Disclaimer Statement This Department of Defense publication (ISSN 1939-2370) is an authorized publication for the members of the Department of Defense. Contents of the IO Sphere IO Sphere Articles in this publication may be reproduced without permission. If reproduced, IO Sphere and contributing authors request a courtesy line and appropriate source citation. QUARTERLY SUBMISSION DEADLINES: 31 MARCH, 30 JUNE, 30 SEPTEMBER, 31 DECEMBER IO Sphere IO Sphere also and editorial commentary on IO and defense related topics. TEXT CHARTS/GRAPHS hard copy) PHOTOGRAPHS copy) FORMAT/LENGTH IO Spheres Send Letters to the Editor, Articles & Editorials to: Joint Information Operations CALL FOR ARTICLES If youre on a .mil network, then IO Sphere is available to you on the Joint Staffs JDEIS electronic publishing site. academic Additional references are found at the IO Sphere Group Photo at the Activation of US Cyber Command.From Left to Right: General David Petraeus, Admiral Michael Mullen, General Keith Alexander, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and General Kevin Chilton. Source: defenseimagery.mil
2 Spring 2010Views from the Top Comments From the JIOWC Director W the professional organization most focused on cyberspace and Information Operations Warfare Center is the lead component parachutist.Mark H. Johnson, SES Director, JIOWC Department of Defense commitment to successfully defending critical information and complexity. importance of cyberspace can no longer be underestimated. The ability to successfully use and defend the domain of cyberspace sovereignty and a large portion of it is privately owned. The and procedures for the successful use and defense of the
4 Spring 2010T hank you General Chilton. I appreciate the kind introduction. I am pleased to be with you today at Stratcom. I would like to thank General Chilton for hosting this important symposium and for all of his work on cyber security. I would also like to welcome our international colleagues and industry partners with us here today. I have been working closely on cyber security this past year. The whole issue is something of a good news/bad news predicament. Which reminds me of a story I know. Its a story of two gentlemen who started off together in high school playing baseball. They were baseball fanatics. They went on to play baseball together at the same college. And they continued their passion over the years by watching games together every weekend. By the time they got well into their eighties, it became pretty clear that one of them was going to pass on fairly soon. Therefore, they made a little pact. Whoever most important question: would there be baseball in heaven? Soon thereafter, one of them did pass on. While the other was sleeping a few nights later, an apparition appeared. Sure baseball in heaven? His friend replied, Well, there is good news, I guess. So his friend goes on to say, There is baseball grass. Youre playing with some of the best players ever: Joe DiMaggio, Ted Williams. Its just what you would have hoped for in heaven. The friend still on earth asked, How can there DEPSECDEF William J. Lynn III Keynote Speech at the 2010 Cyberspace Symposium Source: USSTRATCOM, Photo by Dan RohanDeputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III on CyberspaceThe US Deputy Secretary of Defense Remarks at the USSTRATCOM and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Associations 2010 Cyberspace SymposiumEditors Note:
5 be bad news in that? His friend says, Well, youre pitching tomorrow. And thats the story with cyber security as well. Without question, we are the worlds leading producer and consumer of information technology. It powers our economy. It enables almost everything our military does. Command and control of our forces, intelligence gathering, logistical support of our troopscyber adversary. But cyber also poses a threat. Our very reliance on cyber furnishes an obvious route for adversaries to attack us. Cyber is therefore a source of potential vulnerability. So today, I would like to talk about how DOD is addressing cyber security how we see the environment, what we see as the threats, and what our strategy is to combat those threats. I will also discuss the importance of U.S. Cyber Command, which we formally established last Friday. Finally, I want to address the importance of partnering closely with industry and the need for the Department to develop a better process for IT acquisition. Let me start with the basics. DOD has a large IT footprint. We operate more than 15,000 networks within the dot mil domain. We have seven million computing devices. Ninety thousand people are directly involved in the operation of our information technology. We rely not only on our own networks, but also on many commercial and government networks outside the dot mil domain. The fact is that our department depends on the overall IT infrastructure of our nation. The threat to our computer networks is substantial. They are scanned millions of time a day. They are probed thousands of times a day. And we have not always been successful in stopping intrusions. In fact, over the past several years we have experienced damaging penetrations. Cyber is an especially asymmetric technology. The low cost of computing devices means that our adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons systems to pose a serious threat. They conduct damaging attacks on our society. Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive cyber capabilities, and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. systems. Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure. Cyber is also an attractive weapon to our adversaries because it is hard to identify the origin of an attack and even more A keystroke travels twice around the world in 300 milliseconds. But the forensics necessary to identify an attacker may take months. Without establishing the identity of the attacker in near real time, our paradigm of deterrence breaks down. Missiles come with a return address. Cyber attacks, for the most part, do not. For these reasons established models of deterrence do not wholly apply to cyber. We need a deterrent structure that fuses offensive, defensive, and intelligence operations to meet current and future threats. In our analysis, we see four overlapping networks themselves. This threat was recognized fairly early, and we have years to construct substantial defenses. DEPSECDEF Lynn, General Kevin P. Chilton, and Lieutenant General Larry D. James Source: defenseimagery.mil
6 Spring 2010 We are not invulnerable at this point. But the level of protection the establishment of Cyber Command, we are continuing to increase that protection through the use of more active defenses, which I will discuss in a few moments. The second threat is to the nations critical infrastructure. Computer-induced failures could lead to physical damage and economic disruption on a in the late 90s. The Bush administration made it a part of their cyber initiative. But we have not yet arrived at the point at which these networks are as protected as they need to be. I believe there are steps we can take, and I will outline one possible approach later. The third and in many ways least discussed threat is to our intellectual property. Earlier this year key parts of Googles also targeted dozens of other companies. The defense industry has similarly been targeted. Designs for key weapons systems have been stolen. The threat to intellectual property is less dramatic than a cyber attack on our infrastructure. But it may over the long term be Rogue code, including so-called logic bombs, can be inserted into software as it is being developed, allowing outside actors to manipulate systems from afar. Hardware is also at risk. Remotely operated kill-switches and hidden backdoors can be written into the chips and physical buses used in military hardware. The risk of compromise in the manufacturing process is very real, and in many respects detect, and even harder to prevent. To give you an example of how pervasive the cyber threat is, not even our presidential candidates were spared. In the 2008 campaign, both Barack Obama and John McCain had their computer systems compromised. Emails, travel plans, and policy documents were all compromised. The intrusion was eventually detected and repelled, but not before sensitive information was taken. For all these reasons, President Obama has appointed Howard Schmidt as his Cyber Coordinator and has called cyber, one of the most serious economic and national security challenges that we face as a nation. To respond to the array of cyber threats that confront us, the Pentagon is taking action on several fronts. As a doctrinal matter, the Defense Department has formally recognized cyberspace for what it isa new domain of warfare. Like land, sea, air, and space, cyberspace is a domain that we must operate effectively within. Cyberspace is the only domain that is man made and largely privately owned, but it is nevertheless just as critical to our military effectiveness as the others are. To secure our digital infrastructure, the Department defense is ordinary hygienekeeping systems and software up to date. The internet is teeming with so many viruses and bonnets that an unprotected computer can be infected within minutes of being placed online. To remain secure, any network that has contact with the internet must constantly refresh malware signatures and install security patches. With three million users, keeping our computers up to date is a constant challenge, but one that we are starting to meet. Automated systems now ensure firewalls and anti-virus software are effective hygiene will block about half of attempted intrusions. Perimeter security forms our next line of defense. To monitor number of ports at which our systems accesses the commercial internet. We also deployed host-based security services and intrusion detection systems on our servers and routers. These sensors are linked to network mapping and visualization software that help identify breaches. We believe perimeter defenses block another 30-40% of attempted intrusions. Taken together, proper hygiene and perimeter security furnish a level of protection approaching 90%. But sophisticated adversaries 2010 Cyberspace Symposium Entry Sign Source: IO Sphere Staff Photographer
7 are able to surmount even these defenses, leaving our networks at risk. In cyber, offense is dominant. A fortress mentality will not work. We cannot retreat behind cyber is much like maneuver warfare, in which speed and counterattack matter most. If we stand still for a minute, our adversaries will overtake us. Given the dominance of offense, our defenses need to be dynamic. We need to respond to attacks at network speed, as they happen or even before they arrive. The core of our effort in this regard is at the National Security Agency. The NSA has developed systems that give us the kind of active defenses we need. These active defenses, which use foreign intelligence to help anticipate threats, prevent the last 10 or 20 percent of sophisticated intrusions. Moreover, intrusions will not always be caught at the boundary. Some of them will inevitably they are inside, we have to be able to hunt on our own networks. Cyber is also an area in which the U.S. cannot go it alone. There is a strong logic to collective cyber defenses. Alliances are powerful tools. I have traveled to Australia and the U.K., and will soon be going to Canada. We are seeking to develop a system of shared warning and shared technology. Collective cyber defenses are similar to air and missile defense in that the more attack signatures that you see, the better your defenses will be. The concept of collective defense is a key part of our strategy. Facing these foundational challenges, we made a decision to establish a military command for cyber operations. Until recently, the militarys cyber effort was run by a loose confederation of joint task forces spread too far and too wide, both geographically and institutionally, to be fully effective. Secretary Gates recognized that the scale of the cyber enterprise had outgrown the militarys existing structures. Last June, he ordered their consolidation into a single four-star command, U.S. Cyber Command. is a part of the U.S. Strategic Command. Cyber Command will perform three core missions. It will lead the day-today defense of dot mil networks. It will support military and counterterrorism missions. And under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security, it will assist civil authorities and industry partners. We achieved initial operations capability at Cyber Command last Friday. General Keith Alexander, head of the National Security Agency, has been appointed its commander. The key part of Cyber Command is its linking of intelligence, offense, and defense under one roof. In cyber, the capability to repel attackers is closely tied to the ability to identify threats and anticipate intrusions. You will not be effective in the cyber world if you segregate these three functions. We also need a command to lead the planning, training, and equipping of our forces. In the military, we exercise our US DEPSECDEF William J. Lynn III Source: defenseimagery.mil
8 Spring 2010 capabilities on target ranges and in a variety of simulations. We do not yet have that capability in the cyber world. Therefore, DARPA, which helped build the internet decades ago, is developed a national cyber training rangein effect a model of the internet. Once operational, the training range will allow us runs from the head of Cyber Command to individual units around the world. Service commands, including the Armys Network Enterprise Technology Command, the Navys 10th Fleet Cyber Command, and the 24th Air Force, will ensure cyber is a regular part of training and equipping the force. With But we will not be successful unless we continue to augment our capabilities and our personnel. So today, I would like to describe our next steps in cyber. I see three major challenges ahead: strengthening our human capital over the long term, rethinking IT acquisition, and providing security for those parts of the commercial internet DOD depends upon. Our effectiveness in IT is to a great the number of trained cyber professionals and deepened the program for information assurance and training our network administrators. But even as we strengthen our cadre of cyber professionals, we must recognize that the long-term trend in human capital is against us. Over the next twenty years there is little doubt that China or India will train more computer scientists than we will. We will not be able to keep up. Demographics work against us. If our cyber advantage is predicated solely upon amassing trained cyber professionals, we will lose. Therefore, we need to confront cyber in the same way we confront other quantitatively dominant competitors. We do not always compete on numbers. We compete on technology and information dominance. The same will be true in cyber. We will need automated systems, trained cyber professionals we have. Beyond human capital, improving the acquisition of information technology is a pressing concern. The Department has a traditional way of acquiring technology. It is generally focused on developing airplanes, tanks, and ships. In this very ordered process we decide what the mission is, identify requirements to meet that mission, and analyze alternatives to meet those requirements. Only then, do we develop a program and budget for it. Eight or nine years later, we actually have something. Now this may seem like a long time, but this nation has the best technology any military has ever seen. So the system actually works pretty well. To date, our acquisition of IT largely follows this model. On average, it takes the Department 81 months operational. But if we take into the account the continued growth of computing power, as suggested by Moores law, this 2010 Cyberspace Symposium Defense Vendor Display Area Source: IO Sphere Staff Photographer
9 means that systems are being delivered of the art. By comparison, the iPhone was developed in 24 months. That is less time than it would take us to prepare and defend a budget and receive Congressional approval for it. Steve Jobs gets an iPhone. We get a budget. Its not an acceptable trade. Therefore, we have established a new task force to improve our approach to IT acquisition. The Task Force reports directly to me. I have directed it study how we can refashion IT acquisition around four principles. First, heeding Secretary Gates call to make our department more agile, speed must be our overarching priority. We need to match the acquisition process to the technology development cycle. In IT, this means 12 to 36 months cycles, not 7 or 8 years. Second, we must acknowledge that incremental development, testing, and whenever possible, fielding of new capabilities provides better outcomes in IT than trying to deploy large complex systems in one big bang. Third, to achieve speedy, incremental improvements, we need to carefully examine how to establish the requirements that govern acquisition. Systems must always be tailored to serve the needs of end users, but departing from standard architectures in IT imposes great costs. To achieve defer some customization. Making use of established standards, and open modular platforms, is of paramount importance. Fourth, the departments IT needs range from modernizing nuclear command and control systems to updating word processing software on our office computers. We must recognize that different IT applications demand different levels of oversight and enterprise integration. We are working to outline a series of acquisition paths that apply high levels of institutional due diligence where it is needed and strip away excess requirements where it is not. The problem we are trying to solve is not an easy one. The Defense Department has unique IT needs that limit our ability to replicate the dynamism of private industry. Our systems must work across applications. We cannot usually go without the functionality of existing systems as they are being updated or replaced. In addition, for us it is not merely about purchasing new technology. The planning, programming, and Congressionally-mandated budgeting process must all be in alignment. Despite these significant obstacles, I believe we can make dramatic improvements in IT acquisition. Our focus is on identifying who is being innovative, how to make better use of existing authorities, and where to try pilot projects. Our intent is to target things we can change now, while laying the foundation for longer term reforms that may require Congress to legislate new authorities. Finally, the best-laid defenses on military networks will matter little unless our civilian critical infrastructure is also protected. Critical infrastructure will The Department of Homeland Security appropriately has the lead to protect the dot gov and dot com domains. The Defense Department plays an important supporting role in this mission, and has direct responsibility for securing defense industry networks. Years of concerted investments on the military side have placed critical cyber capabilities within the Defense Department and National Security Agency. We are already using our technical capabilities to support DHS in developing the Einstein 2 and 3 programs to protect government networks. We need to think imaginatively about how this technology can also help secure a space on the internet for critical government and commercial applications. For the dot com world, could we create a secure architecture for that lets private parties opt-in to the protections afforded by active defenses? In this way, protection would be voluntary. Operators of critical infrastructure could opt-in to a government-sponsored security regime. Individual users who do not want to enroll could stay in the wild West of the unprotected internet. This type of secure dot com approach could build on the collaboration between DOD and the defense industry. It could offer an important gateway to ensure our nations critical infrastructure is protected from cyber attacks. As you can see, the front line of national security has been face in cyber seem daunting, it is useful to remember that we are at the beginning of a new technological age. So let me leave you with this simple observation. We just marked the 20th anniversary of the World Wide Web. In comparison, we have just passed the 100th anniversary of military aviation. The Wright Brothers 100 years ago last June. It was the purchased an airplane. We are now 100 years into military aviation, whereas with cyber we only have twenty years of collective experience. Essentially, in the cyber world, its 1929. We are still in the era of dirigibles and biplanes. We are at the dawn of a new epoch, with decades of innovations in safety, performance, and reliability to come. We have a lot of work to do to make the cyber domain safe, so its revolutionary innovations can be used without fear of endangering our national and economic security. But with the advent of Cyber Command and the other steps DOD is taking, we are well on our way. Thank you very much.
10 Spring 2010 Editors Note: Old vs New: Legal Considerations Of Cyber Targeting by Mr. Dondi WestExecutive Summary Sailors Source: defenseimagery.mil
11 Although the rate of technological the test of time. While some legal others argue that the rules related to This paper is intended to introduce the Defining Computer Network Operations target or enemy information systems or other unauthorized actions that Defining Lawful Military (Cyber) Targets operations including military operations combatant commanders must adhere to under the circumstances at the time Targets of the enemy A combatant commander must consider US Navy Technician Working on a Navigation Computer System Source: defenseimagery.mil
12 Spring 2010 Distinction enemy. The considered a civilian object would become a military objective based on its location if it became the means for the enemys armed forces to move to the battle. While still serving as a primary means for civilian transport over the river, the bridge is now a military object, as it is the primary means for the military to cross that same river. Objects like this are known as dual-use objects; objects that simultaneously serve civilian and military objectives. These dual-use objects present a unique challenge for commanders. Balancing Military Necessity with Humanity US Navy Sailors at their Stations in a Cyber Defense Center Source: defenseimagery.mil
13 Although the principle of military necessity appears It must be balanced against the principle of humanity. not cause unnecessary suffering or a military purpose. humanity in the cyber context and can the principle of humanity prior to any engagement decisions.Proportionality of proportionality is by recalling the popular phrase that the ends must justify property must be proportional and not military necessity and humanity into The combatant commander ordering proportionality judgment. A corollary of the principle of proportionality is may cause.Applying proportionality in the context see that proportionality is the calculus Calls for an International Treatise for Cyber Warfare? dropping a bomb on an enemy compound creation of an International Treatise for the ability for commanders to employ cyber capabilities. US Air Force Communications Specialist Servicing Communications Computers Source: defenseimagery.mil
14 Spring 2010 of Cyber and Information Warfare is crippled. ability to conduct Cyber Warfare. Jensen argues that the ConclusionWith the rapid development of technology, it is important to understand the law that governs cyber targeting and warfare. A military commander must consider three factors when deciding if a target can be attacked: (1) Distinction; (2) Balancing Military Necessity with Humanity; and (3) Proportionality. The above framework appears to have withstood the test of time, although some legal scholars are calling for an International Treatise for Cyber Warfare.Footnotes: 1. Aboul-Enein, H. Yousuf and Zuhur, Sherifa, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, p. 22, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Diane Publishing Co., Darby PA, 2. See infra Part III.See infra Part III. 4. See infra Part IV. 5. See Condition (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2 (stating that 6. See DoDD 5100.77, The Law of War Program. 7. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions art. 52. 8. Id. 9. See U.S. Dept of the Navy, NWP 1-14M, Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Jul. 2007). 10. 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), art. 4. 11. Id. 12. The full name is Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 13. See GPI, supra note 21, art. 57, para. 2(a)(ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. 14. Major Eric Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1145, 1156-57 (2003). 15. Id. 16. Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions art. 52(2). 17. See Hague Convention on Land Warfare art. 22 (1907) (demonstrating the essential relationship between military necessity and humanity). 18. See GPI art. 35 para. 2. 19. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 20. Id. 21. Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention To INTL L.J. 179, 179-83 (2006). 22. Jensen supra note 13 at 1146-75.
16 Spring 2010Challenges to Successful Capability Analysis in Cyberspace by Mr. Lee EnemarkEditors Note: targeting in this article is critical to the emerging doctrine of military operations in cyberspace. It is also a great addition to uses currently accepted targeting processes and procedures to frame his discussion of these processes as related to of discussion concerning military operations in cyberspace. The Doctrinal Joint Targeting Cycle Source: Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 Joint TargetingBackground Introduction three in the Joint Targeting Cycle. During the capabilities can affect the target. Any intelligence gaps highlighted during The product damage estimate.The Goal The Three Complex Challenges to Capability Analysis
17 Discussion in cyberspace. Recommendations defense budget process to support those goals. Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) process to ensure CNA weapons reliability data is updated in existing planning tools and is available for future operations. targeting process.Footnotes: 1. Joint Pub 3-60, pg. F-1 2. DoDI O-3600.3
18 Spring 2010 Editors Note: IO professional and his lessons learned from his experience communication related to the current surge in Afghanistan. name.Adapting to the Information Environment in Iraq During the Surge-A Personal ViewbyLieutenant Colonel Nathan Hass MAP of Madain Qada showing proximity to Baghdad and its four major cities. Source: Author D safer and better for the citizens of the area. integration through the targeting process. Our commanders our actions to communicate. Our units incorporated messages into all operations and messages to be used in their engagements that explained the
19 JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS WARFARE CENTERINFORMATION OPERATIONS PRIMER COURSE FOCUS IO CORE CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING SUPPORT IO EXECUTION SUPPORT AND SYNCHRONIZATION JOINT PLANNING AND IO KNOWLEDGE BASELINE IO DOCTRINE AND OVERVIEW OF IO TOOLS INFORMATION OPEN TO IO PROFESSIONALS BASED ON PRIORITY COURSE IS 4 DAYS IN DURATION to the message alignment and that the subordinate battalion to maximize our effects. them up and extending them geographically. I imagined than the original readers. afraid to enter the area because of its reputation for sectarian nation and an audience that participated enthusiastically in communication. Old techniques from OIF III: to a successfully operating radio station. information effects on the local population.
20 Spring 2010 the ability to disseminate messages brigade dedicated a mechanized infantry set of solutions.Our plan of attack: PSYOP Employment: under our subordinate battalions and then used the targeting process and our meeting that had been hitherto poorly an uprising in Jisr Diyala in the spring of that coalition forces had been stealing funds allocated for teacher salaries from a school. During a mission to arrest an to explain the arrest to the people in Iraqi Local Media News Conference Source: Author
21 Iraqi / Arabic Media Engagement: transportation and an interpreter and escort for the media. The the discussion. a successful outcome.IO Initiatives: seen being used in other places. The urgency of the surge meant simultaneously. We sponsored local artists to paint murals. Murals: A local artist painting a mural in Al Wahida Source: Author
22 Spring 2010 We noticed that the person painting the Taxi-side ads:This idea originated after I read a paper appeared to be a means of supplemental graphic artists to communicate directly the latitude in the contract to use their photos or photo montages of projects that targets for the extremists.City-wide Public Address System:I got the idea for the public address system from an article I read about a system a Their system utilized sophisticated damaged.Sons of Iraq Newsletter: east from the area around Jisr Diyala. A and chains of command as the method placement of the product to tens of thousands of men in our area. sentences mentioning accomplishments they especially enjoyed seeing photos of safer. Local Taxi with Banner Source: Author Sons of Iraq Newsletter Source: Author
23 Joint Information Operations Education ProgramsSponsored by the Joint Command, Control and Information Operations School based planning exercises. JIOPC Graduates: core, supporting and related IO capabilities and their potential effects in the operating environment the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the completion of IO planning and execution products planner in a Joint IO or IO-related planning position.For More InformationWeb: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jc2ios/io/default.asp Contact the Registrar: LTC Hugh Mullaly Phone: (757) 443-6333 DSN 646-6333 Fax: (757) 443-6035, DSN 646-6035 E-Mail: email@example.com or firstname.lastname@example.org The Joint Forces Staff College is the Accredited Institution for IO Education and is part of the National Defense course for IO Training in U.S. Department of Defense.
24 Spring 2010Voice of Madain Radio Station: station into operation. prompt people directly to listen to the radio station and call in Capacity building: IO Battle Drills: Voice of Mada in Radio Station Source: Author
25 Three broad categories of incidents incident or the arrest of a member of our local community leaders. The drills also proscribed a decision point for determining actions by echelon. The seriousness and scope of the incident our brigade tactical standard operation IO CONOPs and their functions: explain the purpose of friendly actions in response to deny insurgents ability to gain sympathy from the local populace. the atrocities and crimes are committed story out before the insurgents and force the insurgents to react to our messages. conditions for a return to a safe and secure Influence local population to support US Medic Treating Iraqi Civilian Per the IO Battle Drill Source: Author
26 Spring 2010 payment to the family and helped repair the damage to the Assessment and Effects: reinforcing effects on our target audiences. told one of our battalion commanders that they had heard about called him because they had seen his speech at the opening of a Staff Funnel:
27 a similar staff ethic. They minimized my time and energy on managing the needed to conduct information operations battalions.IO Working Group (IOWG): dispersed geographically to their Combat purpose of representing the battalion for necessity for getting our subordinate IO conducting information operations in a US and Iraqi Key Leader Engagement Source: Author
28 Spring 2010 That Conclusion: I had to adapt and extended.Footnotes: 1. Nahia was a political unit similar to a township that was usually named after a major town or city, but included the area around the city and several smaller villages in that area. 2. Initially in MND-C, Iraqi media was handled by the Public Affairs Arabic media coordination function to the G7. Within the brigade, we divided the function in the same way between the Brigade Public 3. We were not able to do subsequent runs of the taxi-side ads because the restrictions on CERP expenditures in the 2d quarter of FY 2008. The blind bidding process we employed had not caused us to receive the lowest price per unit and we discovered later that we had the ability to get a much lower prince through more of a negotiating process with the contractors. We also realized that to get the saturation impact we wanted from the taxi-side program, we needed to increase the numbers to around 8,000 placements. That boosted the overall cost to the point where other projects took priority, so we never executed a second iteration of the taxi-side contracts. 4. It was a cadre member from the National Training Center visiting our Brigade who asked me about why we were not holding IOWGs. and I had to admit the idea had simply not occurred to me. About the same time, CPT Damond Davis, the FSO from 3-1 CAV who was my staff counterpart for that unit, had begun to clamor for some type of meeting or forum to discuss IO issues and support. I realized then that there was a need for a meeting that would actually help solve problems and save time and effortand that it was feasible using Adobe Connect. training scenarios that realistically present the full complexity of the information environment. There are not enough people or enough time in the training scenario. While the CTCs have gone to great lengths to replicate the problem set that BCTs encountersuch as hiring scores of Iraqi-Americans to live in the replicated villages, the brevity of the training rotations means that responses by the population are scripted rather than sincere responses to the brigades Information Operations efforts. Our CTC rotation, however, was valuable for those of us on the Brigade staff for giving us an introduction to how the staff would work together and work with the subordinate units.
29 Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn and General Chilton Speak to the Media at the Second Annual Cyber Symposium Secretary Lynn and General Chilton Speak with Media at Cyber Symposium Source: defenseimagery.milOmaha, NE included. undergone a tremendous transformation since the inaugural Cyber Command. A continuing point of concern that remains is the international of other operations but it certainly is a different challenge. that all the forces must sustain and increase focus on training of the nation.
30 Spring 2010 Editors Note: is a critical issue for cyberspace operations. This submission Operational Art and Targeting Strategy for Cyberspace Operationsby Lt Col Sam Arwood, Lt Col (Ret) Robert F. Mills, and Maj (Ret) Richard A. Raines, PhD The current military-technical revolution, as in the case of some earlier periods of major change in military affairs, is part of a broader revolution with political, economic and social dimensions. It is being shaped by profound changes in technology, perhaps most notably in the area of information technologySecretary of Defense William J. Perry, October 1994 Abstract targeting strategy for complex systems. The result is a method and outcomes.Introduction addition to being an enabling domain for operations in air and ground forces. USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.1
31 early command and control doctrine for and exercise our capabilities in the some truly transformational approaches much more than an enabler of operations established organizational constructs operations theory and doctrine. We about operational art in cyberspace. Strategy and Instruments of Power include the instruments of national thorough understanding of the national understand that military efforts may be be subordinate to nonmilitary efforts. military actions support and integrate of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of John F. Kennedy Figure 1. System of Systems Analysis 12
32 Spring 2010 cyberspace.Implications of CyberspaceThere should be little argument that our increasing dependence solid information infrastructure. This is not to say it is more Effects-based planning enhances the current planning process effects within the operational environment, characterized as an integrated system-of-systems political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) that must be joint, combined, and interagency actions associated with the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power that are required to create the behavior or capabilities within those systems necessary to achieve those effects. Figure 2. Wardens Five Rings Model 16
33 Targeting Methodologies effects.PMESII Wardens Five Rings into subsystems that are more tractable. These subsystems larger system. These situation. recognizing that the concepts presented could be applied using Figure 3. Seven Rings Model
34 Spring 2010 organizations that control funds for terrorist organizations by these types of target sets should be accounted for in the rings the target sets to highlight the potential contributions that to recognize that these subsystems are present and should be factored into the targeting process.Putting It All Together The means and targets are not limited to military capabilities. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive.18 Figure 4. Mapping INPs to the Seven Rings
35 support tool for targeting and enables the targeting ring in order to assess and its assumptions about the effects this matter experts from other agencies. be considered. The Allied strategic bombing campaign in World War II be seen as acceptable in a protracted simply because a belligerent has the consumables necessary for the military and contract management. Information systems include command and information technology infrastructure. Figure 5. Combat Power Matrix
36 Spring 2010 Conclusion hoping to add clarity and fodder for further discussions on method used in effects based planning.Footnotes: 1. US Cyber Command Fact Sheet, May 25, 2010, http://www.defense. gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/docs/CYberFactSheet%20 UPDATED%20replaces%20May%2021%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 2. Ibid. Department of Defense activities were more consistent with National and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) which seem to be more focused on interconnectedness of systems rather than the physical medium (electronics and electromagnetic spectrum). spectrum, but the increasing use of wireless communication systems network. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 4. Kenneth Allard. Command, Control, and the Common Defense (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), page 93. operations (IO) as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. EW and CNO are clearly related to the cyberspace domain, but this does not mean cyberspace operations should be treated as a subset of IO. IO can be indeed performed in and through cyberspace. However, the objective of cyberspace operations are focused on controlling the cyberspace domain. These are related but different concepts. 6. John F. Kennedy, Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the US Naval Academy, June 7, 1961, http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/ jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html. 7. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), September 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006. 8. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, quoted in USA Today, 6 February 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-03-23rice-cyberterrorism.htm. 9. Johnny Ryan, iWar: A new threat, its convenience and our increasing vulnerability, NATO Review, Winter 2007, http://www. nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/english/analysis2.html. 10. Jeanne Meserve, Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid, CNN.com, 26 September 2007, http:// www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html. 11. General Peter Pace, 2006 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs), http://188.8.131.52/ doctrine/education/sae_2006.pdf. 12. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 Dec 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. 13. Col John A. Warden III, The Enemy as a System, Air power Journal 9, no. 2 (Spring 1995), http://www.air power.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/battle/chp4.html. 15. Major Russell J. Smith, Developing an Air Campaign Strategy, Chronicles Online Journal, 23 Nov 1999, http://www.air power. maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/smith.html. 17. Ibid. 18. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. distinction between combatants and noncombatants; military necessity; proportionality; superfluous injury; indiscriminate Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, May 1999, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/DOD-io-legal/ DOD-io-legal.pdf.
37 Cyberspace Target Systems Analysisby Mr. James D. Jones Introduction and categorizing all components target system that operates in the cyberspace global domain. Once these challenges are target system. This categorization problem set into a tangible target system that targeters can analyze to produce nodal system analysis for target selections that create Risks to Incorporating Computer Terminology to TargetingAlthough usage of the term target system. Figure 1. JP 3-60 Joint Targeting
38 Spring 2010 What is A Target System? systems. Where should a Cyberspace functional target system operate? in different domains. The term domain is not listed in the domains. is a functional target system that operates in the air domain. In The Ground Truth about Cyberspace A global domain within the information environment consisting of and embedded processors and controllers. 4
39 of aerodynamics to function in the air There are basic components that aircraft to interdict that aircraft or defend against operate in the cyberspace domain. aid efforts to interdict or defend against cyberspace domain. analysis is only conducted on target point is raised to highlight the inaccuracy identify the target systems that utilize the Where is the Information Environment? Figure 2. Adapted from Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Figure 3. Adapted from JP 3-13: Information Operations, Information Environment within the four domains of the Operational Environment.
40 Spring 2010 The three dimensions of the information communication means that utilizing the cyberspace domain A New Functional Target System? based means into more manageable target system components and elements more readily analyzed by targeting professionals. selection and prioritization of targets and the matching of an this could be categorized. The biggest challenge in creating this Figure 4. Adapted from JP 3-0: Joint Operations, Information Environment transcending and as a backdrop to the four domains.
41 that could be used as a baseline for target selections that create the desired effects Conclusion familiarity of computer terminology affects targeting and intelligence processes and products to include the factors to be understood to appreciate the military operations. fallacy. it stated the importance of categorizing all components and elements of a operate in the cyberspace global domain. prototype for creating an Information target selections that create the desired Figure 6. Authors rendition of a proposed ITI functional target system Footnotes: 1. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007, pg GL-14. Accessed online 11 March 2009. Websters II New Riverside University Dictionary, 3. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 13 Feb 2008, p. II21 and JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 2006, p. I-1. 4. Accessed online 11 March 2009.
42 Spring 2010A of these panels spans their entire organizations. The information of threats being established and continually updated by the to other organizations for supporting bits and pieces that in OPSEC and CNO A United Front in the Republic of Koreaby Colonel Wes Martin USFK OPSEC and CNO Working Group Source: Author
43 Instructors at the USFK and ROK Combined OPSEC Seminar Source: Author as part of additional countermeasures. As in the case of all to be assigned to the next class. The most recent four classes addressing the current regional counterintelligence and cyber
44 Spring 2010 Published QuarterlySubmission Deadlines 31 March-Spring Issue 30 June-Summer Issue 30 September-Fall Issue 30 December-Winter IssueIO SPHERE CALL OF ARTICLES not in the body of the paper. Insert a note describing IO Sphere the editor. iosphere@ IO Sphere actions. Submission GuidelinesCurrently Seeking Submissions on the Subject Topics of Electronic Warfare, Public Affairs, Strategic Communications, Military Information Support Operations, IO Education and Training, and IO Support to Public Diplomacy. IO Sphere Become a ContributorTO SUBSCRIBE: free subscription to IO Sphere the IO Sphere