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Transformation through training

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Title:
Transformation through training
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Bydgoszcz, Poland
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NATO- Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC)
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Občasno
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English

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serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )

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Nasl. z nasl. zaslona.
General Note:
Opis vira z dne 8. 5. 2012.

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright, Joint Force Training Centre. Permission granted to University of Florida to digitize and display this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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814257067 ( OCLC )
2084-8358 ( ISSN )
ocn814257067
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355.02 ( udc )

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PAGE 2

14 32 82 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 3TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 JFTC Towards New Challenges Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski 8 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training 10 Resolute Support Advisory Training 14 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC Advisory Training 16 JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015 18 Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process How to Demystify the Devil 21 The Treason Files Countering the Threat from British Nationals Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown 32 Major Lessons from COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to Use Them in the Future 39 Together in NATO 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region 42 In Retrospect Life at the JFTC Publishing Institution: Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz (JFTC) Managing director: Brigadier General Lszl SZAB, JFTC Deputy Commander / Chief of Staff Chief Editor: MAJ Goran PIJETLOVIC, Chief PAO JFTC, Spokesperson COM JFTC Editorial Board: Mrs. Kamila SIERZPUTOWSKA, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland Agency, Army of the Czech Republic Advisory Committee: Editorial Contact Information: Public Affairs Office Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz, 85-915, Poland. E-mail: pao@jftc.nato.int Transformation Through TrainingThe aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among training of training, military professional education, and related technological support. In the context of The the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and in the Transformation Through Training magazine. areas of command and staff training, professional military education, simulations and simulation technologies, distributed training, military training of the most recent experience and lessons learned from ongoing operations, training events and recent innovations in the field of simulations and information the life of the international community at the JFTC 4The articles published in this magazine represent opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of NATO. to the archive of Transformation Through Training magazine.

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14 32 82 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 3TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 JFTC Towards New Challenges Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski 8 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training 10 Resolute Support Advisory Training 14 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC Advisory Training 16 JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015 18 Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process How to Demystify the Devil 21 The Treason Files Countering the Threat from British Nationals Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown 32 Major Lessons from COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to Use Them in the Future 39 Together in NATO 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region 42 In Retrospect Life at the JFTC Publishing Institution: Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz (JFTC) Managing director: Brigadier General Lszl SZAB, JFTC Deputy Commander / Chief of Staff Chief Editor: MAJ Goran PIJETLOVIC, Chief PAO JFTC, Spokesperson COM JFTC Editorial Board: Mrs. Kamila SIERZPUTOWSKA, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland Agency, Army of the Czech Republic Advisory Committee: Editorial Contact Information: Public Affairs Office Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz, 85-915, Poland. E-mail: pao@jftc.nato.int Transformation Through TrainingThe aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among training of training, military professional education, and related technological support. In the context of The the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and in the Transformation Through Training magazine. areas of command and staff training, professional military education, simulations and simulation technologies, distributed training, military training of the most recent experience and lessons learned from ongoing operations, training events and recent innovations in the field of simulations and information the life of the international community at the JFTC 4The articles published in this magazine represent opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of NATO. to the archive of Transformation Through Training magazine.

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4 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 5Sir, last year the Joint Force Training Centre celebrated its 10th anniversary. You have been the Commander of the unit for 1,5 year. You took the helm of the JFTC in a very interesting time the change of mission in Afghanistan, new challenges appeared. How do you asses readiness of your centre to respond to todays needs of the Alliance? Did the JFTC make a good use of the past decade? events, exercises, experiments, courses and time. My assessment can in fact be based the JFTC Commander. And I have to admit that it is a very interesting time. The ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan, supported by the JFTC in terms of Headquarters and their staffs preparation, came to an end. and its future members are also trained by challenges appear, like training for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and many others. and its staff. This evolving situation verifies the JFTC made very good use of the past ten years. You said that this moment, full of new challenges, verified the professionalism. How? are preparing them for a train-advise-assist combat-environment. The fact that a soldier changed the training system, revised it and soldiers combat skills in the train-adviseinto advisory qualities. have changed. ISAF required training for training advisors and trainers to advise in the areas of mission execution, planning, support, reporting system, etc. In most areas related to combat preparation, plan budget for upcoming years, equipment Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski JFTC Towards New Challenges

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4 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 5Sir, last year the Joint Force Training Centre celebrated its 10th anniversary. You have been the Commander of the unit for 1,5 year. You took the helm of the JFTC in a very interesting time the change of mission in Afghanistan, new challenges appeared. How do you asses readiness of your centre to respond to todays needs of the Alliance? Did the JFTC make a good use of the past decade? events, exercises, experiments, courses and time. My assessment can in fact be based the JFTC Commander. And I have to admit that it is a very interesting time. The ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan, supported by the JFTC in terms of Headquarters and their staffs preparation, came to an end. and its future members are also trained by challenges appear, like training for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and many others. and its staff. This evolving situation verifies the JFTC made very good use of the past ten years. You said that this moment, full of new challenges, verified the professionalism. How? are preparing them for a train-advise-assist combat-environment. The fact that a soldier changed the training system, revised it and soldiers combat skills in the train-adviseinto advisory qualities. have changed. ISAF required training for training advisors and trainers to advise in the areas of mission execution, planning, support, reporting system, etc. In most areas related to combat preparation, plan budget for upcoming years, equipment Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski JFTC Towards New Challenges

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6 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 7 thanks to the JFTC staffs professionalism. Training for future participants of the Afghan mission is, however, only a part of the JFTCs work. is currently in the transition period from its maintain its capability of performing its core forces readiness. To help achieve this, Allied Leaders have set out the goal of modern, and led. The CFIs task is to help maintain education and training, exercises, and better use of technology. command, Allied Command Transformation test the existing potential, identify shortages, and propose possible solutions aiming at achieving the CFI goals. And here comes the CWIX the annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise their command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems and ones that other nations use. The JFTC meets high standards required to execute this extremely challenging event. We cannot forget either about the VJTF. The geopolitical situation in the Eastern certain concepts, strategies and doctrines a coalition. The JFTC is ready to respond to tasks in this regard. How do you see the JFTCs role in this area? be able to deploy to respond to a security command and control and reception units that are being established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. My intention is to merge training for the Cooperation implemented already during the different command and control, liaison systems so that they could cooperate effectively and fulfil their tasks. When you talk about adjusting to the new reality, one may have an impression that these changes are being implemented seamlessly, without any problems. Is it really so? Experience of the JFTC staff guarantees highly appreciated by our customers. the JFTCs motto. Although it refers mainly to transformation the Alliance undergoes thanks to training, it also describes changes, development the JFTC staff goes through thanks to practice. The JFTC is a relatively Talking about numbers the JFTC consists of 107 posts only. Conducting and hosting so many training events, exercises, courses, experiments with total audience between 4 and 6 thousand people a year how this, as you mentioned yourself, small team, can handle it? Huge support comes from contractors. our Program of Work thanks to devotion of the JFTC permanent staff, the contractors, but also Agency Communications and Information Systems Support Unit Bydgoszcz. We have than just training executed in Bydgoszcz. Our staff travels a lot in support of other training participate in various conferences, recce visits indispensable for preparation and execution of up-to-date training. It is quite common, that the JFTC employees devote their free time so that the JFTC tasks are executed on the highest possible level. to invest in our permanent personnel here I mean training and courses for JFTC members Establishment. This is also my key task for the months to come to prepare the JFTC Human factor is one thing, and what about the infrastructure, tools the JFTC uses in execution of training? Were or are changes in those areas equally challenging? Our largest challenge is combining Simulation systems that support exercises on different called JCATS (Joint Conflict And Tactical Simulation system). It does a great job at to corps level. Although joint operational level the JWC for joint operational level exercises operational and Afghan Mission training. to integrate multiple levels of training into a previously more ambitious project to federate evolving mission. providing and using our given capabilities the JFTC can make a difference for the level in particular VJTF, are far more CAX and CIS extensive than those the JFTC has been simple CIS support at a single location to a large scale, possibly even distributed exercise involving multiple training audience at multiple locations using a complex simulation driven synthetic environment. In in scope and complexity in the upcoming this for some time. The Wargaming Branch participating in the Modeling and Simulations functional area in CWIX and by conducting simulation tests using the South East to provide a state of the art training support to set the stage for exercises reflecting the operational reality (train as you operate). If you were to describe the position of the JFTC in the NATO training network, where would it be? Would execution of NATO training programme be possible without the JFTC? Possible? maybe yes. What I am sure of, is and done in Bydgoszcz. It happens very often see clearly that training at the JFTC is simply training programme complete. indispensable part of the Alliances training system. thank and to congratulate my staff. They professionalism and devotion every day, to express my gratitude and admiration for the Alliance and the difference it makes is invaluable. Questions asked by the JFTC Public Affairs Office

PAGE 7

6 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 7 thanks to the JFTC staffs professionalism. Training for future participants of the Afghan mission is, however, only a part of the JFTCs work. is currently in the transition period from its maintain its capability of performing its core forces readiness. To help achieve this, Allied Leaders have set out the goal of modern, and led. The CFIs task is to help maintain education and training, exercises, and better use of technology. command, Allied Command Transformation test the existing potential, identify shortages, and propose possible solutions aiming at achieving the CFI goals. And here comes the CWIX the annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise their command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems and ones that other nations use. The JFTC meets high standards required to execute this extremely challenging event. We cannot forget either about the VJTF. The geopolitical situation in the Eastern certain concepts, strategies and doctrines a coalition. The JFTC is ready to respond to tasks in this regard. How do you see the JFTCs role in this area? be able to deploy to respond to a security command and control and reception units that are being established in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. My intention is to merge training for the Cooperation implemented already during the different command and control, liaison systems so that they could cooperate effectively and fulfil their tasks. When you talk about adjusting to the new reality, one may have an impression that these changes are being implemented seamlessly, without any problems. Is it really so? Experience of the JFTC staff guarantees highly appreciated by our customers. the JFTCs motto. Although it refers mainly to transformation the Alliance undergoes thanks to training, it also describes changes, development the JFTC staff goes through thanks to practice. The JFTC is a relatively Talking about numbers the JFTC consists of 107 posts only. Conducting and hosting so many training events, exercises, courses, experiments with total audience between 4 and 6 thousand people a year how this, as you mentioned yourself, small team, can handle it? Huge support comes from contractors. our Program of Work thanks to devotion of the JFTC permanent staff, the contractors, but also Agency Communications and Information Systems Support Unit Bydgoszcz. We have than just training executed in Bydgoszcz. Our staff travels a lot in support of other training participate in various conferences, recce visits indispensable for preparation and execution of up-to-date training. It is quite common, that the JFTC employees devote their free time so that the JFTC tasks are executed on the highest possible level. to invest in our permanent personnel here I mean training and courses for JFTC members Establishment. This is also my key task for the months to come to prepare the JFTC Human factor is one thing, and what about the infrastructure, tools the JFTC uses in execution of training? Were or are changes in those areas equally challenging? Our largest challenge is combining Simulation systems that support exercises on different called JCATS (Joint Conflict And Tactical Simulation system). It does a great job at to corps level. Although joint operational level the JWC for joint operational level exercises operational and Afghan Mission training. to integrate multiple levels of training into a previously more ambitious project to federate evolving mission. providing and using our given capabilities the JFTC can make a difference for the level in particular VJTF, are far more CAX and CIS extensive than those the JFTC has been simple CIS support at a single location to a large scale, possibly even distributed exercise involving multiple training audience at multiple locations using a complex simulation driven synthetic environment. In in scope and complexity in the upcoming this for some time. The Wargaming Branch participating in the Modeling and Simulations functional area in CWIX and by conducting simulation tests using the South East to provide a state of the art training support to set the stage for exercises reflecting the operational reality (train as you operate). If you were to describe the position of the JFTC in the NATO training network, where would it be? Would execution of NATO training programme be possible without the JFTC? Possible? maybe yes. What I am sure of, is and done in Bydgoszcz. It happens very often see clearly that training at the JFTC is simply training programme complete. indispensable part of the Alliances training system. thank and to congratulate my staff. They professionalism and devotion every day, to express my gratitude and admiration for the Alliance and the difference it makes is invaluable. Questions asked by the JFTC Public Affairs Office

PAGE 8

MAJ Goran Pijetlovic, German Army, JFTC Public Affairs Officer and Spokesperson COM JFTC Ms. Radoslawa Kubiczek, Polish Civilian, JFTC Public Affairs Specialist Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, pointed out main changes and challenges during the preparation phase of the future Resolute Support training: system."8 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 9during the exercises, created a professional training event that met current needs and challenges the Alliance faced.Execution going to serve in the first structures of pre-deployment training. For the future confident and cohesive staff, thus creating hand received a standardized preparation for their mission of training, advising and assisting their Afghan counterparts and national and regional institutions. prepared and executed the first Resolute Support TE. Within this exercise, specifically aimed at preparing soldiers for from the Resolute Support Headquarters and from Train, Advise, Assist Command supporting the next Resolute Support Training Event and preparing others for deployment. During his visit to the training Commander of the Joint Force Command Brunssum, thanked the JFTC Commander and his staff for the commitment: this in Bydgoszcz. () It is best suited for Bydgoszcz. Its a great pleasure to see the The ISAF combat mission came to an end the aim of training, advising and assisting and other institutions on a national level. in majority of the broadcasts, this change had a fundamental meaning for the Alliance and thus had a vast impact on both the soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and institutions responsible for their preparation for the mission.New task for JFTC Training Centre (JFTC) that formerly focused mainly on ISAF pre-deployment for preparing future members of the RS and needs of the non-combat mission in Afghanistan. primarily on the functionally based train, Afghan ministries, institutions and at in the regional Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAACs) and their advisors training before leaving for Afghanistan. from preparation for a combat mission, to train, advise and assist their Afghan counterparts and representatives of JFTC specialists had to plan, prepare and Tailoring new exercise The key element of the preparation out about the main challenges that Afghan Focused on these, teams of planners from the JFTC Training Division visited Afghanistan several times in order to get a realistic picture of the future mission. In theatre they had a the HQs in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. All the information gathered plus interaction and communication laid a perfect foundation for generating a realistic and up-to-date exercise scenario for the future JFTC training audience. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) support

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MAJ Goran Pijetlovic, German Army, JFTC Public Affairs Officer and Spokesperson COM JFTC Ms. Radoslawa Kubiczek, Polish Civilian, JFTC Public Affairs Specialist Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, pointed out main changes and challenges during the preparation phase of the future Resolute Support training: system."8 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 9during the exercises, created a professional training event that met current needs and challenges the Alliance faced.Execution going to serve in the first structures of pre-deployment training. For the future confident and cohesive staff, thus creating hand received a standardized preparation for their mission of training, advising and assisting their Afghan counterparts and national and regional institutions. prepared and executed the first Resolute Support TE. Within this exercise, specifically aimed at preparing soldiers for from the Resolute Support Headquarters and from Train, Advise, Assist Command supporting the next Resolute Support Training Event and preparing others for deployment. During his visit to the training Commander of the Joint Force Command Brunssum, thanked the JFTC Commander and his staff for the commitment: this in Bydgoszcz. () It is best suited for Bydgoszcz. Its a great pleasure to see the The ISAF combat mission came to an end the aim of training, advising and assisting and other institutions on a national level. in majority of the broadcasts, this change had a fundamental meaning for the Alliance and thus had a vast impact on both the soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and institutions responsible for their preparation for the mission.New task for JFTC Training Centre (JFTC) that formerly focused mainly on ISAF pre-deployment for preparing future members of the RS and needs of the non-combat mission in Afghanistan. primarily on the functionally based train, Afghan ministries, institutions and at in the regional Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAACs) and their advisors training before leaving for Afghanistan. from preparation for a combat mission, to train, advise and assist their Afghan counterparts and representatives of JFTC specialists had to plan, prepare and Tailoring new exercise The key element of the preparation out about the main challenges that Afghan Focused on these, teams of planners from the JFTC Training Division visited Afghanistan several times in order to get a realistic picture of the future mission. In theatre they had a the HQs in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. All the information gathered plus interaction and communication laid a perfect foundation for generating a realistic and up-to-date exercise scenario for the future JFTC training audience. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) support

PAGE 10

USIP Slide MAJ Ronald Roy, Canadian Army, JFTC Training Division Resolute Support Advisory Training 10 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 11Mistakes can be made in training, lessons learnt and then additional practice provided in order to achieve a competent level of proficiency. Advising requires formalized training to develop those special sets of techniques used by any military advisor. This advising techniques are utilized and practiced RS advisors are employed at all levels of command from the Training Advise Assist Command (TAAC) up through to the RS HQ and into the Ministries of Defense personnel from various countries that are to be assigned to specific key personnel Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior (Commanders, G1 thru G6 staff officers and other key like functions). During JFTC Training Events, RS advisors are grouped in teams of eight and are led by a Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME. The Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME main function is to of information and experience can occur and foremost the RS advisors are members not that of Afghanistan. The RS advisors JFTC advisory training is to permit the RS advisors to practice acting as functional experts, and then in time advise in support can also provide a liaison capability to coordinate the planning of operations. The JFTC Advisor Training Model consists of three distinct parts Mission Specific Training (MST), Battle Staff Training (BST) and then the Battle Staff Training plus (BST+). JFTC Advisor Training Model MST is the first module provided by JFTC and is at the tactical level. It consists of a combination of specified lectures, panel discussion and briefings delivered by the pre-deployment training and focused on the theatre environment. During this part of the training, RS advisors are focused on initiating internal team SOPs, developing team spirit, preparing for the BST and module provided by the JFTC, again at the tactical level, and is a demonstration phase led by SMEs. The BST provides training designed to maintain and improve the Advisors proficiency in missionessential tasks comprised of responsibilities from several functional areas / directorates / divisions. The training aim for the RS advisors during the BST is to prepare in theatre. These SMEs led and monitored being involved in Operational Planning observations / problems through the RS HQ Staff process. The BST + is the last module provided by JFTC, again at the tactical level. During this last phase the RS Staff through the provision of FRAGO to initiate interaction in a vignette format. A Vignette is a brief description, use of this training method exposes the and creates discussion. Vignettes also provide for a deeper understanding of SMEs to introduce specific tools and tips to support the preparation of the interaction. This situation brings together Train Advise Assist Team (TAAT) training in support of Resolute Support. There have been three subsequent training events since then training event. For the purpose of this article an a suggestion to an equally experienced person events or activates are executed. A mentor advice to a less experienced and often younger person but does not makes decisions about Matter Expert (SME) in a field or branch can then become an advisor is to veer from the truth. Advising is an acquired skill or ability that requires specialist training. (Some of the skills or abilities are stated in MST BST BST+

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USIP Slide MAJ Ronald Roy, Canadian Army, JFTC Training Division Resolute Support Advisory Training 10 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 11Mistakes can be made in training, lessons learnt and then additional practice provided in order to achieve a competent level of proficiency. Advising requires formalized training to develop those special sets of techniques used by any military advisor. This advising techniques are utilized and practiced RS advisors are employed at all levels of command from the Training Advise Assist Command (TAAC) up through to the RS HQ and into the Ministries of Defense personnel from various countries that are to be assigned to specific key personnel Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior (Commanders, G1 thru G6 staff officers and other key like functions). During JFTC Training Events, RS advisors are grouped in teams of eight and are led by a Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME. The Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor SME main function is to of information and experience can occur and foremost the RS advisors are members not that of Afghanistan. The RS advisors JFTC advisory training is to permit the RS advisors to practice acting as functional experts, and then in time advise in support can also provide a liaison capability to coordinate the planning of operations. The JFTC Advisor Training Model consists of three distinct parts Mission Specific Training (MST), Battle Staff Training (BST) and then the Battle Staff Training plus (BST+). JFTC Advisor Training Model MST is the first module provided by JFTC and is at the tactical level. It consists of a combination of specified lectures, panel discussion and briefings delivered by the pre-deployment training and focused on the theatre environment. During this part of the training, RS advisors are focused on initiating internal team SOPs, developing team spirit, preparing for the BST and module provided by the JFTC, again at the tactical level, and is a demonstration phase led by SMEs. The BST provides training designed to maintain and improve the Advisors proficiency in missionessential tasks comprised of responsibilities from several functional areas / directorates / divisions. The training aim for the RS advisors during the BST is to prepare in theatre. These SMEs led and monitored being involved in Operational Planning observations / problems through the RS HQ Staff process. The BST + is the last module provided by JFTC, again at the tactical level. During this last phase the RS Staff through the provision of FRAGO to initiate interaction in a vignette format. A Vignette is a brief description, use of this training method exposes the and creates discussion. Vignettes also provide for a deeper understanding of SMEs to introduce specific tools and tips to support the preparation of the interaction. This situation brings together Train Advise Assist Team (TAAT) training in support of Resolute Support. There have been three subsequent training events since then training event. For the purpose of this article an a suggestion to an equally experienced person events or activates are executed. A mentor advice to a less experienced and often younger person but does not makes decisions about Matter Expert (SME) in a field or branch can then become an advisor is to veer from the truth. Advising is an acquired skill or ability that requires specialist training. (Some of the skills or abilities are stated in MST BST BST+

PAGE 12

12 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 13 are their enthusiasm, sense of humor and daily commitment in seeing the term sustainable solution to all issue. By recommending realistic goals the RS advisors maintained rapport, gain credibility, demonstrate their value to their advisee and thus increase their influence on their primary advisee. They are most definitely evolutionary steps rather than revolutionary ones. Through this interactive and tested model the JFTC is able to impart key training messages. Training audiences learn that they are not commanders but honest brokers for their Afghan counterparts, furthermore they learn that Afghan failures are not their failures and that all RS each time. RS Advisors are professional competent officers and the requirement for specialized advisory training at JFTC is of benefit to them in order that they can understand their Afghan counterparts and achieve mission success of Train/ Advise/ Assist. real Afghan staff officers from various Afghan Regions and, using these current in theatre scenarios, tasks them to produce or to face daily meetings, thus establishing a professional relationship. The RS advisors utilize his/her listening skills to develop During the BST and BST+, there from corrupting to female recruiting to logistical support problems to budgets to and/or Afghan partners. The second group (18 Vignettes) is designated as stand-alone interaction and no further staff action is required after the interaction has training audience are actually involved, the others as observers (or as our Afghan team members, the Afghan partner and All RS advisors learn from each others positive and negative points for each interaction. The RS advisors not only built their relationship on each interaction but staged in progressively harder and more complex issues so that the RS advisors skills. The most complex and challenging vignettes involve the political / religious / ethic and gender issues, indeed, these are typically assigned to the most experienced Senior Advisors so as to not destroy the less experience advisors as they gain confidence. Through respectful and honest discussions / interactions, the RS advisors attempt to establish common ground, thus permitting him/ her to gain the trust advisors from theatre have noted that every conversation is a negotiation and that they are never really off duty. There their Afghan counter partner in order to maintain the advisor/ advisee relationship. JFTC Training Events encourage RS Afghan system/ procedures function technical or practical solution to the issue. to any successful engagement for an RS through observations and being opennot necessarily appropriate or acceptable to our Afghan partners. Patience, understanding and flexibility of approach in the RS advisor are essential elements to illustrates this developmental model. This approach is taught and practiced training event at the JFTC. Each interaction requires many The RS advisors have to learn that

PAGE 13

12 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 13 are their enthusiasm, sense of humor and daily commitment in seeing the term sustainable solution to all issue. By recommending realistic goals the RS advisors maintained rapport, gain credibility, demonstrate their value to their advisee and thus increase their influence on their primary advisee. They are most definitely evolutionary steps rather than revolutionary ones. Through this interactive and tested model the JFTC is able to impart key training messages. Training audiences learn that they are not commanders but honest brokers for their Afghan counterparts, furthermore they learn that Afghan failures are not their failures and that all RS each time. RS Advisors are professional competent officers and the requirement for specialized advisory training at JFTC is of benefit to them in order that they can understand their Afghan counterparts and achieve mission success of Train/ Advise/ Assist. real Afghan staff officers from various Afghan Regions and, using these current in theatre scenarios, tasks them to produce or to face daily meetings, thus establishing a professional relationship. The RS advisors utilize his/her listening skills to develop During the BST and BST+, there from corrupting to female recruiting to logistical support problems to budgets to and/or Afghan partners. The second group (18 Vignettes) is designated as stand-alone interaction and no further staff action is required after the interaction has training audience are actually involved, the others as observers (or as our Afghan team members, the Afghan partner and All RS advisors learn from each others positive and negative points for each interaction. The RS advisors not only built their relationship on each interaction but staged in progressively harder and more complex issues so that the RS advisors skills. The most complex and challenging vignettes involve the political / religious / ethic and gender issues, indeed, these are typically assigned to the most experienced Senior Advisors so as to not destroy the less experience advisors as they gain confidence. Through respectful and honest discussions / interactions, the RS advisors attempt to establish common ground, thus permitting him/ her to gain the trust advisors from theatre have noted that every conversation is a negotiation and that they are never really off duty. There their Afghan counter partner in order to maintain the advisor/ advisee relationship. JFTC Training Events encourage RS Afghan system/ procedures function technical or practical solution to the issue. to any successful engagement for an RS through observations and being opennot necessarily appropriate or acceptable to our Afghan partners. Patience, understanding and flexibility of approach in the RS advisor are essential elements to illustrates this developmental model. This approach is taught and practiced training event at the JFTC. Each interaction requires many The RS advisors have to learn that

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MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division 14 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 15 Another edition of the annual SACTled Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX) opened on 8 June to the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, for as Modelling and Simulation (M&S) same time national command and control and control systems. CWIX is the one together and technically test their ability to operate together. This interoperability mission can be successful. to expanded cloud. The JFTC has kept the virtualization technology. For the third nations vCloud service for their testing The nations could configure their systems ahead of time from remote locations, tests. They needed less equipment hence CWIX facilitated steady expansion to the cloud service to generate room for more clients. Eventually our goal is to place the majority of CWIX participants on the cloud servers. does the expanding vCloud service expand our technical ability to host more clients, generating larger and more realistic exercises but it also builds up our staff systems. One of the JFTCs functions is a the JFTC can test the systems and develop procedures that support the future training events. It is in this role, aided by residence experience and CWIX triggered flexibility that makes the JFTC the future place for the VJTF. The future of CWIX looks bright. nations have expressed interest in joining CWIX. Among those nations are such Slovakia and the Baltic States. Even the as Montenegro have started looking at CWIX as an event important to their future. stretched but the experienced and highly 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC

PAGE 15

MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division 14 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 15 Another edition of the annual SACTled Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX) opened on 8 June to the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, for as Modelling and Simulation (M&S) same time national command and control and control systems. CWIX is the one together and technically test their ability to operate together. This interoperability mission can be successful. to expanded cloud. The JFTC has kept the virtualization technology. For the third nations vCloud service for their testing The nations could configure their systems ahead of time from remote locations, tests. They needed less equipment hence CWIX facilitated steady expansion to the cloud service to generate room for more clients. Eventually our goal is to place the majority of CWIX participants on the cloud servers. does the expanding vCloud service expand our technical ability to host more clients, generating larger and more realistic exercises but it also builds up our staff systems. One of the JFTCs functions is a the JFTC can test the systems and develop procedures that support the future training events. It is in this role, aided by residence experience and CWIX triggered flexibility that makes the JFTC the future place for the VJTF. The future of CWIX looks bright. nations have expressed interest in joining CWIX. Among those nations are such Slovakia and the Baltic States. Even the as Montenegro have started looking at CWIX as an event important to their future. stretched but the experienced and highly 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC

PAGE 16

MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division 16 17configure their virtualized systems from their locations in advance of arriving at JFTC. They did not have to bring their infrastructure available at JFTC. This conserved the physical space, saved energy, reduced heat output and shipping costs of moving expensive equipment. Furthermore, IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) service model implemented at JFTC reached out beyond that. It is believed that on-demand infrastructure provisioning, resources reassigning and flexibility it offered, changed the model of CWIX capabilities experimentation and testing. It sped up the capabilities deployment and reconfiguration process, extended the performance and productivity indicators. The second aim of JFTC IaaS years cloud computing has become one of the main driving forces in the industry. More and more companies and organizations processed, stored and maintained their data on the cloud accessing it remotely from different locations. potentials of this technology, JFTC together success vCloud Director that is has opened its doors for more CWIX participants.Cooperation Training Support Division, have reached an Engineer Waldemar Slifarski. Thanks to him Fulvio Postogna, a JFTC CIS engineer, the service provided by technical infrastructure expertise and exploit their respective strengths to be a success every year. For example, Wargaming branch. Whenever one of the able to immediately rely on its partner to backfill the gap, providing seamless service to the CWIX community. Future The future of CWIX is bright. The and promotes the closer integration of the Alliance. Together the Bydgoszcz to improve the smooth running of this important event. Within the cloud area the next targets are PaaS (Platform as a service models that are more advanced cloud computing capabilities, aiming at making the JFTC infrastructure even more attractive to the CWIX participants. It has already been five years since the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) became the home for the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise (CWIX). Before this years edition of and Information Agency CIS Support Unit make major refinements to the exercise by improving the money saving cloud services at the JFTC facility in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Through close cooperation the team in Poland has made sure that the future continue to remain a success. What is CWIX? CWIX is a Military Committee directed annual program designed to support the continuous improvement to interoperability for the Alliance and Partner period, CWIX brought together engineers, America. They brought together 181 capability configurationsin key testing areas of Cyber Defense, the Federated Mission Why CWIX? The importance of CWIX cannot be understated. It is the largest annual is designed to bring about continuous improvement in interoperability for the mission it took several years to create entire ISAF coalition sharing real time information across the entire coalition and a matter of months instead of years, giving have a chance to test, document and refine The cloud service at CWIX The cloud service for CWIX promoting mobile computing field in equipment reduction, cloud service JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015

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MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division 16 17configure their virtualized systems from their locations in advance of arriving at JFTC. They did not have to bring their infrastructure available at JFTC. This conserved the physical space, saved energy, reduced heat output and shipping costs of moving expensive equipment. Furthermore, IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) service model implemented at JFTC reached out beyond that. It is believed that on-demand infrastructure provisioning, resources reassigning and flexibility it offered, changed the model of CWIX capabilities experimentation and testing. It sped up the capabilities deployment and reconfiguration process, extended the performance and productivity indicators. The second aim of JFTC IaaS years cloud computing has become one of the main driving forces in the industry. More and more companies and organizations processed, stored and maintained their data on the cloud accessing it remotely from different locations. potentials of this technology, JFTC together success vCloud Director that is has opened its doors for more CWIX participants.Cooperation Training Support Division, have reached an Engineer Waldemar Slifarski. Thanks to him Fulvio Postogna, a JFTC CIS engineer, the service provided by technical infrastructure expertise and exploit their respective strengths to be a success every year. For example, Wargaming branch. Whenever one of the able to immediately rely on its partner to backfill the gap, providing seamless service to the CWIX community. Future The future of CWIX is bright. The and promotes the closer integration of the Alliance. Together the Bydgoszcz to improve the smooth running of this important event. Within the cloud area the next targets are PaaS (Platform as a service models that are more advanced cloud computing capabilities, aiming at making the JFTC infrastructure even more attractive to the CWIX participants. It has already been five years since the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) became the home for the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise (CWIX). Before this years edition of and Information Agency CIS Support Unit make major refinements to the exercise by improving the money saving cloud services at the JFTC facility in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Through close cooperation the team in Poland has made sure that the future continue to remain a success. What is CWIX? CWIX is a Military Committee directed annual program designed to support the continuous improvement to interoperability for the Alliance and Partner period, CWIX brought together engineers, America. They brought together 181 capability configurationsin key testing areas of Cyber Defense, the Federated Mission Why CWIX? The importance of CWIX cannot be understated. It is the largest annual is designed to bring about continuous improvement in interoperability for the mission it took several years to create entire ISAF coalition sharing real time information across the entire coalition and a matter of months instead of years, giving have a chance to test, document and refine The cloud service at CWIX The cloud service for CWIX promoting mobile computing field in equipment reduction, cloud service JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015

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David Dominicci, US Civilian, JFTC Training Support Division 18 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 19making process by the TA is simplified increasing the successful outcome of the overall exercise. It is too technical. M&S has kept up the commercial sector, the M&S community technology to its models. Case in point: the the cloud) has revolutionized the ability of do not have the resources to support such distributions. But too much technology is not of efforts conducted by the TA. M&S is constantly striving to achieve that goal. It increases the risk of failure. On the contrary, M&S actually reduces the risk problems ahead of time, so that they can alter scenarios in order to minimize the risk of failure. M&S can also solve potential the CAX stays on track of achieving all the TOs set out for the TA.How Does M&S Make a Difference It increases the quality of products. insure that only the highest quality training is provided to the TA. Achieving the best possible COP is just a function of this. Through joint cooperation by the Training Division (TD) and the Training Support Division (TSD) at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), the quality of the Training to means better trained soldiers. The Training Audience gets a more realistic experience; which means better Training. By M&S providing as much in turn translates to better training to all that make up the TA. M&S also provides more in its role of insuring de-confliction of M&Ss Role in Training & Exercise M&S tools can be divided into four categories: (1) Exercise Planning & Management Tools Ancillary Tools Services Stage 1: Concept & Specification Development Development Phase I: Foundation Training Phase II: Crisis Response Planning Phase III: Execution Phase IV: Assessment relationship that each of the tool categories has to each one: Exercise Planning & Management Tools. See the above graphic regarding the stages and phases of their use. The Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) is a planner tool for structuring exercise scenarios and defining action timing. Other planning tools are the Training Objective Management De-Confliction Matrix. Constructive Simulation Systems & Ancillary Tools. These simulation systems III. The simulations at the JFTC include: (1) the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) for Operational/Tactical level (JTLS). The Exercise Information Services (EXIS) platform is for managing information from multiple M&S systems and providing tools in exercise planning and execution Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area Services. These interfaces are used in Stage Interoperable Real-Time Information Services Experimentation and analysis tools. EXIS, JEMM, and batch files from JCATS are tools used by the Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) in Welcome to an introduction to event scenario. Our intent is to give you it improves the goal of meeting all the Training Objectives (TOs) for the Training Audience (TA) during a particular event. In from your psyche.What is M&S M&S is a technical capability to provide realistic conditions of field action in a synthetic way. it is the art of using tools, physical and realism in a training environment. It is an essential element to achieving the goal of Train as you Fight. the most realism takes place, to include destruction of a high-value unit, etc.).What M&S is Not Something to be afraid of. M&S among us that are leery of relying on technical tools. But the bottom line is that technology A compromise to training objectives. To make it clear, M&S is a tool to achieve the ultimate outcome of any Computeror surpassing the assigned TOs for the TA. Extra work for unclear reasons with no reward. not on the part of the TA. A simulation center machines that they bring to bear in order to provide a realistic Common Operating Picture maintaining an M&S transparency to that audience. Remember, all the TA should see is COP.Preconceived Notions about M&S It is too complex and hard to understand. There are many in the military that have the opinion that M&S in a CAX is too hard for a regular soldier to comprehend. That cannot be further from the truth. The fact-of-the-matter is that, for the TA, M&S is transparent to them. Unless the TA is section of the CAX, there is no need to even having to be trained in an applicable Model. This leads us to the next notion. It will make our life too complicated. fact the opposite is true. M&S exists to provide a realistic COP of the Battlefield. and expediently updated, the decisionModelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process How to Demystify the Devil

PAGE 19

David Dominicci, US Civilian, JFTC Training Support Division 18 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 19making process by the TA is simplified increasing the successful outcome of the overall exercise. It is too technical. M&S has kept up the commercial sector, the M&S community technology to its models. Case in point: the the cloud) has revolutionized the ability of do not have the resources to support such distributions. But too much technology is not of efforts conducted by the TA. M&S is constantly striving to achieve that goal. It increases the risk of failure. On the contrary, M&S actually reduces the risk problems ahead of time, so that they can alter scenarios in order to minimize the risk of failure. M&S can also solve potential the CAX stays on track of achieving all the TOs set out for the TA.How Does M&S Make a Difference It increases the quality of products. insure that only the highest quality training is provided to the TA. Achieving the best possible COP is just a function of this. Through joint cooperation by the Training Division (TD) and the Training Support Division (TSD) at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), the quality of the Training to means better trained soldiers. The Training Audience gets a more realistic experience; which means better Training. By M&S providing as much in turn translates to better training to all that make up the TA. M&S also provides more in its role of insuring de-confliction of M&Ss Role in Training & Exercise M&S tools can be divided into four categories: (1) Exercise Planning & Management Tools Ancillary Tools Services Stage 1: Concept & Specification Development Development Phase I: Foundation Training Phase II: Crisis Response Planning Phase III: Execution Phase IV: Assessment relationship that each of the tool categories has to each one: Exercise Planning & Management Tools. See the above graphic regarding the stages and phases of their use. The Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) is a planner tool for structuring exercise scenarios and defining action timing. Other planning tools are the Training Objective Management De-Confliction Matrix. Constructive Simulation Systems & Ancillary Tools. These simulation systems III. The simulations at the JFTC include: (1) the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) for Operational/Tactical level (JTLS). The Exercise Information Services (EXIS) platform is for managing information from multiple M&S systems and providing tools in exercise planning and execution Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area Services. These interfaces are used in Stage Interoperable Real-Time Information Services Experimentation and analysis tools. EXIS, JEMM, and batch files from JCATS are tools used by the Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) in Welcome to an introduction to event scenario. Our intent is to give you it improves the goal of meeting all the Training Objectives (TOs) for the Training Audience (TA) during a particular event. In from your psyche.What is M&S M&S is a technical capability to provide realistic conditions of field action in a synthetic way. it is the art of using tools, physical and realism in a training environment. It is an essential element to achieving the goal of Train as you Fight. the most realism takes place, to include destruction of a high-value unit, etc.).What M&S is Not Something to be afraid of. M&S among us that are leery of relying on technical tools. But the bottom line is that technology A compromise to training objectives. To make it clear, M&S is a tool to achieve the ultimate outcome of any Computeror surpassing the assigned TOs for the TA. Extra work for unclear reasons with no reward. not on the part of the TA. A simulation center machines that they bring to bear in order to provide a realistic Common Operating Picture maintaining an M&S transparency to that audience. Remember, all the TA should see is COP.Preconceived Notions about M&S It is too complex and hard to understand. There are many in the military that have the opinion that M&S in a CAX is too hard for a regular soldier to comprehend. That cannot be further from the truth. The fact-of-the-matter is that, for the TA, M&S is transparent to them. Unless the TA is section of the CAX, there is no need to even having to be trained in an applicable Model. This leads us to the next notion. It will make our life too complicated. fact the opposite is true. M&S exists to provide a realistic COP of the Battlefield. and expediently updated, the decisionModelling and Simulation in the Exercise Process How to Demystify the Devil

PAGE 20

Christopher McKeating, GBR Civilian 20 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 21 This essay is an abridged version of the research to date and has been designed not to argue each position or provide references, but to elicit feedback and guide the reader through the authors hypothesis. Although based being tested for its qualitative value professionals and practitioners from American Generals, Admirals and Ministers of State. Through triangulation of any consensus as to the extent of the threat and the measures needed to confront the threat, their comments (1) contextualise the contemporary nature of the threat and the implications of failing to engage it and (2) conceptualise the viability of suppressing the phenomenon through the proposed process of defragmenting. in the Autumn issue of the JFTC journal. analysis, please send your feedback to a consequence of the British Prime Ministers declaration that the country faces a greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before and that we are in the midst of a generational struggle. That the countrys social heritage and cultural capital could be at risk of a long-term terrorism hence lies at the heart of to: 1) further an understanding of the phenomenon of British citizens 2) assessing the threat that they pose and 3) threat might best be countered. Whilst the research accepts the governments assessment of the threat it does not accept British extremism as the root cause of it. That the response to the phenomenon entails a generational struggle i.e vaguely defined enemy, is also rejected: having to endure a deep-rooted, is but one school of thought and does alternatives. The hypothesis is that the phenomenon is a consequence of a global insurgency against the West and that any delay in confronting it as such risks the militarization of nationals loyal to forces beyond the ideological, counter-terrorist approach to confronting extremism in the United Kingdom, not only underestimates, but exacerbates the potential for internecine conflict. The alternative proposed for Britain is to optimize the response to many stages and phases (see the graphic (AAR) process. They can also be used Resolute Support (RS) exercise.The Advantages of using M&SFor EXCON: Proper design of the script Success or failure of any CAX can rest in the successful editing as necessary to insure that TOs are to be achieved. The use of the right tools can make that a reality. Full view of the exercise with the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Keeping an accurate COP is essential to the success of any CAX. This Total control, and altering as necessary to insure training objectives are met can edit the scenarios as necessary in order to changes quickly and accurately. Proper execution of all muscle movements Important events can be planned early and meticulously in order to insure their success. Also, quick and seamless edits can be made on-the-fly to minimize any deviations. Maintaining a consistent picture and control of all exercise tasking. efficient in its operation. Better computer-aided observation collections. O/Ts can obtain collections in a more timely, accurate, and efficient manner. For the TA: A proper COP Maintaining an accurate as necessary if they are drifting off on a tangent. Realism and consistency throughout the exercise Again, making the CAX as real as possible thru the use of M&S makes the Recent exercises at JFTC have utilized live UAV providing that added edge of realism for the TA to utilize and explore further. Proper Perceived Truth based on sensors the units in that area cannot be seen, pure and simple.Upcoming Events Using M&SSouth East European Exercise and Training Network (SEEETN) Balkan Bridges. the technical capabilities of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration Experimentation Examination Exercise (CWIX) 2015. This exercise endorsed, Military Committee directed and Consultation, Command and Control (Bi-SC) annual programme designed to support the continuous improvement of interoperability for the Alliance. Resolute Support (RS) 15-3. This exercise is to educate Individual Augmentees (IAs) of the TA on the mission specifics of RS conditions for team building. Citadel Bonus (CIBS) 2015. This Battle Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) in the refinement of its Integrated Component Command Land (ICC-L) Command Post (CP) organization. Georgia 2016. Still in its planning ability to mentor Georgia in the preparation multinational exercise. Trident Joust 2016. This exercise is for Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This comprising land, air, sea and Special Forces needed.Summary M&S does make a difference for better, more realistic training to the TA, by maintaining an accurate COP, and negating COP. make quicker decisions on the direction of the M&S can simulate a complex joint ease, in order to meet the TOs of the TA. Lastly, M&S is able to support training bear. from your mind. M&S really is a force multiplier that can improve overall training The Treason FilesCountering the Threat from British Nationals Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown

PAGE 21

Christopher McKeating, GBR Civilian 20 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 21 This essay is an abridged version of the research to date and has been designed not to argue each position or provide references, but to elicit feedback and guide the reader through the authors hypothesis. Although based being tested for its qualitative value professionals and practitioners from American Generals, Admirals and Ministers of State. Through triangulation of any consensus as to the extent of the threat and the measures needed to confront the threat, their comments (1) contextualise the contemporary nature of the threat and the implications of failing to engage it and (2) conceptualise the viability of suppressing the phenomenon through the proposed process of defragmenting. in the Autumn issue of the JFTC journal. analysis, please send your feedback to a consequence of the British Prime Ministers declaration that the country faces a greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before and that we are in the midst of a generational struggle. That the countrys social heritage and cultural capital could be at risk of a long-term terrorism hence lies at the heart of to: 1) further an understanding of the phenomenon of British citizens 2) assessing the threat that they pose and 3) threat might best be countered. Whilst the research accepts the governments assessment of the threat it does not accept British extremism as the root cause of it. That the response to the phenomenon entails a generational struggle i.e vaguely defined enemy, is also rejected: having to endure a deep-rooted, is but one school of thought and does alternatives. The hypothesis is that the phenomenon is a consequence of a global insurgency against the West and that any delay in confronting it as such risks the militarization of nationals loyal to forces beyond the ideological, counter-terrorist approach to confronting extremism in the United Kingdom, not only underestimates, but exacerbates the potential for internecine conflict. The alternative proposed for Britain is to optimize the response to many stages and phases (see the graphic (AAR) process. They can also be used Resolute Support (RS) exercise.The Advantages of using M&SFor EXCON: Proper design of the script Success or failure of any CAX can rest in the successful editing as necessary to insure that TOs are to be achieved. The use of the right tools can make that a reality. Full view of the exercise with the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Keeping an accurate COP is essential to the success of any CAX. This Total control, and altering as necessary to insure training objectives are met can edit the scenarios as necessary in order to changes quickly and accurately. Proper execution of all muscle movements Important events can be planned early and meticulously in order to insure their success. Also, quick and seamless edits can be made on-the-fly to minimize any deviations. Maintaining a consistent picture and control of all exercise tasking. efficient in its operation. Better computer-aided observation collections. O/Ts can obtain collections in a more timely, accurate, and efficient manner. For the TA: A proper COP Maintaining an accurate as necessary if they are drifting off on a tangent. Realism and consistency throughout the exercise Again, making the CAX as real as possible thru the use of M&S makes the Recent exercises at JFTC have utilized live UAV providing that added edge of realism for the TA to utilize and explore further. Proper Perceived Truth based on sensors the units in that area cannot be seen, pure and simple.Upcoming Events Using M&SSouth East European Exercise and Training Network (SEEETN) Balkan Bridges. the technical capabilities of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration Experimentation Examination Exercise (CWIX) 2015. This exercise endorsed, Military Committee directed and Consultation, Command and Control (Bi-SC) annual programme designed to support the continuous improvement of interoperability for the Alliance. Resolute Support (RS) 15-3. This exercise is to educate Individual Augmentees (IAs) of the TA on the mission specifics of RS conditions for team building. Citadel Bonus (CIBS) 2015. This Battle Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) in the refinement of its Integrated Component Command Land (ICC-L) Command Post (CP) organization. Georgia 2016. Still in its planning ability to mentor Georgia in the preparation multinational exercise. Trident Joust 2016. This exercise is for Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This comprising land, air, sea and Special Forces needed.Summary M&S does make a difference for better, more realistic training to the TA, by maintaining an accurate COP, and negating COP. make quicker decisions on the direction of the M&S can simulate a complex joint ease, in order to meet the TOs of the TA. Lastly, M&S is able to support training bear. from your mind. M&S really is a force multiplier that can improve overall training The Treason FilesCountering the Threat from British Nationals Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown

PAGE 22

22 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 23military force by each government of the day and the concurrent policies of emancipation and acquiescence of generations past that secured the country and silenced the murderous echoes of struggle, time and political adroitness have been of the essence and it is from this perspective that the analogy is both relevant and important. artificial constructs that not only belie the applicability of lessons from historical precedents but distort the so, it has become near impossible to to balance the equation of threat and the arithmetic of the accumulative, individual efforts of generations past has been lost. The result is that instead of reference and a common anthology, the conflict has been divorced from its roots and left to culture on its zeitgeist of the generational struggle Kingdom has hence become typified and influenced not by political action but by political reaction and, in relative terms, an Asquith-like policy of nonengagement. To return to the analogy, at no point, at least not until the Home Rule a strategic response to the Catholic threat one of either isolation or a acceptable, sustainable level of to negate the cumulative effect of attempts by previous generations to counter the stalemate directly and the generation actually set out to crush any Catholic dissent, is readily apparent. From the Jacobite Rising to the Easter victory dependent on the passing of a and, arguably, unprecedented and dangerous concept. To put this threat to the state into perspective, more than half a million against their King in the years leading service. The import of the analogy Catholics rebelled on no less than six occasions and extreme, redolent, flagrant and radical displays of treason, a rising immigrant population and religions adherents and united the Kingdoms populations. Although the Papist and Relief Acts bear the scars of the tempestuous nature of these paths, their application ensured the demise of the spiritual and communal influence of foreign able to reign in the political outcasts had hitherto engineered by default and apparatus of the state. The fruits of the of immediate significance compared by Wellingtons victory at Waterloo in of the rank and file of the British Army blood. In short, despite the legitimate the revolutions of the Enlightenment having either collapsed against the old regimes of Catholic Europe or indulged emancipation and allegiance to the demand or any egalitarian calling, but that the political development of Britain had been staked and rested upon delivering an alternative to common enemy and an obstacle to the progressive expansion of the Empire. This political commitment to reformation (as opposed to segregation) in the early 19th century not only liberated the country from religious intolerance and buried the prejudices of its recusant inheritance, but enabled Britain to counter the aggressive, antiCatholic sentiment that had stifled the concept of a unified state and release millions of English, Welsh, Scots and Irish nationals from loyalties that their be tantamount to treason. By the time and alongside hundreds of thousands of Muslim volunteers, a generation of Irish, Scots, Welsh, English and enlisted to fight for the shared values and commonality that this reformed concept of King and Country had come to represent. Simply put, in a short period of time, temporal and spiritual allegiances the threat by defragmenting it and thus accelerating the end-game. Defragmenting is a liberal, muscular 1) concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist 2) taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force. In short, the exposition of non-contiguous threats to the United Kingdom by the extraction of front-line populations from the theatre of potential conflict and the content that is exploitable. Such an initiative, compacted and protected by a strengthening in the Covenant communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions and build a better, more secure, liberally orientated, integrated and united Kingdom. The paper is presented in five parts: Part I is an analogical discussion on the general threat and transnational insurgency and not has been targeted by a foreign enemy as a frontline in a global, asymmetrical insurgency measures are needed on the home-front. Part II contests the strategy of a generational struggle to the para-militarization of militant forces, the polarization of Muslim communities and a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and treasonous rhetoric. terrorism measures underestimate and exacerbate the threat from militants in the United Kingdom the implications for the country and the consequences of misinterpreting statesponsored espionage, sabotage and acts of insurgency as acts of terrorism. Part IV proposes that, to reverse the politicization and radicalization of British nationals (Muslim and nonMuslim), the threat needs to be defragmented. Part V propounds the use of Her Majestys Armed Forces to protect the communities held hostage by British militants and, through a transforming the countrys relationship PART I Wild Geese & Jackals This assessment of the threat as severe and that an attack on the interests and assets of the United Kingdom is highly likely. It is argued that this is not due to extremism but a lack of investment Armed Forces, the metamorphosis of Islamic State, Al Qaedas chrysalis and the aggregation and mobilisation of Muslim organizations and non-violent political constructs. In brief, it is because British militants are in the process of re-positioning their forces contemporary state-sponsored terrorism and subversion to the relatively st century It is concluded that, to counter the threat, demonstrable, public acts of allegiance to the Queen and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty by Muslims to the institutions of the state are key. The monarchy and the shared history of the nation are seen as not only fundamental to stifling the dissent and sedition but, as evidenced in the United Kingdoms battle for the allegiance of British Catholics, reversing it. In short, qualifications on allegiance to the United Kingdom and there are political, historical and theological The history of Catholic emancipation and the lighting of bonfires is but one. Indeed, the hundreds of thousands uniform over the centuries epitomize this can be achieved by the encompassing unique ability to transcend politics and religion and consolidate the diverse and often competing identities of its threaten British interests today, there of the countrys six million strong Catholic population. This achievement is not because of Shakespeare, Rome or the stigma of historic acts of terrorism and insurrection but, for the majority of Catholics, centuries of allegiance, patriotism and military service to a shared ideal a history has culminated in an identity that today eclipses the boundaries of race, religion and politics. Although the allegiance of British Catholics has involved a series of tumultuous periods of internal strife generational struggle against British Jihadists, that the potential for treason banner of anointed princes may indeed seem to have been obsoleted by time alone (in hindsight) and usurped and supplanted by the comparative irony of their historical predilection for terror and political zealotry, this is not the direct and immediate deployment of

PAGE 23

22 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 23military force by each government of the day and the concurrent policies of emancipation and acquiescence of generations past that secured the country and silenced the murderous echoes of struggle, time and political adroitness have been of the essence and it is from this perspective that the analogy is both relevant and important. artificial constructs that not only belie the applicability of lessons from historical precedents but distort the so, it has become near impossible to to balance the equation of threat and the arithmetic of the accumulative, individual efforts of generations past has been lost. The result is that instead of reference and a common anthology, the conflict has been divorced from its roots and left to culture on its zeitgeist of the generational struggle Kingdom has hence become typified and influenced not by political action but by political reaction and, in relative terms, an Asquith-like policy of nonengagement. To return to the analogy, at no point, at least not until the Home Rule a strategic response to the Catholic threat one of either isolation or a acceptable, sustainable level of to negate the cumulative effect of attempts by previous generations to counter the stalemate directly and the generation actually set out to crush any Catholic dissent, is readily apparent. From the Jacobite Rising to the Easter victory dependent on the passing of a and, arguably, unprecedented and dangerous concept. To put this threat to the state into perspective, more than half a million against their King in the years leading service. The import of the analogy Catholics rebelled on no less than six occasions and extreme, redolent, flagrant and radical displays of treason, a rising immigrant population and religions adherents and united the Kingdoms populations. Although the Papist and Relief Acts bear the scars of the tempestuous nature of these paths, their application ensured the demise of the spiritual and communal influence of foreign able to reign in the political outcasts had hitherto engineered by default and apparatus of the state. The fruits of the of immediate significance compared by Wellingtons victory at Waterloo in of the rank and file of the British Army blood. In short, despite the legitimate the revolutions of the Enlightenment having either collapsed against the old regimes of Catholic Europe or indulged emancipation and allegiance to the demand or any egalitarian calling, but that the political development of Britain had been staked and rested upon delivering an alternative to common enemy and an obstacle to the progressive expansion of the Empire. This political commitment to reformation (as opposed to segregation) in the early 19th century not only liberated the country from religious intolerance and buried the prejudices of its recusant inheritance, but enabled Britain to counter the aggressive, antiCatholic sentiment that had stifled the concept of a unified state and release millions of English, Welsh, Scots and Irish nationals from loyalties that their be tantamount to treason. By the time and alongside hundreds of thousands of Muslim volunteers, a generation of Irish, Scots, Welsh, English and enlisted to fight for the shared values and commonality that this reformed concept of King and Country had come to represent. Simply put, in a short period of time, temporal and spiritual allegiances the threat by defragmenting it and thus accelerating the end-game. Defragmenting is a liberal, muscular 1) concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist 2) taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force. In short, the exposition of non-contiguous threats to the United Kingdom by the extraction of front-line populations from the theatre of potential conflict and the content that is exploitable. Such an initiative, compacted and protected by a strengthening in the Covenant communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions and build a better, more secure, liberally orientated, integrated and united Kingdom. The paper is presented in five parts: Part I is an analogical discussion on the general threat and transnational insurgency and not has been targeted by a foreign enemy as a frontline in a global, asymmetrical insurgency measures are needed on the home-front. Part II contests the strategy of a generational struggle to the para-militarization of militant forces, the polarization of Muslim communities and a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and treasonous rhetoric. terrorism measures underestimate and exacerbate the threat from militants in the United Kingdom the implications for the country and the consequences of misinterpreting statesponsored espionage, sabotage and acts of insurgency as acts of terrorism. Part IV proposes that, to reverse the politicization and radicalization of British nationals (Muslim and nonMuslim), the threat needs to be defragmented. Part V propounds the use of Her Majestys Armed Forces to protect the communities held hostage by British militants and, through a transforming the countrys relationship PART I Wild Geese & Jackals This assessment of the threat as severe and that an attack on the interests and assets of the United Kingdom is highly likely. It is argued that this is not due to extremism but a lack of investment Armed Forces, the metamorphosis of Islamic State, Al Qaedas chrysalis and the aggregation and mobilisation of Muslim organizations and non-violent political constructs. In brief, it is because British militants are in the process of re-positioning their forces contemporary state-sponsored terrorism and subversion to the relatively st century It is concluded that, to counter the threat, demonstrable, public acts of allegiance to the Queen and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty by Muslims to the institutions of the state are key. The monarchy and the shared history of the nation are seen as not only fundamental to stifling the dissent and sedition but, as evidenced in the United Kingdoms battle for the allegiance of British Catholics, reversing it. In short, qualifications on allegiance to the United Kingdom and there are political, historical and theological The history of Catholic emancipation and the lighting of bonfires is but one. Indeed, the hundreds of thousands uniform over the centuries epitomize this can be achieved by the encompassing unique ability to transcend politics and religion and consolidate the diverse and often competing identities of its threaten British interests today, there of the countrys six million strong Catholic population. This achievement is not because of Shakespeare, Rome or the stigma of historic acts of terrorism and insurrection but, for the majority of Catholics, centuries of allegiance, patriotism and military service to a shared ideal a history has culminated in an identity that today eclipses the boundaries of race, religion and politics. Although the allegiance of British Catholics has involved a series of tumultuous periods of internal strife generational struggle against British Jihadists, that the potential for treason banner of anointed princes may indeed seem to have been obsoleted by time alone (in hindsight) and usurped and supplanted by the comparative irony of their historical predilection for terror and political zealotry, this is not the direct and immediate deployment of

PAGE 24

24 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 25to foster any degree of confidence in its capacity to reverse the offensive and protect its Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Politically, this has been compounded by a lack of pragmatism and experience intentioned but ill-thought-out initiatives to counter the threat from identified individuals and, as a consequence, mistakes that have further exacerbated the situation, namely: 1) the aggregation and characterization of Muslim community leaders and their moderate forces as quasisecular, politically correct constructs 2) the failure to see Al Qaedas chrysalis, its separatist-insurgent forces and the Caliphate as attractive, rational, comprehensible and realistic alternatives for many British Muslims and 3) a lack of investment in the human capital of Her Majestys Armed Forces errors that, for a large portion sponsored terrorism and espionage to eclipse the tentative bonds that had, until recently, held the remnants of the Muslim communitys allegiance and kept any arguably intrinsic threat (if it had hitherto existed) at bay. that the issues surrounding Islam in the United Kingdom have been too controversial, too contested and too fast moving for any grounded academic research to effectively engage or parallel i.e. provide any real-time insights to those having to make value judgments based on the given threat. In effect, policy has therefore been dated, academic debates that rarely terrorism and Islamic radicalisation cyclical and academic discussions that subject based content and bereft of any relevance to the United Kingdom, its history, its Muslim communities, the legacy of their British ancestry and the theologies and philosophies of the Wild them. As such, Islam in the United Kingdom has been manipulated and exploited by forces that have, to the detriment of their constituents, taken issues beyond their mandate and held the historic bonds of traditional allegiances to ransom. In short, the identity of British Muslims has been the United Kingdom and the many Muslim communities that have strong of Muslims today is hence presumed by many to be of a de-territorialised nature the authentic voice of British Muslims is that of a small, highly politicised elite. With the consequences of this being compounded by mass immigration the result has been the generic isolation Muslims en masse from their historical milieu, their cultural heritage and their British lineage: Khudadad Khan VC is testament to this fact. As too are Muhammad Aslam, Abdullah Khan, Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Usman and from Australia, Canada, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom at Ypres. Forgotten are the Red Eagles Wavells insistence that the division one of the greatest fighting formations in British history, It is consequently imperative of this global insurgency and those empathetic to it is based, but the transnational nature of the insurgency, the lack of opportunities to serve, the vulnerability of British Muslims to in the arguments and counter arguments for their deference to forces beyond the is no longer Iraq or Afghanistan but, in herself and her history, the Islamic front-lines of the British home-lands battlefields that are increasingly being shaped by the propaganda of Al Qaeda and the Caliphate. for Great Britain should the government fail to take the initiative and continue to misinterpret the perniciousness of these combatants and the trans-national nature of the global insurgency. With the aggregation and mobilisation of British Muslims and non-violent political constructs and the religious resonance and geopolitical significance of Islamic State and Al Qaeda, it is is not handed to the enemy and that the threat to Great Britain is finally (and formally) identified and recognized insurgency that has rooted itself at different levels, on different fronts and at different locations in the minds and only have the Islamists undermined and challenged the British concept, they have offered a viable alternative. interpretation of the phenomenon as artificially removed from the context of the Wests long standing struggle fuelled not only Islamic States quest to manifest prophecies and the lethality assertions but complimentary and intrinsically British concepts of founded and expressed in terms of civic engagement and the theological and historical barriers to serving the made up of Irish Catholic descent, the of this to British Muslims is clear in that, for much of the 19thth centuries, the greatest influence on the political development of Islam has equally been of British origin. Indeed, from the 18th Century on, the journey from caliphate to British history, particularly so after of Jerusalem and the death knell of the Ottoman Empire by default, the per se themselves and masters over the destiny of over the historical context of the United Kingdoms influence on modern Islam is key to not only defining and understanding the threat from British citizens loyal to forces beyond the suggest that the root cause of the threat to Great Britain today is a disenfranchised Islamic population, the suffering of lost brothers and the inalienable demands of their Protestant, Christian, British heritage. It is patently not merely that the key to countering it lies in the perception King and Country represents today) of British Muslims into question. Islamic States metamorphosis, from a relatively subjunctive epithet to a religious phenomenon and Al Qaedas chrysalis, from its defeat at Tora Bora to its return as the Praetorian, Hydralike vanguard of Revolutionary Islam, has not only devalued the concept of British nationhood but, indirectly, establish any capacity for uniting its peoples against them the threat today hence stems from a lack of investment in consolidating the intrinsic value of a British heritage, the teaching of the Empires Muslim legacy and deploying become an internationally established challenge to it. Without such investment at some point, in the near future, the and fledgling insurgencies, the Jackals this so very different a threat and so very dangerous a threat is not just the epic, international nature of Islamic States metamorphosis or Al Qaedas appetite for political tyranny and terror, but the apocalyptic expectations late 18th century France, the progressive depravity of the violence associated st century Islam has become an intrinsic part of the Jihadists creed and the acceptance, endorsement and glorification of it a quantifying factor in their religiosity and fervour the founding of the Caliphate and Al Qaedas continued penchant for terrorism has, simply put, morphed into a convincing, political and theological manifesto for not only the young, but the disenfranchised and the enraged. a resurgence of attacks in the United Kingdom is hence largely dependent on the number of allegiances nurtured to counter the narrative of this generational outlook and the episodic approach of focusing on terrorists to counter terrorism pays scant regard to constituent masses the individuals that are jailed, killed or de-radicalized are simply replaced. It is therefore argued that, to counter the nature of the threat at large, the focus needs to be re-adjusted and the enemy re-targeted through the peripheral, thematic and immediate lens of counter-insurgency and counter-subversion initiatives any political content that is exploitable negate the value of the communities targeted by the enemy. Unfortunately, despite the furore over the involvement of British Muslim communities in terrorism, there have as yet been no significant inroads to actually understanding the parallels country. As a result, the generational struggle has become a strategy in itself an indictment of this governments an error of judgement that has caused counter-terrorism measures to lack the political and military courage needed and engage effectively the hysteria that emanates from the heart of this insurgency. In turn, opportunities to capitalise on Britains history and its groups and insurgent forces have subsequently been missed and the British state has lost not just many of its citizens but its ability and credibility

PAGE 25

24 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 25to foster any degree of confidence in its capacity to reverse the offensive and protect its Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Politically, this has been compounded by a lack of pragmatism and experience intentioned but ill-thought-out initiatives to counter the threat from identified individuals and, as a consequence, mistakes that have further exacerbated the situation, namely: 1) the aggregation and characterization of Muslim community leaders and their moderate forces as quasisecular, politically correct constructs 2) the failure to see Al Qaedas chrysalis, its separatist-insurgent forces and the Caliphate as attractive, rational, comprehensible and realistic alternatives for many British Muslims and 3) a lack of investment in the human capital of Her Majestys Armed Forces errors that, for a large portion sponsored terrorism and espionage to eclipse the tentative bonds that had, until recently, held the remnants of the Muslim communitys allegiance and kept any arguably intrinsic threat (if it had hitherto existed) at bay. that the issues surrounding Islam in the United Kingdom have been too controversial, too contested and too fast moving for any grounded academic research to effectively engage or parallel i.e. provide any real-time insights to those having to make value judgments based on the given threat. In effect, policy has therefore been dated, academic debates that rarely terrorism and Islamic radicalisation cyclical and academic discussions that subject based content and bereft of any relevance to the United Kingdom, its history, its Muslim communities, the legacy of their British ancestry and the theologies and philosophies of the Wild them. As such, Islam in the United Kingdom has been manipulated and exploited by forces that have, to the detriment of their constituents, taken issues beyond their mandate and held the historic bonds of traditional allegiances to ransom. In short, the identity of British Muslims has been the United Kingdom and the many Muslim communities that have strong of Muslims today is hence presumed by many to be of a de-territorialised nature the authentic voice of British Muslims is that of a small, highly politicised elite. With the consequences of this being compounded by mass immigration the result has been the generic isolation Muslims en masse from their historical milieu, their cultural heritage and their British lineage: Khudadad Khan VC is testament to this fact. As too are Muhammad Aslam, Abdullah Khan, Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Usman and from Australia, Canada, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom at Ypres. Forgotten are the Red Eagles Wavells insistence that the division one of the greatest fighting formations in British history, It is consequently imperative of this global insurgency and those empathetic to it is based, but the transnational nature of the insurgency, the lack of opportunities to serve, the vulnerability of British Muslims to in the arguments and counter arguments for their deference to forces beyond the is no longer Iraq or Afghanistan but, in herself and her history, the Islamic front-lines of the British home-lands battlefields that are increasingly being shaped by the propaganda of Al Qaeda and the Caliphate. for Great Britain should the government fail to take the initiative and continue to misinterpret the perniciousness of these combatants and the trans-national nature of the global insurgency. With the aggregation and mobilisation of British Muslims and non-violent political constructs and the religious resonance and geopolitical significance of Islamic State and Al Qaeda, it is is not handed to the enemy and that the threat to Great Britain is finally (and formally) identified and recognized insurgency that has rooted itself at different levels, on different fronts and at different locations in the minds and only have the Islamists undermined and challenged the British concept, they have offered a viable alternative. interpretation of the phenomenon as artificially removed from the context of the Wests long standing struggle fuelled not only Islamic States quest to manifest prophecies and the lethality assertions but complimentary and intrinsically British concepts of founded and expressed in terms of civic engagement and the theological and historical barriers to serving the made up of Irish Catholic descent, the of this to British Muslims is clear in that, for much of the 19thth centuries, the greatest influence on the political development of Islam has equally been of British origin. Indeed, from the 18th Century on, the journey from caliphate to British history, particularly so after of Jerusalem and the death knell of the Ottoman Empire by default, the per se themselves and masters over the destiny of over the historical context of the United Kingdoms influence on modern Islam is key to not only defining and understanding the threat from British citizens loyal to forces beyond the suggest that the root cause of the threat to Great Britain today is a disenfranchised Islamic population, the suffering of lost brothers and the inalienable demands of their Protestant, Christian, British heritage. It is patently not merely that the key to countering it lies in the perception King and Country represents today) of British Muslims into question. Islamic States metamorphosis, from a relatively subjunctive epithet to a religious phenomenon and Al Qaedas chrysalis, from its defeat at Tora Bora to its return as the Praetorian, Hydralike vanguard of Revolutionary Islam, has not only devalued the concept of British nationhood but, indirectly, establish any capacity for uniting its peoples against them the threat today hence stems from a lack of investment in consolidating the intrinsic value of a British heritage, the teaching of the Empires Muslim legacy and deploying become an internationally established challenge to it. Without such investment at some point, in the near future, the and fledgling insurgencies, the Jackals this so very different a threat and so very dangerous a threat is not just the epic, international nature of Islamic States metamorphosis or Al Qaedas appetite for political tyranny and terror, but the apocalyptic expectations late 18th century France, the progressive depravity of the violence associated st century Islam has become an intrinsic part of the Jihadists creed and the acceptance, endorsement and glorification of it a quantifying factor in their religiosity and fervour the founding of the Caliphate and Al Qaedas continued penchant for terrorism has, simply put, morphed into a convincing, political and theological manifesto for not only the young, but the disenfranchised and the enraged. a resurgence of attacks in the United Kingdom is hence largely dependent on the number of allegiances nurtured to counter the narrative of this generational outlook and the episodic approach of focusing on terrorists to counter terrorism pays scant regard to constituent masses the individuals that are jailed, killed or de-radicalized are simply replaced. It is therefore argued that, to counter the nature of the threat at large, the focus needs to be re-adjusted and the enemy re-targeted through the peripheral, thematic and immediate lens of counter-insurgency and counter-subversion initiatives any political content that is exploitable negate the value of the communities targeted by the enemy. Unfortunately, despite the furore over the involvement of British Muslim communities in terrorism, there have as yet been no significant inroads to actually understanding the parallels country. As a result, the generational struggle has become a strategy in itself an indictment of this governments an error of judgement that has caused counter-terrorism measures to lack the political and military courage needed and engage effectively the hysteria that emanates from the heart of this insurgency. In turn, opportunities to capitalise on Britains history and its groups and insurgent forces have subsequently been missed and the British state has lost not just many of its citizens but its ability and credibility

PAGE 26

26 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 27 Islamic terrorism has been dismissed. Indeed, an appetite has developed for analyses of it as exceptional and Understanding the threat in reverse, as a global insurgency that cannot be contained (never mind destroyed) by of an architecture that engages not the theology of Islam or the nature of its militancy, but the political reality of Jahili terrorism does not exist and that manifestations of it are of an inherently foreign lineage is a bold statement but, from the perspective of countering dynamics and importance of allegiance are readily apparent. With Islamic State legions from Khandahar to Marrakesh the British government needs to be reversed: from one of de-radicalising individual Muslims and countering essence, a shift from the apprehension of specific perpetrators to the defeat and marginalisation of the insurgents strategy and the undermining of the ideological effect that entices British Muslims to the banner and political zealotry of foreign princes. Basically, the nature of the insurgency has graduated from a singular threat to that of a community threat and, through cross-pollination, from a national threat to an ummaic threat. Islamic terrorism has taken on a life beyond that designed to counter it and metamorphosed beyond the parameters of counter-terrorism. The horror of the latest manifestation is that it is designed not to terrorize hearts and minds. Countering the threat to the UK from foreign forces hence involves recognizing that Islamic State and Al Qaeda have evolved beyond the concepts of current analyses. United, they command the hearts and minds of millions of people across the globe today and, far from the product or consequence of foreign policy over the failing states, have a much deeper and intricate history. The success of Islamic State and Al Qaeda and the threat to the United Kingdom is not so much establish frontlines or position on the it is their capacity to encompass the annals of a peoples history. The Home-front: Because Al Qaeda and Islamic State have moved so far beyond the paradigm of terrorism per se, the rise of militant Islam in the UK has largely gone unnoticed and, as a consequence, taken place under the radar of counter-terrorism forces. Artificial parameters on variations of Islam and levels of radicalization have left the security forces fighting a legion of ghosts. Without addressing this and the further politicisation of British Muslims, the risk is a move by the militants from deploying terrorists to employing them a move from the phenomenon of British terrorists to British terrorism. If this process beyond the control of civil forces and centred on grievances that, ultimately, either do not exist or that involve apocalyptic demands an insurgency that transcends any counter-terrorism measures and that, by the very nature point) require direct military action. Although the negative consequences of military action in legacies for the British and that, as a result of it, the deployment of the army is often seen as a last resort, the precedents for not utilizing the armed particularly if applied in an indirect manner and that the mandate is to defragment the threat and counter any insurgency as opposed to any terrorism. In short, due to their experience and that the state needs to be seen to be protecting its people, a role has unfolded for the Armed Services that is not just unprecedented, but unique in the history of modern Britain in not and minds of Muslims abroad, but in leading them at home: replacing the supplementary efforts of police led led counter-insurgency measures that proactively target the populations most the skills of disaggregation, denying ground, interdicting links, exploiting local actors and returning entire communities to modes of normal interaction are key. PART II British Terrorism & the Plurality of the State The Generational Struggle: The Prime Ministers calls for a less tolerant society (in the context of values) and a generational struggle against Islamic extremism have not only contributed to a culture of political conformity that has escalated confrontation, but a counterterrorism strategy that has become dependent on it. One reason for this is that, in an attempt to foster mainstream beliefs, an attempt by the government to manufacture a collective of secular values has undermined both the foundations of British democracy and the inclusive, pluralistic traditions of of Al Qaedas crusade to reconquer lost territories and cities, but terrorism itself and Huntingtons flames of an era characterized by cultural conflict. To be th Century, positions on a generational conflict not only dated. Moreover, the modernity of Islamic States application of revolutionary tradition has made a mockery of this and not only further compounded the paradoxical nature of this conflict but, through its ability to transcend borders and engage symmetrically, brought the populations, the Wests insistence as to the secular nature of the terror has, ironically, compounded this threat and led not only to misinterpretations of the language spoken by Islamic State and Al Qaeda, but miscalculations as to their intentions. By staking the argument and dubious theological grounds, been dismissed. More dangerously, the has been assumed. Regardless of its religious rhetoric and that the language of Islamic State has more in common th century fascism than the magnificent courts of Harun al Rashid or the Golden Age of Baghdads Abbasid Caliphs, understanding that the theological and religious basis for the terror is fundamental to exploiting it. A Foreign Enemy: When the the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is, wrong to try to draw any link between this murder and British foreign policy, linked the murder to Britains policies enemy forces on the streets of Britain foreign policy, as Britain has been targeted in a global insurgency against st America, France, Australia and of arguments to the counter, the United Kingdom, like the United States, is a threat to the insurgency by its very underestimate the adversarial nature of that no other Western country comes close to. or Iraq for example might shift the frontlines of the global insurgency at an operational level and pacify a number of militants intent on individual acts of the theological justification for political violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and Islamic State, or the mechanics of their ideologies. Capitulating to the violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign forces is hence unlikely in itself to reverse any extant threat to Britain and not only risks the consolidation of political Islam as a global force but the strengthening of radical positions a re-positioning futile. Indeed, a glance at the sub-text of the insurgency not only enables insights as to the need for reform, but the vulnerability of the country th century better understand the threat to Britain, an offensive against the West beyond the territorial boundaries of the British state and to take the fight to the enemy, the consensus needs to be deeper than back from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Israel and deeper than a policy of hunkering the question lies: unless absolute, countering the foreign threat by targeting terrorists not only fails to undermine the rationale behind the insurgent forces engaged in political violence, but exacerbates the potential for that rationale to morph, particularly at home. In short, in that counterterrorism is generally reactive and, by definition, employed ex post facto, it is not designed to counter the intangible, idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent so and is not only proactive and geared struggle, but the heart of a struggle. Unfortunately, in that such measures just the military and the police forces of the UK but the state, it is also more radical and overtly confrontational (in the paradigm of this proposal, the mobilisation of the state itself to protect its citizenry). decades, the reason the rationale for counter-terrorism as opposed to counter-insurgency became the vehicle analyses of Al Qaeda and, later, Islamic State, is not because of any reluctance to engage terrorism politically or that place to enable readily, comprehensive understandings of the scale or nature of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda and the horrors of the Caliphate have catapulted Islamic violence beyond the tenets of ordinary terrorism and

PAGE 27

26 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 27 Islamic terrorism has been dismissed. Indeed, an appetite has developed for analyses of it as exceptional and Understanding the threat in reverse, as a global insurgency that cannot be contained (never mind destroyed) by of an architecture that engages not the theology of Islam or the nature of its militancy, but the political reality of Jahili terrorism does not exist and that manifestations of it are of an inherently foreign lineage is a bold statement but, from the perspective of countering dynamics and importance of allegiance are readily apparent. With Islamic State legions from Khandahar to Marrakesh the British government needs to be reversed: from one of de-radicalising individual Muslims and countering essence, a shift from the apprehension of specific perpetrators to the defeat and marginalisation of the insurgents strategy and the undermining of the ideological effect that entices British Muslims to the banner and political zealotry of foreign princes. Basically, the nature of the insurgency has graduated from a singular threat to that of a community threat and, through cross-pollination, from a national threat to an ummaic threat. Islamic terrorism has taken on a life beyond that designed to counter it and metamorphosed beyond the parameters of counter-terrorism. The horror of the latest manifestation is that it is designed not to terrorize hearts and minds. Countering the threat to the UK from foreign forces hence involves recognizing that Islamic State and Al Qaeda have evolved beyond the concepts of current analyses. United, they command the hearts and minds of millions of people across the globe today and, far from the product or consequence of foreign policy over the failing states, have a much deeper and intricate history. The success of Islamic State and Al Qaeda and the threat to the United Kingdom is not so much establish frontlines or position on the it is their capacity to encompass the annals of a peoples history. The Home-front: Because Al Qaeda and Islamic State have moved so far beyond the paradigm of terrorism per se, the rise of militant Islam in the UK has largely gone unnoticed and, as a consequence, taken place under the radar of counter-terrorism forces. Artificial parameters on variations of Islam and levels of radicalization have left the security forces fighting a legion of ghosts. Without addressing this and the further politicisation of British Muslims, the risk is a move by the militants from deploying terrorists to employing them a move from the phenomenon of British terrorists to British terrorism. If this process beyond the control of civil forces and centred on grievances that, ultimately, either do not exist or that involve apocalyptic demands an insurgency that transcends any counter-terrorism measures and that, by the very nature point) require direct military action. Although the negative consequences of military action in legacies for the British and that, as a result of it, the deployment of the army is often seen as a last resort, the precedents for not utilizing the armed particularly if applied in an indirect manner and that the mandate is to defragment the threat and counter any insurgency as opposed to any terrorism. In short, due to their experience and that the state needs to be seen to be protecting its people, a role has unfolded for the Armed Services that is not just unprecedented, but unique in the history of modern Britain in not and minds of Muslims abroad, but in leading them at home: replacing the supplementary efforts of police led led counter-insurgency measures that proactively target the populations most the skills of disaggregation, denying ground, interdicting links, exploiting local actors and returning entire communities to modes of normal interaction are key. PART II British Terrorism & the Plurality of the State The Generational Struggle: The Prime Ministers calls for a less tolerant society (in the context of values) and a generational struggle against Islamic extremism have not only contributed to a culture of political conformity that has escalated confrontation, but a counterterrorism strategy that has become dependent on it. One reason for this is that, in an attempt to foster mainstream beliefs, an attempt by the government to manufacture a collective of secular values has undermined both the foundations of British democracy and the inclusive, pluralistic traditions of of Al Qaedas crusade to reconquer lost territories and cities, but terrorism itself and Huntingtons flames of an era characterized by cultural conflict. To be th Century, positions on a generational conflict not only dated. Moreover, the modernity of Islamic States application of revolutionary tradition has made a mockery of this and not only further compounded the paradoxical nature of this conflict but, through its ability to transcend borders and engage symmetrically, brought the populations, the Wests insistence as to the secular nature of the terror has, ironically, compounded this threat and led not only to misinterpretations of the language spoken by Islamic State and Al Qaeda, but miscalculations as to their intentions. By staking the argument and dubious theological grounds, been dismissed. More dangerously, the has been assumed. Regardless of its religious rhetoric and that the language of Islamic State has more in common th century fascism than the magnificent courts of Harun al Rashid or the Golden Age of Baghdads Abbasid Caliphs, understanding that the theological and religious basis for the terror is fundamental to exploiting it. A Foreign Enemy: When the the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is, wrong to try to draw any link between this murder and British foreign policy, linked the murder to Britains policies enemy forces on the streets of Britain foreign policy, as Britain has been targeted in a global insurgency against st America, France, Australia and of arguments to the counter, the United Kingdom, like the United States, is a threat to the insurgency by its very underestimate the adversarial nature of that no other Western country comes close to. or Iraq for example might shift the frontlines of the global insurgency at an operational level and pacify a number of militants intent on individual acts of the theological justification for political violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and Islamic State, or the mechanics of their ideologies. Capitulating to the violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign forces is hence unlikely in itself to reverse any extant threat to Britain and not only risks the consolidation of political Islam as a global force but the strengthening of radical positions a re-positioning futile. Indeed, a glance at the sub-text of the insurgency not only enables insights as to the need for reform, but the vulnerability of the country th century better understand the threat to Britain, an offensive against the West beyond the territorial boundaries of the British state and to take the fight to the enemy, the consensus needs to be deeper than back from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Israel and deeper than a policy of hunkering the question lies: unless absolute, countering the foreign threat by targeting terrorists not only fails to undermine the rationale behind the insurgent forces engaged in political violence, but exacerbates the potential for that rationale to morph, particularly at home. In short, in that counterterrorism is generally reactive and, by definition, employed ex post facto, it is not designed to counter the intangible, idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent so and is not only proactive and geared struggle, but the heart of a struggle. Unfortunately, in that such measures just the military and the police forces of the UK but the state, it is also more radical and overtly confrontational (in the paradigm of this proposal, the mobilisation of the state itself to protect its citizenry). decades, the reason the rationale for counter-terrorism as opposed to counter-insurgency became the vehicle analyses of Al Qaeda and, later, Islamic State, is not because of any reluctance to engage terrorism politically or that place to enable readily, comprehensive understandings of the scale or nature of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda and the horrors of the Caliphate have catapulted Islamic violence beyond the tenets of ordinary terrorism and

PAGE 28

28 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 29 force, an individual terrorist has likely to employ it to its full effect is flights going in and out of the UK in of shoulder launched missiles), it is merely a question of time. In summary, the opportunity to employ counter-insurgency measures mass-casualty attack and the ability alternative to the status quo, at present, is hence either: to go on the offensive and intensify counter-terrorism alternatively, to defragment the threat control of the lives of the populations targeted by the terrorists. If the British are to develop successful counterinsurgency strategies for the countrys built-up, racially diverse, Muslim communities, its strategists must understand that it is pivotal on such an ideological component. Just as Al Qaeda and Islamic State are competing for the hearts and minds of British PART IV Defragmenting the Threat The Pragmatic Model: The ultimate aim of defragmentation is not integration or social cohesion, but the development of common ground around of oneself to a foreign cause, nor to assimilate the citizenry of the United Kingdom. Whilst the consequences of defragmenting may provide context for the above, its goals are independent of any racial or religious agenda and terrorism. The reason for this is that defragmenting is not about terrorism or the defence of the realm per se but the sovereignty of the nations parts. Under the assumption that phenomenon of nationals adopting terrorism measures have been violent and non-violent ambitions of British Muslims questioning the and an inducement to abandon their inheritance, but an assault on the pluralistic nature of British sovereignty. Whilst integration and desegregation are indeed key to the progression of a nations identity, neither are about the social engineering of a generation based on an artificial interpretation of a culture. The components of the country are simply too fluid, too complicated, too diverse and too intricate in their nature to define, understand and appreciate for them to be stopped in time, disassembled and reassembled to please a generation. Defragmenting is hence neither the disassembly nor reassembly of communities but the protection and enhancement of their clock-like components a protective casing to prevent the fragmentation of the identities and values that each cog and spring represents and that are crucial to the equilibrium of the nation. The aim is therefore to create a protective cover of each component can be accessed and enhanced for its symbiotic qualities. Adapting to the unique dynamics of the threat to these cogs and abandoning the doctrine of counter-terrorism is not, although liberal, is a muscular response incorporates into the security apparatus of the state the communities targeted by the enemy. Moreover, as a counterinsurgency measure, its targets are deeper than those of counter-terrorism and include not just the returnees and the militants, but their parents, their families and familial links abroad. Given the nature of the task in hand and the controversial nature of the proposal, the mechanics of defragmenting the threat need to be put into perspective. The reason for this is that, despite the complexity of the phenomenon, the mission is overtly constituency that has been infiltrated secure its allegiance. Defragmenting has no other ambitions: it is not to these communities, to improve levels of education or to reduce any propensity or predilection for anti-social behaviour any Anglo-centric notion of justice, are deemed prerequisites to allegiance. Interpreting the battlespace as a map of human terrain and exploiting it for the purposes of allegiance alone is not only proactive but devoid of the religious, cultural and racial baggage that characterises counter-terrorism. Hence, instead of attacking civil liberties each act of terrorism, defragmenting means protecting them taking advantage of the situation by offering a bridge from the diabolical to the moral and draining the enemy of its human resources. Defragmenting is hence an innovative, integrated and strategic theory designed to kill an insurgency in its early, embryonic stage. It is a response to a threat that is too so spread out amidst the available intelligence leads at any one specific threat to target, to locate, engage and destroy in time. Defragmenting the that of many other minorities. Without any alternative for strengthening the collective identity, calls for integration, moderacy and cohesion have hence become not only monochrome and divisive, but intolerant, dependent on the endorsement of populist votes and profoundly dangerous especially traditions, values, religions and historic, proven notions of patriotism and loyalty. As a result, the generational struggle has become a strategy in itself and an indictment of the commitment needed to rally Muslims around insurgency. It is hence argued that just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and treasonous rhetoric from elements of the Muslim population, but the groups that have existed peacefully in these islands for many years groups that have not only characterised the pluralistic nature of British democracy have held the United Kingdom together for centuries. Given the artificial and untested nature of the doctrine, it is last the test of time nor the economic, political and social impact of a bombing campaign. It must equally be pointed out that the insurgency has, in any case, little concept or appreciation of the Wests approach to time and approach, the enemy has the advantage of time and is able to exploit the policy of non-engagement that characterizes the reactive, episodic approach of this government. What is at risk here is the pluralistic nature of the countrys and religious forces of the population enemy to exploit and para-militarise its British contingents.PART III Gunpowder, Treason & Plot Attacks to Come: In that one of the most striking features of Islamic terrorism is the destabilizing nature of its mere presence, crucial are the implications of counter-terrorism measures having failed to adequately address its religious and apocalyptic affected the public is extraordinary than a terrorist organization into a global proportions. Counter-terrorism responses to Islamic fundamentalism have hence not only failed in challenging the faade but in protecting from subversion. Indeed, as one of the most striking political features repeated destabilizing nature of militant violence and the reaction or lack of reaction to its realpolitik, the far reaching consequences of Islamic terrorism in this century must not be underestimated. The consequences of focusing on the nature of the exported / imported threat, are hence not only cyclical in that they continue to fail to address this politick but vulnerable in that they can be framed and exploited by the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive an isolated, immigrant, minority population. Furthermore, as counterterrorism is not designed to indent upon the cohesiveness of any incumbent insurgency, it not only fails to prosecute exacerbates the politics behind them. Whilst jailing terrorists and criminalising their actions may indeed be of value to delegitimising their cause, it underestimates the intensity and ferocity of the non-violent conflict convictions. To divest Islamic terrorism of its political capabilities and strategic reach, it is hence necessary to protect Muslim populations from any subversive or the connections outlined above in the of British nationals loyal to forces interdiction of treasonable activity at than generational projects in social engineering, community policing and counter-terrorism. The reason for this is 1) Islamic terrorists in the UK have as yet to go blind, in an all-out directive to force a crisis of legitimacy for the government and the targeted communities 2) Islamic insurgents have barely developed beyond the incipient stage, i.e. because engaging the insurgency as a foreign, intrinsic, strategic and symbiotic component of the enemys gestalt in its early stages increases the likelihood of an earlier, visible and quantifiable victory. The consequences of failing to halt the militant forces of Islam are violent rejection of society by Muslims and the reticent forces of republicanism, an increase in propaganda of the deed, illegalism, demonstrative bloodshed, traits of the modern incipient stage and responses to long-term counterterrorism initiatives. It must not be

PAGE 29

28 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 29 force, an individual terrorist has likely to employ it to its full effect is flights going in and out of the UK in of shoulder launched missiles), it is merely a question of time. In summary, the opportunity to employ counter-insurgency measures mass-casualty attack and the ability alternative to the status quo, at present, is hence either: to go on the offensive and intensify counter-terrorism alternatively, to defragment the threat control of the lives of the populations targeted by the terrorists. If the British are to develop successful counterinsurgency strategies for the countrys built-up, racially diverse, Muslim communities, its strategists must understand that it is pivotal on such an ideological component. Just as Al Qaeda and Islamic State are competing for the hearts and minds of British PART IV Defragmenting the Threat The Pragmatic Model: The ultimate aim of defragmentation is not integration or social cohesion, but the development of common ground around of oneself to a foreign cause, nor to assimilate the citizenry of the United Kingdom. Whilst the consequences of defragmenting may provide context for the above, its goals are independent of any racial or religious agenda and terrorism. The reason for this is that defragmenting is not about terrorism or the defence of the realm per se but the sovereignty of the nations parts. Under the assumption that phenomenon of nationals adopting terrorism measures have been violent and non-violent ambitions of British Muslims questioning the and an inducement to abandon their inheritance, but an assault on the pluralistic nature of British sovereignty. Whilst integration and desegregation are indeed key to the progression of a nations identity, neither are about the social engineering of a generation based on an artificial interpretation of a culture. The components of the country are simply too fluid, too complicated, too diverse and too intricate in their nature to define, understand and appreciate for them to be stopped in time, disassembled and reassembled to please a generation. Defragmenting is hence neither the disassembly nor reassembly of communities but the protection and enhancement of their clock-like components a protective casing to prevent the fragmentation of the identities and values that each cog and spring represents and that are crucial to the equilibrium of the nation. The aim is therefore to create a protective cover of each component can be accessed and enhanced for its symbiotic qualities. Adapting to the unique dynamics of the threat to these cogs and abandoning the doctrine of counter-terrorism is not, although liberal, is a muscular response incorporates into the security apparatus of the state the communities targeted by the enemy. Moreover, as a counterinsurgency measure, its targets are deeper than those of counter-terrorism and include not just the returnees and the militants, but their parents, their families and familial links abroad. Given the nature of the task in hand and the controversial nature of the proposal, the mechanics of defragmenting the threat need to be put into perspective. The reason for this is that, despite the complexity of the phenomenon, the mission is overtly constituency that has been infiltrated secure its allegiance. Defragmenting has no other ambitions: it is not to these communities, to improve levels of education or to reduce any propensity or predilection for anti-social behaviour any Anglo-centric notion of justice, are deemed prerequisites to allegiance. Interpreting the battlespace as a map of human terrain and exploiting it for the purposes of allegiance alone is not only proactive but devoid of the religious, cultural and racial baggage that characterises counter-terrorism. Hence, instead of attacking civil liberties each act of terrorism, defragmenting means protecting them taking advantage of the situation by offering a bridge from the diabolical to the moral and draining the enemy of its human resources. Defragmenting is hence an innovative, integrated and strategic theory designed to kill an insurgency in its early, embryonic stage. It is a response to a threat that is too so spread out amidst the available intelligence leads at any one specific threat to target, to locate, engage and destroy in time. Defragmenting the that of many other minorities. Without any alternative for strengthening the collective identity, calls for integration, moderacy and cohesion have hence become not only monochrome and divisive, but intolerant, dependent on the endorsement of populist votes and profoundly dangerous especially traditions, values, religions and historic, proven notions of patriotism and loyalty. As a result, the generational struggle has become a strategy in itself and an indictment of the commitment needed to rally Muslims around insurgency. It is hence argued that just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour and treasonous rhetoric from elements of the Muslim population, but the groups that have existed peacefully in these islands for many years groups that have not only characterised the pluralistic nature of British democracy have held the United Kingdom together for centuries. Given the artificial and untested nature of the doctrine, it is last the test of time nor the economic, political and social impact of a bombing campaign. It must equally be pointed out that the insurgency has, in any case, little concept or appreciation of the Wests approach to time and approach, the enemy has the advantage of time and is able to exploit the policy of non-engagement that characterizes the reactive, episodic approach of this government. What is at risk here is the pluralistic nature of the countrys and religious forces of the population enemy to exploit and para-militarise its British contingents.PART III Gunpowder, Treason & Plot Attacks to Come: In that one of the most striking features of Islamic terrorism is the destabilizing nature of its mere presence, crucial are the implications of counter-terrorism measures having failed to adequately address its religious and apocalyptic affected the public is extraordinary than a terrorist organization into a global proportions. Counter-terrorism responses to Islamic fundamentalism have hence not only failed in challenging the faade but in protecting from subversion. Indeed, as one of the most striking political features repeated destabilizing nature of militant violence and the reaction or lack of reaction to its realpolitik, the far reaching consequences of Islamic terrorism in this century must not be underestimated. The consequences of focusing on the nature of the exported / imported threat, are hence not only cyclical in that they continue to fail to address this politick but vulnerable in that they can be framed and exploited by the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive an isolated, immigrant, minority population. Furthermore, as counterterrorism is not designed to indent upon the cohesiveness of any incumbent insurgency, it not only fails to prosecute exacerbates the politics behind them. Whilst jailing terrorists and criminalising their actions may indeed be of value to delegitimising their cause, it underestimates the intensity and ferocity of the non-violent conflict convictions. To divest Islamic terrorism of its political capabilities and strategic reach, it is hence necessary to protect Muslim populations from any subversive or the connections outlined above in the of British nationals loyal to forces interdiction of treasonable activity at than generational projects in social engineering, community policing and counter-terrorism. The reason for this is 1) Islamic terrorists in the UK have as yet to go blind, in an all-out directive to force a crisis of legitimacy for the government and the targeted communities 2) Islamic insurgents have barely developed beyond the incipient stage, i.e. because engaging the insurgency as a foreign, intrinsic, strategic and symbiotic component of the enemys gestalt in its early stages increases the likelihood of an earlier, visible and quantifiable victory. The consequences of failing to halt the militant forces of Islam are violent rejection of society by Muslims and the reticent forces of republicanism, an increase in propaganda of the deed, illegalism, demonstrative bloodshed, traits of the modern incipient stage and responses to long-term counterterrorism initiatives. It must not be

PAGE 30

30 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 31detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and national security, a further process of civilianization, privatization and cuts across the armed forces. The problem ad infinitum to last, the enemy have transformed and so too have the stakes. The colonial, tribal and religious conflicts of the past are no longer contained by dictatorial regimes, and the borders of yesterday, have become todays frontiers. The end of age-old alliances and the international, conventional and statecentury political violence that counterterrorism cannot defeat. Although, at present, British brigades have exactly equipment and experience to engage and destroy the armed forces of Islamic morphed from Iraq and Syria to the Wastelands of Somalia, Libya, the Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Maghreb or Aden, indeed even to the barracks from country, divide its populace and leave them defeated. The threat today must therefore Whilst to contain the monster of state and its citizenry, a government maintaining its more often than not it content to feast from a Cyclopic, cavelike existence. With the threat that Britain faces, this is not the case. Britains monster has tendrils beyond the state. The main premise for this is that as national-separatists have a traceable lineage that are inseparable from that of the governments they oppose, they remain, to all intents and purposes, civilians. Al Qaeda and Islamic State, on the other hand, have a bloodline and an ideology that is soaked not in politics or insurrection, but combat. As a result of a shared experience and a shared ideology that stems from the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (a lineage that has enabled them to survive they have arguably transitioned from civilian-terrorists to statelesssoldiers and cannot be appeased. With the stateless-soldiers of Islamic State, the hordes of Cyclopses not only help Military engagement hence needs to involve the mobilisation of the nation and its communities in a combined offensive a symbiotic, ideological advance on the enemy, both at home and abroad. in Sierra Leone is replicated across not just the institutions of the state, but the citizenry: tens of thousands of and regular soldiers into the national countrys security apparatus a Britain Armed Forces and Carriers are first on the horizon to provide aid, engineering Majestys Armed Forces reflect the ethnically and culturally diverse nature the profound changes that the country is undergoing are shared. A social return on investment in defence and a foreign policy that reflects the might of the countrys inheritance has many precedents and can be seen not just in Goves legacy or the nations response to the Ebola crisis, but across the history of the respond militarily to the needs of those in help, the might of her neutrality allegiance at home and pride in the defence and foreign aid budgets, but broker abroad. One of the most historic precedents for this actually lie in the remnants of the British Armys regimental system and is a further are a good starting point to rebuilding the countrys allegiances. Given that advantage of their past, it is sufficient to say that, today, alongside the Irish, parade-grounds of the British Army lie the footsteps of the Sikhs of King Georges Own, the Punjabis of the Burma Rifles, the Bengali Lancers of the Duke of Cambridges Own and the Kenyans, the Ugandans and the Somalis of the Kings African Rifles are but ghostly echoes of a forgotten time. The role of Catholic, Irish, Scots, to be revived), are an irreproachable the key to both countering the threat demonstrable, public acts of allegiance and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty to the institutions of the state. To conclude, defragmenting has not only precedents, but established precedents. threat breaks through this data and concatenates the strings of intelligence response times on the ground become more manageable. Through a process strings (from the terrorist to the target and from the target to the terrorist) it not only identifies the source of the threat and target, but the likely outcome. of understanding the tangible threat concentrating resources on both the terrorist and the target as opposed to any intangible enemy. It also enables practitioners on the ground to tap into real time intelligence that reflects the human terrain. By defragmenting the exposure and experience of the terrorists communities and the terrain of the targets, the Prevent and Protect seen not only to be dated, but to have counter Islamic fundamentalism. the process: 1. Defragmenting the threat from returnees (their competencies) communities (their constituencies) their targets (their proficiencies). The mechanics of the defensive strands of the policy are hence primarily based on an analysis of the terrorists and the levels of proficiency that the United Kingdom. The delivery of that intelligence and the objectives of communities and the castle-building of allegiances throughout them by: A) Concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist i.e. locating, linking and connecting values that are fixed and compatible with, not mainstream politics or social norms, but allegiance to the Crown. B) Taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force through: 1 The enforcement of grassroots democracy via a policy of political, economic and social subsidiarity that isolates Islamic Issues from Muslim Issues. 2 Handling Muslim Issues at their social problems at the most immediate point of contact. 3 Reconfiguring the political landscape by capitalising on the dissipated energy of internal conflict, sectarian competition and the extant fault lines of nationality (Somali, Bengali, Pakistani etc.), religion (Shia, Sunni, Ahmadi etc.) and politics (Jihad-nationalists, Jihadi-trans-nationalists etc .). 4. Investing economically in allegiance and encouraging political and social status quo. 5 Germination of the human product and recycling of the social product. i.e. the exposure and engagement of insurgent forces by dividing the militants into multiple, antagonistic, sectarian factions and forcing their communities into taking public, irrevocable and irrecoverable stances on position and family. C) Enabling those communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions by a strengthening in the Covenant and the nation. i.e. a demonstrable, experienceable return on the defence budget through a radical transformation of civil-military relations both at home and abroad.PART V The New Covenant Civil-Military Relations: That the end of the Cold War reignited colonial, tribal and religious conflict that had been dormant for generations has been the extremism and ethno-nationalist dictatorial regimes and the political, economic and social ramifications of globalization, regional alliances and Soviet Empire, the rise of Salafi-Jihad and the race to reverse the perceived surprising. emanates from radicalized Western Central, AQAM, Islamic State or the Leaderless Jihad is a moot point, for any attack on the West is but one on a much larger battlefield than the homelands of the British Isles. It is hence of great importance that any drive to reverse the threat to the UK recognizes the global nature of the threat, is international in scope and United Kingdom from trans-national conflict and securing the communities held hostage by British militants are but one and the same. The consequences of maintaining the status quo and failing to utilize the mandate of the Armed Forces to protect the country at home and abroad are the increasing para-militarization of non-military forces and, to the

PAGE 31

30 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 31detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and national security, a further process of civilianization, privatization and cuts across the armed forces. The problem ad infinitum to last, the enemy have transformed and so too have the stakes. The colonial, tribal and religious conflicts of the past are no longer contained by dictatorial regimes, and the borders of yesterday, have become todays frontiers. The end of age-old alliances and the international, conventional and statecentury political violence that counterterrorism cannot defeat. Although, at present, British brigades have exactly equipment and experience to engage and destroy the armed forces of Islamic morphed from Iraq and Syria to the Wastelands of Somalia, Libya, the Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Maghreb or Aden, indeed even to the barracks from country, divide its populace and leave them defeated. The threat today must therefore Whilst to contain the monster of state and its citizenry, a government maintaining its more often than not it content to feast from a Cyclopic, cavelike existence. With the threat that Britain faces, this is not the case. Britains monster has tendrils beyond the state. The main premise for this is that as national-separatists have a traceable lineage that are inseparable from that of the governments they oppose, they remain, to all intents and purposes, civilians. Al Qaeda and Islamic State, on the other hand, have a bloodline and an ideology that is soaked not in politics or insurrection, but combat. As a result of a shared experience and a shared ideology that stems from the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (a lineage that has enabled them to survive they have arguably transitioned from civilian-terrorists to statelesssoldiers and cannot be appeased. With the stateless-soldiers of Islamic State, the hordes of Cyclopses not only help Military engagement hence needs to involve the mobilisation of the nation and its communities in a combined offensive a symbiotic, ideological advance on the enemy, both at home and abroad. in Sierra Leone is replicated across not just the institutions of the state, but the citizenry: tens of thousands of and regular soldiers into the national countrys security apparatus a Britain Armed Forces and Carriers are first on the horizon to provide aid, engineering Majestys Armed Forces reflect the ethnically and culturally diverse nature the profound changes that the country is undergoing are shared. A social return on investment in defence and a foreign policy that reflects the might of the countrys inheritance has many precedents and can be seen not just in Goves legacy or the nations response to the Ebola crisis, but across the history of the respond militarily to the needs of those in help, the might of her neutrality allegiance at home and pride in the defence and foreign aid budgets, but broker abroad. One of the most historic precedents for this actually lie in the remnants of the British Armys regimental system and is a further are a good starting point to rebuilding the countrys allegiances. Given that advantage of their past, it is sufficient to say that, today, alongside the Irish, parade-grounds of the British Army lie the footsteps of the Sikhs of King Georges Own, the Punjabis of the Burma Rifles, the Bengali Lancers of the Duke of Cambridges Own and the Kenyans, the Ugandans and the Somalis of the Kings African Rifles are but ghostly echoes of a forgotten time. The role of Catholic, Irish, Scots, to be revived), are an irreproachable the key to both countering the threat demonstrable, public acts of allegiance and the celebration of historical deeds of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty to the institutions of the state. To conclude, defragmenting has not only precedents, but established precedents. threat breaks through this data and concatenates the strings of intelligence response times on the ground become more manageable. Through a process strings (from the terrorist to the target and from the target to the terrorist) it not only identifies the source of the threat and target, but the likely outcome. of understanding the tangible threat concentrating resources on both the terrorist and the target as opposed to any intangible enemy. It also enables practitioners on the ground to tap into real time intelligence that reflects the human terrain. By defragmenting the exposure and experience of the terrorists communities and the terrain of the targets, the Prevent and Protect seen not only to be dated, but to have counter Islamic fundamentalism. the process: 1. Defragmenting the threat from returnees (their competencies) communities (their constituencies) their targets (their proficiencies). The mechanics of the defensive strands of the policy are hence primarily based on an analysis of the terrorists and the levels of proficiency that the United Kingdom. The delivery of that intelligence and the objectives of communities and the castle-building of allegiances throughout them by: A) Concatenating the individual historic bonds of allegiance that exist i.e. locating, linking and connecting values that are fixed and compatible with, not mainstream politics or social norms, but allegiance to the Crown. B) Taking political responsibility for the immediate mobilisation and protection of any community that has been targeted by a foreign force through: 1 The enforcement of grassroots democracy via a policy of political, economic and social subsidiarity that isolates Islamic Issues from Muslim Issues. 2 Handling Muslim Issues at their social problems at the most immediate point of contact. 3 Reconfiguring the political landscape by capitalising on the dissipated energy of internal conflict, sectarian competition and the extant fault lines of nationality (Somali, Bengali, Pakistani etc.), religion (Shia, Sunni, Ahmadi etc.) and politics (Jihad-nationalists, Jihadi-trans-nationalists etc .). 4. Investing economically in allegiance and encouraging political and social status quo. 5 Germination of the human product and recycling of the social product. i.e. the exposure and engagement of insurgent forces by dividing the militants into multiple, antagonistic, sectarian factions and forcing their communities into taking public, irrevocable and irrecoverable stances on position and family. C) Enabling those communities targeted to reconstruct around the key components of mainstream institutions by a strengthening in the Covenant and the nation. i.e. a demonstrable, experienceable return on the defence budget through a radical transformation of civil-military relations both at home and abroad.PART V The New Covenant Civil-Military Relations: That the end of the Cold War reignited colonial, tribal and religious conflict that had been dormant for generations has been the extremism and ethno-nationalist dictatorial regimes and the political, economic and social ramifications of globalization, regional alliances and Soviet Empire, the rise of Salafi-Jihad and the race to reverse the perceived surprising. emanates from radicalized Western Central, AQAM, Islamic State or the Leaderless Jihad is a moot point, for any attack on the West is but one on a much larger battlefield than the homelands of the British Isles. It is hence of great importance that any drive to reverse the threat to the UK recognizes the global nature of the threat, is international in scope and United Kingdom from trans-national conflict and securing the communities held hostage by British militants are but one and the same. The consequences of maintaining the status quo and failing to utilize the mandate of the Armed Forces to protect the country at home and abroad are the increasing para-militarization of non-military forces and, to the

PAGE 32

MAJ Nikolaos Charalampopoulos, GRC Army, JFTC Training Division Major Lessons from COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to Use Them in the Future 32 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 33 terrorists execute individual hits mainly directed against civilian targets. terrorists seek to impose a change in the political status mainly through the use over the targeted area. Putting it in a less armed violence against unarmed people and run tactics to target the governments vulnerabilities and convey their message. Insurgency and terrorism often environment especially for those involved 6Lessons learned from Iraq and AfghanistanUnderstanding the environment that pose a direct or an indirect influence in accomplishment of the mission. In all military operations the study of the it is related to elements that traditionally are considered as non-combatant. To be more specific, the study of corruption in Afghanistan or the gender discrimination in Iraq are closer to the field of social sciences rather than to military matters, but in our case it is important to underline quite different than those applied to a conventional conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highly indicated that success requires more than armed security as it heavily depends on influence and persuasion thus, demands the ability to society through their culture. Just because an Afghan says yes and nods his head, does not necessarily mean that he agrees talking. and it is very hard to be determined. Members from different societies often have different perception of life, religion, justice, social status, sexual orientation and gender norms, even different notions of rationality. History provides many understand or apply the culture of others often led to disastrous results.8 Arab of key elements, all equally important such as tribalism and authoritarianism,9 hierarchy, institutions, roles and statuses, values and beliefs, elders, gender, religion, public protocol, promises and other. Even corruption plays a unique role in the Arab tradition and culture. As Colonel Juan Ayala, a senior adviser to an Iraqi Division, has been part of life since the sands of distract mission focus, severely strain compromise our force protection posture be communication and understanding the interests of native communities. Cultural ability to identify in depth the needs of the local population and plan their next steps accordingly. Moreover, counterinsurgents mistakes made by U.S. planners in Iraq, on a foreign cultural problem.11 Therefore, commanders, small unit leaders and soldiers are highly encouraged to improve their cultural skills through personal personnel, relationship building, patrolling, to offset insurgents advantages. After COIN Planning and Design and executed as any other military operation on condition that its special characteristics and dynamics should be prioritized accordingly. The initial strategy against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan the doctrine employed at the end of the 19thth centuries during the occupy the territory and establish numerous garrisons, eliminate armed opposition and Initially there campaign planning to incorporate concepts such as civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), psychological operations (PYSOPS), public affairs and social/ political internal relations of the country. the army to occupy a sizeable part of the territory, the insurgent attacks remained constant and the population remained mostly negative. coalition forces realized that success is gained mainly by targeting the populace, Introduction happening on our planet have a form of conventional forces is rather an exception. This observation has led a number of strategy analysts and practitioners alike back in 1981, in a rather failed attempt doctrine, based on experiences gained from the Vietnam guerilla campaign.1 Besides, mean to decrease the importance and the in order to demonstrate and describe the through a variety of theoretical approaches in order to describe the military actions has become fashionable again. The US Army in its relevant field manuals, defines government through the use of subversion politico-military struggle designed to of an established government, occupying On the political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 5 The constant theme in the aforementioned definitions is the relationship their main characteristics is that both insurgency is a politico-military struggle, highly lethal and extraordinary complex character, but at the end of the day, At this point, further to the and terrorism. In many cases public are conceptual and ideological differences threats, since an insurgency is considered The aim of this essay is to identify and indicate what is considered to be an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of lessons learned (LL). Moreover, this essay will demonstrate possible ways of how all knowledge gained from past and contemporary experiences can be implemented and used in an attempt to facilitate COIN planning procedures and overcome problems in the future. In order to achieve this it is important for the readers to familiarize themselves with the topic through a short knowledge update starting with some important definitions. Thereafter, this essay will proceed further to a deeper analysis by using a logical methodology based on a step by step study through the lens of the COIN principles, as they have been adopted by the traditional COIN theory.

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MAJ Nikolaos Charalampopoulos, GRC Army, JFTC Training Division Major Lessons from COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to Use Them in the Future 32 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 33 terrorists execute individual hits mainly directed against civilian targets. terrorists seek to impose a change in the political status mainly through the use over the targeted area. Putting it in a less armed violence against unarmed people and run tactics to target the governments vulnerabilities and convey their message. Insurgency and terrorism often environment especially for those involved 6Lessons learned from Iraq and AfghanistanUnderstanding the environment that pose a direct or an indirect influence in accomplishment of the mission. In all military operations the study of the it is related to elements that traditionally are considered as non-combatant. To be more specific, the study of corruption in Afghanistan or the gender discrimination in Iraq are closer to the field of social sciences rather than to military matters, but in our case it is important to underline quite different than those applied to a conventional conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highly indicated that success requires more than armed security as it heavily depends on influence and persuasion thus, demands the ability to society through their culture. Just because an Afghan says yes and nods his head, does not necessarily mean that he agrees talking. and it is very hard to be determined. Members from different societies often have different perception of life, religion, justice, social status, sexual orientation and gender norms, even different notions of rationality. History provides many understand or apply the culture of others often led to disastrous results.8 Arab of key elements, all equally important such as tribalism and authoritarianism,9 hierarchy, institutions, roles and statuses, values and beliefs, elders, gender, religion, public protocol, promises and other. Even corruption plays a unique role in the Arab tradition and culture. As Colonel Juan Ayala, a senior adviser to an Iraqi Division, has been part of life since the sands of distract mission focus, severely strain compromise our force protection posture be communication and understanding the interests of native communities. Cultural ability to identify in depth the needs of the local population and plan their next steps accordingly. Moreover, counterinsurgents mistakes made by U.S. planners in Iraq, on a foreign cultural problem.11 Therefore, commanders, small unit leaders and soldiers are highly encouraged to improve their cultural skills through personal personnel, relationship building, patrolling, to offset insurgents advantages. After COIN Planning and Design and executed as any other military operation on condition that its special characteristics and dynamics should be prioritized accordingly. The initial strategy against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan the doctrine employed at the end of the 19thth centuries during the occupy the territory and establish numerous garrisons, eliminate armed opposition and Initially there campaign planning to incorporate concepts such as civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), psychological operations (PYSOPS), public affairs and social/ political internal relations of the country. the army to occupy a sizeable part of the territory, the insurgent attacks remained constant and the population remained mostly negative. coalition forces realized that success is gained mainly by targeting the populace, Introduction happening on our planet have a form of conventional forces is rather an exception. This observation has led a number of strategy analysts and practitioners alike back in 1981, in a rather failed attempt doctrine, based on experiences gained from the Vietnam guerilla campaign.1 Besides, mean to decrease the importance and the in order to demonstrate and describe the through a variety of theoretical approaches in order to describe the military actions has become fashionable again. The US Army in its relevant field manuals, defines government through the use of subversion politico-military struggle designed to of an established government, occupying On the political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 5 The constant theme in the aforementioned definitions is the relationship their main characteristics is that both insurgency is a politico-military struggle, highly lethal and extraordinary complex character, but at the end of the day, At this point, further to the and terrorism. In many cases public are conceptual and ideological differences threats, since an insurgency is considered The aim of this essay is to identify and indicate what is considered to be an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of lessons learned (LL). Moreover, this essay will demonstrate possible ways of how all knowledge gained from past and contemporary experiences can be implemented and used in an attempt to facilitate COIN planning procedures and overcome problems in the future. In order to achieve this it is important for the readers to familiarize themselves with the topic through a short knowledge update starting with some important definitions. Thereafter, this essay will proceed further to a deeper analysis by using a logical methodology based on a step by step study through the lens of the COIN principles, as they have been adopted by the traditional COIN theory.

PAGE 34

34 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 35credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local and international communities. Utilization issues offers a governmental signature on all actions. Finally, counterinsurgents need to have the same meaning and do not apply to elected government by its populace is prosperity. Unity of effort There is no need to mention that unity Afghanistan, beside international military forces, a great number of governmental other international organizations (IO) are actively involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of the entire area thus, unity of effort must be present at every dimension, every level, and in any daily activity. In this case, the challenge to overcome is very dominated by a number of players, each equally important for the stability of the system. Collaboration among military and this, especially since the military cannot due to its structure and mission. Therefore, field of expertise. Furthermore, the ideal objective. appears to be problematic in Afghanistan synergy. Moreover, reality has proven and control. synchronization rather than command and may turn into failures and give opportunities project.Intelligence in COIN operations is to track and target an enemy has no trenches or front lines, and is hiding among populace. In a situation like this the only tool available is effective, active and encountering an additional theoretical problem: intelligence versus information. collection and analysis on current operational issues based on the traditional from the other side it strives to delineate skills, characteristics, tactics, and goals of consciously study and learn from their one step ahead. terms of sustains and improvements. To start up, coalition forces realized that despite the include friendly indigenous forces and vice as information collectors to include linguists and translators. Moreover, they have elders and key personnel of a given area, and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied and political organizations. Finally, international military troops have to accept communicate that information effectively.Investing Knowledge in FutureLearn and adopt faster and adapts more rapidly, usually Coalition forces should adopt to maintain their superiority in the future. in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the of communist ideology is irreversible, religious fundamentalism is raged basically opposing tendencies in other religions. The technological developments. The increasing to greater recourse to terrorism, possibly as insurgency is politically effective, the most important movements are expected to Technological developments facilitate observation and real-time transmission of information and therefore, impede the concentration of large insurgency groups. means persuading people that their best interest are served by counterinsurgents them that counterinsurgents can protect them. Therefore, the objective, or better say, tasked his forces to primary secure and serve governmental sustainability and economic That is to say that, military forces have to get out from the security of their compounds and actively set their boots people.15 One can argue that since high-tech surveillance equipment offers comparative advantages there is no reason to put soldiers is that nothing can replace visible forces 16 Another fundamental element in involve indigenous forces as a part of the entire process. In this case there must be a preparation phase that includes recruiting, a reasonable period of time indigenous security forces should participate in common operations in the light of embedded partnering, until finally they are capable to responsibility and accountability. When there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can be done unless they decide to take over they finally manage to isolate and eradicate insurgents from their cause and support. Afghanistan have also taught us that insurgency today has the ability to receive support from national and international sources due to its global nature.18 The rise of globalization has significantly changed York to Baghdad, insurgency is leveraged off media that broadcasts its violence and multiplies the latters psychological 19 Globalization has also offered additional potential to insurgents, such as of moving and communication, ability to tracked, but above all, globalization geographical space sanctuaries and facilitated their needs and activities in terms of training, indoctrination, recruitment, and regrouping. From this point of mobilize and energize all available support initiatives and establish measures in order to prevent its rivals from doing the same. Finally, time is of critical importance and must be included in the planning as consuming effort and often its duration is As be measured in advance. Lack of tactical to missed opportunities and intelligence information, reporting and doing nothing is the best reaction.Legitimacy Insurgents primary objective is to delegitimize the current political system struggle and translate this into sympathy and vital support from internal and external actors. The key method that insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their actions are ideas of self-determination and sovereignty, therefore the use of violence from their side is justified as a result of chasing a political objective. In addition, insurgents, through demonstration of moral superiority over state forces try to create their themselves for freedom and independence of their homeland. The idea behind this is that the moral justification for the purpose of a political goal (self-determination and international sympathizers ready to provide support and mainly legitimation for the use of violence in order for them to overset the current status. Theoretically, governments described acceptance and support of their citizens predefined frame. On the other hand, the primary responsibility of any government is to provide security to its people. In to be problematic and become Achilles heel. Indeed, no government can claim full consent from the governed side unless it is securing populace requires efficient and continuous employment of security forces. The overall concept is quite challenging since it requires ability to maintain control a negative impact to the local populace. As to provoke and undermine the governments in delegitimizing the states efforts. Practically speaking, insurgents seek to have the government and coalition forces so as to drive the populace or international opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents impunity and the negative influence of parallel structures that attack governments

PAGE 35

34 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 35credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local and international communities. Utilization issues offers a governmental signature on all actions. Finally, counterinsurgents need to have the same meaning and do not apply to elected government by its populace is prosperity. Unity of effort There is no need to mention that unity Afghanistan, beside international military forces, a great number of governmental other international organizations (IO) are actively involved in the stabilization and reconstruction of the entire area thus, unity of effort must be present at every dimension, every level, and in any daily activity. In this case, the challenge to overcome is very dominated by a number of players, each equally important for the stability of the system. Collaboration among military and this, especially since the military cannot due to its structure and mission. Therefore, field of expertise. Furthermore, the ideal objective. appears to be problematic in Afghanistan synergy. Moreover, reality has proven and control. synchronization rather than command and may turn into failures and give opportunities project.Intelligence in COIN operations is to track and target an enemy has no trenches or front lines, and is hiding among populace. In a situation like this the only tool available is effective, active and encountering an additional theoretical problem: intelligence versus information. collection and analysis on current operational issues based on the traditional from the other side it strives to delineate skills, characteristics, tactics, and goals of consciously study and learn from their one step ahead. terms of sustains and improvements. To start up, coalition forces realized that despite the include friendly indigenous forces and vice as information collectors to include linguists and translators. Moreover, they have elders and key personnel of a given area, and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied and political organizations. Finally, international military troops have to accept communicate that information effectively.Investing Knowledge in FutureLearn and adopt faster and adapts more rapidly, usually Coalition forces should adopt to maintain their superiority in the future. in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the of communist ideology is irreversible, religious fundamentalism is raged basically opposing tendencies in other religions. The technological developments. The increasing to greater recourse to terrorism, possibly as insurgency is politically effective, the most important movements are expected to Technological developments facilitate observation and real-time transmission of information and therefore, impede the concentration of large insurgency groups. means persuading people that their best interest are served by counterinsurgents them that counterinsurgents can protect them. Therefore, the objective, or better say, tasked his forces to primary secure and serve governmental sustainability and economic That is to say that, military forces have to get out from the security of their compounds and actively set their boots people.15 One can argue that since high-tech surveillance equipment offers comparative advantages there is no reason to put soldiers is that nothing can replace visible forces 16 Another fundamental element in involve indigenous forces as a part of the entire process. In this case there must be a preparation phase that includes recruiting, a reasonable period of time indigenous security forces should participate in common operations in the light of embedded partnering, until finally they are capable to responsibility and accountability. When there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can be done unless they decide to take over they finally manage to isolate and eradicate insurgents from their cause and support. Afghanistan have also taught us that insurgency today has the ability to receive support from national and international sources due to its global nature.18 The rise of globalization has significantly changed York to Baghdad, insurgency is leveraged off media that broadcasts its violence and multiplies the latters psychological 19 Globalization has also offered additional potential to insurgents, such as of moving and communication, ability to tracked, but above all, globalization geographical space sanctuaries and facilitated their needs and activities in terms of training, indoctrination, recruitment, and regrouping. From this point of mobilize and energize all available support initiatives and establish measures in order to prevent its rivals from doing the same. Finally, time is of critical importance and must be included in the planning as consuming effort and often its duration is As be measured in advance. Lack of tactical to missed opportunities and intelligence information, reporting and doing nothing is the best reaction.Legitimacy Insurgents primary objective is to delegitimize the current political system struggle and translate this into sympathy and vital support from internal and external actors. The key method that insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their actions are ideas of self-determination and sovereignty, therefore the use of violence from their side is justified as a result of chasing a political objective. In addition, insurgents, through demonstration of moral superiority over state forces try to create their themselves for freedom and independence of their homeland. The idea behind this is that the moral justification for the purpose of a political goal (self-determination and international sympathizers ready to provide support and mainly legitimation for the use of violence in order for them to overset the current status. Theoretically, governments described acceptance and support of their citizens predefined frame. On the other hand, the primary responsibility of any government is to provide security to its people. In to be problematic and become Achilles heel. Indeed, no government can claim full consent from the governed side unless it is securing populace requires efficient and continuous employment of security forces. The overall concept is quite challenging since it requires ability to maintain control a negative impact to the local populace. As to provoke and undermine the governments in delegitimizing the states efforts. Practically speaking, insurgents seek to have the government and coalition forces so as to drive the populace or international opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents impunity and the negative influence of parallel structures that attack governments

PAGE 36

36 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 37 action is assessed as a high threat level and cohesion among unarmed populace, international and indigenous security forces. An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of complex motivations but basically attackers can be categorized as insurgent manipulated, personally motivated, criminally motivated the reason caused an insider threat attack, it in their favor. Usually, there is no specific are characterized by full surprise and shock. of fatalities caused by this type of action most important remark in this case is again the message sent out by insurgents as the political capital and impact gained is much bigger. ConclusionAs mentioned in the previous section, an insurgency is a persistent, ubiquitous, small, that in case a national religious group to resort to the use of force in order to achieve political rational estimations about the expected the modern rebel movements are basically ethnically or religiously motivated since the traditional ideological source of their inspiration Marxism and communism have declined and are no longer valid. The the current social and economic discontent the phenomenon of insurgency is expected to be continued in the immediate future. To recapitulate, learning and adopting is a never ending procedure that applies in every aspect of human activity. It also offers a variety of practical lessons, in terms of policy and military doctrine. insurgencies, there are several cases and therefore, courses of action already that all best practices and LL are equally shared and adopted by friendly forces and organizations. Todays types of insurgency differ from those of the past mainly in terms of motivation and objectives to be achieved. It is important to understand that the principles and the means of this complex ages and therefore, experiences and lessons gained from the past could be re-examined and appropriately tailored to the needs of the contemporary theater of operation. Bibliography amongst the People, Contemporary Security Policy, Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the York-London Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Conflict & the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Commandments from Afghanistan, Foreign Policy and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal of Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US Army What We Learned in Iraq, Global Policy, Volume 1, The British Experience, Contemporary Security Policy, Campaign: Lessons from the British Experience in On the other hand, it should be noted that the technology is not available in most of the countries facing insurgency. Physical superiority of conventional forces against the insurgents is obvious, but the analysis sensitivity for human rights can prevent conventional forces from using the most effective methods to combat the insurgents. Besides, the international interest in human rights is manifested most often selectively transformed from mere annoyance to a threat to the established order, then the state forces act and ignore international public opinion. Consequently, the effectiveness of insurgents seems not to differ from that they apparent, generalizations have no place in an insurgency conflict. avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics victories against an ever replenishing insurgency can be gained in the short term, but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. On the other hand, indigenous political leaders, police and military forces need to be trained and brought onside on the broadest possible basis. The population of the campaign must be transferred over established only by diminishing the active support basis for the insurgency, distinct improvement of the general living conditions of the population, as opposed to those still supporting the anti-government forces. This is a quote from David Galulas destruction in a given area of the insurgents forcesA victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the Future dynamics in COIN Experience gained in theater indicates the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents started to use Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain support from local Muslim communities. Later on, during escalation of the conflict, established in the manner of the Prophet in in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring and coalition forces and international public beginning of an Islamist rally, a global jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and non-believers, and become martyrs. As a Afghanistan in order to fight in the name of their God and of course in support of insurgency. This issue becomes even more critical as it has additional consequences in other experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are they are transferred from one conflict zone plans and needs. It cannot be denied that by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda, the past disenchanted Islamist groups used Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training. The message that insurgents are sending out is that all Muslims must stand united representatives, The second challenge refers to practices used lately by insurgents in terms of sending messages to general public both at a national and international levels. It seems that insurgents have launched a global propaganda campaign in order to apply more pressure in the field of non-kinetic operations. Therefore, negative images and videos contained imagery of violence, dead bodies, beheadings, and depictions of individuals being mishandled are used in order to create negativity amongst the recipients as they portray a pessimistic image of life. Moreover, this method applies social high importance and human rights are a part of their culture. This extreme campaign is facilitated by todays information revolution It is about time for international forces and respective organizations acting in the theater to regain their momentum and money for economic and infrastructure development, governance reform, industrial and agricultural development, social services development through training and mentoring programs and many other actions that could be used to send out an optimistic political stakeholders are still occupied by their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically speaking, the per capita commitment of WWII. Finally, the third challenge is that a position of trust among international

PAGE 37

36 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 37 action is assessed as a high threat level and cohesion among unarmed populace, international and indigenous security forces. An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of complex motivations but basically attackers can be categorized as insurgent manipulated, personally motivated, criminally motivated the reason caused an insider threat attack, it in their favor. Usually, there is no specific are characterized by full surprise and shock. of fatalities caused by this type of action most important remark in this case is again the message sent out by insurgents as the political capital and impact gained is much bigger. ConclusionAs mentioned in the previous section, an insurgency is a persistent, ubiquitous, small, that in case a national religious group to resort to the use of force in order to achieve political rational estimations about the expected the modern rebel movements are basically ethnically or religiously motivated since the traditional ideological source of their inspiration Marxism and communism have declined and are no longer valid. The the current social and economic discontent the phenomenon of insurgency is expected to be continued in the immediate future. To recapitulate, learning and adopting is a never ending procedure that applies in every aspect of human activity. It also offers a variety of practical lessons, in terms of policy and military doctrine. insurgencies, there are several cases and therefore, courses of action already that all best practices and LL are equally shared and adopted by friendly forces and organizations. Todays types of insurgency differ from those of the past mainly in terms of motivation and objectives to be achieved. It is important to understand that the principles and the means of this complex ages and therefore, experiences and lessons gained from the past could be re-examined and appropriately tailored to the needs of the contemporary theater of operation. Bibliography amongst the People, Contemporary Security Policy, Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the York-London Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Conflict & the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Commandments from Afghanistan, Foreign Policy and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal of Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US Army What We Learned in Iraq, Global Policy, Volume 1, The British Experience, Contemporary Security Policy, Campaign: Lessons from the British Experience in On the other hand, it should be noted that the technology is not available in most of the countries facing insurgency. Physical superiority of conventional forces against the insurgents is obvious, but the analysis sensitivity for human rights can prevent conventional forces from using the most effective methods to combat the insurgents. Besides, the international interest in human rights is manifested most often selectively transformed from mere annoyance to a threat to the established order, then the state forces act and ignore international public opinion. Consequently, the effectiveness of insurgents seems not to differ from that they apparent, generalizations have no place in an insurgency conflict. avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics victories against an ever replenishing insurgency can be gained in the short term, but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. On the other hand, indigenous political leaders, police and military forces need to be trained and brought onside on the broadest possible basis. The population of the campaign must be transferred over established only by diminishing the active support basis for the insurgency, distinct improvement of the general living conditions of the population, as opposed to those still supporting the anti-government forces. This is a quote from David Galulas destruction in a given area of the insurgents forcesA victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the Future dynamics in COIN Experience gained in theater indicates the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents started to use Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain support from local Muslim communities. Later on, during escalation of the conflict, established in the manner of the Prophet in in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring and coalition forces and international public beginning of an Islamist rally, a global jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and non-believers, and become martyrs. As a Afghanistan in order to fight in the name of their God and of course in support of insurgency. This issue becomes even more critical as it has additional consequences in other experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are they are transferred from one conflict zone plans and needs. It cannot be denied that by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda, the past disenchanted Islamist groups used Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training. The message that insurgents are sending out is that all Muslims must stand united representatives, The second challenge refers to practices used lately by insurgents in terms of sending messages to general public both at a national and international levels. It seems that insurgents have launched a global propaganda campaign in order to apply more pressure in the field of non-kinetic operations. Therefore, negative images and videos contained imagery of violence, dead bodies, beheadings, and depictions of individuals being mishandled are used in order to create negativity amongst the recipients as they portray a pessimistic image of life. Moreover, this method applies social high importance and human rights are a part of their culture. This extreme campaign is facilitated by todays information revolution It is about time for international forces and respective organizations acting in the theater to regain their momentum and money for economic and infrastructure development, governance reform, industrial and agricultural development, social services development through training and mentoring programs and many other actions that could be used to send out an optimistic political stakeholders are still occupied by their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically speaking, the per capita commitment of WWII. Finally, the third challenge is that a position of trust among international

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Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland 38 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 39 related to the anniversary of Polands only citizens of the region participate in from all over Poland, Polish soldiers and our region. pomorskie province is the main organizer of opened by the Region Marshall, Mr. Piotr the conference, he particularly stressed We treat the celebrations with due respect. We are the region in which matters related to the army are and will be of importance not only because significant NATO structures and military units whose soldiers serve in stabilization missions all over the world are located, but also because companies connected with the army make and important part of our economy. to the role of Polish soldiers in international peace keeping formations in troubled parts of the globe. Among participants of the of scholarly environment: LTC ret. PhD the former Commander of the Polish Army Artillery and Missile Defence Troops, representatives of the fourteen veteran Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The Lighting Press 1 Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G., Thinking Essay of Fred Kaplans The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Small Wars Kilcullen, D., Counter-insurgency Redux, Survival: Global Politics and 56 Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale, Insurgency & Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary Strategy, Routledge, Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US 8 Ibid, p.1 9 culture that merit attention here in regard to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, See more: Thornton, 11 Parallel to that, a number of chapters are used by Boot to describe the geopolitical situation and the conflicts movements have dominated during the past centuries. See more: Boot, M., Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, Liveright Publishing Musa, S., Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan Operations, Policing and 1516 Mills, G., Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan, and Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The 18 Thornton, R., Conclusion: The Way 19 Warfare in the Past and Future, Security Ibid, p.9 Kiras, J.D., Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Pirnie, B.R. & OConnell, E., Utting, K., The Strategic Information Campaign: Lessons from the British Contemporary Security Policy, Cordesman, A.H., The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March 16, Glatz, R., ISAF Lessons Learned: A Corum, J.S., Training Indigenous Forces Insurgencies, U.S. Army War College, Hoffman, B., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Ibid, p.ix Betz, D., Redesigning Land Forces for Wars amongst the People, Contemporary Galula also highlights that special forces and their political organization. If one of those poles is destroyed, it from the outside. See more: Galula, D., Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, is the current leader of al-Qaeda. In his seized by US intelligence, he demonstrates his ambitions to rein in the Iraqi commander and use global jihad as a mean to gain political capital and apply pressure to the international community. See more: Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C., Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, Contemporary Security Petraeus, D., Counterinsurgency Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region Together in NATO

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Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland 38 Transformation Through Training Issue No: 7 July 2015 39 related to the anniversary of Polands only citizens of the region participate in from all over Poland, Polish soldiers and our region. pomorskie province is the main organizer of opened by the Region Marshall, Mr. Piotr the conference, he particularly stressed We treat the celebrations with due respect. We are the region in which matters related to the army are and will be of importance not only because significant NATO structures and military units whose soldiers serve in stabilization missions all over the world are located, but also because companies connected with the army make and important part of our economy. to the role of Polish soldiers in international peace keeping formations in troubled parts of the globe. Among participants of the of scholarly environment: LTC ret. PhD the former Commander of the Polish Army Artillery and Missile Defence Troops, representatives of the fourteen veteran Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The Lighting Press 1 Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G., Thinking Essay of Fred Kaplans The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Small Wars Kilcullen, D., Counter-insurgency Redux, Survival: Global Politics and 56 Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale, Insurgency & Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary Strategy, Routledge, Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US 8 Ibid, p.1 9 culture that merit attention here in regard to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, See more: Thornton, 11 Parallel to that, a number of chapters are used by Boot to describe the geopolitical situation and the conflicts movements have dominated during the past centuries. See more: Boot, M., Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, Liveright Publishing Musa, S., Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan Operations, Policing and 1516 Mills, G., Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan, and Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The 18 Thornton, R., Conclusion: The Way 19 Warfare in the Past and Future, Security Ibid, p.9 Kiras, J.D., Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Pirnie, B.R. & OConnell, E., Utting, K., The Strategic Information Campaign: Lessons from the British Contemporary Security Policy, Cordesman, A.H., The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March 16, Glatz, R., ISAF Lessons Learned: A Corum, J.S., Training Indigenous Forces Insurgencies, U.S. Army War College, Hoffman, B., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Ibid, p.ix Betz, D., Redesigning Land Forces for Wars amongst the People, Contemporary Galula also highlights that special forces and their political organization. If one of those poles is destroyed, it from the outside. See more: Galula, D., Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, is the current leader of al-Qaeda. In his seized by US intelligence, he demonstrates his ambitions to rein in the Iraqi commander and use global jihad as a mean to gain political capital and apply pressure to the international community. See more: Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C., Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, Contemporary Security Petraeus, D., Counterinsurgency Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern Wars A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region Together in NATO

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40 41Province gave their honorary patronage to the Days of the Kazimierz Wielki University th the theme of the Institute Day. JFTC Commander, Janusz Ostoja-Zagrski, the President of the University, university prorectors, PhD Jan Waskan, the Director of the Political Science Institute, JFTC representatives, Military Band conducted guests and graduates of the Political Science Institute, members of the University of the Third Age, youth and high school teachers The program included lectures given by the invited guests, a discussion concerning exhibitions devoted to the 15th anniversary of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz. Association, the Marshall Office of of course the CSAiU gathered almost came from military classes from upperprovince. To let young people experience accommodated in soldiers rooms that normally are used by soldiers getting Forces. On the second day the students had a chance to see the centres training basis, artillery museum and equipment used by the CSAiU soldiers. Rocket launchers, attracted most interest. The program executed during the celebrations of the anniversary of performed by the Military Band from Vocal Band. JFTC Language Expert (JFTC) and peace missions veterans. Also subjects related to defence and military services) took part in the conference. They th High School in th High School in Bydgoszcz, Upper-Secondary School Complex in and School Complex from Marysin, students and teachers from the International School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB). the 1st Regional Competition of English th and 6th grades of primary schools and junior high schools the honorary patron of the event. The next part of the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Polands joining Unitas Durat Cuiaviano Pomeraniensis Marshall of held in front of the Marshall Office building. A Polish Army Honorary Company, of the Artillery and Armament Training members and other invited guests took part in it. Civilians and soldiers of merit received Marshall Medals. The head of the contribution to the states security and functioning of the regional community and community. Last years program of celebrations included, among others, formal simulations of tasks executed during quizzes, exhibitions and entertainment performances. The participants could also enjoy concerts performed by the Military Orchestra and Kobranocka band. barracks. They had to obey the same rules as soldiers. Thanks to courtesy of military institutions the youth and region citizens could participate in the events Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, 1st Logistic Brigade in Bydgoszcz and in th Military Economic Department in pomorskie province is a state institution that has been actively involved in creating a positive image of Polish Armed Forces among the society. To achieve this, it organizes or co-organizes numerous events competitions for students of military classes in the country, contests on military topics (including army songs), etc. The celebrations of the 15th program, created a great opportunity to issues to visit our region. It must be mentioned here that important point on Polands military Polish Army units that are fundamental for the countrys defence system. The program of the session co-organized by the Marshall Ofiice included meetings in the Artillery and Armament Training Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and also in the premises of the Bydgoszcz Military Aviation Plant. In Bydgoszcz, on the other hand,

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40 41Province gave their honorary patronage to the Days of the Kazimierz Wielki University th the theme of the Institute Day. JFTC Commander, Janusz Ostoja-Zagrski, the President of the University, university prorectors, PhD Jan Waskan, the Director of the Political Science Institute, JFTC representatives, Military Band conducted guests and graduates of the Political Science Institute, members of the University of the Third Age, youth and high school teachers The program included lectures given by the invited guests, a discussion concerning exhibitions devoted to the 15th anniversary of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz. Association, the Marshall Office of of course the CSAiU gathered almost came from military classes from upperprovince. To let young people experience accommodated in soldiers rooms that normally are used by soldiers getting Forces. On the second day the students had a chance to see the centres training basis, artillery museum and equipment used by the CSAiU soldiers. Rocket launchers, attracted most interest. The program executed during the celebrations of the anniversary of performed by the Military Band from Vocal Band. JFTC Language Expert (JFTC) and peace missions veterans. Also subjects related to defence and military services) took part in the conference. They th High School in th High School in Bydgoszcz, Upper-Secondary School Complex in and School Complex from Marysin, students and teachers from the International School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB). the 1st Regional Competition of English th and 6th grades of primary schools and junior high schools the honorary patron of the event. The next part of the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Polands joining Unitas Durat Cuiaviano Pomeraniensis Marshall of held in front of the Marshall Office building. A Polish Army Honorary Company, of the Artillery and Armament Training members and other invited guests took part in it. Civilians and soldiers of merit received Marshall Medals. The head of the contribution to the states security and functioning of the regional community and community. Last years program of celebrations included, among others, formal simulations of tasks executed during quizzes, exhibitions and entertainment performances. The participants could also enjoy concerts performed by the Military Orchestra and Kobranocka band. barracks. They had to obey the same rules as soldiers. Thanks to courtesy of military institutions the youth and region citizens could participate in the events Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, 1st Logistic Brigade in Bydgoszcz and in th Military Economic Department in pomorskie province is a state institution that has been actively involved in creating a positive image of Polish Armed Forces among the society. To achieve this, it organizes or co-organizes numerous events competitions for students of military classes in the country, contests on military topics (including army songs), etc. The celebrations of the 15th program, created a great opportunity to issues to visit our region. It must be mentioned here that important point on Polands military Polish Army units that are fundamental for the countrys defence system. The program of the session co-organized by the Marshall Ofiice included meetings in the Artillery and Armament Training Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and also in the premises of the Bydgoszcz Military Aviation Plant. In Bydgoszcz, on the other hand,

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ACT Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management Visits JFTC Turkish Army Major General Salih Sevil, Allied Command Transformation Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management (ACT DCOS R&M) visited the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). He met the JFTC Commander, and his staff on 19 Commander, Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff and division heads, General Sevil the centres current activities and future in-depth questions regarding various aspects the centres compound the ACT DCOS R&M Bydgoszcz training centres capabilities in support of training. The visit took place concurrently Commissioned Officer Course, therefore the distinguished guest used the opportunity to Police Centre of Excellence responsible JFTC staff, facility and equipment supported successful accomplishment of the course. As Turkey is one of 18 nations represented in the JFTC structure, General in Bydgoszcz. Christmas Event 2014 Joint Force Training Centre compound on 16 to meet the Santa and filled the compound the JFTC Support Unit, they celebrated the annual Christmas Event. the beautiful JFTC Christmas Tree. With the sound of beautiful Christmas carols performed by the military orchestra and sang by all Santa Claus presented all young participants The Christmas Event is one of the JFTCs most beautiful traditions. It gathers 2015 New Years Reception delivered by Brigadier General Wojciech centres partners and friends. establishing the JFTC and for the first time in visits. The numbers speak for themselves. () The JFTC Commander also underlined an end. We have to remember that our character of the support provided for the Battalion, the Allied Command Counter Office, City Hall, Local Government, Police, Military Police, Customs Office and other institutions. Thank you for all that you do to Many special and honoured guests Pomorskie Province, Major General Werner Weisenburger, Commander Armed Forces Mayor of Bydgoszcz and Brigadier General the Inspectorate for the Support of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff. In Retrospect Life at JFTC42 43

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ACT Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management Visits JFTC Turkish Army Major General Salih Sevil, Allied Command Transformation Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and Management (ACT DCOS R&M) visited the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). He met the JFTC Commander, and his staff on 19 Commander, Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff and division heads, General Sevil the centres current activities and future in-depth questions regarding various aspects the centres compound the ACT DCOS R&M Bydgoszcz training centres capabilities in support of training. The visit took place concurrently Commissioned Officer Course, therefore the distinguished guest used the opportunity to Police Centre of Excellence responsible JFTC staff, facility and equipment supported successful accomplishment of the course. As Turkey is one of 18 nations represented in the JFTC structure, General in Bydgoszcz. Christmas Event 2014 Joint Force Training Centre compound on 16 to meet the Santa and filled the compound the JFTC Support Unit, they celebrated the annual Christmas Event. the beautiful JFTC Christmas Tree. With the sound of beautiful Christmas carols performed by the military orchestra and sang by all Santa Claus presented all young participants The Christmas Event is one of the JFTCs most beautiful traditions. It gathers 2015 New Years Reception delivered by Brigadier General Wojciech centres partners and friends. establishing the JFTC and for the first time in visits. The numbers speak for themselves. () The JFTC Commander also underlined an end. We have to remember that our character of the support provided for the Battalion, the Allied Command Counter Office, City Hall, Local Government, Police, Military Police, Customs Office and other institutions. Thank you for all that you do to Many special and honoured guests Pomorskie Province, Major General Werner Weisenburger, Commander Armed Forces Mayor of Bydgoszcz and Brigadier General the Inspectorate for the Support of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff. In Retrospect Life at JFTC42 43

PAGE 44

Polish National Defence University Students Discover JFTC Students of the Defence Policy Defence University explored the Joint Force The group, supervised by Lieutenant General of the postgraduate studies. The JFTC guests received broad information regarding the centre, its mission, JFTC Commander, assisted by his staff, also related to centres main training undertakings especially related to the recent changes in Afghanistan and the Resolute Support mission. A vivid discussion touched upon challenges the JFTC faced regarding the continuously changing Alliances needs. compound the guests had an opportunity to see the heart of the centre the training facility support of training events and exercises. JFTC Staff Visits Exploseum visited Exploseum the museum established in the remains of the premises of the DAG Fabrik Bromberg (the centre of the military Third Reich. District Museum in Bydgoszcz. In the past, Reichs Armys demand for explosives on the Eastern front. Currently, it is one of the most interesting tourist attractions in Poland. Visiting the complex of seven buildings EUROCORPS Commander at the JFTC Lieutenant General Guy Buchsenschmidt, the Commander of the EUROCORPS, visited the Joint Force Commander, and explored the centres training capabilities. introduced the guests to the centres history, structure, mission, current activities and future challenges. They also provided detailed interested in. During the demonstration of the centres simulation capabilities, Generals evolve in the future. the JFTC memory book. In Retrospect Life at JFTC44 45

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Polish National Defence University Students Discover JFTC Students of the Defence Policy Defence University explored the Joint Force The group, supervised by Lieutenant General of the postgraduate studies. The JFTC guests received broad information regarding the centre, its mission, JFTC Commander, assisted by his staff, also related to centres main training undertakings especially related to the recent changes in Afghanistan and the Resolute Support mission. A vivid discussion touched upon challenges the JFTC faced regarding the continuously changing Alliances needs. compound the guests had an opportunity to see the heart of the centre the training facility support of training events and exercises. JFTC Staff Visits Exploseum visited Exploseum the museum established in the remains of the premises of the DAG Fabrik Bromberg (the centre of the military Third Reich. District Museum in Bydgoszcz. In the past, Reichs Armys demand for explosives on the Eastern front. Currently, it is one of the most interesting tourist attractions in Poland. Visiting the complex of seven buildings EUROCORPS Commander at the JFTC Lieutenant General Guy Buchsenschmidt, the Commander of the EUROCORPS, visited the Joint Force Commander, and explored the centres training capabilities. introduced the guests to the centres history, structure, mission, current activities and future challenges. They also provided detailed interested in. During the demonstration of the centres simulation capabilities, Generals evolve in the future. the JFTC memory book. In Retrospect Life at JFTC44 45

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JFTC Supports NATO Knowledge Competitions Kuyavia and Pomerania Regions primary Training Centres Commander and Deputy participants of both contests. aimed at encouraging young people to improve participated in the first, school phase and the best of them met in May in the International General Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy in Bydgoszcz. The JFTC has supported it has already become a tradition that the The competition is designed for primary schools of Bydgoszcz. Its main goal is to history, the Alliances role in global peace participants from 9 schools took the challenge them made it to the final. After a stiff rivalry, Open Day for Schools at the JFTC explored the Joint Force Training Centre Open Day for Schools organized by the JFTC and turned out to be a huge success. about Polish Armed Forces missions abroad, JFTC, presentation of simulation tools used participants of the first Open Day for Schools high interest of local schools in the centres In the past the JFTC hosted smaller groups of students interested in the Alliance. event, gathering a bigger number of young representatives of Bydgoszcz International uniform classes representing the Manager High School of Bydgoszcz and Technical College from Szubin. also thanks to the JFTC guests. The centres highly interested in military topics and activities, soldiers careers and life of foreign staff in Poland, laid a foundation for a vivid, fruitful and very substantial discussion. National Military Representatives Explored JFTC guests to the centre and its capabilities. The Vivid discussions and interesting in-depth questions regarding the JFTCs exposed to the JFTCs mission, structure as Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff, and division heads presented evolved throughout the eleven years and ready to prepare future members of ongoing to train national units requiring professional to come to Bydgoszcz and train in this specialized environment. You can use your all the systems there, nor all the equipment, all the tools and expertise needed for a complete and The JFTC guests also had an opportunity to see the demonstration of modern and sophisticated modelling and simulation tools used in support of JFTC training, presented by the Training Support Division. This gave them a clear picture of the centres high level the Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP and structure. 46 47 In Retrospect Life at JFTC

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JFTC Supports NATO Knowledge Competitions Kuyavia and Pomerania Regions primary Training Centres Commander and Deputy participants of both contests. aimed at encouraging young people to improve participated in the first, school phase and the best of them met in May in the International General Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy in Bydgoszcz. The JFTC has supported it has already become a tradition that the The competition is designed for primary schools of Bydgoszcz. Its main goal is to history, the Alliances role in global peace participants from 9 schools took the challenge them made it to the final. After a stiff rivalry, Open Day for Schools at the JFTC explored the Joint Force Training Centre Open Day for Schools organized by the JFTC and turned out to be a huge success. about Polish Armed Forces missions abroad, JFTC, presentation of simulation tools used participants of the first Open Day for Schools high interest of local schools in the centres In the past the JFTC hosted smaller groups of students interested in the Alliance. event, gathering a bigger number of young representatives of Bydgoszcz International uniform classes representing the Manager High School of Bydgoszcz and Technical College from Szubin. also thanks to the JFTC guests. The centres highly interested in military topics and activities, soldiers careers and life of foreign staff in Poland, laid a foundation for a vivid, fruitful and very substantial discussion. National Military Representatives Explored JFTC guests to the centre and its capabilities. The Vivid discussions and interesting in-depth questions regarding the JFTCs exposed to the JFTCs mission, structure as Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff, and division heads presented evolved throughout the eleven years and ready to prepare future members of ongoing to train national units requiring professional to come to Bydgoszcz and train in this specialized environment. You can use your all the systems there, nor all the equipment, all the tools and expertise needed for a complete and The JFTC guests also had an opportunity to see the demonstration of modern and sophisticated modelling and simulation tools used in support of JFTC training, presented by the Training Support Division. This gave them a clear picture of the centres high level the Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP and structure. 46 47 In Retrospect Life at JFTC