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subject: John Seay
interviewer: Arthur White
sj
W: Arthur White, Assistant Professor of Education, University of
Florida interviewing John Seay, Deputy Commissioner of Education)
on his role in the 1968 teacher strike in Florida. Mr. Seay,
if you would give us generally/how Floyd Christian divided up
responsibility among his staff members during this crisis.
S: The commissioner was very much concerned about the teacher
walkout and as far as I was able to serve him, he called upon
me to, on many occasions, to try to intervene and to help and
assist his office in trying to resolve the differences between
teachers and boards, and other educational groups throughout
this state.
W: If this is inappropriate, Mr. Seay, I will delete the question,
but I'd like to take you back to September of 1967, when the
preliminary walkouts occurred, I believe, in Broward County and
Pinellas County. Did you play any role, or were you on the scene
in these strikes, and what were the objectives of Mr. Christian
as you remember them, and your own objectives?
S: I played a role in the Broward County sanctions at the time,;
before the teachers walked out. I met with the board in Broward
County, along with the commissioner's attorney at that time,
Gene Garfield. And my role in that relationship with the Broward
board was to get them14 at least talking to the teachers and
listening to the teachers, and more or less realizing that the
commissioner was very much interested in resolving the differences
that they had. Now, they, did you say the Palm Beach County board?
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J5',No, the Pinellas)
S: ie Pinellas County county board, I was not involved in that at
all.
W: Do you remember, I can't recall any, but do you remember any other
negotiations that occurred between the state department and
any boards of education or the F.E.A. that was prior to the strike?
Do you recall any negotiation you engaged in at that time?
S: Yes, I recall that I was called along with Cecil Golden to go
over to Washington County and meet with that board on an occasion.
And then also, the board in Pasco County, I went there with
Herman 4 and we met with representatives of the teacher
group, and with the board of education, oaf trying to open up
lines of communication between the two groups.
W: I)'general, can you tell me in particular what was blocking
communication, and what the frustrations were here, what were
the major issues, talking about Broward County, why was the board
uncooperative with teachers in this county, what was blocking
negotiations? Was Claude Kirk's men on the scene helping the
situation, was the Republican nature of the Broward board contributing
to the antagonism between teachers? What were the kindsof
factors that were frustrating the situation. I believe this
strike lasted two or three weeks, and that's a long time for a
strike to be sustained. Would you want to comment. f4
S: I really don't know that the, Kirk, as governor, republican, and
as members of the board who were republicans were in a fight
against the democratic members of the board or the democratic
commissioner of education. I really didn't sense it in that
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S: light in the Broward County situation. Although) as it developed,
it could very well be that the board got split between the members
of the democrats and the republicans, but I believe the crisis
came about over the fact that the Broward board had members on
there that were just unbending. They were determined to play the
role of management to the degree that teachers and their organization
to their leadership of the C.T.A. or the County-wide Educational
Association would have to knuckle under to the requirements of
the board. And it was more on the hard-nose aspect of the
negotiations than it was on the political side as I, I looked at
it from the beginning. Now, later on, we might bring in some of
the stubbornness of the governor and some of the positions that
he took on trying to bring teachers under the rule of thumb, but
at that particular point, I did not see the politics as much as
possibly developed later.
W: Are you speaking of in the first week of the strike, is this
essentially the earliest phase of this....
S: I'm thinking about before the strike, when the Broward County
board and teachers were trying to, they were under a threat of
a strike, and the sanctions, and this kind of thing.
W: This was prior to the strike? Did you, when a strike actually
occurred in Broward County, did you actually have any participation
at that point?
S: I recall none after the, after the teachers walked out, other than
telephone conversations.
W: And were any of these significant, did you go on to talk....
S: No, no, no more than just what I did with every county on behalf
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S: of the commissioner, trying to boards not to dismiss teachers
immediately, to hold it open and try to negotiate and get them
back, because Florida at that time)had an acute shortage of
teachers, and we did not want to lose a single good teacher for
Florida. And the commissioner's interest at that time)was to keep
the boards SCW as such that the teachers could come back
and they could maybe resolve their differences of opinion.
W: This is the nre-strike period?
S: No, that was at the strike,.when they walked out, twenty-five,
and the commissioner was trying to get as many of them back as
possible.
W: I see. The telephone conversations occurred during the Broward
strike.
S: Right.
W: So we are still talking about September of '67. This isn't the
big strike yet, we haven't gone into it. Um, when Mr. Christian
spoke to you, do you remember any of the conversations of how he
of
tried to,Ahow your role was negotiated, how these kinds of
decisions were made, what he had to say, when he said you are
to go down there and do this or that. Do you remember any of these
conversations?
S: I don't remember the specifics, but I do remember some of the
general remarks that he made to me. He said ,"Johnny, I want
you to go to Broward County, I'll have a transportation readied
for you, and I want you-to go down there and see what you can do,
take Gene Garfield with you and see if you can't get the teachers
and the board to talk to each other and maybe resolve their differences,
7
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S: because my concern," as he stated it to me, was "to keep as many
of those Broward teachers in the classrooms as possible." Because
as I said, the shortage was acute, and we needed every good
classroom teacher we could, had, and we wanted to recruit others.
And his concern primarily was for the children of Florida, to
keep those teachers in Broward County, and resolve the differences
if his office could play that kind of a role.
W: I, I wasn't sure about the newspapers saying exactly who played
what role, but you moved from September of 1967 to October. At
this point, Phil Constans has 31,449 or so resignations in hand.
The governor has moved in and out of a commitment to a special
session, away from a commitment to a special session, he's
being very fickle about this. Constans prepares for a showdown.
He's, I believe, October 22, Sunday, the teachers were to go to
Tangerine Bowl again and vote on whether to walk out. There's
a series of negotiations and meetings that led to a compromise
where Kirk was willing to call the special session and speed
up the report of his blue ribbon commission on education, etcetera.
Did you play any role in this? Do you recall anything about
these days?
S: Yes, I recall these days very vividly. These were the days we
worked day and night, weekends. We had many meetings with Phil
Constans and the representative from the N.E.A. in Washington,
with the governor and with the governor's staff at that time
Chuck Perry was involved, Xe's now president of the university
in Miami, the new one there, the Florida International University,
and we had many, many hours when the governor, along with the
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S: commissioner and the staff that I mentioned, meeting to try
to get the governor to bring about a special session, which he
finally agreed to do. And at this time, everything was under
sanctions, everything was being held in abeyance, pending the
action of the governor. So there was no strike at this particular
time.
W: At this time, things that I probably could never get from
newspapers or anything like that, and of course you don't
remember if any-of these are important, but do you remember
if there was any particular style of the negotiators, what was
Phil Constans like at this time, what was Chuck Perry like,
how did they negotiate, and as you came to know them and
understand them, do you recall any of these things?
S: Well, I think the thing that I saw in Constans wasAvery arrogant
type of attitude, a stubbornness, one that was just,* demanding.
I saw in Chuck Perry a fellow that was easier to talk with, he was
more amenable to the both sides of the issue. Constans, it appeared
to me, was strictly a teacher representative, he did not appear
at that time to be the management concerned person at all. Now,
the thing that froze up a lot of people in Florida in this process
of negotiating was the fact that not only did N.E.A. send in a
staff to work outthe F.E.A. office here in Tallahassee and
particularly meet with the governor and the commissioner and
members of the legislature, but they had regional offices around
the state where they'd offer their assistance to each of the
C.T.A.'s that wanted them to come in and help them negotiate with
boards. And this caused a lot of people to clam up and that
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S: relationship was not goodas I recall.
W: Who would you say was the most effective negotiator in bringing
about compromise as you remember it? Who got the credit for this
in terms of the inside people, who did they think was most
effective'if anyone was, or was it a composite of people?
S: I really don't know if there was a one person. Of course, I
look upon the man that stood head and shoulders above all in
the state, was the commissioner's role. Now, the commissioner
got blamed, he was not popular with the boards of education,
he was not popular with some of the superintendents that were
appointed at that time by boards-and felt loyal to their boards,
and they differed with the commission. But he commissioner's
role was, I think, centered toward keeping teachers for children.
I don't believe that he was popular to the extent that he was
asking boards to do that which the boards themselves did not
want to do. On the other hand, the commissioner realized all
along that he absolutely had no authority in the matter because
it was a board of education and an employee relationship. The
commissioner's role was strictly an advisory, an in the middle
type of a role that he had no authority to tell boards what to
do, but he was trying to persuade, he was a great persuader.
And on the basis of his persuasion, I think a lot of good things
came out of it that the teachers never realized. And they never
did give him credit for the role that he did play, which was that
of the child and the teacher and getting kids back in school and
keeping doors open. Now, on the other hand, I suspect, from the
way I see it, that the teachers representative side absolultley
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S: failed. The legislature came through in fine fashion. I think
the legislature came through in good style, brought forth an
additional amount of money that was available for teacher's
salaries, and any package program that improves the ~ae rhinlt
situation) To every point, as I recall, that the teachers
were in grievance over. But it was not openly revealed to the
teachers and many of them walked out when they walked out,
they did not realize what the legislature had done on a Friday
at the end of the session as they walked out on a Monday through
the insistence of their leaders.
W: This relationship with Kirk is of interest to me. At first,
Mr. Christian, even during Kirk's campaign for office negotiated
with, and seemed to have cordial relationships. Mr. Seay
yourself was a member of Kirk's "think team" on education. I
think you helped him organize his early conferences on education,
he had three of four of them of different, with different themes
connected with them. What do you recall about those cordial
days with Mr. Kirk and how you felt about him?
S: Well, in all of the relations that I had with the governor,
Governor Kirk at that time, were good. He used the name of
Commissioner Christian quite frequently, and it was always in
the vane of being complimentary. He did ask me, along with
some othersto join his think team. We, on one occasion, went
to Clearwater and for a couple of days and nights, helped him
plan some of his goals, and write some of his statements that
he was going to make to the legislature on education. On many
occasions, when we met with educational groups throughout this
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S: state, and the student leaders throughout the state. He was
always complimentary of what Commissioner Christian was doing,
he was not critical, in my presence. He was very willing to
look to the commissioner for those matters dealing with education.
Now, the role that he played actually in the political arena was
somewhat different from that. As you recall, he himself, as
governor of Florida, took over the superintendency of Manatee
County. He actually carried with him staff to that county office,
and he sat there in the superintendent's office and had telephone
connections wired in so he could handle governor's affairs in
Tallahassee and run the superintendency of Manatee County. Now
that was contrary to any role that Christian would have approved
of, and so, in that light, he more or less took it on himself
to be Commissioner of Education, and undermine the commissioner
and break down many of the things that the commissioner's
trying to do in order to bring about a better relationship. But
publicly, in meetings that I was in the presence of the governor,
he never, in any way, at that time made any remarks that would
reflect critically upon the commissioner.
W: Could I be oriented A2;fih? Was the Manatee County situation
over bussing and desegregation, and this was later, after the
strike? This, and of course, there was the textbook problem,
and this was much retribution later. He did, let's go back
to '67 again, and talk about when the relationships began to
deteriorate between the office of the governor and the governor
himself and the office of the commissioner and the commissioner.
Did you begin to change your attitude toward5Kirk when he began
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W: to veto legislation coming out of the '67 legislature reducing
teacher's salaries and this sort of thing. Was this where you
began to get the word on khat his, when did you begin to be
aware that Mr. Kirk was not supportive to the commissioner's
position?
S: In '67, in the fall of '67, the teachers and the commissioner
were very much disappointed that the appropriations were not
adequate to do the job of retaining the teachers and to providing
for the programs that were needed in a growing state. Kirk
had come in office as you recall, on a platform of making education
first. He was strong in his statements as he ran for the office
of governor in making education first in the nation. His
treatment of the budget, not the budget necessarily, but the
appropriations act, that came out of the '66 legislature didn't
indicate that he was at all concerned with making education first
unless it could be done with less dollars. And of course, that
was one of his main arguments)was that more dollars wouldn't
necessarily buy better education, and he was interested in
ways in which he could reduce cost, and maintain quality of
education, and the ways in which he wanted to maintain or
reduce cost didn't seem appropriate to the people who were
committed to, for certain programs that were going on. So in
the fall of '67 the commissioner could read in between the lines
quickly, that here is a man advocating education first in the
nation and not willing to support the appropriation ven that
the legislature had voted for education, and so the line item
vetoes were, I guess, that act was a beginning of the Christian
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S: analysis of Kirk being more of a talker than he was of producing
education.
W: All right, the next thing was the, you spoke of this already,
but, now we move that the special session is occurring, and this
was in January of '68. Now prior to that, there was a crash
program to try to get this blue ribbon commission report ready
so that the, we could fall back on a, a substantial report in
building the legislation into the special session. Did you play
any role at all in the crash program to get the blue ribbon
commission's report ready under Jacobs in Jacksonville you recall
WAs supposed to have fifteen months and they cut a year off it,
and had to report in three months, and the public relations
firm from New York, of course, is always part of a Kirk operation,
was cut out, and most of the state department, I imagine)was
doing a good deal of the work. Do you recall anything about this?
S: Yes, in fact, not only under the Kirk administration, but as I
see it, under attempts by several of the governors, they have
tried to do an education study in such a short limited span of
time and such a broad aspect of what they were trying to deal
with that none of them, in my opinion, have really produced
quality studies. Now over the years you can go back from the
Bryant administration on and see how legislation has produced
programs in education and funding in education that could be
tagged to any, some of these studies. But this matter of
concentrating and giving tS green light to his committee to
get something ready for the special session was just buying
time in my opinion, for him to delay calling the special session,
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S: with that as being the vehicle that he would use for the reason.
W: Did you do any work with this group?
S: Yes, I did some work with the group, in fact, I met with them
each time that they met as the commissioner's representative,
I was also an advisor to Kirk on educational matters, and not
a member of the study commission of the Kirk one. I was of the,
I was a member of the Burns and the Bryant studies previous to'
to that4 jut I was not a member, I met with them, we worked day
and night, much of the data and the materials that were produced
by the department of education staff.
W: We'll-move now to the actual session. Do you recall anything
particular about this session, the lobbying that was done, what
the state department was trying to achieve, did you have any
-f Mean, like yyiui9
role at all during the actual session?A Di; to explain the
program that the state department was interested in putting across,
or the program from the blue ribbon commission. Were, were you
in
involved dJ this at all?
S: Yes, daily, I was involved in the session. In fact, the commissioner
had grounded many of his staff, that is, grounded meaning that
we had to stay in Tallahassee, we were here until the end of the
session in order to be assistance to the legislators and to the
governor's office. And we daily tried to bring about an improved
appropriation. And as I recall it, at this time, it was greatly
improved, we tried to offset this thing of the teachers argument
of some of the appropriations of the '66 session, or '67 session
being tax relief. That was a compromise that was made in the
legislature, and we think appropriate, although about $664 6
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S: as I recall was not directed towards improving education, but
tax relief. And soI worked with the legislature daily along
with other staff members of the commissioner.
W: Among the commissioner's staff, who had major responsibilities t
besidess yourself, in relation to the crisis and the frustration
of the teachers?
S: We always, as long as I was deputy commissioner under Floyd
Christian, we had a legislative team. I chaired this team, but
we had people like Cecil Golden and Herman Myers, and Howard
Friedman always an effective member of this team because he
had been in state government for so long, he had served under
Colin English and Tom Bailey and Floyd Christian, and he knows
the legislative process as well as any man that I've ever observed.
So he was very effective, and at the same time hated by some
of the people who didn't want to be supportive to the position
of the commissioner and his staff. Mitchell Way was very
effective, Marie Kohler, these, and Ray Tipton and others, I
failed to name all of them, I'm sure, but all of us, plus, plus
the heads of the divisions like Lee Henderson injunior colleges
and Shelley Boone in division of elementary and Carl Praile at
that time, all of us worked on a team, we met daily, we developed
our strategy, and we tried to, the best we could, serve the
purposes of the commissioner's office.
W: The commissioner spent two hours trying to explain the program
that the legislature passed to the leaders of the F.E.A. and
I imagine Constans too. Were you present during that explanation?
S: Yes, I was present. Herman NAkss and a commissioner and I went
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S: down to the F.E.A. building, /s I recall, on a late Friday
afternoon after the legislature had adjourned a few minutes os!ry.
Constans was there and his board was there. Board, F.E.A. board,
and others who were observers were present. And the commissioner
went down/knowing that there was a possibility that the teachers
might be asked to strike /'o try to bring them up to date on
exactly what came out of the legislative packet during the
special session, Herman Myers, being the finance man for the
commissioner detailed it in dollars and cents as to what it
meant, and where the money would go and what benefits would be
derived for teachers. And so for better than two hours, the
commissioner pleaded, he persuaded, tried to persuade, he revealed
the insights of that from his office that should be told to
teachers, and he f6lt like he was obligated to go down there even
though in my opinion, he was not recieved as courteously as he
should have been recieved, I felt a little coolness there, and I
thought that it was not appropriate for the commissioner to have
to walk into a situation like that. In fact, I think if I recall
that I advised him not to go because I didn't think he was going
to have a good reception, and it was not in my opinion, a good
reception. But he felt like that he had to do it because that
was the role that he wanted to play as commissioner.
W: When the strike was called, I believe it was called that Friday
and they went out the following Monday, /o you remember any of
the preliminaries, any of the feelings? Was there a feeling of
betrayal, that this was unfair, that the F.E.A. had if, some ways
gone against good faith in this arrangement?
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S: Absolutely, the people that I knew about the state and the
contacts that we had in the commissioners office, the telephone
calls that we got, the comments from the legislators themselves,
who thought that they had done a good job were, they did feel
that this was an act of betrayal. Many people felt like the
teachers did not understand, and Ifeel to this day that the
teachers did not understand. Many of the teachers walked out
on Monday under the commitment that they had previously given
with written resignations to be released upon the call of the
executive secretary /id so to keep that commitment but did
so under advisement that was not good and accurate and they
did not know the true story. And as you recall, brothers,
some of them stayed in, and some brothers went out, and sisters
stayed in, families were broken up, and it was a tragedy, and
the people all over the state felt like it was a betrayal. And
even now it has not completely been resolved, the people still
have these feeling and it'll be a long time before they'll be
overcome.
W: I'm not very specific on this, because I'm not really certain,
uut~what types of negotiations began? The commissioner.I think,
was interested in being a negotiator, of bringing about compromise
as soon as possible. /ou recall some of the early negotiations
and how these relationships were set up with the F.E.A2
I believewere the groups that you mainly dealt with, the governor's
staff did some dealings with them, but there was not a kind of
relationship where you were negotiating with the governor's staff
and the F.E.A., is this correct?
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S: Well, I really think that the commissioner began to take over
the role of leadership in trying to bring about negotiations between
teachers and school boards, /ore than with the F.E.A.. I think
at that particular time, the, we were at the end of the rope
with F.E.A. and N.E.A.'representatives who were here on the
scene. And so the commissioner had me on the phone, and he
himself was on the telephone, and we made trips to the various
counties trying to get boards to not act hastily. Because many
of the boards had recieved these letters of resignation from
their teachers and the natural reaction of a board would be to
accept them, they were mad with the teachers, and teachers were
under, in grievance with boards, but the commissioner could
sense immediately that to lose that many teachers, 25,000 in
Florida, would just ruin this state. So he had me on the phone
talking to superintedents, talking to school board members,
trying to get them to hold the action on these resignations as
long as possible to see if something couldn't be resolved.
W: What were the effects of these negotiations, were you able to
get some boards to be, to hold back on accepting these resignations
with prejudice as with resultant....
S: Yes, one of the outstanding boards at that time, and the
superintendent there was Shelley Boone in Polk County. The Polk
County board just went into recess.after recieving so many
resignations from teachers, they just went into recess, they did
not take action, and they more or less held this posture for
several weeks, three weeks or more, waiting on maybe the teachers
reconsidering and not pursuing this matter of asking them to
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S: accept resignations. And they worked out many of the grievances,
and many of their teachers did reconsider. But the Polk County
board is one example of where they did not want to take action
because if they had taken action, it would have been to recieve
the resignations of the teachers. That was the basis on which
they were being advised by their attorneys, and it was a hard-
nose basis. Now some teachers, some boards immediately accepted
these resignations, they were hard nosed about it, and when they
accepted the resignations, that broke continuing contract status
of teachers, and they were in a bad situation. And so the
commissioner was able to influence several of the boards to keep
on talking and to, not to act quickly and he was very successful
in this, but it mostly, this was done by telephone conversation
and persuasion, and he asked the boards of education and the
superintendents to come to the Hayden-Burns building on one
occasion, where he tried to explain his reasoning for the
actions that he was asking them to take, and it was not a very
cordial meeting. It was a cool meeting. Some board members,
they got up and had some fiery words to the commissioner for the
role that he was trying to take, and usurp their powers as board
members. He was not trying to this at all, he was trying to
reason with them. Some of the superintendents got up and made
very cutting remarks to the commissioner about playing the role
that he was playing and trying to take the authority and the
autonomy away from local school boards. And this was never
intended, and he tried to make it clear, but they were not in
any position to want to hear it anyway, except their own at that
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S: time. The relationship with the commissioner and the boards
of education, those where they had large numbers of teachers to
go out were, was not good during that particular time.
W: -Negotiations withthe F.E.A. did occur, or after the first
week of the strike, the F.E.A. became disillusioned with the
governor's office, and began to turn more and more to the
commissioner as the chief negotiator for some sort of compromise,
and as of course, a major agent on the school board, the state
school board, that could work out some kind of a face-saving
compromise. Do recall any of these negotiations, were you in
on them?
S: Yeah. That's true, I think they had played their last card
with the governor, and so they realized particularly the leadership
at F.E.A. now realize that the commissioner was in the best
position of all to bring about some of their resolutions, some
of their particular problems, so they, we had more communication
then with the F.E.A. than, I wouldn't say prior because we were
meeting with them trying to bring about special session, but they
turned in to the commissioner to try to use his office and to
use his influence on trying to salvage these teachers. They were
naturally concerned about teachers not getting back in employment.
And the commissioner, he did things that I wouldn't have done,
but it shows bigness on his part. He brought some of those people
that could not be retained in the counties on his own staff
here in Tallahassee. He found jobs for some of these teachers
by some of the communications that he carried on with other people
that he knew throughout this state, and he was the biggest friend
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S: the teacher had after they had gone out on strike, and that,
to this day has never been told to many of the, to all of the
teachers.
W: The actual compromise, it was a three point compromise, it was
a compromise that the state department would use it's good offices
to try to get teachers back in employment, returned to employment,
that 04~2SG inLhold back funds, were held back to balance
the budget from the '65 and '67 legislature would be released)
and that communications, a communication network of sorts,
between the teachers and the board would be fostered.in the
counties by the state departments, ty~t r abby act as a
consulting agency here, it would not of course, was not
professional negotiations, but they would encourage a communication
set up. It was mainly a face saving device, I realize, but do
you recall how this came about, do you recall anything about
the actual compromise settlement? I believe he workeCdout the
first settlement on February 29, and the, and the legislative,
the cabinet aides, excuse me, the cabinet aides of all the major
people in the cabinet were agreeable to vote for it, and of course,
Kirk sabotaged this by calling out union and that you were
collaborating with the F.E.A. and so on. What I'm speaking about
here is, do remember any of the particulars of the negotiation
of the compromise, and how the compromise was drawn up. Did you
have any role in this, Mr. Seay?
S: Little embarrassing to me now, after having been out of the
office about a year, and this happened in '68, I really don't
recall. I know it would all come to my memory if I got to reading
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S: and reviewing, but at this moment, I was very much involved in
the instrument that went to the cabinet. The steps and procedures
that the commissioner recommended to the board of education that
he was taking and suggesting that boards take 94 trying to bring
about the open lines of communication, etcetera. I know the
articles that Howard Friedman produced through Florida schools,
and I know the instrument that we used in Monday report, and
many other things that we attempted at this level to try to
bring about a better communication between teacher-principal
relation, uh, and superintendent and school board. But honestly
at this particular time, the specifics of it I do not recall.
I do recall very vividly the, the, I, in fact, I presented it
for the commissioner to the board of education, the agreement
that was adopted.
W:A Do you recall the meeting?
S: Yeah, I recall the board meeting, I mean the state board of
education meeting.
W: Well, just any particular....
S: ....and as far as I remember about it this morning, it was
handled very much in a routine manner, I don't think the governor
was appreciative of all that it contained, but the commissioner
\00
had -,,/ d-c
W: This is March 8?
S: Yeah, about March 8 of '70, '68, uh huh.
W: You remember the repudiation February 29, of course, when Kirk
shot this thing down. Do you remember if you made any real
changes in it between February 29 and March 84) tryingg to get
HFE 4a 21
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W: it approved, do you recall? You don't recall, okay, fine.
Um, negotiations interest me again. Phil Constans was one of
the major people. Did his attitude begin to change towards the
end of the strike, did he become more.amenable? Didyou notice
any change, could you feel a break coming, a compromise coming?
There are two things you might be interested to know. First of
all, by Friday, I believe, of March 5th or 6th, the teachers in
most counties were going to go back anyway. They had actually
bent him to the point where they said, "All right, we're going
back on the eighth anyway." Christian, I spoke to him about it,
and the commissioner said that didn't know this. jjtJ didn't
know that the strike was actually finished by that point, that we
were still, they were still, but he still wanted to work out the
face saving thing, he still would have done the same thing, but
Constans actually was beaten ,and a further detail would be of
interest is that Constans suddenly changed his mind on Sunday
o1
night after accepting the compromise 0f the previous Friday and
saying that he wanted the teachers held back because he had heard,
I believe, that a lot of teachers were not going to be taken
back on the job by their board, regardless of the intercession
U) I km WMO i ev I' tl3 -5
of the state department. M-z i negotiations developed.
Could you see any changes in Constans attitude, and any, any
reasons for those changes?
S: I don't know whether I saw any changes or not, but I, I, this is
a personal opinion. I believe that Constans was, he could see then
for sure that he was not able to bring those teachers to a position
of closing schools in this state, and accepting the compromise
HFE 4a
sj
S: was a way in which safe phasing could be had. But from that
point on, I saw Constans all the way downhill. I thought that
he lost the respect from the teachers I think, I know he lost
respect 4 the legislature, I'm sure that he didn't have it
with the governor, and as I began to see Constans from that point
on, he was going out of the picture instead of being an
influential factor. And people who look to someone to talk to
and to resolve differences and to bring about some stability
was the commissioner of education.
W: Strike was resolved on March 45g *l, thousands of teachers were
out, boards weren't taking them back. There were lock-outs in
some counties, other counties that were sympathetic striking
going on because teachers weren't being taken back and other
teachers continued to, to stay out, I guess that's the actual
strike stretched into six weeks in some counties. Consequently,
I would be interested to know how you, what role you played as
part of the task force, and how that task force was drawn up to
get teachers reemployed.
S: Most of it was done within the office, of the commissioner's
office. He had, I led this task force, and had some assistance
from other staff members, and we did it by telephone, and by
calling of groups up to Tallahassee to talk to the commissioner,
and on some occasions, we jointly met with the governor, with
boards, and with superintendents. Of course, the governor was
meeting also with boards and superintendents that we would find
out about, we had no knowledge that he was doing this, and this
was resented Very much by the commissioner, and rightfully so.
HFE 4a 23
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S: But we did our work with telephone, the $C'S line, and trying
to keep the doors open, get the teachers hack and to, as I recall,
at the end, we had them all back. I'm saying "we" not having
any authority in hiring and firing, the boards did that, but the
boards had taken them all back in this state that were, had
resigned, with the exception of approximately 3,000 teachers.
And I don't think that they ever got back in Florida, they left
the state and went to other parts of the nation. And approximately
3,000 teachers were lost to this state out of'25,000 that walked
out.
W: You mentioned a vote of resentment, you mean that the governor
was meeting unilaterally with boards?
S: The governor, you know, having the relationship of his party,
She.republican party, with certain heavily republican boards
throughout the state, he was calling them up to his office and
meeting with him on matters of handling this situation, unbeknowhpi
to the commissioner. And we would find out about it by some
of the people in the meeting coming to the commissioners office
after they would adjourn in the governor's office, and we'd find
out about it for the first time. The commissioner's office
was not invited to participate, we did not have knowledge of
many of the meeting that were called here by the governor. And
of course, this was inappropriate, I believe, and the commissioner
felt very strongly about this as being inappropriate.
W: Last thing I'd like you to say, were you, was this an exhausting
experience for everyone involved here?
S: Very much so, I don't know of a person on the teachers'side,
HFE 4a 24
sj
S: or administrator's side or the commissioner or the F.E.A. side
that ever want to go through this again, it was most exhausting.
I've,
It was day and night, I remember, k met with these people until
three o'clock in the morning on trying to resolve some of the
issues that, prior to the special session. I have driven long
hours at night, trying to get from board meetings back home
and get,Aflown many hours by state aircraft trying to get to
communities to talk with boards and talk with teacher representative
groups. Many, many hours, not only on the part of the negotiating
team, the commissioner himself spent hours. The telephone
used tremendously, and the secretary, the secretaries recieving
telegrams, sending telegrams, recieving calls, and sending calls,
just spent many hours beyond those that were of the regular day.
I recall that my secretary spent many hours beyond five o'clock
when most of those who were working in other agencies of government
and other departments of education were not concerned about
she stayed and we worked for, long into the night on these
matters of trying to resolve the crisis.
W: I'm interested in a particular of these meetings.
Were they crowded meetings, noisy meetings, it was a lot of
emotion flowing in these meetings.... if you agree with this,
say
S: Yes, the meetings were crowded, always standing room only, some
people out into the halls, these committee room meetings where
we were meeting. It was noisy, sometimes tempers flared.
Sometimes the presiding officer had difficulty in bringing control
within the group. On occasions for, for short time, recess periods
HFE 4a 25
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S: were called. Yes, I recall all of this was part of it.
W: Who called'you in, was the F.E.A. the ones who called you in,
how'd you actually get to go on all these trips? Was the
school board the ones that called you in, who was the one that
did it?
S: Uh, school boards invited the commissioner to send down some
assistants to help. The commissioner asked for invitations, he
never went without one, but he wanted to know if he could be of
help, and he would send down teams on that basis. I don't
recall that we went anyplace on the invitation of F.E.A.
W: When you went to Escambia County) /hey were surprised there.
Remember this Escambia County?
S: Yes, yes I do. The commissioner himself went to Escambia County,
and I think that was, that was on the invitation, I believe,
of the Escambia County Education Association.
W: Yes, so-there were some C.T.A., but not F.E.A. Or there
couldn't be, really, after you I understand
what I did. Uh, Mr. Seay, the strike in your eyes was a failure.
It didn't achieve anything?
S: Uh, yes it did. I-was a failure from the standpoint of closing
schools, and I think that was a prime motive of it. But it was
successful in many ways. It brought about a realization in this
state of the deplorable conditions in which some of the teachers
were working, some of the schools that were in operation and the
needs that were so obviously needed. It brought about an
awareness that the teachers role was changing, and it has changed
from that point on, up until that point, I think many communities
HFE 4a 26
sj
S: many boards,4many people took teachers for granted, and nothing
that they could talk about as a way of needs or benefits for
children made any difference. But when they had demonstrations
like were held in Orange County at the Tangerine Bowl and with
the number of teachers who actually put their names on the line
that they would walk-out of the classroom if certain conditions
were not met /his brought about an awareness in this state
that never would have been brought about through any other way.
Ofcourse, I'm very much disappointed that the teachers walked
out. I think they had won their position, I think they had
gotten their gains on that Friday when the Legislature had
8ci';+t rou.
adjourned, and ther- walk- o-out on Monday was a disa4-eus effect*
7hat yet has not been overcome.
W: appropriate question, but
are there any conditions that you yourself, if you were a teacher,
would you ever walk out of a classroom?
S: I would not, because I came up in a different day, and of course,
I've been criticized for making statements that I've made on the:
subject. I worked for a very low salary, ninety five dollars a
month when I started teaching. I went into teaching because I
loved the process of teaching. I even loved to teach a Sunday
school class when I am permitted to How. And teaching to me was
an occupation or a profession that I thoroughly enjoyed, I went
into it with my eyes wide open. I would not strike, I would
never walk out of a classroom, I think I would seek other employment
if the conditions got....
lend of interview)
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