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 Front Cover
 Table of Contents
 Background
 Summit summary
 Appendices
 Summit presentations
 Bridge financing for disaster...
 Business disaster preparedness...
 Personal tragedy
 Comparing hurricane and earthquake...
 Back Cover






Title: The Dynamics of Disaster: "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigation"
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Title: The Dynamics of Disaster: "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigation"
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: University of the Virgin Islands
Publisher: University of the Virgin Islands
Place of Publication: Virgin Islands
Publication Date: 2002
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Table of Contents
        Page 1
    Background
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
    Summit summary
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Appendices
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
    Summit presentations
        Page 24
    Bridge financing for disaster recovery
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
    Business disaster preparedness plan (BDPP)
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
    Personal tragedy
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
    Comparing hurricane and earthquake risk and research funding: A report
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
    Back Cover
        Page 50
Full Text



The Dynamics of Disaster
"Impact, Recovery, An Mitigation"

A UVI Economic Summit

Final Project Report


.. 1












Palm Court Harbor View Hotel
November 11-12, 1996








Table of Contents



Page
BACKGOiOND
The UVI Disaster Experience 2
The Dynamics of Disaster 2

SVMMIT SVMMARY
Meteorology: Technology & Forecasting 5
Public Policy 7
Business Recovery Services 9
Construction Engineering 11
Financial/Banking & Insurance 12
Human Services 13

APPENDICES
Program 15
Participants List 18
Future Plans 22

Summit Presnttion
Bridge Financing for Disaster Recovery 25
Business Disaster Preparedness Plan (BDPP) 28
Personal Tragedy 36






The Dynamics ofDisaster impact Rever, and Mitigation" 2


7The WI D/ aster Experience...

On September 15, 1995, Hurricane Marilyn crippled the University of the Virgin Islands less than
a month after the start of the fall semester. Both campuses on St. Croix and St. Thomas --
sustained serious damage, but the grounds and facilities of the main campus on St. Thomas were
devastated. Severe damage to the operational infrastructure and classroom and administrative
buildings forced both campuses to suspend classes and close temporarily. The St. Croix campus
resumed classes on October 9 and students returned to the St. Thomas campus a month later.

Hurricane Marilyn had followed only ten days on the heels of Hurricane Luis, a monstrous system
that had decimated St. Maarten, Antigua and Anguilla and brushed the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Consequently, damage incurred from Hurricane Marilyn was compounded by wind and water
damage from Hurricane Luis. Although mitigation strategies were in process, UVI recovery was
further hampered by wind damage from Hurricane Bertha in July 1996, and water damage from
Hurricane Hortense in early September.

UVI administrators have worked earnestly since September of 1995 to restore both campuses -
and to mitigate potential damages from future storms.


The Dyrna ics of Ds.ater...

The U.S.V.L and the Caribbean are subjected to direct or indirect impacts from such natural
disasters as tropical storms, hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes. The extent to
which we can reduce the impact of natural phenomena is contingent on what we do before the
storms. This suggests the three stages of action and reaction; impact, recovery, and mitigation.

Impact
The total damage was estimated to equal $2.327 billion, and an estimated 15,000 Virgin Islanders,
almost all within the St. Thomas district, lost their employment for at least several weeks because
of Hurricane Marilyn.

Recovery
In the days and weeks following the storm, headlines clearly focused the community's attention,
for example: "Relief Effort Hits Snag, Airlift Planes Grounded", or "WAPA has to Ration
Water". In addition, destruction to the public educational system forced mandatory double
sessions in the few schools that could function after the storm. A major controversy also
developed over the accuracy of weather forecasts and sensitive commmuication of its meaning.

Mitigation
Following the last direct hit by a hurricane (Hugo in September 1989), a great deal of outward
attention was paid to mitigation programs. Specifically, projects were identified and fimded to be
implemented to reduce the impact of future hurricanes. Little evidence has been presented to
indicate the efficacy of ex ante mitigation projects.







The Dynamics ofDisaster "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigation" 3


On November 11 & 12, 1996, leading authorities and designated community leaders in the areas
of meteorology, public policy, business recovery services, construction engineering, banking,
insurance, and human services attended "The Dynamics of Disaster Impact, Recovery, and
Mitigation" a UVI Economic Summit. As an interdisciplinary group, these participants
collaborated to confront the adaptive challenges faced by a community in the wake of a
devastating hurricane.

The summit's main objective was to:
* identify the areas of information and research needs for the U.S.V.I. in regards to mitigation
and recovery from natural hazards;
* to assist the U.S.V.I. to recover more funds for hazard damages;
* to optimize the University's goal as a resource in the territory.

Participants reviewed and discussed
the impact of Hurricane Marilyn and
the recovery effort through different
perspectives. Areas of focus included
the role of economic status in
determining access to support, levels
Sc p of assistance, recovery speed and
special financial products; minimiing
and mitigating financial damage to
businesses and households; the need
and benefit of ways to mitigate natural
disaster suffering for the most
vulnerable among our population; and
proposals defining and organizing roles for regional and international institutions in the recovery
and mitigation following a natural disaster.

On separate paths, numerous public policy and business practice recommendations have been
made, some quite controversial as a result of research at the federal and local level on: hurricane
forecasting and related
communication, building code
amendment, emergency program
management, business practices and
community development
programming.

This conference allowed the
opportunity to share recommendations
on these topics, explore dynamic
relationships among them and define
areas where additional research is
needed. For instance, information
management technology affects all







The Dynamics ofDisaster "Impac, Recovery, and Mitigation" 4


areas. With the tremendous advances being made, new perspectives will be required to make full
use of these emerging technologies. Beyond the explicit theme of the conference; to examine the
broad impact of natural disasters, an implicit theme is to reorient overall community development
policy to integrate natural disaster management.

Included in this report are lists of information gaps and research needs generated by workshop
participants for possible integration into natural disaster management planning agendas of
business and government agencies.


Thomas Brunt, Il, Joanne E. Bozzuto, Esq., Dr. LaVerm
the main speakers during the Plenary Session.






The Dynaics of Disaser impact Recovery, and Mitgafion" 5


J dO.lgO: TThe National Weather Service and the National Weather Office in San
t Juan, Puerto Rico are responsible for warning and forecasting weather
TeCChloy05 systems for the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico and other islands in the
Apt Caribbean. Improvement in the area of technology and forecasting was
vcssti made as a result of Huicane Marilyn. The recently installed Doppler
Radar used to track Hurricane Hortense proves advancement.


The following were information gaps identified in the area of meteorology.

Information Gaps

SUtilize the Graphic Information System (GIS) as an inter-governmental agency tooL The GIS
should include information on each public building in the island; such as its location, value,
type of construction, use of the building, insurance coverage, etc. Such a database should be
comprehensive, standardized, contemporary, maintained, managed, and updated on a periodic
basis in Washington and the Virgin Islands. This will assist in the task ofmaintaining updated
information. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would then have advance
knowledge of information pertinent to recovery efforts prior to their arrival to the territory.
The development and maintenance of a fully computerized wide area network GIS database
can increase the efficiency, and reduce processing time, and at the same time accelerate the
productivity of the entire operation. It can allow the outsourcing of the development of
management and maintenance of the disaster response database and decrease overexpenditure
on the part of FEMA. It can free-up existing resources and increase response efficiency by
offering dual use opportunities to local, regional and federal authorities for other activities,
project and programs. This system can also be utilized by local emergency personnel in
cutting down response time. Details on making such information accessible to the public are
pending.

* Promote the dissemination of intermediate-level information ofhurricane forecasts to link and
interpret National Hurricane Center's advisories for the media and the general public.

* Review historical earthquake-related geological data to help analyze the periodicity and past
impacts of significant earthquake disasters. Address the development of physical and
computer models or scenarios to predict the effect on wind speeds of high altitudes,
orography and other Bernoulli factors, and the likely impacts of tsunamis on different regions
of the Virgin Islands.

* Extend seismic monitoring.

* Promote more focus on utilizing technology to aide in the management of litigation
assessment and recovery.

* Develop a procedure for optimal data gathering within the 6-12 hours after the event to
expedite "state of emergency" declaration.






The Dynamics of Disaser "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigation" 6


* Develop digitized records (scanned) as opposed to paper files to reduce the risk of losing
important documents.

SImprove telephone/cellular/other communications (within the territory) for use in the time
immediately after a disaster.




Al DYNAMICS OF D
NoAII-W 1E


Top Photo: Dr. Robert W. Burpee, Director ofthe Tropical Prediction Center
Bottom Photo: Summit Participants


I~""C-





The Dyamics ofDisaster "Ipact, Recovery, ad Miipgalion" 7


The local government is required to maintain a current mitigation plan
S with FEMA. As a result of Hurricane Marilyn, several federal programs
blic were activated The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency
Polic1 Assistance Act was at the forefront of the VI's recovery effort. Other
programs initiated included the Hazard Mitigation Program, Small
Business Administration Loan Program, Individual and Family Grant
Program, Disaster Employment Assistance, and the Disaster Housing Program.


The following were information gaps and research needs identified in the area ofpublic policy.

Information Gaps...

Publicize priorities of the government for grant proposals and finding guidelines.

Prepare FEMA personnel in advance for the impacted community into which its workers are
coming. In understanding the history and culture, or the resources available, they would be
more efficient in the delivery of their services.

* Develop a list of recommendations to FEMA to facilitate the continuity of a seamless
exchange of communication between the federal government and the local organizations and
agencies, and develop a mechanism for the organizations and development of small unit
recovery plan.

* Increase grant writing workshops, revealing priorities so that the public can apply for what's
available. Once applications are submitted, the public needs to be informed regularly on the
application process.

* Inform Office of Management and Budget and other government agencies of available UVI
expertise in planning and developing priorities.

* Inform federal agencies and FEMA of the need to support small businesses in the early
recovery stages.

* Standardize the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) employee turn-over rate.

* Prepare FEMA personnel in advance of the needs of the impacted community with accurate
and up-to-date information to determine which workers and how many should be sent to the
impacted area, and to effectively aide in the recovery effort.






The Dynamics ofDisaser "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigation" 8

Research Needs...

* Research the need to clarify the application process for Hazard Mitigation and Public
Assistance Programs.

* Research the need to develop recommendations for simplifying the chain of command in the
FEMA organization.







rahmewl "Addie" Ottley
.foxusid on communication
urmdg the Plenary Session.














Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka 11
addressed the business needs
of the Virgin Islands.





The Dynamics of Dbaser "I-mpad, Recovery, a-d Mjiigaio-" 9



The Virgin Islands is considered by many the tourism capital of the
Caribbean. Many businesses suffered a tremendous loss due to the
SIdviI$CSS hurricane. Major airlines limited flights, hotels closed, businesses closed
RIk OVerf or laid-off employees. Over a year later, the economy continues to show
Services signs of a struggle.




The following is a list of information gaps and research needs identified in the area of business
recovery services.

Information Gaps...

Develop a disaster plan for private businesses in order to mitigate losses.

Conduct a survey of damaged structures sustained and why businesses fail following a major
disaster.

* Ilhuminate possible efficient and affordable energy alternatives that can power business
machines in the recovery period.

* Illuminate processes which the public and private sector can adapt to facilitate doing business
in a cash flowing environment.

* Form local contingency planning groups to discuss the needs of businesses in the recovery
period. These recommendations should be developed and sent to local and federal agencies
that assist businesses.

* Collect data on point of failure analysis for the confirmation of facilities.

* Identify advance business recovery techniques to broad use.

* Devise a coalition to assist in economic recovery.

* Educate the public on how the economy works in general with respect to making allocations
and choices during the recovery process. Many times the public don't have the information
they need on how resources need to be allocated. Businesses need to get back and jump-start
so that they can participate in the economy again.






The Dynamics ofDisaster "Impact, Recovery, and Miigalion" 10




Research Needs...

* Research the need to develop partnerships in the community between public and private
leadership groups.

* Research the need to define long-term economic goals in the territory.

* Research the need to empower low and middle income groups to derive opportunity from
disaster these groups are more dependent on government assistance programs.

* Research the need to formulate a territorial disaster plan.

* Research the need to develop strategies for assuring the inclusion of small business entities in
recovery activities.

* Research the need to identify and organize the use of thermo senses in determining the status
of electrical systems.


Summit Participants






TMe Dy.andes ofDimaer "ImnWd. Riwowr. and Mlsration"


The occurrence of three hurricanes and several tropical storms have
caused major concern among government officials. Contractors,
Cotnstlctiol architects, and homeowners attended seminars to familiarize themselves
EttSinCeri~ with the revised building codes. Government officials and the community
recognized that any measure taken to reduce the risk of damage will be
expensive.


The following were information gaps identified in the area of construction engineering.


Information Gaps...

* Collect and study data on the infrastructure on the placement of water and telephone lines.
The hazard and vulnerability of power plants, water pump stations and other facilities should
be considered. Vulnerability maps should be developed for FEMA, VITEMA, and other care
providers. All future infrastructures must be built in areas less vulnerable. Proposed projects
include: underground power lines for the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority and the
University of the Virgin Islands; and improved traffic signal lights (through the Department of
Energy).

* Formulate a plan to visualize the status the community should be in the moment disaster
strikes, and immediately after. An evaluation of the possible impact of the plan to determine
the need for readjustments in the society should be completed so that it can be revised and
adopted before the disaster occurs.

* Accept possibilities of natural disaster when building effectively for the future.

* Evaluate the implementation, enforcement, and compliance ofthe building codes.






The dynamics ofDisaser "Impact, Recery, and Mitigoion" 12


Following the occurrence of Hurricane Marilyn, the financial institutions
in the territory temporarily haked transactions. This left many without
AMCtAI&/ the necessary cash needed to purchase emergency supplies, or conduct
Bankinm 8 personal business. The possibility of such activity occurring again is just
lwSMtAMCC cause for concern.


The following is a list of information gaps identified in the area ofbanking.


Information Gaps...

* Facilitate conducting business in an environment where electronic or off-island databases are
available to bankers.

* Research the availability of utilizing insurance receipts for use as collateral in obtaining bridge
financing.

* Develop a mitigation funding source in the V.I. so that mitigation measures can be
implemented.

* Distribute information on the availability, limitations, and the terms of bridge financing so that
it is known how to pursue such goals and terms.

* Clarify how compliance to building codes influence insurance codes, and the probability of
insurance premiums based on storms occurring or structures withstanding windstorm forces.





The Dynamics f Disaster "Impact, Recovry, and Mligarion" 13




The Department of Human Services played an instrumental role in the
recovery efforts of the V.L Several programs and assistance were
taM administered and many Virgin Islanders received aide based on family
Services need.


The following were information gaps and research needs identified in the area ofhuman services.

Information Gaps..

Conduct public education on land tenure and ownership issues to reduce problems associated
with obtaining the required documentation on the property as a prerequisite for Federal Aid.

Ensure that there is a resource of communicators for foreign language speakers, visually or
hearing impaired. They must be identified in advance so that assistance can be provided
where there is a need. Research their special needs in an environment where critical
information is communicated through radio.

Develop a registry of seniors and the disabled so that the Department of Human Services
could service those in need. The possibility of local churches and organizations being
assigned the task of securing property and/or moving others to sheers prior to the disaster
can aide the department. The training of additional personnel to provide assistance for seniors
can be implemented.

* Launch a campaign to get people prepared for the possibility of another disaster. This may
include preparation by the Mental Health Department officials so that the populace, including
children and senior citizens, and the media can rationalize the impact of an inevitable natural
hazard, and to have maximum information about the crisis so that they won't overreact or
panic. This includes educating the marine community on boating safety before, during and
after the storm.

* Publicize information on the process of distributing goods and services during times of
emergency.

* Communicate and assess various needs of the community.


Research Needs...

* Research how children's trauma can be reduced through group activity during the recovery
stages when school is not in session.




The Dynamics ofDisaster "Impact, Recoery, and Miigation" 14
SResearch how to make counseling services or other sources of support available to all who
experience natural disasters during the recovery states to promote mental health.












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PMa"Cipa"nts List






The Dynamics ofDisaster- "Impact, Recovry, and Miigation" 19


PARTICIPANTS LIST


VELMA A. ABRAMSEN
Assistant to the Director
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

LIXION A. AVILA, PH.D.*
Hurricane Specialist
National Centers for Environmental Pediction
National Weather Service

EDWARD B. BROWN, HIf
District Manager
Business Recovery Services

THOMAS BRUNT, -I
President
St. Thomas/St. John Chamber of Commerce

ROBERT W. BURPEE, PH.D.*
Director
Tropical Prediction Cater
National Hurricane Center

PERCIVAL E. CLOUDEN*
Vice President
Banco Popular of Puerto Rico

JOHN COPENHAVER*
Senior Executive Project Manager
IBM Crisis Response Team

JOAN CREQUE
Administrative Assistant
Eastern Caribbean Cater, UVI

JACQUELYN D. DAVIS
Administrative Assistant
Eastern Caribbean Center

SHARLEEN DABREO
Office ofDisaster Preparedness
Government of the British Virgin Islands


JONETFA DARDEN*
Territorial Public Assistance Officer
Office of Management & Budget, USVI

STANLEY DAWSON
V.I. Insco, Corporation

ROBERT DEJONGH*
President
DeJongh & Associates

JOE ELMORE
American Red Cross
St. Thomas/St. John Chapter

DAISYMAE EVANS*
Associate Director
Federal Grant Management Unit
Office of Management & Budget

JOAN HARRIGAN-FARRELY
Consultant
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

LEO IL FRANCIS*
Director of Facilities
University of the Virgin Islands

MARIE E. GONZALEZ*
Hazard Mitigation Officer
Federal Emergency Management Agency

DERRICK GUMBS
American Red Cross
St. Thomas/St. John Chapter

ERIC HAESSLER, ESQ.*
Counselor at Law

BETTY HERN MORROW, PH.D.*
Professor of Anthropology
Florida International University


*Speaker
*Moderator







The Dynamics of Disaster "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigaton" 20


S.B. JONES-HENDRICKSON, PH.D.*
Professor of Economics
University of the Virgin Islands

CHERILYN HODGE
Administrative Assistant
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

IAN HODGE
Associate Director
Small Business Development Agency
University of the Virgin Islands

SOLOMON S. KABUKA, PH.D.**
Professor of Business
University of the Virgin Islands

ORVILLE KEAN, PH.D.*
President
University of the Virgin Islands

JERRILYN KING
Administrative Assistant
Eastem Caribbean Center, UVI

SHIRLEY LINCOLN
Consultant
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

WILLIAM MCCANN, PH.D.*
Earth Science Consultants, Inc.

CAROL MAYES
The Nature Conservancy

CATHERINE L. MILLS*
Commissioner
Department of Human Services

FRANK L MILLS, PH.D.*
Associate Director
Research Institute
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

JOSEPH E MINOR, PH.D.*
Professional Engineer
University of Missouri-Rolla


NORMA MONTES
Administrative Specialist
Eastern Caribbean Cnter, UVI

GWEN-MARIE MOOLENAAR*
Director of Sponsored Programs
University of the Virgin Islands

RICHARD MOORE, PH.D.**
Director of Research
Globalvest Management Co.

TIFFANY E. MOORHEAD
Department of Public Works
St. Croix, VI

ROBERT NOLIND*
Nolind & Associates

MAXINE NUEZ, PH.D.
Dean of Instruction, St. Thomas Campus
University of the Virgin Islands

ATHNIEL "ADDIE" OTTLEY*
President
Ottley Communications

BASIL OTTLEY*
Research Analyst
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

DENIS PAUL, PH.D.
Vice President for Academic Affairs
University of the Virgin Islands

WALTER G. PEACOCK, PH.D.*
Program Director of Research
International Hurricane Center

LAVERNE E. RAGSTER, PH.D.'
Acting Vice President for Research and Land
Grant Affairs; & Director, Easter Caribbean
Center, UVI

MALIK SEKOU, PH.D.*
Consultant
Eastern Caribbean Center


*Speaker
Moderator







The Dynamics ofDisaser "Impact Recovery, and Miligation" 21


BASIL H. SMITH
V.I. Insco Corporation


HENRY H. SMITH, PH.D.
Director
Water Resources Research Institute, UVI

RUTH E. THOMAS
UVI Board of Trustees

ELEANOR THRAEN, PH.D.
Executive Assistant to the Governor
Office of the Goveror

ED TOWLE, PLHD.
President
Island Resources Foundation


LEROY M. WALKER
Inter-Ocean Insurance

ROY A. WATLINGTON'
Associate Director
Extramural Institute
Eastern Caribbean Center, UVI

GLENN WILCOX
R.R. Caribbean, Inc.

JENNIFER WILSON
International Hurricane Center
Florida International University


MEMBERS OF THE PRESS


LEE CARE
News Director
WSTA Radio
St Thomas

PATRICE JOHNSON
Reporter
Daily News
St. Thomas


PLANNING COMMITTEE

Edward B. Brown, I
S.B. Jones-Hendrickson
Solomon S. Kabuka
Richard Moore
Robert Nolind
LaVerne E. Ragster


*Speaker
'Moderator













future ralis






The Dynamics of Disaster "Impact, Recovery, and Mitifiton" 23



The Eastern Caribbean Center of the University of the Virgin Islands will sponsor future summits
on issues that affect the Virgin Islands and the Caribbean region.

As a significant educational entity in the Caribbean and the alma mater of many leaders
throughout the region, the University will use its relations with the present generation of leaders
to promote a general commitment to incorporating natural hazard considerations into al manner
ofgovemmental responsibilities.

On all levels of education, there is need for supplementation of educational resource materials
with information about the natural phenomena that can affect each community. The University
will encourage local and regional educators to join in an effort to review present curricula to
assess their contents with respect to including the effects of natural phenomena upon societal and
institutional structures.

The University will utilize future summits of the type reported upon here to promote the exchange
of knowledge and the forming of resource-sharing networks among local and regional decision
makers and economic planners.

The University of the Virgin Islands will continue its part in the effort, already started with this
Economic Summit and with the Consultation of Experts on Tsunamis, to employ the most
effective technology in the information-gathering and warning systems for hurricanes and
tsunamis.

Educating the general public through direct informal strategies about hurricane, earthquake,
volcano, mudslide, fire and tsunami threats wil remain a focus of the University. In this effort,
the University will work with the VITEMA (Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency)
locally, with CDERA (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Relief Agency) and with regional health
agencies.












Summit Presetati~os












DynH mics of a Disaster:
"Impact, Recovery., ab Mitigation"

Bribge Financing for
Disaster RecoverN





presented by:
Percival E. Clouden
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands Region





The Dynamics of Disaster "Impact Recovery, nd Mitigation"


* Bridge Financing after a disaster can be an important aspect of the recovery process.

As we are aware, Bridge Financing bridges a gap until a specific event occurs that repays the
loan.

Our experience tells us that after a disaster, insurance proceeds or other financial assistance
take some time to be disbursed into the hands ofthe claimant.

This therefore, puts a dependency on Financial Institutions to be flexible and cooperative but
protective of its assets.

In the case of households where insurance coverage existed, the claim process would have
been completed and agreed upon by both the Insurance Company and the Insured.

The Insured can then negotiate with a Financial Institution, a bridge loan of say 40% of the
settlement amount to begin the rebuilding process, while the settlement check is being
prepared. (This process can take 4-8 weeks.)

Once the funds are received, the Bank also listed as joint payee, establishes an escrow account
from which it pays-off its bridge loan and monitors the rebuilding process to ensure the funds
are used to restore the dwelling to its pro-disaster condition or better. Any surplus funds are
the borrower's benefit.

* Another scenario is where there is no expectation of insurance proceeds, ie. WAPA, since
there is no Pole Insurance.

The board may request an intermediate term loan from local Financial Institutions either on a
participative or non-participative basis, to begin immediate replacement of poles and lines,
with the understanding that 12-18 months later, a bond issue will be made, and a portion of
the proceeds will be used to liquidate the bridge loan. This is typical for utility companies.

* Bridge loans and the circumstances that create them are generally exceptions to normal
operations of the borrower and require special decisions by management.

Consequently, lenders consider bridge loans apart from seasonal, term or permanent capital
loans.

Bridge loan analysis focuses on two areas:
i. The likelihood of the event that will repay the loan occurring and
ii. The ability to service the debt in case the event does not occur.

If the event were not to occur, the Bank could be left with a very long term loan or a
permanent capital loan.






The Dyn-e ofDeast- Inuprca R-eoveq, and Migadtion"


As part ofthe analysis, the Bank decides if the resultant loan could be properly serviced and if
it would comply with loan policy.

Bridge loans are normally structured with maturities that coincide with the anticipated event.
Demand Notes or renewable 90-day Notes are avoided because these instruments are not self-
policing. When a maturity date falls on a bridge loan, the loan should be paid in ful. If it is
not paid, either the event has been delayed or a failure has occurred.

WHAT CAN GO WRONG WITH A BRIDGE LOAN:

Prior liens on the insurance proceeds or divergent claims, such as in a diverse
situation.

Uninsured damage to the asset intended for sale to repay the bridge loan.

Lack of firm commitment to refinance by another institution who intends to pay off
institution.

Inability of the borrower to meet all contingencies of financing commitment.

COMMON LENDERS ERRORS

S Failure to consider all the contingencies that could prevent repayment.

Event which allows for only partial payment ofthe Bridge loan. Le. cost overruns,
interests costs.

Not analyzing the secondary source ofrepayment sufficiently.

Ifthe anticipated repayment event does not occur, the borrower should have the ability
to carry and eventually repay the debt.

Mitigating Factors: To make the recovery process less severe or more bearable.

1. The office of the Lieutenant Governor Banking and Insurance must embark on an
educational process throughout the Virgin Islands Communities on the importance of
Insurance coverage, types of Insurance and technical aspects.

This can be done for homeowners and entrepreneurs and sponsored by the banking
institutions, insurance companies, agencies and the Division of Banking and Insurance.

2. Timely settlement of Claims will avoid bridge loans and thus reduce cost. There should be
legislation to set the time frame from agreement to receipt ofproceeds.

3. Import of temporary construction labor.






















presented by:
Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
Professor of Business
University of the Virgin Islands


Dynamics of a Disastecr
"Impact. RecovONi, ant MitiSmtio "

Business Disaster Prreparebess PbAn
(tatP1P)






The Dynamics ofDisaster "Impact, Recovery, and Mitigalion" 29

BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the (MIEcamic Snumit: The Dynamic ofa Disaster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
Noveamb 12 1996. Harbor View Hotel. St. Thoms U.S. Virgin Islands




A. BUSINESS RECOVERY PLANNING


WHAT?

A PROCESS OF MAKING DECISIONS PRIOR TO A DISASTER ON

HOW TO SPEED UP RECOVERY OF YOUR BUSINESS AFTER

THE DISASTER




WHY?

DISASTER TIME IS NO TIME TO THINK STRATEGICALLY;

NOR IS IT TIME TO OPTIMIZE ON YOUR BUSINESS ACTIONS






The Dynamcs ofDisaster "Inpact, Recovery, and Miligadt"


BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the VI Economic Sunmmit: The Dynamic of a Disaster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12 1996 Harbor View Hotel. St Thomasi US. Virgin Islands



B. FEATURES OF A BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN
(BDPP)


I PHYSICAL LOSSES

LOSSES/LIABILITIES/ASSETS

1. BUSINESS FACILITY









2. INVENTORY





3. EQUIPMENT




4. SUPPLIES


5. DOCUMENTS


ACTION PLAN

1.1 COMPLIANCE WITH BUILDING
CODES

1.2 DISASTER PROTECTION
FEATURES

1.3 INSURANCE COVERAGE



2.1 DISASTER PROTECTION FEATURES

2.2 INSURANCE COVERAGE



3.1 DISASTER PROTECTION FEATURES

3.2 INSURANCE COVERAGE


4.1 DISASTER PROTECTION FEATURES


5.1 DISASTER PROTECTION FEATURES
5.2 KEEPING DUPLICATES AT A SAFE
LOCATION





The Dynamic f Disaster "Impa, Recovery, and Mioeion" 31



BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the UI7 Economic Summit: The Dynamic ofa Dister, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12 1996- Harbor View Hotel. St Thomas. U.S. Virgin Island

II ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL LOSSES AND OBLIGATIONS

LOSSES AND OBLIGATIONS ACTION PLAN

1. SALES 1.1 STAND-BY INVENTORY ORDERS

1.2 STAND-BY SUPPLY
ARRANGEMENTS

1.3 DISASTER CLAUSE IN THE
CONTRACT

1.4 INSURANCE COVERAGE

1.5 BRIDGE FINANCING FOR NEW
INVENTORY/SUPPLIES

1.6 VENDOR/SUPPLIER FINANCING


2. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES




3. CREDITORS




4. PAYROLL



5. SUPPLIERS


6. GOVERNMENT


2.1 FACTOR CONTRACT

2.2 BARTER WITH DEBTORS


3.1 MORATORIUM ARRANGEMENT

3.2 BANK CREDIT ARRANGEMENT


4.1 BANK BRIDGE FINANCING
4.2 BARTER ARRANGEMENT


5.1 BANK BRIDGE FINANCING
5.2 MORATORIUM ARRANGEMENT
5.3 BARTER ARRANGEMENT
5.4 SUPPLIER FINANCING

6.1 MORATORIUM ARRANGEMENT






The Dynmics ofDisaster "Impact, Recvery, and Mitigaion" 32

BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the UVL Economic Summit: The Dynamic of a Disaster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12 1996. Harbor View Hotel St Thomas U.S. Virgin lland



III OPERATIONS LOSSES/DECISIONS


1. COMMUNICATIONS


2. BUSINESS RE-OPENING




3. BUSINESS HOURS




4. PRICING


ACTION PLANS

1.1 DISASTER RESILIENT
TECHNOLOGY


1.2 ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS


2.1 RE-OPENING DATE(S) UNDER

VARIOUS SCENARIOS


3.1 POLICY UNDER VARIOUS

DISASTER SCENARIOS


4.1 POLICY UNDER VARIOUS

DISASTER SCENARIOS


5.1 DISASTER POLICY


5. AUTHORITY






TwDyi of Diaster "Ixpa, Recmmery, and Mitgai an" 33



BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presacmd at the UWIEcaonmic Sumit: The Dynamic ofa Disrster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12 1996- Harbr View Hotel. St Thomas U.S. Virnin Islands


IV. PERSONAL ASSETS


4 TYPES OF BUSINESS STAKEHOLDERS


OWNERS

- EMPLOYEES

- CUSTOMERS

- SUPPLIERS


" EACH HAS PERSONAL ASSETS THAT DISASTERS AFFECT; WHICH

IN TURN AFFECT THE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE OPERATION

OF THE BUSINESS.






The Dynmics of Disaser "Impac, Recoery, and Mfligation" 34



BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the UVI Economic Summit: The Dynamic ofa Disaster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12. 1996. Harbor View Hotel St Thoans. US. Virgin Islalnd


AREAS OF VULNERABILITY FOR THE PERSONAL ASSETS

VULNERABILITIES ACTION PLAN


1. SHELTER











2. FOOD


3. ESSENTIALS








4. COMMUNICATION


1.1 SET ASIDE SPACE IN BUSINESS
FACILITY

1.2 MAKE HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS
WITH HOTEL, ETC

1.3 TEMPORARY REPAIRS ASSISTANCE
1.4 CASH ADVANCES FOR EMPLOYEES/
SUPPLIERS
1.5 DISASTER PAYMENT FOR EMPLOYEES


2.1 DISASTER FOOD BANK

2.1 CASH ADVANCES FOR EMPLOYEES/
SUPPLIERS

2.3 DISASTER PAYMENT FOR EMPLOYEES


3.1 DISASTER SUPPLIES

3.2 CASH ADVANCES FOR EMPLOYEES/
SUPPLIERS

3.3 EMPLOYEES REPAYMENT PLAN
3.4 DISASTER PAYMENT FOR EMPLOYEES


4.1 DISASTER PERSONNEL CONTACT
PLAN

4.2 DISASTER BUSINESS/MANAGEMENT
CONTACT PLAN






The Dynamis of Disaser- "Inmpac Recovery, and Mitgation" 35



BUSINESS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN (BDPP)

Presented at the UVI Economic Summit: The Dynamic of a Disaster, By Dr. Solomon S. Kabuka
November 12. 1996 Harbor View Hotel St. Thomas U.S. Virgin iland


V. OTHER FEATURES OF BDPP


1. BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY

2. SELLING THE BUSINESS

3. CLOSING THE BUSINESS

4. DISASTER BUSINESS FUND 0.5% TO 5% OF SALES; USE BUSINESS
CASUALTY TAX WRITE OFF......SSOM.



LIKE NIGHTMARES, DISASTERS ARE A RECURRING REALITY;

YOU EITHER PLAN FOR THEM BEFORE THEY HAPPEN OR YOU

RISK FACING A DISASTROUS BUSINESS NIGHTMARE AFTER

THEY HAPPEN!!!!! THE CHOICE IS IN YOUR HANDS!!!!!























presented by:
Catherine L. Mills
Commissioner
Department of Human Services


Dtqn"Amics of a Di sister.
"Imract, RcoveN, Amb MfitSigioi"'

'rsoiwal TraSgetM






The Dynamics of Disatr "Impac Recery, and Miigtion" 37





Naiberilt. 1996


OVERVIEW


On September 15, 1995, Hurricane Marilyn, a category 1. 2, 3, or four storm,
depending on how scared you were, where you lived, or how much damage you received.
hit the Virgin Islands. St. Thomas and St. John were particularly hard hit, but St. Croix also
suffered significant damage. Subsequently, on July 8, 1996, Hurricane Bertha hit the
Territory and we started reeling and recovering from this second attack. It is important to
remember that, in many instances, there were homes, businesses, and the economy in
general, that had never quite bounced back from Hurricane Hugo and its wrath of
September 17, 1989. Into this arena enter our most fragile groups of people: the elderly,
the disabled and low income female headed households with children.


DHS STAFF WERE ALSO VICTIMS


The Department of Human Services (DHS) plays a very special part in addressing
the aftermath of a natural disaster. We are responsible for the two single largest individual
assistance programs that address basic needs: food through the Food Stamp Program and
assistance to pay for personal items' expenses and medical care, including burial, through
the Individual and Family Grant (IFG) Program.

It is essential to note that in addition to mobilizing staff to address these federally
funded programs. DHS operates. outside of the prison system, the largest number of
programs for persons in need of residential care and food delivery for those who are
elderly and homebound. Due to the critical nature of these programs. DHS cannot close
or reduce these programs (300 in foster care. 170 in homes for children, youth or the aged)
after a disaster strikes, but must continue to provide food. staffing and shelter to them on
a daily basis.

Recognizing the aforementionea. and taking into account that most of the staff who






The Dynaumis of Disrasr "Iapc, RRecvery, and Midgaion" 38


work in these programs are also hurricane victims without electricity or, in some instances
living in the shelters, these programs continued. Additionally, staff including the
Commissioner, were being asked to participate in a constant barrage of post-disaster
meetings to address disaster needs with FEMA, the American Red Cross, VOLAG,
(representing the voluntary agencies), other government agencies, the Govemor, federal
officials coming for two to three days to review disaster needs and federal officials calling
and requesting counts of the victims and their needs, each one specifying a different
calculation from the one before. All of this, of course, while working in a building with
intermittent power from a generator that breaks down for days or even weeks at a time.

Remember that in all of this. as I mentioned before, most of our staff are working
and going home to houses that are damaged and without power. The lines at the
supermarkets are lengthy and. unless you use only canned goods, you had to shop
frequently. Stores were closed in the evening. Food distribution did start, but it occurred
in the daytime and many staff heavily resented that they had to work so hard and were also
victims, and did not have the time to get in line for the most popular commodities, water.
ice, flashlights, stoves and radios. DHS set up an internal distribution system on-site for
departmental staff, but never receive enough of the popular items to satisfy staff.

I cannot stress enough that DHS' staff performed herculean tasks, as did many
other government agencies, but staffs general consensus was that care givers are very
much ignored during the recovery process. The U. S. Public Health sent scores of persons
to work in the health field, but with the exception of the U. S. Department of Agriculture.
and a disaster specialist from the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, all
federal personnel that arrived in the Tertory, linked to DHS. were primarily there to assess
needs and support or advocate for their special needs groups. A lesson to be learned
from this is that if we expect care givers to perform at optimum levels, we need to
have special accommodations for them and stress counseling tailored to their
needs.

DHS recognized the manoower disaster resultant needs and submitted a grant
request to FEMA. but it was caniec. Why? Because VOLAG. by law. is required to
-espona in the areas we requested. I think there is a failure to recognize that many
territorial VOLAG members are themselves government employees ana could not leave






The DynamiE ofD ier "Impac, Recovry, and Mitd to" 39

their jobs to do volunteer work. Furthermore, organizational volunteerism is more of an
American concept and is not as strong here. A classic example of this misunderstanding
was a serious query of a FEMA official to me, after we requested this assistance, why don't
you use Boy Scout troops to take water, food and ice to senior citizen homes and visit
them daily. The FEMA official was not aware that our troops are primarily headed by
women and if their eldest sons could perform this function they would have to start at home
while their mothers worked. Two lessons to be learned from this are: (1) FEMA laws
do not take local cultural differences into account and they do not seem to have he
flexibility to accommodate special needs. (2) FEMA officials need cultural sensitivity
awareness when going into new places.


RESPONSE TO SPECIAL NEEDS GROUPS

After Hurricanes Marilyn and Bertha. DHS provided both locally and federally
funded services or cash assistance, including:

Approximately S14 million (St. Croix: more than 49.000 persons received and
on St Thomas/St. John: More than 33.000 thousand received) in Hurricane
Marilyn disasterfood stamps and S910,00 in Bertha (all 9,148 were in the St
Thomas/St. John District) were distributed
Expanded Meais-on-Wheeis from 677 to 1.024 elderly persons.
Traveled the island in multi disciplinary teams to individually check on all
disabled persons, foster children. Head Start families and elderly known to
us.
Opened a FEMA funded senior shelter at Bolongo, a smaller one on St. John
and admitted six emergency placements to the homes for the aged.
Issued 545 million aher Marilyn (22.384 households) and. to date. 51.2
million (1,475 housenolds) after Bertha. to IFG eligible persons.
Provided interpreter services at Recovery Centers for the hearing impaired
and Spanish speaking residents.
Increased individual ana family counseling for our clients,
Increased HomemaKer Services to.the elderly with a federal grant from the
U. S. Health ana Human Services and buned the indigent dead.
Trained our staff. cmer govemmental agencies and legislative staff on






The Dynamics ofosater- "Impct, Recovery, and Migatau" 40


responses to the elderly. It was provided by a federal official, facilitated by
DHS (Seniors have difficulty with smell, therefore, more prone to eating
spoiled food. difficultywith hearing, and recovery centers, are noisy and this
results in their not advising they did not understand for fear of appearing
dumb if they say no. etc.)
Operated specialized Recovery Centers for senior citizens, along with FEMA
representatives
Served as advocates throughout the process for many on an individual basis,
including assistance to employees



LESSONS LEARNED


1. The hearing impaired are at a total loss and many become dependent on others
after a disaster as almost all communication emanated from radios.

2. DHS has only two interpreters for the hearing impaired and, in the case of a
disaster, we need about ten times that. Additionally, more written information
needs to be developed and posted daily in central locations. FEMA's "Recovery
Times" was good. but it is not timely enough to meet this need. We also probably
need a centralized listing of soeciaj needs' persons. DHS is aware only of those
who actually receive our services.

3. Disaster literature ana programs need to also be in French, for those who do not
understand English or Spanisn. We also need to develop a roster of residents who
speak other foreign languages to assist after a disaster. For example, we had in the
Bolongo Shelter a German senior c::izen and we naa to look for a private citizen to
communicate for us.

4. Legal guidance neeas to be more readily available after a disaster for special needs'
residents. We also need to start a campaign now to address property ownership
issues. We have a lot of residents. particularly the iow income and elderly, who live
on famiiy land or in the nome of a deceased relative and they neea-legal guidance
to ensure that they wiil be eligibie for federal financial aid in the future, especially






The Dynamic ofDisazr "Infpac Recovery, and Mi, on" 41


since many do not have insurance.

5. We need to recognize that the poor in very small houses were at a disadvantage
if they suffered severe damage. The $25.000 Home Repair Grant was based on
square footage, therefore, if you had a small home you would only get a portion of
the $25,000. Those with larger homes, got the full $25,000, then $12.600 from IFG
to use for structure and, thereafter, more financial assistance from the American
Red Cross for unmet needs. FEMA needs to be more flexible when addressing the
needs of the humble poor, their homes have to be rebuilt as well.

6. We need to develop a comorenensive listing of the fragile elderly who are not DHS
clients so that we can more readily assist them. Perhaos. we also need to have
churches or organizations adopt groups of them and be responsible for helping
these seniors in the physical preparations necessary for a storm and advocate for
them in recovery.

7. FEMA used a new approach of having multiple teams sent to the Temtory in stages.
This resulted in our having to familiarize each new set with the quirks and details of
what was in progress ana it was somewhat frustrating to this local official.

8. We need to resolve more expeoitiously the shelter needs of the disaster victims,
particularly the special needs population. There were instances where the elderly
in shelters started to decomoensate after being there for over a month and had to
be removed and place in the nomes for the aged. The disabled and elderly
cannot, and should not. continue in shelter placement for long periods of time.




Conclusion


The Termory has a 30% oius poverty rate. therefore, more assistance will be
needed after a disaster. T~is is couonie with insurance costs that are so high as to make
them unaffordable. We ail reea to fino ways to address this. Many of our people are not
assertive in seeking assistance, for fear cf aopeanng rude or ungrateful. which may result






TheDynamics of Di sr- "rpac, Recovry, nd Mitgaion" 42


in their not appealing their denials or following through on assistance requests. We all
need to work on this matter.

Major depression sets in when we hear of a storm approaching. More realistically,
I think we need to start a major public information campaign to prepare folks for the fact
that disasters are a way of life in the Canbbean and we have to pray that they will be
smaller ones, but we have to accept that they will occur.

FEMA and the local govemment have been responsive to the disaster needs of the
Territory, but we all need to now sit bacx and analyze our shortcomings. I applaud UVI for
this initiative and I view it as oart of the solution. Let us all continue from here.
























presented by:
Walter G. Peacock, Ph.D.
Program Director of Research
International Hurricane Center
Florida International University


Compalins Hswr icame Ait EAtkqiualk
Risk mb3 Research fumtbi"

A Report







The Dynamics ofDisaster "Imp4 Recoery, and Midgeuon" 44




Due to poprision concnttii eons and an eapctMd ncrese in huMicae
acvfly am h nt 20 years (Gray), and bised upon hiMsnrical acciarnwce.
i t sem nsorl asses fr hmrritan amre mo. Anlly than kie o fwr enniquakes.
Yet te ing fer mitigalo cleary is in Me oAr direction by lurge mpugi

Or. Bot Sheets, former director of the National Hurricane Center



Introduction

This paper presents preliminary findings of a comparison of populations al rsk for humcanes ana

eanhquakes. The findings present not only pooulaions at nsn. c-; also histoncal comparons of damage

resulting from earthquakes and humcanes. In addition preliminary analysis on the aosbursemeni ~o

research funding is inclued. The curoose of Inis analysis is to acaress some of tne isoanty between

research funding for eanrltuake research and funding for humcane research.


Methodology


The findings for the pooulaions at; ris are oases on 1990 Census block grouo oala as umrshead by

FEMA. Tre FSMA oata is from ine C's proouceo for FEMA d Roy Associates tircugn a FEMA

contract wit Michael Baker Engineering. The figures reoorea nere were calculated by ovenaying the

census aata polygons with the ootygons tral reoresent eannouaKe ana numrcane i sK. Hawaii and AlasKa

are not inluOed in the seismicaalaoase. However. it is imoortant 10 note inta bolh Hawall and AlasKa

are considered a nign eannouake nsk and Hawaii is also considered a htgn humcane isK. Therefore. me

total populations for these states are included in me aopropnate nsK populations.

humcane nsK is presented for both 100 anta CO mile Duffers from the east and quif coast of the

United Stales, from Texas to Maine. By hign numcane nsK we mean populations inar are vulnerable to

te effects of a numcane. 00ol wino ant rain Twent-three states. including Hawaii are either totally or

patially at nrs to feel me effects of a nurrcane One hundred nrles is considered tne areas at tme

hignest nrsk: however. nistoncally. numcane effects have been felt even further inland Inlano effects o0




Sheels. Roben. 1995 Personal Communication to James Baker, NOAA Under Secretary and
Adminmstraor.







The Djwieadcs Dienr 'Invac&Rw y, wudM a"


Hurricane Hugo. or example).

High risk earthquake areas are based on county boundaries with the Slatic Coeficient Aa' ground

motion acceleration as represented on NEHRP Maps This seismic layer was furnished by FEMA. There

are seven risk levels with the highest being seven and the lowest one. High Risk, for the purpose of this

analysis, is considered level live and above, or coefficients of .2 or above. Fifteen states, including

Alaska and Hawaii. have areas with high risk. A geographic representation of the 48 contiguous states

can be seen in figure 1


Damage and death figures from humcanes and earthquakes have been gathered from National

Hurricane Center Technical Rerins in addition. these same reports have been the source for the

information on research funding. Ourgoat is not to present this information as new shockrng information.

but rather. to bring to the forefront, once again, the overwhelming inequality This information is not new,

but clearly, it is information forgotten and ignored.


Findings

Population

According to 1990 Census figures. the population of the Uniled Slates was approximately

248.709.873. We acknowledge that populations in a six-year span (the time since the census) change.

sometimes dramatically: however, these figures are still our best estimates. The close to 249 million

people in the US live in approximately 102 million housing units. Of the close to 249 million people in the

United States. a little more than a quarter (27.9%) are most vulnerable to feel the effects Of a riumcane.

More than 69 million people live witnin 100 miles of the Gulf coast. Atlantic coast or in the state of

Hawaii. This population lives in more than 49 million housing units. While this population is most at nsk

for the senous effects resulting from numcanes and tropical storms, as we all too often see. as tropical

systems move inland, the effects become more widespread.

If Ihe bullers from the coast extend inland another 100 miles (making the lotal coastal Duffer 200

miles), an additional 26.5 million people are at nsk to feel the effects of a tropical weather system. This

increases the total at risk population to close to 69.5 million. In addition. close to 11 million more housing







nThDy vnea ofDisaster- "Impact R wec r yand Mitigaton" 46



units ar at risk, increasing Ihe total at risk housing units to a little more than 49 million. Roughly 39% of

the total population, then. lives within geographic areas of high vulnerability for the effects of tropical

weather systems with close to 28% at the greatest risk. Using the more conservative buffer of 100 miles

from the coast, almost twice as many people are at the greatest isk for hurricanes than those at the

highest risk for earthquakes

In the United States. 14.7% (neady 37 million people) of the total population lives in geographic

areas of high earthquake risk. The vast majority of this population lives in the state of California, with the

remaining population Ir. g primarily in the western United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. The

exception to this is the population at risk along the New Madnd Faut in the central United States In

addition. almost 14 million housing units are within the geographic areas of high nsk. This figure is close

to 14% of the total housing units in the United States. Yet. while a significant number of people and

housing units are at risk for earthquakes approximately 48% more people are vulnerable to the effects

of tropical weather systems. In fact. in the last 100 years more deaths and damage can be attributed to

major tropical weather systems than to major earthquakes.

Deaths and Damage
During the 1900's (through February 1996), approximately 15.000 people lost their lives as a

result of the 30 deadliest trooical weather systems in the contiguous United Slates.: In fact. 15.000 is a

conservative number since it oees not account for storms that resulted in less than 30 deaths (such as

Hurricane Andrew) Earthquakes, during this same time penod. caused approximately 1.500 deaths."

Hurricanes, then. in the continental United Slates. caused close to ten times more deaths in the 20"

century than earthquakes. During this century. hurricanes likewise caused more propeny damage.

Tropical weather systems in the continental Unitea States ounng the last century caused

significant orooeny damage. Adiusting all losses to 1994 dollars, the 30 most costliest humcanes


'Heben. Paul J.. Jerry 0. Jarrell. ana Max Mayfield. 1996. he Oeadliest. Costliest and Most
Intense United States Humcanes of this Century (ano Other Freouently Requested Humcane Fadst.
NOAA Technical Memoranoum NWS TPC-1. Update February 1996.
'Raopacort. Ed. Personal communication to Dr. Robert Sheets. Director of National Hurricane
Center as comlmied in Dr. Rooen Sheets memorandum to NOAA Unoer Secretary and Aministor.
.ames Baker.







The DYZik ofDisr "1A Rc4over7, -dMkigatiern"


resulted in losses of over 100.7 billion dollars. Of Ihe 30 most costiest tropical weather events, 23 have

exceeded S1 billion in damage with the costliest event Hurricane Andrew in 1992 with damage of over

.28.6 billion. In addition, three events in Puerto Rico and one in Hawaii resulted in damages exceeding

$1 billon.' In comparison, only 8 earthquakes in the continental United States during the 1900's have

caused over $1 billion in damage (in 1990 dollars).-

Thirteen major and 31 minor earthquakes in the continental United States and six large

earthquakes in Hawaii and Alaska caused approximately 47.97 billion in damage, less than half of the

damage caused by the costliest humcanes during the same time penod. Until the 1994 Nonthridge

earthquake, the hurricane to earthquake damage ratio was as high as 4.5. Yet. even though tropical

weather systems kill more people, damage more property, end place at risk more people and housing

units than earthquakes, research funding overwhelmingly favors earthquake research over hurricane

research.

Research Funding

Research funding disorpononanely favors earthquake research. Over S350 million annually

funds earthquake research and mitigation through both Ihe federally funded sources. The National

Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) which includes NSF, FEMA. USGS. and NIST funds

$100 million in research. C:,er federal funding from agencies including the Department of

Transportation. USAID. NASA Veteran s Administration, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Energy,

Department of Defense. HUD and Helath ano Human Services amounts to an additional $250 million. Of

the NEHRP funding, about S30 million is from NSF In addition. FEMA distributes about S15 to $22





Hebert. Jarrell. and Mayfield. c 8.

'Heber. Jarrell. and Mayfield. c 8.

tGray. William. 1995 Personal communication to Dr. Roben Sheets. then director of the
National Humcane Center. Gray sites the NOAA National Geoonysical Data Center report of September
1992. titled CATALOG of Significant Earnnaualke 2150 BC to 1991 AD for eartlquaKe hgures.

Gray, p. 3.







Th Dynjaa ofDibsasm "Ilma, Recovry, and Miigatin" 48



million of the NEHRP funding.! Tropical weather systems do not have a NEHRP equivalent.

Huricane research, mitigation and operations share abolt a $50 million annual budget This

includes funding for hurricane aircraft reconnaissance and the National Hurricane Canter In The 1994-

1995 fiscal year, FEMA spent S2.89 million an the hurricane problem, up from its previous allocation of

0$9 million.'O Just as FEMA spends 5 to 10 limes as much on earthquakes than tropical weather. NSF

disproportionately funds earthquake projects. According to Rappaports sources. NSF grains for tropical

weather research were 8646.000 in 1992. S750 000 in 1993. and 5875.000 in 1994 Compared to NSF's

$30 million share of NEHRP. NSF grants close to 30 times more money for earthquake

research/mitigation than lor tropical cydone research/mitigalion.

The majority of federal money for hurricanes, however does not go to research. 'Most of the

Federal funding for humcanes goes to support surveillancel and forecasting, not research... By coast.

a very high percent of Federal funding for earthquakes Is directed to research. I am told that the NSF has

four project monitors whose efforts go fully to earthquake research implementation. NSF has no such

exclusive hurncane research monitor. Can there be any doubt that Federal research Ifunding] for

earthquakes is quite out-of-balance in companion with hurricane research?"

DOlcussion

As we can see. during the 1900's. tropical weather systems caused more damage and

deaths than earthquakes. Additionally. today. more people are at risk to tel the effects of tropical

weather systems than are at risk for a major earthquake. However, funding tor research and

mitigation clearly goes the other way No one can suggest that we know all that we need to know



'Sheets. p. 2 and Rappaport. p. 2

SSheets. p. 2.

'Rappaoon. p 3.

'Raopaoort. p 3.

O Dr. William Gray. noted huumcane socialist In personal communication with Dr. Roten
Sheets.







ntk& Pueai- q ofDDIabu "Inyiuc R-erry, -dlM gabiex"


about Iropical weather systems, a predictive science or as a sociological phenaamenn. Neither

can anyone suggest that we understand all we need to know about wind engineering The findings

presented here suggest some issues that need to be further addressed.

Clearly we need to understand more about tropical weather systems. Our knowledge

must extend beyond predicting landfall Unlike with earthquakes, we know that we will have to

deal with more hurricanes making landfall in the United States In fact. in the first four months of

the 1996 hurricane season, three storms have already affected populations on the east coast of the

United States causing millions, if not billions, of dollars in damages and claiming at least thirty

lives. We need more research that addresses issues related to prediction, evacuation, wind

engineering, and mitigation just to highlight a few.

In order to facilitate more research, a tropical weather system equivalent of NEHRP is

necessary. Only through long term consistem support can we begin to understand the dynamics of

tropical cyclones Comparative projects are necessary so we can understand not only the science

of hurricanes, but also how culture and political economy alter the sociological terrain a storm

travels.

In no way are we suggestion that earthquake research is over funded. Our intent is only to

highlight that in comparison, hurricane research is grossly underfunded. Damage. deaths and

populations at risk all emphasize noicate that we must take the hurricane problem more seriously








Abot VVI...
The University of the Virgin Islands was chartered in 1962 as the College of the Virgin Islands.
It is a co-educational, publicly funded, land-grant institution accredited by the Middle States
Association of Colleges and Universities to grant bachelor of science and bachelor of arts degrees;
and associate in arts and associate in science degrees and master's of arts degrees in education,
business administration and public administration. UVI currently enrolls about 3,100 full and
part-time students on its main campus in St. Thomas and sister campus on St. Croix. UVI
conducts research in its academic divisions and at its MacLean Marine Science Center,
Agriculture Experiment Station and the Virgin Islands Environmental Resource Station. It serves
the community through the Eastern Caribbean Center, the Bureau of Public Administration,
Continuing Education Division, Cooperative Extension Service and the Small Business
Development Center.

The /V7 Estern Cribboan Center...
The mission of the UVI Eastern Caribbean Center (ECC) is to foster rational development of the
Eastern Caribbean, including the U.S. Virgin Islands. The ECC seeks to improve relations among
the countries and territories of the region by facilitating quality collaborative ventures. It further
seeks to build institutional capabilities both domestically and regionally. The ECC conducts and
sponsors research in the U.S. Virgin Islands and the rest of the Eastern Caribbean, and
disseminates information to enhance the contribution of scientific inquiry to human well-being in
the Caribbean region.











The Dptantmcs of Disster "hnspaet Recov o anb Mitigatlon", was prepared for the
Eastern Caribbean Center (ECC) of the University of the Virgin Islands with support from the
National Science Foundation (NSF) by Jacquelyn D. Davis. Permission granted to reprint with
credit to author and the Eastern Caribbean Center. The information herein does not reflect the
views of the NSF or the ECC.

To obtain copies, contact:
Eastern Caribbean Center
University of the Virgin Islands
2 John Brewer's Bay
St. Thomas, VI 00802

November, 1996

Photos by Bill Payne Photos




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