Cyberspace Operations: Air Force Space Command Takes the Lead The Science and Technology of Cyber Operations Clausewitz and Network Centric Warfare: A Beautiful Marriage Air Force Space Commands Year of Leadership
1 High Frontier May 2009 Volume 5, Number 3 The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals expressed in this journal are those of the authors alone Editorial content is edited, prepared, and provided by the High Frontier High Frontier High Frontier AFSPC/PA Peterson AFB, CO 80914 Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Commander Vice Commander Director of Public Affairs Creative Editor High Frontier Staff Maj Cathy Barrington Contents Introduction General C. Robert Kehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Senior Leader Perspective Cyberspace Operations: Air Force Space Command Takes the Lead Maj Gen William T. Lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 VADM Nancy E. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Maj Gen John W. Maluda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Dr. Kamal Jabbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Cyberspace Deterrence in Cyberspace Dr. Martin C. Libicki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Dr. David J. Lonsdale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Mr. Timothy L. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Mr. John F. Vona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Lt Col Patrick Clowney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Industry Perspective Ms. Linda R. Gooden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Air Force Space Commands Year of Leadership Year of Leadership CMSgt Richard T. Small . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Historical Perspective Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Book Review Muhammad Mac Elatab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Next Issue: Schriever V
High Frontier 2 Introduction General C. Robert Kehler Commander, Air Force Space Command ~ Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission A medium encompassing the entire Global Information Grid, the cyberspace domain is interwoven throughout military operations. Service members in-garrison and deployed world-wide depend on accurate and reliable information bundled and routed real-time across cyberspace to accomplish a range of increasingly rely upon space-based systems to deliver data, voice, and video; position, navigation, and timing; missile warning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and a myriad of other information through cyberspace. Fully realizing the synergy between the space and cyberspace domains, in October 2008 Air Force leaders decided to align lead cyberspace responsibilities and stand-up a new cyberspace operational numbered Air Force (NAF) under Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). The integration of these domains allows our service to capitalize on inherent syner gies found in space and cyberspace architectures, processes, skill sets and training. This quarters compiles perspec tives from preeminent thinkers across the government, industry, and academia regarding potential challenges, impacts, and initia tives for consideration as we come to grips with cyberspace. tion begins with Maj Gen William Lord, commander, Air Force Cyberspace Command (Provisional), as he elaborates on AFSPCs lead role for cyberspace operations. While providing focused leadership and building on the synergies between these domains, he describes the effort and challenges in consolidating existing Air Force cyberspace organizations under 24 th Air Force, the opera tional NAF which will present cyberspace forces to the command er, United States Strategic Command. Next, VADM Nancy Brown, director of the Command and Control Directorate, Joint Staff, provides insight into the paradigm shift which considers the information realm as a central compo developments. The Senior Leader Perspective concludes with Dr. Kamal Jabbours discussion on the science and technology of cyberspace operations. ticles in the Cyberspace section. Dr. Martin Libicki scopes the possibilities and limits of deterrence in cyberspace. Next, Dr. Da on strategy. Third, Mr. Timothy Thomas summarizes the views of Taiwanese specialists who focus on Chinese information warfare tactics, organization, and policy. In addition, Mr. John Vona ex plains the importance of seamless command and control and inte gration of our capabilities across geographical and organizational General C. Robert Bob Kehler (BS, Education, Pennsylvania State University; MS, Public Administra tion, University of Oklahoma; MA, National Security and Strategic Stud ies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) is commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is re sponsible for the development, ac quisition, and operation of the Air Forces space and missile systems. The general oversees a global net work of satellite command and control, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readiness of Americas intercontinental ballistic missile force. He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). General Kehler will assume cyberspace responsibilities as directed by CORONA Fall. General Kehler has commanded at the squadron, group, and twice at the wing level, and has a broad range of operational and command tours in ICBM operations, space launch, space operations, missile warning, and space control. The general has served on the AFSPC Staff, Air Staff, and Joint Staff and served as the director of the National Kehler was the deputy commander, USSTRATCOM, where he helped provide the president and secretary of defense with a broad range of eral diverse mission areas, including space operations, integrated mis sile defense, computer network operations, and global strike. is authored by Lt Col Patrick Clowney. He describes the beauti ful marriage between Clausewitz and network centric warfare. In the Industry Perspective section, Ms. Linda Gooden of Lockheed Martin addresses the need to protect what is considered by many to be our most powerful weapon systeminformation. Recognizing the escalating threat to military, civil, and commer cial customers in cyberspace, Ms. Gooden socializes an initiative to return the advantage in the cyber security race to the defenders rather than the attackers. Under the AFSPCs Year of Leadership section, CMSgt Rich ard Small, our command chief, outlines activities over the course of 2009 to improve our leadership focus and enhance skills for interacting with those we lead. New to the is the Historical Perspective sec tion. Dr. Rick Sturdevant shares an entertaining view on the origin of decades past in cybernetics and the creative minds of prize-win We conclude this quarters volume with a book review by Mu hammad Mac Sharif Elatab, a Dartmouth College student, on Dr. Martin Libickis stimulat ing and educational and come to realize both the importance and complexity of the cyberspace mission. Our next issue will focus on Schriever V, our Title 10 wargame which seeks to advance issues related to space-based operations, space protection, spacerelated policy, as well as various partnerships and agency coopera tion. We have invited a number of key Schriever V participants to
3 High Frontier Cyberspace Operations: Air Force Space Command Takes the Lead Maj Gen William T. Lord, USAF Commander Air Force Cyberspace Command (Provisional) Barksdale AFB, Louisiana 1 ~ Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton A. Schwartz I n a 15 September 2008 letter to the Air Force, the sec retary of the Air Force and the chief of staff of the Air Force stated, The mission of the United States Air Force is to . Secretary Michael B. Donley and General Norton A. Schwartz went on to add, The mission statement conveys our responsibility, along with other services and agencies, to develop capabilities for the 2 Armed with this clear mission statement and Air Force se nior leadership guidance from the October 2008 CORONA conference, the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), in con cert with Air Force Cyberspace Command (Provisional), is working diligently towards the stand-up of the 24 th Air Force (24 AF), a Component Numbered Air Force (C-NAF) under AFSPC organized to conduct cyberspace operations for the Air Force and our joint partners. In addition, AFSPC will assume management headquarters, component major command (MAJCOM), and lead MAJCOM responsibilities for related cyberspace operational and management tasks. 3 According to the Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, cyberspace is located within The aggregate of individuals, organiza tions, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information 4 02 as A global domain within the in formation environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded pro cessors and controllers. 5 The Air Force considers cyberspace Senior Leader Perspective to be a physical domain, like those of air, land, sea, and space, and therefore subject to all physical laws of nature. In a physi cal sense, the Air Force considers cyberspace to include things such as the internet (Global Information Grid or GIG), telecom munications networks (combat communications, satellite com munications), computer systems, network operations and com mand and control (e.g., Air Force Network Operations Center, Integrated Network Operations Security Centers), and embed ded processors and controllers. 6 A Contested Domain 7 ~ Secretary of Defense Honorable Robert M. Gates Cyberspace is a contested domain. The Air Force, Depart ment of Defense (DoD), and nation as a whole are vulnerable to threats posed in, through and from cyberspace while at the same time dependent upon free and unfettered access. Exam ples abound of the hostile use of cyberspace in recent history. The denial-of-service attacks on Estonian commercial and governmental web services in 2007, reports of cyber attacks preceding the August 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia, and the use of cyberspace by terrorists to coordinate the 2008 and pervasiveness of cyberspace, serve to highlight our poten
High Frontier 4 tial vulnerabilities and show us the nature of the operational DoD, government, economic, and industrial networks to gain access to information that could be vital for activities in each of those arenas. The advantages such adversaries gain through cyberspace afford them the ability to pose a serious threat to our homeland. Cyberspace Operations ployment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and ac tivities to operate and defend the GIG. 8 Armed with these def initions we can draw together our Air Force capabilities in such a way as to foster unity and synergy in our cyberspace efforts. AFSPC, via the 24 AF, will conduct cyberspace operations for the Air Force and combatant commanders. Twenty-Fourth Air Force will conduct operations primarily as a C-NAF to United States Strategic Command, through its operations cen ter and three assigned/subordinate wings. AFSPC will be the Air Forces focal point for establishing, operating/maintaining, defending, exploiting and attacking in, through, and from cy berspace. Each wing under 24 AF will take on a piece of the cyberspace mission for the Air Force. As the management headquarters element for Air Force cy berspace operations, AFSPC will be the leader in organizing, training, and equip ping Air Force cyberspace forces. Twenty-Fourth Air Force Mission The mission of 24 AF will be to de liver cyberspace superiority through persistent and responsive world-class networks and cyber forces. Cyberspace superiority is the critical capability that directly enables all combat air forces ways, means and ends. Twenty-Fourth Air Force will provide combatant com manders with persistent cyber situational awareness in line with national, military, and Air Force objectives. Twenty-Fourth Air Force will also leverage technol ogy to deliver responsive capabilities in, through and from cyberspace to meet new mission requirements in response to adversaries emerging capabilities. Finally, AFSPC and 24 AF will provide world-class cyber professionals, trained and equipped to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. Cyberspace Force Development 9 ~ Lt Gen Richard Y. Newton, USAF, deputy chief of staff, Manpower and Personnel, HQ USAF No discussion of the critical operations conducted to cre ate effects in, through and from cyberspace would be complete without touching on force development. The Air Force must produce professional Airmen with the ability to establish, con trol, and leverage the cyberspace domain. As stated in The Air these Airmen will operate across a broad range of criti employ capabilities from airborne platforms and through space systems, from in-garrison units and from forward deployed professionals since it is they who will establish, control, and achieve effects within a domain upon which all forces rely. 10 mation Grid. ~ Joint Publication 1-02
5 High Frontier Cyberspace force devel opment will take its cues from the well established Space Professional De velopment Program. Look for new, dedi cated Air Force specialty codes designed to cap ture the core competen cies of our varied current cyber-related special ties. A new badge will clearly identify both en the requisite education and training as being cy berspace professionals, as with our current array of Air Force specialties. In development now are new end-to-end training and education courses including rigorous programs as part of professional military education at every level. Final Thoughts There are some challenges on the road ahead such as: work ing through complex legal boundaries between law enforce ment, intelligence, and military activities; operational chal lenges centered on the pace at which cyberspace threats evolve and propagate; and recruiting and retaining a cyberspace savvy workforce when the requisite skills are so marketable in com mercial industry. The good news is: (1) there are many dedi cated professionals working these issues and, (2) now there is a MAJCOM fully committed to success in this domain. With tal force partners, we are postured together to meet these chal lenges and more. AFSPC is the right command at the right time to shepherd our services efforts with cyberspace. The Air Force, combat the synergies produced by linking cyber and space a perfect marriage. 1 General Norton A. Schwartz, 3 September 2008, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=405. 2 Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Letter, 15 September 2008, http://www.af.mil/ Maj Gen William T. Lord (BS, Biological and Life Sci ences, USAFA; MBA, Chap man University; MS, National Resource Strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces) is commander, Air Force Cyber space Command (Provisional), Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. He is responsible for establishing cyberspace as a domain in and through which the Air Force duty he is responsible for es tablishing a new numbered Air Force under Air Force Space Command which will be responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of combat forces to operate in cyberspace. General Lord is a 1977 graduate of the US Air Force Academy. General Lord has held various positions with tours in Europe, US Central Command and the White House. He has had multiple staff assignments, including two major air commands as director of Com munications and Information Systems. General Lord has command ed at the detachment, squadron, group, wing, and joint levels. Prior to his current assignment, General Lord was director, Cyberspace Washington, DC. General Lord has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Air Force Rec ognition Ribbon with two oak leaf clusters, and the Humanitarian School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=401. 3 HQ USAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 07-08 Change 3, draft, 19 December 2008.4 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 12 April 2001 as amended through 17 Oc tober 2008, 262.5 JP 1-02, ated Terms 141.6 PAD 07-08 Change 3, 7 Honorable Robert M. Gates, SECDEF, Submitted Statement given to Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 January 2009. 8 JP 1-02, 141. 9 HAF/A1 Action Group e-mail, 5 February 2009. 10 2008-2018, 15 April 2008, 7. 11 General Stephen Lorenz, General Lorenz on leadership: At war in cyberspace, 23 December 2008, http:// www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123129337. 11 ~ General Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, Air Education and Training Command
High Frontier 6 VADM Nancy E. Brown, USN Director Command and Control Directorate Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington DC O n 12 May 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England promulgated a memorandum for the military the information realm as a central component of the way we This reexamination must stretch from the invisible landscape of social online communities and tools to the hardware on which the cyber world is built. We will need to examine how we do business today in light of the historical route we have taken to get to this point, and with the understanding that we need to develop our hardware, software, and our processes with the capability to evolve into the systems that we will need to accomplish our tasks not just tomorrow, but in ten or a hundred years. We will have a number of new opportunities, and will face a number of new challenges, We have evolved the current infrastructure by buying sys tems to serve a current need at a given time, with the resources that were available and understood by the acquiring authority. We are now facing the immediate challenge of integrating infra structures developed by individual commands within the servic of yesterday. We must apply this integrated whole to the prob lems of today and anticipate tomorrows problems, while de veloping an architecture that is secure, accessible, user-friendly, and allows for both business and command and control (C2) uses. While that may seem a monumental task, it must also al low us to interface with other federal, state, and local agencies. Historically, any new weapon has been seen as an enabler be fore it became a true weapon. One of the most classic examples is the longbow in England which was often seen as a peasants weapon until the battle of Agincourt where it proved effective against the French. A more recent example is the airplane which was originally used solely for reconnaissance and is now a pow Computers have been seen as adjuncts to business processes, enablers for C2, and only recently are beginning to be seen as platforms. Today our networks can be disrupted and our coun trys infrastructure damaged or compromised by a relatively un sophisticated adversary. While the land, sea, air, and space do Senior Leader Perspective mains will remain concerns, we currently have good solutions for battles in those domains. Cyberspace is a domain which because of the potential for lawlessness and the lack of control by any civil authority. It is very much within the realm of the or spacebut on the networks. adversaries have. Otherwise we run the risk of losing a battle Recently, prior to the invasion of Georgia, the country saw sig lished by the Georgian government, it certainly impacted their ability to spread their message, connect with sympathizers, and communicate with their populace. Even prior to that, similar activity was seen in Estonia over the relocation of a Soviet-era World War II memorial in April 2007. The cyber world is both separate from the domains of sea, air, space, and land, and ubiquitous throughout them. What this means is that cyberspace reaches across services, cultures, na tions, and ideologies. While the US is the dominant player in the land domain, unchallenged in the air, and has few near-peers on the oceans, the same is not true in a place where anyone with a computer can make their message heard and a concerted on line social group may have a larger following than any elected Online, our adversaries may not always be clear. We will al groups. Our defense against adversaries in this arena will have to take on an approach different from that in a traditional sage to span thousands of websites and with the power of blogs, (such as the ones that purportedly attacked Georgia) consisting of people who come together for a short time to achieve a spe saries whose form and function are not clear yet, and still others for whom the technology has not even been invented. There are a number of solutions for the problems we face in the cyber world. Not all of them are one-for-one compatible with the physical world. Just as Cyber is a force-multiplier, so too, can it be a problem multiplier. As an example, when we de stroy an opponents anti-aircraft gun, we have limited his ability tacks at our network. Similarly, if we note an attack from a par ticular Internet protocol address, there is a very good chance that the attack is not from that computer, but rather that the computer
7 High Frontier has been compromised and the attack is from another source. Our challenges are numerous and varied. The very archi tecture of the Internet was based on trust. When a computer announces its address to the Internet, all other computers trust that the computer is telling the truth. If the computer is told to pretend to be a different computer, it will do so and other com puters will believe it. Many of our internal organizations have a Cold War men tality when it comes to sharing information. In other words, you have to have a need to know before they will give you the information you need. Its done in the name of security, but it reduces the ability of organizations to collaborate and handi caps our ability to make use of the interactive social networking tools through which business is being done these days. Todays environment requires us to adopt an attitude of requirement to share vice need to know. Security is still important, but we must not let our security needs stop us from taking advan tage of these new tools. Rather, we must build security into our procedures for accomplishing those tasks. Collaboration and information sharing must be the new model for our military if we are to continue to be successful. Our mission partners are never the same. From operation to operation, we may be taking unilateral action, partnering with allies, partnering with local forces, or working with other agen cies in federal, state, and local governments. Each of these situ ations requires a non-standardized approach to sharing informa In the early days, computers were seen as a hindrance to op erations since they were large, bulky, and slow. As comput ers have progressed, they have become a force enabler and a force multiplier. We use computers as indispensable tools with which we develop plans, orchestrate operations and execute C2 of forces. As we move even further forward, we will use them to achieve non-kinetic objectives. They will be used to prep systems, and create effects. Computers have the potential to be as strong a revolution in military affairs as maneuver warfare in World War II, the machine gun in World War I, and the longbow in the Middle Ages. Such a change in warfare requires a corresponding change in doctrine, tactics, operations, and strategy. All of us, from the most senior down, must embrace the unlimited potential that ex ists in this domain and appreciate the far reaching nature of the capabilities available. We can not afford to cede this domain to our adversaries. While many of us are digital immigrants we must learn to understand and leverage this new world that has become critical to our national security. In the diplomatic, information, military, and economic model of national power, the ability to carry out the information por tion is dependent on our networks. In cyberspace, our networks are the platform, information, and the payload. Developing the knowledge and skills to operate effectively in this environment is the challenge. Our success will be measured by our ability to achieve and maintain the information advantage. Todays Environment The premise behind joint operations is that they identify, create and exploit effects. 1 In order to create these combined vice capability at the right time to ensure that the various actions in an operation build on each other to achieve a synergistic ef forth, understand how each service approaches a given problem fectively. Contrary to this premise however, we are organized verti cally. Each service and agency has their own culture and pro cesses which explains how that organization will solve a prob lem. Each organization has evolved, based upon its successes, of the battle. The Navy, controls sea lanes and projects power ashore. The Air Force provides strategic bombing and close air support. The Army maneuvers and provides overwhelming force. And within these cylinders of excellence, each service and agency has become the very best in the world at its priori ties. But each service and agency will organize, train, and equip to perform its mission by itself. No where is this more of a hindrance to mission success than when looking at a joint or coalition network. We have multiple service or agency to solve the same problem in a different way. The joint task force commander and even the combatant com mander are then responsible for integrating these service unique networks. The combatant commander should be thinking about how to use the network to plan, attack, defend, and so forth, not thinking about how to kludge together disparate systems. The commander is also responsible for integrating the dif ferent security postures that each of the services set for their networks. Since the networks must be integrated to collaborate formation. These variations insert road blocks and reduce our effectiveness. This is also true with the different ways services operate their networksfrom very centralized to completely the seams. To be effective we must reduce these gaps and move toward a seamless environment that enhances information shar ing. share information across a number of boundaries. We need to share information within our servicessomething that our cur rent infrastructure has evolved to accomplish. We need to share information across service boundariessomething that our in frastructure is evolving to accomplish, but for which we have a very long road ahead. Joint, however, is no longer good enough. We must be able to operate in a coalition and interagency en they make us more effective in both combat and non-combat op erations. Other agencies are part of our own infrastructure, and there are countless examples where we have to work together, from counter-piracy operations through humanitarian assistance
High Frontier 8 missions, to emergency response missions within our own bor ders. Where We Are Going As long as the requirement for combined effects and there fore joint operations remains; the military needs to procure, educate, and train jointly. In the cyber domain, building that infrastructure means that we have to move away from separate standards, policies, and training to a common framework which removes the barriers of information sharing between services. The Joint Staff has developed this overarching framework: the Global Information Grid (GIG) 2.0. The GIG must be accessible and secure. To that end, the vi sion for GIG 2.0 includes global authentication which means that no matter where or how a person connects to the network, the network will recognize them and allow them to connect. It includes access control which means that the person connect ing to the network will have access to all of the information and only the informationthat they should have access to. The GIG also provides directory services which means that there is a single log on for all aspects of the GIG, whether attach ing via a service network, an agency portal, or a virtual private network. In the end, any authorized user must be able to access appropriate information from anywhere at any time. The GIG provides information and services from the edge. to make decisions and must have the services to apply capabili ties to a given problem. That information must be trustworthy with and that it is an accurate depiction) and available, which tion so that they can make a decision and can employ the proper capabilities before the opportunity has passed. The GIG is made up of every service and agency network, manders, and any other network that connects. As the situa tion currently stands, the combatant commander or joint task force commander is responsible for integrating these diverse networks into a coherent whole that is secure, provides the re quired information, and can be accessed from anywhere in the area of responsibility. The vision for the GIG takes the service, coalition, combined and interagency networks and makes them seamless so that commanders are not forced to be integrators. We must bring together both the wired and wireless worlds to create the infrastructure to pass information from the edge and to the edge. In order to make this joint infrastructure work, we will need to develop common policies and standards that apply to every network and device that connects to the GIG. GIG 2.0 must also include the operational strategies, business processes, organi zational structures, policies, and culture required to implement and support that environment. We must develop standards that enable services and partners to seamlessly integrate and policies that support C2, defense, access, accreditation, and so forth. Lastly, GIG 2.0 provides the framework for unity of com mand. Effective C2 relationships that support unity of com mand rely on authority, responsibility, and accountability. We must ensure that these elements are included in our develop ment. We must manage and defend the network as well as the information, which means that we must manage resources such as bandwidth allocations and spectrum assignments. Without unity of effort, independent solutions waste resources, and risk success by creating seams. We have come a long way from the days when each service could carry out its own operations and we could be successful. We have come a long way from joint operations being enough for success. The world is changing and we have to change with it, or we will become irrelevant. Cyber operations may be dif to operate in this domain. As I mentioned earlier, we have to already have. GIG 2.0 represents a fundamental shift in how we fund, build, and operate our networks. The bottom line is that when we talk about GIG 2.0 we are talking about a framework ments. We are providing an enabling capability that affects each tions are here to stay; they will be fought over the GIG, and GIG 2.0 will ensure our success. 1 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0, August 2005, 14. VADM Nancy E. Brown (MS, Communications Systems Man agement, US Naval Postgraduate School; MA, National Security and Strategic Studies, US Naval War College) is the director, Com mand, Control, Communications and Computer Systems, The Joint Staff. She is the principal advi sor to the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on all C4 systems matters within the Department of Defense. Admiral Brown was commis School in Newport, Rhode Island in June 1974. Her initial assignment was at Naval Communications assigned to Naval Telecommunications Command in Washington, DC where she served as special projects and manpower require Admiral Brown has served in the Defense Commercial Commu at the Naval Communications Station in San Diego, California; commander of Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Cutler, Downeast, Maine; on the National Security Council staff at the White House; commander of the Naval Computer and Tele communications Area Master Station Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Fleet Liaison, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control; the C4 Directorate for both North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command; and as both vice-director and director of the C4 Directorate of the Joint Staff.
9 High Frontier Maj Gen John W. Maluda, USAF Director, Cyberspace Transformation and Strategy Pentagon, Washington DC R ecent world events in Estonia and Georgia demonstrated how actions in the cyberspace domain can affect national and military objectives. Similarly, the recent lock-down on us ing portable devices on our own networks impacted our normal routines and operations. In some corners of the Air Force, not having access to portable devices means we have to copy power point slides to a compact disk rather than carry them on a memory stick. However, at the pointy end of operations, the same lockdown denied the only means of data exchange between critical saries. Clearly, we have a mission imperative to use and defend cyberspace so that we maintain the capability to conduct opera tions at a time and place of our choosing. This article will high light the major Air Force efforts to develop the organizational structures and workforce competencies necessary for providing mission-ready personnel capable of operating in cyberspace. Senior Air Force leadership recognized the need to dominate operations in the cyberspace domain, and they set us on the path toward deliberately developing cyberspace forces and capabili ties by adding cyberspace to the Air Force mission statement in win in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. Then-Secre tary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne formed the Cyberspace Task Force under the direction of Dr. Lani Kass, and partner ing with Lt Gen Robert Elder, 8 th Air Force commander, worked types of operations executed in or through cyberspace. The task force got us started, and the Air Force has been pressing ahead paradigms, and constructs to deliver on senior leaderships vision for cyberspace. A challenging aspect to operations in the cyberspace domain is that underlying technologies are always changing, and everchanging technology drives an ever-changing set of capabilities. With the only constant being change, our efforts had to adapt to new ways of describing and implementing our vision for domi lows: Cyberspace: a global domain within the information environ ment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommuni cations networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. 1 Cyberspace Operations: The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include com puter network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid. 2 ments to our planning had to be made. Factors external to the core cyberspace discussions also in to be consolidated under the Air Force Cyber Major Command (MAJCOM) and be on par with other MAJCOMs like Air Com bat Command and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). But with renewed emphasis on our nuclear enterprise and the rec ognized synergies between the cyber and space mission areas, we adjusted the plan to stand-up a numbered Air Force (24 th Air Force [24 AF]) reporting to AFSPC. What has not changed is the imperative for the Air Force to provide capabilities to use and defend cyberspace to accomplish missions in and through cyberspace in support of national objec tives. Air Force missions in particular rely on global connectivity through cyberspace, whether it be controlling our satellites, com manding and controlling forces from Air Operations Centers, or Without control of cyberspace, we simply cannot achieve the bat have come to expect. People have questions about what it means to stand-up a new cyberspace force, but the fact of the matter is we are doing (and have been doing) cyberspace operations for some time now; we just have not called it that nor have we necessarily done a great job of deliberately developing capabilities and core compe tencies for all facets of this new domain. Particularly in the area of network warfare operations, the expertise for these missions has been developed ad hoc from personnel in a number of func tional areas, but the missions are being accomplished. As with the air domain, it will take some time to develop the optimum constructs for developing and employing capabilities. It has been said that in the cyberspace domain, we are at about the same stage in development as Wilbur and Orville Wright were when they There is much truth in this assessment, but the important thing is to keep making progress. One way we have made progress is the October 2008 deci quarters for cyberspace operations. Creating 24 AF designates a single commander for all facets of cyberspace operations from establishing and sustaining the domain to controlling the infra structure to leveraging the domain for active defense, attack, and exploitation operations. Having a single commander overseeing these missions is a tremendous advantage over the current orga nizational structures where these units report through different chains of command. Under direction of a common commander, we can leverage the strengths of network operations units and Senior Leader Perspective
High Frontier 10 network warfare units to close seams in our cyberspace vulner abilities. It does not do any good to have world-class network warfare forces that can attack and exploit our adversaries in cy berspace only to leave our own infrastructure subject to the ex act same vulnerabilities. Uniting the breadth of our cyberspace forces under 24 AF sets the foundation for us to galvanize our posture in cyberspace like never before. Another advantage of consolidating cyberspace forces under a single numbered Air Force is creating a single face to the joint community for presenting forces to combatant commanders. Cy berspace transcends all of the traditional domains of air, space, land, and sea, forcing the joint community to rely on all services to provide mission-ready forces that can operate in the cyber space domain. Creating 24 AF postures the Air Force for effec With the operational structure of cyberspace forces relatively settled by the creation of 24 AF, the Air Force can focus on the best way to develop and track personnel to meet the operational needs of 24 AF. As mentioned previously, the Air Force already oper ates in cyberspace and has a cadre of personnel with outstanding operational expertise. But the cadre we have today evolved from many functional areas to meet pressing needs at the unit level. We lacked a deliberate, systematic way to develop, track, and use this expertise throughout an Airmans career. Because we already have forces being trained for operations in cyberspace, albeit in an ad hoc manner, we used those training forums to be gin retooling and restructuring some of our initial skills training developing cyberspace operations competencies. These courses were developed through tremendous teamwork over the last 18operational units who put these skillsets to work and are set to come online over the next 18 months. Even with new initial skills courses coming on-line, there is still much work to do. Across the spectrum of developing an Airman from accession through retirement, initial skills training cyberspace domain demands the same operational approach to mission accomplishment that is inherent in the air and space do tion training (MQT) are in varying stages of maturity across the spectrum of cyberspace operations. IQT and MQT courses need to be validated by the new operational structure (i.e., 24 AF) and then institutionalized so that all personnel taking on cyberspace their assigned missions. Beyond IQT and MQT, Airmen must be able to pursue profes sional continuing education (PCE) to develop both operational and technical skills necessary for success at increasingly higher levels of responsibility. A framework for cyberspace PCE has already been proposed, and the Air Force Institute of Technology, in their role as the Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence, methodology for delivering PCE. With 24 AF standing up as the operational leaders in cyberspace operations, they will be integral participants in developing the right mix of skills to be covered in the PCE progression of courses. While it may seem to some that developing our cyberspace capabilities and competencies has taken a long time to get off the ground, we are on the verge of putting real change into motion with newly designated operational leadership and a bevy of new initial skills training courses. It took over 80 years to go from the Desert Storm, but it will not take as long for similar milestones in the cyberspace domain. The Air Force is well postured to bring cyberspace operations into the mainstream of operational plan in air, space, and cyberspace. 1 Joint Publication 1-02, 17 October 2008, 141, http://www.dtic.mil/doc trine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 2 Ibid. Maj Gen John W. Maluda (BS, Math and Physics, Troy State University; BS, Electri cal Engineering, Auburn Uni versity; MS, Systems Manage ment, University of Southern California) is director, Cy berspace Transformation and Strategy, Secretary of the Air Integration and chief informa ington, DC. He is responsible for establishing cyberspace as a domain in and through which deliver sovereign options for defense of the US and its global inter ests. Additionally, he shapes doctrine, strategy, and policy for com munications and information activities and serves as the functional advocate for 30,000 personnel. General Maluda enlisted in the Air Force in 1973 and received his commission in 1978 as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at Troy State University, Alabama. The generals career combatant commands, a defense agency, the White House and the Air Staff. General Maludas staff experience includes positions at Head quarters US Air Force, Air Combat Command, US Air Forces in Europe, Air Force Special Operations Command, US Space Com mand and the White House Communications Agency. He was also the director, Single Integrated Air Picture System Engineering Task Force, and special assistant for Joint Command and Control Mat tion at Headquarters US Air Force. He served as director of Com munications and Information for Headquarters Special Operations Command, US Air Forces in Europe and Air Combat Command. Before assuming his current position, General Maluda was vice commander, 8 th Air Force, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Among his many awards, General Maluda has been awarded Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Le gion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Joint Service Achievement Medal, and the Air Force Achievement Medal. He is as a graduate of both Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
11 High Frontier Dr. Kamal Jabbour, ST Rome, New York T he Air Force Research Laboratory provides the science and technology (S&T) vision, leadership, and products that enable the United States Air Force (USAF) to accomplish its dependence on cyberspace of US weapon systems, critical in imperative to operate freely in this domain. The USAF vision of global vigilance, global reach, and global power depends vitally on the ability to dominate cyberspace through integrated defen sive and offensive operations across blue, red, and gray cyber systems, as well as across the global cyberspace commons. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense (DoD) Dic cyberspace as a global domain within the information environ ment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommuni cations networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers and cyberspace operations as the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such op erations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid. The USAF vision of global vigilance, global reach, and glob major combat operations drives the S&T requirements for cyber operations. Figure 1 illustrates the changing requirements for vigilance, reach, and power as tensions escalate towards combat. Within this context, cyber operations provide a necessary enabler for air and space power, while providing an additional domain where the USAF can deliver effects. The S&T requirements for cyber operations do not focus only on conducting operations in cyberspace, but rather look holisti cally at the cyber S&T necessary to accomplish the USAF vision of global vigilance, global reach, and global power in all three domains of air, space, and cyberspace. main that enables US military superiority, and secondarily as an other domain where the US can deliver effects. Through cross-domain dominance, operations in cyberspace can guarantee freedom of maneuver and assure mission essential GLOBAL VIGILANCE 1 The primary challenges of global vigilance include maintaining persistent, global, multi-do main situational awareness (SA) and using assured, trusted sys tems that can avoid a broad spectrum of threats. In turn, global vigilance depends to some extent on elements of global reach to support sensor positioning and forward basing of assets for SA. We identify (1) SA, (2) assurance and trust, and (3) threat avoidance as the three main capabilities necessary to achieve global vigilance in and through cyberspace. Situational Awareness The strategic objective of cyber SA is to provide automated situation assessment and analysis that meet the operational re quirements of all areas within the cyber domainfriendly blue networks, traversal gray networks or global commons, and adver peacetime to major combat operations. Mission awareness lies at the heart of SA. Understanding the of assets and the interdependence of missions drives the require ments for SA. perception of the ele ments in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. 2 Perception: Perception represents the transformation of a sig of the elements of an environment appears in intrusion detection tion management, network management, and policy management. The real-time collection and long-term maintenance of meaning ful data for blue, gray, and red systems present a fundamental technical challenge for perception. Aggregation refers to correlation and fusion of raw data into activities of interest based on factual relationships or an implied requirement for additional meaning. The set of activities of in terest at any point in time describe the current situation of the environment, and depend highly on the local environment. A technical challenge of aggregation is developing the appropri ate situation at the appropriate level for the appropriate operator while maintaining consistency among differing views of similar Senior Leader Perspective
High Frontier 12 situations. Comprehension: The perception of activities of interest paves the way to their understanding and contextual placement into the environment and the comprehension of their meaning. Compre hension of meaning of a situation through assessment and analy research. Understanding a situation requires a broad range of analysis and an assessment of the impact of the situation on com ponents, systems and missions. Comprehension of meaning may require establishing addi tional relationships between activities of interest. Assessing the impact of an attack on a mission requires both attack activity and assets that support those functions. The combination of these two activities can lead to deeper understanding of the impact of an at tack on missions. Extending this analysis to hypothetical future situations allows reaction planning and response development. Projection: The projection of status in the near future entails taking the current situation and analyzing plausible threats, op portunities, risks, and possible next steps. The path from the cur rent situation to plausible future situations becomes the basis for developing courses of action (COAs) to move along a probable path and providing input into rules of engagement (ROEs). The projection of status ranges from analyzing an attack graph to determining the existence of additional attack paths to discov this range of possible actions, the projection of a situation to plau sible future situations presents a substantial technical challenge. Assurance and Trust Assuring mission and information, and trusting systems and data, provide the foundation for global vigilance across the spec Mission Assurance (MA): MA as a process to ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with the intended purpose or plan. It is a summation of the activities and measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting infrastructures are avail able to the DoD to carry out the National Military Strategy. The principal responsibility of a commander is to assure mis sion execution in a timely manner. The reliance of MEFs on cy berspace makes cyberspace the target of choice for an adversary who cannot, or chooses not to, face us in conventional battle. To assure these MEFs in a contested cyber domain requires mapping MEF dependence on cyberspace, mission prioritization to ensure continuity of operations, and a comprehensive risk management strategy. IA as measures that protect and defend information and infor mation systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenti sures that information and systems remain available in a contest ed cyber environment. Authentication provides a mathematical mechanism for one entity to establish its identity to another en tity. Non-repudiation provides attribution of transactions in cy avoidance in cyberspace. Trust: Trusting a system requires trusting its hardware, soft ware, and information. It is necessary to maintain trust in the information that these systems handle, both the integrity of data at rest and data in motion as systems evolve in capability and technology. Threat Avoidance Avoiding a threat provides a strategic defensive strategy that a three-pronged approach to cyber threat avoidance. First, we employ deterrence to prevent the initiation of attacks. Second, we seek to make most threats irrelevant by modifying the cyber domain to eliminate vulnerabilities or make them inaccessible. Third, we use real-time agility through anticipation and escape maneuvers to evade the threat. Deterrence: Effective cyber deterrence requires either a cred ible threat of retaliation with timely detection and attribution of attacks, or a disincentive by increasing the cost of an attack and play a role in deterrence. Effective employment of deterrence presumes a rational ad can be communicated. Deterrence also requires that the defender possess both the means and the will to retaliate to an attack. Modifying the cyberspace domain to eliminate vulnerabilities or make them inaccessible to an adver sary provides a viable approach to threat avoidance. Sound hard ware and software development practices can eliminate before hand vulnerabilities by designing them out of a system. Since and replacement of protocols, architectures, hardware, and soft Polymorphic techniques offer a dynamic approach for con if necessary, by varying protocols at multiple layers to deny an attacker SA and remove the advantages of time and preparation. Agility: Agility in defense includes establishing indications and warning mechanisms that detect anomalous activities or enti ties, rapid analysis of the activity to include attribution and geolocation, anticipation of future behaviors and effects, and effec tive real-time provisioning of defensive measures. Real-time threat avoidance presents an adversary with an agile moving target through evasion tactics, stealth, detection preven ure of evasion tactics and confront an emerging threat with active escape tactics. In such instances, SA enables defensive agility via an accurate environmental context. GLOBAL REACH The
13 High Frontier concepts that support global reach in cyberspace include access technologies to position and deploy cyber assets, survival in a contested cyber environment, and cross-domain superiority for command and control of integrated mission execution. Global reach is enabled through predominantly defensive measures when tension pushes a situation away from peace to enable the capabilities that support global power in the event of Access In all domains of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, ac cess refers to deploying and positioning friendly forces across in sizethe amount of available land, sea, air, and space is es sentially constantthe cyberspace domain changes dynamically, lenges for the positioning of cyber assets. Survival An effective defense-in-depth avoids a large percentage of threats, and defeats those threats that turn into attacks. When an attack evades detection and defeat, and disrupts US systems and networks, the defensive priority turns to survival and mission as surance. In this context, mission assurance seeks to ensure that underlying cyber infrastructure. system, equipment, process, or procedure to function continually during and after a disturbance. USAF systems carry varying sur vivability requirements depending on MEF criticality and protec tion conditions. Fight Through: Existing approaches to information system security and survivability focus on preventing, detecting, and containing unintentional errors and intentional cyber attacks. turbance resulted from an error or an attack complicates autono mous recovery. The concept of collaborative trusted agents that execute faith fully the commanders intent in the face of a dynamic cyber attacks. Through formal design methods and a self-protection guarantee, a class of general purpose agents can deploy specialpurpose payloads to enhance the ability of a system to detect and for system recovery. Recovery describes the ability of a computer system to regain or even exceed its initial operating capability. While continuing MEFs, damaged systems must recover any lost services, compo nents or data. These systems must discover their own vulnera bilities, identify the root cause of errors and attacks, and regener ate themselves with immunity to improve their ability to deliver critical services. Synthetic diversity ensures overall population survivability by removing like vulnerabilities of an otherwise vulnerable monoculture. Since attacks in cyberspace happen in milliseconds, recovery must be automaticnot requiring human intervention. Automat ic recovery requires a rapid understanding of the root cause of a failure or successful cyber attack. This knowledge must trans late into the development and delivery of diverse, immune, and functionally equivalent code and components into a vulnerable system to restore it to a trusted state. Automatic recovery recon stitutes the system to its initial operating capability and decreases its vulnerability to similar attacks. Mission-Aware Systems: The current DoD IA posture relies on solutions that seek to protect information and information systems, rather than the missions that depend on them. USAF systems must control dynamically end-to-end resources to pro vide mission aware service delivery and IA-enabled MA. These sources to provide an acceptable level of service and security. tacks towards recovery, preserving MEFs while restoring system functionality and trust. Cross Domain Operations In Internet terminology, a domain refers to a group of com puters or Internet protocol addresses that share higher-order ad dressing bits or higher-order naming convention. Consequently, computer security terminology calls cross-domain operations term cross-domain to represent operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. and cyberspace requires an ability to maneuver through cyber space as a means to attacking and defending from any domain against another. Effective cross domain operations require re alistic modeling, simulation, and war gaming of the integrated effects among multiple domains, integrated planning of effects delivery, and cross-domain command and control. Modeling, Simulation, and War Gaming: Robust modeling and simulation, and realistic war gaming, permit experimental pre-deployment, prototyping, and evaluation of cross-domain effects. The wartime employment of cross-domain capabilities guarantees robust and agile execution of the commanders intent, while ensuring cyber protection and MA across the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, rely on cyberspace operations, and these do not occur separately from air and space operations, but as an integrated interdependent operation. Integrated effects modeling, simulation, and war-gaming must include the integrated delivery of effects from blue and red sys tems in every domain against red and blue systems in every do main. Integrated effects exercises must provide a realistic envi ronment for cross-domain operations, in which activities in one domain have a direct bearing on activities in another domain. Many parallels exist between opera tions in the more traditional domains of air and space and in the emerging domain of cyberspace. As we integrate these capabili ties, planning requirements for cyber assets mirror those for tra
High Frontier 14 ditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and combat assets. The practice of procedural versus positive control over air assets and the time scales of the Air Operations Center do not translate well to cyberspace where decision cycles hover around a fraction of a second. Conversely, placing cyber assets under procedural control requires the incorporation into the op erational tempo a set of previously agreed upon rules for a broad range of future scenarios. 3 Integrated planning must take into consideration the chal (IFF) procedures and the potential of cyber fratricide and crossdomain fratricide. The ability to tag and identify cyber assets and to ascertain continuously their status and integrity create techni cal challenges unique to cyberspace. In addition, the routine use of the global cyberspace commons necessitates extending IFF technology to individual sessions, transactions and packets. Cross-Domain Command and Control: Cross-domain su periority enables MEF execution in a contested cyber domain and permits achieving and maintaining freedom of use of air, space, and cyberspace. Cross-domain dominance refers to the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through air, space, and cyberspace. It permits rapid and simultaneous, lethal and nonlethal effects in these three domains to attain strategic, opera sea, air, space, and cyberspace. 4 a choice among domains to deliver a desired effect against a tra attack can deliver comparable effects against an intelligent target. Similarly, cyber countermeasures can play a cross-domain role in defending intelligent systems against a range of conventional and non-conventional threats. GLOBAL POWER command and control of cyberspace, on which modern US mili tary capability depends. The global projection of cyber power to complement or en able kinetic power creates S&T challenges of developing precise fects, and taking response action to external events. Delivering Precision Effects Precision effects are the intended outcomes of offensive op weapons, precision effects became synonymous with low-collat eral damage, given the maturity of tools and techniques for mea suring the effectiveness of munitions. In measuring the effects of cyber operations, operators rely on intuitive estimates of effec tiveness that depend in large part on the experience and expertise of the operator. Robust Effects: Cyberspace operations can produce strategic, operational, and tactical effects across the entire spectrum of con Sustained Cyberspace Operations: Secondand higherorder effects of cyberspace operations may extend beyond the timating the duration and extent of cyber effects raises technical challenges unique to this domain. Delivering Cross-Domain Effects: Cyberspace operations can create effects in other domains. The various effects upon adversaries and their systems are often categorized using the Dfamily of terminology: deter, deny, disrupt, deceive, dissuade, degrade, destroy, and defeat. Cross-domain effects delivery ex air, space, and cyberspace, and includes the use of cyberspace as an auxiliary to national power to deliver diplomatic, information, military, and economic effects. Cyber Effects-Based Assessment Cyber effects-based assessment (EBA) refers to the process the outcome of a cyber operation into tactical, operational, and strategic impact. This process must occur in near real-time dur ing the prosecution of a mission by fusing multiple sensors and combining multiple means of measuring effects. This process from the application of cyber power. Cyber EBA seeks to inform the commander of the mission im pact of cyber operations. To this effect, cyber EBA requires a re lationship between physical EBA (a router is down) and mission EBA (personnel system disruption). Mission planning geared toward EBA permits adequate pre-positioning of cyber sensors and assets and proper sequencing of operations and events. A distributed cyber sensor network provides a comprehensive multi-dimensional impact assessment capable of identifying and assessing changes to network status, system performance, and adversary behavior. Effects on Systems: EBA is to determine the effects of a cyber operation on a target system. Computers, network infrastructure, intelligent weapon systems, and critical infrastructure provide potential targets, and require specialized methods for assessing effects. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) and associated methods for measuring MOE are necessary to assess accurately the higher-order effects of a cyber operation against a target. Effects on Users: A second application of cyber EBA includes ing in scope from a single user to a society of users, it is essential to develop the capability to assess the impact of cyber activity on behavior. A knowledge-based representation of human, organi zational, cultural, and societal structures and behavior aids in this assessment. Cyber Effects Assessment of Kinetic Operations: A third category of cyber EBA refers to assessing through cyber means the kinetic effects of traditional combat operations. This catego ry includes capabilities for determining changes to network traf primary and secondary effects of kinetic attacks. This category includes also the seamless fusion of cyber ISR with traditional ISR collections.
15 High Frontier Response Action Computer network defense response action (CND-RA) refers to actions taken in cyberspace to defend blue forces against ad versary attack. These response actions must take place in real time during the prosecution of a cyber mission. Although RA focuses primarily on blue response to an asym metric hostile cyber action that seeks to negate US superiority in a traditional domain, RA must become an integral part of op eration planning in coordination with, and in response to, kinetic actions. Together, these active response actions seek to assure mission success in the last mile of force projection in the cyber domain. Response Action for Attack Containment: Rapid forensics play an integral role in CND-RA by detecting attacks, attribut ing them to a source, estimating damage and enabling response COA to contain the attack and limit the damage. Additionally, rapid collateral effects estimate and battle damage assessment of contemplated RA permits automating such a response within the ROEs. Offensive Response Action: A traditional view of cyber oper ations separates defensive activities from offensive activities. As attacks grow in sophistication and rapid response action requires automating ROEs, technical and legal challenges arise in using offensive operations to defeat an attack. CONCLUSIONS This article presented a S&T perspective on cyber operations within the focus necessary to operate in a contested cyber domain and to assure critical military missions in land, sea, air, and space against threats in cyberspace. We recognize that the USAF depends vitally on cyberspace to achieve its vision of global vigilance, global reach, and glob al power. Further, the USAF projects global vigilance, global reach, and global power differently at various stages of tension of the USAF on cyberspace operations varies with the stage of Global vigilance at peacetime requires persistent SA in all do mains, mission and information assurance, and threat avoidance through deterrence and technology. Global reach requires access tacks, and integrated planning of MEFs and their dependence on cyberspace. Global Power calls for predominantly offensive combat op erations, enabled through the delivery of precision effects in cy berspace, reliable effects assessment, and automated response action. 1 General Norton A. Schwartz, Fly, Fight, and Win, September 2008 2 a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems, 37, no. 1 (1995): 32-64. 3 Procedural control a method of airspace control that relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and proce dures, Joint Publication (JP) 3-01; Positive control a method of airspace craft within an airspace, conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. 4 The Air Force Strategic Studies Group at CHECKMATE said we believe superiority represents freedom to act, but dominance includes the ability to exploit. This implies that dominance exceeds superiority. 3-30: air superiority that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing forces superiority is a degree of dominance. Excerpts from Cross Domain Dominance brief, notes pages, Lt Col Brad Detroit Lyons, Lt Col Tim Dexter Rapp, Air Force Strategic Studies Group CHECKMATE, 10 June 2008. Dr. Kamal Jabbour, ST (BE Electrical Engineering with Distinction, American Uni versity of Beirut; PhD Elec trical Engineering, University of Salford, UK) a member of cadre of senior executives, is senior scientist for Informa tion Assurance, Information Directorate, Air Force Re search Laboratory (AFRL), Rome, New York. He serves thority and independent re information warfare and offensive information warfare technology. He conceives, plans, and advocates major research and develop technical resources, and provides expert technical consultation to other Air Force organizations, Department of Defense, and govern ment agencies, universities, and industry. Dr. Jabbour began his professional career on the computer engineering faculty at Syracuse University, where he taught and conducted research for two decades, including a three-year term as department chairman. In 1999, he joined the Cyber Operations Branch at AFRL through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and transitioned gradually from academia to government. In response to President Bushs National Strategy to Secure Cy berspace, Dr. Jabbour created the Advanced Course in Engineer ing (ACE) Cyber Security Boot Camp to develop the best ROTC cadets into future cyber security leaders. The ACE combines ad ment, and weekly eight-mile runs into a challenging cyber security boot camp. The ACE received designation of a Special Interest Item Command. Dr. Jabbour has received one US patent, published more than pervised 21 theses and dissertations. An avid distance runner, Dr. Jabbour wrote a weekly column on running in the Syracuse PostStandard from 1997 to 2003.
High Frontier 16 Deterrence in Cyberspace Dr. Martin C. Libicki Senior Management Scientist RAND Corporation Arlington, Virginia F or most domains, deterrence is like oxygen: little noticed when it is working and painfully obvious when it has failed. Alas, if cyber-deterrence fails and hostile states do bad things in cyberspace, it may not be immediately obvious. Cor rupted data often looks like uncorrupted data. Many systems commonly malfunction all by themselves. Error may be obvi ous only when the system is being relied on to perform in a crisis. Even with evidence of deliberate hostile ( mischie vous) tampering, it is unclear who was behind it, what they were trying to achieve, or whether they had something that could be put at risk. Cyber-deterrence suffers, or depending on To scope the possibilities and limits of deterrence in cy Second, we make a few critical observations about how cyberattacks take place. Third, we limn some motives for cyber-at tacks. Fourth, we draw some contrasts between nuclear/con ventional deterrence and cyber-deterrence. As William Kauffman argued, 1 Deterrence consists of es defend a certain interest; secondly, the demonstrated capability actually to achieve the defense of the interest in question, or able to gain his end, would not seem worth the effort to him. Although the ability to ward off attack on systems would, in fact, deter someone from attacking them, we intend to use a not to attack you because their doing so would result in retali ation. 2 An attack, in turn, is an attempt to get a system to malfunc tion in ways that reduce its value to the user: for example, the system works more slowly or not at all, or it cannot connect to other systems, or its information and/or algorithms have been corrupted. Examples of what a major cyber-attack might do include shutting down electric power or scrambling bank re cords. Military effects may include disabling command-andmissiles at ghosts. puter network espionage) be considered an attack? Such an act alters the target computer in the sense of getting it to send in formation to a place it should not gobut it otherwise does not keep the computer from operating and even generating correct information and commands. Espionage ought not be encour aged even by default, but, historically, the rules of war tend usually considered an actionable legitimate As a practical matter, one can expect that the intelligence services of every competent state are busy trying to read each others mail. One must also imagine that the ones you do not hear about are doing a better job of it than the ones you do hear about. Thus, evidence that someone has penetrated a network may be a bet ter indicator of their incompetence than malice. We further assume that cyber-deterrence is retaliation in kind. The reason for this exclusion is not because it makes sense to do so but because it illustrates more of the conundrums of cyber-deterrence. 3 Some of these conundrums apply to re taliating for cyber-attacks by kinetic means; others apply to re taliating for, say, kinetic attacks with cyber means. Finally, we assume that nothing seriously kinetic is taking place at the time with the putative attacking country. If war is going on, deterrence in cyberspace would be impossible to erned. 4 What Permits Cyber-Attacks Although cyberspace, like everything else, is rooted in the material world, it is, for all practical purposes, man-made. The cyber world is a virtual medium over which the user has, at least in theory, a great measure of control. A system that is dis connected from the rest of the worlds networks and built with trustworthy components, and manned by trustworthy individu als is likely to be quite secure even against the most determined of attacks. These characteristics can or should describe most equipment). 5 However, many systems are connected to the out side world, and so users must devise ways to scrutinize packets that come into it from the outside world so as to block harmful content. This is the case because everything that gets into a sys tem gets in because the system has allowed it to and because the system only does what its designers and operators let it do thus, in theory there is no forced entry in cyberspace. In prac tice, of course, bad things do get in all the time. The software that makes systems run is exceedingly complex, often opaque to the user and inevitably imperfect. Even when software is completely transparent (as it is in the open-source world), it is still quite complex. Ensuring that no combination of bytes can cause a system to malfunction is a daunting challenge. Indeed, complexity is ultimately the primary source of near ly all computer malfunctions, both inadvertent and malevolent. 6 The system viewed by designers may be capable of warding off mischief. But users and systems administrators may carry a completely different and incomplete perspective on the system; the difference between the two can lead to security breaches. 7 Cyberspace
17 High Frontier how the system actually reacts to inputs and what it puts out. ways has the last word. Divergence between the security model as designed and used, and the security features resident in the code, is the primary source of vulnerabilities. Taking advantage of such vulnerabilities is, in turn, how hackers get systems to do what they want rather than what the designers, administrators, and users think the system should have done. The fact that almost all attacks come from taking advantage of vulnerabilities has several implications. 8 First, attacks them selves may be self-limiting. Users who are aware that their systems are not working correctly may, with effort, learn why. Knowing why, they may also understand how far to trust their problem is in acquired software) seek help from those who has to come up with some other trick to wreak similar harm. Even if the nature of the vulnerability cannot be discerned, the facts are that rarely is physical equipment destroyed and a com petent organization should be backing up its data and retaining clean copies of its software. This would mean that almost all of the damage from any attack is temporary. 9 Second, attacks require guile rather than brute force. Persistent rather than des one, but a thousand networked hackers working independently ployees of a state intelligence agency. 10 Third, for this reason, there are essentially no distinguishing physical requisites for launching an attackand correspondingly, almost nothing of theirs that can be destroyed or disabled in order to prevent an attack from taking place. 11 One is tempted to ascribe sec ondary status to the divination of motives for attack when con sidering how to deter them. After all, the message of deterrence in any mode is Dontor else! irrespective of how reason able or rational the attackers motives are. Conversely, it is rarely wise to conclude that deterrence is unnecessary because no rational person would see net gains from a particular form of attack. Nevertheless, some attention to motive is important because it shapes the nature and credibility of the response and sug gests how well the fear of failure or the threat of punishment can deter attacks. Essentially, one can divide motives into four categories: errors, coercion, preemption, and spite. Errors are many and various: for example, a self-induced on it but which veers off unexpectedly; a response by the attacker to what it erroneously thought was an earlier strike by the target; and attack that looks as if it came from a state but actually came from unauthorized sources. Understood correctly, errors may not merit retaliation. Coercion exists to warn the attacked country to respect the attackers intereststo act in a certain way. Some times an attack is tantamount to a dare; sometimes, the attacker can make the point and stay hidden since its in terests may be shared by other state and non-state actors. Here, retaliation sends a warning of its own back. Preemption targets national defense/security systems on the hope that a crippled response capability gives freer rein for the attacker to operate in the kinetic domain. If the attacker refrains from follow-on kinetic operations, however, one might guess that the cyber-attacks did not kinetic optionsor else had been mischaracterized by the target. In such circumstances, warding off kinetic threats during the window when cyber systems are malfunction but later. Spite (as a motive) is a way to classify attacks intended place. Deterrence has become so commonplace a notion during the Cold War period (and afterwards) that its pre-requisites are often overlooked. The importance of these pre-requisites, how ever, returns when the subject of cyber-deterrence is raised. Do We Have an Actionable Basis for Deterrence? Returning to the Kaufmann criteria for deterrence, the inter ests we would defend must have some precision; it will not do for the US government to unilaterally assert the right to police all behaviors in cyberspace. Most would agree that the nations interests extend beyond its government systems to include criti cal infrastructures (e.g., banking, electric power). Beyond that, lies foggy terrain. Hostile activity in cyberspace takes place constantly. Hackers vary from the curious and careless, to po litical demonstrators, cynical businessmen, shysters, criminals, nihilists, and state actors. Only a picayune fraction of such attacks are investigated. Of these, only some can be traced be hind the borders of a hostile state and not all of those are statesponsored. So what kind of threshold should make mischief in cyberspace actionable? To avoid retaliation in error and avoid consuming the gross national product in investigating every breach in cyberspace, there probably has to be some discernible difference in magnitude between our threshold for retaliation and the magnitude of damage that might be ascribed to back ground noise (whose level and composition varies over time). Although most state-created mischief in cyberspace is spying, is spying actionable? 12 Loss of life makes a tractable threshold the highly interesting targets can crash without people being killed in the process. If some dollar threshold makes an attack actionable, how would it be communicated and how would it be measured to the understanding if not necessary the satisfaction of the attacker who would then face retaliation? Do We Know Who Did It? For nuclear and massed conventional attacks the source is usually immediately obvious. This is not true in cyberspace.
High Frontier 18 Even if one could trace back incriminating packets to (the Inter net protocol address of) the computer that sent them, one cannot really be sure if the attack is the fault of the computers owner (it could be an implant that the real attacker placed in some one elses computer and then activated). Even if the attacker is the systems owner, one cannot know if such an attack was authorized by the state. Attacks can be launched from literally anywhere (including by trusted insiders) and only states that were truly brazen or feckless would launch an attack from their own networks. Counting on technology to yield attribution fo digital anonymity. 13 Intelligence on the attacker may help, but starting a war, even one limited to cyberspace, based solely on intelligence has its problems. Otherwise, one will not be able to make reasonable attribution unless the attacker virtually an nounces its role. Needless to add, without solid attribution, the case for retaliation has to overcome the non-zero probability that one may hit the wrong party back. It does not help that unlike most forms of combat (but like terrorism) it is not always clear at the outset whether any one cyber-attack is a glitch, a crime or an act of war. If a glitch, its elucidation is the owners responsibility; if a crime, it is a mat ter of law enforcement; only if it is an act of war would national security entities (e.g., Department of Defense) get involved. The three communities have quite different standards of evi dence and thresholds for proof. The international nature of cy berspace adds further complexity. All this introduces seams in the systems and authorities to detect, classify, and respond to attacks. Figuring this out, however, and agreeing on an appropriate response may take time, causing a potential hostile actor to time-discount (or to dismiss altogether) the possibility of a punitive retaliatory response. Can You Deliver on a Response? Because almost all forms of retaliation require the target have a vulnerability to take advantage of, the ability to predict what retaliation will do depends on ones ability to predict what vulnerabilities the target has. 14 Forecasting is possible but dif main publicly undisclosed (aka zero-day vulnerabilities) and thus undiscovered by the other side. 15 Through as response on any given day, a deterrence posture requires the ability to predict that one can respond as long as the deterrence policy is operativea period of years or decades. Zero-day lar, can be discovered and patched (indeed, they may already be patched unbeknownst to the unwary hacker). The effects of the attack may also be speculative. Many kinetic weapons (e.g., nuclear bombs) tend to work much the same way against any target; a test in Alamogordo (New Mexico) can predict what happens to Hiroshima. Not so for attacks on information sys tems. Furthermore, a great deal of the damage to any informa tion system is strongly related to how its human operators react: easily damage can be routed around; how frequently the data is backed up; extant contingency plans; or whether customers have a great deal of faith in the systems to begin with. Again, without observing how the other side reacts to an attack, one can only guess at the response. Finally, what puts targets at risk from cyber-attack is precisely the complacency of their owners and the belief that their systems face no serious threats apart from those that have been anticipated and dealt with. Thus they can rely on systems with only nominal fall-back capabilities. Once such targets are put at obvious risk, operators may no lon ger be so complacent and thus targets may not be so vulnerable. Note a key paradox: the more complacent the target operators areand hence the more vulnerable they really arethe less likely threats against them will be taken seriously, a non of deterrence. And Do It Again? By this point the alert reader can probably guess the an (especially if infrastructure is seriously disrupted or corrupted), the aforementioned complacency will vanish. Targets will be come much harder to hit with new attacks. 16 To be sure, the retaliator may have laid in several potential attacks all of which breached defenses while defenders were complacent. However, one can expect that the alert defender will be reviewing exist ing systems for anomalous behavior and unexplained code and may well unearth follow-up attacks in waiting. 17 Worse, for those wishes to re-establish deterrence, operators may convince so this time their defenses would be adequate and that they there fore have nothing to fear from retaliation. Can Deterrence Capabilities at Least be Used for CounterForce Ends? Counter-force can sometimes have the character of a second prize: we built a capability; it did not deter; we had to use it, but at least, by using it, we reduced the other sides ability to hurt us. No such second-prize exists in cyber-deterrence. Unless the other side foolishly builds its cyber-strike capability on its own network, which can then be disabled, it is nigh-impossible to disable its ability to strike. Cyber-attacks rely on clever hack
19 High Frontier ers, exquisite intelligence, useful tools, and some connectivity to the targetonly the latter can be disabled through cyber-at tacks. The latter response, disconnection, suggests yet another paradox. To disconnect attackers from the target requires dis connecting the target from the world since the attackers could strike from literally anywhere. So while cyber-warriors have to worry about second-strike capability, such a capability is more surely diminished by the after-effects of their own strikes than by the effects of the adversarys strikes. The contrast with nuclear war needs little elaboration. Can We Keep the Fight Limited to the Two Contestants? Deterrence rests on communications, and communications requires enough clarity to separate the consequences of good behavior (being left alone) from the consequences of bad be havior (being hurt). 18 The harder it is to measure causes and consequences, the fainter the message, to the point where ev ery decision is judged not on the response it brings, but on the smaller issue of whether its results (of violence) merit the effort (to generate it). Once third parties, with their various agendas, get into the mix, clarity of message suffers greatly. An act of re taliation that puts a target into play may engender follow-up at tacks from third parties. Third parties are less likely than states vulnerabilities. Third party attacks, if nothing else, will make has ended and the counter has been reset (Well stop and see if youve learned your lesson not to do this again.) Converse ly, the inability to control escalation does send a message of: dont start, because no one knows where this will end. Is Deterrence Sending the Wrong Message to Our Own Side? Most of the infrastructures that the US public depends on for example: banking, power, and telecommunicationsare privately owned and operated. Making sure that the informa tion systems that run these are safe from disruption and corrup tion is a responsibility that can only be discharged by system operators. A policy of deterrence puts the focus on the attackers rather than the system owners who failed to meet their public obligations. Although untested in the courts, system owners may be able to shield themselves from lawsuits by arguing that cyber-attacks were acts of war and thus merit protection against third partieseven though there is no such thing as forced entry in cyberspace. 19 Can One Avoid Escalation? It is generally believed that a nuclear exchange already puts all parties at the top of the escalation ladder. 20 Not so, of course, might be considered an escalation from cyber-attacks, howev er painful. Hence the concern: if one actually responded to a cyber-attack with retaliation in cyberspace in order to indicate great displeasure without losing control over events, can one be Russia, for one, has said the reverse: any cyber-attack against it that rises to the strategic level may be responded to with other strategic (hint: nuclear) means. 21 One might argue that the an swer to escalation threats is to maintain escalation dominance, but such a posture, while logical, does not completely erase the seem to be (seem whenever there is doubt about who carried out the attack or whether it crossed a reasonable threshold). Conclusions Deterrence is tough, and it is even tougher when dealing with the ambiguities of cyberspace. Historically, war can, in large part, be measured in terms of land taken and enemies disarmed. Deterrence, by contrast, works or fails by affecting what others believe. It calls on at least one side to generate rules, communi cate them to the adversary, and convince the adversary that you intend to enforce them both positively (dont, or Ill ) and negatively (since you didnt, I wont ). With nuclear deter rence and even predecessors such as the threat of massive air raids, deterrence involved no small element of primitive fear. The threat of retaliation in cyberspace puts no one directly at corporeal risk; the fear factor is muted. degree of clarity since one is trying to impart a dual message: bad behavior will be punished and good behavior rewarded (or at least not punished). Ambiguity is noise; noise damages the perpetrator of a cyberspace attack, do not help. Doubts, on both sides, about whether retaliation will have the right level of ef fectenough to be noticed but not so much as to be seen as escalatorydo not help. Uncertainty as to what motive any one attack, and thus what the other sides calculus really is, does not help. None of this is to say that deterrence, as such, is not a valid concept. It can be. There may be circumstances where some attempt to establish deterrence in cyberspace in hard to avoid, notably where the attacker virtually dares you to strike back. But here the gap between theory and practice is wide and must be carefully bridged: measure twice, cut once. 1 W. W. Kaufmann, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1958). 2 This is not to denigrate the usefulness of deterrence-by-denial. In deed, implicit in our argument that deterrence-by-punishment is problem atic is the conclusion that one must rely on deterrence-by-denial, which, of retaliation. Indeed, the two are synergistic. A good defense weeds out minor attacks and thus minor attackersmaking it easier to focus on major attacks and, for attribution purposes, major attackers. Conversely, counter-retaliation (by the original attacker) would be blunted by dint of having good defenses. 3 Since individuals or groups (e.g., the Russian Business Network) are prosecution of individuals rather than states is the primary use of govern ment power in deterring attacks. Sometimes one can deter governments by threatening plausibly to prosecute their employees (e.g., as was done to Libyan agents because of the destruction of the jet over Lockerbie). Re
High Frontier 20 taliation-in-kind, rather than something more violent, is also a statement by the retaliator that what happens in cyberspace stays in cyberspace. If the attacker believes as much, the risk of escalation outside cyberspace may be muted, but there is no guarantee that forbearance will be mutual. 4 The role and effectiveness of cyber deterrence in the context of an ongoing conventional war has many but not all of the same elements pres for instance, may complicate or even supersede the gain/loss calculus that characterizes the decision to retaliate in cyberspace. If one retaliated against the wartime foe for a cyber-attack carried out by someone else, few tears would be shed. 5 This is not to minimize assessment issues and risks associated with this is a complex concern that deserves more attention than we can give it here. 6 This is less true for insider attackssuch as those facilitated by be ing able to put hands (literally) on a targeted computer, conniving insiders, or the ability to compromise hardware or software at its source (aka sup en masse 7 For example, until recently users probably assumed that thumb drives were passive containers of data. Most personal computers, how ever, can be programmed to look for boot-up instructions on thumb drives, and some of them are so programmed. Such computers can thus be in fected on boot-up by infected thumb drives. 8 are a primary exception to this rule, since they can cut systems off from the rest of the world without the systems, themselves, being otherwise affected. Uniquely, they do not arise from the target systems vulnerabili ties as such, although their effects can be mitigated by more commodious network routing architectures. 9 In 2007, DHS blew up an electrical generator as part of a simulated cyber-attack (www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html). So, it is possible. Nevertheless, a long-standing tenet in machine control is that no software failure (whether accidental or induced) should lead to hardware failure; see Nancy Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Com (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995). 10 Brute-force code-breaking with expensive machinery is one part of breaking into a system for which state intelligence agencies do have an edge (even though an RSA encryption code was famously cracked by the volunteer effort of thousands of personal computer owners). 11 Sometimes, one can interrupt an attack in progress if it is coming from a single source. But foes can use other attack methods that are hard er to interrupt: e.g., attacks from coordinated redundant sources, or preprogrammed attacks implanted within the target network and triggered months or years later. 12 The means by which systems are jimmied in order to let information that can disrupt or corrupt such systems. But taking such activities more seriously than might be warranted by the espionage label does not mean that they are actionable prior to actual harm taking place. 13 Although the transition to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) should make it easier to trace packets back to their source, the attacking machine can use Wi-Fi to piggyback onto a completely innocent machine, to one ticated cell-phone/SIM card combinationboth purchased anonymous lycould also be used to carry out an attack and would be effectively untraceable if used no more than a few times and each call is over before someone can get to the caller. 14 If the retaliator wants a calibrated response, it also has to know how much collateral damage may come from retaliation. Attacks of all types risk some collateral damage. The complex, interconnected nature of cy berspace and the poorly understood interdependence of critical infrastruc tures suggest that our ability to bound much less estimate collateral dam age is highly underdeveloped. 15 By contrast, the great majority of malware reported in the quasi-tech nical press (e.g., CNET) exploits vulnerabilities that have been announced and patched but whose patches have not been entirely implemented within the global user base. These days, the really large infections are meant to recruit computers to form networks of zombies (computers under the picking on the most weakly defended computers. Attacking a serious in frastructure measures often means penetrating systems that are or at least should be strongly defended. 16 undetected if its effects are to remain hiddenprecisely the kind of retal iatory strike that cannot convey deterrence. Since the most likely effect of a detectable attack is to shut down or isolate the affected network, such an attack is immediately inimical to creating a second attack. 17 system, or route around the corrupted code without touching it, thereby sible. 18 In classic deterrence theory, this is called positive deterrence or as surance. An adversary is unlikely to be deterred from some action if hes likely to be punished regardless. 19 A somewhat more legitimate case for shielding system owners from lawsuits may exist if it was government regulation (e.g., mandating open interconnect) that unavoidably exposed system owners to vulnerabilities that they could do nothing aboutsomething hard to prove. 20 That noted, Herman Kahns New York, Praeger, 15 being non-nuclear). 21 How ironic that it is that Russia is the only state that can credibly be accused of having attacked another in cyberspace (perhaps Estonia in 2007, but with more certainty, Georgia in 2008 and Kyrgyzstan in 2009). Dr. Martin C. Libicki (PhD, U.C. Berkeley, 1978) has been a senior management scientist at RAND since 1998, focusing on the impacts of information technology on domestic and national security. This work is documented in commercially published books, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare and Information Technology Stan dards: Quest for the Common Byte as well as in numerous monographs, notably CyberDeterrence and Cyber-War, What is Information Warfare, The Mesh and the Net: Specula and Who Runs What in the Global Information Grid He was also the editor of the RAND textbook, New Challenges New Tools for Defense De cisionmaking His most recent assignments were on the subjects of organizing the Air Force for cyber-war, exploiting cell phones in counter-insurgency, developing a post-9/11 information technol ogy strategy for the US Department of Justice, using biometrics for identity management, assessing Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencys Terrorist Information Awareness program, con ducting information security analysis for the FBI, and evaluating In-Q-Tel. Prior employment includes 12 years at the National De fense University, three years on the Navy Staff as program spon sor for industrial preparedness, and three years as a policy analyst He has also received a masters degree in city planning from U.C. Berkeley (1974).
21 High Frontier Dr. David J. Lonsdale Lecturer, Strategic Studies University of Hull Hull, United Kingdom A of cyberspace can only be understood in how it relates to, and affects, strategy. When faced with the latest develop ment in military affairs, the strategic analyst must always pose the question: so what? This article seeks to provide some initial analysis on this very stark, but crucial question in relation to and its complex nature. Particular attention will be given to the multidimensional nature of strategy. Indeed, the dimensions of strategy provide us with a useful conceptual framework, within cyberspace. Of course, what follows can be only a cursory ex amination of the impact of cyberspace on each of the dimen sions of strategy. How each dimension of strategy fares in the cyberspace age deserves detailed analysis. Nonetheless, the breadth of this article will provide an indication of the reach cyberspace has a part to play in all of the dimensions, it does egy. Thus, like the air dimension before it, cyberspace affects the grammar of war, but not its logic. 1 STRATEGY DEFINED wards the attainment of policy objectives. Although this simple between policy and military force), it does little to highlight the inherent complexity of the process. The word process is deliberately used to underline the fact that strategy is an active pursuit, both practically and conceptually, within which mili tary force is translated into political effect. The complexity of strategy, which is the result of many factors, can be described in many different ways. One approach may focus attention on the nature of war, whilst another may highlight the paradoxi cal logic or disharmony among the levels of strategy. 2 One of the most useful and comprehensive discussions on the subject is to be found in Colin S. Grays work on the dimensions of strategy. 3 argues that success in strategy requires a level of competence in each of them. The current article will assess how cyberspace affects, or is affected by, each of the 17 dimensions. At the end of the analysis, we should have a fairly good understanding of strategy. Gray delineated the 17 dimensions into three categories: people and politics (which includes people, society, culture, politics, and ethics); preparation for war (economics and logis tics, organization, military administration, information and in telligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology); and war proper (military operations, command, geography, friction, adversary, and time). The following analysis will show that more pronounced in some than in others. CYBERSPACE AND THE DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY People Gray persuasively argues that people matter most in strat egy. 4 From the fact that war comes into existence to serve the interests of human communities, through to the harsh reality of fundamentally a human activity. Will cyberspace in any way alter this basic truth? Since a form of strategic power can be exercised through cyberspace (for example via attacks against information infrastructures), it is plausible that people may become somewhat removed from the physical act of warfare. However, this statement is only valid if so-called strategic information warfare proves to be a war-winning instrument. 5 If information attacks do not prove independently decisive, then more traditional physical forms of force will have to be employed. The 2007 denial of service attacks against Estonia formation attacks. However, the rapid recovery of Estonias information infrastructure suggests that the strategic effects of such an attack may be limited. This argument is strengthened when one conducts an analysis of conventional strategic bomb ing campaigns. The air campaign analogy is valid since both forms of war share important characteristics. Most importantly, both methods of war seek to undermine the capability and will of the enemy to resist via attacks against perceived centers of gravity. They both rely upon perceived vulnerabilities within industrial or information age societies and economies. Al though the air campaigns waged against Germany, Japan, and to the respective war efforts, they can hardly be described as decisive. Indeed, a number of common obstacles to the cam paigns can be detected. Particularly worthy of mention are: op intelligence shortfalls, political restrictions, poor strategy, and enemy resilience. 6 It is highly plausible that information at tacks will fail to achieve strategically decisive results for the same reasons as conventional bombing campaigns. that human affairs are normally decided on land, where humans live and work. Thus, at some level most strategic issues are decided by the man on the scene with a gun. 7 In which case, people will still be required to face the harsh realities of the Cyberspace
High Frontier 22 frontline. Nonetheless, operations in cyberspace (including information operations within the battlespace) could make a have. Society Modern armed forces are recruited from, and at some level supported by, a society. In turn, society is governed by some form of executive decision making body. The complex set of relationships among society, government, and the armed forces 8 For our purposes, Clausewitzs most important thought on the subject was his advice to ensure that a balance is established among the different actors and their respective needs within the trinity. Whether such a balance can be maintained, at least to some degree, increasingly depends upon events within cyber space. As mentioned in the previous section, modern society can be directly attacked through its information infrastructure, thereby potentially striking at its support for a war. In addi tion, cyberspace can act as the medium through which an en emy can wage a propaganda campaign to undermine relation ships within the trinity. However, we must not fall into the trap of technological determinism. Just because the trinity can be targeted through cyberspace, it does not automatically fol low that such attacks will translate into strategic effect. Infor mation infrastructures can be defended and governments can use cyberspace for their own propaganda efforts to strengthen the trinity. Within cyberspace, as in the other environments of strategy, relationships among belligerents will be dynamic and somewhat unpredictable. Politics Politics is fundamentally about human interaction. Cyber space in no way changes that fact. Rather, it merely acts as another medium within which those interactions occur. None ways. Certain actors in both domestic and global politics owe political movements have achieved a certain degree of power to cyberspace. 9 Thus, certain actors now play a role on the strategic stage mainly through the opportunities afforded by main actors in the global system are still nation states, and their dominance is primarily a result of their military power and the economic resources upon which it is based. In addition, al though cyberspace may enable more effective promotion of certain political causes, it does not change the fundamental re lationship between politics and military force. Strategy is still strategy in the information age. Ethics At some level the behavior of societies engaged in strategy is framed by ethical norms and values. Depending upon the context (especially what is at stake), societies will not tolerate certain actions in the pursuit of policy objectives. Cyberspace acts as a medium through which messages and/or images can be transmitted to play upon these norms and values. The transmis sion of images from the battlespace clearly has an impact on the societies and polities engaged in strategy. In addition, norms and values can be disseminated via cyberspace. It is tempting to suggest that western liberal norms pertaining to human rights will increasingly dominate the global strategic environment. However, groups that promote especially brutal forms of war (such as certain terrorist organizations) are proving to be adept at spreading their own perspectives on moral values. Thus, it macy. On the issue of ethics, it is also worth noting that certain methods of information attack appear to offer the promise of less lethal forms of war. Thus, from an ethical perspective, However, this is dependent upon the operational and strategic will ever prove decisive enough to make war a more humane activity. 10 Economics and Logistics forms of supply and thereby smaller logistic tails. An improved sensor-to-shooter relationship, resulting in a greater chance of assured kill, should reduce logistical requirements for a cy berspace-savvy force. In addition, just-in-time (JIT) logistics these developments suggest that cyberspace may produce forms of strategic activity that are less draining economically on the respective societies taking part. Also, forces should have less vulnerable lines of communication. However, cyberspace is not forms of warfare and their related logistical elements present new opportunities for enemy counters. JIT logistics may be especially susceptible to disruption precisely because they are so attractive is also their greatest vulnerability. We should also be careful not to assume that attritional forms of warfare have disappeared, in which case large logistical requirements may have a future. Organization and Military Administration These two dimensions can be discussed together since they are both affected by cyberspace in similar ways. The process of strategy, and the organizations that conduct that process, may gain certain advantages from the exploitation of cyberspace. In tunities for more effective organizational styles and structures. Indeed, quite correctly new organizations and units are being created, such as the 24 th Air Force, to rationalize activity in this area and to develop the required expertise. At a structural level, the most prominent organizational change facilitated by cyber space is the rise of the network. 11 The adoption of network structures offers the promise of more streamlined bureaucracy and the delegation of decision making to those most effectively placed to use it. While these are clear advantages that need to
23 High Frontier be exploited, they do little, if anything, to solve the problems associated with the interface of politics and military force. Dis juncture between these two different worlds is more cultural than organizational in nature. Information and Intelligence If cyberspace is the medium that underpins much of modern strategy, then information is the key resource. Many of the advantages wrought by cyberspace emanate from the ability to move information around more effectively. Although a total lifting of the fog of war is unlikely, certain forms of uncertain ty can be reduced through the application of information age technologies. Thus, some form of information dominance or dominant battlespace knowledge is both desirable and perhaps possible. However, notions that the battle for information will become decisive are overstepping the mark. 12 Many obstacles stand between the exploitation of information and victory. In an age of plentiful information, friction in the form of informa tion overload will be close at hand. And, as the war for Kosovo revealed, cyberspace is just as likely to transmit the enemys in tended acts of deception, as it is to transmit genuine and useful information. 13 Finally, as Gray notes, important though infor mation undoubtedly is, alone it does not destroy a single piece of enemy equipment. 14 Strategic Theory and Doctrine ence over modern doctrine and strategic theory. One only has to wise, especially in an age of plentiful information, to produce detailed institutional doctrine on the use of information and ex ploitation of cyberspace. Indeed, Gray persuasively argues that doctrine performs an important role as the nexus between ideas and action. 15 However, it is vital that modern doctrine does not become overly prescriptive, attempts to reinvent the wheel, or produces mantras from fairly empty concepts. For example, obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of 16 This appears to be a prime example of reinventing or less than good strategy. This is not to say that operational concepts such as EBO are empty of value or content. It is mere ly to note that they represent nothing new in strategy and that they should not be mistaken for a new dawn in strategic perfor mance or understanding. Although new or developing methods of warfare require doctrinal and theoretical development, these should be grounded in, and informed by, experience, historical knowledge, and the work of the universal theorists, most espe cially Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. An unfounded sense of living through an age of revolutionary change can lead one to discard past traditions and ideas without good cause. In addi tion, the constant development of new operational concepts can overly complicate strategy, and thereby ride roughshod over Clausewitzs advice concerning the value of simplicity. 17 Technology Like the other environments of war, perhaps with the no table exception of land, the strategic utilization of cyberspace requires the development and application of technology. In fact, cyberspace is largely constructed of technology. Thus, a keen appreciation of the place of the technological dimension of strategy is an important consideration in the exploitation of just relate to the fact that it enables or requires the development ing environment is that it acts as a force multiplier to existing forces. In theory, and often increasingly in practice, the ex of force. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that although technology normally represents a vital dimension of strategy, it is only one among 17. Theorists and practitioners alike should resist the temptation to reduce strategic performance down to the technological level. 18 Military Operations dimensions of strategy so obvious that it is often overlooked. Well-versed in the Clausewitzian tradition, Gray is also quick to identify how vital this dimension is: Strategy, no matter how apparently brilliant, is moot until somebody does it. 19 The im pact of cyberspace in this dimension is pervasive. There is little a modern, regular force does that does not rely upon cyberspace to some extent. Indeed, it has long been postulated that new operational concepts will be born out of the development of cyberspace. Dominant battlespace knowledge, network-centric warfare, and swarming, to name but three, typify potential cy berspace-enabled forms of warfare. However, important though they may be, it is not clear exactly how new, revolutionary, or realizable these operations will prove to be. At the opening of the Second World War, German blitzkrieg appeared both new and decisive. However, in many important respects, blitzkrieg was an operational level example of a tactic used by Alexander the Great. 20 In addition, the early promise of rapid, maneuverbased victories was eventually countered by the enemy or neu tralized by geography. Thus, the Second World War became characterized, at least to some degree, by attritional forms of warfare. 21 Similarly, limited war theory, given operational real ity with the most advanced technology of the day, was found wanting in Vietnam against a wily foe and in the face of poor strategy. Context is everything in strategy. Cyberspace may promise much, and therefore deserves study and development. However, those looking for quick and easy victories are likely to be disappointed. Command mand is undertaken. Network command structures may enable
High Frontier 24 ity. In so doing, cyberspace may enable the creation of more military operations. In this respect, cyberspace holds the po tential to radically alter the structure and process of command. However, cyberspace will make no difference to the cognitive and emotional qualities required for successful command. The Clausewitzian military genius, a template for good command, requires such characteristics as moral courage, an appreciation of the politics/military nexus, and certain intellectual abilities. These, and other attributes are not possessed by many. There tuning of the art of command. As Winston Churchill wrote, [wars] highest solution must be evolved from the eye and brain and soul of a single man nothing but genius, the demon in man, can answer the riddles of war. 22 Geography Geography is an interesting dimension of strategy when con sidering the impact of cyberspace. Cyberspace is largely a new man-made geographic environment where strategy is playedout. The development and maturation of this new environment has strategic implications. However, the existing forms of ge ography (especially the land environment) represent an abiding background for the conduct of strategy. In some respects, cy berspace appears to diminish the impact or relevance of certain terrains. For example, global positioning system navigation has all but eliminated the chances of getting lost in featureless desert terrain. Some analysts, like Dr. Martin C. Libicki, have even suggested that the coming dominance of information op geography entirely. 23 cause information operations will rarely be decisive. Secondly, as Clausewitz argued (although of course not using such terms as information dominance), even if information dominance co erces one side to capitulate, it is not information dominance per se that acts as the coercive force. Rather, it is the prospect of what would happen if physical battle took place that represents the true coercive element. 24 Finally, it is an inescapable truism that people live on the land and at some point control has to be exerted on the ground. Nonetheless, the obvious dominance of the land environ space as a new or developing geography for strategy. Thus, it is important to understand the nature of cyberspace and to train and equip oneself to operate effectively within it. The current article is not the place to undertake a detailed analysis of the na ture of cyberspace. The one point that is worth making, and in achieve. Therefore, akin to the air and sea environments, the best one can hope for is to achieve control of a certain aspect of cyberspace for long enough to achieve ones goals. Friction, Chance, and Uncertainty Cyberspace has something of a dichotomous relationship with friction. In some important respects the exploitation of cyberspace helps to reduce uncertainty and thereby diminishes an important source of friction. Some form of control of cy formation among friendly forces. Control does, however, have other positive effects. Either by acts of deception, or by inter sary can be increased. Despite these positive effects, friction is so varied in its causes that it can never be entirely removed. Uncertainty may be reduced, but it can never be eradicated. Although information can be collected and disseminated on a wide range of relevant topics, some knowledge is much more quality of enemy forces are somewhat intangible factors in war fare. The exploitation of cyberspace also has the potential to create new sources of friction. Most obviously, the increased processes, leading to information overload. In addition, net This could have particularly serious consequences for a force accustomed to an information-rich operating environment. In in order to help reduce certain causes of friction. However, it must be remembered that friction acts upon cyberspace, just as much as cyberspace acts upon friction. Adversary From an internal perspective the process by which military force produces positive political outcomes (strategy) is chal lenging enough. The task is further complicated by interaction with an intelligent and active foe. And yet, as Gray notes, it is easy to overlook this fundamental dimension when one is lost home or within an alliance. 25 role is no more simply and effectively expressed than by the Confederate General George Pickett, who, when asked why they had lost the battle of Gettysburg replied, I think the Union Army had something to do with it. 26 As noted in relation to a number of the dimensions already discussed, cyberspace cre ates a range of opportunities to increase ones chances against the enemy. Either by attacking enemy information systems, or sourceful enemy will soon understand the basis for such an im balance in capabilities. He can then either operate in a manner force, or he can attack the system and processes upon which ones forces rely. As Gray notes, what works today will not work tomorrow, precisely because it did work today. 27 This does not mean that the advantages to be gained from cyber space will be quickly negated. It is merely to note that strategy is a competitive and dynamic activity and advantages have to be constantly fought for and maintained. Time Although time is essentially a constant, perceptions of it can be manipulated for strategic effect. 28 In one sense, cyberspace
25 High Frontier enables one to operate at the speed of electrons. A fairly simple information attack can be completed within the same timeframe it takes an email to reach its destination. Even if we assume that a war will include physical military forces, cyberspace still offers the potential to conclude ones operations more rapidly than in the past. Precision-guided munitions suggest that an air campaign can hit all of its main targets within minutes and well-coordinated networked surface forces should be able to operate with an increased tempo of operations. Therefore, at least in theory, the exploitation of cyberspace brings with it the promise of shorter, more decisive forms of war. However, such possibilities, when added to the social and political impact of images from the battlespace, may produce an intolerance to protracted wars. In such circumstances, the advantages of a protracted war, long recognized by irregular forces, may have even greater potency. Thus, although cyberspace may enable a modern force to compress the time dimension, enemies may be able to counter that, and thereby exploit a new Achilles heal. Conclusion of cyberspace reaches into all of the dimensions of strategy. cal levels. Theoretically, the role of cyberspace must become embedded in our thoughts and thereby be accepted in the same way that we accept the air and space environments for example. In turn, this must be represented in doctrine, so that ideas can be translated into practice in the most effective manner possible. At a practical level, it is essential that strategic actors prepare implications for the development of military culture, organiza tion, and capability requirements. The further rationalization of cyberspace commands and operations is therefore to be wel comed. However, at the same time we must resist the tempta tion to assume that the maturation of cyberspace has funda mentally changed the nature of strategy, or indeed enabled the development of radically new operational concepts. War will remain a violent, competitive political act, laden with friction. The man on the scene with a gun will continue to be the ulti mate arbiter in war. The exploitation of cyberspace is merely a means to support that man in his role. 1 This is a reference to Clausewitzs distinction between the character and nature of war. The former is changeable, whereas the latter is not. See Carl von Clausewitz, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 2 For discussions on the paradoxical logic and disharmony within the levels see Edward N. Luttwak, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987). For a general discussion on the nature of war see David J. Lonsdale et al., Strategy, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 2008). 3 Colin S. Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Grays work on the dimensions of strategy builds upon earlier work on the subject by both Clausewitz and Michael Howard. For the latter, see Michael Howard, The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, For 57 (1979): 976-986. 4 Gray, Modern Strategy, 26. 5 For a discussion of strategic information warfare see, for example, G. Rattray, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 6 For a detailed analysis of these obstacles see David J. Lonsdale, The (London: Frank Cass, 2004) especially pages 151-166. 7 J. C. Wylie, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1967). 8 Clausewitz, 89. 9 For a discussion of these issues see J. T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76, no. 1 (1997), and J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, The (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). 10 For a discussion of humane warfare see C. Coker, (London: Routledge, 2001). 11 Leading exponents on the rise of the network are Arquilla and Ron feldt. See John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). 12 Such claims are evident in the work of Martin Libicki. See, for ex ample, Martin C. Libicki, The Emerging Primacy of Information, Orbis 40, no. 2 (1996). 13 B. Lambeth, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 14 Gray, 39. 15 Ibid., 36. 16 US Joint Forces Command, (Norfolk, VA: Concepts Department J9, 2001), 5. 17 Clausewitz, 271. 18 J. F. C. Fuller, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946). 19 Gray, 38. 20 David J. Lonsdale, (Lon don: Routledge, 2007). 21 This argument is strongly made in John Ellis, (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1990). 22 Winston S. Churchill, quoted in M. Carver, Montgomery, ed. J. Keegan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 148. 23 M. Libicki, The Emerging Primacy of Information. 24 Clausewitz, 97 25 Gray, 42 26 Quoted in R. L. DiNardo and J. Hughes, Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare, 9, no. 4 (1995), 76. 27 Gray, 42. 28 Whilst on the Earth and operating at normal speeds time is essential ly constant. However, it is recognized by this author that time is actually from large masses and speed of travel. Dr. David J. Lonsdale (MA, Aberdeen; MA, Hull; PhD, Hull) is a lecturer in Strate gic Studies at the University of Hull. Prior to this he worked at the University of Read ing, and was a lecturer in Defence Studies at Kings College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. His primary area of research is strategic theory and its application to contemporary and his torical issues. Dr Lonsdales publications include The Nature of War in the Informa the Great: Lessons in Strategy, Clausewitz and Information War fare, in and Strategy, in Understanding Modern Warfare
High Frontier 26 Mr. Timothy L. Thomas Senior Analyst Fort Leavenworth, Kansas T aiwanese military specialists have studied Chinese IW topics for over two decades. Due to their common language, culture, and close proximity with the mainland, the Taiwanese are capable of discerning nuances in the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLAs) approach to IW that might escape a Western analyst. Some of the interesting PLA IW concepts that Taiwanese military professionals have discussed, for example, include: Acupuncture war Highly-controlled war Strategic information war Political work Web sites Intangible war Net force Surgical war Understanding the PLAs potential use of information tech nology and IW theory is key to the future security strategy of the Republic of Taiwan. It is mandatory for Taiwanese govern ment and civilian professionals to study Chinese IW intensely and be able to predict and foresee the PLAs potential use of IW against Taiwan in both peacetime and wartime. This article will examine Taiwans analysis of several issues (asymmetric war, IW theory, political work and psychological war, media war, and PLA IW institutes) associated with PLA IW. Also covered in this article will be Taiwans view of the PLAs focus on the revolution in military affairs and how that revolution has transformed the PLA from a mechanized to an informationized force. These developments impact the PLAs policy, organization, education, structure, and theory of IW. 1 A Taiwanese View of the Peoples Liberation Armys Revolution in Military Affairs The Chinese military has studied the meaning and impact of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) for more than two decades. While it might be assumed that Chinas understanding of the RMA would be similar to that of the US or other nations, it is not. For example, in 2001, retired Chinese Maj Gen Wang ization where theory and practice are the focus. He added that Chinese progress toward an RMA is signaled by its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence modern ization, network-based war-gaming, IW personnel training and 2 Thus Wangs Chinese perspective indicates that the information revolution is the key component of the current RMA. US analyst Richard O. shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which ei ther renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competen cies of a dominant player; or creates one or more new core com petencies, in some new dimension of warfare; or both. 3 The US and Chinese differences most likely are a direct re is in technology while the Chinese rely on theory and strategy to enable (in their opinion) their inferior force to overcome US ure with an opinion on the RMA. One Chinese author noted that the RMA is really a cognition system revolution and a new phase in military strategy research. Another author added that the RMA involves a series of changes to military theory, meth ods of operations, weaponry, systems organization, command organization, and so on; an understanding closer to most US RMA concepts. One thing is certain: the Chinese hope to develop an RMA concept with Chinese characteristics. A Chinese general noted that Only with superior thought processes and superior moves, and by seeking a developmental strategy of imbalance will we truly be able to avoid traveling the path that the enemy expects. In the realm of IW, trying to keep up with the Jones by developing whatever they possess will lead to falling into traps set by others 4 Taiwans understanding of the Chinese RMA does not neces sarily coincide with these views completely. Maj Li An-yao, who was serving in the Air Force Command of the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan when he wrote about this topic, stated that the revolution in military affairs has changed Chinas strategic views on international security and on constructing acteristics of the Chinese communists revolution in military affairs that concern Taiwan: the gap in military technologies has affected Chinas national security and forced the PLA to place priority on technological development; the transformation has forced adjustments in battle thought, theory, equipment, and training (this point coincides with Chinese theorists noted above); a show of weakness by the PLA can help thwart the China threat theories being developed; the study of asymmetri cal and unrestricted warfare has developed deterrents and coun ters to Western developments (currently such thinking includes the use of a preemptive strike); and IW can help win a future war in the Taiwan Strait since it is marked by high technologies, a brief time period, and few casualties. 5 Li was impressed with the contributions of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to new thinking and its impact on cur rent projections. Deng emphasized Peoples War (PW) under Cyberspace
27 High Frontier modern conditions and he recommended a shift in the center of gravity in Chinese decision-making to economic construction and the development of science and technology. Today toplevel decision-makers in China understand fully the importance of economic modernization alongside military modernization. Modernization helps China change its way of conducting a war. Li writes that the Chinese link IW to a technical form of war ture of a war. Chinas RMA must be laced with such Chinese characteristics in accordance with the societal shift in the forms of technology and war from the mechanized to the information age. 6 However, Li also pointed out Chinas RMA weaknesses. First among them is the age of the military leadership. Next are obstacles in the development of new weapons and equip ment such as increased costs, the lag in domestically produced weapons, the technical integration of weapons purchased from foreign nations, and the reliability of precision guidance com ponents. Finally, China lacks experience in offensive operations and in Navy and Air Force operations. Li concluded by noting that Taiwan must pay close attention to the direction of Chinas army building, study the course and results of PLA military re form, and draw upon the experience of the rise of the Chinese communists following the path of overcoming strength with knowledge as soon as possible. 7 wrote about Chinas RMA concept. While noting that the PLA must expedite its military reform with Chinese characteristics, Hsu believes China must also take into account the recent suc cesses of the US and its coalition partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In those locations, decapitation operations were utilized against the leadership of the regimes. These actions indicate one must innovate (the soul of the RMA to Hsu) and learn from other experiences such as those of the US if it wants to avoid perilous situations. 8 One of those lessons, Hsu writes, is that China must be adept at highly-controlled warfare since it was a special characteris tic of the war in Iraq. The PLAs Academy of Military Science noted that the 2003 US-Iraq war was characterized by a high control level, high demand for control, and a high degree of control. War is evolving from general war to highly controlled war. This change is felt not only in military affairs, but also in the emphasis on control over political, economic, and other sec tors to include psychological control. Highly-controlled war is a new form of warfare in which the direct purpose is to control a political regime and in which political, economic, diplomat ic, and other resources are integrated effectively to control the scale, form, means, and results of the war, with the backing of absolute military superiority. 9 War is expanding from tangible to intangible war as a result. 10 Other ways in which Chinas RMA differs from Western countries include: Pursing a different strategic purpose than the West (which pursues world hegemony in Chinas opinion). Utilizing different motivations than the West to stay in line with the profound changes in modern warfare. Starting from a different technological point than the West, since China is still going through the late stages of mechanization. Utilizing different operational RMA forms, such as leap frog developments instead of the Wests gradual develop ment. 11 For these reasons, Hsu notes, the PLA cannot copy the model of advanced Western countries. It must be familiar with the laws of the RMA and apply their contextual situation to it in order to avoid being trapped in an arms race with the West as happened to the former Soviet Union. Study of the Iraq war and US suc cesses in Kosovo convinced China that the idea of winning local wars under high-tech conditions had evolved to that of winning informatized war based on high-tech conditions. 12 A Taiwanese View of the Peoples Liberation Armys Asymmetric War Concept In the information age, stratagems and psychological opera tions of all types can play havoc with an opponent especially when combined with the use or even potential use of exotic scription and they are not restricted by time and space. Strata gems used in the time of Sun Tzu are equally applicable in the virtual environment of today. Asymmetric warfare is a method for China to deal effectively with its current potential superpower opponent, the US. Sur gical war, paralyzing war, and unrestricted warfare operations are all examples of asymmetric warfare operational measures that the Taiwanese ascribe to the PLA. Taiwanese author Chen which any two opposing parties in a war can try their best in us ing their own advantages in strategy, weapons technology, and applications of their arms and services as much as possible to overwhelmingly. 13 Chen states that stratagems are one of the most typical ways that China uses asymmetric warfare. He notes that a stratagem is used to force an enemy to make mistakes which can then be taken advantage of. He quoted from a few Chinese military classics to demonstrate this point: In the art of warfare, a psychological offense is better than capturing a city, and a psychological war is preferable to an armed war. ~ Zhu Ge Liang A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander in chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. ~ Chapter VII: Maneuvering, Sun Tzus All warfare is based on deception. ~ Chapter I: Laying Plans, Sun Tzus In war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. ~ Chapter VI: Weak Points and Strong, Sun Tzus battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to se cure victory. ~ Chapter V: Energy, Sun Tzus
High Frontier 28 Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected. ~ Chapter I: Laying Plans, Sun Tzus Art of In war practice dissimulation and you will succeed. ~ Chapter VII: Maneuvering, Sun Tzus Thus the highest form of generalship is to frustrate the enemys plans. ~ Chapter III: Attack by Stratagem, Sun Tzus The key to overcome an enemy relies more on the use of strategy to deceive the enemy than the use of force. Thus, people who are good at commanding the troops are those who can deceive and who also can avoid being deceived. ~ Chapter on Deception, Jie Xuans Chen focused on technological aspects of asymmetric war fare operations that aim to paralyze an opponent before their destruction, if the latter scenario was even needed. First are soft-kill weapon systems, which include electronic jamming equipment, computer viruses, directed-energy weapons, laser beam weapons, and non-directed-energy weapons. Second are precision and remote tactical missile attacks, not only aimed at troop assembly points or hardware construction targets, but also aimed to paralyze command, control, communications, comput ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), ra dar reconnaissance systems, and command center targets. Third is the development of an electronic warfare (EW) capability, electromagnetic pulse weapons, and the ability to construct a comprehensive surgical warfare infrastructure (based on im porting weapons from Russia at an increased tempo). Surgical warfare aims to attack the vulnerability of high-tech weapons cripple the whole system. Finally, the development of a space warfare capability puts the crowning touch on Chinas asym metric warfare capability: the ability to sabotage or destroy an enemys space systems. Chens conclusion was that China is headed quickly in the direction of winning a regional war under high-tech conditions via asymmetric warfare operations. It is unfortunate that he did not go into more detail as to how the two areas he covered (stratagems and technology) might be integrated. Another author, Chung Chien, wrote that a symmetric war involving the PLA and other nations may last for a long time and is not an option sought by China. An asymmetric warfare operation, on the other hand, has the opportunity to last but a matter of hours or weeks and would be a preferred operation, one without bloodshed. Two types of operations that Chung mentioned the PLA might enact were: a PLA long range block ade of Taiwans sea lines of communication, cutting Taiwans logistic life-line through the Spratlys; and an electromagnetic pulse attack that would shut down all services in Taiwan and make command and control impossible. 14 A Taiwanese View of the Peoples Liberation Armys Information Warfare Concept Taiwanese professor Pan Chin-chang wrote in 2007 that the PLA views informatized warfare (another way of saying IW) as a war pattern which refers to that included under nuclear deterrence in the information age, where two sides in a war use information as the lead, comprehensively use information to in tegrate platforms and informatized weapons, and conduct joint combat efforts by multiple services and branches in all-dimen sional space, including land, sea, air, space, and electronics. 15 Informatized warfare includes precision combat, network com bat, special operations, and space combat. Such combat in cludes direct attacks that jump over time and space and aim to paralyze the opponents combat system. 16 Informatized warfare will require the comprehensive integration of four capabilities: and accurate strikes. 17 The PLAs IW focus is on the control of information. The ability to manipulate information and seize information supremacy is the preeminent quality in future war, according to Pan. 18 This was not always the view that Taiwan took of PLA IW theory and practice. In fact, Taiwans views of the PLAs IW capability have evolved over time. In the late 1990s, Lin Chinching, director of the Telecommunications Bureau of the Min istry of National Defense (MND) in Taiwan, served as a promi nent spokesman for IW issues and continued to do so for several years. He listed three ways that China might strike at Taiwans digital infrastructure. First, he stated that Chinas goal was to paralyze Taiwan by destroying its command and control sys tem using an electromagnetic device the size of a briefcase. 19 Second, citing EW theory, he said China would use acupunc ture-point-prodding, the ancient Chinese martial art theory of taking out an enemy with a strike on a pressure point. Finally, he noted that China would try to steal Taiwans military secrets via the Internet or the use of computer viruses. 20 In response to the Chinese IW threat, Lin says Taiwan set up a Strategy Planning Committee for IW. He noted that Tai wan had also established computer emergency response teams; established a telecommunication and information security committee; stipulated laws and relations concerning telecom munications and information security; improved procedures to access computers; and installed warning devices on all net works to strengthen the awareness of computer personnel about potential threats. 21 Taiwan is also trying to make people aware of the Chinese potential to spread false news about the stock market through the mass media and cause confusion or panic in society. 22 cial for the development of IW capabilities on both sides of the strait. He noted that China had established an IW simulation center, developed viruses to be used in attacks against networks, and imported foreign information technology and equipment. By 2005 he believed the PLA could establish a neural network systems to provide better troop mobility; develop a tactical data link system; digitize and mobilize command and control sys tems; strengthen satellite communications research and devel As a communist totalitarian nation, China will also use the entire nations effort to mobilize IWs development. 23
29 High Frontier Also in 2000, Taiwan Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen stated that a military unit in charge of cyber warfare would be estab lished. The unit would be responsible for protecting Taiwans computer systems from hackers and for denying access to un under the rank of lieutenant general would be tested on their knowledge of IW and computer information and that their test reviewed for promotion. 24 The initial military cyber unit would be a battalion sized unit of specialized troops with a focus on the development of IW and EW capabilities, especially C4ISR. These areas will account for 23 percent of the defense budget according to Lin. 25 In 2005 another Taiwanese author with the last name of Lin, Lin Tsung-ta, who by reputation is one of Taiwans most out standing scholars on Chinese IW, wrote a book titled He focused on Chinese IWs asymmetric character, its use of civilian entities and ap plicability to PW theory, and its preemptive and deterring quali ties. Chinese IW requires attacking vital points, words that are conceptually similar to Lins focus on acupuncture war. 26 Lin noted that Chinas National Defense Science and Tech is EW/command and control warfare equipment. The second is offensive information weaponry, described as: computer virus weapons, nano-machines, chip microbes; hackers; high energy radio frequency guns; and power damaging munitions. The third type of weaponry is defensive weapons, to include: network multi-layer Internet defense networks. Further, Lin added that combat power in the opinion of many Chinese scholars lies in the control and counter-control of information since those who future wars. 27 There are new types of PW, Lin stated, such as hacker force and propaganda force PW. Like military forces they can ob tain military intelligence, bolster morale, and interfere with an enemy information system. Combat goals can be reached simply by damaging another sides economy. Peoples IW is an asymmetric and non-violent type of national war. China is deepening the study of Network PW mobilization education to make every Netizen (Internet citizen) a network combat ant. Mobilizing IW talent in the military and in society will be the key to future successes. As of 2005, the PLA had carried out deliberations on organizational institutions for PW, civil ian mobilization plans, strategies and tactics, and training for Network PW. Strategies provide an intangible combat power according to Lin. Legal systems, secrecy, market competition, and intellectual property rights are other ways to add intangible power to the PLAs arsenal. 28 Peoples IW uses asymmetric operational methods to enable bat zone and in the enemys rear area. Moreover the goal of Chinese PW is to proactively protect international information infrastructures while attacking enemy rear political, economic, and military information systems, damaging the enemys eco nomic order in the rear, weakening the enemys combat poten process, enterprises and individuals nationwide use their com puters, communications equipment, and other information sys tems signals and resources to provide sustained support to the nations information infrastructure in the strategic rear. 29 Finally, PW strategy relies heavily on military moderniza tion. Economic growth is crucial and a high-tech national de fense industry must be developed. Lin notes that China intends to pursue international exchanges to increase its national de fense economic potential. 30 In September 2007 Maj Gen Tschai Hui-chen, the director of Information Assurance for Taiwans Ministry of National Defense and deputy chief of the general staff for communica tions, electronics, and information, spoke at a conference at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Tschai noted in a section of her report to conference attendees that with regard to threats and challenges before Taiwan, China remains the greatest concern in both ar eas. She discussed general information security threats, stra tegic IW threats, and general security threats posed by Chinas emphasis on IW. Of interest is that in her report, she covered many of the topics listed in Taiwans view of Chinese IW from the mid-1990s: deterrence, paralysis, network force, asymmet ric war, strategic information war, long-range precision war, and network psychological war. 31 Thus it appears that Taiwans concerns with regard to Chinese IW have not changed much over the years other than to stress that the Chinese are more advanced in both their budgetary spending on and development of information technology. Naturally, even though the general categories have remained basically the same, each is much more sophisticated and ad vanced than it was in the 1990s. A Taiwanese View on the Peoples Liberation Armys Political Work and Psychological War The PLA has always been expert at the use of psychological warfare techniques, particularly the application of psychologi Strait in 1996 and the development of an Anti-Secession Law in 2005 exerted both psychological pressure on Taiwan to toe the line and abandon any thoughts of independence from the mainland. A recent episode of psychological pressure involved the former Russian Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier Varyag. Chinese sailors and civilians refurbishing the carrier state that it will soon be renamed the Shi Lang (after the Chinese general China paid attention to the island). 32 Mr. Pan Chin-chang, a teacher at Taiwans National Defense University in 2007, wrote a few excellent articles on the PLAs informatized political work and use of psychological warfare techniques. Pan described the PLAs political work database and political work Web site that enhances the combat functions of informatized political work. The PLA believes, he writes, that informatized warfare is not just competition in weapons and equipment but also in ideology, will power, political strength,
High Frontier 30 spiritual factors, and psychological capacity. Information in cludes not only military information transmitted by digitized weapons and equipment but also political and ideological infor mation to be used to launch psychological offensives against the enemy. Informatized warfare involves not only the competition of military force but also non-military competition of political and psychological power. 33 Pan stated that on 20 October 2005 the PLA inaugurated its political work Web site. No longer would paper be the only way to convey teaching materials. The Web sites operations center is located at the General Political Department in Beijing. The six major functions of the Web site are operational guid ance, news and information dissemination, propaganda and education, study and training, culture and entertainment, and communication and interaction. The site offers online lectures, distance learning, and even psychological counseling. 34 The site is carrying some 3,000 items per day, the Web site is updated every minute, there are 44 channels, including nine interactive and online-posting channels, which carry 382 sec ond-level columns, 2,530 third-level columns, 53 large-sized databases, numerous books, videos, and games, more than 1,000 kinds of newspapers and journals, and every article document can be opened and refreshed instantly. 35 National Defense Uni versity has developed six types of software for political work command platforms for the site and is researching over thirty projects concerning the informatization of political work. 36 The PLA is studying other aspects of political work as well. A symposium held at Nanjings Academy of Political Science in December 2004, for example, highlighted eight aspects of ings as: developing the theory of informatization of political work; training professionals; applying information technol ogy to political work; developing and enriching information resources; allocating information equipment and facilities to political work; constructing political work for an information network; formulating policies, laws, ordinances, and standards for the informatization of political work; and enhancing infor mation-related capabilities of political work cadres. The Nan jing Academy stressed the importance of political competition in future wars, citing competition in political stratagem, media propaganda, and psychological manipulation as well as legal competition. 37 Psychological warfare, a major aspect of informatized war fare and political work, is now a part of the PLAs state strategy, Pan added. This has resulted in the development of the follow ing categories: political psychological warfare, economic psy chological warfare, military psychological warfare, diplomatic psychological warfare, religious psychological warfare, cultural psychological warfare, propaganda psychological warfare, and deterrent psychological warfare. All of these types of psycho logical warfare can be used to enhance beheading an enemy force instead of attacking it with conventional forces. 38 Regarding the future development of psychological warfare, the PLA proposes: Establishing psychological warfare command institutes Creating psychological warfare specialty troops Setting up psychological warfare research institutes Cultivating a team of psychological key members Developing psychological warfare technologies and de vices Establishing special psychological warfare training ven ues And establishing psychological warfare platforms with computer networks 39 The use of these facilities will enable the PLA to stealthily substitute one thing for another, to replace and edit people and landscapes in a virtual world, and to produce some false and shocking scenes to deceive and incite discontent. Network con frontation training is required to improve the conduct of net work psychological warfare and help develop countermeasures against its use by enemy forces. Troops are developing and conducting simulated training using sound, light, electronics, and information technologies. 40 litical Work Research Institute of the PLAs Academy of Mili tary Science, Gong Fangbin, wrote that: A study by the PLA General Staff Department also concluded that the actual cases of the several high-tech wars in recent years have shown that information technology, when applied to the ment of instant psychological warfare propaganda operations; the invention of intellectual equipment for psychological war and the integration of psychological warfare and armed war fare. 41 Political cadres must be capable of buttressing local opinion and demoralizing enemy attitudes. With regard to local opin ion, cadres must be able to manipulate information and launch the three types of warfare (legal, public opinion, and psycho logical) before a military operation begins. This will ensure that the people are on the side of the armed forces and that they will trust that the war being fought is a just war, according to Pans interpretation of the PLAs work. With regard to demoralizing the enemy, Pan cites PLA Professor Zhang Zhaozhong, who noted that it is necessary to distort the enemys cognition sys tem through IW and psychological warfare, and thus win a war 42 Zhang also stressed the importance of strategic IW as a new form of war that can take on an independent posture and even be launched several months or years before an armed invasion takes place. Targets of strategic IW include national political, monetary, communications, and other crucial sectors down to single weapon systems such as aircraft carriers. Developments can lead to the use of strategic deception, strategic psychological warfare, strategic deterrence, or strategic information attacks. 43 Not all is well with political work in the PLA, however, ac cording to Pan. He notes that duplicate organizations still exist, lent as top-down communications, and communication equip ment is still susceptible to damage. These constraints continue to limit the effectiveness of the PLAs political work Web site. However, the PLA will continue to use military force alone in
31 High Frontier the absence of other psychological factors to continue to intimi date Taiwan. 44 A Taiwanese View on the Peoples Liberation Armys Media Warfare Closely related to political work and psychological opera of research in terms of terminology, media warfare appears to be an updated version of propaganda work whose impor tance, the PLA ascertains, has not diminished. As Mao noted, the Red Armys priority in conducting its propaganda work is and most important work for the Red Army. 45 In a high-tech will have to overcome a psychology of fear, panic, isolation, and pessimism. Solid media warfare prepared ahead of time can help alleviate some of these concerns. 46 Taiwan researcher Liu Wan-lin discussed how China had closely followed the two Gulf Wars and drawn several important conclusions. The PLA believes that the media must be managed and controlled to establish an effective propaganda system that puts pressure on an opponent. The true nature of a war must be publicized, as well as world opinion about the war and the PLAs policy. World opinion should be prepared ahead of time since modern war is a political and diplomatic process as well as a military process, according to Lius analysis of Chinese media. Media warfare can create opportunities and conditions strategy simultaneously. 47 Media warfare is an aspect of former Chinese President Jiang Zemins three warfare concept for political work that includes media war, legal war, and psychological war. Due to media the PLA issued a new PLA Political Work Regulation and di rected military educational organizations to increase their focus on this topic. More than 50 software suites on political work, The Academy of Military Science created a Research Center for Cross-Strait Issues and a Research Institute for Political Work. 48 and soldiers were provided a booklet titled Concise Handbook of Law-Abiding Combat Operations and the Nanjing Political Academy opened a new course called Media Warfare. The PLAs Xian Political Academy handed out materials on 100 Questions and Answers on Media Warfare, Psychological War fare, and Legal Warfare. They prepared a course on Political Warfare Operational Command Automation and established more than 10 new research and teaching divisions to include a psychological warfare department, a military security protection department, a wartime political warfare work division, and an information technology and political warfare work division. 49 Media warfare measures can help China win the consent and support of the international community. The PLA hopes to off set the use of deceptive propaganda by a potential opponent and thereby assure that the direction of the media and public opinion is on the side of the PLA. The PLA will also continue to contain Taiwan, in Lius opinion, via the use of the US while promoting its One China policy. 50 A Taiwanese View of the Peoples Liberation Armys Electronic Warfare Assets PLAs electronic warfare capabilities. They cover topics such as the PLAs capabilities, troops, EW attack potential, and Tai wanese responses. Navy Commander Hsu Keng-wei wrote on the PLAs EW attack options in 2008 and his article will be highlighted here. 51 Hsu stated that the PLA has built a dense network of elec tronic monitoring stations and radar early warning installations opposite Taiwan. The function of these assets is to surveil, detect, and jam Taiwanese anti-air, early warning, and control facilities. Recently, the PLA has succeeded in reverse engineer ing the EW equipment of several countries which has greatly improved their capabilities. They have also learned how to at tach EW equipment to unmanned aerial vehicles. Hsu added that the East China Electronic Warfare Network has learned how to integrate all EW troops stationed in Zhejiang and Fujian and focus them on Taiwan. 52 Taiwan scholars believe that by 2012 the PLA will have electromagnetic pulse weapons capable of paralyzing Taiwans electronic business, aviation controls, banks, the stock market, and the Internet if war erupts. A computer network attack could also take the form of a preemptive move by the PLA to jam and paralyze US support before a war begins. Hsu named the HD 5, HD 6, and TU-154 aircraft as EW re connaissance and jamming platforms designed for use against platforms available to the PLA, recent Chinese successes in space have added to Taiwans concerns. These successes, from Hsus perspective, indicate that China can collect a huge amount of information on Taiwan and establish an electronic order of battle to weaken our militarys EW capability and further de stroy our EW facilities for command, control, communication, and intelligence. 53 The PLA regularly practices working in an intense EW environment in their military exercises which has increased their practical experience in this area. In acupuncture 54 A Taiwanese View of Chinas Military Information Warfare Institutes Taiwanese reporter Liao Wenzhong, in a set of two articles on Chinas military net force, listed a series of institutes and programs in China associated with the IW effort. He set the of its in which it disclosed that the PLA had formed a science and tech nology experimental force in order to respond to 21 st century warfare challenges. 55 The force included a space, net, EW, and psychological warfare force that serves as the basic force for
High Frontier 32 IW. The PLA would be responsible for offensive network war fare and EW while other aspects (network security, psychologi cal warfare, and intelligence warfare) would be the responsibil ity of other government departments. This was far from the beginning of the Chinese effort, as the following time line for IW developments demonstrates. Much of the work began in the early 1990s. All of these references were included in Liaos two articles: 1992 Chinese authorities develop the China Internet Plan controlled by the mainland. 56 1997 The Communist Party of China (CPC) creates the Na tional Informatization Leadership Group. 57 renewed the project for the main computers of the gen and the use of equipment with low electromagnetic leaks were instituted. 58 1998 The State Council created the Ministry of Informa tion Industry; 59 and the Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security created the State Research Center of Anti-Computer Invasion and the Prevention of Viruses. The Third Research Institute trains infor mation security agents to be responsible for the pre vention and handling of computer viruses and basic testing. It takes on projects from the State 863 Plan and the design plan of the Gold Shield Project Security Support System. 60 1999 The CPC started to create information warriors. 61 1999 The Central Military Commission of the PLA estab teaching section at the Xian PLA Political College. Courses taught included military and social psychol ogy, psychology under high-tech conditions, network warfare and psychological warfare, and psychological warfare theories and practices. 62 2001-03 The PLA created research centers within related IW zhou (IW simulation research center), Jinan (IW con research center), Nanjing (IW intelligence research center), and Xian (IW operations research center). The IW operation research center in Beijing has worked with the special information research center, former ly known as the psychic function research center. 63 2002 The IW division of the national strategic level of the CPC determined that the PLA would be responsible for EW and IW, also known as integrated network and EW; the 4 th Department of the General Staff is to form a net force composed of the PLA and information militia from the National Defense Mobilization Com mission and civil information technology industry, of 64 2002 It is predicted that there are 46 million Internet users in China. 65 2002 The Ministry of Defense set up scholarships and ac cepted more than 200 students from different universi ties to study and then work for the military after gradu ation. 66 2002 The PLA presented the concept of a local war under informatized conditions to replace the term local war under high-tech conditions. 67 2002 The formation of an information militia for all of Chi nents: an EW unit, a network warfare unit, a hacker unit, and an information rescue unit. Wartime tasks in clude extensive reconnaissance, information defense, and information attacks. 682003-04 Large information technology companies in developed in cities on the east coast of mainland China create na tional defense information militia units. 69 2003 The CPC and State Council approved the Ministry of Public Securitys effort to build the Gold Shield Proj ect, which would transform the entire information management sector of the public security system into an electronic version. 70 2003 The State Development and Reform Commission of the State Council approved the 1203 Project of the Ministry of Public Security, the public key infrastruc ture, and authorization management systems. 71 2004 The Ministry of Public Security and departments of public security in six provinces and municipalities were connected to security application systems with the PKI/PMI platform. 72 2004 The number of Internet crime cases rose from 2,700 in 2000 to 13,600 in 2004; the number of network po lice and network security guards in China rises to 230,000. China recognizes the need for an indepen dent Chinese Internet. 73 2005 News networks in the US focusing on propaganda war at the enemys rear had been formed. 74 2005 A Network Security Information Agency was orga nized, a social mechanism more like informants for intelligence agencies. They monitor social situations, perform social control, and conduct special case inves tigations of network use. Among network friends they are referred to as net spies. 75 Ministry of Information Industry jointly issued the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News and Information Services. Anti-government speeches are not allowed under this provision. 76 2005 There were close to 130 million Internet users in China. 77 2006 The CPC declares that wireless local area network (WLAN) Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure Association has been created in Beijing. It is the Chi nese National Standard for WLAN to which China has independent intellectual property rights. 78 2006 The reports that the
33 High Frontier Second Artillery Force has created an informatized blue army formed by professional electronics infor tronic and network attacks against the red army. 79 2006 China cracks down on Internet crime and requires net work users to go online with their actual names, iden 80 Other organizations and programs do exist but no dates were provided for their founding. In his article on network decapi tation, Liao listed state (party) and PLA organizations. At the state level there is the Network and Information Security Team responsible for coordinating all institutes responsible for infor mation security, such as the Ministries of Public Security, State Accreditation Administration, among others. The Public In formation Network Security Supervision Bureau and the Net Supervision Division are in charge of the national network for information security. Some responsibility is also shared with the Division of Network and Information Security under the In formation Communication Bureau for network secrets protec tion and security. 81 With regard to the PLA, Liao noted that it is the 4 th Depart ment of the General Staff that is responsible for compiling IW textbooks in China. The PLA has conducted many red ver sus blue IW exercises. It was noted that the formation of the blue army by the PLA is meant to copy the combat meth odology of the Red Team in the USs IW development cen ter. Military exercises with IW subthemes, such as Vanguard 206B,showed how different sub-phases, characteristics, armed services, branches, and transportation equipment could be in tegrated through the information power of an EW troops net force. 82 The PLA believes there will be a battle for virtual territory der the State Mobilization Commission. It will continue to try to become independent of the world of networks by developing a China Internet as well. Liao concluded the article by noting the following: The net force is a brand new type of Grand War scheme that combines high-tech knowledge with politics, economy, psychol ogy, and information networks and that is all people being sol diers, the integration of peace and warfare, and dual usage for the military and civilians. The combat types of the net force include both offense and defense. It must cooperate with strictly designed psychological warfare, and must possess the capabil ity of acquiring 24-hour accurate intelligence. Furthermore, it requires a set of rapid and dense network platforms for intel and from all directions. 83 Chinas independent and dedicated net force will be able to hide while Taiwans Microsoft system will be exposed. Taiwan sible. In the article on network security, Liao also discussed or ganizations and the PLA. The CPC formed an Information is mainly responsible for the overall mobilization of Chinese manpower and resources during wartime. Thus the military can incorporate the local information forces through the informa the goal of utilizing the civil forces for military purposes and integrating peacetime and wartime. Civil forces include the information industry, communications management posts, com munications science and technology, information education, broadcasting and TV, and satellite communications. 84 The CPCs Department of Information Industry has a secret science. These individuals are termed network warriors and have the freedom to test computer programs. They are taught to monitor Internet surfers or become hackers, software designers, or decoders. Others are sent abroad to settle in a foreign country and become a station for Chinas IW efforts in that country. 85 The Psychological Warfare Institute concluded that psycho logical warfare must be integrated from the beginning of a con deterrence; must utilize network warfare throughout while pre venting the enemy from breaking into friendly units; and must have a design aligned with national policies, strategies, and the CPCs military strategy and psychological warfare effort. The latter is the base for strategic warfare and uses the Internet and networks as representative operational techniques. 86 Chinas State Council has proposed that it will use McWILL (Multi-carrier Wireless Internet Local Loop) as its broadband wireless Internet system, to which it has independent intellec tual property rights. It can cover a radius of 19 kilometers and its urban single station coverage can be one to three kilometers. It can maintain good communication while moving at 72 miles per hour. 87 An organization that the PLA created is the Institute of Tech nology. It was created from the Communications Engineering College, the College of Engineering Force, the Meteorological College of the Air Force, and 63 other related research institutes Technology was the director of the 4 th Department of the Gen Institute founded a Research Center for Internet Technology for the entire army and allocated more than 400 experts and pro fessors to the center. The institute plans to accept 60 students with doctorate degrees each year to enrich its faculty. Research projects are focused on the organizational structure of the mili tary, weapons and equipment, campaign and tactics, education, training, and logistical support. 88 Conclusion There are areas of agreement between Taiwanese and West ern analysts as to the direction of Chinese IW. One obvious area of agreement is both groups focus on the Chinese interest in gaining control of cyber operations. Information supremacy
High Frontier 34 is another area of common agreement. Taiwanese IW experts do, however, extract a different terminological understanding in some cases than do Western analysts and these differences lead to different degrees of emphasis. Some of the interesting PLA IW concepts that Taiwanese mil itary professionals highlight in the discussion above included: Acupuncture war, which establishes the examination of critical points in a network that, much like the pressure points in martial arts, when taken out, can shut down an entire system. Highly-controlled war, which is a new form of warfare that attempts to control the scale, form, means, and results of a war with information. Strategic information war, which is understood to be the integration of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and other areas to produce an overall or comprehensive information victory. The targets of strategic IW include national political, monetary, communications, and other crucial sectors down to single weapon systems such as aircraft carriers. Political work Web sites, which have established distant learning capabilities and data-bases for quick access to information not readily available in the past. Intangible war, which focuses on strategies, market com petition, legal systems, and intellectual property rights. These are areas of importance that the West must not overlook. Network warriors are computer geniuses in computer sci ence who have the freedom to test computer programs. They are taught to monitor Internet surfers or become hackers, software designers, or decoders. Others are sent abroad to settle in a foreign country and become a station for Chinas IW efforts in that country. Further, it is important to remember that China obtained Microsofts code. We do not have the code that the Chinese will use internally and probably never will. This allows them to interact with our systems and code to a degree unimaginable in the past and in a way that we cannot replicate with their sys tem. Other Taiwanese observations of PLA capabilities were also of interest. For example, when reviewing Chinas military strat egies after the 17 th National Party Congress, several points were military strategy, for which Taiwan must be prepared. First, military strategy toward Taiwan revealed the requirement to win a partial war under informatization conditions by 2050. 89 The three step strategy to do so involves creating a solid infor mation base by 2010, achieving a quantum leap in technology around 2020, and achieving the goal of winning an informatiza tion war by the middle of the 21 st century. Further, Taiwan must consider not just how the PLA has turned from a semi-mechanized force to an informatized force but more importantly what this implies for their mode of op erations and application of military strength against Taiwan. In creased reconnaissance, monitoring, and long-range capabilities will increase the PLAs overall capacity and impact on Taiwans current assumptions about CPC invasion options. Decisive bat tle may be replaced by hide-and-seek operations under infor matization conditions that use deterrence, blockades, paralysis, and other information measures. Harassing attacks may be sup plemented with a threat put forward to take massive military action to force us into political peace talks. 90 Taiwan is rightly concerned with the aggressive direction that the Chinese have taken with their informatized force. A close that the PLA is making and how it will integrate them with their military forces operations and strategy. 1 This article is taken from a chapter in the authors forthcoming book slated for publication in the summer of 2009. 2 Wang Baocun, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs, China no. 5 (2001): 149, 154. 3 O. Hundley, RAND, 1999, 9. 4 Dai Qingmin, Discourse on Armed Forces Informationization Building and Information Warfare Building, ed. Shen Weiguang (New China Press, 2004), 39-47. 5 Li An-yao, PLA Thinking on War, Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics, Taipei Internet version, 25 April 2008 as downloaded and translated by the Open Source Center (OSC) Web site, doc. no. CPP20080421312006. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Hsu Hsieh-jung, An Investigation of the Impact of the Second Gulf War on the PRCs New Revolution in Military Affairs, Hsien-ping Hsuehshu Pan-nien-kan, online 1 December 2007 as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20080701312002. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Chen Wei-kuan, A Study of Our Due Perception of the PLAs Asymmetric Warfare, Taipei 25 July 2007 as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20080507312001. 14 Chung Chien, High-Tech War Preparation of the PLA, Tak ing Taiwan Without Bloodshed, Taiwan Defense Affairs 1 September 2000, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20050411000204. 15 Pan Chin-chang, On the Role of Psychological Warfare as a Part of the PLAs Informatized Warfare Operations, 4 June 2007 as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20071119312002. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Maubo Chang, Taiwan Central news Agency, 1350 GMT 21 May 1999, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. FTS19990521000902. 20 Ibid. 21 Lin Jui-yang, The ROC Armed Forces Strengthen Security over In formation, 17 August 1999, 3, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. FTS19990818000447. 22 Seiji Yajima, Interview in Japanese Journal with Lin Chin-ching, 5 November 1999, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. FTS1999110500047. 23 Lin Chin-ching, Comparison of PRC-ROC Information War fare Capabilities, 1 March 2000, 68-73, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20000725000181. 24 Maubo Chang, Central News Agency, 1456 GMT, 22 November
35 High Frontier 2000, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20001122000162. 25 Brian Hsu, (no title provided) Taipei Times 23 November 2000, as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20001124000107. 26 Lin Tsung-ta, (Crystal Books, May 2005) as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20071102320002. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Tschai Hui-chen, A Discussion of Information Warfare from a Tai wanese Perspective, IO Sphere special edition 2008, 15-21. 32 See http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20080109/ aspx. 33 Pan Chin-chang, A Study of the PLAs Informatized Operations for Political Work, online, 25 July 2007 as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20080616312009. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Pan Chin-chang, On the Role of Psychological Warfare as a Part of the PLAs Informatized Warfare Operations, 4 June 2007 as translated and downloaded from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20071119312002. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Pan Chin-chang, A Study of the PLAs Informatized Operations for Political Work. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Liu Wan-lin, An Investigation into the Impact of the PRCs Military Media Warfare on the ROC Military, Taipei 22 April 2008, as downloaded and translated by the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20080602312005. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Hsu Keng-wei, How to Effectively Counter the PRC Militarys Electronic Warfare Attacks, Taipei 22 April 2008, as downloaded and translated by the OSC Web site, docu ment number CPP20080602312007. For a more detailed examination of the PLAs EW capabilities (too extensive for this brief survey), see Liu Yi-Chung, How to Enhance the EW Capabilities of the ROC Military to Satisfy War Requirements across the Taiwan Strait, Taipei 1 June 2006, as downloaded and translated by the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20061004312001. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security, Public Security, and the Peoples Liberation Army, Taipei 1-31 March 2007, 58-65 as downloaded and translated by the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20071023318001. 56 Ibid. 57 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 58 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapitation Strike and Public Security Net Force, Taipei 1 April 2007-30 April 2007, 58-65, as downloaded and trans lated from the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20071016318001. 59 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 60 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 61 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 66 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 75 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 79 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Liao Wen-chung, China Military Net Force: Network Decapita tion 83 Ibid. 84 Liao Wenzhong, China Military Net Force: National Security 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Liu Wen-hsiang and Wu Chien-te, Investigation into the PRCs Taiwan Military Strategy after the 17 th National Congress of the Com munist Party of China (CPC), Taipei as downloaded and translated by the OSC Web site, doc. no. CPP20080819312002. 90 Ibid. Mr. Timothy L. Thomas (BS, Engineering Science, USMA; MA, International Relations, University of Southern Cali fornia) is a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Kansas. Mr. Thomas con ducts extensive research and publishing in the areas of peacekeeping, information war, psychological opera and political-military affairs. Mr. Thomas was a US Army cialized in Soviet/Russian studies. His military assignments in cluded serving as the director of Soviet Studies at the United States Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany; as an inspector of Soviet tactical operations under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and as a brigade S-2 and company com mander in the 82 nd Airborne Division. He has written three books on information warfare topics, focusing on recent developments in China and Russia. Mr. Thomas is an adjunct professor at the US Armys Eurasian Institute; an adjunct lecturer at the USAF Special Operations School; and a member of two Russian organizations, the Academy of International Information, and the Academy of Natural Sciences.
High Frontier 36 Mr. John F. Vona Technical Director and Chief Concepts and Technology Directorate Langley AFB,Virginia 1 ~ General Kevin Chilton, commander, US Strategic Command I be pursued based strictly on traditional regional perspectives or single domains. In responding to the challenges of the 21 st cen tury, resources and capabilities must support the global effects se nior leaders seek to achieve. Commanding and controlling these global capabilities must work seamlessly across geographical and organizational boundaries. In addition, the command and control (C2) of domains such as air, space, and cyberspace must be well integrated. The breadth and depth required for such innovation necessitates collaboration and cooperation including government, industry, and academia. The Department has determined it is appropriate for each ~ Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009 The Global Cyberspace Integration Center (GCIC) teams with major commands, joint and coalition partners, national agencies, industry and academia to develop, integrate and standardize air, space, and cyberspace components. The GCIC manages C2 inno vation, experimentation and transition efforts including the Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment. The GCIC plans, programs, and guides enterprise-level capability-based planning, require networks, combat support, and C2 systems. It also serves as lead command for tactical datalinks to include joint interoperability of tactical C2 systems, joint and coalition C2 interoperability data standards, air component information management, and satellite communication terminal management. ~ Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009 Building upon the success of Strategic Worldwide Integration Capability (SWIC), a previous GCIC-led C2 prototyping effort to improve global air operations collaboration and information sharing in support of 8 th Air Force, the Air Force GCIC has under taken an innovative Global Effects C2 effort. Leveraging part labs, and acquisition centers through previous C2 efforts, the Air Force GCIC employs a proven collaborative concept develop bilities in helping reduce risks to full-scale acquisition programs. ~ Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009 Initial phases of the Global Effects C2 (GEC2) Pilot have been working to demonstrate a more integrated air and cyberspace C2 environment. The foundation of the Global Effects C2 Pilot in associated processes, are being adapted to better support global information sharing, collaboration, and synchronizationinde pendent of geographic boundaries and integrated across the air, space, and cyberspace domains. 5 ~ Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009 GEC2 activities are in full-swing. The GCIC has facilitated concepts, and maturing tactics, techniques, and procedures. Re quirements and concepts are aimed at integrating air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to plan, coordinate, and execute both ki netic and non-kinetic means to deliver integrated global effects at provide the primary input during WAWs, stakeholders from the research and acquisition communities also participate to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and requirements. In addition, the participation of technology providers such as indus try and government laboratories allows immediate discussion re garding the art of the possible consistent with constraints such viders to supply the prototype capability for each increment of the pilot. Additionally, GCIC formulates and manages the appropri ate experimentation or risk reduction event to provide the appro priate environment for capability integration and assessment. 6 ~ General Norton Schwartz, chief of staff, USAF Cyberspace
37 High Frontier In the July 2008 initial risk reduction event, the GEC2 Pilot demonstrated the ability to merge strategic and theater strategies. In addition, web services for targeting and planning were dem onstrated. Kinetic and non-kinetic targeting and planning were also integrated. Two programs of record, The Joint Targeting Toolkit (JTT), developed by Air Force Research Laboratorys (AFRL) Infor mation Directorate, and Project Suter System (PSS), developed ployed for targeting tasks. These systems are employed today in operations centers to support targeting operations, but were ini tially designed before the widespread use of technology permit ting net-centric global collaboration and information sharing. To achieve the GEC2 objective of integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects, a Computer Network Operations Database (CNODB), a National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)-led initia tive, was included for cyberspace targeting and planning. The CNODB provides a repository of potential cyber targets based on validated analysis. JTT and PSS are being adapted to interoper ate as well as to access the CNODB through web services. The Syzygy Interactive Network Visualization capability, pro vided as part of NASICs CNODB, was used to provide analysts the ability to display associations and links between computer, social, military and political networks. The visualization of these zation. The SWIC was used by the Air Forces Strategic Command Air Operations Center to produce an integrated tasking order and attack plan matching prioritized targets with units responsible for execution. This cross-domain integration (e.g., air, space, and cyberspace) is one of the key GEC2 goals. Later in 2008, the GEC2 Pilot team participated in the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)-led Pirates Dagger cyber limited objective experiment (LOE). During this LOE, the demonstra tion was expanded to include initial execution and standalone as sessment capabilities. Operational assessment was conducted via AFRL Information Directorates Advanced Capability for Understanding and Man aging Effects Networks (ACUMEN) advanced technology dem onstration (ATD). The ACUMEN capability is being enhanced to plied Technology Council in July 2008. Measures of effective ness are being developed to address integrated kinetic and nonkinetic operations. The information from this assessment will be fed back into the process to aid in the development of additional course of actions (COA) and re-planning. 7 ~ General Kevin Chilton, commander, US Strategic Command Through collaboration with US Strategic Command and US JFCOM, the GEC2 results to date are helping to mature joint ing with the science and technology community regarding fur requirements and concepts will help reduce risk to full-scale ac quisition efforts aimed at delivering integrated C2 capabilities ca pable of addressing 21 st The GCIC plans to continue GEC2 into 2010. Activities are scheduled to include integration with combatant command/joint task force activities and additional analysis regarding global func upcoming phases are improved COA generation, collateral dam age estimation, battle damage assessment, and improved cyber space visualization. Industry is encouraged to provide relevant technologies in these areas via the GCIC web site at http://www. gcic.af.mil/gcicinnovationsubmissionsite/index.asp. 1 General Kevin Chilton, commander, US Strategic Command, Air Force Association Conference, Orlando, Florida, 26 February 2009.2 Mr. Dennis C. Blair, director, National Intelligence, Hearing of the House permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 25 February 2009.3 January 2009.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 General Norton Schwartz, chief of staff, Air Force Association Con ference, Orlando Florida, 26 February 2009.7 General Kevin Chilton, commander, US Strategic Command, Wag ing Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009).8 Integration Interview with Defense Systems, 3 March 2009. Mr. John F. Vona (BS and MS, Elec trical Engineering, Syracuse Univer sity, New York) is technical director and chief, Concepts and Technology Directorate, Air Force Global Cy berspace Integration Center (GCIC), Langley AFB, Virginia. As a Head quarter Air Force Field Operating Agency reporting to the Secretary of integration and chief information of budgets and advocates for enterprise wide command and control (C2) capabilities. Mr. Vona oversees advanced concepts and technology initiatives, operational and tech nical analyses and assessments, technology transition planning, and tion strategies through leadership of the $28 million C2 constel lation program. In addition, he works to guide and advocate for Department of Defense science and technology investment through collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory, other gov ernment laboratories, acquisition product centers, industry and aca demia. Mr. Vona serves as GCIC senior acquisition advisor. Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Vona served as the deputy technical director for the Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Langley AFB, Virginia. Mr. Vona spent sixteen years in various positions at the Air Force Research Laboratory, Information Directorate, Rome, New York. Mr. Vona is a graduate of the Syracuse University Maxwell School of Government National Security Studies Program and Air Universitys Air War College
High Frontier 38 Lt Col Patrick Clowney, USAF Pentagon, Washington DC S ince the dawn of the information age with its emphasis on the plaudits, principles, and propositions of technology, a great deal of speculation has surrounded the role of Carl von Clausewitzs genius in network centric warfare (NCW). NCW is an emerging theory of warfare in the information age that de scribes the combination of organizations, strategies, and emerg ing tactics, techniques, and procedures that a networked force 1 Military genius refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study 2 It also refers to what Clausewitz termed or the inward eye, intuition. 3 Cyber advocates and pundits speculate that the proliferation of open systems, spread of infor mation sharing technologies, and growth of virtual-communal societies will abrogate the necessity for a military genius. On the other hand, more traditional military experts and analysts posit the essentially human nature of war; and the friction introduced by technology itself has not changed the nature of war, with the implication that Clausewitzian genius remains an important fac tor in military success. For these traditionalists, cyberspace, like air, space, land, and water, is just another medium that affects the changing character of war. Cyber advocates usually espouse the opposite point of view. Although theoretical arguments exist supporting and opposing the relevance of a military genius in NCW, this essay opines that since Clausewitzs rationalecom plexity, uncertainty, and chancefor a military genius and the nature of warfare remain relevant and prevalent in NCW, the role of the military genius still deserves a prominent place in the annals of warfare. Clausewitz, Complexity, and Network Centric Warfare genius is required that remains relevant to NCW is the complex ity of war. He wrote, any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. 4 Complexity in this sense meant the affecting a war environment. Some of the variables included the very nature of war: the passions of the people, the play of chance and probability, and the instruments of policy. 5 As complexity remains relevant in NCW, a military genius is required to tra verse a complex and perplexing environment. In one sense, the capabilities offered by NCW may appear to assuage complexity and NCW does provide tools that help manage the informational complexity of modern war. However, cyber technologies and informational derivatives of those tech nologies introduce additional complexity, rather than a decline. An abridged consideration of the development of weaponry and types of war help illustrate this concept. In terms of weaponry, types of weapons have evolved from rocks to nuclear weapons. As the weaponry changed, so did the complexity of war. Com manders, be they cavemen or joint force commanders, had to deal with not only the traditional forms of warfare, but the im plications of new weaponry. Their wars in effect became more complex. With respect to the types of warfare, as humanity and weaponry have evolved, so has the type of warfare. During Clausewitzs time, attritional warfare was the predominate type of war, and Clausewitz was surely referring to this type in his pronouncements on complexity. However, as man and machine evolved, the character of warfare became more complex. For example, the Department of Defense has a spectrum of warfare These multiple forms add to the complexity of war and com manders must be versed in all. NCW, like all evolutions or revo lutions in warfare, adds to this complexity. Paul T. Mitchell presents further insights into the growth of complexities surrounding NCW. Mitchell writes that NCW is changing how militaries operate in both battle and in opera tions other than war, and that the sharing of information can only grow in importance as armed forces continue their never-end ing quest for a competitive advantage. 6 These changes add to the complexity of war. Mitchell also highlights the complexi ties associated with coalition operations in NCW. He argues that states will continue to share information amongst them, but perfect transparency will be impossible. 7 Information is simply too central to the competitive advantages offered by NCW to be jeopardized by automatic disclosure. 8 Dr. Martin C. Libicki also Cyberspace
39 High Frontier adds, the increasingly complex demands being made on and largely accommodated by information systems, make the infor mation systems more complex. The robustness of information often produces more noise into the decision making process. 9 important. The dictates of sovereignty, noise, and comparative advantage ensures that seamless command interoperability will remain an issue, ensuring further complexity in war. 10 As such, a military genius is required to navigate the complex environ ment. Clausewitz propounded that the complexities of war merit the attributes of a military genius. The history of technology and the derivatives of NCW suggest that complexity remains prevalent in NCW. Because of this complexity, the military genius is still required to employ NCW within the arena of warfare. Clausewitz, Uncertainty, and Network Centric Warfare Closely related to complexity, Clausewitz also offered the idea of uncertainty in war as another reason for needing a mili tary genius. He stated that war operates in the realm of uncer tainty. He estimated that three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. 11 Because of uncertainty, a sensitive and discrimi nating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth. 12 a constant uncertainty in warthe impossibility of calculating moral forces and the interaction of humans at all levels. 13 Advo cates of NCW often assert that NCW technologies and the free complexity, tangible and intangible uncertainties may actually increase in NCW. Therefore, a military genius is still required to mitigate uncertainties in war. Michael I. Handel in addresses the relation ship between uncertainty and military genius and adds support to the necessity of a military genius in NCW. Handel writes that many military experts writing on NCW often imply that war has transformed into a rationale activity based on perfect or near perfect information. 14 These experts also claim vast amounts of information make war highly predictable. 15 However, Handel tify laws or principles of war when in fact the conduct of war is a situational dependent art. 16 On this concept and the critique of those attempting to apply hard science to war, Clausewitz said, Efforts were made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. They did present a positive goal, but people failed to take adequate account of the endless complexities involved the conduct of war branches out in al 17 Uncov ering the manifestations of Clausewitzs uncertainties in NCW illuminates the necessity for a military genius. The unpredictability of human nature that leads to uncertainty will remain present in NCW. Inherent in the cyber medium are humans; they are involved in every level of NCW. From control nodes, humans control NCW. Although computers have the capacity to help humans interpret data and make complex de cisions, a human remains the deciding factor. Furthermore, as esizes that computer-based decision will exhibit or approach the unpredictability of humans. 18 Moreover, the unpredictability introduced by humans can be a source of good decisions. For example, many businesses seek inputs via wiki-sites. The goal is to encourage collaboration to produce better products. 19 In many cases, the businesses have gleaned ideas that have produced better products. The belief, to decision makers in the Combined Air Operations Center.
High Frontier 40 information creates a diversity of ideas from which companies information, a human still makes the decision on which informa tion is applicable to the ultimate product. Although many solu tions may exist, a human decides the best course of action. In NCW, this same logic still applies. Technologies afford commanders and decision-makers unprecedented situational exposure to so much information that is rooted in morale and un predictable human forces, the commanders ability to decipher, feel, and predict outcomes becomes more imperative. As John Ferris and Michael I. Handel declare, this uncertainty attributed to human nature is the condition when military genius reveals itself. 20 Therefore, whether computers or humans are making decisions, unpredictability will remain present. A military ge nius is required to deal with this uncertainty. In NCW, uncertainty can manifest in humans and technology. The technologies and information sharing associated with NCW the commander. However, it is unrealistic to assume that perfect information will always be available and negate the need for a military genius. On the contrary, history suggests the prolifera tion of technology will likely require a commander, a military genius, who has the acumen to amalgamate the strengths of NCW along with other tools and facets of warfare to develop a cogent strategy. Clausewitz, Chance, and Network Centric Warfare Along with complexity and uncertainty, chance also played a huge role in Clausewitzs rationale for a military genius. He wrote, war is the realm of chance. 21 thoughts on chance: No other human activity gives it greater scope; no other has such incessant and varied dealings with the intruder. 22 Chance makes everything more uncertain and in terferes with the whole course of events. 23 Therefore, since all information and assumptions are open to doubt and with chance ed. 24 NCW will not change this. Before delving into the relationship between chance and but he addresses three forms of chance. Alan D. Beyerchen, pro fessor of military history at Ohio State, offers that chance is a stochastic phenomenon, since Clausewitz repeatedly stresses the nexus between politics and war. 25 The second form of chance is tion together in the inevitable confusion of war. 26 The third is able pieces and then perceive as chance the interactions of those 27 All three aspects of chance can be expected in NCW. Like in all forms of war, the elements of chance remain rel evant in NCW. With regard to the nexus between politics and war, the commander will have to contend with the capricious nature of policy. For example, a commander developing a war strategy based on policy may prefer to attack the infrastructure of an adversary through cyberspace in order to cajole an adver sary without kinetic means. However, policymakers may pre fer a kinetic strike as well as a cyber attack. In this instance, the chasm between policy and strategy has introduced chance. In these instances, a military genius is required to possess the respect to undetectable causes producing chance, NCW has many. Seth Lloyds theories on computer science and entropy help illustrate this concept. Lloyd, borrowing from Second Law of Thermodynamics, postulates that the information takes on the properties of entropya continuous proliferation of unknown information interacting with itself. 28 Although the interactions may produce plausible solutions to real problems, they may also introduce more chaos into a system. 29 As chaos, or undetectable causes increase, so can chance. In such an environment rife with chance, the intuition of military genius is required to deal with chance. The last aspect of chance, the tendency to put the pieces of war into preconceived boxes, bears consideration. Lonsdale and others argue that NCW is based on the preconception of a static rather than a reactive enemy, or they fail to consider the enemys reactions to NCW. As Dr. Everett C. Dolman notes, move and subsequent moves. 30 wars carries its own preconceptions. Each interaction in war
41 High Frontier between adversaries is unique unto itself and that uniqueness fosters a dynamic strategic environment. As Libicki remarks, mand and control system that would give them some feel for what the dysfunctional coping strategies might be. 31 NCW, like tainty discussions earlier illuminate these points. However, the predilection of some NCW theorists may well introduce chance in NCW. Consequently, a military genius is required for such an environment. Given Clausewitzs assertions on chance, a military genius still appears a requisite for warfare. No matter how chance manifests, a commander with intuition appears necessary. The NCW environment promises to pose many of the same concerns and risks as traditional warfare. A military genius is required to lessen the negative impacts of chance. Conclusion Clausewitzs concept of a military genius is applicable to NCW. Clausewitzs rationalecomplexity, uncertainty, and chanceare present in NCW as it is to all forms of war. Sir Michael Howard provided credence to these assertions. He stat ed the technological dimension of strategy is but one amongst four; operational, social, and logistical are the others. 32 Howard argues the relative dominance of each dimension is dependant upon circumstance. 33 In other words, the degree to which the technological capabilities of NCW will be a deciding factor in a ing situations as well as the complex interaction of technology quired to navigate, adapt, and think in a mercurial environment of which NCW is but a small part. 1 Department of Defense, March 2005), 3. 2 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, On ed. rev. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 102. 3 Ibid. 4 Clausewitz, 100. 5 Clausewitz, 89. 6 Paul T. Mitchell and International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006); Clausewitz et al., 7 Ibid., 52. 8 Ibid. 9 Martin C. Libicki and Rand Corporation, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 10 Ibid. 11 Clausewitz, 102. 12 Clausewitz, 101. 13 David J. Lonsdale, Cass SeriesStrategy and History, 9 (London ; New York: Frank Cass, 2004). 14 Michael I. Handel, 3 rd rev. and expanded ed. (London; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2001). 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. Lt Col Patrick Clowney (BS, En gineering Science, USAFA; MPA, University of Oklahoma; MA, Or ganizational Behavior, The George Washington University) is an ac tagon. He entered the Air Force in 1994 after graduating from the United States Air Force Academy. He earned his Navigator wings from Joint Specialized Under graduate Navigator Training at Randolph AFB, Texas. Following navigator training, he was assigned Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Colonel Clowney transitioned to the AC-130H in June 2001. He served as a mission commander for AC-130 operations during Operation Enduring Freedom and as chief of Future Operations, Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Clowney has also com Colonel Clowney is a former Air Force intern where he served of the Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs Weapons Di including over 200 combat hours during Operation Enduring Free dom. Among his many awards, Colonel Clowney has been award ed the Meritorious Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Air Achievement Naval Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. 17 Clausewitz, 134. 18 Seth Lloyd, entist Takes on the Cosmos 1 st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006), 37. 19 Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, (New York: Portfolio, 2006). 20 John Ferris and Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncer tainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations, 10, no. 1 (1995): 1-4. 21 Clausewitz, 101. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 102. 25 Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, 17, no. 3 (Winter, 1992): 59-90. Copyright 1993 by the president and fellows of Harvard College and the Massachu setts Institute of Technology. Reprinted as ppendix 1 in Tom Czerwinski, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998) http://www.ndu. edu/inss/books/books%20201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%2 0and%20Nat'l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/ch07.html. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Lloyd, 76. 29 Ibid. 30 This assertion was taken from class notes from lectures performed by Dr. Everett C. Dolman in a Coercion class in October 2007 at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL. 31 Libicki, 54. 32 Lonsdale, 5. 33 Ibid.
High Frontier 42 Information Ms. Linda R. Gooden Executive Vice President Lockheed Martin Gaithersburg, Maryland W hen military leaders and defense experts began several years ago at the dawn of the information age to assert that information is Americas most powerful weapon system, many people scratched their heads. How can a long series of 0s and 1s be more powerful than an intercontinental ballistic Today, of course, there are few who would question the value of timely, accurate, and reliable information that can be pack aged, transmitted, and manipulated with lightning-fast agility. Its the lifeblood of virtually every enterprise, from large corpo rations managing multinational operations to individuals man aging a household budget. For the military, digital information is the ultimate force multiplier. It delivers real-time situational awareness from the command level down to individual weap ons platforms, and it enables the translation of that awareness into effective action. The ability of a commander to see in real time the position and status of his assetsas well as his ene whats around the next corner or behind the next mountain is simply invaluable. If digital information has become the lifeblood of our na the Global Information Grid (GIG). Increasingly the architecture of cyber space exists in real space: the satellites and supporting ground stations through which much of global data transmission must at some point pass. Thats why the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is uniquely positioned to carry out the Air Forces cyberspace mission and pres commander at US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Its also why AFSPC will play a vital role as a component of STRATCOMs Joint Task ForceGlobal Network Operations (JTF-GNO), bring ing unique perspective into the manage across the network, and information as surance and network protection. At Lockheed Martin, we also appre ciate the critical link between space and cyberspace. We design, build, and operate spacecraft and the technology they carry. In addition, we are the largest provider of information technology to the federal government, and we assist the Department of Defense in developing netcentricity concepts and designing network solutions. From these many vantage points, we have observed not only the tremendous capabilities brought by the growth of the GIG, but also the serious challenges involved in protecting it. A report from the Commission on Cyber Security for the 44 th Presidency in December 2008 reveals: Cyber security is now one of the major national security problems facing the United States. Cyber threats come from many sources. Some are statetual property. Some are initiated by military enemies to thwart operations and gain a tactical advantage. Some are criminal attempts to gain personal information for identity theft. And still others are simply attacks perpetrated by malcontents bent on causing damage and disruption. The US military faces every one of these threats and at a greater level of intensity than any other target. Thats nothing new, of course. Cyber defense was the original reason behind the formation of JTF-GNOs heritage organization in 1999. Whats new is the sophistication of todays cyber threats and the stealth nature of the attacks. Recognizing the escalation of the threat to our military, civil, and commercial customers, Lockheed Martin recently estab lished a Center for Cyber Security Innovation led by Lee Hol Industry Perspective
43 High Frontier of Homeland Security, with strategic support from retired US Air Force Lt Gen Charles Croom. The purpose of our initia tive is to return the advantage in the cyber security race to the defenders rather than the attackers. In recent years, attackers have become much more effective at breaking into networks and carrying out their work undetected. No longer is it suf network operator does not realize an attack has occurred and data has been compromised until the event is over. The answer is to design cyber security solutions that not only detect rapidly and respond aggressively but also to look across cyberspace for threat activity and predict how nascent attacks will behave. We need to prevent rather than react, and the tool we will use to do that is technology itself. We are currently pur suing solutions that enable cyber assets to respond automatical ly to block vulnerabilities and cascade defenses from machine to machine, locking down the network to a trusted state until security is assured and full systems capability is restored. These types of solutions are not easy to design or to imple ment, especially across a network of the size, complexity, and importance of the GIG. But they can and must be developed. We can no longer rely on traditional point solutions that aim to protect an end users computer or a particular network de vice. Cyber security must consist of holistic, end-to-end solu tions capable of detecting an attack anywhere around the globe and immediately responding to drive out the intruder. These solutions must be designed into our systems as an integral part of the network itself, rather than as a system add-on. At Lock heed Martin, we are implementing this approach in all of our business units. We are requiring every product development effort to incorporate cyber security from the earliest stages of design. We are sharing best practices across the corporation. And we are conducting netcentric exercises in cyber defense using our innovation centers, such as the Center for Innovation in Suffolk, Virginia, and a newly constructed technology center complete with cyber range opening in Maryland later this year. The imperative nature of effective cyber defense goes beyond protecting resources and preserving a tactical advantage. It goes to the heart of the value of information itself. Ultimately, information is useful only when the user has ab solute faith in its integrity. Soldiers about to turn the corner of a building do not know or care that the information they are receiving has passed through multiple networks and was relayed by the worlds most sophisticated satellites. They only care that its accurate. Their lives depend on it. Providing these can be proud to own. Ms. Linda Gooden (BS, Com puter Technology, Youngstown State University; BS, Business Administration, University of Maryland University College) is executive vice president of Lockheed Martins Informa tion Systems and Global Ser vices (IS&GS) business area Martin Corporation. Under her leadership, IS&GS includes 54,000 experienced profes sionals who provide integrated information technology solu tions, systems and services to support worldwide missions of civil, defense, intelligence, and other government customers. Established in February 2007 as one of four principal business areas within Lockheed Martin, IS&GS countries around the world. Ms. Gooden actively supports professional, academic, and civic organizations, serving on numerous executive boards including Eisenhower Fellowships Board of Trustees; Armed Forces Com munications and Electronics Association International; Information Technology Association of America; University of Marylands A. James Clark School of Engineering; University of Maryland, Bal timore; and Prince Georges Community College Foundation. She also serves on the Board of Directors for ADP, Inc. In 2008, Ms. Gooden was inducted into the Maryland Business Hall of Fame and named to Corporate Board Member magazines Top 50 Women in Technology. She was selected in 2007 as Execu tive of the Year by the Greater Washington Government Contractor Engineer and Information Technology magazine. Ms. Gooden was featured as one of Black Enterprise magazines 100 Most Powerful Executives in Corporate America for 2009. She won puter Weeks 2002 Federal 100 Eagle Award and received Women in Technologys 2002 Corporate Leadership Award. Prior to assuming her current role, Ms. Gooden was executive vice president of Lockheed Martins Information Technology and Global Services business area, and before that she was president of Lockheed Martin Information Technology, a business unit she grew over 10 years to become a multibillion dollar business. She was vice president of Lockheed Martins Software Support Ser vices unit from 1994 and earlier held other positions of increasing responsibility. In 2005, she was awarded an honorary Doctor of Public Ser vice degree from the University of Maryland University College in recognition of her service to the community and to higher educa tion. She successfully completed the Executive Program Manager course at the Defense Systems Management College in 1998.
High Frontier 44 Air Force Space Commands Year of Leadership Year of Leadership CMSgt Richard T. Small, USAF Command Chief, Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado L eadership is the foundation on which the Air Force and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) achieve success in every mission area. Experience teaches us that the quality of tomorrows leaders depends on the effectiveness of the train ing we provide today. In our professionthe profession of individual Airmen, their organizations, and the Air Force. From September 2008 through August 2009, AFSPC is focusing on the critical role our leaders play in executing the commands missions. Under the banner, Year of Leadership, we are conducting activities that emphasize important leader ship attributes and traits, improve leadership focus, enhance leadership skills, and increase leadership interaction with those we lead. Why a Year of Leadership? We live in a complex world with complex security risks. Our nation, our allies, and our friends rely on us to guarantee a safe, secure and combat ready force with an unwavering com mitment to excellence and the highest possible standards. The Air Force is an excellent organization, globally renowned for having the most deliberate and effective programs and leaders to create mission success. Along with our joint partners, Amer icas Airmen protect the nations security. AFSPC is and must remain committed to leading the way by leveraging its greatest assetits leadersto guarantee mission success. In every organizationmilitary or civilian, public or pri vatesuccess rises or falls on one fundamental element and that element is leadership. From the intercontinental ballistic missile forcethe ultimate backstop to our national security to the global positioning system, our Airmen operate space ca pabilities vital to national security, economic growth, and pub lic safety. These capabilities serve joint forces, the nation, and the world at large shaping Americas approach to warfare. To that end, leaders at every level must accept responsibility, take ownership, enforce standards, and demand accountability. They must also be hands-on leaders. Our Airmen deserve re sources and the best leadership we can provide them to meet our standards. We must set them up for success. For us, perfection remains our standard. We clearly under stand the awesome responsibility that comes with the global impact of our missions. We also must understand that, as lead ers, the manner in which we perform our duties not only im pacts the daily operations of the unit, but the mission readiness single leader will cascade across generations of Airmen impact they will lead our Air Force in the future. Whether reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise or activating that require positive leadership at all levels. Hands on lead ers who set the appropriate tone and establish the proper way forward can best address these challenges. While net-centric tools can help us guide and direct actions or manage processes, to-face leadership. Leadership remains a contact sport. What is the Year of Leadership? AFSPCs Year of Leadership blends a variety of initiatives and events together to enhance awareness and understanding of the roles and responsibilities of leaders. We have dedicated 12 full months to focus on leadership across the command to: Reinvigorate leaders commitment to the Air Force as a profession and way of life, not as a job living our core valuesIntegrity First, Service Before Self, and Excel lence In All We Doregardless of rank, location, or ech elon of assignment Emphasize the importance of standards setting them, leading by them, living them, holding ourselves, and our fellow Airmen accountable to them being the example ulate Foster leadership with a warrior mindsetknowing the criticality of our global mission and the impact we have Insist on excellenceat all timesand demand a posi gets to root causes Encourage speaking up not walking past failures or ting the attention of those who can
45 High Frontier Emphasize developing and maintaining a professional at titudesupporting downward-directed policies Facilitate hands-on leadership getting leaders out from Put leaders out front during physical training, thus lead readiness and individual well-being Cultivate increased awareness of importance of taking action on personal and professional needs and issues for Airmen and their families Promote leading beyond the work center ... getting in volved in unit, base, and local community activities Highlight the need to invest quality time developing and furthering careers of deserving subordinates from performance evaluations to award submissions to perfor mance feedback Expand professional development and inspire continuous self-improvement through educational and developmen tal opportunities technical, functional, academic, and professional ing subordinates, delivering bad news or when facing a hard issue Enhance AFSPCs leadership role through engagement beyond the fence line with professional civic and military associations and organizations Articulate the history, heritage and mission of AFSPC and the Air Force educate Airmen to do the same and ensure understanding of the priorities of unit leaders and the command Accentuate An American Airman First reminding the commands Airmen that they are the As a road map to achieving these goals, each of the 12 months is focused on an important topic, trait, or aspect of leadership: back to basics, discipline, core values, compassion, follower ship, and so forth. Commanders develop a schedule of events, activities, and leadership encounter opportunities tailored to each months focus area. Further, commanders were provided a list of actions around which they could structure their local efforts, such as: Designating one day per week to facilitate, encourage, and accommodate work center level leadership encoun ters by de-emphasizing e-mail, computer-based activities, and scheduled meetings. tion, including 24-hour work centers or outlying/remote locations Establishing periodic and recurring leadership encoun ters with professional military organizations/associa tion, Airmans councils, civilian workforce forums, and so forth. de corps, and engage with Airmen outside work centers; monthly competitive warrior run to encourage increased dons to bolster esprit de corps Encouraging guest speakers at Airman Leadership School graduations, First Term Airmen Center (FTAC) comple tion ceremonies, quarterly/annual awards banquets, and so forth, to tailor speeches/messages to Year of Leader ship focus areas Ensuring supervisors attend/participate in completion ceremonies for Airmen completing FTAC Integrating CGOs into portions of senior noncom nd
High Frontier 46 courses Offering representatives from professional military or ganizations or associations (CGO council, chiefs group, NCO association, Airmans council) the opportunity to attend wing/installation staff meetings Establishing leadership encounter opportunities, particu larly for Airmen (E-4 and below), such as an Airmans Night focused on junior enlisted Airmen, organized by mid-tier NCO association Developing a shadow program where junior personnel can spend time with senior leaders to observe them in leadership roles Establishing a force development council comprised of leaders from professional military organizations or asso ciations to identify, facilitate, and encourage professional and leadership development commanders in executing the Year of Leadership. Headquar ters (HQ) AFSPC Public Affairs helped kickstart the effort with an initial commanders video underscoring the importance of the initiative and produces each month a Leadership in Focus video consistent with the monthly focus area. Headquarters AFSPC Manpower, Personnel, and Services (A1) is reviving and revising the commands Vigilant Look program. The re vised course will target CGOs, mid-grade NCOs and civilian equivalents with a week-long professional development oppor tunity focused on improving and enhancing the understanding currently scheduled for August 2009. Along with each installations career assistance advisor, HQ AFSPC/A1 completed a top-to-bottom review of the commands professional development programs at the NCO and SNCO levels. The focus of this review was to ensure these programs are properly focused and provide the scope of instruction ap propriate for each level of leadership development. As a result, we are implementing standardized lessons plans for NCO and SNCO professional development cours es. In recognition of the synergy to be gained from integrat ing CGOs into SNCO professional devel opment, each SNCO program will have a Leadership Team Day. This portion of the course will team CGOs and SNCOs during presentations/ discussion on topics CMSgt Richard T. Small (AAS, Administrative Manage ment and Personnel Adminis tration, Community College of the Air Force, Alabama; AA, Management Studies, Univer sity of Maryland; BA, Human Resource Administration, Saint Leo College, Florida; MPA, Personnel Management, Troy State University, Alabama) is the command chief master ser geant, Air Force Space Com mand, Peterson AFB, Colora do. Air Force Space Command is responsible for the develop ment, acquisition, and operation of the Air Forces space and mis sile systems. The command oversees a global network of satellite command and control, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readiness of Americas interconti nental ballistic missile force. Chief Small is responsible to the com mander for the professional development, military readiness, and mission effectiveness of the commands enlisted Airmen assigned to Chief Small entered the Air Force in October 1983, and is a na tive of Kershaw, South Carolina. He has served in a variety of pro gressively responsible positions at every echelon from squadron to Headquarters Air Force, as well as the diplomatic staff of the Ameri multinational, coalition, Joint service and interagency experience in support of Operations Southern Watch, Joint Forge, Allied Force, manent party command chief for the 379 th Air Expeditionary Wing and deployed with special operations forces as command chief for the Combined/Joint Special Operations Air Component. such as standards, promotions, counseling and mentoring. Some installations have recruited senior mentors in support of their programs. General Ron Fogelman, USAF, retired for mer Air Force chief of staff (CSAF), discussed core values in a packed auditorium at Peterson AFB, Colorado. General Fogel man shared his unique perspective on the topic, as he was the Master Sergeant of the Air Force Sam E. Parish, retired as he led them in a discussion on the importance of followership. From leadership discussions in our squadron commanders course to being the theme for the commands annual Airmen of the year awards program, we have leveraged the Year of Leadership at every turn to inform our leaders of the critical role they play in mission success and inspire them to higher levels of achieve ment. These are just a few examples from countless others which illustrate the importance and impact of the Year of Leader ship. By embracing this effort and applying it to the entire team, the activities and actions are proving to be a key to unlock our best leadership skills and techniques. In the words of one of our youngest Airmen, this effort has raised the leadership bar in AFSPC. ercise.
47 High Frontier Cyberspace: Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant Deputy Command Historian Peterson AFB, Colorado I n the beginning was the word, and the word was cy berspace. Or, was it? Just days after Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) became the services focal point for the cyberspace mission in October 2008, General C. Robert Kehler, precisely what the Air Force was asking AFSPC to do in cy berspace. His remarks prompted AFSPC historians to wonder about the origin of the word cyberspace and its journey into the vocabulary of the United States Air Force (USAF). space as a completely new word and shared it in print for the issue of magazine. He referred to a matrix-simulator console as the Cyberspace Seven (p. 72). Although he used cyberspace only once in that composition, he liked the word enough to use it more than twenty times in his prize-winning 1984 novel A synonym for the matrix or grid, which Gibson characterized as rooted in early graphics programs and military experimentation with cranial jacks, cy berspace was a con sensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every na tion, by children being taught mathematical concepts A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of ev ery computer in the human sys tem. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data (p. 69). Popularization of cyberspace began with record sales of and Gibsons publica tion of two additional novels (1986) and (1988)to complete what became known as the Sprawl trilogy. ries Gibson said he coined cyberspace because it seemed like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning, even for me, as I saw it emerge on the page. He did not foresee that a word he intended as nothing more than a metaphor would become a ubiquitous descriptor for the everchanging domain created, and constantly recreated, by people all over the world communicating via the Internet and other electronic means. Although Gibson discounted semantics when it came to cy berspace, it almost certainly is a condensation of two sepa rate words that also appear in : cybernetics and the context of governing people, cybernetics emerged in the Historical Perspective
High Frontier 48 ture of so-called information feedback or regulatory systems. chusetts Institute of Technology mathematician Norbert Wiener, who worked during World War II on guided missile technology and studied how the feedback principle allowed sophisticated observed how plants and animals employ the feedback prin ciple to change their actions in response to their environment, which led him to introduce the neologism cybernetics into popularized the term with publication of his book later perceived human-computer interfaces. As for the second half of cyberspace, etymologists trace derivation of the English word space back through the Old French espace to the Latin word spatium (interval, ex tent, area, or expanse). Historically, from medieval times to the present, from Dante Alighieris to Wil liam Gibsons people of the Western World have conceptualized space in different wayssometimes in physical terms, sometimes nonphysical, and often in a combination of physical and nonphysical dimensions. For example, science writer Margaret Wertheim, in her book cat egorized cyberspace as a communally shared network of physi cal and logical relationships (p. 303). She perceived both outer space and cyberspace as mediated spaces, because both are realms we know only through vir tual eyesd o mains we cannot experience except through a tech (p. 143). Credit for ap plication of cy berspace to the global, electronic place mapped, and remapped daily, by Internet users goes to John Perry Barlow. A Wyoming native, who attended the Fountain Valley School in Colora do Springs, Colo rado, in the early 1960s and wrote lyrics for the Grateful Dead rock band during the 1970s and 1980s, Barlow published an article in the 22 January 1990 issue of titled Being in Nothingness. He predicted people would de velop cyberspace because its there. Sort of. Furthermore, the settlement of cyberspace, he explained, would occur as the next logical step in the quest to eliminate the interface the mind-machine information barrier. In early June 1990, Barlow elaborated on this concept in a article titled Crime and Puzzlement, where he wrote that cyberspace extends across that immense son. He added, Cyberspace, in its present condition, has a lot in common with the 19th Century West. It is, of course, a perfect breeding ground for both outlaws and new ideas about liberty. Like open range, the property boundaries of cyber space are hard to stake and harder still to defend. Ultimately, on 8 February 1996, Barlows staunch libertari anism and his thorough rejection of the recently promulgated Telecommunications Reform Act drove him to compose A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. He asserted, Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communi cations. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. Your legal concepts of prop erty, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based on matter. There is no matter here. We will create a civilization of the mind in cyberspace. Barlows manifesto appeared on dozens of web sites within days, and cyber surfers soon dubbed him the Thomas Jefferson of Cy berspace. By 1997, the year lexicographers added cyberspace to the the term already had begun to creep into the jargon of USAF membersboth active duty and civilian. An article by 1Lt Gary Vincent in the Summer 1993 issue of proposed a cybernetic de sign for command and control. In the Spring 1995 issue of that same journal, Air War College professor George Steins article titled Information Warfare found new and dangerous fare. Later that year, USAF Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman signed a memorandum to accompany distribution of Cyber Strike gible place between computers where information momentarily exists on its route from one end of the global network to the other. A chapter in published by Air University Press in September 1995, referred to the realms of land, sea, space, and cyberspace. Eventually, none other than
49 High Frontier Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant (BA, History, University of Northern Iowa; MA, History, University of Northern Iowa; PhD, Uni versity of California, Santa Bar bara) is deputy command his torian, Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. He joined the Air Force History and Museums Program in April 1984 as chief historian, Airlift Information Systems Division, Scott AFB, Illinois, and moved one year later to the Chidlaw Building near downtown Colora do Springs as chief historian, Space Communications Division (SPCD). When SPCD was inactivated in 1991, he moved to the in 1999. Dr. Sturdevant appears frequently as a guest lecturer on space history topics and is author or co-author of chapters or essays in (1997); Organizing for the Use of Space: Historical Perspec tives on a Persistent Issue (1995); Golden Legacy, Boundless Aerospace Power (2000); Air Warfare: An International Ency clopedia (2002); Launch Vehicles (2002); Technology Contributions to the Nation (2004); Encyclopedia of 20th-Century Technology (2005); (2007); and Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense through Space (2008). His articles or book reviews have appeared in such journals as Space Times Journal of the British Interplanetary Society Air & Space/Smithsonian Quest: The History of Space Air Power History for Space & Missile Professionals and Journal of the West He sits on the editorial board of Quest and on the staff of tier Dr. Sturdevant is an active member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American Astronautical Society (AAS), British Interplanetary Society (BIS), and Society for the History of Technology (SHOT). His professional honors include the Air Force Exemplary Civilian Service Award (19951999), the AAS Presidents Recognition Award (2005), and elec tion as an AAS Fellow (2007). USAF Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan, stated in the Win ter 1999 issue of that Our aviation forefathers certainly did not limit their visions but established the Air Force on a journey we have extended into space and cyberspace. USAFs acceptance of cyberspace as a word and a domain. In the Spring 2001 issue of Gen eral Simon Peter Worden pointed to the issue of protecting the global commons of outer and cyberspace and perceived ef fective space and cyberspace control as constituting a criti cal new national security dimension. Intentionally, on Pearl Harbor Day in 2005, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and USAF Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley released a joint letter to airmen with a new mission statement: The mission of the USAF is to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global inter two individuals signed a 6 September 2006 memorandum call ing for Establishment of an Operational Command for Cyber space. From that point onward, USAF senior leaders and under lings alike have produced an unceasing plethora of articles, takes its mission in this domain, they need look no further than Air Universitys cyberspace web site (http://www.au.af.mil/ info-ops/cyberspace.htm). Suggestions for Further Reading 1. Michael Benedikt, ed., Cyberspace: First Steps (Cam bridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991). 2. Rebecca Bryant, What Kind of Space is Cyberspace? 5 (2001):138-155. 3. Anna Cicognani, On the Linguistic Nature of Cyberspace and Virtual Communities, 1996, http://fragment.nl/mirror/var ious/Cicognani_1996.html. 4. Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman, netics (New York: Basic Books, 2005). 5. William Gibson, th (New York: Ace Books, 2004). 6. Ananda Mitra, Cybernetic Space: Bringing the Virtual and Real Together, 3, no. 2 (Spring 2003), http://www.jiad.org/article31. Ananda Mitra and Rae Lynn Schwartz, From Cyber Space to Cybernetic Space: Rethinking the Relationship between Real and Virtual Spaces, 7, no. 1 (Octo ber 2001), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol7/issue1/mitra.html. 7. Margaret Wertheim, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999). Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and USAF Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley
High Frontier 50 Book Review tion Warfare. By Martin C. Libicki. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. 336 $85.00 ISBN: 0521871603 M artin C. Libicki is an expert of information warfare at the RAND Corporation. In his latest book Cyberspace Libicki advocates the friendly conquest of cyber space. This idea draws upon political scientist Joseph Nyes conception of soft power. The idea introduced in 1990 and further developed in the eponymous 2004 book emphasizes the value of non-coercive tools of grand strategy, such as media, diplomacy, and economic aid. Libicki argues that offensive in formation warfare operations will have only limited utility, and that soft power strategies have untapped potential. The friendly conquest of cyberspace he envisions could be achieved in much the same way Facebook conquered Internet social networking: bearing the costs of developing a useful product, distributing it cheaply, and reaping the rewards once the consumers are stuckunwilling or unable to switch to a competitor. In this manner, a team of software designers with ulterior motives could hope to gain the willing, perhaps enthusiastic, assent of its victims. Although the friendly conquest of cyberspace is the main idea, there is no central idea. The contents of one chapter do not necessarily support or relate to the contents of the next: top ics converge and diverge like the tributaries of a river. This is not a weakness, though. Libicki intends to give the non-expert an introduction (e.g., an understanding of how private infor mation is collected on the Internet), his own predictions (e.g., the effects of decreasing storage costs), and his recommendations, all in a little over 300 pages. Libicki discusses both cyber defense and cyber attack. For Libicki cyber warfare is not simply a matter of attacking opponents information: it is ultimately about affecting the decisions that are made. One way to do this is by creating noise, wreak[ing] confu sion rather than destruction. Information overload fuels confusion. Essentially, infor mation can be acquired by search engines, web crawlers, and so forth, much faster than human analysts can process it. Libicki also notes that getting information in cyberspace does not require hacking into a networklow tech tactics can be just as troublesome. Information can be acquired via phishing scams, scams in which con art ists masquerade as someone they are nota Nigerian prince in need of money or Bank of hopes of obtaining your personal data. Often times, deceit is not even necessary: anyone who blogs or joins a social net working site gives up their private information willingly. Al though Libicki does not discuss it in detail, abundance of easily accessible personal information could be used in personalized psychological operations. a simple example: instead of e-mailing every American a laun dry list of US government shortcomings and failures, enemies could send tailored messages. An undergraduate computer sci ence major could design a program that searches the Educa tion and Work details of millions of Facebook users. Every tal, or markets, it would send the user an e-mail about the overbearing regulations, and so forth. Any summary of the will not do it puter networking, military strategy, organizational psychology, and cyber punk literature. The novice will not be overwhelmed and the expert will have come away learning something new. After reading this book, I have concluded that a weakness science and math education in generalis a serious strategic threat. Talented computer scientists are supply inelastic. It but additional computer scientists simply cannot be cranked out when demand rises. If things do not change, it is likely we will be caught on the horns of (what I like to call) the Groves Dilemma. During the Manhat tan Project, General Leslie Groves had to decide whether to let scientists with sus the highest sensitivity or to struggle with who won World War II, embroiled us in the Cold War. A larger supply of man power is the best way to overcome this dilemma. As it is said: a man of knowl edge increaseth might.
51 High Frontier High Frontier HQ AFSPC/PA, High Frontier