastal
resources. Secondary cities are experiencing similar problems on a smaller scale.

At current growth rates, Haiti's urban population (approximately 30 percent) will grow
from the present 2.2 million to 9.4 million by 2020. Only 37 percent and 41 percent of
people in P-au-P and secondary cities, respectively, have access to potable water and only 30
percent of the urban population has access to sanitation such as latrines or toilets. Improperly
disposed urban sanitary waste contributes to 75 percent of infant mortality, 50 percent of
children's deaths, and 20 percent of all deaths.

The Constraints

Concerted action to halt environmental degradation is constrained by 1) unsustainable
agricultural practices (see Sustainable Increased Income for the Poor SO for description) 2)
reliance on wood-based energy; 3) dysfunctional policy and institutional framework; and 4)
lack of community organizations to manage natural resources.

a. Reliance on Wood-Based Energy. In the energy sector, the growing gap between
fuel wood supply and demand has already precipitated wide-spread environmental
degradation. Two aspects of energy production must be resolved to reduce the reliance on
wood-based energy: 1) The demand for wood and charcoal based fuels must be reduced to a
sustainable level (equal to the rate of tree production dedicated for this use) and 2) electric
energy production and management must be improved.

The demand for energy for Haitian households and commercial enterprises is met by
cutting of equivalents 30 million trees per year while Haitians plant only 10 million trees per


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 43








year; thus use outstrips supply by a factor of three. Without a quick intervention to
decrease wood energy consumption, both accelerated environmental degradation and an
energy crisis will occur in Haiti. To replace fuel wood, alternative energy sources (wind,
solar, hydro, kerosene, LPG, electric) are needed. Presently these alternatives are not
widely available.
Electric energy currently only provides approximately 2 percent of the country's energy
requirements. Electricity production in secondary cities and Port-au-Prince has been
managed by the state-operated electric utility (hydro-electric and diesel turbines). The
Haitian electricity system is characterized by high technical and non-technical (theft and poor
billing and collection) losses and related poor financial performance, poor reliability and
insufficient maintenance, inadequate generation and lack of funds for expansion. Even with
donor interest and funding, given institutional and political constraints, it is expected that
improvements will be very difficult.

b. Dysfunctional Policy and Institutional Framework. The failure of local and national
institutions in Haiti to manage productive natural resources and infrastructure as well as to
provide public goods is a significant constraint (reference: Food Security Strategy and the
extensive customer survey of selected watersheds). Lack of resources and administrative
capability further weakens the GOH structure that is in place.

The Ministry of Environment, created by Presidential decree in 1995, does not have an
organic law which legitimizes its mandate and authorizes long-term staff. Instead the
Ministry of Agriculture retains the legal mandate to protect national resources.
Responsibility for solid waste collection continues to be with the Ministry of Public Works
and the mayors' offices. The responsibility for water within the GOH is also divided
between several Ministries. The development of a comprehensive policy for water manage-
ment is being funded by the IDB. Without clear institutional responsibilities, qualified and
dedicated personnel, sufficient resources or a comprehensive governmental policy or plan,
Haiti's laws protecting the environment cannot be enforced.

c. Lack of Community Organization and Management. A history of elitism,
exploitation, dictatorship, state predation and crony capitalism has left Haiti with weak local
institutions to manage productive natural resources and infrastructure. Whereas local
organizations have emerged naturally in other countries as rational responses to community
needs, real community organizations were systematically repressed in Haiti over the last forty
years. Although the recent political opening has finally provided the opportunity for the
development of grassroots organizations, nascent Haitian community groups lack the legal
status, organizational and technical know-how to undertake projects and to engage in
effective advocacy. Since the GOH, without significant structural improvement, cannot
realistically be expected to successfully manage and maintain roads, irrigation canals, and
water systems, community participation in their management is essential.

This constraint crosses all sectors, but it is particularly important in environmental issues
because the on-the-ground problems demand community solutions. For environmental
initiatives, a major challenge is to generate funds for managing any given system. For


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 44









instance, the technical solutions are readily available for collecting and disposing of solid and
sanitary waste. However, there is no mechanism in place to collect sufficient revenue to
sustainably finance and manage an improved system. A USAID funded report identified that
a user tax on water or electricity is the most promising way to collect revenues for solid
waste collection. Yet, these utilities are currently having difficulties generating sufficient
revenues to cover their own operating costs.

Program Accomplishments to Date

-- USAID has had great success in producing models of sustainable agriculture and
community cooperation. In addition to increasing incomes in our hillside programs (also see
Sustainably Increased Income for the Poor SO), over 130,000 PLUS farmers and 20,000
coffee farmers have planted multipurpose and coffee trees and begun using sound agricultural
practices which slow environmental degradation. These practices not only slow soil erosion
and increase humidity retention, they also foster community action. Many participating
farmers or peasant extensionists have been elected to local government positions from which
they can influence community action. A $21.5 million IBRD project currently funds the
replication of USAID's models.

-- Urban environmental interventions have also produced replicable models. In close
collaboration with local public utilities and in tandem with a UNDP project, a water project
has been completed in Cit6 Soleil, perhaps the worst slum in the Western world with a
population of 200,000 people in two square kilometers and one of the most unstable areas of
Haiti. Clean water is now sold to 175,000 people through 76 community operated fountains.
The proceeds are used to fund the collection of solid waste which clogs canals and leads to
the flooding of sanitary waste into people's homes.

-- On the policy front, USAID's team has secured ministerial support for development of
the National Environmental Action Plan neapP). The NEAP, even while in the stages of
negotiation, has already helped mobilize 93 communes to draft their first environmental plans
ever; more than 660 grass-root NGOs have also collaborated in this nation-wide effort to
identify viable solutions to Haiti's pressing ecological challenges.

3. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships

The key critical assumptions are:

Other donors on-going programs continued and their funding maintained and dispersed
as projected over the 5 year period.

Political conditions, public lack of confidence, and/or insecurity do not produce
disruptive events that severely effect our customers and partners.

Accomplishment of the environmental SO depends on achievement of results by the rest
of the USAID's SOs. Other Strategic Objectives will improve the level of human capital,


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 45








increase incomes, address the population problem, and improve governance. The More
Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained SO will supply expertise to organize
civil society; the Achieve Desired Family Size SO will address the population issue so
critical to halting environmental degradation; and the Sustainably Increased Income for the
Poor SO will supply the financial incentives that make it possible for the rural poor to
practice environmentally sustainable natural resource management.

Causal Relationships

To achieve the SO and overcome the constraints identified in the problem analysis
section, two intermediate results have been identified that are required to achieve the SO:
IR1-Sustainable Energy Options Used and IR2-Civil Society and Government Implementing
Environmental Solutions (see Results Framework). The illustrative approaches section
provides more details about the types of interventions envisioned for each intermediate result.

In order to concentrate results and provide visible models of success, environmental
interventions will target critical watersheds in rural areas and in urban areas, the high
potential zones.

4. Commitment and Capacity of Development Partners

Improving the environmental sector is a development objective of several multilateral,
bilateral, and PVO organizations active in Haiti. These organizations have been working
closely together in collaboration with the government to develop complementary strategies.

In the environmental sector, UNDP, IBRD, and Canadian Government are our
partners in the development of the NEAP and capacity building for the Ministry of Environ-
ment. The IBRD has initiated the Environment and Rural Poverty Program involving the
management of National Parks including Park Macaya, and a Communal Development Fund.
The IDB, UNDP, IBRD, and Canadians have also planned substantial investments in the
water sector. The IDB, IBRD, EU, and Canadians are planning substantial investments in
the energy sector. The Canadians, French, and Dutch are also interested in the household
fuel segment of energy. Additionally, significant interventions are planned by donors for
decentralization and local governments.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 46


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 46











Table 4. MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CONTRIBUTIONS ($ Millions)


Sectors IBRD IDB EU Canada UNDP
Environment 158 10.10
NEAP 0.42 Yes Yes
Parks 21.5
Institution Building
Water Yes 4.8
Haiti/Dom. Republic Cross 20 148 10-25 18.9 3.30
border Yes Yes
Energy 24.0 39.9 21.4 19.70
Household energy 0.5
Alternate energy
Power generation 39.9 19.2
Decentralization/ 25-30 33.81 56.9 39.01
Local Government

USAID's direct partner under the new environmental program, Agriculturally Sustain-
able Systems and Environmental Transformation (ASSET), is Winrock. Baseline perfor-
mance results will not be available until 1998 from the Winrock contract. CARE and Pan-
American Development Foundation (PADF) have been involved in promoting dissemination
of improved stoves on a small scale.

5. Sustainability

Haiti's social and economic development cannot be sustained without addressing
continued environmental degradation of the rural and urban areas. This SO concentrates on
sustainability by emphasizing the building of both local and national institutions (IR2) that
will continue addressing critical environment problems with decreasing internationally
managed assistance. The proposed multi-donor supported Haitian Environmental Foundation
(HEF) is an example of an institution that will use Haitian solutions to address environmental
problems through the most promising locally active organizations. The program on energy
substitution (IR1) will arrest the environmental problems constraining economic growth.
Both IRs emphasize improved local management of institutions, a determining element to
ensure sustainable management of all investments. Equally important, this SO will work
closely with Sustainably Increased Income for the Poor SO because without increased
incomes, any environmental effort is doomed.

Sustainability is also supported by concentrating on:

-environmentally-friendly technologies, economic activities and policies


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 47








- the provision of a framework to improve service delivery in the targeted sectors for
continuation beyond USAID funding time frame

- increasing awareness and promoting discussions of and support for environmental issues
leading to community action

- priority community-requested activities and market-driven, income producing activities

- use of participatory approach and public-private partnerships

6. Illustrative Approaches

Through synergies with other SOs, primarily the Sustainably Increased Income for the
Poor, and other donors, USAID's efforts will be focused on addressing community and
national concerns on energy and environmental degradation. Activities for these SOs will be
selected in terms of their capacity to deliver the desired results following the principles which
guide our approach (e.g., participation, market-driven, reinforcing the democratic process,
environmentally friendly, fostering private solutions to public challenges, and sustainability).
These activities will be grouped into two IRs.

IR 1: Sustainable Energy Options Used

This IR will resolve the constraints identified in the energy sector and will focus on two
major themes.

a. More Rational Selection and Efficient Use and Production of Fuel Sources.
USAID will coordinate with other donors to support priorities identified at a Household
Energy Conference sponsored by the IBRD. These recommended interventions will produce
a quick impact in reducing consumption of charcoal and wood fuels. Four of the priority
interventions concentrate on promoting improved charcoal stoves and charcoal or wood
substitution stoves for both households and businesses.

Promotion of improved stoves will require a sustained marketing program involving a
variety of media and demonstrations to various groups to create demand. The creation of
demand must be carefully tied to production to ensure consumer demands can be met.
Initially 300 to 400 artisans will be trained. As demand grows, production through small-
scale enterprises will produce greater quantities and better quality stoves. Credit for stove
promotion programs will be coordinated with financial elements of the Sustainably Increased
Income for the Poor SO. The four most promising interventions in the household and
industrial energy sector are the promotion of improved charcoal, kerosene and LPG stoves
and improved energy technologies for industries.

1) Efficient Charcoal Stoves. Since charcoal is the traditional household fuel, with little
training, the Haitian poor could adopt the improved charcoal stoves. This initiative would
promote 130,000 improved charcoal stoves over 4 years to 65,000 households and 13,000


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 48










stoves to small-enterprises while creating sustainable commercial stove production and sales
systems.

2) Kerosene Stoves. Kerosene cooking offers economic advantages over both LPG and
charcoal. Kerosene can be more readily transported outside of urban centers into areas
unreachable by LPG. CARE household trials identified a potentially large market for
"butterfly kerosene" stoves (not readily available in Haiti but that could be promoted).
Improved efficiency from kerosene stoves requires pressurized improvements and/or fuel
reformulation to resolve lighting problems. A partnership with petroleum companies is
desirable for this type of technical modification. By promoting the stoves, it is projected that
30,000 units will be sold.

3) LPG Stoves. LPG, butane, is the preferred substitution option with increased
household incomes and access to the fuel due to its convenience, cleanliness, and modem
appeal. Efforts were made in 1989-92 to promote the use of LPG stoves. About 1 in 4
urban homes in Port-au-Prince purchased the stove at subsidized prices. One gas company
has expressed interest in decentralized small-scale LPG distribution in small-quantity. So, an
opportunity exists to promote the use of LPG to about 60,000 current owners of LPG stoves
potentially doubling LPG consumption.

4)Improved Industrial Technologies. Another priority intervention will be assisting
businesses currently purchasing large supplies of wood for cooking, baking, distilling, and
heating, for distilleries, restaurants, and dry cleaners to purchase equipment using alternate
fuels such as kerosene. Industrial use of wood fuel is actually prohibited by a Presidential
Decree dated July 7, 1987, but not currently enforced. Since operating costs are often less
for alternate fuels to wood, businesses have a strong financial incentive to use them. USAID
will assist businesses identify more appropriate technologies and obtain credit for their
purchase.

b. Improved Sustainable Power Availability. Power availability is critical to create
alternative energy sources for creating opportunities to increase incomes, facilitating small-
business growth, agro-processing and tourism, among other areas. The goal of the multi-
donor efforts in this sector is improved power supply reliability, increased financial viability
of electrical systems, decreased non-technical losses (theft), and decreased unmet demand.
USAID's priority will be to work with community groups to improve the management of
either existing systems or those being constructed or repaired.. In close collaboration with
other elements in this strategy (i.e. HPZs, policy), this IR will encourage private solutions to
energy constraints.

Once efforts are underway to improve major power supply systems, USAID will begin to
develop strategies for increasing the availability of electricity in cities and smaller
communities using reasonably priced yet sustainable and less environmentally damaging fuels
and technology. Specifically, USAID will promote ways to increase the capital (e.g. the
Municipal Development Fund) and technology available for system expansion from non-
government sources and increased private sector involvement in planning, management and


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 49








operation of power sector. Emphasis will be on developing and analyzing approaches (build,
own transfer (BOT) to local investors, private power sale to the national utility, municipal
ownership, etc.), for meeting the needs of those not receiving electricity from the current
system. The first step will be to develop objective guidelines for prioritization of new supply
and non-distorting means to channel public assistance and credit (e.g. through capital
contributions as opposed to operating subsidies). In close collaboration with the HPZ
element and its Municipal Development Fund, oversight schemes will be promoted to prevent
the abuses which could arise from localized monopoly power.

In addition, our program will augment the use of environmentally sound and financially
viable small-power supply through renewable energy production (phased-in as restructuring
proceeds and creates a conducive policy and financial structure). This component will
include project identification, prefeasibility study financing, facilitate access to credit (e.g.
Environmental Enterprises), and assistance in addressing policy and institution constraints.
Emphasis will be on such options as small-hydro, sustainable biomass, wind, and solar (as
appropriate on a household basis). Other examples include activities with potential for
income generation, such as biomass power supply coupled with agricultural processing and
production of cattle feed.

IR 2: Civil Society and Government Implementing Environmental Solutions

This result will be achieved at the national level and in close collaboration with other
donors. Interventions will seek to strengthen government institutions as well as quickly
capitalize on the opportunity to reinforce community participation in the solution of environ-
mental and energy problems. Jointly with the More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic
Governance Attained SO's civil society activities, community organizations and civil society
groups will be trained and empowered with technical and financial support. The
development, organization, and mobilization of grass-root community groups will allow
initiation of community solutions to problems beyond individual capacity and interests (e.g.,
the farm, the microenterprise). Specific activities contributing to this IR are described
below:

a. Policy and Institutions Protect the Environment. Three main activities support the
development of policy and institution building.

1) Strengthened Environmental Framework. USAID will build the capacity of key
government agencies (i.e., the Ministries of Environment, Mines and Energy) and emerging
civil society groups to resolve the constraints previously identified. Continued administrative
and technical support is envisioned for the Ministry of Environment to develop and imple-
ment a framework for the environment. Two actions are critical: 1) a clear organic law
specifying which government organizations have responsibility for the protection of the
environment; and 2) the development and implementation of the NEAP. The NEAP will
help prioritize interventions for both donors and the GOH in sectors that effect the environ-
ment. It is important that environmental data also be collected as part of the Environmental
and Agricultural Information System (Sustainably Increased Income for the Poor SO).


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 50









The local groups supported include: producer associations, artisan groups, municipal
developments authorities, tourism promotion cells, community based environmental action
groups, water user associations, environmental and financial local NGOs, caisses populaires.

Equally important and reinforced by results in the More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic
Governance Attained SO's program, coalitions of environmental organizations will be
fostered to build a sustainable and indigenous demand for environmental protection.

Support to both government and local groups will build momentum through increasing the
capacity of the government to supply and increasing the demand for improved services from
local organizations for the establishment of the necessary policy, administrative, and institu-
tional setting to arrest environmental degradation.

In the energy sector, a unified concerted effort with major donors will promote timely
and effective electricity sector policy reforms leading to restructuring of EDH. Another
major impediment to electric sector restructuring will be increasing US and other investor
confidence, stimulating local investment and involvement, increasing transparency, and
potentially initial direct risk mitigation. USAID's role will be to lower the barriers to entry
for investors, as well as to increase the probability of successful investments.

2) Environmental Awareness Campaign. A key part of this process, is the imple-
mentation of an environmental awareness campaign. This campaign will raise general
awareness and understanding of key environmental issues, motivate and inspire change for
the sector, and ensure the widespread discussion of policies before they are formally
proposed to the government. In addition, the introduction of environmental educational
materials into the school system will be promoted. The Sustainable Increased Income for the
Poor SO's Center for Applied Research and the unit assisting the Haitian Parliament will also
by used to treat environmental issues and legislation.

3) Haitian Environmental Foundation (HEF). One of the highlights of the planned efforts
in institution building will be the creation of a Haitian Environmental Foundation. It is
necessary to have a sustainable mechanism in place, operated by Haitians, that encourages
the strengthening of local and national governmental and non-governmental institutions to
produce the type of results that in the past only international NGOS were able to receive
funding to produce. Producing results will still be important, but the Foundation will have
the flexibility to support the work of international NGOs, -local NGOS, and the GOH as well
as to involve Haitians, particularly well educated ones, in solutions to the environmental
crisis that particularly effects the poor (see illustrative approaches for more detail about the
types of activities that could be financed). The donor community, the GOH and leading
private sector groups have already expressed interest in the HEF. Use of the HEF for
implementing the proposed IBRD program in bio-diversity has already received a favorable
response from the IBRD.

The HEF, can support activities that:
Advocate for change through environmental social marketing and educational material


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 51








Coordinate analysis and research on environmental issues
Finance local level activities such as:
agricultural initiatives aimed at improving agro-ecological conditions
environmental interventions

The important precepts that will be promoted through the Foundation include: public-
private collaboration; conflict resolution (including agreement by the communities on land
management issues and partnerships between hillside and down-slope farmers); sustainability,
accountability and ability to monitor results; and the ability to identify/attract local and
international funding.

b. Civil Society Organizations Implementing Environmental Solutions. Two main
activities involve civil society implementation of environmental initiatives.

1) Community Action on Critical Watersheds. This set of activities will concentrate on
broad-based natural resource management (NRM) focusing on improved management of
natural resources, productive infrastructure, and water including interventions identified in
commune level NRM plans and the NEAP.
The agricultural extension system approach is very effective but has not been implemented
nationwide due to the cost. It is essential to create a community-driven model that is more
cost effective, sustainable, and replicable to enable citizens to rehabilitate degraded lands and
increase their sustainable productive capacity throughout the country. This process will be
supportive of USAID's democracy and civil society programs emphasizing decentralization
and local initiative. USAID will provide training, TA, and financial resources for
community groups in activities such as: nursery and tree management, soil conservation,
water management/sanitation as well as assistance in proposal preparation and the financial
management of grants. The grants will be for implementing and learning how to manage
community-generated ideas that have potential to be sustainable. Assistance will also be
provided for the development and implementation of NRM plans.

The first USAID pilot using the community approach will be in Rivibres Grise and
Blanche subwatersheds. These watersheds are the recharge zones for the aquifer used for
potable water in Port-au-Prince and the source of significant destruction from floods.
Another important watershed is the Artibonite that encompasses both Haiti and the Domini-
can Republic. The targeted critical watersheds will be determined in the work plan review
(Winrock) through a consultative process that includes the selection of objective criteria, the
result of NEAP priority interventions, discussions with the GOH, and synergistic potential
with other donors and other USAID activities.

2) Improved Resource Management of Urban Areas. Substantial investments are planned
by IDB and UNDP to support improvements in water distribution. Investments in larger
scale wastewater treatment and solid waste collection will not be sustainable without
identifying a source of funding for operating costs and strengthening the regulatory
framework and institutional capacity for environmental issues (see IR1). With the GOH's
inability to enforce environmental regulations, improvements in waste management is


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 52









voluntary. Therefore, urban environmental activities will focus NEAP priority actions and
improved community management of water and solid and sanitary waste of existing systems,
systems financed by other donors or through USAID's NEAP, HEF, or HPZ IR.

Activities will continue to be promoted to improve sanitation services and community
resource management through the propagation of successful models, such as the pilot water
management activity developed in Cite Soleil. Activities will emphasize financially
sustainability, community-based urban sanitation, behavior modification, low cost tech-
nologies, and efforts that involve NGOs and community groups into partnerships with local
government in essential urban services.

8. Expected Results and Impact:

SO: Environmental Degradation Slowed

The Strategic Objective level Indicators and Targets are:

Population benefitting from improved environmental practices in solid waste disposal,
soil and water conservation, energy efficiency, and sylviculture (million): Baseline 1997:
0.9; Target: 1999 -1, 2000-1.3, 2001-1.8, 2002-2.2, 2003-2.6, 2004--3

IR 1: *Sustainable Energy Options Used

** Increased number of households and businesses using new or improved environmental-
ly sound energy sources (cumulative number): Baseline 1999-TBD; Target:1999-2500,
2000-45,500, 2001-96,000, 2002-120,000, 2003- 145,000, 2004-160,000

- Improved power supplies in secondary cities (cumulative number) assisted by USAID
program: Target: 1999-0, 2000-1, 2001-2, 2002-3, 2003-4

- ***Reduction in wood/charcoal consumption (percent): Baseline 1999; Target: 1999-2%,
2000-5 %, 2001-10%, 2002-15%, 2003-20%, equivalent to 280,000 tons of wood saved

Note: *The funding for energy programs will end in 2003. However, increases in 2004 will
still continue due to private businesses continued interest.

**The target for 2003, the year which funding ends for energy programs, includes improved
charcoal stoves in 51,000 households, kerosene in 14,000 households, LPG in 50,000 house-
holds, improved technologies in 5,000 businesses and 25,000 households impacted by
improved power sector generation. If other donors commit to funding a part of the house-
hold energy sector, USAID will be able to focus more on the power sector interventions
including rural electrification using alternative technologies (solar, photovoltaics).


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 53


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 53








***The percentage charcoal/wood reduced will be determined from savings generated by
stove sales compared to a base of the estimated wood/charcoal consumption for the year 1999
increased by 5 percent each year for income, urbanization, and population growth.

IR 2: Civil Society and Government Implementing Environmental Solutions

- Increase in the population aware of environmental issues and solutions (percent): Baseline
1998-TBD; Target: 1999-5%, 2000-10, 2001-20%, 2002-40%, 2003-50%, 2004-60%


- *Population (1000s) using improved environmental practices in solid waste disposal, soil
and water conservation, energy efficiency, and silviculture: Baseline 1997: 150; Target:
1999-175, 2000-230, 2001-320, 2002-375, 2003-430, 2004-500

- ***Increase in hectares of land protected through community programs (number): Base-
line 1997- 7,800 hectares; Target: 1999-12,400, 2000-14,850, 2001-17,400, 2002-19900,
2003-22,420, 2004-25,000

Note *All of these results include the anticipated impact of HEF activities (IR1). Assumes
that HEF will require a community NRM plan as a prerequisite for funding.

** When more information becomes available, USAID would like to measure increased
biomass as one of the indicators. This number is based on PADF PLUS baseline and an
additional 2,350 hectares/year from PADF PLUS.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan El' 1999-2(K)4 Page 54


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 54









SO: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION SLOWED

Indicators for the SO:- Population benefiting from improved environmental practices in solid waste disposal, soil and water conservation, energy efficiency, and sylviculture.


MISSION
GOAL









STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE






INTERMEDIATE RESULTS










INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
INDICATORS


IR 2: Civil Society and Gove
Implementing Environmental
Solutions






- Increase % In the population aware of
environmental issues and solutions.
- Population (1000s) using Improved environ
practices In solid waste disposal, soil and we
conservation,
energy efficiency, and sylviculture.
- Increase In No. of hectares of land protected
through community programs.


"u:pcpspub\123data\p-env.wk4"


REDUCED POVERTY
IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


- Increased No. of households and buslnesse
or Improved environmentally sound energy a
- Improved power supplies In secondary clte
USAID program.
* Reduction In woodlcharcoal consumption.








C. Achieve Desired Family Size


1. Statement of Strategic Objective: Achieve Desired Family Size

The wording for the Strategic Objective "Achieve Desired Family Size" best
reflects USAID's extensive discussions with health sector partners, customers and
counterparts regarding .two issues of critical importance to Haiti's economic development:
the health and well-being of its children, and rapid population growth rates. Both child
survival interventions resulting in reduced infant and child mortality and morbidity, and
reproductive health services permitting women and their partners to delay or space births are
essential to achieving "desired" family size.

There is a paradox in the demographic situation prevailing in Haiti today. The
total fertility rate dropped from 6.3 in 1987 to 4.8 in 1994. The desired fertility between
1991 and 1994 was 3, strong evidence of the wish of most individuals to have a smaller
number of children. Yet the population continues to grow at a high rate of 2.3 percent
annually. This rapid population growth jeopardizes investments made for the economic and
social development of the country, further depletes an already stressed natural environment,
and hinders efforts to respond to the needs of society.

An ad hoc Haitian Task Force on Population and Reproductive Health emerged in
1997, signalling its willingness to coordinate local organizational support to address the
reproductive health needs of Haitians. The Task Force has developed a draft strategy and
budget for achieving desired family size entitled "A Call to Action", based on the priority
interventions identified at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
held in Cairo. This initiative not only indicates grassroots support for sector programs but is
a sign of the positive changes taking place in Haitian civil society.

2. Problem Analysis

Haiti's continuing rapid population growth has serious implications for its
economic well-being. At current fertility rates, Haitian women will give birth to an average
of 4.8 children during their reproductive years and the current population, estimated at 8
million, will double by the year 2027. More than half of women in union and 42 percent of
men either do not want any children now or want no more children. If all unwanted births
were avoided, the total fertility would be 3.0, nearly two children less than current fertility.
One in eight children born will not live to the age of five, the highest under-five mortality
rate in the Western Hemisphere, and one in three children is chronically malnourished.
Maternal mortality is estimated at a high 1,000 per 100,000 live births. The Ministry of
Public Health and Prevention estimates that 10 percent of Haiti's urban population is infected
with HIV and it is estimated that almost half the women of reproductive age have a current,
untreated sexually transmitted disease or infection. Yet large numbers of Haitians have no
access to Reproductive Health (RH) or Child Survival (CS) services.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan Fl' 1999-2004 Page 56


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 56









Many Haitian decision-makers still do not grasp the interrelationships between
population growth, reproductive health, deterioration of the environment, failure of the
educational system and socio-economic problems. As a result there is no national population
policy and demographic variables are not taken into account in development planning. Fully
46 percent of Haiti's population is age 15 and under; when employment is taken into
consideration, there are 2.8 dependents for each economically active adult. This age group
will be entering reproductive age over the next 15 years; thus even accelerated action to help
individuals achieve desired family size will not decrease the number of reproductive age
Haitians by the year 2012. If current trends continue, the total urban population, currently
33 percent, will increase to 55 percent by 2010, with ominous consequences for the urban
sector. At that time Port-au-Prince is expected to house 70 percent of the urban population.

According to official statistics, 60 percent of the population has access to services;
but in practice only 25 percent of the population has access to family planning services.
With respect to specific services, only eight specialized institutions concentrated mostly in the
capital city offer more than 3 modem contraceptive methods and 78 percent of health care
facilities offer no assistance for child delivery. Services offered do not respond adequately to
the behavior and health care requirements of young adults aged 12-24, who make up one
third of the population. Child Survival programs are equally inadequate: full child
immunization is only 30 percent, one in five children has received no immunizations by age
one, and only 31 percent of diarrhea cases are treated with oral rehydration solution. The
health system itself is dispersed among public, private and jointly administered agencies and
is characterized by an unequitable distribution of facilities and resources; poor availability
and management of essential drugs; and service providers with weak or limited RH and CS
skills.

Education of girls and women has a strong influence on their knowledge and use
of services. Over one-third of Haitian women age 15-49 have no education. The children of
these women are 1.7 times more likely to die before reaching the age of five than children of
mothers with a secondary education. More than one-third of adolescent girls gives birth
before reaching the age of 20; early childbearing is much more prevalent among teenagers
with no education (26 percent) than those with a secondary education (8 percent).

Similarly, women's rights and economic participation have a profound effect on
childbearing and the welfare of children. There appears to be a growing deficit of males in
nearly all age groups, probably due to emigration, and a disproportionate number of women
migrate from rural to urban areas seeking economic opportunities: in 1995 there were 125
women for every 100 men in Haitian cities. Women presently head over 40 percent of
Haitian households and in an attempt to gain economic support from men, bear children to
cement the relationship. The instability of these informal unions, particularly in the cities,
often leaves women responsible for the support of numerous children from former unions.
One in ten children under age 15 is fatherless and/or motherless and only half live in
households with both biological parents present.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 57


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 57








Women's ability to negotiate within relationships is also limited. In a 1996
survey, 29 percent of women interviewed stated they did not consent to their first sexual
experience and 70 percent reported being victims of violence. In 1980 women represented
only 10 percent of the HIV-positive population, but by 1993 made up half of this group.
Yet, while 43 percent of men who consider themselves at risk of AIDS have modified their
behavior to avoid the disease, only 23 percent of women have done so. The absence of
provisions to protect women in general and minors in particular promotes paternal
irresponsibility while increasing the social burden of women.

Program Accomplishments to Date

The USAID health sector program focuses on building a public-private partnership of
service providers linked to a national community health organizational structure. USAID
supports programs in all of Haiti's nine departments as part of a nationwide, coordinated
donor health program. Despite challenges, USAID's 22 NGO partners have succeeded in
maintaining service delivery to 2.3 million beneficiaries nationwide, and contraceptive
prevalence rates (CPR) in several program target areas are nearly double the national CPR.
A social marketing program partially financed by USAID sold 7.5 million condoms in 1997
and expanded sales of oral and injectable contraceptives. USAID will launch family planning
programs with an additional 20 NGO partners in early 1998.

Child survival and maternal health indicators in USAID-financed program areas
demonstrate substantial impact. Immunization coverage rates of 59 percent in USAID-
financed areas compare favorably to the national rate of 40 percent. Two thirds of pregnant
women in USAID-financed program areas have a provider-assisted delivery compared to the
national averages of 46 percent; 61 percent of mothers treat diarrhea with ORS, double the
national average of 31 percent; and almost one in five infants is exclusively breastfed for six
months, against a 3 percent average nationwide. Title II food aid resources have been
integrated with a full package of health interventions at participating institutions, with a 30
percent decline in chronic malnutrition within one of three Cooperating Sponsor programs.

The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), in collaboration with health sector
donors, is committed to addressing several topics of critical importance to service delivery
and management including decentralization of services and decision-making; improved
management of essential drugs, including contraceptives; Integrated Management of
Childhood Illness (IMCI); and development of a national "master plan" for planned GOH and
donor financing.

3. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships

Strong political will and leadership affirming and building national support for
demographic priorities are essential to program success.

Communities and NGOs play a central role in influencing decision-making and
policy at all levels and their participation is critical to successful interventions.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 58










Increased use of reproductive health, child survival, and HIV/AIDS prevention
services and behaviors will significantly contribute to achieving desired family size.

Improved education, economic opportunities and legal status of females are critical
factors in the reproductive health of women and their partners.

Decentralizing service delivery and decision-making to the departmental and
commune levels is the most appropriate means for addressing unmet demand.

Integrated programming of Title II food aid and health sector resources will
improve child survival; improved child health" will have a positive impact on fertility
decisions.

An enabling environment for the private sector and private-public partnerships will
result in increased availability of services and reduced public sector resource requirements.

Close coordination between the GOH, donors, the private sector and other
implementing partners is essential to national-level impact.

Renewed economic growth in Haiti will be a key factor in reducing fertility and
achieving desired family size; failure to get the economy moving will seriously restrict
options for families and women in particular.

4. Commitment and Capacity of Development Partners

Numerous bilateral and multilateral donors and NGOs actively support USAID's
health sector priorities in Haiti. USAID is the principal donor in family planning,
HIV/AIDS prevention and education, and plays a key role in child survival. Representatives
of all donors meet with the MSPP on a monthly basis to coordinate activities, discuss sector
issues and exchange information. Table 3 summarizes donor support for sector-related
activities.






-:o .






USA.iD/Hai -~~. 'St~rategic. P'lan.:. F 1999-2004i Page 59


US"ND/aid Strategic Plan FY 1999-2044


Page 59









Table 3
Donor Support for Health Sector Activities
1997- 1998 (millions)
$ (1.9)

AGENCY Repro. MCH Health Basic & Women's Food
Health Institutions Prim. Educ. Empower. Aid
UNFPA 2.5 -

UNICEF 3.7 .5 1.1 1.9

WHO/PAHO .7 .2 1.0 -
Japan -* -
EU 1.0 4.5 2.0 -9.2
IDB 10.0 15.0 5.0
Canada 1.1 5.
France -.4 .6 -
Germany 1.8
Netherlands .63 --
Switzerland .5 -
IBRD 5.0 2.8 2.2 2.0 -
UNDP .1 .7
UNHCR --- -3.8

*Financing planned, levels unknown


The UNICEF Program focuses primarily on immunization support and integrated
delivery of the minimum package of child survival interventions. PAHO's priorities include
immunization support, management and distribution of essential drugs, and a safety net
program for supplying essential drugs, supplies and equipment to health facilities following
natural disasters or political crises. EU, IBRD and IDB assistance is heavily targeted to
health system administration and development, including infrastructure rehabilitation,
decentralized management and long-term technical assistance based at the Ministry of
Health. The IBRD provides service delivery support including drugs and equipment. The
EU, as well, provides assistance for potable water systems.

UNFPA, IBRD, PAHO and Dutch Cooperation support family planning activities,
including contraceptives and social marketing. UNFPA's future financial support will be
directed to clinical training, interventions targeted to youth, advocacy and policy. BID plans
to program future financial support for reproductive health, although it is unlikely that this
funding will be available prior to 1999. USAID collaborates closely with other donors to


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 60










selectively identify financing priorities and shortfalls and plans to actively lobby and leverage
donor support and commitment for the priority activities identified under this strategy.

USAID presently finances 22 NGOs responsible for implementing RH and CS
activities, all of which have been evaluated as capable of adhering to USAID financial
management and reporting requirements; an additional 20 NGOs will receive financing to
implement family planning activities in early CY 1998. The Title II food aid program is
implemented by three Cooperating Sponsors: CARE, CRS and ADRA.

5. Illustrative Approaches

USAID's Strategic Objective "Achieve Desired Family Size" will focus on five
Intermediate Results (IR).

IR1: Increased Use of Quality Child Survival and Nutrition Services: All USAID-financed
child survival programs partners will be responsible for implementing a "minimum package"
of priority child survival services that together will ensure maximum impact on the primary
causes of infant and child mortality in Haiti: diarrheal disease, malnutrition, acute
respiratory infection (ARI), vaccine-preventable childhood illness, low birthweight, and
neonatal tetanus. This minimum package of interventions includes immunization,
breastfeeding promotion, oral rehydration therapy (ORT), acute respiratory infection (ARI)
treatment, and vitamin A supplementation. To further enhance the impact of these
interventions, USAID has integrated its Title II maternal child health food aid programs with
child survival programs. At participating sites, nutritional supplementation is provided to at-
risk pregnant women and malnourished children age five and under. Program-supported
interventions will focus on further expanding the number of sites offering Title II food aid
supplementation, while improving the quality of services at existing sites. To improve the
quality of services, USAID will support clinical training in case management and referral,
and strengthening of management systems at fixed sites. Recognizing the critical role of the
community in addressing the causes of childhood illness, resources will be directed to
identifying and training community health workers and to giving the community a voice in
health program decision-making through participation on the UCS advisory board.

IR2: Increased Use of Quality Reproductive Health Services (Reproductive Health services
include family planning, pre- and post-natal care, HIV/STI prevention): Program activities
will expand access to RH services by increasing the number of service delivery points
offering reproductive health services and the range of services and family planning methods
available at these points. To rapidly address Haiti's unmet demand for family planning
services, USAID will provide increased support for non-fixed site delivery mechanisms,
including community-based distribution and social marketing programs. In addition the SO
will assess the potential for expanding access to reproductive health and child survival
services through enterprise-based programs.

Continued demand for services is highly dependent on the quality of services provided. To
improve quality of service delivery, the SO will finance staff training in communications and


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 61








technical skills, including national norms and standards for reproductive health and a
standard package of BCC messages. Quality program management is equally important and
activities under this IR will be directed to implementing or strengthening training, logistics,
monitoring and evaluation, and supervision systems within participating partner programs.
The MSPP has adopted a national health services management policy, dividing each of
Haiti's departments into sub-units called UCS (Community Health Units). USAID will be
responsible for ensuring that 20 UCS within 3 departments develop the basic services,
referral systems and management systems to offer the full range of priority reproductive
health and child survival services. Recognizing the role of the community in women's
reproductive health choices, this IR will support formal recognition and participation of
community health program representatives on each UCS advisory board.

IR 3: Improved Public Policy Environment for Reproductive Health and Child Survival
Programs: USAID program support will include activities promoting increased high level
political support and strengthened civil society advocacy for RP health issues, building on the
Haiti Task Force "Call to Action." A group of Haitian Parliamentarians has recently
signalled its interest in reproductive health issues and program resources will be directed to
consolidating and directing this important decision-making support. In parallel to efforts
supporting the designation of a high-level population official within the GOH, USAID will
support development of an autonomous private sector population foundation with the capacity
to analyze and project the implications of population growth for development planning,
promote effective public sector policy and seek independent financing for its initiatives.

Activities under this IR will also support targeted assistance for important health sector
policy initiatives adopted by the MSPP and jointly financed by the donor community:
finalization, adoption and dissemination of reproductive health norms and standards;
development and implementation of a standard package of Behavior Change Communication
(BCC) messages by all implementing partners; and the development and launch of a national
Health Information System. USAID will apply its comparative advantage in data for
decision-making to strengthen both MOH and implementing partner capacity for collecting,
analyzing and applying program data to plan and evaluate quality, decentralized programs.

IR4: Women Empowered to Make Reproductive Health Decisions. This IR will support
interventions and activities promoting enhanced economic opportunities for women, better
and longer education for girls, and improved status for women within Haitian society.
Women invest a greater percentage of disposable income on the health of themselves and
their families than do men, thus increasing economic opportunities for women is an
investment in the health of those women and their children. Working closely with the
Sustainable Increased Incomes for the Poor (SIIP) SO team, the SO will support training and
development of income-producing skills. As well, the SO will establish linkages with
existing SIIP programs to expand financial services for women and streamline the procedures
to grant them loans. In addition, the SO will expand microenterprise and microcredit
activities targeted to women within existing programs implemented by USAID's reproductive
health and child survival program partners.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 62










Educated women are more likely to delay childbearing, space or limit births, seek pre- and
post-natal care, and seek or provide appropriate care for their infants and children. Working
closely with the Improving Human Capacity SO, this IR will support interventions and
activities designed to provide incentives for girls to enter school at the appropriate age and
remain in school longer, and improve the quality of education provided. Activities under
consideration include social awareness campaigns focussing on the importance of education
for girls; incentives for families to invest in educating girls, including scholarships and
integrated school feeding programs; and introducing material on RH and family life in school
curricula.

Women's decisions regarding reproductive health and child survival are influenced by their
status within the family and society. The SO will work primarily through programs funded
by the Inclusive Democratic Governance (IDG) SO to support activities improving women's
status at two intervention points: the individual and advocacy groups. For individual
women, the SO will provide training in sexual negotiation skills and legal assistance targeted
to sexual and domestic violence. At the organizational level, the SO will support women's
advocacy groups to disseminate information, strengthening their capacity to engage decision-
makers; train health providers to recognize, treat and counsel victims; and promote
community support groups for victims of domestic and sexual violence.

IR5: Youth Better Prepared for and Men More Engaged in Responsible Family Life: The
reproductive health decisions of youth and men are of critical importance to reducing fertility
and HIV transmission. Fully 50 percent of Haiti's population is age 15 and under and the
attitudes and practices of this group has serious long-term implications for the health of the
nation. Men's health decisions influence those of their partners as well. The SO will focus
on developing RH and HIV/STI prevention services and information adapted to the needs of
young people and couples. Activities will include direct services and counseling in RH and
HIV/STI and communications programs targeted to youth, including identification and
dissemination of high-impact messages through the most appropriate channels. The SO will
promote youth-to-youth communications programs and will involve parents and community
leaders in program interventions through outreach programs. The program will also promote
increased male participation and involvement in RH health programs and improved male
attitudes towards women and family responsibilities. The SO will support development of RP
health program interventions and messages designed to inform, attract and influence males.
The SO will give special attention to BCC messages reinforcing awareness of children as the
joint responsibility of couples.

6. Sustainability.

USAID, its partners and the MSPP have taken a number of actions designed to
promote RH and CS program sustainability. The MSPP has developed a strong health sector
policy framework for national program implementation, including national strategic plans for
reproductive health, AIDS prevention, child survival and Information, Education and
Communication. The GOH's operational health sector policies, including decentralization,
its efforts to ensure a dependable supply of essential drugs, its leadership in development of


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 63









five-year strategies for family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention, and national level
coordination of donor inputs are strong factors supporting long-term sustainability. In
addition, the development of policies, norms and standards, and implementation of a national
health management system for private and public programs are critical to the sustainability of
a program jointly implemented by the public and private sectors and financed by multiple
donors.

The MSPP, as well, is actively developing and implementing a national-level RH
and CS management information system, and developing and disseminating a standard BCC
package, and plans to adopt the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI)
approach to identification and treatment of childhood illness. At the SO level, USAID is
promoting sustainability through introduction of a standardized "minimum package" of
priority CS interventions, support to organize and decentralize health sector services in 20
Community Health Units (UCS) located in three departments, and application of nationally-
approved norms and standards for Reproductive Health at all program-financed sites.

Haiti's health sector program is characterized by strong donor coordination.
Donors meet monthly at a meeting chaired by the MSPP to coordinate inputs, minimize
duplication, resolve implementation gaps and discuss technical issues. Most health sector
activities involve joint donor financing, described earlier, and there is a high degree of
collaboration and coordination to ensure that financing decisions reflect each individual
donors' management and technical comparative advantage.

Haiti has a strong cadre of health sector professionals, many trained during the
1980's, who are providing strong leadership in both the public and private sectors. There is
a substantial and growing number of local NGOs capable of effectively implementing service
delivery programs and USAID presently finances activities through approximately 40 of these
organizations. The USAID health sector program is designed to provide additional systems
strengthening for these NGOs in program and budget management and technical skills during
the course of activity implementation.

One of the activities planned under this SO, in collaboration with UNFPA, is the
development of a private sector foundation for population. Drawing on the skills of private
and public sector experts and building on the growing interest of parliamentarians and the ad
hoc task force for Population for reproductive health program advocacy and policy efforts to
date, the foundation will serve as a policy "think-tank"and the focal point for future advocacy
efforts, including seeking outside sources of private funding for program-related efforts. The
foundation will forge a strong public-private partnership for addressing reproductive health
needs and issues, further promoting program sustainability.

This SO reflects the full participation of USAID's implementing partners, thus
building ownership for planned activities and promoting commitment to achieving planned
results. While financial sustainability of public and NGO services remains a distant goal, the
civil society and policy environment interventions planned under this SO will encourage the
longer-term sustainability of the full range of health services.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 64









7. Expected Results and Impact


Strategic Objective level (Achieve Desired Family Size) Indicators and Targets
(year 2004):

Total Fertility Rate decreases from 4.8 to 4.0

Child Mortality Rate decreases from 131/1000 to 112/1000

Prevalence of Malnutrition in Children under age 5 decreases from 27 percent to 20
percent in program-supported areas

Intermediate Results level Indicators and Targets:

IR1: Increased Use of Quality CS and nutrition services (indicators/targets for USAID-
supported programs):
Percentage of children 12-23 months of age immunized against measles: Targets
(baseline 1996 59%); 1999-68%; 2000-71%; 2001-74%;2002-77%;2003-80%; 2004-
83%
Percentage of children receiving two vitamin A capsules per year: Targets (baseline
1996-37%; 1999-42%; 2000-47%; 2001-52%; 2002-57%; 2003-62%; 2004-67%
% of women using ORT to treat diarrhea: Targets (baseline 1996-57%); 1999-63%;
2000-66%; 2001-69%; 2002-72%; 2003-75%; 2004-78%
number of child survival sites with integrated nutritional supplementation (baseline
1997-61); 1999-78; 2000-107; 2001-123; 2002-130; 2003-140; 2004-150

IR 2: Increased Use of Quality RH Services
Couple Years of Protection at USAID-financed sites
Targets:
Fixed-site program (baseline 1997-76,000), 1999-213,000; 2000-240,000; 2001-
276,000; 2002-324,00; 2003-390,000; 2004-472,000
Social marketing program (baseline 1997 70,000); 1999-93,000; 2000-111,000;
2001-128,000; 2002-148,000; 2003-171,000; 2004-197,000
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate for modern methods at USAID-financed sites
Targets (baseline 1997 17%); 1999-23%; 2000-26%; 2001-29%; 2002-32%; 2003-
;35%; 2004-38%
% of sites offering 4 or more modem methods of contraception: Targets (baseline
1997-29%); 1999-40%; 2000-50%; 2001-60%; 2002-70%; 2003-80%; 2004-90%
Number of program-supported UCS offering the full range of family planning,
maternity and STI services: Targets (baseline 1997 0); 1999-3; 2000-6; 2001-9;
2002-13; 2003-17; 2004-20
Strategy for community participation in UCS developed and implemented: Target
Year 2000

IR 3: Improved public policy environment for Reproductive Health and Child Survival


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 65









"Call to Action" finalized and employed to leverage increased donor support (Year 1
target)
National RH norms and standards developed, approved and disseminated (Year 2
target)
Designation of Population-dedicated official within GOH (Year 2 target)
Advocacy group coalition action plan to lobby Parliament on RH and CS issues (Year
2 target)
Autonomous private sector population foundation in operation (Year 5 target)
Additional targets TBD for years 3-5 based on identified opportunities and constraints

IR4: Women Empowered To Make Reproductive Health Decisions
% of girls completing primary school (baseline and targets TBD)
% women in target area with access to credit (baseline and targets TBD)
number of women's groups receiving advocacy support (Baseline TBD); targets
(cumulative): 1999-3; 2000-6; 2001-8; 2002-12; 2003-14; 2004-15

IR 5: Youth Better Prepared for and Men More Engaged in Responsible Family Life
Safer Sex Composite in youth program target areas (Baseline 1998 TBD); targets
TBD
(Proportion of the population age 15-24 reporting abstinence from sex over the
previous 12 months or a single sex partner in the previous 12 months or consistent
condom use with all sex partners in the last three months)
number of new family planning clients age 15-24 (by sex) served by youth program
(Baseline 1997 11,000); targets: 1999-25,000; 2000-30,000; 2001-35,000; 2002-
45,000; 2003-60,000; 2004-86,000
information campaigns targeted to youth through youth-appropriate channels (Target:
1 campaign/message annually)
number of male family planning clients (baseline 1997-18,607); targets: 1999-41,300;
2000-43,100; 2001-44,100; 2002-45,100; 2003-46,400; 2004-47,500
number of condoms sold in millions (baseline 1997-7.5); 1999-9.3; 2000-10.3; 2001-
11.3; 2002-12.4; 2003-13.5; 2004-14.6
communications package for males developed (Year 2 target)

Performance will be monitored through service statistics routinely reported by
Contractors and grantees; periodic surveys conducted by USAID and other donors, including
the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS); and studies and surveys implemented during the
course of program implementation including studies of knowledge, attitudes and practices and
program quality.









USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 66










SO: ACHIEVE DESIRED FAMILY SIZE

Indicators for the SO: -Total Fertiity Rate decreases from 4.8 to 4.0.
Child Mortality Rate decreases from 131/1000 to 112/1000.
Prevalence of Malnutrition In Children under Age 5 decreases from 27% to 20% In program-supported areas.


M13SION
I OAL I


REDUCED POVERTY
IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE


IR 1: Increased Use o IR 2: Increased Use o
Child Survival (CS) an Reproductive Health (
Services Services


S% of chldan 12. monsihao
Immunized against measles.
* %t of cMden receiving tvw v

*No. of child surlval dites vit
iseil lonspplementaionL


SCoul years of protection at
USAIDl ned snies
- Contaceptv prevalenc rat
modern methods at USAIDin
-% of sites offering 4 or mor
methods of contracepon.
- No. of proram-supportd U
offering the ful range offamily
planning, maternity and S o
SSratogy for community par
In UC developed and Implen


IR3: Improved Public
Environment for Repr
Health and Child Survi
Programs







- Call to Action fnlized and
to lveoraed Increased donor
- Nationl RH norms and stand
developed, approved and ia
PiariptoO"f1?Ot tionict5
-Advocacy group coallon act
to lobby Paniamenl on RH and
Issues.
- Autonomous private sector p
foundtlon In operation.


IR 4: VWmen Empowe IR 5: Youth Better Pr
Make Reproductive H and Men More Engag
Decisions Responsible Family Li







* of girls completing primer Safr sex composite In youth
- % of women n target area wI prdgm tare areas.
to credit N. of family planning clients
- No. of wmns groups recl or nder (by sox) served by yo
advocacy support. profam.
Iformatlon campaigns target
youth through youth-appropria
channels.
No. of male family planning c
N. of condoms sold n milllo
Communications package for
developed.


"u:1pcpspub%123data'sp-dfs.wk4"


F ITEREDIATE RESULTS













INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
INDICATORS


- m


____~_I~--- Now








D. Increased Human Capacity


1. Statement of Strategic Objective: The development of human capacity is a
necessary condition for poverty reduction as well as the success of USAID's other strategic
objectives in Haiti. For example, most Haitians are not yet sufficiently skilled to take
advantage of greater economic opportunities, even if more jobs are created and the popula-
tion stabilizes. A participatory democracy may be impossible if Haitians have limited access
to information. Few Haitians will leave poverty behind them without developing their skills.
To address poverty through increased human capacity, this SO will focus on basic education-
-an investment in the future workforce-- while simultaneously improving the training of the
current workforce to meet business needs. Finally, to enable Haitians to continue to expand
their abilities throughout their lives, they will need to learn and re-learn. This SO will open
up access to media that can provide such opportunities to them.

The elaboration of this SO has been undertaken in consultation with a variety of partners. At
a recent USAID forum with education stakeholders in Haiti, participants were ask to agree
on critical elements for developing human capacity to take advantage of economic
opportunity. The group cited a eleven factors, some of which were anticipated. For
example, literacy, critical thinking, technical capacity, and capacity to learn new things were
highly ranked. Other elements cited were less predictable, such as, hope for employment,
motivation for professional improvement, access to information, positive attitudes and values,
capacity to create and seize opportunities, the ability to 'act' with others,and good health,
capacity to learn new skills, access to information, and motivation for professional improve-
ment. These last factors, in particular, changed and redirected the development of our SO.
Since that meeting, USAID has distilled the critical factors down to four Intermediate
Results:

IR1 Improved Quality in Primary Education

IR2 Provision of Educational Opportunities for Vulnerable School-Age Children

IR3 Improved Access to Quality Market-Oriented Technical Training

IR4 Improved Access to Information Technology

2. Problem Analysis

Although reliable data are scarce in Haiti, the best available statistics on human
resources capacity sketch a bleak situation: only 35 percent of adults are literate, about 80
percent of the rural population lives below the poverty line, and more than 70 percent of the
people are underemployed. To improve these statistics, USAID will improve the quality of
primary education. We will support equipping young people to move out of poverty.
Primary education is the scaffolding on which other education rest; even for those who do
not go on to other schooling, primary education should be the place where children "learn to
learn," arguably today's most valuable skill for these technological times.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 68









Support for quality primary education arises from the fact that primary school
graduates in Haiti are already better off than the unschooled. They tend to be more
productive and have smaller families. For example, farmers with primary education are 14
percent more productive than less educated farmers, an effect that does not appear to
increase substantially with additional education. Women who have graduated from primary
school have smaller families; a recent survey found that primary school was associated with a
reduction of 1.3 in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 6.1 to 4.6 children. Thus it is likely
that other USAID strategic objectives--notably income growth and population stability--can be
furthered if primary schools do a better job educating pupils.

Yet another reason for supporting primary education is that Haitians obviously
want it. Every school day, commuter traffic in Port-au-Prince is brought to its knees,
crawling through the streets, while half the population leaves its children off at school and
the other immobilized half watches. Haitian commitment to schooling dates back to the first
Constitution in 1805 when free, compulsory education was endorsed. Nearly 200 years later,
the government has not been able to realize this objective. Nevertheless, great amounts of
time, money and effort are currently devoted to children's education; in 1994 an estimated 12
percent of GDP was spent on education, with families directly contributing six times as much
as the government to this expense. The family contribution is so high because most children
go to private schools. The average Haitian private school was estimated to cost Haitian $134
per child per year, or almost 9 percent of household income (1995 CARE survey). Nearly
80 percent of primary schools are currently private because the government has not been able
to meet local demand.

But despite the money being spent and the zeal for education, many schools are
not educating children well. Two out of three entrants will drop out before completion;
more than half of those remaining will repeat at least one grade before they pass the sixth
year exam. Repetition in the early grades averages around 20 percent and most children
drop out after 3 years of schooling. Facts like these signal a major quality problem.

The very best and the very worst of schools are private. The former cater to
prosperous Haitians, while the latter are referred to as "borlette" schools--lottery schools
where completing primary school is about as likely as holding a winning ticket. Public
schools can be found between these two extremes -- better but not always much cheaper than
the "borlette" schools5. In fact, all but the very top schools are really lotteries. Poor quality
teaching and class room conditions are present throughout Haiti..

In the private sector, which comprises 76 percent of primary schools, 67 percent
of the teachers have less than the two years of secondary school and almost none come from
normal schools (teacher training colleges). Recent teacher aptitude tests, in this sector,
showed that most teachers had difficulty with fourth grade math and that they couldn't read


Public school directors request payments from parents when they do not receive salary payments from
the Ministry of Education. This can raise the cost to something similar to the private schools.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 69








or write French adequately, even though the curriculum and upper primary classes are in this
language. Even in the public sector, 34 percent of the teachers have no qualifications to be
teachers. With teachers as poorly prepared as this, the statistics are not surprising.

Resources are being ill-used in the primary sector: wastage6 is very high in many
schools, squandering parents' school payments, government revenue, children's opportunity
costs and teachers' efforts. It takes approximately 16 pupil years (rather than the intended 6
years) for the system to produce one primary school graduate. This meager harvest is
obtained at an undetermined cost in repetition and unproductive expenditures. Quality has
been selected as this strategic objective's first intermediate result to address the poor
capabilities of teachers and dearth of materials which contribute to these high repetition and
dropout statistics. Through quality improvements, access and efficiency will be also
improved. With better education, repetition will decrease so that classes can accommodate
more non-repeaters. This will also reduced the number of over-age children in each class so
teachers can do a better job of instruction. While improved classroom quality will not
eliminate all dropout, it should encourage a higher percent of children to complete the
primary cycle and thus give parents a higher return on their investments.

The second intermediate result will be the provision of educational
opportunities for vulnerable groups, such as the poorest children, including orphans.
Many Haitians do not have enough money to send their children to school. To increase the
chances that children of the poorest families will attend, the school feeding program is being
expanded. By providing one meal a day for students, this program attracts children who
would otherwise not attend school and helps keep them enrolled. It allows some poor
parents to budget for school fees because their food expenditures are reduced.

The program also has a favorable impact on primary school learning, especially
within this disadvantaged group. Nutritional deficits may lead to a lack of concentration at
school, interrupted attendance due to sickness and learning difficulties. Moreover, micro-
nutrient deficient children7 are more likely to repeat their [school] year than the average
pupil, adding further to overall system costs. In addition to these attendance and nutritional
benefits, the school feeding program will also encourage PTA advocacy for better school
management and quality.

To support disadvantaged children, USAID will also offer a small grants program
to orphanages' that want to improve the education and training of their children. In most
Haitian orphanages, children are not receiving much education. Small grants can be used to


6By wastage, this reference means pupil dropout and repetition.

7Recent studies in Ghana show that the de-worming program that accompanies school feeding affects
school achievement positively, and that the improvement is twice as strong for girls as for boys. While
undocumented, the same benefits may arise from school feeding in Haiti.

8Ninety eight orphanages are also benefitting from school feeding.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 70









enrich the capabilities of orphans. They will also make a difference in the capacity of
orphans to take advantage of opportunities. This program will be the beginning of a longer
term effort to coordinate and organize orphanages as advocacy groups that can generate and
deploy resources more equitably among these institutions.

If resources permit, USAID will work for a third intermediate result of access
to quality market-oriented technical training. While essential in the long run, primary
school interventions will not immediately impact the Haitian job market where there is a
disconnect between employers' needs and the labor market. Rather than "second guess"
market demand, USAID will support the development of labor market assessment capability.
If USAID activities encourage the latter to track the employment success of their graduates,
to adjust their curriculum to the job market, and to maintain close links with employers'
associations, this will be the most effective way of enhancing skills to meet demands.

A market-driven approach to training will potentially be trailed this year when and
if USAID supports the re-tooling of 2500 ex-civil servants. Those who wish to profit from
the training will be given vouchers that can be used at approved training schools. Approval
will be based upon the financial soundness of the training school and its willingness and
ability to track the employment success (including self-employment) of its graduates. These
results will be collected and publicized to encourage those training programs and types of
training that meet labor market demands. The re-training of the civil servants will serve as a
pilot for the workforce development project that will follow it, if resources permit.

A fourth intermediate result of greater access to information will reduce
barriers to communication. Lack of information in Haiti affects the poverty level throughout
the country. Despite Haiti's small size, its rugged topography isolates rural people. For
example, the entire population of approximately 8 million is served by only 60,000
telephones. A more available, transparent, and reliable information flow will be brought
about by internet access in selected institutions (with a focus on secondary cities), rural radio
and even cellular telephones in remote areas. At present it is next to impossible for villagers
to obtain information on markets or events in country or overseas. Improved access to
information should promote higher incomes and a more informed citizenry.

In sum, the IHC strategic objective aims to position Haitians so they can take
advantage of economic opportunities. Better quality education in the primary schools is a
basis for the future. This is especial true given, our special attention to vulnerable groups of
school-age children. In addition, the IHC SO team proposes to support market-driven
training to boast employment right away. To complete the spectrum of Activities which
assist people to take advantage of economic opportunities as well as continued learning, IHC
will support new sources of information and expand the scope of existing media.

Certain IHC activities will work in tandem with other USAID strategic objectives.
For example, quality education will affect girls' education, a important component to achieve
desired family size. The development of school support groups will contribute to civil


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 71









society advocacy. Workforce training will help increase incomes, and the expansion of access
to information will strengthen both democratic governance and economic growth in Haiti.

Program Accomplishments to Date

USAID has been working to improve primary education since 1986. USAID's primary
education program, Incentives to Improve Basic Education (IIBE) Project, has worked
predominantly with the private school system to increase children's access to a higher quality
and better managed elementary education. The program has focused on policy dialogue and
educational policy reform; institutional development, teacher diagnostics and training; and
research. IIBE also pioneered interactive radio instruction for math and reading; the radio
pilot was evaluated favorably and will expand further under the ED 2004 project that began
in September 1997.

USAID has supported private schools through a Cooperative Agreement with the Haitian
Foundation for Private Education (FONHEP), a local NGO established by Catholic and
Protestant school sectors. About half of all independent private schools, the fastest growing
education sub-sector, have recently been incorporated into FONHEP. Currently more than
6,700 of Haiti's schools are organized under the FONHEP umbrella.

Through IIBE, USAID has supported improvements in the public education sector. Over
the past several years, USAID has funded the Ministry's efforts to develop a National
Education Plan (NEP) for improving education in Haiti. An important component of this
support was technical assistance to the Ministry of Education to help develop the NEP. In
close collaboration with the MOE, IIBE invited Haitian educators to discuss and provide
inputs to the NEP at a series of regional conferences. In 1996 a full census was done of
public primary schools.

Under Education 2004, a recently launched $20 million education package, USAID
continues support for both public and private schools. Through a combination of training
and materials, quality school networks will be put in place to ensure adequate learning for
network pupils. In addition, Education 2004 will underwrite from five to ten regional fora on
national education policy issues, with debate led by the Ministry of Education. The NEP
will continue to have some USAID support for the five years of the Education 2004 project.

4. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships

that better classroom learning will reduce repetition and dropout in primary
school, and encourage completion

that teacher and director training, classroom materials, learner-centered teaching,
and interactive radio instruction will improve classroom learning

that encouraging pupil team work will eventually improve conflict resolution in the
wider society


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 72











that feeding school children will improve attendance and performance while
reducing school drop out

that school feeding programs can leverage improved primary school quality

that educational opportunities for orphans will help reduce poverty

that stronger links between training institutions and employers will reduce
unemployment

that training providers will be able to track the employment success of their
graduates, and respond to market changes

that access to information about economic opportunities will increase opportunities
to increase incomes

that availability of/access to internet and cellular phone service for a reasonable
price will increase demand for them.


5. Commitment and Capacity of Development Partners

There are many types of donors working in the education sector. Most seem to
be doing outstanding work but donor coordination is apparently just beginning. UNESCO is
the lead donor in education and plans are already in place to begin regular donor meetings.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan Fl' 1999-2004 Page 73


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 73









Table 4
Donor Support for Human Capacity Development
1997-1998
(in US$ millions)


Agency & Radio Teacher/ Teaching School Market Internet TOTAL*
Donor Education/ Director Materials Feeding Driven Access
Distance Training Training
Education

IBRD -- 1.00

I.D.B / /" 29.10


UNESCO 4 4 4 41 0.35**

UNICEF 1 1 1 **

UNDP 0.9 0.63

JICA N 3.0 -


E.U. 2.3 -


French f if 2.23
Coopera.

CIDA f f 2.0 1.40


Spanish -
Consulate
Others*


* Total does not include school feeding programs.
**Total amount for UNESCO and UNICEF.
Figures from this report are taken from the IBRD "Haiti: External
Commitments, Disbursements and Projections Dec. 1997"
Legends
f = active in this area --- = not active in area Blank sp;


Financing, Indicative


aces = to be determined


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 74


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 74










6. Illustrative Approaches


USAID/ Haiti will be "Improving Human Capacity" through 4 Intermediate Results (IR):

IR1- Improved Quality in Primary Education: Program activities will aim to improve the
learning, teaching and management of both private and public primary schools through
quality networks for 1,000 schools. Better learning and teaching will be promoted by
interactive radio instruction and the distribution of teaching materials. Teachers will be
trained in pedagogy and subject matter, with special attention being given to gender equity,
classroom teamwork and learner-centered instruction. School directors will be instructed in
school and staff management. School support groups (PTAs) will be encouraged to seek the
best quality possible in their schools and to act as advocates for improvements. School
feeding programs, which benefit parents indirectly, will also leverage school quality
improvements sought in this results package.

With the Ministry of Education taking the lead, ED 2004 will assist with several policy
dialogue workshops or fora, pertinent to the National Education Plan, that will involve
major stakeholders in the education sector. Topics that may be addressed include private
school accreditation, curriculum relevance, educational financing, and language of
instruction.

IR2 Provision of Educational Opportunities for Vulnerable School-Age Children

To bolster the attendance, educational attainment, and well-being of school children from
poor families, this IR will provide school feeding programs for all schools in the quality
networks. As noted earlier this is expected to draw more poor children into school and to
keep them there. It will also benefit orphans, who are among the most impoverished
children in the country. Special funds, accessible through small grants applications, will be
available for orphanages that improve educational opportunities for their charges. These
grants will be administered by a newly formed umbrella NGO to coordinate aid to the many
orphanages in Haiti.

IR3 Improved Access to Quality Market-Oriented Technical Training

This IR will strengthen the link between private training programs and the employment
market to match training and employment needs. Training .providers that can track the
success of their trainees and thus assess and plan for growing market needs will be ready to
adjust their programs to labor market changes. USAID support will strengthen the capability
of these programs to monitor and analyze the employment records of their graduates.
Funding will also be provided to help schools repackage their curriculum based on their
findings. Finally, they will also be trained and encouraged to advertise/market their success
to draw in more trainees and income. The incentive for providers to do this will be the
potential of expanding enrollment in their programs because of their ability to provide
training in the everchanging skills that employers seek.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 75









IR4 Improved Access to Information Technology


Information flow is currently one of the largest obstacles to economic development in Haiti.
But the "Information Revolution" makes it possible to skirt many of the infrastructure
problems--lack of cables and wires-- which used to isolate rural Haitians from economic and
political information and the opportunities they facilitate. Under this IR, USAID will
support the expanded use of internet in institutions in High Potential Zones (secondary cities)
that can serve as learning centers for poorer Haitians. This expansion will be possible if an
initiative similar to Leland can be introduced in Haiti. By subsidizing satellite connections
and insuring private providers, USAID can insure that internet service expands while
remaining at a sustainable reasonable cost. Expansion of cellular phone service will also
play a crucial role in the spread of information into and between secondary cities and more
populated rural areas. Finally, on the "low tech"side, groups d'ecoute or listening groups
will be formed among school support groups to discuss radio programs of common interest:
health, politics, school management, microcredit possibilities, culture, etc. All of these
media will provide Haitians with better chances to develop their skills to meet economic
opportunities.

7. Achieving Program Sustainability

The sustainability of the IHC strategy hinges on its ability to reward demand with
resources in such a way that demand will expand sufficiently to support continuity of
improved services after USAID funding stops. This applies to IRs 1,3, and 4. For example,
in IR 4: Improved Access to Information Technology, the demand for connectivity already
exists. T616co has a backlog of 250,000 requests for telephone lines, and bandit Internet
connections, tapping on satellites abandoned by the US Marines, are springing up in factory
backyards. It is hoped that privatization will satisfy this T616co backlog. And, if precedents
with the Leland Initiative in Africa work for Haiti, IHC's support for private Haitian
providers to supply Internet connections at reasonable rates should increase current interest,
thus expanding Internet usage quickly in urban parts of Haiti. As USAID support to Internet
gradually shrinks, market forces should sustain the private sector providers at a continuing
affordable rate.

A similar kind of process will support the sustainability of workforce development.
For example, one of the outstanding middle management training institutes in Haiti has
recently been overwhelmed with requests for its graduates; the national police are competing
with insurance, banking and the assembly sector to employ them. Under the workforce
development plan, institutes like this one will strengthen links with the private sector to
anticipate and meet such demand more readily. Less successful training institutions may be
funded to do the same type of monitoring and then changing their curriculum to increase
their graduates' employment rate. However, it needs to be clear that the IHC SO is not
funding a particular linkage, or training package. What is being funded is a process rather
than a result, a process of continuously re-tooling curricula and training to meet employers'
interests. Again, as with the IR dealing with information technology, this IR should be self-
sustaining if the process is established, strengthened, and eventually rewarded for success..


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 76










The situation for IR 1: Improved Quality in Primary Schools is a bit different from the two
just mentioned. In the case of primary schools, the demand is very strong and being
answered--but with variable quality. The number and size of private schools are growing
very rapidly in response to this demand, but the calibre varies extremely. As said, some
such schools are very good, others are really microenterprises to make quick money for little
effort. But the "customers"--in this case the pupils and their parents--are voting with their
feet: two out of three children are walking out of school before they are fully literate.

What is needed in this last case is a public-private partnership to improve, monitor
and sustain quality in private as well as public schools. The National Education Plan (NEP)
has this intention and USAID's ED 2004 will support this. A major focus of the NEP is to
improve the capacity of teachers through in-service training. To do this, the MOE has plans
to establish at least one EFACAP school in each of Haiti's 133 communes. These
lab/teacher training schools will work with 15 to 20 surrounding schools to strengthen
teachers and bring about more learning in the classroom; some of them will be supported by
USAID, others by other donors. As in ED 2004's smaller school quality networks noted
earlier, each EFACAP network can include private as well as public schools among the
beneficiaries if they meet basic MOE criteria. This cooperative effort to improve the quality
of all schools is a first step in bridging the gap between the public and private education
sectors.

Primary education will remain predominantly private in the near future; this is why
the bulk of USAID funding will continue to support these schools. In fact, USAID remains
the only major donor assisting these schools which comprise three quarters of the total
number.. But at this juncture, it is important that their quality be monitored by the MOE
and FONHEP. National policy dialogue on the issue of school quality standards and
accreditation, also to be funded by ED 2004, will take place during the coming year. Once a
clear set of criteria is adopted, the MOE and FONHEP can work in tandem to exhort that the
standards be met and sustained.

8. Expected Results and Impact

Indicators for SO: Increased Human Capacity

Indicator: Percentage of school children completing primary school, desegregated by gender.
Measurement tool: pass rate on the CEP (the primary school leaving examination).
Baseline: 30%
Target: 40%

Indicator: Percentage of the population that has access to information technology
Baseline: TBD in Year 1
Target: TBD

IR 1 Improved Quality in Primary Education


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 77









Indicator: Percent of pupils achieving performance norms in math and language,
desegregated by gender
Baseline: TBD in Year 1
Target: x% improvement on test scores in grade 6 TBD

Indicator: Reduced drop-out and repetition rates, desegregated by gender
Baseline: TBD
Target: Decrease of 7% in dropout rate in grade 4
Decrease of 10% in dropout rate of girls in grade 4
Decrease of 7% in repetition rate in grade 4

IR 2 Provision of Educational Opportunities for Vulnerable School-Age Children

Indicator: Percentage of school children being fed
Baseline: TBD i:
Target: TBD

Indicator: Percentage of orphanages offering new educational enrichment benefits to their
charges
Baseline: TBD
Target: TBD

IR 3 Improved access to high quality, market-oriented technical training

Indicator: Percent of graduates from workforce training programs who find appropriate
employment
Baseline: TBD in Year 1
Target: TBD

IR 4 Improved access to information technology

Indicator: Percent of selected groups (NGOs, learning centers, private sector organizations)
that have internet access
Baseline: TBD
Target: TBD

Indicator: Percent of school support organizations using "Listening Groups"
Baseline: 0
Target: 500


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 78


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 78








SO: INCREASED HUMAN CAPACITY


Indicators for the SO:


- Percentage of school children completing primary school, disaggregated by gender.
- Percentage of the population that has access to Information technology.


STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE


I INTERMEDIATE RESULTS


INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
INDICATORS


IR 1: Improved
Quality in
Primary
Education






- % of pupils achieving perform
norms In math and language,
disaggregated by gender.
- Reduced drop-out and repe
disaggregated by gender.


IR 2: Provision of Edu
Opportunities for Vuln
School-Age Children






- % of school children being f
- % of orphanages offering
enrichment benefits to their c


IR 3: Improved Access
Market-oiented Techn







- % of graduates from workfor
training programs who find ap
employment.


IR 4: Improved Access t
Information Technology








access.%
- % of school support organize
"Listening Groups".


"u:)pcpspub\123data\sp-hc.wk4"


REDUCED POVERTY
IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


MISSION
GOAL









E. More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained

1. Statement of Strategic Objective: More Genuinely Inclusive Demo-
cratic Governance Attained.

Actions under this Strategic Objective aim to increase Haitian citizens'
participation in governance at all levels: elections, justice, national and local government
and civil society. USAID will work with institutions, such as parliament and the courts, to
increase their ability to respond to citizens' needs, and with communities to improve citizens'
ability to understand, organize and advocate their political views.

Haiti is at a crossroads in its democratic development. The history of US
involvement in Haiti calls for our continued support to this country's developing democratic
institutions. Customers' expressed priorities also justify USAID's strategic focus on gover-
nance: Intensive discussions with Haitians of all ranks revealed a universal demand for more
responsive and competent governance with an electorate capable of holding its representatives
to account.

An equally compelling basis for this SO is the link between good governance and
the reduction of poverty through economic expansion. At the most practical level, both
foreign investors and local entrepreneurs require a functioning justice system which protects
property, promotes trade and provides a stable platform for commercial life. An empowered
and informed population also helps to create the atmosphere for a flourishing economy by
demanding that fair and consistent adjudication replace corrupt, arbitrary decision-making.
More generally, an empowered population has the ability to voice its concerns and economic
needs and to hold its officials accountable, increasing the possibility that development will be
representative and transparent. Thus, an inclusive democracy promises better lives in both
the political and the economic realms.

2. Problem Analysis

Each of Haiti's citizens should benefit from achievement of our Strategic
Objective, and is therefore considered our ultimate customer. It is these people who have
identified their top priority need -- for genuine inclusion in democratic governance. At the
same time, we acknowledge that there are important sub-sets of individuals who are more
closely linked to USAID's activities, and as a result, are considered primary customers. In
the justice area, these include parties to criminal and civil cases, victims of crimes, judges,
prosecutors, and court clerks. In elections, this includes candidates, political parties, and
voters. In the governance area, we work most directly with members of Parliament, staffers,
and support personnel, mayors and other locally-elected officials, municipal staffs, and the
regional and national associations of local government officials. And in civil society
development, our customers are popular organizations, community groups, business
associations, non-governmental organizations, and the poor and/or disadvantaged sectors of
Haitian society (e.g. women.)

US IDHu taegcPa Y19920 ae8


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 80









Another group deserving attention is Haiti's traditional and emerging middle class.
This group, which may constitute approximately 10% of the population, consists of business
owners, technocrats, professionals, and some of the intelligentsia. While not homogeneous,
this group shares certain basic concerns among which are a desire for law and order,
transparency especially in commercial dealings, predictability; a desire for clear rules of the
game;commitment to economic growth, and unease about how the political future is likely to
affect them. As is true in many cases in Haiti, there are few cross-cutting strands connecting
this group to other socio-economic groups and identifying common interests or concerns.

To learn more about our customer's needs, in the widest sense possible, during
the last year, the JDG office has carried out surveys and"assessments culminating in the rapid
rural appraisal mentioned above. These documents have helped us to prepare a general
profile of our customers, and some of these findings are mentioned below. (The documents
are included in the Appendix).

As testimony to the challenges USAID faces:

69% believe that public officials don't care about them
Only 19% believe that the judiciary protects human rights
60% believe that their local government leaders are almost never responsive to their
needs
s 73 % believe that the public services in their community are poor

Yet a basis for democratic growth exists:

More than two-thirds believe voting is a potentially powerful instrument for influenc-
ing the direction of the state
82% believe that by organizing into groups they can have a voice in how their
government operates
About half have confidence in the political system, with support lower in Port au
Prince and isolated rural areas than in the rest of the countryside
People are fairly confident in the newly trained police, although this is lower in Port
au Prince than in rural areas
68% feel that the justice system treats them "well"or "very well
Over 81% are registered to vote
About 40% have attended political rallies or meetings at least once
40% belong to religious groups; and 33 percent belong to more than one group

3. Problem Analysis

This decade has seen democracy's birth in Haiti. Yet, after more than 200 years of
dictatorship and tyranny, it is to be expected that the new state has not found its equilibrium
in only its first four years of democracy. The forms of representative government exist but
stalemate between the parliament and the presidency as well as internal party struggles
hamper forward movement. A civilian police force has been established but allegations of


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 81









misconduct, abuse and corruption continue to mar its performance. Of even higher concern
is the apparent inability of the present justice system to bring cases of police misconduct to
trial.

After an exciting high of 70 percent voter turnout to elect President Aristide in 1990,
there was a drop to 50 percent in June 1995 for legislative and local elections, to 30 percent
in December 1995 for new Presidential elections, and finally to an alarming estimate of less
than 5 percent in April 1997 for parliament and local government.

The manifest loss of confidence in democracy, dramatically demonstrated by these
latest election statistics, is the most concrete indicator of the need for a new strategy in the
area of governance and democracy. To further inform itself the JDG Office (justice, democ-
racy and governance) funded a series of assessments and surveys, culminating in a rapid
rural appraisal throughout Haiti to determine what our customers thought were the most
serious problems they faced in the governance and democracy arena.. They identified the
major problems as (1) widespread disillusionment with democracy and democratic processes,
(2) elected officials' failure to represent the views and serve the needs of the people, and (3)
a general perception that justice is corrupt.

Perceived Failure of Democratic Processes: Disillusionment with democratic pro-
cesses is most dramatically shown through the drop in election participation described above.
Political parties are not functioning to represent real interest groups or offer meaningful
choices. Indeed, they are seen to be interested only in the race for power, seeming to forget
election promises once elected. This focus on power to the exclusion of performance is
exemplified in the unedifying spectacle offered by the present government which has, for
eight months, left the country without a prime minister and cabinet because of disputes over
the April election results.

Throughout the country, people expressed a strong feeling of being manipulated by
the electoral process as candidates sought office for personal power rather than for common
goals. More alarmingly, there was significant testimony to coercion during the runup to the
elections. Resentment and even fear caused by real or perceived abuse were clearly reflected
in the low voter turnout in April 1997.

Additionally, confusion dogs the whole democratic process, as citizens struggle to
reach consensus on the rules of the game. There is widespread disagreement on how to form
a Permanent Elections Council (CEP) given that the mechanism intended to nominate
members has not yet come fully into existence; the fact that elections, most notably the last
one in April,were not seen as free and fair calls the legitimacy of elected officials into doubt;
there are questions about the length of term officials should serve, confused by too many
elections, often delayed beyond their original dates; finally the constitutionally mandated
decentralization process has not yet had enabling legislature passed to define it into action.

Parliament, the one institution which has the potential to be genuinely representative,
has yet to earn the support of the populace. The problems stem from poor communication


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 82










and poor organization. There is insufficient interaction between citizens and members of the
two chambers of Parliament. Our earlier Democracy Sector Assessment noted that "The
Haitian Parliament's organizational ineffectiveness inhibits effective representation in a
variety of ways and poses a long-term threat to the legitimacy of the institution".

Leaders' Decisions Are Not Considered Representative: Haitians overwhelmingly
believe they are under-represented and largely excluded from this new democracy. In part,
the problem is the lack, cited above, of communication between officials and their constitu-
ents. A more concrete source of malaise lies in the failure of local governments to deliver
services. The country has no coherent framework for implementing the decentralization
envisaged in the 1987 Constitution. Despite some loosening of'centralized purse strings, few
municipalities can count on the financial support they should expect from Port-au-Prince with
the result that mayors lack the resources to respond to citizens' needs. The newest local
authorities, created by the 1987 constitution, lack not only material resources but training in
the basic elements of their responsibilities.

The other side of the coin is the incapacity of the populace to exercise their oversight
function and make their needs heard through effective advocacy. In a country of 8,000,000,
there are only 165 registered NGOs. Thus, civil society has yet to find its voice and demand
inclusion.

Perception that Justice is Corrupt: One of the most serious constraints to
democracy in Haiti is the weakness of the judicial system. For democracy to take root, and
retain the support of the people, it must operate within a legal framework which guarantees
respect for citizens' rights and ensures that everyone, including governments and public
servants are subject to the laws and accountable to the people. While there have been
notable improvements in the last four years, as shown in our accomplishments section, the
judicial system is still weak in its ability to guarantee due process, weak in its institutional
capacity to administer justice, and weak in its commitment to reform. As a result, one of the
major challenges facing USAID in this sector is how to help the GOH build a judicial system
in which respect for the rule of law and human rights prevail.

The judicial system remains an exclusive system which does not reach a significant
portion of the population. There are only 185 tribunaux de paix (the lowest level of trial
judge) in a country divided into 565 communal sections. There are only 29 juges
d'instruction, the magistrates responsible for investigating most serious criminal offenses,
including collection of evidence and the interrogation of witness, to determine if the case
should proceed to trial. With fewer than two juges d'instruction per jurisdiction, there are
inadequate resources to investigate criminal cases. Two hundred new Judicial (investigative)
Police have been trained to assist in detective work, under the direction of the juges
d'instruction, but their mandates are still unclear. In this void, the lowest level juge de paix
is often required to be his own investigator and police agent.

The system is virtually inaccessible to poor Haitian citizens who lack the means or
education necessary to be heard in the Haitian judicial system. While it is encouraging to see


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 83









that in some of the jurisdictions where USAID is working the constitutional requirement that
detainees come before a judge within the first 48 hours after arrest is increasingly observed,
this is still not the case in the majority of the country. In addition, pretrial detention can last
many months, due at least in part to the insufficiency ofjuges d'instruction and other
personnel needed to carry out investigations. When the poor finally come before the court,
most have no legal counsel, lacking necessary funds to engage a lawyer. Since these
offenders have little or no understanding of the law or their own rights they are doubly
hampered in obtaining a fair trial.

Human rights abuses in prisons continue to go unaddressed; prison conditions fall
well below international standards; inefficiency, corruption and abuse of procedures go
unchallenged; and laws are often ignored or implemented selectively for political reasons.
Furthermore, Haitian citizens do not have a strong understanding of what their human rights
are. In sum, the Haitian judicial system is plagued with severe problems and is in dire need
of reform.

In addition to the above problems which impede access to the rule of law for the
majority of Haitians, codes and laws are outdated and have rarely been amended since their
introduction in 1835. One area of concern is laws regarding the cadre of judicial personnel.
At present judges receive very low salaries, and are retained at the whim of the executive.
These factors of lack of independence, low pay and indefinite job status create little incentive
to remain on the bench or improve professional skills. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice is
technically responsible for the police, yet they are accorded an autonomy, and in status terms
such as salaries, a superiority to judicial personnel. The power and relative organization of
the police have made the judiciary reluctant to try cases of police misconduct and abuse for
fear of reprisals, further exacerbating people's perceptions that there is no rule of law and
that there is impunity for those entrusted to establish and enforce justice who do not abide by
the law. According to a recent assessment of the justice sector and confirmed by USAID
focus groups, many members of the judiciary personnel are viewed as corrupt and lacking
basic legal skills.

In summary, the major problems which confront this new democracy are a lack of
political inclusion in which an overwhelming percentage of the population feel unrepresented
and excluded from the political center; a lack of clear consensus on the rules of the game,
particularly in the realm of new democratic procedures including both elections and
decentralization; and weak governance characterized by a lack of transparency, accountability
and adherence to the rule of law.

3. Program Accomplishments to Date

During the last strategy period, the democracy strategy was to foster more effective and
responsive democratic institutions and empowered communities.

Major accomplishments during this period span the areas of justice and security,
elections, parliament, civil society, and local government.

USAJ/Hati -Strtegi Pln FY199-200 Pae 8


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 84









Justice and Security. Major accomplishments include the peaceful demobilization of the
Haitian Armed Forces through re-training or monetary compensation, the establishment of a
5,200 member civilian police force, on-the-job training for 360 judges and prosecutors in
Port-au-Prince and eight major cities, as well as basic training courses at the Ecole de la
Magistrature, Haiti's Constitutionally-mandated judicial training school, for over 430 judges
and prosecutors. In addition, seven joint judiciary-police seminars to enhance coordination
of investigations of criminal offenses between prosecutors, judges of instruction, justices of
the peace and police officers took place. Currently, 60 recent law school graduates are
participating in a six month pilot judicial training program to improve their understanding of
the judicial and prosecutorial functions. Furthermore, over 200 judicial (investigative) police
were trained to work with prosecutors and judges of instruction in conducting criminal
investigations. This will facilitate more rapid investigation of cases. Lastly, a recently
launched pilot effort in judicial mentoring has met with favorable results.

Further, to increase access to the justice system and reinforce the rule of law, NGOs and bar
associations in six cities provide legal services to poor Haitian citizens. From January 1996
to December 1997, some 14,956 Haitians have received legal assistance. Finally, the United
States has provided technical assistance to the Haitian government to enable it to improve
case tracking and case management techniques, particularly in criminal cases. This
assistance has enabled cases to proceed more efficiently and fairly through the penal chain,
resulting in a drop in the number of persons in pre-trial detention beyond the time allowed by
law.

Moreover, to address the much-lessened but still persistent problem of human rights abuse,
the Human Rights Fund that existed during the defacto period was reestablished. Under the
new program, nearly 150 victims of human rights abuses have received medical and other
direct victim assistance, group therapy and one-on-one counseling sessions have been held
with victims and their families; eight grants have been awarded to local human rights groups
for civic education and advocacy efforts; a conference on Rehabilitation of Victims of
Organized Violence was held and allowed Haitians to discuss openly the effects of human
rights abuses on societies and individuals for the first time; and, a small pilot program (two
jurisdictions) is building relations between communities and the Haitian National Police.

Elections. USAID assistance in the planning and implementation of local parliamentary and
presidential elections in Haiti since 1994 has resulted in a number of major accomplishments.
Approximately 97 percent of all eligible voters registered for the. elections in 1995 and in a
supplemental registration in 1997. The Presidential elections in December 1995 resulted in
the first peaceful transition of power from one democratically elected President to another. A
locally initiated election observer unit has been formed as a result of a business group
initiative, with USG-financed observer training. Election protests by candidates to the
Electoral Council in 1997 were presented with an increasing level of concrete evidence of
electoral wrongdoing, as compared to previous elections. A small but competent cadre of
Haitian electoral technicians has emerged from the electoral process since 1995, as a result of
training received from the USAID-financed UN and IFES technicians. In stark contrast to
previous elections, the Haitian government assumed responsibility for financing approximate-


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 85








ly 75 percent of the cost of the April 1997 elections. In addition, elections are now part and
parcel of the Haitian Government Budget, for the first time since the new Constitution was
enacted in 1987.

Parliament. Under the last strategy period, the Haitian Parliament has distinguished itself as
an independent and increasingly responsible democratic institution. An interpellation, called
by Parliament in March 1997, was conducted with dignity and was televised and broadcast
by radio. When a scandal arose when several parliamentarians mis-used visas for personal
benefit, they were censured by the Legislature and parliamentarians themselves were at the
forefront of popular outrage. With USAID's support, major accomplishments include:
assisting the Finance Commissions of both Houses with the analysis of the budgets for FY96
and FY97 and ensuring that the Commissions efficiently and thoroughly analyze future
budgets; forming several support units to improve administrative structures and upgrade
personnel (e.g. Committee Support Secretariat- Research and Reference Unit and a Press and
Public Relations Unit); training staff on legislative drafting, drafting the minutes of proceed-
ings, protocol and public relations; and sponsoring study tours to the U.S., Panama, Brazil
and Canada to allow members and staff of both Houses to interact with counterparts and to
exchange viewston key issues.

Local Government. Mayors and other local officials have made great strides in working
toward the decentralization that is called for in the 1987 Constitution and that has yet to
become reality. USAID helped create the National Federation of Haitian Mayors, linking 11
regional groups, which now advocates for decentralization reforms. This group received
President Pr6val's mandate to develop essential decentralization legislation which is now
pending Parliamentary action. Haiti's mayors are learning from worldwide experiences in
decentralization via five seminars sponsored by USAID regarding decentralization experience
from the U.S., the Philippines, Colombia and Bolivia, as well as from attending the Inter-
American Conference of Mayors in Miami, to which a delegation of mayors was sent. Upon
returning to their municipalities, USAID assisted the mayors who attended the Miami confer-
ence to organize a national town clean-up program, communal soccer championships, and
other public service initiatives. Eighty five mayors and municipal employees have received
training in subjects including preparation of municipal by-laws and leadership skills, and ten
municipalities have benefitted from intensive technical support to identify priorities, prepare
plans of action, and develop new institutional arrangements for provision of basic goods and
services. Moreover, the issue of decentralization remains in the spotlight; USAID has
supported public meetings of elected officials and civil society in twenty communes to inform
citizens on issues of decentralization and has produced 10 national weekly radio broadcasts
on decentralization.

Civil Society. Civil society is increasingly active and vocal about its priorities and concerns
and is placing pressure on the government to respond. After President Aristide's return,
with USAID support, civil society groups implemented over 2,250 community projects in
113 of Haiti's 133 communes. More recently, in response to political crisis, more than 90
civil society groups from across the country have spoken out in favor of resolving the
impasse. Additionally, civil society is increasingly taking stands on key policy issues, such


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 86










as decentralization. Among the principal accomplishments, USAID's civil society program
has: sponsored two National Dialogues and a public information campaign on the issue of
decentralization and participation in Les Cayes, Gonaives, and Cap-Haitien bringing together
more than 500 organizations from different points of view in constructive, policy-oriented
debate; conducted and published a nationwide public opinion survey on democratic values,
providing essential information to civil society and government on peoples' perceptions of
their relationship to government institutions and officials; trained 28 members of 12 civil
society organizations from a variety of sectors (e.g. health, education, agriculture, environ-
ment, private sector, justice and human rights) in advocacy skills; provided three small
grants for networking and coalition building to organizations working on women's legal
rights, environmental protection, and decentralization to more effectively influence policy
reforms in these areas; assisted 6,000 people to participate in civic education initiatives
related to election participation, decentralization, and the role of territorial assemblies; spon-
sored a U.S. study tour for six representatives of civil society organizations to observe how
civil society functions in a democracy, after which participants carried out civic education
workshops for over 200 community leaders throughout the country.

While the last strategy saw impressive accomplishments, much remains to be done. The new
strategy addresses this issue by placing more emphasis on the demand side of the equation on
the theory that a stronger and effective demand from the citizens of Haiti for genuine
inclusion in decision-making will lead to more responsive governance. If institutions are
weak now, and political will to strengthen them is weak, increased demand should improve
elections, accountability of officials, delivery of the rule of law and public decision-making,
by creating more consensus. Our strategy will also attempt to bring clarity to the rules of
the game by strengthening elections processes and supporting decentralization reforms. We
will also address the issue of weak governance by working with elected officials, both in
local government and in Parliament, to improve their ability to deliver services. To the
extent there is political will, we will also work with the judicial sector to improve its
capacity to deliver the rule of law.

Our strategy also plays a role in integrating the middle class/elite better into the
democratic process. Many of these strands are cross-cutting, especially in the field of
improved advocacy, where we will work with businessmen's associations to ensure that their
ability to lobby for their needs effectively is strengthened. In addition, our work to improve
and extend the rule of law directly addresses their needs for law and order and should also
improve stability of contracts and other legal issues. Finally, our planned efforts in peace
and reconciliation will focus on identifying areas of common concern and experience between
many classes and should thus forge a link of shared history.

4. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships

There will be a genuine commitment from the Haitian power elite to the principles
S of democracy. -
Until the Presidential elections in 2000 there will not be strong political
S commitment to reforms and institutional strengthening within ministries.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 87








There will be a continuing willingness on the part of the Haitian people to insist
on participation.
The Government of Haiti, and political actors in general, will eventually cede to
popular and international pressure to institute free and fair elections.
If people are involved and understand why decisions are being made, their
demands for services will become more reasonable and more focused.
Increased demand should improve elections, accountability of officials, and
decision-making.
Haiti's democracy will not be overthrown.

5. Commitment and Capacity of Other Development Partners in Achieving the
Objective:

The multitude of donors working in this area is a good indication of the
importance all attach to strengthening inclusion and governance in this fledgling democracy.
The areas in which they are most active are rule of law, election support, participation and
strengthening parliament.

In rule of law, Canada, the European Community (EU), the UNDP, MICIVIH are
the major actors. The UNDP is active in prison reform. The Canadians are working
collaboratively with USAID in improvements of the administration of justice (they are
working on higher level courts, while USAID focuses on the lowest level justice de paix
administration and the Department of Justice works at the level of Prosecutor's Offices).
The EU complements our efforts in one of our model jurisdictions by providing legal assis-
tance to indigent claimants and funding activities of legal and human rights advocacy groups.
MICIVIH addresses human rights abuses and is supporting creation of juvenile courts, as
well as strengthening the Office for Protection of Citizens. While not a major donor in this
field, the French play an important role in legal reform and also support the concept of
establishing juvenile courts. The French have also played an important role at the Ecole de
la Magistrature, training the core faculty for the pilot training program. They have also
assigned a magistrate to work at the Ecole on a full time basis.

Parliamentary activities in the past have been supported by the UNDP
International Parliamentarians Union (IPU) at about $300,000/year. The IDB plans to
include Parliamentary assistance in its new modernization of the state project and will focus
heavily on increasing communication channels between MPs and their constituents with a
proposed FY 1999 loan of over $6 million for 4 years. Finally, there are a number of
Parliament-to-Parliament programs including Canada and France which offer limited
commodity procurement (especially reference materials) and observational study tours.

In the area of local government and decentralization, the IDB is considered the
lead donor, although at present its project is stalled waiting for Parliament approval. The
UNDP has a Municipal Development project which is a major complementary activity to the
USAID effort. Both the UNDP and the EU encourage decentralization of government
services to the regional level. The IBRD's new Basic Infrastructure activity will help to


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 88










support initiatives from local communities as will the UNDP Landuse Planning Project,
which among other things aims at development of a decentralized planning capacity leading
to a decentralized public investment program budget.

Many donors encourage popular participation: the UNDP offers training to NGOs;
both the IBRD and the IDB have provided grants to local organizations and communities to
improve infrastructure. Donor support for civil society, advocacy and civic education is
largely still in the planning stages, with the exception of the work of the UN-OAS Civilian
Mission which supports human rights organizations, monitors the human rights situation, and
supports judicial reform. The United Nations has several planned efforts related to civil
society and advocacy, with primary emphasis on advocacy for family planning and maternal
and child health. Additionally, the UNDP is considering supporting a human rights and civic
education program, now in the preliminary design stage. Finally, the EU has long planned a
program to strengthen civil society as a democratic actor; however, the program is not yet
operational. Because these programs are in their preliminary phases, USAID has an
opportunity to coordinate to ensure that programs are mutually reinforcing and potentially
leverage assistance in areas where USAID alone cannot fill the void, such as civic education.

USAID has been the major donor in support of free and fair elections, through
grants to IFES, IRI and NDI, as well as to the UNDP. Other prominent donors have
included Canada, France, Japan, Venezuela and the UNDP. The trend now is to leave the
actual costs of the elections to the GOH while donors prefer in the future to support election
monitoring.

Table 5
Donor Support for Democracy Sector Activities
1997- 1998 (millions)

AGENCY Police/Security Justice Human Rights Political Party Elections Civil Society Parliament Local
Development Government

EU 10.0 16.0
over 3 years
IDB 6.0
IBRD-World Bank N/A*
OAS N/A*
UNDP N/A*
MICIVIH N/A*
Canada 13.0 over 3 35 over 4 0.7 over 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.7 over 4 0.00
years years years years
France .8 over 3 years .7 over 3
years


Amounts not available from these organizations


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 89









6. Illustrative Approaches


Four intermediate results will contribute to achievement of the Strategic Objective:

IR 1: Civil Society Organizations Positively Influence Policies and Oversee Public
Institutions. USAID will support stronger advocacy groups and widespread civic education
activities to promote a more knowledgeable and demanding public. Training of CSOs in
organizational methods, advocacy techniques and substantive issues such as women' rights
will be supplemented by interventions to improve information-dissemination, including work
with journalists, information clearinghouse organizations and networking groups. These
activities will be a fruitful area for joint planning and financing with other SOs. We envision
work with women's groups on issues such as reproductive rights, businessmen's groups to
improve their ability to lobby for issues such as growth of the private sector and property
rights, environmental groups, human rights groups to create pressure to improve the rule of
law.

IR 2: Elections Are More Credible and Participatory. This Intermediate Result will
address more credible and participatory elections. For credible elections three components
are vital: more informed electorate; stronger political parties that offer real and well-defined
choices; and oversight mechanisms to ensure that elections are free and fair. Training for
political parties will work toward development of genuine issue-oriented platforms that reflect
views expressed by civil society, and the inclusion of women in their activities; parallel
activities with CSOs aim to insure that strong entities exist to supervise and organize elec-
tions and to monitor the process. Electoral education will also be offered in a variety of
arenas to create a more demanding and knowledgeable electorate. Technical assistance will
be offered to the election process, to support training of registration and poll workers,
registration processes, the Conseil Electoral Permanent, and other procedural issues
surrounding establishment of voter lists, logistical support and other issues.

IR 3: More Responsive Governance by Elected Officials. We will work to improve
governance by elected officials, both at the local level and in Parliament. To ensure this,
activities will give training to local officials to improve capacity in policy analysis, revenue
administration, development planning, community outreach and other topics. To increase re-
sources available to municipalities, USAID will support legal reforms aimed at devolution
and decentralization and will introduce pilot credit or other development funds at the local
level. Cross-fertilization from the Economic Growth SO and secondary cities program will
enhance the impact of these interventions, using the municipal credit fund whenever possible
in areas where decentralization is most developed and local officials have received sufficient
training to ensure that these funds are put to the best use. Where appropriate we will also
coordinate with EG to develop tourist activities.

For Parliamentarians to respond more effectively to citizens' needs, they must learn to
communicate with their constituencies, and they must have the ability to respond effectively.
USAID plans to seek out the most effective and responsive MPs and work with them to
create role models. We envision sponsoring a series of regional workshops in which


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 90









Parliamentarians meet with interested constituents to discuss proposed legislature. This will
both ensure that constituent views are better understood, and also that constituents have a
better understanding of the constraints under which MPs work. In addition, development of
research capacity in Parliament, workshops and observational visits are also planned. To
complement work with parliamentarians, the civil society development activities mentioned
above will strengthen the oversight and advocacy skills of the constituents. Where possible
the regional workshops will focus on pending legislation involved in achievement of our
other SOs, as well as our own theme of decentralization.

IR 4: People Increasingly Treated According to the Rule of Law. Our activities will
continue to work on the supply side by providing a supply of trained judicial personnel,
through training and mentoring programs for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and
clerks .Legal assistance to the poor will be expanded to other parts of the country. Case
tracking systems will speed the work of the courts in model jurisdictions, and may be
increased when evidence exists that they are indeed reducing time needed to resolve cases.
We will, however put additional emphasis on creation of a demand for the rule of law. This
will have two approaches: the formal approach of reforms to introduce sanctions for judicial
misconduct, and the more grass-roots approach of working directly with people.

This represents a new emphasis in our program, in which we will attempt to fund four new
activities: creation of a National Reconciliation program to begin a healing process for the
abuses of the last 10-15 years; strengthening of existing indigenous human rights groups to
foster the emergence of "watchdogs" to monitor human rights abuses and bring them to
public attention, promotion of an active campaign aimed at ensuring that the population, and
particularly the youth are aware of their Constitution and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, thus ensuring a commonality of values which will be a strong platform for
renewed demand; and finally if funds permit, assistance to set up juvenile detention facilities
to protect youth from the crowded and unwholesome prison conditions to which they are now
subject, and to train them in skills allowing them to enter the work force.

7. Sustainability

Strengthening people's voice in public policy and development issues, helping to
make elections more credible and participatory, strengthening representative governance, and
improving the rule of law are in themselves elements which will contribute to the
sustainability of democracy in Haiti. Since the emphasis of this strategic objective is to
increase the demand for genuine inclusion or representation, most of the activities will seek
to identify Haitian NGOs, political parties or other interest groups, and to strengthen their
ability to voice their concerns and to represent their constituents effectively. In other cases,
creation of watch-dog groups will guarantee that public officials become more accountable.

Adoption of certain policies by the GOH will assure the sustainability of USAID's
investments. The passage of important laws, such as those in the areas of decentralization
and judicial reform, will create the enabling environment for sustained democratic
development. Additionally, to ensure institutional sustainability, we will work whenever


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 91









possible with existing organizations, and in fact, at present we do not plan to create any new
organizations. When necessary, we will strengthen the organizational capacity and financial
viability of those institutions that are considered critical for sustained democratic
development, such as watchdog groups and human rights organizations. Moreover, USAID
will coordinate with other donors to seek complementarity in programs that will assure
sustainability, such as in the area of legal assistance where the E.U. and the French have
funded activities as well as USAID. Finally, through enhancing the demand for democratic
governance, indigenous feed-back mechanisms will be reinforced, creating a dynamic that
will go far toward ensuring sustainability of the supply-side activities (rule of law and
representative governance).

8. Expected Results and Impact

There are four performance indicators for the Strategic Objective, More genuinely
inclusive democratic governance attained.

The first will be the percentage of participation in the Presidential elections of
2000 and 2005. The target is 40 percent. Baseline to be used will be the turnout in 1995
which was estimated by international observers at 25 percent9.

The second indicator is % of citizens who say that their local and parliamentary
elected officials (mayors, senators and deputies) care a great deal or a fair amount about the
problems facing people in their localities.
Targets: (baseline 1997: 12%) 1999: 16%; 2000: 20%; 2001: 25%; 2002: 30%; 2003: 34%;
2004: 37%; 2005: 40%. Means of Measurement: Annual USIS poll; average of responses to
questions regarding parliamentarians' and mayors' ability to resolve problems.

The third indicator is % of citizens who say they have great deal or a fair amount
of confidence in the justice system. Targets: (baseline 1997: 24%) 2000:28%; 2001:30%;
2002:33%; 2 003:36%; 2004:40%; 2005:45%. Means of Measurement: Annual USIS poll.

The fourth indicator is # of public policies on critical areas for development that
are changed based on CSO advocacy. These public policies include those related to
environment, education, economic development, health, justice. Targets: (baseline 1997:7);
1999:7; 2000:4; 2001:8; 2002:8; 2003:7; 2004:6; 2005:5. Means of Measurement: Annual
survey conducted by contractor/grantee among CSOs to determine their success rate in influ-
encing critical policies related to development. Survey results will be verified independently
by interviews with appropriate Ministry, Parliament, and/or through news reports.

Data for all indicators at the Strategic Objective level will be desegregated by gender, and
whenever possible also for Intermediate Results.



'Estimates on this vary from 20 percent to 30 percent. We have chosen a middle figure of 25 percent.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 92









IR 1 Civil Society Organizations Positively Influence Policies and Oversee Public
Institutions

Indicators:
1. # advocacy initiatives effectively carried out by targeted CSOs. Targets: (baseline
1998:TBD); 1999:20% over baseline; 2000:30% over baseline; 2001:50% over
baseline; 2002: 65% over baseline; 2003:75% over baseline; 2004:90%; 2005:100%
over baseline. Means of Measurement: Annual survey conducted by
contractor/grantee among USAID-assisted CSOs to determine whether advocacy
initiatives were carried out per written agreements and/or according to standards of
effectiveness.
2. # CSOs involved in oversight of public institutions. Targets: (baseline: TBD); 1999:
5% over baseline; 2000:10%; 2003:15%; 2004: 20%; 2005:25%. Means of
Measurement: Inventory, updated annually, by contractor/grantee.

IR 2: Elections are More Credible and Participatory

Indicators:
1. % of citizens who say that elections were free and fair.
Targets: (baseline 1997: 18 %); 1999: 30 %; 2001: 40%; 2003: 50 %; 2005: 55 %.
Means of Measurement: USIS or USAID-sponsored opinion polls every two years,
between Presidential, Parliamentary and local elections.
2. % of citizens who say that political parties provide meaningful choices.
Targets: (baseline 1997:29%*) 1999:30%; 2001:35%; 2003:40%; 2005:45% Mean
of Measurement: USIS or USAID-sponsored opinion polls every two years, between
Presidential, Parliamentary and local elections.
% of people who expressed confidence in political parties; 28% for men and 29.3%
for women.

IR 3: More Responsive Governance by Elected Officials

Indicators:
1. Increased local government access to revenues. Targets: (baseline: TBD); 1999: 0%
over baseline; 2000: 5% over baseline; 2001: 8% over baseline; 2002: 10% over
baseline; 2003: 20% over baseline; 2004: 25% over baseline; 2005: 27% over
baseline. Means of Measurement: Ministry of Finance and Municipal Budget
records, collected annually by contractor/grantee.
2. Percentage of bills and budget amendments which reflect citizen input from town
meetings, regional workshops and other dialogue fora.
Targets: (baseline: TBD); 1999: 0% over baseline; 2000: 5% over baseline; 2001:
8% over baseline; 2002: 10% over baseline; 2003: 20% over baseline; 2004: 25%
over baseline; 2005: 27% over baseline.
Means of Measurement: Parliamentary records, collected annually by contrac-
tor/grantee.


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 93









3. Level of confidence in local government officials; Targets: (baseline 1997:8%);
1999:15%; 2000:18%; 2001:20%; 2002:23%; 2003:30%; 2 004:35%; 2005:38%.
Means of Measurement: USIS-, USAID-, or proje-t-sponsored survey.

IR 4: People Increasingly Treated According to the Rule of Law

Indicators :
1. Level of User Satisfaction with the Courts (this will measure if user thought the judge
knew his job well; if the amount of time waiting for a hearing seemed fair; if user
thought everyone behaved ethically). Targets: 1999: 10% partially satisfied (on one
point); 2000: 15% partially satisfied; 2001: 20% partially satisfied; 2002:25% par-
tially satisfied; 2003: 30% satisfied (2 points); 2004:35% satisfied; 2005: 40%
satisfied. Means of Measurement: Twice a year a survey will be administered in
USAID's model jurisdictions, at least once being at the time of assizes. An index of
three questions will be used.
2. Percentage of citizens who believe that their human rights are respected. Targets:
(baseline 1998: TBD); 1999: 5% over baseline; 2000: 7% over baseline; 2001: 12%
over baseline; 2002: 15% over baseline; 2003: 17% over baseline; 2004: 20% over
baseline; 2005: 25% over baseline. Means of Measurement: USAID- or USIS-
sponsored public opinion poll.


USAID/Haisi Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004 Page 94


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 94








SO: MORE GENUINELY INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE ATTAINED

Indicators for the SO:- Percentage participation in presidential elections.
Percentage of members of targeted CSOs that believe they can have an impact on public policy & govemmnt oversight processes.
Percentage of citizens who say that their local and parliamentary officials (mayors, senators and deputies) care a great deal or a fair amount about the problems
facing people in their localities.
Percentage of citizens who say they have great deal or a fair amount of confidence In the justice system.


MISSION
GOAL








STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE








INTERMEDIATE RESULTS









INTERMEDIATE RESULTS
INDICATORS


IR 1: Civil Society Org
Positively Influence P
Oversee public Institut







-No. of advocacy initiatives effectt
carried out by targeted CSO.
* No. of CO involved in overight
Institutions.


IR 2: Elections more C
and Participatory








S% of citizen who say that election
and fair.
- % of citizen who sy that politic
provide meaningful choice.


IR 3: More Responsive
Govemance by Electe







f
- Incresed local government acce
revenue..
- % of bills and budget amendment
reflect citizen input from town me@
regional workshops and other dial
- Level of confidence in local over
officials.


R18 4: People Increasingl
According to the Rule of








SLevel of user eatiafaction with the
- % of citizens who believe that the
right are respected.


"u:\pcpspub\123datalsp-dg.wk4"









F. Streamlined Government


1. Special Objective Statement Streamlined Government

2. Problem Analysis

Two Administrations (those of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Ren6 Pr6val) and three
governments (those of Smarck Michel, Claudette Werleigh and Rosny Smarth) have been,
since late 1994, struggling with the implementation of a comprehensive structural economic
reform program complete with economic policy and legislative actions in an attempt to re-
define the Haitian economy and State. The ultimate objectives of the re-definition exercise
are twofold. First, it is to initiate the process leading to an economically more streamlined
(both qualitatively and quantitatively), efficient and, thus, credible central government.
Second, it is to induce the re-defined and more liberal Haitian economy to grow at
approximately 4.5 percent per annum with an inflation rate of approximately 10-15 percent.
In practical terms, the GOH has been attempting to implement several successive structural
reform programs supported by the IFIs and bilateral donors. Although the contents of those
donor-financed structural reform programs were varied, they have included one or more of
the following policy issues: (1) improvement of public finance; (2) downsizing of the civil
service and civil service reform in general; (3) privatization of SOEs; (4) trade liberalization;
(5) financial sector reform; and (6) decentralization.

The structural imbalance between the GOH's need to finance the bloated civil
service and much needed social investment, on the one hand, and GOH's low tax revenue
collection, on the other hand, has been plaguing Haiti since the return of democracy in late
1994. There have been intermittent strikes by civil servants demanding higher wages and
back pay since October 1994. Pressured by those strikes, the GOH has authorized unplanned
and ad hoc payments for wage increases or salary arrears. For example, in spite of the GOH
October 1996 decision to freeze the wage bill at 2.4 billion per year for FYs 1996-98, the
actual wage bill has risen to G 3.1 billion a 29 percent increase by December 1997.
Those extemporaneous payments have, in turn, threatened fiscal and financial stability.

Subsidies to inefficient, money-losing SOEs have, since FY 1995, constituted a
significant budgetary drain and threatened the fiscal stability. To eliminate the budget drain,
the GOH proposed to privatize (i.e. sales of shares, management contract or
lease/concession) a first group of nine SOEs.

In FY 1995, tariffs on selected commodities reached more than 50 percent of CIF
prices. In addition, Haiti had the highest port charges in the Caribbean region and port
clearance procedures were protracted and time-consuming. Imports were subjected to
quantitative restrictions and licensing. Monopoly rights were granted to SOEs and selected
private interest groups for the production and sale of selected goods and services. Thus,
Haiti has, since FY 1995, been plagued with high cost imported goods, corruption,
inefficiency and low foreign investment. Tariff reform, customs reform, trade liberalization


USAID/Haiti Strategic Plan FY 1999-2004


Page 96




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs