Title: Mrs. Bobbie James
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Title: Mrs. Bobbie James
Series Title: Mrs. Bobbie James
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FLA REP. 2AB Wells, typist.

Interview w/
Mrs. Bobbie James,
GOP historian


K: ... biographical material. How about how you got started in

politics, family background 'and so forth?

J: You want me ... ?

K: Just go ahead, start all over.

J: Just like we did before.

K: Sure.

J: Well, born in Jacksonville and when I was three years old we moved

to Delray Beach and tikan I was raised in a family, well, both

sides Demo--, Deep Southern Democratd party and I

was raised a-- e-- the principles generally --3

/CV/ q and .__ l the people of the South.

K: I'm interested --- what in your growing up years did your parents

teach you or did you come to understand as those basic Demo-

cratic principles?

J: I wouldn't ... I di-cdr_ have to say that it wasn't basic Demo-

crat principles, because there was an enormous difference be-

tween Northern and Southern Democrat principles.

K: Basic southernn principles.

J: Basic Southern principles--I think that has to be emphasized, really,

because there is a tremendous difference there. Uh, and that


basic, the basic principle is one of state government, where

state government is the determining factor for most of the

activities tah- your life ie- regulated .,. the activities that

any citizen lives in a day-to-day basis. And so that's the

basic principle--that state government is the key ,Ce ]H

K: More important than both local government and national govern-


J: Right. If you put local and Federal government and their re-

gulation and their effect on my life together, and on any

individual's life, I feel that they have far, far ... combined,

they have far, far less impact than the state does. And I think
this / the way our country was set up and intended to be in the

beginning. And so I grew up with the idea that I had to pay

more attention to who was elected to my state legislature, to

my governorship than I had to pay to the President. That was

why Southern Democrats could split and vote for a Republican

President but at the same time they stayed within the framework

of the Democratic party at home because this was where the

laws were made. And at that time with there being no strong Re-

publican party the only place you could go to have an influence

was in the Democratic primaries particularly. So I grew up

with a strong sense of state government and from that the

economics that naturally flowed from the philosophy of



strong and responsible state government and any of the other

areas of government that flow from that one basic reciple-

And I felt in growing up that I found no difference, in fact

I found that Republicans shared that same basic philosophy

with me more by far than the Northern Democrats. And I found

that the Northern Democratic influence was not healthy on

Southern Democrats; that it was a factor that was really

tearing the Democratic party apart and I felt that in alot-

between Republicans and Democrats, Southern Democrats would

be a good idea because these people shared a basic philosophy

that was very, very similar, very few exceptions even economics-


K: t f4h '>-( conservatism.

J: Right, ... which ...

K:. State rights.

J: Yes.

K: Anti-government influence?

J: Yes.

K: Big government influence?

J: Right. Predominantly state responsibility. There's a difference

between states' rights and states' responsibilities. And that's

where Republicans and Southern Democrats came together in almost

total harmony--w-4. state responsibility, which of course would

haebe infer4,c lesser Federal control and stronger govern-

ment control. But ... uh, state control. At the same time)


Republicans and Southern Democrats wanted their state to take

responsibility, not just say, "well, this is our right." But to

take the responsibility for governmental activity.
K: So you've become an active Republican,/your husband was an

active Republican.

J: Well, he ... he actually ... I was going to be a Republican

anyway, but I think he sort of cli;ehed the idea because
when I talked with him as a lifelong Republican/ I found that

we had no differences. We've often laughed that when we were

courting we talked about the two most dangerous subjects that

any young couple can talk about--religion and politics. Sut i

left a Democrat family and Republican4ami-yand he left a

Methodist family and became a Presbyterian! And we've been happy

ever since. We resolved all of our problems.

K: Mrs. James, you have ... you were appointed party historian,

Republican Party historian in November of 1966, and of course

that's the ... and you are now still presently Republican Party

historian. Of course 1966 was when Republicans finally captured

for the first time in a while at least the governor's office,
and Governor Kirk wns elected in 1966. What / you doing in

that campaign?

J: In 1966 particularly in Palm Beach County we had the feeling that

if we were going to build a two-party state we couldn't do it

just by supporting the top of the ticket so to speak--the big



names running for the big offices. We had to work for the

total fig all the way through. So although for instance

Governor Kirk had a campaign organization here in Palm Beach

County that organization was to a large extent subservient to the

Republican Party organization that we had built out of the

old Goldwater organization.' "And we worked at all levels.

K: What do you mean "the old Goldwater organization"?

J: Well, before the Goldwater campaign there was, there was a Re-

publican Party in the county, but it didn't seem to reach into

the grass roots level--only the highly interested Republicans

really worked in it. And they did a good job. They kept the

party alive in the county at times when we weren't electing
anybody to public office But they weren't able to / out to

the grass roots and to get the message across to Southern Demo-

crats who would agree with them. But the (oldwater campaign

brought all factions of people together. It brought together

Southern Democrats, Republicans ...

K: It was kind of like a popular movement then wasn't it? On

the local level.

J: It really was. That's right. In this county it was the over-

whelming popularity of Goldwater brought so many people B-&.

my husband was chairman of the Goldwater for President

committee in Palm Beach 'County. And therefore we got to know

people all over the county that worked at the grass roots


level. He and I had never worked in the official party organi-

zation to much of an extent until this campaign. And other

people were like us. So we began ...

K: Okay, about that campaign. So what were you doing?

J: Ummm, ... .

K: That was after Goldwater ... gotten involved ...

J: Well, from this old Goldwater organization then we really cf /r:- .

-.g- a good working organization from all over the county. It

wasn't just in one city or one particular area but we drew

people from the Glades, from Jupiter, which is quite a ways
the j
north of us, all the way down through/South just a

mixture of people all over. So we had ... the nice thing about

it then was you had workers spotted all over the county and

everybody could work, for instance, in their hometowns where

they knew people they could contact, and where their ... the

respect that local people had for them could sort of wash over

onto the candidate they were working for. And so when we talk

about working for Kirk, Kirk was one of the candidates. And

most Republican workers viewed him as that--- as one of the can-

didates. Of course we wanted a governor, in the worst way, but

we also wanted legislators there to help him. We wanted county

commissioners to work with him and ...

K: Did you expect him to win?

J: In the beginning, we felt it would be a '&fi" close race, but


toward the end we got more and more confident. The calls to

ou4local headquarters, for instance, the one here in Delray,

we answered call after call of people calling in about the gover-

nor, asking questions about our gubernatorial candidate,

not governor then of course. We were even calling him "Gover-

nor" before the election because we thought 9 this helped his
image too. And he liked to do that, you know. At luncheons

he would get up and say, "Now say, 'Governor Kirk'." And

everybody would respond "Governor Kirk." "Now doesn't

that sound nice? Yes, well, that's what it's going to be."

So it became an optimistic campaign. And toward the end

we began to believe we could do fabt. We knew it was going to

be close, but we felt we could do it. And I know on our tele-

phoners with our poll-watching system we had, we sent people to

the polls with a list. of registered Republican voters and a
list of Democrats / were favorable to Kirk or were favorable

to the majority of Republicans on our ballot. And we did that

by telephoning and by door-to-door canvassing to ask people
their opinions. Well,/they were very favorable for Kirk or

they were very favorable for most of the Republicans on the

ballot, we put their name on the list. And that day on

election day i- they came in we marked off the ones who we knew

were our people who had voted. And at noon everyone, every

Republican, who had not voted we called. We had telephoners


meet at the headquarters. We had our poll-watchers take their

lists to them. And every name that wasn't checked off got a

telephone call right away and if they -t0044dvt get 'em right

then they kept trying right up 'till seven o'clock, 'till the

polls closed. And our theme in those telephone calls more

often than not was "we've got to have you out to vote." And

they would say, "well, my vote isn't going to count," or "gee,

I've got a problem with a ride to the polls," and we'd say,

"we'll get you," "we'll get you there" "your (vote does

count because we think we can elect a Republican governor."

And so often they would say, "Do you really think we can

elect a Republican?" 'And we said,, "Yes, if you come vote,

we promise you we'll have a Republican governor." And)by golly,

they came and voted and we got a Republican governor.

But the campaign picked up steam. And I ... the old political

saying is "we climaxed at exactly the right time."

K: What were the issues that mattered in Palm Beach County? Of

course Robert King High was from south Florida. Granted Dade
I suppose,
Countyis different than Palm Beach County but much of but

much of the same kind of interest would have been involved

in both counties. What, what kind of issues mattered here

between Governor, then gubernatorial candidate, Claude Kirk

and Robert King High?

J: You mean what issues?


K: Yeah.

J: That he enunciated or ...?

K: What kinds of things made the difference? Why could people

vote for Governor Kirk and not, and not for High?

J: Because in al-ot of respects, outside of Dade County, Southern
t ,
Democrats and Republicans alike don't agree generally with

the philosophy expressed in Dade County. They just have a

different way of looking at life and looking at government. And

so outside of Dade County) Robert King High was a definite

detriment. We were all extreme ly pleased that Haydon Burns

loct because we felt Haydon Burns was, would have been far more

formidable because his philosophy was not that divergent from

our own/ that we would have had the issues. But with Robert

King High we had the issues because Robert King High 1-, the

political establishment in Dade County was very liberal.

K: I was just going to ask, did the fact that people like Leoy

Collins and the so-called"Liberal LeiAoy' ag and all of that

business, did that matter here in Palm Beach County, too?

J: It had a fantastically strong influence. It was one of the

determining things. I think really the two reasons Claude

Kirk was elected was, and I would hate to say "number one" and
"number two"/because either one could be number one or number

two, but one thing was Robert King Hi gh's liberal, you almost

want to say "northern Democrat liberal" philosophy, and the


other thing was the first strong organization of the Republican

Party. It was the first time the Republican Party Aand its

organization was a factor in, in electing a Republican to


K: Does this go back a-further than the 1964 campaign--this

developing organization?

J: Yes, it ... when the '64 campaign ended, and the Goldwater

election was over) there was no sto We didn't fold up our

tents and go home and say, "well, we got a year to wait until

we get ready." The momentum just kept on going after the '64

election. Maybe it was because ... I don't know, there was

such harmony, /nd so many of us had worked together so long

that we became friends as well as political allies. And so it

was a constant work after that. It just built up, t.- / tpj>.

K:, Was this true all over the state?

J: Yes.

K: So when you're talking about 'many of us being close friends','

who around the state formed the nucleus from '64 and pushed?

The people--by name, if you would? Who were the people that

began to push the party towards 1966 in a new kind of way


J: Well, for the actual names of a+ot of them I think Bill will

haue to give those to you, but among the others there was

Bo_ _"_ in Dade County.

K: What is ...what was he at the time?


J: State committeeman.

K: State committeeman.

J: Really, it was your state committee, your new state committee

that was elected in 1966, now they began in 1964 saying, if we

had had a decent statewide party, we could have carried it for
Goldwater instead of losing by A relatively small margin we did.

We'd have carried it. You ... it had to be lousy party organization

that lost the state for him. There was no other answer when

everybody on the street was for him.

K: What were the problems?

J: In '64? The problem really was that the state committee had been
too dominated by/very small group who were Post Office pa-

tronage people.

K: Who?

J: G. Harold Alexander, Tom Brown, well, tfe all of the people in

that little clique.

K: Run by Alexander and Brown?
J: Right. Actually4Tom Brown was ... sort of a premier for, that's

a terrible word, but sort of a premier for G. Harold Alexander.

G. Harold Alexander was the total power in Republican politics.

And I don't know if it was because he didn't have any knowledge

of how to organize the party or whether he wanted to keep the

power to himself ...

K: A s wae not to organize the party...

J: Right, right. I don't know which. I can't say) -hs-ame--


because I can't read his heart. You have to know a person's

heart and mind to know that- But at any rate no one had been
you know,
encouraged to run. Oh, maybe an occasional/"oh, why don't

you run for office?" But no "come on, fellow, we need you."

"I'll get you some financial support. I'll get people to

donate to you. We'll help you." None of this. There.was no

real support for our candidates. Bill Cramer likes to tell

h-ss-story of when he ran for Congress and he was running against

a Democrat, this was in the general election. And I think,

well, it was after the deadline for receiving funds, and Tom

Brown took him, I can't remember whether it was a check or

money, cash, from the party. And Bill Cramer, I believe

it was a check because Bill Cramer framed it because he wanted

to always remember that when he needed the party so bad it

came in a day late or something like that. But this was true

everywhere. If they did anything it was too late to be of

help; there was no organization. So in after the '64 election ...

K: Can we stop here for a second?

J: Umm,

K: When yoa say there was no organization let's establish what

organization there was.

J : ..

K: There was G. Harold Alexander, who was the party, state party

chairman. Were there state committees in each of the counties?

J: Uh, ...


K: All 67 counties?

J: I don't know if there were because I don't even if today there

are state committeemen and women in every county. We've often

had vacanciesbut we had them. But even those who wanted to

do a good job were held back.

K: Okay- Just in terms of structure.

J: Right.

K: Was there still a ... was there a state party headquarters

with an executive director such as Mr. David is today?

J: No. In '64 there wasn't.

K: Okay. So there really was a lacking basic structure as well as

... as well as involved' people. There just simply wasn't.even ..

J: Yes, right. We had state committeemen and women, now the Re-

publican party, you see, never paid ... for instance, if you

have a state convention, the Republican party never paid the

traveling expenses or anything of their state committeemen

and committeewomen. You paid your own way. And with the

Democrats, they paid for their people to come to the meetings.

Maybe that's why they held fewer meetings! They couldn't

afford to get them all together! But at any rate in ours faj e
you paid your way or I think there was a ... in the Gedden i t*r.)

Papers I think it points out that there is a letter in there

where another state committeeman paid the way o this Negro

committeeman who couldn't afford to go so he helped him out.


And maybe between people there would be help. But anyway they,

they would meet occasionally and it was really occasionally.

They didn't meet very often.

K: No statewide fundraising programs?

J: No, if it was, it was geared more toward a fund-raising for the

President. And you see and it went back to the state committee

and they took credit in Washington for sending the money.

K: Then after the '64 campaign) state committees got going and

started moving towards this 1966 idea tof developing a struc-

ture that could elect Republican candidates from top to bot-


J: Well, you, to really get the picture, it wasn't that just suddenly

these state committe4people who hadn't been used, suddenly

did it. cThe real picture was that the people who)d met together

in the Goldwater organization and in the Young Republican

group, between '64 and" '65 the Goldwater people and the Young Re-
N Marquita
publicans got together And thanks to / Maytag _,

just a marvelous friend o- the Republicnn Party, she knew that

the Young Republicans guldn't finance the work that needed to

be done. So she helped raise funds.

K: Who was she? Or who is she?

J: Marquita Maytag is the former wife of Bud Maytag, president

of the. National Airlines. But Marquita, Bud and Marquita both

are strong Republicans and strong conservatives, but, and

because they had the financial ability to go where they wanted


and do what they wanted, Marquita just turned her efforts to

helping to build a strong Republican Party here because ...

K: What did she do?i )

J: She served as state co-chairman with (xegtra ,.L as

Goldwater for President in Florida. And then she, after that

campaign was over, she financed the Young Republicans.

K: Out of her own private sources?

J: Yeah, out of her own money.

K: Do you happen to / know how much money she gave?

J: No, I don't. I believe the person who could probably give you

the figure best would be Hal J1+i But it was a considerable

amount of money. And so the Young Republicans began to M ge.

and the Goldwater people joined with them and ...

K: Who were the Goldwater people? When you're talking about ...

J: Well, people like my husband, like the __E____ in Broward
4L) A m V 'down IIt >&-coCoS Cr/
County, W .what's her name, -- Shirley: 'Bob- t ig

again; well, I can't ... my mind isn't quick enough right off

hand to pick them out, ...

K: That's arigt no problem.
J: But I could remember them. I'll probably/remember a half an hour

from now ...

K: That's ei-gh-. That's no problem.

J: But anyway these, lot of these people got together and then ...

K: This would have been in the post-'64--1965 period of time.


J: Between '64 and '66.

K: ... '66.

J: And they are the ones who eventually established it because

this group of people which Bill will have to give you the names

on because he, I can remember a ot of them but I mmaif---.

lut Lou Frey was one, and Fred / i and Bill Taylor in

Jacksonville and Bill Murphin in Martin County, uh, Martin,

Murphin .. came fro the Goldwater thing ....

There were,I don't know, it seems to be there were about

twelve or fifteen of them, and they would hold meeting generally

in Orlando. And they made it secret. Because when you're

planning to completely revitalize the party you've got to work

hard and you've got to keep some of your plans secret. So

they met and they decided that in order to have a vital, strong

Republican party we were going to have to have state committee-

men and committeewomen who wouldn't just stay home because

G. Harold Alexander wouldn't call a meeting. We needed a strong

state committee, we needed a strong chairman whose purpose was

not to run for office or not to garner patronage, but whose

purpose was to elect Republican public officials, the only

purpose. These men that met) as I mentioned earlier not one of
them had any / of running for office. They had in no way

indicated to anybody any desires. All they wanted to de-s-

fa*=-ae the party structure was- to guarantee that we could elect



people that could set up organizations that would elect them.

So they met and what they did was go around the state and where

you had weak committeemen and committeewomen, uh, or people ...

your less progressive ones, that they would try to get some-

body to run for that office. For instance, in Palm Beach County---

and ours is typical.' of all around the state we had a state

committeeman who's a wonderful man, a dedicated Republican,

just marvelous person. But he didn't have the drive to go out

and organize, to force state committee meetings, tb demand them.

K: What was his name?

J: Colonel Campbell, c Campbell. And he was from Long

Island. And he was a wonderful man. So Bill went to him and he

said, "Colonel Campbell, he said, "I don't know, maybe it's

because you're retiring, you've lost your enthusiasm because

you've given so many years to the party in Long Island before

you came down here, but I want to run for your job. And quite

frankly I'd like you not to run and give me your support." So

Colonel Campbell said he'd be delighted to, that he wanted to

see a strong party too, and that he just didn't have the push

to get out and do what had to be done and he'd love to have Bill
then --
do it. And/the state committeewoman/quite frankly,\our state

committeewoman was, is a marvelous woman. She was, she is just

brilliant, and she'd dedicated to the party, but ...

K: Now who is she?

J: Virginia Engstrom, and she still lives in Lake Worth. She's been


in this county and worked hard in Republican politics all the

time. But she ran, but then 0 she was opposed by Ann Cassidy,

the present state committeewoman in Boca. Ann had been,' helped

with the national finance committee and several other things.

So Ann ran. And I don't think, I don't really think it was be-

cause people felt that Virginia couldn't do the job that she

won. The Young Republicans and the Goldwater people had just

made such a plea to throw out this old, ineffective party and

get a new vital party. And I think Virginia was a victim.

K: Of the ...sweeping....

J: Of the sweep. I mean, you know, just get rid of all the old

... no matter what their intentions were, get rid of 'em-,and

get a new bunch. So we had a very, very Jspirited campaign

here in Palm Beach County and they had a very spirited one in

Jacksonville. There were some cases where we didn't change

state committee people because in their counties the state

committeemen and women went out and said, "We hate'this state

committee. We want a new state committee. We, you know, re-

elected4 and we'll work with the new." So there were alot of

them that we didn't have to put anybody in ain because they

were good people that came out charging against their ....

K: And Bill Murphin became the new party chairman?

J: Well, the group met and they were trying to decide who would be

the chairman. Because here are a bunch of people you have to


remember who were on the young side. Oh, I think all of them were

under forty. And they were having to make a living for their

families and travel to try and build this party so it was, you

know, who wants the lousy job, who's got time to go spend and

do all tese, who'll give up their business for a year and do

it? So uh, among others Lou Frey was ...it was suggested that

Lou would do it. He had been president of the Young Repub-

licans. ans he knew people all over the state from that as

well as a number of other Republican activities. But -. Ed

Gurney wouldn't let him. He refused to let Lou run. He was

... he was not in favor of his being president of the YQung


K: Was Gurney involved with this new reform movement in the

first place?

J: No.

K: Then how did this factor in whether ... how did he have the in-

put to decide that Frey wouldn't run it, if you understand my


J: Because Frey was the junior law partner. Ha! Ed, you know, I

don't want you doing it. So Lou then was, as I say, when he

ran for president of the ... federation) Gurney was extremely

unhappy. And then when it came to this, Lou knew he'd just


be booted out of the law firm if he did. And I'm not sure,

this I think is probably the genesis of the not too happy

relationship between Frey and Gurney today. Because EdI

don't know, maybe he wanted Lou to just work for him or

something. I don't really understand why except that I do

know that he did hold him back from advancing in the party.

So anyway Lou said kk can't afford to lose hU4 job, can't

run, and I think a number of others had equal excuses. And

finally it-4-Q,, v Bill Murphin and ....

K: Who didn't have the necessary, excuse.

J: Right. He owned his pharmacy, he was doing pretty well,

and we figured, well, you can have another pharacist fill

prescriptions for a year so you're chosen. And Bill wasn't
at all happy with being A Nobody would have been because

it called for a tremendous personal sacrifice. Bill Murphin

sacrificed _T__ for the party And then some of

the others, they would take turns, and if you knew Mrs. Smith

in such and such a county, you took Bill and they went tc

th ouses, visited with them, talked to them, and just by

absolute personal contact they won over. Now Holly, ...

K: Charles Holly.

J: Charles Holly was a candidate for state chairman at that time.

We'd all known Chuck when he ran for governor in '64 and liked

Chuck, but we just didn't feel that he had the real ... azoo!

or something, to go out and really A_ this thing, and then


too, he had had so many connections with the old party.

K: With the Alexander faction?

J: Right. Now, he, he was opposed to that.

K: Okay, so Bill Murphin ...
J: Was chosen and they, they did work well in the '66 party

elections came up, and at that time they were held in March,

I believe it was March or April-, it was in the spring

anyway, and so when the elections were held, by golly, our

people won. And went to the state convention in Tampa and

Holly ran against him but it was just pretty obvious that it

was overwhelming. We had done our work -thate we wers-geng-teo win.

And it was obvious also that some of the old Alexander bunch,

like Tom Brown and ... oh, the lady from ... can't think of

her name, anyway some of the more prominent and stronger mem-

bers of Alexander's group) saw the handwriting on the wall and

they joined forces then with the Murphin group and Chuck Holly

graciously gave up after the first ... in the ... Bill won

overwhelmingly on the first ballot. But I think the reason

that they couldn't rally around Chuck really was they felt

you needed a whold new start; somebody who hasn't been involved

you know in any of the past things so you can't distrust them.

You know, there's no inborn distrust to start with. But on

the first ballotwe had a ball counting that. That place

was packed in there. And people there from Washington and



everything to watch it because there was a revolution going

on in Florida---the Young Republicans, they just, you know,

pulled off a miracle. And as soon as it was over the Alexan-

der people then began to cooperate very well. I admit these

agents needed leadership, you just don't know why they hadn't

produced, but they started. They, they came in and they ...

K: You made the statement about this convention of people from

Washington came down. Who came down?

J: I can't remember their names.

K: Where were they from?

J: I've got it in the records) I think. But they were from the
national committee. And/the man's name is so familiar ...

K: Well, we can look it up, that's not the problem.

J: Anyway, they came down and ...

K: Where was the convention held in Tampa?

J: That's in the records too and I can't think offhand,)Et, ktaj

_T _k_ -It was on the bay.p

K: OK. That's no problem either. That's no problem. So this,

the W44 balloting, this first balloting, you were getting

ready to talk about the balloting.
J: We had / walkie-talkie going around checking just to make

sure none of our committee people were going to play golf.

And on the first ballot it, it was a great victory. And

Chuck only very graciously ... the animosity that you might

have suspected from OJ such a terrific battle didn't materialize.



Instead I think there was a relieve that the mini-revolution

was over, and that everybody could hold hands and Chuck Holly

was more than gracious in his concession. And ...

K: Was G. Harold Alexander there?

J: No, not to my knowledge. He wasn't there, if he was I did

not see the man. I don't believe he was. Tom Brown was

running his faction for him, and I think really, Tom Brown

is another person who's a very fine person, a good Christian

man, but it was just, you know, politically, he didn't,I

guess, have the leadership or something, and so G. Harold

Alexander called all the shots. I o t 4oC U) [ ~ te iV,

isa ge );Tom Brown was just as gracious as he could

be. Bill Cramer who had said it was a lost cause, why

don't you support, I think it was Holly, ead4 instead of

dividing forces, and we said we're going to divide theirs,

and so Bill Cramer came over and said, you ge-4- -you did

a fantastic job, I'm with you, if I can do anything to help,

I will. And then after tbat, after the ...election itself

was over with) the group, the old group that started the whole

thing, /2- /FL 4f-- Ao i -e5 and they

finalized decisions as to who would be treasurer, ff4 who

would be area vice-chairman, and who would be this,that, and

the other because by then the feeling of unity was so strong

that they felt that whatever slate'they wanted they'd

pretty well get in. And they were pretty nice, too, about


picking people from each, from Holly's faction and from

Alexander's to put on the board. And I mean people who'd

been dedicated to him, too, not just token people. And

it worked out well because it started the party that year

on a totally harmonious basis. You know, in political cam-

paigns of any sort you usually have anomosity lagging over

and omebody'll say, "well, yeah, I won't work against him,

but I'm not going to work for him, I'll just sit oct _Dyi

fL7 7 a / j1sh ." Well, they didn't do that. They were all

real good about saying, well, you all wanted this th6-gV >A )

now we're going to work and try it and see f if you can

make it go. So the spirit of the thing, I've never seen
before vf- since --the unity in the Republican Party that

came out of that Tampa meeting. There was no bitterness...

K: Can you date the meeting? Can you tell me when ...

J: I believe it was, it was either the last few days in May or

the first in June of '66 when this happened, and that's

too in the records, in my records. But people went there so
bouyed up, I know we, we had a, we were building / cottage

in Nopth Carolina, and big U-Haul it with furniture

and all in it, and you know, we went up there and the whole

time we were there we were anxious to get home, to go back

to work. And this, I think was the attitude of everybody.


And this is what I mean about we didn't have a lag between
'64 and the '66 elections. /'. was just a constant _O_ eM

K: That's very clear. And it's also very interesting be-

cause it reinforces some feelings Irpp heard from other

Republicans, Pat Dodson in Pensacola being one)who argued

that this, there was a pai-y cleanliness feeling; it was

a matter of now we have an opportunity to do something,

And so when Governor Kirkqfinally d~1 become governor, in

1966, there had been this party reformation and there was

a new series of candidates, new turnover of office and A ~

a four-year Republican administration of Governor Kirk's

was underway. Now during this period of time you were

still Republican Party historian. One question we should

clarify for )purposes of the record: as Republican Party

historian what were your officJl functions?

J: Well, now, I was not historian at the time of that particular


K: No, but you became after November of '66 ...

J: In November ... after June.

K: Right.

J: And the main purpose that I was to serve was to begin gathering

materials about our past, about our history. I was not CkArk&ec

...-. keeping a running record of what was happening

in that time. It was just to have information available.


We felt and it was borne out that once our party began moving

4 there would be college students that would be interest ed

in it, more helpgpond we tt that this was a good way to

work with youth. We wanted young people to know about our

party because we were a young party, we were not an old party,

we ... everybody that was really active in the party was

forty or under. So ... and I shouldn't ... we had older

people, but the big thrust state-wide, now your counties

you had older people h-a- were just angels to us, ...

K: Sure.

J: But state-wide the party took on a whole young look and

we wanted to serve people so that was, that was one of my

functions. And then we 'felt there was a need to know

about our party in the past, to lay to rest this old buga-

boo about the terrible, terrible Republicans of the past.

And I think one of the reasons that this, we never had

!I faformally a historian. I think t one of the reasons was

that -W E=Tonf' wife loves history, like I do. And

we were talking about Republican history and Iy done

just a little study into it at the time, and so she encouraged

Bill in this historical venture for the party. And then

it became more and more apparent how needed it,wasbecause

you could not find records. Every chairman kept his re-

cords,-would not release them to'anybody and others threw

them away; you know, this fellow's been booted out of office,


so let's throw away all the correspondence and start new.

And so that pretty well ... it was just a collection of

of materials, iW.- i&4

K: Let me jump up and then we can go back. But I'm really

interested and it follows because we have sort of developed

from, in 1964 with reformation and beginning in '65 and

culminating with the convention in '66 and the election

of Murphin and the reform group in the Republican Party,

and I think that's an appropriate title, /d then the election

of Governor Kirk in November of '66,there was always this

harmony. Four years later in 1970 there is a tremendous

split in the Republican Party. What happened? How did it

come about? Who was involved?

J: Well, I think the reason for it was that we were acting like

a minority party instead of forcing ourselves to act like

a majority party. We still,I think had a complex of being

a minority and one problem I think was some of the public

officials that were elected didn't really realize that the

party had had the impact on the election that it did.

K: Who, for example, didn't realize that? Anybody in particular?

J: Well, I think probably Claude Kirk was the one who realized
it least. A talked about the fact that newly elected

politicians have a problem and I don't care, they'll all probably

deny it, but they all have massive egos. And it's only human


nature---you've gone out and you have laid yourself bare

to the public and they have elected you. And to have that

many people pulling your lever in that ballot box has got to

have a psychological impact on your ego. But this is under-

standable. And you get the idea, well, they like me. And

you forget that there were ayot of them who if they saw you

on the street wouldn't know you. They voted for you because

maybe what your neighbor had said, because a poll watcher

got them there to vote the Republican ticket, so many

people ...I'd say the vast majority of people who go to the

polls can't tell you three people whose names are on the

ballot a week after the election. But Claude Kirk had a

marvelous personality. personality that lent itself

well to party support. It made it easy for party workers

to sell him)because of his personality. &the fact is that

without those party workers out digging in the grass roots

he couldn't have won. His-election was not that big a

landslide. He had to have that hard grass roots work that

was done. I don't think he ever really realized that. I

believe that this is a weakness that is very common to almost

every politician. And particular+ those in higher office.

The higher the office the bigger that ego thinking that was
me. 'Cause after all A see their name on every brochure

and every bulletin board, they see.their faces on television,

you know. And after a while, the ego gets going Now



this is particularly true in the first few years of ser-

vice, the first, say, four years. After that a good politician,

a good legislator, a good governor begins to ... that ego

begins then to tame down. He begins to realize the help

he's getting from other people. And so it, it mellows with

age until really with your older politicians I think it

almost fades away again. But it's a traumatic experience

to be elected to office. And I think if Claude Kirk had been

elected to the House of Representatives and then to the Senate

and worked his way up governmentally, that ego would have

had time to subside somewhat before he hit the governorship.

But fresh off the street and straight in the governor's


K: A very heady experience.

J: It was a heady experience and I don't think he realized until

too late the tremendous impact that party unity had had in

electing him.

K: From the party point of view how soon did the problem be-

gin to arise? This, that eventually culminated in the split.

in 1970. How soon after 1966 did this problem and how did

it come about?-

J: Well, let's see. Kirk was elected in '66 and '67 was his

first session and the harmony was still terribly strong

there. The legislators wanted to work with him so much,


and he was pretty good about working with them. Some-

times I think he limited his counsels.

K: Let me interject to say this is/your husband was also in

the legislature in '67.

J: '67.

K: '67.

J: Right. Kirk was elected in '66 and my husband was elected

in a special election in March.

K: After reapportionment?

J: Right. Of '67. So really the '66 election really didn't

mean a great deal because everybody had to stand for reflection

in '67 anyhow. So in '67 the, they went there, well, first
that e). &b-
let me say/the '67 really drained the party. It drained it

because we had been, we grew so fast ,hat '64 to '66

period we grew so fast, in fact from nothing almost that

suddenly we needed people to run for office.



Tape A, Side 2,
Klingman interview w/
Bobbie James.

J: It did. And those, the orig final old group that didn't want
to run for anything suddenly found themselves for

something. That was Xtt4 LIU vA.v _ in '67. The reapportion-

ment made another seat here in Palm Beach County. And we

just didn't have anybody that was knowledgeable and had

been that active to, you had to pick them so quickly, you

know, we had about six weeks to run the election. And so
a4oZA-ev i-"at'2)
by gosh, all of a sudden we gotte-see who we're going to get.

So Bill had of course had worked as state committeeman very

hard for the others in '66. And so the legislators, the ones

we had then in office for e-4#-y-er- called up Bill and said,

"Bill, you're the only one. You know we could run somebody

else and they might win, but with you, you've had experience,

you've helped us with our campaigns, you know what it's

about, you're a campaigner, let's go, we've only got six

weeks." And Bill said, you know, he said,"oh, I don't bnow

aboutt.'. I can't afford to run." And they said you can't

afford not to. And besides that, Bill, it's only two months

every two year! ,And that was the first thing .- 4-tA ' _

K: FirstT t, 4 &'W r" C y (

J: That was the first thing we?.heard that wasn't true.

K: Yeah.

J: But they did think it was true. That was the way the legislature



K: On the surface.

J: So he ran. Throughout this we were ... anybody that had

been involved and seemed capable we had to draw them out of

the Young Republican group and out of the state committee

and get them running. Chuck who had been executive

director of the Young Republicans, which was our only organi-

zation between '64 and '66, Chuck WiVt was executive

director,4nd he had to run because here he lived in St. Lucie

County and we didn't have anybody to run in St. Lucie County.

So put Chuck in. This just happened all over the state.

And so in '67 the5 llot of the legislators had been people who

had been very active in this reform movement. We were proud

of having elected a governor. We were so proud of everything
that ...there was just ... Claude Kirk had not had had a more

dedicated group of'diciples than the Republicans. They

worked together. I had never seen a group of men work like

our legislators, our Republican legislators, worked in '67.

Ralph Turlington gave them a hard time; oh boy, 'cause he's

you kncw, quite partisan Democrat. And he's an extremely parti-

san Democratic speaker and he gave them the works that they
matured under. learned how to legislate from the hard

necessity of having to because Ralph was L( on them, And,

of i course, the Democrats were doing their best partisan-wise

to hurt Claude Kirk any way they 5 could. And between his

Fla Rep 2AB

personality and the tremendous harmony of the Republican leg-

islators it was something that couldn't be stopped. You

just ... we heard so many of our Democratic legislators

zr < say, you know, just "how do you lick the gu?"

"how do you 34ke. a guy like that?" Well, you couldn't. It

was such a harmonious group. The7stuck with him on vetoes.

K: Okay, Republicans in harmony with Kirk catching hell from

the Democrats.

J: Absolutely. It was a .-fierce session. I've never seen

one that was quite ... it was a very partisan session, and

the fighting was really rough. It really was. Don Reed was

minority leader for the Republican Party, and Don was really

at his finest in '67, '68, '69. He, h really led the party

beautifully and as I say, the ... each legislator tried to

help each other as.well as they could and)you seeso many of

us were new that it was really rough on them to come in to

learning to be a legislator under such a baptism of fire.

K: There really wasn't time for intraparty disputes or personal
power cliques
S to develop yet then.

J: No, it's kind of like, you know, you can't very well fight among

yourselves when the enemy is forever at the gate.

K: ( ).

J: Right. So they were there, but a)Lot of constructive things

began to happen though because I think that was when the

Fla Rep 2AB

Democrats learned that you've got to work together. It

didn't happen in '67, but when Fred Schultz became the Demo-

crati-e speaker of the House in '68 he recognized the fact

that Ralph Turlington's session as speaker was not as pro-

ductive as it would have been if Ralph had been more coopera-

tive with the Republicanlegislators. For instance, com-

mittee assignments---a speaker can -yhaa be very fair or

he can be extremely unfair. He wields total power in the

legislature and the Senate president does in the Senate.

And Fred Schultz did exactly the opposite of Turlington and

that's why the most meaningful legislationI feel that came

out of Florida in the last oh, almost a hundred years, t_ ot

uin under Fred Schultz and that was because he recognized

the need ...

K: For cooperation.

J: ... for cooperation. And he was extremely fair to Republican
legislators, on committee assignments,/all sorts of things.

There were times when there were partisan votes when he used

his rights to defeat but basically he worked very, very well

with republicans and helped them and he was not nearly as

antagonistic toward Claude Kirk as Turlington had been. Now

I don't ...

K: 5that went wrong?

J: Well, I think what went wrong was'that the '68 elections were


coming up and it was Presidential. And uh, well, no, it

even started way before that, uh, really toward the end of '67

there was a tremendous antagonism between Murphin and Kirk.

K: Personal?

J: Uh, ...

K: Political?

J: A little of both. Uh, ...

K: Can you amplify both?

J: Yeah, but ...

K: Personal I guess is obvious.

J: Yeah.

K: Political, primarily.

J: For one thing I think it was to some extent personality' in that

Bill Murphin J is a pretty easy-going person to work with; if

you gave him half a chance he was, he wasn't bad to work with.

You might disagree with him, but that didn't mean you were

enemies. Lcrd, I disagreed with him on lots of things and

we were still great, great, close personal friends. But Jean
and Bill, Jean Murphin and Bill were a real4 a great husband

and wife team. She worked with Bill I~-support'Fig him just

like I did with my Bill. We do the old dirty work, you know,
we're the 4 ones who do the typing into the middle hours of

the night and all that kind&of mess;irunkerrands and try to

keep the family together at the same time. And I think there


was a definite personality clash between Jean Murphin and Claude

Kirk. They did not like each other.

K: Just 'cause I'm curious and I'm, I'm, it's not very important
I suppose one way or / did this have anything to do with

Kirks wife? Did Erika Mattfield entetinto this?

J: No. Oh, no.

K: OK.

J: No, ..

K: I don't want to get on this subjdct except to ask a question.

If it's "no," I really don't, I 4owant to pursue it.

J: No.

K: How about the political problems then between Murphin and


J: Now with the political problems I think ... it centered a great

deal on the fact that Bill Murphin was not allowed the influ-

ence v and patronage and other things that the party rightfully

deserves from a candidate. I don't care whether you're a

Democratic governor or a Republican governor, there are/certain

things, not just your raw patronage like giving state

bids to a friend or something, but there are all sorts of
little appointments and positions. Some of them so meaning-

less, you know, like appointing a worker to work at the Jai-

lai frontons or something. This is such puny little stuff,

somebody's going to get the job, why not? You know, we, we

expected a Democratic governor to mainly have Democrats


working at the Jai-lai. It gives your grass roots people,

you know, .-.

K: Reward,

J: ... a li-t-l rewardand this is politics and will never change.

K: Kirk did not consult the party for these kinds of things?
J: Uh, uh, there were oftentimes that ... Kirk set up his own

advisory committees and he mainly picked people who thought

he'd been strongest for him. And Murphin wanted to take some
of the patronage, you see, and / it out among just your

little party workers. People who hadn't just been for Kirk,

who'd been for everybody. And so ...

K: So, can I clarify here for a minute Mrs. James? The Kirk ad-

visory committees conceptually were Kirk advisory committees

as opposed to party advisory committees or Republican advisory


J: Oh, yes. ... $ Well, they were called that. The name of the

committee was the Kirk advisory committee.

K: That, that helps, that goes a long way to explain it. OK.

J: So, mainly, in Palm Beach county we had an excellent Kirk ad-

visory committee and the people on it were as much party

people as they were Kirk people.

K: Your husband, for example, certainly was.

J: Right. He was on it, and ...Governor Kirk's campaign chair-
Chalmers ,k
man, YIrs. Ruth / was on it, but Ruth Ahalmers had worked



minor issues weren't really that important to him -n th~

J No, that's right. Well, to some extent, I don't know what

kind of a machine, he wanted a machine in the sense that he

wanted to control the state committee so that if he had an

opportunity to be Vice-President(, ,r President, he would have

his whole state machine behind him to ... for instance, if he

wanted to run for President ...the way it works is, he wanted

to run for Vice-Presiden,He wanted to say, "Nixon, I want

to be your Vice-President. Now I can throw all of Florida

behind you. I control the state party, so I'll guarantee

you that all the delegates 4s Florida will be for you and

for me. This happens in every state in both parties where

you, they try to get control in order to step up to this

higher office or to maintain an office but, uh, so he

was building an organization, but I can't help but believe

that it wasn't all Claude Kirk. The biggest dissension

came with his aides.

K: Who?

J: I wish I could remember the name of the fellow who was his

chief aide, uh, I've got it right there again in the records,

but just offhand, but this one particular fellow was a

very poor choice for the job he had. He had -to-be a go-AA-i0

between Kirk and Murphin in that he had to convey messages


in this party organization for years. She was as much a party

person as a Kirk person. So in our county with the exception

of a very few, there were a couple on the committee who were

almost totally Kirk instead of party people, but because

of the influence of the others, they were becoming party

people as well as Kirk people, you know So our ... but in

aL-ot of the counties there was dissension between the Kirk

committee people and the party people. The party people

felt, my gosh, we went out and did all this work, and

we're not getting anything, so Murphin was speaking up for

them and it's true when Bill held ... for our ninth Con-

gressional district, when he held meetings there began to be

more and more ... we ... we need some patronage; how can we

build a party when we can't even get anybody a job when there ...

when Democrats will be appointed and, and we can't get,

the Kirk for, uh, Democrats for Kirk will be putting people

in and we can't put anybody in. How can we build a party?

Sure you build a Kirk machine but you don't have a Republican

party. What happens if Kirk dies, you know? So ...

K: Was this in part at leas5 in your opinion, and of course, I'm

sure the governor would have a different opinion, but in your

opinion at least was this because as early as say, 1967 or

1968 Guvernor Kirk very definitely was thinking about a

machine that would launch him into national office? That these


back and forth.

K: Party liason.

J: Yes, kind of. And4, a5\\ owQ6 to Murphin. I don't

think rtha-t Claude Kirk started out with.the delusions of

grandeur A< 0n) alone I think these people eaA- it. And

they said it to, to almost a sickness standpoint. And so

they, his staff did more to alienate him from the party than

I think Claude Kirk would, if he, he and Murphin needed to

handle their differences man-to-man, one-on-one, instead of

having any staff involved. But Kirk surrounded himself with

people who were not really party people. And this hurt. This

happens to a great many governors, presidents. They surround

themselves with people who are not party-oriented enough

to know when the danger point's been reached.

K: So the split between Murphin and Kirk, moving towards the Re-

publican National Convention in 1968.Governor Kirk who has hired
/ and I don't remember when,William Safire or Safire to be a

speechwriter to project this image of liberalism and goes

off to campaign in Alabama against George Wallace and as we

know it doesn't do him any good because this ... it doesn't

get him on anybody's ticket as Vice-President. But you

went to the Republican National Convention and Governor Kirk

and the, the problems that occurred within the Florida dele-

gation,,part of this Murphin-Kirk split. What went on there?

J: Well, really I think I should go back just a little bit be-

cause on this split thing it wasn't just one thing,



to work for the patronage for the party and all. We had a,

let me see, it was in the spring, late winter of '68, about
February or March, there had always been +he- conflict between

Cramer and Kirk.

K: What was the cause of that?

J: Well, I think Cramer always, Bill Cramer always felt that he

had the, a good fellowship with the state committee, with

the new vibrant state committee. He had a very good rela-

tionship with -i-. He did not dominate it, but Bill Cramer

had enough experience that quite frankly he was a good coun-

selor j at times in helping to organize and all because he

had to rough it out all by himself ...

K: Sure. He'd been the only Republican for a long time.

J: The only Republican elected official and he was a great help

to us. So there was a good feeling. I, I would never

say that Cramer dominated it, he, nor the machine

dominated it, but they worked harmoniously with the rest of

the group. They might get some of the things they 4 wanted

sometimes, but then the state committee got what it wanted

and it worked A uLl tQp ''^ Well, Cramer, of

course, had aspirations. He was looking ahead. He'd been

a congressman for a number of years and he was thinking ...

he had toyed with the governorship, he toyed with the state

Senate, and -then againI'm trying-to dig in my memory, there

was a clash when Claude Kirk ran for governor and Bill will


remember it, don't think I can, but there was ..., Bill

Cramer pulled a little naughty and I don't know exactly what

it was, he ... oh, I know, after the primary, after Kirk won

the Republican primary, Cramer began to feel, as we all did,

as I told you the optimism began to build that he could be

elected, and so Cramer felt, my gosh, I made a mistake, this

was the year I should have run for governor, and if he'd run the

primary, he'd a won because nobody knew Claude Kirk that

well and the Republican organization knew Bill Cramer. 'Cause

he had helped his party when there was nobody to help 4it.

And so he, as I understand it, and I'm giving it to you from

having heard on both sides but not being present when the

thing was actually consummated, but I understand that Bill

Cramer tried to pay off Kirk to step out of the race in

which case the Republican party, you see, would have called a

convention. The state committee would have nominated the

nom--, the Republican nominee. And so what he wanted Kirk

to do was to resign as a candidate, step out, let the state

committee elect him as a nominee and put him in as the Re-

publican nominee for governor.

K: That's not guaranteed to make for good feelings.
J: Oh, no,/you see, that was a naughty. Cramer should never have

done that. And I understand from both his people and from

Kirk's people that that did happen.

K: That's very interesting.

J: But that was a real naughty naughty. And that's what was the


initial reason for the awful feelings between Kirk and Cramer.

And they both probably fed it a good bit. I really feel, though,

that if Claude Kirk had been patient/and not gotten too

overanxious that the party would have slapped down Bill

Cramer. They were not going to let him have control of the

committee. This new group wasn't going to let anybody have

control. And that's where Claude Kirk ran up against a brick

wall. He tried to take the committee away after these

people had sweated blood to build it. And so anyway, he

... there was 6t little fighting, but if you wanted to

put us on either side, we almost had to be, almost on

Cramer's side in a way, although we worked awful hard for Kirk

and supported him. Still, we respected Bill Cramer. And we

weren't going to ...we would never 1 Cpramer undo Kirk

And when Kirk tried to undo Cramer and the committee, we

weren't going to allow that either. So in '68 Kirk was

getting a little testy about tW nA a (Ya- i% \L about not

being able to gain control of t- committee. He did alot of

little {f'<-{ on his own to try to get control of the

state committee.

K: Want to talk about some of those?

J: And ... well, just little things like in a, well, for instance,

he used his _/ g_ in a county. You know, you support

Kirk people and we'll let you have patronage. Trying to


buy off the state committee people this way 4nd that went

on and went on and on. And so at any rate) he kept eyeing

trying to take over this then. 3And when they had the, oh,

the election for who, national committeewoman, .e Paula

Hawkins was elected, and I can't give you the dates, ...

K: That's alright.

J: ... It was in Orlando.

K: Right.

J: And at that meeting Claude Kirk had his little men running around

with their walkie-talkies and they're trying to coerce if

they couldn't convince, it was convince or coerce, state

committee people into voting for his candidate for national

committeeman. -Now Bill Cramer had been our national conmiitLee-

man and he was up for reelection to that job, and so he

put up Nat L. Nat Z 's a great fellow, oh, he's just

adorable and he didn't like the position he was put in but

you see ...

K: For Kirk?

J: He(didn't complain ,)what could he do? So he had to run. And
Wly I- Un -pp
you could see -thre-ian was extremely about the whole thing

and then he, Kirk put up Mary (__T_! ___to run against Paula

Hawkins. So I think that should have been a lesson to Kirk

and later on to Gurney. That you don't try to tess- your

way into to taking over a committee like that, especially

one that is so newly united and so" newly victorious, 'ioka 51 <~

in shaping themselves and in electing officials. So anyway


Paula won on the first ballot. Bill Cramer won and he didn't

even have to have a ballot because Nat kne;7-by this

time the wholi thing was futile and so he withdrew before

it had even begun. And so hard feelings then were well esta-

blished at that point. And that must have been sometime

in the early part of '68, filwci 1 .. Well, any-

way, it was coming down to is Kirk going to own the Republican

party or are we going to have a Republican party that has

Kirk for governor? We cannot be taken over. He didn't

build the party, he doesn't deserve it, when he's gone,

there's going to be ... there won't forever be Claude Kirk,

but there will always be a Republican party. So we've got

to keep any public official from owning it, Cramer or Kirk

or anybody else that comes knocking at the door. So the

party stood awfully good and firm. They were just magnificent

in their strength and in their refusal to be baited by either

side. And. as I say, Cramer was playing it pretty smart be-

cause he wasn't that entangled with the committee. He

wanted their 4-L relations, a much smarter politician

than Kirk was. So in February or March there were committee

meetings in Tallahassee and the legislators were up there

and so this one night Kirk called Don Reed, the minority

leader. And he wanted Don to come over and talk with him.

He was having a feud there and he wanted to talk some
party stuff. And so Don said, (he said, "Bill QuM and I


are going out to dinner." He said, "Bring Bill James along,too."

He said, "This is party stuff. Seid-he might as well hear it

too.' So they met there and was there, and Jack

11S CjA _, and Bill and Den, and not more than one or two

other people, I, I'm not sure about that. So anyway, Kirk

had decided that he was going to go all out. He was going to

be the party. And he wanted to know if they were going to

support him or ...

K: Or _

J: Right. Are you going to be party people or are you going to

be Kirk people. In fact, and ... I can see it because he's

so dramatic. I could see him doing it. He stood up in the

room, drew a line with his finger right down the pa-ty, and

he said, "This is the Kirk party and that is the Republican party

and you decide which side you're going to be on." So at

this point Don Reed gets up, buttons his coat, and .just

walks out the door without saying a word. And so Bill C 4^W ) # 0

Sy, Jso Bill stands up, buttons his

coat, arts out the door, and Bill got just about to the

door and ha, the governor yells out, "Where in the blankety-

blank blank do you think you're going, Bill James?" And

Bill turned around i and he said, "I'm following my

leader." Well, that really did him in because he had h-is,41A

the idea of himself as the leader, well, -Beo was the leader

Fla Rep 2AB

of the Republican Party in the legislature. And Bill was

trying to make a point to him that "I'm with the party."

And so they left and I, was it that night, or ...? Yea,

it was that night in the wee hours of the I morning Kirk sent

a state trooper to the motel room, and banging on their motel

room door. Well, they'd gone out to eat. I think they went

looking for them right after. They couldn't

find them because Bill and Don had walked. They didn't

even call a taxi, they just walked. And so they stopped to

eat. Well, anyway, about ... seems to me it was two or

three o'clock in the morning, here comes this bang, bang,

bang i at the door and it's this state trooper, he say,

"The governor ...", says, "Representative Reed?" I'll never

forget Bill ... "no, he's the one over there with the hole

in his shorts!" .... He says ...He said I thought you

were coming after me for murdering somebody, so he said, well,

he said, "The governor wants you and Mr. Reed back over

to the Mansion right now." And so they said, well, if you

go along back to the Mansion we'll come later." go they

got dressed and went back over there. And I can't remember,

I believe that was the night ... it was either that night or at

the delegation. But anyway that incident was just more

humorous than anything. But it also showed really one

thing about Claude Kirk: that was a working man. He could


have been 4-tirs4tt a fantastic governor because he knew, he

didn't even know what rest was. The man worked hours and

hours and hours. And he-sweatedr like no man I've ever

known to try and be a good governor because he didn't

have the legislative experience in the government, and he
was having to make up a on-the-job training/government,

you know ...

K: Right.

J: And it was a terrific job and the man did, he came up with sc-e

surprisingly good things, and really most of those came

from him, not from his staff. He had a marvelous mind and

a fantastically good personality, but events just seemed to

conspire to really ruin what could have been a great governor.

But anyway that happened. So then he got awful1s angry with

the legislature because the legislators would not, were not

willing to join him in leaving their party for the Kirk

party. And so one thing after another happened and then the

salary thing came up. Now the governor had been all for the

salary increase, time and again Bill U heard him say
it, Don Reed, there, there were just A all over

the place that he favored an increase salary.

K: Seems to me when the issue first was raised and he "Cd__ O/eftd _O

2/1 J^ i them some sort of threat, if I'm not mistaken,

I remember it was a change in point of view.

J: Yeah. It was. Well, and, and ..'. if ... if it was not a

direct quote from him, then it was a quote from ...

Fla Rep 2AB

K: Sources.

J: From someone ...

K: I'm sure I remember seeing ...

J: ... in the paper where he could have retracted it if he

didn't say it. But at any rate ... so he was ... things

were just getting worse and worse and worse for him anyhow,

and then that G., that Harold Carswell bit came up. And ...

K: By Harold Carswell bit you mean now we're moving towards

the election ... this is 1970. We haven't ...

J: .No, no, no, didn't have ... in '69, '69, that's right. So

anyway, ...

K: We're going towards the ...

J: I think the salary thing was even ...no, wait a minute, ...

K: The salary thing was in '68.

J: '69.

K: '69.

J: '69. Now I'm getting ahead of myself.

K: Ar-ight, let's go to the Republican Convention.

J: Alrac that's ...

K: The Murphin--Kirk issue at the Republican Convention.

J: Right.

K: Then we can move forward after that.

J: Fight. I, I jumped ahead.

K: That's okay.



J: Now going back, well, now after that event in February or

March where the Kirk party or whatever, uh, so then Murphin

as state chairman had been going around the coun y and really

made excellent points for Florida around the country., The

other state chairmen were real fond of him. And they were

extreme ly impressed by the gains we had made in public

offices. So the Nixon group was very much impressed with

Murphin and they began to put pressure on Murphin, you

know, (We a slate favorable to us. And Claude

Kirk wantedd to be in charge of the slate. This is really

why, you see, he wanted the state committee, because the

state committee holds an awful lot of power in se---

lecting the delegates so -- he had wanted to select 1is

So he set up a slate and there were just too many members

on his slate that were not party-oriented. It was just

too Kirk and not party. And it ignored *ot of people

who had worked very hard in the party in the state.

And so Murphin was going to try to, you know, you like

to let your governor head up -the delegation and all. So

he thought well, if the slate was halfway decent he'd

take it. Well, there were changes that just had to be made

and Kirk wouldn't make them. He kicked off people that

it would have been a disgrace not to have picked them

C 6 ~ f People who deserved positions. And


... I'm not sure of all of them on there but there were

several that ... it really was bad news. He was putting --J2

in a couple of cases his staff on as delegates. So

panic started to reign in the party. And so we got a call on

night from Fort Lauderdale and Murphin was down at 3p v -

i^^3^=3 Inn 40J t0 tPA4s v

I later 4n4 stuff, I think I

think I'd rather have held out for a while. But we

got a call saying, "Bill,come down quick; we've got a problem

with this slate." So we went down t9qa-UI' s house,

the state committeeman from Broward County, and the J eqbj-

were there, and the Murphins were there, and Bill Murphin

said, "Y'all, I'm just going to lay it out to you. Here's

the slate Kirk wants; you know we can't have it. What are

we going to do? We've got to think of something. We're

going to have to put in our own slate." So it's pretty

tough to challenge a governor's slate if he puts in a

slate for delegates. We didn't want to run against

the governor. And yet he just simply would not give

in on certain positions for delegates and alternates.

So we said, "no, can't have that," so we started calling

around the state to various people and we said, "it looks

like we've got a crisis on our hands. What are we going to
do?" So they said,"/can't be run over. We're not going



to let anybody run this party. We tried to tell the

governor that when we elected tv/i the national committee-

man and everything. And he won't believe usso I guess

we're just going to have to butt heads with him." So

there was a meeting then called, a broader meeting, I

think it was for the next day. People were flying in from

all over the place I and it was either the next day or

two days later, I think-i-t-wa-e the next day, people were

just shshshsh coming in like to a hive. Had a pretty

big i meeting at the Broward County headquarters in Broward

County. And Tommy Thomas was there, he'd just flown in

from Panama City, and well, just the strong people in

the party all over the state. And some of them had been

avid supporters of Claude Kirk. Tommy Thomas was, you know,
the devil
he worked like A out there in the Panhandle for Claude

Kirk for governor. And he came down and he knew there

were problems. And there were problems with the money.

That was one of the chief problems toopthat we met about

was that the governor was causing a real problem charging

things to the party. They'd have funcdaising events and

he was supposed to split it, he took part of the money,

the biggest part)and then, I don't know, it was split

something like 60-40 or 70-30, 1_ anyway the party got

the smaller part. But it was to help build the party.




And yet here's the governor spending money to do the things

he wanted to do. Well, the jet was just running into too

much money and it was beginning to look like the Republican

party was going to get stuck

and we just wouldn't have any money to

run campaigns with after that. So they had to call a halt

to that. So got with the governor about that and you know,
this has
said, it's gotta be, l/ gotta be stopped. They had hotel

bills from over on Miami Beach that were just oh, a?.embar-

rassing as all get out, and and the Republican party wasn't

about to start wining and dining staff members over there.

So anyway-/we finally got out of that and that was when the

Governor's Club tetek you know, that was ... the Governor's

Club was an offshoot from that because the party footed

bills; we footed bills and footed bills, but it just came to the

time we couldn't foot them anymore. He just ... we couldn't

afford the style in which he was becoming rapidly accustomed

to living! But anyway we got together and we went through-

out the state and we'd come to ...we took it county by

county and picked the strongest people for the districts,

to run as district delegates and at-large. And we came,

we came up with what I think was a heckuva good slate.

I ran from Palm Beach county because, and from our dis- .

strict, Ninth Congressional district actually, which en-

compasses a number of other counties, but ... I ran

Fla Rep 2AB

because there were people, uh, Mrs. Thomas, Ruth Thomas,

who'l been a fine delegate but she' been Kirk's chairman

and the party was just nervous about anybody too deeply

in the Kirk, prior Kirk campaign per se. And since Bill

was on the committee, a Kirk committee, and we had worked

for Kirk, but .we #Yworked for everybody, I was decided

to be the strongest one. If Kirk put up an opposing ballot

they felt UiA4 I would have a better chance of winning. The

same way with my partner who was Bob who's the man from

our district. So what we did was pick a slate where the

person in their own county could pull the most votes in

case there was a Kirk slate file. And we had to fight

it out. So ... but before this came about, before ... well,

we, we set up a slate and then Bill and ...and ~~-- i / /

... oh, ... can't remember, but I know those three, think

there was a private plane, they were hopping back and forth

here picking up each other, and they flew to Tallahassee

to file the slate. And their instructions were to go to

Claude Kirk and say, now this is the slate. If you want

to make some very minor changes, we'll make 'em. Well, first,

first of all, no, first of all ... down at the meeting

in Broward County when all of us were there, we put in one

of those conference calls to Kirk and so Bill Murphin

talked to him and he told him about, t-h&t-these people,

about what the slate was going to have to be like and he



said, "Governor, you know, we'll try and work with you, to
swap a few if, if/not totally satisfactory to you, but most

of these people really worked for you anyhow. N this is

the slate." Well, sir, he blew a fuse! Whew! The

language that went on on that telephone! So after it

all ... several others tried to talk to him. Dave Lane

tried to talk to him.

K: Who was Dave Lane?

J: He's Senator Lane from Broward County. And he tried to

talk to him. And Dave 4 is pretty easy going; he wasn't

as party identified as the others. He was trying just to

work within the legislative point of view. No, sir. So,

.then we heard that well, maybe the governor might mellow.

He, I think what he tried to do was to get a slate. And

he started calling some of those that were on the original

slate to be on his and they wouldn't go. I think he began

to realize that we had done him in; that we had picked

the strength; we had commitments from them that they

would not switch slates, nor would they appear on both !& o

And to freeze him out completely on the thing. And

I mean that's politics for you. So their final instructions

they said Bill Murphin shouldn't go see him because

there's just has been too much fighting between the two.

So as I say it was (Bill, my Billand Bill Ydung and

T~it- 1Y)Cf

Fla Rep 2AB. / 56

maybe Warren Henderson, anyway, they

went up there and just before the deadline filed the

slate. They went over and they said, "Now Governor, this

is the slate; we're still willing to, you know, let you re-

place a couple if you absolutely have to, but there's some

of these that are going to stay on." And there was one in

particular I know-that ... a good state committeeman

from Jacksonville ...Bill u Kirk said "I will not

have him on any slate I head; I, absolutely not." And Henderson

said, "We're not taking him off." He has been a worker, he

helped put this party together and you're just tnot taking

him off." So ...if I remember correctly Kirk just

wouldn't have anything to do with it. I do believe that he

finally compromised. I know Lloyd was put on as

the governor's alternate. They let him have whomever he

wanted as alternate and Lloyd was a super fellow. So any-

way they filed the slate and Kirk did not file a con-

testing slate. Well, in the future fvr 1970 those hard

feelings never ...

K: Never ...

J: That was just another disastrous Kirk defeat. He was defeated

first at the state committee and then on the slate and you

know,by this time you'd think he'd start to learn that I'm

not going to take control of that committee; they won't let me,

so why not work with them. Dadgum him, he just wouldn't do

Fla Rep 2AB



K: So then in 1970, then came problems with the ,Senatorial raee
and/Carswell issue.

J: Oh, let's see. Well, he hurt himself more following on up

working on up to that, when he went for Rockefeller he

was just plain out-en-the-stree. It was the most stupid

decision anybody jj yo 'W -

K: Yeah, even,'yes, I can understand that from the point of

view of the party without any trouble. Now one Republican

I did talk to suggested that this may have been more, not

Kirk at all, but William Safire or Safire's, however it's

pronounced ....

J: Safire.

K: Safire's choice or option--that he sort of propelled Kirk

into this.

J: He may well have done that. I'm not so sure that Safire

ever really understood Florida.

K: Didn't stay around long.

J: No. And ... he sure didn't, and I think it was 'cause he

just didn't understand how things worked here. That we don't

work like they did in New York. And I, I wouldn't doubt

... uh, it wouldn't surprise me that he suggested that to Claude

Kirk becauseas I say, Claude Kirk himself was a pretty

good and pretty smart person, but oh, god, the people he

Tape 1, Side 2.

chose to give him advice! It just couldn't have been worse.

I have never seen such horrible selection of people around

you. He thought he needed protection from the party and if

he only knew his strongest protection itself was the

party. The party would have protected him had he trusted
them. But these people/came in as his staff led him to

believe that he couldn't trust anybody, And so I wouldn't

doubt it, ... it wouldn't surprise me if Safire suggested

that to him. Some people said that Claude Kirk sold out

to Rockefeller because there was pretty well, the talk

was pretty loose that Rockefeller would pay any delegate

that would spy. I. don't know that anybody in our delegation

ever found out if it was true or not because t-ees- ...

you know, they, well, they'dAbeen run out of the state. So

nobody ever tried it, but somebody suggested that and even

the people that Claude Kirk hates the worst refused to

believe that and told people that they were lying when

they said it because Bill Murphin, Bill Cramer, everyone

of the people that Claude Kirk came to hate the most never

believed he was a crook. Never believed he was dishonest.

And quite frankly never really believed that he really

wanted-v when it got right down to it. He might change

his mind, but they don't g feel that at the time he said

it that he ever lied to them. He, Claude Kirk is a pretty,,


58 ) Tape 1
side 2

basically, pretty darn good guy if he had just had better

political sense. He ... that just ruined him. But I

wouldn't doubt that. I know at the convention

we had quite a time. I was really more

for Reagan than for Nixon, J because I have a strong feeling

that Ronald Reagan's one of the finest men that ever lived.

And I think he's a very competent person and I really 2'was

basically for him. I didn't have anything against Nixon at

the time but I was really for Ronald Reagan. And I wanted

to see at least .---win on first half the ballots just te- see

what would happen. And, so, but Murphin was dead set>

< "oh, brother, you're not going for Reagan" ^ We

were not supposed to be ... when I joined the pa-ry I was not

committed to voting a, a unit ...

K: Unit rule.

J: A unit rule. Uh, he did not say that. Now he did get

commitments from some people, but he did not get it from me>

ever. And so I felt T-ee not to, but when they got there,

well, I felt that it would just further dirupt the party
if I cast ... now we did have one fellow/cast a vote for

Reagan, Mr( ) But I felt that it wasn't going to help.

At ht-at point we lost, I felt, any chance of keeping Nixon

off the first ballot and so I felt it would just disrupt

the party in our state; add, add to ths growing i-ch"ie

FLA REP 2AB Tape 1
59 side 2

... so I decided that I would voluntarily go unit-rule.

K: At least from an outsider's point of view it seemed, it

seemed watching the convention Mr. Nixon was a shoo-in on

the first ballot.

J: Well, he wasn't when we first got there. But I've never

seen, whew, such pressure. I'd never be a delegate again

to another national convention 'til the day I die. I hate

it. The pressure is unbelievable on the delegates And it

comes not really so much from the outside as from inside

your own party organization. And well, I tell you, that was

a traumatic experience. I just ... well, in the first

place you don't get to sleep either, so your brain ...

K: Yeah, I know, it's very difficult ...

J: ... isn't working at peak capacity.
K: ... it's very difficult thing.

J: I would say eight 6r nine days there the longest sleep I got

was one night I got two hours sleep. The rest of it was

less than two hours andyou know, you come home just in a

stupor. But anyway, the night of the convention I begged

... we, Lloyd AWy and I stood under that television

...thing, spider, that was in the very center. You know,

Florida was in the front in the center. We had a gorgeous

seating. At the convention we were to the right of the podium

right in the front row. And the center aisle was down here

and there was this big television apparatus above us that

60 Tape 1
side 2

had steel things we could ...


J: ... anyway Lloyd t.' and I went under the spider and I

was really distressed and he was.. We were both just stand-

ing there booing like a couple of kids because I think

we both saw in the future. Lloyd Ak"t was by far

Claude Kirk's most efficient aide. He, if anything, 1eyd5 r '

tried his best to keep the party and Kirk from being at

odds. But Lloyd had an awfully hard job. He was loyal to

the governor right to the coie, and on the other hand, he

saw the mistakes he madebut Lloyd couldn't, you know, come

out and speak for the governor, he was his aide, But he and

I were there just in a terrible traumatic thing, and I said,

"Lloyd, if you'll just get the governor to vote for Reagan

instead of for Rockefeller, it'll clean up his image." I

promise you I'll break the unity rule which I had just, that

day, I think, decided, well, even though I wasn't pledged.

the unit rule, I' would do it. I said I'll break it and

I'll vote for him and I thi.k-,. I just know there are about

six or eight others of us who feel strongly enough about
wanting the governor's image to be repaired / this ridiculous

Rockefeller thing that I'll talk t6 them, and I think we

FLA REP Tape 2
Side 1.


can get 'em, and we'll be in a minority but at least it won't

look bad for the governor. And uh, so, Lloyd tried. But

Kirk was just adamant. Now one of his problems, you have to

understand in theat-was that after the delegates were chosen,

I think it was in June, we had a meeting in Orlando, the

state committee met at the same time. And after the ft-te

committee met, the delegates to the national convention

met. And we caucused. And the main poitt of the caucus

was who was going to be permanent chairman 'of the delegation

to go to Miami Beach. And I told you about our problem

with Kirk, with getting a slate set up and all this. Well,

when they called this meeting the governor was in Eurppe.

I was terribly angry at the committee or at the delegation for

calling a meeting while the governor was out of, out of town.

K: Making things worse.

J: Right. It wasn't necessary. We could have waited, you know,

a week or two;fh-ere was no big rush. I had the feeling that

it was deliberately done. And this is one of the minuses

for Murphin. I think that they deliberately called the

meeting so Kirk wouldn't be there. Well, I had, I had always

supported the state committee and the party and voted

against the governor every time he tried to take over the

party. But at the same time I didn' want the party stomping

the governor's face in the ground.- I thought that was

equally bad. I didn't want either one hurting each other.

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
Side 1.


J: So I, I guess I surprised everybody because in the meeting the

day before Bill and I had worked and worked to have Paul &V f

made national committeewoman; and Bill Cramer, we overcame

the battle about that and Nat Reed withdrew. And so

we were known as big strong party people. But when they

tried to do this, I made the motion that we defer the meeting

until the governor got back no matter what they wanted to do.

But it was obvious that Bill Murphin had lined up the troops

to make him permanent chairman and this was another slap in

the face for the governor. In the first thing was not

making him the favorite son. I wasn't really too keen on

that because except for the fact that I felt that it was

demeaning to the first Republican governor not to let him be either

favorite son or permanent chairman,-one of the two.

K: Something symbolic.

J: Something symbolic that would say to the nation, you know, we

may have our squabbles, but,you know, down here we're strong

and we're moving and we've got harmony when it comes to the

showdown. But nothing would do and so they made him honorary

chairman which was so ridiculous until it was almost a

laughable thing. I think there were only about four of us who

had the courage to vote to wait 'til Kirk came back, and

it was totally O\- foh boy, the Murphins got aw-

ful made at me. They really were angry with me but I

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 1


couldn't help but cross them because there was a principle

there that was a little too big. And after it was all over

with the governor's aides talked to us and uh, as if we

were part of his camp, and we tried to explain to 4AM, Jim,

Wolf was one of them, we tried to explain to them that

sure, we were for the governor, but this didn't mean we de-

serted the party. One day we would support the governor if

he was right and the next day the party; we'd oppose Kirk

if the party was right. And we were just trying to hold

that being the status quo; let him have his glory as governor,

and let the party have the party. And so anyway it, that was

the background trauma. And the anomosity that was built

up there carried on through and Kirk just was not going to

back off. By that time it became a matter of pride with him;

he was going to stick with what he was doing. And it

really was sad because it hurt him in the coming election

real badly and it just ruptured therv- 0e efe \ar i

K: What happened in 1A=es This is all the background

that leads towards it. In 1970 Jack Eckerd opposes Claude

Kirk. Is this a party opposition maneuver or was this Jack

Eckerd on his own?

J: No, ...

K: And also Kirk and Carswell and Gurney we need to talk about--

those two things.

J: Right. Right. Well, it, in '69 when ... yeah, in '69 you

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
Side 1.


had your salary issue and this was important because this was

the first coalition, more or less, of Gurney and Kirk. Uh,

when the salary bill came up, the governor had talked to Don

Reed, he'd talked to a number of Republican legislative

leaders, and it was all assured that the governor was in

favor of a salary raise. Now this was right in the very be-

ginning. Well, the governor had some problems -then with

legislators on various -el pieces of legislation, little

almost nit-picking things, but he, he was losing confidence

in himself. He ... I'm almost thinking ... well, no, ...

Osborne was already lieutenant governor, that's right, ...

K: Umm, huh.

J: Uh, I'm not sure but in conversations with him you could

see that he was beginning to get scared of the coming election.

And he was becoming more and more ... after losing the

party, attemptto get the party, he was beginning to run

scared. And instead of turning back to the legislators

and trying to work with themhe began alienating himself

from them. So when the salary thing came up I have never

been sure exactly who put it in his mind to take a total re-

verse, but he had assured them that he would not veto the

salary bill. That was assured. So he, he did veto it. It

shocked us all. I talked to Ray Osborne at ... there were

a group of us at Don Reed's house and th said that he was

not consulted on this change about. That his last impression

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
Side 1.

was that the governor would, would not veto the salary

bill. Well, he really, right up until the very minute, Re-

publican legislators were sure that he would not veto

it. And, and it hurt the Republican legislators so badly

because Democratic legisy&ors were very timid about voting

for the salary bill, some of themq4nd those that were timid

went to Don Reed and to my husband and others, are you sure

the governor's not going to veto it? I don't want to get

caught in a veto thing on this salary bit; it's right, but

I'm afraid of it. And so, yes, guarantee he said it, he gave

us his word and he's : never lied before to any of the legislators7

4Ht-e. what he was going to do in legislation, e never, ever

broke his word. So when they were just caught in it. Even

though some of the press kept saying, yes, he's going to,

even though it started to leak from the staff that he was g&ing

to.-- Republican legislators simply did not believe it because

Claude Kirk did not go back on his word. Well, when he

actually did it) and they did not believe it until it actually

came through, and they were stunned. Absolutely stunned.

And then to heap abuse on top of abuse)he came into the

session, and I'll never forget that day, you could cut the

tension,9it was so thick. Republican legislators were al-

most shaking they were so nervous. The Democrats were

just boiling, just boiling. And he came in that hall and

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 1


when he walked in you knew V _' (ihe look

on his face was .. just like one man who is going to

attack theAarmy; a determination; I'd just never seen quite

such a look on his face. And he walked up to the podium

and when he began, it, -.-it's hard to explain the emotion.

It filled that entire place. He abused the.:egislature

in a way that no governor anywhere in the world;no matter

what his party should ever do. He was totally p! tioV to

them. He had taken ... his attitude was that Florida

government was one-man rule, and that one-man rule was Claude

Kirk and that there wasn't an honest person in the legisla-
they were
ture;/all a bunch of crooks. That he was the only honest man.
-- you
And he railed in his speechon his veto speech, /t can read

and you have to imagine the circumstances of how the legisla-

ture felt --absolutely tricked into voting for something;
he guaranteed it wouldn't be vetoed and then / him stand
he did;
up there and call them, call them the -sam things A p accuse
them of nepotism when in the first place was only a very

'minor number of legislators who had their wives on their

roll, and quite frankly the wives who were working, I was

one of them, well,the wives, who were working by and far

were far superior to any aide the legislature could have hired.

And on top of that there was in the House then, .a nepotism

bill that everybody knew was going to pass. And it, which it

did. And it ... all it did was grandfather in those permanently

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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employed. And from then on you couldn't be employed if

your husband was a legislator. And it, for him to accuse

them of something that they so obviously were ready to correct,

that had gone on in the legislature for centuries, or true

for a century, you know, to accuse them of that when they

were ready to remedy it and it was just known very well they

would, these things hurt. It would be like the legislators

standing up and accusing Claude Kirk of something that

prior administrations had allowed to happen, you know in the

governorship. So I know when we walked out that day, it took

all the strength and party gumption those Republicans had

to stand up and'applaud him-wiea he left. It was very weak,

but it was there. Well, the comments in the gallery, I

often wondered what Claude Kirk would have thought if he had

heard the comments in the gallery from just your ordinary

citizens who were sitting up there. Even they realized that

this had been a brutal, brutal attack on people for no good

reason. So from then on it was Claude Kirk versus the legis-

lature of the state of Florida. And Republicans couldn't

defend what he said; there's nobody to defend him. It was,

it was really something -- the issue. Now he did call the

Kirk committees- and get them to _'__it_, _ _ that

came up there. He would say, you know, just before he es

FLA REP 2AB tape 2
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J: well, when the veto came, he said, oh, I've got all of these

thousands of letters and I've got them in counties and so

you legislators come read these from your counties. Well,

you'd have to /be pretty stupid not to be able to read the

results of the letters. There ere the Kirk committee members

and then people we knew the Kirk committee people knew; it

was obviously ... there were genuine letters there. But

there were obviously manufactured letters. The, he had

given the word to his people to manufacture "let's kill the

legislature" because '^ 4/4 (/ ALy' So ... I have
a strong feeling that Ed Gurney was involved .in A because

Ed Gurney came to Tallahassee for a Republican dinner at

the Tallahassee Country Club about oh, I'd say a week or so

after the vote was taken on the salary bill. And after ...

during the meeting Ed sent word to Bill, to my Bill, to stay

after the meeting; that he wanted to talk to him about some-

thing. Well, h4-~& U6 h And so after

the meeting they got in a corner by themselves, Ed, and

Bill and Duke. And I waited outside 'cause we'd come with another

couple, and you know, they were pretty understanding that

we were waiting and waiting and waiting for Bill to come,

but they txd when Bill came ewn they said, "I just

can hardly believe what I heard." He said~Ed Gurney is

trying to tell me how to legislate, He said, you know

I have suggested or I've written in\ favor thds and so

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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national legislation. He said I never told him he was going

to have to do anything. And he said, V4e's come to me and

issued an ultimatum to me that I am to go in there and put

in a bill to do away with the salary increase or Ed said he

would be satisfied to lower it; I believe he told Bill to

six thousand instead of twelve. And they discussed it and
discussed it and argued a good (bit, and finally Bill's

strong feeling about state government he said, "Ed, I don't

tell you how to run Congress, you don't tell me how to run

my job as a legislator. You go back up to Washington and

you cut your big $45,000 salary in half, and the day you do

I'll put in a bill reducing the legislatves- from twelve to

six." He said, "let's call a spade a spade." If I'm not worth

the six thousand, you're not worth -4. forty-five." And
he said, so when you are ready, and Ed Gurney sai4,that's/just

a ridiculous proposition. He said,"'fter all I'm a United

State Senator, you're just a legislator." And Bill said, "Well,

I happen to believe that as a legislator I'm more impor-

tant to my people than you," And so he said, I suppose

you and I have a different opinion en the principles of

government which is most important. And he saidI have not

shamed you because you have voted constantly for pay raises

and you shouldn't come down here and tell me how to operate

the state of Florida because you've never been in the Florida


FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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legislature. You don't have any experience in state govern-

ment. Yours is limited solely to national government so 7

really don't think you're qualified to tell me what to do.

So, that was probably the beginning of the problems we

suffered later. And so anyway the salary thing then totally

alienated Kirk from the rest of his, from the legislators.

There were-those who still tried to work with him somewhat.

Some had, were so afraid of reelection that they voted a-

gainst the salary, and some voted ... who had voted for the

salary, voted to uphold the veto, but of course it lost. And

it took alot,a whale of a lot of courage from that legis-

lature with all of the dissension over it that Kirk had

managed to make of it.

K: That was really the straw, the last one?

J: That was the straw that broke the old camel's back with the

legislature. The only legislators that continued to sup-

port Kirk were very weak legislators who had very
limited political power. They were in there becauseAthe

political power of their county chairmen and so forth n &a

the Republican organization in their county but they, they

had never been party leaders in any way, shape, or form. So

anyway after that ... that was real break. Then we moved on

into later '69, and the thing just boiled and boiled. And in,

I believe it was in '70, about the time the legislature was

convening in '70, that the Harold Carswell thing really

broke. And they decided ... the Senate, United States

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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Senate, decided not to make him a judge. Well, by this

time it had become apparent that Gurney and Kirk had

merged forces as a team against the party thinking that

the two ...

K: Together as a faction.

J: Together could really do it. Ed Gurney had been strictly

party when he was elected in ... what was it?

K: '68. He came in with Mr. Nixon. '68.

J: '68?

K: Taking George Smathers' seat.

J: Yeah. I, ...

K:. 'Cause he's up for reelection.
J: The years are kind of hazy 'nowi unless I count back on

my fingers.

K: Well, I've got it. I can guarantee that. Six years you're in

the Senate and he's up for reelection.

J: Yeah. Well, when ... during the '68 Convention he was very

much party man, he was anti-Kirk; most of the almost all

newspapers clippings and party records will show that Gurney

stuck with the party in its dissensions with Kirk. I don't

know whether Claude Kirk went to Ed Gurney or Ed Gurney came

to him, but however the affair materialized, the two joined

forces. Ed Gurney also was not happy with Bill Cramer. Bill

Cramer had stepped aside to let Gurney run. You see, Bill


FLA REP 2AB tape 2
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was the senior Congressman and when that election time came

up it was Bill Cramer's turn. He should have had the nod.

He'd stepped aside for Kirk, it was '68, 'cause he'd stepped

aside with the Kirk thing, not altogether graciously but

nevertheless he didn't run for governor, so everyone knew

that with his seniority he should be the candidate for Senate.

And his years in Congress, his experience in national govern-

ment. But there was a determination by '70 by the Gurney

people they just couldn't tolerate Cramer. One thing I think

that hurt him, hurt Gurnef's feelings Vhnt-h42d-c-, as a

fresh n Senator, that even though he was a Senator, Bill

Cramer was the one called in to weekly conferences with the

President Ne was far more of an advisor to the President

than Gurney was. And I think there was jealousy here as well

as along'the line in state politics. So then in 1970 the

party people were going to go with Gurney, I mean with

Cramer for that Senate seat because Gurney had his

and that was Cramer ...Kirk had his governorship, Gurney had

his Senate seat, now it's time for Cramer to get his. And

then ... the three top ones more or less would all IhQa

a position they, you know, that nobody would have been slighted.

But they just couldn't swmg. it. Between Gurney and Kirk

their hatred for Cramer just overcame their good sense. And ...

K: G. Harold Carswell appeared on the picture.

J: And poor old Harold Carswell. Bless his heart. He is one

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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sweetest people in the world. He is so nice and he ..

he was so bad for that campaign. I, it, he was like, you

know a toy being manipulated and it was sad because the

man is a good man, a sound person. And I think he might have

made a good Senator. But the fact was that he had not been

that involved in Repulfican politics.

K: Well, he wouldn't as a judge. Of course not.

J: No. He hadn't been and earlier of course he'd been a Demo-

crat when he wasn't in a judgeship. And we had nothing

against democrats turning Republican but ...and running for

office, but nevertheless not to usurp a long, long-time +

dedicated, proven Republican. So a number of us really pleaded,

you know, don't do this, run Carswell for Congress in this

district or wherever you want to and we'll work like dogs

for you. And I think we, we really all would have tried aw-

fully hard. I think he was going to have to run against

Fuqua or something -if he ran for Congress. But anyway, ...

the regular party workers were just realty upset about

this because this was a blatant attempt to wipe Cramer out.

So the 1970 session was totally unproductive as far as what

the governor could do. There was st11ll ... the legislature

was still making good progress under Shit-,z really good

progress. That '69 and '70 were fantastically good years in

Florida government. All of the good reforms were made in

those two years. And 'because of the cooperation of Fred

Shuir-rand the legislators both parties and in allot of
A+ \

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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measures by Claude Kirk himself. He contributed a good bit

to it. But with the coming election it, it was just getting

more and more frantic. There was still that awful bitterness

between the legislature and Kirk. So after the session was

over, a4 everybody went home and a year ago, a year before,

in '69 it looked like it was going to be a fan astic Repub-

lican year turned out to be a glorious mess. And it all

because of ie.fighting within the party. If Claude Kirk

had not alienated the legislature, even if he had refused to

sign the salary bill, _A so that he wouldn't have

to say he supported it to the people, they wouldn't have

minded. But the veto and the brutal attack on them on their

floor of the House was just more than they could stand.

K: Where did Jack Eckerd come in?

J: Well, as the races began to shape up Skip Bifalis threw his

hat in. But quite frankly there was just an awful lot of

feeling around the state that he c,=d- t was a decoy

for Kirk. That he was an opponent to keep out a viable

opponent/in the primary against Kirk. Skip put up a pretty

good front. We knew him very well, but to this day ... we were

very good friends; I worked for Skip in all of his campaigns-

here te- the senate. But it just really became apparent

that there was too much of a coalition there. Skip I think

drew./ off alot of conservatives that ... well, quite frankly,

I guess really that if Skip hadn't'run, Eckerd just might

have pulled the trick. But everything was pretty fractured.

FLA REP 2AB tape 2
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there was Skip, and there was the governor, and there was

Eckerd. .Eckerd finally came on the scene. Now he came on

the scene when, when Cramer realized that he was being

undone and sold down the river and going to be sold down the

river by the governor and by Gurney, he knew that even if he

won the primary he was going to get sold down the river.

So as a defense mechanism he called Murphin who by this time

had gone to Washington- he called Murphin in to try and get

the old group back together to, to promote Eckerd and unseat
Kirk. I think one of the things they felt was if Eckerd

began running strong, that it might scare Kirk and Gurney

into sayl' declaring peace and saying, well, look, we'll

leave Cramer alone if you'll just get this guy out of the rase.

Well, it didn't work that way because Gurney and Kirk just

knew that they had the power. They're the two big public

officials in the state ada that they could control finances

and they could control everything else. And they had workers.

There were a1ot of, of the old group that had worked to form

the party.

K: The Alexander ...

J: No, no ...

K: Oh, you mean of y etle group.

J: Of the reform group.

K: Reform group?

J: Right.

FLA REP 2AB tape 2
side 1.


K: Who still liked what the governor was all about?

J: Well, it, it wasn't really always, they didn't-_really agree

with him all the time, but they felt that he was the first*

Republican governor. They wanted him reelected and they'd

just sacrifice Cramer or anybody else to stay loyal. And

this should have been an indication, you know, to Kirk, that

you know, somewhere I've been playing it wrong because even

if these people will stick with me while I've been doing

it bad, think how many would have come with me if I'd done the

things decent toward the committee. So anyway) I think it
was a defense mechanism by Cramertto pull in Jack Eckerd.

Now I don't know that Eckerd really feels this way. But IV I(ea

a strong feeling that Cramer was awfully instrumental in d5.> o

K% Did not the reform group at any time d- people like your

husband, Don Reed and others in the legislaturethink that

perhaps.the party ought to generate its own grass roots can-

didate against Kirk? It never, never came ... couldn't find

somebody, w.s that, was that the problem?

J: Well, I think most of us kept hoping ...

K: That it was gding to heal itself sooner or later.

J: That it was going to heal. That pretty soon Kirk would say,

okay, you know, y'all just give me the party support and I'll

forget about hating Gramer and I'll mind my business if you'll

just, you know, get elected and call a truce. And it was ,1 ?o-

unbelieveable that he didn't. But I think when he got Gurney's


side 1.


support that that gave him his confidence to go on. And it,

it really, it was just a bad scene because it ... there was ...

it, the party was so split apart. I don't think the Eckerd

people really wanted to split the party apart--those who

worked for him. We, we made a commitment, Bill and I did, at

the very beginning of the campaign that we were not going to

work for any gubhinatorial candidate. That we were going to say

nothing bad about the governor, in fact we never had. In

fact at one Young Republicans speech when the Young Republicans

were just bitter towards' the governor, and they were ready

to hiss him. And they invited Bill to give the introduction < k

And before Bill gave the introductionthis was about a year

or two before the election. When Bill ... before the meeting

Bill saw Bill Murphin and he said, "Murphin, you may not like

what I say Lj __, but I'm going to say _

And so Bill Murphin said something about, well, I wish

you wouldn't because I really can't think of anything nice

you can say. So Bill got up and made a very glowing intro-

duction of the governor, everybit of it true. But praising

good old party rah-rah-r And I think ed Claude Kirk almost

passed out.' I don't think he dreamed he would get that from

a convention that was after Kirk's hide. That whole group

on the introduction just rose up -4 Mid,-g because they'd

seen Republican leaders say, "This is o't man," you know, as

the old saying goes, he may be a fool, but he's our fool, you

know ... and but anyway ... So we had decided to stay

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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totally out of it and all sorts of things began to happen.

There was so much nit-picking. I went, I was invited to a

Jack Eckerd luncheon. So I went. It, I went to a Skip B0-

fallis dinner, too. Well, I went to the Skip BEfalis dinner

... we got a call from a Kirk person in Boca just __Li _

S_ about going to a Bufalis dinner. And then when

we got invited to a Eckerd ... I did to a Eckerd luncheon

and I no trtg Q&.- _____ from the Kirk group

even in the papers about it. And so I just gd said,

" "Look, if some of the Kirk supporters would like to invite

ihri- to a dinner or luncheon I'll be glad to go to theirs

too. I'm going to everybody's." And the governor, I think

kept thinking the legislators were waiting, they were just

waiting and they're going to attack me just before the

campaign. So he, his people were doing some of the darndest
you have
things 4 ever seen. Here in ... right here in Delray

Beach< Gurney people were actually working against my husband,

actively to defeat him, Republicans here in Delray.

K: To elect a Democrat?

J: To elect a, Democrat, oh, yes. Even to the point oV____

And this would never have happened

if Ed Gurney had said "no," you know, you don't campaign

against Republicans and, because his very close friend

here was the leader in it, his clase personal friend whom

I helped whom I 'worked for and gave names to and helped

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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build Gurney supporters here when Gurney ran for election.

I gave them their south county chairmen.

K: In the general election when Kirk who did win the primary

over Eckerd had to face Reubin Askew, you mean the party

didn't even, didn't heal then either. The Democrats

were running to help elect Republicans and Republicans were

helping elect the Democrats?

J: Right. Kirk and Gurney supporters were actually in the

general election against Democrats for the first time we'd

ever experienced such a thing. In fact it took us both

a while to find out 44 about it 'cause we just didn't believe

it would happen. But ... there were Kirk workers in con-

dominiums calling up.telling people bad things about Republican

legislators and I know because they called one of our friends

in a condominium and she called us and she was just fit to be

tied. And so Gurney and Kirk did work against their ... now

they didn't come out publicly in the papers to do that.

but their supporters actively worked against Republican

legislators. Well, to the credit of the Republican legis-

lators \( tuu- ~ V 4 Republican, they did not actively

engage themselves in Kirk's campaign. Going out, working

for him, getting ...

K: They didn't actively oppose it either.

J: Right, but they didn't, they never ... there's, I don't believe

you'll find in any newspaper .one'word of print where a leg-

islator condemned the governor for anything. And they were

FLA REP 2AU Tape 2
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biting their tongues; in fact I think it was 1 about a week

before the electionClaude Kirk called the house one

night. And he called Bill to thank him personally for not

attacking him and for not l\ and taking sides and,

against him. And Bill said, you know, well, Governor, you're
oppose ab
welcome but I don't / of any, you know, I'm not going to

go out on the stump and oppose ... nor am I going to have

my workers out opposing Republicans. Uh, I may not work

for them, but I'm not going to oppose them. And he ay&

,you run on your record, I'll run on my record, and then

we'll see what the people want to do. Well, so many Republicans

lost by hairline margins. Bill lost by a very small margin ---&

for ha- Senate vote it was ... he lost by 800 and something q

That means 400 and something people, if they'd voted for

Bill instead of for the other fellow Bill would have won.

And I can almost count that in Gurney supporters just2 right

here in our little community. And so that 0 was one factor.

There were others that ... if you take away that you can

say well, = -& something else, you know, could have

defeated him But there were about five things, and one of

them was the Gurney-Kirk alliance And if it had been ab-

sent Bill would have won,Tn Broward County 9/ hey lost about

five or six seats that would have been won had they not

worked against them. So, it was just a tragedy that--- it

just got split wide apart It was either the Kirk party or

the Republican party or nobody t.

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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K: Okay. The 1970 election was a disaster. Democrats took

the state governor's chair back, the Senate chair. Where

is the Republican Party going? Where where has it come

since 1970 and where is it going?

J: Well, another little aftermath that ... of the 1970 campaign

really was the Cramer involvement there. They didn't stop

the attacks on Cramer in the general election-bit tt, some

of them were very subtle, but it was found all over the
state. Uh, a little pamphlet, / defections from the party

over to the Democrat4. I don't think Lawton Chiles had (AV

a ghost of a chance a winr if he, if Cramer had had

either the total support or the abstinence of opposition

from the Gurney and Kirk people, but they really handed it

to him. We saw it here in Palm Beach County, and it, it was

a bitter struggle. Crarer pulled some little shenanigans.

t~S ', his aide, Jack pulled some things near the

end, putting out some brochures~, I can't describe them

right off hand, but they're in my records, that were not good.

He was really, they were getting so desperate and so upset

by tie party opposition. We were all beginning to just have

a traumatic experience. We'd never experienced opposoi on in
our/party. And especially people we'd helped elect to

office. Cramer worked for Gurney) and then he just got stabbed

when he ran. So, 6 L panicked and put out some brochures

FLA REP 2AB Tapw 2
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that turned people off that were going to vote for Cramer---

Democrats who were going to vote for Cramer. It was just

a poor, poor choice in campaign material. So anyway~the

election ended and in the meantime during this election

Duke Critten I believe, was used by

Gurney to try to head off Cramer, to put pressure on the

legislators. The legislators got no support whatever from

their party chairman during tha- time. It was really a

t / CLZ 6- to be a legislator running and I

know that Cramer felt, by gosh, after over a dedicated party

work )look what's happening to me. These people are -u-vttjs

on me. So the party was left then with a chairman who

really was basically a very fine man; -ble-d been ... the

state committee people started getting back together--the old

group started saying, good Lord, what has been wrought on

us after our tremendous successes. What are we going to do?

So as soon as the elections were over it was obvious that

we had to have a new staLe chairman, because Duke had Ijust

... was too bruised and battered to ever bring the party

back in harmony again. Duke had made the mistake that party

leaders who haven't worked at the grass roots level for

a long time often make, and that is he looked to his top of-

ficeholders, by top I mean the highest ranking. He looked

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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to them to build a party instead of to the party -

K: From the top down rather than from the bottom up.

J: Right. It was the old trying to build from the top

and you can't do that. When you're a minority you have got

to start at the bottom and build your blocks. You just

can't start at the top. So ... Duke had made that critical

error and I don't think Duke Critenfsn really supported

at all Gurney's allowing his supporters to work against

other Republcans. I don't really think that Duke really
in this)
knew how involved they wereAdespite the cries from the

legislators, you know, that we're being undone. I don't think

Duke really realized the extent of it. For instance with

Bill when he said at a Young Republican-Club, uh, Young Re-

publican Federation meeting shortly after the election

... he was talking about the election, he said/ aa4 one of

the tragedies was -losing Bill James. And I believe he was

honest about that. I don't believe he realized that Ed

and the Kirk people were working against Bill. I just

do not believe it. The man was just too good and honest

to do that, ut nevertheless he'd been used. So he did

run, though. Gurney then was determined, the party was

on its knees and he was going to take it. If not Gurney, at

least his aide;,nd of course he says his aides do all of these

things, that they're the ones that got him in the money

mess and everything And yet I can'+ really see how you

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
Side 1.


can'4et an aide, how you can't know these things are ~ap-

Tea4g We know what goes on with our workers; and al-
V ot
though it's -a'United States Senate thing you have ways of

hearing eventually andC1lling an abrupt halt to it. Well,

instead Gurney was going to run Crittenton again; I think

Duke at first was very reluctant to run, but he was in the

mess and he was going to see it through. So gurney supported

him and again the troops had hit the field. And so they

started calling each other, and Bill got several calls,

from north Florida particularly to run for state chairman

now that he wasn't in the legislature. Well, Paula Hawkins

was not keen on Bill's running even though Bill and Paula

had worked very closely together. She wasn't because

Bill didn't have money and it just ... you know, enough

money to pay the personal expenses that a state chairman

has to pay because 'it, it really 'is a financial ... it's

bad enough to be a state committeeman, but to be state

chairman R just absolutely drains one~personal financial

assets. And we really didn't have the money to pay for

all of Ii that and Bill told 44m "the only way I'll run

chairman is to be paid. I just, I can't do it and I'd

think about it if you wanted me, if wanted to draft me

and said you'll pay me." And so he was on the phone con-

stantly with other state coiumittfeemen and finally one day

-Greg7 g'"t and David Lane, Senator Lane,and myself
-r- '
.f7~ '*y^

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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went to Panama City to talk to Tommy. We had gone over and

over and over and over the list and Tommy seemed to be

the one that could probably pull it together. In the

first place he could call on the loyalty of the north

Florida people, -

K: I guess for the record we ought to say Tommy Thomas.

J: Tommy Thomas. Could, Tommy Thomas,being from Panama City)

could count on the solid support of the north end people

and you see they were having to fight not G. Alex--, G.

Harold Alexander this time) eczSe-United States Senate,

and his influence, which it-might even you start think-

ing of patronage, judgeships that he approved and all, that's

a pretty potent opponent; far more than just some little

ordinary state chairman. So ... they figured he could

carry that group and then we knew that in the, on the

east coast and west coast those we could get. So it at

added up to victory if we, if Tommy Thomas wanted to run

and if he was the man to run. So the four of us m;ve-

ap to Panama City one morning and... or one day and we

talked well into the wee hours of the night tQ-Tommy

Thomas at his beach cottage, and ...

K: Can you date that?

J: Oh, '

K: Roughly.

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
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J: It seems to be that it would be in December or January.

K: Of '70-or '717

J: December of '70 or January of '71 somewhere ...

K: That's close enough.

Jt ... in that general vicinity.

K: That's fine.

J: And so we flew over over there and talked to Tommy 'til the

wee hours of the morning and left early the next morAing 'cause

Dave Lane had an operation scheduled in Fort Lauderdale. 4e uf

we talked with Tommy and the philosophy that had been the

original philosophy of the reform movement, the ideas, the

way a party should be run, the building of the Kgrass roots,

a, the installation of the legislative liasons so that we

never have the split between the legislators and the party

that occurred during that salary thing with Duke. We,

we wanted to prevent a separation of elected officials, par-

ticularly legislators, from the state party and the state

party chairman. We wanted always to have a go-between

who kept each one advised. You see, the legislators really
even 1
didn't/know how Duke felt on the salary -b-A- until after it

was over and he 1-0ei f L So we want that mis-

take so we -j 4 bTk t owt o 1_ei 0 U0 : that he

wanted to work with the legislator ; he thought that had

been a catastrophe. So just all sorts of things in regard to

party organization Tommy Thomas was right down the line

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 1.


mentioning thtgs that ... and had he I not been thinking

about it or not been a sharp person he probably wouldn't

have thought x _____ .And so we left that

day pretty well convinced that this was 4 the man who

could do the job. And he had the money to fund it and Tommy

Thomas hap a manner about him which has borne out --one of

great candor and honesty and loyalty that just really is

admirable in a person. And Tmmay-was needed in state

.chairman. When ... when they give their word they mean it

and they're not going to undo you. If a problem comes

up they're going to consult with their board; they're not

going to let some public official] lead them down the rose

path like Gurney had Critten6x2." So then the battle was on

again and the travelling started and ... Bill travelled

throughout the state and the state committee people that he

worked with and talked with and more or less had always

been assigned to keep in touch with and work with

he took Tommy. And they 4us t rode many an older road down

here in central Florida looking for some of our Republiean

state committeemen and committeewo- in. And then others,

was working on people he knew and the team just went back in
and & 'tv-,
action,4 gant- fe to get Tommy Thomas elected. And

we went to ... I think it was Orlando again, and I'm almost

sure/ elped- and Tommy was again elected. He still ha4

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 1.


little biting things from the Alexander group because they
never really quite, you know, they could still harbor eome
Stt kU
e.4 resentment over the original reform movement. But then

Tommy came in and he hasn't been the fireball type leader that

me' ebut then Tommy doesn't ah-e .a ': fireball

__ either, that, you know, he's gotta keep running with.

And Tommy has .....

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


J: ... and that goes with all public officials, the elected

officials Tommy always works with, does his darnest to help

thenTgpe's spent so much of his personal money helping to

establish that headquarters in Tallahassee which is so

essential. It, he's picked it up where ...

K: .-htrgt't hat didn't exist ..then.

J: No.

K; Before.

J; Murphin established one there in, let's see, '67 or '68.

K: It would have been '67, according to Susy Hatfield.

J: Right, I think it was.

K: ... records go back that far.

J: Right, all I remember was it was over a barber shop there

right around the corner from I e( a little rented

office. And it was, it was in '67 and so Murphin established

a headquarters there, but we just didn't have the money to

keep funding it. And Bill was trying to still make a living out

of. that drugstore in Martin County. So they moved the head-

quarters first to Palm Beach County. We had a problem with

our county organization at the time. We had an old G. Harold

Alexander man who was still chairman and it gave us fits here.

And they harassed Bill to such an extent that he had to leave

Palm Beach County He just had to take the headquarters

out. They were forever snooping in the headquarters. So

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


--key moved it to Broward County, where Gray W'ilsfton

took it under his wing. Good old Gray. Lord knows, you

can always depend on Gray to help out when the party's got a

problem. So Gray turned his county headquarters prac-

ticaly over to the state headquarters, just like both of

them beinTin the same building. He owns the Building

in Fort Lauderdale, Sixth Street, I believe. And so they

lived happily there. But it still wasn't the same as being in

Tallahasseeand everybody knew that it was, you know, a second-

best, but it was all we could do. We were paying the governor's

expenses, we were trying to raise money for candidates, we

were just, you know, had our hands in peoples' pockets all

the time dragging a few pennies out, you know.

K: No help from Washington at all?

J: Uh, ...

K: The national party, with expensive things?
J: AThe national Republican Party has never helped Florida. They

have only taken from Florida. And the records through

the years you will see in those files is one of the national

committee coming down here, a big fund-raising, they take

all the money,.run to Washington, and we never see it So the

state party then had to go out and put on year dinners and

try .e-.-e-as-t- start raising money. nd Phyllis Moore, in

Fort Lauderdale, the state committeewoman there who is

also, has also been a trooper all the way through, Phyllis

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2

se ttp, with .. she and / set up the Boost ..., was it

Boost 4)Su/464jf Ae-( drive where you pay ten dollars

or fifty or a hundred and you're _... I

think the hundred is the Diamond krt C Golden

Elephant or some kind of elephant. And the ten dollars

is the sustaining membership where you get the party news-

letter and your little card that you're a sustaining mem-

ber of the party and everything. And that really helped

our finances. It became the backbone of supporting the

party. And the dinners helped here and there4 5ut you see

our method of fund-raising quite often depends on each county

having their own fund-raising dinners and things. And sup-

porting to as much a degree as they can local candidates; by that

I mean from the state legislature on down. And we depend on

the National Committee to take care of the congressmen,

along with their personal fund-raising. So the state then

tried to help and it did start, they did do a great job,

really a fantastic job to be starting from absolute scratch.

And ... so when Tommy took over then he, o get back to the

headquarters, he knew, that was one of the things we talked

about on the beach in Panama City, he knew the need for the

headquarters, -ase. =-ie afford .-9- travel back and forth

from Panama City. So we thought we were just going to be

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2.


renting there, e =e 'just, he operates on

a big scale. I mean there's no sense going halfway; if you're

going to do something, do it right. So he found this

building which was a tremendous V A' right in down-

town Tallahassee. And it was his money that bought it for

us and then we went around the state getting clubs to pledge

money like my Republican Club here in Delray and our Women's

Republican s-"---pledged a thousand dollars-in, I think we

paid $400 the first year, and then $300 for the next two years,

so over a three-year period. And many, many other clubs

did the same thing. And Bill had been chairman of the Campaign

Coordinating Committee in Ealm Beach County and we ended

up with a- little over $1000 in our account left over

from the campaign -f '70. So that was given.. We, we gave

it in the name of the county, the new county executive

committee. But it was sent in as a lump sum. So just going

around the state, begging borrowing, doing whatever we could/

we finally got money and I, I don't think it's too far from

being paid off now, but if Tommy had not 4 put up the initial

money ...

K: It never would have happened.

J: It never would have happened. But I think it's permanent now

and it's, it's where it should be.

K4 Have the party factions healed?

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
Side 2.


J: I think they're healing because of Tommy Thomas. There

never was that big a split among the workers.

K: Urn, huh.

J: Like in our county. Those who worked for Bafalis and for

Eckerd and for Kirk are friends'now, ready to work together.

In this ...In the '72 campaign we could have done without.

them. We had people from the Kirk campaign; why, one night

stuffing envelopes we all got to laughing about it because

we had representatives from Bafalis, from Eckerd,and from

Kirk all sitting at our table stuffing envelopes. And we

remarked about it then, that isn't it great to be back to-

gether again? You know, how in the devil did we ever let

anybody tear us apart? And the Kirk, Eckerdand Bafalis

people, every single one of them, in retrospect, in thinking

backlwere sorry they did what they did. Each one expressed,
and some of them/really red-hot in that campaign; I mean

they were working -furiously against the others and yet when

they stopped Ind thought about it they would have made a dif-

ferent decision if they could have just known the outcome.

We had Kirk people calling us up for six months after the

election apologizing to Bill for doing the things they

had done against him. And so the people were never really

split; it was the leadership.

K: Personalities of the leadership?

J: Yeah, what, what's happened now -is :a&It Tommy has refused

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


to be dominated by any public official. Cramer is busy

with his law practice, he still likes national politics.

Gnrney, of course, at the moment has his hands full. But after

the campaign wac over, the people started coming back together

immediately. There was no delay in the people getting back together.

But as I say we had to run the campaign to get Tommy elected

state chairman." And then after that ....

K: Who opposed him?

J: Duke Crittenton, Duke ran again.

K: OK.

J: But in '71 right after that '70 election the first session, and

I've been really, I, Don Reed said, "Bobbie, I want you to

work in the office for me, in the Minority office." He said,

"You know more people in my district than I know and you

know how to write answers back to help me with correspondence

and you know the party so well you could handle a ot of
those things / me." So by that time Tommy had already

said, "Bill, come to be legislative liason. You're the only

guy we've got who's an ex-legislator and a, a state com-

mitteeman at the same time. So come do the job." So Bill

said, "Aai4g.,' I'll be there, I'll help you!' So we

decked our baggage from here and went to Tallahassee and took

the kids up and I worked for Don and Bill worked for the

state headquarters. And one, they were having a Young

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


Republican convention and this must have been, well, they

had a Woman's Federation one too while we were up there,

in March, April back ... during the session time. I guess

April and May. First there was the Young Republican con-

vmntion and I just about dropped my teeth. Gurney's former

aide, oh, that aic o* D __A ***

K: Williams?

J: No, the other one.

K: J}U-L G ?C

J: Uh, huh. His ... { had been ...

K: Groot?

J: Groot! Jim Groot. That name just, just, ... it makes me

curdle because I knew what was going to happen. He called

us and I'll be darned if I didn't find out that Groot, now

whether Gurney again knew about this, I don't know, but I

just can't believe that he didn't know. They were trying to

take over the Young Republicans. whey failed with the party;

Tommy'd been elected. Now they were trying to get the Young

Republicans. Well, yeah, you thought, Wy Lord, will the

battles never stop? Will they never stopped trying to take

over somewh4e 'Jin the party? So, he called B and to me, he

accused Jo Metcalf, she's now married to a ex-legislator

from Broward County, ,b J 5iA called up and

accused Jo Metcalf of all these things, and I knew Jo Metcalf.

FLA REp 2AB Tape 2
side 2


I couldn't believe it. That this was true. He said that

she was avoiding him, or something to this effect. And

that he couldn't get hold of her. Well, from his conver-

sation it immediately became apparent that they were in it

thick and fast, in trying to determine who was going to be

the next Young Republican president. So we weren't terribly

happy with the leadership in the ws because our best

leadership had been drained out. And we were still trying

to find some good men. Bill Cork had done a pretty good

job when he was left there stranded after all the other

leaders left, but by this time the Young Republicans were

a little weak but they still depended greatly on the advice

of Young Repub--, older Young Republicans who had once

been active during reform time. So when he called up ) I

really got a little angry about the thing, but I didn't

say too much to him bause-I didn't know him too well.

Well, you know, he, he had been Robert King High's aide

during the Kirk and High campaign. And I thought, an4 an

extremely liberal fellow, I mean, he ... you know, Robert

King High, liberal and I thought how

can Ed Gurney have a man like that in there? It doesn't

make sense in a national ...

K: It does sound very odd.
J: You know, I, I -- couldn't believe it. And in the Minority


Tape 2
side 2


Office, one of the fellows there that worked in the Minority

Office said, "gee, whiz, I went to school with Jim Groot;He's a- r

And he said I can't understand either why Gurney haA him.

Well, anyway, I called, I got a hold of Jo Metcalf,lt-.' /I"

t.L i,, A[, and I said, "Jo, ... you know, so-and-so

says this, thatand the other. And I'm very angry about it."

And then another, can't remember if it was an aide of Gurney's

or just who. And I really let them have it. I, I just
said, you know, you are, you just aren't satisfied with

the damages that's been done. You're trying to bring

it up all over 4J again. And for Jim Groot to say those

ugly things about Jo that aren't true and are totally un-

called for is just splitting the party all over again.

And I think it's pretty rotten. And I think that Jim Groot

ought to be out of there. And I said, lie's going to cause

Senator Gurney grief ug, i A if he's left in there. Well,

I guess calls were made from this one to that one to another

q one. The next thing know is the phone's ringing. And

Jim Groot is-as. sweet as- (- p From nasty, nasty to 4-ut

sweet a- Y cC "Oh, I didn't mean for you to think that

I was saying ugly things." ~n-Ther-wo.~ds you'd think when

you said 'em, you know, how can you say that and then say, I

didn't think I was saying ugly things. And so he was just

being very, very sweet and kind. And I thought to myself

I don't why I'm telling Gurney people they better get rid

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


of Jim Grootbut as early as say/April of '71, Gurney

was warned that Groot was bad, bad news. He went down

to the Young Republican convention, Groot showed up to

manage his forces& hey tried, unfortunately, they got an

awfully sweet young fellow and his wife that we'd always

worked with and who were Republican, they just, begging

him into-running for chairman and it hurt us to oppose him.

wen Actually we liked him better than the other ne- but

we couldn't afford it.

K: Who are we talking about?

J: I'm trying to think of his name. He's ... oh Lord, Bill had

dinner at their house; he's, I'believe a dentist over in

Tampa; oh, dear, I'll think of it ...

K: That's OK.

J: ... as I go along. But at any rate, it's also in the paper, in

the records, but he, he was a very fine person. When he called

Bill, Bill told him, he said, you know, ft kills me not to

support you, but I know that Gurney has got his finger in

this thing or at least Groot has. No, no, Bill, he doesn't.

Well,the minute we got to the convention of course, there,

it was so obvious it was, you know, beyond any disbelief.

So we fought out another battle and Gurney lost that one.

And I think,after thatI that Gurney began then to think, well,

maybe, he, he's realized, you know, that there's no way, no

way ...

FLA REP 2AB Tape 2
side 2


K: 'Course when you say now.he's realizing, now it's a little,

probably a little late.

J: But ...

K: In reality.

J: Well, as far as Groot goes, it's too late. Gurney learned

his lesson too late. And again, if only he'd listened to

loyal party people. I'm not always saying that he should

do what they say do, but he should bear in mind that they're

to be trusted over, yech, some Robert King High aide,

for criminy's sake. And so of course, Groot was in on that

money-collecting thing. Gurney said so himself on the tele-

vision. And so the way it is now Tommy Thomas is bringing

back the harmony and the people are getting back together

because Tommy has not let any public officials even get a

head start on grabbing control of the party. He helped

Paula. in the last campaign, Paula Hawkins, he worked like

a dog for her, but he didn't slack any of the rest of us

doing it. In this next, I think right now, Tommy's admirably

keeping very quiet. Now I don't know, Gurney may say, well,

why isn't ,he speaking out publicly and defending me, but

Tommy Thomas has the whole party to think about, not just

one ATebndspeza i after all, Gurney didn't

ask Tommy's advice when he was getting into this stuff.

K: Before he got into the trouble.

J: So Tommy is trying to hold the image of the party apart and

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