Citation
IO sphere

Material Information

Title:
IO sphere the professional journal of joint information operations
Alternate title:
Information operations sphere
Creator:
Joint Information Operations Center (U.S.)
Place of Publication:
San Antonio, TX
Publisher:
Office of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command; Joint Information Operations Center
Publication Date:
Frequency:
Quarterly
regular
Language:
English
Physical Description:
v. : ill. ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Information warfare -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Command and control systems -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Command and control systems ( fast )
Information warfare ( fast )
Genre:
Periodicals. ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

Notes

Dates or Sequential Designation:
Spring 2005-
General Note:
Title from cover.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
60491428 ( OCLC )
2007215928 ( LCCN )
1939-2370 ( ISSN )
ocm60491428
Classification:
U163 .I547 ( lcc )
355 ( ddc )

Related Items

Preceded by:
Cyber sword : the professional journal of joint information operations

UFDC Membership

Aggregations:
Digital Military Collection

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Full Text

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Disclaimer Statement This Department of Defense publication (ISSN 1939-2370) is an authorized publication for the members of the Department of Defense and interested stakeholders. Contents of the IO Sphere IO Sphere Articles in this publication may be reproduced without permission. If reproduced, IO Sphere and contributing authors request a courtesy line and appropriate source citation. GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES: IO Sphere IO Sphere also to include accepted submissions. The IO Sphere TEXT CHARTS/GRAPHS PHOTOGRAPHS FORMAT/LENGTH Send letters to the editor, articles, press releases & editorials to: CALL FOR ARTICLESIO Sphere If youre on a .mil network, then IO Sphere is available to you on the Joint Staffs JDEIS electronic publishing site. IO SphereEndnote references for all academic articles Afghanistan VisitUndersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Mr. Michael Vickers, visits Coalition Forces in Afghanistan

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2 September 2012Views from the Top Information Operations Intelligence Integration (IOII)By Maj Gen John N.T. ShanahanDeputy Director for Global Operations Joint Staff J-39

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3 IO SPHERE IS GOING DIGITAL San Antonio, TXIO Sphere IO Sphere preferences. IO Sphere IO Sphere a part of IO Sphere. The IO Sphere staff and leadership are IO Sphere IO Sphere This issue of IO Spher to attain its true potential as a force multiplier and become

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4 September 2012 Joint Information Operations Assessment Methodolgy-Part IIBy Mr. Charles ChenowethEditors Note: IO Sphere Figure 1 Joint IO Assessment Methodology

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5 be compared to the baseline. systems. better operations. Figure 2 Analytic Construct for Joint IO Assessment

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6 September 2012

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7

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8 September 2012Culture Has ConsequencesBy Editors Note: IO Sphere T compound hidden inside their shoes under the soles of their interaction. Because culture forms the sum total of the learned Culture has consequences, and those consequences can be deadly.

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9

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10 September 2012Intelligence Community: The Key to Success in the Information EnvironmentBy Mr. Joshua CookEditors Note: IO Sphere Factors of GlobalizationT 2

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11 from our community and our operational partners to close the Endnotes:1. Director of National Intelligences Vision 2015. 2. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, 2020. 3. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 4. SECDEF Memorandum on SC & IO in the DOD 25 January 2011

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12 September 2012 Figure 1. Islamic Jihad Union Banner Source: sehadetzamani.comThe Anatomy of a Militant Radical Islamic Website: The Islamic Jihad Unions Information OperationsBy Ms. Karen Kaya Article Synopsis and Editors Note: This article analyzes to this issue of IO Sphere. IntroductionT attacks are an important part of their information operations. The IJUs Information Operations 2 Themes and Messages Figure 2. Islamic Jihad Union Website Source: sehadetzamani.com

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13 posted on the site typically document A press release by the Islamic Jihad Union reported that, on March planes had conducted an attack on Muslims and killed 3 mujahedeen and 14 Muslim brothers. A new statement made today [March 18, American Spy Planes conducted another attack at the Digor Region later that same day; and that this attack was solely aimed at the CIVILIAN POPULATION. As a result of this attack, 40 Muslims from the CIVILIAN POPULATION have been killed, and 20 have been wounded. As such, it is noted that are continuing their CIVILIAN MASSACRES. The whole world should know that the Invader Infidel AMERICA and its puppet Apostate PAKISTAN, are conducting CIVILIAN MASSACRES in the North Waziristan Tribal Areas. The accessible. models. This appears to be a tool aimed posts almost daily statements on their death. country. They also released a picture of them. Brother Ebu Yasir El Turki from the Figure 3. Islamic Jihad Union Fighter Source: sehadetzamani.com Young Child Indoctrinated with Jihad Training Source: Google Images

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14 September 2012 The Pakistani government and Pakistani Generals, who have been purchased by the US Army, are releasing their But we react to their attacks against us. And this is exactly what America wants. We are aware of this and focus our attention on the Americans. But the Pakistani army, who have traded their religion for a small fee to the Americans, are attacking us like hungry dogs. We are merely defending ourselves against the Pakistani army, while counterattacking the American army. We know that the Pakistani armys weaponry, equipment and salary are being supplied by America. But it is impossible for the Pakistani army to deal with the Mujahedeen. Even the worlds superpower, the US hasnt been able to deal with the Mujahedeen.10 Claiming Responsibility for Attacks Europeans. failed attack. On 3 March 2008, our Mujahid of the ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION has successfully carried out an operation against a the Sabari Nation Valley in Afghanistans Paktika Region. This Heroic Mujahid, with Gods help, has attacked the Tons of Explosives. According to witnesses and the Taliban Figure 4. Islamic Jihad Union Press Release Video Source: sehadetzamani.com Figure 5. Alleged Islamic Jihad Union Suicide Bomber Source: sehadetzamani.com

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15 Mujahedeen, with whom we organized the operation, Following our operation, 5 helicopters continuously carried bodies out of the rubble. The number of soldiers who died in the camp was kept secret. According to witnesses and Mujahedeen, the bodies of at least 60 American soldiers and 70 Collaborator Afghan soldiers were carried. This operation was in retaliation to our recently Martyred Mujahid Sheikh Ebu Leys El Libi and other Martyred Mujahedeen. This operation was carried out by bold Cneyt ifti (Saad Ebu Furkan), who came from Germany but of Turkish origin, who traded his luxurious life for Heaven.In the coming days, we will release scenes from this operation and a video recording of our brothers last words to the Ummah [Islamic nation].Target Audience Conclusion 22 IJU Militants Detained in North West Pakistan Source: Google Images

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16 September 2012 monitor the site. Endnotes: 1. Islamic Group Claims Uzbekistan Attacks, JihadWatch.org, April 12, 2004; http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2004/04/001535print. html.2. Crawford, David. Web Sites for Germanys Turks Fuel Fear of Homegrown Terror, The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2007; http:// online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118964547572825925.html. 3. Amerika Katiliama Devam Ediyor (The U.S. Continues its Massacres), Sehadetzamani.com, March 18, 2011; http://sehadetzamani. com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2444. Civilians), Sehadetzamani.com, March 9, 2011; http://sehadetzamani. com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2435. 5. Islamic Group Claims Uzbekistan Attacks. JihadWatch.org, April 12, 2004; http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2004/04/001535print.html. by One), Sehadetzamani.com, January 4, 2011; http://sehadetzamani. com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2413. 7. Islam Emirligi Operasyon Raporu (The Islamic Emirate Operation Report), Sehadetzamani.com, July 26, 2010; http://sehadetzamani.com/ haber_detay.php?haber_id=2385. 8. Bavarian Cneyt ifti is Germanys First Suicide Bomber, The Sunday Times, March 18, 2008; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/europe/article3571785.ece. of the Islamic Jihad Union Mujahideen), Sehadetvakti.com April 14, 2008; http://www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1907. Hamza Harbi), Sehadetvakti.com, March 10, 2011; http://sehadetzamani. com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2438. 18, 2007; http://www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1565. 12. Samigullina, Alia. Business of Shabak, Politika, August 10, 2004; http://www.gazeta.ru/2004/07/31/oa_128728.shtml. 13. U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under Executive Order 13224, U.S. Department of State website state.gov; May 26 2005; http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/46838. pdf; Landler, Mark and Nicholas Kulish. Police Arrest 3 in German Terror Plot, International Herald Tribune, September 5, 2007; http:// www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=7393593. in Terror Attack), Sabah, September 6, 2007; http://www.sabah.com. tr/2007/09/06//haber,4194354E1AF7440487CB8815A9842086.html. Press Release), Sehadetvakti.com, September 11, 2007; http://www. sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1587. 16. Germany: Authorities Say Uzbekistan-Based Group behind Terrorist Plot, Radio Free Europe, September 6, 2007; http://www.rferl.org/ featuresarticle/2007/09/6ec8adad-f98f-413d-95e1-776074d74a24.html. 17. During raids in Germany following the plot, police also found an IJU manual for bomb making. Saidazimova, Gulnoza. Germany: Authorities Say Uzbekistan-Based Group behind Terrorist Plot, Radio Free Europe, September 6, 2007, Ibid.; and Laabs, Dirk. German Case Offered Alleged Earful, LATimes.com September 8, 2007; http:// www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-plot8sep08,1,6897745. story?ctrack=3&cset=true. 18. Terrorist Plots in Europe: Foiled, This Time, The Economist, September 6, 2007; http://www.economist.com/node/9769480. 19. Islami Cihad Ittehadi BASIN AIKLAMASI (Islamic Jihad Union PRESS STATEMENT), Sehadetvakti.com, March 6, 2008; http://www. sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1889. 20. In der Westlichen Presse wird ja der Islam als Terrorismus dargestellt. Es wird ja behauptet das di (Our Interview with the Islamic Jihad Union Mujahideen Abdulgaffar El Almani), Sehadetvakti.com, May 23, 2008; http://www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1921. 31, 2007; http://www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1202. 22. According to Uzbek and international human rights groups, thousands of religious Uzbek Muslims have reportedly been jailed in recent years for practicing Islam outside government-sanctioned institutions. The statement from the Islamic Jihad Group that claimed responsibility for the March and April 2004 attacks in Uzbekistan, also claimed that Muslims were being tortured and imprisoned as a way to terrorize and degrade them. Islamic Group Claims Uzbekistan Attacks, Jihad Watch.org, April 12, 2004; http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2004/04/001535print. Union Press Release), Sehadetvakti.com, September 11, 2007; http:// www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1587. 23. Schmitt, Eric. Europeans Get Terror Training inside Pakistan, New world/europe/10germany.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 24. Uzbek Terror Networks: Germany, Jamoat and the IJU, The Jamestown Foundation, November 8, 2007; http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4533&tx_ttnews[backPid]=182&no_ cache=1.

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17 Structuring Tactical Military Information Support Operations for By LTC J.R. Reiling, US ArmyEditors Note: Introduction Background Analysis Source: defenseimagery.mil

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20 September 2012 teams are frequently operating alone or in conjunction with other small forces (such as a Civil Affairs team or an infantry patrol), often in areas not regularly covered by other US forces. This increased vulnerability is occurring in the context of a LIC environment wherein casualties are more keenly felt by US leadership attempting to maintain public support for the operation. Force protection (FORCEPRO) requirements to travel outside the wire in the LIC environment we operate in today have evolved to a consistent two-vehicle, four-person minimum. The current MIS Team comes up one short in both areas, forcing it to cast about for reinforcement in order to perform its job. On a major forward operating base, this is an inconvenience, but not impossible to overcome. The motor pool can usually come up happy to get off the compound for a few hours who will even aid kit up to standard and beyond is to invite a medic from the clinic to accompany you on a mission). It is a different story when operating with special operations forces. In this situation the MIS Team is in an austere environment where almost everyone else frequently leaves the camp on an irregular battle rhythm including nighttime. These soldiers will have less incentive to accompany the MIS Team on missions above and beyond their demanding workload. The MIS Team may be well-integrated into the operational missions conducted by their host team. However, they often have problems trying to get support to get out and conduct the routine patrolling and interaction critical to conditioning the local population in order to make future operations more successful.ProposalA new MIS Team organization and equipment could include (see Figure 2): 3 x 37F MISO specialists 1 x 11B Infantryman 1 x M1114 with loudspeaker 1 x M1114 A dedicated second vehicle would increase the MIS Team capability by allowing them to stage newspapers, novelty items and other things normally disseminated to target audiences during patrols. Reserve ammunition, fuel, food and other stocks can also be laid in rather than being loaded and unloaded from borrowed vehicles for every mission. Figure 1 Current Tactical MISO Team Figure 2 Proposed Tactical MISO Team

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21 Like the second vehicle, a fourth team member would enable the MIS Team to meet FORCEPRO minimums in a LIC environment. While on patrol, the fourth team member would assist with vehicle security and/or overwatch for the remaining team members (necessary missions in a LIC environment which increasing the MISO capability of the MIS Team. An 11B would be the best MOS for directly bringing combat capability to the MIS Team. The infantryman would also be able to share their skill with other team members and increase the overall combat capabilities of the MIS Team. An alternative would be to simply provide the MIS Team with an additional MISO soldier, which would likely be the preferred option of the MISO community. However, the MISO force is currently badly undermanned and it is unlikely that the assignment and training pipelines will alleviate this shortfall in the foreseeable future. Giving each team an 11B would be a more realistic lower-cost option that still improves the overall capability and survivability of the MIS Team. A reorganized MIS Team would be more expensive to deploy and maintain due to the increase in personnel and equipment. However, this should be measured against the opportunity cost gain from MISO practitioners no longer having to spend time in a combat operations zone securing and integrating the resources needed to conduct their mission, or cases of MIS Teams at austere locations not being able to conduct their mission at all. The larger structure would correspondingly result in an increase in time available to the MISO specialists to plan and execute their primary mission.ConclusionThe force restructuring described above could prove to be a than the current organization. It would enable MISO to deploy ready to support any host organization it is assigned to, and be better able to operate and survive in a LIC environment. forces restructured as discussed above would no longer be optimal for the operational environment. In fact, they would be exhibiting what may then be known as Anbar Province thinking.ReferencesInformation on current MIS Team organization and equipment taken from US Army Field Manual 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 28 Oct 2005 as well as undated usage guide PSYOP vs MISO published by the MIS Directorate, U.S. Army John F. derived from Figure 2-5 Tactical Psychological Operations detachment of USA FM 3-05.302. US Tactical MISO Team with Vehicle and Loudspeaker Source: defenseimagery.mil

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22 September 2012 Editors Note: Mr. Josh Cook is a stanch advocate of ensuring His hard work in organizing the IOII effort has made him the foremost authority on the communitys evolution. His contribution on this subject is very important to this issue of IO Sphere. Evolution of Information Operations Intelligence IntegrationBy Mr. Joshua CookThe authors of the above quote are talking in general about a focus on threat-centric intelligence vs. populationcentric intelligence. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn (US Army), Captain Matt Pottinger (US Marine Corps), and Mr. Paul Bachelor in their report Fixing Intel: A Blue Print for Making Intelligence in Afghanistan Relevant propose that intelligence is often focused on things rather than people. Their arguments resonate particularly well with the Information Operations Intelligence Integration (IOII) community. Namely, IOII fuses vitally needed all-source information environment (IE)-centric data, to include friendly, adversary and, equally important, neutral intelligence and information. In this article, we will explore activities undertaken by the IOII Community of Action (COA) to ensure intelligence personnel dedicated to supporting IO are in the right place and possess the right skill sets to provide exceptional intelligence products and analysis to IO planners. The IOII COA has come a long way toward that goal since the 2009 Intelligence Support to Information Operations of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD-I), which called for a normalization of the ISIO force. That year, to address issues facing our community, as well as showcase the integrative nature of our work, we shifted our identity from the ISIO Community of Interest to the IOII COA. The 2011 Secretary an integrating strategy falls in line with how the intelligence personnel assigned to support IO planners have viewed their job for some time. This paradigm was announced at the 4th by Lt Gen John C. Koziol Deputy OSD-I for Joint Coalition membership and participation from across the Department, Defense Intelligence Guidance for FY11-17, which established IOII as a priority for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Through these actions, we have addressed IOII-related issues in doctrine, training, and force development. Over the past three years, we have worked to codify our beliefs and principles by influencing key Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. DOD Directive (DODD) 3600.01, Information Operations, now states, the IO force are military professionals in the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components; DOD civilian professionals; and select academic and contract personnel who directly support the integration of IO. The IO force consists of information-related capability specialists, IO planners, and intelligence personnel dedicated to supporting IO. The takeaway here is that, although we have our own set of issues and processes, intelligence personnel are considered part of the IO force and are key to successful IO. Additionally, DODD 3600.01 directs OUSD-I to craft a DOD instruction regarding IOII. This will further codify the COA and its work in upcoming years. With regard to joint publications (JP), JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of Operations Environment, now discusses the central IOII activity of time ever, the information operations community recognized and analytic methods to characterize and forecast, identify

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23 planning, coordination, and integration skills for personnel more information call 210-977-6238 (DSN 969) or E-mail: jewc.eww.training@us.af.mil.

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24 September 2012 Source: defenseimagery.milvulnerabilities, determine effects, and assess the information environment has been widely accepted. With regard to training, we recognized basic and advanced IOII knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) at the 4th Annual IOII conference in 2009. Taking these forward to the 5th Annual conference, we addressed shortfalls in the advanced IOII training arena by identifying advanced-level IOII training objectives and developed a course curriculum to tackle these the 6th Annual IOII conference, and as a result, the rest of 2011 Agencys (DIA) ISIO course that teaches to the basic KSA level. Our 2011-2012 efforts focus on developing, validating through a pilot course, and certifying what has become the IE Advanced Analysis (IEAA) course that will teach to the requirements) against intelligence professionals dedicated to supporting IO planners. working group, and subsequently a larger cross-section of conference attendees, agreed that there should not be an IOII force with special occupational identifiers (e.g., military occupational specialties, Air Force specialty codes) or special supporting IO planners should be trained in IOII based on the The 7th Annual conference force development working group and attached training requirements to them. The training requirements (i.e., DIAs ISIO course, the Joint Information Operations Planners Course, and IEAA) are now being reviewed before formal submission. Also during the 2012 under the IO mission grouping to ensure those assigned to perform the IOII function have appropriate evaluation criteria in place. Those recommendations will go forward as a part of an update to IO UJTs at large. Through the hard work of the IOII COA in the areas of doctrine and force development (training, education, and force management), we have made noteworthy progress that we are the ones who will provide the IE baselines IO planners will utilize to narrow their planning efforts and set up the assessment of their activities. We will build out the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products that describes adversary capabilities in the IE. We will work with the broader J2 community to ensure collection plans and assets are in place to inform the measure of effect and the whole IO force because, after all, IOII allows operations and intelligence to achieve a mutual understanding of and the interrelationship among the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions of the IE.

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25 For Information on the 2013 IOII Conference Contact Mr. Josh Cook at joshua.cook@us.af.mil

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26 September 2012 IO Sphere Transition to the Digital AgeSan Antonio, TX-(September 15, 2012) The IO Sphere will no longer be issued in print form after this issue. This is part of a DOD initiative to reduce the cost of print journals. In trying to make the transition as easy as possible and provide our been researching getting the IO Sphere into as many digital reading venues as possible. One of the main thrusts of this effort is to get IO Sphere published in a format that allows use on most available e-reader hardware and e-reader applications on Apple and Android products. The only e-reader platform we currently are not supporting is Microsoft as they have terminated their e-reader software earlier this year. The capability exists to support, so we Digital versions for use on e-reader platforms will be available starting with this issue and should be released and available within a week or two following release of the print version. As each platform is different, there are a variety of methods for loading the IO Sphere on the platform of your choice. There will be three digital versions of the IO Sphere: .mobi, for use on Kindle products and apps; ePub, for use on most other e-reader platforms and apps including Nook and iBooks; .pdf for reading on the computer, but more importantly, for printing. IPad is probably the easiest platform for loading the IO Sphere. If you have the Kindle app, you can choose whether to download the ePub or mobi version as both will work. Simply download the version you prefer and tap the IO Sphere icon. IPad will give you the choice of app, either iBooks or Kindle depending on the version you downloaded. Tap your choice and the IO Sphere will open in the application for reading. Other tablets create a problem providing straight forward instructions for loading the IO Sphere as there are dozens, if not hundreds, of different tablets all coming pre-loaded with different applications. Many, perhaps even most, of these tablets may work in the same way as with the iPad, but there is no way to test all of the various tablets to see if this is actually true. Since both Android and Windows tablets, with the exception of the e-reader pseudo tablets (Nook Color, Nook Tablet, and Kindle Fire), can load a Kindle app, the surest method of loading app. Kindle also has a fairly easy method for loading the IO Sphere on your device or app. Every Kindle has a unique e-mail and it will automatically load into the device or app next time its connected to a network. Conversely, if you provide your Kindle e-mail address to the IO Sphere editorial team, we can must update your Kindle Approved Personal Document E-mail List to include the e-mail address sending the IO Sphere. The e-mail you created your Kindle account with is automatically on the list. Complete instructions for doing this can be found in Kindle support and will also be posted in the same folder as Kindle hardware. The procedure is essentially the same as with the Nook below. Nook isnt quite as easy as either of the other two options, but content on Nooks is called sideloading. To do this, download in your Nook and browse to the Files folder. Inside that folder documents; save the IO Sphere into the folder you prefer. Safely remove your Nook hardware and you are ready to open the journal as you would with any other Nook content. IO Sphere will be mailing out post cards to all the subscribers on the new digital distribution with more information. If you have any questions please contact the editor at jiowc.iosphere@ us.af.mil.

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27 Tendency AnalysisBy What is Tendency Analysis? Some schools of thought will describe tendencies as being nuanced observables in an environment that tip off somebody that something is about to occur. I have also heard it described as something small that tells a soldier to not go down a particular alleyway. The nuanced observables used in these descriptions of tendency analysis are described as working on the sub consciousness of the observer.1 However, this is not really tendency analysis, but rather anomaly analysis on the minute scale, and how minute anomalies register on the human brain and manifest within our perceptions and thoughts. kind of thought or action.2 that people will have a particular fondness for, or a pattern to, a preferred way of thinking or actions/reactions to stimuli. In other words, people will have a preferred pattern to how they think and how they will react to a given situation. Tendency analysis, therefore, is the effort to truly get inside an adversarys thought and decision-making process to set the cognitive conditions for them to make the decisions we desire them to make to do the actions/reactions we desire them to do. To illustrate some of these principles, we can examine three examples: a sports analogy, an example from pop culture, and a historical military example. The sports analogy is a basketball game, and the focus is the match-up between the point guards on each team. In this example, the reader is the one of the point guards observing that he dribbles the ball predominately right handed and shoots right handed. The logical conclusion is that he is right-handed. Being right-handed, it can be assumed that he is going to have a preference or tendency to go his strong side: the right. This can the opposing right-handed player, the observer can now set conditions by providing subtle observable behaviors, such as player into a trap set on his strong side, or force him to go to his weak side. A classic Hollywood example appears in the movie Patton, when George C. Scott, as Patton, declares after his forces defeat German forces in North Africa under the presumed command of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Rommel, you and scene cannot be attributed as authentic, it does highlight a principle of tendency analysis. The scene hints that Patton had studied Rommels writings and learned how Rommel thought, and acted/reacted under certain conditions. Patton knew his adversary. This becomes a major component of tendency analysis: getting to know as much about how the adversary thinks and reacts to certain stimuli when making decisions. Pattern analysis is also an integral feeder component for tendency analysis. By examining the patterns of decision making as revealed through behaviors and actions/reactions to environmental stimuli, the tendencies of the decision makers Editors Note: Tendency analysis is an important aspect of IOII. The need to be able to gain information and intelligence from trends and tendencies is critical to gaining insight into culture and human factors that make up attitudes and beliefs. Information-related activities in support of traditional military operations are dependent on this type of intelligence analysis.

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28 September 2012 Source: defenseimagery.milcan be revealed and taken advantage of. A classic military example of the application of pattern and tendency analysis can be seen in the 206 BC Battle of Ilipia, near modern day Seville, Spain, between Roman forces under Scipio Africanus and Hannibals Carthaginian forces under the command of Hasdrubal and Mago attacked the Roman forces immediately forces were able to throw back this initial assault. Over the next few days, observed the patterns that betrayed the mindset of his opponents. Scipio noted that the Carthaginian commanders at a certain time, showed a preference for favored formations, and react to a given situation in the same manner. Scipio always same formation: the legions in the center and the Iberian forces on the wings. In doing so, Scipio set a pattern of response and habit that he wanted them to perceive. On the morning Scipio decided to attack, fed his forces earlier than normal; before daylight. He then moved them forward toward the enemy encampment, waiting until they were closer to form up their battle formations. He changed the arrangement of forces by placing his stronger legion forces on the wings and the weaker Iberian forces in the center. Attacking before daylight, the Carthaginians were caught off guard and found themselves having to quickly arm and rush into battle unfed. As expected, the Carthaginian commanders formed up their forces in their preferred formations, expecting Scipio to have done the same. However, now Scipios stronger forces were able to collapse the wings of the opposing forces and hammer 3While we can never know exactly what was in the mind of Scipio, his battle strategy and his maneuver tactics show he used pattern-analysis thought processes to determine the tendency of his enemys decision making, and adjusted his actions accordingly to present a deceptive picture of his own tendencies. Going back to our original example in the beginning of this paper of anomaly analysis, we can now see that anomaly analysis and tendency analysis, both dependent upon pattern and trend analysis as information feeders and human factors analysis to know the enemy, are different sides of the same coin. From our perspective, we want to learn the tendencies of our other side of the coin, we want to look for anomalies within our environment to analyze them to reveal not only potential enemy actions, but also to take advantage of our own tendencies. This area of analysis can be that line of effort that could turn the tables of a single engagement, affecting the outcome of larger battles across many dimensions of the conduct of warfare.Endnotes: 1. Hall, Wayne. M. (2010). Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC., page 205-2173. 2. Merriam Webster. (1999). Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary: 3. Scullard, Howard. H. (1970). Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. New York: Cornell University.

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29 Coalition Soldier Engaging with Afghan Children Source: defenseimagery.mil Cultures and Organizations: How IOII Can Support Successful Non-Lethal OperationsBy Editors Note: Non-Lethal Operations are largely operations that are centered around information-related activities. IO is a central part of those operations and almost all traditional military activities in the future will include significant operations that are considered non-lethal. These operations are dependent upon intelligence and proper intelligence integration. CPT Molinas experience in these operations is insightful. The world is a beautiful place with a rich history full of diverse cultures in remote places. I have spent two, soon to be three, years of my life in Afghanistan interacting with the Pashtun people, traveling the same land Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great ruled. Visiting Babaji castle, the deployment to Afghanistan. My time in Afghanistan has shown me the value of Information Operations Intelligence Integration (IOII) throughout all phases of combat operations. How can IOII support winning hearts and minds guiding successful nonlethal operations? My time in the Joint Information Operations has taught me that IOII permits operations and intelligence to achieve a shared acceptance of the interconnectivity among the physical, information, and cognitive domains of the information environment. The symbiotic relationship between operations and intelligence requires advanced thought processes and an changing Complex Adaptive System (CAS) (Hall & Citrebaum 2010, and Sternberg, 2002). This article will discuss the nature of social reality, realizing some general assumptions, and high/ low-context cultural patterns IOII can support to win hearts and minds and guide successful non-lethal operations. Edgar Schein, a world-renowned expert in social psychology, has published over 14 books Oganizational Psychology (3rd ed., 1980), Career Dynamics (1978), Organizational Culture and Leadership (1985, 1992, 2004) as well as many others. His study of social groups and the psychology behind individuals in the information environment; i.e., where they work, live, an edge in the preparation of IO where understanding of sociocultural dimensions paramount. Social reality refers to those things members of a group regard as matters of consensus that are not externally, empirically testable (Schein, 2010). Social

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30 September 2012 reality in Afghanistan operates on a different set of norms than in the United States. When individuals hold different (Schein, 2010). Our training and negotiation approach has changed from the do as I say days. American and Afghan leaders have learned to have a respect for the individual, sharing ideas, norms, and beliefs. American and Afghan leaders have learned respect for the individual, sharing ideas, norms, and generation in Afghanistan. To win hearts and minds, we must determine a groups assumptions using systematic research, socio-cultural psychology, and case-study methodology. Afghanistans cultures fall into the group assumption of focusing on the past to shape tomorrow (Schein, 2010). They hold family ties and tell stories that date back a thousand years. These stories become lore and legend, making change very a need to understand culture, said knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographic terrain. To understand socio-cultural thought processes, advanced graduate-level analysis and social psychology help establish a baseline (technical, functional, cultural) of the culture in which intelligence practitioners are operating (Hall & Citrebaum, 2010). Afghan society employs a standard known as polychromic time; that is, using time as an approximate standard, a guide, as contrasted to the Western mode of precise adherence to the clock. Middle Eastern countries use polychromic time to accomplish multiple tasks simultaneously (Schein, 2010). Americans place importance on time as a measure of value and to manage military operations for Inshallah (God Willing), as a measure for importance as Afghans feel that if God wills them to be there at 10 am, they will be there because God made it so. When United States personnel make an Afghans understand that time is important to Americans. Afghans will be insulted if American leaders are late, but they expect Afghan leaders to be late in respect to Inshallah. Diplomacy becomes problematic if societies hold distinctive assumptions about reality. Socio-cultural understanding is integral to looking past the assumptions of a society. Only after days and months of working with village elders and the Afghan people, you begin to see different types of authority among Afghan social structure (Schein, 2010). intelligence-analysis skill sets and who have had multiple deployments are better equipped, as they are already privy to the culture, norms, and typologies (autocratic, paternalistic, consultative or democratic, participative and power sharing, Typology is imperative for the reason that organizational type supersedes many of the macro cultures that exist in the world (Schein, 2010). Large organizations are likely to center most of their time focusing energy that is foreign to remote tribes throughout the world (Morgan, 2006). This is no different in Afghan Policemen and Soldiers Inspect an Electrical Light Fixture During a Class Session Source: defenseimagery.mil

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31 the United States Army; the intelligence analyst is subordinate to the organization during combat operations. Soldiers coming assumptions and conceptual categories that allow them to discriminate and label most of what they have experienced immersing himself or herself in Afghan culture, the faster the soldiers false assumptions of the Afghan people and their own superiority complex will disappear. Highand low-context cultural patterns are also present in Afghanistan. In the low-context, unidirectional culture, events have clear universal meanings; in the high-context, mutual causality culture, events can be understood only in context, meanings can vary, categories can change, and causality cannot be unambiguously established. (Schein, 2010) The Afghan people are high-context people; that is, most of their cultural behaviors are not public. Members of this society are expected to act based on years of interaction. Adversary political, military, economic, social, and informational when dealing with cultures that are unfamiliar to intelligence analysts. My case that socio-cultural understanding is essential to IOII will eventually allow advanced intelligence personnel to complete PMESII analysis, but only after applying observables (cultural, functional, situational, biometric, and technical). American soldiers who have deployed more than once and have actively engaged the people learning Pashtu and Dari are still low context for the reason that American soldiers are still faced with boundaries that are not in line with the Afghan peoples beliefs. For example, in my first deployment to Afghanistan, I had an Afghan interpreter who presented himself as pro-Afghanistan wanting to rid his country of Taliban oppression. He taught me Pashtu and introduced me to his culture. This added to my credibility during meetings with village elders. I reciprocated the teaching by sharing with my interpreter American military values, without ever discussing religion, which was prohibited by command. We later realized, however, that he had only played the part of pro-Afghanistan for months, providing the enemy with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The lesson learned was that no matter how hard you try to understand Afghan view of themselves and us, the reality is much more complex and the loyalties can be shifting and adjustable even among Afghans who are helping the coalition. Active listening will get you far in Afghan culture. Village elders love to talk and tell their Cross-cultural communication strategies suggest that a local interpreter can aid you to develop a bond with the local populace. I am still a fan of using local interpreters to help the leader in bringing down barriers Afghan people may have when they see soldiers with weapons. As a result of the Taliban interpreter providing the adversary with TTPs, I changed many aspects about our operation, making our teams more enhance operational security. I devoted myself to learning more about the Afghan culture in order to remove any misconceptions I might have been using at the time. As leaders, we must continue to learn from our victories and defeats and trust our instincts. By coming to terms with the true nature of social reality, grasping group assumptions, and recognizing high/low context cultural patterns, IOII can support winning hearts and minds guiding successful nonlethal operations.References: 1. Hall, Wayne. M. (2010). Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC., page 205-2173. 2. Merriam Webster. (1999). Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary: 3. Scullard, Howard. H. (1970). Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. New York: Cornell University. Source: defenseimagery.mil

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32 September 2012 Face and Information OperationsBy Editors Note: The concept of face is extremely important in many societies. Western and developed societies have lost some of the importance of face in their transition to the importance of the individual, but in many parts of Asia and the Islamic world Face is a critical component of society. This makes it a very important consideration in IO. A recent video of a US Army Police Advisor yelling at Iraqi policemen for cowardice and treachery became an overnight YouTube sensation.1 While the soldier probably had good reasons for being angry, he certainly caused a variety of problems for the coalition forces. One problem in in a country where honor is social capital. He also caused the coalition to lose face with the people they needed support from. The soldier probably never realized the consequences of his actions because he failed to understand how important face, or honor was in Iraq. While conventional wisdom advises that, you should praise in public and scold in private, there is little indoctrination or training that discusses the role of face in intercultural communications. Most Americans would probably assume that the concept of face involves avoiding embarrassment or establishing a good reputation. They might also assume that face is somewhat more important in Asian than in Western cultures; however, face is more important than most people think. Face is an essential element in effective inter-cultural communication and failure to act accordingly can doom an intercultural relationship. For deployed military personnel, respect of face can mean the someones cooperation. Therefore, it is vital that military personnel and their civilian counterparts know how to respect and enhance the face of their engagement partners. Face is essentially a projected image of ones self or group in a relational situation. In other words, face is how you want a this image can result in face loss depending upon the people and context involved. Face is context and culturally dependent as one projects different types of face with different people or groups.2 People can create a Dr. Jeckle and Mr. Hyde type dichotomy by creating different personalities for different audiences. For example, a drill sergeants face among recruits is different from what he would project with his friends and neighbors. Tripping and falling while on a march might cause him to lose face with recruits but not with his friends. Face-work is the process of managing ones image by following the unwritten rules of social interaction within a given culture.3 Judges have to maintain the image of being upstanding and moral members of society in order to justify the power they exert over other people. If a judge were caught on tape being drunk and disorderly, he would lose face, while a vagrant would not lose it because he is often expected to be a drunk, and to act that way. Thus, to engage in face-work, you must understand the rules of interaction within a society. For instance, the rules of interaction within military culture are so different from the rules within civilian society that basic training is required to teach civilians to be a soldier. Thus, problems arise when a person applies rules appropriate for one culture in a relationship with a person from another culture. There are three types of face orientation that all people and groups practice: self, other or group, and mutual. Self-face belongs to a unique individual, whereas other-face belongs to another person or group. Mutual-face is shared between oneself and others; although, these two do not have to belong to the same group. You can engage in face-work strategies that focus on enhancing your self-face, giving face to others or enhancing mutual face.4 In reality, all people engage in all three types of face-work, depending on the context of the situation. A person who is highly concerned with self-face at work may freely give other-face to their friend during social situations and engage in mutual-face-work with their bowling club. The context of the consequence upon what orientation one employs. Face-work orientation is affected by how collectivist or individualistic a culture is. Individualistic cultures place more value on self-face since their individual identity is more salient; therefore, people in these cultures will engage in face-work to preserve their self-identity. If ones self-face is strongly integrated with anothers, as a parent-child relationship would entail, then protection of anothers face is as important as protecting self-face. Collectivist cultures have the opposite tendency and are more concerned with protection of the groups image. They mostly engage in otherand mutual-face-work these individuals are still concerned with their own self-image, especially within the group.5In a work situation, an individualist will want to project an image of individual excellence that leads the boss to think highly of them. They are less likely to try and give face to their peers, and are unlikely to take the blame for failure in order to preserve group face. A collectivist will more often the groups identity. They are also more concerned with giving face to others in the group, especially their superiors. Thus, in a collectivist culture, threatening group face will provoke more resistance than threatening an individuals identity. The exception would be an iconic individual like the Prophet Mohammed whose identity is thoroughly infused within the Muslim group identity. What made the yelling incident so dangerous is that the soldier threatened the group identity of the Iraqi police and parts of their social network. These Iraqis the groups face. Collectivist cultures value face and face-work more than individualistic cultures. They will expend more resources in order to maintain face and will react aggressively when it is threatened. People in collectivist societies are more interdependent with their in-group members than in individualist societies. Extensive interdependence requires that the groups establish strict rules for personal conduct in order

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33 Every person has a role and place in the groups hierarchy, and adhering to this role preserves the face of others. This exists within military culture where teams must subvert their individual needs to those of the group in order for that team to 6 Collectivists are concerned with maintaining the harmony and face of their in-groups, but not with out-groups. Research shows that collectivists make stricter differentiations between in and out groups than individualists.7 In a business transaction an individualist will generally have little concern about working with someone from an out-group, while a collectivist would in collectivist societies who see an attack on the out-group as gaining positive face for them. This reality has face-work implications for military personnel who have to cope with it, but that will be discussed later.Threatening the face of another person or group will almost can either be prevented or mitigated through good face-work. Since face-work is essentially a communication activity, the communication styles and methods employed have a profound impact upon whether you give face or threaten it. The greater the difference between two cultures, and the more probable enhanced in collectivist cultures when the offender is a member of an out-group. Thus, a US military overseas operation is whether a culture is high or low context provides an essential America and all other individualistic societies are low context cultures (LCC) in that their communication styles are primarily verbal, direct, and assertive. Ideally messages stand-alone and do not require any additional visual aides to understand. LCC communication relies less upon factors within the environment, or nuance, of the relationship between the parties to deliver a message. Due to a lower level of inter-dependence, maintaining harmony in relationships is less important. Individualists also the relationship in general. Thus, LCC are task oriented, and have a short-term perspective of time which is why Americans prefer to get to the bottom line quickly.8 In the U.S., if your zipper is down someone will usually tell you without concern that it might embarrass you in the short-term. Thus, the soldier who berated his Iraqi advisees was communicating in a low context manner that was essentially normal for him. High context cultures (HCC) are usually also collectivist societies like those in the Middle East, Asia, and Russia. They rely less upon verbal communication, preferring more subtle and indirect methods like non-verbal cues. HCC uses communication to preserve group face and maintain harmony by compelling the communicator to follow strict rules of very important, and they are very concerned with ensuring that is down in Asia, they may not tell you directly, but rather signal it through non-verbal language in order to avoid embarrassing you. In HCC, preservation of the long-term relationship is more important than delivering the message.9 loss between collectivist HCC and individualist LCC parties. LCC members, especially military personnel, will often prefer and assertive talk. These assertive and direct messages threaten a collectivists face because they are so contrary to their rules of social interaction. Dominating strategies are often avoided in HCC because they are threatening to the relationship. Direct and overt communication that lacks tactfulness can shock an HCC member, especially if he is in the presence of his primary group.10 Threatening the groups face obliges its members to societies use to manage face-work. People in HCC prefer to to maintain harmony and preserve relationships. The use of be offensive since they can perceive that they are being ignored, which causes self-face loss. They might react by being more direct and aggressive in their communication style. This was a common problem in Vietnam between American advisors who frequently complained that their Vietnamese counterparts were ignoring and avoiding them. The Vietnamese probably with superiors. Two main super-strategies exist for maintaining and enhancing prevention, which is communication behavior designed to preclude face-loss, or cover face vulnerabilities. The second super-strategy is restorative face-work, and is designed to repair lost face after an incident. These two strategies are often done in conjunction with each other, and prevention is done before, during and after a face loss incident.11 These strategies manifest themselves in a number of communication behaviors determined by culture and the context of the situation. A problem can arise when parties in an interaction misunderstand the purpose of these face-work behaviors. Preventative face-loss strategies are proactive, dynamic, and used continuously. Collectivist cultures engage in more prevention behaviors than individualists do because they interaction rituals are designed to serve a preventative purpose. Most military personnel who have interacted with Arabs have wondered why they always begin and end a meeting with small talk. Extensive research has shown that they follow this pattern in order to establish the partys role and hierarchy in the relationship. It is a preventative face-work strategy known as credentialing where a person or group establishes their bona 12 When analyzing and interpreting seemingly strange behaviors from your interaction partner, it would be prudent to identify if they are employing a prevention strategy. Preventative strategy often includes a suspended judgment appeal where you ask someone to hear and consider your argument before you make it. If you are going to make a claim that is likely to provoke an immediate negative response from an audience because you appear to be assaulting their beliefs, you can initiate by making a suspension statement. For instance, if you want to stop a foreign counterpart from abusing a detainee who just hurt one of their troops, you can ask them to hear you out so they can consider the advantages of not beating him. Another strategy is a pre-disclosure statement that helps the audience to bond or identify with you before you make a critical statement.13 Before you want the foreign troops you are advising to engage in an after-action review, you may want to

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34 September 2012 yourself to this face-threatening act, it eliminates the impression that you are just trying to be judgmental with them. The third strategy is a pre-apology to lower expectations from the other party, so there is less face loss in the event of failure. To the average American servicemen, hearing a pre-apology from a military or civilian counterpart may seem defeatist or create the impression that they intend to fail. In many ways, the statement InshaAllah which means God willing, in Arabic, is a type of pre-apology. The disclaimer handicaps the speaker by his statement that he cannot do something. A tribal sheikh who wants to avoid cooperating with you in providing security for an area can create the impression that he is poorer your police counterpart states that he cannot go on a dangerous operation with you because he doesnt have gas for his trucks. Face-restoration strategies are designed to repair face loss after it occurs and can be used to repair a relationship or restore an image of strength. Individualists engage in more face restoring behaviors than collectivists since they engage in fewer prevention behaviors. The type of strategy used depends upon the relationship. Aggressive strategies are used if the relationship is not important; however, when the relationship is important, one would use more self-deprecating unassertive strategies. In collectivist cultures the key to the type of restorative strategies preferred is whether the other party is part of the in-group or out-group.14 Restoring face among in-groups requires an unassertive strategy, while out-groups would often dictate an assertive strategy. you attack the person or group who caused the face loss. In a tit for tat exchange of violence is necessary to preserve face. Yelling and threatening are direct aggression gestures short of violence, which are also tactics, used to restore face. The second face-restoration strategy is passive aggressiveness, where you might deny the incident or act confused in order to mitigate face loss. This is a good strategy for weaker parties to resist stronger ones when strategies that are more overt would not face, he might fail to implement actions that are needed for a civil affairs project. Plain avoidance is also an option that can often be interpreted as aggressive since it seeks to avoid any productive resolution of the problem.15 Both of these strategies are best reserved for use against out-groups, especially when the relationship is not important. The third face-restoration strategy is making an excuse that minimizes personal or group responsibility for the face-loss incident. Excuses can blame the problem on dispositional attributions that ascribe the cause of an event to the individual. An excuse can also make situational attributions that lay the blame on external factors beyond an individuals control. Collectivists are more likely to use dispositional accounts to describe failure in order to save group face. Individualists are more likely to use situational attributions to avoid self-face loss. Physical remediation is a restorative strategy, and is where you take immediate action to help and correct the situation. If one accidently kills or injures someone at your checkpoint who was not a threat to you, making a solutia payment is a physical guilt, or shame, when the offending party is willing to admit their responsibility.16 Implications for Information OperationsThe reality of face and face-work has profound implications for the planning and execution of information operations (IO). Every culture is unique and has different rules of social interaction that guide the use of face-work. An IO practitioner must try to understand as many of these rules as possible. There is no substitute for doing the research and relying upon the advice of legitimate cultural experts. In communication with members of high context cultures, you should acknowledge that, as a foreigner in their country, you do not fully understand their culture and do not mean to offend them. The IO practitioner should seek to integrate face-prevention strategies into soldier and leader engagements with the indigenous population of the host country. These interactions present the Source: defenseimagery.mil

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35 most opportune and the most dangerous communication situations. Mutual-face prevention activities are ideal since you usually want to build a relationship. Taking the time to drink tea and chat with an Arab in their home with your body armor off gives them face since you are demonstrating trust that they protect their guests. They will be obliged to reciprocate and Accounting for and accepting your partners face-prevention strategies are essential. partner is a viable and potentially a high-payoff situation. Shifting the blame from a potential incident like a risky mission from your partner to yourself is an innovative strategy. Arranging to give them the credit for success multiplies the potential effect of this strategy. Saving face matters less to Americans, we can take a small hit to our pride much easier mission can pay off through the creation of strong relationships. are not going to lose the wrong kind of face. For instance, you cant risk your image as a protector of human rights to cover for your partners abuse of them. Furthermore, the IO practitioner needs to recognize the salience of group face in collectivist cultures. Assaulting a groups face is going to have serious consequences and can create serious resistance. Thus, when you need to attack someone in a group, it is wise to isolate them from the group. One might want to simultaneously assuage the groups face in order to mitigate the chances of a negative reaction. In general, it is always prudent to give face to others as much as leaders to undertake actions that need to be performed. Publicly praising a leader in front of his people gives both self and threatening activity and should be done prudently with the risk knowingly assessed. Furthermore, criticizing or being openly intrusive in their operations threatens their negative face. Discover what methods of inspection and correction are considered to be appropriate in their culture and seek to emulate them to the best extent possible.Conclusion The reality of face requires that military personnel and their civilian counterparts acknowledge the impact it can have upon operations. All people have a self-image, as well as the groups they belong to, and all engage in some form of face-work to control this self-image. In collectivist cultures, face is more important and their group identity is more salient. Because we predominantly operate within collectivist cultures, face is a crucial aspect of human terrain. Face is both a liability and an asset depending upon how you manage it. If you threaten someones face, you create a liability since they will certainly resist you in some way. If you protect or enhance the face of another, you can win their compliance or even their allegiance. The worst thing deployed military personnel can do is to ignore Since face-work is a communication behavior, its planning and management will often fall within the realm of IO. Face will be most critical during leader and soldier engagements with the indigenous population. Face and its application must be included into the comprehensive pre-deployment, and during deployment training program. Face must be managed throughout the course of the relationship and the deployment. engagement tactics to achieve the most optimal effect possible. Additionally, Military Information Support Operations and Public Affairs activities must be managed to account for facework. Thus, the IO practitioner must work hard to capitalize on this potential asset while avoiding face-threatening acts that can make unnecessary enemies.Endnotes: 1. The Video Clip of the U.S. Army Soldier berating a group of Iraqi Policemen was retrieved on 5 December 2011 from, http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=JGbQBl8KlCo. 2. Gudykunst, William B, and Seiichi Morisaki. Face in Japan and in the United States, in The Challenge of Facework: Cross Cultural and Interpersonal Issues, edited by Stella Ting-Toomey, 47-93. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Theory in Theories in Intercultural Communication, edited by William Gudykunst, 213-233. Fullerton: California State University, 1988. 4. Ting-Toomey, Stella. The Matrix of Face: An updated face negotiation theory, in Theorizing about intercultural communication, edited by William Gudykunst, 71-92. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2004. into Practice, in Handbook of Intercultural Training, 3rd edition, edited by Dan Landis, Janet M. Bennett, and Milton J. Bennett. pp. 217-248. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 2004. 6. Oetzel, John, and Stella Ting-Toomey. Face Concerns in Interpersonal Communication Research 30 (December 2003): 599-624. 47-93. 8. Ting-Toomey, Translating Conflict Face-Negotiation Theory into Practice, 217-248. 9. Ting-Toomey, Translating Conflict Face-Negotiation Theory into Practice, 217-248. 10. Chang, Hui-Ching, and Richard G. Holt. A Chinese Perspective on Face as Inter-Relational Concern, in The Challenge of Facework: Cross Cultural and Interpersonal Issues, edited by Stella Ting-Toomey, 95-132. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 11. Ting-Toomey, The Matrix of Face: An updated face negotiation theory, 71-92. 12. Scollon, Ron, and Suzie Wong Scollon. Face Parameters in EastWest Discourse, in the The Challenge of Facework: Cross Cultural and Interpersonal Issues, edited by Stella Ting-Toomey, 231-267. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 13. Ting-Toomey, The Matrix of Face: An updated face negotiation theory, 71-92. Practice, 217-248. 15. Edelmann, Robert J. Embarrassment and Blushing: Factors Cultural and Interpersonal Issues, edited by Stella Ting-Toomey, 231-267. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 16. Edelmann, Robert J. Embarrassment and Blushing: Factors

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36 September 2012Please submit your contribution in Microsoft Word format, version 6.0 or higher, double-spaced in 10-point, Times New Roman font. Place graphs, photographs, and/or charts in separate attachments, not in the body of the paper. Insert a note describing object placement in the body of the paper. Example, Place attachment one here. All charts/graphs/ photographs should be at least 200 DPI resolution and in TIFF or JPEG format. Also, you may submit a high-quality hard copy of graphics for scanning. the IO Sphere, contact the editor. jiowc.iosphere@us.af.mil. Point of contact is the IO Sphere Editor, Mr. Henry K. Howerton at 210-9775227 or DSN 969-5227. IO Sphere is published at security screened, and released by authors parent command/agency/organization/company prior to submission. Please include a letter or email documenting these actions. P 15 May Second Issue of Year 15 August Third Issue of Year IO SPHERE Support Operations, IO Education and Training, IO Intelligence Integration, IO IO Sphere welcomes your articles, papers, and commentaries regarding all aspects of full-spectrum Information Operations and Information-Related activities and capabilities, as well as IO intelligence integration. Articles or book reviews should be 6003000 words, preferably with an operational, training, or similar focus as related to IO. Contact the editor for submission guidelines at jiowc.iosphere@us.af. mil. INFORMATON: If you or your organization would like a free information and updates on IO Sphere, write to the editor at jiowc.iosphere@us.af.mil. Please include your name, 9-digit zip code and number of individuals in your organization. For more information, contact the IO Sphere editor at (210) 977-5227 or DSN 969-5227.