Employing Elements of National Power in Schriever V A Space Doctrine for Soldier, Scientist, and Citizen: What It Will Take to Secure the Space Domain The Value of the Domain Coalition Space Operations: Lessons Learned from Schriever V Wargame
1 High FrontierContentsIntroduction General C. Robert Kehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Senior Leader Perspective Building the Political Consensus to Deter Attacks on Our Nations Space Systems US Representative Terry Everett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Employing Elements of National Power in Schriever V VADM Carl V. Mauney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Schriever V Wargames: The Boundaries of Space and Cyberspace Lt Gen Larry D. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Schriever V A UK Perspective AVM T. M. Timo Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A Space Doctrine for Soldier, Scientist, and Citizen: What It Will Take to Secure the Space Domain Political-Military Implications of Space Warfare on Homeland Defense and Allied Relations BG Robert J. Felderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Schriever V Wargame The Value of the Domain Coalition Space Operations: Lessons Learned from Schriever V Wargame Mr. Joseph D. Rouge and Mr. Dennis L. Danielson . . . . . . . . . 28 Schriever V: Lessons Learned A Canadian Perspective Col Franois Malo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Industry Perspective The Strategic Value of Schriever V: Policy and Strategy Insights for the Quadrennial Defense Review Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Schriever V: Managing and Understanding Consequences to Military Space Historical Perspective Schriever Wargames: The Battle for the Ultimate High Ground Mr. James C. Mesco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Book Review Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making from the Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Next Issue: Space Acquisition August 2009 Volume 5, Number 4 The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals expressed in this journal are those of the authors alone Editorial content is edited, prepared, and provided by the High Frontier High Frontier High Frontier AFSPC/PA Peterson AFB, CO 80914 Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson Air Force Base, ColoradoCommander Vice Commander Director of Public Affairs Creative Editor High Frontier Staff Maj Cathy Barrington Maj Theresa Malasavage Schriever V Wargames Defending Freedom
High Frontier 2 Introduction General C. Robert Kehler Commander, Air Force Space CommandO in joint and coalition space operations as well. While the wargame began as a venue to examine advanced space technologies in vari information activities. Decision making and supporting command and control processes have emerged as some of the most impor tant aspects of the wargame. Each wargame has also demonstrated the importance of integration at the national and international level. Just as real-world military operations have proven the value of co of coalition space and cyberspace operations. Schriever V focused on the integration of the whole of governmentreaching beyond Department of Defense and incorporating critical participation from commercial space companies and consortia. Some would say the complexity of space activities now calls for a whole of nations ap proach. The Schriever V game provided actionable insights for all begin in cyberspace and soon extend to space. I am grateful for the outstanding support and participation of all our playerstheir contributions have helped in developing a strategy to protect US and allied space capabilities. This issue of High Frontier compiles the perspective of the game participants and highlights the complex wargame. Former Representative Terry Everett served as the game president during Schriever V and provides an insightful perspective on the national level issues that surfaced during the game. VADM cusses how elements of national power were combined in the two of government approach was effectively used during Schriever V. th critical operational issues exposed during the wargame and future Air Staff of the Royal Air Force discusses the value of integrating coalition members into the wargame and advocates developing a standing Coalition Joint Task Force-Space. Ambassador Lincoln the many aspects of what it will take to properly secure the space strategy for North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command details the requirement for a family of systems approach including space and cyberspace capabilities for homeland defense. The commander of the Space Innovation and Development Cen section by explaining how the game is structured to account for the global impact of warfare on space systems. Mr. Joseph Rouge and General C. Robert Bob Kehler (BS, Education, Pennsylvania State University; MS, Public Administration, University of Oklahoma; MA, National Security and Strategic Studies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) is commander, Air Force Space Com mand (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colo rado. He is responsible for the develop ment, acquisition, and operation of the Air Forces space and missile systems. The general oversees a global net work of satellite command and control, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readiness of Americas in tercontinental ballistic missile force. He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). General Kehler will assume cyberspace responsi bilities as directed by CORONA Fall. General Kehler has commanded at the squadron, group, and twice at the wing level, and has a broad range of operational and command tours in ICBM operations, space launch, space operations, missile warning, and space control. The general has served on the AFSPC Staff, Air Staff, and Joint Staff and served as the director of the National Kehler was the deputy commander, USSTRATCOM, where he helped provide the president and secretary of defense with a broad range of eral diverse mission areas, including space operations, integrated mis sile defense, computer network operations, and global strike. light lessons learned on integrating and sharing information among coalition members and the way ahead. Col Fran completes the section by emphasizing how global dependence on space necessitates a comprehensive approach to preserve and pro tect the domain. heed Martin Corporation provides a unique point of view for the tions policy makers must grapple with as space strategy and policy recommends industry intensify developments in support of opera tionally responsive space and space situational awareness. games orientation from technology test bed to policy focused. Dr. Rick Sturdevant concludes the journal with a review of the book Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making from the a book that espouses the values of wargaming as a method of exposing both solutions and problems. this edition of the High Frontier exposes the complexities facing volving the space domain. Our next issue will focus on space ac quisition. Air Force Space Command is unique because we are the only major command in the Air Force with our own acquisition arm. This hybrid structure creates opportunities that must be leveraged to achieve excellent program acquisition practices and mission suc cess.
3 High FrontierBuilding the Political Consensus to Deter Attacks on Our Nations Space SystemsUS Representative Terry Everett (R-Alabama) Senior Advisor to the Space Protection Program Rehobeth, AlabamaLast March I had a most unusual experienceI played the president of the United States in the Schriever V wargame sponsored by the commander of Air Force Space space. The Schriever game took on both issues by embrac ing a whole of government approach that not only included military options for protecting space but also brought to bear policy counsel from knowledgeable team members who played the presidents cabinet and presented a full spectrum of government policy initiatives was invaluable to me in the course of eight days of game play. Late one evening as I was preparing to record a message player-president it was clear we were in the midst of a deepening crisis. The crisis had started as a dispute over natural resources and had rapidly escalated to attacks on our space caabout everything our team had done to defuse the crisis that Senior Leader Perspective transparent in our actions in accordance with international standardsall to no avail. I thought about the signals that were misread by our notional opponent who had not understood the grim challenges or the great risks that both nations would face. Neither did our opponent understand that we would not view the actions they had taken the same way they did. I wondered how to explain to the American people that we had worked tirelessly with our coali tion partners to defuse a crisis which had already resulted in the loss of global transport and communication servicesservices which deprived the people of the world the information they My team members and I knew that the US clearly depends nized that all nations have become dependent on space assets should ever be put into the position and face the decisions that I was about to make. concerned when there are so many other pressing problems facing us? Why is it necessary to develop solutions to a problem -Our Growing Dependency on Space Capabilities We have witnessed tremendous growth in commercial and civil uses of space; growth that was not imagined a few years ago. On Space Report 2009 hicles which communicated to the ground via satellites. And the dependency will rapidly increase as space technology continues to improve. conventional military superiority and provide us with an overall strategic advantage relative to any other country. General Kehler has stated that the loss of our space assets would make us dependent on 1950s technology while the former commander of High Frontier that I have often told members of Congress the sortie and two 500 pound bombs. This successful strike mission resolution satellite imagery to geo-locate the target within meters; GPS guided precision munitions to minimize collateral damage. Many in the space community have heard me make these points
High Frontier 4 a real possibility. We can ill afford a 9/11 in space. It would some part of the nations information technology infrastruc events. Secretary Robert M. Gates recently signed out a direc element of risk to our national security. Events over the July 4th weekend proved his point: denial of service attacks were targeta report by the Associated Press. The report quoted Maj Gen one of the federal agency web sites got saturated with as many as 1 million hits per second per attack amounting to 4 billion Internet hits at once.1 stood as a cautionary tale about attacks occurring on our space systems would not be a surprise. If there is one lesson to be learned from the game it is that we have an obligation to protect our assets. never face these circumstances. But creating a national and international consensus and making the necessary preparations to reduce the risk of encountering a future crisis in space will nations can ill-afford the possibility of losing the use of space. Even those nations which have no assets in space would suffer greatly if those assets were lost. The Need for an Effective Space and Cyber Deterrence Strategy The implications of our nations dependence on its space capabilities coupled with the potential vulnerability of these to develop a modern strategy of deterrence. This strategy must encompass both space and cyber capabilities. This strategy consensus will need to extend to friends and allies as well. potential adversaries are showing increasing interest in counterspace capabilities; others who possess space-faring fare once startsas some experts think could happen relatively early in a crisis or warthe consequences to the future use of space would be devastating and long lasting. Key elements in traditional theories of deterrencemutual nuclear triadmay not necessarily apply to space. An adver sary in any case may not have bought into any of them. We do are readily transferable to space. That is a dangerous assumpbe unfounded. much of the impetus for nuclear proliferation has come from to this strategy: to the extent that fear of the US motivates proliferation, the real drive for nuclear weapons capability in Iran and North Korea, as it was in Libya, does not come from fear of US nuclear capability or the content of US nuclear policy. It will not be eased by reductions in or the downplaying of US nuclear caconventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes, as it has done before. [emphasis added]2I think it natural to extend Secretary Browns argument to space. Countries that seek to dissuade US intervention will look for other ways besides nuclear weapons to degrade or disable US conventional military capability. Counter-space (and counter-cyber) systems present an attractive alternative and some of these are relatively low-cost. Because no country relies as heavily on space capabilities for supporting the operations of military forces as does the US any approach to deterring attacks on our space systems would inherently be asymmetrical. We would need to look elsewhere for leverage. And we might need to concede that even if an some elements of our space systems would likely occur. But the issue goes beyond our military capabilities. Fundaall nations. Any crisis that leads to attacks on space systems and services would instantly be felt around the world. No one ... while the US uses space more than any other country, all nations can ill-afford the possibility of losing the use of space. Even those nations which have no assets in space would suffer greatly if those assets were lost.
5 High Frontierwould be unaffected. The Schriever Wargame in this respect truly was a cautionary tale. Achieving a Practical Deterrent Strategy The fundamental starting point for devising a strategy of deterrence is to consider how space is used: the mission per formed by space systems typically is to gather and deliver in3 only space can provide the critical needs of our nation. The A strategy which deters attacks on these systems and the consequences of the loss of critical information if these systems are attacked. This will require a new look at deterrence theory. Much of the discussion to date within the Congress and exWe therefore must take a close look at the extent to which previous deterrence theories would apply to potential adversar of potential opponents and the circumstances under which they would contemplate attacking our space systems and services. including how to limit threatening behavior that would connology development and acquisition programs. give greater attention to a deterrent strategy that would stake. absent in the executive branch and the Congress. strategic framework to guide concepts and operations. would be based upon our uses of space for information gathering and transmission and an understanding of how potential adversaries perceive its importance to us and to themselves. are nevertheless many issues that a practical implementation 1. Instill in our civilian and military leadership the recognition that they must become relentlessly demanding customers of research and analysis that explains the tial opponents as applied to space systems. 2. Establish programs that will deliver exquisite transpar ency in the operations of space systems. 3. Promote policy stewardship for developing and main taining a deterrent strategy. Become a Demanding Customer. Secretary of Defense Gates said in his national defense strategy that deterrence reany attack so as to discourage an adversary from even contem plating an attack upon us.4I would take Secretary Gates exhortations to heart. Our civilian and military leadership must have a deep and multi-di mensional understanding of adversary behavior. In his seminal The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century points out that knowledge of the adversary is a lynchpin of a durable deter rence strategy.5 need to determine whether an opponent is motivated to practice lists a set of information requirements associated with identify ing and describing those factors likely to affect an adversarys deterrent threats. sides were misreading signals that were deliberately conveyed to reduce the chances of escalation of attacks on space systems. ence our opponents decisions nor did we understand the poliderstand the linkage between an unfolding crisis on the ground and how this might translate into threats against space systems. A practical solution to this problem is to create customer demand for quality analysis of foreign leadership goals and inten tions with respect to space. Our senior leadership should not take any research product from any sourceacademic institu tion or intelligence agencyat face value. They will need to ening behavior that would constitute a red line that must not be crossed, or how to manage war termination stages.
High Frontier 6 learn more and our analysts will become better. Analysts really do appreciate tough questions from policy makers. Beto those things that pertain to implementing an effective deter rence strategy. But no improvements will occur if we do not take these steps. Build Exquisite Transparency. In any crises where a deter for sharing with our friends and alliesboth before as well as during a crisis. Satisfying this thirst for information will require exquisite transparencyhaving the means to understand what is happening in space and then to be able to share it and explain it quickly and completely. Often this is referred to as of transparency. Policy leaders will demand information that can be used with Congress as well as allies. There will be a call to release as much technical information as possible to describe what hapThere will be a need to brief governments as quickly as possiblewe want governments to understand our position and be attack on a satellite (not ours) occurred. I consulted with my with the situation a number of key questions had to be posed to 1. 2. What alternative explanations are possible and what is 3. 4. What does the attacker know about the outcome? If this 5. Why should I care about this? What steps or actions would make the situation worse (possibly leading to more attacks)? What are the trends in the reaction? 8. this problem impact our own space access? 9. What services have been disrupted and how could these this be done? 10. Who uses similar space capabilities? Who owns and be enlisted to replace the capability? we needed the information to explain our position to our friends crisis in space by ourselves. A good deterrence strategy presupposes that we will have our allies with us from the start. And that will not happen if we do not have a plan for conveying the details of a space crisis to them quickly and completely. virtually impossible to answer if we lack the means to collect the information. So we must be willing to invest in substantial improvements in the means to identify and determine the status will not meet these critical needs. cluding debris) are all elements of what we need to know. Improvements in our knowledge and willingness to share it would lead to greater stability because all parties could potentially know what is happening or what is about to happen. In times of that we can distinguish between normal operations in space and those that could be the beginning of a threat. Achieving the capability to determine what is happening with the requisite level of precision is not so simple. We need to understand what kinds of SSA data would best contribute to the stability of the space domain and how we can best share this goal. Implementation of a transparency processes (the procedures for the actual sharing of information) will also be a comWe would also need to consider economic arguments for transparency. Can transparency be promoted for economic formation would undercut particular commercial interests? formation available for sharing with our friends and alliesboth before as well as during a crisis.
7 High FrontierWith the right degree of SSA and the right processes in a president would need to have answered in a space crisis. But we will also need to have the policy support apparatus in place to act upon this information in a timely manner. This brings me to the last practical recommendation: Promote Policy Stewardship. This is the most critical of my three recommendations. Our government must make a susto ensure that we have the policy tools in place to actually deal with a space crisis before it becomes a crisis. And in the event contain a crisis involving space systems. Policy preparations will be vital because a war in space could start and escalate globally in the time it takes to hold a single meeting of the presidents National Security Council. There will be little time for debate and analysis of policy options. The importance of policy stewardship can be understood by looking at the history of past attempts to develop a deterrent strategy. standing up the US Air Force. Among his many challenges was to consider how to deal with a new strategic mission that viously served in the strategic bombing survey. This effort took considerable time and resources to mature. From 1945 at academic institutions and think tanks. Leaders in and out of government became well known for their contributions to name a few. The public became educated and a general consensus grew up on how to best posture our nuclear deterrent forces. Weapons systems were designed and deployed to maxi sustained commitment came progress and results. bate. We need to ask ourselves if we really want to rely on a ment strategies will mitigate the consequences of an attack on protect assets that are vital to our national security and way of life. An effective deterrent strategy would include three more elements: a clear message to any opponent that attacks would an unacceptably highcost for embarking on such a course of supported by the community of space-faring nations. Good policy stewardship of a strategy to deter attacks on space systems will require a lot of effort. It will entail both a deep understanding of any opponents views of how war might come to space and a commitment to respond decisively if we come under attack. Among the tasks that our policy makers must contemplate are these: 1. Sponsoring a review and study of deterrence issues as applied to space and cyber. 2. Making sure that our plans for information sharing with respect to space are robust and compatible with the needs of our friends and coalition partners. 3. That there is a policy process in place to continuously assess whether a major crisis might escalate into space options and implicationsin the event a crises is approaching such a tipping point (think about the ten questions I posed earlier and the short timelines in which to act). 4. That we have a plan for war-ending which is designed to be consistent with our needs for space and preserving our way of life and our institutions. my to an unacceptable degree of risk. To close this window of vulnerability for our space assets we that the US should lead an international debate about how to craft a control regime in space that serves its national security interests and the broader interests of the international commu nity. I am skeptical that considering a control regime with such in the absence of a clearly understood and articulated deterrent strategy. I do think that getting an international agreement on ways to remove space debris that interferes with free access to steps: 1. Promote the establishment of a private organization to analyze and explain this issue to members of Congress and to the public at largea Committee on the Present Danger in Space.Our government must make a sustained, properly organized, and appropriately funded initiative to ensure that we have the policy tools in place to actually deal with a space crisis before it becomes a crisis.
High Frontier 8 2. Encourage space communications companies and aerotecting their assets in the event of future crises. These compass space assets owned and operated by our friends and allies. 3. Develop and implement a broadly based education effort to debate the need for a space deterrent strategy and to promote the publics understanding of our reliance on space for day-to-day activities and the fragility of these capabilities in wartime. One Final Observation space through sustained investment and innovation. From beplanetary explorationall of these achievements represented substantial commitment of national resources and talent and defacto led to global recognition and acceptance that the US had leadership of the space domain. The future of the US continues to be bound up with space. The decline of future investment and innovation would be most harmful in that it would lead to a strategy of merely defending the status quo space capabilities. Ultimately the US would be seen as losing its leadership in space and perhaps feed the ambition of those who would challenge our capabilities in space. So any strategy for deterring space attacks must be matched with a plan to continue a robust level of investment and innovation in space capabilities for both military and civil missions. Our continued leadership in space inevitably will become a critical element of a deterrent strategy.Notes:1 Associated Press ap_on_go_ot/us_us_cyber_attack (accessed 21 July 2009).2 The Washington Quarterly 3 a deterrent strategy that applies to space must also be constructed to apply components of a deterrent strategy as applied to space. I will leave for a future article the problems and issues of how to integrate space and cyber into a common deterrent framework. US Representative Terry Everett (R-Alabama) is a former eight-term Republican congressman from the Second Congressional District of Alabama (1993-2008) and currently is a senior advisor to the Space Protection Program. He served in the US Air Force from 1955-59 as an intelli gence specialist. Stateside, he pursued a three decade career in journalism culminating in the ownership of a chain of newspapers in south Alabama. In Congress, Everett has served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, and Ranking Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences Investigation and Oversight Subcommittee. In 1998, Congressman Everett received the Excellence in Programmatic Oversight Award from the House Republican Leadership for his probe into improper burial waivers at Arlington the newly-created House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. His efforts as chairman focused on improving space acquisition programs and he spearheaded key legislative initiatives in national security space, including: development of a space protection strategy, management of the space cadre and establishment as chairman of the Strategic Forces subcommittee, he held frequent including space control, threats, acquisition challenges, and space policy. Congressman Everett was awarded the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance for his work in support of missile defense. Also, he was awarded the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Gold Medal from NNSA. Everett retired from the US House in 2008. The decline of future investment and innovation would be most harmful in that it would lead to a strategy of merely defending the status quo in space, of trying to keep and defend the capabilities we have, while other nations build up their own space capabilities. 4 National Defense Strategy 5 The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (National established in 1945. Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
9 High FrontierEmploying Elements of National Power in Schriever VVADM Carl V. Mauney, USN Deputy Commander US Strategic Command Offutt AFB, NebraskaI COM) participated in the Schriever V Wargame hosted at full-spectrum space operations in the joint and coalition enviloss of space systems we use in support of national security opexplore potential means for deterring aggression in space and linkages to cyberspace operations. Schriever V brought together professionals from all parts of partners such as the Federal Aviation Administration; the Department of State; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Department of Interior; the Department of Treasury; the National Security Council; the director of national (COCOMs) and is unique in that its missions are global in naturewith particular regard to conducting military operations across borders or boundaries in meeting assigned objec and cyberspace operations. Besides executing operations day mass destruction. We like to say that we endeavor to provide global security for Americaa complex challenge in a world where continu technologies all serve as catalysts in driving the transformation of how we think about and maintain our nations security. The Schriever V Wargame culminated over two years of and including the wide set of space stakeholders. Each prepara tory event focused on a different aspect of the national security space arena and served to bring key issues into clearer focus for was an excellent venue in which we considered strategic and operational questions related to space operations and space protection in an increasingly crowded and potentially contested dation of work that has been done in other venues to better understand the roles of deterrence and cyberspace operations in the space domain. In looking beyond a pure military response tured understanding about employing a whole-of-government to optimally bring all elements of national power to bear in a synchronized manner. Schriever V additionally included clear objectives that generated focus and actions across a wide range of activities. These efforts included operational synchronization between diplomatic efforts to limit the crisis and control escalation and This integrated approach considered traditional interactions insights into strengths and weaknesses of the present organiza tional construct in preparing responses to the postulated crisis. The scenario included operations that crossed several COCOM regional boundary lines. In considering the space dochallenged the ability of the COCOMs to align operational pri-Senior Leader Perspective The examination of the nexus of military, the rest of the government, and commercial space capabilities revealed insights into strengths and weaknesses of the present organizational construct in preparing responses to the postulated crisis.
High Frontier 10 orities and objectives in order to best employ our high demand and low density capabilities. communicate in real time and to align information and decision ning process was essential to synchronizing efforts to advance tive application of combat power to achieve objectives. We know that in the 21st emphasis on operations that are conducted in space or through space to assure our global information needs are met and for maintaining the security of our nation and that of our allies. We must continue to diversify our lines of communication and our space capabilities to prevent dependences on these capabilities from becoming vulnerabilities that others could exploit to preclude our success or threaten our security in the future. are fundamental to many aspects of modern lifefrom a mili tary perspective as well as from commercial and civil perspectives. We use space-based capabilities to deter and prevent maand cyberspace capabilities to help win our nations wars. Like sion in space and ultimate victory will not be brought about solely by military action. partment of Defense (DoD) the need for a more robust approach to developing inter-agency solutions to the complex challenges the military must continue to participate in and indeed work to strengthen the collaborative partnership with inter-agency and allied stakeholders. agency partners along with our coalition partners must have constancy in our understanding of the security environment and must identify our common security objectives. Given the existing methods of safeguarding space information and capa relevant information in a time sensitive manner. When faced with a terrestrial crisis where a space asset was included employing diplomatic actionsbilaterally and at the United Nationsto: term impact of the offending states actions. One of the strengths of the response options produced by the enabled synchronized actions by the key stakeholders in our national space enterprise. Blue actions appeared to gain effectiveness when conducted within the whole-of-government/ nation(s) construct. When hostilities tions continued in parallel with military operations and were assessed as contrib Follow-on diplomatic actions includ sanctions against belligerents. Econom actions would negatively impact world integrated strategic communications campaign produced consistent messages supporting coalition military and non-We know that in the 21st century, we will continue to place emphasis on operations that are conducted in space or through space to assure our global information needs are met and for maintaining the security of our nation and that of our allies. Figure 1. General C. Robert Kehler, commander of Air Force Space Command, discussing policy implementation during a senior leadership seminar at the National Reconnaissance
11 High Frontier VADM Carl V. Mauney (BS, Electrical Engineering, Geor gia Tech; MBA, Business Administration, Chaminade University, Honolulu, Hawaii) is the deputy command er, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Offutt AFB, Nebraska. USSTRATCOM provides a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the president and secretary of defense. Command mission areas include full-spectrum global strike; space operations; computer network operations; Department of Defense information operations; strategic warning; integrated missile defense; and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; combating weapons of mass deVice Admiral Mauney, a native of Jackson, Mississippi, completed submarine sea assignments aboard USS Tunny (SSN 682), USS James Madison (SSBN 627) (Blue), and USS Los Angeles ers (SSN 686) and commander, Submarine Squadron 4 in Groton, chief of staff for US Naval Forces Central Command/US 5th Fleet and executive assistant to commander, US Central Command (Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom). Following promoNavy staff as director, Strategy, Policy and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (OPNAV N34/N5). He was then assigned as deputy commander, US 6th Fleet, as director of Plans and Operations for US Naval Forces Europe/US 6th Fleet, commander, Submarine Group 8/Task Force 69 and in NATO as commander, Allied Submarines Naval Forces South. His most recent assignment was as director, Submarine Warfare (OPNAV N87). Vice Admiral Mauney has been awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal and various other unit and service awards. He was a federal executive fellow at the US Department of State in 1996/1997 and is also a graduate of the Navy Executive Business Program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. port. The varied processes and diverse lexicons of all the players made quick communications and shared understanding of what Look report pointed out that once these processes and lexicons Particular Schriever V insights that may facilitate employment of all elements of national power effectively during a fuerful formula for success. space capabilities dictates a robust method of sharing operational perspectives and developing mechanisms that will rapidly sort resources according to an agreed upon and continuously evolving set of priorities. 3. Pre-planning and regular communications between the military and other agencies must occur with respect to actions needed to support military plans as well as diplomacy and other activities. 4. Organizational processes to facilitate interagency coor dination and regular exercises will ensure that the imple mentation of developed plans can occur when needed. 5. By bringing allies and friendly space-faring nations into bilities. The Schriever V Wargame provided an excellent opportuFigure 2. Combined Air Operations Center-Nellis Game Floor. USSTRATCOM Cell participants work through a wargame vignette.Among combatant commanders, the global nature of space capabilities dictates a robust method of sharing operational perspectives and developing mechanisms that will rapidly sort resources according to an agreed upon and continuously evolving set of priorities. insights that are already being employed in the 2010 Space Posture Review and in a multitude of other space venues. We will look to the further evolution of our space operating concepts and capabilities with the next Schriever Wargame in 2010.
High Frontier 12 Schriever V Wargame: The Boundaries of Space and CyberspaceLt Gen Larry D. James, USAF Commander, 14th Air Force Vandenberg AFB, CaliforniaT ties are attacked and denied across many parts of the battlespace. This is the scenario for Air Force Space Commands (AFSPCs) bringing in all elements of national and coalition power to ex hance decision making in a contested space environment bilities operations in a coalition environment alternatives needed to expand multi-theater and homeland defense space support versary courses of action. several key lessons that were learned. These focus on space and capabilities into our overall operations. Intersections and Integration of Space and Cyberspace operations are intertwined at multiple levels. Emerging threats vantage of space and cyberspace domains. Common attributes immediate access to information utilizing minimal resources. Space and cyberspace are truly contested domains and our na tions critical information is more valuable than ever. It must be of the space infrastructure are tied in some fashion to the cyber domain. Space and cyberspace capabilities continue to shape Senior Leader Perspective the worlds approach to warfare. They are embedded in an in creasingly diverse arsenal of modern weaponry and are threaded cyberspace operations will become an even more powerful force multiplier. warfare at the speed of light Characteristics of this concept include agile decision speed of light speed of light strategies will have to be integrated into traditional lines of operation and schemes of maneuver to be truly effective. cross the whole-of-government. Integrating knowledge and creating an effective response in this environment is a challenge. to the wargame. The results clearly showed that in the operat linked. We must continue to operationalize our cyber capabili ties. We must also understand the space/cyber linkages while grated environment. Importance of Space Situational Awareness tracking objects and conducting conjunction assessments. It is environment for our SSA capabilities. Being able to accurately intelligence to understand capabilities and intent was just as im integrate and fuse this information in a manner so that it was these decision makers were put at a disadvantage as they sought sary actions.
13 High FrontierThe need for integrated SSA capabilities was made clear during Schriever V. This includes a full suite of ground based bilities. It also includes the intelligence and assessment capa bilities to rapidly integrate and fuse this information to create knowledge that is useable and actionable for decision makers at all levels. Coalition Support and Integration One of the key components of Schriever V 2009 was the in tegration of our allies to a level that was unprecedented in past wargames. Coalition partners brought a multitude of capabili Operating as a coalition inherently strengthens our abilities in this realm. This was evident as the US lost capability during the course of the game. Coalition partners could backstop and apparent that an integrated assessment and tasking mechanism was required. This resulted in the creation of the Coalition each nation represented allowed their systems to be managed and tasked by one operations command and control entitythe ing combined effects and capabilities that would not have been possible with each country operating independently. speed of light capability is essential. There is an absolute need to continue to explore how to operationalize a CSpOC construct to effectively manage coalition/US space capabilities. With the participation that formal agreements between coalition partners must be ag gressively pursued to meet our common interests in order to combat our common threat. Integration of Commercial Capabilities in Our Operations and the CSpOC The DoD has a sound relationship with commercial space remote imaging organizations that support US and national se we continue to face challenges. The DoD space community is and accuracy of SSA data while protecting sensitive informa tion. The DoD has engaged with most of the major commercial satellite operators who provide support to the US government to provide inputs to our SSA. was important in maintaining coalition capabilities as coali mechanisms allowing the coalition to make best use of com of commercial assets and effectively utilized them for their own purposes. The results clearly showed the need to develop bet ter concept of operations for integrating commercial capabilities and to have on the shelf plans and agreements that allow this utilization during heightened tensions and hostilities. It also re munication capabilities and how we procure these services. Ad that having a commercial service representative in the CSpOC would be highly useful. Sorting out how that can be implement ed is one of the key actions out of Schriever V. Conclusion critical areas requiring action from the space and cyber commu nities as we continue to build and improve capabilities in both domains. Warfare at the speed of light sion quality information to our senior leaders. The power of the commercial providers in our planning and operational concepts. Fourteenth Air Force and the Joint Forces Component Com mand-Space will work closely with AFSPC and US Strategic Command to take the lessons learned from Schriever V and turn move into this challenging future. Lt Gen Larry D. James (BS, Astronautical Engineering, USAFA; MS, Astronautical Engineering, MIT) is commander, 14th Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE), US Strategic Command (USSTRACOM), Vandenberg AFB, California. As the US Air Forces operational space component to USSTRATCOM, General James leads more than 20,500 personnel responsible for providing missile warning, space superiority, space situational awareness, satellite operations, space launch, and range operations. As commander, JFCC SPACE, he directs all assigned and attached USSTRATCOM space forces providing tailored, responsive, local and global space effects in support of national, USSTRATCOM, and combatant commander objectives. General James career has spanned a wide variety of operations and acquisition assignments, including space shuttle payload specialist, Air Staff program element monitor, GPS satellite program manager and chief of operations, 14th Air Force. General James has commanded at the squadron, group, and wing levels, and was vice commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center. He has served on the staffs of Headquarters US Air Force, US Space Command and AFSPC. He also served as the senior Saudi Arabia. Prior to his current assignment, the general was vice commander, 5th Air Force, and deputy commander, 13th Air Force, Yokota AB, Japan.
High Frontier 14 Schriever V A UK PerspectiveAVM T. M. Timo Anderson, RAF Assistant Chief of the Air Staff Whitehall, United KingdomO 1 at the Schriever IV Wargame. Readers who participated in Schriever IV may recall cussing the ally who inserted a large and delighted to be invited to return in March 2009 for Schrieof quality individuals who participated in all aspects of the pated learning from and contributing to this signature space wargamethey were not disappointed. inevitably have implications and effects in some or all of the Brits call the comprehensive approach to crisis resolution. But coordinating and managing actions across this spectrum of comprehensive activity is a hugely complex task and one the context of the key components General Kehler has identiCoalition Integration General Kehler and the game designers went to immense lengths to ensure that the non-US players were fully integrated started the wargame with a mindset that there were two elements to the blue team: the US on the one side and the allies groundswell of opinion that this approach was no longer prefscribed all the nations working collectively towards a common team was much closer to a properly integrated coalition making best use of all nations capabilities. nance structures need to be recognized and accommodated is thinks they are the captain. Not that the concept of subordifor many years. We only have to look at recent operations in many theatres to see that equipping coalition commanders with operational control/tactical control (TACON) of assigned forcdifferent? Joint Publication 3-14 states that:2 integrates and synchronizes Department of Defense [DoD] space capabilities to ensure the most effective use of these resources. US Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM] must be the event of war against the US and/or its allies. the experience that having multiple commanders of elements of capabilities under a single commander has direct relevance for I think we all saw at Schriever V that a possible way to be to create a Combined Joint Task Force-Space (CJTF-Space) to integrate and synchronize all the coalition partners space capabilities. Such a CJTF-Space would provide the framework for nations to apportion forces to a single commander in supcomplementary capabilities and resources would deliver maxi CJTF-Space? It should be obvious that a standing CJTF-Space would enable us to respond to a crisis in space more rapidly and hard to see how we would respond effectively and in a timely fashion to an international crisis without such a construct to help ease the path. A standing CJTF-Space would allow like-minded nations to the devil would be in the detailswho should command; how Senior Leader Perspective
15 High Frontierwould the command and control structure work; and what forcforthbut we are not necessarily starting from a clean sheet of paper. The model of the joint force air component commander operating through a combined air operations center is mature the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) and Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) construct is proving to be very effective. I therefore believe that the who should command question is simply answered. Whatever the US would provide the bulk of the space capabilities and would therefore likely provide the commander CJTF-Space. It seems to me to make sense that commander JFCC SPACE should be one and the same person. to command from and a staff to plan and help him/her execute mander CJTF-Spaces operations center look like? Command are increasingly closely integrated. Were commander JFCC 3 the JSpOC could possibly form the core of commander CJTF-Spaces operations center. But as tual entity incorporating links to all the allies space operations centers? Might its virtual structure even be tailored in response the preserve of departments of defense and ministries of despace and critical components of any cross-government(s) approach to a crisis. Should we incorporate these elements too would we maintain national and commercial security within that will require much work and there are no clear answers yet. elements will we be able to bring truly synchronized and effective international power to bear on the crises of the future. We maxim we forget at our peril. mander CJTF-Space? Certainly the procedures would have to above? I would argue that answers to questions such as these far better surely to address them now by trialling a standing CJTF-Space. Complicating any suggestion of a future standing CJTFSpace operations center are the contemporary constraints that releasability and interoperability of information technology (IT) place upon us. At Schriever V we luxuriated in an environIT systems allowed true multi-national collaboration. Never ing the idealized environment we experienced at Schriever V into the real world! But translate it we must if a future standing CJTF-Space operations centre is to be a feasible concept. A potential vision of the art of the possible is the JSpOC Ver demonstrated capabilities certainly seem to be able to integrate Space Council perts in the Schriever V Space Council who represented a broad our Australian and Canadian allies. But what the space council dimension of the wargame demonstrated most to me was suitable peacetime construct for common and integrated space of mutual interest. It is obviously vital in any coalition operation to understand where our policies and legal opinions are time to determine these areas of agreement and potential difan acute need for rapid decision-making that can meet the remander CJTF-Space would intuitively understand his/her misthe peacetime policy and legal work that would underpin them
High Frontier 16 of each others political objectives and constraints was in place to enable commander CJTF-Space to employ assigned assets to maximum effectand with minimum friction or interference! Not that the Schriever V Space Council was a panacea that at Schriever 10 (SW 10) without having made some tangible progress in translating the space council concept into the real interim what we are trying to achieve and set about construct the extant bilateral Space Cooperation Forums coming together Space Cooperation Forum within which objectives could be expressed and such a roadmap developed. Way Forward sential before any of us commit to coalition actions in space. common understanding is nownot when we are faced with to opponents maneuvers will surely limit our effectiveness and put success at riskin such a fast moving and strategically vital collectively cost. A space council and a CJTF-Space should be our comment on both before SW 10. other domain that labours under the name of cyberspace. Space professionals reading this fully understand that swift decisions these decisions could be considered pedestrian when looking at rate cyber will therefore be a massive challengebut a necessary one from which we must not shrink. The Royal Air Force ably and generously supported by our US Air Force colleagues. The most immediate impression I have of our own work in this it is likely to be completely overshadowed by the complexi promoting above may not just be a way of better facilitating AVM Timo Anderson is a background and commenced ating the Tornado GR1. Successive tours on front-line squadrons, including with the Royal Australian Air Force ics F111C, provided the early backdrop for several operational deployments. Following a senior staff tour in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), in early 1999 he assumed command of No 14 Squadron. Shortly after his arrival to the squadron, he was charged with leading the Royal Air Forces (RAFs) Tornado GR1 squadrons committed to NATOs Operation Allied Force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and was appointed a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order as a result of his efforts in this regard. In 2000, he was promoted group captain and was granted command of RAF Brggen in Ger many, at the time home to the largest Tornado wing in NATO. He was promoted to air commodore and took post as MoD Director Equipment Capability (Deep Target Attack) in September 2003. Having attended the UKs Higher Command and Staff Course in early 2005, in August that year he assumed the concurrent appoint ments of commandant of the Royal Air Force Air Warfare Centre, director of the UKs Defence Electronic Warfare Centre and assistant chief of staff for intelligence at HQ RAF Strike Command. He was promoted to air vice-marshal and appointed as the assistant chief of the Air Staff in March 2007. He is a member of the Air Force Board and Head of the Services Operations Support Branch. His primary responsibilities range across the development of the RAFs strategy, acting as the RAFs designated User in the MoDs Through Life Capability Management process and leading ning rounds. He is the Release to Service Authority for all RAF aircraft and is chairman of the MoDs Military Aviation Regulation and Safety Board. A non-executive director of the Civil Aviation Authority Board, he is also the MoD Senior Responsible Owner for both Space and UAVs. He is president of RAF Rugby Union, president of the Northern Ireland Wing of the Air Training Corps, and vice-president of the No 14 Squadron Association. RAF stands ready to contribute to the development and execu activities and strengthening the foundation from which we can all Fly, Fight, and Win Notes:1 Assistant chief of the Air Staff is a similar role to that of vice chief of staff of the US Air Force.2 Space Operations3 Commander JFCC SPACE is already dual-hatted as commander 14th Air Force; command of a standing CJTF-Space would thus add a third hat.
17 High FrontierA Space Doctrine for Soldier, Scientist, and Citizen: What It Will Take to Secure the Space Domain Chairman, The Henry L. Stimson Center Washington, DC Introduction: From the Iron Age to the Info Age in Ten Short YearsA signaling the arrival of the 21st was nevertheless living more frugally under post-Cold War bud gets. President Bill Clinton claimed a peace dividend after the fall of the Soviet Union. Vice President Al Gore promoted greater use by Department of Defense (DoD) of commercial offcations. The US defense establishment energetically embraced the in ture with COTS equipment and services to achieve advances in elliteswhether dedicated US government satellites or capacity contracted from commercial satellite providersbecame a ma jor enabler of US military operations. Policy and doctrine in the With the initiation of post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan and robust real time connectivity across long distances. Where 10 years earlier the defense policy concern was that impairment of its access to space communications could cause important but the recognition was already widespread that major functional capabilities in todays military exist only by virtue of continuous the effectiveness of Americas global information technologyabout the revolution in military affairs and the transformation in that made it possible. That backbone runs through space. Among the earliest signals to the policy community that space look-ahead involving several hundred participants and commis space infrastructure on which the Army of the future would sub stantially rely. The move was invalidated by the control team so as to permit that technological infrastructure in space was at once fragile and empowering. In a National Defense Panel Report to the secre we now hold in information operations and more traditional military operations could be put at risk. [W]e must protect our space assets to include our commercial assets and deny our enemies the opportunity to gain military advantages through the use of space.1 Command (prior to being merged with US Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM]) gave the undersigned and a policy blue future. Our task as National Command Authority was to man deceptive tactics to go with them. That experience yielded the important recognition that space management logic and protocols of past conventional or nuclear to a different paradigm than participants had ever encountered believing that these unique national-level policy issues needed ... [W]e must protect our space assets to include our commercial assets and deny our enemies the opportunity to gain military advantages through the use of space. Senior Leader Perspective
High Frontier 18 to be examined in detail given that the world was increasingly likely to view the US militarys reliance on space-based assets as a lucrative target in a future war.2Schriever V A Civilians Policy Perspective As a participant on the US policy team at the Schriever V Air Force in particular as the military proponent for the space domain. Informed by the gaming experiences of a decade ear perceived at that time regarding the militarys equities in space had been validated in the intervening years. In particular: cations and intelligence would have a major and growing the prevention of such an occurrence an ever more urgent priority; upon critical space infrastructure used by the US military is occurring in such a scenariothe capability known as space situational awareness (SSA). US space-based capabilities is the militarys concern that necessity of pre-delegated authority to a US commander already conversant with the space environment and the tactical dimensions of hostilities in space. was a greater sensibility about terrestrial interests unrelated to experts brought to the policy discussion a rich appreciation that other governments and their populations have very substantial tions. Allied players were impressively conversant with norms of international law and policy pertaining to the worlds access to space. Whatever latitude for US action in space American legal advisors may determine to be permissible under the accumu has shown that the US will underappreciate the views of other The central focus in Schriever V was not national policy but Air Force business: to examine whether the capabilities it had previously deemed essential proved in a simulated future opera tion to be useful and relevant to the mission of defending US based communications; and to probe the dynamics of an unfold ing crisis through several moves to look for what worked well successfully. It is a core responsibility of the US Air Force Space Com able to counter potential threats to US interests in space. The Schriever wargaming franchise has proved to be a valuable tool What a Military Game Will Not Try to Answer If there is a risk emanating from a major exercise such as national security community at large may conclude that all the reality is that they have not. This is no shortcoming on the Air the boundaries of the defense mission. planning mechanism for policy and doctrine at the national levelno non-military franchise to focus on the decisions that consequential questions of all. Americas future civilian leaders arise in spacequestions appropriately left outside the param eters of the Schriever V exercise. They include: is best served by conducting destructive actions against rable acts of aggression against the US? of military actions taken to compel an adversary which could result in degrading or eliminating space-based com munications for substantial geographic areas of the world? and how US military actions in space comport with inter national treaty obligations and generally-observed norms? countries when the US is considering military options po tentially detrimental to the future space environment and the global interests it serves? withstanding the forbidding time constraints and daunting (for all but space professionals) complexity of the space systems environment?
19 High Frontier to consider and address so as to ensure that prudent military planning will rest on a coherent foundation of national policy and strategya foundation that can come only from the presi dent and Congress. Not to provide such a foundation would be a disservice to our military. To Militarize or Not to Militarize That is Not the Question Almost from the start of DoDs embrace of the information leadership have warned that military dependence on unimpeded cies have viewed with mounting concern the prospect that space that destructive activities in orbit could pose to satellites and calls to keep space from being militarized. The conundrum for US policymakers is that both perspectives have a valid point: the US military and its alliance and coalition potentially a very long time. then space has been militarized for many years. On the other (followed in February 2008 by the US Navy shootdown of a point that space could be regarded as separate from the national While the earths exoatmosphere is perhaps not pristine in terms tritus of space warfare. There is a divergence of views between the military who who fear the deepening military dependence upon space could the corresponding US interest. That is: the US needs to keep any aggressor from degrading or destroying space assets on which space domain for technological utilization by all of humankind in perpetuity. The National Interest in Space Is Military Necessity Always Paramount? including for future generations. If one were uncertain about the what would happen if any party engaged in destructive acts in space. debris that satellites were frequently at risk of catastrophic col damage on space-based electronics. Consider the reaction of governments and their citizens if the International Space Sta space travel alike were deemed too risky to justify the effort and investment. Now consider their perspectives if some of these whose jobs and lifestyles rely upon space-enabled information moon and exploratory unmanned missions on Mars would be forfeited if the US were seen to have had a role in so damaging acted in self-defense against a very threatening adversary. The prospect of such a development has given rise to recom mendations and proposals for multilateral prohibitions on such destructive acts.3 tries that might hold at risk its space capabilities appear inclined to adopt common restraints on their freedom of action in space. One reason is that potential adversaries of the US do not appear to be suitably impressed or deterred by a recognition of the pro the expectation of severe collateral damage that would be global in scope and generational in duration might be deemed a high with a future adversary. Such is the ultimate priority that war civil life. ther the future of space as a permissive domain nor the ability of the American President to seek leverage and even dominance over an adversary in an escalating crisis. The beginning of wis dom in contemplating this doctrine is to recognize that among
High Frontier 20 gardless of who winswill likely be US military space-en tainly not the optimal way to secure the national security domain of space. Reexamined If there is one theme that consistently emerges from the in decision and action are radically compressed in comparison to critically-important space assets orbiting over hostile territory could potentially be destroyed in the time it would take to com and reach a decision on a military response. It is unarguable that ing of limiting the destructive consequences of the event. Figure 1 portrays this imperative. This concern understandably leads many to conclude that au thority to use force against an adversary posing a grave risk to president to a military commander well-versed on this unique set of operational issues. The unstated corollary is that the US re the adversarys space infrastructure. There are several reasons why pre-delegating authority to a military commander for the use of force in the space domain may not best serve the national interest. 1. Presidential Responsibility. Pre-delegation does not change the fact that the authority to use force is and re warplans related to space contingencies are very likely to contain tight rules of engagement and precise withholds broad dispensation akin to a traditional executive order military commanders as to satisfy a presidents penchant for control. 2. Presidential Knowledge. The common but unstated assumption is that because there is no time to brief the she must pass the baton in advance to a knowledgeable icas space assets. Yet this problem is not so easily solved. As the author has posited repeatedly in the wargaming arena with scenarios involving potentially severe conse tion whose implications he or she does not understand. not stay intimately engaged in managing the crisis. 3. The Political Dimension of Controlling Escalation. A crisis in space would presumably start with an adversary taking hostile action against militarily-important US space the worst-case possibility that a rapid destruction of US space capability is underway. This compels the US Air outcome. The question for the National Command Au an accident? Or a one-off demonstration intended as a political warning to the US relating to broader issues be tween the two adversaries? What if the attribution to a particular adversary was incorrectperhaps even manip ulated through offensive cyber operations by a third party provocateur ? The point here is two-fold. As with any thus the US management of the crisis must of necessity a hair-trigger kinetic response in space by the US confers Figure 1. Vulnerability of Assets and the Need to Act Fast. Figure 2. The Damage Timeline.
21 High Frontier better characterization of the intent of the adversary before irrevocably harmful escalation is undertaken. Figure 2 de picts the advantage of such an approach. 4. The Moral Burden. Imagine if a US military commander Or consider the decision calculus facing a contemporary US commander if he or she knew that a tactical course the same time raise the global temperature by two to three supply by over 50 percent. Would such a decision ap propriately rest with that commander? The consequences a substantial loss of service to the civil sector or persis place a profound moral burden on the individual whose decision produced such an outcome. The authority to take irrespective of pre-delegated ROE. Given the moral grav ity of military decisions with such broad and enduring future decision to employ force in space will be withheld and exercised only by the president. The authors pre diction does not have to be correct more than once for a military space doctrine relying on the expectation of broad pre-delegated authority to fail. Implications For all the participants appreciation of net speed in the cant developments that would have any prospect of occurring at net speed: an adversary could commit wholesale aggression and substantially destroy space assets used by the US military; and the US could do much the same against space assets used by an adversary. What the US military has no prospect of doing today at net speed is acquiring real-time knowledge that its systems are might know quickly that data has ceased to be transmitted; after ing their anticipated trajectories; and there could be terrestrial SSA to support a timely assessment and reliable characterization of an adversarys rapid escalation to hostilities in space. Not only does this remove the strongest rationale for pre-del egating authority to respond with force in defense of US space in time to do something about it; but it means that until further in time to prevent destruction of our space-based infrastructure. several: threats to US space-based assets would best be countered by should US actions ever cause severe disruption or destruction in with an adversary country. The goal of any coercive US mili to consider the use of force against territorial targets in response to an adversarys aggression in space: but the requirements of will be better to bomb an adversarys counter-space weapons in his homeland than to join him in causing the irrevocable degra dation of space. This has implications for command arrangements in a future focus on the decision calculus of that government and its own assign a comparatively high value to its own access to space. The US will identify options for holding at risk equities that minimizing collateral impacts on third-party countries and pop ulations. Because the protection of space as a permanent pre in a non-symmetrical fashion against the terrestrial interests of Figure 3. Where We Need to Get.
High Frontier 22 an adversary who was threatening the worlds interests in space would be defensible. What the US Needs A Doctrine to Keep the War Away from Space tinuing to examine and address the military dimensions of ther steps that the senior civilian leadership should consider to egy commensurate with the profoundly broad interests involved. 1. Invest Urgently in SSA. The path away from extreme vulnerability begins with improving our ability to know what is occurring in space. Only when the US has suf perceive and attribute causes to anomalies in its space sys tems will it be in a position to exercise effective tactical responses to an adversary bent on degrading or destroying those systems. 2. Draw a New Red Line in Space. An action by any party to degrade or destroy space-based assets on which the US president should declare this as the core of a new space security doctrine whose over-arching purpose encompass es both the militarys equities and the other fundamental war with no geographic constraints. 3. Identify the Countries of Primary Concern. No secu rity purpose is served by pretending that we do not know who the countries are with potentially destabilizing mili tary capabilities in the space domain. Russia and China see themselves as major powers; they merit special policy treatment for the purpose of ensuring that future disagree ments do not escalate to the point of threatening US or tial for miscalculation on all sides. 4. Politicians. Experience shows that senior military com may be able to defuse rising tensions when their politi cal leaders cannot. In the interest of preventing escalat ing tensions from leading to hostile actions and permanent bilateral US-Russia and US-China contacts between the senior military commanders responsible for space opera tions. 5. While Planning for a Future Crisis, Be Prepared for One Today. of the constraints of the day. Activities such as the Schrie ver V wargame properly focus a community of expert players on the parameters of an effective defense posture from others. But what happens if a threat is posed against US space assets two years from now? There may be merit but as yet it has lost nothing. Space systems continue to em power the national defense and thus Americas security. The domain of space is still preserved for present and future gen vorable conditions is worthy of a comprehensive national policy commitment that clearly supports them all. Notes:1 Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century: Re2 The Army Space Journal 2002).3 tect the domain of space. See: http://www.stimson.org/space/program home.cfm. Ambassador Lincoln P. (Harvard, a.b., cum laude, Government, 1974; Fletcher School, M.A.L.D., 1980) was the presidents special envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense System (MAN PADS) Threat Reduction from 2008-09; from 2001-2005 he was assistant secretary of state for political military affairs and the special representative of the president and secretary of state for Humanitarian Mine Action. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), deputy assistant to the vice president for National Security Affairs (1991-02), mem ber, US Delegation to Philippine Bases Negotiations (1990-91), member, US Water Mediation in the Middle East (1989-90), and principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89), among other positions in the Department of Defense (OSD/ISA) beginning in 1981. He is chairman of the board of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a founding board member of Survivor Corps (formerly Landmine Survivors Network), and is the Bipartisan Policy Center.
23 High FrontierPolitical-Military Implications of Space Warfare on Homeland Defense and Allied Relations BG Robert J. Felderman, USA Deputy Director Plans, Policy, and Strategy NORAD and USNORTHCOM J5 Peterson AFB, ColoradoC the homeland and allied relations. Due to the global nature of sideration must be given to friendly and ally space impacts on the homeland as well as the impact to the geographic combatant leveraging the right capabilities to achieve the desired end state. uncertain security environment. The impacts to our nations all challenges from strategic attack to security implications on space support assets to those incurred by the wrath of Mother Nature. with the mission to anticipate and conduct homeland defense protect and secure the US and its interests.1 is co-located with North American Aerospace Defense Comother agencies and organizations to include allies and regional Senior Leader Perspective 2 cyber capabilities and resources that impacted NORAD and no fail missions in support of our homeland were not put at unreasonable risk. Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, of air and space protection from threat missiles.3 This doctrine on Phase II (seize the initiative) and Phase III (dominate) of support from space capabilities and resources is integrated air and missile defense (IAMD). In todays theater area of operaon a threat assessment. We focus IAMD forces and assets on dar and interagency assets like Federal Aviation Administra of action is not a mission we take lightly; but it is a mission Many of the assets used in an overseas theater are the same as those planned for use in the homeland. For defense support of purchased solely for this mission. events or disasters are handled by civil authorities. This is our culture and the American way of life. For air security and de-
High Frontier 24 against these multiple homeland missions be maintained and responding to attacks or disasters in the homeland. sets requiring protection in our AOR. US Airspace is the most of aircraft are general aviation that may or may not participate with the FAA management structure. we have no fallback position so the requirement to conduct our for our homeland. Any event or response in a geographical combatant comglobal synchronization of any combatant commander actions be mitigated to determine the impact and risk to support of the homeland. some other agency before coming to DoD. As we identify these gaps we incorporate them into our plans and prioritize capabili ties to respond should they be needed. All of these capabilities may be impacted by the loss or degradation of space or cyber resources. We must also obtain a better understanding of force protection requirements and prioritization for critical space and cyber infrastructure in our AOR. defense and civil support operations focus upon the homeland in the homeland. Whether it is a large scale strategic attack defend, protect, and secure or prioritizations prevented us from doing what we need to acThe homeland requires a family of systems approach that depends heavily on space and cyber capabilities. We need to develop policy and governance between our interagency partners to ensure that these space and cyber capabilities are always available for this more restrictive homeland mission. departments programs in order to institutionalize and enhance same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingen buy. Already we have seen that impact to existing and future contracts that will further impact space and cyber support to the combatant commands. Dr. sion of DoD is an equally important rationale against assigning lead responsibility to the department.4 This paper suggests he envisions additional capabilities that will require space and sures designed to improve locality-to-locality and state-to-state reinforcement. Dr. Stockton includes terrorist attacks in his description of mega-catastrophes. While DoD is seen as the resource of last resort he gives support that the DoD may be better suited as the primary federal agency to respond to such our space and cyber resources committed to the homeland mission. There are some who believe the US is not ready for the next catastrophe.5 and the US is clearly more prepared than it was seven or eight years ago. There is a continuing perception that there is still er assets and capabilities are guaranteed or merely potentially available. Not only must we solve this confusion about roles of last resort our resources and capabilities are supported by our space and cyber domain assets. Access to capabilities that are now inextricably tied to space complish their missions. Our ability to anticipate, deter, detect, prepare for, prevent, and mitigate catastrophic attacks or events is directly tied to continued access to this domain. Loss or severe and unthinkable consequences for the North American continent and its people. fense and allied relations. The same space assets that are used -... it is imperative that the global synchronization of any combatant commander actions be mitigated to determine the impact and risk to support of the homeland.
25 High Frontier these actions must be considered from an allied political mili tary standpoint. The impact on the global space environment and requirements in multiple AORs must be part of the deci sion calculus prior to accepting risk to space based assets or understand the implications of their regional actions to homeland defense and to the allied partners. myriad. The inclusion of allies at this level of planning enhances trust between the coalition members and ensures that no differences in national policy or perception prevent the smooth members are unaware of the differences between themselves and other members and assume support particularly in critical lied participation in course of action development allows them be particularly effective in resolving political and military issues. Allies are critical to the space effort. In addition to proin an action may have different consequences for a regional ally than for the US particularly in relation to trade and must be factored into the planning calculus. Including allies in the level ensures the effectiveness and synergy of the coalition and We must develop alternatives for mission assurance should cyber capabilities. We must identify and assess single points of failure across our critical infrastructure and key resources. This must include coalition sharing of space for early warning; with industry for excess capacity and prioritization. lead a comprehensive approach for the alignment of all homeland defense plans. This approach should make certain space and cyber impacts on mission requirements in support of the of the homeland is the #1 priority for the DoD. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this article are those of the author and do not necAmerican Aerospace Defense Command. Article contribution or review was made by Maj Daniel J. Knight, Mr. Barry Cardwell, and Maj W. Jarman.Notes: 1 2 Ibid.3 Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 October 1999.4 Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century 21-31.5 Center The Washington Quarterly ary 2009. BG Robert J. Felderman (BS, Aviation Management and Flight Operations, Univer sity of Dubuque, Iowa; MS, National Security Strategy, National Defense University, Washington, DC) is the US deputy director of plans, policy, and strategy for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), stationed at Peterson AFB, Colorado. He provides advice on USNORTHCOM long range strategy, doctrine, policy, and plans to support national objectives in the combatant commands area of responsibility; and develops strate gies and policies in support of US objectives in support of Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions. General Felderman also provides advice on bi-national strategy, doctrine, policy, and capa bilities to conduct NORAD missions of air sovereignty, aerospace warning and defense, and maritime warning against traditional and asymmetrical attacks on North America. General Felderman represented the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM during the Schriever IV (2007) and V (2009) Space Wargames. General Felderman has commanded at the company, battalion, ry), aviation, medical service corps, and strategic plans. He is a years of aviation duty serving in assault, attack, cavalry, medevac, and maintenance aviation units. Prior to receiving his commis sion, General Felderman served as an enlisted soldier in the Army, achieving the rank of sergeant, and as an airman in the Air National Guard as a weapons control systems specialist on the F-106 (Delta Dart). Prior to his current assignment, General Felderman served as the operations deputy director for National Guard matters at USNORTHCOM, special assistant to the chief of the National Guard Bureau (detailed as USNORTHCOM J3 deputy director), and as director of the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center. General Felderman was recently published in the Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leaven worth, Kansas; The US Army and the Interagency Process: Histor ical Perspectives, the Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium. He was the symposium key note speaker on the subject USNORTHCOM interagency coor dination.
High Frontier 26 The Value of the DomainCol Robert F. Wright, Jr., USAF Commander Space Innovation and Development Center Schriever AFB, ColoradoThe Schriever Wargame is a series of executive-level Force Space Command (AFSPC) and executed by the Space ly bolster Americas national security. These improvements evolved as a result of changes in how military space agencies are organized and how they are integrated to operate across nathe games has developed into a fundamental discussion regardtures of the space enterprise. This has served to provide a fertile ground for deliberation amongst senior space community lead deterrence have become more critical than ever before. Naval forces can reach across the worlds oceans; army forces plan execute accurate weapons delivery through global reach and global power. With the lightning speed and global distances cyber systems will be called on to provide even more critical capabilities to enable and secure the defense of the US and its allies. Our national leaders will continue to rely on space effects provided smartly by space war warriors to provide timely and precise decisions during times of peace and the potential crises of war in the 21st century. cannot survive without them. The Schriever series has focused on the application of effects and capabilities The games have allowed space leaders in government and industry to consider new and inutility of emerging transformational concepts as we look to the vides a venue for experts from across the space domain to gather and trade ideas and concepts of current operations and future and space partners. The insights from the Schriever Wargame of our military strategy and force structure. Reluctant players in the real world rapidly become advocates of real-world change during the game. Voices of consent can further development of space support across the space community. These consenting voices including those from the National Security Space Enleaders and players on the world stage. AFSPC is the lead for all Air Force -Schriever V Wargame Figure 1. Combined Air Operations Center-Nellis Brig Gen Jack Weinstein, AFSPC director of plans, programs, and analyses, presents Schriever V Wargame outbrief to Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley; Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz (via video teleconferencing); AFSPC Commander General C. Robert Kehler, Congress-
27 High Frontier tary strategists) pursuing different agendas within the space domain. The Schriever Wargame series is a venue for these groups to collaborate and experiment with national-level guidance in an impartial setting while looking at a future scenario that serves as a backdrop and catalyst for the event. The US and the international community continue the pur suit of more space capabilities and more reliance on space effects for daily living. As dependence on the space environment domain could become pivotal to the interest of nation states in national security and defense of all nations. Acts of aggression in space are no longer limited to the combatants. The impact of warfare on space systems and space effects becomes a global event and escalates into a crisis impacting more than just the intended adversary. Major issues that have been explored in the game series have been as diverse as worldwide opinion regarding space concepts and operations; innovative strategic space concepts; developing a single integrated campaign plan; and evolutions of Combined Space Operations Center construct. We will continue to explore these and other critical issues in the Schriever Wargame series and provide the nation with opwith which to recapitalize the peaceful use of space in the 21st century. (BS, US Air Force Academy; MS, Systems Management, University of Southern Cali fornia) is commander, Space Innovation and Development Center, Schriever AFB, Colorado. The Space Innovation and Development Center is the centerpiece of Air Force Space Commands (AFSPCs) efforts to fully integrate space into the daily operational Air Force. The center develops new tech niques and procedures to apply space-based capabilities to military training, exercises, plans, and operations in support of provides oversight of the Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities program. Colonel Wrights career in space and communications includes commanding two communications squadrons and a communica tions group, including a one year deployed tour supporting Operation Southern Watch. He has held several key staff positions, inmander, United States Central Command. He also served on the tems) staff as a program element monitor; at United States Central Command Headquarters J6, at Headquarters AFSPC, and as vice commander, 14th Air Force. Colonel Wright completed the DoD Executive Leadership Development Program, is a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College, graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College, was accepted in to the John Malone Fellowship in Arabic and Islamic Studies (Abu Dhabi and Qatar) and completed Senior Service School as a national defense fellow. Major issues that have been explored in the game series have been as diverse as worldwide opinion regarding space concepts and operations; innovative strategic space concepts; developing a single integrated campaign plan; and evolutions of Combined Space Operations Center construct. The Schriever Wargame series is at the forefront of inprovided the space community with valuable information on emerging concepts and capabilities that have crucial military the fact that these wargames provide an unequaled opportunity tions.Figure 2. Combined Air Operations Center-Nellis Game Floor 14th Air Force Commander Lt Gen Larry James, commander, 14th Air Force and Joint Functional Component Command for Space, discusses options with his space operations team.
High Frontier 28 Coalition Space Operations: Lessons Learned from Schriever V WargameMr. Joseph D. Rouge, SES Pentagon, Washington DC Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology Pentagon, Washington DCT commercial space sector and industry. US participants includ munity. Allied participation also extended beyond defense de the Schriever wargame series. This article highlights some of the lessons learned and way ahead. Wargame Preparation Preparation for the wargame included workshops attended by representatives from each country and organization as appropri op a notional Cooperative Security Space Defense Agreement four countries defense departments. The framework assumed a senior-level space council existed for governance of the agree ly to address issues. It was assumed for the start of the game that was also assumed that there was a high level of information shar ing between space operations centers of the four allies at the start of the game. This information sharing was in support of each countrys national space operations with very limited combined operations in place. In effect the wargame was set to begin with a de facto parallel command structure in place as used in Joint Publication 1. Wargame Execution operators that it would be much easier and timely to conduct co ordinated operations among the four countries if the force struc ture was integrated rather than operating in parallel. The result was to create a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-like orga nization within the wargame supported by a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC). With these structures in place it was much easier to coordinate planning and execution among the four countries. The notional construct used during the re The value of this construct was further under scored as wargame events developed highlight ment (ROE) and agree on redlines with national caveats as appropriate. Although ROE were discussed during workshops leading up to the need for national caveats to respect the differ ences among the four nations due to policies and they were important to note and necessary to account for in planning. It was also necessary to integrate commercial space and industry into the process of assessing events in the wargame and planning for an appropriate response. With the CJTF-like structure and CSpOC constructs tween the nations where they existed. The wargame play was facilitated by use of a shared computer system to which all par Figure 1. Notional Coalition Space Operations Center.Schriever V Wargame
29 High Frontierticipants had access according to their play in the game. This greatly facilitated the game play and information sharing among the different teams. It highlighted of course the contrast with the real world where even among US national security space ac tors there are challenges in getting the right information to the right people in a timely manner. US systems are not designed to accommodate multi-level security and information sharing with allies. Processes that exist are cumbersome at best and allow for very limited exchange of information. No one experiences this in doing their job because of the inability to operate on computer systems used by their US co-workers. Lessons Learned dustry is needed and must be pre-planned. The steps to accom plish this are as follows: should establish a real-world security space defense agree ment among the four countries with other nations to follow in the future. Such an agreement provides an umbrella under which a CSpOC can be developed and operated to include personal exchanges where agreed. It will also facilitate discussion of and development of a standing CJTF-like organization for space. Such an agreement is a starting point that could be expanded if required. Austra and it only makes sense to put such an agreement in place. 2. Expand the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mis sion System (JMS) program of record to create a CSpOC. This can be done by looking for an appropriate entry point in the JMS program. This effort must also include com puter systems with appropriate multi-levels of security that can bridge connectivity challenges between the four allies. Information sharing policy and implementation needs to support cooperation. The CSpOC also needs to include representation from or have connectivity with commercial space and industry. The CSpOC can either be a facility in one location or a virtual facility through connectivity with a number of locations. be developed and put in place for use by the CSpOC and CJTF-Space. Conclusion There is no shortage of articles espousing that space is be coming congested and contested. The question is what are we going to do? For the 450 or so people representing four of the the answer is clearwe need to move decisively in the direction of coalition space operations. This wargame demonstrated the need for this solution and highlighted a few of the challenges ahead. The alternative is not acceptableit is time to move for ward together now! Mr. Joseph D. Rouge (BS, Aerospace Engineering, University of Southern California; MS, Aerospace Engineering, University of Southern Cali fornia; MS, Business Administration, Auburn University) is the director, National SecuPentagon, Washington, DC. He is responsible for leading a multi-agency unit tasked to create unity of effort across all of National Security Space. sponsible for promoting synergy and integrating interagency space policy, strategy, acquisition, launch, planning programming, and technology development. Mr. Rouge came on active duty in September 1974, serving in a variety of positions involving space surveillance systems, Strategic Defense Initiative Programs, and systems engineering and program integration. He has served on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, at the Air Force Inspection Agency and on the staff at Headquarters US Air Force. Mr. Rouge was a research fellow at the Airpower Research Institute, located at Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine and Education, where he authored a book on national military space strategy. He was also a research fellow at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, authoring a book on national security strategy. Mr. Rouge retired from active duty as chief of NSSOs Integration Division, and he served as associate director before assuming his current duties as director. Mr. Dennis Danielson (BS, Electrical Engineering, US Air Force Academy; MS, Space Operations, Air Force Institute of Technology) is a senior engineering and technical manager for Jacobs Technology, supporting the National Secuassignments include CH-53 helicopters at Nakham Phenom Air Base, Thailand and Sembach AB,Germany. He ments as a T-37 instructor pilot in the NATO pilot training program at Sheppard AFB, Texas Oklahoma. His space assignments include crew commander in the Space Surveillance Center, chief of plans, evaluations and training in the Space Control Operations Division at USSPACECOM, and later commander of Clear AFS, Alaska. He received a National Defense Fellowship to study at the University of Illinois and served on the Joint Staff as the senior military representative for strategic and theater ballistic missile defense negotiations with countries of helicopters, turbo-prop, and jet aircraft and holds the senior space badge. Mr. Danielson concluded his 30-year career in the US Air Force upon his retirement from service, where upon he assumed his current position.
High Frontier 30 Schriever V: Lessons Learned A Canadian PerspectiveCol Franois Malo, CF Director of Space Development Chief Force Development National Defence Headquarters Government of CanadaI tional planning and to execute tactical operations. Over the a force multiplier to a fundamental enabler of effective military operations. Our commanders depend on the precision provided by GPS to enhance the agility of forces and to synchronize lite communications enable us to exercise command and share comprehensive situational awareness on a global scale through search and rescue capabilities contribute to force protection quirements. Space capabilities also support other key elements of naand timing signals provided by the GPS munication is critical to civil and commercial activities on a global scalea demand that has generated the capacity now heavily leveraged by military forces worldwide. The information that fuels space line of communications (SLOC). Our dependence on space-based capa bilities is such that militaries must now question their ability to achieve operational success in theatres where access to space capabilities would be denied or severely limited. Space is a challenging environment to exploit. It is both austere and contested. It is subject to natural harmful electromagnetic phenomena and increased usage has created a demonstrated risk of collision between resident can afford some degree of space access as well as the ability to poses in the pursuit of national and international objectives. national and military SLOC. Space control exists to maintain information superiority. These facts now resonate within Canadas Department of National Defence. The experience and insight acquired over the last four Schriever games helped shape our understanding of the role space plays in support of the defense and security agenda. What has also become increasingly evident over the last few years is that no nation can deliver and guarantee all of the space effects our commanders demand. There is there ly serve more than one combatant command in a single orbit. Implementing a coalition approach to space support can proeffects. To properly manage and responsively apportion a coalitions space capabilities requires a coalition command and control capability empowered with the right authority to manage the delivery of space effects. The need for a coalition approach to space control is also Figure 1. Red Flag Auditorium Mr. Kurt Nelson, from the Schriever Wargame Team, provides guidance on wargame mechanics to game participants.Schriever V Wargame
31 High Frontier 30 year participation in the space surveillance network with the tem. Assets such as this require a collaborative management lated in Schriever V as the Coalition Joint Space Operations Center (CJSpOC) or the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) for to the design stage. The CJTF for Space construct would facili tate the request for forces process as well as provide the means ments as well as be a means to communicate allied request for space effects. The construct would also facilitate the sharing of the space common operating picture with coalition partners and leverage a distributed network of space analysis capabilities to effectively generate space domain awareness and defend coali tion space systems from natural and intended threats. learned in other theatersa comprehensive approach is critical to achieve strategic effect. This is especially true in the deter rence and defensive phases of the space campaign plan. Greater emphasis must be placed on seeking better synergies between shy away from pointing out to the world when an actor intends to or has behaved in a manner contrary to established interna tional law/norms. Failing to do so would jeopardize our future aspirations. We cannot afford a day without spaceour global economy is fuelled by space effects. Militaries may have more out space. The military mandate is to protect the homeland space. Only focusing on the latter would be misguided as at the day without space would be a military failure. Our collective strategic objective must be to maintain freedom of access and responsible use of space. That objective can only be achieved through a synchronized and comprehensive coalition engagement. Col Franois Malo (BA, Political Science, University of Manitoba; Command and Staff Program, Advance Military Staff Program, Canadian Forces College) is the direc tor of space development (D Space D) at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa Canada. D Space D is responsible for the Canadian Military Space Program. Enrolled as an air weapons controller in 1982 (aka 13B) and served with the Canadian NORAD Region. In Force Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In June 1998, Major Malo joined to NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, Geilenkirchen Germany as a mission crew comover 120 hours on combat support missions during NATOs air campaign against the former republic of Yugoslavia. On 1 August 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Malo was seconded to the Canadian Space Agency in Montreal Quebec as the Canadian Forces liai Defense Sector, Rome New York. During his tour in Rome, Lieu tenant Colonel Malo led the operational squadron responsible for the air defense of the northeastern US during one of the busiest period in NORADs history. Assigned to National Defence Headquarters in 2005, Colonel Malo served as the Air Force A3 and for the last two years, as D Space D, nested within the Chief of Force Development Division. The diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, or comprehensive, focus of Schriever V reinforced what we have learned in other theatersa comprehensive approach is critical to achieve strategic effect. Our collective strategic objective must be to maintain freedom of access and responsible use of space. That objective can only be achieved through a synchronized and comprehensive coalition engagement. Canada appreciates the opportunity to conceive futures through the Schriever Wargames. The future we have seen suggests that a hands-off approach will not yield a desirable outcome. We look forward to future engagements to eventually shape a Grand Space Strategy.
High Frontier 32 The Strategic Value of Schriever V: Policy and Strategy Insights for the Quadrennial Defense Review Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz Vice President, Situational Awareness Lockheed Martin Corporation Herndon, VirginiaWould it be helpful when formulating US grand strategy ducted at the speed of light in the global commons of outer space and cyberspace? Would it be valuable to have a better grasp of domains? Would it be useful to understand how global effects created in those domains might impact the whole-of-nations and a better sense of the policy and operational challenges posed by greatly compressed decision-making timelines required for mis sion success in those operating environments? These are rhetori The Schriever V Wargame was auspiciously timed to help inform the analysis and formulation of national security policy and defense strategy. The output of the game aligns with the opportunity for a new administration to examine strategic issues about how to protect and advance US national interests while it Posture Review. Insights from the game can serve as useful in puts to both reviews and help ensure that the roles of space and cyber capabilities are properly considered in the development of a new National Security Strategy to deal with our dynamic and dangerous world. Schriever V was the latest in a series of wargames sponsored game was the largest and most sophisticated of the series. It included over four hundred participants from Department of De internationalwere well represented. This author was fortunate to participate in the Executive or National Command Authority cell in all of the games as either a erated on a range of topics that closely approximated the com While observations gleaned from a wargame should be scruti nized carefully for their validity and relevance before extrapolat forum to illuminate key issues that should be addressed by senior ners. This article provides an overview of some of the main policy and strategy issues highlighted by the wargame. Space and Cyber Security Outer space and cyberspace increasingly are interdependent and interconnected domains. The key intersection between them is information. Space capabilities are of course major compo world operating simultaneously in both the space and cyber do cal infrastructures and provides applications that are integrated into nearly every sector of our critical infrastructure including gency services. The issue of space and cyberspace security thus has attained national prominence because of its profound impli cations for our society. Given the many and varied relationships and overlaps among defense relationships in the space and cyber domains? Effective protection and defense of space assets and supporting infrastruc ture will require a clear understanding of the range of capabilities and effects of information operations and cyber measures and space protection effort employs non-materiel solutions such as new operational constructs between organizational entities to en sure mission effectiveness. Understanding the Stakes preservation and well-being of the nation. They include broad Industry Perspective
33 High Frontier and international order. Vital interests are those interests that and vitality. Freedom of access to and use of outer space and cyberspace clearly are vital national interests. But space and cyber activities are transparent to many Americans who simply take them for granted. A fundamental issue is how to ensure that our national de cision-makers truly understand the stakes for the US in those domains before national decision-makers typically are focused on other issues. The question thus is how best to get the attention of policy mak ers in the executive and legislative branches of the US govern and defend those interests. This is not a trivial problem given the array of daunting domestic and international issues the country needs to confront. But it is essential that our national politi cal leadership comprehend why unimpeded access to and use of space and cyberspace are vital nation interests. This will require an appreciation of the value of space and and national security. It will also require an understanding of consequences of disruption or loss of critical space and cyber port our foreign policy and defense commitments to allies and friends. Denied freedom of action to employ force multipliers in forces will be reduced to that of a 1950s-era force. Shaping the Environment They are global commons like international waters and airspace within which the US conducts intelligence activities and military operations to achieve our national security objectives. In that ing environments where our assets are held at risk. A closely related issue thus is what measures should the US undertake now to shape the space and cyber environments in ways that will help us to protect and defend our national interests? Actions taken during the pre-crisis or pre-hostilities phase are a leadership position in international deliberations of legal and controls on exports of space and information technology goods and services with military applications are required to prevent process should not hamper our international competitiveness or erode our technological leadership. nations approach will be required to properly shape the space and cyber domains given the mutual interests of our allies and friends and the likelihood of alliance or coalition involvement in a future contingency. All tools of statecraft must be brought to bear and wielded synergistically to achieve such strategic ef fects. Yet there are substantial challenges to focusing all the ele ments of national or coalition power to achieve this objective. positively in the space and cyber domains. Alliances and Coalitions coalitions to secure and defend our interests around the world. The fact that there is safety or strength in numbers is a truism that likely applies to the space and cyber domains just as it does to other operating environments. A comprehensive both to shaping the space and cyber environments and strength ening deterrence. Any potential adversarys risk calculus would have to take into account the prospect of engaging not only the US but our allies or coalition partners as well in response to -The US must actively promote the peaceful uses of space and cyberspace, facilitate a code of conduct to establish norms of responsible space fairing and cyber behavior, establish a leadership position in international deliberations of legal and regulatory matters affecting space and cyber activities, and protect our spaceand cyber-related commerce, trade, and security equities within international regulatory bodies.
High Frontier 34 ing would be enhanced by the ability to rely upon alliance or of just our own. The political-military cohesion of any alliance or coalition of course may become a center of gravity for the US in the event the complexity of decision-making increases as a function of the number of participants involved. Individual nations policy views and red lines will have to be addressed and accommo ducted at light speed. Deterrence and Dissuasion There are a plethora of questions about whether or how the US can deter aggression against our interests in the space and cyber domains and dissuade an adversary from pursuing capa bilities to threaten our assets. While we successfully relied upon the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter the expansion of Soviet how does deterrence work in a multi-polar international security state actors such as transnational terrorist groups? What are the ing and forecasts that can be employed for military purposes? Will the prospect of despoiling space with thousands of pieces of debris that could stay in Earth orbit for a millennium provide a restraint comparable to the horrors of thermonuclear war? Is it possible to dissuade a nation state or subnational group from pursuing anti-satellite (ASAT) or computer network attack capa bilities that could disable critical infrastructures? ing another ASAT test or emplacing malicious software into our critical infrastructures? Should we rely on deterrence through the current asymmetry of value between our reliance/depen dence on space and cyber assets compared to potential adversar ies? Rather than being an approach to avoid the costs of mis vulnerability of our space and cyber assets so as not to provoke attack? Will the vulnerability of our space assets and critical infrastructures controlled by computer networks lead us to be self-deterred? Can we extend deterrence to protect the space and that will ensure the costs of aggression in the space and cyber domains outweigh its risks to an adversary? Diplomacy and Arms Control diplomatic efforts would be useful to enhance international se countervail foreign efforts to constrain US national security space activities and protect our interests in space? A diplomatic strategy is needed to shape the international policy and legal re national security space program. A key piece of that strategy must be a strategic communications campaign to frame the terms of the policy debate and inform international opinion. posed various measures to prevent an arms race in space. Should or incidents in space agreement? Some of the questions that must be addressed in this regard include should the US pursue through tacit or formal arrangements? Do we negotiate on a measures are not used inappropriately to constrain US national security space activities? Intelligence and Situational Awareness Knowledge of ones adversary is of course a prerequisite for achieving decision advantage and victory in warfare conducted in any domain. Given the importance of understanding foreign US intelligence activities adequately support space and cyber activities. Are the allocation of intelligence collection and ana lytical resources to assess the threat to US space and cyber assets and operations commensurate with our growing dependence and vulnerability? Are gaps in our knowledge being systemically addressed and closed? Is intelligence support for characterizing and attributing hostile intentions and actions being given a high priority in the competition for intelligence collection and ana lytic resources? The intelligence community must address a broad array of must be made about how to allocate scarce resources. Nonethe cyberspace requires adequate intelligence capabilities to manage questions pertinent to space and cyber policy and strategy for sance (ISR) are integral to space SA. The scope of the SA mis sion has expanded to become a national mission supporting
35 High Frontierall of the government space sectors as well as commercial and foreign entities. Vast amounts of relevant data are available to technical barriers to intersector and international cooperation are and integration necessary to operate effectively in an alliance or coalition environment. Providing appropriate SA services to commercial and foreign entities as well as establishing coopera tive relationships that can leverage allied and friendly ISR capa bilities is prudent and necessary. Such relationships will enable SA is absolutely essential to answering the basic questions na tional decision-makers and combatant commanders will have in awareness (SSA) will provide the means necessary to establish is critical to the process of obtaining pre-delegated authorities space agreement will be dependent upon our SA capabilities. Yet it should be recognized that the space and cyber mediums mation policy makers would like to have and what is available. Ensuring policy makers and decision processes are prepared to deal with the inevitable ambiguity and uncertainty will be an important matter. New Technology and On-Orbit Operations and new operational concepts for their on-orbit operations raise many potential issues. Such new satellite technology has been to behave will be key to establishing the precedent and the de facto norm for conducting on-orbit operations with such new technology. Using microand nano-satellites for self-inspection commercial space operations. telligence or defense missions involving non-cooperative space more politically sensitive. There are clearly insights to be gained by examining analogous activities from other operational me diums such as the seas and air. Vessels on the high seas and tentions is the norm when maneuvering in proximity to another ship or aircraft. does the US want to pursue such capabilities and conceptsnot Careful consideration of this matter is necessary since the risk is helping to create a norm that effectively licenses the conduct of such operations involving our own space assets by foreign enti Space Protection and Defense The overarching issue is what defense activities are required the question of what is the proper mix of passive and active de fenses? It would be imprudent to rely on deterrence alone as the chief means of mission protection. Given the nature and ex tent of our susceptibilities and vulnerabilities to a broad range of ing a range of approaches to solve the problem. So what is the best approach to reduce the vulnerability cre ated by our dependence upon space and cyber assets for security and recover from subsequent attrition? Can we condition po tential adversaries and channel threats into areas where we are protection priorities and requirements? To what extent should we prepare to protect commercial and allied assets and opera arrangements? know-how poses challenges to US and allied military forces and operations. The ability to hold space and cyber assets at risk would support the credible threat of force required to support deterrence and its effective use in defense of our assets in re sponse to aggression. The question of what role active defenses a series of policy issues. While the weaponization of space ties are likely to emerge regarding offensive operations in the cyber domain. Response Planning Policy makers will want to maintain the maximum degree of ing how to respond to deliberate interference with US freedom of action in space and cyberspace. No responding to aggression is not an attractive option. Diplomatic and economic responses should of course be considered and may have utility. But they must be prepared in advance for the contingency. What should be the symmetric or asymmetric responses available to military commanders and national decision makers? Should the action be a response-in-kind or should it entail verti -
High Frontier 36 cal or horizontal escalation? If the adversary does not own or a tit-for-tat response will not be useful. National decision-mak ers will be concerned about discrimination and restraint in the options and major attack options control escalation? At the other cross an adversarys homeland threshold with non-kinetic or ki netic weapons to retaliate or disarm an enemy who has attacked lives? What escalation risks are policy makers willing to take to respond to an enemys campaign against our space assets? The speed of weapons effects from nanoseconds to minutes redlines established during the Cold War with respect to missile properly communicated those redlines and thresholds to poten tial adversaries? tied to space and terrestrial postures and conditions to enable the policy and operational responses necessary to deal with the policy review and approval of war plans take into account the decision making processes as well as command and control operations in a coalition environment? Given the compressed ing to shift from an observe-decide-act approach to a decideobserve-act posture? Conclusion The strategic value of the Schriever V Wargame was that it berspace and yielded timely policy and strategy insights that can Review. The game highlighted numerous strategic issues that should be taken into consideration as the Obama administration analyzes and formulates national security policy and defense strategy. The understanding gained from Schriever V could help the US national security establishment to address the challenges berspace. It should be useful to understand the roles of space Observations from the game should also contribute to the design of decision-making processes and procedures to deal with speed of light space and cyber warfare. The US has vital national interests to protect and advance in the space and cyber domains. By providing a window to the planners. There are many questions that must be answered if the whole-of-nations approach with our allies or coalition partners ture president and commander in chief should be placed in the position of having to tackle those issues in the midst of a deep dressing the policy and strategy issues highlighted by the game will help to ensure that America is prepared to deal with the com and dangerous world. The author served as a mentor to the Executive Decision Team and as national security advisor for part of Schriever V. Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz (BA, with Distinction, Security Studies, George Washington University, Washington DC; MA, National Security Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC) is a vice president for situational awareness at Lockheed Martin Corporation. He is responsible for the development of cross-corporate business strategies and advanced concepts for integrated national security space, intelli gence, and information mission solutions. Prior to joining Lockheed Martin in 2003, Mr. Berkowitz executive in the positions of assistant deputy under secretary of defense for space policy and director of space policy where he lead the analysis, formulation, and oversight of US Government and Defense Department policy guidance for the conduct of defense and intelligence activities in outer space. Mr. Berkowitz also was the director of space studies at National Security Research, Inc., a professional staff member in the Foreign Technology Center of SRI International, a foreign affairs analyst in the Congressional Research Services Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, and an intelligence specialist in the Department of States Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Since leaving the Defense Department, he has also served as a consultant to the Defense Department and the intelligence community. Mr. Berkowitz was awarded the Defense Departments highest civilian award, the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, twice. Mr. Berkowitz writings have appeared in Peter L. Hays, et. al., eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), Airpower Journal, Armed Forces Journal International Comparative Strategy Global Affairs, High Frontier, Janes Intelligence Review Janes Soviet Intelligence Review Journal of the British Interplanetary Society Naval Forces, RUSI Journal, Signal, Space Markets, Strategic Review US Naval Institute Proceedings, Space News, Defense News, and The Washington Post.
37 High FrontierSchriever V: Managing and Understanding Consequences to Military SpaceMaj Gen Franklin Judd Blaisdell, USAF, retired Director, Space and Air Force Programs, Raytheon Company Arlington, VirginiaA operation of an entire interconnected world economy. Space has become a must have element in the domains of credit card trans casts. The military applications are critical and extend from missile Schriever V Wargame capitalized on a world space dependency and did so at a very strategic level. It pushed all participants (including the coalition) into addressing the whys and wherefores of losing key elements of national power together with the next order tasks of replacing the must have systems. The fact that space has been viewed in many circles as an operational medium sheltered from at pass the litmus test anymore. ber of strategic questions come to mind in this type of worldwide the world today and what consideration is being given to who will are more and more countries today that are eager to gain use of the recent phenomena has manifested what we now call the drive for pridesats or nations putting up payloads in orbit simply to gain equally those that will sit on the sideline and wait for their chance a distinct advantage to those countries with surviving assets and a litical necessities. sets (both for the US and coalition) can not be emphasized strongly environment will keep the US reactive instead of proactive in a crisis. Consideration should be given to on-orbit assets (which postured in many ways but the key is they are on-orbit and ready in the event of crisis. Many feel the ORS mission today is not getting Industry Perspective the attention it needs to demonstrate several levels of the responsive concept. A concentrated effort to utilize plug and play opportuni ties on small payloads to supplement larger constellations is a good while the technological challenges of future generation constella tions are being tested. Capability now through small payload diver on the larger constellations. their part in cataloging and tracking the disposition of transpon riding on a payload or operating under contractual agreements with multinational industries is important to decision makers. This may tied to space which many fail to consider as part of the puzzle. The ability to understand the strategies of an adversary in space or the rest of the netcentricities that are tied to space is an important ingre with your capabilities on a commercial platform presents a real various consequences of management and the threat triggers that are constantly changing require a lot of work. The great news is that wargames like Schriever V contribute to that opportunity. There is no doubt in my mind that this type of intellectual rigor needs to continue. The rewards for the nation are worth the effort and the retired (BA, History, Syracuse University, NY; MS, Economics, South Dakota State University, SD) is director of Space and Air Force Programs at Raytheon Company in Arlington, Virginia. General Blaisdell retired from the US Air Force after serving as the director of of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He was responsible for providing policy, guidance, expertise, and oversight to the Air Force nuclear, space, force protection, and homeland defense programs. General Blaisdell has commanded a Minuteman III squadron, as well as the largest missile operations group at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. He has also commanded the 30th Space Wing and Western Range at Vandenberg AFB, California, and the 21st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colorado.
High Frontier 38 Schriever Wargames: The Battle for the Ultimate High GroundMr. James C. Mesco Historian Space Innovation and Development Center (SIDC) Schriever AFB, Colorado Several decades from now, the important battles may be space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction of our national resources to ensure that we do not lag in obtaining space supremacy. The mission is to maintain peace. Air Force Systems Command1G ognized the importance of space to Americans defense and projection of national policy. It was therefore appropriate that the only wargame focused on space bear his name. Prior wargame planners never fully explored the possible extent to ver 2001. The SWCs Analysis and Engineering (SWC/AE) Division team designed the wargame. Besides supporting for discussion and debate on the development and employ our national security objectives. To apply all possible space pass every possible capability available to commanders in the on space power available. These included retired senior Air leaders in charge of space forces at the time. The wargame th Air Force; Maj Gen David 2The Schriever 2001 Wargame began on 22 January at innovations into this wargame never seen before in other Title 10 events; the creation of a Blue Commander-in-Chief Space (CINCSPACE) team which allowed an in-depth examination of the spectrum of CINCSPACE to commander joint task force allowed the examination of the relationships between government and commercial entities in a time of crisis. SWC/AE designed the vignettes and events to frame key time slices during advancing space power in the world of the future and provided insight that was important to the ongoing major Department of Defense (DoD) military capability projections such as the 3 Air Force leadership to provide funding and resources to supthe SWC held Schriever II (S-II) at Schriever AFB. The S-II Wargame examined many factors and weapons systems the -Historical Perspective Besides supporting events like other wargames, this wargame provided a forum for discussion and debate on the development and employment of future aerospace systems, and their contributions to our national security objectives.
39 High Frontier vent or counter space threats to the US and its allies. In the workshops and four large seminars in conjunction with its mission partners. This pre-game series of events allowed a more in-depth examination of how DoD managed space and focused conducted the Schriever III Wargame from 5-11 February 2005 Combined Air Operations Center-Nellis (CAOC-N) to increase the capability for hosting and presentation of events. Over 300 participation of allied personnel in the Schriever Wargame. In preparation for this wargame the SWC held seminars to focus seminars occurred at many bases across the US. This wargame focused on space threats and responses in the year 2020. Folwith many of the original mentors from Schriever 2001.4The Schriever IV Wargame was the fourth in the AFSPC series established by the AFSPC commander to provide infor mation for future requirements. The purpose of this wargame was to bring together air and space operational planners to examine the capabilities and command relationships required by a Joint Space Operations Center to support combatant commands (COCOMs). The objectives were to: investigate means to defend/augment/replace space systems through advanced architectures and technologies; examine seams in C2 relationships for space support to US Strategic Command and regional commanders; explore the effects of integrated 2025 improve understanding of the role of military space in secur ing the homeland. AFSPC and the SIDC wanted the lessons learned from this wargame to aid in shaping space strategy and planning through 2025. The SIDC planned and executed the wargame in the CAOC-N and Red Flag facilities from 24-30 and the US Air Force Warfare Center hosted and participated in and workshops were needed as building blocks to plan for the include those that came from command developed analytical research questions as well as any emerging issues that develop during the wargame. While some development of these ideas lecting information for the post-wargame analysis phase. One major issue in the wargame preparation was the presence of foreign nationals in US C2 facilities. The SIDC worked all the preparation and resources to include clearing access to the facilities and clearing assets such as computers for use by the The Schriever Wargame Series had become a vital national asSchriever Wargame Series is additionally important in educat ing combatant command staffs and developing national space very high pay off from this game series.5Shortly after completing the initial reports on the S-IV velop the wargame objectives. To meet those objectives and along with other Air Force and DoD organizations held four seminars in 2008. These seminars provided recommendations for; space policy and rules of engagement to enable coalition operations; explored space support for homeland defense-civil support; developed and rehearsed space events; evolved blue space campaign plan; and reviewed game design and policy play with the senior leaders. These seminars laid the foundation for Schriever V held at Nellis AFB on 14-20 March 2009.During the wargame, the wargame team concentrated on collecting the key insights of the discussions, to include those that came from command developed analytical research questions as well as any emerging issues that develop during the wargame.
High Frontier 40 Notes:1 Reach and Power, the Heritage of the United States Air Force in Pictures and Artifacts 2 3 2001.4 5 Mr. James C. Mesco (BA, History, Slippery Rock State University; MA, History, Georgia College and State University) is the historian for the Space Innovation and Development Center (SIDC), Schriever AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for collecting, organizing, analyzing and interpreting documents and writing the history of the or ganizations operations and special programs in peace and war. He served on active duty from 1980 and retired from the Air Force. He became an Air Force civilian in 2004. Since May 1999, he has served as the SIDC historian. Mr. Mesco entered the US Air Force in September 1980. His initial assignment was as a missile combat crew member and completed over 300 combat alerts. In 1985, he became an historian in the Air Force History Program. He served as an historian in the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota; 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; 26th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Zweibrucken AB, Germany; Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Georgia; 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colorado and 50th Space Wing, (then Falcon AFB, Colorado, later renamed Schriever AFB) and the Space Warfare Center (later renamed the SIDC), Schriever AFB. He deployed and served as the historian for the 4404th Composite Wing, King Abdul Aziz, AB, Saudi Arabia; NCO historian for Headquarters, European Command, Patch Barrack, Stuttgart, Germany; the Balkans Combined Air Operations Center historian, Dal Molin AB, Italy and 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Udied, AB, Qatar. Mr. Mesco received recognition for his efforts as a historian with the 1988 USAFE Program Services Award, 1997 AFSPC Historian Achievement Award, and 1999 USAF Excellence in Wing History Program Award. He published articles in Air Force Journal of Logistics, and QUEST, Quarterly. Subscribe to High Frontier ElectronicallyIt's as easy as 1, 2, 3 ... High Frontier, professionals, is available as an electronic Select AFSPC High Frontier Journal Click on the 1 Log on to the Subscription Cen at the Air Force Link 3 2
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High Frontier 42 Book Review Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making from the istorians can identify multiple origins for wargaming. The century Europe and came to America in the 1880s. Around the cally in popularity from the 1950s through the 1990s. By the techniques drawn from commercial and military wargames was to doctrinal development and operational planning. In Wargaming for Leaders their many years of relevant experience to acquaint readers with ing. The glue binding together their books three sections Wargamesand individual chapters is the concept of cognitive warfare. The authors use this term to describe what happens when expert players minds interact with one another to spawn unexpected and often startling outcomes (p. 4). They empha size two necessary conditions for any successful wargame: the groups with different equities. Even when those conditions are development and outcomes of more than a dozen wargames they personally designed over the past couple of decades. One called how the collective play of the participants in a nonthreatening environment can reveal unpleasant truths about a particular strategy because something is called a game does not mean its outcomes are capricious. Sometimes a wargame can tell a very disturbing story rorism wargame emphasized the importance competition central to most military and busi specify The Big Ideathe primary lesson learneddrawn from having played the game. signed and conducted to test a strategy or battle plan in a virtual environment before the civilian and military leadership commit to engage critical problems of mutual interest that are too big for Although Wargaming for Leaders offers outstanding examples useful book. They pride themselves in objective and unbiased wargaming that is about problem solving problem exposing (p. 250). One of the most challenging prob for doing it. a risk-free environment (p. 250). Within an events can cause priorities to change quite rapidly and a crisis can spin out of control even if the correct decisions to contain it are made in what once was considered good time Wargaming for Leaders take pride in being able to design informative exercises in days instead of weeks or months. knowing that revelations from wargaming help rooms around the world. Reviewed by Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, duty com mand historian, HQ Air Force Space Com mand.
43 High Frontier High Frontier HQ AFSPC/PA, High Frontier