1 High Frontier Contents Introduction General Kevin P. Chilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Senior Leader Perspective The Importance of Space Commerce to National Power Mr. Edward M. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 in International Cooperation Brig Gen Robert M. Worley, II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Space Policy Human Space Flight and National Power Dr. John M. Logsdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Ms. Theresa Hitchens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Dr. Steven Lambakis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Lt Col Michael L. Lakos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 in the 21 Century Col Mark C. Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Industry Perspective Dr. Matthew J. Von Bencke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 To Get There, Go There Dr. Robert L. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Dr. Dana J. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Mr. Peter S. Breidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Maj Joseph Anthony Musacchia, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Launch Control Center NetLink Capt Joseph T. Page II, Capt Mark C. Bigley, and MSgt Douglas S. Angell . . . 66 Book Review Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 Announcements . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Next Issue: Space Innovation March 2007 Volume 3, Number 2 The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals High Frontier Editorial content is edited, prepared, and provided by High Frontier High Frontier AFSPC/PA Peterson AFB, CO 80914 this journal are those of the authors alone and do not Headquarters Space Command Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Commander Director of Public Affairs Creative Editor Capt Catie Hague MSgt Jennifer Thibault
High Frontier 2 Introduction General Kevin P. Chilton Commander, Air Force Space Command ~ US National Space Policy T he High Frontier journal continues to evolve into a com prehensive offering dedicated to challenging conventional space community. Within these pages, we have gathered a wide range of recognized national space policy experts. Together, these authors offer their opinions and provide us with their insights on the impact of space policy and challenges for the future. From a Senior Leader perspective, space impacts virtually every facet of life today, from providing governments and civil agencies with space capabilities to sharing technological devel opments with the international community. Navigation, timing, communications, and weather are all proven capabilities provided munity. In this issue, Mr. Edward Morris takes this opportunity to highlight the unique contributions of space commerce for our readers, while Brigadier General Rob Worley drills through the main the leader in space. Together, these perspectives provide an interesting framework for this unique edition. This is a complex subject with a multitude of interpretations, but we must, as stewards of space, understand the utility and limitations of policy. National sovereignty in the space domain, distinctive views on the function of space in our national indus trial complex and unique editorials on possible challenges to our on new capabilities, techniques, and technological developments tives. Whether equipping our security forces with state of the art the seemingly endless innovation of our warriors continues to pro mote best practices and charts the course for future growth. In this issue, there are a number of thought provoking discus sions, probing everything from the origins of national space pol icy to the impacts of evolving space technologies. We hope you enjoy this edition of High Frontier, and welcome the opportunity our Nation. GENERAL BERNARD A. SCHRIEVER MEMORIAL ESSAY CONTEST In an effort to stimulate thought, discussion, and debate on the nature and employment of space power, and do so in the memory of a great space power pioneer, I am pleased to announce the estab lishment of the inaugural General Bernard A. Schriever Memorial approach to determine critical developments (doctrinal, techno logical, or otherwise) we might witness in space power over the next 30 years, and the impact that development will have on na tional security matters. Our Air Force relies on innovative ideas and critical thinking to maintain its edge, and it is my sincere hope that you will take this opportunity to share your ideas with others within Air Force Space Command. This contest will be hosted by the 50 th Space Wing, Schriever AFB, sponsored by the Lance P. Sijan Chapter of the Air Force Association, and is open to all AFSPC military and civilian per sonnel. Essay submissions must be received by 13 April 2007. Winners will be announced in May 2007. Awards will be present ed to our top three essay winners and those receiving Honorable Symposium. Winning essays will be published in the High Fron tier journal in August 2007. For further information regarding the essay contest, please visit www.schriever.af.mil/library/essaycon test.asp. All related correspondence and essays should be submit ted to firstname.lastname@example.org. General Kevin P. Chilton (BS, Engineering Science, USAFA; MS, Mechanical Engineering, Columbia University) is Com mander, Air Force Space Com mand, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for the devel opment, acquisition and opera tion of the Air Forces space and missile systems. The general oversees a global network of satellite command and control, communications, missile warn ing and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readiness of Americas intercontinental bal listic missile force. He leads more than 39,700 space profession als who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Strategic Command. 15 and is a graduate of the US Air Force Test Pilot School. He prior to joining the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1987. General Chilton is a command-rated astronaut and test space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program Manager for Operations for the International Space Station. The general has served on the Air Force Space Command Staff, the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, and commanded the 9 th sance Wing. Prior to assuming his current position, he was Com mander, 8 th Air Force and Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and Global Strike. Among his many awards, General Chilton has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the NASA Exceptional Service Medal. At his promotion ceremony four-star general.
3 High Frontier The Importance of Space Commerce to National Power Mr. Edward M. Morris National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration United States Department of Commerce S pace has always fascinated the American public and demonstrated our technological prowess to the world. The commercial use of space has provided more than just sci 1960s, the creation of International Telecommunications Satel lite Organization jump-started a new global industry, brought quarter century later by giving the world free access to accurate satellite navigation without user fees. bilities are critical to our national security, public safety, and technological leadership. It is also important to note that the importance of space to the national economy has increased greatly as the private sector has discovered innovative ways to exploit space as a unique enterprise. Space drives lucrative business opportunities and enables the development of major infrastructures for government and commercial customers here on Earth. In many cases, these activities have become so routine, de pendable, and convenient that it is easy for the public to forget that space is involved. Commercial services such as CNN, Di recTV, XM Radio, and Google Earth all rely on space-based and reliably. Additionally, the federal government directly purchases commercial space capabilities in areas such as satellite com munications and imagery to meet its civilian and military re quirements. The government also provides data acquired from space-based capabilities to directly support commerce. For ex ample, daily weather forecasts utilized by business would be far less reliable and timely without Earth-observing satellites. It is a key component of our national power and economic security. One of the stated fundamental goals of the 2006 National Space Policy is to enable a dynamic, globally competitive domes tic commercial space sector in order to promote innovations, 1 The policy also recognizes the impor marketplace. 2 Like others before it, the 2006 National Space As the principle unit for space commerce policy activities Space Commercialization (OSC) is responsible for ensuring effective implementation of commercial space guidelines of the National Space Policy. The OSC Mission Statement is to foster the conditions for market-driven economic growth and mission, OSC focuses primarily on three high-priority areas nomic strength, national security, and public safety: position ing, navigation, and timing (PNT); commercial remote sensing (CRS); and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) civilian space operations. In December 2004, President George W. Bush authorized a new national policy that established guidance and implemen tation actions for space-based PNT programs, augmentations, 3 GPS is the space-based component of PNT that is vital to non-military national interests including economic development and growth, public safety, life. GPS has evolved into a critical information infrastructure that touches the lives of most Americans on a daily basis. Many components and functions of federal, state, and local For example, within the DOC, GPS helps NOAA navigate its The National Institute of Standards and Technology uses GPS to communicate its time standard to customers in industry and to other national laboratories for inclusion in the international Senior Leader Perspective
High Frontier 4 cult to quantify because it is so pervasive and integrated into the fabric of society. Simply counting the total number of GPS us ers in the world is a challenge, because the technology is often embedded in other products, such as cell phones. According to ABI Research, global sales of GPS user equipment currently exceed $20 billion a year and will continue growing at a healthy rate for the foreseeable future. 4 However, equipment sales represent only the tip of the eco nomic iceberg. The true value of GPS is in the increased busi has created new services and enhanced existing products, like OnStar, by accessing GPS capabilities. The DOC published an article focusing GPS satellites, which began launching in 2006. One of the ation GPS delivers is a second most likely scenario, the Commerce Department estimates L2C over the next 30 years. 5 government is making to the GPS constellation over the next civil GPS signal that will greatly enhance accuracy, availabil ity, and reliability, especially for safety-critical transportation applications. The aviation community is very interested in the third signal because it will help improve both navigation safety and airspace capacity. Additional signals will also re duce downtime for any business operation that uses GPS where working with international partners to design a fourth signal that will boost the global availability of space-based PNT, es pecially in the urban canyons of cities. As these GPS upgrades come online, the importance of space-based PNT to economic, public safety, and other national power interests will continue to increase. Commercial space-based remote sensing, the collection of GPS in that it was originally developed for national security purposes, but was eventually released for commercial exploita tion in the 1990s due to its economic potential. In April 2003, President Bush authorized a new national policy that establish es guidance and implementation actions for CRS capabilities. 6 Commercial satellite imagery has a multitude of groundomy. Individual farmers and communities use it for precision farming and to monitor crops for disease and deploy localized remedies when needed. Land-use managers use it to assess and plan city growth. Insurance companies use before-and-af and other disasters. The media routinely adds satellite imagery to news reports to illustrate where important events have oc curred. Software developers incorporate satellite imagery into Satellite imagery is most useful when combined with GPS, electronic maps, and localized data into a geographic informa tion system (GIS). Perhaps the most popular example of this is the Google Earth application, which recently made commercial satellite imagery freely avail able via the Internet. Other Virtual Earth and Yahoo Maps. These mapping portals have brought satellite imagery creased public awareness of space-based imagery. Commercial satellite imag capabilities to the national security community. Remote sens al security community purchases large quantities of commercial imagery to augment its own intelligence gathering capabilities. On the civilian side, NOAA utilizes commercial imagery, coupled with data recorded from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellites and used throughout the federal government, academia and industry, to monitor and reefs, wetlands, and glaciers all over the world. Additional ly, commercial imagery is also used by human rights groups around the globe to monitor and document events in places such as the Darfur region. In the area of disaster response and relief, the commercial space-based remote sensing industry has played a vital role in recent years, collecting tens of thousands of square miles of imagery for dissemination to aid workers around the globe. Following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the 2005 earth quake in Pakistan, and the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in ernment and other organizations to assist in damage assess ments and rescue relief operations in remote areas that could best be observed by satellites. Commercial satellite imagery ing which residents should be evacuated and where emergency personnel should be dispatched. Total sales for the entire commercial remote sensing indus try, including both satellite and aerial imagery, were estimated at $2.6 billion in 2003. 7 According to one leading industry analyst, the space-based segment of that market is worth $300 million today and could exceed $1 billion by 2012. The fed eral government is also a committed customer of commercial remote sensing. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency mercial imagery through the ClearView program, which expe
5 High Frontier operators for use by various agencies across the federal govern ment. NGA is also planning on purchasing higher resolution sensing industry are GeoEye and DigitalGlobe. GeoEye was formed from the recent merger of ORBIMAGE and Space Im aging and operates three satellites and more than a dozen inter about $160 million from commercial imagery products and ser vices. DigitalGlobe currently operates one satellite and three ground stations. Within a year, both companies will launch new commercial imaging systems with far greater capabilities than the current systems on orbit. The enhanced level of accuracy of data derived from these systems will enable new applications petitive global market for satellite imagery. A leading provider of information technology market re search stated that overall GIS goods and services revenue to taled $1.84 billion in 2003 and projected a 9.7 percent rise to $2.02 billion in 2004, including many products that do not in corporate commercial satellite imagery. 8 However, like GPS, sales numbers only include their GIS cost and do not include Civil Space Operations it also provides accurate and dependable weather forecasting. that are on-duty 24 hours a day to support weather forecasting and prediction services critical to our economic and national interests. and environment forecasts each day and future planned capa user community including television meteorologists, private weather companies, aviation and agriculture communities, and national and international government agencies. Additionally, weather and climate sensitive industries account for one-third 9 One of the most critical functions of NOAA satellites is from NOAA satellites complement other weather observations, models use the most current information to simulate future weather, ocean, and climate conditions. Total annual federal spending for weather information, in cluding satellite data and information, is estimated at about $25 per household (including aviation and defense, in addition to NOAA). A detailed national survey revealed the average value of all current weather forecast information from public and private sectors is approximately $109 per household, with a total national value of $11.4 billion per year. 10 This survey also showed the annual value of improving the daily forecast in terms of more accurate one-day and multi-day forecasts, geo graphic detail, and frequency of updates is $16 per household, or $1.73 billion per year. The average value of weather forecast information relative to the total federal spending produces a net to households in other countries that rely on weather informa and the associated emergency response results in $3 billion sav ings. 11 Two-thirds of these savings are attributed to the reduc tion in hurricane-related deaths, and one-third is attributed to a reduction in property-related damage because of preparedness actions. Advances in satellite information, data assimilation tech niques, and more powerful computers to run more sophisticated numerical models have led to more accurate weather forecasts provide the time necessary for people to implement plans to secure their lives and businesses. For example, these forecasts of money by helping determine if and when operational sys tems should be taken off-line. Estimates indicate that the value of existing 48-hour hurricane forecast information to oil and gas producers averaged roughly $8 million per year during the 1990s. 12 boats and equipment to a safe harbor. magnetic disturbances in the atmosphere can disrupt electronic and electrical systems that can impact utility companies, air ronment Center (SEC) utilizes space-based assets to provide national and international warnings of space weather events that can affect people and business operations. The SEC pro vides forecasts and warnings of solar and geomagnetic activity of Transportation, NASA, and military and commercial space system operators. Such warnings are critical to the prevention of economic losses from power grid outages, satellite failures, and other avoidable incidents. Commercial communication satellites are also vulnerable to the effects of space weather. A
High Frontier 6 geomagnetic storm in 1994 damaged two Canadian communi cation satellites, which were replaced at a cost of about $400 million. In addition, in January 1997, a geomagnetic storm se valued at $200 million, leaving it inoperable. 13 To address the growing requirements for environmental data Science and Technology Policy are leading the implementation of the Integrated Earth Observation System is an essential component of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), which is a global Earth data collection and dissemination ini GEOSS will allow users to share, compare, and analyze a di verse array of datasets, providing the information necessary to mitigate the impacts of natural hazards. GEOSS will provide the global information required to understand the interactions between Earth processes and thereby improve the forecasting skills for a wide range of natural phenomena, such as a hur impact of El Nio throughout the globe. GEOSS will also pro mote improved decision-making in various sectors, including natural resource management, public health, agriculture and stellation are among the critical components of the GEOSS ini tiative. Conclusion It is clear that space commerce brings value to our economy and broader national objectives. The contribution of the spaceoperations are key to our national power and international economy are constrained only by American imagination and creativity. National policy decisions have shaped the evolution of space commerce directly or indirectly since the beginning of is working to help shape decisions that encourage space com merce while protecting and advancing the national interest. In that spirit, the OSC is taking a leadership role in ensuring con tinued federal government support of space commerce to real ize its vision: 1 US National Space Policy, National Security Presidential Directive (accessed on 23 January 2007). 2 Ibid., 6 3 NSPD 39, 15 December 2004. 4 ABIresearch, 2005. 5 IRV Study reference GPS or GNSS World? 6 7 CRSL Industry Statistics, Mr. Edward M. Morris (BS, sity; MBA, Business Adminis tration, Pepperdine University) of Space Commercialization (OSC), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), US Department of Commerce in January 2006. He is also the US government representative and co-chair of the US-European Union Glob al Positioning System (GPS)Galileo Working Group on Trade and Civil Applications. Prior to his appointment with NOAA, Mr. Morris worked with Orbital Sciences Corporation from 1991 to 2006. His most recent position was senior director of the Washing ton, DC Operations, responsible for development and implementa tion of White House, federal agency, and legislative actions and policies related to military, civil, and commercial space matters, as well as, missile defense and tactical weapons programs. He re ceived the Outstanding Management Award in 2001 for outstand ing achievement of key company business development goals. In 1997, he was assigned as Director of Business Development for the Launch Systems Group, primarily responsible for technical and marketing roles for missile defense, international, and classi included project management and systems engineering of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and commercial launch services valued at $100 million. Mr. Morris served in the US Air Force from 1982 to 1991 in Space Acquisition, Launch Operations, and Headquarters USAF staff po variety of staff and personnel assignments attaining the rank of col onel. His military honors include the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal, and Air Force Achieve ment Medal. He is a graduate of Air War College, Air Command Application (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 8 Daratech, Inc., Worldwide GIS Revenue Forecast to Top $2.02 Bil bridge, MA. 9 J. Lazo and L. Chestnut, report, prepared for NO 2002). 10 John A. Dutton, Opportunities and priorities in a new era for weath 83, no. 9 (September 2002): 1303-1311. 11 Minutes of the 55th Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, Hugh Willoughby, 5-9 March 2001, Orlando, FL. 12 Timothy J. Considine et al., The Value Hurricane Forecasts to Oil and Gas Producer in the Gulf of Mexico, 43 no. 9 (September 2004) 1270-1281. 13 Arthur W. Green and William Brown, Reducing the Risk from Geo
7 High Frontier The New National Space Policy and Air Force Space Commands Role in International Cooperation Brig Gen Robert M. Worley II Director of Strategic Plans, Programs, Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado D omestic and international media accounts of the new National Security Presidential Directive establishing in space with little regard to international considerations. Edi torial headlines regarding the policy such as: and To reinforce a common to go-it-alone in space. 1 I hold a much different view based on both the policy content and the international nature of many of the operations and activities conducted by Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). International cooperation has been a con latest National Space Policy is no exception. In fact, encour aging international cooperation with foreign nations is one of the fundamental goals of the new policy. I submit that AFSPC has practiced the spirit and intent of this aspect of the policy policy in particular, I will provide an overview of the new Na tional Space Policy, and then describe how AFSPC is engaged in international cooperation to collectively provide space ef fects from a secure space domain in support of joint operations worldwide. ments of high-level guidance, and exists to articulate national goals and objectives for a particular topic or domain. Policy is typically general in nature and forms a basis for action for subordinate organizations and agencies. International audi ternational perceptions and communicates messages that affect our international relationships. Policy is also political and can vary based on changes in administration, congressional priori ties, political climate and many other factors. since the days of the Eisenhower administration during which time the decision was made to pursue the peaceful uses of outer space. This thinking greatly shapes how people use space to day and how people view space use for tomorrow. The current outer space legal regime recognizes that the exploration and the interests of all countries, irrespective of the degree of their 2 Moreover, it declares that outer space is 3 It also abides by the rules and decision-making procedures call ing for registration of space objects and restrictions on weapons of mass destruction in space. 4 Although the release of the new space policy re sulted in some criticism of the mind that this country is com mitted to the existing space le gal regime. All actions taken in space by this nation are con to which it is party, as well as applicable international law and President Bush signed the new National Space Policy, on 31 August 2006; an act which culminated an extensive review of of space-related policies signed by President Bush in the last four years. These include documents on commercial remote sensing; space exploration; space-based precision, navigation and timing; and space transportation. The new National Space of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the 5 6 Another principle listed in the nation over outer space and rejects any limitations on the 7 Additionally, the policy is clear that space capabilities, in cluding space segments and supporting links are vital to its na Senior Leader Perspective ~ Outer Space Treaty, 1967
High Frontier 8 in space. 8 It even goes so far to say that, Freedom of action in 9 New to this space policy is the mention of homeland security with respect to the stated space policy goals. It spe 10 This policy also promotes the need for a robust science and technology base supporting national security, homeland se 11 Other goals in the policy include seeking to enable a competitive domestic commercial space sector, unhindered operations in and through space, and general guidelines which address the development of space professionals, improving space system development and pro curement, strengthening interagency partnerships, and bolster areas of national security, civil space, commercial space, space nuclear power, radio frequency spectrum, and orbital debris. International space cooperation plays a prominent role in the latest National Space Policy. As one of the top three guiding cooperate with other nations in the peaceful use of outer space 12 Addition Encourage international cooperation with foreign nations and/ that further the peaceful exploration and use of space, as well as to advance national security, homeland security, and foreign 13 Finally, there is a separate section dealing exclusively with international space cooperation which encour operation include space exploration, providing space surveil lance information, as well as developing and operating Earthobservation systems. Efforts currently underway within the national security space sector, and AFSPC in particular, are consistent with the inter national cooperation guidelines outlined in the National Space Policy. AFSPC is inherently a global command with personnel Garcia, Kwajalein, and Ascension Island to name a few. The agreements we have in place with our international partners go a long way toward fostering understanding and support of the mutual interests and foreign policy objectives of all involved. We have long operated hand-in-hand with Canada under the North American Aerospace Defense Command Agreement in conducting the critical mission of defending North America. This takes the form of, among other things, the integration of Canadian military members into our crew/watch activities in is no substitute for working side-by-side with our allies (in this case both Canada and Denmark) to accomplish an important mission on behalf of our respective countries. Space opera tions missions are an important part of our relationship with and engaging in space operations activities of mutual interest When it comes to providing space data and capabilities to our allies and the broader international community, I believe out in the space policy) as the maintainers of the catalog of space objects. Customers around the world, with a validated need to know, have Web access to information from our space sur veillance network under the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) program which assists all concerned with exact satellite location information. This information is critical for situational awareness in space and preventing objects from colliding. We also share missile warning data, weather information and in to the international community, free of charge, the positioning, navigation, and timing information provided by the global posi tioning system. Rounding out this list are AFSPC international nications systems. security is critically dependent on space capabilities and that this dependence will continue to grow in the future. Given the Air Force, and AFSPC are working diligently to enhance and expand international cooperation in many areas to include
9 High Frontier at Vandenberg AFB, California, offering training and educa tion courses from the National Security Space Institute, and space organizations. Furthermore, AFSPC has an active and longstanding engagement program hosting frequent visits of our command facilities by allied military and civilian leaders North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. These activities are not new. In 1994, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to serve as the Air Force and AFSPC senior representative to a Latin American space symposium organized and hosted by Chile. Additionally, AFSPC has recently hosted dignitaries and and Canada to name just a few. It is through these and other efforts that we are able to foster trust and take initiatives which volved. Notwithstanding the assessments in some press accounts, True, it asserts certain rights of freedom of action in space, re that we are committed to the use of space for peaceful purposes and that to ensure our national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives, we must have robust, effective, and agencies are working in concert with the principles and goals of the new space policy as it relates to international space coop eration, but AFSPC leads the way in the national security space sector. As a global command with facilities and people located around the world, AFSPC has been actively involved for many years, at many levels in international space cooperation. Now, more than ever, we must continue to build and expand these valued relationships. The security of our Nation and our allies, as well as our position in the international community depend on it. 1 19 October 2006, http://www.timesonline. co.uk/article/0,,30809-2410592,00.html (accessed 31 January 2007); Marc icle a/2006/10/19/MNGA0LRRTR1.DTL (accessed 31 January 2007); Ehsan 20 October 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HJ20Aa02.html (ac www.cfr.org/publication/12179/toward_american_space_dominance.html 2 Outer Space Treaty (OST), Article I, 1967. 3 Outer Space Treaty (OST), Article II, 1967. 4 Outer Space Treaty (OST), Article VII, IV, 1967. 5 US National Space Policy, 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 US National Space Policy, 2. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. Brig Gen Robert M. Worley II (BS, Organizational Behavior, for reassignment as Deputy Di rector, Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Force, Washington, DC. Cur rently General Worley is the Director of Strategic Plans, Pro grams, Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned, Headquar ters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for programming and national relations and foreign disclosure programs; and overseeing ties. Academy in May 1978. His initial assignment involved test devel opment for the Weighted Airman Promotion System. He was then worked global positioning system phase-in issues and Strategic Defense Initiative architectures and employment concepts. He has served as the director of Operations for the Global Positioning Sys tem Squadron during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, employment issues for satellite systems. General Worley has commanded the 12 th Missile Squadron, 12 th Space Warning Squadron, 50 th Operations Group, and 30 th Space Wing, where he led spacelift operations and directed the Western Test Range at Vandenberg AFB, California. Prior to his current as signment, he was the Director of Mission Support, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, where he advised the commander on all matters relating to civil engineering, services, personnel, public affairs, history, chaplain services, and contracting support. General Worley has been awarded the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal and Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster. The Gen and Staff College, and Air War College.
High Frontier 10 Human Space Flight and National Power Dr. John M. Logsdon Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University A pability to launch people in to space, and in the past 45 years sent 290 different men and women into orbit and beyond, some of them several times. There are many reasons for carry article focuses on one particular rationale: the assertion that hu 1 As used here, power outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior military power the abil ity to threaten the use of, and use if necessary, force; economic power soft power the ability of a country to obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity 2 more of these types of national power? Since the very start of the space age in 1957indeed even ernment leaders that having military crews operating in orbit can Air Force role in space, through the cancellation of the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) program in 1969, there were many military auspices. Both the Dynasor X-20 program and the MOL or more effectively by other means doomed these programs. 3 focused on the Space Shuttle, to be operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) but to be used by the national security community as its sole means of access to space once declared operational, which happened in 1982. 4 A specialists, national security payloads were redesigned so that operations, and dedicated military and national security missions, of a Shuttle launch facility at Vandenberg AFB, California to be 1985, Pete Aldridge issued the following guidance: The Air Force has been examining the potential role of military man in space for over two decades. Thus far, our military space unique capabilities. Accordingly, the following policy should be used in the planning of future space systems by the Air Force: The Air Force policy is to ensure that the unique capabilities that can be derived from the presence of military man in space shall be utilized to the extent feasible and practical to enhance existing and future missions in the interest of national security 5 This guidance quickly became obsolete. Among the many myths that was punctured by the 28 January 1986 Challenger accident was the notion that the Space Shuttle could be an af fordable and routine means of conducting national security op erations in space. By the start of 1987, Department of Defense (DoD) planning for future uses of the Space Shuttle had ceased (although several previously planned national security missions and Titan expendable launch vehicles. (The production of what became the Titan IV launcher had been authorized in 1985 as a backup to the Shuttle for the most critical national security pay loads.) The unfortunate experience of the DoD in becoming depen dent on what was in essence an experimental system, controlled by a civilian agency, did not completely dampen military inter in 1986 became with NASA a co-funder of the National Aerospace Plane, a tech nology development effort aimed at a system that could runway takeoff. When the technological hurdles, the DoD withdrew from the ef fort. Over the past 15 years, there have been sporadic ex pressions of military interest in developing dedicated sys 6 Research and some develop ment, but at a relatively mod est level of funding, continue, and there are advocates for Lockheed Martin Space Policy
11 High Frontier military services and the defense research establishment. It is fair to conclude, however, that the 50-year quest to demonstrate not borne fruit. world. To the degree that the skills and technologies developed indeed those who would argue that the hundreds of billions of funds away from other, more economically productive sectors. This assessment could change in the future if, as some predict, public space travel, more colloquially known as space tourism, becomes an economic success. There are predictions that public space travel could become a multi-billion dollar annual business. ly-funded efforts, the systems that might make travel to orbit and even beyond affordable enough and safe enough to create a busi turers for most of the time since scheduled air travel began have dominated the passenger aircraft market, thereby being a major could speculate that the equipment for commercial space travel in the future, especially if it is developed in such a way to also That this could be the case has been recognized from the start dent Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1960, declared, To the true conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can sub stitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on the 7 The May 1961 DoD memorandum sug gesting to President John F. Kennedy that he set a manned lunar landing as a national goal noted that Dramatic achievements in space symbolize the technological power and organizing ca decision to pursue space projects aimed at national prestige. Our attainments are a major element in the international competition such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part undertakings may affect our military strength only indirectly if at and that It is man, not machines, that captures the imagination 8 may have most clearly and pungently been stated by former Sec retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who in 1971 was deputy ing to President Richard M. Nixon about recommendations of not approve Space Shuttle development decision which would Weinberger suggested: of view. Most important is the fact that they give the Ameri can people a much needed lift in spirit, (and the people of the world an equally needed look at American superiority). [Can celing Apollo 16 and 17 and not approving Shuttle development] ing credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defense commit ments, and voluntarily starting to give up our super-power sta tus, and our desire to maintain world superiority. 9 Twelve years later, NASA made much the same argument in approve the development of a space station, saying that The 10 Space Station (ISS) programs have lived up to their promised performance, and thus it is a fair question to ask whether human certain, particularly given the uneven record of the international astronauts on the space shuttle is a useful foreign policy tool. Even so, space achievements involving direct human presence remain a potent source of national pride, and that such pride American astronaut on the Moon, a Space Shuttle launchrank
High Frontier 12 is threatened when we fail in our space efforts, and catastrophes such as Challenger and Columbia seem to tap deep emotions. Space Exploration and National Power sustained and affordable human and robotic partnership to ex to the Moon and the human missions to Mars. The fundamental and eco 11 In what ways can human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond contribute to space power, and thus to national security? This question has been eloquently addressed by the current ened, yet least discussed, aspect of national security involves be ing the kind of nation and, doing the kinds of things, that inspire others to want to cooperate as allies and partners rather than to be robust program of human and robotic exploration sets us above and apart from all others. It offers the perfect venue for lead ership in an alliance of great nations, and provides the perfect opportunity to bind others to us as partners in the pursuit of com mon dreams. And if we are a nation joined with others in pursuit arenas. a world of some future timewhether it be 2020 or 2040 or wheneverwhen some other nations or alliances are capable of reaching and exploring the Moon, or voyaging to Mars, and the such a world America would still be regarded as a leader among nations, never mind the 12 These remarks have been quoted at some length because they well conceived and well executed, is a valuable source of soft an important contribution to having the rest of the world see the 1 sity Spacepower Theory Group on 11 August 2006. 2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2002), 4-9. 3 See David N. Spires, (Washington, DC: Air Force Space Command in asso 4 1982-1983 plans to develop a space station, fearing that such a develop ment would distract NASA from Shuttle operations. 5 6 Air Force December 2003. 7 26 January 1960, reprinted in John M. Logsdon et al., (Washington: NASA Special Publi cation 4407, 1995), 365. 8 James E. Webb and Robert McNamara, for the vice president, memo randum, Recommendations for the National Space Program: Changes, 444, 446. 9 dum, 12 August 1971, reprinted in 547. 10 NASA, Revised Talking Points for the Space Station Presentation 597. 11 12 http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/146291main_NationalSpaceSymposium_new. pdf (accessed 24 January 2007). Dr. John M. Logsdon (BS, Physics, Xavier University; PhD, Political Science, New York University) is director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington Uni versitys Elliott School of In ternational Affairs, where he is also research professor and professor emeritus of Political Science and International Af fairs. Dr. Logsdons research interests focus on the policy and historical aspects of US and international space activities. Dr. Logsdon is the author of The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest and is general editor of the eight-volume series Exploring the Unknown: Selected Docu ments in the History of the US Civil Space Program. He has writ ten numerous articles and reports on space policy and history. He is frequently consulted by the electronic and print media for his views on space issues. Dr. Logsdon is a member of the NASA Advisory Council and of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee of the Department of Transportation. In 2003, he served as a member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. He is a recipient of the NASA Distinguished Public Service and Public Service Med als, the 2005 John F. Kennedy Award from the American Astro nautical Society, and the 2006 Barry Goldwater Space Educator Award of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is a fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and As tronautics and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the International Academy of Astro nautics.
13 High Frontier Former Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy A fter several years of interagency deliberations, Presi dent George W. Bush signed a new National Space activities in outer space. 1 Despite slight differences in tone and emphasis, the new policy statement remains largely consistent with its predecessors. Since President Dwight D. Eisenhower 2 property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. 3 The preservation of this right will be the space policy issue ment. There is a clear trend toward challenges to the freedom of space. This trend is evidenced by the increasing prevalence of foreign efforts to interfere with satellite operations. For exam ing signals in 2002, Libya and Iran interfered with international communications satellite transmissions in 2005, and China ap 4 (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, 5 there should be no failure of Space Management and Organization observed that the threat 6 7 The Commission underscored this point with 8 dertake preparations to preserve our freedom of action in space. This article addresses the policy rationale for space defense ca pabilities and the range of options available to ensure the sur vivability and operational continuity of critical space missions. It examines how to dissuade and deter those who might seek to ties in the event deterrence fails, and respond to hostile interfer Space Defense Imperative Protecting Americas Freedom of Action in Space outer space. America has leveraged this asymmetric advantage to enhance our international prestige, economic well-being, and national security. Space activities are indelibly woven into the socioeconomic fabric of the nation. While transparent to many tion, telecommunications, entertainment, and emergency ser vices central to our daily lives. Moreover, space systems are now integral to the American way of war. They provide global command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) support for all phases of military operations, from mission planning to execution. military forces upon the global capabilities provided by space systems has never been greater. The data collected, generated, and relayed by our defense and intelligence satellite systems, as well as civil and commercial satellites used to augment na Space systems enable the knowledge necessary to maintain mil itary preparedness, implement joint operational concepts, and support the planning and conduct of military operations across are now critical to the decision superiority of our armed forces. egy. Disruption or loss of critical space mission capabilities thus would substantially decrease our combat effectiveness and increase the risks and costs of military operations. In the post-Cold War period, the threats posed to our satel lite systems were expected to diminish with the dissolution of the modernization of our defense and intelligence space capa bilities. Opportunities for improved mission protection were traded-off to reduce costs and/or improve performance. In ad dition, collection and analysis of potential threats to our space assets lacked priority in the competition for resources. toric crossroads. We are in the midst of recapitalizing nearly our entire space force structure. Concurrently, the operational sion could be made by an adversary. Indeed, the threshold for an attack has decreased since the end of the Cold War because igniting the powder trail to global thermonuclear war. them is no longer solely the province of major powers. Access to space is less expensive and more widely available than ever been compromised by foreign espionage, media disclosures, Space Policy
High Frontier 14 and our own diplomatic demarches. Amateur astronomers track on the Internet. Many nations and sub-national groups can develop weapons The means to attack the ground segments and supporting criti cal infrastructure of our satellite systems remains present, while the global diffusion of dual-use radio and laser technology that could be used to interfere with our assets on-orbit is worri some. Moreover, the continu ing proliferation of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology is increasing the probability of a nuclear deto nation in space. America is more dependent upon its space capabilities than any other nation or sub-national group. Our dependence upon vulnerable satellite systems is provocative. Adversaries must be expected to understand the learned from recent military operations obviously was the value edly will be acted upon by our foes. Operation Iraqi Freedom should be a wake up call for the War, enemy forces attempted to challenge our use of space to enhance the combat effectiveness of coalition military opera nitions for the delivery of precision strikes did not succeed, it would be imprudent to conclude future enemies will not attempt to neutralize our space capabilities. 9 History shows that no other medium has ever remained a capabilities, economic vitality, or political will. They may at tack our space systems as symbols of our military and economic prowess to reduce our international status as a global superpow will be forcibly challenged. One of the most important policy choices facing American decision-makers is whether or not the interests in space. Deterrence and Dissuasion cessfully relied upon the threat of nuclear retaliation against the gression. National security satellite systems played a central role in helping policy-makers manage the exigencies of the American-Soviet confrontation. by a coercive control structure, which denied access to informa tion about the intentions of its political leadership and the ca pabilities of their armed forces. The National Reconnaissance operate satellites that could help to pierce that veil of secrecy. sets were primarily oriented towards peacetime support of the president and preparation of our strategic war plan. Civil and commercial space assets were not relied upon for na tional security missions. With some exceptions, defense and intelligence satellite systems were not expected to survive very far beyond the onset of nuclear hostilities. The umbrella of nuclear deterrence was relied upon to extend protection to defense commitments. dom of action in space. The National Space Policy states the systems as an infringement on its rights and will dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or develop 10 Moreover, Defense Space measures, including, if directed by the National Command Au thorities the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on 11 The utility of deterrence with respect to space activities should not be considered in the narrow context of war or peace in the medium of space. Despite limited war theories and the peacenot war or peace in space. Whether or not an adversary function to protect space systems will depend upon the stakes lation. Establishing the necessary conditions for deterrence to work, rence works in the minds of those we seek to deter. Deterrence should work when the threatened consequences are believed by the adversary to be proportionate to the interests at stake. The costs of aggression must be seen by the adversary to outweigh the risks. Threats of punishment or denial must be credible to ensure the consequence. peer nation states, rogue states with weapons of mass destruc tion, and transnational terrorist groups, the threat of nuclear re taliation may not be a credible means of establishing deterrence. non-nuclear (kinetic and non-kinetic) capabilities, gives defense
15 High Frontier planners a broader set of tools for creating strategic effects that the design and conduct of military campaigns provides a more credible basis upon which to base deterrent threats. It also gives policy-makers an expanded set of options. vince the adversary (or the adversary misunderstands) that it is committed to the protection of our vital interests. Given the not reduce the vulnerability of its space assets. It must be noted, of course, that it is also possible for a madman, religious fa natic, or terrorist to be beyond deterrence. Consequently, while tems, it would be imprudent to rely upon deterrence alone as the means to achieve mission protection. Rather, passive and active defenses are also essential to ensure the resilience and endur Passive and Active Defenses While impregnable defenses have never been built, defenses to perform their intended missions. The scope of the space mission protection challenge is determined by national policy and strategy. National policy establishes the ends we seek to achieve. National strategy determines the nexus of those ends an attack on Taiwan, defeat and punish Iranian aggression) es tablish what is required, how much is needed, and for how long, of our national security space systems. Defenses must be suf the time span relevant to the defense, intelligence, or homeland security missions they support. Surprise attack in space is a real possibility and it must be recognized that an enemy may attempt a clandestine or covert attack. Defenses will work if they withstand, delay or disrupt an attack, or compel the attacker to expend a disproportionate amount of scarce resources. In particular, defenses must be nerable space systems. Rather, the requirement should be to design space systemsnot individual orbital platformsto ensure the graceful degradation of the overall system commen surate with the forces it is supporting for mission survivability. Space systems, of course, are comprised of launch, ground con trol, communications, processing, and orbital elements. While each segment poses different opportunities and challenges for attack and protection, the system will only be as resilient as its weakest segment. There is of course a broad array of potential passive mea sures for enhancing space system survivability. Indeed, there are architectural countermeasures for dealing with the range of prospective threats to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or de stroy space assets. Some measures obviously will be militarily cal and industrial competence to create a space force structure capable of mitigating attack. When confronted by a Soviet adversary with the capabil lied upon a variety of passive defense measures to ensure that robust to protect our national interests. While the national re connaissance program primarily relied upon security measures to maintain the covertness of vital imaging and signals intelli gence assets, the defense space program expended considerable resources to protect space-based strategic forces C3ISR assets such as Milstar and GPS through hardening, redundancy, pro liferation, autonomy, variety of orbital planes, warning sensors, and other passive measures. quences of surprise and attrition of critical space assets in a deep crisis. Similarly, we must be prepared for a sudden threat surge against space-based strategic forces C3ISR systems during nonnuclear hostilities and a multi-weapon space control campaign termine how to mitigate susceptibilities, eliminate single point the appropriate mix of survival aids for critical missions. The timing for decisions on survivability enhancements to force structure is in transition with either new system starts or block upgrades. The legacy of these decisions will remain with Given that the offense is probably the stronger form of war fare in space and absolute survivability is impossible, the poten tial contributions of active defense measures for space mission tures may need to be capable of some form of self-defense or defense by escort space vehicles. Space control weapons sys tems should be examined for their utility in defensive satellite roles against certain classes of anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) threats such as co-orbital interceptors, space mines, or other systems with kill mechanisms that require proximity. ASAT systems, however, would depend among other things upon the scale and diversity of the weapons inventory. While similar targeting challenges would also apply to countering an high-leverage results if such countermeasures are feasible are obvious. Perhaps the greatest payoff in terms of space system suppression denied the enemy knowledge of satellite launches, orbital paths, and maneuvers.
High Frontier 16 Space control weapons may not function perfectly in a de fensive satellite role. Such capabilities clearly would not be commercial space systems. Their importance for helping to lions of dollars in space and related assets. Defending the space lines of communications is critically important for the conduct of military operations, execution of national policy, and global space would be the equivalent of a major maritime nation de ciding to forego deploying a navy. Arms Control behavior (by establishing precedents for customary international law) helped to shape the extant outer space international legal agreements that place prohibitions and limitations on the conduct of certain types of military activities in space. This includes, for example, prohibitions on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, detonation of nuclear weapons in space, verify strategic arms reduction treaties. terests. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations asserted that there is no need for such measures because there is no arms race in space and the current body of international law governing space activities is adequate. Nonetheless, some foreign govern ments, members of Congress, and the extra-governmental arms control community continue to advocate new negotiations. Russia, China, France, and Canada, for example, have proposed 12 Space arms control advocates have proposed measures for restricting ASAT deployment, testing, and use, as well as col lateral measures for regulating space activities more generally. Restrictions on deployment could be either comprehensive or limited. The objective of a comprehensive deployment ban would be to eliminate all ASAT capabilities, while a limited deployment ban would aim to restrict the deployment of spe restricting the parties to existing (i.e., ground-based kinetic en ergy) weapon systems, is an example of a limited deployment regime. The basic objective of proposals for restrictions on testing is its mission. The logic behind such proposals is that uncertainty about weapons reliability would arise without regular testing. Like ASAT deployment restrictions, testing restrictions could be either comprehensive or limited. The most comprehensive testing restrictions would limit the type, frequency, or location of tests. A high-altitude test ban is an example of a limited test regime. In addition, restrictions on the use of ASAT capabilities would prohibit hostile acts against satellites. The purpose of a an unambiguous threshold providing warning or further hostile intentions. Rather than placing constraints on ASAT testing, deploy ment, and use, proposals for collateral measures would build on the body of international laws regulating the orderly use of would specify certain rules for space operations or orbits. De tailed rules for minimum separation distances between satellites tive of such measures is to reduce the prospect of operational misunderstandings arising from instances where apparently provocative or threatening actions are observed but not readily cation and increase the effectiveness of unilateral survivability measures. Placing controls on dedicated ASAT weapons would not monality between civilian and military technologies, informa icated ASAT weapons would not eliminate the threat posed by launch vehicles, exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense in terceptors, electronic warfare systems, maneuvering spacecraft, ing, deployment, and use would not ensure the survivability of ground segments. Such arms control measures simply could not substitute for unilateral survivability measures. Moreover, such arms control would not constrain the threat while permitting space-based force enhancement assets to run space. Space systems which support hostile operations against Nonetheless, certain collateral arms control measures might complement active defense. A rules-of-the-road agreement ers unambiguously subject to direct attack. Such an agreement might facilitate defense against surprise attack with some types of space mines and other forms of kinetic energy weapons. It space systems against weapons with radio-frequency or directed energy kill mechanisms that project over longer distances. Before considering how to respond to deliberate interfer to contemplate whether we would even know if we were at tacked. Space systems are complex and anomalies caused by technical malfunctions and space weather phenomena are a re
17 High Frontier ality. It is conceivable that an adversary might seek to make its strike against our space assets as ambiguous as possible to mask its origin. National policy-makers will expect the com Joint Functional Component Command for Space to be able to are under attack. ing rules of engagement, the necessary prerequisite to justify taking any military action in self-defense is the determination of hostile act or hostile intent. Military commanders have the inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means, consis tent with the requirements for necessity and proportionality, to protect their units from hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. The authority to conduct some types of defensive ac tions for national or collective self-defense, however, may be reserved by the president and secretary of defense because of Policy-makers will want answers to a series of questions in order to help comprehend the situation and authorize responses fense planners should expect, among other things, to be asked: committed the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent? is the nature of the attack? are the consequences? will we recover disrupted or lost capability? did the attack originate? How conclusive is the evidence of an at tack? did the attack happenwhat is the purpose of the attack? The ability to make a determination of hostile act or intent and gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for space situational awareness (SSA). The transition from space surveillance to a more capable SSA should lead the intelligence community and force providers to deliver enhanced capabili ties for indications and warning (I&W), attack reporting, ISR and targeting support for space operations, and space environ mental monitoring. Improved ISR is, of course, fundamental to strengthening our SSA capabilities, enhancing I&W, and being able to attribute the source of an attack. The lack of improved SSA for characterization and attribution will constrain policy and operational responses. upon our space C2 capabilities. Smart, agile, and responsive tiveness of its space assets, develop courses of action, and react to developing situations. The establishment of the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB, California, as the focal point for space C2 is a key step toward providing the robust and persistent shared SSA required for the planning and execution of action in space. Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding ing of responses involving military activities must take into ac count the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarm space assets should take priority. geting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achiev ing such a counterforce mission objective. It is important to recognize, however, this most likely would entail extending the expect that concerns about the escalatory risks of conducting lead to political constraints on offensive responses in some con tingencies. National decision-makers will be concerned about discrimination and restraint in the use of force. In particular, the president and secretary of defense could be averse to autho rizing strikes against ground-based laser or direct ascent ASAT sites on the soil of a nuclear armed opponent in retaliation for nuclear attack on North America. weight than the homeland threshold in planning response op homeland to remain a sanctuary once they have initiated nonserious are the escalatory risks of crossing the homeland thresh policy and operational communities will have to address these in space. It is clear, however, that policy-makers can expect to face decisions about the types of effective actions they are will ing to authorize in order to deter or neutralize the effect of an passage through space because it has the most to lose if the me be willing to take risks of escalation to respond appropriately If not made aware of the stakes and implications of inaction, it should be recognized that the American leadership and public might be insensitive to hostile interference with satellite opera tions that does not involve the direct loss of life. Consequent ly, informed decision-making will require the stewards of our space power to educate policy-makers, combatant commanders, and the American public about the political, military, and eco nomic consequences of being denied the use of important space capabilities. Conclusion The decision whether America can utilize its space assets to protect and advance its national interests must not be placed in the hands of our adversaries. The need to undertake serious
High Frontier 18 through and operate in space without interference is an impera tive. America urgently needs to confront the impending chal lenge to the freedom of space. It would be extremely imprudent cal, and procedural approaches to enhancing the survivability and endurance of satellite systems. need to exploit the medium rather than simply deny an enemy its use, a mix of active and passive defense measures should be the approach to providing both the credible deterrent and general, such a mix will be more robust than relying upon either active or passive measures alone because of the synergy pro duced by a combination of offense and defense. The danger of pursuing such a course is less the risk of inciting an arms race than America creating an Achilles Heel because of the extent of its dependence upon space assets and an inadequate approach to their mission protection. assets would deter us from protecting our national interests and supporting our security commitments to allies. Reducing the vulnerability of critical satellite systems is needed to diminish the risk of self-deterrence or security failure. America is a na tion at war and we must not be lax about space mission protec be allowed to foreclose such defense preparations. Protecting employed for national security be provided mission protection commensurate with their value to the Nation. 1 US National Space Policy, ence and Technology Policy, released October 2006, www.ostp.gov/html/ 2 Logsdon, et. al., eds., ration (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 3 US National Space Policy, 1. 4 Jeremy Singer, War in Iraq Boosts Case for More Jam Resistant The Courier Mail 25 September 2006, 1, 6; Warren Fer 2 October 2006, 28; Top Commander: Chi 12 October 2006. 5 23 January 2007. 6 Management and Organization (Washington, DC: 11 January 2001), xv. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 15 September 2004. 10 US National Space Policy, 1. 11 Space Policy, Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, 9 July 1999, 6. 12 (CD/1700); Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agree ment on the Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the ted to the Conference on Disarmament by Russia and China; and The International Trade, Canada. Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz (BA, with Distinction, Security Stud ies, George Washington Uni versity; MA, National Security Studies, Georgetown University) tary of Defense as a career senior executive in the positions of as sistant deputy under secretary of defense for Space Policy and director of Space Policy from 1992 to 2003. In this capacity, he was responsible for the analy sis, formulation, and oversight of US Government and Defense Department policy guidance for the conduct of defense and intelli gence activities in outer space. This included establishing direction for: national security space management and organization; space forces and their employment, including space transportation sys tion operations, and space weapons; international agreements and legal regimes, including arms control, affecting space activities; commercial imagery; space cooperation with foreign governments; and the integration of space capabilities into operations and contin gency plans. Previously, Mr. Berkowitz held positions as the director of Space Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, and as an intelli gence specialist in the Department of States Bureau of Intelligence executive with an aerospace prime contractor. Mr. Berkowitz was awarded the Defense Departments highest ci vilian award, the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, of Meritorious Executive, Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award, OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award, and the OSD Award for Excellence. In addition, Mr. Berkowitz received the Na Award. Mr. Berkowitz writings have appeared in Peter L. Hays, et. al., eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and US National Security, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Strategic Review, Global Affairs, Compara tive Strategy, Janes Intelligence Review, Janes Soviet Intelligence Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Forces, Airpower Journal, Armed Forces Journal International, Signal, Space Mar kets, RUSI Journal, Space News, Defense News, and The Washing ton Post.
19 High Frontier The Perfect Storm: International Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy Ms. Theresa Hitchens Director, Center for Defense Information W hen the White House released President George W. in the evening on the Friday before Columbus Day (6 October hoping the document would receive as little public attention as possible. 1 There was no accompanying press release; key Con gressional staff had been given only a brief heads-up, along with assurances that the new policy differed little in substance from ton. When the next week saw little media attention, this public changed dramatically with the publication of a front-page story by on 18 October 2006 triggering a barrage of negative coverageboth at home and abroad. 2 The criticism did not come solely from media outlets and pundits that might be reliably expected to bash the Bush administration at any op portunity. Louis Friedman, president of the Planetary Society, published an op-ed on the website titled, Bel 3 Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, wrote: The blunt and States at odds with the priorities of the other space-faring nations. The language is so broad that it reads more like a blanket 4 An editorial in Space Technology 5 The London generally considered a conservative voice in the British media, published an article that captured the tone of much of the foreign coverage (headlined America wants it all life, the 6 ran the gamut from a Russian bluster regarding a military re Atlantic Treaty Organization alliesall of which are publicly dedicated to negotiations on a treaty to ban space weapons. Most worrisome, however, was the 11 January 2007 Chinese test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon that may or may not have been timed as a responsean action that, no matter what the motivation, nonetheless is bound to have wide-ranging nega 7 The controversy prompted belated moves by the Pentagon and ton on 13 December 2006 by Robert Joseph, State Department undersecretary for arms control and international securitythe damage had already been done. The new NSP appears to have cemented long-standing concerns among friendly and not-souse force both in space and from space, while undercutting in ternational norms against such actions and distancing itself from international law and institutions regarding space. This harsh cluding: The fact that the NSP language is itself undiplomatic and unilateral in tone. 8 9 regarding space within international fora that have isolated 10 The continued political fall-out from the Iraq War. Lack of public diplomacy on military space issues in gen eral, and the new policy in particular, especially with re gard to allies. The rest of this article attempts to lay out the key factors be on interviews with diplomats by this author); and postulate the possible repercussions. Given basement-level public approval ratings abroad for be surprising. A survey by a group of newspapers in Britain, Canada, and Israel in October 2006 found that 69 percent of a more dangerous place since 2001, and voted President Bush as more dangerous to international security than North Korean strongman Kim Jong-il. Even in Israel the survey found Space Policy
High Frontier 20 dramatically sliding support for the Bush administration, with 36 more dangerous versus only 25 percent who said the opposite. 11 America-bashing has become almost de rigeur in Russia; and, as Arab world is even lower. The Iraq war and the events leading militaristic, unilateralist superpower. Consequently, the new space policyeven if substantially comparable to the Clinton era policyis being viewed through an already darkened prism. lateralism, the new NSP does nothing to disabuse that percep emphasizes national security to the extent of stridency. Many NSP phrases, such as the following, forward the perception of Rejects any limitations on the fundamental rights of space. Will dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing the capabilities intended to do so. Will take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities, respond to interference and deny, if nec national interests. Will oppose the development of new legal regimes or to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements States to conduce research, development, testing and interests. 12 It also must be remembered that the European public, in par ticular, has traditionally been actively hostile to the concept of ASAT operations and weapons in spacefor example, President 1980s prompted widespread controversy (and even demonstra tions) in Europe. While the new NSP does not explicitly commit based missile defenses, and space-based offensive weapons, it does not rule out such actionsand its language arguably threat ens the use of force in space against adversaries, thus implying the use of such weaponry. 13 Further, statements by administra and technologies. 14 For example, in June 2006, John Mohanco, Nuclear and Security Affairs, told the Conference on Disarma plore the possible role that space-related weapons may play in 15 Finally, the apparent attempt by the White House to down play the new policywhich was signed on 31 August 2006 by President Bush but not released until a three-day holiday week end a month and a half laterfurther created the impression in the media, both foreign and domestic, that something nefarious was afoot. Indeed, it can be argued that if the White House or 16 overseas also could be seen as relatively predictable. First, the language in the Bush NSP, while more muscular and direct than that of its predecessor, nonetheless is similar on the controversial issue of space control used by the Clinton adminis tration. 17 space, this again could be read as merely a blunt admission of the policies already being followed in practice by the Bush adminis tration, which are familiar to its international interlocutors. For the need for a treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 18 Similarly, at the October 2005 meeting asking member states to provide 19 Mr. Mohanco, in his June 2006 statement to the Conference on 20 Thus, the relatively muted response in Europe to the new NSP by for eign governments was explained by one European diplomat who more loudly. Further, European space experts noted that the complicated lines of organizational responsibility for space activities in Eu only are there various agencies within each European nation with space-related responsibilities, there also are several European or Agency and the European Commission. This means reluctance of one or another of the bureaucracies, according to European initiatives, these sources said. Second, the rather more robust Russian responseincluding a thinly veiled scolding from Russian President Vladimir Putin tices, and the increasing level of anti-Americanism in Russia. 21 Russia has been one of the chief promoters of a space weapons ban treaty, having submitted a draft treatyalong with China and several other co-sponsorsto the Conference on Disarma ment in 2002, 22 ploy weapons in space. 23
21 High Frontier hesitated to rattle their light-sabers on occasion. For example, in June 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov threatened country of concern, the timing of his remarks, following a rash of media reports about the NSP review, made it clear the target 24 The negative media reaction in China was also to be expect commentary is somewhat unusual for a government that has typ much to do with Chinese plans for an ASAT testwhich is obvi ously as spectacular (if negative) a response as possible. allies and potential adversaries to focus more intently on the is sues of space security and space weapons than any time in the recent past in ways both obviously negative but perhaps in some cases also positive. Hostility While there is little on the public record, it is fairly clear that is being viewed in a positive light by the government of any major space power. Certainly, no other government came out to endorse the new NSP, and with the exception of Israel, there to negotiate or discuss using international regimes to prevent an diplomats have run the gamut from quietly resigned to publicly critical to, in the case of China, overtly hostile. Among American allies, concern is focused on two aspects: the unwillingness of Washington to engage in meaningful dia logue on cooperative measures to ensure the future of space se established norm against the deployment of ASATs and spacebased weapons. Allies were further dismayed at the lack of en gagement regarding the new NSP prior to its release; indeed, frustration. space operations. In a similar vein, a Norwegian diplomat said simply that Oslo is concerned by any national action that could be seen as undercutting international norms and processes. The German response, too, has been laconic. German diplo mats said informal discussions were held between the German nomics and Technology, as well as NGOs, but that there was substance was to be expected. Said one German diplomat: The goals and objectives in space, but it does not include any new or 25 Another noted that future reaction to implements the policy. In France, a meeting of domestic space agencies and experts was called to examine the NSP and its implications for France and experts, the key issue is not what the new policy says, or even its this time to more strongly state its well-known positions and risk breaking the status quo. As one French diplomat explained, it or deploying space weapons is good for all space-faring pow ers, maintaining a relative stability in military space competition while not preventing research and development needed to back a dential document and thus of high political import, it could be seen as legitimizing space-weapons testing and use, especially in China, thus creating a more dangerous space environmenta concern that seems to have been proven correct. According to Canadian sources, Prime Minister Stephen issue of space weaponsopposition to which has been a longCanada as a continuation of the Clinton policy of keeping all government remains strongly opposed to space weaponization and will continue to work to enable a broad vision of space se curity that rests on international cooperation. On the bright side, measures. As noted, the Russian reaction has been more publicly criti in Moscow on 8 November 2006 chastised those who would tin said: Some nations are trying to untie their hands to deploy lateral actions by some powers, as well as attempts by some to unceremoniously hammer through their positions while fully ig 26 Vitaly Davidov, deputy head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos, pulled even fewer punches regarding the NSP. This document can be seen as to he was quoted in the English-language Moscow News. Now the Americans are saying they not only want to go to space but 27 While there were a handful of extremely negative press re ports in Chinaincluding charges that the NSP was aimed di rectly at China, cording to Chinese experts here and in Beijing. 28 China is the most vocal proponent in international circles of PAROS, and publicly has committed itself to opposing the weaponization of space. Further, Chinese diplomats have not hesitated to criti
High Frontier 22 at the Conference on Disarmament in opposition to PAROS at nearly any opportunity, so the silence was rather unexpected. 29 Then, on 17 January 2007, came reports of the Chinese ASAT test using a missile to destroy an aging Chinese weather satellite, FY-1C, orbiting at about 850 km in altitude. 30 several years has been asserting that China is already developing report on Chinese military power stated that one such ASAT pro gram appears to be a ground based laser designed to damage or 31 an assertion that garnered renewed attention in October 2006 with reports regarding an incident (or nese ground-based laser. 32 Although evidence supplied by DoD has been thin, and in some cases dubious, Chinese military writ ings on asymmetric warfare have long made it clear that China has been investigating the possibilities of satellite attack capa ous to speculate on the Chinese motivations for the ASAT test, the timing of the event could have been deliberate as a direct re due to increased Chinese frustration with a lack of response by determination that the only way to bring Washington to the table regarding its concerns would be through a display of hard-power strength. This strategy is not without precedent: the administra tion of President Jimmy Carter, made a similar calculation in taking a two-track approach of attempting to bring the Soviets to the table on an ASAT weapons ban treaty while simultaneously 33 But in the eyes are now on Beijing. Repercussion Risks Obviously, the Chinese ASAT test raises the specter of a nega tive action-reaction cycle between Washington and Beijingand on the face of it represents the worst-case scenario stemming from the misunderstandings and misperceptions fostered by the tions seem unlikely, as other nations are instead more liable to wait to see how Washington moves to implement the policy. of Congressional leadership to the Democratsboth factors that could impact how much leeway the Bush administration has to policy would seem to make sense. That said, there remains po tential for subtle reactions by others, including allies, in the short and medium term that could have negative repercussions for the In Europe, several questions arise regarding future transatlan tic relations in space. A fundamental issue, according to diplo mats, is in regards to balancing cooperation with Russia and the lobbying for higher levels of space cooperation with Europe, an initiative that has the direct backing of President Putin, accord and the Roskosmos on 10 March 2006 signed a pact designed to boost cooperation in a wide range of space activities from explo ration to launch vehicles. 34 ing to agree on its own European Space Policy, an effort that is expected to come to fruition in 2008. One of the questions un derlying that effort is the extent to which Europe needs to estab lish strategic autonomy in space, including in the military arena. To the extent that the new NSP furthers the long-standing per partner in spaceon the civil and commercial side, as well as, the military sideEuropean thinking may be nudged further in the direction of autonomy and overtures by Russia for coopera tion may look more attractive. Europe to set limited priorities both for international cooperation and in collective/national space programs. The European Space ($10.7 billion). 35 Total European spending on military space in 2006 is estimated at 1 billion Euros ($1.30 billion). 36 Indeed, and 30 times more on military space. 37 In other words, choices Europe will not be able to afford robust civil cooperation with that are considered ever more important to military operations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon has been urging European allies to put more attention to the protection of space assets, another potential budgetary realities may force European nations and the Euro circumstances. of their space budget in view of a potentially more risky environ ment in the futurediscussions that have taken on greater ur gency in the wake of the NSP. France has the largest space bud get of any European nation.7 billion Euros ($2.2 billion) per straints. For example, one diplomat explained that France would have to think hard about whether it now wants to shift funding to protection of its space assets rather than toward cooperation with NASA on Moon-Mars initiatives. In the broader sense, the new NSP may lead to more con certed action by the international community to develop diplo at a minimum seek to politically embarrass and further isolate Washington. One possibility is that some nations may choose to referring an investigation to the Legal Subcommittee. Of course, such a move would now require a similar condemnation of the Chinese. Canada is also leading a push within the Conference
23 High Frontier PAROS, an effort that already has widespread support. 38 Another possibility is that some nations, such as India and Russia, may redouble their efforts to launch an overhaul of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). In fact, the head of the Indian Space Research Organization, G. Madhavan Nair, speaking at the Indian Law Institute on 29 November 2006, said that the OST and other current space treaties have become obsolete because of issues such as increasing space debris and space weaponization. There is a need to replace the entire set of treaties by a compre 39 actually harm rather than help future security in space, given that some nations would like to rollback certain provisions such as ellites. India, for example, has complained bitterly that services such as Google Earth are harming its security and New Delhi is sure to react, and likely overreact, to the Chinese ASAT test. 40 Finally, one could logically expect Russia and China to con tinue to attempt to make political and economic hay by portray their attempts to forge stronger space cooperation with Europe claratory policy writ large to justify its ASAT test on the grounds 41 Conclusion ablewhether other space-faring powers will actively seek to respond in concrete political, economic or military ways. It could be that even the Chinese ASAT test was an attention-get ting device, rather than a signal of a full-court press to militar use threatening activities in order to focus world attention on Pyongyang. First, questions loom about how (or even if) the budget priorities, or in research and development of new spacebe not what Washington says, but what it does. Second, it is not with individual nations or regions, and that balance is certainly going to be different for each bilateral/regional relationship; with allies and competitors have other economic, political and mili space policies and strategies in Europe, Russia, China and India political, and military priorities and approaches. Interestingly, more coherent strategic thinkingwhich could be a positive those bodies taking strong collective actionthough certainly they will continue to serve as political pulpits, and as venues for At the same time, the reaction overseasespecially amongst charged with space-related portfolios. Public opinion matters and governments (at least those in democratic countries) are obliged to take that into account. It should be obvious that the actions regarding space serve to deepen already negative views further eroded. And while no nation (even China at this time) may have the economic or military clout to directly challenge act individually or in concert to economically and politically iso given the growing importance of space activities to any given explain its views, policies, strategies and intentions regarding space, especially to allies and friendly nations; to exhibit more willingness to hear and seriously take into account the concerns of others; and to recognize that rejection of rules of behavior in space opens the way for more overtly negative behavior, as muddied the waters. 1 US National Space Policy, ence and Technology Policy, released October 2006, www.ostp.gov/html/ 2 18 October 2006, A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101701484.html. 3 Louis Friedman, Belligerent Tone Mars Bush Administration Space 25 October 2006, http://www.spacedaily.com/ html. 4 Winter 2006, 33-36. 5 Aviation 30 October 2006, 58. 6 19 October 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ar ticle/0,,30809-2410592,00.html. 7 17 January 2007, http://www.aviationnow.com/ 17 January 2007, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1359/chinese-test-asat. 8 For a full analysis of the text, see: Theresa Hitchens, The Bush Na Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/program/document. Michael Katz-Hyman, The Bush National Space Policy: Freedom of Ac 9 Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, 9 August 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf; Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1,
High Frontier 24 2 August 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_ 2_1.pdf; and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, 27 November 2006, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil. 10 in Outer Space (PAROS) since the mid-1990s discussions that have states. 11 Julien Glover, British believe Bush is more dangerous than Kim The Guardian 3 November 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ usa/story/0,,1938434,00.html. 12 US National Space Policy, 1-2. 13 US National Space Policy, capabilities, and freedom of action in space, dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so, take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to in terference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities 14 JP 3-14; AFDD 2-2.1. 15 Geneva, press release, 13 June 2006, http://www.usmission.ch/Press2006/ 16 This author spoke with several reporters who characterized the man thus making the story all the more interesting to them. 17 That said, the Clinton administration was widely regarded as opposed to the development of ASAT or space-based weapons, and the lack of po litical will for implementing a space control strategy was bemoaned by Air docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm. The document states that in order for a robust develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons development had not been developed. Further, the plan states clearly that: At present, 18 The Acronym Institute, http://www.acronym.org.uk/un/2005up01.htm. 19 Ibid. 20 Mohanco. 21 Russia Concerned About Space Weapons Deployment Pu 9 November 2006, http://www.mosnews.com/ news/2006/11/09/spacewar.shtml. 22 For a text of the document, plus a statement by Russian Ambassador Leonid A. Stotnikov explaining the initiative, Disarmament Documenta tion, Russia-China CD Working Paper on New Space Treaty, The Acro nym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, June 2002, http://www.acro nym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc10.htm. 23 plomacy, 20 October 2004, http://www.acronym.org.uk/un/2004paro.htm. 24 2 June 2005, http://www. msnbc.msn.com/id/8073961/. 25 German diplomat, interview by author via e-mail, 19 December 2006. 26 27 30 November 2006, http://www.mosnews. com/news/2006/11/30/spacecritic.shtml. 28 using China as an excuse for building space weapons, but also that China 26 October 2006, http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2006-10/26/content_7277637. htm (translation provided by Eric Hagt, director of the World Security In 29 For example, see the 30 June 2006 statement to the Conference on un.ch/eng/xwdt/t201853.htm. 30 Covault. 31 retary of Defense, May 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/ 32 2 October 2006, 10. 33 Springs, CO, 104-105. 34 14 March 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/space/russia/highlights/milestone.html. 35 Peter B. deSelding, Ministers approve 8.26 billion euro package for 12 December 2005, 6. 36 Tracking European space policies have we got the civil/military 2005, http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/NDA_SOD_18Oct2005. pdf. 37 Ibid. 38 Ambassador Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament: Get no. 10, December 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_12/Meyer.asp. 39 India needs strong legal group in order to pursue space science: 30 November 2006, http://www.indlawnews. com/B1627A40CCE6442F0927336BF6133578. 40 10 (accessed 24 January 2007). 41 Note bene: peacetime of persistent space debris in a heavily used orbit not only unjus Ms. Theresa Hitchens is the Center for Defense Informa tion (CDI) director, she also leads CDIs Space Security Project. Ms. Hitchens was the editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000, she has had a long career in journal ism, with a focus on military, defense industry, and NATO affairs. Her time at Defense News sels bureau chief, from 1989 to 1993. From 1983 to 1988, she worked at Inside Washington Publishers on the groups envi ronmental and defense-related newsletters, covering issues from nuclear waste to electronic warfare to military space. Ms. Hitchens has had a long interest in security policy and poli tics, having served internships with Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, and with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. Most recently, she was director of research at the British American Se curity Information Council, a think tank based in Washington and London. The author of Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course, she also continues to write on space and nuclear arms control issues for a number of outside publications. She serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the Interna tional Institute for Strategic Studies.
25 High Frontier Dr. Steven Lambakis Senior Defense Analyst National Institute for Public Policy P interest waned quickly because, in the end, the new policy is a fairly inconsequential document. 1 Truth is, policies come to life through programs and budgets. Words unsupported by money or deeds are, well, just words. That said, there was goodness in the alities of combat on the edge of Earth. It also caused us to once again consider ways space may be used to enhance traditional military missions. There are three combat mission areas in particular that could spacespace control, offensive strike, and missile defense. I will focus on the latter. Adding a space-based layer of hit-tokill interceptors to enhance the performance of the newly de numerous military and diplomatic advantages. Highly effec tive defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would offer a great pay-off over the long-term when one takes into account threat and national vulnerability to catastrophic attack. 2 1998 by a respected bipartisan commission. 3 The commission military forces or build up an inventory of terror weapons. fend populations and military assets from shortto medium-range ballistic missiles and demonstrated the progress made with this capability in Operation Iraqi Freedom, when Patriot batteries in tercepted all threatening short-range ballistic missiles launched defensive capabilities, the country was completely vulnerable to a long-range ballistic missile strike. Without such protection the citizens were exposed to sudden attacks from above and the gov ernment exposed to foreign strategies involving coercion, intim idation, and deterrence. The summer of 2006 crisis in Lebanon, territory with more than 4,000 projectiles, illustrated that states and non-state actors are willing to use missiles and rockets to produce terror and further political aims. because they represent a challenging threat. An intercontinental Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense ballistic missile (ICBM) can travel at extremely high speedsat times more than 15,000 mph. Kinetic energy interceptors collide with targets in space thousands of miles away at closing speeds that can exceed 25,000 mph. Besides hurling very small objects through air and space at very high speeds, ballistic missiles can be launched from anywhere at any time from multiple directions, to anywhere on the globe. Adding to this challenge, we can ex pect adversaries to employ countermeasures to foil missile de fense calculations and disrupt system operations. tic missiles are the surest and fastest way to destroy a distant city or military asset. They can give a state regional or even global tool of terror, especially if those missiles are married to weapons of mass destruction. Longer-range systems would give hostile rogue states a capability to vault over the oceans to strike Ameri In the future, we may face adversaries unknown to us today, this uncertainty for missile defense planners is enormous. This cision or by a surprise shift in capabilities from one region to a measure of what is possible today and, therefore, a low-end representation of what we must be prepared to defeat tomorrow. either unrealized or unknown but yet are possible to develop. There has been steady interest and investment of scarce re sources by some 20 to 30 countries in acquiring ballistic missiles and improving payload destructive power, warhead accuracy, and delivery range. Turnkey missile systems have been trans ferred from one state to another and may one day be purchased by terrorists. So why must we pay attention? Because a missile strike involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons could wreak catastrophic damage, far surpassing the levels of destruc tion, economic dislocation, and terror produced by the 11 Sep tember 2001 attacks. The international web of trading relationships in ballistic mis siles and related technologies is extensive. Short-range ballistic missile systems are plentiful and available for sale on the in ternational black market. Equally worrisome is the heightened interest in longer-range systems. For example, North Korea is developing an improved performance intermediate-range ballis tic missile that can travel about 3,200 km. North Korea also has an intense development program to produce an ICBM. The Space Policy
High Frontier 26 Taepo Dong-2 ICBM may have a two-stage variant (and travel around 10,000 km) and a three-stage variant (15,000 km). The 4 July 2006 test of the Taepo Dong-2 failed moments after lift-off, demonstrating that the North Koreans have more work to do. There is every indication, however, they will continue to strive for a viable long-range strike capability in addition to producing and selling shorter-range systems that may be used to threaten its neighbors, such as Japan. gram. Besides its numerous short-range systems, Iran is devel oping a medium-range ballistic missile (Shahab-3) based on North Korean No Dong technology. In its quest for longer reach, Iran is developing an extended range Shahab-3 (which can travel 1,300 km and threaten Israel) and a new medium-range system (which may travel 2,000 km and reach into portions of Europe). In November 2006, Iran showcased on television several ballis tic missile launches, to include the Shahab-3, demonstrating for the world the importance Tehran places on its ballistic missile development program. Iran is believed to be working on inter continental range ballistic missiles, which may be in its arsenal by 2015, that is if it does not import longer-range systems from proliferators like North Korea earlier than that. Countries like China and Russia have done considerable work on ballistic missile and countermeasure technologies. 4 Having developed and deployed advanced ballistic missiles of all ranges and done extensive research on nuclear weapons, we are right fully concerned, not only about the tremendous and devastating offensive potential of these foreign ballistic missile forces, but also about the willingness of these two governments to prolifer ate ballistic missile technologies abroad and sell their expertise to other countries. cal uncertainties to weigh as we consider how to proceed with will play in the use and proliferation of ballistic missiles is no today and tomorrow and with what capabilities? How can we technologically and operationally defend ourselves against an array of ballistic missile threats? The truth is, we cannot know for certain, so we must be ready for many contingencies. How Space Can Help Are we attempting the impossible? I believe highly-effective defenses against future ballistic missile threats will be a chal political will to focus on the best ways to leverage the space environment to accomplish this mission. With several successful hit-to-kill intercept tests in the bag and the proven combat performance of short-range land-based defenses, we have shown that we can hit-a-bullet-with-a-bul tion and advances in materials, and over the past twenty years have improved performance in interceptors, sensors, and battle management. This technological progress is key to considering whether the operation of space-based interceptors is feasible, ef affordable. been slow. In part we can blame this on the technically chal lenging nature of the mission. Political disagreements over the years have also hampered progress. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 stood in the way of developing a fully integrated, layered system to defeat missiles of all ranges. This treaty for bade different basing modes for missile defense, including bas ing interceptors in space. After more than three decades of living within these legal constraints and living with homeland vulner in order to strengthen homeland defense. Today we are considering new sensor and interceptor basing modes at sea, in the air, and in space as part of a layered defense concept. The initial layered ballistic missile defense system addressing all missile threats. But at least something is out there system can address a portion of the threat spectrum, and we can enhance, augment, and upgrade that capability by building on it matter how limited, than to have no capability at all in the face circling missile defense assets improve what we have? Flexibility Today we have an aggressive missile defense development program to look at future basing possibilities for sensors and weapons as part of a layered defense concept. Weapons and sen sors at sea, in the air, and in space would enlarge the engagement sites at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, California timized to defend against a limited threat posed by North Korea this operational geometry? Optimal orbits for engaging missiles from space would de gagement zone between latitudes north and south of the equator at similar distances. With weapons on-orbit, missile defenders would have a capability to engage intercontinentalto mediumrange ballistic missiles launched from any region within that sibility of critical space-based interceptor functions has already been done (as part of the Brilliant Pebbles development program in the 1980s and early 1990s). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), should it receive the support of the administration and Congress, could continue development efforts to perfect com mand and control of space-based assets and long-term storage of propellant, among other things. The important point here is that, all at once, a space-based layer of weapons gives the current missile defense system a true global engagement capability. Without space, the only way to
27 High Frontier and mobile sensors and radars (on ground and at sea). As you might imagine, the cost of doing so would be prohibitive, and would probably not be politically sustainable. Without a space-based layer, missile defenses would con tinue to require numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements with our allies and friends to host various missile defense assets. And there would continue to be a risk that these assets would not be properly positioned to defend against a particular threat. coverage capability into the system, they can offer a very costfor dealing with an uncertain and evolving threat. it mean to have more than one layer? It means having more than just a terminal or midcourse capability against a particular threat. In the best of all worlds, a truly robust system will make available engagement opportunities in the boost, midcourse, and terminal layers. To have multiple layers means having shot opportunities in more than one engagement phase (boost, midcourse, or terminal) against a threat, missile, or payload. To have layers is to have a capability to deal with an increased number of launched mis siles and warheads. A layered defense system also makes it more sile defense countermeasure that works well in one engagement phase will not work well or at all in another phase. And adding countermeasure capabilities comes at a price. A robust defensive system will force the enemy to consider using up valuable pay load space that would otherwise be assigned to deadly munitions in order to install additional defensive countermeasures onto its offensive missile system. In one sense, the reduction in the size of the munitions payload is already a victory for the defense. Boost phase missile defense capabilities create a defensive when it is traveling at slower (though accelerating) speeds and does not have a boost defense layer, which requires develop ment of high-power lasers, faster terrestrial-based kinetic energy interceptor capabilities, or space-basing of sensors and defensive weapons. The MDA is putting in place the requisite command, control, battle management, and communication infrastructure, and is developing and demonstrating the technologies needed to op erate an Airborne Laser (ABL), which uses directed energy to cause weakness and instability in the airframe of a ballistic mis sile. The ABL would be capable of engaging ballistic missiles of all ranges. Also in development is a high acceleration kinetic energy booster that, when mated with an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, could be based on land or at sea and would be effective against longer-range ballistic missiles. The disadvantage of these terrestrial options is that they must be in position to be effective. Technological marvel that it is, the ABL is limited logisticallyit must be in the air (along with inof the threat launch site to be operationally effective. A trans portable high-acceleration landor sea-based interceptor would also require positioning within range of the missile launch (along with adequate sensor coverage for detection, tracking, and dis crimination). What this means is that launches out of the deep interiors of some countries might circumvent the terrestrial boost-phase defenses under development. Even if the ABL could operate along enemy borders, in other words, it may not be effective against threat missiles launched a thousand miles away. Missiles
High Frontier 28 launched from far away and away from the positions occupied by the kinetic energy interceptors also could evade the early de fenses, although midcourse defenses may be able to engage them (hence the value of a layered defense system). These terrestrial capabilities would be welcome additions to the system, but the question is, can we do better? The ability to stage ballistic missile launches far away from their border areas makes it challenging for the defense for sev eral reasons. Sensors can help discriminate and track the bal listic missile and payload and cue the missile defense system for possible engagement. To the degree we can place radars closer to the threat launch site, we are better off. The closer we are, the earlier we can look at the launching missile and the better and more accurate the information provided to the system will be. Launches out of deep interiors may keep that information away from missile defenders. One way to overcome this disadvantage is to place advanced detect and warn of missile launches worldwide. The missile de fense system will continue to leverage the Air Force non-imag ing infrared Defense Support Program (which has been around since the mid-1960s) and the follow-on space-based infrared systemhigh satellites for threat detection and early warning. There are other sensing functions that can be optimally ex for several years with Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. Space-based sensors would have a global foot print, improve situational awareness, and help shorten the track detection timeline and improve track accuracy, which means improving performance for all elements of the system (spacebased and terrestrial). These satellites will also provide faster cues to other radars and weapons elements of the system and provide better information on threat missiles, including position, are launched and operational, though, we will be limited to ter restrial tracking sensors with their attendant drawbacks. A space-based interceptor layer would help take away the geographical advantage held by the offense, since space-based assets would be on-call 24/7 and would have near-global access to launch points. Missile defense operations from space not only would allow the system to address a very large set of possible threat launch points around the globe, but they would also allow enemy interiors. We must recognize that improving the performance of the bal to meet unforeseen threats or to defend against a known adver sary), layers (to increase engagement redundancy), and inven tory (more interceptors or shots in the system to deal with larger contribution in each of these areas. While interceptor platforms a constellation as small as 100 interceptor platforms (with, for example, four interceptors per platform) will act like a mobile defense asset and be ready to engage at multiple points around the world at a time. Because the missile defense system has more than one layer, it will have multiple elements working together synergistically, sharing information, sharing existing sensors, communicating as a single system worldwide. Even a small constellation of spacebased interceptor platforms leveraging existing terrestrial sen sors and the extensive command, control, battle management, and communication network would allow the entire system to in boost and midcourse from space would thin out the number of attacking payloads, and thereby increase the probability of engagement for other midcourse and terminal defenses and im prove overall system synergy. Ironically, when one considers the emotional and at times hy perbolic debate over deploying weapons in space, much of the missile defense battle involving ground-based or sea-based in terceptors already takes place in space. 5 The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) mated to booster stacks are designed to col lide with the target in low Earth orbit. The EKV is a space attacker, therefore, has an ability to preposition before the de fender can get to the point where he must engage. The currently deployed terrestrial-based interceptors, in other words, are not in the most optimal position to do battle with high-speed offensive pre-position assets in space, where we know the battle is going to take place? The on-call, persistent defensive capabilities made available by space-based assets would improve missile defense response times, expand areas of engagement, provide better information on offensive missile events, and generally improve the world threats. This would allow it to improve crisis response times and interests and more readily able to meet the defense commitments also improve, and the leadership, in turn, would have greater wider range of missile threats. Will there ever be a time when we will need the powerful ca pabilities discussed above? Robust missile defenses, at a mini mum, could further the defensive goals of dissuading our allies from investing in ballistic missile programs and deterring ag gressive missile behavior. Yet there are instances imaginable too when we would want to have the strongest, most reliable, most effective defenses possible. What if, for example, a hostile country decided that the best onate a nuclear weapon several hundred kilometers above the no buildings would be destroyed, the resulting explosion would send out an invisible electro-magnetic pulse that would disable portation infrastructures of part or all of the country. The impact
29 High Frontier on the economy and the health and safety of citizens would be felt worldwide. According to a recent report by a congressio nally chartered commission to look at the electromagnetic pulse cult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability 6 Indeed, our vulnerability might invite such an attack. The stakes, in fact, are that high, and the possible threat posed by a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile is that chilling. A robust missile defense system may be the only recourse we have to de fend ourselves against such a threat. tive missile defenses in place? And if most of us favor strength ening defenses to improve our ability to kill long-range missiles early enough in their trajectory (that is, from boost phase to early midcourse phase), why would we not be in favor of a vigorous program to develop and deploy interceptors that provide on-call, worldwide reach, and a boost phase layer within the currently deployed ballistic missile defense system? Why, in other words, would we not want to investigate more fully the performance possibilities of space-based interceptors? Military Space and Politics listic missile defense system ended a decades-old and bitter par tisan battle and inaugurated a new defense era. There is a limited its deployed troops against ballistic missile attack. There also are plans in place to improve the system incrementally to address current and emerging threats. Yet at the moment, those plans shy Policy makers in favor of the space option have not done the political spadework required to push it forward. The current ad ministration has not been willing to take it on, despite the heady language in the 2006 National Space Policy. Congress also has a few space proponents, but the groundswell of support required to authorize and fund this approach will be impossible to build on Capitol Hill without leadership from the administration. Other reasons: domestic and international political correctness since the inauguration of President George W. Bush. There is a vigorous arms control lobby that views space as the last regula zations that are generously funded to oppose military programs arms control faithful look to leverage what they can from the po litical correctness crowd. And, in the end, the adversaries of the constructed by arms control and political correctness. It all comes down to one questionhow effective do we want to be against an evolving ballistic missile threat? If you can agree that American cities face a serious, potentially catastrophic threat in the future (whether that threat be from a nuclear strike or an electromagnetic pulse event), the answer ought to be that we should make our missile defense system as effective as pos along the high ground surrounding Earth. 1 US National Space Policy, ence and Technology Policy, released October 2006, www.ostp.gov/html/ Space policy since President Eisenhower has been remarkably consistent with respect to national goals in space, with each iteration respecting the need among the various administrations may be found in the budget submissions ven Lambakis, spending on military space programs, a decentralized defense space organiza indicate that this country is deeply divided on this subject, the tough words in 2 the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, testimony, 7 April 2005, If the nation needs it (missile defense), we have a thin line. We have an emergency capability. But the focus needs to be on in creasing the depth of the sensors, the command and control and the weapons 3 Donald Rumsfeld, et al., 15 July 1998, http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat.htm; Center, NAIC-1031-0985-03, August 2003, 9; The Iranian Ballistic Missile 21 September 2000. 4 Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 17 March 2005, fense, January 2001, 17. 5 I have addressed these criticisms in Steven Lambakis, Space Weapons: February/March 2001, no. 105, 41-51, no. 2 (Autumn 2003): 75-83. 6 Dr. John Foster, Jr., et al., vol 1: Ex ecutive Report, report to Congress, 2004, 1, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/library/congress/2004_r/04-07-22emp.pdf (accessed 24 January 2007); see also Curt Weldon and Roscoe Bartlett, Counter the Mega-Threat: EMP (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 00-112. Dr. Steven Lambakis (PhD, World Politics, Catholic Uni versity of America) is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. His book, On the Edge of Earth: The Fu ture of American Space Power (University Press of Kentucky, 2001), examines the develop ment of American space pow er and highlights space policy articles in Policy Review, Joint Forces Quarterly, Space Poli cy, Armed Forces Journal International, Orbis, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Astropolitics, Defense News, Space News, and Com parative Strategy. Since 2000, he has supported the director of the House Science Committee, Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee and appeared on the television show Debates/Debates to discuss the weaponization of space.
High Frontier 30 How Can the Space Medium Be Further Exploited to Counter Terrorism? Lt Col Michael L. Lakos, USAF HQ USEUCOM J-5 Africa Division A Airmen to integrate air, space and information opera tions. 1 laid the groundwork for future thinking on the value of space power. 2 Space power evolved in a dramatic fashion very similar to what air power went through in the 20 th century. Where that evolution will lead is a question of enormous impact. Explorer 1 satellite, through the Apollo Moon landing, to the successful space shuttle missions. Today, the strength of the foe. over other space fairing nations, it must continue to design, de velop and even deploy new space capabilities to further exploit the medium of space. In particular, this continued exploitation ism. space applies to countering terrorism. It would also be of use in analyzing the nature of terrorism and its differences with conventional warfare, as well as the application of space power in the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). For exam even prevent terrorism? Can space assets be used to interrupt information warfare applications from space be used to iden tify terrorism cells, terrorist targets, plans, and so forth? With this in mind, how can present and, more importantly, future space capabilities be used to combat terrorism? Further discussions of conducting counter terrorism operations in and and how these capabilities could augment counter terrorism operations. bat? Space is a unique medium to operate through in order to interfere with states that sponsor terrorism is becoming ever space enhance global strike operations and maintain the ulti mate high ground? Terrorism and How Space Applies to Counter Terrorism Terrorists and terrorist cells seek to defeat us at our own layer for offensive or defensive actions would help protect the to exploit coverage and engagement gaps in our defenses. With this in mind, what is terrorism, what is the process(es) of terrorism. Can space be used to interrupt terrorism or ter current/future space systems to deter, deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy terrorist networks? situation has muddied the waters with respect to combating terrorism. Internationally acclaimed counter terrorism expert rorism include three factors: its essence (violence or threat of violence), its targets (civilians or non-combatants), and its aim (to gain or maintain some form of political power by instilling fear and forcing political or social change). 3 A helpful work Space Policy ~ General Bernard A. Schriever
31 High Frontier ticle, is: the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 4 Although the primary focus of this article is to assess how tant to understand how terrorists use space for their own ben is tasked to answer the disruptive challenges from state and non-state actors who employ technologies and capabilities that include cyber and space operations or directed energy weapons currently enjoy. 5 vanced, space-based satellites enable reliable precision weap ons, highly accurate air/surface navigation, swift and secure worldwide communication, timely intelligence-surveillancereconnaissance data, and so forth. But these highly technical systems are not without their vulnerabilities. If adversaries capabilities, all the modern sophisticated weapons systems and tactics could fail. For most, the realization comes when the capability is lost, such as the Galaxy IV satellite disruption in May 1998. The failure of that one satellite left about 80-90 percent of the 45 out pay-at the-pump capability. 6 The satellite suffered an error in its onboard control system, the backup switch also failed, and the $250 million satellite rotated out of position, complete 7 Could this have been a terrorist event? Most analysts claim that the failure was caused by solar activity (what space op one of the biggest satellite telecommunications outages in re cent years. Although international terrorists would hardly be able to reach space directly by current conventional means due to a lack of territory, capability, and infrastructure (unless they team up with a rogue state[s]), they could wreak havoc on space assets by destroying ground stations. Cyber-terrorists cation nodes, computer networks, and so forth. They could lite telecommunications ground station could be knocked out, a satellite imagery downlink station could be targeted or worst case a satellite in orbit could be destroyed. Such threats create a crucial need for tight security and protection of domestic and international cyber networks. The key is to not allow the terrorists to get to the point that space segment(s). International terrorism will not be defeated from space, but space assets can contribute substantially to its terrorism? In response to the terrorist threat, the Air Force is develop ing and deploying terrestrial and space-based assets to counter the terrorist threats of the future. One of the concepts being addressed by the Air Force and other agencies is aggressively employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as in this effort. As was witnessed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, space-based collection systems, although indispensable, still 8 tional-warhead or conventional ballistic missiles (CBM). The to address threatssuch as terrorist groups and underground weapons stocks and military facilitiesthat have proliferated 9 The CBM concept continues to gain momentum. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $500 million to create a new force of conventionally armed, long-range missiles capable of striking 10 Currently, the CBM concept calls for this type of weapon sys Another possible option is deploying a small space vehicle that could disperse weapons while traveling at 20 times the speed of sound. 11 These types of hypervelocity weapons are in space. Their intent is to strike targets on the ground, in the air, on the seas, and so forth. and future space-based assets and technology could be used The key is surveillance and tracking. For example, using sig nals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, space systems provide the platforms for surveillance and tracking. Such space-based assets could be combined with traditional terrestrial-based ac tivities such as money tracking and asset freezing to disrupt Financial Action Task Force and the Interagency Terrorist Fi nancing Working Group are two groups that are working to ward this effort. Electronic banking relies on satellite technology; electrons formation warfare tactics and techniques to monitor electronic transactions. Another resource frequently used by terrorist organizations
High Frontier 32 transactions move at the speed of light. Current SIGINT plat forms, together with traditional communications intelligence sources and methods, could be employed in an offensive or defensive fashion to disrupt such activities. As demonstrated, those involved in the GWOT will con stantly have to remain one step ahead of the terrorists. Tech nology drives this effort but also represents a vulnerability. Conducting counter terrorism operations from space and with space-based assets is a logical step, one that will become even more compelling in the future. the luxury of trading the military principle of mass for speed and accuracy. In October, 2005 former Air Force Space Com mand Commander, General Lance W. Lord, retired, highlight ed this point: The capabilities and effects we provide from and through space are an enormous advantage to our American and coali precision attack to maximize our combat effects on the battle ducing collateral damage to civilian lives and property. When you integrate space into our military operations on the ground, tiveness while decreasing the number of American and coali Those are keys to success in any war, but particularly in the conducting in Afghanistan, Iraq and around the world in the 12 terrorism is the defense ad vanced global positioning system receiver (DAGR), shown below. Army ground units currently use the DAGRs to track insurgents and enemy activity. 13 If you compare space op erations to air operations, one can readily see the simi lar advantages Airmen have had for yearstransparency, precision, persistence, and mo bility. Space combat, as politically incorrect as it may sound, is on the horizon or above it. If forces are not or cannot be deployed in an area of interest due to poor visibility or terrain, a capability to strike from space might provide some strategic and tactical regional options. 14 This strike capability would help solve the potential problem of getting into areas of denied access to strike targets deep within a heavily defended region, bilities of global reach and global attack. To further examine the prospect that space will become a distinctive capabilities relate to space power and their use in countering terrorism. to what Airmen around the Air Force do on a daily basis. Four of the six distinctive capabilities are related to space power whether the battleground is air, land, sea, or space-based. Precision Engagement and Global Attack 1. Space maneuver vehicles (SMV) 152. Space operation vehicles (SOV) 163. Common aero vehicles (CAV) 17 Rapid Global Mobility 1. Military space plane (MSP) 2. Near-space platforms Agile Combat Support 1. Reusable single-stage-to-orbit launch vehicles (RLV) 2. SMVs or SOVs 3. On-orbit space depot Modifying or enhancing each of these capabilities in space is the next step. These competencies will provide the Joint Force commander more weapons to conduct joint/multination al operations. Precision Engagement Document (AFDD) 1 is the ability to command, control, and 18 Global Attack is the ability of the Air Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions 19 can and will be conducted from space in the future. CAVs are possible future space vehicles that the DoD, led by and for which it is seeking funding. 20 and conducts wargames with global attack capabilities from
33 High Frontier and through space. In fact, The combination of space-based navigational and timing services with precise weapons guid ance is making the promise 21 Code wargame, Global En gagement, has showcased sev eral types of space capabilities including tungsten rods (frag mentary penetrators) launched from space at speeds up to Mach 17 and CAVs that will deliver these precision weapons anywhere on the globe in less than 60 minutes. To use an ex ample of speed and precision, consider the raid on Abu Musab guided bomb and a global positioning system (GPS)-aided pre cision guided munition to destroy the safe house. If you staged tungsten rods or CAVs on-orbit for potential future targeting, the timelines of a precision strike could be reduced even more, thereby further denying a terrorist safe passage and/or cover. Transporting or delivering these new weapons leads into the rapid global mobility mission area. Rapid Global Mobility the timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range 22 Prior to the decision to cancel the X33 program, there were several MSP concepts on the drawing board: A military space plane architecture has many compelling ad reduced risk of lost crew (from traditional piloted aircraft) or reduced dependence on a dwindling number of increasingly unwelcome overseas bases (making forward staging/basing harder and harder). 23 which is the atmosphere between 65,000 and 325,000 feet. 24 For example, Raytheon Corporation is working on concepts in volving short duration (hours or less), medium duration (hours to weeks), and long duration (weeks to months) type space platforms. Such platforms include unmanned aerial vehicles, airships, steerable balloons, and static balloons. 25 Why would enabler when combined with low, medium and geosynchro near-space, we believe we can provide persistence, payload 26 These near-space platforms also are quickly recoverable, can be developed/launched more quickly and, once again, pro vide another asset to the Joint Force commander. Imagine a near-space platform high over the mountains of Afghanistan tracking terrorist squads that are continuously on the move. ditional overhead reconnais sance assets are either out of line of sight or not currently tionally, ground forces and air forces may not be in the proper positions at all times so near-instantaneous queuing from a near-space platform could be the key discriminator in a strike mission. Finally, Agile Combat Support how the Air Force supports the forces we deploy forward 27 Once again, drawing from Global Engagement and other wargame and the joint land, air, and sea simulation, the Air Force is wargaming with fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit space launch vehicles (e.g., VentureStar), space maneuvering, and space operations vehicles that could put bombs on tar A VentureStar vehicle could possibly ferry troops and logis mind, future combat support could include, support missions enabled by military space planes for satellite deployment and rapid constellation replenishment, to force enhancement mis 28 Reus able Launch Vehicles (RLVs) could become a tremendous asset Afghanistan terrain as an example, troop resupply is a danger ous and complicated endeavor. But, a VentureStar type space vehicle or transport that could get supplies, additional troops, and so forth into theater or into denied or hard-to-reach areas capture terrorists and other types of enemy forces. Agile combat support could also involve an on-orbit space depot that provides logistical support for continuous space force reconstitution missions. Additionally, the strike mission may be accomplished against surface, air, or space targets. Strikes from space may also enable attacks on targets which would otherwise be beyond the reach of air, land, and sea forces, thus enabling Precision Engagement/Global Attack missions to be executed quicker and more effectively. 29 Precision Engagement, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobil ing these competencies and moving deeper into the realm of space warfare will further complement the existing arsenal in on-orbit. Some would argue that our ICBMs could act as an offensive counterspace weapon (OCS, defensive counterspace known as DCS) since they travel from/through space. As men tioned earlier, some current experts advocate a conventional ~ Department of the Air Force,
High Frontier 34 ICBM capability. This type of weapon could be used to strike a ground target, a moving target in the air or on the ground, or eventually, even a space-based target. All involve a change in philosophy, renewed political will, and further legal analysis. Is there a political will to pursue space combat power? Many Americans generally agree that space should not be weaponized or even militarized. Some would argue that we have already militarized space by using GPS satellites for pre cision-guided munitions and space-based imagery for targeting and battle damage assessment. The critical piece will be if we cross the threshold with space-based weapons, either offensive or defensive in nature. The political will is also often tied to the legal questions pertaining to space warfare. Furthermore, what international treaties/agreements and doc trine in relation to space combat are applicable? Space law is of relatively recent vintage, with the Soviet launch of Sputnik I 30 To begin, the question of what is space law must be answered followed by what are the international treaties that apply to space operations/space policies (since the Air Force is the executive agent for space)? Space law can be described as the body of law applicable to is most often associated with the rules, principles and standards ganization. However, space law also includes international agreements, treaties, conventions, rules and regulations of in ternational organizations (e.g., the International Telecommuni and administrative orders, and judicial decisions. 31 basis for space law over the years: the informal customary 32 Although the peacefully, the organization does allow states to act individual ly or collectively in self-defense. It is this provision that most space control proponents stand by with respect to offensive/de fensive counterspace and space superiority systems. Through the years, our domestic/national space policies pro the controversial Space Defense Initiative of the Reagan ad ministration to the 1996 Clinton administration policy that is being updated by the Bush administration. This new national space policy, is expected to give a green light to the already policy and practice that put a priority on the peaceful uses of 33 Counterspace opponents claim space law and treaties pre counterspace as those kinetic and nonkinetic operations con ducted to maintain a desired degree of space superiority by the destruction, degradation, or disruption of enemy space capabil 34 They include both OCS and DCS missions. capabilities. For example, attacking a satellite ground station with airpower or a satellite communications link with a com performs passive space protection missions with the Laser Control Center collision avoidance analysis. 35 Additionally, recent press reports indicate that the Bush ad ministration is considering further enhancement of its ground based-laser capability. The largely secret project, parts of which have been made public through Air Force budget doc uments is part of a wide-ranging effort to develop space weapons, both defensive and offensive. No treaty or law for 36 The nexus for this type of arms research dates back to the 1996 presidential directive which allows for 37 tations to conducting counter-terrorist operations from space. Research and development will continue in order to keep the the sea, and in the air. It also clearly enjoys certain space advantages over other space fairing nations. As the value of space power grows over the course of the next twenty years, four recommendations can be offered: In a speech given in February 1957, the late General Ber ~ Ms. Theresa Hitchens
35 High Frontier future of space and space superiority. He said, Our safety as Several decades from now the important battles may not be sea 38 We are at that point now, but we must prepare for the eventuality of actual space successful in this GWOT. In future wars, it is inevitable that 39 EELVs has completed their maiden voyages, and our satel lite systems are becoming more and more technical. It is with this vision that we must look towards the future and further (precision engagement, global attack, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support). The quickening pace of war will 40 to change the way wars/campaigns are waged. taining space supremacy by continuing to invest in space tech nology and programs ensuring that advocacy remains strong development and system deployment should not be a hurdle. dramatically limit military operations to, from, and within 41 Producing new technology and new capabilities will further enhance the combat power of a joint/multinational force. Tech nological advances in space operations in this global campaign against an asymmetrical enemy are paramount to victory. Exploiting the space medium should continue to be the aim space have been critical in the current counter terrorism cam paigns and staying ahead of the enemy is vital. Developing ability of joint and multinational/coalition forces to hunt, cap ture and defeat the terrorist threat. Space continues to provide ability to wage their type of warfare but this asymmetrical ad vantage could very easily be taken away if not properly pro tected. Conclusion ibility, and longevity in space, the time has come to increase our presence in space and to develop the capabilities that will ensure our success in space operations continues. In this article, space power was examined through an analy sis of how space operations are relevant to counter terrorism by describing the unique aspects of space power and the mili ism was analyzed. Finally, an opinion on what is the future national policy makers and military leaders was proposed. Preparing to conduct military operations in space may pre vent a Space Pearl Harbor Former CSAF, General Ronald R. Fogleman, retired, said, The Air Force must change its mind 42 Who will step forward to lead the charge to this new medium, to achieving space supremacy? The next Billy Mitchell or Guilio Douhet of space is out there somewhere carrying that space torch which must remain lit so that the path to space power can remain bright. Space warfare is on the horizon. 1 States Air Force, (Washington, DC: De partment of the Air Force, 2000), 4. 2 year 2020 and beyond and to explore new technologies and how these new capabilities could best be exploited to support and preserve the se power, began in 1993 and was presented to the CSAF in June 1994 was called ing of was that global presence through robust space 3 College of International Security Studies, Program on Terrorism shall European Center for Security Studies, 2006, 4. 4 ed., handout, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2002, 21. 5 The White House, 16 March 2006, 44, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ nss/2006/ (accessed 30 March 2006). 6 Protecting Commercial Space versity, 1999), 9, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/99-035.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006). 7 Daniel N. Baker and Michael J. Carlowicz, ISTP and Beyond: A Center, http://pwg.gsfc.nasa.gov/istp/outreach/beyond.html (accessed 20 20 April 2006). 8 Air and Space Power 19, no. 2 (Summer 05) http://www.airpower. maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/danskine.html (accessed 15 March 2006). 9 Anne Scott Tyson, Pentagon Seeks to Fund New Force Of 8 March 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/07/ AR2006030701546.html (accessed 3 April 2006). 10 Ibid. 11 14 March 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/03/14/ pentagon_eyeing_weapons_in_space/ (accessed 15 March 2006). 12 nology 4, no. 3 (20 October 2005) http://www.military-aerospace-tech 13 Satellite Flyer 9 March 03-09.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006). Previously, maps, compasses,
High Frontier 36 another ace in the hole. The DAGR is equipped with better anti-jamming transmit false information. 14 well AFB, AL, May 1995), 2. 15 Image courtesy of: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/launch/ x-40-smv.gif (accessed 25 September 2006). 16 Image courtesy of: http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Sept02/ VA0210.html (accessed 25 September 2006). 17 Image courtesy of: http://www.andrews-space.com/thumb/php September 2006). 18 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD 1), 17 November 2003, 80. 19 Ibid, 79. 20 The Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) is a small, very powerful, space vehicle and capable of staying in orbit for up to one year. The Space Operations Vehicles (SOV) is designed for vertical takeoff and single stage to orbit operations carrying satellites all the way to orbit. Once an SOV is launched from one of the three bases it performs its mission and then lands at its home base or one of the two other bases. The SOV could be used to launch microsatellites and CAVs. The Common Aero ity to re-enter and disperse its payload in the atmosphere with high ac curacy. CAVs are unmanned maneuverable spacecraft that would travel that commanders could order a CAV not to release its payload if they decided not to follow through with an attack. Walter Pincus, Pentagon 16 March 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A3827221 Department of the Air Force, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2000), 13. 22 AFDD-1, 80. 23 18 December 2000, 29. 24 264,000 feet or the altitude where the astronaut designator is awarded. 25 Frank Prautzsch, Raytheon Corp., Future Initiatives in Near and conference, Brussels, Belgium, 8 March 2006). 26 TSgt Jennifer Thibault, 20 October 2005, http://www.military-aerospace-technology.com/print_article. 27 AFDD, 81. 28 Sponable, 29. 29 Major Michael A. Rampino, (Maxwell AFB AL: Thesis, School of Advanced 30 Michael N. Schmitt, Military Space Operations and International 31 oosa/en/FAQ/splawfaq.html (accessed 20 January 2006). 32 Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; Convention on International Liability for Damage Causes by Space Objects; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; and Agreement Governing the Activities of Outer Space Affairs, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties. html (accessed 25 September 2006). Lt Col Michael L. Lakos (BS, Math/German, Virginia Military Institute; MA, Space Systems Management, Webster University; Master of Operational Art and Science, Air University) is an international politicalDivision, Strategy, Policy, and Assessments Directorate at Headquarters, United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. Colonel Lakos plans and manages EUCOM Theater Security Cooperation in the J-5 Central Africa region and coordinates policy and training issues. Defense, Joint Staff, EUCOM directorates, Components, Defense Colonel Lakos entered the Air Force in 1986 as a distinguished military graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) AF to coming on extended active duty in January 1987. He graduated from the third class of Undergraduate Space Training at Lowry at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station (CMAS), Colorado. His career includes assignments in operations and policy positions involving space control, space operations, and space launch. He has served in staff positions at Headquarters US Air Force, was the chief, Space Operations on the Secretary and Chief of Staff Executive the space division of the Air Force Weapons School. Prior to his current position, Colonel Lakos was an Air Force Fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. 33 15 March 2006). 34 AFDD-1, 42. 35 12 July 2000, Kirtland AFB, http://www.spacedaily.com/ news/laser-00i.html (accessed June 25, 2006). Any Department of De information on satellite vulnerabilities to help determine if there are any 36 3 May 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/ 37 Ibid. 38 Rampino, 43. 39 Schmitt, 22. 40 Peter L. Hays et al., Space Power for a New Millennium: Space and US National Security (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000), 211. 41 Schmitt, 22. 42 space Power Breakfast Symposium, Washington, DC, 1 February 2001).
37 High Frontier Global Positioning System International Challenges and Opportunities in the 21 st Century Col Mark C. Crews, USAF, GPS Chief Engineer, Los Angeles AFB, California T he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) is a truly international system with civilian users in every nation allied nations have global access to GPS military signals. Since signals worldwide without interruption. Through accurate posi tioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), GPS has both propelled international commerce and enabled revolutionary changes in modern warfare. Today, GPS sets the worldwide standard for Global Naviga tion Satellite Systems (GNSS). The GPS Wing at Los Angeles AFB, California continues to sustain and modernize the GPS constellation as depicted by the most recent 17 November 2006 launch of the 3 rd GPS has manifold civil applications ranging from automobile navigation, aircraft guidance, emergency location, tsunami and earthquake monitoring, and business transaction authentication, to land surveying. GPS military uses span the gamut of naviga tion and timing functions from aviation and rescue to targeting. As other nations deploy GNSS and GPS seeks to better serve GPS has become more important. GPS threats and opportunities have never been greater, and cooperation is needed to counter threats and to pursue oppor making it a scarce resource increasingly sought by competing GPS to share spectrum with other systems in carefully con trolled ways, misguided attempts by other GNSS or non-GNSS systems to share GPS spectrum could be detrimental to GPS and other GNSS. Conversely, deliber ate cooperation with other GNSS developers and operators results in improved civil receiver perfor mance, providing more capable and robust service to all GNSS users. Recognizing the unique techni cal and programmatic expertise Department of State has repeatedly turned to the GPS Wing for techni cal leadership in support of interna tional GNSS activities. Since the GPS Wing mission is to [a]cquire and sustain survivable, effective, and affordable [GPS] services for 1 Successfully accomplishing this mission while meeting na tional space policy goals requires the extensive international exchanges summarized in this article. The following section national work. In section two, work to ensure compatibility is described, followed by section three, an overview of efforts to enhance performance and interoperability. GPS Wing involve ment in aviation standards and international military user equip GPS is a continuous, space-based, all-weather PNT system. GPS satellites transmit radio signals that GPS receivers use to determine extremely accurate three-dimensional position and velocity information together with a precise common time ref erence. Although the nominal constellation consists of 24 me dium Earth orbiting satellites, the constellation has grown to as many as 30 operational satellites in recent years. Each satellite circles the Earth at an altitude of 20,200 km (10,900 nm) with an orbital period of approximately 12 hours, in six orbital planes. Satellites currently transmit military and civilian navigation sig nals on each of two different L-band frequencies, L1 (1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.6 MHz). A third L-band frequency, L5 (1176.45 MHz), will also be used for civil signals starting later in this decade. GPS is used worldwide for civilian as well as military pur user fees to all users, along with openly providing the technical information needed to develop civilian GPS receivers and PNT accuracy, reliability, worldwide availability, and passive standalone operations. There is increasing international interest in GPS augmenta tions and in the establishment of independent GNSS. For in (SBAS) that provide greater accuracy and integrity to users who receive SBAS signals while continuing to receive the necessary GPS signals as well. SBAS signals use the same frequencies as GPS signals and, therefore, must be designed to be compat ible and interoperable with GPS signals. In addition, the Rus sian Federation is repopulating its Global Navigation Satellite leo, China is considering its own GNSS called Compass, and Japan is developing a regional augmentation system called the Space Policy
High Frontier 38 Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). By deliberate engage collaboration between GPS and these other systems. Developing and modifying space systems takes many years, and users expect continued interoperability and compatibility today will not take effect until the next decade, and will persist thereafter. Clearly, a consistent, long-term vision is needed in the international development and coordination of GNSS. In recognition of increasing global use of GPS, and grow ing international interest in developing additional satellite navigation systems, the White House released a National Space-Based PNT Policy in December 2004. 2 This policy establishes guidance for spacepurposes. The policy update was timed perfectly to help guide international efforts: Remain the pre-eminent military space-based PNT ser vice; Remain an essential component of international PNT ser vices. 3 In response to this guidance, the GPS Wing proactively works with our allies and other GNSS providers in the design architecture. In turn, the GPS Wing engages in diverse inter national activities including International Telecommunication signal compatibility, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other allied GPS user equipment forums. Each activity seeks to provide uncompromised and enhanced GPS service. Leading these activities is important since they under pin successful GPS modernization, helping to ensure continuing and pre-eminent GPS service for all users. Compatibility In the context of satellite navigation, compatibility is the ability of multiple systems to be used either independently or collectively without unacceptable mutual interference. For the preventing the hostile use of GNSS and preserving peaceful ci vilian uses of GNSS outside the area of operations. Achieving GNSS compatibility is particularly challenging because GNSS signals have low power, wide-area coverage, and overlapping frequencies. The satellites transmit each signal with only tens of watts of power, more than 20,000 km above than the Earth, resulting in received signal powers typically less than a femtowattorders of magnitude lower than the thermal noise power in a receiver. Since many of these signals are re ceived at each point on Earth, and many signals have overlap interfere. The unique signal characteristics make GNSS com patibility assessments very different from compatibility assess ments for geostationary satel lite communications, requiring cation. Successful GNSS compati bility requires early internation al engagement in parallel with the development of GPS con stituent components, including ground control, satellites, and receivers. For example, as ini tial space-vehicle (SV) signal design efforts commence, signal and the GPS Wing takes action to secure international authori zations for SV signal transmissions. ment of Defense (DoD) Directive 4650.1, systems must have proper domestic and international authorizations to broadcast signals. 4 Proper authorization not only assures the GPS right to broadcast, but it also provides the basis for legal actions to protect against interference to GPS. To ensure GPS mission success, the GPS Wing has acquired radio frequency spectrum protect GPS spectrum. The GPS Wing works to protect GPS spectrum from two potential external types of interference: GNSS and other ra dio services. Should the GPS Wing fail to achieve adequate protection, changes to GPS programs could be required, with detrimental effects on GPS modernization schedules and GPS programmatic costs. The GPS Wing protects spectrum in the global arena at the sentatives of all nations of the world meet to review and re an international treaty that governs the use of radio frequency for GPS and GNSS operations. The GPS Wing also works diligently to prevent interference from other GNSS signals. The GPS Wing participates in mul tiple international forums to sort through compatibility issues between GPS and other systems. The goal is to identify and re solve the natural tensions between sharing and protecting radio frequency spectrum, and then complete the technical and legal steps required for optimal GPS service. An example of this effort is the collaboration between the and coordination of Global Navigation Sat
39 High Frontier and 2004. The GPS Wing (then called the GPS Joint Program community to ensure that Galileo signal designs have adequate frequency separation from the modernized GPS military signal eral effort led to a mutually satisfactory solution that was docu Colin Powell, European Commission Vice-President Loyola de Palacio, and the Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen. Techni cal aspects of the GPS-Galileo Agreement involved (1) balanc ing the performance and radio frequency compatibility of all signals, (2) achieving interoperability of civil signals, and (3) code PNT service while denying hostile use of PNT services. These three objectives were met by the GPS-Galileo Agreement of 26 June 2004. Figure 2 depicts the resulting baseline signal Note that the GPS M-code and the Galileo Public Regulated Service signals are spectrally separated from civilian signals. In addition, the GPS L1C and Galileo E1 Open Service signals share the same spectrum for enhanced interoperability while be ing spectrally separated from GPS Coarse Acquisition (L1 C/A) code for improved radio frequency compatibility. Finally, GPS must prevent interference from systems other than GNSS. The very low received power levels of GNSS sig nals makes these signals vulnerable to interference from other systems, whose received power levels may be orders of mag nitude higher. The continuing worldwide growth in radio fre quency devices, combined with the limited availability of radio frequency spectrum, means that new radio frequency systems and services are always looking for spectrumincluding spec trum currently used for GNSS. communications and sensing, petitioned the Federal Commu nications Commission and international bodies for permission to radiate signals in the GPS frequency bands. Because of its GPS and all GNSS, the GPS Wing conducted its own interfer thresholds. These tests, combined with other information from GPS Wing technical experts, served as the foundation for regu assessment process not been followed, GPS could have expe rienced detrimental interference that would have unacceptably degraded its performance. 5 Performance and Interoperability Since GNSS performance improves with more satellites in from multiple GNSS constellations. Receivers with a limited view of the sky (due to blockage from buildings and trees) will lites, and thus obtain position and time. Receivers with a better view of the sky will take advantage of the redundant signals to obtain improved accuracy and better integrity. Highly interop erable signals allow lower cost receivers to take advantage of the multiple constellations. PNT services that, when used together, provide better capabili ties at the user level than would be achieved by relying solely on one service or signal. The GPS Wing works actively with experts from other GNSS systems to design civil signals for im proved interoperability. The goal is to cooperatively design sat ellite systems that not only transmit compatible signals, but also deliver enhanced performance via signal interoperability. Sometimes enhanced performance arises from the creative collaborative efforts of bilateral working groups. An example of such an accomplishment is the joint development of the Multiplexed Binary Offset Carrier (MBOC) spreading modu lation for the GPS L1C signal and the Galileo Open Service signal in the L1 frequency band (centered at 1575.42 MHz). spreading modulation, it also allowed for optimization of this baseline signal structure. In winter 2006, a group of European yielding MBOC. The GPS-Galileo Working Group on Interop GPS Wing chief engineer, recommended that GPS and Galileo adopt MBOC, which will ultimately provide better overall per formance while retaining frequency separation from military signals. Interoperability is also promoted by maximizing the com monality of civil signal designs used in different systems. GNSS receivers of common signals (having similar technical charac teristics) can be smaller, use less power, and cost less, allowing them to provide better performance and proliferate throughout the marketplace. Since the GPS Wing is a key participant in signal design and maintains interface control documents on all other countries on GNSS interoperability.
High Frontier 40 information and explore opportunities for inter-system compat ibility. As a result of these joint efforts, QZSS plans to provide signals that are common with existing and future modernized GPS signals. Consequently, receivers using these interoperable signals can be developed with the lowest cost while providing the best possible performance. Through multiple bilateral efforts led by the GPS Wing, the GPS, Galileo, SBAS, and QZSS. Discussions with Russia are also ongoing concerning the possibility of enhanced interoper ability between GPS and GLONASS. Should a mutually ac ceptable solution be found, the GPS Wing will be successful in enhancing performance and interoperability of civil signals on able to civilian GNSS users worldwide. While the Federal Aviation Administration works with other civil aviation authorities on navigation standards for civilian air military aviation navigation standards. GPS Wing goals in de veloping GPS air navigation standards are twofold: (1) to en navigation activities within the same domestic and international airspace and (2) to ensure that aviation standards and policy are GPS navigation standards are developed around two funda mental GPS services: the standard positioning service (SPS) and the precise positioning service (PPS). The SPS is open to all users, while the PPS is an encrypted service allowing access to authorized (primarily military) users. In support of these ser performance that the federal government commits to provide to civil GPS users. 6 On behalf of the DoD, the GPS Wing is ing military operations. These standards also affect GPS pro curement, since they are used by recognized aviation authorities Thus, the GPS Wing mitigates programmatic risks by working with aviation and receiver manufacturer personnel to provide adequate signals and standards governing the use of those sig nals. Individual nations participate in international forums such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and NATO to collectively develop recommended practices relating ultimately affect seamless military operations and the design of GPS satellites. In military aviation, the GPS Wing led the development of GPS PPS standards can be measured in lower cost of military aircraft navigation systems, streamlined overall airworthiness Air navigation standards work conducted by the GPS Wing in transit international airspace. In addition to generating air navigation standards, the GPS Wing also works with 25 NATO nations and over 20 other allied nations to standardize and promote the use of GPS for military operations. In particular, the GPS Wing is responsible for GPS foreign military sales (FMS), the joint development of future military user equipment, standardization agreements, and tests and evaluation of Navwar operations. Furthermore, every six months, the GPS Wing supports a NATO navigation subcom including navigation standards, dissemination of cryptographic keys, equipment interoperability, Navwar operations, and other common navigation issues. In furtherance of this effort, the GPS Wing collaborates and interfaces with international military partners as they integrate 2006, the GPS Wing delivered to allies roughly $50 million dardization of GPS receivers across allied forces support such equipment sales. In doing so, Navwar capabilities are enhanced in coalition warfare, including synchronized troop movements, jamming environments, and weapon delivery. Looking to the future, the GPS Wing anticipates enlisting additional allied co
41 High Frontier operation in the development of technology demonstrators and system prototypes in areas such as GPS secure receivers, antijamming equipment, and joint trials and exercises. ticle are essential for GPS program success. The relationships, approaches, and agreements formed in each international in teraction are carefully constructed to support each other. Even of military GPS provides international support for ongoing GPS Wing efforts in compatibility, and worldwide civilian use of GPS provides support for enhanced performance and interoper ability with other GNSS. The future of GPS Wing international activities offer contin ued opportunities and challenges. Domestic and international radio frequency spectrum for navigation, uplink, and downlink signals. Several important new activities involving compatibil ity with other GNSS are also on the horizon, building on the continuing work with current GNSS partners to protect military GPS capabilities. While designing and protecting GPS signals, the GPS Wing will also work towards M-code protection by establishing proper aviation standards and coordination with NATO and other allies. As the GPS Wing continues to acquire modernized space segments, control segments, and military user equipment, its in ternational activities complement these acquisition activities to provide the best possible satellite navigation capabilities for the 1 mission statement, http://gps.losangeles.af.mil/jpo (accessed 9 January 2007). 2 Fact Sheet, Policy (15 December 2004). 3 Ibid., III. Col Mark C. Crews (BS, Electrical Engineering, US Air Force Academy; MS, MIT; MS, Management, Colorado Techni cal University; PhD, Electrical Engineering, University of Ox ford, United Kingdom) serves as the GPS chief engineer in the GPS Wing at the Space and Missiles Systems Center. His gineer of automated communi cations systems at Scott AFB, Illinois. In 1987, he served on the faculty in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Air Force Academy. In 1992, he reported to Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, where he served as principal engineer for the B-1B weapons system. Subsequently, he attended Air Command and Staff College from 1995-1996 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Next, he returned to the Air Force Academy where he later assumed the position of deputy department head of Electri cal Engineering. In 2000, he assumed duties as chief of the Air borne Laser Technologies Branch at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. advanced laser beam control tests where he directed work at the test beds in New Mexico. He also served as deputy commander of Vehicles Directorate and the Directed Energy Directorate. He is a lege, and Air War College. 4 Department of Defense Directive 4650.1, Policy for Management and 8 June 2004. 5 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, iii, xx (NTIA Special Publi cation 01-45, 2001). 6 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communica tions, and Intelligence, Service Performance Standard, October 2001.
High Frontier 42 The Moon is a Land without Sovereignty: Will it be a Business-Friendly Environment? Research Professor, Space Policy Institute Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University A rticle II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) states that, 1 There is a simplistic misinterpretation that these few words mean own anything in space. Some people argue that without the abil develop space businesses. Currently, the primary thrust of this argument centers on the ownership of real property on the Moon recent invitation to both domestic and foreign entities to develop commercial opportunities on its planned lunar base and settle ment about 15 years hence has further stimulated discussion of this issue. A full discussion of property rights in space is complex and beyond the scope of this short article. However, the ownership condition for investing in a lunar business with the ability to re able businesses often do not own the land or the buildings they occupy. They use different types of legal contracts including: leased property, condominium ownership agreements, coopera is an option, but not a necessity. In short, ways can be found by the various governments involved in lunar activities to encourage business investments when, and if, companies identify potential The most important concern for private businesses in space activities is not property rights. It is the ability for a company to make a rate of return on a new investment that is greater than the return it can get from other investments. The length of time to realize that return is also very important. A typical business years, but it can sometimes be slightly longer). A space activ ity that may not materialize for 20 years is well beyond any real business plan that most companies would consider today. Far more important business risks than property rights would have to cash into a future lunar enterprise. 2 For space commercial invest ments, governments should deal with current problems, not the hypothetical (and solvable) legal issues that will not have true The issue of sovereignty is more directly concerned with hav ing a government or intergovernmental organization guarantee the protection of the right of that business to use the land or re sources and not to encounter competing claims on the land from others. Property rights and national sovereignty exist in a limited form in space today. Anything launched into space is owned by the nation or individual (including companies) that launches it whether in space or on Earth. 3 Nations have agreed to recognize sovereignty over some space equipment and facilities, such as the International Space Station (ISS) where the governing multi to assert elements of sovereignty over that portion of the ISS. 4 Also, intellectual property rights on the ISS are allocated through special provisions of the Space Station Agreement. 5 of its sovereign domain. 6 Taking and using resources from the considerations such as limits to environmental damage have to be adhered to. 7 these are not traditional property rights, they do reserve very lim ited bands of the spectrum for exclusive use by governments or businesses, albeit for a limited time. Outer space is regulated and controlled by treaties, governmen tal legislation and policy, and through common practice. There are many types of property and many types of property rights in space just as there are many types of property and property rights terrestrially. In fact, in capitalist nations property rights are economy. The same conditions are expected to apply to space activities, at least by the major capitalist nations planning space exploration, and exploitation. The myth that ownership is prohibited in space has led to mis understandings about the potential for commercial use of space resources and to a call for the negotiation of new treaties. This is unwarranted and would likely result in many years of more rather than fewer rules and regulations being in limbo because: The treaties in place, although not perfect, provide a foun dation for space activities that have become customary in ternational law and establish basic principles of behavior that are accepted by all space-faring nations. Renegotiating the treaties could put all current provisions on the table for discussion and create more commercial (and political) uncertainty rather than less. 8 This would have a negative effect on business investment decisions because of increased perceived (and possibly real) risk. Commercial proposals for using lunar resources are cur Space Policy
43 High Frontier activities that threaten resources or environmental damage are imminent. None of the business proposals can establish 9 a theoretical future business could jeopardize a truly valid business opportunity. Most of the governmental and private sector attention is on the Moon. A prerequisite is for research and develop ment programs that will prove or disprove the value of lu nar resources for sustaining human life on the Moon and/or discovering new and valuable uses for lunar resources. At least in the near future, these activities will be carried out by government(s) or private partnerships with governments; any commercial participation will necessarily be heavily 10 nition of key words is not entirely consistent, either among the loosely in the treaties that they are still subject to international ne For example, the Registration Convention does not provide for the transfer of ownership in the event of a sale, bankruptcy, lease, or other business transaction. 11 And that convention leaves the interpretation of what a space object is and the timing of the ac The enforcement of the provisions of the treaties is weak. It is left to negotiations between aggrieved parties and, if that fails, to the affected nations. This can become a lengthy and uncertain path for a possible commercial dispute. The International Court of legal appeals. The focus of the currently debated issues is primarily with the right of a nation or its citizens to claim physical property and resources on the Moon and to use that property for political, secu rity, or commercial gains. The treaties clearly prohibit a declara tion of sovereignty over the lunar territory; they do not prohibit the use of that property. But the treaties do limit use. Limitations include military operations and environmental damage. Another provision that can interfere with commercial operations is the re quirement of a right of others to travel through the property as well as visit the facility. 12 erations. What were mainly far-future questions about land and resource ownership on the Moon are beginning to become real questions that need answers. At present, most of those issues are more relevant to government programs rather than commer eventually to develop commercial enterprises on this territory, additional questions that the current treaties are unable to resolve Are there plans for the exploration, exploitation, or use of the Moon? Does it matter which one of the objectives is claimed by the nations or enterprises? of system to defend the property? Since any equipment put on the Moon is owned by the nation that built and launched it, is defending property the equivalent of defending the territory on which it is placed? Will lunar resources be owned by the user? Are rights sim ilar to those of some nations on the Earth where the owner of the property also owns everything beneath and above the property? If so, how far down or up might the rights apply? Moon Treaty mean? What are the positions and roles of na tions that do not have the technology to access the Moon? If other states claim the right to use parts of the Moon, can jurisdictions with lenient laws? What will the status of intellectual property developed on the Moon be? Will provisions, regulations, and negotiated agreements concerning the Moon also be applicable to other celestial bodies such as asteroids? Will they be applied to other as pects of space such as orbital paths? the Moon. It is important to remember that other nations also have plans and the potential to establish bases on the policy on sovereignty and property rights towards some one else getting to the South Pole of the Moon and putting international negotiations? Answers to these questions will be important for commercial activity to develop in space. The fact remains that commercial A case in point is the Arospatiale-BAC Concorde supersonic transport (SST). The technology for the SST existed well before the commercial plane was built. It took about 15 years of devel opment before the Concorde was tested and ready for commer it technically had to conform to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) that govern all commercial planes. The Concorde was negotiated waivers to those FARS and imposed special rules that
High Frontier 44 governments found ways to accommodate the new technology and allow the companies to operate commercially. operations are still in the future, but with the success of Space ShipOne (built by Scaled Composites, LLC) winning the X-prize, a bill requiring the DOT and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to propose rules to encourage this activity and to provide 13 In December 2006, 14 Whether ceed or not, the legal and regulatory system responded in a timely fashion. Finally, returning to the issue of the ownership of property the ownership of land itself is not permitted. In the former Soviet protected. The solution was a special government organization nies similar to property rights in a western society. It is likely that some form of inter-governmental accommoda tion will be found for private space activities at the proper time and with the proper limitations. The most important incentive for a commercial enterprise is the assurance that a fair rate of return can be made on a capital investment. That assurance can be accommodated through many avenues that may or may not involve the actual ownership of the land and resources. It will be appropriate means to provide those incentives, but only when a real, not a hypothetical problem, exists. in the history of terrestrial business activities, it is clear that solu tions can be found to not only permit, but also provide incentives for private business to exist on the Moon and in other outer space ventures. 1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora 2 For example, reducing the up-front cost of launching payloads into space and/or reducing the risks of launch failures. 3 Outer Space Treaty (OST), and the Liability Convention, Article VII (see note 10, below). 4 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, the Governments of Mem ber States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Gov Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (1998), http:// 5 Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement. 6 US National Space Policy, 7 OST, see note 1. 8 For example, the provisions of the Law of the Seas Treaty that call for with the New York Agreement of 1994 which set up an international Adminis tration which grants permits for mining the sea bed and acts in commercially... Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, http://www. un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm. It is interesting to note that this compromise was not needed until it was shown that there were resources in the sea bed that had true commercial potential and companies were in position with the technological capability to actually other celestial bodies has yet to be found. 9 a time frame that is well beyond normal business plans (i.e., greater than 10 posals can stand alone as competitive commercial investment opportunities. 10 Apart from the OST, these include: the Liability Convention (cited in note 1); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), 28 11 Registration Convention, see note 10. But it should be noted that a clear putes arise over these issues in the future, either negotiation between the parties involved and/or a lengthy legal battle and judicial interpretation may occur. Alternatively, the parties with the potential to use the Moon may be able to such contractual agreements will or could become customary international law is, of course, unknown at present. 12 The Moon Treaty goes further than the OST in prohibiting any military bases on the Moon (Article 3). Article 4 states that: The exploration and use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher stan dards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and develop 13 cial Space Launch Amendment Act of 2004. 14 Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Partici Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld (BA, Uni versity of Pennsylvania; MA, Wash ington University; PhD, Economics, Temple University; JD, George Washington University) is a research professor at the Space Policy Insti tute, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington Uni versity, and is an expert in the eco nomic, legal, and policy issues of space and advanced technological development. Dr. Hertzfeld has served as a senior economist and policy analyst at both NASA and the National Science Foundation, and has been a consultant to many agencies and organizations. Dr. Hertzfeld is a member of the Bar in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. He is the co-editor of Space Economics (AIAA 1992), as well as many articles on space economic and legal issues.
45 High Frontier Call to Action: A Space Diplomacy Offensive Dr. Matthew J. Von Bencke Bencke International and Strategic Consulting, LLC T Cold War propaganda battles of the early 1960s. Though through several generations since then, this anachronistic rheto ricand associated institutions and normspersist and now con strain our pursuit of national security. Our military has become increasingly dependent on reliable access to space-based assets, and so it is only natural and prudent to seek some forms of space trol unilaterally could unnecessarily provoke potential adversar leverage the increasingly international space industries and civil programs. Conversely, a proactive diplomatic campaign to re vamp associated international agreements could loosen policy international standing. It is ironic that an arena characterized by cutting edge tech nologies remains trapped in a rusty, rhetorical cage dating from actually humanistic propaganda: In July 1955, the Americans and Soviets both announced their intentions to launch research satel lites as a part of the International Geophysical Year. Later, in naissance satellites have free right of passage since, they argued, it is the Earth that rotates underneath them. Then, in early 1959 the Soviets changed policy, declaring that reconnaissance satel 1 The Soviets had decided to leverage their closed system by projecting 1961 Berlin Wall crises. 2 The Soviet propaganda was a thin sham: For instance, the Soviets introduced a resolution banning space-based reconnais the next 10 months, before introducing a second such resolution 3 The Soviets continued to exploit their closed system and dual standards to claim the moral high ground in space through 1991. For ex amples, fast forward to 1987, when Mikhail Gorbachev lectured Secretary of State during Strategic Arms Re duction Treaty negotiations about what he called the root to 1988, when, addressing the the mantle as the global diplomat leading the world into nuclear 4 The Soviet approach may have been a cynical sham, but it and diplomatic space experts focused on how to institutionalize 5 These international experts formed an dividing spectrum, registering spacecraft, and assigning liability, the major thrust of international space law has been to proscribe military uses of space. 6 Along the way, the politics of consensus 7 The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) further proscribed military uses of space. Industry Perspective NASA Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachyev,
High Frontier 46 publicly debating the need to defend space-based assets has been largely taboo. Only in the last 24 years have we seriously be gun seeking space and other assets to defeat incoming offensive missiles, and that has involved rancorous, partisan, and healthy debate. Defeating incoming missiles is, at least in principle, a situational awareness upon which they depend. Though our in tentions in securing space control may be to preserve the peace, reasonable parties will be able to consider such activities po tentially more offensive and destabilizing than missile defense. that norms have constrained policies, and policies have con strained programs for decades. Technologies, the nature of our military and geopolitics have shifted considerably over that pe riod, but the norms and policies remain relatively static. Almost 50 years ago, the two superand space-powers tacitly agreed to bility in an information-starved, fragile peace hovering on the edge of mutual-assured destruction. Today these satellites pro vide many more essential and advanced functions, and yet they are more vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated and diffused technologies. The result is that though we are now more dependent than ever on space assets for monitoring, targeting, communications, positioning, and other functions, we are ill-equipped to defend ers have begun publicly describing the importance of controlling space, even though it has been nearly 16 years since space assets War. 8 Even the watershed August 2006 National Space Policy is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all na before asserting the right to space control: ground and space segments and supporting linksvital to its will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interfer ence; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capa Now that one administration has explicitly acknowledged that we will assert space control in order to defend our national in terests, what should we do about our rusty cage of internation one hand, it is tempting to do nothing. In fact, short of placing nuclear weapons in space, existing treaties do little to constrain our research and deployment. We could just abandon our (weak) many of our space control and counterspace measures are, will, However, allowing the cage to rust unreformed would harm by future administrations. debate and occasionally fail very publicly. The world is well aware that we are pursuing space superiority. Because we are building on our clear leadership in this arena, ironically we risk undermining ourselves by provoking potential adversaries into countermeasures in order to advance what they perceive as their tion of its own satellite; other possibilities include a nuclear ex plosion in space and ground-based lasers. Moreover, our pursuit of space superiority makes us vulnerable to damaging propagan da. As the geopolitical poles continue to shift and civilizations clash, the global competition for hearts and minds is heating up superpower, regional theocracy, or anti-American rogue, we should dismantle the Cold War framework which makes it all ing technologies that can deny the use of space. We also need to since it will take years to realign global space norms. Third, in the meantime, we need to prevent a scenario where national governments attempt to prevent our access to elements of the increasingly international space industries and civil pro grams. Today many large aerospace companies are trans-nation al, and most civil space spending is on programs dependent on global cooperation. In a world of international dependencies, the leader, so that the country can guide and leverage research and development wherever it is done. Conversely, a proactive diplomatic campaign to revamp asso ciated international agreements could loosen policy constraints, proudly asserting our right to space superiority, we can more ef fectively catch up to the sciences of maritime and air superiority. bate, research, and investment, while space superiority discourse has been relatively muted. Geopolitics and technologies have changed dramatically since we helped craft our own Cold War ra of complex relationships, and space technology has diffused to several space powers, as well as to a global industry that some times out-innovates even the largest militaries. For instance, the changing war planning. These and other changes provide us the opportunity to take a fresh look at which elements of space are conducive to inter we want to keep out of international discourse or regulation. To offer just one hypothetical, we may choose to provide some space-based services as a common good to improve transpar ency and retard competitive technologies, thereby adapting the global positioning system model. For example, we may want to establish and promote a multilateral treaty to require more de tailed advanced notice on launches, and then publish our own observations to signatories regardless of whether the launching party provided advanced data. Though we already have many such agreements in place, establishing a treaty system open to all would create incentives for participationand make it that much easier to punish outliers. It could also evolve to promoting a com
47 High Frontier a universal, undeniable good, so that those who do deny access can be internationally condemned. There are other precedents for applicable multilateral institutions, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is just one possibility. The point is that, rather than secretly or shyly pursuing secure use of space, we can proudly assert that important elements of stance, preventing accidental wars, surprise attacks, and monitor ing nuclear proliferation. Space has always included both competition and cooperation. This will not change. There will be other areas that are not condu cive to international cooperation. For example, beginning in the with regard to the ABMT to Russia, China, and other nations. Though our ultimate course depended little on their desires, we explained in remarkable detail our plans, goals, and technologies, in large part to prevent an over-reaction. While we should be clear that we will defend our right to space superiority, we should also make it exceedingly clearespecially to potential adversar iesthat we are not seeking a unilateral offensive advantage. alliances, new military spending races, and even pre-emptive attacks. Here, too, nuclear and maritime sciences offer useful precedents, including international signaling and practices; joint exercises and exchanges; and search and rescue operations and norms. Just as we have complex communication protocols in place to establish intent and prevent accidental nuclear or naval escalations, we may prefer a future in which we can confront potentially hostile space forces with iterative options short of of fensive engagement. Such a system will require careful planning and a series of biand/or multi-lateral protocols. This article does not presume to design the norms and institu tions that will govern future military activities in space. Instead, assertions: space, and to deny others the use of space. This depen dency will continue to grow with time. 2. Existing space law, institutions, and norms are anachronis this legacy framework. 4. Pursuing space superiority without this complementary diplomatic offensive would put us at a disadvantage in the competition for global hearts and minds, and could impair our ability to access global space talent and technologies. 5. Instead, by asserting our right to space control while considering certain limits on our behaviors, we will loosen policy constraints, advance the science of space superiority, This diplomatic and ideational offensive will take years and require coordination across many branches of the government, as well as allies, academia, and industry, to be successful. It is no surprise that institutions, ideas, and norms change more slowly than technologies, geopolitics, and militaries. Their persistence is a truism that dates back to the dawn of politics, and they pro vide a bulwark (however imperfect) against radical affronts to humankind. Changing large, shared bodies of knowledge and values requires persistent activity by leaders with acknowledged expertise in the relevant domain. It would be wise and timely for an opportunity to consciously, carefully, and proactively drive change in the global institutions, laws, and ideas that are con straining our increasingly important pursuit of space security. 1 G. P. Zadoroshnyi, Iskustvenii Sputnik Zemli I Mezhdunarodnoe Pra 17 (Moscow) no. 3, (March 1956): 35-44; William H. Schauer, (Holmes and Meier: 1976), 245. 2 In August 1961 Khrushchev demanded that the Western powers sign a peace treaty with East Germany by year-end, and began construction of the Berlin Wall. However, Kennedy rejected the ultimatum, armed with knowl ICBM advantage. 3 Matthew J. Von Bencke, (Westview: 1997), 45. 4 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (Scribner: 1995), 997; Don Ober dorfer, The Turn (Touchstone: 1992), 248-49. 5 Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, October 1967. 6 See the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Out Other Celestial Bodies (1967); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979). 7 sentation at the Strategic Space and Defense 2006 conference, I believe Space Technology, 6 November 2006, 54. 8 For example, General Kevin P. Chilton, ASFPC commander, recently there, under Space Technology, 9 October 2006, 72. Dr. Matthew J. Von Bencke Harvard University; MA, Studies, Stanford University; PhD, Political Science, Uni versity of California, Berke ley) owns Bencke Internation al and Strategic Consulting, LLC, and is the director of the Microsoft. He has published several articles and books in space policy, including The Politics of Space: A History Dr. Bencke also worked at Boeing in Defense and Space (Busi ness Development and Strategy), as well as Commercial Airplanes (Business and Global Strategy). While there he worked on National Missile Defense, the International Space Station, Sea Launch, satel Jet program.
High Frontier 48 To Get There, Go There Dr. Robert L. Butterworth Aries Analytics, Inc. W tired, persistently criticized Air Force launch operations. Getting Force responsibility exclusively since the mid-1960s, when the di security satellites were not launched on command. Indeed, they were rarely launched on schedule: one Titan IV in particular was on the pad so long that General Horner threatened to paint a building number on it. should be able to call up a new satellite just as he could an air strike, and some even joked that if the payload were late, he would launch without it. Hearing his complaints, space cognoscenti would roll their eyes and try to explain that the goal was a functioning satel lite in orbit, that most delays resulted from the payload, and that in nearly every case, timeliness was not particularly important. Nor needs: once in space, the satellite might need adjustments to its orbit, time for out-gassing, and system tests and checks. Besides, even if a reliable and prompt on-demand launch capability were available, what would it launch? What satellite would a command er need that would justify such a capability? A Contested Medium But perhaps General Horner was just a bit ahead of his time. He had been the air component commander for the Gulf War, in which the integration of space systems into tactical military operations military analysts wrote, in creating a space-based reconnaissance control solutions to platforms delivering weapons of precise lethal ity to destroy the targets in near-real time. 1 Soviet analysts credited this capability with bringing about a revolution in military affairs. Some years later, Chinese analysts, taking a somewhat broader 2 signed for reconnaissance in a benign environment are now tactical military targets. They were probably targeted by Soviet systems strategic than tactical. Soviet attacks against them could not have materially aided Soviet armored thrusts into Germany, although they may have been one of the triggers that started the war. Today, the loss of those satellites would likely degrade American tactical evolutions directly and immediately, slowing operations until alter native collection could be established and requiring larger forces to substitute for the precision enabled by space systems. ity is costly. Lesser means are required for lesser goals, of course: Interfering with some operations of some of these satellites might serve the purposes of an adversary in less conventional, lower in tacks on ground facilities and information networks, for example, are relatively low-cost efforts that could impose limited additional An attacker would need to accomplish substantially more in higher intensity scenarios involving large conventional force tings would require denying critical space services, and doing so in attacking the satellites in space. attacks might really be intended to forestall such hostilities. Such could be the calculation, for example, of a country whose local mil plans for reinforcing the area were disrupted. If the aggressor could fait accompli rather than escalate to a full-scale conventional war. A critical element in delaying and degrading a prompt response from tary option for doing so currently are direct-ascent technologies; in the future, perhaps directed energy weapons and space mines will also prove attractive. But it is true now, as it will be later, that no These developments create a new context that challenges legacy heavily on space systems, and those systems can be attacked by an now confront the need to ensure the delivery of those militarily essential services that come from space systems operating in a mili plans for space defense with little programmatic support beyond funding for research and limited technology exploration. Money spent on satellite protection was money lost to collection for intel ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Intelligence and defense program managers alike saw the contest in the budget are na as between protection and capability. But the strategic context is different now: in contested space, there will be no capability with to devise a truly military space architecture. Ground Effects This change is felt most acutely by military planners, although it certainly affects the intelligence community as well. It was only about 15 years ago that space-based ISR services began to be inte grated into joint tactical operations; now the military must consider how it might have to protect or substitute for them. Doing so is cance of losing certain satellites: the plumbing that links space plat forms to military functions is neither widely nor clearly understood. It seems likely that many presumed substitutes, redundancies, and work-arounds will prove to have important space dependencies or to be inapplicable to the scenario at hand. These assessments are not likely to be resolved for some time, Industry Perspective
49 High Frontier Dr. Robert L. Butterworth is president of Aries Analytics, Inc., and principal investigator for the companys national security research. He has extensive gov ernment experience and formal academic training in defense and intelligence planning issues. Dur ing his government service, he worked on national security pro grams in the White House, the US Senate, and the Department of De fense. He is a former tenured associate professor at Pennsylvania State University and is the author of several contributions to basic and applied research in international affairs and national security studies. In the past few years, he has provided Congressional tes timony on space policy issues, taught courses in space policy at the Air War College and at George Washington University and would be forced to conduct the mechanized warfare of an earlier ning. The point deserves particular emphasis in considerations of programs and budgets: space services and products are valued Trading space support against terrestrial platforms is nearly always a false dichotomy. Like pilot training and weapons development, for example, space is an essential part of the integrated systems bomb damage assessment, threat warning, navigation, precision at tack, communications, blue force tracking, reach-back, and combat search and rescue, among other functions. concerns was to devise ways to know whether a satellite was being sidered from time to time as threat or policy or technology circum stances change. Some of them involve making the satellite hard to kill, by hardening components against laser or radio-frequency attacks, for example, or by actively defending it. Others would in various ways make the satellite hard to target, perhaps through orbital maneuvers, satellite design, and attacks against enemy sur veillance and tracking systems. A third group of measures would prepare ready replacements for satellites lost to enemy action, stor ing them either in space or on the ground for rapid launch. There have also been various proposals to respond offensively. Proposals satellites hostage, have generally been unpersuasive because space enemy ground sites promise to be more effective but pose compli cated speculations about escalation and rules of engagement. Earlier work on these options usually aimed to remedy particu context, the principal worries concerned probing and interference still be valuable for peacetime collection today, but they seem illtarget acquisition and means of achieving desired effects are not known in critical detail, and if there is discomfort with Gaussian predictions of debris lethality, a broader approach less vulnerable to surprise would be appealing. General Horner Redux that ground replenishment might be the dominant solution provid ing a capability that would mitigate a variety of threats, expected options to surge on-orbit capacity, launch into non-standard orbits, and clandestine launch. An enemy would need some time to de tect and characterize the tracks of these replacement satellites, par ticularly if initial attacks created debris clouds, allowing the new with an offensive counterspace capability, any initial strike against That last statement, about deterrence, can only be conjectural. But a ground replenishment architecture is not: Principal elements of it have been developed already. Furthest along is assured access to space. Quick response launch operations, launches from austere sites, and mobile range support and safety equipment have all been demonstrated in the past 10 years. Work on the satellites to be launched in this way, assured func tionality in space, is a bit less advanced, although militarily use ful payloads have been demonstrated in several small satellite technology but requirementsdeciding which sensors will be most useful to commanders in wartime. How should the capabilities of vised to meet wartime requirements with satellites weighing a ton or less? Once decided, the replenishment satellites might well be erations and products. Ground replenishment of this sort is not by any means a com and the need for rapid response, it probably would work best in response to threats against satellites in low Earth orbit. But those are the threats developing most rapidly today, and ground replen ishment offers to mitigate them substantially. Most importantly, this approach embodies a critical change in thinking, compelled by the new strategic contextconceiving a truly military space architecture to support military operations when space is militarily contested. 1 ble of ranges far into enemy defensive depths, including homelands. For contemporary discussions, see Notra Trulock III, General Staff Academy Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 18 September 1991; Col 17 May 1991, 2. 2
High Frontier 50 National Space Policy: Opportunities and Challenges in Shaping the International Space Regime Dr. Dana J. Johnson Senior Analyst, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center A statements of national policy or strategy, used as imple mentation guidelines for national agencies and for the application of resources. National space policies are motivated and shaped by bureaucratic compromise, domestic politics, and foreign pol icy goals, and are intended for multiple audiences: the national legislative body, the general public, and foreign allies, adversar mental organizations (NGOs). National space policy can shape international security and the international space regime when it ties or in their exploitation of space data, information, or services provided by other states, commercial providers, or NGOs. interests and activities in the space environment, and includes 1 These interests rest upon the enunciation of national goals and expec security writ large The topics in American national space policy tional audience of friends, allies, and adversaries. ers and military planners developing courses of action involving international collaboration? First, planners need to assess the of the emerging international security environment, national policy objectives, ongoing and future coalition military opera tions, and future threats. Identifying the unique or niche space capabilities of other countries should be complemented with an tions shaping them. Those space capabilities can be employed to: collaborate with American space capabilities in coalitions of vide situational awareness for other governments and NGOs. Fi nally, policy makers and planners need to understand the broader Industry Perspective and the emerging international security environment related? How are these asymmetric challenges and associated pri orities related to the national space policy? evant to their security interests? achieve its policy objectives? space policy for its continuance of long-standing space principles and objectives, and for topics within the new policy that receive greater emphasis and consequently, greater international scrutiny. These topics include the role space systems play in achieving agreements. On 6 October 2006, the Bush administration released its new national space policy without fanfare. 2 The public and media focused on its defense-related aspects and not on its continuity in space policy holds true to this generalization, as it continues the goals and objectives of past policies, adhering to principles of access of space for peaceful purposes for all, and international space cooperation. But the new policy differs from earlier poli cies in several important ways that impact foreign space policies and the international space regime. ground and space segments and supporting links) to be vital to critical national infrastructure with the space systems supporting them. Accordingly, it contains more explicit guidance on the need to deter threats and deny the use of space capabilities to right of self-defense and the rejection of claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space and celestial bodies are consistent Space Treaty (OST), respectively. This has direct implications for the development of space superiority and missile defense capabilities, for example. Actual deployment and use of such
51 High Frontier Secondly, the new policy goes further than its predecessors arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the 3 OST and related space agreements and to support enforcement of treaty compliance, but to accede to a new multilateral agreement 4 Such new OST, for example. international space cooperation as appropriate, and consistent of space for national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives are advanced. Potential areas for international cooperation include space exploration, Earth observation systems, national security and foreign policy interests. 5 The new policy diplomatic activities in building understanding overseas of American national space policies and programs and encouraging Addressing this issue leads to a review of the emerging chal the operational contributions that space capabilities would make to meeting those challenges. Two recent national security documents provide context for connecting national space policy, space capabilities, and the ex ternal environment. These are the National Security Strategy issued by the White House in March 2006, 6 and the port 7 released by the Department of Defense in February 2006. Both documents acknowledge the importance of maintaining the ments also acknowledge the emergence of asymmetric security face in the future and describe the priorities needed to meet those challenges. These challenges and priorities include: Irregular Challenges: This challenge acknowledges the rise of multi-national, multiethnic terrorist networks that exploit information sources tional public opinion, and undermine governments friendly continue to attack and defeat these global networks, defend the homeland against terrorist attacks, and counter ideo logical support over time, this effort requires international cooperation and collaboration as well as tailored regional strategies to defeat the global terrorist network. Catastrophic Challenges: Deterring use by the number of states possessing WMD, or denying access to WMD by non-state actors against populations requires non-traditional respons es and international collaborative vigilance and defense. Protection of global information-related capabilities, such as spacecraft and communications networks vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse, requires cooperation on multiple levels. Preventing proliferation, and responding if coun ter-proliferation efforts fail, necessitates using all means of national powerdiplomatic, economic, and political, as well as military. This challenge also encompasses protecting against non-state actors who tar frastructures including space assets. Traditional means of deterrence may not apply as nation-states are no longer the sole possessors of catastrophic means of violence and nonstate actors are not deterred by military force. Defending the homeland requires a layered, active defense strategy and partnerships with other states to deny non-state actors the ability to attack the homeland. Identifying and charac terizing threats, and preventing, interdicting, and defeating them require not only intelligence and traditional military forces, but also situational awareness, missile defense, and consequence management capabilities. Disruptive Challenges: Both major and emerging nations shape those choices and to hedge against uncertainty. Ele ments of those strategies include seeking cooperation with countries on issues of common interest including space, re ducing security vulnerabilities and bolstering capabilities Irregular Challenge s Tr aditional Challenges De fe at Te rrorist Networks Pr event A cquisitio n or Use of WM D Def end Homeland in Depth Shape Choices of C ountries at Strategic Crossroads To da y s Capability Po rt fo li o Disruptiv e Challenge s Catastrophic Challenge s
High Frontier 52 power that could threaten regional and global stability. 8 The new space policy includes several fundamental goals whose achievement is crucial to executing the national security These fundamental space policy goals include: rity, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives; defend national interests there; Encourage international cooperation with foreign nations furthering the peaceful exploration and use of space, and advancing national security, homeland security, and for eign policy objectives. 9 Just as existing military capabilities for more traditional forms of warfare are expected to meet these challenges, so must space capabilities. Space systems already provide critical force en hancement functions: missile warning and nuclear detonation de tection, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), environmen tal monitoring, communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These functions support traditional military operations and provide critical information and data nec essary for decision-making by national leaders and military com manders. However, in order to effectively deal with the evolving bilities will be increasingly tasked with supporting more users at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of decision-making. The strategic uncertainty and dynamic dimensions of these chal lenges place a premium on capabilities that can penetrate denied systems to individuals), speeds, and in different environments (land, sea, undersea, air, and space). That information is passed over space-based communications links (e.g., commercial sat ellite communications, governmental telecommunications), lo cated precisely by global positioning systems (GPS), and fused with information from other airborne, land-based, and sea-based ISR platforms to give policy-makers and military commanders the required situational awareness and knowledge necessary for timely and effective decision-making. In keeping with the national security strategy, the national space policy directs the secretary of defense to develop capa bilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, 10 The director of national intelligence is directed to ensure that timely information and data support foreign, defense, and eco nomic policies; diplomatic activities, indications and warning; support military planning and satisfy operational requirements 11 Ensuring freedom of action in space could conceivably lead to efforts to deny terrorists and their sources of support access to satellite-based communications networks, thus depriving them sanctuary in the information do based information about satellite functions and orbital param eters. 12 capabilities to defend and respond overwhelmingly to WMD at tacks, along with air and missile defenses 13 are linked in part bilities to support continuous, global strategic and tactical warn 14 warning and tracking satellites can also contribute to regional and global stability by hedging against strategic uncertainty and possible failure of diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions 15 The new policy notes that using space for national and home on maintaining reliable access to and use of radio frequency spec trum and orbital assignments. Maintaining reliable spectrum ac cess and use entails explicitly addressing spectrum and orbital requirements prior to approving new space system acquisitions, of interest are not affected by harmful spectrum interference. 16 A munications, space research (e.g., radio astronomy), meteorol ogy, global positioning, remote sensing, public safety, and other functions requiring transmission of information or data. 17 Spec trum management allocation decisions are made in the Interna at World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs) held every key spectrum frequencies used by weapons systems and enablers prior to a WRC. Furthermore, each country maintains sovereign control over spectrum within its own territorythis can poten tions and a resulting adverse effect on the ability of the coalition to prosecute a theater war. Protecting the spectrum used by the GPS, for example, is critical for national security, civil, and safe ty-of-life functions, but it is also important for the innumerable multi-national PNT applications that are enabled by GPS. Pre venting possible interference, whether purposeful or inadvertent, with the spectrum used by GPS and other space systems is a mat ter of national space policy as well as national security strategy, and, by extension, of international concern. Finally, minimizing orbital debris is highlighted in the na tional space policy, again a consistent topic from past national space policies since 1989. The policy acknowledges the risks posed by orbital debris to space operations and services, and to the safety of people and property on Earth. It directs that depart Mitigation Standard Practices, and address orbital debris issues
53 High Frontier through Departments of Commerce and Transportation licensing in international fora to encourage adoption of debris minimiza tion practices and information exchange. 18 Developing policies, procedures, and capabilities to inhibit orbital debris creation and to keep track of it in orbit have the desired correlated effects of maintaining space situational awareness, protecting vital space assets, and ultimately, conducting space control. Here as well, cies and the international security environment. Not all countries will articulate a national space policy to indigenous space capabilities, purchasing space services from commercial providers, engaging in bilateral and multi-national space projects (e.g., the International Space Station [ISS]) or or ganizations (e.g., the European Space Agency [ESA]), or pos sessing the highly skilled workforce and technological capacity required, a government may not consider it necessary to issue a broad statement of national policy to guide its space activities. For other countries with space interests, policy statements serve as evidence of their long-term goals, of perceptions of the con tributions that space systems make to enhancing their national prestige and power, and of political will to make the space infra structure organization and investment necessary to be considered a space-faring nation. Referring again to the QDR security challenges described earlier, one can argue that these challenges are also important have to be concerned with trends and implications of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges as well as with more tra ditional regional and global challenges facing them uniquely. Consequently, the strategic choices other nations make regarding space capabilities will also be shaped by challenges to their secu rity and by their relationships with the leading space-faring na space power relationships, unless those relationships are based on common shared values and expectations or are seen as means 19 Small and regional powers may hedge their options by shap ing their national space policies in order to preserve, protect, and major space power protection without becoming a threat to that protector. Alternatively, they may pursue independent courses of action, including maintaining a strong presence in the interna tional space regime while remaining non-aligned except where their security interests mandate limited space collaboration for shared objectives. Three brief case studies of small and medium space powers follow to illustrate the range of hedging options: space capabilities but with space-related geographical and politi cal advantages; Switzerland, traditionally an international space regime proponent and participant in an independent European cally nonaligned and an independent, technologically sophisti cated space actor expanding its global security interests. These case studies can illuminate possible opportunities to shape the international security environment through space collaboration and shared goals. view, published by the Department of Industry, Tourism and Re sources. 20 This document states that the Australian Government is engaged in space activities in support of national strategic, 21 Australia is a sophisticated user of space capabilities for national security, communications, broadcasting, astronomy and space science, natural resource management, navigation and timing services, and other areas. 22 Pre-eminent among these activities is the role of space in sup porting Australian national security, particularly in contributing to border surveillance, anti-terrorism, and telecommunications security. The policy framework for space engagement encom passes characteristics of being userand market-driven rather than supply-driven or technology-pushed, and emphasizes inter national collaboration and cooperation where Australia has com petitive advantages including geographical position and political stability. 23 There is no strategic, economic or social reason for the Australian of international cooperative arrangements and by purchasing products and services in the domestic and global market place. velopment and science/research funding programs This does not, however, preclude government facilitating the development of space services, such as commercial launch operations if they are commercially viable and sustainable. Nor does it preclude space hardware design and manufacture, for example in niche areas such as instrumentation, sub-systems or components. The Australian government encourages commercially viable and sustainable endeavours in the space sector. 24 Because of these characteristics, Australian strengths lie in providing ground-segment space systems and networks, as dem onstrated by the Woomera Rocket Range and the Canberra Deep Space Communications Complex. The ground-based networks and facilities provide key support to National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ESA, and the international astronomy is a signatory to many space-related international treaties, includ ing the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 25 Australia employs space capabilitiesits own as well as those provided through international alliances and commercial relationshipsin support of its national interests globally and in 26 Paradoxically, while geographical location and political stability are important to becoming a trusted space part ner, Australian national security policy acknowledges these same
High Frontier 54 characteristics cannot protect it against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles or against terrorist acts directed against Australian citizens. This situation was clearly shown by the al-Qaida-inspired terrorist attacks in Bali. 27 Proliferation of launch vehicle technology is a national secu rity concern, as is the protection of spectrum from interference, and both require bilateral and international collaboration, includ 28 Spectrum protection is particularly important to Australian national securi ty, given Australian ground-based space facilities and networks, and the transition of the Australian defense forces to a network centric orientation. Australian defense strategy and the evolu tion of the armed forces are laid out in a series of documents, including and the map 29 addresses the importance of protecting key spectrum for data transmission to and from space from natural and intentional in terference. This complements the elements of the network cen tric warfare concept for information sharing and connectivity among command and control, sensors, and engagement systems, and contributes to information superiorityproviding the right information about adversary forces to friendly forces at the right time and in a superior manner. 30 Successful implementation of a national security-oriented space policy that addresses the en abling information systems and infrastructures, ISR, PNT, and lationship mandates a goal of interoperability and commonality among systemsand thus places a premium on shared goals of spectrum management. The Australian Department of Defence considers that management of spectrum resources has be come an important risk mitigation strategy for Defence in both 31 Combined with its global security commitments and coalition operations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, and its relationship terests. One country not usually considered in the forefront of space policy and activities is Switzerland, but this perception is deceptive. 32 While having no national space pro entirely within the framework of European space programs and activities. Swiss space activities are consistent with the objec tive of preserving Swiss independence and welfare, and with the foreign policy objectives established in the new Swiss Federal Constitutional of 2000. 33 Since 1815, Switzerland has maintained a stance of perma nent armed neutrality. This has not prevented it from engaging in activities entailing limited military, political, or economic activi Partnership for Peace (1996) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), and deploying armed troops for international or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 34 Switzerland is also an active participant in the MTCR and other export control regimes, and thus shares common interests in noninterests in Iran since 1980, and closer economic, counter-ter rorism, and other ties are evolving with the establishment of the 35 Conceivably, a closer space security relationship could develop, given Swiss diplomatic and economic strengths and shared interests in the Global War on Terrorism. During the Cold War, Switzerland was a strong proponent Swiss space activities have been more balanced among Swiss and industrial policy. 36 To do this, Switzerland has an extensive governmental space organization and a space policy governing its activities. 37 Swiss space policy demonstrates the importance objectives and capabilities. 38 As a founding member of ESA, the Swiss government and industry are heavily involved in Eu ropean space programs, including Galileo, the joint ESA-Euro has led them to actively support a position of nondiscrimination a highly industrialized country, Switzerland has a strong space industrial base involving about 50 companies providing highquality advanced technologies and capabilities to space research. According to the Swiss government, the industry generates about two times the investment made by Switzerland in ESA (122 mil lion Swiss francs in 2003). 39 head of the Swiss delegation at the European Council. The SSO mental Coordination Committee for Space Affairs, and is a part of the State Secretariat for Science and Research (SER), the ad ministrative organization responsible for planning and imple menting Swiss space policy. The SER oversees the space budget mined by the Federal Council (government) with the advice of the 20-member Federal Space Affairs Commission. Swiss space policy acknowledges: (1) the importance of research, both basic and applied, and the education of scientists and researchers; (2) the importance of space activities to cutting-edge technologies and industry; (3) the role of space activities in contributing to European space efforts; and (4) the contribution of Swiss space activities to international cooperation and foreign policy goals. 40 Swiss space policy includes broad objectives in space science, lites, telecommunications, navigation, launchers, and industry and technology. 41 activities, and potential opportunities to engage in cooperative space projects beyond ISS could be considered by both govern ments. Sweden The Scandinavian country has long maintained a
55 High Frontier technologically advanced civil space capability, not only a strong industrial base but also a launch capability (European Space and Sounding Rocket Range, or Esrange, run by the Swedish Space Corporation [SSC] near Kiruna 200 km north of the Arctic Cir cle). SSC provides launch services for sounding rockets, strato spheric balloons, and ground-based instrumentation, testing, and space operations, including the establishment and promotion of 42 While SSC, Esrange, and associated civil and commercial space activities represent a mature national space capability, the exploitation of space assets by the Swedish Armed Forces has lagged comparatively. Historically non-aligned in peacetime and neutral in wartime, Swedish national defense consists of a total pose is to defend Sweden against armed attack, assert Swedish territorial integrity, contribute to global peace and security, and strengthen Swedish society in times of severe peacetime emer gencies. 43 Since 2002, Swedish national security policy has been transitioning from a strictly non-aligned and Baltic Sea-oriented focus to greater active participation in peacekeeping and com bat operations overseas, including Bosnia (under the European Afghanistan (in the International Security Assistance Force). 44 Swedish military capabilities tend to be NATO-compatible, and ity. Expanding global engagements by the Swedish military will PNT, satellite communications, and imagery. Furthermore, be ginning in the late 1990s, the Swedish military has been transi capable of meeting a range of contingencies, necessitating great er attention to protection of information networks. Being able to execute this transition is tied to the strength of the Swedish economy, information technologiesincluding space-based and industrial base. This forward-looking view of the role of provides an opportunity for Sweden to engage with other simi 45 military space cooperation remains to be developed. vanced space capabilities compared to most other countries and brings those advanced capabilities to bear in coalition operations. Few potential coalition partners possess a similar span and depth of space capabilities and resources. Consequently, opportunities for truly integrated coalition operations may be constrained to those countries like Australia and Sweden that possess technolo opportunities center on common objectives and shared values, compatible technological capabilities (to support operational in teroperability), and yet with a certain level of independence that can serve both the interests of the small or medium power as pendent on space capabilities, these countries may provide niche space systems that can alleviate gaps in space system develop funding issues. Certainly opportunities for closer working rela tionships among space-faring nations can, and should, be seri ously considered. Developing a multinational space agreement beyond the OST to deal with security problems is not likely to be of great ben constrains rogue nation behavior. As a more preferable course that share common interests and align with them to build basic space competencies to deal with regionally-based threats. Build gions, governmental structures, cultures, and levels of space-re lated technologies. Space powers like Switzerland and Sweden can assist because of their non-aligned, independent outlooks, their diplomatic presence in the international space regime, and their technologically advanced industrial capacities. security reasons, other countries will pursue compatible space policies and goals because they see the value to their security. States may face strategic challenges alone. Are there opportunities and challenges for national space pol icy to shape the international space regime? Certainly. An in ternational space regime presupposes that national governments are able to engage in foreign relations with other governments, and not non-state actors such as terrorists with whom there is no comparable engagement or negotiation. National space poli cies can serve to identify common or shared interests, values, and objectives between countries with differing space capabili ties, technologies, and cultures. They can help shape responses to shared security threats, whether those threats are terrorists and their global networks, rogue nations seeking to disrupt the regional status quo, or potential near-peer competitors seeking space policy can serve as a standard for foreign space policies and operating techniques and procedures, or shapes their exploi tation of space data, information, or services in ways support Much remains to be seen on how this new national space policy will fare in fostering greater positive collaboration and common values among those nations actively pursuing space capabilities today and in the future.
High Frontier 56 1 civil, and commercial space communities. 2 President Bush signed the space policy on 31 August 2006, but it was not publicly released until October when it was placed on the website for the US National Space Policy 3 Ibid., 2. 4 Robert Joseph, under secretary of State for Arms Control and Interna Roundtable on Science & Public Policy, George C. Marshall Institute, Wash ington, DC, 13 December 2006). 5 US National Space Policy, 7. 6 President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United (Washington, DC: The White House, 16 March 2006). 7 Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), hereaf ter cited as the 8 19-35. 9 US National Space Policy, 2006, 2. 10 Ibid., 4. 11 Ibid., 4-5. 12 Joseph. 13 27. 14 US National Space Policy, 4. 15 30. 16 Ibid., 8-9. 17 R/ (accessed 2 January 2007). 18 US National Space Policy, 9. 19 For example, the emerging strategic partnership with India in space, security, non-proliferation, and other topics provides a framework for build fact sheet, White House, 2 March 2006. 20 Aerospace and Defence Industries Branch, (Canberra, ACT: De partment of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Australian government, Au gust 2004, updated October 2004). DITR has prime responsibility for civil 21 Ibid., 2. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 2-3. 25 26 Senator the Honorable Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2003), 9. 27 Ibid., 11-12. 28 Ibid., 17. 29 Ibid.; Adm C. A. Barrie, RAN, chief of the Defence Force, Force 2020 (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2002); Gen P. J. Cosgrove, AC MC, chief of the Defence Force, (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2003); Department of Defence, (Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2005). Network centric warfare (NCW). 30 Ibid., 5-7. 31 Ibid., 31. 32 see Peter Creola, HSR-31 (The Neth erlands: European Space Agency, ESA Publications Division, March 2003). 33 New Foreign Policy Report of the Federal Council, Summary, found at: http://www.europa.admin. ch/europapol/off/ap/e/index.htm (accessed January 16, 2007). 34 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm. 35 Ibid. 36 Creola, 23. 37 view of the constitutional relationship between the Cantons and the Confed eration. The Confederation has the power to negotiate and adopt internation al treaties, whereas the creation of a national space program would have had to have been approved by the Cantons. A revision to the Swiss constitution in the Swiss Confederation. See Creola, 6. 38 tion to ESA, Patrick Piffaretti, it was our country which, 40 years ago, took the initiative in the process of cooperation which produced [ESA]. This and political. The space business is pure added-value. In participating in a cooperative context, our country has created opportunities for itself that it (c. 2003). 39 ch/htm/international/space/science-e.html (accessed 12 January 2007); and (c. 2003). 40 See Space Policy: Guidelines and Main Objectives of the Swiss Space e.html (accessed 2 January 2007). 41 Ibid. 42 www.ssc.se/esrange. Sir Richard Branson of Virgin Galactic is a partner in using Spaceport Sweden for space tourism by 2011. 43 gov.se/sb/d/4187 (accessed 15 January 2007). 44 Swedish_Armed_Forces (accessed 16 January 2007). 45 Lt Gen Johan Kihl, director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Swedish Dana J. Johnson and Ariel E. Levite, eds., RAND CF-177-FIAS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 67-81. Dana J. Johnson (AB, University University; Ph.D., University of Southern California) is a senior analyst with the Northrop Grum man Analysis Center in Arlington, Virginia, responsible for assessing space and missile defense issues and trends for Northrop Grummans business sectors. Dr. Johnson has extensive experience in government and industry aerospace-related re where she spent almost 15 years as a national security policy ana she led or participated in a number of studies in space, aerospace, and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Department of Defense, the Air gressionally mandated commissions, including the NIMA Commis Commission. Dr. Johnson also served as the Project Air Force liai son to the Air Staff. Other prior experience includes policy and mis sion analysis of national security space programs in several leading aerospace companies, and diplomatic history and research at the an adjunct professor at Georgetown Universitys Security Studies Program and Missouri State Universitys Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, teaching classes on space and security.
57 High Frontier Space Radar: The Quest for Joint Warfare Transformation Mr. Peter S. Breidt Air Force Space Command /A5FR P ersistent, agile, and responsive is the vision for Space Ra able space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system designed from conception for the operational 1 In essence, the SR system is just thata constellation of Earth orbiting radars. However, the capability represents much more than that. It is a leading edge program, a trailblazer for transformation within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence com munity (IC). In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rums feld challenged the military to transformto think, organize, and operate differently with new capabilities that leverage in formation age technology and operating concepts to achieve and maintain an asymmetric 2 SR embodies the transforma tion concept. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is work ing in full partnership with the the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the ligence communities. We are one nation and we intend to build one SR system to support our collective needs. So, how is SR transformational? Since its inception the SR program has embraced the trans formation concept. By design and by direction, SR is breaking down stovepipes and building bridges between the operational military and intelligence communities. The shared vision is a space system offering agility and responsiveness on a scale access 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Once operational and working in concert with transformational communications and net-centric capabilities, it is envisioned to advance and bring to fruition transformation in space support to joint operations with the real potential to radically change the employment of air, land, and sea forces. Space-based ISR systemsincluding radar satellitesare not new or novel concepts. For example, Canada has been op erating their RADARSAT since November 1995. What makes our SR program differenttransformationalis who it will serve, how it will be employed, and how it is being developed. cussing the transformational aspects of SR. Requirements Basis proved in early 2006 by both the DoD and IC requirements process. 3 The SR ICD pulls from a multitude of requirements support the future joint force. Together, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and associated Joint Operating and Func ible, adaptable, modular, deployable force where interoperabil ity is the standard, and joint operations take place at the lower echelons. Linked and synchronized forces will be equipped and prepared to quickly respond to a changing and unpredictable environ ment. The future joint force must be knowledge empow ered so decision superiority will be essential to success in the battlespaceforces at every echelon must be able to make better, more informed decisions and implement them faster than the enemy can respond. A robust, integrated, responsive ISR architecture is neces sary to support this future force operations concept. To sup port decision superiority the future ISR architecture must have the ability to synchronize all-source collection, processing, and data exploitation from available ISR sources. 4 The goal is un and other customerstimely, actionable information on a wide range of conventional and asymmetric threats. This support it will be to support on-going and dynamic combat operations. As threats become more unpredictable and reaction times de crease, requirements for global situational awareness also grow. SR promises to meet these ISR challenges. SR Operations Concept Building on the ICD, the SR user community has approved re vised drafts of the SR system concept of operations (CONOPS) and SR Capability Development Document (CDD). 5 These documents state a multi-mode system is necessary to satisfy needs of diverse users. Five distinct product types, generated Warfighter Focus
High Frontier 58 synthetic aperture radar (SAR), surface moving target indica tions (SMTI), open ocean surveillance (OOS), high resolu tion terrain information (HRTI), and advanced geospatial in telligence (AGI) products will be employed to provide a new space-based major force enhancement capability. 6 SAR products have been used extensively by the DoD and IC for some time, for purposes ranging from developing intel ligence preparation of the battlespace to targeting support and conducting battle damage assessment. In fact, the military may rely increasingly upon this phenomenology to complement the from airborne collectors. for radar tactics originally developed for airborne platforms. Like existing air platforms such as the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and RQ-4A Global Hawk, SR will apply radar energy to understand the movement of vehicles on the ground. The SMTI mode will allow the user to select vari ous sizes of search boxes, from single digits to hundreds of ki lometers wide based on the mission and level of information enemy intent by understanding normal behavior and identifying to support extremely challenging high payoff missions such as the tracking and targeting of mobile missile transporter/erector launchers. Once operational, the interleaving of these modes will result in revolutionary applications the SR user community cannot yet envision. SR operations will be integrated and synchronized with Air Operations Centers (AOCs) and service Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) enabling users at the tip of the spear ity and agility to support multiple users at the same time. So, while it is providing data to a combined air operations center it may also support land or sea operations centers with other applications such as open ocean surveillance or mapping like functions. At the same time the system will provide critical data to analysts in the State Department, Department of Energy, and other IC members working both longand short-range is sues in support of our overall national security. mand by contributing to the maritime domain awareness and homeland defense missions. This mode operates much like SMTIit detects the movement of objects, but does so over ocean vice land or littoral areas. OOS allows users to monitor indicate enemy intent. When applied in an integrated manner with other ISR assets, OOS enables the tracking of potential weapons of mass destruction shipments across the oceans. HRTI capabilities will be operationalized to allow for mili tary, intelligence, and civil applications to better employ this profound mapping capability. HRTI is similar to digital terrain STS-99 mission in February 2000, though may be more de tailed. 7 High resolution map making is only one highly an ticipated application of HRTI data. Other applications of HRTI include detailed information on natural disasters, employment of precision guided weapons, and development of detailed in gress/egress strategies for special operations forces.
59 High Frontier Finally, the user community looks forward to the imple rived from the same raw payload data used to develop other and products. The timely exploitation and dissemination of these powerful products will support DoD and IC operations and analysis. Timely AGI and HRTI products will contribute to near realtime situational awareness of the battlespace to aid commanders in identifying natural environmental hazards and other impacts to operations. 8 Air Force expeditionary combat support per sonnel will also take advantage of these products to eliminate some of the uncertainty involved with establishing contingency Transformational Aspects of Space Radar: A key attribute of the future ISR architecture is increased persistence. Persistent coverage across time, over multiple the aters simultaneously, and across a wide range of the electromag netic spectrum, will be necessary to address our information needs. Joint operating and functional concepts demand new methods for employing ISR capabilities. In keeping with these evolving concepts, SR will operate in a horizontally integrated joint architecturecombined operations with multi-service platforms feeding data to multi-service ground terminals. This network approach will yield the persistent ISR coverage our termsthe level of persistence required depends on the mis sion at hand. For our purposes, persistence can be described as the integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing capabilities operating to detect and understand the quality required to expeditiously assess and predict adversary actions and deny enemy sanctuary. 9 More simply stated, revisit havior. Rather, revisit just needs to be timely enough to under stand the pace of activity relative to the situation. For example, monitoring activity in open ocean shipping lanes will normally require much less revisit than monitoring the movement of land vehicles across complex terrain. SR will make a critical contri bution to overall ISR persistence by providing a robust constel lation of low Earth orbiting radar platforms, about nine space vehicles operating in concert with each other. cally steered array (ESA) radar antenna (sometimes referred to as an electronically scanned array antenna). ESA technology has been successfully employed in opera for over 30 years. Af ter decades of invest ment and operational use, the time is right to transition this power ful technology to the space environment. ESA is a key enabler of our vision for a SR constellation with the unprecedented ability to act locally in ways/ roles traditionally re served for air assets. The ESA allows the user to focus the without slewing the antenna, thus preserving precious energy and allowing the engagement and rapid retargeting of multiple targets near simultaneously across disparate geographic loca tions. In addition, the electronic agility of the ESA will enable the user to transition between the numerous radar modes in a seamless manner, allowing for the near simultaneous collection and integration of multiple SR products. Operational users across the DoD and IC have been consis tent in their call for a more responsive space ISR platformSR will be responsive to this call. 10 Meeting this vision requires an enterprise approach to the system engineering of this capabil ity. The Air Force has teamed with NGA and NRO to mature
High Frontier 60 the ground architecture in a manner that allows operators to tailor their support needs, from requests for responsive task ing through the call for timely dissemination of products. The ground segment, including the supporting communications, that will complete the overall SR system is being developed to ity. The result will be a highly responsive system of systems where rapid mode changes are not only feasible, but routine in support of user needs and the changing target environment. These responsive system capabilities will be coupled with tac tics, techniques, and procedures to realize the dynamic opera tions described below. The net result is routine and reliable end-to-end support to time-critical operationsfrom near-realtime tasking to rapid product deliverywith minimal disrup tion to pre-planned collection. Once operational, the persistent, agile, and responsive na ture of SR will provide assured access to space-based ISR and enable mission success for the military, intelligence, and civil users it will support. Dynamic Operations Machineto-machine interfaces will facilitate self-cuing within the SR system and automatic cross-cuing between other airborne and space-based ISR systems. For instance, if the SMTI mode detects vehicle movement in a particular area of high interest, the SR sensor may be automatically re-tasked to collect a SAR image of the target area. In some cases, this would occur during the same pass over the target. If this was not possible or feasible, the next SR satellite coming into view or another ISR sensor with access to the target would collect the image. Time-dominant processing will take place to get de sired products to users within their timelines. At the same time, consistent with tasking and priorities, signals intelligence (SI GINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) collection systems will automatically react to SR collected users and analysts alike as part of the continuous evolution of SR employment concepts and applications. processing, and exploitation operationsis a common element of SR employment concepts. Fast processing and automatic collection operations will produce huge volumes of data; too much data to rely solely on man-in-the-loop processes. Auto matic target detection, automatic clutter cancellation applica tions, and data fusion applications, are just some of the tools SMTI, will normally take minimal processing and exploitation time. Generating AGI products on the other hand will often entail complex processing algorithms. Even so, the objective is to generate these products and get the actionable information they reveal to users in time to take appropriate action. NGA has taken on the responsibility of developing and providing common user exploitation and analysis tools for SR and other sources of geospatial data. Consistent with family of system operations, SR data will not be analyzed in a vacuum. SR collection managers, opera tors, and data analysts will be closely tied to operations and ac tivities of other imagery sources and those of other intelligence disciplines such as SIGINT, human intelligence, MASINT, and open source intelligence. All-source intelligence centers, like the Defense Intelligence Agency and eventually DCGS sites, will integrate SR data with other sources to provide operators Dissemination will be accomplished over a National Securi ty Enterprise through both push and pull mechanisms. A mix of secure networks, broadcasts, and direct downlinks will ensure SR collected data and system information is accessible and dis into real-time battlespace awareness tools, common operating relation with data from other intelligence sources and integra platforms will occur at joint operating centers, joint intelligence management centers, and other operations centers. SR data and to facilitate wide dissemination. SR, upon operational capability, will deliver dynamic and community users. However, to achieve initial and eventually
61 High Frontier full capabilities the SR community will need to thoroughly em brace and apply the lessons learned from previous and on-go ing space system acquisition efforts. As such, SR development will be consistent with rigorous systems engineering and upfront technological risk reduction strategies to lower acquisi tion risk. The capability users seek from SRpersistence, agility, and alternatives to mechanical age technologies with digital age technologies. Managing the associated risk will be challeng ing. The task is to reduce technology and integration risks in a controlled manner to achieve the goal of a timely delivery of transformational capability to the operators. For example, the SR acquisition team has made great strides by investing substantially in the development of prototype ESA transmit/re technology will continue to mature on schedule, and with each related cost estimates. tween the intelligence community and the operational mili tarya veritable lightning rod for national security space inte community customers form the start. 11 NRO has designed, de veloped, and operated all other national space systems for the AFSPC and NRO have been collaborating for some time, es pecially since release of the Space Commission report in 2001, the two space acquisition organizations follow different user requirements processes and different bodies provide require ments oversight. 12 While there has been some shared require ments oversight recently, the actual requirements development processes have remained relatively in-house efforts with NRO consulting with intelligence agencies and AFSPC consulting with the services and joint commands. The requirements pro cess for SR is breaking this mold. SR User Community AFSPC is leading the way in building and operating struc tured user forums at the colonel (O-6) and working levels to facilitate an inclusive requirements and CONOPS development requirements and concepts of operations working groups com prised of members from over 20 DoD and IC organizations to ensure user needs are comprehensive and based on capabili ties and effect. These combined groups are also engaged in and demonstrate technical feasibility and affordability. While much work remains, the working groups steadily grow the rela tionships required to bring this capability to fruition. As described earlier, the envisioned ISR network provides an unprecedented level of responsiveness to the user in support of time-critical scenarios. While responsiveness and agility are attributes that every operator embraces, advances in these ar eas have direct impact on overall system assuredness. Simply agility and responsiveness. The SR program is investing in the analysis and development of algorithms and automated sched uling functions to optimize tasking agility, while minimizing disruption of pre-planned collections. The SR program is real and growing, though it will take some time to realize an operational capability. The next major SR acquisition milestone is Key Decision PointB (KDP-B), the approval to enter into the preliminary design phase of ac quisition. This is a critical milestone since it represents formal program initiation and requires a commitment for full funding. 13 To reach this point AFSPC, NGA, and ODNI will continue to lead user efforts to solidify requirements for a SR capability culminate with a CDD and CONOPS jointly approved by the sion Requirements Board. The SR IPO will use these documents to develop system level requirements, architecture products, initial designs, and tion Board will review this work for the KDP-B decision on whether or not the program is ready to enter the preliminary design phase. Currently, the SR community plans to complete all requirements for KDP-B by the end of calendar year 2008 to support an initial launch capability in the 2016 timeframe. Full operations capability, which includes the complete con launch. While the IPO is developing the SR satellites and associ ated command and control segments, others will be working to ensure users can employ the end-to-end system in a seam NRO, Electronics Systems Center, and user training institutions are just a few of the organizations required to develop inter faces, systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and other programs to support SR operations and employment.
High Frontier 62 Conclusions AFSPC is committed to develop transformational advance ments in our ability to task, collect, process, exploit, and dissem 14 leaders better understand the environment and avert crisis situ ations. Should this fail, SR will help shape the battlespace, take instigative actions, and react to developing situations. Over the next decade AFSPC will work in concert with oth ers in the space and ISR communities to develop, deliver, and operationalize an interactive SR system to answer the call for transformational ISR. Persistence, agility, and responsiveness evolutionary capabilities and transformational path allows all to press forward with enhanced relationships between military and intelligence agencies and better ops-intel support concepts. Once operational, the system will expand our horizons on what is possible from space and help our Nation maintain an asym metric advantage over adversaries. In a wordSR is transformational. By working through the challenges of transformation, those making SR a reality will ibility to drive its operations construct and mission operations. The resultdata, information, products, and applications that lead to decision superiority, mission success, and, ultimately, joint warfare transformation. 1 2 Department of Defense, (Wash April 2003), 1. 3 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United (Wash 5 6 7 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, NASA, Jet Propulsion Labora tory, California Institute, http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/index.html (ac cessed 25 September 2006). 8 Department of the Air Force, Flight Plan sion, 2004), 55. 9 Mr. Peter S. Breidt (BA, Basic Science, US Air Force Academy, Colorado; MS, Ad ministration, Central Michi gan University, Michigan) is an associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, Colorado Springs, Colorado. He supports Air Force Space Command, Di the development and coordi capability needs. Prior to joining Booz Allen Hamilton, Mr. Breidt served in the US Air Force for over 22 years. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant through the US Air Force Academy in December 1981. During his US Air Force career Mr. Breidts assignments included space operations and staff duties ment and Integration Center (Space Warfare Center at the time). Prior to his current position, Mr. Breidt supported the Deputy Di erations, Operations Directorate, the Joint Staff. ISR Transformation Government Symposium, Denver, CO, 28-30 Sep tember 2004). 10 11 Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Director of Central Intelligence 12 (Washington, DC: The Commis Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, 11 January 2001). 13 National Security Space Acquisition Policy, Number 03-01, Guid ance for DoD Space System Acquisition Process, 27 December 2004. 14 Air Force Space Command, (Peterson AFB, CO, 1 October 2003), 18.
63 High Frontier Security Forces and the Technological Edge Maj Joseph Anthony Musacchia, Jr. Commander, 341 st Security Support Squadron Malmstrom AFB, Montana W hen one thinks of technology and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), images of satellites, launch plat forms, space radars, and a mighty intercontinental ballistic mis permeates the mind. Rarely do people visualize our Air Force security forces harnessing technology to secure these powerful aerospace platforms and weapon systems. Division began researching and developing Minuteman solidpropellant ICBMs. 1 From this humble beginning our space ca pabilities have evolved and served us well. But now an emerg ing threat demands new and updated require ments. 2 In 1958, the technology and method of providing security for these assets were fortunately, as launch systems have evolved and been updated with more modern technol ogy the methods of se curing our capabilities did not until now. The thrust and back bone of space and nu clear physical security has always been man at the launch facility. This construct places our security forces in a reactionary posture. To protect the resource, our security forces Air men establish a tight pe rimeter and prepare for close quarter-battle in the immediate vicinity. The tactics, manpower, ments are compliancedriven and based on Department of Defense and AFSPC instructions. Although this method of defense worked well in the Cold War era, the methods did not. Today the threat has changed, and our security force tactics Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes, security forces began a transfor Terrorism (GWOT). This transformation is designed to alter the posture of security forces from a compliance-based force to a capability-based/operationally-focused defensive force. is integrated base defense and nuclear security. The strategic gaps and shortfalls and then seek to close those gaps and miti gate or counteract those shortfalls. This transformation will be achieved by promot ing a force protection culture and integrating technology into secu rity forces operations. 3 This transformation is occurring through out the Air Force and AFSPC security forces are leading the charge to ensure free and open access to space and our ability to protect our aerospace power. A primary illustra tion of this develop ment occurred recently in 20 th Air Force, the headquarters oversee ing three ICBM wings at Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Minot AFB, North Dakota; and F. E. Warren AFB, Wyo ming. In 2004, Head cured nearly $351.7 million worth of com mercial, off-the-shelf security enhancement technology for security forces use throughout the Air Force. Most Warfighter Focus
High Frontier 64 missions, but some of the equipment had potential applica tions at 20 th Air Force units. AFSPC acquired two key pieces of equipment for 20 th Air Force: the man-portable surveillance target acquisition radar (MSTARS) and the wide area surveil lance thermal imager (WSTI). The equipment had to undergo rigorous testing prior to using it in close proximity to 20 th Air and approval, AFSPC security forces employed this technology in conjunction with current compliance-based ground security effectively accomplish the mission. Why is this and other new developing technology a necessi ty in the heartland of America? Italian airpower theorist Guilio Douhet said long ago, It is easier and more effective to destroy principle applies to our space capabilities. No nation can rival our capabilities in space. Therefore our impressive space capa bilities are a potential target. As Douhet pointed out, disrupting this capability is easier to accomplish on the ground. The new enemy we face in the GWOT often attempts to at tack aerospace platforms on the ground using standoff attacks, as indicated by the multiple daily attacks occurring in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a method that has been successful throughout history. As noted by Alan Vick's book, 78 percent of all attacks against aerospace platforms until 1992 were standoff attacks and these attacks 4 Research by the RAND Corporation for Project Air Force concluded the con ily a sanctuary from these attacks. In deed, it is where the threat is greatest Force leaders need to concentrate their attention and resources. 5 The role of GWOT era is pivotal as they provide deterrence against weapons of mass sponsive actions requires that our nu clear forces be capable of responding to any crisis, at any level. 6 But, since these weapons live in the ground until called on, their security, daily, and dur ing periods of vulnerability, is key to their operational readiness. As stated earlier, one of the security is nuclear security and a combat mission is pre cisely what it is. Twentieth Air Force security forces are responsible for pro tecting nuclear weapon systems, espe cially when they are at their most vul nerable state when they are being maintained. Security forces provide optimal protection to our Airmen and assets as they secure an to repair and/or upgrade systems. This mission takes place ev ery day at many of the 500 launch facilities across the vast, tions are geographically separated from the main support base by sometimes hundreds of miles. Today, security forces are not confronting the enemy of the Cold War era, but one who has attacked our homeland in new than the loss of security of a nuclear asset or an overt attack against one of our nuclear aerospace ground platforms. To ad dress this new enemy, AFSPC security forces use the MSTARS and WSTI technology in combination with time-proven tac tics. In the past, during missile maintenance, security forces pos sessed little to no standoff detection capability. Security forces were limited to what they could detect with their natural eye sight or binoculars. In perfect weather conditions, security forces had effective visibility for perhaps two miles. More of ten than not, effective visual detection is often hampered by rugged terrain and vegetation. Therefore, security forces could not effectively assess possible threats and engage adversaries until they were practically at the launch facility. In typical Cold War thinking, teams compensated for this limitation by forming a tight perimeter in the immediate vicinity of the resources, with as many personnel as possible, and hoped they would achieve
65 High Frontier Today, Airmen understand that our new enemy will use more lethal ground weapon systems. Security forces can no longer afford to wait for the enemy to attack. They have to engage the enemy before its ready. We have to disrupt and defeat the terrorist as soon as possible and as far away from the resources as possible. Increased detection distance allows security forces adequate time to assess the situation and, if warranted, mount a defense and attack away from the resource. When warned of approaching threats, security can occupy key terrain and pre pare to engage. 7 The MSTAR and WSTI make this type of defense possible. Depending on the terrain, the technology allows security forc es to detect and pinpoint anyone or anything up to 25 miles away from the location of our resources, versus the two miles the equipment allows for radar location, thermal image detec tion, closed circuit television visual assessment, and acoustic attack can be prevented or disrupted from a distance and forces can deny the enemy its goals and objective by stopping the at tack before it ever starts. This technology provides security forces with a key prin ciple of war, by never permitting the enemy to achieve damentals such as by preventing enemy forces from approaching defensive positions, and taking every plans are prepared in advance, the threat we face will constantly change. It is only through the use of accurate, timely intel ligence that we can modify plans to best operate in the new dynamic defensive environment that AFSPC security forces resource; we must make every attempt to prevent combat from occurring. The MSTARS and WSTI make this possible provid ing a technologic advantage. Currently, this technology is employed by security forces throughout AFSPC, particularly at Malmstrom AFB, Montana who defend a 23,500 square mile ICBM complex larger than the state of West Virginia. With the effective use of this tech their strategic vision by closing the capability gap and allow ing our forces to As stated by the former AFSPC command chief, Chief Master Sergeant Ronald G. Kriete, We remain the best Air and Space 8 We must continue to advance and develop new and creative ways to command the tactical edge. The implementation of these technological security enhancements maintains that sharp edge as well as achieves the goal of former AFSPC Commander General Lance W. Lord by, Growing the intellectual proper ties of our space professionals that will harvest more decisive, 9 The use of these innovative security techniques truly brings AFSPC se curity into the 21 st century and provides the tactical edge nec essary to deny the enemy its objective. Most importantly, it 1 Milestones in Space History 28 February 1958, High Frontier Fall 2004, 5. 2 High Frontier Fall 2004, 3-5. 3 tember 2004. 4 Alan Vick, (Rand, 1995). 5 David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, (Rand, 1995). 6 Richard A. Paulsen, 7 James J. Gallagher, (Stackpole Books, 1994). 8 High Frontier Summer 2004, 14. 9 High Frontier Summer 2004, 3-4. ~ Maj Joseph A. Musacchia (BA, Criminology, Louisiana State University; BCJ, Loui siana State University; MA Criminology, Louisiana State University) is Commander, st Security Support Squad ron, Malmstrom AFB, Mon tana. He is responsible for providing over 1,200 Security Forces personnel with train ing, equipment and support to foster the most advanced force in Air Force Space Com mand. Major Musacchia ensures forces are given the tools to sup port up to 10,000 base personnel and the largest ICBM complex in the world. Major Musacchias previous military positions include: chief, th Security Forces Squadron, Laughlin AFB, Texas. Element leader, 39 th Security Forces Squad ron, Incirlik AB, Turkey. Flight leader, 319 th Missile Squadron and element leader, 90 th Security Forces Squadron, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. completed in residence the Police Administrations Course at Uni versity of Kentucky. He has been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal with one device, the Air Force Commendation Medal with one device as well as the Air Force Achievement Medal.
High Frontier 66 Launch Control Center NetLink Capt Joseph T. Page II Missile Combat Crew Member, 741 st Missile Squadron Capt Mark C. Bigley Minuteman III Missile Combat Crew Commander, 741 st Missile Squadron MSgt Douglas S. Angell NCOIC, Electronics Laboratory Minot AFB, North Dakota I performing a vital mission: worldwide nuclear deterrence. Five hundred intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch ICBM missile combat crew members located in underground launch control centers (LCC). 1 Affectionately known as mis a-day, 365 days-a-year availability of nuclear forces. to the maintenance and operation of ICBMs. Typical alert duty is a 24-hour shift; however, the duty day including transit to and from the LCC equals an average of 30 hours. 2 During an alert, 14 hours of uninterrupted operations, testing, and maintenance is common. When crew members are not otherwise occupied with gree, improve their job knowledge or simply relax. However, at all times, crew members remain ready to immediately respond to security violations, address maintenance concerns, or to comply with higher headquarters direction. pulling alert do not have access to a personal computer (PC) and the base local area network (LAN) that is, until a 91 st Space veloped the NetLink architecture. The LCC NetLink concept will deliver personal computing capability to missile combat crews in the LCC. Additionally, access to the LAN will allow crew members to change the outcome of potentially catastrophic situations and take a giant leap forward from the days of the 3 The advent of LCC NetLink greatly increases the versatility of ICBM crews. The system enhances effectiveness by providing crew members access to remote-monitoring equipment, essen tial data programs, and training materials in their underground control center. Crews can also complete tasks that require access to a computer, such as professional military education (PME) wise, Internet access to off-duty education courses is increasing both morale and grade point averages. LCC NetLink is poised to enhance productivity while crew members perform alert duties. NetLink Uses The inclusion of a computer system inside the LCC will in crease situational awareness for missile combat crews, while also aboveground world are the weapon system console and the tele phone. Remote Automated Weather System (RAWS) and Re mote Visual Assessment (RVA), when connected with NetLink access, have the potential to enhance operational effectiveness. be accessed while crews are pulling alert. RVA has the potential to enhance security awareness by link ing a video camera at a remote launch facility (LF) to the missile alert facility (MAF). The camera can identify enemy activity at RVA use analog video equipment to broadcast information to the MAF. With NetLink, crews in the capsule will have that same sight picture. With a high-speed connection and image-process ing capability, multiple views (i.e., infrared, night vision, etc.) are possible. RAWS allows weather data fusion, through information sent from remote nodes in the missile complex. RAWS provides wind, cloud, rain, temperature, barometric pressure, and visibili ty information. These systems provide vital meteorological data supports medical evacuation or security helicopter operations, but all operations including maintenance and security. Since base weather forecasters rely on equipment located on and around an Air Force base, the immense size of the missile casters a picture of the missile complex, either as a whole or pieces at a time. By fusing this data together, the forecasters get and geography. RAWS data is currently available online via the base network. By including RAWS data on the LCC NetLink conditions means quicker reaction by security, maintenance and operations crews to protect equipment and personnel. Linking LCC NetLink directly to support base network re sources will enable crew members to subscribe to the same data products as other 24-hour operations centers. One such source of information is the improved maintenance management program Warfighter Focus
67 High Frontier (IMMP). Through IMMP, crews can review maintenance sched ules and task work orders for their MAF or LCC. The immediate advantage for both maintainers and operators is forewarning. As more information is available to crews, they shift from reactive to proactive leadership. LCC NetLink enables crews to stay one step ahead of poten tial risks throughout the vast 8,500-mile missile complex using real-time monitoring systems. 3 Applications such as the GPSenabled transportation control system provide tracking capabil ity for GPS-equipped, government-owned vehicles traveling in that offer three-meter resolution, ground-mapping, and geo graphic information system overlays, crew members effectively close any gap in physical distance and become totally integrated with activities inside their area of responsibility. Since the LCC is an austere work environment, an alert ity. Many training materials available for missile crews are now in computer-based training format, either through HTML web pages or dynamic web presentations. During alert downtime, crew members can complete supplementary training, reference self-study lesson plans, as well as accomplish any administra tive tasking requiring rapid coordination, such as performance reports and award nominations. mat. ACSC distance learning includes video presentations and interactive applications delivered via CD-ROM and through the Internet. 4 LCC NetLink provides crew members access to each PME format while on alert. LCC NetLink allows personal computing in the LCC with ing nuclear operations. The overarching security concern in the LCC is information security, with emissions security (EMSEC), communications security, computer security, transmission se curity (TRANSEC), and operations security held in the highest regard. 5 nuclear surety. LCC NetLink operates well within the bounds of keyboard, video and mouse (KVM) relay, the physical separa dures governing the use of LCC NetLink. 6 The LCC is engineered to mitigate EMSEC and TRANSEC risks, safeguard sensitive nuclear war plan data and ensure nu clear surety is maintained; 7 each feature is critical to the safe and secure operation of the Minuteman ICBM weapon system. The LCC NetLink program relies on an innovative application of commercial off-the-shelf hardware to operate within the LCC environment. A KVM system provides remote access to a PC terminal via the KVM ports. These units can be connected to the PC using a variety of methods such as a serial interface, universal serial bus, parallel, network re lay, or, for LCC NetLink, LCC NetLink application of a KVM relay system allows use of the remote video monitor as both a computer monitor and television. All equipment used in the LCC received an electromagnetic com patibility evaluation at the 526 th ICBM Systems Wing successful results. 8 technology meets strict EMSEC and TRANSEC requirements takes signals from a remote keyboard and mouse and modulates to another KVM relay (upstairs in the MAF). Once the encoded data reaches the second relay connected to the host PC, demodu lation of the keyboard and mouse signals occurs. The demodu lated signals then arrive at the PC in a recognizable format. The PC then transmits a video signal to the remote terminal in the LCC using the same method. In this manner, a user can interact with the computer as if they were sitting directly in front of it.
High Frontier 68 since the system does not represent a stand-alone computing platform. Computers used in conjunction with LCC NetLink fall under the same policies and must adhere to the same require ments as other computers connected to a government network. in a secure location aboveground within the MAF. LCC NetLink also eliminates potential EMSEC and TRANSEC issues associ ated with secure environments by removing all access to storage devices, drive bays, and communications ports within the LCC. PC receives the same level of service as other data-processing equipment under their control. The operating system, software version of the popular Windows operating system. Conclusion 2006 at Juliett-01 MAF/LCC located at Minot AFB, North Da kota. LCC NetLink will provide an overwhelming advantage to deployed ICBM combat crews, demonstrating a unique ap proach to information access in restrictive environments. In this information age, it is vital that Air Force members utilize technology to enhance the command and control capabilities of every operation. 1 Air Force Space Command, http://www. afspc.af.mil/units/ (accessed 25 September 2006). ICBM bases are located near Minot, North Dakota (Minot AFB), Cheyenne, Wyoming (F. E. War ren AFB), and Great Falls, Montana (Malmstrom AFB). Minot and Malm Wyoming. 2 3 MSgt D. Angell, LCC NetLink, 91MOS/MXOPE PowerPoint pre sentation for 91SW/CC and 91OG/CC, 8 December 2005. 4 and http://acsc.maxwell.af.mil (accessed 25 September 2006). 5 The Boeing Company, ICBM Prime Team, 25 October 2005, document contents 6 Statement (NCIS) for the Launch Control Center (LCC) NetLink Installa tion, memorandum for HQ AFSPC/XONO, 27 February 2006. 7 name.htm (accessed 25 September 2006). Single Integrated Operational documents and operator vocabulary. 8 D.R. Moody, Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) Evaluation of LCC Remote Computer Items, memorandum for 526 ICBM SW/ENS and AFSPC/CEF, 25 October 2005. Capt Joseph T. Page II (BS, Electronic Engineer ing Technology, NMSU, New Mexico; MS Space Studies, American Military University) is a Mis st Missile Squadron, Minot AFB, North Dakota. Captain Prerequisite Training in June 2001, and ICBM st Missile Squadron. From November 2001 to June 2003, Captain Page performed duties as a Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander, being upgraded to his cur rent position as Missile Combat Crew Commander in July 2003. Capt Mark C. Bigley (BS, Biochemistry, Virgin ia Tech) is a Minuteman III Missile Combat Crew Senior Commander Evaluator currently assigned to the 91 st Operations Group, Minot AFB, North LCC NetLink program. While on nuclear alert at the squadron command post, he is responsible the proper launch of 50 nuclear missiles, directs missile crews and oversees $3.3 billion in criti cal weapon system assets. Captain Bigley earned a commission in the May 2002. He is a graduate of Space 100 training at Vandenberg AFB, California, and is currently enrolled at the University of North Dakota working toward a graduate degree in space studies. MSgt Douglas S. Angell (AS, Community Col lege of the Air Force; Daytona Beach Community College) is the NCOIC of the Electronics Labo ratory, Minot AFB, North Dakota. MSgt Angell leads technicians who maintain/calibrate Launch Facility and Launch Control Center electronic components and equipment that sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system (ICBM). He is also responsible for cer and aerospace vehicle equipment ensuring the combat readiness of the 91 st Space Wings ICBM force. MSgt Angell has been the noncommis nical Engineering and the assistant NCOIC of the Electro-Mechanical Team section. MSgt Angell is a graduate of the NCO academy, Airman Leadership School and a John L. Levitow award winner from the NCO preparatory course.
69 High Frontier Book Review Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics Chinese Space Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics. By Roger Handberg and Zhen Li. New York: Routledge, 2007. Figures. Tables. Appendices. Notes. References. Index. Pp. vi, 202. $120.00 Hardback ISBN: 978-0-415-36582-6 satellite, with the launch and safe return of a human in 2003; and it con ducted a successful anti-satellite test in 2007. Still, the intent be tions with respect to military space? How important to the Chi nese are civil and commercial space activities? Why is China In political scientists Roger Handberg and Zhen Li shed light on such questions by analyzing the evo lution of Chinese space policy through two political lenses domestic and international. Focusing their study in this way reduces the decisional opaqueness and cultural uniqueness in Chinese space activities that Joan Johnson-Freese emphasized in (1998). It circumvents the narrower technical approach found in Brian (1998) and who concentrates on the military importance of Chinese space capabilities in (1999), Handberg and Li adopt a broader perspective. They argue one can best understand the overall course of Chinese space activity as analogous to the paths taken originally tries developed long-range missiles to deliver thermonuclear warheads and, subsequently, used those rockets to launch satel lites. They did this initially for national security and prestige but, eventually, each perceived an important synergism between space activities and socioeconomic development. Among space-faring to invest the economic and technical resources needed for independently achieving human commit those resources during the late 1950s and the 1960s, circumstances peculiar to Chi power in space. space depended both on its domestic condi tions and its general role in the international system. Handberg and Li identify four dis tinct eras based on changing political, eco nomic, and technical conditions. First, during 1956-66, China faced an unquestionably hostile international environment. Despite severe economic and technological con straints, a group led by Mao Zedong and his defense minister Lin Biao sought to construct a satellite for purposes of national prestige and as an internal propaganda tool to enhance their po litical power. The intense domestic strife of the Cultural Revo lution, during which Mao sought to bolster his personal power, underlay the second era in Chinese space activity, 1966-76. Lin the space program formerly under his patronage; the Maoists self criticism or imprisonment. Meanwhile, academic policies associated with the ongoing Cultural Revolution undermined the education of future scientists, engineers, and technicians inside program withered. The remaining eras, 1976-1986 and 1986-present, removed many obstacles to progress, not the least being political barriers, Deng Xiaoping became undisputed leader in 1978, the third era focused broadly on economic growth, with civilian space appli cations being related to economic development. Chinese space policy also fostered a commercial launch market and joint re search and development (R&D) ventures with foreign partners to accelerate maturation of space technologies for civilian use. Given the dual-use nature of satellite systems, China recognized that as space science and technology strengthened the national economy, military capabilities also improved. Beginning in 1986 with the National High Technology Research and Develop ment (863) Program, the fourth era included policies to enhance ingness to invest more resources, both economic and technologi cal, in the space program brought remarkable success, including in orbit. Finally, Handberg and Li use their analytical model to as recently demonstrated ability to keep its space-faring aspirations aligned with politi cally available resources both fascinating and praiseworthy. Nonetheless, the direction and success of their space program depends on how the Chinese address four issues: achiev tinuity in space policy; their stance toward international cooperation; transitioning from a government-dominated to a mixed program; and military space activities. For seasoned academicians, and curious students alike, Chi offers substantial insight to actions.
High Frontier 70 GENERAL BERNARD A. SCHRIEVER MEMORIAL ESSAY CONTEST In an effort to stimulate thought, discussion, and debate on the nature and employment of space power in the name and memory of a great space power pioneer, the 50 th Space Wing is pleased to announce the establishment of the inaugural General Bernard A. Schriever Memorial Essay Contest. challenges and take a visionary approach to determine what critical development (doctrinal, technological, or otherwise) we might witness in space power over the next 30 years, and what impact that development will have on national security matters. Our Air Force relies on innovative ideas and critical thinking to maintain its edge. This contest serves as an opportunity to share your ideas with other space professionals. The contest is hosted by the 50 th Space Wing and sponsored by the Lance P. Sijan Chapter of the Air Force Association. It is open to all Air Force Space Command military and civilian personnel. Essays should be submitted no later than 13 April 2007. Winners will be announced in May 2007. We will ners and honorable mentions at the June 2007 Air Force Association Space Warfare Symposium. Air High Frontier journal will publish the winning essays in its August 2007 issue. GUIDELINES Submissions must be original analytical and/or inter pretive work not currently submitted nor previously published elsewhere. Essays are limited to 3,500 words and should be double-spaced. We encour age you to submit photographs and other supporting graphic elements along with your essay. Please include the title of your essay in the subject line of your e-mail. In the body of the e-mail, include your name, address, telephone number, the title of your essay and a biography of 50 words or less. ing the judging process, your essay cover page should include the title of your essay (as noted in the e-mail) and the total word count. Footnotes and text for sup porting graphics do not count toward the overall word count. Do not include your name on the cover page. All submissions must be dated on or before 13 April 2007. Top prize winners will be published in the High Frontier the professional journal of Air Force Space Command. ENTRIES Submit entries and all related correspondence electronically to email@example.com.
71 High Frontier GENERAL BERNARD A. SCHRIEVER MEMORIAL ESSAY CONTEST High Frontier