THE FLORIDA S'l ATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES




FAR FROM FIELDS OF GLORY

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FLORKIDA DURING THE CIVIL WAR,

1864-1865



by

DAVID JAMES COLES



A Dissertationl submitted to the
Department of Hstory
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor ol Phiiosophy









Dcegrec Awarded:
Fall semester, 1996






All rights Restrved

























JAYA11 11ill

R chelle A. Marrinan
Outside Committee Member

t- I



Committee el-



Comitte erner




















This work is lovingly dedicated to

Michael Drew Coles and K~athryn Alexandra Coles

and to the memory of

Christopher David Coles


























research, I received a Dissertation Yeur Fellowship from the United States Army's

Center of Military History, which enabled me to travel to various archives and libraries.

The staff at these repositories were unfailingly helpful in providing access to their

collections and suggesting places for further research. Phyllis Holzenberg, a former

employee of the Interlibrary Loan Department, Strozier Library, Florida State

University, cheerfully supplied many obscure nineteenth century source materials.

James Burke ofilic Florida State Archives read the manuscript and caught a number of

enrors- while Sam Bums gave vital assistance over the final weeks when it seemed even

try computer was conspiring against me. I thank both of them for their help Russell

Alexander, Joan Morris, Jody Nomian. Richard Roberts, and the rest of the Archives'

staff also provided me with encouragement

Over the many years it has taken to complete this dissertation, Dr. James P.

Jones has served as my major professor. He has become a close friend as well as

professional mentor, willing to help me with my work or simply to talk sports. politics,

music. or military history Is Batter-Up open yet? Dr, William W. Rogers also offered

encouragement and, when needed. a swift kick in the pants to get me going. This work









of History. They provided helpful comments and suggestions along the way,. and I

thank them for their patience and their assistance. Dr. Rochelle Marrinan served as mv?

outside committee member, and I appreciate her willingness to take time out of her busy

schedule for this purpose. Dr J Leitch Wright. Jr served as one of my master's thesis

advisers. anld assisted me during the early phases of my doctoral program. His tragic

death deprived Florida State University of one of its foremost scholars and was a

heartbreaking personal loss as well.

Over the past fourteen years I developed a number of close friendships among

my fellow graduate -tudents. Mary have completed their degrees, others wre pulrsuing

different careers, but all have provided companionship and support when needed

Thanks to Frank Alduino, Will Benedicts, James M. Denham. Mary Louise Ellis,

Stephen Engle, Tim Fevv, Kathryn Holland-Braund. Joe Knetsch. Miguel Lemus.

Christopher Meyers. David Proctor. Lynn Willoughby, mid many, many others.

Canter Brown proved to be a loyal friend and supporter. who helped corn. i ne

me that I could finish this project w hen I had almost given up hope my self. He also

read most of the following chapters and his keen editorial eye saved me from

innumerable croors in grammar, style. and interpretation. Richard Ferry of Macclenny.

Florida, unselfishly shared many Olustee-related items from his v luminous mn \ate

collection- Bruce G;raetz of the Museum, of Florida History and the foremost scholar of

the St. Markis experdition, read that chapter of my dissertation and gav'e me access to rare

source material from his files. Charles Sv itzer of 'eachtrce City. Georgia, allowed me

to examine and quote from the journal of his ancestor. Michael McCormick: while

Robert DB Carlisle and Dr Roger Lochhead of Chatham. Massachusetts similarly

allowed me access to the autobiography of Charles Rockwell. Likevwise, Duane Ashe

pro% ided several valuable sources relating to the Second Maine Cavalry.









Don Hillhouse and Zack Waters deserve special thanks. Fellow students of

Florida's role in the Civil War, both have become close friends who I have been able to

ask for favors anld advice. They have also shown a remarkable ability to locate

previously unknown manuscript materials which they have generously shaped. This

work would be poorer without their help Yes. Zack. I'll finish the Gettysburg book!

Of course, completion ofa work such as this is impossible without a supportive

family- My parents. grandmother, and in-laws always provided encouragement. My

children, Michael and Kathryn, have had to sacrifice some. but hopefully not too many,

family outings while dad was "at the archives," or 'at the library." I hope that this work

justifies those absences. My wife Belinda kept the family together during those periods.

and was always willing to help me in a variety of ways with the dissertation. or simply

by providing me with a shoulder to lemon Thank you for your patience, love, and

support.


































I "OUR FLORIDA ENTERPRISE'": NATIONAL POLITICS AND)
TH1E 1864 FLORIDA EXPEDITION .......................



2. "STICKNEY AND OTHERS HAVE MISINFORMED YOU":
OPENING MOVEMENTS OF I HE 1864 FLORIDA
EXPED IT IONN .......... ........... ............... ......... ................ ... ....... .

3 M EN AND ARM S .................. .......... ...... ....... .. ......... ...................



4. "YOU ',ILL COME BACK FASTER THAN YOU GiO": THE BATTLE
OF OLUSTEE ............... . -- ...... ... ..... .. ..................... ..........I



5. "SHOOTING NIGGERS SIR": CONFEDERATE MISTREATMENT
OF CAPTURED BLACKS AT THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE 14....l



6. RECRIMINA~TIONS. RAIDS. AND RETRENCH IMENT: OPERATIONS
IN NORTHEAST FLORIDA, MARCH 1964-MARCH 1965 .. ......... I

7. C`AI-TLE WARS: THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH FLORIDA.










THE FORGOTTEN CONFLICT WARINTHEFLORIDA
PANH'AND)LE.1864-1865 ..... .................



LAST CHANCE FOR GLORY: THE ST MARKS EXPEDITION
AND THE 13ATTLE OF NATURAL BRIDGE .. ......



"A'i TERRIBLE AND SAD RESULT": THE END OF THE CIVIL
WAR IN FLORIDA. MARCH-JUNE 1865 ........ ..... .-..



BIBLIOGR APHY .. .......... ... .......... ...

BIOGRAPHICA L SKETCH .......... .. .............














LIST OF FIGURES






I "Johnson's Florida ........ ............... ..... ....... .. ....... .10

2. "`Perrine s New Topographical War Map ofthe Southern States"....... 20

3. Detail ofJacksonville and vivmnit) ........... ...................... ........ .. ..... .49

4. Detail ofnortheast Florida ........... -.............. .. ..... .... .............-....... .... 54

5. Detail of region between Lake City and Columbus .................. ... ....... 64

6 "Sketch of the Battle-Field of Oceanl Pond" ...... ......................................1 117

7. First phase of the battle....... ......... ................... ................ ... __ .............. 120

8. Second phase oftlac battle -. ...... ........................................ ............. ... 126

9 Third phase of the battle ..... .... .. ............... .. ... .............................. 137

10. Fourth and final phase ofthe battle .. ............. ....... .............. .... -. 140

11 "Jlacksonville and Vichaty ............ .. ..... .. ........ ........ ........ .187

12 Upper St. Johns River .. ... ... ....... ......... ........................ .............. .. 05

13 b lorida gulf coast, vicinity of Cedar Keys.. .. ............ ......................... .. 234

14. South Florida ........... ... ... ... .... ... .....-.................... .... .. .. 25

15. Pensacola Bay ............... ... ................ ... ... .. ..... ......... ...... ...... 277

16. Confederate officer's map of gulf coast from Mobile. Alabama to
Milton, Flonida ... ........ .... ............. ........ .. ..... 1-82








17. Western I lorida panhandle and Alabama gulf coast ... .....

18. Florida panhandle from the Apalachicola to the Choctawhatcht

19. "Scene of Operations Against St. Mark's Florida March 1865"'

M0. Area between Tallahassee mild St. Marks. including St. Marks
River mid Natulral Bridge..... .. ....... .. ..................... ...

21. Natumil Bridie battlefield ... ........ ............... .






















During the last tw o y-ears, of the Civil War. military operations within the state i

F~lorida increased dramatically. This dissertation focuses on that time period, begiruini

with the political, military, and economic background to the 1864 Federal invasion of

cast Florida. which ended in defeat at the battle of Olustee. Presidential politics playei:

a major role in launching the expedition. while Florida's increased economic

importance, in the ferna ofcattle. hogs, salt- and sugar to feed southern armies. also

contributed to the decision to invade the state.

Following the reverse at O~lustce, Union forces continued to occupy

Jacksonville. and over the next year a series of small engagements and raids took place

in northeast Florida. The southern peninsula also became the scene of milita, activity

during this period. as Union forces occupied positions on the mainland in an attempt I(

disrupt the Confederate cattle trade. In the panhandle. northern solchera occupied

fortifications near Pensacola tluoughout the war. During 1 864-1865 they launched

numerous i aids into the interior, culminating in the battle Of Marianna Necar the war's














The North's use of a significant number of black units in Florida, as well a!

formation of two. regiments of Florida Unionists. is explored in this study Combor

arrny-navy operations. the impact of econo-ic considerations on milit-I) acti Itie

the increased Unionist sentiment aniong Florida's civilian Populatiton are also exar






















Florida remains the forgotten state of the Confederacy Ranking last in

population and wealth. and located far from the maj or theaters of the war. the "smallest

tadpole in the dirty pool of secession." has received little recognition of its role in the

war.,

Nevertheless. Florida provided some 15,000 men to the Confederate comes

Small when compared with more populous states like Virginia and North Carolina- this

number represented an amount greater than Florida's Iota] number ofregistered voters in

1 960. and -a perhaps the highest percentage ofpopulation to enlistments ofany

Confederate state. Additionally, during the later stages of the war mnd particularly after

the fall of Vicksburg. Florida became a significant source of supplies. providing

southern annies with large amounts of beef, pork. fish. sugar. molasses. and salt.

While no major battles on the scale of those in Virginia and Terraessee occurred

on Florida's soil. the state experienced considerable military activity. Fort Pickens near

Pensacola remained in Union hands throughout the war. Ratheil thanl Fort Sunnier,

Pensacola Ba might easily have become the location where hostilities conamenced in

the spring of 1861 Later in 1861-1862, several bombardments and one minor battle
















Uontederate command evacuated Vensacola, as well as cmandina, ,I. Augustine,

Jack~sonville. Union troops occupied the first two locations and held them for the i

the war, while Jacksom, ille suffered through four separate occupations.

Throughout the war- Florida was the scene of numerous raids and skirmilshel

with much of the coastal region of the state. as well as southern Florida mild the wee

panhandle. remaining a no-man's land where neither side exercised effective conrno

Some ofthe bitterest brother-against-brother fighting took place in the state. equal

many- respects to the brutal Loyalist-Patriot clashes of the Aracricari Revolution.

Although small in number and ill-equipped and trained, Florida's Confederate deft

thwarted Union attempts to take the state and, at the time of Tallahassee's surrende

May. 1865j. it remained the last Confederate capital east oftlic Mississippi not yet

captured by Union troops.

Military operations increased in the state during the last two years of the al

This dissertation will detail the military operations during the period ofthe most ir

activity. from January 1864. until the end ofthe war Thle largest and most serious

Union expedition into H~orida occurred in February. 1864. when approximately 7,(

troops landed at Jacksonville for the purpose of restoring northern role. The camp;

ended in disaster on February 20 with the Battle of Olustee. the bloodiest military
















deserves recognition for a number of reasons It "as an overwLIhelming Confedecrate

victory at a time when the South desperately needed one. Union losses approached

fort) percent. among the highest casualty percentages of the entire war. Union

participants referred to the battle as a second Braddock's or Dade's massacre.

More significantly. the political causes and consequences of the campaign far

outweighed the relatively low number of troops involved. The 1 864 Florida expedition

culminated ovecr two yewrs ofintrigue at the highest levels of Washing ton government.

Treasurv Secretary Salmon P Chase's presidential aspirations contributed to the fiasco,

as he hoped to reconstruct the state in time to send delegates to the 1864 Republican

Convention. Chase appointee Lymmm D Sticknce. member of the Florida Direct Tax

Commission. assisted the secretary in this goal through a series of dubious business and

political activities.

Less directly involved in Florida affairs. President Lincoln nonetheless sent his

private secretary, John Hay. to the state to aid in the registration of voters who took a

loy~alty oath to the United States government. The president hoped to promote his own

political interests at Chase's expense. With the unsuccessful conclusion ofthc








tllaCK; troops COmprisce a large portion Ot the Feederal force at Olustee. I he battle

occurred during a crucial transitional phase in the use of Negro troops This period,

from mid-] 863 to early 1864, sawr the role of black units expand from an experimental

nature to an integral pail of the Union war effort At Battery Wagner, Port Hudson. and

Olustee. blacks earned the right to fight for their freedom alongside whites These

battles presaged the even larger role ofl~egro soldiers in the war's last months.

Another feature of the battle as Confederate Mistreatment of the large numbers

of blacks captured there. Previlous students of the campaign have ignored or

dowpnplayed this tragic event, but extensi~e primary research stronON) indicates that

such mistreatment took place. Undoubtedly numbers of black soldiers captured at

Olustee v~cre killed or otherwise abused by their southern captors.

These ingredients make the 1864 Florida campaign a legitimate: subject for

historical study it is unusual. therefore- that so little scholxrly research has been

devoted to the topic. Onl. a handful of articles or books hav-e dealt with Olusice.

Mostly an a cursory fashion, and few have attempted to combine the political and

military aspects into a detailed description ofthe entire canipaignn

O)lustee did not end military operations in the state. Federal troops remained in

Jacksonville after the battle, and both sides for a time actually increased the wie of their

forces in the state. The Yankees established garrisons on the upper St. Johns River

while the Rebels seeded the river with torpedoes to destroy Union gunboats. The

Federal hcaxily fortified Jackisonville. mid the Confederates established strong

positions at Camp Milton. east ofthe town. Each side, mea-hile, undertook








expeditions to test enemy defenses. Eventually both sides reduced their forces in the

state. Still, over die next sixteen months Union and Confederate soldiers met in a

number of smaller battles and skirmishes. including those at Marianna. Station Number

Four, Fort Myers. and Natural Bridge.

South Florida became the scene of nmllitar activity during 1864-1865 because of

the increasing importance of Florida beef. Confederate officials established a cavalry

force to ceuard the cattle region. and Union troops occupied Fort Myers in an effort to

disrupt cattle shipments.s Northern military and naval leaders in Florida encouraged

Unilonist sentiment within the state. Eventually two regiments, the Firlst and Second

Florida Union Cavalry were organized The Second Regiment served primarily in South

Florida. and also occupied posts as far north as Cedar Keys. General Alexander Asboth.

cocurnander of the District of West Florida, organized the First Florida C-1alry, which

fought in the Florida parthandle and in southern Alabama in 1864-1865 Unionism

represents another aspect of the war in Florida which has previously received little

scholarly attention.

Late in the war, in a combined army -navy operation. the Federals made an effort

to capture the blockade running port of St Marks. They also likel) hoped to capture

Tallahassee. At the battle of Natural Bridge a motley- force of defenders repelled the

invaders and kept the capital in Rebel hands for two more months. When the

Confederacy finally collapsed. Florida's defenders were among the last organized troops

east of the Mississippi River to capitulate. In the aftermath, political refugees like Judah

Benjamin and John C Breckinridge trav eled through die state in an effort to avoid








capture. T~he Federals apprehended some. while others reached safety in Cuba or the

Bahamas. By June 1865, Florida's Civil War had ended. In providing details on the!

subjects- arid by integrating military, political. economic. and social issues into a sing

narrative, it is hoped that this work will fill a void in Civil War scholarship and prom

further study.


























Presidential election yecar politics set in motion the chain of events that

culminated in the Febmuary 20. 1864 battle of Olustee, the largest Civil ar engagement

to take place on Florida soil Treasury Secretary Salmon Portland Chase hoped to u-est

the 1864 Republican nomination from President Abruhaaa Lincoln. As part of this goal,

Chase and his supporters worked d to establish a loyal Florida govcmiment that \\wuld

support the secretary at his part 's convention- Lincoln also became interested in

Florida affairs. partly to counter Chasess activities, but also as a test of his 1863

Reconstruction Proclamation. Additionally, in the event ofa presidential election sent

to the House of Representatives, a ne~rly-reconstructed Florida government -ould ha~e

the satne voting strength as much larger states like New York, Penns) Ivania. or Ohio.

The 1 864 Florida exnedition culminate ed mote than two vears of political intnizue at the








Northern involvement in Florida began soon aft er the outbreak- of hosailnrlt

Union officials apparently became convinced that large numbers of Floridians ren

loyal to the flag. and eagerly awaited the return ofnarthern troops In early Marcl

1862 Federal soldiers occupied the coastal towns of Fernandina. St. Augustine- an

Jacksonville, which had been largely stripped of Confederate defenders following

defeats in Tennessee.2

Soon after thle return of Federal forces a group ofl-Inionists met in Jacksor

They declared Florida's secession void. and asked the Union military to maintain ;

presence within the state to protect their interests. This positive reaction to the Fe

occupation seemed to reinforce the view* that many Floridians desired the quick rc,

of United States rule. Unfortunately for the Jacksonville Uralonists. General Davii

Hunter, commander of the Department of the South which included east Florida. %

not impressed with Union sentiment within the state. As a result northern troops

evacuated Jacktsonville in early April 1862, although they continued to maintain

footholds at Fernandina and St. Augustine In the fall of 1862 Union troops again
















These tax commissioners w ere under the authority of the Department of the

Treasury and appointed directly b y! Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase. Considered by

many to be the most serious rix a[ to President Lincoln for the 1 864 Republican

nomination. Chase recognized thle enormous power that could be w ielded by these

commissioners. He moved quickly to appoint men in Flor-ida who represented his own

political interests In Septembesr. 1862 Chase chose John S Sanums. Hairrison Reed.

and Lyman D. Stickney to senve as Direct Tax Commissioners for the State of Florida

Sticktney soon rose to become the most prominent and powerful of the three, and it was

largely through his efforts and Chase's that the Federal govcriurrent maintained an

interest in the reconstruction of a loyal state goverourent in Florida.'

Stickney proved a strong and able ally for Chase. He might best be described as

a professional opportunist, familiar with politics at the local. state and national le\-els.

Bomn in Vermont. SticloneY studied law in his native state before moving to Robert

Owens' utopian command ry at Ne Hanmon3 Indianla. in the 1940's. After subsequent

antebellum careers in railroad speculation and newspaper editing. he appeared in Florida

shordv! before the outbreak of the Civill Wan. During the wi mer of 1860-1861 Suickney

obtained a grant of land from the Florida Leg islature for the founding a fa colony in the

so uthern pon ion of the state. He "professfedi to be thle agent and partner of an















L IJ R t.11



tt 3







develop tropical agriculture in H~onda.-~ Sticliey's Florida trip had actuallN been

financed by several small farmers, and when he finally established a colony near

present-day Fort Myers, it was rumored to be "a base for receiving African slaves."''

Although his colony collapsed in the spring of 1861. Stickney remained in the

state Movilng to Key West and proclaiming himself a Unionist. he actually ran a ship

between the Keys and the mainland. trading with both sides. When he left Key West in

May or June. 1861. Stick~ney's major legacy was an unpaid hotel bill of$144.00.

Following his departure from Florida, Stickne) traveled to Washington. "~prospecting

for a good spot at the public trough "' He promoted himself as a Florida Unionist. and

even authored articles for the Agriculture Department on soil arid climate conditions and

on tropical agriculture inthe state '

During the next year Stickney became known to Salmon Chase, and in

September. 1 862 the secretary chose him to serve as tax commissioner for Florida. The

two men held similar views on future operations in the state. Already nurturng 1864

presidential ambitions, Chase vilewed Florida as one of several areas offiossible support

Stickney, meanwhile. clinging tightly to the secretary'~s coattails. believed that a Chase

victory could only increase his own power and prestige. Unfortunately for Chase, as

historian William W. Davis has writen-



























labor reg generation of the South, Soon. though. his interest turned to Florida. He hoped

eventually to colonize the state wilth between twenty and fifty thousand northern

volunteers, who would defeat mny Confederate forces in the state. and then remain as

colonists. In early 1862 Thayer apparently discussed the venture with President

Lincoln. who initially gave the project his tentative support.12

Despite the Union occupation mnd subsequent withdrawal from Jacksonville in

early 1862, Thayer continued his interest in the state. After Stickney's appointment in

the, finll oftlint ve-r Thav- rollnh,,,T,,i with th, -cmmrinc i b-, frriun


















resettlement, and the permanent subjugation of the southern white popu-

lation-all ... ran counter to Lincoln's stand against the anti-slavery

radicals (such as Chase. llhaddeus S~tevens. Berriamin F. Wade, and

Zachariah Chandler) within his own part) `"




Despite Lincoln's coolness, Thayer persisted in his proposal. Chase strongly supported

the scheme, which was also promoted by other leaders in the Republican Party.

Ulltmately a Februay 7, 1863 meeting offrhaye supports atthe Coper nstitte i

Niew York formed a "Committee of Five"~ to present his plan to Congress

Unfortunately for Tlhayer's backers, the legislature took no firm action onl the proposal."

By the spring of 1863 Thayer's Florida colonization scheme had large])- been

abandoned. but some northerners retained a stronger interest in the state. In particular.

Samuel P Chase and Lyman Stickney still hoped to manipulate elcnts to their own















After his appointment as tax commissioner in the fall of 1862, Lyroan Stickne.

remained in Washington for several months. Not until January. 1863 did he and the

othcr commissioners. John S. Sammis and Harrison Reed. arrive at Fernandina. Soon

became obvious that, in addition to his desire to increase his sphere ofinfluence in the

state, Stickney hoped to profit personally from his appointment. He shipped- at

government expense, large quantities of consumer goods to Fernandina. and establish,

a corrinercial company, with two political allies. Calvin Robinson and Williari Momil

(Robinson. Morrll. and Company) Stickney remained a silent partner in the firm.

replenishing its stock from government stores and confiscated goods. In addition, he

beccme involved in such varied activities as the selling of iron confiscated front the

Florida Railroad Company. and the operation of newspapers in Beaufort, South

Carolina. and Fernandina (The Free South and The Peninsula). His newspapers profit

greatly from the sale of inflated advertising space to the government. These

advertisements were used to inform property owners oftax appraisals and auctions. A

further detailing of Stickney's business transactions is beyond the scope ofthis work.

might simply' be stated that wherever money could be made in Florida. Stickney vwas

there to make ii. and he w~as certainly not hesitant in using his public position to

improve his personal finances. "'








Like Stickney. the twoD other members of the Florida Tax Commission. Harrison

Reed and Johni Sarmais, secured personal enrichment through their appointments Reed

had always been Stickney's: rival for control of the commission. while Sammis had at

first been a Stickney all%. Ho-ever, the two clashed over the railroad iron sale. mid

Sammis eventually turned against his former friend. In June. 1863. during one of

Stickney's frequent absences from the state. Reed and Sammis held an auction of

confiscated property at Fernandina. The auction tooki place on short notice, and raised a

disappointinglN low suni- In addition, Reed and Sammis each purchased several pieces

of property for themselves. This event precipitated a long squabble between Stickney

and thle other two commissioners, which received much critical attention in the northern

press. The Internal Revenue Commission eventualIN disallowed the Fernandina sales.

and b early 1864 both Sammus and Reed had resigned their positions."'

The resignations of his rivals left Stickne, in ulndisputed control of the Florida

Tax Commission. Throughout the controversy he had maintained the confidence and

support of Chase. who saw the commissioner as an important ally in the reconstruction

ofatiro-Chase Florida government. By the fall of 1863, Chase was seriously uork~ing

for the 1 864 Republican nomination H e perceived the race between President Lincoln

and himself as extremely close. and felt the balance of fitmer might rest in the hands of

the delegates w~ho would attend from reconstructed Southern states. This explains

Chase's continuing interest in Florida, air interest that might otherwise have seemed

peculiar. conlsidering the relative unimportance of Florida on the national level. He felt








that the state. "ifireconstructed under Siickney's leadership. would fit well into the

category ofusefull delegations ""8

In order to assure Florida's support for Chase in 1864. fur-ther militant) activity

would be necessary to extend the area of Federal control in the state. Throughout 1863

Lyman Stick~ney had lobbied to promote the advantages of such activity in Florida.

Ovid Futch perceptively writes that. to restore Florida to the Union.




the politicians needed railitary aid. Stickney and Chase were acutely

aware that their plans for reconstruction in Florida weitec completely

dependent upon successful military operations They rcalired that

military conquest and occupation of Florida were more likely- to come to

pass if they encouraged it Hence they let slip no opportunity to inforru

the proper persons of the extreme need for'liberating' the southeastern

peninsula. Northern newspapers began to pairu. woeful scenes of the

suffering of loy.] Floridians. A few rebels were in control of the state.

but ifthe loyal citizens could only get a bit of aicL they could thrown off

the rebel yoke."g




Fortunately for Stickney. he maintained good relationships with various

commanders in the Department of the South, thre military district that included the

coastal areas of South Carolina and Georgia. and the eastern half of Florida Much ofhis

time was scent shuttlmQs between Floridal. W\ashintiton. and South Carolina. conterrinn












































)on after the St. Marys raid Stickney. Higginson and black troop orgari~re

ufux Saxton met with Departmen of the South commander General Dav

id persuaded him to authorize mother expedition to Jacksonville. In a Icl

of War Stanton. Saxton justified thle operation by stressing the possibliv.























Stickney supported the proposal because a colony of freedmesn ould undoubtedly

prove strong supporters of Chase's more radical political and social policies.

On March 10. 1863 Higginson led a small force up the St Jokns and casil took

Jacksonville. The Union force included Higginson's First South Carolina. Colonel

James Montgomery's Second South Carolina Colored Volunteers, and later the Eighth

Maine and Sixth Connecticut Infantry Regiments For several weeks the Federals

conducted raids up the St. Johns as far as Palatka gathering supplies and new' recruits

for the black regiments. Unfortunately for the ambitious Stickney, the third occupation

of Jackson% i Ile proved to be as short as the previous two. About to conumence

operations against Charleston. General Hunter needed all available men for dutN there.

He could not afford the luxury of a seconclar, mieration ef dubious worth in Florida











To one less intrepid than Chase's political organizer. this third evacuation

officktsonville might well have been the end of hopc and the

culmination of despair. But the undaunted Stickney was worried ont)

for fear Chase might be discouraged.2'




For the remainder of 1863 "'Judge"~ Stick~ney, as he was referred to because of

background, worked hard for the return of Union troops to east Florida. and to

nce Chase of the continued feasibility of such a plan In April he traveled to

1ngton to coDIfer with Chase. asking that the secretary use his influence to obtain

troops for Florida He still believed that it was possible "'to make Florida a loy

Late before the meeting of the next Congress," and that if military forces could 1,

D the state. "nothung further, except arms to supply negros as they are enlisted ir

my, will be required to restore the jurisdiction of the United States throughout

[a 1'2 For his part, Chase maintained his enthusiasm for operations both in Floni

wecral other Southern states where conditions looked promising for his candidacy

mter he mentioned the possibility of organizing free states in Florida- Alabama,

iana. and Texas 21

During May and June. 1863 Chase and Stickney contacted political generals

G(arfield and James Wadsworth, to make proposals regarding future military

Lions in Florida The% were by now\ seriously promoting the extensive use of bi;

ents in the stale. Neither Garfeld nor W'ad-orth pro\ed interested enough in i


























*/ I-

















Figure 2. "Petrine~s Newr Topoeraphical War M~ap of the Southemn States.-
Published b E. R. Jewett & Co Buffalo. NY. 1861.








proposal to become actively involved themselves, with the latter replying. "I have

always been opposed to detaching troops to operate in the extremities of the

Confederacy, and what I should prefer for myself w-ould be a field of more active

military operatiors."27 After this setback Chase attempted to interest Mansfield Frer

"a belligerent Northern missionary to the Sea Islands"~ to recruit a black regiment fon

service in Florida "' French replied enthusiastically-




I believe no power can be bghrouhtobear on ereeini Florida equal to

that ofa colored army, [he womele marchh five thousand of these wronged.

injured victims. against their cruel. guilty. oppressors--let it be trumpeted in

advance, by a hundred negroes that the 'day ofjubilee' had come .... and y(

would see such a panic, as when the Syrians Iled, through few,. from Sumarkr

.The rebels would see justice in such a war ... Let the colored men do this

work and it would be the crowning work of all the \\ar.`'




Although French could not have known the details. Union militant, and political lead

had already begun developing similar plans. Obviously Chase was becoming embrc

in what Stickney called "our Florida enterprise,""

On June 12 General Quincy Adarns Gllruoie assumed command of the

Department of the South The thirty-eight year old Gillmore grachlated at the top of

1849q West Poilnt class, and had had an distinguished antebellum engineering career

After the outbreak of the war lie won fame for his engineering feats along the Adlant









coast. particularly in his direction of siege operations against Fort Pulaski. Georgia. in

April. 1962. Not surprisingIN. Lymart Stipleney soon contacted thle new department

commander and discussed with him the possibility of another Florida expedition. He

found in Gillmore a strong, ambitious ally who supported both the Florida plan and the

Chase nomination movement. In a later letter to the secretary. Stick~ney 'Tole that

Gillmore "has given me very- strong evidence that he's your frieri."

Fully in September, Sticknev visited Chase in Washington, The secretary

described the meeting in his diary:




In the afternoon Mr. Stickney called. He hadjust arrived from Florida,

and lastly from Morris Island. He says that it is casy now to take

possession of Florida: that five thousand men can accomplish it. Gen.

Saxton desires the command and Gen. Gilmore [sic] approves the

expedition. and is killing to spare one or two regiments to aid it. If the

business can be promptly taken hold of. and pushed vigorously, Mr.

Stickney is confident that Florida can be restored as a Free State by the

first ofDecember'?




Subsequoent events moved rapidly. and If Stickricy's date for FloridarS

reconstruction prove ed slightly pieniature, he did convince Chase that the time w~as

quickly approaching for a major miiitarr intervention into the state Not content to

remain exclusively committed to Chase, Stickney apparently met with or at least


















To strengthen his power base in Florida, in October Chase appointed his

ial secretary, Homer G. Planiz. as Key West District Attorney. Plantz promoted

!'s interests in the southern part of Florida while Sticknev' did the same in the

John flay, Abraham Lincoln's private secretary and soon to be deeply involved it

[a affairs himself. later wrote that Plantz went to Ke) West "wilth but twn ideas. to

noney for himself& votes for Chase."" "In this sorry Florida episode," writes a

:biographer, the Treasury Secretary. "was the victim of o~erly optimistic

ragement bv his Florida agents who had ex-pected to profit through his candidacy.

eagerness to believe the positive reports that he could be nominated, Chase had

rsely accepted the views of the unscrupulous Stickney and Plaraz.'-"

L~yman Stickney again met with Quincy Gillman, in early December.

gently at this meeting definite plans were forriulated for a movement into Florida

ommissioner reported to Chase that Gilhoore "gave his cordial assent" to such an








the enate ought to be in a harry to conflinn him as Mal generall Wait

until the D~elegation in Congress from Florida ask his confirmation for

his service in conquering the rebels of their state.""



In early December. 1863 Salmon 13. Chase's prospects for the 1864 Republican

nomination appeared bright On December 8, Linoln issued his lenient Proclamation

of Amnesty and Reconstruction, which provided for the readmirtance of the seceded

states after only ten percent of their 1860 voters took an oaih of allegiance to the United

Stalicsgovernment The more radical elements of the Republican Party blasted the plan.

The following day a group ofinfluential pro-Chose Republicans met in Washington to

criticize the president anld announce their support for the Treasury Secretarv Chase.

who -'had never totally reconciled himself to the loss of the presidential nomination in

1 860 ... [wras propelled] into a fun,~ of effort to win the nomination in 1864.`7

It was against this background that Quincy Gillmore asked the War Department

for permission to commence operations in Florida. In a December 15 letter to General-

in-chief Henry; Haiieckt. Gillmore, noted that his operations against Charleston could not

succeed without increased naval support, and suggested twoo possible altematf~es One

option consisted of the surprise capture of Savannah. w hile the other possbihty? was to

1 operate in f- lorida and reco% er all the most valuable portion of that state. cut off a rich

source of thle enemy's supplies. and increase the number of in) colored troops ,31"








Halleck replied to Gillmore on December 22. authorizing him to "undertake

such operations in your department as you may dearn best. making secure the posilionss

you already hold in front ol'Charleston "" He added that Gillmore should not expect

any reinforcements to aid in these im\ ements. These qualifications would hamper

Gilllmore's ability to launch a major new operation, since the total number of troops In

the Departolell of the Sonth in December. 1863, was only 33.506. Many of these

troops were needed to maintain the positions before Charleston and Savannah. while

others were preparing to return north for thirty days furlough after reenlistin, "

Despite these handicaps. Gillmore seemed enthusiastic about the possibilities of

the campaign. Suclbney meanwhile, now that his plans appeared close to fruition.

became even bolder in his activities. On December 14 he appeared on board the U.S S

Vermont at Port Royal Harbor, South Carolina, and told its commander that several

gunboats would soon be needed to assist in an upcoming expedition into Florida.

Commander William Reynolds of the Vermont informed the commissioner that orders

from Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren. commander of the South Atlantic Blockading

Squadron, would be required for the Navy's participation. Dahigren complained to the

Secretary of the Navy Gideon W~elles of Stickiney's interference, claiming that any

Florida movement might hamper Union activities against Charleston. The admiral had



































governmem. While his motives were unclear, Ovid Futch writes that Stick~ney was

simply "~making an effort to ingsratiate himself with the President, so that he would be in

line for political rewards regardless of the outcome of the contest."" in furtherance of

this aim. Sticknev also wrote to John Hay, Lincoln's private secretary. Hay had visited

Florida in 186, and became enchanted with the state. The commissioner asked ifhe

would be interested in serving in a free state Florida legislature. At Lincoln's urging. Ha]








the state to conduct thle registration ofctzn citizens who had taken the IoN a]ty oath, and

provided with enough blank forms and other paraphernaia to conduct his mission.""

On January 13. 1864 the president wrote directly to General Glillmore. informinn

the officer of Hay's appointment and his purpose for going to Florida. This letter Mas

delivered to Gtllmore by Hay when he reached Hilton Head on January 19-




1 understand air effort is being made by some orth? gentlemen to

reconstruct a loyal state government in Florida. Florida is in your

department. and it is not unlikely that you may be there in person I have

given Mr. Hay a commission of Major, and sent him to you with some

blank books and other blanks. to aid in the reconstruction He-11l

explain, as to the marmer of using the blanks. and also my general views

on the subject It is desirable for all to cooperate, but ifireconcileable

differences ofopinion shall arise, you are master. I wish the thing done

in the most speedy way possible. so that. when done. it lie within the

range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor, of course.

lll have to be done by' others, but I shall be greatly- obliged ify on will

give It Such general supervision as you can find consistent with vour








there preparatory to an advance west at an early day."'" He then asked Secretary of War

Stanton to send to his department the sev era] new black regiments that were being

organizedIn the North. Gi I more outlined his plan for the upcoming Florida expedition

to Stanton and asked for The new~ units to relieve his veterans for participation in the

campaign. He also complained about the lack of experienced cavalry in his department,

hinting for reinforcements.""

Stanton and Halleck. apparently had reservations about the operation. but

informed Gillmore that "the mattet had been left entirely to your judgment and

discretion, with the means at your command."' Halleck felt:




it is impossible to judge here of its [the campaign's] advantages or

practicability. Ifit is expected togive anoutlet for cotton. or open a

favorable field for the enlistment ofcoloned troops- the adv-antages may

be sufficient to justifj- the expense in money and troops. But simply as

military operations I attach very little importance to such expeditions If

successful they merely absorb our troops in garinsons to occupy the

places. but have little or no influence upon the progress of the wanr 5'




Halleck's and Stanton's lack of enthusiasm failed to deter Gillmore, who outlined

the specific purposes of the Florida movement to them in a January 31 letter:








First. To procure an outlet for cotton. lumber. timber. turpentine. read the

other products of that State Second. To cut off one of the enemy's

sources of conumssary- supplies He now draws largely upon the hends

of Florida for his beef. and is making preparations to take up a portion of

the Fernandina and Saint Mark's Railroad for the purpose of connecting

the road from Jacksom~ille and Tallahassee with Thomasvlle.. on the

Savannah. Albany and GCulf Railroad. and perhaps with Albany. on the

Southwestern Railroad. Third To obtain recruits for mN colored

regiments Fourth l~o inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of

Florida to her allegiance. in accordance with instructions which I have

received from the President by the Iamds of Ma3 John Hay', assi .stant

adjutant-general.

I arn expected to accomplish these objects ith the means at my

command. The only requisitions which I have made mn excess of my

ordinary wants to enable me to accomplish this vork\ speedily are for

1.500 horses and 1,500 sets horse equipment. to enable me to mount

someminantry If the filling of these requisitions ill occasion any

embarassmeml to the departments of supply they can be reduced 30 per

cent 3




In his earlier communications withl Washington, (ii Imore had ignored the

campaign's political considerations, preferring instead to concentrate on the marginal








military ach, antages inherent in the invasion.. Perhaps he had hoped the Lincoln

administration remained unaware offus close ties with the Stickney-Cliase faction. and

the influence that these had had on his decision to invade the state. The military

objectives of the expedition were not entirely without merit. Lo? al businessmen in both

the north and south longed for new outlets for cotton and other southern goods. and it

was also believed that Florida represented a favorable area for the recruitment of black,

units The foremost military consideration.. however. inv-olv ed cutting off the suppIN of

Florida foodstuffs from the Confederacy With Vicksburg's surrendet in July, 1 963, the

trans-Mississippi states became logistically useless to the remainder of the South, and

the cattle and grain of Florida grew in importance.'

Confederate supply officers soon besieged Major Pleasants W. Whhite.

Confederate commissary agent for the state. with urgent appeals for supplies to feed the

major Southern armies White, a prominent Quincy lawyer appointed art Jure 1863.

took, his position seriously and "soon canned a reputation as a talented and zealous

administrator, inspiring to his subordinates." Within months ofhis appointment, the

catastrophic impact of the Vicksburg defeat became evident. CommussarY- officers from

the Confederate anincs in Charleston and north Georgia besieged "Nhite with appeals

for beef. pork,. and other Florida supplies O)ne South Carolina official lamented: "we

are almost entirely dependent on Florida our situation is full of danger from want of

meat." A another wrTote. "I] assure you that near], all now depends on yo.."',

White responded to these appeals in November 1863 by issuing a circular which

urged the collection of food and supplies Instead of ordering its pub] ication. w 'hich








would have alerted Federal informants and damaged Confederate morale. he provided

the document to his district commissaries and ordered its distribution throughout the

state In the document White stated, in part




fG]eneral and immediate action is imperative to save our arm. ith it our

cause, from disaster. The issues ofthis contest are nowv transferred to the people

at home. Ifthe) fail to do their duty and sustain the army in its present position

it must fall back .... [T]he best-appointed army cannot maintain its position

without support at home. The people should never suffer it be said that they

alucd their cattle and hogs, their comn and money, mom: than their liberties and

honor, and that they had to be compelled to support an army they sent to battle

in their defense . These brave men are now suffering for want of food. Not

out), men from F~lorida. but the hole army of the South wre in this condition.

Our honor as a people demands that we do our duty to them. They must be

lied 5'




Confederate leaders later assumed that the Federals had learned of this

document's existence. and that the "W'hite Circular" was a major reason for the Florida

campaign Robert Taylor. author of the principle study of Florida's economy during the

har years. agrees with this assessment "Itr did not prove difficult for Union intelligence

officers to acquire the W\hite Circular and pass the information it disclosed 10 Such

generals as Gillmore aInd Seymour before operations began." he writes. and -[t]here can








be little doubt that this extraordinary report influenced Union leaders inl their decision to

move deep iiito northern Florida in 1864.""' Florida 0% ~il War historians are divided on

the issue, with William Nulty also arguing that suppIN issues overrode political concerns

in leading to the campaign. John Johns and William Davis both downplay the

sigenificance ofthe Minet Circular. with Johns determining "the influence this had on

the Unilon decision to invade is questionable.""' Indeed, no specific mention ofthe

circular can be found in the cor-respondence of Federal military leaders in the period

prior to the campaign The Federals obtained a copy of the W-hitc Circular when theN-

occupied Baldwin on February 10. and the Newf York, Herald subsequently published it

in its entirety in the February 20 issue, but this w~as [on, after the decision to invade

Florida hiad been made. Federal commanders had a general idea of Florida's increased

logistical importance to the Confederacy, but there is no indication that the White

Circular specificalb, affected the decision to invade east Florida'


xistcci. the Florida expedition would not have taken p

w\entually occurred The occupation of'Jacksonville vr

:cold still aggressively raid into the interior had the po

'onfeclerate supply operations The Florida campaign













the efforts of Salmon P. Chase and Ilyman Stickney contributed greatly to the

continued Federal interest in Florida. In the year and a half between his appointment a.

Direct Tax Commissioner and the Union inv asion of Februar), 1864. Sticicnev, labored

incessantly for an increased Nonthemn presence in the state. His main goal w~as to

promote the interests of lus ally Chase. and at tire Salle time increase his own power.

President Lincoln became involved in Florida affairs comparativelyr late. Unldoubtedly

aware of Chase's activities, the president showed serious interest only after General

Gillmore had already determined to commence military operations within the state

Lincoln's motives were tw-ofield. He believed that Florida would prov-e a useful testing

ground for his December, 1863 Reconstruction Proclamation and. more selfishl). hoped

that a loyal Florida government would support him for renomination or in a general

election sent to the House of Representatives."

While Lincoln's motives were far from pure. he did little to deserve the abuse

heaped upon him after the Florida disaster. Above all, the Olostec campaign was a

Chase and Sticknev affair Stickney-s intrigues, and Chase's inability or unwillingness

to recognize the tax commissioner's exaggerations and basic dishorrestv, led to the

manipulation ofilorthern political and military leaders that ended in tire pine barrens of

north central Florida on February 20, 1864 near a railroad stop called Olustee.

Remarkably. in the charg-s and recriminations that followed. the large, managed to

escape public scrutiny Despite this. the fact remains that the time. effort. and nearlv-






























[cai tUacliground ol tric v lorioa campai!
'hasc and Radical Politics in Florida,
)2: idem. "Salmon P. Chase and Civij














.. .... .... .. .











I V. .1 1.

tinent repots and corespondence









58, Treasury Department. Internal Revenue Office Records. National A~rchives.
Washington. DC.









Smith,"Carptbag Iperiaism,"110-112.1-..


P Chase. May 6, 1864. ad Wiliam H on Pfster f] to hase. ay 12 1864,Direc






' pach."Samon CaseandRadial oliics" 1819;Stikne to has. My 6








'Futch. "Salmon P. Chase and Radical Politics," 1-6. See also ide. "tcne oSalmon P hs

Salmon P Chase- 218-219 'lim o fse ?]t hs.M) I.16,Drc


had been enthusiastic about the plan ms M~ayandtheFrutraio

Smith- "Carpetbag Imperialism. 122. i I i-










SIbid.. 126-129.

l bid_. 129-130: Futch, -Salmon P. Chase and Radical Politics," 21-23.

Finuch, "Salmon P. Chase and Radical Politics, 23-25. 28-29: Smith. "Carpetbag
Imperialism," 260-262: Shofner. Nor Is It Over Yet. 5-9; "Theodore Bissell's testirao
against L D. Stickney." Direct T- C(ommission Records.

'7Shofnesr, "Andrew Johnson and the Fernandinal Unionists,"' 213-215: Smith,
"'Carpetbag Imperialism," 268-275 Futch. "Salmon P. Chase and Radical Polifics," 3




Corrumssion Records..

'"Smith, "Carpetbag Imperialism," 276.

'"Futch. "Salmon P. Chase and Radical Politics," 47.




Library ofCongrcss. Washington. DC.


I L--~. '"''. .' I II IIn. LIni. .




!?OR-A. 1. XIV. 423.








FinFuch. "Salmon P Chase and Radical Politics.'- 3 1-32. See also Smith. "Carpetbage











':Quoted in Smith, "Carpetbag Imperialism." 268

2' Ibid.


!9Mansfield French to Salmon P. Chase. October 10, 1863. Chase PUPCTS. In this and
A - - ' ' I . sic- to indicate



'"Stickricy to Chase, J- & h 1863, Chase Papers








i . I I I... ir. I F 1 . .1 1.



j I I H .






"Blue. Salmon P. Chase, 19

St Sicknev to Chase, December IL. 1863. Chase Papers.








'iOR-A. 1, XV[11. Pt 2, 129






















































I I H . 1 ....I .I . 1 .







Igust 27. 1863 and September 2. 1863. 'Miae to John F- Cumming
;: and White to Jarnes McKay. October 2. 1863 for early letrters
importance of Floida's beef supplies.





















I' ~laylor. Rebel Storehouse. 1J7.


ii I I i~ !'~i. ~I I ? I I L II I !

II .!.:~ ..I


'~'l~ea YarL Hemld. February? 20. 186-(.


~1.11 ~1 .I I 1;11- 1 I I 1.11 1:. .;

' - ~ ,rll;.l.. .. ~...~1. .. ? ,I; i.~: ~ .. I .~~ ~~1.
' 'Y h !. II. 1l n i I IIIT 11~1?11 1111
'.I 1.1 11111 1111 Illil III II

~'I '' ' "' I '~~~ ~' -' - I! 'I.. ..;.i ..- ! 1 1.,11

'-~II~-~ !-1 ! .?-,I ..".:il.l.


II-.? I II ...~ ,1.. .~ : ...1. i.....;. ,..,.....
~' I'- 1 11.1! ~;l~i 'I I ~ .I- Ir.,,.i ?riiri































and another 1.000 sailors mid marines. They had come to attempt the "Third Annual

Conquest of Florida." as one participant would facetioulsly refer 10 the expedition.' It

was FebruarN 6. 1864 A fortnight later a large percentage of these men would become

casualties in what was one of the most complete defeats suffered bN the Union armN

during the war

As detailed in the previous chapter. political and milittm, considerations had. by

Jarman) 18X64, convinced Major General Quincv Gillmore of the desirability of com-

mencin, military operations in east F~lorida at an early date. With the arrival of John

Hm) at Gillmore's Hilton Head. South Carolina. headquarters on Januar% 19, serious

preparations for the campaign began. By Febritan 1, Gillmore had obtained final

approval to proceed. He began selecting units to participate in the operation. and oxer

the next several cla~s regiments began arriving at Hilton Head from Fort Pulaski.















chosen to lead the expedcition.2

Giihnotre ordered Sevniour to "embark without delay the following regiments

and batteries of your command-"' including Colonel Williana Barton's Brigade with the

Seventh Connecticut. Se\ enth New Hampshire. and the Eighth United States Colored

Troops (USCTT): and Colonel Jarnes Montg!omery's Brigade with the Second South

Carolina Colored lrdfantr the Third Unitedd States Colored. and the Fifty-fourth

M~assachusetts, also a black unit. The Fortieth Massachusetts Mounted Infantry.. an

Independent Battalion of hassachusctts Cavalry. and three artillery batteries were also

selected for the expedition Colonel Guy V He-r led this last mounted brigade. Not

included in the first movement order but also assiv dt h xpdto ee h ov


seventh, FonLy-eighth, and 11 5dil New York Infantry.'

Vague in his early orders to Seymour. Gillmnore hoped to keep the destination of

the movement a secret for as long as possible. There could have been little doubt

among the troops. however. that they could soon be involv-ed in active campaigning

Orders went out for each man to carr six days' rations. at least sixt) rounds of

ammunition, and his personal equipment. The regiments onl brought two wagons

apiece (and one for each mounted company) to carry additional material.'

Additionally. Seymour was instructed to "~see that no females [accompany] your

command. and [to] give strict orders that none shall follow except rejpularlN appointed



























yesterday we had [a) General review by Gillmore 8,- last knight the cooks

was ordered to cook scix days raitions & that we should have too days

rations in our hav ersacks we wre not to take our tents or anything except

our knapsacks lightly packed with just what we need it is hard telling

where we are going but i think we will find out when we get to the

Stoping place all the troops are going with one battcry of light artillery 10

regiments in all Some Says we we going down to florida to Jackrson% ille

and Some Says up to polkataligo to destroy the brige that crosses the








,quaaron wouic. ne necoea to iranspon mIe Y ar-ec troops me severin nuriarec nines

from South Carolina to Florida. The arin) commander contacted Dahlgren on

Febhruary 5, informing the admiral of his desire "'tio throm, a force into Florida on the

west bank of [thel St. Johns River"~' anld asking for the navy'., assistance 7

Despite his earlier criticisms of L) man Stick~ney`s activities and his view that

operations in Florida merely detracted horn the more important theaters ofwar.

Dahlgren agreed to provide vessels for thle expedition. President Lincoln's recent

interest in the movement certainly contributed to this chatage of attitude. Politics

permeated even, aspect of tbe Florida campaign. Dabigren quickly assembled an

impressive naval armada which, by the time of the Union landings at Jacksonville,

included tbitty-eight transports. tugs, and warships. They would prove invaluable in the

combined operations that followed.'

February, 5 clawned cold, rainy. and windy. "not a nice day- for arr excursion." as

described by John Appleton. white major in the black, Fifty-fourth Massachusetts. "We

are hoping that the start will be put offuntil tomorrow but wre getting ready all the

same."' At nine p m. Gillmore ordered Se) mour to begin loading his men onto

Dahlgren's "raitinlg ships, in hopes that they could be at sea before daybreak on

Fcbruaryi 6. He further explained that the entire fleet was to rendezvous off the Mouth

of the St. Joints on the morning of February 7. Although Seymour wras to be in tactical

command of the expedition. Gillmore would accompany it in tire early stages.""

By the morning of the sixth, the invasion force was at sea. Most of the men still

had no idea of their destination. Milton Whoodford of the Seventh Connecticut later


















seemingly to find into how small a compass a regiment could be packed

The 7th Conn. and the 7th N.H. were both put on the 'Ben Delffrd.' a

moderate sized steamer. and if you ever saw a flock of sheep or drove of

pigs in a small pen. you can form some idea of the shape m e were in.

For a whille me had no room to lie down or even to sit down, and

just had to stand as close as me could stand all ox-er the boat. Afier a

while one or another would fund a comer or space somewhere to stow

himself, until we could finally all sit down; then ifone wanted to go an

deck, he had to walk over the rest.-.

The sea was rather rough, and about nine or ten o'clock a good

many might have been seen Icarring over the side of the vessel, paying

their tribute to 'Old Ncp.' In fact, more than half of us were sea-sick. 0

suchai ime! WVere %on everrsea-sicV? If so. I need not describe it to )ou.

and if not. I need not try. for I couldn't."




Despite these rclativcly minor problems, the Union fleet arm ~ed off the mouth of

the St- Johns early on February 7. The transport Island Cit,\ reached the area the day

befine. to informl the gunboats Ottawa and Norwich. on blockading, dutv at [he river's








mouth. of the fleet's imminent a-nva I, I he I hur iet D. Weed had also been sent in

advance to mark the river's channel for the main bodN On The sixth the navy landed

pickets at the rivers month to prevent word of the ships' arrival from reaching the

Confederate defenders. In addition, a group of Flondal Unionists volunteered to go

ashore mid "cut the telegraph wire and bumn a railroad bridge." helping to isolate

unsuspecting Jacksonxille."

On the morning of February 7. the remainder of the northern fleet arrn\ed off the

St. Johns and tugs began assisting u s lid ata~rpn oerte hll~snda

at thle river's mouth. One t-asport, the Burnside. foundered on the bar and washed

ashore a total wreck-. Fortunately no one was killed in the episode. The remainder of

the fleet entered the river without further incident and ascended it towards Jacksonville.

located on the river's west bank about twenty miles fioln its mouth "

John Appleton was aboard the steamer Maple Leaf along with General

Seymour. his staff. and a number of Florida Unionist reftigees who were returning to act

as guides and pilots. As the ship entered the St. Johns, Appleton described [he scene in

hisjournal




[H]eautiful black &~ white birds, pelicans and others. fly and swim about

us. The white sardy beaches on each side with the lines of dark green

foliage, make a pretty picture. The entrance to the river is marked by

two white Light houses- As we steamed up river we passed mart)





















usly csanining the shoreline for Confederate defenders. Finding

sports approached the w~harv-es along the town's waterfront to begin

-icCh, meanwhile, continued upriver to the mouth of McGirt's

Confederate blockade runner St. Mlarv's there and forcing its crew to

second Mate Elrjah Norris of the General Hunter led the first party

-d the wharves a group of Rebel pickets. who had hidden themselves

















I o continue the chase about twenty Union cavalrymena from the Massachusetts

Independent Batrtalion were put ashore and galloped off after the southerners. They

follo,,ed the Rebels w~estward for about five miles "'over a rotten plank road, capturing;

signal station. and several prisoners ""8 Union signal officer Gustavus Dania

accompanied the cavaolrymen to the signal station west ofiocn -1here the northerners

found "a 30 pdr [cannon] loaded with broken glass, cowr shoes & nails and pointed

down the road in the direction we were approaching." fortunately for the Federals, the

Confederate defenders had, in their confusion, neglected to fire the piece. In all,

twenty-two prisoners were captured by the Federals "V

The northern troops that landed at Jacksonvller found it largely deserted. The

previous Union occupations bad taken their toll on the town. Some buildings lay gutted

from the fires set by withdrawing Union troops in 18613. and many of the remainder

were emptv. Ofthe nearly 3,000O people who had lived in Jacksonville at the thrie of the

1860O United States Census. few remained. Most of these were women and children

who, not surprisingly, professed to be Unionists. The presence of black soldiers

shocked the inhabitants. A soldier in the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts described "Ltlhe

faces of the ladies in Jackisonville. indicat[ing] a sort of Parisimn disgust as the wvell-

appointed Union anmy-. composed in part ofl-incoln's 'niggers, fi led through the








street S -' Another northerner thought the town Ilook~ed] much like a devastated

Northern city. with its ruined gas-wrorkrs. burned saw mills, and warehouses."~ Others

were impressed by the beauty of the town. despite the damage it had suffered "

By dark on the seventh, Jacksonville was in Unijon hands Federal troops troved

to the western outskirts ofthe town and established defensive positions. General

Seymour had hoped to move quickie against Camp Filnegan- a Confederate position about

eight miles west of the cit3 astride the Florida, Atlantic and Gulf Central Railroad- but a

nuniber of Union transports had difficulty clearing the bar at the mouth of the St. Johns

and did not arrive at Jacksonville until the afternoon ofFebniary 8 Despite this delay.

Gillmore and Seymour had every reason to be pleased with the operation to this point.

Union gunboats controlled the St. Johns. Jackisonville had been occupied with little

bloodshed. and northern forces were prepared to move westward as soon as the remainder

of their troops arrived. Thus fur the reconstruction of Florida appeared as easy as Lyrziar

Stickinev and Salmon Chase had envisioned, and President Lincoln had hopcd.-2

BN late afternoon on February S. most of Scy mourn's troops had landed at

Jacksonville. The general immediately moved against Camp Finegan, where he

believed "that the enemy would make a stand with some force of cavalry and

artil e, 2 The Federal advance consisted of Colonel Henry's mounted brigade on the

right. Colonel W\illiam Barton's in thie center- and James Har~lev's on the left. Between

the cmbarkation from South Carolina and the landings in Florida, the Federals made

various alterations in the organization oftheir forces. Colonel Barron was given

command of a ne, brigade made up of the Fort -seventh. Foru -eighmh. and I I 5th New~



























j,




Fiue eai f Ics-il advciiyfrm"NrhrnPrto; ord.

Co pldadPbise tteUiedSae os i'e fi ,16








York. while Colonel Hawlev was placed in charge of Rarton's old brigade. H-awley had

previously commanded the Seventh Connecticut. Additional regiments also arrived In

Jacksonville in the days following the initial landings. including the First North

Carolina Colored Volunteers (also known as the Thirty -fifth USCT). the Third UISCT.

the Tventy-founth Massachusetts. and the Fifty-fifth Massachusetts."

Seymour originally designed the attack on Camp Finegan as ajoint operation by

the three brigades. Hemr's mounted troops, however, soon outpaced the slower foot

soldiers and moved on toward the Confederate camp by themselves. Thle Union czo alry

rode swiftly westward in pitch darkness and along unfamiliar roads. hoping to reach the

crimp before the Confederates could escape. A company from thle Massachusetts

Cavalry Battalion led the advance, and about tvo miles from Camp Finegan charged

and captured six Rebel pickets 2'

The Confederate force at Camp Finegan consisted of about 350 men under the

conimand of Colonel Aibner Mclcormick, Second Florida Cavalry. As neither

MlcCormick nor Henry desired a major battle. Henry decided to bypass the Rebels and

continued westward, while McCormick's men abandoned their camp. The Union

commander hoped to reach an artillery camp located at Ten Mile Run. several miles

further west. He left the securing ofCarup Finegarn to the following Union infantry,

who camped there later that evening. "Col Wished to capture the Bann? at 10 Mil[c]

station bc ond.- wrote Massachusetts cavwitiaymn Clotaire Gav in his diarv. and 'said








The Fcclcrals reached Camp Cooper at Ten M~ile Run at about midnight. and to

their arnaz~ement found the Confederate defenders of the Milton Light Artillery sitting

around campfires or sleeping. "peacefully dreaming of a future great Confederacy '27

The southerners had been in the process ofwithdrawing their guris to the west. but,

unaware of the close proximity of the Federals. Captain Joseph L Dunharn had allowed

his men to rest for the night. ^The Rebels were am akened by a sergeant riding through

the camp shouting. "Save yourselves if you cart: the ene-) is right upon you!" They

had little time to react."s Hem,) quirkll lined up his troopers. ordered his bugler to

sound the charge. and shouted- Affever you yell in your lives. buys. yell now."'2' An

eyewitness remembered. "in halfa minute's time our caN air), had dashed into the center

ofthe carop and surrounded it on all sides."" Clotanre Glay recalled "Churg[ing] in at

Day Brake [we] captured ... artillery Cotton Turpentine & Rosen & Commissary~

stores."

Some eighteen Confederates were taken in the attack. along with a large amour

of equipment and four pieces ofartillmr. As the elated Feclerals rummaged through th

captured camp- they discovered a Confederate telegraph operator in the act of sending

message to his commanders, informing them of the disaster. Major AtLherton Stevens

the Massachusetts cavalry "walked into the room and seized the fellow by the throat....

and in a few seconds his instrument was knocked to pieces and the mrire cut,"32

Henn'-s cominand did not return to Jacksonville after these spectacular

successes. They instead continued mrestward- deeper into Confederate controlled

territorv. A~t clawn on Februarv 9- the Yarkees had reached Baldmin. a tinv vll-en of











belied its importance, located as it was at the intersection of the only two major rail

lines in Florida. the Pensacola and Georgia and the Florida. Atlantic. and Giulf Central.

rumming cast-west from Tallahassee through Lake City to Jacksom ille. and the Florida

Railroad, running northeast-southwest from Fernandina through Gainesville to Cedar

Key. A Union occupation of Baldwin could virtually shut down rail traffic in the state

One Confederate official went so far as to call the tow~n "the key to the Peninsula -"

Despite Baldwin's importance, the speed of Henry's advance. coupled with tile

confusion and lack, of Confederate defenders in east Florida. left the town virtually

undefended when the Federals arrived. The Union cavalrymen captured a huge amount

of equipment and supplies at the depot, including three railroad cars. one of~hich held

mother Rebel fieldpiece. Approximately half a million dollars worth of material was

captured in the town "

More southern prisoners felt into Union hands at Baldwin. Among these w~as

Lieutenant Joseph Barco offfid First Florida Battalion Balrro had escaped from Callip

Finegan the previous night. losing all of his extra clothing mid equipment in what he

called the Confederate "~stampede" from that location. Following a brief imprisonment

at Jacksonville. Banrco was subsequenfly' sent to Hilton Head Fort Nlfflcnr. Mary land:

and Governor's Island, New York In a letter writen to his wife, Barco noted thle good








After capturing Baldwin, Henry

security of Baldwin to the following in]

had been for Sevniour's troops to advar

possible. and Henry was determined to

down for breakfast at the town's lone hr

currenev found in the trash at the train

plantation (present dav Macclenny) wh,

companies of the Second Florida Caval

over the south branch of the St. Mar s I

Casualties before reforming. drawing pi:

scattering the Rebel defenders. The Fe(

forty horses.3'

Captain Charles Currier of the F:

As the Federal skirmishers approached

pickets of the enemy in considerable for

creek." Major Stevens "sent a company,

was the emptying of a number of saddic

and fired se\eral rounds. while -the cha

wind went the [Massachusetts] Indepen

",as dismounted and followed, fording

high. charging up the banki and into the

Yankee cheer. mil)- to find the encre b


's troopers again struck w~estward. leaving the

'antry Go~emor Gillmore's initial instructions

ce aslar towards the Suwannee River as

do just that. Before leaving, some Yankees sat

)tel. Thc) paid for the meal with Confederate

lepot. Hem's~ force continued on to Barber's

2re the found Majut Robert I larrison and two

n. defending a "strong position" opposite a ford

iver. Henr' s men suffered about a score of

stols and sabres. and charging across the stream,

Jerals captured a number of Rebels and about




ortieth Massachusetts participated in the action.

the ri-er. he remembered, they "encountered the

rce in a thicket on the farther side of Swift

, down the road to draw their fire. The result

!s." Elder's artillery then unlimbered its guns

Tge was sounded, and on to them like a whirl

dent Battalion The Fortieth Massachusetts

thle creek through wIater in some places breast

thicket. under the inspiration of a rousing

broken and on the run." The IFederals rounded on

































S ,I



'1^. 1 .- '








the Con federate prisoners arid tended to their owrn casualties. The cncm! dead. Currie

noted, "were left where they had fallen."3'

At six p no that evening. after destroying portions of the railroad. the raiders

reached Sanderson, fifteen miles further uest. The Confederates had abandoned the

town. leaving "the central portion wrapped in flames." Henry now eyed Lake City. the

most important town between Jacksonvillle and Florida's capital city of Tallahassee.

Despite the exhaustion of both men and horses, the Union command rested at Sandersl

for only a fie, hours before continuing its march. Sanderson was then occupied by tht

Union infantry that was following Henr)'s last-moving troopers."8

By riding all night. at midmorning of February I I the Federals had approaches

to within three miles of Lake City Here they found a significant force of Confederater

in a strong defensive position. In the days since the Union landings. Brigadier Genera

Joseph Finegan. conarander of Confederate forces in east Florida. bad assembled a

force of 490 infantry, I 10O cav-alry, and two pieces of artillery from his scattered

command On February 8, for example, the First Georgia Regulars mild the TweniN-

eighth Georgia I leavy A4rtillery Battalion (Bonaud's) left their camps along the

Apalachicola River for Lake City, which they reached mwo davs liter The town's

citirers had previously treated soldiers from these units poorly, evecn refusing to sell

them food. "The near approach ofthe enemy has made the change,- wrote First

Sergeant William A~ndrews. and the townspeople provided a "beautifuli dinner" for the

troops. "A4 friend in need is a friend indeed.- Andrews sarcastically commented. On







































on they were in sight, and. on seeing our sk~im

)-eded to attack\ uq. It was a foggy morning e

)ached within seventy-flive or a hundred yards

-h mh-e I w- -- ---ommad ffth hrmr































railroad bridge over the Suvarmee River at Colutubus. I he

crical advantage over the Confederate defenders of Lake City.

heir mounts been in better condition," writes historian Wll-lu

-es could have easily been bypassed. and Henry could have

)r no opposition to destroy the railroad bridge over the

s, hils expedition had already accomplished part ofthe military











condition of transportation, admissible, and indeed that what has been

said ofthe desire of F Iorida tocombac no isa dl u o The

backbone of rebeldom is not here, and Florida will not cast its lot until

more important successes elsewhere are assured I.. would advise that the

forces be withdrawn at once from the interior. that Jack~sonvller alone be

held and that Palatka [upri\cr from Jacksonville] be also held. which

xvill permit as many~ Union people- &- c.. to come in as %ill join us

oluntarilN This movement is in opposition to sound strategy, and is not

directed. I understand. by General Halleck, who would doubtless have

not advised it. Many more men than you have here now will be required

to support its operation, which has not been matured, as should have

been done. As far as I can ]earn yet, Lake City will be defended by muie

artillery and infantry than I ha% -e with mie. To be thwarted. defeated. wi I

be a sad termination to a project, brilliant thus fax, but for which you

would not answer- in case of mishap. to your military superior. and

Stickiney and others have misinformed you. The Union cause would

have been far more benefited by Jeff, Davis having removed this railroad

to Virginia than by any trival and noti-strategic, success you may meet,

because victories must be decisive elsewhere before Florida can be wun


back, bN heart devotion. BN all means. theiefore, fall back. to

Jacksonville. which y-ou arc now bound to hold.. and use the Saint John's








as a base for your operations into the middle of the State bN detachments

of cavalry- instead offirittering a~ay the infantry of your department in

such an operation as this. I believe I am not alone in these view~s."




This letter is the first indication in the official records that either of the Union

commanders held such views A Federal officer. however, later recalled that Gilllmore

and Seymour had met at Baldwin on icbmaryv 10. and, from what the officer heard,

"neither general had much faith in the success of the expedition .. [feeling] that it was

purely a political move "' Of course. Gillmore had been aware from the first of the

political nature ofthe campaign. and had in fact been heavily involved in the intrigue that

led to the expedition."i

In an event, on the evening of the eleventh Giillmorc instructed Seymour to

concentrate at Sanderson if he met strong resistance. He also informed the general that

pall of tbe Fifty-lburth Massachusetts was being sent to Baldwin for support. On

February 12, following Henry's repulse in front of Lakte City.. the department

commander ordered Seymour's forces to concentrate at Baldwin "without delay." fie

was concerned about reports that Confederate reinforcements were arriving in Florida

and might threaten Seymour's flank."e

Over the next several days Sey-mour's confidence seems to have remmred The

fon% ard elements of his command retired to Barber's but not as far as Baldw in. He

informed Gillmore that the evacuation of Barber's would hamper an), future advance

Just two days before. he had insisted that onlN Jacksonville be held and that no further








yestwaurd advance be made. Seymour also ordered a part ion of Colonel Henry's

-ommand to raid Giaires% le and capture or destroy the railroad trains that were

)elicved to be there Captain G. E. Marshall of the Fortieth Massachusetts led this raid,

)ccupied Gainesville for fifty-six hours and skirmished with a small force from the

;ccond Florida Cavalry before returning oni February 17 17

NV'nile Seymour's enthusiasm for the Florida campaign was returning, Gilmore's

;eems to have been declining. On February 13. he wrote to Major General Hemy)

Talleck. describing the early movements of the campaign. H-e then added




I intend to construct small works, capable ofresisting a coup de main. at

Jacksonville, Baldwin. Palatka, and perhaps one or two other important

points, so strong that 200 or 300 men will be sufficient at each point.

Twenty-fivec hundred men. in addition to the two regiments that havee

been permanently stationed in this State (one at Saint Augustine and one

at Fernandina). ought to be ampie in Florida.. I have written to the

Secretat,' of the Treasury iecommendinR that the nort of Jacksonville be




























On the fifteenth General Glltiore le

Hilton Head. Before leaving he placed Seyi

of Florida. Three davs after his departure,((

from Seymour that stated he now intended z

ostensible objective was the destruction oftt

the difficulty of accurmilating enough supp]:

vwas no operative locomotive to use along th

to advance "wi~ithout supplies."' Continuing.

demonstration against Savannah. to deter th.

force against him. He informed the startled

up to Barbers and that "'by the time you rece


&dancing to the Suw~annee River. His

he railroad bridge at Columbus. He note(

ies for an advance, particularly. since there,

e occupied railroad, but added he propost

Seymour urged Gillmore to make a

- Confederates from assembling a large

Giillmore that he was moving all his trool

ive this I shall be in motion.""0 Perhaps








are heart Iy tired of the war."~ This directly contradicted the views expressed in his

pessimistic letter of February I I

Immediately after being informed of Sevmour's intention to move westward

toward the Suwanneer. the shocked Gillmore sent his chief-of-staff. Brigadier General

John Turner, to Florida with a letter instructing Seymour to stop his advance. J11] am

very much surprised at ... the character of your plans."' he wrote,




You must have forgotten my last instructions. which were for the present

to hold Baldwin and the Saint Mary's South Fork,. as your outposts to the

westward ofJacksonvlle, and to occupy Palatka, Magnolia, on the Saint

Johns Your project distinctly and avowedly ignores these operations

and sulbstitutes a plan which not only involves your command in a distant

movement. without provisions, far beyond a point from which vou once

withdrew on account of'precisely the sanne necessity. but presupposes a

simultaneous demonstration of'great importance' lo you elsewhere, over

which you have no control, and which requires the co-operation of the

navy




Gllnuire continued bv- quoting Seymour's own letters of February I I and 16. noting thl

complete rev ersal of lus opinions on the importance of moving on Lake City. and the

question of Union sentiment in Florida Not surprisingly he added. "I arn very much

cont!Aed by these conflicting views.'-i General Turner. who later noted that "General








Gilmore did not intend or expect General Seymour to advance, although it was not

expressed in so man)- words, as 'You shall not advance,"' should have arrived in Flor

in time to stop Seymour from launching his westward movement. Unfortunately.

ston~ eater claied hisshi fo io. htgh hours. By the time Turner reached

Jacksonville Seymour's army was already engaged in battle 5'

It is impossible to determine vhy Seymour decided to resume his advance on

Lake City and the Suwannee River. His actions during the early portion of the

cauripaign were inconsistent at best. alternating between extremes of caution and basic

despair and optimism. John Hay noted his peculiar behavior:




Seymour has seemed very unsteady and queer since the beginning of the

campaign. He has been subject to violent alternations oftimidity &

rashness, now declaring Florida loyalty was all bosh, no" lauding it as

the purest article extant. now insisting that Beauregurd was in front with

the whole Confederacy & now asserting that he could whip all the rebels

in Florida with good brigade "




Due to the scarcity of Seymour manuscript material, histormas can onl!v

speculate on the general's state of mind in mid-February 1864.5' In a post-,ar article,

General Joseph Hawley wrote that Seymour held a council ofw\ar witlh his principle

subordinates a dav' or two before the battle Accordinp to Hawtlev. of those present

















Ir~ .1 ; I '


vif
























Seymour "may have become disenchanted with the prospect of being involved ith an

operation smaller in scale and less strategical Iy important" than another he had

previlously proposed for a rad against a railroad junction in South Carolina. Seymour

belle% ed, Nulty argues, that the destruction of the Suwannee River brndge at Columbus

was strategically significant since its loss "would separate East and West Florida."' The

general may have also believed in the existence ofa second bridge: over the Suwaonce

near Suipher Springs on the still incomplete connector line between Live Oak. Florida.

and Lawmon. Georgia. "'The existence of even an incomplete connector rail line,

particularly one crossing the Suw~annee River relatrvel close to the bridge at Columbus

may also have tempted General Sey~mour to risk an advance." Nulty concludes."s

While the second bridge theor) is intriguing. there is no evidence in the official

records to indicate that SCVMOUT WaS even aware of its existence. in a post-battle letter

to a fellow officer. Seymour did state that the capture of Lake City and the subsequent

destruction of the Columbus bridge were the expedition-s original goals. Fle blamed








Gillmore for not providing his command with adequate transportation. which might

have enabled him to easily occupy Lake City-




Gen G. charged himself\~ith putting a Locomotive on the R. R INl had had it I

should have crossed to the Solstice without an hour's delay, but I couldn't

supply my, men wilth the few, wagons I had--& when Henn, got to L[akel City

with his Cavalo I couldn't make a fight. because I couldn't stay there, if

successful. As I w~as convinced that we could not hold a point so far in the

interior I urged holding the S. Fork of St Marys (Barbers) as a base. instead of

Lake City. This was done. The instant I could accumulate provisions enough to

sally out, in pursuit of~the original aim & end of~the expedition, the destroying

[ofl communications bv the Suwanee-thaat moment I advanced "




This remarkable letter ignores the correspondence in which Gillmore ordered

Seymour to construct defenses at Baldwin and to attempt no farther advance If a

private understanding had existed to allow an advance to Lake City, it seems unlikelN

that Giillmore would have immediately sent his chief of staff to Florida to stop

Seymour's movement Seymour certanly acted rashly and in violation of his orders, at

least from Gillmore's perspective Probably he assumed he could easily take Lake City

and advanced to the Suwannee. destroying the bridge and then returning to his position at

Baldwin A spectacular. successfull raid would improve his standing with Gillmorc. and

restore sonic of his reputation so badly damaged the year before with his defeat at








Battery Wagner near Charleston."o Seymour later wrote that he believed he acted in

accordance with Gillmore~s instructions. "`I must add that my movements have been

entirely and fully in accordance with my views of the designs expressed to me by

[General Gilllmore]," Sey~mour contended, modified as I have a right to modify them by

a personal presence and command.- He had always "expected to advance from

[Barbers] when% er and wherever it might seem proper." as soon as enough supplies

had been stockpiled, Seymlour "saw; no reason why I should not carryout the major-

general's expressed desire--that is. to push on to the Suwarmece ""'

While Trunian SeVmouT contemplated his westward advance, the political

considerations and intrigue that had led to the 1 864 cast Florida campaign continued,

The primary) goal of the Unilon expedition remained the registration of enough loval

voters to bring a reconstructed Florida back into the union before the 1864 election.

Both the Chase and Lincoln factions certainly agreed with this The point on which

they differed was over who would gain control of this free Florida government

following its organization Following his arrival at Hilton Head in nnidJanuar..John

Hay traveled to Union-occupied Fernandina, to see for himself the true, feelings of the

population. In a February 8 letter to Lincoln- Hay conamented:




I have found among the leading men I have met a most

graulk ing unanimity ofsentiment. Those who have firmiri! been

classed as Conservative are killing to accept readily, the accomplished

events of the war and to come back at once: while those ofmort radical








views who, we have reason to fear. would rather embarrass us. are

readily in favor of your plan as exhibited in the case of Louisiana and

Ark~ansas. There is no opposition to be apprehended from either native

Unionists or Treasury Agents. The people are ignorant and apathetic.

'They seem to know nothing and care nothing about the matter. They

ha% e % ague objections to being shot and ha% ing their houses burned. but

don't know why it is to be done. They will be very glad to see a

government stroriL enough to protect them against these every day

incidents of the last two years. I have the best assurances that we will get

the tenth required although so large a portion of the rebel population is

in the army &r so many of the loyal people refugees in the North. that the

state is well-nigh depopulated. We will have a clean slate to begin

witb.'2




After his briefstay in Fernandina. Hay hastened to Jackrsonville. arriving there

on February 9 The following day he posted copies oflincoln's Reconstruction

Proclamation around the town, "The few citizens gathered around--the lettered reading

the unlettered listening with something that looked like a ghost of interest I [a)

began his search for loyal voters on Februan? 11, with a visit to the captured

Confederate soldiers held in the Jacksonville guardhouse. He read Lincoln's

Proclamation to the assembled prisoners and explained


















-ights as citizens of the UI.S.

'It is a matter for )r own choice. There is to be neither force nor

)ersuasion used in the matter. It is u matter you must decide for yrselve

'Thlere has been some doubt expressed as to whether you ixiiI be

protected I am authorized to promise thiat you will be, ...

'Inducement is peace & protection & reestablishment ofvr State

lovt' NVhen I finished the little I had to say they crowded around me

asking innumerable questions. I got away & had au office fixed up in th

juartermaster's block & w aited for my flock. They. soon canie. a dinty,

lirtv swumn of tivey coats & filed into the room. escorted bv a neero








inhabitants remained hesitant. wouried about Confederate reprisals should the Yanke

again abandonl Jacksonville. Despite this the Major believed:




The fact that more than 50O per cent of the prisoners of ivu were eager to

desert & get out of the service shows how the spirit ofthe common

people is broken. E-rr~body seemed tired of the war Peace on anv

terms was what they wanted. They have no care for the political

quoestions involv ed. Most ofthern had not read tile oath & w hen I

insisted on their learning what it was they would say listlessly.'Yes, I

guess I'll take it.' Some of the mosrt intelligent cursed their politicians &

especially South Carolina, but most looked hopefully to the prospect of

having a government to protect them after the anarchy of the fewl years

past. There was little of what might be called loyalty. But what I built

rav hopes on is the evident weariness of the war & anxiety for peace.

The leading man of the town, Judee Burritt. is deeply exercised

about the reconstruction .... Between the Gillmorc who is here & the

Finegan that may return he knows not how to choose. If he is true to

Gillmore he mav get cotton. If he is false to Finegan he maN stretch




















whom the rebellion has left in the state there are not fifty who were ever

in the habit of taking any political position or leading action of any

consequence who are not rank secessionists--and there are very [Few

men an~yhow~ not in the army who are not of the subdued. ignorant.

spiritless poor cracker sort. So far then as this movemecnt ma)' have an5

political design I regard it as a thorough humbug--and (he child of

Stickney & Co.'s intrigues & his Florida will quietly follow the fate of

the leading states ofthe Confederacy & when the head & licart of the

rebellion are destroyed at Richmond Cumberland Gap and Chattanooga

we shall hewr very little from poor Flonda.17




Ha? left for St Augustine on Feboaraw 12. to continue his efforts in that town,

while Colonel Edward Hallowell of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts administered the

oath-taking in Jacksonville. Unfortunalteh,. the number of nckv signees slowed

drainatically after the first day. A major problem was the fact, as Hay noted in a letter












As might be expected, Lyman Stickney also arrived in Florida with the

expedition. staying actively inv~olved in political and militant, affairs that concerned the

state. He presented himselfto Flay as a strong supporter of the president, while writing

to Chase on Fehruary 16 that "the President'splan f~or the restoration of Florida will be;

failure.""' Stickney would have preferred to bring Florida back into the Union with a

.'ramp convention composed ofa small group of carpetbaggers and poor-hihte

unionists," which he could more easily control; "he had notfung to gain iLincoln's

prestige increased due to a successful execution ofthe ten percent plan."~'

Confederate leaders were unprepared for the initial Union landings in Florida

After some initial confusion though, thev reacted quickly and decisively to the Nontherr

threat to Florida. At the time of the occupation of Jacksonville. about 1.500 troops

under the command of Brigadier General Joseph FinegEan defended eastern Florida. Tlu

District of F~ast Florida, which included the portion of Florida cast of the Suwarmce

River, was part of the Department of South Carolina. Georgia, and Florida. comonatrded

by General Pienre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. The entire number of effecti- troops

in his department w~as only about 30.000. with which Beaturegard had to conduct the

defense, fChcrl,.,uou and ,, -11 -,i P-l-,a I ----~rrrl mvpmnt






















mid-Januar 1864 General Beauregard received reports of enemv actix it), around Hi [tot"

Head that led him to belic% e a Union oflensive w\as imminent. Vier~in' Sa\annah as

the most fiikel target, Beauregard went to that city on Januar-v 16. where he remained

until FebruatT 3 Whenl no Union attack material-cld, the general remumed to

Charleston. He left instructions with the militat-v commander at Savannah. Major








by onh! a small detachment of cavalry). ith several hundred more cavalry mid artillery

at Camp Finegan and Tenl Mile Run a few\ miles to the west. The General immediately

inforried Beauregard of these developments. who ordered him to "do what you can to

hold enemv at bax end prevent capture of slaves Finegan quickly mov-ed to

consolidate the scattered troops of his district. with which he hoped to limit the Yankee

advance until help arrived from other areas."l

In the first cla) s of~the invasion Finegan could do little more than harass the

Unilonists. In this achvilr,. wiMth the exception of the debacles at Camp Finegan and Tel

Mile Run, his troops proved fairly successful. The troopers of the Second Florida

Cavalry remained in the saddle for days, continually skirmishing with the Union

invaders. Captain Winston Stephens conunanded one of these companies. He describe

his unit's activities in a letter to his wife Octavia.




We have so far been able to elude the cnem, though we have at times

been surrounded & front appearances we thought our prospect was fair

for a northern prison Our command consists of 256 men in the Infantry

and 56 cavalry and we are trying tojoin Gerd Finegan but so far the

encroy's Cavalry have untraveled us. I don't know ifvve will be able to

get out without being captured We are having hard times and plenty

of it. I think the Enemv are some ten thousand or more. I have lost some

men captured and somee lost and nlot .et reported I have but about 45

men with me.`














possibility of removal front his command. His inexperience in handling troops in

combat discouraged both Beauregard and Florida Go~cernor Job. Milton. who preferred

a more seasoned officer in commatid of the district. Another Confederate officer ~Tote

from Tallaharssee that there w'as a "vant of ecadidence" in Fineean "as cri untried and


on icave were rouncea up ana place in new regiments.

; one such man. On leave from Company A- Third Florida

usin's house at Mandarin, (rtelas found hirnself forcibl.,

emr to the front."~ Ellen Call Long. daughter of former

th Call. remembered that three teen-aped soldiers were











Notice To the People of Flouida," asking citizens to 'ronibin[e] themselves in efficient

military organizations of mounted troops, if they have horses, and of infantry, if they]

have riot, anld reporting to are for temporary military service Ile urged Floridians to:




[Clome forward anld exhibit the patriotism and bravery which are their

characteristic traits. and. with their aid our gallant troops will soon di-ke

the enemy front the Cmuntr Let all unite in this honorable and manly

purpose, and lose no time in commencing the most ~igorous and

determined action `0




Despite such stirring appeals, the bulk of Finegean's reinforcements came From

South Carolina and Georgia. not Florida As mentioned previously, Generaal Bearroegan,

began sending troops to Florida immediately upon hewing of the Union landings.

Brigadier General Alfred Colquitt's Brigade left the Charleston defenses for F~lorida, but

was held up again because ofa Februar 9 Union drversionw, mo\ ement on Johns

Island by F~ederal troops under Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig. This

diversion. and another near Savannah. accomplished their objectives of disrupting the

flow of troops from South Carolina to Florida, but the Unionists did not exploit them

fully. Schimnclfennig's movement lasted onl!v several days, and the Confederates were

able to repulse it. and then continue sending men south to F~lorida. Conlquitt's Brilgade

reached Lake Cit. just davs before the Battle of Olustee In retrospect,























boarded trains for Lake whi~.uhle others marched from Valdosta to Madison. YL)-crat

soldiers' accounts mention the generosity of the citizens of Madison, who provided

refreshments for the weary soldiers as they passed through."'

By February 13 Finegan had assembled a force of about 1,800 infantry, 450

cavalry, and several batteries ofartillery. Over the next week; Colquit's Brigade arrived

at Lake Cit, increasing his totals to 4600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and assorted artillery

units. In less than two w-eek~s the Confederates had reacted to the Union threat and

assembled a force that could meet the approaching Union army with rough purity. By

the nineteenth Seymour had concentrated his army at Barbers in preparation of mov ing

westward the next morning. Finegan. meanwhile, had brought his force thirteen miles

out from Lake City. near the village of Olustee and Ocean Pond, He established a

position known as Camp Beauregard. and his chief enginecr, Lieutenant M. B Grant,

began supervising construction of a line ol defensive fortifications stretching from

Ocean Pond on the left, across the railroad and the L~ake City and Jacksonville road,

with its right flank protected by an impassable swamp. Here he awaited the Union

advance: he did not have lorn, to wait.''















f-.I . - j A I -.. r .. n . I 1. .. I C r 1I

Captain A~lfred Sears of the First New York Engineers, stationed at Fort Clinch near
Femandina during the campaign. See Alfred Sewrs to Thomas Brooks. March 15. 1864
Thomas Benton Brooks Papers, Florida State Nrchi~es. Tallahassee. Florida.








OP,,. I. XXXV. Pt. 1. 280: Bold. The Federal Campainn of 1864, 4.

4 Ibid.


'Ibid.

j'; I I i..l '- I i:



'ORN. 1. XV, 273, 276-277.

Ib id. See previous chapter for Dablaeren's views on Stick~neN and on operations in1
Horida.





OPAOI. 1, XXXV. Pt. 1. 280-281.

SVaughn D. Bomet. ed., "A Connecticut Yarikee After Olustee." Florida I listorica
Ouanrlerh -17(January 1949): 242-243.

j. j.



''ORN. 1, XV, 278-28 1.











"' ORM 1I, WV 278-281 New York Times. February 20. 1864, Martin and Schafer.
Jacksorrvillc'r Ordeal bv Fire, 1 80-182 Nulty, Confederate F'lorida. 81-81.





':Appleton Journal, February 7. 1 864, Appleton Papcrs Emilio, History of the HIIN-,










isLester L. Srrift, ed., "Captain Dana in Florida: A Narrative of the Seymour
Expedition,- Civil War Hision I (September 1965): 247.

2' Adams. ed., On the Altar of Freedom. 1 13.





they had caused.

22 Nulty. Confederate Florida, 91-86.

21 ORA, 1. XXXV, pt 1, 295-296.


I~: I ~ .~ II~i~.~ ;!, I I F .I

i 996) 67-70








h I I;: I I I I ~I. 1 1 1 1 1 i;

j1 1 . 1 . . - I









































Joseph Barco to ife,, Match 2. 1864, Joseph Barco Papers, Florida Collection, Sta
brary of Florida, Tallahassee. Florida.


J~




Currier Recollection, 73-74.


Cro-nnshicid.. History of the First Regiment, 261.





-~I I I : P.


f. T "' '"'~ " "~111''"



































'"ORA\. 1, XXXV, Pt. 1. 293. Most ofthe relevant correspondence is also published




'nORA, 1. XXXV, Pt. 1, 27T.

Ibi~lbd.. 284. 2K6 Nulty- Confederate Florida. 114-119.


[bid .286.

'?ORA, 1, XXXV,. Pt. 1, 285-286,

"ORA, 1, XXXV. Pt. 1, 286

SNulty, Confederate Florid 115-116; U. S. Congress, Senate Report No. 4 9.

SDeruiett. Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of~lohn Flay\. 164.

SUnfortunatelN. no large collection of Sey mour manuscript material has survived.
Individual Ictterrs are in the Loomis Langdon Papers, Florida State Archives,
Tallahasee. Florida: and the Truman Sey mour Papers. P. K. Yonge Library- of Florid













is r I .... .... t. l I


I A A J..- .' r....''r_- l


r.-. ~~~

'BNulty. Confederate Florida. 116-118: ORWr 1. 1-111. 9S-98.

'9Truman Seymour to John T. SpragEue, March 26, 1864-. Seymour Papers- National
Archi~es.






O'ORA- 1, XXXV. Pt. 1. 287.

62 Quoted in Smith, "Carpetbag Imperialism." 283-284.


"'Dennect. Lincoln and the Civil War in the Letters and Diaries of John Hav. 159.

blb~ld 160-161

"iIbid., 161.

"Ibid-- 161-162.

67 Joseph Hawley~ to wife,. February 16, 1864, Joseph Hawley Papers. Librar) of
Congress




Record Group 393, United States Army Continental Commands. 1821-1920. National
Archives


"LLman D. Stickne to Salmon 1'. Chase, February 16. 1864, Salmon P Chase Papers.

~"Smith, "Carpetbag Imperialism," 288.

















ORA 1. XXXV. Pt. 1. 321-322.

Ibidhi.. 578. 580.

:'Ibid., 579. 94-59j.

`'Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens. F~ebruary- 11, 1864, Stephcns-Br~ant Papers.
P. K. Yongee Library ofFlorida History. Uni% ersin! of~florida.

71 (),A. 1. LIN, 3 09


77ORA. I, XXXV. Pt. 1. 323. 326.

r h. I I I .

Florida





%UThe Floridian and Journal, March 5, 1864.

"'General Schimmelfenig's Report of the Demonstration on Johns Island, 1864. Record
Group 393, United States A~rmy Continental Commands, 1821- 1920. National Archives,




II ~ ~~ I : I~,- I ' I. I- ... .....

; 1 : 11~ 11 11 .1 2 ii i do" h H! 1?1 )11





i ~~~ I I H 1 1 r.171 I 1 1 -1 1 1 4 111 ~1.










R'OR-k 1. XY-XV, Pt. I. 326 331; 1, XXV. 3,38-3411. Gcorge Dav. Leshlr PenN- and
i r i. I I l lll i 1 .1. .1 .1 I I i...































































84































and old, veterans and recruits, heroes and cowardss In their composition. armarrents,

tramung and ability. they typified the volunteers that fought for the Union and

Confederacy. and a stud) of these =tiesz can serve as a microcosm for Civil War

armies as whole.

The Union army. comiranded by Brigadier General Trunin Seymour, spent the

night of February t19 at Barbers Station. about twenty)-five miles cast of Lake City.

Their commander wuss a thirty-nmne year old Vermonter, son of a Methodist minister and

1846 graduate of West Point. An artilleryman. Seymour served in the Mexican and

Florida wars. receiving several brevet promotions. He was present at the Fort Surrite

bombardment in April. 1861. and in early 1862 was promoted to brigadier general.

serving in the Ami) of the Potomac's Fifth Corps during the Peninsular Campaign. At

Second Bull Run. South Mountain and Antietam lie performed capably. particularly in








his brigade's capture of Turner's Gap, MarN land. SeN in

ofthe South late in 1862, where he gained notoriety for

controversial assault on Baltcry Wagnerr in July 1863

little field duty for the remainder of the Near One of Ot

experienced subordinates, Seymour was chosen to cantl

for the Florida campaign, and- following Gillmore's reul

himself in charge of the expedition Full-lieuded. but

appearance, SeN mour's reputation was dial of an aggres

commander. wvho often succeeded in battle, but at a hea

at Olustee reaffinued this estimate of his generalship.'

Weakened by the necessity of posting garrisons

Jacksonville to Barbers Station- the Union ariny approal

onlv 5.000 to s,500 effective. These reductions negate

superiorit over the Confederates, and should have con,

advised advance After all the reductions and transfers

commander organized his remaining units into three Inf

cavalry and mounted infantry. and supporting artillen ce

Sevniour's small anniN consisted of the I-ortN-seventh. F

York Infantry. commanded by Colonel William B. Bart

provided the Federal commander with his most reliable








The Fortyseventh New York\. also known as the Washington GraysF. had been

recruited mostly in New York City and B~rooklyn. botween.kily and September 186).

Following its muster into Federal service, the regiment went tlo Washington. where it

remained in carrp for several months. Soon, however. the New Yorkers were

transferred to the South Carolina coastal islands. recently captured by a Union

expedition under Generaal Ambrose E. Burnside. The Oray s remained in South Carofir

throughout 1862 and 1863. and were actively engaged in operations against Charlestor

Despite its long period of service in the Carolinas. the Fort% -sevecnth had not yet

participated in a rnajor battle. A veteran regiment, at the finec of the Florida expeditior

the Forly-seventh still had not proved itselfin combat 3

The second regiment in Barton's New York brigade was the Forty-eighth New

York Volunteer Infantry. Organized in Brooklyn, New York\ City, and Peekskill durri

the late summer of 1861i a dark period lot the North following the humiliation of First

Bull Run, the regiment also included companies from New Jersey- Connecticut, and

Massachusetts.'

The Forty-eighth was also known as the Continental Guards Regiment or

"Perry's Saints." The foriner designation referred to the multi-state composition of the

unit, while the later honored the regiment' organizer and first commander. Colonel

James H Perry. Perry had attended West Point for three years in the I 930's. before

resigning to serve prominently in the Army of [lie Republic of Texas during its War of

Independenlce with Mexico. Disillusioned by the bloodshed and carnage of that war. hi








the Methodist Church in lsle York. Because of Perry's prominence as a minister. the

Forty-eighth attracted a different kind ofrmmcrit Many seminar) students and others

with strongly religious backgrounds had joined the regiment. Perry contributed to the

unusual, if not unique. composition of the unit by- discouraging the consumption of

alcohol In June 1862 the regirrent was at Tybee Island. near Savannah. when a

quantity of alcohol washed ashore from a stranded ship. Mau of Perry's men

consurned these spirits and became drunk. Colonel Perry died of a heart attack the nex

day, but whether his at tack was the result of the previous dav's activities is unclear.'

Soon after its organization- the Forty -eighth left for the lower A~tlantic Coast,

where it would actively campaign for the next two years. Unlike. the Forty-sevcendl

New 'fork, Perry's Saints participated in se-eral heated battles during the period.

including the bloody, ill-fated assault on Batter Wagner in July 1803, in which the

regiment suffered nearly 250 casualties. The Forty-ecighth saw no further combat actiol

after Batter) Wagner, serving on garrison duty at St. Augustine arid in various locations

along the Georgia and South Carolina coast At the time of the Florida carapaign. the

regiment was seriously understrength. Nearly 300 veterans of the unit had recently bcc

awarded thinty-day furloughs as a reward for their reenlistment mad had left for the

north

The 11 5th New York, or "Iron Hearted Regiment," made up the remainder oftl-

brigeade Composed of lough upstaters from the Mohawk Valley. the regiment suffere,

through an ignominious initiation into military service. Barely two weeks after its

Aup.ust 30. 1862. departure from New~ York, the regintent was included in the