• TABLE OF CONTENTS
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 Title Page
 Acknowledgement
 Table of Contents
 List of abbreviations used in this...
 List of Figures
 List of Tables
 Errata
 Executive summary
 Introduction
 Methods
 Results and discussion
 Summary and conclusions
 References
 Appendices






Title: Emergy analysis perspectives of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska
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Title: Emergy analysis perspectives of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Brown, M. T.
Woithe, R. D.
Odum, Howard T.
Montague, C. L.
Odum, E. C.
Publisher: Center for Wetlands and Water Resources, University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: January, 1993
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General Note: Report to the Cousteau Society
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Volume ID: VID00001
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Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Title Page
    Acknowledgement
        Page i
    Table of Contents
        Page ii
    List of abbreviations used in this study
        Page iii
    List of Figures
        Page iv
    List of Tables
        Page v
    Errata
        Page v-a
        Page v-b
    Executive summary
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Introduction
        Page 1
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        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
    Methods
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
    Results and discussion
        Page 28
        Page 29
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    Summary and conclusions
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
    References
        Page 70
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        Page 73
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    Appendices
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Full Text









Report to
THE COUSTEAU SOCIETY





EMERGY ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVES OF THE EXXON VALDEZ
OIL SPILL IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA






M.T. Brown, R.D. Woithe, H.T. Odum, C.L. Montague, and E.C. Odum















Research Studies Conducted Under Contract No. 49105719456-12
H.T. Odum and M.T. Brown, Principal Investigators
CFWWR Publication #93-01




January 1993



Center for Wetlands and Water Resources
University of Florida
Phelps Laboratory, Museum Road
Gainesville, Florida 32611-2061
Telephone: (904) 392-2424 Telefax: (904) 392-3624










ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


This study of Alaska and questions surrounding the Exxon Valdez oil spill and tank vessel oil
transportation, resulted from ongoing collaborative research with The Cousteau Society. It is one in a
series of studies, funded by The Cousteau Society, dealing with the interface between humanity and
nature. As in previous studies, questions of public policy were quantitatively explored and suggestions
were made for sustainable patterns of development and resource allocation.

The research support of The Cousteau Society was part of its pledge to evaluate and monitor the
Valdez spill made when filming Outrage At Valdez in 1989. We are very much indebted to the Society,
its members, and in particular, Jean-Michell Cousteau and Richard Murphy for their interest and
suggestions.

We are grateful for the sponsorship, logistic support, and assistance during our research trips to
Alaska to Douglas L. Kane and the University of Alaska Water Research Center; Sandy Wyllie-
Echeverria, Peter McRoy, Howard Feder, Thomas Royer, and the University of Alaska, Institute of Marine
Science, Fairbanks, Alaska; David Sale, L.J. Evans, and the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation; Andrew Hooten and the crew and staff of the barge Camp David, Cordova, Alaska. We are
indebted to the Oil Spill Public Information Center, Anchorage, Alaska, and Exxon Company, U.S.A. for
their aid and contributions to our research efforts. An additional note of thanks is due Debra Childs, Julia
Langford, Ross Morton, and Paul Owen of the University of Florida, Center for Wetlands and Water
Resources, for their assistance in the preparation of this document.











EMERGY ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVES OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA



TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................... vi

L INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem (M.T. Brown)............................................................................................. 1
Plan of Study (M.T. Brown)................................................................................................................ 2
Emergy Analysis Perspectives (M.T. Brown)..................................................................................... 2
Description of the Study Area (R.D. Woithe and C.L. Montague) ....................................... ............... 4
Historical Perspectives of the T/VExxon Valdez Oil Spill (R.D. Woithe and C.L. Montague)................... 10
Oil Spill Cleanup and Prevention Alternatives (C.L. Montague)........................................................ 12

IL METHODS
General M ethods (M.T. Brown)....................................................................................................... 17
Analysis of the Ecologic and Economic Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (R.D. Woithe) ................ 24
Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives (R.D. Woithe) ........................................................... 26

HI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Emergy Analysis of Alaska (R.D. Wolthe) ...................................................................................... 28
Analysis of the Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (R.D. Woithe)................................. ........... ... 36
Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives (R.D. Woithe) .......................................... ........... ... 45
Information Frenzy and the Valdez Oil Spill Disaster (H.T. Odum and E.C. Odum) .............................. 53
Net Emergy Analysis of Alaskan North Slope Oil (M.T. Brown)...................................................... 63


IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Natural Resource and Economic Losses of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (M.T. Brown) ...................... 67
Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives (M.T. Brown) ............................................................................. 67

REFERENCES CITED ............................................................................................................................ 70

APPENDICES
A. Transformities and Emergy-Money Ratios Used in This Study (R.D. Woithe)................................. 80
B. Notes and Calculations in Support of the Emergy Analyses of the State of Alaska and
Prince William Sound Regions (R.D. Woithe)..................................................................... 83
C. Calculation of Transformities for the Prince William Sound Ecosystem (R.D. Woithe)............... 91
D. Notes and Calculations in Support of the Emergy Analysis of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
(R.D. W oithe).......................................................................................................... 103
E. Notes and Calculations in Support of the Emergy Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives
(R.D. W oithe)............................................ ........................................................... 111
F. Notes and Calculations in Support of the Emergy Analysis of Information Frenzy and the Valdez
Oil Spill Disaster (H.T. Odum and E.C. Odum) ......................................................... 118
G. Notes and Calculations in Support of the Emergy Analysis of North Slope Oil (M.T. Brown)......... 121










LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS STUDY


A.D.C.E.D.

A.D.E.C.

A.D.F.G.

A.D.N.R.

A.O.G.

A.O.S.C.

bbl

F.A.O.

N.O.A.A.

N.R.C.

N.R.T.

sej

U.S.C.O.T.A.

U.S.D.C.

U.S.D.I.


Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Alaska Department of Fish and Game

Alaska Department of Natural Resources

Alaska Office of the Governor

Alaska Oil Spill Commission

barrels

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

National Research Council

National Response Team

solar emjoules

United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment

United States Department of Commerce

United States Department of the Interior










LIST OF FIGURES


Page:
Figure L1. A map of the state of Alaska, U.S.A ................................................................................... 6
Figure L2. A map of the 24 March 1989 T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill (A.D.E.C., Unpublished)............... 7
Figure L3. A map of the Prince William Sound region of Alaska.................................... ................ 8
Figure IL.. Symbols of the Energy Circuit Language (Odum, 1971; 1983)............................................. 18
Figure 1.2. Simplified diagrams illustrating: a.) the calculation of Net Emergy Yield Ratio for an
economic conversion where purchased energy is used to upgrade a lower grade resource;
b.) the calculation of an Emergy Exchange Ratio for trade between two nations; and c.)
the calculation of a Transformity for the flow D that is a product of the process that
requires the input of three different sources of emergy (A, B, and C). ......................... 21
Figure I.3. A diagram illustrating a regional economy that imports (F) and uses resident renewable
inputs (I) and nonrenewable storage (N) ................................................................... 22
Figure IL4. A model of the costs and benefits of oil spill damage and oil spill prevention methods for the
U.S. oil transportation system ..................................................................................... 25
Figure IlI1. The state of Alaska model ................................................................................................ 29
Figure 1.2. The Prince William Sound regional model ................................................. ............. 30
Figure 1L3. A comparison of emergy signatures of: a). the Prince William Sound region of Alaska
circa 1988 (Table m.6); b). the state of Alaska circa 1985 (Table I.1)....................... 40
Figure II.4. The distribution of emergy values for natural resource losses resulting form the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in sej and percent of total natural resource emergy loss for the highest
and lowest loss estimates (Table III.9)........................................................................ 42
Figure II115. The distribution of the emergy values for the highest (a) and lowest (b) total emergy loss
resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Table 111.9)................................................ 43
Figure II1.6. The relative impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a percent of annual emergy use of each
of three regions: the state of Alaska, the region from Prince William Sound to Kodiak
Island impacted by the oil spill, and the Prince William Sound region ........................ 46
Figure III.7. A comparison of the net emergy benefits of the ten oil spill prevention methods for the U.S.
tanker fleet adjusted for an oil spill in the continental U.S. from Table III.10................ 49
Figure II.8. A comparison of the net emergy benefits of the ten oil spill prevention methods for the
Alaskan tanker fleet from Table III.11.......................................................................... 50
Figure 1I.9. An emergy systems diagram of the processing of environmental stress information by the
U.S. television industry................................................................................................ 56
Figure I.10. An example of oil spill images broadcast by television in the aftermath of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill (Photograph: Alaska Sea Grant Program, Fairbanks, AK).................. 58
Figure I1ll. Solar emergy inputs in the transformations that convert environmental damage to shared
information and human group response...................................................................... 59
Figure II.12. Energy systems diagram of the economy of Alaska and oil delivery system.................... 64
Figure II.13. Summary diagram of net emergy of North Slope oil ...................................................... 66
Figure C.1. The aggregated Prince William Sound trophic web model................................................. 93
Figure C.2. The detailed Prince William Sound trophic web model .................................... ............ 94










LIST OF TABLES


Page:
Table II.1. Emergy analysis of the state of Alaska (Figure 1.1) in 1985............................................... 31
Table IIL2. Emergy value of major, long term emergy storage (Qi) of Alaska in 1985 ........................ 32
Table 1.3. Summary of annual emergy flux and money in the Alaskan economy from Table Il.1........... 33
Table I.4. Alaskan 1985 emergy indices derived from Table 111.1 ...................................................... 34
Table 1.5. A comparison of emergy indices of Alaska in 1985 to those for 12 other nations in 1980
given by Huang and Odum (1991)................................................................................ 35
Table 116. Emergy analysis of the Prince William Sound region of Alaska (Figure 11.2) in 1988........... 37
Table II.7. Summary of annual Prince William Sound empower and money flows from Table III.6......... 38
Table II.8. Prince William Sound region 1988 emergy indices derived from Table m1.6......................... 39
Table 111.9. Emergy losses (Li, LPPi, and Mi) of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.............................................. 41
Table IIL10. The emergy investments in implementation, natural resource damage prevented, economic
system losses prevented, and preliminary net emergy benefits for 10 spill prevention
alternatives for the U.S. tanker fleet adjusted for an oil spill in the continental U.S......... 47
Table 1I.11. The emergy investments in implementation, natural resource damage prevented, economic
system losses prevented, and preliminary net emergy benefits for Alaskan tanker fleet
spill prevention alternatives. ......................................................................................... 48
Table IL.12. Emergy analysis of the U.S. television industry............................................................... 55
Table 1I.13. Emergy aspects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill based on one hour television transmission and
0.5 hour reception per person..................................................................................... 57
Table 11IL14. Emergy analysis of human disturbance from the Exxon Valdez oil spill............................ 60
Table I.15. Emergy analysis of North Slope oil................................................................................. 65
Table A.1. Transformities (Ti) and emergy-money ratios used in emergy calculations .......................... 81
Table B.1. Conversion factors for storage and flows used in the state of Alaska and the Prince William
Sound regional analyses............................................................................................... 84
Table C.1. Designations for the aggregated Prince William Sound trophic web model (Figure C. 1).......... 96
Table C.2. The solar transformities calculated using the aggregated Prince William Sound trophic web
m odel (Figure C.1)....................................................................................................... 97
Table C.3. Designations for the detailed Prince William Sound trophic web model (Figure C.2)............ 98
Table C.4. The solar transformities of the detailed Prince William Sound trophic model (Figure C.2)
calculated from Table C.5 and equation C.1 assuming 30%, 10%, and 5%
Lindem an efficiencies ................................................. ............................................. 99
Table C.5. Flows of the detailed Prince William Sound trophic web model generated from the
relationships reported by McRoy and Wyllie-Echeverria (1991) .................................... 100
Table C.6. Trophic levels calculated from the detailed Prince William Sound trophic model (Table C.3)
using NETWRK3 (Ulanowicz, 1986) compared to those given by
DeGange and Sanger (1987). ........................................................................................ 102
Table D.1. Mass-energy conversion factors (GJi) used in the natural resource damage and economic
system loss analyses..................................................................................................... 104
Table D.2. Designations for the Exxon Valdez oil spill natural resource and economic loss
analyses (Table 1I.9) ................................................................................................. 105
Table D.3. Biomass and energy estimates of the natural resource damage associated with the
Exxon Valdez oil spill (Table III.9)............................................................................. 106
Table E.1. Designations for the oil spill prevention analyses..................................................................... 112
Table E.2. The equations used in the oil spill prevention alternatives analyses to calculate net emergy
benefits for each alternative i...................................................................................... 113
Table E.3. Data used in calculation of U.S. tanker fleet oil spill prevention alternative net emergy
benefits in Table 11l.10................................................................................................. 114
Table E.4. Data used in calculation of Alaskan tanker fleet oil spill prevention alternative net emergy
benefits in Table III.11.............................................................................................. 117










ERRATA


Page 33 A footnote for the "Solar Empower" column should be added and should read "Results
were corrected for significant figures after all calculations were complete."

Page 33 Summary flow "R" value of "4500" should read "4100."

Page 33 In expression for summary flow "N, term "22" should read term "29."

Page 33 Summary flow "Nl" value of "270" should read "230."

Page 33 Summary flow "P1E" value of "210" should read "252."

Page 33 Summary flow "B" description "Exports transformed within" should read "Other
exports."

Page 33 Summary flow "B" value of "34" should read "200" (as the following addition to the
expression for "B" indicates, this is actually a change in methodology rather than an
error).

Page 33 Expression for summary flow "B" should read "21 + 22 + 23."

Page 33 Expression for summary flow "FF" should read "13 + 14 + 15 + 17."

Page 34 A footnote for the "Value" column should be added and should read "Results were
corrected for significant figures after all calculations were complete."

Page 34 Index "12" value of "7600" should read "6500."

Page 34 Index "14" value of "2400" should read "2500."

Page 34 Index "16" value of "0.069" should read "0.087."

Page 34 Index "17" value of "0.075" should read "0.052."

Page 34 Index "18" value of "13" should read "19."

Page 34 Index "19" value of "2200" should read "2300."










ERRATA


Page 33 A footnote for the "Solar Empower" column should be added and should read "Results
were corrected for significant figures after all calculations were complete."

Page 33 Summary flow "R" value of "4500" should read "4100."

Page 33 In expression for summary flow "N, term "22" should read term "29."

Page 33 Summary flow "NI" value of "270" should read "230."

Page 33 Summary flow "PIE" value of "210" should read "252."

Page 33 Summary flow "B" description "Exports transformed within" should read "Other
exports."

Page 33 Summary flow "B" value of "34" should read "200" (as the following addition to the
expression for "B" indicates, this is actually a change in methodology rather than an
error).

Page 33 Expression for summary flow "B" should read "21 + 22 + 23."

Page 33 Expression for summary flow "FF" should read "13 + 14 + 15 + 17."

Page 34 A footnote for the "Value" column should be added and should read "Results were
corrected for significant figures after all calculations were complete."

Page 34 Index "12" value of "7600" should read "6500."

Page 34 Index "14" value of "2400" should read "2500."

Page 34 Index "16" value of "0.069" should read "0.087."

Page 34 Index "17" value of "0.075" should read "0.052."

Page 34 Index "18" value of "13" should read "19."

Page 34 Index "19" value of "2200" should read "2300."










EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Emer~g Analysis Perspectives of
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound, Alaskaa

This study used emergyb analysis techniques to evaluate both the economic and environmental
impacts of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Emergy analysis allows the comparison and
incorporation of environmental, economic, and social costs and benefits to provide a more comprehensive
perspective for policy decisions. Impacts of the spill were estimated and the estimates used to infer the
fraction of gross domestic product (macroeconomic valuec ) that was directly and indirectly impacted by
the spill. The oil spill and subsequent events were placed in perspective by comparing the emergy
changes associated with the spill to annual emergy budgets of the world economy, the United States, the
state of Alaska, and the Prince William Sound region.
The direct economic losses, expressed in macroeconomic value, amounted to 3.2 billion
macroeconomic dollars distributed as follows: 1.0% to 1.6% lost fishery harvest; 1.1% to 1.6% lost Exxon
Valdez cargo; 4.0% to 6.8% fuel used in cleanup; 4.0% to 6.0% social disruption; and 56% to 80.6%
human labor in cleanup.
Emergy analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and cleanup revealed that the cleanup costs
exceeded the natural resource and direct economic losses incurred by between 110% and 740%, depending
on the magnitude of the actual natural resource losses. In other words, the cleanup costs were 1.1 to 7.4
times more costly than the natural resource and economic damages that actually resulted from the spill.

The annual emergy budget for the state of Alaska was calculated and compared to those of
other states and nations. Alaska had a much higher proportion of free environmental emergy to
purchased emergy than that other states, a condition representative of Alaska's less developed condition.
Compared to Sweden, a country with somewhat similar environmental resources, Alaska has a poor
pattern of emergy use. Emergy analysis of the Alaska balance of trade reveals part of the reason. When
exporting environmental products, such as salmon and oil, Alaska exported ten times more energy value
to the buying states or nations than it received in exchange. It is suggested that a policy of home use
would increase the long term economy and real standard of living in Alaska ten fold, while building a
better pattern of environmental sustainability.

The emergy analysis of the annual environmental contributions to Alaska found an annual
support of 4.5E+23 sej per year. Some of this emergy was embodied in the high levels of precipitation
and wind in southern Alaska that maintain glaciers, support oceanic salinity gradients, and drive the
westward ocean currents. These currents were the means for the rapid dispersal and reduced impact of the
Valdez spill. The emergy of stored reserves, including oil, coal, peat, and glaciers, was estimated to have
a quadrillion dollar macroeconomic value.





a Report to The Cousteau Society by Mark T. Brown, Robert D. Woithe, Howard T. Odum, Clay.L. Montague, and Elizabeth C.Odum
b Emergy measures energy previously required to produce a product or drive a process. The concept was used from 1967 to 1982 under
the name "embodied energy" and redefined in 1983. Sometimes referred to as energy memory (Scienceman, 1987), emergy is expressed in
emioules of the same form (solar emjoules; sej) to differentiate it from energy expressed injoules.
c Macroeconomic value of a product is the fraction of gross domestic product based on the emergy of the product. A dollar estimated from
the emergy content is sometimes called an Emdollar. Solar emergy values, in solar emjoules, are divided by the solar emjoules/$ of the
United States to obtain the equivalent macroeconomic dollar value (1.4 trillion solar emjoules per $ in 1992).










An evaluation of the transformitiesd of principal species in Gulf of Alaska ecosystems was
performed. The higher the transformity, the higher a species is in the hierarchical chain of nature's
work. In general, the high transformity species have long lives, large territories, and greater importance
to the ecosystem. Transformities ranged from 10,000 sej/J for kelp to 100 million sej/J for sea otters and
killer whales. Tables of transformities for species simplify future evaluations of ecologic and wildlife
contributions and issues.

An evaluation of the trans-Alaskan pipeline showed a net emergy yield (over a 30-year life
span) of thirteen to one. Thus, the pipeline will eventually yield ten times more emergy than was used in
its construction and operation. The pipeline's emergy flow is enormous in comparison to other aspects of
the Alaskan system. The emergy value of the oil flow delayed during the eight-day pipeline shutdown
following the Valdez spill was greater than the oil spill damage. If political power follows in some degree
from emergy, it is not likely that wildlife interests can prevent further oil drilling on the North Slope. It
also follows that with such extreme emergy wealth involved, there is no reason why some of the wealth
cannot be used to prevent environmental damage on the North Slope and insure continued emergy
contributions of the tundra.

The value of total impact of the oil spill and associated events was between 3.3 and 4.8 billion
macroeconomic dollars, 56% to 80% of which was in the cleanup effort. When expressed in emergy, the
annual losses associated with the spill and cleanup represented:

1.1% to 1.3% of Alaska's emergy budget
87% to 130% of the oil spill region's emergy budget and
330% to 490% of the budget of the Prince William Sound region.


Emergy benefit-cost ratios were calculated for ten alternative methods of oil spill
prevention. The benefits were calculated as the damage that would not be incurred should the method be
implemented. The macroeconomic value required to implement each of the alternative prevention
measures varied from 288 million to 8.8 billion macroeconomic dollars. Many measures proposed for
preventing oil spills were found to divert more resources than would be saved (emergy required for
prevention was greater than the losses prevented). Implementing these methods would result in a net loss.
Double-hulled oil tankers were one of the alternatives found to be inappropriate. Three proposed
measures for spill prevention did have positive net emergy benefits.
In order to consider minimum and maximum benefits net emergy ratios were calculated for
each prevention alternative over a range of possible conditions. None of the 10 prevention measures were
a net emergy benefit for their minimum conditions, while seven had benefit ratios up to 2.4/1 under the
most favorable circumstance.

An emergy analysis was conducted for the process of transforming images of environmental
damage of the oil spill into the shared memory in millions of people. Based on several assumptions,
the emergy of the shared information about the spill was 3.4 times that of the spill phenomena. The
pressure of the unified public opinion caused Exxon to invest up to 7.4 times more emergy into Alaska (in
the form of cash payments) than was in the shared information. Thus a great amplification was achieved
by the information system in going from the image of disaster to the response that resulted, possibly
because of the high emergy of information already in people sensitized to environmental issues. The
investment of emergy created a social storm phenomenon analogous to other systems in which energy is


d Transformitv. The total energy, measured in one form, required to produce one unit of energy of the given product. Transformities have
the dimensions ofemergy/energy (sej/J). The transformity of a given product is calculated by summing all the energy inflows to the
process creating the product and dividing by the energy of the created product Transformities are used to convert energies of different
forms to emergy of the same form.










The great waste and secondary disaster produced by the television information system in the
present state of American culture appears to be pathological. As a newly organizing system, global
television may require trial and error before developing a pattern that contributes maximum energy and
the most prosperous sustainable economy. If confirmed with additional study, the emergy analysis of the
system of environmental response by the television industry may suggest better means for finding
appropriate responses.



References Cited:
Scienceman, D. 1987. Energy and energy. Pp. 257-276 in G. Pillet and T. Murota (eds.) Environmental Economics -The Analysis ofA
Major Interface. Roland Leimgrubers, Geneva, Switzerland,










I. INTRODUCTION


This study of Alaska and questions surrounding the T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted from
ongoing, collaborative research efforts with The Cousteau Society. It is one in a series of studies, funded
by The Cousteau Society, dealing with the interface between humanity and nature. As in previous studies
in various regions of the world, questions of public policy were quantitatively explored and suggestions
made for sustainable patterns of development and effective allocation of resources.
This study used emergya analysis techniques to evaluate both the economic and environmental
impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Emergy analysis allows comparison and incorporation of
environmental costs and benefits with variables of traditional economic costs and benefits to provide a
more comprehensive perspective for policy decisions. The analysis quantified, on a common basis, the
environmental damage in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska, the economic costs associated
with clean up, and the economic impacts of lost fishery production and tourism. Included were economic
goods and services, fuels, and the fluxes of renewable energies as well as environmental changes that
occurred, such as the loss of marine primary production and animals that were killed by the spill.
The spill, the cleanup that resulted, and the various alternatives that were proposed to prevent oil
spills following the Valdez spill offered a unique opportunity to develop perspectives for the public policy
arena that might shed some light on the complex questions surrounding environmental disasters and their
prevention.


Statement of the Problem

Among the most important problems facing human society today is the development of
procedures for the integrated study of human and natural processes that will lead to sound management of
natural resources. Increasingly, there is a need to understand both human and natural domains, each in
the context of the other, and to develop management strategies and evaluation techniques which
acknowledge and promote the vital interconnections between the two. Neither the discipline of economics
nor that of ecology has alone adequately addressed the problems society presently faces. Faced with
questions related to environmental impacts, and the costs and benefits of methods to prevent or mitigate
these impacts, society often fails to adequately factor in the environment because of the inherent
limitations of economic analysis. Both economic and environmental costs can be determined for most
environmental disturbances. However, the two types of costs are most often accounted for in different
units of measure (economic measurements in dollars and ecologic measurements in acres of impacted area
or numbers of animals affected, for example). Environmental costs may be accounted for quantitatively
with economic measurements if some direct "value" to humans can be determined. Otherwise,
environmental costs remains in units of measure that do not combine easily with the units of economic
costs. The public decision-making process is then forced to weigh impacts in different realms having
differing quantitative bases, determine an equitable allocation of costs and benefits, and ultimately
generate a policy decision.
To account for all costs and benefits associated with environmental disasters and to make the best
policy decisions regarding the allocation of resources for the mitigation and prevention of impacts, a wider
view is necessary: This view must combine the systems of humanity and nature and not treat the affairs of
humans and the productive processes of the biosphere as distinct entities. A new paradigm for such an
analysis is emerging, a paradigm that includes both the affairs of humans and the processes and
components of the environment. It is an interface between ecology and economics. This interfacing field
is "ecological economics," and among its tools is the quantitative evaluation technique of "emergy
analysis."a

a Emergy measures energy previously required to produce a product or drive a process. The concept was used from 1967 to 1982 under
the name "embodied energy" and redefined in 1983. Sometimes referred to as energy memory (Scienceman, 1987), emergy is
expressed in emjoules of the same form (solar emjoules; sej) to differentiate it from energy expressed injoules.









Environmental disasters such as oil spills, present a particularly difficult problem for public
policy decision-makers. Such questions emerge as: for a particular disaster, what level of response is
appropriate? Or, what level of prevention is appropriate to insure that environmental disasters do not
occur? To answer these questions, costs to the environment and economic system must be weighed
against each other and benefits related in such a way that the costs of prevention are not greater than the
costs that are being prevented. Yet, most often, the problem of costs and benefits being quantified in
differing units of measure money on the one hand, and environmental deterioration and social
disruption on the other still remains.


Plan of Study

To gain perspective and understand the place of the oil spill in the economy of Alaska and the
Prince William Sound region, an emergy analysis of the state and region were conducted. The
environmental, economic, and social impacts of the spill were then evaluated and compared at the two
scales. Finally, to provide some perspective on the relative merits of various prevention technologies, the
costs of these technologies were compared to the costs of two spills; the Valdez spill in Alaska, and a
hypothetical spill in a developed region of the southeast United States coast.
This final analysis (of the costs of the spill verses the costs of prevention) has extremely
important implications. As is well known, but often forgotten when policy decisions are made, technology
has its own environmental costs. Many oil spill cleanup technologies damage the environment they are
supposed to rehabilitate. Furthermore, there is environmental damage "embodied" (from environmental
disruption that results from mining, harvesting, refining, or transporting a resource) in the resources used
to create and implement oil spill prevention/cleanup alternatives, technology and equipment. For
instance, a proposed oil spill prevention alternative is to double-hull the tanker fleet. The double hulling
of the world tanker fleet will result in a great deal of environmental impact sustained inland from the
mining and transformation of the iron ore to steel plate and its installation by maritime industries. While
it is nearly impossible to evaluate all the secondary impacts associated with a proposed technology,
emergy analysis evaluates the relative amounts of work from the biosphere and from human economic
systems that goes into the technology. Thus the emergy value of a commodity, like a second hull on a
tanker, has both a global biosphere contribution of renewable and nonrenewable energy, and inputs from
the human economy. Theory suggests that the environmental costs associated with a good or service are
proportional to its emergy costs (Odum, 1971; 1988; Odum and Odum, 1983). A net yield ratio can be
calculated if the emergy required to prevent an environmental impact is related to the emergy that is saved
by preventing the impact. This net yield ratio is the ratio of emergy saved (environmental impacts
diverted) to emergy spent (the costs of prevention). If the ratio is greater than one, the prevention
technology has a positive net benefit. If the ratio is less than one, the prevention technology's benefit is
questionable.


Emergy Analysis Perspectives


Emergy, Wealth and Value

In this analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, economic, environmental, and social
costs were quantified and compared in common units of measure, emergy. Emergy is a relatively new
concept and represents an alternative system of value from which to develop public policy options. Unlike
more traditional economic theory which bases value in terms of utility and willingness to pay, emergy
bases value on the amount of renewable and nonrenewable energy that is "embodied" in a commodity.
This concept gives many people difficulty since they have been trained from an early age to think that
value is based on utility. Something is valuable if it has utility; the more utility and the more that people
perceive its usefulness, the more value it has. Thus if something has no perceived utility it has no value,









regardless of how much energy may have been embodied in it. This belief system reinforces and amplifies
many of the environmental dilemmas the world community now faces.
Clean air and water, productive forests and estuaries have small values in a utility-based value
system until they are in short enough supply so as to make them "appear" valuable. That is to say, they
were not valuable until their scarcity forced the market to price their scarcity. Yet they were always
valuable, supplying air to breath, water to drink and resources for economic conversions into usable
products. An emergy-based value system recognizes their value regardless of their utility at any one
moment in time. There is an implicit assumption in an emergy system of value that is akin to utility
value, however. Basically, it is assumed that emergy value is proportional to use value, because the
biosphere does not make mistakes. Thus if a commodity (whether a natural resource, or an economic
good) has embodied in it a given amount of the biosphere's energy, its value to the biosphere in its use is
equivalent to that which was invested in it.
Emergy is a quantitative measure of the resources required to develop a product (whether a
mineral resource that results from bio-geologic processes, a biologic resource such as wood, or an
economic product that results from industrial processes) and express the required resources in units of one
form of energy (usually solar). We suggest that evaluations using emergy may help to clarify policy
options because the use of emergy as a measure of value overcomes four important limitations of previous
attempts to quantify environmental impacts, development cost/benefits, and alternative technologies.
These limitations are as follows: 1.) Mixing units of measure like weight, volume, heat capacity, or
economic market price cannot lead to comparative analysis. The relative contribution to a nation's
economic vitality derived from fossil fuels (measured in barrels), sunlight (measured in ergs), and
phosphorus in fertilizers (measured in kilograms) is difficult to determine. 2.) Evaluations that use the
heat value of resources for quantification assume that the only value of a resource is the heat that is
derived from its combustion. In this way, for example, human services are evaluated as the calories
expended doing work, and when compared to other inputs to a given process are several orders of
magnitude smaller and often considered irrelevant. 3.) Non-monied resources and processes (i.e., those
outside the monied economy) are often considered externalities and not quantified. Most processes and all
economies are driven by a combination of renewable and nonrenewable energy. Renewable energies
(sunlight, rain, winds, tides, etc.) are outside the monied economy and therefore are generally not
accounted for in economic evaluations. Yet they are absolutely necessary in all economies and make up a
large portion of most products. Economic vitality depends on the successful use of available resources,
both renewable and nonrenewable (fuels, mineral resources, and the goods derived from them); thus
evaluations that leave out renewable energies because they are externalities consistently "undervalue" the
total production in economies and environmental processes. 4.) Price determines value. The price of a
product or service reflects human preferences often called "willingness to pay." It can also reflect the
amount of human services "embodied" in a product. A valuing system based on human preference assigns
either relatively arbitrary values or no value to necessary resources or environmental services.
Emergy is a measure of the real wealth of an economy (Odum 1984; Odum and Arding 1991).
Since wealth is ultimately tied to resources, it is necessary to express wealth in units that reflect the
resource base. Conditioned as we are, that price reflects value, we often believe that money is the measure
of wealth and that price determines value. Price suggests what humans are willing to pay for something;
but value to the public is determined by the effect a resource has in stimulating an economy. For instance,
a gallon of gas will power a car the same distance no matter what its price; thus its value to the driver is
the number of miles (work) that can be driven. Its price reflects the scarcity of gasoline and how
important it is to do the work. Price is often inverse to a resource's contribution to an economy. When a
resource is plentiful, its price is low, yet it contributes much to the economy. When a resource is scarce its
total contribution to the economy is small yet its price is high.
Emergy may be a measure of the equivalence when one resource is substituted for another.
Sunlight and fossil fuels are very different energies, yet when their heat values are used the difference is
not elucidated. A joule of sunlight is not equivalent to a joule of fossil fuel in any system other than a heat
engine. In the realm of the combined system of humanity and nature, sunlight and fuels are not equally
substitutable joule for joule. However, when a given amount of fuel energy is expressed as solar emergy,
its equivalence to sunlight energy is defined. Since emergy is a measure of the work that goes into a









product expressed in units of one type of energy (sunlight), it is also a measure of what the product should
contribute in useful work in relation to sunlight.
The failing of previous theories of resource-based value, and most current ones as well, has been
that they did not account for different types of energy, but assumed that the heat value of energy was a
common denominator by which quantification and comparisons could be made. We believe this to be
incorrect. All energy types are not equivalent in their ability to do work. Without accounting for the
differences in what has been termed the quality of different types of energy, erroneous conclusions can
result. Use of emergy to represent all the contributions to any given product or process accounts for
differences in resource quality and expresses different resources in equivalent capacity to do work.
We recognize the difficulty that these concepts present since they use new terminology and a
different measure of value from those in common usage. However, the concept of value and national
wealth stemming from resources is not new, but is as old as economics itself. The history of economic
thought is replete with considerable discussion and analysis of national wealth as measured by resources
and by attempts to measure value as it stems from resource use. Only recently has economic theory been
dominated by the determination of value based on price and national wealth measured by currency.
During times of resource scarcity, economic values were related most often to resources (land, labor or
energy) and resource use, but during times of resource abundance, economic values were related most
often to currency and price.


Theory of Maximum Empower Designs

Theory suggests (Odum 1971, 1983; Odum and Odum 1983) that economies of nature and
humans organize so as to develop the maximum empower possible; and that in so doing they prevail and
are sustained over alternatives. Empower is defined as the emergy measured in a flow per unit time. The
theoretical basis is found in the Maximum Power Principle (Lotka 1922a, 1922b, and 1945). To
maximize power, an economy develops an organization of useful processes that increases total production
through positive feedback and by overcoming limiting factors. Economies, in the long run, cannot prevail
in competition with others if emergy is wasted in nonproductive processes; yet in the short run, one can
observe apparent contradictions. However, since observations of any system are time dependent, the real
issue is not that processes exist that seem to "waste" emergy (i.e., do not reinforce productive processes)
and thus violate the maximum power principle, but whether they can do so indefinitely in a competitive
environment where selective processes are geared to eliminate them. This view is in contradiction to
some economic theories that suggest any expenditure of money and resources leads to economic vitality,
whether or not it is for unnecessary products or services.
Many scientists are used to thinking of systems as organizations of processes that are sustained
by their driving energies and resources, and that competition and competitive exclusion are the means by
which systems self-organize and develop sustainable patterns. Yet few believe that the criterion for
survival, or sustainability, is maximum empower or that competition and competitive exclusion are
selective processes that operate to maximize emergy. Other criteria for survival that have been suggested
include: minimum cost, minimum risk, maximum stability, maximum efficiency, maximum production,
least work, and maximum diversity, among others. The viewpoint used in this study is that economies,
and processes within economies, organize and operate so as to increase real wealth and prevail according
to the maximum empower principle, a refinement of the maximum power principle, and that a measure of
real wealth is emergy.


Description of the Study Area


The State of Alaska

The state of Alaska system is composed of 1.49E+06 km2 of land area and 1.68E+06 km2 of
continental shelf area (Hartman and Johnson, 1978). The land area includes large areas of tundra,










500,000 km2 of boreal forest and 60,000 km2 of coastal forest, and several mountain ranges (Figure I.1).
Well over half the state is underlain by permafrost (Hartman and Johnson, 1978). The northern Alaskan
coasts on the Bering, Chuckchi and Beaufort Seas have relatively low tidal ranges but extensive areas of
tidal energy-absorbing continental shelf (Figure 1.1). The Pacific coast of southeastern Alaska is
dominated by deep fjords with tidal ranges up to 10 m and a continental shelf break close to shore
presumably resulting in a lower proportion of tidal energy absorption than the northern coasts (Figure
1.1). A significant volume of Yukon River water and therefore chemical potential energy, enters Alaska
from Canada's Yukon Territory. Much of Alaskan land is held by federal and state governments in
national and state parks, monuments, refuges and preserves. Only one-twentieth of a percent of the state's
land is developed or altered (Smith, 1990).
Half of Alaskan citizens live in the Anchorage metropolitan area. A significant number of
Alaskans live in rural villages. As a result, subsistence hunting, fishing and other subsistence activities,
which are given priority over sport activities by state law, are an important subsystem used to harvest
natural production for use within the state. The petroleum, mining, fishing, forestry, and tourist-related
service industries, and divisions of federal government appear to be the mainstays of the Alaskan
economic system. The Prudhoe Bay, Endicott, and other petroleum fields on the North Slope of the
Brooks Range account for the majority of Alaskan petroleum production. This petroleum is transported to
Port Valdez in Prince William Sound via the trans-Alaskan Pipeline. Two refineries amidst the Kenai
Peninsula and Cook inlet oil fields and a third in North Pole, Alaska supply half the state's use of refined
petroleum fuel (Smith, 1990). Crude oil and natural gas make up a large percentage of Alaskan exports,
but the majority of the state's natural gas is used internally or disposed of by re-injection into the oil fields.
Alaska has significant coal reserves, the majority of which are bituminous and sub-bituminous. In 1985,
the year of the Alaska analysis, all of the state's coal production was used in its own power plants, though
in 1990 half of an increased production was exported to Korea (Smith, 1990).
The Alaskan forest industry is almost entirely dependent upon trade with Japan. Owing to
federal law, timber production from federal lands cannot be exported unprocessed and is therefore
exported as rough cut lumber, wood pulp and chips. Timber exports from private lands, primarily native
corporations, are generally in round log form (Smith, 1990). The Alaskan fishing industry landings are
the largest in the United States. Alaska also has the largest catch by foreign vessels of any U.S. state.
Japanese and Polish vessels account for over 75% of this catch. Much of the domestic catch is also
exported directly to Japan. Japan is Alaska's major international trading partner, being the destination for
over 70% of the state's international exports. Canada is the source of approximately half the state's
international imports (Smith, 1990).


The Prince William Sound Region

The oil from the T/VExxon Valdez made landfall on a diverse length of the Gulf of Alaska coast,
a 1400 km arc in the North Eastern Pacific Ocean extending west from the islands of southeast Alaska
and Northern British Columbia to the Aleutian Islands (Figure 1.2). From the grounding sight in
northeastern Prince William Sound, the oil moved southwest reaching its most distant landfall at the
Chignack area of the Alaska Peninsula 900 km from Bligh Reef (Galt et al., 1991).
A coastal mountain range with peaks exceeding 4000 m stretches along the Gulf of Alaska coast
restricting weather systems, resulting in high precipitation. The coastal drainage basins are narrow and
most fresh water enters the Gulf from small, short streams as a disperse line source rather than
concentrated point sources. The Alaska Coastal Current flows westward within 20 km of the shore driven
by freshwater inputs and wind (Royer et al., 1990). The Alaska Current, a counter-clockwise deflection of
the Koroshio Current, flows beyond the continental shelf, parallel to the Alaska Coastal Current. Based
upon coastal relief, and the oceanography and biology of the area, the impact zone of the spill may be
divided into four general regions: 1) the southwestern two-thirds of Prince William Sound; 2) the
southeastern coast of the Kenai Peninsula; 3) the mouth of Cook inlet; and 4) the Kodiak Archipelago and
the Shelikof Strait region of the Alaska Peninsula (Figure 1.2). Because the spill occurred in Prince
William Sound and this region was perhaps the most heavily impacted, and because the boundaries of
Prince William Sound are identifiable for analysis purposes, the focus of this report is here. General













Continental
Shelf Break
Shelf Break


Chukchi Sea








I





Bering Sea
I

\ I
i e
Be*n Sea


Trans-Alaska Pipeline


Figure 1.1. A map of the state of Alaska, U.S.A.

















































Figure 1.2. A map of the 24 March 1989 T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill (A.D.E.C., Unpublished).









































0 5 0 HINCHINBROOK ISLAND

0



Fgu


A, GULF








Figure 1.3. A map of the Prince William Sound region of Alaska.









principles developed from analysis of Prince William Sound are to some degree pro-ratable to the other
regions of impact.
Prince William Sound is a 38,000 square km embayment in the northern gulf of Alaska (Figure
1.3). It includes 15 islands of over 40 km2 in size, over 150 smaller islands, and numerous islets, sea
stacks, and reefs (Mickelson, 1989). Tides within the sound are of a mixed semidiurnal type with an
average range of 5 m. The area is seismicly active. On 27 March 1964, Good Friday, the largest recorded
earthquake in North America, epicentered in the sound, changed shoreline elevations 10 m and damaged
many of the region's towns and habitats.
The majority of Prince William Sound is within the Chugach National Forest. Prior to the spill,
the destruction of salmon streams by logging was at the forefront of debate among the region's many
interest groups. The towns of Valdez, Cordova and Whittier and the native American villages of Tatitlek
and Chenga Bay are situated on the sound and are the base for the local fishing and transportation
industries. Valdez is the southern terminus of the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline originating at Prudhoe Bay
on the Bering Sea. Nine public and private salmon hatcheries within the sound produce the stock for most
of the area's salmon harvest.
Most of the southwestern coastline of Prince William Sound is a steep, high wave energy, rocky
shoreline with small areas of low wave energy, rocky beaches. The 5 m tides range over an intertidal area
dominated by numerous algae including rockweed (Fucus distichus), kelps (Laminaria spp.), sea lettuce
(Ulva lactuca) and filamentous green algae (Urospora spp.). The waters and intertidal zone of Prince
William Sound support approximately 182 killer whales (Orcinus orca), 3000 to 5000 harbor seals
(Phoca vitulina) (Bottini and Nicholl, 1991), 4000 to 10,000 sea otters (Enhydra lutris) (Calkins, 1987),
dall's porpoise (Phocoenoides dalli), steller sea lions (Eumetopiasjubatus), river otters (Lutra
canadensis), brown (Ursus arctos) and black (U. americanus) bears, and black tailed deer (Odocoileus
hemionus), along with transient species such as the humpbacked whale (Megaptera novaengliae). The
sound serves as seasonal and permanent habitat for tens of thousands of marine birds including loons,
murrelets and sea ducks (DeGrange and Sanger, 1987) as well as highly visible species like the bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus). Most of these animals are found throughout the area of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. A large number of bird and marine mammal species migrate through the region each year.
Immediately southwest of Prince William Sound is the Kenai Peninsula. The Gulf of Alaska
coast of the Kenai Peninsula is an unsheltered, rocky, high energy coast cut by numerous fjords. Millions
of pelagic marine birds breed in colonies on the peninsula, notably murres, puffins, kittiwakes, cormorants
and petrels (Isleib and Kessel, 1989). The only town in the area is Seward, and Kenai Fjords National
Park and Kachemak Bay State Wilderness Park encompass most of the region.
Beyond the Kenai Peninsula is the mouth of Cook Inlet, a large sediment-laden body of water
much different in character from the areas to the north. Cook Inlet has extensive mud flats as opposed to
rocky coast and consequently different intertidal communities. A number of towns are located in the
lower Cook Inlet region including the towns of Homer and Seldovia and the predominantly Native
American villages of English Bay and Port Graham. Cook Inlet is an area of offshore oil production and
has been the site of numerous oil spills. Katmai National Park and Preserve extends from within Cook
Inlet southwest down the Shelikof Strait on the Alaska Peninsula.
The Gulf of Alaska coast of the Alaska Peninsula and the offshore Kodiak Archipelago, comprise
another area of rough coastline with numerous islands. This region has more kelp forests than the Prince
William Sound area (Sears and Zimmerman, 1977), and presumably more of classic sea otter kelp
ecosystem interactions described by Estes and Palmisano (1974). As in the Kenai Peninsula, the rocky
cliffs of this area have numerous marine bird colonies comprised of millions of birds (Isleib and Kessel,
1989). The Kodiak region contains the town of Kodiak and the villages of Ouzinki, Old Harbor, Karluk,
Anhiok and Larsen Bay. The numerous public land holdings in this region include Kodiak Island,
Becharof, Alaska Peninsula and Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuges, Aniakchak National
Monument and Preserve and the Chugach National Forest.
The Prince William Sound, Kenai Peninsula, Cook Inlet and Kodiak regions contain numerous
species which are the basis of commercial fisheries. Pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha) accounts
for the largest commercial landing in the region, though red (0. nerka), king (0. tshawytscha), silver (0.
kisutch) and chum salmon (0. keta) are also harvested. Pacific herring (Clupea harengus) and herring
roe are also harvested, particularly in Prince William Sound. Traditionally, bottom fish such as halibut









(Hippoglossus stenolepis) and pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) as well as benthic epifauana like king
(Paralithodes camtschatica) and tanner (Chionoecetes spp.) and dungeness crabs (Cancer magister) have
supported fisheries. There are also large sport fishing industries, particularly for salmon and halibut. Sea
otters furs were harvested by Native and later European and U.S. fisherman. The sea otter stock is still
recovering from a severe over harvest in the nineteenth century.


Historical Perspectives of the T/VExxon Valdez Oil Spill

The 997-foot Tank Vessel (T/V) Exxon Valdez ran aground at 12:04 A.M., 24 March 1989 on
Bligh Reef, a rocky shoal in northeastern Prince William Sound 25 miles south of Valdez, Alaska. The
vessel struck Bligh Reef while navigating outside of the designated shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid
ice flows from nearby glaciers. The ship's high momentum combined with the rocky bottom resulted in
the rupture of 8 of the 11 cargo tanks (National Response Team, 1989). During the next ten hours, the
Exxon Valdez lost an estimated 258,000 barrels of Alaska North Slope crude oil, 20% of its cargo
(Harrison, 1991), creating one of the two largest oil spills in U.S. waters and the 35th largest oil spill (to
that date) internationally (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990). The Valdez was
outbound from the Alyeska terminal at the Port of Valdez, the southern terminus of the trans-Alaskan
Pipeline from Alaska's North Slope oil fields on the Bering Sea. Factors which have been suggested to
have caused the spill and increased the severity of its impact include crew error and failure; failure of
Exxon Shipping Company to manage its personnel; reduced manning levels on tankers (Alaska Office of
the Governor, 1989); inadequate quantities of dispersant, skimmers, booms and other response equipment
at the terminal; poor response management (Kelso and Kendziorek, 1991); inadequate ship construction
(Kelso, 1989); equipment failure; severe weather; and failure to meet the goals of the response plans in
place (National Response Team, 1989; Alaska Oil Spill Commission, 1990).
Lightering of the remaining Valdez cargo began a day after the grounding and the vessel was
surrounded with containment boom 35 hours after the grounding. Test applications of dispersant were
begun the day of the spill, and the effectiveness was found to be diminished by the calm water. A small
amount of oil was removed from the water by mechanical skimmers, but problems in off loading full
skimmers decreased the operation's capacity (Richter, 1990). On 25 March, 15,000 to 30,000 gallons of
oil were burned using fire containment boom leaving 300 gallons of residue (Allen, 1990). High winds on
27 March forced the suspension of dispersent application and controlled burning. The windstorm moved
the spilled oil rapidly southwest oiling Naked, Smith and Knight Islands and breaking apart the slick
increasing oil evaporation and weathering and the formation of oil-water emulsion known as mousse (Galt
et al, 1991). A map showing the extent of the oil spill is given in Figure 1.2.
By 30 March, the oil had moved beyond Montague Strait into the Kenai Peninsula region of the
Gulf of Alaska. At a distance of 160 km from the grounding site, the leading edge of the spill began to
break into isolated patches and the spill lost its contiguity. The Alaska Coastal Current moved the oil
about 10 km a day so that by 1 April parts of the spill were south of Seward 225 km from Bligh Reef.
The majority of the heavy oiling was limited to the offshore islands in the Kenai Peninsula region, with
very little entering the major fjords (Galt et al., 1991). Mousse had reached Gore Point and a small
fraction had turned into the mouth of Cook Inlet, 400 km from the spill site, on 11 April (Figure 1.2).
Through the middle of April, the slick continued to break into numerous small patches composed
of small chunks of mousse tar balls. Zones of converging fresh and salt water in the mouth of Cook Inlet
concentrated the isolated patches along with other objects floating on the surface such as flotsam and
sleeping birds (Galt et al., 1991). The vast majority of the bird mortalities were murres and other Alcids,
diving birds from colonies on the rocky Gulf of Alaska coast (Piatt et al., 1990). The spill reached its
greatest extent after 18 May with tarring on Trinity and Chirikof Islands and in the Chignik area of the
Alaska Peninsula, over 800 km from Bligh Reef, where scattered tar balls were observed. Gait et al.
(1991) estimate that 35% of the spilled oil evaporated or dispersed into the water column, 40% affected
the shoreline within Prince William Sound and 25% left the sound, and 10% reached beyond Gore Point
with 2% being transported to the Shelikof Strait region. Maki (1991) calculated 1752 km of shoreline had
been oiled over a distance of 15,134 km of coastline.









Crude oil is a naturally occurring mixture of thousands of fossil hydrocarbon compounds which
are separated in the refining process into products such as fuel oil and gasoline. An estimated 1.5 million
barrels of crude oil enter the world's oceans each year from natural seeps (National Research Council,
1985), and natural, hydrocarbon-degrading organisms are ubiquitous. The lighter and more soluble
compounds in crude oil are generally the most toxic and also the first to be removed or degraded during
the weathering of oil (Mielke, 1990). Thus the toxicity and therefore the ecological impact of an oil spill
depends on both the type of oil spilled and its state of weathering.
The oil recovery and shoreline cleaning involved numerous groups and types of equipment.
Shoreline surveys were conducted by private and government groups. Weir, submersion paddle belt, disc,
and sorbent belt skimmers were used as were oil containment and sorbent boom. The majority of heavily
and medium oiled shorelines were treated with a warm water wash in conjunction with booms and
skimmers. Mechanical treatment of shoreline with cold water as well as manual removal of oily debris
and sediment was implemented as well. Following water washing treatment, some areas were treated with
INIPOL and Custumblen fertilizers, in a treatment known as bioremediation, in order to increase bacterial
degradation of oil (Exxon, 1990). A total of eight oiled-wildlife rehabilitation centers operating in
conjunction with 140 boats and five aircraft for collection, were established and operated in 1989
(Monahan and Maki, 1991). As of March 1991 the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
estimated that of the original 258,000 barrels of oil spilled: 350 barrels had been burned, 51,000 to
103,000 barrels had evaporated, 18,000 to 22,000 barrels were recovered as part of oil-water emulsion,
and an undetermined amount had been removed as part of oiled sediments and solid waste (Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation, 1991). Local individuals also deployed containment booms
for protection and collected oil and oiled sediments (Davidson, 1989; Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation, 1991).
The impact of the T/VExxon Valdez oil spill on the Gulf of Alaska coastal habitat is still being
determined. Preliminary results suggest 3,500 to 5, 500 sea otters, 200 harbor seals, up to 11 killer
whales, 1400 bald eagles (Bottini and Nicholl, 1991), and 100,000 to 300,000 marine birds (of which
approximately 70% were Alcids) and 215,000 1989 Alcid chicks (Piatt et al., 1990) died as a direct result
of the oil. Houghton et al. (1991) found up to 100% decrease in plant coverage and 95% decrease in
invertebrate numbers on oiled and cleaned shoreline. No massive fish die-offs were observed though
preliminary analysis indicates a 50% to 70% greater mortality of pink salmon eggs laid in oiled stream
intertidal areas as compared to unoiled sites in 1989 and 1990 respectively. Several species offish
showed evidence for continuing exposure to hydrocarbons, but injury has only been documented for dolly
varden trout (Salvelinus malma), where adult mortality was found to be 32% greater in the oiled subtidal
zone, and herring (Clupea harengus) spawning in the subtidal zone where increases in abnormal embryos
and larvae, larval eye tumors and egg mortality have been documented. Intertidal fish have been found to
be less abundant and those fish present had higher gill parasitism and respiration rates relative to unoiled
sites (Bottini and Nicholl, 1991).


Fate and effects of Spilled Oil.

Crude oil contains a full spectrum of organic components from highly toxic and volatile low
molecular weight organic compounds, such as benzene, toluene, and alkanes, to high molecular weight
organic of low volatility and toxicity. When separated from the mixture the heavier components combine
to form denser organic, tars, and asphalts (Mielke 1990). This process occurs intentionally in refineries,
and occurs naturally following a marine oil spill. The fate of spilled oil involves the processes of
spreading (slick formation), photo-oxidation, dissolution, evaporation, emulsification, sedimentation,
biodegradation, and asphalt formation.
Spreading, Photo-oxidation. Immediately with the onset of a marine spill, oil spreads along the
surface of the water, forming a thinner and thinner layer, vastly increases the surface area of the spill that
is exposed to sunlight, air, and water, and extends the amount of shoreline potentially impacted by the
spilled oil. Over a period of days to weeks, the thickness of the oil slick approaches a mono-molecular










layer and breaks into patches. At this stage the maximum surface area is exposed to the sun and air and
to naturally occurring oil-decomposing microbes in the water.
Dissolution and Evaporation. Within a matter of minutes of the spill, however, a separation process
begins. Those low molecular weight organic that are water soluble dissolve into seawater in the first
minutes and hours. Many of these are highly toxic, such as benzene. Soluble toxic components account
for the acute toxicity of oil spills to marine organisms. Low molecular weight organic are also highly
volatile. Those that do not dissolve in seawater evaporate. The lightest organic dissolve during the first
days. Heavier volatiles evaporate over the next few weeks. Within the first few days of the Exxon Valdez
spill, an estimated 20% to 40% of the spilled oil evaporated (50,000 to 100,000 barrels). Air quality over
the evaporating spill was very poor. Pilots and aerial observers of the spill reported noxious odors,
watering eyes, and skin irritation (Sale, Personal Communication)a.
Emulsification and Sedimentation. What remains after the dissolution and evaporation processes are
the heavier constituents of crude oil. In moderate seas and surf, these can emulsify, forming "mousse," a
substance the consistency of a chocolate mousse and containing a relatively high water content. Some of
the heavier components of crude oil that remain in open water are denser than seawater and begin to sink,
being dispersed with currents eventually to settle along the bottom. Other remaining oil may be blown
onto nearby shores where oil coats the surface and works into the sediment through the action of tides and
waves.
Though less toxic than the original crude oil, the acute effects of a large slick of weathered oil are
still devastating to animals and plants in its path as it traps them against a shoreline. Certain seabird and
sea mammal populations can be damaged because of the visco-elasticity of the oil, which fouls fur and
feathers, and interferes with movement, feeding behavior, and respiration. Many intertidal plants and
invertebrates can be smothered by an oil coating as the oil comes ashore.
Biodegradation. Nevertheless, natural processes continue to transport and transform oil washed onto
beaches and nearshore sediments. Microbes and direct sunlight, decompose oil in sediments. Tides and
breaking waves, which helped mediate the initial contamination of the shore, continue to mix and re-mix
sediments, re-exposing remaining oil to the weathering process. Most of the oil may eventually
decompose, being incorporated into marine food chains and eventually converted to basic inorganic
components -- primarily carbon dioxide and water. In the mean time, while some organisms suffer from
toxic end products of hydrocarbon metabolism and perhaps bio-accumulated refractory toxins, others may
benefit from the added organic "food."
Asphalt Formation. Thick accumulations of remaining oil may eventually form hardened asphalt
pavements. In very heavily oiled sediments, sufficient quantities of heavy organic molecules may remain
after the lighter components have decomposed, dispersed, or evaporated. If in sufficient quantity, these
may combine to form tar and bind together sediments into a hard asphalt pavement. Such a pavement
may be relatively long-lasting in the marine environment and will change the physical characteristics of
the affected sites. These changes will likely result in a shift from infaunal communities to hard bottom
communities at these sites. In the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, no asphalt formation has yet been
detected, but several sites are being considered for re-cleaning in heavily oiled areas of Prince William
Sound out of concern over possible asphalt formation (Sale, Personal Communication).a


Oil Spill Prevention and Cleanup Alternatives.

As long as oil is still being removed from the ground, complete prevention of spills is not
possible. Spills result from accidents associated with drilling, pumping, and transporting oil and liquid
petroleum products. The Alaskan oil spill has focused attention worldwide on oil spill prevention and
cleanup alternatives and policies. Numerous reviews of related technologies have resulted. Especially
notable among these are the Spill Report of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission (1990) and the earlier
management analysis by Townsend and Heneman (1989).



a David Sale, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Anchorage, Alaska.









Prevention strategies are in fact risk-reduction strategies, not risk-eliminating strategies. Hence
consideration of cleanup alternatives remains essential to any prevention plan. Like prevention, however,
complete cleanup of an oil spill is also not possible. Cleanup is considered good if 20% of the spill can be
recovered. Cleanup of larger spills has been considerably less. For example, despite the nearly $2.5
billion spent on the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez spill, less than 10% is estimated to have actually been
removed from the marine environment by cleanup operations (Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation, 1991; National Response Team, 1989).
Furthermore, cleanup technologies have environmental impacts of their own (Dunford et al.,
1991). In some situations, "doing nothing" is the best alternative (Foster et al., 1990). Small amounts of
oil in a salt marsh, for example, might be decomposed by natural processes more effectively and with less
disruption than with a cleanup procedure that involves personnel and equipment deployment in the marsh
itself.
Indirect strategies for spill prevention include reducing risk through increased oil conservation
(reducing global dependence on oil), and increased use of alternative methods of transporting oil (e.g.,
pipelines) (States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, 1990). Oil conservation may not reduce the total
percentage of oil spilled, but should reduce the number of spills per year. Spill prevention is not by itself,
however, a compelling motivation for reducing global dependence on oil. Nevertheless, as global supplies
of oil are depleted, spills will become more rare.
Prevention and cleanup strategies each have components that can be considered "hardware" and
"software." Prevention hardware includes improved design of tanker cargo holds (e.g., double-hulling),
improved tanker agility (e.g., bow thrusters), and improved navigational safety equipment and personnel
(e.g., tanker escorts, radar, traffic controllers) (Keith, 1991; Unpublished Manuscript). Prevention
"software" includes improved training and qualification criteria for personnel and more effective laws and
law enforcement (States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, 1990).
Cleanup "hardware" includes the equipment and personnel for mechanical spill removal in open
water and on oiled shores. It also includes dispersants, burning, and bioremediation techniques (U.S.
C.O.T.A., 1990). As with prevention, cleanup software includes training and qualification criteria for
personnel, but it also includes other aspects of preparedness: the positioning of sufficient quantities of
well-maintained spill-response equipment and personnel in proximity to spills. The spill-response
capabilities of the much criticized Alyeska Pipeline Company in Valdez, Alaska were inadequate at the
time of the Exxon Valdez spill. Today, however, they have a state-of-the-art facility able to respond to a
similar spill and to help prevent spills by providing tanker escorts in and out of the Port of Valdez. This
facility currently costs approximately $125,000 per day to operate (Alaska Information Service, 1989).


Major Prevention Alternatives

Double Hulls. Tanker hull design alternatives include Federal oil-spill legislation enacted in 1990
addressing prevention of spills by requiring the phasing out of all single-hulled U.S. tankers over 5000
gross deadweight tons by the year 2010. No new single-hulled tankers will be built and single-hulled
vessels will be decommissioned or retrofitted with double hulls. This legislation does not apply, however,
to foreign tankers operating in U.S. waters.
Double hulls currently exist on 26 of the 93 tankers registered for Alaska trade (State of Alaska
1990). The single-hulled tankers range in size from 16,000 to 265,000 deadweight tons. The Exxon
Valdez was 211,000 deadweight tons. To retrofit single-hulled tankers with double hulls will cost perhaps
$65,000 to $70,000 per 1000 deadweight tons. New construction of double-hulled tankers is roughly $1
million per 1000 deadweight tons (Keith, Unpublished Manuscript).
Other hull designs are also possible, such as an intermediate oil-tight deck to separate oil cargo
carried above the waterline from that carried below the waterline. Oil below this deck will have a
negative head pressure compared to the water outside, thus creating a natural vacuum in the event of a
hull puncture which should prevent a spill by allowing water pressure to hold oil the tanker (Ost 1991,
Husain and Koepenick, 1990).









Bow Thrusters and Ballast Controls. Some tanker spills could be avoided if tankers were more agile.
Smaller tankers can turn to avoid catastrophes that can be seen but not avoided by larger tankers.
Installing bow thrusters and automated ballast controls on tankers would increase the ability of tanker
operators to turn and control tanker stability (Keith, Unpublished Manuscript).
Escorts, Preparedness, and Navigational Equipment. In addition to double-hulling the tanker fleet,
the federal oil spill legislation of 1990 requires a two-tug escort for all tankers going in and out of
Alaska's oil ports, a new light on Bligh Reef and upgrades of other navigational equipment, and stiffer
licensing requirements for tanker pilots. Such prevention measures have undoubtedly resulted in
considerable reduction in spill likelihood in Prince William Sound and elsewhere, though estimates of the
magnitude of this reduction have not been publicized.
Exclusive Use of Overland Oil Pipelines. An extreme alternative is simply not to ship Alaskan oil
over water, but rather to ship all Alaskan oil to the United States via a network of oil pipelines. A similar
proposal was considered prior to the construction of the Alaskan oil pipeline. This alternative is not a
practical option at present, but is included for analytical comparison to give perspective on the problem.
Pipelines also have spills and maintenance problems.


Cleanup Alternatives

Perhaps the most significant cleanup "software" is embodied in the individual responsible for
making on-sight decisions about what to protect given the circumstances of a spill. Since it is impossible
for humans to completely clean up a spill, someone has to make moment-to-moment decisions about what
to protect with the available tactics on site. Generally this is the responsibility of an on-scene coordinator
with the U.S. Coast Guard, but this person may not always in practice be allowed much autonomy
(Westermeyer 1991).

Open-Water Cleanup Techniques. Weather permitting, oil on the water can be herded and contained
with booms (sometimes assisted by herding and gelling chemicals), then skimmed from the water surface
and stored in containment vessels. Oil recovered by these mechanical means can be reprocessed for sale
to help minimize economic losses.
Several physical variables determine the efficacy and desirability of mechanical cleanup
procedures in open water. These include the size of the slick, which is a function of local currents and the
time between the onset of a spill and the onset of an effective response; the toxicity and viscosity of the
spilled oil, which affect safety as well as mechanical efficiency of the cleanup; and weather, sea state, and
the location of the spill, which affect the logistics of cleanup operations (Westermeyer 1991, U.S.
Congress 1990).
When mechanical recovery is not possible in open water, other techniques are often considered
which attempt to enhance the natural processes of dispersal and decomposition of oil before oil reaches
sensitive areas. Most of these are controversial, however, because of concern over possible damaging side
effects. Burning an oil slick, for example, can rapidly decompose and evaporate spilled oil that is
concentrated and not emulsified, but concerns over resulting air pollution prevented its timely use in
Prince William Sound (Allen 1991). Timely burning, however, could reduce the impact of oil threatening
sensitive shorelines. As can be imagined, on-site decisions are genuinely difficult.
Perhaps the most controversial technique is the use of dispersal agents. These are chemical
agents that break up an oil slick into smaller, more dense particles that generally sink. Some wind energy
must be available for the dispersants to work. Application in calm weather is ineffective (Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation, 1991). If the water is deep and the sinking rate is low
relative to horizontal transport, the dispersed oil particles are spread over a large area of marine bottom.
The impact of the spill is thus diluted over an extensive area. Controversy arises over the toxicity of many
dispersal agents and the potential impact on bottom-dwelling organisms. The approach has been
criticized as simply cosmetic: by causing the spill to disappear from the surface, the fate and effects of the
dispersed oil may be ignored. If the alternative, however, is to allow damage nearshore, the decision may
not be easy. Are shores more valuable to protect than the sea bottom? The answer depends on what is on










the bottom compared to the shore and how concentrated and toxic the oil will be once it reaches the
bottom or the shore.
Another tactic is bioremediation. This is a set of techniques for enhancing biodegradation of oil
either by adding populations of cultured or genetically-engineered oil-consuming bacteria or simply by
adding nutrients (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus) in an attempt to stimulate natural oil decomposition by
relieving a growth-limiting factor. Concerns about bioremediation involve uncertainty about the efficacy
of these techniques in open water. While waiting to see if they are working, proven techniques are not
being deployed at that site.

Shoreline Cleanup. In the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the greatest problem by far was the oiling of the
ecologically productive and biologically spectacular southwestern shore of Alaska. In the lower two thirds
of Prince William Sound, approximately 36% of the shoreline was oiled, 6% heavily, 21% lightly, and the
remainder intermediate (Exxon, 1990). Dying seabirds, bald eagles, and sea otters produced a public
relations nightmare. A public outcry arose to punish Exxon. People demanded removal of the oil by
whatever means possible, perhaps feeling that this was the natural punishment for Exxon. Hundreds of
millions of dollars were spent in shoreline cleanup. Unfortunately, intensive cleaning of the beach was
not necessarily beneficial to those shore organisms that happened to have survived the spill.
Shoreline cleanup procedures include physical removal by manual or hydro-mechanical means.
Manual cleanup involves crews on the shore using shovels and rakes to bag oily flotsam (mousse
"patties"), and small accumulations of tar and asphalt. Manual use of sorbents may be included to hand-
wipe or dab the affected shore (Exxon, 1990; 1991). Manual operations are recommended for small areas
of contamination. Pooled oil can be vacuumed from the shore and large accumulations of tar or asphalt
may require large digging machinery.
Hydro-mechanical techniques were commonly used along the affected Alaskan shoreline to
remove oil from contaminated sediments. These included washing the surface with ambient temperature
or pressurized warm water (100 psi and 140F) to drive surface oil downslope where it was trapped by
booms and picked up by skimmers.
A method that was tested but not employed on a large scale, perhaps due to logistical problems,
was a high-pressure subsurface injection of warm water or air during incoming tides. Oil at depth in
contaminated sediments was loosened and floated to the surface for removal. Current techniques for
loosening oil at depth involve tilling the shoreline by hand or with machinery. Because of the potential
for disruption of shoreline ecosystems, however, this technique is used only in areas of high recreational
value.
Solvents were tested for loosening subsurface oil prior to warm-water washing. They were found
to significantly increase the amount of oil removed. One (Corexit 9850) was proposed but has not
received approval for wide-spread use partly because of uncertainty about its disruption of shoreline
ecosystems.
Intertidal and subtidal ecosystems areas will naturally clean themselves (Foster et al, 1990; Jahns
et al., 1991; Michel et al., 1991; Baker et al., 1990). Interference in this process by using high-pressure,
warm water, and solvents is counterproductive as learned both in the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 and
previously in the Torrey Canyon spill of 1987 (Kerr, 1991).
Bioremediation by adding limiting nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) was tested with
encouraging, but not entirely consistent, results on shores (Pritchard and Costa, 1991; U.S.C.O.T.A.,
1991; Environmental Protection Agency, 1990; Chianelli et al., 1991). Although found to be most
effective when water-soluble fertilizers were applied on affected shores through sprinkler systems, this
technique was not practical for most affected shores. Broadcast of fertilizer granules (i.e., Customblen)
and oleophilic sprays (i.e., Inipol EAP 22) were more practical and were often effective if applications
were repeated every three to five weeks. In well aerated sediments, enhancement of biodegradation was
detected to 50 cm depth. Tilling has been proposed to prepare some contaminated sediments for
bioremediation by fertilizer additions.
The federal oil spill legislation of 1990 required pre-positioning of spill cleanup facilities capable
of removing a 200,000 bbl spill in Prince William Sound and a Coast Guard oil-spill strike team for
Alaska. Moreover it created a 5 cent per barrel tax on crude oil which will raise $1 billion to pay for










cleanup costs of future oil spills. The cleanup preparedness for another spill in Prince William Sound is
now considerable. Plans are for the Petroleum Industry Response Organization to construct similar oil-
spill response facilities in five regions around the United States where the risk of oil spills are great
(National Response Team, 1990). The maintenance costs of these will likely be in the tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars per year.










H. METHODS


General Methods for Emergy Analysis

This section gives general methods of energy analysis for the evaluations that follow in the
results section. The general methodology for emergy analysis is a "top-down" systems approach. The first
step is to construct systems diagrams that are a means of organizing thinking and relationships between
components and pathways of exchange and resource flow (systems symbols and brief definitions are given
in Figure II.1). The second step is to construct emergy analysis tables directly from the diagrams. The
final step involves calculating several emergy indices that relate emergy flows of the economy with those
of the environment, and allow the prediction of economic viability and carrying capacity. Additionally,
using the results of the emergy analysis, comparisons between the emergy costs and benefits of proposed
developments as well as insights related to international flows of money and resources can be made.
Before presenting detailed descriptions of each step in the methodology, definitions are given for
several key words and concepts.


Definitions

Energy. Traditionally referred to as the ability to do work. Energy is a property of all things
which can be turned into heat and is measured in heat units (BTUs, calories, or joules).

Emergy. An expression of all the energy used in the work processes that generate a product or
service in units of one form of energy. Solar emergy of a product is the emergy of the product expressed
in equivalent solar energy required to generate it. Sometimes its convenient to think of emergy as energy
memory.

Emioule. The unit of measure of emergy. It is expressed in the units of energy previously used to
generate the product; for instance the solar emergy of wood is expressed as joules of solar energy that were
required to produce the wood. Solar emjoule is abbreviated "sej."

Empower. The emergy value of a flow of energy per unit time, expressed as sej/time.

Empower density. Empower per unit area, expressed as sej/time*area.

Macroeconomic dollar. A measure of the money that circulates in an economy as the result of
some process. In practice, to obtain the macroeconomic dollar value of an emergy flow or storage, the
emergy is divided by the ratio of total emergy to Gross National Product for the national economy.

Nonrenewable Energy. Energy and material storage such as fossil fuels, mineral ores, and soils
that are consumed at rates that far exceed the rates at which they are produced.

Renewable Energy. Constant and reoccurring energy flows of the biosphere that ultimately drive
the biological and chemical processes of the earth and contribute to geologic processes.

Resident Energy. Renewable energies that are characteristic of a region.

Transformitv. The total energy, measured in one form, required to produce one unit of energy of
the given product. Transformities have the dimensions of emergy/energy (sej/J). The transformity of a
given product is calculated by summing all the emergy inflows to the process creating the product and
















Q-


1O


Figure 1.1. Symbols of the Energy Circuit Language (Odum, 1971; 1983).


ENERGY CIRCUIT: a flow of energy, often with a flow of materials.

SOURCE: outside source of energy; a forcing function.


STORAGE: a compartment of energy storage within the system
storing a quantity as the balance of inflows and outflows.


HEAT SINK: dispersion of potential energy into heat that
accompanies all real transformation processes and storage.

INTERACTION: process which combines different types of energy
flows or material flows to produce an outflow in proportion to
a function of the inflows.

PRODUCER: unit that collects and transforms low-quality energy
under control interactions of higher quality flows.


CONSUMER: unit that transforms energy quality, stores it, and feeds
it back autocatalytically to improve inflow.


TRANSACTION: a unit that indicates the sale of goods or services
(solid line) in exchange for payment of money (dashed line).

SWITCHING ACTION: symbol that indicates one or more switching
functions where flows are interrupted or initiated.

BOX: miscellaneous symbol for whatever unit or function is labeled.


-n-










dividing by the energy of the created product. Transformities are used to convert energies of different
forms to emergy of the same form.


Further Elaboration on the Methods Used for Emergy Analysis

Step 1: Overview System Diagrams. A system diagram in "overview" is drawn first to put the system
of interest into perspective, combine information about the system from various sources, and to organize
data-gathering efforts. The process of diagramming the system of interest in overview ensures that all
driving energies and interactions are included. Since the diagram includes both the economy and
environment of the system, it is like an impact diagram which shows all relevant interactions.
Then a second simplified (or aggregated) diagram which retains the most important essence of
the more complex version is drawn. The final, aggregated diagram of the system of interest is used to
construct a table of data requirements for the emergy analysis. Each pathway that crosses the system
boundary is evaluated.

Step 2: Emergy Analysis Tables. Emergy analysis of a system of interest is usually conducted at two
scales. First the system within which the system of interest is embedded is analyzed and indices necessary
for evaluation and comparative purposes are generated. Second, the system of interest is analyzed. Both
analyses are conducted using an emergy analysis table organized with the following headings:

1 2 3 4 5 6
Note Item Raw Units Transformity Solar Macro-
Emergy economic $

Each row in the table is an inflow or outflow pathway in the aggregated systems diagram; pathways are
evaluated as fluxes in units per year. An explanation of each column is given next:

Column 1 The line number and footnote number that contains sources and calculations for the
item.
Column 2 The item name that corresponds to the name of the pathway in the aggregated
systems diagram.
Column 3 The actual units of the flow, usually evaluated as flux per year. Most often the units
are energy (joules/year), but sometimes are given in grams/year or dollars/year.
Column 4 Transformity of the item, usually derived from previous studies.
Column 5 Solar Emergy (sej), is the product of the raw units in Column 3 with the
transformity in Column 4.
Column 6 The result of dividing solar emergy in Column 5 by the emergy-to-money ratio
(calculated independently) for the economy of the nation within which the
system of interest is embedded.


Step 3: Calculation of Emergy Indices. Once the emergy analysis tables are completed, several
indices using data from the tables are calculated to gain perspective for and aid in public policy
decision-making. The principles used in judging development alternatives are as follows: 1.) When
alternative investments are compared, the investment that contributes the most emergy value to the public
economy in the long run is most likely to be successful; and 2.) When a single system is analyzed, the
energy intensity of the development should match that of the local economy. Two ratios are calculated:
Emergy Investment Ratio (IR), and the Environmental Loading Ratio (ELR). Several other indices help
in gaining perspective about processes and are necessary precursors to the IR and ELR; they are: Emergy
Money Ratio, Emergy Per Capita, Emergy Density, Emergy Exchange Ratio, Net Emergy Yield Ratio,
and Solar Transformity.









Emergy-money ratio. The ratio of total emergy flow in the economy of a region or nation to the
GNP of the region or nation. The emergy money ratio is a relative measure of purchasing power when the
ratios of two or more nations or regions are compared.
Emergy per capital. The ratio of total emergy use in the economy of a region or nation to the total
population. Emergy per capital can be used as a measure of the average standard of living of the
population.
Emergv density. The ratio of total emergy use in the economy of a region or nation to the total
area of the region or nation. Renewable and nonrenewable emergy density are also calculated separately
by dividing the total renewable emergy by area and the total nonrenewable emergy by area, respectively.
Net emergy yield ratio. The ratio of the emergy yield from a process to the emergy costs of that
process. The ratio is a measure of how much a process will contribute to the economy. Primary energy
sources have yield ratios in the range of 3 to 1 to as high as 11 to 1; thus they contribute much to the
wealth of the economy. Figure II.2a shows the method of calculating the net emergy yield ratio.
Emergy exchange ratio. The ratio of emergy exchanged in a trade or purchase (what is received
to what is given). The ratio is always expressed relative to one or the other trading partners and is a
measure of the relative trade advantage of one partner over the other. Figure II.2a shows the relationship
and calculation of the emergy exchange ratio.
Net emerge yield ratio. The ratio of the emergy yield from a process to the emergy costs. The
ratio is a measure of how much a process will contribute to the economy. Primary energy sources have
yield ratios that range from 3 to 1 to as high as 11 to 1; thus, they contribute much to the wealth of the
economy. Figure II.2a shows the method of calculating the net emergy yield ratio.


Determining the Intensity of Development and Economic Competitiveness:
EMERGY INVESTMENT RATIO

Given in Figure II.3 is a diagram illustrating the use of nonrenewable and renewable energies in
a regional economy. The interaction of indigenous energies (both renewable (I) and nonrenewable (N)
with purchased resources from outside (F)) is the primary process by which humans interface with their
environment. The investment ratio (IR) is the ratio of purchased inputs (F) to free energies derived from
local sources (the sum of I and N) as follows:

IR = F/(I+N) (1)

The name is derived from the fact that it is a ratio of "invested" emergy to resident emergy. The
Investment Ratio is a dimensionless number; the larger the number the greater the amount of purchased
emergy per unit of resident emergy. When the ratios of two developments of like kind are compared, an
indication of their economic competitiveness is derived. The investment ratio can also be used to indicate
if a process is economical in its utilization of purchased inputs in comparison with other alternative
investments within the same economy. Comparison between a regional investment ratio and the ratio for
a proposed development may also be used as an indicator of the intensiveness of the development within
the local economy.

Determining Environmental Impact: ENVIRONMENTAL LOADING RATIO

Nearly all productive processes of humanity involve the interaction of nonrenewable energies
with renewable emergies of the environment, and in so doing the environment is "loaded" (meaning to
strain, stress, or pressure). Figure II.3 shows environmental loading as the interaction of purchased
emergy and nonrenewable storage of emergy from within the system with the renewable emergy








Purchased Inflow (F)


Inflow From Renewable or
Non Renewable Source


Outflow of
Upgraded Energy (Y)


Net Emergy Yield Ratio = (Y-F)/F


Imports (A)


Nation A: Emergy Exchange Ratio
(b)


Imports-
Exports


A+_ (all in emergy
j Transformity of D= A+B+C aof some type)
D (energy)


Figure 11.2. Simplified diagrams illustrating: a.) the calculation of Net Emergy Yield Ratio for an
economic conversion where purchased energy is used to upgrade a lower grade resource;
b.) the calculation of an Emergy Exchange Ratio for trade between two nations; and c.)
the calculation of a Transformity for the flow D that is a product of the process that
requires the input of three different sources of emergy (A, B, and C).












Purchased Inputs (F)


Investment Ratio of Regional Economy: IR=F/I*N
Environmental Loading Ratio of Regional Economy: ELR = F+ N/I
Yield Ratio of Regional Economy: YR = Y/F











Figure 11.3 A diagram illustrating a regional economy that imports (F) and uses resident renewable inputs
(I) and nonrenewable storage (N). Several ratios used for comparisons between systems
are given below the diagram and explained in the text. The letters on the pathways refer
to flows of emergy per unit time, thus the ratios of flows are dynamic and changing over
time.









pathway through environmental work. An index of environmental loading, the Environmental Loading
Ratio (ELR) is the ratio of nonrenewable emergy (N + F) to renewable emergy (I) as follows:

ELR = (N+F)/ I (2)

Low ELRs reflect relatively small environmental loading, while high ELRs suggest greater
loading. The ELR reflects the potential environmental strain or stress of a development when compared
to the same ratio for the region and can be used to calculate carrying capacity.


Criteria for Alternative Public Policies

Public policy alternatives that involve decisions regarding the development and use of resources
are guided by two criteria in this study: 1.) the alternative should increase the total energy inflow to the
economy, and 2.) the alternative should be sustainable in the long run.
Development alternatives that result in higher emergy inputs to an economy increase its vitality
and competitive position. A principle that is useful in understanding why this is so is the Maximum
Empower Principle (which follows from the work of Lotka (1922), who named it the "maximum power
principle"). In essence, the Maximum Empower Principle states that the system that will prevail in
competition with others is the one that develops the most useful work with inflowing emergy sources.
Useful work is related to using inflowing emergy in reinforcement actions that insure, and if possible
increase, the inflow of emergy. The principle is somewhat circular. That is, processes that are successful
maximize useful work, and useful work is that work which increases inflowing emergy. It is important
that the term useful is used here. Energy dissipation without useful contribution to increasing inflowing
emergy is not reinforcing and thus cannot compete with systems that use inflowing emergy in self-
reinforcing ways. Thus drilling oil wells and then burning off the oil may use oil faster (in the short run)
than refining and using it to run machines, but it will not compete in the long run with a system that uses
oil to develop and run machines that increase drilling capacity and ultimately the supply of oil.
Alternatives that do not maximize energy cannot compete in the long run and are "selected
against." In the trial and error processes of open markets and individual human choices, the patterns that
generate more emergy will tend to be copied and will prevail. Recommendations for future plans and
policies that are likely to be successful are those that go in the natural direction toward maximum emergy
flow.
A second guiding criterion for many alternatives is that they be sustainable in the long run.
Ultimately sustainable development is an activity that uses no nonrenewable energy, for once supplies
have dwindled, development that depends on them must also dwindle. However, the criteria for
maximum empower would suggest that energy be used effectively in the competitive struggle for
existence. Thus when energy is available, its use in actions that reinforce overall performance is a
prerequisite for sustainability. To do otherwise would suggest that the development would not be
competitive, and would not be sustainable in the short run. This alternative (no use of nonrenewable
energy) provides the lower boundary for sustainability. The upper bound is determined by the maximum
empower principle as well. Sustainable developments are those that operate at maximum power, neither
too slow (efficient) nor too fast (inefficient). The question of defining sustainability becomes one of
defining maximum power. Investment ratio and the environmental loading ratio are used as the criteria
for sustainability. By matching the ratios of a development with those of the economy in which it is
imbedded, a proposed development is as sustainable as the economy as a whole.


Analysis of Public Policy Options

The emergy analysis procedure is designed to evaluate the flows of energy and materials of
systems in common units that enable one to compare environmental and economic aspects of systems.
Questions concerning development policy and the use of resources usually involve environmental impacts
that must be weighed against economic gains. Most often impacts and benefits are quantified in different









units and result in a paralyses of the decision-making process because there is not a common means of
evaluating the trade-offs between environment and development. Emergy provides a common basis, the
energy of one form that is required by all productive processes.
While "Ecological Economics" and the methods of Emergy Analysis are comparatively new and
still evolving, we believe they offer an important step in developing a quantitative basis for public policy
decision making.


Analysis of the Ecologic and Economic Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill


Environmental Costs

The emergy losses that occurred as the result of damage to natural ecological systems in Prince
William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska (A, Figure 11.4) from the Exxon Valdez oil spill included any
natural resource damage for which there was not an equal, corresponding gain by another natural resource
(for example increased prey availability to a competitor of damaged resource). If a specific natural
resource damage resulted in both an energy gain and loss, the net gain was subtracted from, or the net
loss added to, the total energy loss.
Net decreases in primary production (LPP.) of phytoplankton resulting from the Valdez oil spill
were calculated as the product of the following four components: 1.) the annual net production of
phytoplankton per m2; 2.) the fraction of this production that was lost (estimated from decreases observed
in phytoplankton populations following other spills (Trudel, 1978; National Research Council, 1985)); 3.)
the maximum area covered by the Valdez spill at any one time; and 4) a duration for this maximum extent
(time, estimated by integrating the time of coverage for smaller extents normalized for their respective
areas). Lost primary production by intertidal algae was calculated as the product of the: 1.) sum of the
differences between post-spill standing stock biomass of intertidal algae and pre-spill standing stock
biomass of intertidal algae (for a recovery assumed to be a linear increase from post-spill standing stock to
pre-spill standing stock over 5 to 10 year period); and 2.) the annual production per unit biomass.
Zooplankton and phytoplankton mortalities measured as biomass were calculated as the product
of: 1.) the pre-spill standing stock per unit area; 2.) estimated percent mortality, and 3.) the maximum
area of the Valdez spill. Intertidal producers, herbivores, meiofauna, and macrofauna mortalities in units
of biomass were estimated as the product of the initial standing stock per unit area, estimated percent
mortalities, and the total area of shoreline oiled.
Natural resource damage estimates that were reported in numbers of individuals killed were
converted into dry-weight biomass and a general value for the ratio of dry weight to live body weight for
vertebrates (H. = 0.30 g-dry wt./g-live wt. (Carter, 1969)) was used where a specific H. is not given. The
biomass mortalities were converted to energy losses using biomass to energy conversion factors to
generate energy losses as the result of different types of natural resource damage.
The emergy values of specific components and flows of the ecosystem were calculated using
transformities given in Appendix A. Appendix C gives details of the calculations of trophic levels and
transformities of individual species for the Prince William Sound ecosystem. The emergy losses of
individual species and groups were added to determine the total emergy of natural resource damages
(VNRL). A sensitivity analysis was performed by halving and doubling components of the loss
calculations to determine their effect on the individual and total natural resource damage emergy losses.


Economic Costs

The emergy lost by the economic systems of Alaska and the United States as a result of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill (F and G, Figure 11.4) included lost fishery harvests, human labor and material
expenditures for the oil recovery and shoreline cleaning operations, and other perturbations and changes































Spilled H




Human
stress
losses -









Figure 11.4. A model of the costs and benefits of oil spill damage and oil spill prevention methods for the U.S. oil transportation system. the total loss from an
oil spill is defined as: A + B + F + G + I H, and the investment required to implement a prevention alternative is defined as: C + D + E, where, A =
natural resource damage resulting from the oil spill, B = spilled oil, C = new technology invested in transport systems, D = new equipment invested in
transport systems, E = additional human labor invested in transport systems, F = equipment and technology used in oil spill cleanup, G = human labor
used in oil spill cleanup, H = spilled oil recovered during cleanup, I = human productivity losses due to stress as a result of the oil spill










of flows in the human system that resulted from the spill. The emergy loss associated with the oil that was
not shipped out of Port Valdez as a result of the oil spill (National Response Team, 1989) was calculated,
but not added into the total economic system losses as there was no evidence that the United States used
less oil in 1989 as a result of the spill. As in the natural resource damage assessment, where an emergy
loss was associated with an emergy gain, the net loss was added to, or the net gain was subtracted from,
the total loss.
The emergy values of the economic system losses were calculated using transformity values
referenced in Appendix A. The total economic system emergy loss (VESL) resulting from the spill was
calculated as the sum of: 1.) the economic losses; 2.) labor costs in cleanup; 3.) social disruption; 4.) the
loss of Exxon Valdez crude oil cargo; and 5.) the fuel used in cleanup operations. A sensitivity analysis
was performed by halving and doubling the individual values used to calculate losses in order to
determine the values' effects upon the economic system losses as a result of the spill. Emergy values for
human stress losses as a result of the spill were estimated from social and cultural impact studies of the
Valdez and other spills by Brown and Owen (Unpublished Data)a.


Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives

An emergy analysis of oil spill prevention alternatives (C, D, and E in Figure 1.4) was conducted
to determine the net emergy benefits of seven tank vessel designs and three spill prevention system
modifications analyzed by the National Research Council (1991) and Keith et al. (1990). These net
emergy benefits were calculated separately for: 1.) the tanker fleet serving the United States and 2.) the
fleet licensed for Alaska.


The United States Tanker Fleet

For the United States tanker fleet, the monetary implementation and operation costs and oil
spillage prevention estimates for the three prevention systems of Keith et al., originally developed for
Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound, Alaska, were extrapolated to national cost and prevention estimates
by determining the cost and prevention per metric ton of oil transported through each of the two Alaskan
sites and then multiplying by a representative annual oil transport of 600 million metric tons in United
States waters (National Research Council, 1991). The emergy investment required to implement each
alternative was measured in units of human services and steel required to implement and operate the
alternative. The steel required to implement an alternative for the U.S. fleet was calculated in two ways.
The maximum estimate was calculated as the amount of steel required to refit the 1500 different tankers
which use the 15 major U.S. ports each year, assuming each tanker was of average size in the world fleet,
78,700 lightweight tons (lightweight denotes the weight of a vessel without cargo, crew, fuel or stores)
(National Research Council, 1991). The minimum estimate was calculated as the amount of steel
required to refit the 257 U.S. flag tankers (National Research Council, 1991), assuming each was of world
fleet average size.
The Alaskan emergy-money ratio was used with the monetary cost estimates of Keith et al.
(1990) for oil spill prevention methods. Odum's (1992) 1.6E+12 sej/$ U.S. emergy-money ratio
(Appendix A) was used with the National Research Council (1991) estimates. The two different ratios
were used because the Keith et al. data were for Alaska while the National Research Council data were for
the United States as a whole. The sum of the natural resource emergy loss (VNRL) and the economic
system emergy loss (VESL) per metric ton of oil spilled in the Exxon Valdez oil spill, were used as an
estimate for total damage per metric ton of oil spilled for all U.S. spills. Loss estimates were given as
ranges. The highest loss estimates were used in best-case prevention estimates and lowest loss estimates
were used in worst-case prevention estimates.
The emergy benefits as the result of natural resource ecologicc) damage and economic system
losses that would not occur as a result of an implemented oil spill prevention alternative, were also given

a M.T. Brown and P. Owen. University of Florida, Center for Wetlands and Water Resources.









as a range. Each alternative's best-case (highest) and worst-case (lowest) net emergy benefits were
calculated as the sum of emergies of economic system losses and natural resource damages that did not
occur as a result of implementing the alternative, less the emergy used in implementing the alternative.
The National Research Council (1991) reported a range of oil spillage prevention estimates for tanker
designs. Lowest emergy in implementation and highest spillage prevention estimates were used with
highest natural resource loss prevention estimates to calculate best-case net emergy benefits.
The human stress and productivity losses as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill were not
included in this analysis because the low human populations of Prince William Sound, the Kenai
Peninsula and Kodiak Island were not typical of much of the United States coastline. As such, the human
stress losses from the Valdez spill may not have been indicative of a general U.S. oil spill. Thus, the
emergy benefit of a given prevention alternative that results from prevented human stress losses in Alaska
may underestimate that for the United States in general. Since coastal ecosystems are different, and
population density and economic activity are greater along much of the coast of the contiguous U.S.,
estimates of damages were adjusted to include these additional losses. Best- and worst-case additional
loss estimates were calculated using coastal ecosystems typical of the southeastern United States. Ecologic
loss per metric ton of oil spilled was derived using data for oil spilled and area oiled estimates for salt
marshes and mangroves from: the Amazon Ventura oil spill in Georgia (Brown, 1989); the 1985 Nairin,
Louisiana, Shell pipeline spill (Fischel et al., 1989); the 1986 Naval Air Station Roosevelt Roads jet fuel
spill in Puerto Rico (Ballou and Lewis, 1989); and the Refineria Panama spill in Panama (Cubit et al.,
1987; Teas et al., 1989). Standing stock biomass and primary productivity estimates for Atlantic and Gulf
of Mexico wetlands were used to estimate losses in oiled areas. The highest and lowest ecological system
loss estimates calculated for southeastern coastal ecosystems were then added to the highest and lowest
ecological loss estimates calculated for the Valdez spill.
Additional economic losses in the continental U.S. were estimated using Florida beach tourism
industry data of Bell and Leesworthy (1986) and tourist visit declines following the 1978 Amoco Cadiz oil
spill in Brittany, France (Bonnieux and Rainelli, 1978). Annual coastal tourist industry receipts and
employees per kilometer of Florida beach were used with the length of shoreline oiled per metric ton of
Exxon Valdez cargo and one- and four-year tourism declines to generate lowest and highest loss estimates.
These additional loss estimates were summed with the economic loss estimates of the Valdez spill to
calculate economic loss estimates per metric ton of oil spilled adjusted for a spill off the contiguous U.S.
Tourism receipt declines were taken as an emergy loss under the assumption that the lost income would
result in a corresponding decrease in goods and services imported into the coastal region.


The Alaskan Tanker Fleet

The net emergy benefits of modifications to the Alaskan tanker fleet were calculated in the same
manner as for the U.S. fleet. The data of Keith et al. (1990) were used for monetary costs of system and
tanker modifications. The steel required for implementing tanker modifications was estimated from the
characteristics of the 93 vessel Alaskan tanker fleet described by the Alaskan Oil Spill Commission (1990)
and the dead weight of vessels described by other sources. Steel requirements were estimated assuming a
0.1 to 1 light weight to dead weight ratio and a weight of steel equal to a vessels light weight required to
double hull a single-hulled tanker. High monetary cost and steel estimates assumed double hulling of all
70 single hulled vessels of the fleet, while low estimates assumed double-hulling of only half of these
vessels. The oil spillage prevention estimates used for each system modification and the low prevention
estimates used for tanker modifications were those given by Keith et al. The high prevention values for
tanker modifications were estimated at three times the Keith et al. values, as spillage prevention was
assumed to occur not only in Alaska, but along the remainder of each tanker's route as well.









m. RESULTS & DISCUSSION


Emergy Analysis of Alaska


The state of Alaska energy systems model is diagrammed in Figure II. 1. The major natural
emergy sources are the chemical potential energies of rain (J204-B) and inflowing Canadian river water
(J208-B), and the energy absorbed from tide (J205-B). These natural, driving energy flows support the
ecologic-economic system of Alaska through both economically valued and economically unvalued
processes. The resources harvested in economically valued processes (J209-223 through J212-223, J213-
223 through J215-223, and J212-219, Figure I.1) include minerals, oil, natural gas, coal, timber, and
fish. The Prince William Sound region model is diagrammed in Figure I.2. The major natural emergy
sources were chemical potential energy of fresh water (from rain, runoff, and glaciers (J403-B)), the
absorption of tidal energy (J404-B) and a smaller value associated with input of seismic energy (J406-B)-


State Economic System

The emergy signature derived from the state of Alaska analysis is given in Table 11.1. The
emergy of each major, long-term storage is shown in Table 11.2. Energy conversion factors used in this
analysis are given in Appendix B. Table nI.3 gives a summary of several categories of related flows. The
sum of the major renewable emergy sources (the chemical potential energies of rain and inflowing
Canadian river water, and the energy absorbed from tides) (R) is given in Table II.3. These natural,
driving energy flows support the ecologic-economic system of Alaska through both economically valued
and unvalued processes. The emergy values of resources that were harvested in economically valued
processes are estimated in the indigenous renewable energy section of Table III.3.
The Alaskan system used and exported energy from its reserves of coal, natural gas, and oil at a
rate much greater than they are replaced through natural formation in geologic processes. These flows
are included under the heading of nonrenewable sources (Table III.3). Fishery products exported to the
remainder of the United States (U.S. Fishery products, Table I. 1) were assumed to be processed within
the Alaskan system and are therefore included in the summary flow of exports transformed within the
system (B, Table III.3). The emergy values of the mineral exports reported by the U.S. Department of the
Interior (1988) in 1985 were insignificant with the exception of those for silver and gold (Table m1.3).
Several indices derived from Table 11i.3 are given in Table 111.4. These indices serve to
characterize Alaska with respect to its driving forces, emergy flux per person, emergy flux per dollar of
economic transactions, and fossil fuel and electric use. Very little of the emergy used was imported.
Ninety-seven percent of total emergy use was derived from indigenous sources (12, Table 111.4). Ninety-
two percent of Alaska's emergy use resulted from non-economic, locally renewable processes (15, Table
lI.4) and was calculated as free in monetary terms. The ratio of emergy in exports to emergy in imports
was 13 to one (18, table 111.4). Only small fractions of the state's emergy use were derived from electricity
(0.60%) and fossil fuel (5.0%). The Alaskan emergy-money ratio was calculated as 2.3E+13 sej/$ for
1985 (116, Table 11I.4). The emergy flux per unit area was 3.0E+11 sej/m2.
Alaska is probably unique among U.S. states for its high percent emergy use from within, high
energy use per capital, and high emergy-money ratio. Emergy indices for Alaska are distinctly different
from those of the United States as a whole as well as from other developed countries such as the
Netherlands, Taiwan, and Switzerland (Table Ii.5). Alaska's 97% emergy use from within compares
with those of Australia, Liberia, Brazil, and India. These values result largely from Alaska's small
population and large area relative to other U.S. states and most developed countries. The state includes
some more densely populated regions, particularly the Anchorage area, which probably have emergy
signatures more typical of the United States. Sparsely populated regions with small, often isolated towns
and villages comprise over 99% of the Alaskan landscape (Smith, 1990).
Ninety-eight percent of Alaska's emergy support comes from within. The economic system this
emergy supports is characterized by pulses or as a "boom and bust" system. This may be related to the









































Other markets
(218.219)























.Other markets


Other markets
(218. 219)


Figure I.l The state of Alaska model.














































Figure III.2. The Prince William Sound regional model.










Table II.1. Emergy analysis of the state of Alaska (Figure III.1) in 1985. Data and calculations are given
in Appendix B.


Solar Solar
Raw Units Transformity Emergy
Note Name J,$,g or people/y sej/unit E20 sej/y


RENEWABLE SOURCES
1 Sunlight 6.5E+21 J/y 1 65
2 Wind, kinetic 2.6E+19 J/y 620 160
3 Rain, geopotential 7.8E+18 J/y 8900 700
4 Rain, chemical 1.2E+19 J/y 15000 1800
5 Tide 8.2E+18 J/y 24000 1900
6 Waves 2.7E+18 J/y 26000 700
7 Earth cycle 3.6E+18 J/y 29000 1000
8 River water 8.3E+17 J/y 41000 340

INDIGENOUS RENEWABLE ENERGY
9 Fuelwood production 7.5E+15 J/y 3.5E+04 2.6
10 Hydroelectricity 2.8E+15 J/y 1.6E+05 4.4
11 Forest extraction 1.2E+15 J/y 3.5E+04 0.42
12 Fisheries 6.2E+11 J/y 5.0E+06 0.031

NONRENEWABLE SOURCES FROM WITHIN SYSTEM
13 Coal 1.8E+16 J/y 4.0E+04 7.1
14 Natural gas 2.2E+17 J/y 4.8E+04 110
15 Oil 2.1E+17 J/y 5.3E+04 110
16 Fuel derived electricity 1.5E+16 J/y 1.6E+05 24

IMPORTS AND OUTSIDE SOURCES
17 Fuel 7.1E+16 J/y 5.3E+04 38
18 International services 5.6E+08 $/y 1.6E+12 8.9
19 U.S. services 5.1E+09 $Sy 1.6E+12 82
20 Net immigration 5250 p/y 9.4E+16 50

EXPORTS
21 International fishery products 3.4E+15 J/y 5.0E+06 170
22 U.S. fishery products 6.7E+14 J/y 5.0E+06 34
23 Forestry products 5.9E+15 J/y 3.5E+04 2.1
24 Natural gas 2.9E+17 J/y 4.8E+04 140
25 Oil 3.4E+18 J/y 5.3E+04 1800
26 Service in exports to Intmtl. 2.6E+09 $/y 1.6E+12 42
27 Service in exports to U.S. 1.3E+10 $/y 1.6E+12 210
28 Silver 7.5E+05 g/y 3.0E+14 2.2
29 Gold 5.0E+06 g/y 4.4E+14 22











Table f11.2. Emergy value of major, long-term emergy storage (Qi) of Alaska in 1985. Calculations and
data are given in Appendix B.


Note
Qi


Storage


Raw Units
J, gor$


Solar
Transformity
sej/unit


Solar
Emergy
E20 sej


1 Timber 3.5E+18
2 Coal 1.6E+20-1.6E+23
3 Natural Gas 1.3E+20-1.6E+20
4 Crude Oil 3.4E+19-6.7E+19
5 Topsoil 1.2E+21
6 Other Minerals (Au, Ag, Zn, Pt, Pb, etc.)
Unknown
7 Capital Assets 5.7E+10


J 35000
J 40000
J 48000
J 53000
J 63000


1.6E+12


1200
64000-64000000
62000-77000
18000-36000
760000


Unknown
920










Table 11.3. Summary of annual emergy flux and money in the Alaskan economy from Table III. 1. All
expressions are from Odum (1992). Numerical terms in expressions refer to values
associated with line numbers in Table III.1.


Summary Flow used in Table III.4


R Renewable sources (chemical rain, tide, river water)
4+5+8

N Nonrenewable sources from within Alaska
13 + 14 + 15 + 24 + 25 + 28 + 22

N1 Nonrenewable sources used within Alaska
13 + 14 + 15

N2 Nonrenewable sources exported without use
24 + 25 + 28 + 22

F Imported fuels
17

P2I Emergy value of human services embodied in imports
18 + 19

PIE Emergy value of human services embodied in exports
26 + 27

B Exports transformed within
22

EL Emergy in electricity use
10 + 16

FF Emergy in fossil fuel use
13 + 14 + 15

H Net human immigration
20

U Emergy value of total Alaskan energy use
R+N1 F + FP2I


Solar Empower
(E20 sej/y)


4500


2200


270


2000


38


91


210


34


28


270


50


4500










Table III.4. Alaskan 1985 emergy indices derived from Table III.1. All expressions are from Odum
(1992). Terms in expressions are from Table 11.4.


Index Name Exp

11 Flow of Imported Emergy F-

12 Total Emergy Inflows R

13 Economic Component U

14 Total Exported Emergy N

15 Percent Locally Renewable R
& Percent of Emergy Use Which is Free

16 Economic/Environment Ratio (I

17 Ratio of Imports to Exports (F

18 Ratio of Exports to Imports (N

19 Net Imports (F

110 Percent of Emergy Use Purchased (F

Ill Fraction of Emergy Use That is
Imported Services P2

112 Percent of Emergy Use Derived From
Indigenous Sources (

113 Use Per Unit Area U

114 Use Per Person U

115 Renewable Carrying Capacity
at Present Living Standard (R

116 Alaskan Emergy-Money Ratio U

117 Fraction Electric E]

118 Fraction Fossil Fuels Fl

119 Fuel Use Per Person Ft


session

+P2I

+N+F+P2I+H

-R

2+B+P1E

/U


J-R)/R

'+P2I+H)/(N2+B+P1E)

2+B+P1E)/(F+P2I+H)

*+P2I+H)-(N2+B+P1E)

'+P2I)/U


I/U


I1+R)/U

/(area)
/AK populationa

/U)*(AK populationa)

/GNP

L/U

FU

F/AK population


a1985 Alaskan Population = 4.9E+05 people (.S.D.C, 1989)
1985 Alaskan Population = 4.9E+05 people (U.S.D.C., 1989)


Value

130E+20

7600E+20

360E+20

2400E+20

92


0.069

0.075

13

-2200E+20

2.9


Units

sej/y

sej/y

sej/y

sej/y

percent








sej/y

percent


0.020


97

3.0E+11

9.1E+17


4.5E+05

2.3E+13

0.0060

0.050

5.1E+16


percent

sej/m

sej/person


people

sej/$





sej/person










Table III.5. A comparison of emergy indices of Alaska in 1985 to those for 12 other nations in 1980
given by Huang and Odum (1991).




Emergy
Empower Use From Per Capita Emergy-
System Density2 Within Emergy Use Money Ratio
Ell sej/m -y % E15 sej/person-y E12 sej/$

Netherlands 100.0 23 26 2.2
Taiwan 37.0 24 8 2.5
Switzerland 18.0 19 12 0.7
Poland 11.0 66 10 6.0
Dominica 8.8 69 13 15.
U.S.A. 7.0 77 29 2.3
Liberia 4.2 92 26 35.
Spain 3.1 24 6 1.6
ALASKA 3.0 97 910 23.
New Zealand 2.9 60 26 3.0
Brazil 2.1 91 15 8.4
India 2.1 88 1 6.4
Australia 1.4 92 59 6.4










13 to 1 emergy export to import ratio (18, Table I.4) and to the less than 2% of exports that are
transformed within. Many of the most important Alaskan industrial functions are extraction for export.
Most of these industries are seasonal in nature resulting in annual production and employment pulses.
The effect of a catastrophic event like an oil spill may be small in a system adapted to historical
patterns of pulsing compared to a system normally immune to pulses. Historically, large outside inputs,
such as those occurring during gold rushes and construction of the trans-Alaskan pipeline, have initiated
pulses within the state's relatively small economic system (Smith, 1990). The pipeline construction
caused a large demand for labor and a boom in employment and immigration that was followed by an
unemployment bust when construction was finished and the less labor-intensive extraction processes
began. The elastic demand for Alaskan exports, because other sources are easily substituted, ties the
Alaskan system to fluctuations in the world markets, perhaps reinforcing the pulsing behavior. An
example of this was the collapse of the 1991 Alaskan salmon market as a result of competition from farm-
raised fish in the Japanese market (Gay, 1991).


Prince William Sound Regional Economic System

The Prince William Sound region energy systems model is diagrammed in Figure III.2. The
emergy signature derived from the Prince William Sound regional model is given in Table III.6.
Conversion factors used to calculate the energy flows in the analysis are given in Appendix B. A
summary of several related flows for the region is given in Table 111.7. The major natural emergy sources
were the chemical potential energy of fresh water (from rain, runoff, and glaciers), the absorption of tidal
energy and a smaller value associated with input of seismic energy. These sources yielded a 9.5E+10
sej/m2 natural, annual emergy flux for Prince William Sound (R in Table 1II.7). Table III.8 gives several
emergy indices for the Prince William Sound region. Imports comprised 35% (110, Table II.8) and fossil
fuels accounted for 27% of the emergy in the region's energy use. The per capital emergy use of the region
was 1.7E+17 sej/person-year (114, Table mI.8).
Because of their similarity to the emergy indices of United States in general, the indices of the
Prince William Sound region allow the use of the Exxon Valdez spill as a case study for U.S. oil spills in
general, where those of Alaska as a whole would not support this use. The emergy in the fossil fuel
support for the Prince William Sound region (27%) is an order of magnitude greater than that for Alaska
(5.0%). The 35% of Prince William Sound emergy support derived from imports is also an order of
magnitude greater than the state's 2.9%. The ratio of imports to export is 0.86 to 1, again an order of
magnitude larger than the 0.075 to 1 value calculated for Alaska. The region's emergy support derived
from imports, is similar to that of the United States as a whole which derives 33% of its support from
imports. Largely as the result of the greater population density of Prince William Sound with respect to
Alaska as a whole, the emergy characteristics of the sound region appear to fall between those of Alaska
and the United States, being closer to the remainder of the United States. A comparison of the emergy
signatures of the Prince William Sound region and the state of Alaska is shown in Figure III.3.


Analysis of the Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill


Emergy Analysis of Ecologic and Economic Losses

The components of the natural resource and economic system loss analyses are defined in
Appendix D. The emergy values of the natural resource ecologicc) and economic system losses resulting
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill are given in Table 11.9. Biomass loss estimates and conversion factors
used to calculate the energy values in Table M11.9 are given in Tables IID.1 and IIID.3. The distribution
of emergy values for the natural resource loss is graphed in Figure 111.4 and the distribution of emergy
losses among ecologic and economic components is graphed in Figure III.5. The total economic system
losses were 2 to 21 times greater than the natural resource losses. The major loss in both the highest and









Table 11.6. Emergy analysis of the Prince William Sound region of Alaska (Figure III.2) in 1988. Data
and calculations are given in Appendix B.

Solar Solar
Raw Units Transformity Emergy
Note Name J or $/y sej/unit E20 sej/y


RENEWABLE SOURCES:
1 Sunlight 3.9E+19 J/y 1 0.39
2 Wind, kinetic 8.6E+15 J/y 620 0.22
3 Fresh water, chemical 2.6E+16 J/y 15000 4.0
4 Tide 1.9E+16 J/y 24000 4.5
5 Waves 6.3E+14 J/y 26000 0.68
6 Seismic energy 7.3E+11 J/y 3.7E+07 0.27


IMPORTS:
7 Fuel 7.1E+15 J/y 53000 3.8
8 Services 9.2E+07 $/y 1.6E+12 1.5


EXPORTS:
9 Fishery products 9.1E+13 J/y 5.0E+06 4.6
10 Services 9.1E+07 $/y 1.6E+12 1.5










Table III.7. Summary of annual Prince William Sound empower and money flows from Table 111.6. All
expressions are from Odum (1992) except R2. Numerical terms in expressions refer to
values associated with line numbers in Table 11I.6.


Summary Flow


R Renewable sources (chemical fresh water, tide, seismic)
3+4+6

R2 Renewable sources exported without use
9

F Imported fuels
7

P2I Emergy value of human services embodied in imports
10

P1E Emergy value of human services embodied in exports
8

U Emergy value of total Prince William Sound energy use
R + F + P2I


Solar Empower
(E20 sej/y)


9.8


4.6


3.8


1.5


1.5


15


-----










Table III.8 Prince William Sound region 1988 emergy indices derived from Table III.6. All expressions
are from Odum (1992) except 14, 17, 18, and 19. Terms in expressions are from Table
III.7.


Index Name ExI

I11 Flow of Imported Emergy F

12 Total Emergy Inflows R

13 Economic Component U

14 Total Exported Emergy P

15 Percent Locally Renewable R
& Percent of Emergy Use Which is Free

16 Economic/Environment Ratio (1

17 Ratio of Imports to Exports (I

18 Ratio of Exports to Imports (

19 Net Imports (I

110 Percent of Emergy Use Purchased (I

Il1 Fraction of Emergy Use That is
Imported Services P

113 Use Per Unit Area U

114 Use Per Person U

115 Renewable Carrying Capacity
at Present Living Standard (I

119 Fuel Use Per Person F


iression

+P2I

+F+P2I

-R

1E+R2

/U


J-R)/R

+P2I)/(R2+P1E)

R2+P1E)/(F+P2I)

-+P2I)-(R2+PlE)

F+P2I)/U


21/U

/(area)
I/PWS populationa

/U)*(PWS populationa)

(PWS population


1988 Prince William Sound region Population = 8,000 people (A.D.C.E.D., 1984; Michelson, 1989)


Value

5.3E+20

1.5E+21

5.2E+20

6.1E+20

65


0.54

0.86

1.2

-8.0E+19

35


0.10

1.6E+10

1.9E+17


5200

4.6E+16


Units

sej/y

sej/y

sej/y

sej/y

percent








sej/y

percent




sej/m2

sej/person


people

sej/person

















40 ruVw


S20 Seismic Services

Solar Waves EXPORTS


RENEWABLE IMPORTS
(20) Service


(40)
Fishery Products
(60)
a. Prince William Sound Region


3,000



02,000 Rm, Tai.



1,000
1,00 Wive Cmdim IMPORTS EXPORTS
0 Rivn
Wd N.O Oil Isoil agtiOa
S. Coal Inrl US F~ S; Srvum
C4us MI, so-v
RENEWABLE NONRENEWABLE savim US N


(1,000)



(2,000) Oil

b. State Of Alaska

Figure 111.3. A comparison of emergy signatures of:
a). the Prince William Sound region of Alaska circa 1988 (Table m.6)
b). the state of Alaska circa 1985 (Table III.1).










Table 1II.9. Emergy losses (Li, LPPi, and Mi) of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Sources and descriptions for natural


Loss F


resource losses are given in Appendix D.

Energy
'orm J


NATURAL RESOURCE LOSSES


M2
M33
M37
M38
M39
M40
LPP40
M41
LPP41
43
M44

45
M46+M46a
M47


Zooplankton
Bald Eagles
Harbor Seals
Sea Otters
Killer Whales
Phytoplankton biomass
Phytoplankton production
Intertidal Producer biomass
Intertidal Producer production
Intertidal Herbivores
Intertidal Mieo- & Microfauna &
Microflora
Intertidal Macrofauna
Murres
Procellarids


0.53-16E+15
8.0E+10
6.0E+11
5.3-8.4E+11
0-5.3E+11
0-2.9E+16
0-3.7E+15
5.2-15E+15
1.4-7.5E+14
2.7-5.3E+13
0-2.3E+14

0-1.3E+14
1.5-1.7E+12
1.6-1.8E+11


ECONOMIC SYSTEM LOSSES
L10 Herring Fishery Harvest
L A T AK North Slope Oil Production Loss


L
fuel
Loil


Fuel
Exxon Valdez cargo


People Social Disruption


L
services


Human Labor In Cleanup


EMERGY LOSS TOTALS
Primary Producers

Intertidal Invertebrates

Zooplankton

Vertebrates


VNRL

VESL


7.5E+13
7.8E+16
5.9E+15
1.6E+15
person-y
1.6E+04

2.7E+09
2.7E+09


1.1E+06
5.3E+04
5.3E+04
5.3E+04
sei/person-v
1.9E+17
sei2/
1.6E+12


8.3
410.
31.
8.5


5.6-53.

0.30-18.

5.8-170.

13.-19.

25.-260.


Natural Resource Losses:

Economic System Losses (excluding LAKNS)

Total Loss (excluding LAKNS)


5.2
260.
19.
5.3


270.


3.5-33.

0.19-11.

3.6-110.

8.1-12.

16.-160.


330.-480.


Solar
Transformity
sei/J


1.5E+05
2.5E+07
1.1E+07
9.2E+07
1.7E+08
1.1E+04
1.1E+04
1.1E+04
1.1E+04
1.1E+05
2.9E+05

8.1E+05
4.7E+07
2.3E+07


Solar
Emergy
1E+19 sei


5.8-170.
0.20
0.66
4.9-7.6
0.0-8.9
0.0-32.
0.0-4.1
5.6-17.
0.14-0.83
0.30-0.58
0.0-6.8

0.0-11.
7.2-8.1
0.36-0.41


Macro-
economic $
1E+07 m$


1E+07 m$


3.6-110
0.13
0.41
3.1-4.8
0.0-5.6
0.0-20.
0.0-2.6
3.5-11.
0.09-0.52
0.19-0.36
0.0-4.3

0.0-6.9
4.5-5.1
0.23-0.26


533.-768.























Birds



Marine Mammals




Intertidal Producers



Intertidal Invertebrates




Phytoplankton




Zooplankton


= 22


170E+20 sej High lIs Estimate 63%


I I I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
1E+20 Solar Emjoules

l High Loss Estimate O Iow Loss Estimate


Figure 11.4. The distribution of emergy values for natural resource losses resulting form the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in sej and percent of total natural resource emergy loss for the highest
(2.6E+21 sej) and lowest (5E+20 sej) loss estimates (Table m.9).












33.9% Environmental Damage


56.0% Human Services In Cleanup


4.0% Social Disruption
S4.0% Cleanup Vessel Fuel
1.1% Valdez Oil Cargo Lost
1.0 Lost Fisheries Catch


a.) distribution of the 7.7E+21 sej highest total emergy loss estimate


4.6% Environmental Damage
5.7% Social Disruption
6.8% Cleanup Vessel Fuel
1.6% Valdez Oil Cargo Lost
1.6% Lost Fisheries Catch


80.6% Human Services In Cleanup


b.) distribution of the 5.3E+21 sej lowest loss total emergy loss estimate






Figure 1I.5. The distribution of the emergy values for the highest (a) and lowest (b) estimates for total
emergy loss resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Table 111.9).









lowest estimates was the human services (embodied labor) involved in the response and cleaning
operations (Figure 111.5). The energy value of the actual oil spilled was 8.5E+19 sej, less than two
percent of the total loss.
The value of the total ecologic and economic system losses (VESL, Table 111.9) were not sensitive
to halving and doubling the component values used in the natural resource and economic system loss
analyses. Doubling planktonic variables (zooplankton fractional mortality and area of the Valdez spill,
Table 11.10 increased the highest loss natural resource loss estimate (VNRL) 65% to a maximum of
430E+19 sej, while halving it decreased the lowest loss natural resource loss estimate by 20% to 5.0E+19
sej. Halving and doubling other variables resulted in changes in natural resource loss of less than 10E+19
sej (4%) for the high estimate and 1.OE+19 sej (4%) for the low estimate. The economic system loss
analysis was only sensitive to changes in the estimate of services invested by Exxon in the cleaning
operations (Table 111.9). Halving and doubling this variable halved and doubled the economic system loss.
The highest natural resource emergy losses were found in widely distributed and relatively
immobile classes of organisms such as plankton, intertidal producers, and intertidal invertebrates. These
classes of organisms and oil have similar transformities of between 1.1E+04 and 1.1E+05 sej/J. This
observation may suggest that the trophic levels which will be most impacted by a pollutant may be
predicted from the transformity of the pollutant. However, the mobility and distribution of these
organisms is also similar to that of the spilled oil. Phytoplankton, zooplankton, and floating oil are all
widely distributed and moved by wind and ocean currents. Intertidal organisms and oil stranded on
shorelines have limited mobility and are concentrated in the intertidal zone. The distribution and mobility
of planktonic and intertidal organisms and spilled oil may, however, be related to their transformities.
Hence, the similarity between pollutant and impacted trophic level transformities may yet warrant further
investigation.
Assuming an equal amount of emergy passes through all levels in the trophic hierarchy as in the
canonical trophic levels of Ulanowicz and Kemp (1979), there should be an equal storage of emergy at
each level (Odum, 1987a). Thus, the emergy in standing stocks of plankton trophic levels is equal to that
in vertebrate trophic levels, yet, emergy losses due to vertebrate mortality only comprise 10% to 53% of
the total natural resource loss (Table 1.9). This suggests differing responses to oil spills among trophic
levels. The difference between emergy losses for plankton and for vertebrates may reflect different life
history strategies, the differences between r and K strategist classes of organisms (MacArthur and Wilson,
1967). The r strategy of adapting to environmental variability with rapid growth and reproduction, small
body size, and numerous offspring may be manifest in increased production following the spill, thereby
replacing mortality losses relatively fast. The K strategy of slower growth and reproduction, larger body
size, and fewer, larger offspring may result in a high metabolic investment by these strategists in avoiding
the spilled oil in order to keep mortality to a minimum.
Non-lethal metabolic losses as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill have not been reported and
were not analyzed in the emergy loss calculations. Most quantitative reports of natural resource damage
from oil spills consist solely of mortality estimates. The small emergy value of lost primary production
relative to the value of primary producer mortality losses suggests non-lethal metabolic losses may be
small for r strategists. As suggested above, the same might not be true for K strategists.
A factor influencing the ratio between the emergy in non-lethal stress losses and mortality losses
is the distribution of stress over the impacted area. Oil spills produce patches of high intensity stress and
damage which many K selected organisms often appear to avoid (National Research Council, 1985).
Thus, these organisms may avoid the majority of non-lethal stress losses by avoiding oil slicks all
together, and the majority of the losses would be mortality losses from the small fraction of their
populations that fail to avoid slicks. If this is true, non-lethal stress losses should not be important to the
outcome of the analysis.
Though non-lethal stress losses for higher transformity K strategists may not be significant, these
losses are potentially significant for lower transformity, shorter generation time, organisms intermediate
between r and K strategists, such as herring, capelin, and sandlance. Neither non-lethal metabolic losses
nor mortalities in the Valdez spill are reported for this group, and no estimate for these losses was
included in this analysis. Hence, the value for the lowest estimate may underestimate the total emergy
loss. Improving the estimate would require estimates for individual organisms, non-lethal stress losses
during an oil spill, and the total number of organisms affected. While standing stocks of some species are










known for the Prince William Sound and Gulf of Alaska area, most are not, particularly those of fish
species. While estimates of standing stocks and metabolic losses could improve understanding of oil spill
impacts, even if the emergy value of vertebrate metabolic losses in the Valdez spill were found to be five
times the emergy value of vertebrate mortalities, the overall damage estimates would not be significantly
changed.


Impacts of Losses at Three Scales

The relative impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill measured as a percent of annual emergy use at
three scales, local, regional, and state, is shown in Figure 111.6. The oil spill may have had the positive
effects upon the Alaskan economy suggested by Smith (1990) because the effect of the oil spill was
noticeable, but small (1.1% to 1.3%) relative to the system's total emergy use. In the Prince William
Sound region, where much of the spill damage and loss occurred and where the emergy loss was 330% to
490% of the region's annual emergy use, the Valdez spill was almost certainly a catastrophe. The
calculated emergy losses from the spill were between 87% to 130% of the annual emergy use of the region
from Prince William Sound to Kodak Island effected by the spill. The Alaskan system may have adjusted
to the relative small change and made use of the additional outside support, whereas the Prince William
Sound system may have been overwhelmed by the large, intense perturbations to which it could not adjust.
The value of total emergy loss from the Exxon Valdez oil spill was equal to 1.1% to 1.3% of the
total emergy in Alaska's annual energy use (U, Table III.3). The values of total natural resource loss and
total economic system loss were equal to 0.046% to 0.47% and 0.78% of U, respectively. A 1.9E+17
sej/person-year per capital emergy use (114, Table 111.8) was calculated from the Prince William Sound
regional model. When this was multiplied by the population of the entire oil spill region, it yielded an
emergy value for annual energy use of 5.7E+21 sej/y. Using this value, the total loss was equal to 87% to
130%, the natural resource losses equal to 4.4 to 46%, and the services invested in response were equal to
84% of the emergy value of the region's annual energy use. The total loss was equal to 330% to 490% of
the Prince William Sound region's 1.5E+21 sej/y emergy use (U, Table 1.7). The heaviest, and possibly
the majority of the oil spill damage occurred in this region.
The actual effect of the spill on a local area within the spill region depended upon the amount of
ecological damage in that area as well as the area's proximity to bases for cleanup operations like Valdez
and Seward. The spill was a catastrophe in areas sustaining heavy ecological damage and areas that were
the staging sites and bases for the cleanup operations. Areas that were not heavily damaged by the spill
and that supplied labor to cleanup operations, such as much of the Kenai Peninsula, reaped the economic
benefits of the spill without sustaining the extent of severe social disruption that accompanied the large
influxes of people, material, and money into the staging areas.

Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives


Descriptions of prevention alternatives that were analyzed for the United States and Alaskan
tanker fleets are given in Appendix E. The analysis of prevention alternatives were performed and
presented in two ways. The first was based on the costs and benefits for the United States tanker fleet,
assuming the costs and benefits were proportional to those experienced in Alaska from the Exxon Valdez
spill, and adjusted for an oil spill in the contiguous U.S (see Appendix E). The second was based on the
costs and benefits for the Alaskan tanker fleet, using the costs and benefits calculated from the Valdez
spill alone. Net emergy benefits for each alternative are given in Tables III.10 and Il. 11 and Figures 111.7
and 11.8.




















Total Oil Spill Loss as
Percent of Region's Annual
Emergy Support

600-1


400-/


o1o/


87% 4


1.1%


Alaska


Oil Spill Region
Prince William found
to Kodiak island


Prince William Sound Region


[ I Low Loss Estimate I High Loss Estimate j


Figure 1.6. The relative impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a percent of annual emergy use of each
of three regions: the state of Alaska, the region from Prince William Sound to Kodiak
Island impacted by the oil spill, and the Prince William Sound region.


490%


130%


1.3%


" I~~s""""""


Hill ......












Table HI.10. The emergy investments in implementation, natural resource damage prevented, economic
system losses prevented, and preliminary net emergy benefits for 10 spill prevention
alternatives for the U.S. tanker fleet adjusted for an oil spill in the continental U.S.
Notes, calculations, and alternative descriptions are given in Appendix E.


Alternative


Emergy
Investment
In
Implementation
A
E20 sej/y


1 Group I System
Modifications:


2 Group I System
Modifications:



3 Group I & I System
Modifications:



4 Double-Hulled Vessels
W/ Hydrostatic Vacuum:



5 Double-Sided Vessels
W/ Hydrostatic Vacuum:



6 MARPOL Vessels With
Hydrostatic Vacuum:



7 Vessels With
Intermediate Oil-tight
Deck & Double Sides



8 Double-Hulled Vessels:




9 Vessels With Small
Tanks:



10 Double-Bottomed
Vessels:


Natural
Resource
Emergy
Benefit
B
E20 sej/y


Economic
System,
Emergy
Benefit
C
E20 sej/y


0.13
25



0.38
7.4



0.44
8.8



0.51
15.



0.51
15.


Net
Emergy
Benefit

B+C-A
E20 sei


Ratio of Net
Emergy
Benefit

(B+C)/A
sei/sei


-25.
+0.76



-100.
-0.40



-130.
-0.31


-14.
+0.59


0.54
14.











Table m.l.11. The emergy investments in implementation, natural resource damage prevented, economic
system losses prevented, and preliminary net emergy benefits for Alaskan tanker fleet
spill prevention alternatives. Notes, calculations, and alternative descriptions are given
in Appendix E.


Alternative


Emergy
Investment
In
Implementation
A
E20 sej/y


11 Group I System
Modifications:


12 Group II System 4.'
Modifications: 4.


13 Double-Hulled Vessels 21.
(Group Il Modifications): 12.


14 Group I & H System
Modifications:


15 Group I, II & III System 27.
Modifications: 16.


Natural
Resource
Emergy
Benefit
B
E20 sej/y


0.099
1.0


0.29
3.0


0.39
4.0


0.35
3.6


0.54
5.7


Economic
System
Emergy
Benefit
C
E20 sej/y


Net
Emergy
Benefit

B+C-A
E20 sej


Ratio of Net
Emergy
Benefit

(B+C)/A
sei/sei


+1.6
+2.5


+1.2
+3.9


-14.
-0.60


+1.9
+5.1



-19.
-2.8


0.37
0.95


0.29
0.82
























Double Bottom


Smaller Tanks


Double Hull


Interm. Oil-Tight Deck


MARPOL w/ Vaccum


2ble Side w/ Vaccum


2ble Hull w/ Vaccum


Both I & II


II. Equipment Changes


1. Personel Changes


-130E+20 seJ


-1oo1+20 sej


IF I I IF 1 i
-70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
Net Emergy Benefit 1E+20 sej


I i
10 20


SWorst-Case E Best-Case


Figure 1.7. A comparison of the net emergy benefits of the ten oil spill prevention methods for the U.S.
tanker fleet adjusted for an oil spill in the continental U.S. from Table 1H. 10


L'


I


I


If

















Oil Spill Prevention Alternative
Groups 1, II & Il System Modifications




Groups I & I System Modifications




Double Hull Vessels (Group Ill Modifications)




Groupl System Modifications




Group I System Modifications


- --


-15 -10 -5
Net Emergy Benefit


0


I Worst-Case J Best-Case


ZI


Figure III.8. A comparison of the net emergy benefits of the ten oil spill prevention methods for the
Alaskan tanker fleet from Table III. 11.


- 1E+20 sej


5 10


I









United States Tanker Fleet


Net emergy benefits for the United States tanker fleet are given in Table 1I.10 and summarized
in Figure 11.7. The fraction of the emergy investment in prevention alternative implementation that was
from steel accounted for approximately half of the total emergy investment in implementation for each of
the tanker design alternatives. Human services used directly in, and embodied in materials used in tanker
design implementation accounted for the other half. The human service estimates account for most of the
range in emergy investment in implementation values. The magnitude of the contiguous 48 states'
adjustments to the Exxon Valdez losses suggest that the Valdez spill may have resulted in lower losses
because of its location. The increased tourism losses and coastal wetland damage occurring if the case
study spill took place in the continental U.S. instead of Alaska have a significant effect on the results of
the oil spill prevention analysis. These adjusted loss estimates are still not enough to cause any alternative
to have both positive best- and positive worst-case net energy benefits.
The net emergy benefit and necessary human stress loss results were most sensitive to changes in
human labor investment in implementation, steel investment in implementation, and spillage prevention
estimates. Halving and doubling the investment estimates changed the net emergy benefits by less than
25%. Halving and doubling the emergy-money ratio and steel transformity variables produced the same
behavior. Halving and doubling the spillage prevention estimates changed net emergy benefit by less than
10%. Halving and doubling other variables resulted in net emergy benefit changes of less than 5%. None
of the halving and doubling trials resulted in additional positive net benefits for any of the alternatives
An analysis of the emergy investment in implementation for each of the individual system
modifications within the categories of groups I and II (Appendix E) would likely show some of these
individual modifications to have better net emergy benefits than others. These changes would result from
the differing investments of labor and materials in each of the individual modifications. It is difficult to
anticipate how many of these would be positive without a more detailed analysis. Better net emergy
benefits may also be possible for all the prevention alternatives if they were optimally implemented. At
some point, each alternative reaches a point of diminishing returns (benefits) for additional investment. If
only the individual tankers that can be refitted for the least emergy investment are refitted, and only the
most successful, lowest emergy investment system modifications are made, the net emergy benefits should
be higher. For example, establishing tanker exclusion zones only in critical areas with high ecological
value, may yield a positive net emergy benefit. However, sweeping legislative mandates that require
specific designs of all tankers and specific system modifications in all ports and on all shipping routes will
probably produce negative net emergy benefits similar to those given in Table I. 10.
Though some inaccuracy was introduced by using dollar costs as a measure of human labor in
each alternative, this method still appears to be the best way of integrating the human services embodied
in the hierarchy of agricultural, extraction, manufacturing, distribution, and other processes that support
the people implementing the prevention alternatives (given the specific lack of data for these processes).
Other inaccuracies may have resulted from applying simple percentage estimates of steel use in the tanker
design alternatives. Though these inaccuracies may be significant for any one year, the world tanker fleet
is extremely heterogeneous (National Research Council, 1991), and as a result the tanker fleet calling at
U.S. ports varies both in size and design composition from year to year. This variability seems large
enough to justify the use of the percentage estimates discussed above.


Alaskan Tanker Fleet

The net emergy benefits for group I, group II, and concurrent groups I and II system
modifications for the Alaskan fleet were all positive (Table III. 11). The net emergy benefits for double
hulling the Alaskan fleet (group III modifications) were all negative (Table m1. 11). As with the U.S.
tanker fleet, approximately half the emergy investment in implementation for tanker modifications was
from steel. Also similar to the U.S. fleet, the net emergy benefits were most sensitive to changes in the
estimates for the human labor investment in implementation and for steel investment in implementation
(Appendix E). Halving and doubling the investment estimates, emergy-money ratios, and steel
transformity values changed the net emergy benefits by a little less than 25%. Halving and doubling









spillage estimates changes net emergy values by less than 10%. All other halving and doubling trials
resulted in net emergy benefits by less than 5%.


Oil Spill Clean Up

While quantitative data on the relationship of the investment in, and benefits from, shoreline
cleaning are lacking, there appear to be several emergy thresholds related to the intensity of shoreline
cleaning. The first series of thresholds are those points at which the total emergy invested in shoreline
cleaning will produce a larger net emergy benefit if allocated to another process, for instance, if energy
and money that were to be used for cleaning were allocated to purchase and preserve local forests from
damaging exploitation. There also appears to be a point at which emergy invested in cleaning produces
no additional ecological benefit, followed by a situation in which additional cleaning emergy produces
additional ecological damage. This behavior has been documented in monetary terms by Dunford et al.
(1991). But at a larger scale, cleaning that produces some additional, local ecological damage may lower
or mitigate total losses in the larger system. For example, the closure of Prince William Sound and Gulf
of Alaska fisheries following the Exxon Valdez oil spill was mandated by government regulations
whenever fishing gear was fouled with oil. Under these circumstances, additional cleaning may be
justified, since the losses resulting from closure of the fishery may be greater than the costs of shoreline
cleaning.


Conclusions

Variability in loss estimates may be enough to cause additional prevention methods to have
positive best-case net benefits. The data and sensitivity analyses, however, suggest that the worst-case net
benefits will remain negative. Consequently, each prevention method is a break-even proposal with no
substantial increased net emergy yield when implemented at the national level. Odum (1992) reports a 6
to 1 emergy yield ratio for current, economically successful processes in developed countries. Though
coastal areas are of great ecologic and economic importance, it is apparent that analyses of other natural
resource management strategies should be conducted before implementing the alternative oil spill
prevention methods discussed here. The MARPOL tanker already the product of a pollution control
treaty is currently designed to prevent oil spillage (National Research Council, 1991). MARPOL
tankers may be currently preventing oil spills in the most optimal fashion for some transportation routes.
However, the results of the U.S. and Alaskan tanker fleet analyses suggest that management strategies
employing the lowest investment prevention methods in the highest yielding situations will produce the
largest positive net emergy benefits, while sweeping, industry and nation-wide regulations would appear
to have very low or negative benefits.
Two specific series of additional analyses are required to generate the information needed to
identify the best oil spill prevention alternatives. The first of these is detailed analyses of the equipment
intensive and labor intensive prevention options assembled in the Group I and Group II prevention
categories (Appendix E). These analyses require data on the resource investment required for
implementation and operation and predictions for spillage prevention for each prevention technology.
The second series of analyses is required for tank vessel routes. In order to calculate the effect of selective
implementation of tanker design changes for regions with particularly high value or sensitive coastal
resources, the number of tankers that pass through these areas and amount of time they are in the areas
must be estimated. These two series of analyses can then be combined with the results of this study to
identify the specific conditions under which oil spill prevention technologies can be implemented with the
highest net emergy benefits.










Information Frenzy and the Valdez Oil Spill Disaster


Currently, advances in global information processing, particularly in the television industry, are
causing the people of the world to increasingly share information. The sharing of information joins
people and makes certain groups immensely influential. As the result of the numerous energy
transformations required to develop, copy, distribute, and maintain shared information in large human
populations, shared information has a high emergy value. Following trial-and-error selection, which sorts
useful information from noise or useless information, the influence of useful information may be
proportional to its emergy value. As the people of the world become more and more conscious of the
inherent symbiosis of humanity and nature, information related to the environment is emerging as a major
component of global sharing, however, both the system of global information and of environmental
management are new, rapidly changing, and little understood. The extraordinary "information storm"
that followed the T/VExxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, raised questions about the
relationship between environmental policy and information. An emergy analysis was conducted for the
spill, its effects, the information storm that developed, and the responses that followed. Innovations
(detailed in the following pages) were developed to evaluate the emergy of information in order to
consider the way amplification of disaster images amplified the response to the Valdez spill and diverted
global resources.


Emergy of Television in the United States

Using data assembled by Morton (1991), the inputs used by television were evaluated as items 1
through 4 in Table III.12. Transmission inputs included the electricity, assets (buildings and equipment),
and the services of the people of the industry. Items 5 through 8 evaluated the television reception, its
electricity, equipment and especially the audience of people watching the received television signals. The
audience's time engaged in television interaction was evaluated as the time of watching multiplied by their
metabolism and by the transformity of their level of education. This involves the hypothesis that the
delivery of information to a person can be evaluated by using the emergy per unit energy accumulated
with their education and experience (Odum, 1988). An energy systems diagram of the relationships
evaluated is shown in Figure 111.9.
Previous evaluations provided an estimate of the whole emergy use of the United States. People
are at the top of the energy hierarchy of the nation, and their information processing is at the top of
human activity (Odum, 1988). Thus in an aggregated overview, the information flow in the whole
country depends both directly and indirectly on the entire national emergy budget. The hours of human
interaction with television each day were used to assign the fraction (7/24) of the national emergy
supporting the system that culminates in information. These approximations were used to evaluate the
magnitude of emergy in the television broadcast of Valdez oil spill news (Table III. 13).


Damage and its Extraction and Transmission as Information

Figure 111.10 shows the type of images shown on television in the aftermath of the Valdez spill.
Evaluations of the Valdez oil spill (Table 11.9; Woithe, 1992) included the oil loss, the damages to sea
otters, sea birds, shore life, fisheries, and other marine organisms. As shown in Figure III.11 (from left to
right) the images of damage are extracted by television journalists, and successively transmitted, then
received by television watchers, causing a group response that resulted in responses by Exxon Corporation
and government agencies. At each step, more emergy comes in, further contributing to the emergy value
of the information and actions. The evaluations are given in Table 11. 13 and summarized in Figure
II. 11.
The emergy of the damage phenomenon given in Table H. 13 is based upon the assumption that
the journalistic reporting was an honest and successful effort to capture the magnitude of the disaster. The
emergy of the damage was taken as the emergy required to collect, sort, and assemble the damage
information (item 2). Line 4 gives the emergy of copying and transmitting the information, based on










Table 11. 12. Line 5 is the emergy of operating television receivers. Line 6 includes the emergy of people
watching television broadcasts for an assumed total of 30 minutes per person over the course of the many
weeks of oil spill news coverage. The cumulative total emergy (equivalent to 490 million macroeconomic
dollars) in developing the shared oil spill information among the people of a nation, was several times
larger than the spill's environmental damage (16 to 160 million macroeconomic dollars).


Amplified Oil Spill Response

As indicated by item 8 of Table 11.13, the response by Exxon and government agencies was
approximately 3 billion dollars, much of it paid into the small Alaskan economy area as part of oil spill
cleanup. Part of the money bought fuels, goods, and services within Alaska where the emergy per dollar
is large and part was used to purchase goods and services from the other states where the emergy per
dollar was small. The magnitude of this payment expressed in emergy terms was huge compared to the
spill itself (Table 111.9). A shared information emergy of 490 million macroeconomic dollars had elicited
a response 2 to 20 times larger than the environmental damage caused by the spill. Questions raised by
this response include: 1.) Should we expect emergy response to be in proportion to emergy used in
developing the shared information? 2.) Would this much amplification have occurred if people were not
already environmentally sensitized with earlier information inputs?
The many assumptions in this calculation make the results very approximate, but the results do
show the large magnitude of information involved, the way information sharing cascades, and the
information needed for this kind of calculation to be improved in the future.


A "Storm" From Emergy Dumping

The surge of local buying power, followed by goods, services, and fuels rushing into the oil spill
region, was equivalent to the storms of disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic activity, and
wars. All of these events develop secondary storms of destruction when emergy is released suddenly. The
dumping of emergy into the Valdez spill region produced a social storm. A few items of oil spill
disruption that comprised this storm are evaluated in Table III.14
Disruptions and spill damage included the loss of normal livelihood of fishing and fish
processing, extra people coming in to do cleanup, and added costs of services like police, counseling, and
garbage collection. While the concentration was on the cleanup of the spill and the rescue of the wildlife,
much was happening to the people. Similar to certain areas impacted by Hurricanes Hugo (South
Carolina and the Caribbean (1989)) and Andrew (Florida and Louisiana (1992)), Alaska experienced an
economic boom, bigger than anything since the building of the trans-Alaskan pipeline. As was also the
case following the two hurricanes, both direct, actual damage, and damaged public perceptions completely
shut down some local industries. The Cordova and Kodiak herring fisheries, which earned $14 million in
1988, were closed in 1989. The fish processing industry that depended on these catches was also out of
business. (N.R.T., 1989). In Prince William Sound and Kodiak, 8 million salmon of the 14 million
projected salmon were caught (Townsend & Heneman, 1989). The price of salmon fell by half. This was
partially the result of consumer suspicion of possible impurities because of the spill. (Alaska Oil Spill
Reporter, 1989). As in the case of the two hurricanes, there was also a boom in short-term employment.
The unemployment rate in the state dropped to 7.7%, and to 5.5% in the Valdez-Cordova area. This was
about a 1% drop. It is estimated that half of the decrease was due to the spill. (Alaska Oil Spill Reporter,
1989). This effect was so great that seasonal jobs outside of the spill region went unfilled, and state-wide
labor shortages in retail and service businesses developed.
The effect on native villages was economic disruption; from an economy based on subsistence
fishing, they became one of day laborer for the cleanup. More cash was available, but it was accompanied
by a stressful change in customary lifestyle. There was no harvest of some fish like herring and salmon,
and there was worry that other subsistence foodstocks were oil-tainted. Others were more concerned with
their livelihoods and routines. Children were upset, traffic increased, and there was more overtime work.










Table M. 12. Emergy analysis of the U.S. television industry.


Item

Television Transmission:
Electricity
Assets Cost
People
Total to Extract, Copy and Transmit


Solar Emergy Flux
1E+22 sej/y


20.3
0.28
22.1
42.7


5 Television Reception, 1.62E+08 Sets:
6 Electricity 4.5
7 Assets Cost 9.5
Total to Receive 14.0

8 People Watching 263

9 Annual Emergy Support for the United States 900

10 Reception (Emergy per Television Set per year) 7.1E+14 sej/set-y


Note

1
2
3
4












































Television processing of environmental stress information.


Figure I.9. An emergy systems diagram of the processing of environmental stress information by the
U.S. television industry.










Table 11.13. Emergy aspects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill based on one hour television transmission and
0.5 hour reception per person.


Process E

Emergy of phenomenon (oil spill)

Emergy of damage

Emergy of the assembled information about that damage

Emergy of copying and transmitting that information

Emergy of receiving

Emergy of watching and sharing, U.S.A.


:20 sej

4.0

2.3

2.3

0.49

0.55

5.1


Macroeconomic Valuea
million m$

250.

140.

140.

31.

34.

320.


7 Cumulative total 7.9490


8 Response by Exxon and Government 132. 8250.

9 Oil flow interrupted 47.7 2981.


a Expressed in 1989 U.S. macroeconomic dollars using an emergy-money ratio of 1.6 E12 sej/$ from Odum (1992)











I' Ji


tsV H # ...i


I


00











Figure III. 10. An example of oil spill images broadcast by television in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
(Photograph: Alaska Sea Grant Program, Fairbanks, AK).











E20 solar emjoules


ENERGY of
services in
response to
public pressure


Figure III.11. Solar emergy inputs in the transformations that convert environmental damage to shared information and human group response.










Table I. 14. Emergy analysis of human disturbance from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.


Item Value Transformity Emergy value
E20 sej

1. Unemployment decrease 31 people 8.4E+17 sej/person 0.26

2. Increase in alcohol- and $4.0E7 10E+12 sej/$ 4.0
drug-related crime

3. Population increase 1045 people 8.4E+17 sej/person 8.8

4. State assistance to $1.3 E6 10E+12 sej/$ 0.13
communities

5. Increase in money earned $130 E6 10E+12 sej/$ 13.0

6. Evaluations of crime, bankruptcy, and stress are incomplete









The population of the city of Valdez grew to double the 3,000 permanent population. Arrests rose by
500%, double those at the time of the pipeline population boom of 10,000 people. The increased crimes
included domestic violence, depression, fights, divorces, alcoholism and drug use (Townsend & Heneman,
1989). The Valdez counseling center caseload was three times the normal size; and 1/2 the residents of
Valdez and 2/3 the residents of Cordova had "significant post-traumatic stress."


Overview

The effect of the energy amplification of disaster images from the Exxon Valdez oil spill may
have benefited general, global, environmental progress, but the ill conceived responses to the spill were
disastrous. From both national and world points of view, a very large amount of energy was diverted
from normal productive processes and dumped to make a second useless frenzy at the impacted site (the
first frenzy being the oil spill). The closing of the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline for eight days had a larger
impact than the environmental damage of the oil spill (Table II. 13). The pipeline closing reduced the
economic production of the western United States, and even affected the price of oil. Oil not used was
production not made.
Although Alaska experienced a small scale economic boom, the state's long range processes of
general emergy production and use were disrupted. The payments by oil companies after the spill were
not so different from the state's annual payments to each Alaskan citizen (approximately $800 in the year
of the Valdez spill) from the Permanent Fund (a fund established and supported by mineral lease rentals
and royalties). Emergy analysis showed these payments to be tiny compared to the potential in the oil
stream moving out of the state (Table Il. 1). The emergy analysis of the whole state shows it to have the
characteristics of under-developed countries (Table 111.5). Because of policies forced on Alaska by the
U.S. and world economic systems, the state exports its resources like oil, timber, and fish. Our analysis of
the fish sold to Japan, shows a net emergy benefit to Japan of more than 10 to 1 (M.T. Brown,
Unpublished Data). An analysis of the trans-Alaskan Pipeline as a whole by M.T. Brown shows the net
export of emergy to the mainland to be more than 9 times the emergy received by Alaska. If these
resources were kept and used at home, the economy would be stimulated to 9 to 10 times the present
pattern. Prices would eventually fall, standards of living would rise, and total productivity and
consumption would increase. Sweden, with the same kind of climate and environmental resources, keeps
its resources and supports a prosperous, balanced economy; while Alaska strips and sells its emergy with
only the exporters profiting.
The attitudes that prevail in Alaska, holding that economic benefit comes from sale rather than
use of resources, are frontier oriented and have been deeply ingrained since pioneer times. These attitudes
readily play into the hands of other economies that want the resources. To be fair, without energy
analysis, the buyers in these other economies think they have given fair value for the resources they
purchase. In Alaska, the misuse of information in education perpetuates attitudes that cause a bountiful
state to operate at a fraction of its potential. The oil spill and other issues of conservation have galvanized
environmental concerns about Alaska. Without emergy perspectives, however, the information these
concerns are based upon is unbalanced and diverts people from the real need to develop a better balance of
humanity and nature in Alaska in which symbiosis and sustainability replace strip and sell.


Better Uses of Global Storms of Shared Information

The frenzy of media attention following the Valdez oil spill reached a world-wide information
threshold about the environment that set public responses in motion and caused corporate funds to be
spent in dubious and destructive measures. The emergy analyses in this report suggest the responses were
out of proportion to the size of the spill. Devastating as the oil was to the coast of Alaska and its people,
the response was on a world scale, as if the spill had occurred in every television viewer's home state or
district.
In centuries past, before there was a world-wide sharing of information, mechanisms of social
psychology produced responses to disasters more or less in proportion to the number of people whose lives









were affected. Journalists and politicians followed public behavior and opinion; behavior and opinion that
was mostly oriented to the small scale of people's lives. Before the television era, with news arriving in
muted form late or not at all, people at a distance were not drawn into the emotional responses of people
directly affected by a disaster.
By 1991, with worldwide, instant sharing of information through television images, the impacts
of disastrous phenomena are brought, as if they were local impacts, to millions of people far from the site
of the disaster. In the Valdez example, the information was amplified by the number of television viewers
so that the response was as if the spill was everywhere. In other words, the impacts of a moderate-scale
disaster were amplified so vastly that people responded at a very large scale, too large a scale for the
number of people directly affected. This public response resulted in a reaction by corporate and
government leaders (accustomed to responding in proportion to the public outcry) out of proportion to the
disaster. This mis-proportioned reaction was largely the result of the amplification of the Valdez disaster
information by world television.
With the current deluge of information reaching people, repetition may elicit the social
psychology of large-group response. The repetitive images of a developing crisis such as a spreading oil
spill can amplify the information in the images such that disaster information and its emotional impact
are shared and the enormous power of unified group response is released. In the Valdez disaster, people
were already sensitized by years of bad environmental news. The Valdez disaster became a catalyst for
group reaction to all environmental destruction.
The sharing of information increases the information's emergy and transformity and, therefore,
the impact the information is capable of generating. Thus, transformity, as a general energy scaling
factor, may be used to indicate the appropriate responses to environmental problems. These indicated
appropriate responses might then be joined with the repetitive disaster images to produce actual public
responses that are beneficial to both the impacted ecosystems and human society. In the Valdez oil spill,
the appropriate response for people of Alaska was amplified into a world-wide response. It may be that
social group response occurs in proportion to the number of people absorbing the information. The
emergy of the information shared is proportional to the number of people sharing. The amount of
information received depends on the amount of television transmission and the number of people
watching the transmissions.
In the Valdez phenomenon, we were able to compare the emergy of the disaster with that of the
shared information and the monetary responses. Our emergy evaluation showed the total response was
much larger than the direct impact, but the amplification system may have been serving the evolving
system of humanity by causing humanity to develop more global environmental responsibility. The
government, legal, and corporate response of diverting billion dollar levels of emergy from their normal,
productive processes, into the local disaster area without anything to accomplish, was nationally wasteful.
Worst of all, by dumping in emergy without a useful task for it to perform, a secondary disaster was
generated locally.
Energy cannot be released without doing work. In the absence of arrangements for useful work,
dumping energy generates temporary systems of turbulent frenzy. The surge of money into the small area
of the oil spill region had a similar effect, producing a secondary turbulence in the social structure of a
pluralistic population that wrenched people from their previous roles and their relationships with the
natural lands and waters.
The Valdez incident showed that human society has not yet learned how to put its responses on
the appropriate scale for the phenomenon of interest. In fact, people in advertising, sports, politics,
entertainment, and even conservation, work very hard to do the opposite. They work to make something
of small scale cause a large-scale response for the benefit of their enterprise. Perhaps the Valdez example
can be used as a symbol to show how to make appropriate responses. Once society recognizes that
appropriate and inappropriate responses to disasters can be determined and (after the main classes of
disaster are evaluated) guidelines for public policy can be set out to help prevent inappropriate, frenzied
waste.
Eventually, as the global self-organization process proceeds in the relationship of society and
resources, inappropriate responses may be displaced by responses with more common sense. Emergy
analysis is a way to global common sense. In the Valdez example, the appropriate response after the
frenzied information sharing generated a group demand for global action toward better environmental










harmony and toward constraints on unfettered economic exploitation. Perhaps this action is already in
progress and the opportunity is now available for global leadership by organizations like The Cousteau
Society.


Net Emergy Analysis of Alaskan North Slope Oil

The area north of the Brooks Range along the coast of the arctic sea in the northern most part of
Alaska is often referred to as the North Slope. Suggested to be one of the last great oil bearing areas in
North America, to date, reserves of the main oil field at Prudhoe Bay have been estimated as 11 to 12
billion barrels (ADNR, 1990). In addition to the "proven reserves" the industry suggests that using what
is termed enhanced recovery, an additional 11 billion barrels may be extracted from the north slope field.
At current pumping rates (about 2 million barrels a day), north slope oil accounts for almost 25% of the
energy needs of the U.S. economy.
Oil from the north slope is transported overland to the southern coast of Alaska through an 800
mile pipeline that terminates at the coastal town of Valdez, Alaska (Figure 1.1). A large storage and
transfer station is located at Valdez, where the oil is transferred to tankers for shipment to the "lower forty
eight" states. Prior to construction in 1975, the pipeline and related facilities were estimated to cost $2.5
billion, yet by completion in 1978, the construction costs were over nine billion dollars. Useful life of the
project was estimated at the time of completion as 30 years.
A systems diagram of the oil delivery system is shown in Figure 11i.12. Crude oil is extracted
and shipped by pipeline to Valdez where it is loaded on tankers to be transported to the west coast of the
U.S. The main external inputs to the delivery system are fuels, goods (steel) and services (human labor).
State and Federal taxes are shown as emergy costs, and assumed to represent services consumed as part of
the oil delivery system. Transportation costs are the costs of shipment by tanker to the west coast of the
U.S. Environmental impacts are shown in two ways, direct stress on the ecological systems from
production platforms, staging areas, pipeline roads etc. that results from clearing, and the direct impact of
the oil spill. Social impacts of the pipeline construction and oil spill are also shown in the diagram.


Net Emergy Evaluation

Table II1.15 and Figure 111.13 summarize the emergy yield of crude oil for known reserves on the
north slope and various costs associated with its extraction and delivery to the west coast of the United
States. The evaluation assumes that the reserves and pipeline will last 30 years. The largest costs in
emergy terms are services associated with production of the well fields, operation and maintenance, and
transportation. Services used to construct the pipeline and terminal facilities amount to about 7% of total
costs, while the emergy of steel used in the pipeline and terminal was only about 3% of the total costs.
The services represented by State and Federal taxes are about 26% of total costs. The Exxon Valdez oil
spill represented only about 2% of total costs. Direct environmental impacts are insignificant when
compared to the other costs in Table 1. 15. The calculation of environmental impacts assumed impacted
areas to be the areas that were directly influenced by roadways, pipelines, drilling platforms, and terminal
facilities. While there was much discussion in the literature concerning potential secondary impacts, no
estimates of the magnitude of secondary impacts were found.
The net emergy yield ratio for north slope oil (not including reserves in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge) is about 13 to 1. Considering infrastructure requirements, adverse conditions, and
distance to markets the yield ratio is relatively high. Not factored into the analysis are additional repairs
to the pipeline in the coming years, or the effects of additional oil spills.



































% / \Env. H Revenue\ s axu"
Stress X


Assets Pip line I .Tanks --- Tankers \

North Slope
Oil Production Pipeline Valdez Transport





North Slope Oil In Alaska M.T. Brown 1993




Figure i. 12. Energy systems diagram of the economy of Alaska and oil delivery system. Oil is extracted from in the production process, shipped via
pipeline, stored at valdez and finally shipped via tanker to the lower 48 states. Revenue to the State of Alaska from the sale of oil is divided into
two categories: (1) general revenue in the form of purchases of goods and labor payments, and (2) state taxes.










Table HI. 15. Emergy analysis of North Slope oil (assuming a 30-year pipeline life).


Item


Total oil flow
Costs
Envir. production
Steel
Services


Units


Pipeline & Facilities
Production costs
O&M costs
Repairs
State taxes
Federal taxes
Transportation
Valdez oil spill
Total Costs


6.4E+19

8.0E+15
4.6E+06

2.5E+09
4.7E+10
3.9E+09
1.5E+09
2.3E+10
1.1E+10
4.2E+09


Transformity
(sei/unit)


J 53000

sej 1
ton 1.8E+15


6.9E+12
2.0E+12
6.9E+12
2.0E+12
2.0E+12
2.0E+12
6.9E+12


Emergy Emdoll;
(1E+21sej) (E9 $19


3400 2100

0.00 0.0
8.2 5.1

17 11
94 598
27 17
3.0 1.9
45 28
22 14
29 18
7.7 4.8
250 160


Net Emergy Yield Ratio = (3400 / 250) = 13


Note











































Net Emergy of North Slope Oil=337/24.5=13.3/1



Figure 111.13. Summary diagram of net energy of north slope oil.










IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS


Using techniques of energy analysis, this study evaluated both economic and environmental
impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The analysis quantified, on a common basis, the environmental
components of the region that were impacted and the economic costs associated with clean up, lost fishery
production, and social disruption. In addition, several oil spill prevention technologies were analyzed and
related to the environmental losses they would prevent should they be implemented. Emergy benefit-cost
ratios were calculated for proposed oil spill prevention technologies where the benefits were the damage
that would not be incurred should the technology be implemented.
The spill, the ensuing cleanup, and the various alternatives that were proposed to prevent oil
spills of its magnitude offered a unique opportunity to develop perspectives for the public policy arena that
might shed some light on the complex questions surrounding environmental disasters and their
prevention.


Natural Resource and Economic Losses of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill

The costs of the Exxon Valdez oil spill can be grouped into two areas: 1.) natural resource losses
(flora and fauna killed or impaired), 2.) direct economic losses (lost fishing revenue and the costs of
cleanup). By far the greatest losses were associated with cleanup. Cleanup costs were between 56% and
80.6% of the total losses resulting from the spill. Losses resulting from death and impairment of flora and
fauna amounted to between 4.6% and 33.9%. The unusually large spread in the estimates of natural
resource losses was due to uncertainty concerning the actual losses in some compartments of the marine
food chain, especially phytoplankton and zooplankton. Because of this uncertainty, we felt that it was
better to report losses as a range rather than as an average between the two numbers. It is interesting to
note that more fuel was consumed as part of the cleanup efforts than was spilled. While the
environmental deterioration that may have resulted from the consumption of the fuels is probably less than
oil spilled directly in the marine environment, none-the-less, there were some additional impacts
associated with the use of this quantity of fuel.
An attempt was made to evaluate the social disruption that resulted from the spill and cleanup
efforts by assuming that the normal productivity of the population in the spill region was disrupted for a
period of two years. When analyzed in this manner, the social disruption was equal in magnitude to the
fuels consumed in cleanup, and exceeded the natural resource damages in the lowest total loss estimate. A
larger population was probably affected by the spill than just the population of the region; estimates of this
disruption of normal activity were difficult to determine.
All told, the oil spill accounted for about 1% of the annual emergy budget of the State of Alaska,
and between 87% and 130% of the annual emergy budget of the region from Prince William Sound to
Kodiak Island. By far, the biggest impacts were experienced in Prince William Sound itself, where the
spill represented between 330% to 490% of its total annual emergy budget. The spill had disastrous
effects within these two smaller regions, judged by the relative proportion of their annual emergy budgets,
yet probably had minor impact to the state's economy as a whole. In fact, when the consequences of
spending $2.5 billion on the cleanup are considered at the scale of the State, the spill probably stimulated
the economy.


Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives

There is no question that oil spills are costly, both in terms of their damages to natural resources
and their economic costs. The total costs, when expressed in macro-economic dollars were between $3.3
and $4.8 billion. The majority of total losses associated with the Exxon Valdez oil spill were related to the
economic costs of cleanup (about 90%). Thus, preventing oil spills before they happen would seem to
make good economic and environmental sense. Yet, if the costs of prevention are greater than the losses
incurred, the net overall effect is to reduce productivity and spend resources needlessly. In the wake of the










Exxon Valdez oil spill, there was a call for better protection, more stringent rules governing oil shipment,
and modifications to tankers to reduce the likelihood of spills of its magnitude occurring again. To shed
some light on the policy debate that ensued, we analyzed proposed oil spill prevention technologies and
compared them to the damages that occurred in Alaska. In addition, we estimated what the damages
would be if a spill of this magnitude were to occur in the lower 48 states and compared the costs of
prevention to these damages.
Ten oil spill prevention alternatives studied by the National Research Council (1991) and by
Keith et al.(1990) were analyzed to gain perspective on this most important public policy debate. The
evaluation of prevention alternatives was conducted for two different scenarios: 1.) technologies applied
to only the Alaskan tanker fleet;, and 2.) technologies applied to the U.S. tanker fleet. This second
analysis was conducted assuming that the oil spill occurred in the lower 48 states and adjusted for
increased economic and natural resource damages because of the greater densities of human populations
and economic activity in the coastal zone and because of the larger area of highly productive coastal
wetlands in the lower 48 states.


Results of the Emergy Analysis of Oil Spill Prevention Alternatives

The Alaskan Tanker Fleet: The emergy costs of five spill prevention alternatives when expressed in
macroeconomic dollars varied from $281 million to $1.8 billion. On the face of it, it would seem that
investments of this magnitude would provide a positive net yield. However, each of the alternatives will
not completely stop oil spills, only decrease their magnitude. Keith et al. (1990) gave the expected
volumes of oil that would be released with each of the five alternatives. Using the damage estimates from
the Exxon Valdez spill and converting to damage per unit of oil spilled, benefit-cost ratios were calculated
for each of the alternatives. Three of the five alternatives had net emergy benefit ratios greater than one:

4.4/1 to 6.4/1 Group I System Modifications
1.3/1 to 1.8/1 Group II system Modifications
1.4/1 to 2.0/1 Group I and I System Modifications (combined)

Group I system modifications, in general, consisted of alcohol and drug testing of crews, navigation
training, two-person watch requirement, improved loading and unloading procedures, and improved spill
response coordination. Group I system modifications included: vessel monitoring system, traffic
separation lanes, designated anchorage areas, emergency response and pollution control vessels, and
improved loading and unloading. Because of its high emergy costs, the two alternatives that included
doubling hulling had net emergy benefit ratios less that one.

The U.S Tanker Fleet: The emergy costs of the 10 prevention alternatives for the U.S. tanker fleet
measured in macroeconomic dollars varied from 288 million to 8.8 billion em$. As in the previous
analysis, the net emergy benefit ratio was calculated using the damages that would not occur should the
prevention alternative be implemented verses the costs of its implementation. Using the damage estimates
from the Exxon Valdez spill and converting to damage per unit of oil spilled (but adjusting for increased
damages that would result from a spill in the lower 48 states), benefit-cost ratios were calculated for each
of the 10 alternatives. A range of net emergy ratios were calculated for each alternative's (minimum and
maximum expected benefits). None of the 10 alternatives had minimum net emergy benefit ratios greater
than one, while seven had maximum ratios greater than one. The majority of these had ratios less than
2/1; the exceptions, with best-case ratios greater than 2/1 were:

2.16/1 Group I Modifications
2.4/1 Double Bottom










The group I modifications consisted of the same modifications as for the Alaskan alternatives. Double
bottom modifications studied by the National Research Council (1991) consisted of double hulling only
the bottom portion of the hulls of the tanker fleet.
In all, the analysis of spill prevention alternatives suggested that:

1.) Alternatives that consisted primarily of training, testing and improved response and
technology for cleanup had the best chances of providing a net emergy benefit,

2.) Alternatives that consisted of redesign and modification of the tanker fleet had poor
potential of providing a net emergy benefit, and

3.) Alternatives implemented on a regional scale with protection of particular high value
resource areas as a target had the highest potential for providing net emergy
benefits.










REFERENCES CITED


Alaska Conference of Mayors. 1989. Mayor Georgia Buck from City of Whittier in Minutes of the Sept
7, 1989 Meeting. Alaska Conference of Mayors, Subcommittee of Oiled Mayors.

Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development. 1984. The Alaska Economic and
Statistical Review: 1984. Department of Commerce and Economic Development,
Juneau, AK.

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. 1991. Current ADEC Facts & Figures: Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 3/24/91. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
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APPENDIX A

TRANSFORMITIES AND EMERGY-MONEY RATIOS USED IN THIS STUDY.










Table A.1. Transformities (Ti) and emergy-money ratios used in emergy calculations.


Name


units Source


Alaska Emergy-Money Ratio
2.3E+13
Coal 40000
Crude Oil 53000
Earth cycle energy 29000
Fuel-generated electricity 160000
Fuelwood 35000
Gold 5000000
Human labor (high school education)
2.5E+07


Hydroelectricity
Immigrating humans 9
Mangrove biomass
Natural gas
Petroleum fuels
Rain chemical energy
Rain geopotential energy
River water
Seismic energy 7
Silver
Salt marsh biomass

Solar energy
Tidal energy
Timber
Topsoil
Wave energy
Wind energy
Primary Producers 1.
Herring 1.
Zooplankton 1.
Fisheries 1.

Bald Eagles 2.
Harbor Seals 6.
Sea Otters 9.
Killer Whales 1.
Phytoplankton 1.
Fisheries 1.

Intertidal Algae 1.
Intertidal Herbivores 1.
Intertidal Mieofauna 2.
Intertidal Macrofauna 8.
Murres 4.


160000
.4E+16
15000
48000
530000
15000
8900
41000
.3E+11
750000
9000


1
24000
35000
63000
26000
620
.1E+04
1E+06
OE+05
6E+06

5E+07
1E+07
2E+07
7E+08
1E+04
6E+06

1E+04
1E+05
.9E+05
1E+05
7E+07


sej/$
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/g

sej/J
sej/J
sej/person
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/g
sej/J

sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J

sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J

sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/J


state of Alaska analysis, this study
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)

(Odum, 1988)
Odum et al. (1987a)
estimated from Odum (1988)
Odum and Arding (1991)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Alexander (1978)
estimated from Odum et al. (1987a)
averaged for components from Hornbeck
and Odum (In Review)
by emergy definition
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Appendix C
Appendix C
Appendix C
averaged for commercial species from
Appendix C
Appendix C
Appendix C
Appendix C (see text)
Appendix C
from primary producers in Appendix C
averaged for commercial species from
Appendix C
from primary producers in Appendix C
Appendix C
Appendix C
Appendix C
averaged for taxon transformities from
Appendix C


Designation


T2
T212

T33
T37
T38
T39
40
409
T
41
43
44
45
46










Table A.1 continued.

Designation Name


T47 Procellarids

S crude oil
T petroleum fuel
f"l crude oil
steel steel
U.S. emergy-money ratio


units


2.3E+07 sej/J


53000
53000
530000
1.8E+09
1.6E+12


sej/J
sej/J
sej/J
sej/g
sej/$


Source


averaged for taxon transformities from
Appendix C
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Odum et al. (1987a)
Huang and Odum (1991)
Odum (1992)


























APPENDIX B.


NOTES AND CALCULATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE EMERGY ANALYSES OF THE STATE
OF ALASKA AND PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGION










Table B.1. Conversion factors for storage and flows used in the state of Alaska and the Prince William
Sound regional analyses.

Item Value Units Source
vertebrate dry wt. to live wt. biomass ratio
0.30 g-dry/g-live Carter (1969)
uncured timber density
0.90 g/cm estimated from F.A.O. (1980)
timber dry wt. to uncured wt. ratio
0.20 g-dry/g-uncured estimated from F.A.O. (1980)
plant or invertebrate biomass to energy conversion
16700 J/g-dry wt. estimated from Odum (1969)
vertebrate biomass to energy conversion
20900 J/g-dry wt. estimated from Odum (1969)
coal mass to energy conversion
2.2E+13 J/Mg Shonka (1979)
natural gas (wet) volume to energy conversion
3.8E+07 J/m3 Shonka (1979)
crude oil volume to energy conversion
6.1E+09 J/bbl Shonka (1979)
petroleum fuel volume to energy conversion
5.5E+6 J/bbl Shonka (1979)









Notes to Table II.1. Emergy Analysis of the State of Alaska in 1985. All equations are from Odum et
al. (1987) except equation B.5 which is from Odum and Arding (1991). Where
necessary, flows were converted to energy using conversion factors given in Table D.1.

Note Description & Source
1 AK Solar Energy Inflow
= ((AK Land Area) + (Continental Shelf Area of AK)) m2 (Solar Input) J/m2-y *
(1- Albedo) (B.1)
Alaska Land Area = 1.49E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Solar Input = 3.13E+09 J/m2-y (calculated from Lindsberg et al. (1965))
Albedo = 0.35 (estimated from Budyko (1974))
2 AK Wind Energy Inflow (estimated from Odum (1992))
3 AK Rain Geopotential Energy Inflow
= (Mean Elevation of AK) m (Annual AK Precipitation Runoff) m3/y (Density of Fresh
Water) kg/m3 (Gravitational Constant) m/s2 (B.2)
Mean Elevation of AK = 1000 m (calculated from Hartman and Johnson (1978))
Annual AK Precipitation Runoff = 8.0E+11 m3/y (calculated from Hartman and Johnson
(1978))
Density of Fresh Water = 1.0E+06 kg/m3
Gravitational Constant = 9.8 m/s2
4 AK Rain Chemical Energy Inflow
= ((AK Land Area) m2 (1/Fraction of Rainfall Evapotranspirated) (Mean Annual AK
Rainfall Over Land) m/y + (AK Continental Shelf Area) m2 (Mean Annual AK Rainfall
Over Continental Shelf) m2/y) ((Moles of Water) Universal Gas Constant) *
(Temperature)) kcal/oK-g ((Concentration of Sea water) loge((Concentration of Sea
Water)/(Concentration of Rain Water))) (Density of Fresh Water) Kg/m3 (B.3)
AK Land Area = 1.49E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Fraction of Rainfall Evapotranspirated = 0.5 (assumed)
Mean Annual AK Rainfall Over Land = 1.0 m/y (calculated from Hartman and Johnson
(1978))
AK Continental Shelf Area = 1.68E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Mean Annual AK Rainfall Over Continental Shelf = 1.0 m/y (calculated from Hartman and
Johnson (1978))
(Moles of Water) (Universal Gas Constant) (Temperature) = 3.12E-02 kcal/oK-g
Concentration of Sea Water = 9.65E+05 ppm (assumed)
Concentration of Rain Water = 1.OE+06 (estimated from Odum et al. (1987a))
Density of Fresh Water = 1.OE+06 kg/m3
5 AK Tidal Energy Inflow
= (Area of AK Continental Shelf) m2 1/2 (Annual Number of Tides in AK) #/y* (Mean AK
Tidal Range)2 m2* (Fraction of Tide Absorbed in AK) (Density of Ocean Water) kg/m3*
(Gravitational Constant) m/s2* 1.0E-07 J/erg 3.15+07 s/y 100 cm/m (B.4)
Area of AK Continental Shelf= 1.68E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Annual Tides AK= 548 tides/y (estimated from Hartman and Johnson (1978))
Mean AK Tidal Range = 166 cm (calculated from Hartman and Johnson (1978))
Fraction of Tide Absorbed in AK = 0.13 (estimated from Odum et al. (1987a))
Density of Ocean Water = 1.025 kg/m3
Gravitational Constant = 9.8 m/s2
6 AK wave energy inflow (Odum, 1992)










Notes to Table II.1. Continued.
Note Description & Source


7 AK earth cycle energy inflow
= (Land Area of AK) m2 ((Fraction of AK Land Area that is Geologically Active) (Heat Flow
of Active Area) + (Fraction of AK Land Area that is Geologically Stable) (Heat Flow of
Stable Area)) (B.5)
Land Area of AK= 1.49E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Fraction of Land Area Geologically Active = 0.33 (estimated from Hartman and Johnson
(1978))
Heat Flow of Active Area = 5.26E+06 J/m2-y
Fraction of Land Area Geologically Stable = 0.66 (estimated from Hartman and Johnson
(1978))
8 AK Canadian River Water Inflow
= (Annual Canadian River Water Inflow to AK) m3/y ((Moles of Water Universal Gas
Constant) (Temperature)) kcal/K-g ((Concentration of Sea water) loge((Concentration
of Sea Water)/(Concentration of Canadian River Water))) *
(Density of Fresh Water) Kg/m3 (B.6)
Annual Canadian River Water Inflow to AK = 1.85E+11 m3/y (Hartman and Johnson,
1978)
((Moles of Water) (Universal Gas Constant) (Temperature))= 3.12E-02 kcal/K-g
Concentration of Sea Water = 9.65E+05 ppm (assumed)
Concentration of Canadian River Water = 1.OE+06 (estimated from Odum et al. (1987a))
Density of Fresh Water = 1.OE+06 kg/m3
9 1985 AK fuelwood use (U.S.D.C, 1989)
10 1985 AK hydroelectric generation (U.S.D.C., 1989)
11 1985 AK forest products use (estimated from A.D.C.E.D. (1984))
12 1985 AK fishery products consumption (estimated from U.S.D.C (1988))
13 1985 AK coal use (U.S.D.C., 1989)
14 1985 AK natural gas use (U.S.D.C., 1989)
15 1985 AK oil refined and used (U.S.D.C., 1989)
16 1985 AK electricity generation from fossil fuels (calculated from U.S.D.C. (1989))
17 1985 AK fuel imports (calculated from U.S.D.C. (1988) & Smith (1990))
18 1985 AK import of international service (extrapolated from Smith (1990))
19 1985 AK import of U.S. services (Extrapolated from Federal Government & Tourism
payments (U.S.D.C., 1989))
20 1985 AK immigration (averaged from U.S.D.C. (1989))
21 1985 AK fishery products export to international systems (Smith, 1990)
22 1985 AK fishery products export to U.S. (extrapolated from A.D.C.E.D. (1984) &
Smith (1990))
23 1985 AK forestry products exports (Smith, 1990)
24 1985 AK natural gas exports (Smith, 1990)










Notes to Table II1. Continued.
Note Description & Source


25 1985 AK oil exports (Smith, 1990)
26 1985 AK emergy of services embodied in exports to international systems
(extrapolated from Smith (1990))
27 1985 AK emergy of services embodied in exports to U.S. (extrapolated from Smith
(1990))
28 1985 AK silver exports (U.S.D.I., 1988)
29 1985 AK gold exports (U.S.D.I., 1988)










Notes to Table I112. Emergy values of major, long term storage (Qi) of Alaska in 1985. Where
necessary, storage were converted to energy using conversion factors given
in Table D.1.

Storage Description & Source


1 Timber storage (U.S.D.C., 1988)

2 Coal storage (Smith, 1990)

3 Natural gas storage (A.D.N.R, 1990)

4 Crude oil storage (A.D.N.R, 1990)

5 Topsoil storage
= (AK Land Area) m2 (Average Humus Content of AK Soil) g/m2 (Energy Conversion
Factor For Soil Humus) J/g (B.7)
AK Land Area= 1.49E+12 m2 (Hartman and Johnson, 1978)
Average Humus Content of AK Soil = 3.6E+04 g/m2 (estimated from Glazovskaya (1986))
Energy Conversion Factor For Soil Humus = 2.3E+04 J/g (Odum et al., 1987a)

7 Infrastructure, equipment & other capital assets storage (U.S.D.C., 1988)










Notes to Table 11.6. Emergy Analysis of the Prince William Sound Region of Alaska in 1988.
Equations used to calculate flow estimates are from Odum et al. (1987). Where
necessary, flows were converted to energy using conversion factors given in Table D.1.

Note Description and Source
1 PWS solar energy inflow
= (Area of PWS) m2 (Solar Input/m2) J/m2-y (1 Albedo) (B.8)
PWS Area = 9.14E+09 m2 (Exxon Co. U.S.A., Unpublished Data)
Solar Input= 3.13E+09 J/m2-y (calculated from Lindsberg et al. (1965))
Albedo = 0.35 (estimated from Budyko (1974))
2 PWS wind energy inflow
= (Area of PWS) m2 (Atmospheric Boundary Layer Height) m (Density of Air) kg/m3 *
(Specific Heat of Air) kcal/kg-OK (Horizontal Temperature Gradient) oK/m (PWS Wind
Vector) m/s 4186 J/kcal 3.15E+07 s/y (B.9)
PWS Area = 9.14E+09 m2 (Exxon Co. U.S.A., Unpublished Data)
Density of Air = 1.23 kg/m3
Specific Heat of Air = 0.24 kcal/kg-oK (Odum et al., 1987a)
Horizontal Temperature Gradient = 3.0E-09 kcal/K-g (calculated from Royer (1982))
PWS Wind Vector = 8.0 m/s (Luick et al., 1987)
3 PWS fresh water chemical potential energy inflow
= (Annual Fresh Water Input to PWS) m3/y ((Moles of Water Universal Gas Constant) *
(Temperature)) kcal/K-g ((Concentration of PWS water) loge((Concentration of PWS
Water)/(Concentration of Freshwater))) (Density of Fresh Water) Kg/m3 (B.10)
Annual Fresh Water Input to PWS = 2.2E+10 m3/y (estimated from Royer (1982; 1983))
((Moles of Water) (Universal Gas Constant) (Temperature)) = 3.12E-02 kcal/K-g
Concentration of PWS Water = 1.OE+06 ppm (estimated from Muench and Schmidt
(1982))
Concentration of Fresh Water = 9.9E+05 (estimated from Odum et al. (1987a))
Density of Fresh Water = 1.OE+06 kg/m3
4 PWS tidal energy inflow
= (Area of PWS) m2 1/2 (Number of Tides per year in PWS) #/y* (Mean PWS Tidal Range)2
m2* (Fraction of Tide Absorbed in PWS) (Density of Ocean Water) kg/m3* (Gravitational
Constant) m/s2* 1.0E-07 J/erg 3.15+07 s/y 100 cm/m (B.11)
PWS Area = 9.14E+09 m2 (Exxon Co. U.S.A., Unpublished Data)
Tides/y in PWS = 500 tides/y (estimated from Mickelson (1989) adjusting for semi-diurnal
characteristics)
Mean PWS Tidal Range = 232 cm (calculated from Hartman and Johnson (1978))
Fraction of Tide Absorbed in PWS = 0.13 (Estimated using 0.07 absorption for open waters
and 0.50 for fjord waters)
Density of Ocean Water = 1.025 kg/m3
Gravitational Constant = 9.8 m/s2




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