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High frontier

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High frontier
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United States -- Air Force Space Command
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Vol. 1, no. 1 (summer 2004)-Vol. 7, no. 4 (August 2011).
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Vol. 2, no. 2 lacks date within publication but file name is: "Jan06_1WEB.pdf."
General Note:
"The journal for space & missile professionals"--Vol. 1, no. 1-vol. 5, no. 4.
General Note:
"The journal for space, cyberspace, & missile professionals"--Vol. 6, no. 1.
General Note:
"The journal for space and cyberspace professionals"--Vol. 6, no. 2-vol. 7, no. 4.
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United States Air Force Space Command.

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University of Florida
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1 High Frontier August 2008 Volume 4, Number 4 The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals expressed in this journal are those of the authors alone Editorial content is edited, prepared, and provided by the High Frontier High Frontier High Frontier AFSPC/PA Peterson AFB, CO 80914 Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Commander Vice Commander Director of Public Affairs Creative Editor High Frontier Staff Maj Frank Zane MSgt Jennifer Thibault Contents Introduction General C. Robert Kehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Senior Leader Perspective National Security Space Collaboration as a National Defense Imperative Mr. Scott F. Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Mission AssuranceA Key Part of Space Vehicle Launch Mission Success Maj Gen Ellen M. Pawlikowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Building an Integrated Intelligence Network: Challenges and Opportunities Dr. Pete Rustan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Transforming National Space Security: Enabling DoD and Intelligence Community Defensive Space Control Collaboration BG Jeffrey C. Horne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Brig Gen Katherine E. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 National Security Space A Personal Perspective: An Interview with General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., USAF, Retired Mr. George W. Bradley III and Dr. Rick Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . .20 National Security Space Collaboration Constructing a National Security Space Plan Mr. Joseph D. Rouge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Assuring Access to Space: The Partnership Continues Col John G. Stizza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Common Language, Common Culture: How the Space Community Must Change Language and Perspective to Achieve Cross-Domain Integration and Dominance Lt Col Dana Flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Rescuing Apollo: Building Consensus toward a National Strategy for Space Maj Patrick A. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Historical Perspective Dr. F. Robert Naka Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Book Review Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Next Issue: Space Protection

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High Frontier 2 Introduction General C. Robert Kehler Commander, Air Force Space Command The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed. ~ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 T he Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Mission is clear; deliver space and missile capabilities to America and its developed and wielded by space professionals who are recog operations. This quarters High Frontier compiles perspectives light some challenges as we look toward the future. the evolving partnerships between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) and how these newly forged relationships help address Americas most pressing na sion assurance as a key part of space vehicle launch mission suc ties facing the DoD and IC in building a fully integrated intelli National Security Space to enable DoD and IC defensive space control collaboration. The Senior Leader Perspective concludes in the spotlight as he is interviewed and provides his personal perspective on National Security Space. articles on National Security Space Collaboration. Mr. Joseph the construction of a National Security Space Plan. Col John marizes the historical partnership between the Air Force and General C. Robert Bob Kehler (BS, Education, Pennsylvania State University; MS, Public Administra tion, University of Oklahoma; MA, National Security and Strategic Stud ies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) is commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for the development, acquisition, and op eration of the Air Forces space and missile systems. The general oversees a global network of satellite command and control, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and en sures the combat readiness of Americas intercontinental ballistic mis sile force. He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). General Kehler has commanded at the squadron, group, and twice at the wing level, and has a broad range of operational and command tours in ICBM operations, space launch, space operations, missile warn ing, and space control. The general has served on the AFSPC Staff, Air Staff, and Joint Staff and served as the director of the National Security was the deputy commander, USSTRATCOM, where he helped provide the president and secretary of defense with a broad range of strategic mission areas, including space operations, integrated missile defense, computer network operations, and global strike. the NRO to leverage both organizations strengths to create an unparalleled focus on mission success. He further empha sizes the decades of close coordination and relationships with another space launch partnerthe National Aeronautics and suggests a common Air Force language and common culture of viewing assets and missions to achieve cross-domain integra Security Space Collaboration section is authored by Maj Patrick building a consensus for a national space strategy to provide the actions in the years ahead. of the NRO (1969-1972) and former chief scientist of the Air Force (1975-1978). We round out this quarters volume with a Hopefully this issue spurs insightful discussions and I hope encourage you to think about the implications of a National Se and how space protection contributes to deterrence.

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3 High Frontier National Security Space Collaboration as a National Defense Imperative Senior Leader Perspective Mr. Scott F. Large Chantilly, Virginia I Defense (DoD) projects later incorporated into the National Re 1 joined Americas space community with the launch of privately lites; commercial imaging satellites followed later. Although these moved the lines that have traditionally separated these distinct aspects of Americas space community. Less than a decade into interdependency has increased to the point where actions in one sector can conceivably affect all aspects of Americas space en well as a growing use of foreign space capabilities. American decision-makers and military users are as dependent on commercial and civil systems as they are on national NRO or are the foundational applications for nearly every mission Ameri cas defense and intelligence communities undertakesupporting farmers grow the food that feeds the population and assists indus try in transporting materials that meet the nations needs. Another with accurate life-saving weather predication data. Commercial imaging satellites are increasingly important supplements to the NROs reconnaissance systems and have already made great con global communications form the backbone of Americas economic tary satellite communication architecture. This blending of com merce and defense data transmission demonstrates the commercial Effectively leveraging the various parts of Americas space program is a major challenge facing the national security space community. The DoD and IC recognized this emerging problem ing these systems unique abilities will become more acute. The architectures and collaborating to ensure the greatest amount of leveraging between both communities. National security space el multi-intelligence tasking with data from a broad spectrum of They are also creating interoperable computer networks that share the value of overhead-derived intelligence data. The DoD and IC are also organizationally changing to apply the strengths of different agencies to some of Americas most pressing national security challenges. After the 9/11 terrorist at embedded collection managers and analysts in major commands improve the delivery of timely intelligence to Americas frontline spective from the DoD. NROs relationship with Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and the Navys Space Warfare elements. The NROs relationship with dating back to the NROs founding on 6 September 1961 as a hy and the Air Force chief of staff built on that relationship by signing

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High Frontier 4 star equivalent leader to AFSPC headquarters to serve as the depu relationship between the NRO Operations Center (NROC) and the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)both 24/7 operated watchesUSSTRATCOM ate contingency response actions for all Air Force and NRO or bital assets in response to immediate space threats. The NRO and USSTRATCOM also agreed that the JSpOC and NROC would serve as each others back-up facility and establish common emer 2 and AFSPC strengthened US space situational awareness and de fensive space capabilitiesan effort that gained great urgency af ter the widely publicized 11 January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite Americas on-orbit and ground-based space systems. Protection affects every aspect of Americas space community due to the in strengths of Americas entire space community. Increased threats to Americas space systems prompted the 31 March 2008 NRO and AFSPC creation of a joint Space Protection tions on how best to protect [Americas] space systems and stay curity space efforts through an integrated strategy and to articulate mend solutions leading to comprehensive space protection capa 3 ad hoc efforts had typically composed the generally limited to individual efforts as people rotated between and requirements into a central national strategy. This senior level mize the national investment in space. The Space Protection Pro gram will use IC threat assessments of US space adversaries to processes that avoid duplicative efforts. or larger objects orbiting the Earth. These objects include active foreign satellites. Maintaining a detailed catalog of orbiting ob sions and provides the US space community with vital space situ fornia. The NRO also supports the Talon Spectrum Red Cloud ties program effort to load unique data directly into the catalog of the space surveillance network. The Talon Spectrum Red Cloud initiative will enable non-traditional sensor data to reach the space and improve detailed space situational awareness. The 2006 NRO-Air Force statement of intent emphasizes the tent professional space cadre. Accomplishing this goal is a criti shortage of skilled engineers and scientists for present and future national security space programs. The US aerospace industry is the fact that the average US aerospace engineer is nearly 60 for retirement. 4 The acquisition reforms that the national security space com aerospace workforce shortage. The NRO and other national secu an Independent Variable and Total System Performance Respon ment established system requirements for new acquisitions and left acquisition practices produced procurement failures and hindered the professional development of a generation of program man agers who were not given the opportunity to develop real-world sary to manage large procurement activities successfully.

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5 High Frontier lishing professional development regimens for space operators. Employees at the NRO follow parent service or agency require does not postpone or eliminate a parent agency or service edu agency or service does not provide. The NRO and AFSPC are collaborating to set common career standards and supervise the development of space professionals through the Space Assign statement of intent. The boards overall objective is to strengthen oversight of the career development of all Air Force credentialed space professionals. It focuses on balancing the Air Force and the appropriate development and utilization of space profession Force and NRO. The NRO and AFSPC also support the National Space Secu tional programs. It provides a broad cadre of space professionals and ground-based space capabilities. The NSSI grew out of the Space Tactics School and the Space Operations School. The Space 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War that concluded campaign planners had not fully leveraged the nations space capabilities. Established concepts and systems. are also collaborating through the Space Industrial Base Council tain Americas space systems. Representatives from major US government agencies with equities in Americas space program compose the SIBC and analyze US and foreign markets and poli missions. This is important because shortfalls in certain satellite mission assurance efforts by adding unrealistic costs or time to programs in instances when the national space community is the only market. AFSPC relationship is heading in the right direction to meet value of NRO systems and created a more responsive organization able to confront Americas most pressing national security chal improved intelligence. This collaboration has already resulted in Notes: 1 Prologue: Quarterly Journal of the National Archives, 27 (Spring 2 3 2008. 4 Crosslink Mr. Scott F. Large (BS, Engi neering, University of Central Florida) became the sixteenth National Reconnaissance Of and was also appointed as sistant to the secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence Space Technology) in October 2007. Mr. Large joined the Cen tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1986 as a project manage Development and Engineering developing advanced space craft payloads at the NRO. He held various senior development and systems engineering positions within the NROs Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate through 1996. Also dur ing this time, he served one year as the executive assistant to the DNRO. In 1997, he became deputy director of the Future Imagery Architecture Program. In 1998, Mr. Large was appointed the deputy chief for programs within the CIA Directorate of Operations Technology Management gram while assisting in the development of the programs strategic plan and program management process. In 2000, he was selected as director of the Clandestine Signals Intelligence Operations Group of Science and Technology. While there, he led the development and execution of critical collection operations for the Intelligence Community. In September 2000, he became the deputy director of Mr. Larges last CIA assignment was as the associate deputy director for the Science and Technology Directorate, beginning in September 2001. He returned to the NRO to serve as director, Im agery Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate, from July 2003 to November 2006. Mr. Large was the director, Source Op erations and Management Directorate at the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency until April 2007 when he again returned to the NRO to assume the position of NRO principal deputy director.

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High Frontier 6 Mission AssuranceA Key Part of Space Vehicle Launch Mission Success Maj Gen Ellen M. Pawlikowski, USAF Chantilly, Virginia R ecent years have shown unprecedented levels of launch success for both Air Force and National Reconnaissance people and organizations have employed processes and worked in a disciplined and collaborative fashion to ensure every aspect ing a billion dollar payload. This collection of activities over the lifecycle of a space vehicle development program and through launch is called mission assurance. ance is a key part of ensuring mission success for Air Force and NRO launches. All launches involve integrating the activities are both internal to the Air Force or between the Air Force and the NRO. The mission assurance process allows the disparate organizations involved in the lifecycle of a program to speak in a common language with a common framework about different Senior Leader Perspective ery aspect of a mission to ensure all risks are known. Requiring programs to go through this process ensures that no rock is left unturned before launch. Mission assurance gives us the high ensures the best opportunity for mission success. The Need for Strong Space Vehicle Mission Assurance Practices and NRO payloads totaling over $3 billion. As a result of these the failures and provide a report on the causes and corrective actions being taken to prevent their recurrence. The resulting was completed in November 1999. Three follow-up reviews were conducted through 2003. reform in the early 1990s. The BAR recommended changes to strengthen those processes by returning to earlier methods to prevent future failures. The BAR recommended incorporating and government involvement in the mission assurance process tory process that lays the foundation for successful launches. Each launch offers oneand only onechance at mission success. There are no unconstrained ing; there is no second chance for success. We must ensure that every launch places a satellite in the correct orbit and that incorporate the lessons of the BAR into program that provides the Delta IV and Atlas V space launch vehicles. Mission assurance is both a process and a culture that must be adhered to by all individuals involved with launch. As a Figure 1. This notional chart shows that launch often is the greatest risk to any space system over its entire lifecycle.

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7 High Frontier mission success. Mission assurance includes a disciplined appli beginning at concept design and continuing through launch op The launch mission assurance process consists of three pri residual launch risks have been satisfactorily assessed and ac acceptable. This process requires an in-depth review and vali additional technical assessments of the system design to increase process represents a third set of eyes to ensure the contractor and been independently assessed. Both the Air Force and NRO are doing this routinely and Mission Assurance Team. Both organizations perform mission assurance checks and readiness assessments as independent arms of their respective commanders. Carrying out these structured and disciplined mission assur ance processes is critical to mission success. But equally impor tant is maintaining a culture of mission assurance. The way of doing the business of mission assurance requires strict attention percent mission success. Each individual must assume personal accountability and responsibilities both to perform successfully their part of the mission and to work collaboratively with others to ensure the process functions as a whole. This culture is revali sion assurance is incorporated into various training classes and Though we have had an impressive string of successful launch with our successes. The culture of mission assurance requires launch is unique and poses new and different integration chal out with the same rigor and focus as those for the last launch. We are only as good as our last launch. Key Features of Space Vehicle Launch Mission Assurance Procurement strategy. for launch procurement that makes industry a full partner in the vicebuying the hardware and touch labor associated with each plus portion of the contract is to maintain launch capabilities for arise. An award fee plan tied to this portion of the contract en sures that launch providers will maintain key mission assurance continue to perform quality work. industry has become a full partner in mission assurance because they are incentivized to maintain sound mission assurance ca pabilities across launches. This procurement strategy provides assured US access to space and ensures that launch vehicle pro sion success. Clear accountability. One of the key recommendations of there was no single entity responsible for understanding and tracking the pedigree of a launch vehicle from design to delivery of a spacecraft on orbit. Spacelift Operations, and sibility to the commander of the SMC (SMC/CC) for delivering systems to orbit. These instructions implement Air Force Policy Space, Space Operations, Space Launch Operations. mand (AFSPC) roles and responsibilities relating to spacelift op Concentrating this authority and accountability in the SMC/CC ensures that the certifying individual gains insight throughout the development of the satellite-launch vehicle system to make roles and responsibilities between developers and launch op Missile Maintenance Management, outline

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High Frontier 8 the interdependent responsibilities of the developers and acquirers at SMC or NRO and the launch operators at the 14 th Air Force. Clarifying how these two organiza tions interact up to and on the day of launch assigns clear responsibility and accountability to ensure that nothing is overlooked due to confusion over roles and responsibilities. One key indi weeks between cer is the mission direc authority for Air Force payloads and NRO authority for NRO cus for mission assurance and mission success. The Aerospace ganizational and technical role in providing mission assurance. technical continuity for SMC and NRO. Though active duty military personnel rotate frequently through launch and system can remain with programs through most or all of a development cycle. tion maintains a depth of independent technical capabilities to analyze potential issues and render assessments on space poration has a long history of developing capabilities. These processes and tools have been validated many times over through The Aerospace Corporations ongoing support of all major Air Force mine whether a particular issue will result in mission failure. This technical depth bedrock foundation for those missions requiring partnership be tween SMC and NRO. Review process. reviews conducted after launch. The three major reviews preceding every launch are the Mis and Launch Readiness Review (LRR). These critical reviews and readiness and training of the operating personnel. The pur pose is to determine whether all elements of the launch system are ready to accept the payload and proceed toward launch. Suc tus; impacts from previous missions; open technical issues; and one to two weeks before launch. The FRR results in the SMC/ recommendation of the mission director and the senior represen tatives of the launch team. Figure 2. The Aerospace Corporation has a long history of developing tools, models, data, analysis, and testing capabilities to support mission assurance for both the Air process.

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9 High Frontier the launch system are operationally ready to support the launch. based on the mission teams assessment of the integrated launch vehicle and spacecraft stack. by both The Aerospace Corporation and the launch vehicle pro tions in the event of a mission failure or mishap. Output prod are assessed for impact on subsequent missions and the launch value can be carried over from the lessons of one launch to the Mission Assurance Works ance process has detected and corrected issues that would have caused launch failures if left uncorrected. perts at The Aerospace Corporation analyzed test data and bear probable cause of the failure was a change to a lower-strength material for the bearing. They also concluded that low pressure gine contributed to the failures. criterion for Air Force engines and provides added engine reli ability. Detecting this issue during testing shows that the many re space Corporation and their partnership with the Air Force and remember this issue and ensure that the same conditions do not place future missions at risk. Strengthening Launch Mission Assurance for the Future A hallmark of mission assurance is striving for continuous improvement. Each mission and each launch teaches us one incorporating new developments will strengthen the mission success ratio. As the space vehicle launch mission assurance process itself sion Assurance Forum. This forum brings together stakeholders from industry and government across the space vehicle enter increased cross-pollination and increased mission success for all types of US space assets. Conclusion mission assurance. This refocused mind-set has permeated the national security space community and is manifested in a culture the mission feels accountable for thoroughly resolving every is sue and assuring 100 percent mission success. These revitalized initiatives will increase the credibility of the Maj Gen Ellen M. Pawlikows ki (BS, Chemical Engineering, New Jersey Institute of Technol ogy; PhD, Chemical Engineer ing, University of California at Berkeley) is the deputy director, and commander, Air Force Space Command Element, Chantilly, Virginia. As deputy director, she assists the director and principal deputy director in the day-to-day direction of the NRO and also serves as the commander for Air Force civilian and uniformed personnel assigned to the organization. Major General Pawlikowski has served in a variety of techni cal management, leadership, and staff positions in the Air Force. Previous assignments include vice commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, California, and commander, Military Satellite Communications Systems Wing, Space and Mis sile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, California. She was se lected for promotion to major general in March 2008.

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High Frontier 10 Building an Integrated Intelligence Network: Challenges and Opportunities Dr. Pete Rustan Director, Ground Enterprise Directorate Chantilly, Virginia O the internet and have deployed many networks to conduct their more powerful than anything available to them. People often vision is a fully integrated Department of Defense/Intelligence rized users empowered with the tools and services necessary to intelligence products. This architecture must information on-demand to improve the speed world. This article describes the challenges the NRO faces as we develop information products and services for use across the DoD and IC that ride on this powerful network with accurate and timely intelligence information on any problem the tremendous opportunities available as we build this integrated intelligence network. known as the premier acquirer and operator of the nations space reconnaissance capabili needs to work with our partners in the DoD and the IC to add more value to the data the NRO ligence analysts. While the NRO must maintain also transform itself into a world class provider of information products and services. To start the National Geospatial Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to build an integrated and scalable ground architecture capable of fus ing overhead geospatial intelligence and signals intelligence laboration will provide new information products and services through an enhanced multi-intelligence (multi-INT) framework we must build on our information assurance capabilities to se curely share data with our mission partners and users. Our busi ness should leverage the streamlined business practices used by scale by leveraging system commonality. Challenges and Opportunities Figure 1 illustrates some of the major challenges facing the Figure 1. Challenges facing the Department of Defense/Intelligence Community in building a fully integrated intelligence network. Senior Leader Perspective

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11 High Frontier lenges and the potential opportunities available to solve these problems. Cultural Challenge 30 Percent second relates to information sharing. Global geopolitical chal to solving present and future intelligence challenges. Unfortu tions offer the strongest resistance to change because they have tablished prior to the advent of the internet. Human nature is cumstances surrounding the initial conditions have changed cannot predict the intended and unintended consequences of the ganizations have become very risk averse. We have established a multitude of processes that require inordinate amounts of time to tolerate any changes. The recapitalization cycle for successful IT businesses is mea up over many years. It would seem much easier to build a brand new system from scratch to achieve a given set of capabilities than to evolve a legacy system. Legacy systems generally have a number of unique and highly customized designs focused on approval even though their successful implementation would result in increased capabilities and long-term lower costs. We must also embrace the open standards that are being widely accepted throughout the IT/IS industry to enable us to be give us access to a broader commercial industry base and should also reduce the overhead associated with test and integration error. The future of space acquisition must be based on larger constellations of small that plug into modular ground systems (ac quired separately from the satellites) using the latest commercial IT developments. Information shar ing is another cultural change that must be addressed. The terror ist attacks on 11 Sep tember 2001 forced us to begin the process of breaking down cul tural barriers within and sparked the begin ning of a fundamental transformation to meet the changing threat environment. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commis sion) proposed sweeping changes to the IC. The 108 th Congress were signed into law by President George W. Bush. In October called for integrating domestic and foreign US intelligence and aimed at eliminating gaps in our understanding of threats to our future capabilities as well as present results. as a fully integrated entity and do not have effective mecha nisms for making all data available to each other using standard a much more agile enemy and to allow us to take advantage of the information sharing technologies that we have become so important capability we must have to address present challenges network with the ability to deliver fused information products and services from various collectors directly to our user com munity. Unfortunately, the largest and most established government organizations offer the stron gest resistance to change because they have become highly bureaucratic, generally follow ing processes established prior to the advent of the internet. Figure 2. The 9/11 Commission Report.

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High Frontier 12 enhanced information products and services based on multiple collectors over an interoperable network to yield far greater intelligence. Users should be able to make improvements to knowledge that the available information is assured and secure. We should work with the users to build interactive tools and information stream produced by the DoD and IC should become a data feed accessible by authorized users. Governance Challenge 20 Percent DoD and IC agencies are tied to their functional managerial roles that were established by policies written when we faced a different enemy and when we did not have access to the infor mation technologies available today. These organizations will have to shed outdated roles to create a virtual enterprise. Break leadership and direct guidance from the president and the Na sets of governing rules will have to be provided. created the Integrated Intelligence Architecture Leadership Board (IIALB). The IIALB provides a forum to jointly evalu ate and structure solutions to network interoperability prob prioritized interoperability needs. The JTB applies a business model. The IIALB governance body should provide effective management to ensure every piece of information is discover able and accessible in real-time. Mission Assurance Challenge 20 Percent or tampered with in any way and that the information provided is from a trusted source. Making security transparent to the information to the users. Integrating security mechanisms into the integrated ground architecture and providing them as a ser vice will preclude providers from having to develop and imple ment unique solutions. A cohesive and deliberate approach to security and mission assurance is fundamental to addressing the customers needs. Technical Challenge 15 Percent decision makers require on-demand access to information prod fundamental need in the community. That need applies to a wide monitoring weapons of mass destruction global war on terror combat search and rescue support high value target location and tracking drug interdiction and ship tracking missile launch detection weapon and space system performance characterization strategic indications and warning ness) by building an integrated and interoperable DoD/IC net Access. proach is to work with our partners to post all information prod ucts and services at the earliest point of consumability instead of only delivering those information products and services to individuals that request the information. Content. Users will always demand continuously improving products and services. Improved performance characteristics fusion across all collection platforms are central to our intel ligence needs. Analysts must also be able to combine real-time information with information collected in the past to determine strategic and tactical changes. Timeliness. Figure 3. Improvement Focus Areas.

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13 High Frontier disparate systems and dissemination mechanisms. While the analyst tracking a strategic threat. The bottom line is that users need their information on their timelines. To make ACT a reality we must integrate our ground infra command and control areas have to be optimized to ensure that mon set of standards to facilitate multi-mission tasking and data to new common standards. We will take advantage of com terprise using the best available commercial technologies for future systems. We must enable dissemination of data to our forces in the approach where we continuously enhance the speed and capac ity of the networks while investigating data format changes that allow data streaming in real-time over low bandwidth commu nications. Overcoming these technical challenges will enable a funda Concept of Operations Challenge 15 Percent Our end state will be an IC enterprise that information on-demand to improve the speed the world. Our intelligence network must be designed to anticipate mission needs for infor mation by making the complete spectrum of sources of information seamlessly fused and available to the users. Our concept of opera tions will encourage new collaboration opportu nities with improved analytic practices. It will using common standards and cost-effective en terprise-wide IT services. It will provide users with common administrative and operational services accessible through a common desktop operating across multiple security levels based on the users credentials. Implementing the Vision The adoption of SOA is one of the largest trends in commercial markets today. SOAs foster innovation and agile development plementation behind the service. This enables service managers changing the fundamental service provided. The implementa tion of SOA is directly tied to the use of open standards that enable us to evolve away from customized solutions and foster greater access to information than ever before. manner consistent with the emerging DoD DCGS and Joint In telligence Operations Command (JIOC) enterprises. It is de signed to meet the community requirement for information at should leverage the large DoD investment in developing the ar industrial base. The attributes we are striving to achieve with common core services and infrastructure Figure 4. Five Key Enablers for Implementing the Vision.

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High Frontier 14 re-use of services single query access to multiple intelligence sources discoverable data and services global situational awareness rapid acquisition and transition of new capabilities Network consolidation is essential to the success of our Chiefs of Staffs strategic guidance to establish a single infor mation environment across the community. We are engaging to enable community collaboration across a peered federation of DoD and IC enterprise frameworks. There are two essential A growing trend in the commercial IT market is the use of software cost savings by capitalizing on mission commonality. Data centers can also provide a common repository for mission data archiving. By merging our data into master data reposi meeting their needs. that between 50 percent and 80 percent of the mission man ing these functions using data centers and operating the space craft using SOA should provide economies of scale. Summary This article describes the capabilities that could be available to the DoD and IC if we build an integrated interoperable intel Dr. Pete Rustan (BSEE and MSEE, Illinois Institute of Tech nology, Chicago; PhD, Electrical Engineering, University of Flor Enterprise Directorate (D/GED), (NRO), after serving as the NROs director of Advanced Systems and Technology for over four years. Dr. Rustan served a 26 year ca reer in the United States Air Force, where he distinguished himself in the management of seven space craft development programs that used advanced technologies and implemented the faster, cheaper, and better approach to acquir ing space systems. He was the mission manager for the Clementine spacecraft, which mapped the surface of the moon and obtained more than 1.8 million images using 11 spectral bands. The con struction and testing of the Clementine mission took just 22 months from concept to launch and cost only $80 million. The Clementine spacecraft with six cameras could be built on a shortened schedule. the presence of ice on the moons South Pole. During his last tour of duty in the military, which was coinci dentally at the NRO, Dr. Rustan promoted and demonstrated that NRO mission objectives could be met by building a constellation of smaller and cheaper systems. Dr. Rustan remains an advocate for rapid prototyping and selecting the best value proposition that addresses our intelligence needs. Dr. Rustan has received many national and international awards, including the Aviation Week and Space Technology Laureate and Hall of Fame, the Disney Discovery Award for Technological Inno vation, the National Space Club Astronautics Engineer Award, the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, and was featured by Space News in their Top 100 in Space 1989. proposition. The author encourages collaborative developments between the various IC agencies and the DoD to build information prod ucts and services based on data collected from multi-INT sen sors. We must proceed with a sense of urgency since todays problems cannot be addressed effectively unless these informa tion products and services are made available on an integrated and interoperable intelligence network that is more powerful than anything available to the enemy. To prevent future attacks this kind of integrated intelligence network. we can leverage economies of scale by developing integrated mission management, mis system for each spacecraft, but build a basic, common architecture for new systems to plug into with minimum customization.

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15 High Frontier Transforming National Space Security: Enabling DoD and Intelligence Community Defensive Space Control Collaboration BG Jeffrey C. Horne, USA Deputy Director for Mission Support Chantilly, Virginia T odays national security environment is characterized an increasingly challenging operational environment. As you ligence Community (IC) are working to counter these rapidly Americas combined space architecture gives national policy further provide critical enabling capabilities when operating in concert with a wide realm of intelligence partners. Responding to operational challenges and constrained bud includes a broad and increasingly networked array of commu critical interdependencies vulnerable to threats from Americas adversaries. The successful Chinese anti-satellite test in Janu ary 2007 demonstrated that lesson to the national security space community. This watershed event reminded us that space can based capabilities support more than military and intelligence nications as well. It also highlighted the need to accelerate joint icas space-based systems. One tangible sign that the DoD and IC communities are moving in this direction is the growing re National Reconnaissance Operations Center (NROC) and the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Space Opera tions Center (JSpOC). to integrate their respective space capabilities to enhance our overall capabilities and provide enhanced situational aware deputy director for Mission Support (DDMS) as the deputy commander (DCDR) of STRATCOMs Joint Functional Com ponent Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE). The agreement and the DNRO as we accomplish our joint Space Mission sets. Serve as the senior military advisor to the director of the NRO for Operational Matters and ensure our operational erational needs. Ensure that NRO activities provide effective program Maintain the program interface and operational support Recommend processes and procedures yielding common synchronizing responses to these events between the DoD and NRO space activities and supporting components. ing capabilities and advocating for resources to support viding space capabilities to the combatant commanders and the IC. A March 2008 instruction from DNRO Scott F. Large gave us further responsibility for creating and maintaining NRO in tegrating operations and assured processes for defensive coun Senior Leader Perspective

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High Frontier 16 situational awareness operations. My dual oversight of these functions should better enable continuity of operations across the IC and DoD joint space operations environment. We presently have multiple components that conduct space created in response to the September 11 th evolved into a capability that provides enterprise system status US government agencies. The NROC conducts survivability porting to support defensive space control. It also provides us with critical support as the NRO focal point for special access programs in support of NROC mission elements. Under the COM element responsible for planning and conducting DoD force application of DoD space assets. Successful accomplish ment of these missions hinges on USSTRATCOMs ability to understand and remain constantly aware of both the terrestrial and space threat environments in much the same way as the NRO leadership requires situational awareness of IC space as sets. ties to improve information sharing and create mutual backup The recent shoot down of a disabled US intelligence satel lite highlighted the improved relationship between the NRO improving their mutual capabilities. During Operation Burnt days before atmospheric reentry. Both organizations leveraged their intimate knowledge of their own organizations abilities to resolve the situation. This event highlighted the fact that while formidable complement of assets to bear on the toughest na the hub of an unprecedented collaboration of more than two tions centers on opposite sides of the country resulted in a suc cessful worldwide effort to prevent the loss of human life that could have resulted from the uncontrolled reentry of a satellite the opportunity to improve DoD and IC space protection capa Awareness capabilities. We need better tools and technological trained and equipped with improved processing and modeling decision-making. We also require the means to communicate As the two communities work together to craft a joint space protection strategy and build and equip our communities to bet hat relationship and the corresponding work of the NROC and to protect the nations vital space interests.The author wishes to acknowledge the following for contributing to the article: Mr. Rob Fountain (Associate Deputy Director for Mission Sup port), Lt Col Gary Melusen, Maj Jake Middleton, Mr. Fred Davenport, and the entire JFCC Space and NRO team for their amazing efforts to support. BG Jeffrey C. Horne (BS, Business Administration, Ohio State; MS, Information Systems Management, United States Naval Postgraduate School; MSST, Security and Strategic Studies, US Army War College) is currently dep uty commander, Joint Func tional Component Command for Space, US Strategic Com mand and is the deputy direc tor for Mission Support, Na Brigadier General Horne has served in the US Strategic Com From January 2006 to December 2007, he served in Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom as effects coordinator, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. From July 2004 to January 2006, he was deputy commanding general for operations, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/United States Army Forces Stra tegic Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He also worked on the National Missile Defense Program as training and doctrine command systems manager, United States Army Space and Mis sile Defense Command, Arlington, Virginia, from June 2000 to June 2004.

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17 High Frontier Black and White Space Brig Gen Katherine E. Roberts, USAF Director, Signals Intelligence Systems Acquisition Chantilly, Virginia T he integration of black and white space has been the cally from the inception of the space age. Since the watershed 1 I assert it is worse than irrelevant; it is an impediment to prog ress. Background formed the foundation upon which the concept was built. The imperative was to establish and maintain the military capability mentation of the concept depended upon which imperative took precedence. The editors of the book Eye in the Sky: The CO RONA Story described the lessons from Pearl Harbor and the contingencies. The natural inclination for military leaders was to plan for the worst-case scenario [nuclear war] For many dangers of not knowing what Americas potential adversaries were planning and capable of doing 2 oriented systems such as those oriented towards bomb damage assessment were The two imple mentations also had different technical needs. the systems iden had to provide de tails on potential data latencies on the order of days to weeks were tolerable in were much more focused on perishable data where speed took 3 The Impetus for Change People began to focus on integrating the two implementations as it became clear the data was agnostic; it could be used to ad dress either strategic or tactical questions as long as one under stood its limitations such as accuracy or availability. Other key gan to address the data latency issue; the concept of maneuver the push by the Soviets to build and sell increasingly accurate long range surface-to-air missiles. In response to these oppor tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During that time General Norman Schwarzkopf complained frequently about his inabil had to be disseminated to military forces in-theater using couri ers and airplanes. 4 This is not to say the two imperatives have changed. Pre venting strategic surprise is still of the highest priority as is be Senior Leader Perspective KH-4A (Key Hole) of Corona family with 2 de scent capsules. Historically the concept of black and white tween the fear of another Pearl Harbor and the fear of expansionist communism.

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High Frontier 18 ing able to wage and win the nations wars. What has changed is our understanding of what information is strategic and what information is tactical. The driver behind this shift is the global telecommunication revolution. Can You Hear Me Now? 5 ting information were key factors in delineating the boundary between strategic and tactical information. The value of strate gic information had to endure beyond the time required to as $1.33 (then year dollars) per word. 6 Today with the advent of the World Wide Web we have the start of a true global grid that encompasses both land line and over-the-air broadcast. Not the boundary between strategic and tactical information? have been completely removed. Today one persons tactical in formation or action is anothers strategic information or action. The magnitude of this change was illustrated early in Opera ly. The entire sequence of events took only a few minutes. In but this is the age of global communications. The sequence of was swift and the impact lasting. While most of us would have considered it strategic. The images of the US soldier placing an among many replayed thousands of times a day on Jihadist Web sites as part of their strategic Information Operation campaign. typecast as strategic or tactical. The data these systems pro vide feeds the information set that informs the nations deci the global telecommunications revolution is broader than just stood until now is no longer valid because it implies there are two separate implementations that can and should be brought together. Such a concept impedes progress because the bound aries implied by the phrasing of an idea often constrain the dis cussions of potential solutions. A Glimpse of the Future The removal of the previously accepted understandings of strategic and tactical has put us in a time of transition. We need 7 In this the revolution in global communications has rendered the discussion of black and white, that is, strategic and tactical, space integration moot. Time and treasure are no lon ger factors; therefore, space systems should no longer be typecast as strategic or tactical. Cpl Edward Chin, from New York, of the 3 rd Battalion, 4 th Marines Husseins statue before tearing it down in downtown Baghdad, 9 April 2003. AP Photo/Laurent Rebours, File

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19 High Frontier connotation with regards to all elements of national power as The current approach to achieving the goal of providing data curely interconnecting people and systems independent of time Users are empowered to better protect assets; more effectively 8 military situational awareness. While we have started on a path is here to stay. What opportunities the move to net-centric will present is a matter open for debate. Even the most wild-eyed zealot can only imagine a tiny part of the change the move will tion. Each would be an active participant in the machine to Summary The nations civilian and military leaders need information across the spectrum of peace through war. The information it global telecommunications revolution. As we move to a netthe issue of value added. We are indeed in a time of transition. It is up to us to move out and shape the future. Brig Gen Katherine E. Rob erts (BA, Physics, Indiana Uni versity; MS, Space Technology, Johns Hopkins University) is director, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Systems Acquisi tion, National Reconnaissance is responsible for the develop ment, acquisition, and deploy ment of multi-billion dollar space and C3I systems needed to satisfy military, intelligence community, and civil needs. Her multiservice and multia gency organizations advanced SIGINT systems are used as force multipliers by national and DoD policymakers, providing direct General Roberts entered the Air Force as a distinguished gradu ate of ROTC at Indiana University in 1977. Her career has spanned a wide variety of space operations, acquisitions, and staff assign manager of a major acquisition program, major command and uni fense. General Roberts has been the vice director of operations at US Space Command and the vice director for space operations at US Strategic Command during the execution of Operation Iraqi Free dom. General Roberts has also served as the commander, Com mand and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Wing at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Prior to assuming her current position, she was the special assistant to the deputy di The information itself is agnostic: how we put the puzzle pieces together is what builds cred ible strategic and tactical context. To this end the question of integrating black, that is, strategic systems and capabilities, with white, that is, tactical systems and capabilities, is no longer the correct one. Notes: 1 SECRET EMPIRE: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of Americas Space Espionage 2 Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites 3 4 Strategic Apprais al: United States Air and Space Power in the 21 st Century, ed. Zalmay 5 Television advertising slogan used by Verizon beginning in about 2005. 6 Scien 7 space.com/spacenews/archive06/LairdOpEd_0904.html (accessed 16 May 2008). 8 Net-Centric Data Strategy

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High Frontier 20 National Security Space A Personal Perspective: An Interview with General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., USAF, Retired Senior Leader Profile Mr. George W. Bradley III Command Historian Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant Deputy Command Historian Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado T he following interview by George W. Bradley III and Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant with General Thomas S. Moorman ing June 2008. General Moorman retired in August 1997 after having served as Air Force vice chief of staff from 1994 to 1997. The general has served in a variety of intelligence and reconnais sance related positions within the United States and worldwide. deeply involved in the planning and organizing for the estab lishment of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). During his ditionally represented the Air Force in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and was authorized to accept SDI program Air Force. As commander and vice com responsible for operating military space well as maintaining the intercontinental bal listic missile force. Over his career he has headed a number of blue ribbon panels on has had the unique opportunity to observe and interact with the national security space sector. This interview is a brief summary of his observations on national security space. sition of AFSPC or the US Air Force. 1 INTERVIEW Bradley/Sturdevant: you become involved with national security space? Moorman: term is conventionally used to include both the military and in in national security space since 1964. While I was not actually customer of the Corona program during the height of the Cold War. Command (SAC) B-47 bomb wing in Kansas. Our bomb wing was responsible for plans to strike several hundred targets in the which were often based upon World War II-era reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. produced intelligence that debunked the so-called missile gap. Corona also produced more imagery of the Soviet Union in one mission than had been acquired in all other imagery collection charting production capability in the early attempt to keep up with the need to rapidly duty to one of several photointerpretation team of enlisted interpreters whose job was to manually update each wings target ma were revealed in the imagery and revise the predicted radar returns. rona imagery fundamentally changed my life. I became fascinated with reconnais General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., USAF, Retired.

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21 High Frontier tion of product. After tours with the SR-71 wing and with tacti directly involved in national security space for the remainder of my careersome 27 more years. Bradley/Sturdevant: did national security space evolve from that time to the present? Moorman: This is a broad-ranging question covering over lite reconnaissance programs. The preponderance of the military functions performed by space systems have grown to include often the under secretary of the Air Force) as the director of the organizational construct was that the National Reconnaissance rangement ensured that the NRO would enjoy a high priority for this support within the Air Force. The evolution of national security space can be generally characterized by individual decades. The decade of the 60s saw eration of systems with dramatically improved capabilities were developed. The 80s can be described as both the decade of space organization as well as a period of ever-increasing space sup port to crises and contingencies. With respect to space organiza Space Command (1985) and the Army Space Command (1988). The decade of the 90s began with Desert Shield/Desert Storm. contributions of space to rapidly achieving our objectives in Iraq Today we continue to be engaged in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Bradley/Sturdevant: What were the major challenges con fronting national security space from the 1970s to the 1990s and how successfully did both black and white space meet those challenges? Moorman: summarize a few key challenges. The subject matter is also very closely related to the previous question. Let me say at the outset that the challenges for black and both the military and intelligence programs were dealing with the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite space systems gradually increased throughout the 80s in support (1983); Eldorado Canyon Libya (1986); Earnest Will -Persian Gulf Minesweeping (1988); and Just Cause Panama (1989). cycle. The growth in use of black space systems during this period few military operators had any appreciation of the capabilities of national decision makers). Corona satellite imagery of Lop Nor atomic test site, China, 8 December 1966.

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High Frontier 22 was such that the systems provided superb support to deliber ate planning in support of the nuclear warplan or the Single output from satellite reconnaissance. the Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) weapon system. The Soviets had developed a co-orbital system that threatened our low altitude testing of their system in 1976 as I recall. This set in motion a which directed the initiation of an ASAT program (an F-15 with a miniature homing vehicle) and a series of measures to improve of studies on how best to organize and manage space systems to into military operations and the need to provide sharper opera tional focus and advocacy for this increasingly critical mission area. The culmination of these studies was the creation of AFSPC other services created their respective space commands and a space. I would [be] remiss if I didnt mention two events which I of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The other event was Desert Storm. Keeping track of the Soviet Union had been a primary focus of the NRO since its inception in 1960. With the demise of the streamlined management prerogatives began to erode. These in the 90s and continue to this day. the services understanding and planning for space capabilities is telligence Community (IC) that supports space reconnaissance is military now understandably wanted not only more and broader wanted a greater say in the requirements for new systems. Meet ing those demands continues to be a major challenge today. Bradley/Sturdevant: Although there is some disagreement major role. Were on-scene commanders afforded timely access caused the disconnect? Moorman: The IC and the NRO gave the highest priority to an unprecedented volume of data and intelligence products from especially in wartime. There was also the question of dissemination of the data to On 13 September 1985, an F-15 launched an ASM-135A anti-satellite weapon that intercepted and destroyed a Solwind satellite.

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23 High Frontier receive and use the information. 1992. Bradley/Sturdevant: From your perspective as a senior space Moorman: served in various capacities within the NRO. These assignments gave me sensitivity and understanding of NRO culture and ca pabilities. I also had developed very close relationships with a fortune to be the NRO representative on a series of space organi zational studies. I was also the interface to the white Air Force on a number of support agreements and programmatic issues. I had some understanding of black/white space interfaces and the need for improved collaboration. tions business in Cheyenne Mountain. This included managing tasked to assess operational threats and to provide warning data of threats to US space systems. Recall that the Soviet Union Force was developing the F-15 ASAT. I think we in the SPA DOC had a very good relationship with various satellite ownerearly 80s our collaboration with the NRO on space defense-re the Air Force supported the NRO by providing satellite com mand and control (C2) services. This support has been provided since the very beginnings of the national security space business. smooth transition required considerable coordination. The Challenger space acquisition community and AFSPC. it was critical that the NRO was comfortable that the command would continue to provide the quality support and emphasis mis sion success. AFSPC worked closely with the NRO to provide that support. When General Charles A. Horner became the commander of the air component commander during Desert Storm. He had a space warfare center to develop new applications for space sys tems and to train operators on how to use space systems. This the Deputy Director of Military Support (DDMS). I would be remiss if I didnt mention another area of collabo surably to improving the quality of collaboration and the under standing between the two communities. I guess I am one of then was assigned to white space. The list of senior people who and Mr. Doug Lovero. I have undoubtedly left some folks out New facilities for the Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) inside Cheyenne Mountain opened in March 1982.

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High Frontier 24 Bradley/Sturdevant: With the improvements in the use of support commanders in the area of responsibility received from Moorman: I am not comfortable in commenting as I do not Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). I think this is a question the in-theater DIRSPACEFOR and the NROs DDMS are work ing hard to improve the support in any way they can. Bradley/Sturdevant: Do you think the current organization al distribution of responsibilities for national security space is why? Moorman: on the congressionally-directed Space Commission chaired by Mr. Don Rumsfeld. The commission made a number of recom mendations on the organization and management of national se believe the commissions concerns regarding the vulnerabilities when the commission report was published in 2001. secretary of the Air Force as also the DNRO is the right way to go; I believe we should return to that construct. I also support the creation of a major force program for space (MFP 12). I think it would be a useful tool to provide better visibility to man age space programs and to ensure a more coherent military space program. It would also provide a great mechanism to syn chronize the acqui their associated minals. I under stand that Congress has [recently] di rected that an MFP 12 be created. orable trends is that all four of the sec tors that constitute the national space and commercial) are growing more there is no national interagency forum to oversee the implemen tation of national space policy and to coordinate and frame crossforum could help develop national positions on space matters being considered in international [circles]. The Rumsfeld Space Commission recommended that this group be established and created under the National Security Council structure. I believe we still need an interagency group for space. ment panel on National Security Space Management and Orga nizationa Space Commission IIhas been underway for sev of Martin Marietta and former director of the Goddard Space future. Bradley/Sturdevant: What do you envision as the biggest and how well poised is the space community to meet those chal lenges? Moorman: One thing for sure is that I am not comfortable in looking out 25 The second general comment I would make is there is no shortage of future challenges for national security space. Here is a list in no particular order. The Threat. The Chinese ASAT test of January 2007 has reminded us of our vulnerability to attack. This rapid and unam biguous kinetic intercept of one of their own weather satellites underscores vulnerabilities. There are also a host of other poten tial threats in this timeframe which will challenge our space situ this problem for decades and done literally hundreds of studies asymmetrical targets. The challenge is to free up the resources to take action across all components of the space control mis in crafting space deterrence theory and doctrine to go along with real capability. Responsiveness. Improving responsiveness is one of the holy grails of the space business. It seems like an eternal quest. Nev of events mean that there is a requirement for certain capabilities to be launched and checked out perhaps in hours versus months. The Defense Department has a program to work this challenge called Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). I am not sure adopt a responsiveness mindset. Cover of 2001 Space Commission Report, Ex ecutive Summary Volume.

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25 High Frontier Improving Space Acquisition. The past decade has been a bad period for both black and white space acquisition. I think we are making progress in overcoming our problems by adopt and tackling of space acquisition and program management. In tempting to budget to a higher probability of success. Space ac performance goals not only directly affect our national security performance. People. Ensuring that the national security space community has to be on any list of national security space challenges. This it will probably take at least that long to correct. I believe that Interdependence. This is a catch-all term that covers several challenges. I have already addressed the interdependence of the space sectors and why we need a White House level inter-agency group to deal with this convergence. sance mission area. Because we have not totally come to grips radar. This inability to reach consensus on new multi-role sys vironment is a prescription for inaction. Here I am not carrying challenge. Industrial Base. I think this is a challenge that is well under the health of the large primes but the viability of the second and percentage of the innovation in national security space. Another basic challenge is to create the processes and databases to permit the industrial base. The effects of globalization and the trend to employ more offshore suppliers compound this challenge. Bradley/Sturdevant: Thank you General Moorman. Notes: 1 Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant (BA, History, University of Northern Iowa; MA, History, University of Northern Iowa; PhD, University of California, Santa Barbara) is deputy command historian, Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. He joined the Air Force History and Museums Program in April 1984 as chief historian, Airlift Information Systems Division, Scott AFB, Il linois, and moved one year later to the Chidlaw Building near downtown Colorado Springs as chief historian, Space Communications Division (SPCD). When SPCD and became deputy command historian in 1999. Dr. Sturdevant appears frequently as a guest lecturer on space histo ry topics and is author or co-author of chapters or essays in Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (1997); Or ganizing for the Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on a Persis tent Issue (1995); Golden Legacy, Boundless Future: Essays on the United States Air Force and the Rise of Aerospace Power (2000); Air Warfare: An International Encyclopedia (2002); To Reach the High Frontier: A History of US Launch Vehicles (2002); The Limit less Sky: Air Force Science and Technology Contributions to the Nation (2004); Encyclopedia of 20th-Century Technology (2005); Societal Impact of Space Flight (2007); and Harnessing the Heav ens: National Defense through Space (2008). His articles or book reviews have appeared in such journals as Space Times Journal of the British Interplanetary Society Air & Space/Smithsonian , Air Power History High Frontier: The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals and Journal of the West He sits on the editorial board of Quest and on the staff of High Frontier Dr. Sturdevant is an active member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American Astronautical Society (AAS), British Interplanetary Society (BIS), and Society for the History of Technology (SHOT). His professional honors include the Air Force Exemplary Civilian Service Award (19951999), the AAS Presidents Recognition Award (2005), and elec tion as an AAS Fellow (2007). Mr. George W. Bradley III He began his federal career in 1979 when he joined the Department of Defense as a civil service employee and has served as an Air Force his torian in various positions for over 25 years. He is the author of An Illustrated History of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center and Newark Air Force Station. as senior editor for several books on Air Force space history.

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High Frontier 26 Constructing a National Security Space Plan Mr. Joseph D. Rouge, SES Director Washington, DC S pace-based capabilities and services enhance the national power of the United States and pervade every aspect of our American way of life. Satellites provide us weather information before our morning (GPS) signal from space. critical that one cannot fathom going to war without them. The Make no mistakeour countrys space dependence will deep en as transformation and network-centric warfare heighten the importance of rapid collection and dissemination of information. mean the difference between life and death. It was said by former Secretary of the Air Force Dr. James G. only thing you want. A Need for Collaboration of all services and components of Department of Defense (DoD) focused prioritized strategies that deliver the capabilities needed there must be collaboration throughout the NSSC planning efforts National Security Presidential Directives Presidential Decision Memorandums Guidance for Development of the Force Guidance for Employment of the Force There must also be coordination with capability portfolio man NSSP as a Collaborative Tool DoD Directive 5101.2 assigned space planning to the DoD by the secretary of the Air Force. The chief product of this plan ning is captured in the National Security Space Plan (NSSP). The NSSP is based on annually updated space plans and architectures DoD EA for Space articulates results of coordinated space plan (POM). The main intent of the NSSP is to provide the NSSC with accurate information and structured recommendations regarding national security space (NSS) capabilities. The NSSP outlines space capabilities in response to guidance system developers to deliver these capabilities in a resource-con NSSC baseline for where we are, where we want to go, and how to get there. A Capabilities-Based Plan The NSSP provides an integrated view of space capability Environmental monitoring. suns surface to just below the surface of the Earths land and water masses. Industrial base. The space industrial base (SIB) includes all industries that support NSS acquisition programs. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Spacedecision support. Missile warning and attack assessment (including nuclear detonation). Capability for detection and characterization of ballistic missile launches and nuclear detonation. Can dover capabilities for missile defense. Position, navigation, and timing (PNT). PNT is gener ating and using signals to enable determination of precise the nations economic infrastructure. Science and technology (S&T). plied research and advanced technology development ac tivities. Satellite Communications (SATCOM). Provides capabil National Security Space Collaboration

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27 High Frontier grid. Satellite operations. Satellite control and mission data handling processes and infrastructure necessary for telem Space access. Space control (includes space command and control [C2]). Space control operations encompass space situ of space assets. This is the foundation for all space activi ties and requires robust space surveillance and reconnais sance. Space force application. nuclear weapons. major categories of analysis and evaluation. These categories future desired states capabilities roadmaps minimum assured capabilities risk factors Who Does the NSSP Support? Recommendations contained in the NSSP are designed to in (DNI) in presidential budget decisions. The intended audience is validated capability architectures. Space Planning Considerations Additional considerations in the planning process include main The NSSP captures what is contained in programs of record side the vMFP that will utilize space capabilities that cannot be may require consideration of subsystems outside the vMFP. The procurement of a GPS receiver for our ground forces is not neces sarily contained in the vMFP. The NSSC as a whole is intended control equipment and receiver equipment for our services which Stakeholders Vital to Success No plan can be formulated without involvement by key mem bers from the NSSC. The vetting process used for the NSSP sur faces space priorities and acknowledges differences with other DoD and IC investments. Rigorous analysis leads to the identi POM deliberations. The objective is to provide proper situational where and why established a formal three-tier enterprise vetting construct (EVC) The EVC process occurs as needed throughout the year. Each also uses integrated product teams for each core capability area. Stakeholder membership includes participation of subject matter The Space Program Review Committee (SPRC) meets at the The Space Enterprise Board (SEB) meets at the 2-Star GO/Flag/SES Figure 1. NSSP Relationships.

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High Frontier 28 The Space Steering Council (SSC) meets at the 4-star GO/ Flag/SES level and is the top EVC level designed to assist the DoD EA for Space. It is chaired by the DoD EA for Space. It considers proposals from the SEB. It informs 3-star program secretary of defense (SECDEF) and DNI reports. It establishes ensures the space enterprise is properly aligned with national en terprise and introduces strategic issues for deliberations. Space Enablers The NSSP takes into consideration the enabling functions of reduce risk or maintain capability. The resulting recommenda if it were not for a robust cadre of space professionals. Through role in space missions. Through the use of improved manage ment methodologies and increased professional development healthy space industrial base workforce must be one of our top coordinates actions on industrial base issues. Along with address on the health of US companies and how they are balancing com petitiveness and security concerns. Future Outlook The NSSP is the DoD EAs input to documents such as the that informs decision makers and guides planning and program ming actions. It provides general direction for the DoD and IC to OSD and DNI for use in reviewing the components POM sub missions. Advancing our nations space-related capabilities continues to be a key factor in maintaining our competitive advantage in not become stagnant. The NSS community must continue to en gage in consistent and recurring review processes to ensure our nation maintains an asymmetric advantage in space. Conclusion The NSSO developed the NSSP to provide unity of effort across space and integrate space systems with the other domains. It represents a continuous process that informs decision makers users in a contested domain. Figure 2. Enterprise Vetting Construct. Mr. Joseph D. Rouge (BS, Aerospace Engineering, Uni versity of Southern California; MS, Aerospace Engineering, University of Southern Cali fornia; MS, Business Admin istration, Auburn University) is the director, National Secu Pentagon, Washington, DC. He is responsible for leading a multiagency unit tasked to create unity of effort across all of National Security Space. sponsible for promoting synergy and integrating interagency space policy, strategy, acquisition, launch, planning program ming, and technology development. Mr. Rouge came on active duty in September 1974, serving in a variety of positions involving space surveillance systems, Strategic Defense Initiative Programs, and systems engineering and program integration. He has served on the faculty of the In dustrial College of the Armed Forces, at the Air Force Inspection Agency and on the staff at Headquarters US Air Force. Mr. Rouge was a research fellow at the Airpower Research In stitute, located at Air Universitys Center for Aerospace Doctrine and Education, where he authored a book on national military space strategy. He was also a research fellow at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, authoring a book on national se retired in June 2004 as chief of NSSOs Integration Division, and he has also served as associate director.

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29 High Frontier Assuring Access to Space: The Partnership Continues Col John G. Stizza, USAF Chantilly, Virginia A History of Partnership I n the November 2006 edition of High Frontier, the Nation collaboration between the Air Force and the NRO that enabled the and accurately into space. This partnership has allowed the Air Force and the NRO to leverage both organizations strengths with out duplication and create an unparalleled focus on mission suc the NRO funds half of The Aerospace Corporation Federally Funded Research and Development Center technical resources used by the Space and Missile Systems Center Launch and Range ally well since the late 1990s following three Titan IV failures IV systems. The success of this partnership continues into the Force and NRO Delta IV and Atlas V missions launched success fully to date. The Air Force and NRO continue to strengthen their partnership by bringing to bear the unique capabilities of each or ganization. space launch partnerthe National Aeronautics and Space Ad have been working together to access space since the late 1970s when the Space Shuttle was designated the primary means of de NASA personnel worked together in planning the integration and launch vehicles following the loss of space shuttle Challenger in 1986. Perhaps nowhere was this cooperation more evident than in the launch campaign for NRO Launch-24 (NROL-24) in December 41) on 10 December and the Air Force and NRO took all the steps required to meet that date. Also progressing toward launch during this time was Space Shuttle Atlantis carrying the European Space milestone in completing the ISS and one that NASA and the Eu ropean space community had awaited for over a decade. Atlantis Atlantis launch window was to close on 13 December. When it became tor and NASA administrator mutually agreed that Atlantis should have the eastern range priority through the end of the shuttles th Space Wing launch crews continued progressing to a 10 Decem Atlantis either launched or was scrubbed. NROL-24s probability of launching before the holidays. delaying the launch until at least 8 Decembertwo days prior th Space Wing kept both on track. Should NASA engineers determine to stand down Atlantis, the Air Force refocused on launching NROL-24. Atlantis was again delayed of NROL-24 seem almost impossible given the necessity to re At lantis, the three mission partners leaned forward to go as far as Figure 1. NROL-24 ready for launch at Space Launch Complex-41, Cape Canaveral AFS, Florida, December 2007. National Security Space Collaboration

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High Frontier 30 other Atlantis attempt on 10 December. Atlantis launch th the EELV launch service provideran all-out effort was initiated to attempt a launch of NROL-24 in about 32 hours. One critical NROL-24 from the Vertical Integration Facility (VIF) to SLC-41 as soon as possible in the event of an Atlantis scrub. Within 45 carrying the NROL-24 payload left the VIF and rolled to SLC-41. complished in one-third the normal time. Remaining procedures trusting relationship among mission partners. goals is the Delta IV heavy lift upgrade program currently under way. NRO mission requirements demanded more performance than the Delta IV heavy lift vehicle (HLV) currently provides. the Air Force and NASA to evaluate a plan forward to achieve the necessary performance improvements. These partners deter NRO would attain the performance it required. The Air Force (as the EELV program manager) would have the option to make the boosters for some future Delta IV missions. NASA would re ceive all RS-68A program data to enable it to develop another serve as the primary means for delivering large-scale equipment to spacefrom the lunar landing craft and materials for establish Earth orbit. This will enable the NRO Delta IV HLV upgrade program to meet its goals and pro vide a more robust capability for deliver ing payloads to Earth orbit and beyond. Conclusion Assured access to space is critical for US national security. Whether providing a precision navigation gateway to space for the nation. That partnership continues.Figure 2. The Delta IV RS-68 main engine upgrade. Data from the NRO-funded up grade will be shared with the Air Force and NASA. Col John G. Stizza (BS, US Air Force Academy [USAFA]) Launch at the National Recon tilly, Virginia. He is respon sible for successful delivery of every NRO satellite on orbit, on time. After graduation from the USAFA in 1983, Colonel Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, tems engineer. He was respon sible for designing, testing, and and allied Air Forces around the globe. In 1988, he was assigned to the western Space and Missile Center, Vandenberg AFB, California, facilities. In 1991, he became the lead systems engineer for Space Launch Complex 40, overseeing the demolition and rebuild of the $450 million launch complex to accommodate the nations largest expendable booster, the Titan IV. In 1993, he transferred to the 45 th Space Wing, Cape Canaveral AS, Florida, where he completed tours 45 th Space Wing chief of standardization and evaluation. During and nine Delta II launches. In 1997, Colonel Stizza moved to NRO Legislative Liaison where he provided the interface between the US Congress and NRO programs, eventually assuming the role of dep uty director, legislative liaison. Colonel Stizza then assumed com mand of the NRO Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colorado, in December 2000. His unit provided telemetry acquisition and re lay for all NRO launches and all evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) launches for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). They also executed 175+ daily NRO satellite contacts in support of intelli gence gathering operations worldwide. He then moved to the staff at HQ AFSPC managing efforts to maintain the nations launch ranges and satellite control networks while also managing procurement of the next-generation launch vehicleEELV. In 2005, Colonel Stizza returned to the NRO at Los Angeles AFB, California, where he took

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31 High Frontier Common Language, Common Culture: How the Space Community Must Change Language and Perspective to Achieve Cross-Domain Integration and Dominance Lt Col Dana Flood, USAF Deputy Division Chief Intelligence Plans an d Requirements Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado For the Air Force to achieve cross-domain dominance, it white space communities must speak the same language as the rest of the joint force in order to properly integrate. I parent Air Force culture. must stop. The space community should change the way it cul turally views both its assets and missions in order to properly that overhead non-imaging infrared (ONIR) assets are intelli These recommendations may seem like heresy to the bulk of the High Frontier to lead the charge across the breadth of the defense and intel ligence communities and change the way all operators of ONIR platforms and users of ONIR data view these systems. Out of the Black: ONIR is ISR better served in the ISR arena by black space assets operated by outside organizations than by white space ISR assets operated command to even admit that ONIR assets are ISR platforms. space community to better integrate white ISR to the broader Air Force and joint ISR enterprise. 1 achievable. Commander General C. Robert Kehler has said and written on one of those communities has to change. 2 ONIR systems. The language the community uses confusing ity impedes coordination and cooperation in contributing to the The Defense Support Program (DSP) and Space-Based In frared System (SBIRS) satellites are AFSPCs current ONIR platforms. 3 4 The problem is that the satellite itself doesnt actually do any of these things. and intelligence professionals inside and outside of the space community use its data to do those four missions. Though this meaningless term. The phrase does not appear in Joint Publica tion (JP) 1-02 (the Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of swap this phrase with battlespace awareness (BA). This is a the rest of the force. National Security Space Collaboration

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High Frontier 32 is not a mission in and of itself. developed by the combination and analysis of information from multiple sources. SBIRS is a series of sensors that use ISR to The BA and TI functions of SBIRS are analogous to the mission of the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The AWACS radar performs surveillance; the battle managers onboard turn that into actionable offensive counterOCA or DCA. SBIRS should be thought of in the same fash ion. One can make a similar argument about the missile warn ing and missile defense roles of SBIRS and DSP. Throughout 5 Warning Squadron (2 SWS) uses ONIR data from SBIRS and warning as a subset of ISR. This neither minimizes nor invali thus inhibits cross-domain integration. and stated at all levels of the organization. Lest readers question eral Kehler has already said that SBIRS is ISR. In his March paragraphs discussed a different aspect of SBIRS. 6 Further briefed to Congress under the ISR rubric? command needs to be more clear and go all the way down the line within and outside of AFSPC. 7 Doing so does not mini multiple users and be used to develop a wide variety of intel ligence products with absolutely no degradation to the 2 SWS receiving the data. outmoded paradigm that views intelligence and operations as separate functions with separate funding lines. This is not the is op erations. Nor are there any Title 10/Title 50 concerns. All mili can function in any domain. There are advantages to be gained from the designation. and the joint world understand what ONIR assets are and helps provide a mental framework for how they can be used. The space; changing our vocabulary helps propagate knowledge of what can be gained from white space as well. AFSPC argument for augmented architectures. The Air Force ISRA) is devoted to connecting all major commands (MAJ COMs) and air operations centers (AOCs) to the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). By pointing out to AFISRA that AFSPC ISR assets collect terabytes of data that is largely than later. 8 will do it. They are neither malicious nor incompetent; but they are accustomed to focusing on airborne collection and process are unlikely to come out of their domain and budgetary comfort ing and manpower. AFSPC cannot afford to continue to support disparate tasking and dissemination systems for what have been traditionally and lectors. As the Air Force ISR concept of operations (CONOPS) 9 Although this may be the view collection managers at the Combined Air and Space Operations Ryan ONeal of efforts to task and acquire ONIR data through

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33 High Frontier standard channels. 10 It will be neither cheap nor quick to transition SBIRS task ing to the same collection management process used to task it will be necessary. It is certainly possible to build tasking US Strategic Command must have assurances that these assets will always be able to provide key ISR data for missile warn gainbringing more ISR data derived from white space to the its infancy and the Missile Defense Agencys Space Tracking to be launched. of other ONIR assets outside of this MAJCOM all fall under the same umbrella of tasking and dissemination. This will en able space professionals to contribute to a positive cultural shift throughout the defense and intelligence communities. What is a Space Effect? The Rise of DomainNeutral Language High Frontier published in the last does it add to or detract from AFSPCs ability to achieve crossdomain integration? literature and see what develops. At least three articles refer to ISR imagery from orbital as sets as a space effect. 11 Regardless whether it comes from na article notes that the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) is 12 It would logically follow (given that the authors of most of these ter of all overhead imagery requirements. and core competencies as a guideline. In contemporary Air main-neutral fashion. The Space Lift capability resides within 13 erations are in the Global Strike CONOPS. 14 This model better call it ISR. Rather than calling what the Wideband Global Sys This would provide precision and accuracy of language that ten is imprecise and an invitation to misunderstanding. Killing the term improves rather than hurts the commands ability to achieve cross-domain integration. Space Operations site current and predictive knowledge of the space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations 15 set of BA. the opposite effect. By clearly spelling out the role of SSA

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High Frontier 34 understand space operations and requirements. This change would allow space professionals to use common language to make the case for a bigger slice of the budgetary pie. Words Matter The arguments outlined above may seem eye-gougingly to many. But the more discerning reader should understand the implications. We are faced with two competing courses of action. We can continue to talk the talk of cross-domain concrete steps to achieve that integration. These steps require proved architectures. The prospect of making these semantic changes is frighten ing or heretical to many. But there is no reason to fear. Gen eral Mosley and General Kehler have given us all a charge to will take us down the path of implementing his vision. Do ing a better job of integrating white space capabilities into the cross-domain dominance (and the cross-domain integration which is its prerequisite) if everyone in the Air Force embraces a common language and common culture. Notes: 1 emphasis on providing intelligence products to help ensure space superi ongoing behind the scenes to meet this goal. 2 fessionals within Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) worldwide. But there is still a long way to go both in the area of space professionals personnel understanding space operations. 3 These arguments about the nature of SBIRS and DSP are also ap of the term was rightly resisted by AFSPC for years. Use of this acronym to describe the sensors in question contributes to confusion about the use gram based on having systems on orbit; this is an admittedly somewhat loose designation inasmuch as the system is not at present fully opera tional. 4 sheets/factsheet.asp?id=3675. 5 Space Observer, 6 Lt Col Dana Flood (BA, His tory, University of Portland; MS, Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College; MA, National Secu rity Studies, College of Naval Warfare) is the deputy division chief for Intelligence Plans and Requirements, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. Colonel Floods previ ous staff assignments includ ing HAF Long Range Plans (XPXP), the Joint Single Inte His operational assignments include 30 months in the CENTCOM AOR, having worked at both squadron and AOC level; he also has served a year in the 36 th Fighter Squadron (Osan AB, Korea) and three years at the 509 th OSS (Whiteman AFB, Missouri). United States Air Force Weapons School. He has previously au precision on combat performance of GPS-assisted weapons. 7 sheets belie this notion. SBIRS clearly is ISR (a fact that is understood by command has yet to embrace that fact. 8 This is not to say that ONIR data from Air Force and other organiza help enable a far more robust role in what is currently known as the bat tlespace characterization/awareness mission set. 9 2008. 10 June 2008. Interviews with several collection managers were conducted on 18 June in response to the Kittell email. Captain ONeals quotation is representative of all comments. 11 High Frontier High Frontier High Frontier 6-7. 12 High Frontier 13 Global Mobility CONOPS 14 Global Strike CONOPS 15 Space Operations, GL 11.

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35 High Frontier Rescuing Apollo: Building Consensus toward a National Strategy for Space Maj Patrick A. Brown, USAF Chief of Strategic Studies Directorate of Plans, Programs and Analyses Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado Now it is time to take longer stridestime for a great new American enterprisetime for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth. I believe that this nation should commit itself to achiev ing the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and ~ President John F. Kennedy M quirement for a national strategy for space. This countrys na recognition and demand has brought forth a resurgence of na tional security and political interest in space. And this renewed interest highlights the imperative to in establishing national space strate gies capable of driving the imagina tion and direction of US space pro grams now and into the futurea goal reminiscent of President John F. Kennedys vision. perceptions of Americas global 1 Just as Project Apollo embodied President Kennedys bold challenge and our countrys motiva economic development and scien orated space program [that] stimulates professional education to the long-term competitiveness and national security of the 2 The theme and focus of this quarters High Frontier, Na theme of this High Frontier, a review of the current develop ment status of national space strategies and the strategic foun dation of a prospective national strategy for space provides an appropriate starting point for this quarters journal. Charting a Destination toward a National Strategy for Space comprehensive strategy. This strat egy will provide the basis for future and to serve as a guide for future actions in concert with those stated hereafter referred to as the National Space Policy. dividual mission areas and capabili ties from disparate space organiza space strategy has not been issued. The non-issuance has not been for a lack of leadership or desire. National Strategy for Space A national space strategy should recognize this nations diverse and dispersed national security challeng Figure 1. President John F. Kennedy calls for a mission to send man to the moon during a joint session of Con gress on 25 May 1961. National Security Space Collaboration

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High Frontier 36 balization and the emergence of violent and persistent non-state actors in the post-Cold War era requires timely intelligence and capabilities greatly enhance. Retaining this decisive advantage should be the guiding focus of a national space strategy. With out the proper stewardship of space and a national consensus on losing its space edge. tection of sovereign US space assets. If space is indeed an en strategy should directly address this challenge. linkages to higher-level guidance and lower-level implemen tation plans and enterprise architectures; enable unhindered space operations and freedom of action/access; develop space ment and technological solutions; leadership and professional development; and a strategic investment approach. Authority and Responsibility the National Space Policy and chart responsibilities in those ar eas where military and intelligence organizations overlap with seamless linkages between the space strategy and higher-level guidance and lower-level implementation documents. goal of ensuring access to space and freedom of action in space. curity space implementation plans and space control concepts ready established and functional. A sound strategy should only Enable Unhindered Space Operations and Freedom of Action/Access This strategy should outline the imperative goal of enabling unhindered US operations in and through space and ensure space capabilities are available to further US national security by ensuring access to space and freedom of action in space. To Figure 2. The 363 ft tall Apollo 11 space vehicle is launched from Pad A, Launch Complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, at 9:37 a.m., 16 July Figure 3. This view of the Earth rising over the moons horizon was taken from the Apollo 11 spacecraft. The lunar terrain pictured is in the area of Smuths Sea on the nearside. Coordinates of the center of the terrain are 85 degrees east longitude and three degrees north latitude.

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37 High Frontier assured space control capabilities; chief among these being comprehensive space situational awareness. The end state is Develop Space Partnerships and Dependencies intent is to provide a common goal and vision to enable vi partners. A common vision will also enable national security prise architectures. This strategy emphasis must be on deliv ering integrated effects and on producing space capabilities tional space activities that support national security issues. The bilities that together will meet the needs and challenges identi security through international cooperation with foreign (allied) nations and/or consortia on space activities that are of mutual international partners have become even more essential to our future security environment in space. This strategy should lay ready set forth in the National Space Policy. Improve Planning, Development, and Technological Solutions approach will require a prioritized national security space plan and assessment with increased investment in systems engineer ing and integrated solutions which capture the complementary advantages and dependencies of space and non-space systems. able a robust science and technology base supporting national security by producing innovative solutions. Technological and industrial dominance have been a prevail ing theme in many of our national successes over the past cen tury. As witnessed with the Apollo program and many others industrial capabilities has proved very successful. The US must maintain its technological edge and the means to nurture inno vative approaches to enable employment of spacepower for the goals of this strategy. To create and improve innovative solutions the US must in to form a national science and technology program. These ef and preserve US leadership in critical space-related technolo advantage in space. Space Leadership and Professional Development employ the space systems that provide a decisive asymmetric advantage in space. Making an early and sustained investment nities will ensure the space cadre is ready to lead and teach development requires direct leadership involvement. The price Strategic Investment Approach A national strategy for space must provide the foundation for in other transformational capabilities and industrial base con National Defense Strategy. While this strategy should not pri ing new space capabilities. Such an approach will require a prioritized national security space plan and assessment with increased investment in systems engineering and inte grated solutions that capture the complementary advantages and dependencies of space and non-space systems.

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High Frontier 38 Maj Patrick A. Brown (BBA Management, Midwestern State University; MS, Admin istration, Central Michigan University; MMOAS) is the chief of Strategic Studies, Di rectorate of Plans, Programs and Analyses, HQ AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for providing the AFSPC commander with a comprehensive range of stra tegic options and independent assessments to enable strategic recommendation and deci sions. He is also the command focal point for interactions with the chief of staff of the Air Forces Strategic Studies Group (CHECKMATE). Major Brown was com career includes assignments as a missile combat crew commander at Minot AFB, North Dakota, a missile combat crew initial quali AFB, California, the sole space advisor, planner, and chief of Spe cial Technical Operations (STO) for 9 th Air Force/US Central Com mand Air Forces commander at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, the as sistant director of operations for the USAF Weapons Schools space squadron at Nellis AFB, Nevada. He has deployed numerous times to theater combined air and space operations centers to include po sitions in strategy and STO during Operation Iraqi Freedoms Ma jor Combat Operations from February to April 2003, the primary Afghanistan air strategy planner for Operation Enduring Freedom from December 2003 to March 2004, and other deployments where STO chief, and deputy director of space forces in support of major theater exercises. Major Brown is a resident graduate of the Squad and Staff College. resource allocation in accordance with objective-based goals. Charting a Way Forward to come. leaders recognized that not only was the US seeking interna 3 look to the national security space team to provide space capa the space medium and enhance space capabilities to help solve the security challenges we are faced with today and in the fu ture. A national space strategy and its objectives is needed to and to guide our actions in the years ahead. Achieve ment of these strategic objectives will ensure the US ability to sustain spacepower as a decisive asymmetric advantage into the 21 st century. Notes: 1 Times, www.washingtontimes.com/ article/20080411/EDITORI AL/190619503/1013/EDITO RIAL. 2 Ibid. 3 lomon/Apollo.html. II, and Virgil Grissom At the very end of the table is Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, MSC director, who made the an nouncement.

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39 High Frontier Not Related to Reconnaissance in Any Way: An Interview with Dr. F. Robert Naka Historical Perspective Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant Deputy Command Historian Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado D via e-mail during April-June 2008. Born in California to Japa efforts of the National Japanese American Student Relocation February 1943. After graduating from the University of Mis sity of Minnesota and a doctorate at Harvard University. INTERVIEW Sturdevant: Please describe the circumstances that led to your employment at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory after receiving a doctorate in elec tron optics from Harvard in 1951. Naka: I became acquainted with professors at MIT and management at General Electric (GE) through an inquiry about establishing a chapter of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers at the Harvard Graduate working on my doctorate. I pointed out that the chapter was more suited not award a degree in engineering pointed out that there were too few of they were much busier with their re search than undergraduates would not seem feasible to try. That seemed sis for my becoming better acquainted with them. The GE managers invited I also took a business trip with the used to telephone me to suggest a joke to start a speech he had to give. I would provide him with one after I determined whether set up an interview with Prof. Albert G. Hill. I was attracted to the idea even though I interviewed with other organizations June 1951. Sturdevant: What was your con tribution to the design of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line? Naka: I began work on Project a group of engineers and psycholo gists who were charged with inves tigating the relationship of man and radar signals by people as the radar signal detectors. I wrote a paper on this in the Lincoln Laboratory Tech nical Journal Since my wife was a hand signal detection coordination we found that the responses were es sentially identical. We then tried to Dr. F. Robert Bob Naka.

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High Frontier 40 10 personnel per site to do all the work. That meant that the radar signal detection personnel had to be able to do other tasks even though the backup might be inferior to the human detec tector. A comparison test with the human ear and the electronic device showed that they were equal. Sturdevant: Why were you selected to work on U-2 devel Naka: This is a question that is more properly asked of Dr. Prior to that time I had worked on the DEW Line Radars (plu ral) and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars. I was in strumental in the design of the Millstone Hill Radar. All during this time I had been given photographs of foreign radar anten nas and asked to describe what the radar characteristics might be. I had been appointed in February 1956 as group leader of have been selected as one of three men to work on the U-2. The other two men were Dr. Franklin A. Rodgers and Mr. Thomas C. Bazemore. radar cross-section of the U-2 was. Then I contributed to the design of the radar cross-section reduction material. As it be equipped. I developed the theory of what electromagnetic other related phenomena. Sturdevant: How did your joining The MITRE Corporation in 1959 come about? When and how did you become MITREs chief scientist? Naka: join MITRE because it was set up to work on Air Defense with out having a research laboratory capability; he asked me to form a laboratory. I was very reluctant to engage in that endeavor but on the third time he approached me (after having discussed the matter with other candidates) I accepted. At one time I was Some time after Dr. John McLucas became MITREs presi Pentagon with him with the covert title of DDNRO and the have just disappeared. Sturdevant: Millstone Hill Radar, ca. 1958. MIT Lincoln Laboratory SR-71 Blackbird.

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41 High Frontier stealth technology. Can you elaborate on this subject? Naka: problem. The people working on the radar cross-section reduc tion of the U-2 follow-on had walked off the job. After I said from MITRE and solve the problem. I told Bob Everett that a problem had developed that seemed to require my help and I with Herb Miller. He had told me that I would need to make perimental site. for a leave-of-absence and told my family that we would need trated enough to walk off the job. I then produced the better Sturdevant: In his autobiographical book Technocrat: Managing Defense, Air, and Space Programs Dur know you as well as he would have liked while he was presi Coast leading an important project to improve the surveillance volved with space-related activities? Naka: the name of the study that I kicked off in January 1968. I was commander of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and Lt who had commanded the anti-satellite program at Johnston Is land. I was supported by personnel from The Aerospace Cor Our point of contact at AFSC was Maj Gen Glenn Kent and at ADC was Maj Gen Michael Ingelido. The study included an ICBM and rocket launch detector we earth-satellite and ICBM penetrator-and-decoy tracker called the low-altitude surveillance platform. We know them today as Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High and SBIRS Low. There were various incarnations in between. We compared the capabilities of these space assets against airand ground-based sensors. We concluded that the space-based systems were the most cost-effective systems inspite of the high initial cost and provided worldwide coverage. The aircraft-based sensor sys and have limited coverage. The ground-based systems with the lowest initial costs would have severe limited coverage. Air Force Maj Bill Craig did the work on the ICBM termi nal-defense phase that rounded out the study. At that time Lt Gen John ONeill was the commander of the chaired by Dr. Edward Teller. I understood that he was tough where he was director and met with his deputy on how to brief me so long to draw the curves and label the important points was very important. He would follow the discussion and not I did just that. I kept stopping and asking if there were any questions. He usually had none. When I briefed the part on deployed satellites using 60 GHz microwave technology. Dr. required for lasers because of the power requirement and point environmental test phase at facilities in Sunnyvale, California, 19 March 2008. Lockheed Martin

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High Frontier 42 They would like to accomplish this mission with aircraft. I American continental coverage compared to worldwide satel based on a set of assumptions. When a member of the audience and therehe was a supporter for years later. I can elaborate I would say in retrospect that it was one of the most com plete studies ever done. I have chaired many studies so I can say that with conviction. Sturdevant: When Dr. McLucas became NRO director in (1969-1972)? What were your most noteworthy accomplish Naka: that our time at the NRO was the most satisfying activity of our careers. Dr. McLucas left MITRE to become the Under Secretary of the Air Force about the beginning of March 1969. At his fare well party I said to him to call on us if he needed some kind of help. He knew that I had convened a committee to advise and took the job. The NRO was then a small group of very talented people with a huge budget. I had an immediate staff of about 30 peo were jointly manned with National Security Agency (NSA) personnel. position assignment scheme to enhance their opportunities to be promoted to O-7. Lew thought my ideas were splendid and that no one had ever done that before. I was able to move Lew Rosenberg how to be promoted to brigadier general. He made major general on his own. The NRO was a completely vertically integrated organiza U-2 aircraft squadrons reporting to me. I began my tour with program to see all aspects of the organization and to attend as many program reviews and operations as were possible. ing me. and NRO director of the staff preceding Brig Gen Lew Allen I asked John McLucas what would happen if I switched of run the NRO on a daily basis and he would deal with the Con and his Deputy Dave Packard were doing. As things turned larly attended meetings of the United States Intelligence Board ten briefed the presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee. Management: very interested in becoming DDNRO when John McLucas ar U-2 Spy Plane.

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43 High Frontier who readily approved. McLucas didnt know at that time that director of the U-2 Program under Dick Bissell. me about was that there was still great animosity between the Air Force Program A and CIA Reconnaissance Programs. One I wish he could be at the meeting to which I was going. He gave his itinerary. After the meeting was over I asked John Crowley bility for a good part of the program. John answered they never invited those people. Later that day I took John Crowley aside didnt make sense to me. I would like you to invite General those tensions would build up again. that Program A was developing a competitive space satellite an tenna at a company that was different from the company work saying that friendly competition was a healthy activity. It was a good thing I did that because ultimately the technology be ing pursued by Brownmans contractor didnt work and was replaced by the one from Program A. plaints about the actions I was taking. An oddity was that the Air Force secretariat began to realize that I could get answers would come to me to determine what Johns opinions were on a I attended many breakfast meetings with Mel Laird and Dave Packard when John McLucas was out of town. NSA Director VADM Noel Gaylor and Defense Intelligence Agency Director those meetings was the Vietnam War and how to get out. One issue that I tackled started at the USIB meeting. I sat my left was assistant secretary of state for intelligence and on his left was Vice Admiral Gaylor. I felt that a certain satellite should have its surveillance point changed because there could be more valuable data collected from a different location. Noel disagreed and wanted the aim point left the way it was. I was all that was needed. Noel Gaylor made an impassioned plea that the group was assuming that the current satellite would so I organized an argument not only about the value of the pro gram but also what could be collected if the satellites aim point then a committee of the intelligence committee that generated now I said it was up to him to make the presentation to the NRO director told me later that the US government owed me a debt of gratitude for my insight! Technical: Two of the management issues above were a me to chair a committee in April 1969 to make an estimate of for a new satellite system and what we should consider to be success. I conducted such a review and made my recommen operations. I observed that if I were to have an additional com puter installed I might be able to improve operations of the new of another computer at the AWS. At that time the purchase of computers was controlled by the controller of the Air Force. I had my staff prepare a report based on the analysis and sent it to the controller with a letter of transmittal signed by me. He

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High Frontier 44 Secretarys Mess a few days later. I also became a hero at the AWS. Research I started in 1970 led to another program that neces sitated training photointerpreters to handle a new product. As House concurrence that he said he felt he could obtain. One continue and keep him informed. I do not recall what location I selected. I postulated that the problem was that humans are accustomed them with monochromatic backscatter. I suggested that we pre angles to simulate a condition of forward scatter. I transferred the responsibility for the project to Program A. The new pro clever things to proceed. The upshot of my idea turned out to be correct for the wrong reason. It turned out that there was a favorable look angle that permitted the viewer to sort one type of target from another. I chaired many technical committees during and after my service at the NRO. One of these had to do with the changing use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This was somehow called on foreign instrumentation signals for a new satellite system. This fact is noted in the citation of my portrait hanging in the Security: that because I was not to be related to reconnaissance in any way. Brian proposed a weather satellite with about three-mile resolu about. I was very mindful of the security restrictions under which I was laboring. Sturdevant: Over served on numerous and government ad ing the NASA Space Program Advisory Council and the US Advisory Board (AF are you still involved with advising on space-related issues and systems? Naka: I am not now active in the AF to note here two space studies that I chaired. a thorough study of tracking of aircraft from a constellation of earth-satellite-based radars. We considered not only the spaceof the radar system on stealth aircraft. Then Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Donald Rice was a proponent of the system. and Asteroids and Comets a number of years ago. In the last few years I have been involved in two activities sile and Space Intelligence Center director. Sturdevant: What is your advisory role related to the Global Positioning System? Naka: I am one of the original members asked some 10 or 11 years ago initially to review the GPS III Operations Require ments Document. It became apparent that the Air Force was and GPS II Follow-On satellites as then programmed and to put all the improvements including anti-jam capability into GPS III. The GPS-IRT (Independent Review Team) pointed out that insert improvements into the satellites in the production line already been produced and were sitting in storage waiting to mendations. The value of the GPS-IRT is that we spin off committees that Advisory Boards Ad Hoc Committee on Space Surveillance, Debris, and Asteroids and Comets

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45 High Frontier of Air Force Space Command and to the director of the GPS to proceed. I have chaired two such committees. Sturdevant: Since you have been involved over many years positive or negative? Naka: is allowed to work on the project without continually having to brief some groups in the funding line of authority. The latter Another value is that the program is often structured to (sometimes succeeded by his deputy) leading the effort from research and development to acquisition to launch and then to operations. This is more likely to be true in a civilian environ Sturdevant: What would you recommend for strengthen ing the overall enterprise of national security space in the nearterm? Do you have any suggestions for long-term changes in national security space activities? Naka: I havent been a close observer of the NRO for a good 10 years or so. In that time the control of the NRO seems no continuum from research to operations. Mizzou Engi neer azine/EngrMagazine06.pdf. 2. Dr. John L. McLucas with Kenneth J. Alnwick and Lawrence R. Lincoln Laboratory Journal pdf/vol12_no2/12_2distantearly.pdf. Encyclopedia of Space Science and Technology Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant (BA, History, University of Northern Iowa; MA, History, University of Northern Iowa; PhD, Uni versity of California, Santa Bar bara) is deputy command his torian, Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC), Peterson AFB, Colorado. He joined the Air Force History and Museums Program in April 1984 as chief historian, Airlift Information Systems Division, Scott AFB, Illinois, and moved one year later to the Chidlaw Building near downtown Colora do Springs as chief historian, Space Communications Division (SPCD). When SPCD was inactivated in 1991, he moved to the in 1999. Dr. Sturdevant appears frequently as a guest lecturer on space history topics and is author or co-author of chapters or essays in Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (1997); Organizing for the Use of Space: Historical Perspec tives on a Persistent Issue (1995); Golden Legacy, Boundless Future: Essays on the United States Air Force and the Rise of Aerospace Power (2000); Air Warfare: An International Ency clopedia (2002); To Reach the High Frontier: A History of US Launch Vehicles (2002); The Limitless Sky: Air Force Science and Technology Contributions to the Nation (2004); Encyclopedia of 20th-Century Technology (2005); Societal Impact of Space Flight (2007); and Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense through Space (2008). His articles or book reviews have appeared in such journals as Space Times Journal of the British Interplanetary Society Air & Space/Smithsonian Quest: The History of Space Air Power History High Frontier: The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals and Journal of the West He sits on the editorial board of Quest and on the staff of High Fron tier Dr. Sturdevant is an active member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American Astronautical Society (AAS), British Interplanetary Society (BIS), and Society for the History of Technology (SHOT). His professional honors include the Air Force Exemplary Civilian Service Award (19951999), the AAS Presidents Recognition Award (2005), and elec tion as an AAS Fellow (2007).

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High Frontier 46 Book Review Twilight War: The Folly of US Space Dominance Twilight War: The Folly of US Space Dominance. By Mike history but has become more heated in recent years. Even be and General Bernard Schriever publicly advocated military ef forts to establish and maintain US control of outer space. Presi General Thomas White reasoned that US possession of at least dependence on space-based systems for both military and civil opment and deployment of space weapons to ensure US space dominance. In a narrative analysis heavily oriented toward pol with the notion that unilateral US military actions in space will guarantee national security. Moore claims such unilateralism al repeatedly for negotiation of a new treaty somewhat awkwardly labeled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)to secure space more comprehensively as a have eschewed collective judgments in favor unique US role in preserving space for peace gally free to place weapons in space as long as they do not violate terms of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Far from nave about the probability that vors controlling or countering such attempts through collective arrangements. Admitting committing nations to avoid actions that might provoke or injure that presently appears to be driving space-faring nations toward weaponizing space. It might culminate eventually in a hardhead treaty banning space-based weapons than did Brookings Institu tion realist Michael OHanlon in ary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space (2004). Spy Satellites and Other Intelligence Technologies That Changed History Mike Moores concludes with a different warning our virtues as a body politic. Rather than leaving it to elected actively and intensely before deciding whether unilateral domi nance of outer space is in our best interest. cept the oft-repeated idea that space must inevitably become an unilateral and collective actions; whether we ter. For the author of agreement among all space-faring nations to ban space weapons. He asserts unequivocally that a comprehensive ban on space weapons and collective enforcement of space for peace ful purposes would pose less risk for every one concerned than would US unilateralism. When someone with as contradictory a stance Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age praises space security should take notice. uty command historian, HQ Air Force Space Command.

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