High frontier

Material Information

High frontier
United States -- Air Force Space Command
Place of Publication:
Peterson Air Force Base, CO
Headquarters, Air Force Space Command
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Astronautics, Military -- Periodicals -- United States ( lcsh )
Armed Forces -- Officers ( fast )
Astronautics, Military ( fast )
United States ( fast )
Periodicals. ( fast )
Periodicals. ( lcgft )
serial ( sobekcm )
programmed text ( marcgt )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )
Periodicals ( lcgft )


Dates or Sequential Designation:
Vol. 1, no. 1 (summer 2004)-Vol. 7, no. 4 (August 2011).
Numbering Peculiarities:
Vol. 2, no. 2 lacks date within publication but file name is: "Jan06_1WEB.pdf."
General Note:
"The journal for space & missile professionals"--Vol. 1, no. 1-vol. 5, no. 4.
General Note:
"The journal for space, cyberspace, & missile professionals"--Vol. 6, no. 1.
General Note:
"The journal for space and cyberspace professionals"--Vol. 6, no. 2-vol. 7, no. 4.
Statement of Responsibility:
United States Air Force Space Command.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
60426098 ( OCLC )
2006230115 ( LCCN )
1933-3366 ( ISSN )
358 ( ddc )

UFDC Membership

Digital Military Collection


This item is only available as the following downloads:

Full Text


1 High Frontier Contents Introduction Assured Access to Space in a Competitive World General Kevin P. Chilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Senior Leader Perspective Assured Access to Space General James E. Cartwright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Framing the Assured Access Debate: A Brief History of Air Force Space Launch General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Assured Access to Space The Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration: Partners for Space Access Ms. Patricia Grace Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Launch Vehicle Program Mr. Ray F. Johnson and Mr. Edmardo Joe Tomei . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Mission Assurance = Assured Access to Space, The Recipe for Success Col Jack Weinstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 The Power of Partnership, Assuring Access to Space Col James O. Norman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Toward Responsive Space Access Brig Gen Susan J. Helms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Mr. Robert C. Armstrong, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 Increasing the Solvency of Spacepower Maj John Wagner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Industry Perspective Mr. Daniel J. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Assured Access to Space, Space Transportation Perspective Mr. Michael C. Gass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Mr. Rob Peckham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Lt Gen C. Robert Kehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Mr. Eric Miller, Lt Col Richard A. Lane, Mr. Allen Kirkham, et al. . . . . . .58 Space Professional Update Maj Marc Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Book Review Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy 1st Lt Brent D. Ziarnick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Next Issue: International Space Policy November 2006 Volume 3, Number 1 The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals High Frontier Editorial content is edited, prepared, and provided by High Frontier High Frontier AFSPC/PA Peterson AFB, CO 80914 this journal are those of the authors alone and do not Headquarters Space Command Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Commander Director of Public Affairs Creative Editor Capt Catie Hague


High Frontier 2 Introduction General Kevin P. Chilton Commander, Air Force Space Command day is the hope of today and reality of tomorrow. Dr. Robert Goddard E ach new issue of the High Frontier journal sets the bar higher for quality and critical thinking on issues of impor tance to the National Security Space (NSS) enterprise. This issue offers informed perspectives on the state of our launch capabilities tains informative articles on topics ranging from the enhancement of joint space operations to the command and control of small sat ellites. We have compiled an impressive list of authors, provid ing historical insight, thoughts on current operations, as well as suggestions for our way ahead. As always, our goal is to stimu late thought across the NSS enterprise, embracing a multitude of diverse opinions. You may have also noticed the High Frontier is going digital announcement on the front cover. This effort will make the journal more reader friendly while reducing the costs associated with publishing more than 12,000 copies. We encour age everyone to take a look at our on-line site and if you read an interesting article, send the link ( to a co-worker or friend. The rockets we launch into space carry with them the communi cation, weather, surveillance, navigation, and other national assets which are integral to our national security as well as our economy. both the most exciting and the most dangerous. If something is going to go wrong, it most likely will happen on the way into orbit. For that reason, space launch is a business we pay close attention to and it is also an area where we set high standards. boosters while successfully bringing on our Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) class of launch systems. With an unprec edented streak of 14 operational successes in a row, our EELVs are well on the way to proving their worth to our Nation. Today, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has successfully launched 47 national security payloads in a row. This impressive streak dates back to the Broad Area Review, undertaken in response to multiple launch failures in the late 1990s. It is also a direct result of the launch experts who provide technical expertise, operational savvy, and mission assurance. Without question, these professionals are a national asset and we are doing everything in our power to at tract, develop, and retain as many of them as possible. Our future success depends on it. While we continue to develop more traditional satellite con stellations, we also have an eye on the future and smaller, more tactical spacecraft. Dubbed responsive space, our goal is not to supplant legacy or EELV operations. As technology improves we aim to pursue the development of smaller satellites, opening up the possibility of smaller classes of boosters. The Minotaur program and tactical satellites are perfect examples of this. There are three Assured Access to Space in a Competitive World key missions for responsive lift being discussed. First, use respon sive operations in augmenting surveillance and reconnaissance platforms in response to the needs of a combatant commander. Second, responsive operations may have utility in replacing space assets that have been disabled by attack or natural phenomenon. This is not meant to imply a one-for-one replacement strategy. A quick launch replacement capability would only provide the most vital capabilities of the asset in question. These capabilities would be enough to meet combatant commander requirements until the launch of a fully capable replacement. Finally, responsive space holds promise to enhance Space Situational Awareness. Since the early 1990s we have continued to see a dramatic in crease in the use and integration of space into military and hu manitarian operations. Our combatant commanders rely on the so we must guarantee access to the space domain. For us, that translates into a steadfast commitment to the EELV program while simultaneously searching out innovative, responsive options. With your help, the space and missile experts at AFSPC, will continue to guarantee assured access to space. General Kevin P. Chilton (BS, Engineering Science, USAFA; MS, Mechanical Engineering, Columbia University) is Com mander, Air Force Space Com mand, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He is responsible for the devel opment, acquisition and op eration of the Air Forces space and missile systems. The gen eral oversees a global network of satellite command and con trol, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readi ness of Americas intercontinental ballistic missile force. He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Strategic Command. 15 and is a graduate of the US Air Force Test Pilot School. He prior to joining the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1987. General Chilton is a command-rated astronaut and test space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program Manager for Operations for the International Space Station. The general has served on the Air Force Space Command Staff, the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, and commanded the 9 th sance Wing. Prior to assuming his current position, he was Com mander, 8 th Air Force and Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and Global Strike. Among his many awards, General Chilton has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the NASA Exceptional Service Medal. At his promotion ceremony four-star general.


3 High Frontier General James E. Cartwright Commander, US Strategic Command tional matters. With our new UCP responsibilities toward space, assured access to space is one of the most important issues facing the Command. General James E. Cartwright, Commander, US Strategic Command T tion and discovery. Today, the United States is on the threshold of a new era of space, devoted to mastering opera tions in space. Space-based technology is revolutionizing ma jor aspects of commercial and social activity, and space-related capabilities help national leaders implement American foreign policy and, when necessary, use military power in ways never before employed. In the future, the US will conduct operations to, from, in and through space in support of its national interests both on the Earth and in space. The US must have the same capabilities in space as it does on the land, in the air, and at sea to defend its assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile use of space against US interests. In other words, we must have Assured Access to Space to to the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). tains six major elements: Operationally Responsive Acquisition This is an energetic topic within national circles and has not yielded any one single way ahead. What is clear is that assured access to space is held back when it takes literally decades to acquire new systems that are of ten obsolete before they are launched. Assured ac cess to space is also threatened when the cost of these sys tems is so great that we cannot afford more than one or two units of a space capability. Limited systems are vulner able to loss through either natural or manmade threats. Assured Access to Space Senior Leader Perspective There are four major goals of operationally responsive ac quisition: Reducing Development and Deployment Time and Cost The Department of Defense is leveraging the best commer cial practices available. For example, the industry trend has been to take advantage of advances in miniaturization, automa tion, and materials to create more capable smallsats, microsats, and even nanosats. Smaller size allows for multiple satellites to be launched on a single small booster. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency recently launched an experimental project to test whether the advanced technologies embedded in two miniature satellites and a new upper stage kick motor can project are eagerly anticipated. Capitalizing on Emerging and Innovative Capabilities Continue the process of integrating the products of highinto operational systems. Too often, successful technology demonstrations do not lead to increased operational capabili ties because no planning was conducted for the transition. The Micro-Satellite Technology Experiment, or MiTex for short, will investigate and demonstrate advanced, lighter, off-theshelf space technologies. This demonstration will give military planners real-life experience to draw upon when designing new constellations. Connecting Space to the User Space systems must not exist in a stovepipe, but must be rel evant to the Joint Force operational commander and adaptable to joint warfare. Project IRISInternet Protocol Routing In Spaceis another Advanced Concept Technology Demonstra tion currently underway to literally take the Internet into space. and receive real-time information and knowledge. Responding to the Urgent Need An improved mechanism is needed for delivering effects to joint warfare in response to an urgent or unanticipated need. predict exactly how and when space capabilities will be needed, planning. The national space partners are working to develop tactical satellitesTACSATsto demonstrate that operation ally relevant, rapidly deployable spacecraft can support military operations anywhere on Earth. The selectable payloads will be der direct control of the Joint Task Force commander, making space assets an organic part of the force.


High Frontier 4 A balanced mix of launch-on-demand, store-on-orbit, and launch-on-schedule systems is required, as well as the ability Launch systems must include more than just the physical hard ware of the boosters, but also all the supporting equipment and when key personnel and equipment assets are tied to a single launch facility. The ability to launch and operationalize a satel lite in a matter of hours or days instead of weeks is vital to our national security interests. Technological advancements alone are not the solution. They must be met with an appropriate culture and delivered to tional Component Command for Space and appointed a com mander who is charged with executing command and control of space assets and with preparing for a new paradigm of respon are now directly participating in technology programs, building concept of operations and developing tactics, techniques and procedures for operational employment. The operationally responsive space concept requires devel oping processes for theater commanders to directly task sup porting space assets. Allowing the theater to manage space as sets will result in some institutional resistance, but it increases the speed sions and maneuver faster will win. The speed of decision-making is an asymmetric advantage of the US military and can be enabled through the space domain. Space is a harsh environment and early space advances required con siderable technological sophistica tion. The high cost and low density of military systems naturally leads to a low tolerance for risk. It is time to reconsider this philosophy. There is always risk; the key is the ability to understand, quantify, and manage that risk. Better tools are needed to evaluate our systems under stress whether natural or man-madeen abling leaders to make choices on where they can accept risk. The new approach to Assured Access not only recognizes failures are possible but also assumes we can rapidly assess their impact and can react appropri ately. Every military member and every platform is a sensor. Sen sor capability across all mission areas must be shared. Data less of the source being terrestrial or space-based. Access to the whole greater than the sum of the individuals. The primary functions of capabilities operated in space are to collect (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), broadcast (e.g., global positioning system), and move (e.g., satellite communications [SATCOM]) infor mation vital to Joint Force decisionmaking. This requires a seamless in tegration of space contributions into employ. The integration process must be considered at the start, be ginning with the conception of new space systems. Warrior Mindset Finally, space systems are weap requirements and utilities provided as a service. For example, there was a time when SATCOM interfer ence was ignored if it was not sig a channel. Today, such interference is considered potentially hostile and investigated until we can rule out hostile intent. of orbiting satellites that provides navigation data to military and civilian users worldwide. Lockheed Martin


5 High Frontier More importantly, space systems exist for a purpose, and systems to be there for them under stress conditions. Our ad versaries have the capabilityin some cases have already em ployed capabilitiesto deny US access to space. Adversaries already recognize the importance of our space systems to joint inopportune time. To truly assure access to space, improved space situational awareness is needed to detect, characterize, locate, and mitigate all sources of interference or degradation. General James E. Cart wright (MA, National Security and Strategic Studies, Naval Island) is Commander, United States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He is responsible for the global com mand and control of US stra tegic forces to meet decisive national security objectives. broad range of strategic ca pabilities and options for the President and Secretary of Defense. Command mission areas include full-spectrum global strike, space operations, computer network operations, Department of Defense information operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense, and global Command, Control, Communica General Cartwright was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in November 1971. He attended Naval Flight Of Aviator training and graduated in January 1977. He has opera J-8 the Joint Staff; Deputy Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budgets Headquarters, US Marine Corps; and Assistant Program Manager General Cartwright was named the Outstanding Carrier Aviator by the Association of Naval Aviation. He graduated with distinc tion from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He was selected for and completed a fellowship with This requires wartime reserve modes, contingency plans for outages, the ability to re-route services (across all platforms), to reconstitute or augment existing capabilities, or to neutralize the source of the disruption. This holistic view of Assured Access to Space is ambitious but necessary. The US cannot afford to wait for major tech nological breakthroughs that may yet be decades in the future. Current capability gaps need to be addressed today, leveraging existing technology and better employing existing weapon sys tems. US reliance on our space-based architecture is obvious to friend and foe alike. It is our freedom of action in space, at a time and place of our choosing, that must be assured. To truly assure access to space, improved space situational awareness is needed to detect,


High Frontier 6 Framing the Assured Access Debate: A Brief History of Air Force Space Launch General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF, retired Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton Assured access is a requirement for critical national secu allow continued space operations, consistent with risk manage ment and affordability. 1 Introduction While the term assured access to space was coined in 1983, the concept traces its roots to the earliest days of the Air rent approach to assured access requires some appreciation of the evolution of our Air Force launch capabilities and the major Launch Modernization Plan (SLMP) was completed in 1994 and ultimately led to the creation of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The second, the Assured Access Space Study, was completed two years ago and helped frame the debate on whether the government should maintain one or two major launch vehicle providers. The story begins at the dawn of the Space Age. In 1955, Geophysical Year (IGY) (1957-1958), with the intent to estab lish the principles of freedom of space and international the IGY, the US selected the non-military Naval Research the Vanguard program had schedule and budget problems. 2 As a consequence the Soviets beat us to space by orbiting Sputnik I in October 1957. The launch of Sputnik created a US national crisis. Sput nik was an 184 lb. instrumented package launched via a rocket weighed less than four pounds. 3 This demonstrated the Sovi ets were technologically sophisticated enough to deploy both operating spacecraft and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Over the next few years, the US reaction to Sputnik resulted in the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad ministration (NASA) in the fall of 1958, the creation that same year of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (the forerun ner of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), and continued competition between the services for supremacy in the space and ballistic missile missions. 4 In the fall of 1959, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy assigned the Air Force responsibility for the development, production, and launch of space boosters (as well as payload integration). 5 This decision was the direct result of a concerted effort by Air Force leader ship, spearheaded by Maj Gen Bernard A. Schriever, to acquire all or part of the space mission. cles (ELV) were derived from Atlas, Titan, and Thor long-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile development efforts ongoing under General Schriever since 1954. 6 Atlas was conceived as an intercontinental ballistic mis late 1958. Atlas would go on to have a short career as an ICBM, but a long one as a space launcher. Since 1957, tions. 7 The two-stage Titan ICBM was originally built as a back up to the Atlas missile. Development forked into two paths, one supporting the crewed Gemini program, while the other provided an ICBM capability for 20 years. When the Titan missiles were retired in the mid-1980s, some of them were refurbished and converted to space launch vehicles. The last Titan vehicle was launched in 2005, making it the 368 th vehicle in this family. 8 The Delta family began with roots in Thor and Vanguard in the late 1950s and continues to serve as a space launch er today. Delta began as a small launcher, originally ca pable of only lifting 150 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit, and then evolved to a more powerful medium-lift four decades of service. 9 Although by the early 1970s Atlas, Titan, and Delta had be come reliable ELVs, the country soon pursued a more ambitious means to space. The debate surrounding the future of manned space programs in the post-Apollo, post-Vietnam budgets era was settled when the Nixon Administration chose to build the Space Transportation System more commonly referred to as the Space Shuttle. Once initial design and development were com pleted, President Jimmy Carter, Jr., decided that only the Space Shuttle would launch US satellites into space. The rationale for cost targets, the four Shuttles would have to launch all national security satellites. 10 This meant that existing national security Senior Leader Perspective


7 High Frontier that an upper stage had to be developed to provide propulsion to rity satellites under development would be designed for Shuttle launch only. In late 1983, the national security space community under the leadership of Mr. Edward C. Pete Aldridge, who was dual-hatted as the Under Secretary of the Air Force and Direc concern with risks inherent in the Shuttle only approach as it put all payloads on a single launch system. Arguing that the country needed assured access in the event of a Shuttle problem, Secretary Aldridge was able to convince the White House and the Congress to purchase ten expendable vehicles to complement the Shuttle. 11 The Air Force compet ed the complementary ELV, and selected the Titan 34D7later known as the Titan IV. The wisdom of the assured access policy was soon to be ap parent due to a tragic series of events in the mid-1980s. In Space Shuttle Challenger tragically exploded during its boost phase. Then another Titan 34D ELV failed in April 1986. With neither the Shuttle nor Titan operational, the United States was unable to launch the preponderance of its military or civilian spacecraft. 12 Individuals who remember these trying times are often the greatest proponents of assured access as they recall a time when we were without a launch capability. The Nation responded to the assured access crisis through a variety of short-term and longer-term initiatives. In the short term, the Department of Defense (DoD) authorized the purchase of additional Titan IVs, the Air Force ordered the procurement of a medium launch vehicle (selecting the Delta II in January advanced version of the Atlas Centaur upper stage was started. 13 launch capability experienced a downtime of 32 months. The longer-term initiatives resulted from the nature of US space launch vehicles available in the post-Challenger era. These boosters were costly to build and operate, were based upon 1960s era, ballistic missile-derived technology, and re quired a large force of technicians and months of launch prepa ration. Moreover, the DoD now expected that spacelift require ments would increase given the projected heavy-lift needs of missile defense systems. 14 This combination of cost, work force, responsiveness, and increased projected demand con vinced the DoD to study new launch approaches. anticipation of greater launch demand and improved perfor mance resulted in a series of efforts to modernize space launch. 1987, and conceived as a modular family of boosters capable of lifting from 5,200 lbs. up to 198,000 lbs. into low Earth orbit (LEO). However, two years later the Berlin Wall fell which signaled the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, ALS was scaled back to a technology development program. Even if ALS in its original form was not needed, the DoD still desired to improve of studies this time under a new name the National Launch System (NLS). NLS looked at a family of boosters and upper stages, all using a new space transportation main engine. NLS was also relatively short-lived. Congress was highly skepti cal of the wisdom of the $12 billion investment, and the DoD ended the effort in 1991. The National Space Council under Vice President Dan Quayle then chartered a study called Future of the US Space Launch Capability (a.k.a. the Aldridge Study) to take a national perspective. In its November 1992 report, the study recommended developing a new medium-lift (20,000 lbs. to LEO) ELV called Spacelifter, which would form the core of a modular vehicle family able to put up to 50,000 lbs. in to LEO. 15 This idea, too, died for lack of support and funding. The failure to proceed with ALS, NLS, and Spacelifter re sulted from the inability to reach consensus on launch require ments among the key players DoD, NASA, and the intel ligence community. Nevertheless, the DoD still wanted an having widely differing support requirements. By late 1993, the country had several years of launch stud ies and false starts with no real progress toward modernization. Congress now stepped in with the 1994 National Defense Au thorization Act, directing the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to Congress, a plan that establishes and clearly de of space launch capabilities for the DoD or, if appropriate, for the government as a whole. 16 In December 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense formed a study group to address the congressional tasking, and asked that I lead the effort. At the time, I was the Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command. The 1994 Space Launch Modern ization Plan report was the result of three months of intensive effort by a study team that included representatives of various national security and civil space organizations, including the differing views and interests in this area and the underlying causes that had led to an inability to maintain consensus within the executive branch. 17 These differing interests and perspec tives are summarized below: The defense space sector was most interested in cost-ef fective, medium-class launches for its force enhancement payloads, while seeing future needs for improved oper ability, dependability, and responsiveness. able heavy lift capability for its large and expensive pay loads. The civil space sector focused on safe, reliable human to reduce the costs of space transportation by pursuing a


High Frontier 8 reusable space launch system. The commercial space sector was synergistic with the de fense space sector because both were interested in lower prices and dependable launch schedules, and both saw limited opportunities to expand the launch market. 18 Production and launch rate stability, to reduce costs, maintain continuity, and improve reliability. Reliability, to control the cost of failure and make re sources available for investment. Technology, to provide a foundation for modernization at reasonable cost, schedule, and risk. Space launch management, to achieve consensus and re verse technological/industrial drift and atrophy. Funding commitment, to move beyond the austere up grades. 19 The 1994 SLMP addressed each of these requirements in its groups: (1) fundamental drivers of the space launch industry; (2) critical drivers of cost, capability, or operations; (3) special focus areas; and (4) current operations enhancement areas. 20 It is not important to address the details of the study. However, from my perspective, the SLMP was successful because it con sidered the varied needs and attempted to create a win-win for the DoD, NRO, FAA, and NASA. With the big players on the same sheet of music, a new initiative could go forward. The results of the SLMP formed the foundation of the 1994 National Space Transportation Policy. This policy established the DoD as the lead agency for improvement and evolution gy development [while] NASA will be the lead agency for technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable space transportation systems, such as the single-stageto-orbit concept. 21 In the EELV Cost Concept Validation phase, DoD awarded four Concept Validation contracts in August 1995. In Novem ber 1997, with a booming commercial satellite market believed to lie ahead, DoD decided to award two pre-engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contracts rather than the expected one, and bring both vehicles onto the market. Lock heed Martin and McDonnell Douglas (which later merged with Boeing) were awarded EMD contracts. 22 The Air Force spent $2 billion in EELV development funds, common components, processes, and infrastructure was ex Air Force expected the EELV would cut the cost of launching government payloads in the National Mission Model by 25 to 50 percent (compared to Delta, Atlas, and Titan), a cost savings of $5 billion to $10 billion between 2002 and 2020. 23 It was nication satellite business, the industry could sustain two robust keep the prices low. In October 1998, during the EELV Buy I phase, Boeing received a contract for 19 EELV missions, while a contract for nine missions went to Lockheed Martin. Each company re ceived $500 million in EELV EMD work. Subsequent environ mental changes included the infusion of additional development funds to offset the lagging commercial market, the removal of seven launches from Boeing on the grounds of corporate mis conduct, and the renewed debate on whether two EELV provid ers should be sustained. 24 In 1999, the DoD faced another assured access crisis. With these due to upper stage anomalies. In the previous two years, nine out of 51 vehicles suffered critical failures. As a conse quence, a Broad Area Review (BAR) was directed by the White House that was chaired by former Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen eral Larry D. Welch. The BAR panel noted that contractors had been focusing too many resources on EELV development, and Review stressed mission success and recommended disciplined system engineering and the importance of a comprehensive independent review process. The BAR also noted an urgent need to identify clear lines of authority and accountability with government and industry for delivering spacecraft on-orbit. 25 In hindsight, the BAR was one of the most useful study efforts ever as the US has not experienced a launch failure since the BAR recommendations were implemented. 2004 Assured Access to Space Study During 2003 and early 2004, there was considerable de bate on the viability of maintaining both EELV providers. The launch demand, which had been projected based largely on an anticipated explosion in the commercial communications satel lite market, had not materialized, and consequently, the industry was overcapitalized. Moreover, there were serious questions Consequently, two different views developed during the bud get debates of early 2004. On one side were those in the bud committeeswho favored downselecting to one EELV provid er. On the other side was the operational communitythe Air Force and the NRO, who were mindful of the launch problems in the mid-1980s, and wanted more assured access, that is, the insurance of two providers. As a consequence, I was asked in the early summer of 2004 by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in cooperation with the Under Secretary of the Air Forcethe DoD Executive Agent for Space to address the following questionWhat is the plan and the investments the DoD should make to better support assured access to space? 26 The purpose of the study was to outline the milestones, op tions, and alternatives to improve further the national security prehensive analysis to support decision-making, understanding


9 High Frontier the impact of EELV decisions on future launch options, and identifying events or actions that could reduce uncertainty. The study was conducted as a contractor-led, governmentsupported activity throughout the summer and fall of 2004. Advising and guiding the execution of the study were some ernment and industry. It should be noted that the study was neither a total update of the 1994 SLMP plan nor a new plan, but a focused update on assured space access and reliability as those factors apply to the EELV program and options. The study team set out to determine: The relationship between launch and production rates and reliability. Whether a single EELV provider could provide the reli ability, performance, and necessary infrastructure to meet national space requirements. maintaining two EELV providers; down-selecting to a single EELV provider; establishing a joint hybrid model; and developing a new launch system. Investment options that could better support assured space access. 27 The study approach included extensive data gathering from a wide variety of government stakeholder organizations and industry representatives. Over the course of four months, the study team interviewed and visited a broad range of govern major launch providers, sub-tier suppliers, and small launch vendors. methodology and primary lines of inquiry. Demand the total current addressable EELV market was about half that of the 1994 SLMP projection, and approximately 40 percent of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. In ad dition, the analysis showed that the DoD was the largest user in the EELV market, comprising more than 80 percent of the total launch demand and that this percentage would continue for the foreseeable future. 28 Reduced expectations for EELV commer nine years) shows about 10 DoD missions per year, 1.4 NASA missions per year, and one commercial mission per year. 29 An additional factor in demand modeling is the impact of than the original projections. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the Gooch Factor after Col Larry Gooch, USAF, retired who had commanded both East and West Coast launch organizations. He observed that the Nation only launches ap proximately 70 percent what it plans to launch. The study team audited this claim by comparing the mission model from the then. As Colonel Gooch had predicted, the analysis showed that 70 percent of the planned launches from 1995-2004 were cent Gooch factor, and arrived at a revised forecast of 75-110 30 different in both magnitude and composition than in prior years. The DoD dominates the mission model, which consists of eight to 12 missions a year, and only includes limited NASA and commercial missions.


High Frontier 10 Reliability The study team found that design and process reliability are relevant metric due to the extremely high number of launches The study team found value in an approach, which measures early launch system reliability and predicts life cycle reliability, pioneered by Mr. Edmardo Joe Tomei and Dr. Sergio Guarro of the Aerospace Corporation. The Aerospace analysis indi seven launches of a new program, failures are not correlated cess and workmanship errors. 31 Process reliability is a function of both production and op erations parameters. Contractors design their processes for a process limits, then error will result because of rushed labor. Alternatively, if production or operations fall below the mini The study team applied the 3/7 launch reliability methodol ogy to each EELV model. Within an EELV family, variations exist between models; however, the common components with in an EELV family should not be ignored. For example, design reliability of the four-meter payload fairing of the Delta IV family is considered most ly retired after three launches of a Delta 400-series booster. Similarly, process reliability of the Atlas V solid rocket mo tors is established after seven launches of Atlas vehicles with strap-on motors. The con clusions from 3/7 reliability analysis were incorporated into tainty (discussed later). Resiliency The study found that most people wanted to describe assured access in terms of reliability. As the study team progressed in our analysis, it became apparent that often what people were describing was the need for resiliency rather than reliability. while resiliency considers the collective ability of all available launch systems to meet national security needs. Given the po tential confusion between resiliency and reliability, the study team believed that it was important to establish a common un derstanding of resiliency. One commonly raised scenario in a down-select situation is the potential for the selected launch provider to have a fail ure, with no available back-up launch capability. In this case, impacted, and on-orbit capability would be diminished. In a downselect scenario, the extent of the consequences related to resiliency is scenario-dependent. cant capability shortfall resulting from a single launch failure. Under this scenario, an on-pad failure of an unrelated payload occurs before the scheduled replacement can be launched. If the DoD had not invested in additional launch facilities on each coast, the launch stand-down time following the failure could be as long as 23 months. However, if additional launch pads were built on each coast, the launch slip could be only six months. 32 Accordingly, the study team concluded that invest ment in additional launch pads on each coast (under a one-pro vider scenario) greatly speeds recovery after a launch failure. The greatest value of resiliency is tied to this maximum mission regret scenario. select scenario. The government would likely need to invest more in the remaining provider to reduce risk. For example, a down-select to a single provider may require building additional launch pads on each coast, and possibly other infrastructure as well. Down-selecting to one provider can also increase risk by having all eggs in one basket. If there are two EELV provid ers and one vehicle family experiences an off-pad failure, the


11 High Frontier a down-select scenario, without non-EELV backup launch capa bility, every payload rides on one vehicle family; hence, if there is a problem with that vehicle family, every payload is affected. EELV Options The outputs of this study included options with key invest ment milestones. It is important to emphasize that the study did not recommend one EELV option over the others. Instead, the study output was a comprehensive analysis to support deci sion making on the way aheadto understand the impact of EELV decisions on future launch options and to identify events or actions that can reduce uncertainty. This latter statement is all-important as all options have varying degrees of uncertainty. The study team highlighted the tremendous interplay and inter Down-select to one EELV provider, included cost savings, improved business case, and high er production and operations rates. Some of the relevant competition, reduced future launch options, and limited resiliency. Maintain two EELV providers for the near future with certainty, preserving options for the future, and ensuring resiliency. Cautions included higher infrastructure costs, sustainment of out-year funding, and process reliability risks with low launch and production tempo. Combine EELV operations. This option involved the two contractors combining their engineering, production and launch capabilities into a joint venture. This option would dampen both the upside and downside of the ben approach. Develop a new launch system. A new launch system could be based on the most modern technology and could side or caution of a new launch system is the massive investment and lengthy development and test time. 33 Uncertainty Understanding and quantifying uncertainty is key to in formed decision making. In that light, the study team drew three general conclusions regarding uncertainty: choosing an option is directly related to uncertainty. Uncertainty changes over time and is reduced as events occur. cessful execution may reduce uncertainty. 34 amined existing space launch policy and strategies, acquisition plans and programs, and development and operational plans. Proven EELV. At the time of this study (October 2004), time represented a high degree of uncertainty in systemlife reliability. Business Case. This category of uncertainty included the timing, scope, and acquisition strategy of future EELV commercial demand; and the effects and duration of the Boeing suspension. Engines. Despite the demonstrated success of current time and test data, the timing associated with US pro duction capabilities, and the future viability of EELV en gines. Heavy Launch Capability. It will require several years capability. As of this writing, the US has only launched one heavy EELV (August 2006). NASA Requirements. ture requirements for heavy lift by the conclusion of this study. Since then, NASA has decided not to use EELV to meet any of its space exploration mission needs. 35 The study team conducted a detailed analysis of these factors over time in order to understand their impact on the decision activities, and milestones that could reduce uncertainty. Based on this analysis, the study team made three impor tant observations. First, there were no simple or unambiguous decisions regarding the way ahead for EELV as each option can make the EELV options more attractive, or reduce the un uncertainty will be collectively reduced. In summary, the 2004 Assured Access to Space Study deter mined that this is an enormously complex issue with no easy solutions. What was clear is that the demand for EELV was and tion appears to have two very capable, but relatively immature derscores the complexity and uncertainty facing decision mak ers. Uncertainty remains high although reductions in uncer tainty are projected at the end of 2007 and in 2009. 36 Given this degree of uncertainty and the associated risks, the DoD chose to continue to fund two EELV providers. In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin agreed to form a joint venture (the third option examined in the study) that would combine the production, engineering, test and launch generation technologies that will increase responsiveness, improve reliability, and reduce costs.


High Frontier 12 29 Ibid, 16. 30 Ibid. 31 (Aerospace Corporation, 2004). 32 Enabling Assured Access Final Report, 29. 33 Ibid, 6. 34 Ibid, 41. 35 Ibid, 42. 36 Ibid, 49. operations associated with US Government EELV launches. The DoD and the Federal Trade Commission approved this joint venture in October 2006. Summary and Conclusions The Air Force has come a long way in its 60 years of space launch. Today, our space launch systems are achieving extraor dinary reliability, demonstrated by a current streak of 47 con secutive launch successes across a variety of systems. This un precedented success is due to a solid technology base, a strong government and industry partnership that emphasizes mission success and sustained, committed leadership by the Air Force. While our recent launch record which includes 13 of 13 EELV successes is indeed impressive, we should not rest on our laurels. Assured access is not a destination, but rather a journey. As a nation, we need to continue to adequately fund space launch operations and develop the next-generation tech nologies that will increase responsiveness, improve reliability, and reduce costs. Through these actions, we can ensure the Nation will have continuous, uninterrupted access to space for decades to come. 1 US Space Transportation Policy, fact sheet, 6 January 2005, http:// search=%22SpaceTransFactSheetJan2005%22 (accessed 25 September 2006). 2 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier: The United States Air Force and the Military Space Program, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1977, 8. 3 David N. Spires, Space Leadership (Air Force Space Command, 1998), 51. 4 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier, 10. 5 David N. Spires, 77. 6 Enabling Assured Access to Space Study: Launch Vehicle Appendix (McLean, Booz Allen Hamilton, 2004), 8. 7 Ibid, 19. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid, 20. 10 E.C. Aldridge Jr., Assured Access: The Bureaucratic Space War, Dr. Robert H. Goddard Historical Essay, 1. 11 Curtis Peebles, High Frontier, 28. 12 E.C. Aldridge Jr., Assured Access, 14. 13 Ibid, 15. 14 Enabling Assured Access to Space Study, appendix, 51. 15 Ibid, 51-52. 16 Enabling Assured Access Final Report, (McLean, Booz Allen Ham ilton, 2005) 9. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, 11. 21 National Space Transportation Policy, 5 August 1994, http://www. (accessed 26 September 2006). 22 Enabling Assured Access Appendix, 55. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Space Launch Vehicles Broad Area Review Panel, Space Launch richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/Space_Launch_Vehicles_Broad_ Area_Review.pdf#search=%22broad%20area%20review%22 (accessed 26 September 2006). 26 Enabling Assured Access Final Report, 3. 27 Enabling Assured Access Final Report, 4. 28 Ibid, 4. General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. USAF, retired (BA, History and Political Science, Dartmouth College; MBA, Business Admin istration, Western New England College; MS, Political Science, Auburn University) is currently a Vice President at Booz Allen Hamilton responsible for the ness. General Moorman retired as the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. As a member of the Congres sionally-directed Space Com mendations. He led Booz Allen s USD Acquisition and Technology Subsequently, he led a number of space industrial base-related efforts for the government. In General Moorman s last military assignment as Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, he acted on behalf of the Chief of Staff dur ing his temporary absence. He oversaw and managed the day-today activities of the Air Staff at the Pentagon, chaired the Air Force Council, and was the Air Force representative to a number of joint and Committee, the Defense Medical Advisory Committee, the Senior view. General Moorman also chaired the Air Force Board of Direc tors charged with developing the Air Force strategic vision for the 21 st century. As Commander and Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command ing military space systems; ground-based radar and missile warning satellites; the Nation s space launch centers at Patrick AFB, Florida, and Vandenberg AFB, California; the worldwide network of space surveillance radars; and maintaining the intercontinental ballistic mis sile (ICBM) force. As Commander, General Moorman provided Air Force space support to the coalition forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In addition to numerous military awards and decorations, General Moorman was honored several times for contributions to the Nations premier award of the National Space Club; the National Geograph ic Societys General Thomas D. White US Air Force Space Trophy (1991), awarded for outstanding contributions to the Nations progress in space; the American Astronautical Societys Military Astronautics Ernie Ford Distinguished Achievement Award (1996), for exceptional leadership in US space programs. In 1998, General Moorman was chosen by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics as the Von Karman lecturer, and the National Air and Space Museum to present the Wernher von Braun lecture.


13 High Frontier Ms. Patricia Grace Smith Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration I n April 2006, the Air Force and the Federal Aviation Ad ministration (FAA) convened a summit meeting in Colo rado Springs, Colorado. The event made it possible for private entrepreneurial launch vehicle developers to come together and show how their work might help meet Air Force needs on the sentations, Air Force representatives spoke about a number of their space activities and possible areas where the initiative of private enterprise might play a role. On the surface, it appeared to be a fairly conventional gath ering. But what distinguished this meeting from previous ones was that there had never been any previous ones. This was a entrepreneurs had ever met as a group with the Air Force. What took place in Colorado Springs underscored the fact that a new and growing number of private providers are work ing on a variety of ways to deliver ready access to space. And it further emphasized the value of the strong and effective partnership that the meeting sponsorsthe Air Force and the FAAhave been building for years. It showed how two or ganizations working closely together could help build better The Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration: Partners for Space Access certainly to the vendors, and potentially to the Air Force and the Nation. Of course, the FAA was glad to take a lead role in arranging the summit since promoting and facilitating the com That said, people unfamiliar with it might still ask what an Air Force and FAA partnership has to do with access to space it is not hard to appreciate the Air Force side of the relationship, involvement. By Executive Order in 1984, President Ronald Reagan es Department of Transportation (DOT). In October of 1995, the by the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Trans portation (AST). Simply put, AST regulates commercial space so, and promotes the development of the US commercial space transportation industry. AST duties include licensing commercial space launch op erations to determine whether a planned launch can be done safely, without injury to the uninvolved public or damage to eration of re-entry vehicles and issues ex perimental permits for suborbital reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). Finally, AST li censes the operation of non-federal launch sites, more commonly called spaceports, currently totaling six including commercial operations at Vandenberg AFB, California; the Mojave Civilian Flight Test Center, California; the Virginia Space Flight Cen ter at Wallops Island, Virginia; the Florida spaceport at Cape Canaveral, Florida; the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska; and the Clinton Sherman Industrial Airpark near Burns Flat, Oklahoma. AST launch operation activity was ex clusively focused on expendable launch vehicles (ELV) until 2004. That year, AST licensed the launch and re-entry of Space ShipOne, an RLV, that went on to capture the $10 million Ansari X-Prize. As a result of the Commercial Space Launch Amend ments Act of 2004, AST was assigned du Assured Access to Space


High Frontier 14 making process governing the crew and passengers for com mercial suborbital RLVs and for experimental launch permits. After more than two decades of licensing experience with ELVs, Safety Standards The Air Force and the FAA partnership reaches back nearly a decade to 1997 when the two organizations began work on de veloping common launch safety standards. In February 2000, of Science and Technology and the National Security Council recommended that the Air Force and the FAA continue their cooperative development of common safety requirements to be applied to government and commercial launches at federal and non-federal launch sites. In the years that followed, the Air Force devoted consider able resources and time to this intensely thorough effort, even tually involving more than 100 technical experts and engineers assigned to the Common Stan dards Working Group. All the effort was aimed at further ensuring safety, while reduc ing administrative burdens for users at ranges where both the FAA and the Air Force have re sponsibilities to maintain pub lic safety. The work was part of an evo lutionary process. For years, the Air Force has protected the responsibility to maintain public safety during commercial tion at federal ranges. Rapidly emerging interest in non-federal launch sites called out for the same approach to public safety that exists at federal sites. The commitment of the partners, in concert with the industry, has succeeded. On 25 August 2006 the FAA formally issued new common launch safety standards designed to create con sistent, integrated space launch rules and requirements for the Nation. This new rule will strengthen public safety by harmo nizing launch procedures that help identify potential problems early and by implementing a formal system of safety checks and balances. The new regulations govern commercial ELV launch operations at federal and non-federal launch sites. By codifying safety practices derived from decades of Department of Defense and NASA experience and now in place at federal ranges, proven safety requirements are now readily accessible in one document. Common launch safety requirements for all launch sites means that launch providers can more easily use systems quali eral programs launching at multiple ranges such as the Missile Defense Agency that uses both federal and non-federal launch sites. Moreover, the Air Force and the FAA partnership has already facilitated the launch mishap investigation process by promoting better planning, coordination, and information shar ing. the way and produced formal, common standards, of value to launch operators, the FAA and the Air Force and, most impor tant, the public. Beyond these vital benchmarks, by bringing the parties closer, it means access to space will improve, not only by insuring common rules, but also by creating an envi ronment more hospitable to more launch operators. At the April entrepreneurial space summit, Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command, noted In that regard, he said there were a number of things in which the Air Force was interested, including the area of responsive spacelift the area of re sponsive spacecraft. That is an opportunity environment where the commercial world can deliver a service. That same month, in an ar ticle for this journal, he wrote: Space is an inherently joint activity. 1 Those six words are at the heart of the Air Force and the FAA partnership and unquestionably at the heart of cess to space. The Air Force has led the way to assured space access and has begun to look closely at RLVs as evidenced by its work on the Affordable Responsive Spacelift program. The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio has the lead on the program, and AFRL is an advocate for strengthen ing the RLV community through partnerships with the FAA and commercial launch providers. The principal goal is to build reusable systems more quickly with cutting edge technical ad vances to ensure that the Air Force can meet its assured access to space goals. manders. They use the global positioning satellites for naviga tion and targeting and weather satellites for air tasking order development and movements. They use space-based commu nications capabilities for blue force tracking and realtime tar geting. These commanders constantly request more bandwidth and more advanced systems to complete their missions. These resourceful commanders will still send up an aircraft when nec essary as a communications relay, but they recognize that space systems provide the optimum stable, reliable, and secure com munications option. and Air Force missions evolve, the value of the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration partnership and the connection with the private entrepreneurial space sector can pay even greater economic and national defense dividends in the years to come.


15 High Frontier Without question, the years ahead will intensify demand for the redundancy to deliver uninterrupted, high-quality command and control access to theatre operations. In pursuit of that ob approval, assure global coverage, increase capacity, and shrink ate resources, linked to space-based assets. In that respect, NASA announced the winners of the Com mercial Orbital Transportation Services competition in late Au gust. The companies chosen will develop vehicles intended to of those vehicles, which will be licensed by the FAA, will in outcomes of substantial interest to the Air Force. There is nothing revolutionary about commercial involve Bell, Boeing, Chance Vaught, Consolidated, Curtiss, Grum man, Lockheed, Martin, North American, Northrop, and others that built the planes that made the skies our own. In the same tradition of technical know-how and innovation, another generation of vehicle builders is preparing for involve ment in a world of affordable access to space, with the poten tial to help in everyday support of national defense needs and rant. When General Klotz said space is an inherently joint ac tivity, he was speaking from the lessons of our history and looking to tomorrow and beyond. The commercial space trans portation industry has established itself as a dynamic, exciting industry, responsible in 2004 for more than $98 billion in eco nomic activity, $25 billion in earnings, and more than 550,000 jobs. It is an industry with a lineage of experience and reli ability expanding into an additional line of business private The commercial sector brings with it the potential for a di verse range of vehicles and launch options that can help avoid total reliance on any one vehicle, or any single launch site. That would give the Nation an extended set of dependable space transportation alternatives, a vital factor in any program of assured access to space. As the range of commercial space expands, and Air Force missions evolve, the value of the Air Force and the FAA partnership and the connection with the pri vate entrepreneurial space sector can pay even greater econom ic and national defense dividends in the years to come. The potential for delivering new results as well as new opportunities holds great promise. Today, around the world, nations are embracing the promise of space and developing hardware and programs of their own. They are enthusiastic about the commercial payload side, and the exploration side. And they are not unaware of the national security implications. In the United States, we have an extra advantage. To the enthusiasm and innovation of our own new Ms. Patricia G. Smith (BA, Tuskegee University) serves as Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transporta tion within the Department of Transportations Federal Avia tion Administration (FAA), for overseeing and regulat ing the US commercial space transportation industry. Ms. Smiths work has con FAA keep pace with the rapid changes affecting the industry. She has worked extensively to develop new and updated licensing, experimental permits, and insurance regulations for commercial launch operations, as well as working to ensure that the industry remains a leader in a grow ing, internationally competitive marketplace. Ms. Smith began her career at the Department of Transportation became OCSTs Chief of Staff. In November 1995, OCST was additional FAA line of business. With this transfer, Ms. Smith was named Deputy Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (AST), joining the ranks of FAAs Senior Executive Service. In June 1998, Ms. Smith was named FAA As sociate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation. served as Chief of FCCs Consumer Assistance and Small Busi her principle responsibilities, Ms. Smith worked on several ma jor initiatives on behalf of the agency, among them as executive committee team member for the FCC Spectrum Auctions Imple US assets in history. Ms. Smith, along with her team members, received Vice President Gores Hammer Award. Ms. Smith also held positions at the Department of Defense, De the Senate Commerce Committee. Ms. Smith did graduate work at Auburn University, George Washington University, and Harvard University School of Busi ness. In 1996, she was awarded the Distinguished Alumni Award from Tuskegee University. She is the recipient of numerous other awards and has served on several boards. ence in national defense, civil, and commercial space. It is a powerful combination of assetsan unfolding partnership pointing the way to assured space access, while reinforcing our leadership role on the high frontier. 1 Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, Space Command and Control: The Lynch pin to Our Success, High Frontier 2, no. 3 (April 2006): 2.


High Frontier 16 on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Mr. Ray F. Johnson Vice President Space Launch Operations The Aerospace Corporation Mr. Edmardo Joe Tomei Space Launch Operations Chief Engineer The Aerospace Corporation T he catastrophic failures of Space Shuttle Challenger and Titan 34D-9 within three months in 1986 had a devastat ing effect on the Department of Defense (DoD) space commu nity, and resulted in a series of actions to recover from the lack of space access caused by these disasters. The Titan, Delta, and At las launch programs, which were in the process of being phased out, were revitalized; the Air Force Space Shuttle Program was cancelled; and a series of far reaching studies were performed over several years. All of these actions had as their primary mo tive assuring access to space for national security. The resulting Space Launch Modernization Plan of 1994, 1 directed by Con gress and led by General Thomas S. Moorman, presented various alternatives ranging from no change at all to a complete overhaul launch needs, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) concept was chosen as the best balance between cost and risk. EELV sought to eliminate the variety of expendable launch vehiclesTitans II and IV, Delta II, Atlas II, and so forthand meant the launch pads and payload interfaces would all need to be standardized, and the rockets would employ a modular design to accommodate different payload classes. By 1997, the worldwide demand for commercial launches into geosynchronous transfer orbit was expected to grow dramatically. Given this robust commercial market, the Air Force decided to re vise its acquisition strategy and allow two contractors to proceed into the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase and receive Initial Launch Service contracts. Giving the Air Force a choice in selecting the launch provider would assure access to This cost-sharing arrangement provided only partial fund ing for the development of the two launch systems. The bal ance would come from the contractors themselves. In exchange, the contractors would retain ownership and control of all system designs and launch operations and could thus shape their devel opment plans to support long-term corporate goals. The govern ment plan was to rely on the commercial market to establish con mission assurance. The government assumed that seven or eight ernment mission. Shortly after the Air Force changed its acquisition strategy, the between 1997 and 1999. As a result, the government formed a Broad Area Review (BAR) of Space Launch, 2 headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch, retired, to in vestigate and evaluate potential systemic causes of failures across all launch systems. The BAR found that engineering process and workmanship errors were the primary cause of the launch fail ures and degradation of system engineering, risk management, mended that the Air Force EELV Program heed the lessons of the heritage launch failures and become a smart, more involved cus tomer. During the same period, the projected boom in the com mercial market began to dissipate and the number of commercial were drastically reduced, effectively eliminating the risk reduc tion anticipated by the original Air Force acquisition plan. As a result of the BAR recommendations, additional mission assurance steps were taken on EELV. Early in the program inde pendent mission assurance typically performed by The Aerospace Corporation on DoD launches was not planned since government involvement was limited to an insight role in the commercial acquisition approach. However, as the program approached the emphasis on government mission assurance led to a reinvigora 3 The EELV program includes two families of launch vehi clesthe Atlas V and the Delta IValong with their associated infrastructure and support systems, assuring independent access to space. Each is based on a two-stage, medium-lift vehicle, aug mented by solid rockets as needed to increase payload capability, and a three-core, heavy-lift variant. Both have achieved notable successes in their early launches, but the EELV program is still in its infancy, and will need continued scrutiny to ensure that the anticipated gains in cost and reliability will be realized over the long term. The Atlas V traces its roots to the Atlas intercontinental bal listic missiles developed in the late 1950s. First used as a space launch vehicle for Project SCORE in 1958, its modern evolution begins with the Atlas IIA, introduced in 1992. The Atlas IIA fea Assured Access to Space


17 High Frontier tured a three-meter-di ameter, pressure-stabi lized booster powered by three liquid oxygen/ kerosene (booster and sustainer) engines. The the Centaur IIwas also three-meters in diameter and featured a dual RL10A-4 engine. The Atlas IIAS, intro duced in 1993, used four solid rocket boost ers to increase perfor mance. The next major Atlas variant, the IIIA, included the Russian-built RD-180 engine, which is also featured to restrictions on access to RD-180 design and test data. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne is in the process of developing an RD-180 US co-production capability as a risk-reduction effort. The Atlas This vehicle introduced the Common Centaur upper stage, which the 3.8-meter-diameter common core booster, which forms the basic building block of all Atlas V vehicles. Upgrades to avionics and redundant systems were also incorporated. The Atlas V core vehicles can be equipped with payload fairings measuring fourstrapped together. All variants use the same main engine, core booster, Common Cen taur, and avionics. This commonality enables the Atlas V to support a wide range of missions and facilitates upgrade from one variant to the next if performance requirements increase. Atlas that can support direct injection into geosynchronous orbit. The four-meter ve hicles can lift 4,950 7,620 kilograms to geosynchronous trans series can lift 3,950 8,665 kilograms, and the heavy lift vehicle can lift 12,600 kilo grams. The Delta IV lin eage also traces back to the late 1950s and has its origin in the Thor ballistic mis sile. First used as a space launch vehicle in 1958 on the Pioneer lunar missions, the Thor evolved into the Delta launch vehicle in 1960. The modern evolution stems from the Delta II, which 27A liquid-oxygen/kerosene main engine on a core vehicle mea suring 2.4-meters in diameter. The Delta II is dependent on strapon solid rocket motors for liftoff. The second stage is powered by an engine running on N2O4 and Aerozine 50. For high-energy missions such as a GPS transfer orbit or Earth escape trajectory, a third stage can be added with a solid rocket motor. The next development was the introduction of a four-meterdiameter cryogenic (liquid-oxygen/liquid-hydrogen) upper stage on the Delta III, powered by an RL10B-2 engine. The RL10B-2 extendable nozzle. The Delta III booster uses a shorter and wider fuel tank than the Delta II to accommodate the larger upper stage and payload fairing. In addition, slightly larger graphite-epoxy solid rocket motors were employed. The Delta III doubled the of payloads. ta III four-meter-diam eter upper stage to a eter common booster 68 main engine is the uid-hydrogen main en gine developed in the United States since the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). It uses a gas-generator cycle with a relatively low chamber pressure. Although it has sig


High Frontier 18 SSME, it produces almost twice the thrust and is much simpler and cheaper to produce. The complete Delta IV family includes three classes of ve hiclesmedium, medium plus, and heavy. The medium vehicle comprises a common booster core and a four-meter-diameter payload fairing. The medium-plus vehicle includes a version with a four-meter-diameter payload fairing and two solid motors, or four solid motors. The heavy-lift vehicle, similar to Atlas V, consists of three cores strapped together. The Delta IV medium can lift 3,900 kilograms to geosynchronous transfer orbit, while the medium-plus variants can lift 4,5356,395 kilograms and the heavy lift vehicle can carry up to 12,340 kilograms. Standard Payload Interfaces Along with the improvements in performance, reliability, and tion (SIS) for all EELV payloads. 4 The SIS was developed by a joint government-industry team with representatives from launch vehicle and space vehicle programs, and Aerospace serving as the technical arbiter and editor. The SIS includes more than 100 requirements for all aspects of the LV/SV interface including not only mechanical and electrical interfaces, but also mission design vices. While a rigorous mission integration process is still required, spacecraft that adhere closely to the SIS can greatly simplify the integration process. The SIS facilitates the dual integration of the transition of a spacecraft from one payload class to another. The fact that both Delta IV and Atlas V provide the same stan Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), GPS IIF, Advanced Extremely High Frequency Communication (AEHF). In order to implement an independent mission assurance pro cess on EELV, The Aerospace Corporation was asked to employ the process used for over 40 years on heritage programs to deter 5 However, since this pro cess had not been in place during the design review phase of the program, Aerospace developed a tool in the form of a Launch 6 unique in its breadth and depth. This comprehensive, end-todreds, if not thousands, of components, procedures, and test re ports. It draws upon independently derived system and subsys tem models to objectively validate contractor data. It provides assessment using independent analytical tools and independently acquired telemetry data to generate useful feedback and monitor performance trends. Planning and Management The Launch Readiness Veri


19 High Frontier ecution management tool developed to identify, prioritize, assign, schedule, track, and close as many as 2,000 individual tasks for each mission. Responsible engineers are assigned to assure the successful completion of each task as required by the launch cam paign. The management accountability process entails three in Review prior to the Flight Readiness Review (FRR). The Aerospace Launch all top-level performance requirements are properly supported by lower-level systems and subsystems. Independent analyses validate system designs including dynamic loads and clearanc es, structural margins, thermal protection, and control stability. Design engineers verify that system, subsystem, and component Manufacturing and Quality The manufacturing process is control processes are checked for compliance with standards and requirements. After reviewing the results of initial production, Aerospace provides technical support to resolve problems with manufacturing techniques. This support can entail in-plant re view of hardware and processes. Even before hardware can be screened for defects, acceptance test plans and procedures must be reviewed to ensure that the test environments and pass/fail criteria can be trusted to screen out faulty components. Aero space responsibilities in this area include witnessing selected ac ceptance testing of critical items and reviewing anomaly reports and corrective actions. Aerospace personnel also monitor fail ure investigations, and, in certain critical cases, augment them with independent investigations, which can include metallurgical analyses, material compatibility checks, electronic component testing, and contamination assessments. One particularly impor tant task is the hardware pedigree review, which focuses on in dividual components and subsystems to establish that they were Every space launch needed to get the payload from the launch pad to its intended cation of critical system software, especially pertaining to guid ance, navigation, and control. Mission de sign analysis provides assurance that the launch system is capable cient margin to guarantee mission success. Aerospace performs an independent analysis to verify adequate mission planning for quate performance margins for the radio-frequency link, power, propellant, and consumables. Dynamic loads must be analyzed to verify booster capability and compliance with the interface control document. Guidance, navigation, and control perfor mance must also be analyzed for acceptable injection accuracy and control stability. At the launch site, numerous tasks must be accomplished to prepare for launch. Aerospace assesses these processes to establish that they ade quately support mission readiness and satisfy design requirements and operational constraints. Critical tasks and tests are witnessed and evaluated for compliance with requirements and procedures. lution. Aerospace personnel support all major launch site tests and readiness reviews, and provide technical corroboration for the test team. When all procedures have been properly documented and all test results and corrective actions fall within acceptable levels, Aerospace can give its Missile Systems Center (SMC). The assessment culminates in FRR. The objective is to ensure that the primary contractors, The launch programs agree that the launch vehicle and payload are Countdown and Launch Operations Aerospace personnel are on-station during countdown and launch, supporting launch decisions with the knowledge and experience gained during the an independent review of launch placards, countdown anomalies, deviations and workarounds, and launch constraint violations. Any anomaly or deviation observed up until liftoff may result in using special computer and software tools, allowing independent


High Frontier 20 Mr. Edmardo Joe Tomei (BS and MS, Aerospace Engi neering, University of Michi gan and University of South ern California) is the Chief Engineer for space launch programs with The Aerospace Corporation responsible for technical insight and support to all space launch activity within the company. These have included Titan, Atlas, Delta, and Shuttle launch pro grams for the Air Force and NASA, as well as a variety of other launch systems. He has been involved in all Air Force launch activity in the past 15 years and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Shuttle return to Mr. Tomei was formerly Chief Engineer for the EELV Program, director of advanced plans and studies, manager for develop ment and launch operations on the Air Force Shuttle Program, He has over 38 years of experience in launch operations, launch vehicle design, systems engineering, launch system safety, pro pulsion systems, range safety and operations, and launch vehicle explosive hazards. Mr. Ray F. Johnson (BS, Me chanical Engineering, Univer sity of California at Berkeley; MBA, University of Chicago) is vice president of Space Launch Operations with The Aerospace Corporation. Mr. Johnson is responsible for Aerospace support to all Air Force launch, range and satel lite control programs, includ ing Titan IV, Delta II, Atlas II, Upper Stages, the Delta IV, and Atlas V Evolved Expendable Satellite Control Network. He has responsibility for the compa nys launch operations at Cape Canaveral, Florida and Vanden berg AFB, California. He also is responsible for the management of civil and commercial contracts involving launch operations. Mr. Johnson joined Aerospace in 1987 as a project engineer in the Propulsion section in 1988. He was director of the Centaur Direc responsible for Aerospaces support in developing the Centaur upper stage for use on the Titan IV launch vehicle. In November 1993, Mr. Johnson was appointed principal direc tor of the Vehicle Performance Subdivision, Engineering and Technology Group, with responsibility for engineering support launch vehicle and spacecraft thermal analysis. Before being named vice president, Mr. Johnson was general manager of the Launch Programs Division with responsibility for managing Aerospaces technical support to the Air Force for the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch programs. before the countdown can resume. of the most rigorous analysis happens after liftoff. For example, are used to perform trend analyses, capture lessons learned, and provide feedback for the next readiness assessment. cal part of every SMC launch. The impartial and independent technical issues have been resolved and that residual launch risks The current success record of 47 consecutive SMC operational space launches is no accident. The reinvigoration of independent mission assurance on the heritage programs was mirrored on the required a focused, prioritized effort, and adding independent been an incremental process. The SMC commitment to mission technically sound and the risks are acceptable with maximum probability of mission success. 1 May 1994. 2 Space Launch Broad Area Review Report November 1999. 3 Randy Kendall, EELV: The Next Stage of Space Launch, Cross link Winter 2003/2004. 4 tion version 6.0, 15 August 2000. 5 Crosslink Winter 2002/2003. 6 EELV Program, Conference on Quality in the Space and Defense Indus tries, (proceedings, March 2002).


21 High Frontier Mission Assurance = Assured Access to Space The Recipe for Success Col Jack Weinstein, USAF Commander, 30 th Space Wing Vandenberg AFB, California S the world in which we live and the enemies we face. Simply stated, without the entire launch-base team, on-orbit satellites with timely, relevant, and accurate information that saves lives and defeats our enemies would not be possible. Teamwork and the value of the launch-base team provides assured access to space. Even though recent success stories like B-26 in October of 2005 and the inaugural West Coast launch of the Delta IV NRO L-22 this past June suggest that space launch is a seemingly routine process; in reality, it remains the Make no mistake; there is nothing routine about space attention to detail and the highest degree of safety, security, and technical standards. We have come a long way in the progress that we have made and a large portion of that progress was a direct result of the 1999 Broad Area Review (BAR). As a result of launch failures in the 1990s to include engi neering, workmanship, and manufacturing issues, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Air Force examine the problem and recommend changes that would prevent such failures in the fu ture. In addition to this tasking, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff directed Air Force Space Com mand and the NRO to establish a BAR to assess causes of fail ure and recommendations for changes in practices, procedures, and operations. The BAR examined launch activities from 1985-1999 including At las, Delta, and Titan, as well as the transition to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV); Atlas V and Delta IV. The BAR charter ad dressed the need for an in-depth examination of government and com mercial launch failures and recommendations to improve launch mission success. At that time, there was a need to as sure mission success in heritage programs due to the fact that over $15 billion in assets were slated for launch on those vehicles. Concurrently, the launch community needed to prepare for a seamless transition to EELV. The report concluded that engineering and workmanship space launch failures totaling nearly $3 billion in losses. Fur ther mishaps across the board, to include the devastating 1997 Delta II NAVSTAR GPS IIR-1 Class A mishap, prompted an in-depth review of the failures and actions taken to prevent fu ture mishaps. As part of the assessment, the BAR examined the complete launch process and recommended changes in prac tices, procedures, and operations. Although the overall Department of Defense assessment contained 19 recommendations from the BAR that applied to addressed: 1. The government must ensure industry acts to correct causes of recent failures and improve systems engineer ing and process discipline; mission success for remaining launches and transition to EELV; 3. The government and industry partnership must be en hanced with increased management, engineering support and emphasis on mission success; nated and disseminated transition plan to EELVs; and ability with enhancements and increased oversight. Assured Access to Space


High Frontier 22 Given the unprec edented string of suc cessful launches since the BAR, it is reasonably safe to conclude that the recommendations pro vided in the review, most importantly, government oversight and continu ous, relentless involve ment in the space launch process provided the an swers needed to ensure assured access to space. The foundation of space launch mission success is mission assurance. At a team of blue-suit, contractor, and civilian space launch profes sionals integrated into the overall space launch campaign. Ulti mately, I believe, it is our people and their renewed mission fo cus that brought us to where we are now and continue to provide With the phase-out of the highly successful Titan program and earlier Atlas variants, our two new EELVs are the Atlas V and Delta IV. The Delta IV medium possesses a single com pable of launching 9,285 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit whereas the Delta IV heavy is capable of launching 28,950 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit. The Atlas V uses a singlestrap-on solid rocket motors, and is capable of launching over 19,000 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit depending on the One component of mission assurance with respect to EELV and these vehicles is integrated risk assessment and mission as surance for launch stakeholders. The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 1200-series governing directives include launch and range roles and respon sibilities (AFSPCI 101208), spacelift launch strategies and schedul ing procedures (AFSPCI 10-1213), and support to commercial space launch activities (AFSPCI 101215). The launch-base team implements AFSPC policy for launch and range roles, responsibili ties, strategies, sched uling procedures, and support to commercial space launch activities. Similarly, EELV mission assurance is covered un der Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) 1200-series instructions to include Assurance of Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effec tiveness for Space and Missile Systems (SMCI 63-1201), Space Flight Worthiness (SMCI 631202), the Independent Readiness Review Team (SMCI 63-1203) and the SMC Readiness Re view Process (SMCI 631204). The launch-base team takes this guidance one step further through the implementation of local operating instructions and critical activities that offer risk assessment of launch processing activities and guidance, as necessary, to the contractor team. The launch-base team pro vides on-site risk management delegated through the Launch and Range Systems Wing. The mission assurance activities the process that ensure system components are ready as stated in the SMCI 63-1200-series EELV Operational Safety, Suitabil ity and Effectiveness Assurance Process. It is important to note that the review authorities differ depending on the mission. For example, the NRO chairs the Mission Readiness Review for NRO payloads. Similarly, the Commander, Launch and Range Systems Wing, chairs the Mission Readiness Review for other government launches. The dark blue scrolls indicate the portions of the Launch nally, countdown and launch operations. Without a doubt, the launch-base team is an absolutely critical piece of the entire process, the BAR and proving more and more relevant as space launch missions continue to be rocket science and continue to launch one-of-a-kind sat ellites that can cost over a billion dollars. In addition to the launch-base team, our engineering and acqui sition space profession als take the LVM and analyze the processes


23 High Frontier four employ the Orion 50 XL and Orion 38 Peg asus motors respectively. of the vehicle utilizes the Pegasus fairing to pro tect the payload. Similarly, the Pegasus is a three-stage, smallsatellite launch vehicle with the capability to lift 620 lbs. to a 100-nautical mile orbit. Unlike any other expendable space launch vehicle, the Pega sus utilizes the L-1011 aircraft for the initial released from the belly of the aircraft, free-falls for several sec onds, and ignites stage one for the initial acceleration to orbit. Mission assurance for both Minotaur and Pegasus involves ex ecuting a procedure review, documenting via database inputs, tracking procedures, monitoring operations, and ensuring the government and contractor mission assurance teams work to gether. Spacelift mission assurance can be thought of as a system of processes that provide rigorous, continuous, cradle-to-grave assessment, valida of requirements at the part, component, and system levels to minimize risk, as sure adequate mar gins and, improve the probability for mis sion success. Both the EELV and Mino taur/Pegasus mission assurance components rely on a blue-suit, plishment of the mission. Our enlisted space professionals, experts in missile systems maintenance, are key factors in the relentless pursuit of mis sion assurance. These men and women provide the eyes-on, detailed assessments of the work occurring at the space launch complex and on the space launch vehicle. Our Airmen serve as the critical link between pad operations and the entire mis sion assurance process. They possess the knowledge, skill-set, and discipline required of spacelift operations and provide the direct link between launch pad operations and leadership to en sure technical issues and government interests are kept at the forefront. These sterling professionals perform several categories of mission assurance. First, they perform infrastructure manage ment to include sustainment and program integration for space lift facilities and act as the point of contact for facility and range in order to ensure that a cognitive assessment of the necessary tasks are, in fact, accomplished on the pad to ensure mis sion success. Technical experts such as material and electrical engineers quirements and see to it that the right level of testing is performed at each step. At the same time, our acquisition professionals analyze all the requirements from both a contractor and Air the campaign progresses, our engineers and acquirers are re sponsible for the inputs from the pad, ensure the correctness and completeness throughout the process, and work with the launch-base team and the Launch and Range Systems Wing to clarify, mitigate, or upchannel status as necessary. Risk analysis and status is a fundamental input into the re risk analysis process by providing a forum for the launch-base team to provide inputs in support of the various reviews. The launch-base team utilizes the LVM to populate an information perform, document, and track risk assessments within the readi A top-down approach to risk management begins with the stated requirements for insight. The LVM provides data used to populate the LVDB, a tool used by the launch-base team to monitor and assess this risk. Risk assessment and management are continuously performed and reported at the review process milestones, as well as on-going risk status forums occurring throughout the major milestones. A second form of launch-base team mis sion assurance similar to the EELV method of risk assessment is utilized in other spacelift campaigns to include Minotaur and Pegasus. The Minotaur is a four-stage, small-sat ellite launch vehicle with the capability to lift 750 lbs. to a 400-nautical mile, sun-synchronous orbit. Stages one and two utilize Minuteman II rocket mo tors while stages three and Mission, 22 March 2006.


High Frontier 24 director takes everything submitted to this point and conducts a symphony of processes, checklists, and coordination thereby ensuring that everything is complete, ready, and in-place for mission success. The countdown and subsequent successful launch, while vitally important and impressive to watch, is just the tip of a very long process; mission assurance begins years earlier. An unprecedented string of success has led us to where we are today. Our Nation is stronger, our military members are safer, and our space capabilities are providing cutting-edge, state-of-the-art imagery, and communications like never before. To say that mission assurance is important is an understatement. It is the only way to achieve mission success. Government oversight of the entire space launch process to include on-scene technical advice and risk assessment by the launch-base team is absolutely critical to the overall success of space launch and the insertion of payloads into proper orbit. One set of eyes is not enough, we tried that in the 1990s and it led to disaster. Whether it is an honest mistake on the pad or a known shortcut by someone, somewhere in the process, the fact remains that we only get one chance to do it right. There are over a million items that need to be perfect in order for a launch to happen. Mission assurance is the integrity that we provide the American people so that when we launch, the satellite is going on it. Mission assurance, through intellect and discipline, is the only way we as a space community will be able to both sustain and guarantee mission success now and into the future. communication-related issues. Second, they perform environmental management to ensure that launch-base pro grams comply with all applicable environmen tal regulations. Lastly, and most importantly, they ensure compli ance with all applicable safety regulations and ensure all personal and at all times. They also perform critical tasks throughout the entire booster process. For Minotaur missions, they conduct booster trans port and emplacement, and perform contractor surveillance throughout the entire campaign. Additionally, they provide an experienced maintenance perspective for government program management status and consideration. Finally, with regard to EELV missions, they review processes for correctness and en sure that the tasks are not only accomplished, but accomplished Cradle-to-grave mission assurance occurs between the launch-base team and SMC with our enlisted space profession als on the scene at the Defense Meteorological Satellite Pro assurance at the Lockheed Martin DMSP factory in Sunnyvale, California. During these visits, they act on behalf of the com mander of the DMSP Systems Group and attend all meetings and reviews. During processing at the launch-base they provide mission assurance through observation. They execute squadron tasks to meet wing responsibilities delegated from programs that divided. Finally, they provide launch site surveillance, moni tor processing and integration tasks, identify risk areas, assign risk assessment, recommend corrective actions, and determine launch-base processing tasks. Eyes-on, aggressive oversight from cradle-to-grave, from the engineers to the acquirers to the maintenance technicians must be continuous, it must be perfect, and it must not stop there. Integration must now occur with the launch-base range team. The range team will assess all outstanding risk and develop/ execute procedures accordingly from the initial campaign kickoff meeting, which focuses the entire contractor, blue-suit, and civilian launch team on the tasks, requirements, and issues for the mission, to the launch readiness review where processes and range operations commander follow each and every step with precise, focused discipline delivering the level of perfection necessary to ensure public safety and mission success. Range instrumentation, telemetry, radars, digital transpon ders, and all other assets are precisely calibrated to exact speci Col Jack Weinstein (BS, University of Lowell; MS, University; MS, Industrial College of the Armed Forces) is the 30 th Space Wing com mander, Vandenberg AFB, California. Colonel Wein stein leads the wings launch, range, and expeditionary missions. Additionally, the wing provides infrastructure and testing support for Mis sile Defense Agency groundbased interceptors. He has served on the Headquarters Air Com bat Command, Air Force Space Command, and United States Strategic Command staffs. His operational assignments include MMIII combat crew, 321 st Missile Wing, Grand Forks AFB, North th Space Warning Squadron, Thule Air Base, Greenland; Commander, 2 nd Space Warning Squadron, futt AFB, Nebraska, and Commander, 90 th Operations Group, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Prior to his current assignment, Colonel Weinstein was the CENTAF Director of Space Forces. Colonel TSgt Roy Heichelbech, and SSgt David th


25 High Frontier The Power of Partnership Assuring Access to Space Col James O. Norman, USAF The partnership between the Air Force (AF) and the National in the area of space launch is decades old. During its time as a covert organization, the AF element of the NRO acquired launch vehicles for NRO satellites via AF contracts and shared funding responsibility for many launch vehicle infrastructure requirements. This is a partnership practice that continues to day. This arrangement allows the AF and the NRO to leverage the strengths of both without unnecessary duplication and al lows unparalleled focus on mission success. For instance, the NRO funds half of the Aerospace Corporation Federally Funded Research and Development Center resources (hundreds of man AF and the NRO ensuring the appropriate amount of Aerospace Corporation expertise can be brought to bear for launch system analysis. The AFNRO partnership has worked exceptionally well since the late 1990s, following the three Titan failures in 1998. Since that time, the AF and NRO working together have launched 42 consecutive missions successfully, including the last of the Atlas IIAS, the Atlas IIIB, and the Titan IV systems. They continue to work together as they make the transition to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), namely the Lockheed Martin Atlas V and the Boeing Delta IV families. With Space (NSS) missions. As we go forward under EELV, the NRO will continue to fund half of the Aerospace Corporation launch support and will also provide 30 percent of the EELV launch capability funding for Atlas V and Delta IV. Evidence of this launch from Vandenberg AFB, California. During this launch campaign, the NRO, the AF, and our contractor teammates the required technical expertise to bear to ensure resolution of these issues leading to the launch of NROL-22 on 27 June 2006. This article outlines the NRO/OSL philosophy of mission assur ance and contains examples of how the partnership performed quired to integrate a critical NRO payload on a new booster, and the act of launching from a pad that had never before been used cannot be overstated and are collectively a tribute to the hard work and teamwork of the entire government and industry team that made it happen. Mission Assurance NRO satellites are state-of-the-art, hard-to-launch, fragile, and demand the most strenuous environmental and cleanliness requirements. Each satellite is a handcrafted technical marvel. Hundreds of thousands of hours are expended to painstakingly build, stitch, tape, glue, screw, and engineer a symphony of mov and antenna deployments, and solar array movements. Years of subsystem and system testing assure conformance to rigorous technical requirements. Industry standards for manufacturing, safety, parts accounting, quality, and reliability are tracked. The goal is to advance the state-of-the-art and the collection capabil ity with each satellite, not simply build a copy of the last one. to ten years prior to launchthe NRO/OSL is engaged with an NRO satellite SPO to ensure launch aspects are a part of the spy on the booster, but also on issues such as payload transport from factory to launch-base, payload processing while at the launchgranted, the exhaustive process to integrate satellite and launch vehicle begins. Usually, a multi-year process, all elements of so forth, are taken into account to ensure the launch vehicle does not break the satellite during ascent. Then on launch day, the satellite is consigned to nothing short of a controlled explosion as it is lofted hundreds or thousands of miles into orbit. And this Assured Access to Space launch from Vandenberg AFB, California.


High Frontier 26 complex and expensive satellites while on the Earth and then off the Earth and into orbit? The answer is use of a rigorous mission assurance process that is smart, innovative, exhaustive, meticulous and, yes, costly. One can think of it as insurance on the investment. If billions of dollars are invested in a satellite, it is prudent to also do everything possible to ensure it is delivered to its proper destination undamaged. Launch is a high-risk operation. In fact, launch is by far the highest-risk event in the life of any satellite. It is correct to say that a thousand miracles must occur simultaneously for a satel lite to successfully defy Newtonian physics and arrive safely in orbit. The spectacular launch mishaps of the past bear sober witness to the failure of any one of these miracles to occur. Fundamentally, NRO mission assurance processes focus on risk management not risk elimination Painstaking risk identi risks and risk management plans are developed to retire them early. Nice words, but what does it really mean? The NRO/OSL, AF, and industry partners meet early in a mis Then the NRO/OSL funds the AF booster SPO to perform those reviews. Pedigree reviews require that technical teams visit the built drawings are reviewed and actual production hardware is examined to ensure critical hardware has been built to proper Second, robust systems engineering processes must be in sion. Rocket engine upgrades, avionics improvements, propel lant breakthroughs, and so forth, may have marked sub-system tems may prove deleterious. Good systems engineering ferrets out these ticking time bombs before cataclysmic mistakes prop defense for this critical systems review activity. Third, an independent team of highly competent technical ing the launch vehicle build, transport, or pre-launch testing. In the NRO, these technical experts are known as the Mission As surance Team (MAT). Independence is key. The MAT reports directly to the NRO mission directornot the launch vehicle tifying the mission risk of out of family or out of spec con ditions. This team is not problems they discoverthat is the job of systems engineering. Instead, the MAT provides in-depth assessments of the prob lem couched in terms of launch risk. Again, paramount to the independence If it becomes part of the solution process, it loses its independence. mission software, loads analysis, acoustics breakdown, vibra tion and shock environments, propellant slosh models, mass properties calculations, and so forth, are performed to ensure sound. The IV&V plan is conceived approximately two years include up to 1,000 items. IV&V is different for each mission; for instance, if a mature, well-understood launch vehicle is used, less IV&V is required. However, the current family of EELVs is not fully mature. Thus, IV&V serves as a hallmark risk reduc tion measure. Finally, the senior review cycle culminates the technical risk management process to ensure all risks are either eliminated, managed to the lowest possible level, or retired as an acceptable risk. This review cycle occurs in one month prior to launch and ally at the vice president or sector president level), proceeds to Readiness Reviews. While this process may sound onerous and painfully cumbersome, one must never lose sight of the fact that it is all about the mission not just the launch vehicle, but also the very expensive and highly capable payload being placed into orbit and the incredibly valuable and timely information it will be imprudent not to spend the time to ensure all mission risks were examined in detail and dispositioned appropriately. These reviews exercise the risk management process at every level by ensuring all known risks are addressed and mitigation efforts are completed. Having said all this, it is important to keep in mind that it is virtually impossible to completely eliminate risk from the launch equation. Knowing where to draw the line between ac ceptable and unacceptable risk can be daunting even to the most experienced launch veterans. However, by measuring twice and cutting once, NRO launch managers rely on vigorous risk management principles to make launch decisions. Capturing


27 High Frontier and managing risk with independent assessments, strong sys tems engineering, hearty IV&V, and a thorough review cycle offer the best opportunity to string together those thousand miracles on day of launch. The following are examples of this risk management ap proach applied in partnership with the AF and contractor team mates during the NROL-22 launch campaign that resulted in a perfect launch. Upper Stage Liquid Hydrogen Slosh: As the inaugural NRO EELV launch, NROL-22 brought forth many intriguing challenges for the technical community. One such challenge, reaching across a number of disciplines and organizations, was the liquid hydrogen (LH2) slosh investigation and resolution. This issue was found two days prior to the original October 2005 launch date when the Analex Corporation, an IV&V con tractor, discovered a discrepancy in the propellant slosh behav trajectory, which had been provided and analyzed 30 days prior Delta IV intermediate launch vehicles were very different from per stage LH2 tank during the passive thermal control maneuver propellant usage analysis. This issue was presented to the entire of this issue and the potential catastrophic impact was lost on no one on that 3 October afternoon. The unanticipated slosh could have made the upper stage uncontrollable and unable to place the satellite in the proper orbit. Needless to say, the launch ser vice contractor along with the AF and other industry team mem bers recommended we stand down from that launch attempt. As disappointing as that was, it was the right decision because mission success is the top priority. Upon reviewing the slosh re sults, a team of NRO/OSL, AF, Boeing, Aerospace Corporation, and Analex personnel was established to investigate and resolve the issue for NROL-22. As an added dynamic, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-N (GOES-N), the National ellite, was the next Delta IV scheduled to launch, and with a the issue for both missions. Through the use of multiple teleconferences each week, the team began building a fault tree with inputs from all members of the community. Through the use of resources at Boeing, Aero space Corporation, and Analex, the fault tree was quickly and suggested solution for GOES-N, Aerospace Corporation and Analex members worked with Boeing to understand how the solution would be implemented for NROL-22. Analysts at Boe ing, Aerospace Corporation, Analex, and L-3 Communications worked to support the slosh resolution team through trajectory integration of multiple modeling tools. Heeding lessons of the past, the team also undertook the task of ensuring the proposed LH2 slosh mitigation solution did not have unintended conse quences for other subsystems. Rigorous discussions ensued between analysts from multiple technical disciplines to ensure the end, an engineering review board hosted by Boeing and at tended by all affected parties agreed that the proposed NROLDelta IV booster system. of collaboration within the contractor and government launch community. In addition, this effort helped substantiate the value of IV&V in the EELV era and helped foster a foundation of trust between the Delta IV launch vehicle contractor and the NROand AF-funded IV&V contractors. With everyone working to gether, the correct technical decisions were made in a timely manner that supported the mission schedule with corollary ben operations at Vandenberg AFB, California.


High Frontier 28 Composite Structure Strength: Another technical concern that arose in parallel with resolving the LH2 slosh issue was the discovery of booster composite structure strength concerns. The Delta IV booster has several major composite components, such ter body, thermal shield, and aeroskirt, so a structural concern was a major risk issue to launch schedule and mission success. Like slosh, this issue also highlighted the absolute need for teaming and collaboration for timely and correct issue resolu tion. The issue was found while performing composite material coupon tests at the request of NRO/OSL to verify the strength of composite structures following a composite curing process change. Boeing, the Delta IV booster contractor, discovered an undesirable and unexpected production close-out joint feature not related to the cure cycle process change. The composite coupons with this production close-out joint were breaking at less force than Boeing had anticipated. This new data was ter rible news to the entire launch team. The low strength condition created concerns where these close-out joints occurred for the structural margins of safety for the seven composite structures used throughout the Delta IV vehicle. Composites issues are much more critical on the Delta IV than on previous US launch use composites for multiple major structures in the primary load path of the vehicle. Boeing assembled a team of structural experts from various Boeing divisions (including their commercial aircraft division) and others from the launch community, including Aerospace Corporation, the AF EELV SPO (SMC/LR), and NRO/OSL. OSL brought in additional experts to further augment the in vestigation team. This team worked together to understand the mine the true characteristics of the composite, and effectively tests was presented to Boeing launch vehicle management, and discussed as an integrated team. The multi-organizational ap proach to work this issue to conclusion was essential in identify ing multiple test options. No single test option could be used the combination of the various options resulted in much higher provided the solution in a timely fashion to support the June 2006 NROL-22 launch. Payload De-encapsulation and Re-encapsulation: In addi tion to the two major booster issuesslosh and compositesa Recall that two days from launch in October 2005, the launch was scrubbed. The payload was demated from the booster and returned to the payload processing facility to provide protection from other launches and the best support environment while work proceeded on booster issues. The satellite was left encap sulated in the payload fairing in order to avoid the handling risk of removing the fairing as well as to maintain the best posture to return the satellite to the rocket at the earliest opportunity. Unfortunately, the previously mentioned composite issue and a new issue related to the payload required a complete de-encap sulation of the payload. The entire NROL-22 team, including NRO/OSL, SMC/LR, the 30 th Space Wing (30 SW), the launch vehicle and satellite vehicle contractors, Aerospace Corpora tion, and Spaceport Systems International (the payload process ing facility owner), were challenged to develop and maintain a new integrated schedule to keep the launch on track for 27 June 2006. At no time in the more than four year integration launch during the resolution of these additional challenging issues. At approximately three months prior to launch, the NROL-22 integration team was faced with issues that essentially removed any margin from the launch schedule. The challenge: deter mine how to de-encapsulate the payload, solve the anomalies, and then re-encapsulate to meet the satellite mate date on the Delta IV booster. All of this unexpected, out-of-position work needed to be collectively performed by the entire team on an integrated schedule to determine what resources were needed and by what organization. What work should be done in paral lel with the satellite work? What work could be moved later in assets needed to be rescheduled to support this shifting work, so the 30 SW was a critical member of the team. The entire integration team successfully scheduled and com pleted all work required to meet the satellite transport and mate to booster date in early June. NROL-22 was launched on sched sues is a testament to the power of partnership across the space and launch community. Flight Termination System Batteries: A fourth situation that threatened to impact our ability to meet the 27 June 2006, launch date arose from test results that brought into question (FTS) batteries. During destructive physical analysis after qual tabs from the cell plates to the terminal were discovered broken, a condition that could have led to a reduced battery capacity. these particular FTS batteries. The 45 th Space Wing (45 SW) Cape Canaveral, Florida as well. This lien threatened the launch of several vehicles in the near term including NROL-22. In response to the multitude of issues building in the time leading up to launch, weekly NROL-22 mission integration meetings were instituted with members from the entire launch team to provide status on current issues. Those making up this group included members from the 45 and 30 SWs, the AF launch service integrating contractor (Boeing), the Aerospace Corporation, and several systems engineering and systems inte gration contractors. Soliciting participation from all parties proved effective in determining alternate paths to mitigate the high-risk schedule the


29 High Frontier team faced. Soon it was discovered that there were not enough The team then decided that the most appropriate course of ac tion was to pursue another FTS battery supplier used by Lock heed Martin. This presented a unique challenge due to the fact that Boeing and Lockheed Martin are competitors in the space launch industry. Nevertheless, a collaborative effort, spearhead ed by the SMC/LR SPO Director and supported by the Space Wings and NRO/OSL, led to the establishment of a proprietary information arrangement between Lockheed Martin and Boeing regarding the alternate battery, which, in turn, resulted in the 22 mission. Boeing, in full coordination with representatives from all stakeholders, developed the plan and procedures for installation and checkout of the alternate batteries. The plan accounted for unique characteristics of the substitute batteries, such as capac ity, dimensions, number of cells, weight, wet stand life, mount ing requirements, and so forth, that differed from the character istics of the original batteries. To further guard against a slip in the schedule and provide asked to develop several scenarios to determine optimum deci for the alternate batteries, as well as to determine the last oppor tunity to support the launch date should the original FTS batter ies be exonerated by range safety. In summary, it took a creative and innovative team across Col James O. Jim Norman (BS, Human Factors Engineer ing, US Air Force Academy; MS Business Administration, Central Michigan University) Virginia. Colonel Norman is the Mission Director for all sible for the programming and vehicles, launch vehicle inte gration, transport of satellites, launch-base processing, and infra Academy graduate. He has a broad background in systems en gineering and acquisition program management of airborne and space-based reconnaissance systems from tours of duty with the performed space operations duties while assigned to the DoDs Aerospace Data Facility at Buckley AFB, Colorado and served in space-related staff positions for the Director of Central Intelli of the Air Force (Space) and the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Colonel Norman is a 2001 Air Force Fellow and attended the In ternational Security and Military Affairs Program at the Mershon Center on the campus of The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio for Senior Developmental Education. multiple organizations and geographic regions to overcome the challenge of this situation. All members of the team put the mis to mitigate and manage risk. Rather than blame each other, the NRO/OSL, SMC, and contractor team developed innovative so lutions that provided victory for all parties involved. The end result of AF leadership and NRO/OSL support provided a solid set of FTS batteries for the eventual successful 27 June 2006, launch of NROL-22. Conclusions In the words of some of my predecessors, Launch is hard and Launch work is teamwork. The NRO recog nizes the power that partnering brings to the mission success equation. While this article focused on the partnering between the AF and the NRO on Delta IV, there are many other examples that illustrate how valuable the partnership is, not only between the NRO and the AF, but also with NASA. Launch is not a com modityit is still an engineering exercise fraught with technical risks that must be managed in order to provide the greatest pos sible assurance for access to space. It is through partnering that mission owners, whether NRO, AF, or NASA, can choose to apply the appropriate levels of mission review and mission as surance to meet their mission needs. The NRO looks to partner with the AF and industry to deliver world-class satellites to the proper orbit.


High Frontier 30 Toward Responsive Space Access Brig Gen Susan J. Helms, USAF Commander, 45 th Space Wing R vantages our space capabilities provide to military com based capabilities continuously grows. Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), points out, Space is not just important, but critical to the very nature of both our military strength and our society as a whole, and the idea of space being more responsive is unquestionably a necessity. 1 The need for additional bandwidth to support critical communi cations or the requirements for persistent imagery over multiple pected loss of a critical space capability and/or the inability to re plenish capability when required can be viewed as a potential vul nerability for our Nation. And if a new satellite launch campaign is part of the delivery process, delays in the delivery of those ef fects to the combatant commander can be protracted over months or years. When facing a future where space itself can become a cal resources on-orbit demands a more responsive launch posture than has been the case in the past. January 2005 US Space Transportation Policy which directs, Be fore 2010, the United States shall demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security requirements. 2 But we cannot wait for longterm technology breakthroughs to address the issue. Rather, every aspect of space, including our existing launch capabilities, should be analyzed for potential improvements in current responsiveness. An evolutionary move toward responsive spacelift forms the basic curately, affordably, and decisively position and operate national and military assets in and through space. Historically, our ear ly space access vehicles have been inherently un responsive. Their design, manufacture, processing, and launch were charac terized by time-consuming lengthy test, checkout, and launch operations. Con versely, a mature respon sive space access capability that realizes a delivery goal measured in hours or days is at the opposite end of the continuum. Currently, we operate between those two extremes at the Eastern and Western launch ranges. To move forward toward sive space access program seeks to address the need for a more agile launch posture through strong focus on four complementary elements: design of the lift vehicle, design of the satellite, support of responsiveness through infrastructure and support concepts, and a responsive launch range. A More Responsive Booster vehicle requires more transportation/hosting, assembly/re-assem will function precisely as designed. The Titan IV was the pin nacle of the intercontinental ballistic missile-based launch vehicle more than 360 space launches, the Titan launch vehicle was modi every ounce of performance allowable by the laws of physics. The last East Coast Titan launch in April 2005 was historic and a tribute to its success as the workhorse that helped to bring down example of our inability to rapidly respond to the dynamic needs of a new era. The Titan IV was not designed, but rather rede signed to carry high-cost satellites, and there was a price to pay in responsiveness. Conversely, a less complex and more robust vehicle allows turned around with the development of the Evolved Expendable erational orbits rather than throw a warhead halfway around the world on a ballistic trajectory. The EELV Atlas V and Delta IV designs capitalize on decades of lessons learned and the availability of state-of-the-art materials, cantly reduce piece parts and increase inherent reliabilities. With these improvements came a more robust design that can be assem tion tests. By comparison, the last two Titan IV mission process days and 548 days respectively, while the most recent EELV At 3 In another example, the Atlas V has a 35 percent part-count reduction compared to legacy Atlas IIAS. 4 Although the EELV systems are neither de signed to nor able to meet the hope of call up and launch within a few days, the reduced processing time and reliability shown by the early EELV launches certainly enables an improved lift ve hicle preparation process over heritage launch systems, and move Cape Canaveral AFS. Assured Access to Space


31 High Frontier launch delivery capabilities closer to the goal of responsiveness. Spacecraft Responsiveness We have discussed the responsiveness of launch vehicles, but what about space craft responsiveness? Often, the most limiting element to responsive space is the satellite system. This is due to lengthy development, test, launch processing, and initial on-orbit checkout requirements. As block of protected satellite communica tions spacecraft, underwent nearly four months of checkout after launch before being declared operational. This was two months faster than the planned six month checkout as AFSPC rushed to get the payload operational to support Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition to becoming more agile in the on-orbit checkout of spacecraft, we enable more agile launch operations. Much has been said about evolving spacecraft toward a ship and shoot process, where payloads arrive at Cape Canaveral ready to launch, with limited to nearly no on-site assembly or test ing required. In reality, there is a competitive tension between site, consistent with booster processing for that vehicle, so that exposure to risk and expense is minimized, and a desire to have call to replenish on-orbit capability. Based on the way satellites are designed today, the latter situation would inherently require repetitive processing and checkout at the launch site to ensure the satellite was ready for the mission, since spacecraft of today are not inherently designed to spend time in storage barns. There would have to be a paradigm shift in the satellite design criteria in order to support a ship and shoot posture. Experience has proven, however, that regardless of on-paper designs, launch-base integration and checkout is required and necessary for essential ly all satellites built today. While it is not the intent to build an extension of the factory, launch site experts do offer program managers and senior corporate and government leadership addi ticularly true as we migrate from well-established legacy systems to one-of-a-kind payloads designed to perform unique missions. Some concepts that may make spacecraft more responsive are a standardized spacecraft bus, modular payloads, and space-totems designed for a robust responsive posture will inherently would have to be done differently to incorporate responsiveness as a priority. However, the approach of building simple, low-cost spacecraft for military purposes has begun with the advent of the tactical satellite (TACSAT) program, a program designed to chal lenge the current paradigm. The TACSAT demonstrations will prove to be extremely enlightening, as they will allow our current culture to evaluate new methods to develop operationally respon sive satellites with high military value, agile tasking capability, quick delivery, and low cost. Responsive Infrastructure and Support Spacecraft and booster processing facilities and the workforce arrangement to make that processing happen are critical to re sponsive launch. For our heritage launch systems, time was not the driving factor. Instead, the complex and expensive payloads drove the focus to be 100 percent mission success. A launch site infrastructure plan and workforce was developed based upon se process involved hundreds of contractor technicians, engineers, and auditors and nearly an equal number of government and dition, complex legacy launch vehicle systems came with equally complex ground support or handling equipment and the facilities that house them. For Titan, these complex facilities included the cessing satellites on the launch pad. These unique facilities and the demands to maintain them now present themselves as inhibi tors to responsiveness by their very nature, as they were designed for 100 percent mission success. Our current Department of De fense spacecraft processing facilities at the Eastern Range have supported the successful processing of a constellation of satel able military superiority and enhance national power. However, Figure 2. Titan IV Canaveral AFS, Florida.


High Frontier 32 and design also make them costly to maintain and modernize. Further, the increased focus on tropical weather underscores their inability to withstand major hurricane strikes. In order to meet the responsiveness envisioned for the future, we need to explore modular, secure, and storm-resistant process ing facilities that can accommodate a wide variety of small to large spacecraft programs resident at Cape Canaveral, and the workforce necessary to execute a responsive launch concept of operations. To provide operationally responsive support at the hardware, integrate the launch vehicle and satellite, mate the sat ellite to the launch vehicle, do an integrated systems check, and launch it. Ideally, as many steps as possible should be performed requires a different workforce and facilities paradigm than are in place today for heritage programs. However, it is worth noting that both EELV (Atlas V and Delta IV) processing concepts, although very different from each other, support the tenets of maximizing parallel processing and mini are processed in parallel at separate facilities. Once ready they are brought together where the satellite is mated to the booster and an integrated systems check occurs. A few days later the integrated stack is ready for launch. While mission success is still the driv improvement with end-state goals of less than two weeks, and the infrastructure and workforce were designed to support that goal. ity of facilities. In earlier days, facilities were designed to support component of the launch vehicle system. Now, with EELV, since the major launch vehicle components arrive at the launch site al ready assembled and checked out, the facilities are less special ized. The EELV system, including launch vehicle systems, infra structure, and processes, was designed for a new, commercially competitive environment. Relieved of some government require Reduced processing timelines and increasing responsiveness and drivers in facility development. Even though the motives that based, in many ways, on EELV facility concepts. Assuming the philosophical and programmatic challenges are overcome to produce an operationally responsive launch vehicle of responsive spacecraft delivery to orbit is a responsive launch range. As General Klotz points out, Our launch ranges do a su perb job of supporting a myriad of users. But to meet responsive 5 Unlike launch and satellite vehicle responsiveness that are driven primar ily by design, the responsiveness of the launch range is more a function of competing require ments, constraints, and policies that govern range operations at es. These competing factors are the result of measures undertak en to address the greatest limita tions on range operations: public safety and cost. public safety. The objectives of responsive launch constructs the context of the two extremes of the responsiveness continu um. 6 As an example, for a commercial communications satellite launched from Cape Canaveral on an expendable launch vehicle, public safety takes a leading role. Strict constraints are imposed on launch execution. It is reasonable to assume that launches of the future, no matter how responsive, will face similar constraints. Being able to clearly articulate the operational requirements with respect to safety is key to establishing the necessary framework for the creation of a more responsive launch range. The second fundamental limitation on range operations is cost. If each program had a dedicated suite of instrumentation and per sonnel, the responsiveness of the range would be exceptional. Of course, this is not realistic given the number of range users, the vast array of range requirements (driven by different payloads and trajectories), and the budgets established to pay for range opera rd stage motor in a processing facility at Cape Canaveral AFS.


33 High Frontier tions and maintenance. This does not imply, however, that the cies while maintaining an acceptable level of responsiveness to a variety of range customers. The range continues to address this challenge through improvements to range architecture, and the processes, facilities, and workforce that goes with it. The architecture of the eastern range has existed in its current form for several decades: land-based tracking, data relay, and de the evolution of the launch ranges has also seen an increase in de pendency on these platforms. For example, recent improvements increasingly complex range schedule; however, budget consider ations have resulted in the cessation of 24-hour range scheduling support. The impact of a reduction in range availability can be mitigated through process improvements with respect to the cur rent expectations of range customers (less need to schedule activ ity on the range), but any reduction may have an adverse effect on range responsiveness to short-notice requirements. The advent of global positioning system (GPS) metric tracking lite System are two examples of how exploitation of our current space-based technologies is reducing our dependence on expen vehicles with GPS tracking systems will enable both launch ranges to cut back on traditional radar and optical systems which are becoming very costly to maintain. The ability to reduce cost without reducing capability is absolutely essential to realizing the goals of an operationally responsive range, and overall, an agile launch delivery paradigm. Summary In spite of our history, we are on an evolutionary path toward more responsive space access. The EELV program has stream lined the overhead of readying boosters through a reduction of The TACSAT program will investigate the viability of responsive satellites with a strong emphasis on low cost and small, simple payload packaging. Likewise, the progress toward a capability such as GPS metric tracking can streamline the range architec ture and supporting workforce while managing risks to the public. Elegant vehicle design, simpler processes for boosters and sat for launch deliveryall of these evolutionary improvements are interrelated and must be synergized together as a total effort to gain the most leverage in the strategic goal of operationally re sponsive space access. We have come a long way from the earliest days of space launch, but we have much yet to accomplish. Responsive launch vehicles, payloads, and ranges will not realize their potential with out equally responsive acquisition and operations processes and organizations executing the mission from concept design through launch and on-orbit checkout. While getting to the desired end state will take time, it is important to realize we are making in cremental progress every day. Through improved operations concepts, launch-base processes, and upkeep of critical space infrastructure, we as a Nation are moving our critical spacelift capabilities toward responsive space access. 1 sive Space Conference, Los Angeles, CA, 25 April 2006. 2 US Space Transportation Policy, fact sheet, 6 January 2005, http:// ch=%22SpaceTransFactSheetJan2005%22 (accessed 25 September 2006). 3 Titan IV B-39 was the next to last Titan IV mission from the Cape and sion, was transferred from the West Coast and experienced delays due to hurricanes and payload problems estimated at approximately 120 of the 548 total days at the Cape. The most recent Atlas V launch, AV008, processing 4 Col R. K. Saxer, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System: The Next Step in Affordable Space Transportation, March-April 2002, 2-15. 5 6 Mr. Kelvin Coleman and Lt Col Tim Brown, Commercial Range gov/ppt/LOSWG/Coleman.ppt (accessed 25 September 2006). Responsive months to hours. Brig Gen Susan J. Helms (BS, Aeronautical Engineer ing, US Air Force Academy, Astronautics, Stanford Univer sity, California) is command th Space Wing, Director, Florida, and Deputy Depart ment of Defense Manager for Manned Space Flight Support to NASA. th Space Wing com mander, she is responsible for the processing and launch of US government and commercial lion-square-mile area that includes a network of radar, telemetry tracking, and telecommunication hardware operating at sites up the East Coast and in the Atlantic Ocean including detachments at Antigua Air Station and Ascension Island. The range supports an average of 20 launches per year aboard Delta and Atlas Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, assuring access to space for Amer ica. General Helms also manages wing launch and range infra structure supporting space launch and missile test operations. General Helms was commissioned from the US Air Force Acad emy in 1980. She has served as an F-15 and F-16 weapons sepa nadian Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment, and an astro naut. General Helms is a graduate of the Air Force Test Pilot School, Flight Test Engineer Course, Edwards AFB, California, Canadian military aircraft. Selected by NASA in January 1990, and served aboard the International Space Station as a member General Helms has logged 211 days in space, including a space walk of eight hours and 56 minutes, a world record.


High Frontier 34 The Power to Explore Americas Next-Generation Fleet of Launch Vehicles Mr. Robert C. Armstrong, Jr. Deputy Manager for Integration, I Mars. This pioneer will be equipped with information well as a variety of successful surface rovers that have given This pivotal event will shape the landscape not only of space pre-eminence, but also of leadership on our home planet. To begin that far-reaching journey, near-term lunar exploration will prepare astronauts to travel to Mars, while yielding new knowledge about Earth and its largest satellitethe moon. As it prepares to retire the venerable Space Shuttle, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its partners are engaged in designing and developing the Ares I launch ve hicle, which will loft the Orion crew exploration vehicle into orbit early next decade, and the Ares V heavy-lift launch ve hicle, which will propel the lunar surface access module into the moon. Unlike the Apollo missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this new wave of exploration will give astronauts the opportunity to live off the planet for long periods, establish ing a permanent base from which to trek across a vast amount of uncharted territory and discover important resources. While astronauts are logging time living and working on the International Space Station and on the moon, engineers will continue to evolve these new space trans portation architec tions that are suitable for the much longer trips to Marson the order of years, rather than days, weeks, or months. This initia tive will position the United States to mas ter space, much as earlier pioneers con quered the land and seas in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, and the air and low Earth or bit in the 20 th century. Setting a course for the unknown always carries with it great risk, but the resulting tently proven the worth of such daring endeavors. Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, manages the Ares I and Ares V vehicle developments for the Constellation Pro the Exploration Mission Systems Directorate at NASA Head quarters in Washington, DC. Several prime contractors have Figure 1. America is returning to the Moon to prepare for longer Figure 2. The Ares I launch vehicle will Launch Abort system on top of the capsule will improve crew safety and survival in the event of a launch emergency during Assured Access to Space


35 High Frontier been brought on board and other acquisitions are forthcoming. To deliver the best value for the investment within the target timelines, this government and industry team is drawing upon past equipment and lessons learned and transitioning those tra ditions into modern systems that are safe, reliable, and afford able. With an eye on the distant horizon, the team is obliged to ration across the decades ahead. Across the country, rocket scientists, business planners, technicians, and operations experts are designing the next gen eration of launch vehicles and spacecraft that will assure United States access to space. The Ares I will deliver the Orion crew Earth departure stage will carry the lunar surface access module to orbit, where Orion will dock with it for the trip to the moon. Once in lunar orbit, the crewmembers will transfer to the lunar face. After completing their mission on the moon, the astro nauts will board Orion and head home to a landing on Earth. The Ares I will be launched upon a Space Shuttle-derived its upper stage, which will be powered by an Apollo Saturnderived J-2X engine. The Ares V will use two solid rocket stage consisting of a Saturn-class tank delivering fuel to a which is the same as that used for the Ares I upper stage engine, will perform the trans-lunar injection burn. This hardware evolution and commonality is expected to reduce technical, schedule, and cost uncertainties in the high-risk business of space transportation. for the Ares I and ensure that the requirements and the selected concept will satisfy the mission. NASA performs systems en bring together the wide range of engineering disciplines needed tation system. Applying industry standards and best practices, these engineering and business experts will investigate the sub systems, ranging from avionics to thermal protection, to deter mine the best way of delivering an integrated system that can deliver the power to explore the moon, Mars, and beyond. hicle concept, a variety of high-tech tools are used to inform de cision-makingfrom relatively straightforward algorithms and statistical formulas, to complex virtual reality environments can interact with the two-dimensional system while having the sense of three-dimensional space. This research will culminate base critical design and operations decisions. Engineers currently are performing a series of analyses to determine the optimum design solutions for the requirements demanded of the system, such as launch availability under a variety of weather conditions and turnaround time to prepare capsule will dock with the lunar surface access departure stage, which will propel the mated combination into lunar Figure 5. The Ares I and Ares V propulsion elements are derived from past and present proven systems. The arrows show how the two vehicles share common hardware, to reduce development and operations costs within the upper stage structure.


High Frontier 36 Using data from sub in wind tunnels and from hardware testing such as shuttle solid ings during tests and engineers marshal a portfolio of design assets. Added to this is component testing, such as that already in progress for the J-2X engine. Beginning in 2009, a series of suborbital altitudes, and then evolving to full-scale hardware performing orbital missions. This incremental approach to test This design and development work is progressing at NASA centers and aerospace companies across the Nation. Recently, a memorandum of agreement was signed between NASA and the US Air Force Space Command to upgrade the RS-68 engine tions. Synergies such as this will help reduce technical, cost, and schedule risks in this complex business. Costly invention and reinvention are prevented by drawing on the best workforce and facilities NASA has to offer. For example, the massive Michoud Assembly Facility in New Or ing. This is the same facility that made the Saturn V and now produces the Space Shuttle tanks. Likewise, test stands, launch pads, and other ground and mission operations centers across the Nation will be modernized for this 21 st amount of early data to the aerodynamic database being created by the Ares team. payloads. Processing concepts and mission scenarios are being scrubbed to reduce operations costs, including increasing auto mation and accessibility, while reducing the touch labor needed The most powerful nations on Earth have the ability to launch astronauts into space. National strength also derives offer unique opportunities for international partnership on a grand scale. Yet, without a doubt, the country that places the on our home planet. Federal spending, delivering this new capability has enormous implications for economic expansion and national security. The Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles are on track to deliver Amer routes to undiscovered territories and the resources they offer those bold enough to strike out on the next leg of the journey. Robert C. Armstrong, Jr. (BS, Virginia Polytechnic In stitute and State University) is Deputy Manager for Integra tion in the Exploration Launch NASAs Marshall Space Flight Center, where he is responsible for strategic planning and op erational execution. Mr. Armstrongs areas of ex pertise include engineering and business, internal and external communications, and interre lated systems and processes designed to enhance mission success for one of NASAs highest priority projects, which is develop ing the next generation of safe, reliable, and cost-effective space transportation systems for the human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Previously, Mr. Armstrong was a Project Manager for the Orbital Space Plane Program and the Space Launch Initiative. He also chitecture concept activities. He began his NASA career in 1981 as a Project Engineer in the Systems Dynamics Laboratory. Prior to joining NASA, Mr. Armstrong was a Project Engineer at the Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) in Tul lahoma, Tennessee, where he conducted hypervelocity tests at various AEDC facilities, including the infamous chicken gun which was used to verify that military aircraft windshields could withstand bird impacts.


37 High Frontier Increasing the Solvency of Spacepower Maj John Wagner, USAF 45 th Launch Support Squadron The key question that you should be asking is: Can the Air Force get its space programs back on the right path? Senator Wayne Allard (R-Colorado) M ilitary spacepower has historically proven to be a solid investment for the United States. With operating costs a third or less of developmental costs, and spacecraft lifetimes that exceed 10 years of continuous operation, space capabilities provided to armed forces and government agencies have bol stered each of the US national instruments of power and helped some cases, such as the enormous growth of global positioning system (GPS) applications beyond military position, navigation, and timing, American spacecraft have revolutionized world wide transportation and commerceincreasing US credibility and prestige worldwide through technological leadership. With weather prediction and forecasting, advanced satellite commu nication, missile launch and impact warning, precise position, navigation and timing, and multiple methods of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, US military space programs have proven essential to national security. Further, military space has enabled the transformation of all services, branches, and specialties into more integrated, more lethal and ultimately more effective forces with a smaller number of personnel. 1 analyst Loren Thompson commented that Every one of the next-generation constellations being developed has encoun tered unanticipated cost growth, schedule slippage, and tech raise doubts about whether government and industry can suc cessfully execute military plans for space. 2 Thompson is not alone in this view. Lt Gen Larry J. Dodgen, the commander of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, stated things that will be there in space [and] I have severe doubts whether or not such capabilities will be available as planned. 3 A more scathing critique, indicating the depth of the problem, Space Power Caucus and Appropriations Committee member. During a speech to the National Defense Industrial Associa tion, Senator Allard said, Over the last decade, we have done everything possible to sabotage our space supremacy. And, we have done this in every area of government at every possible even Congress [is] responsible, and all are guilty of ignoring the warning signs. 4 These criticisms come at a critical juncture for military space. Heritage spacecraft, designed against Cold War threats, have performed well throughout their design lifetimes, but their time on-orbit is running out (Table 1). The Department of De fense (DoD), with the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space, is now in the unenviable position of having to modernize all of its current on-orbit systems. Every spacecraft constellation is in transition. Delays and cost overruns are no longer a nui sancethey threaten the recapitalization of existing, and de velopment of future, military space capabilities and the expan sion of these capabilities to ensure the space superiority of the United States. For example, when the DoD awarded the system prime contract to Lockheed Martin in 1996, space-based in frared systemhigh (SBIRShigh) was expected to cost about year dollars, triggering Nunn-McCurdy congressional reviews in December 2001, June 2004 and July 2005. 5 The Air Force 19 percent of Air Force modernization spending. 6 Spacecraft Launch Date* Age** Design Life (years) Average Age** MILSTAR-6 8-Apr-03 3.15 10 7.14 MILSTAR-1 7-Feb-94 12.32 GPS IIR-14 (M) 26-Sep-05 0.68 10 8.43 GPS IIA-15*** 9-Sep-92 13.73 DSP-22 14-Feb-04 2.3 3 (goal 5) 8.48 DSP-14 14-Jun-89 16.98 DMSP-16 18-Oct-03 2.62 3 8.24 DMSP-12 24-Mar-95 11.76 UFO-11 18-Dec-03 2.45 10 10.13 UFO-1 25-Mar-93 13.19 DSCS IIIB-06 29-Aug-03 2.76 10 8.53 DSCS IIIB-22 2-Jul-92 13.92 in Constellations. Launch dates in ZULU, according to the AFSPC Launch Information th spacecraft from the latest launch, comprising a full constellation with spares. A few older spacecraft remain operational, but age calculations are limited to the 28 most recently launched spacecraft. Assured Access to Space


High Frontier 38 Exacerbating the problem is the fact that many of the cost overruns, delays and corresponding congressional funding cuts to recapitalize spacecraft have occurred during rising military budgets. This is not a guaranteed trend. Recent years have surgency operations, homeland security, gulf coast hurricane estimated $797 billion over 10 years. 7 As a result, Deputy De fense Secretary Gordon England directed the military services in a 2005 memo to cut some $32 billion in projected spending through 2011. 8 We are at a critical juncture, Senate Budget hearing in March 2006. Just as we strongly support the war on terrorism, we must also recognize that there is no such thing as 9 egies not only effectively achieve objectives, they do so ciently as wellat the lowest cost of any option. 10 In war, this obviously means avoiding pyrrhic victories and ensuring objec tives are reached at an acceptable cost in personnel and material. Throughout war and peace, acceptable force structures must be developed that anticipate future victory at an acceptable cost, in order to ensure the United States maintains a continuing na tional advantage. The status quo approach to space acquisition its air problems, and other component failures. 11 Tradeoffs in needed space as a separate and distinct military mission area, the Air Force continues to fund what are, in effect, two major military mission areasair and spacewith an annual budget share in tended for only one. Although all military services and most and services, the Air Force provides nearly all military space funding, providing other services with essentially a free ride. 12 Meanwhile, demands for space support and space force en the need to recapitalize both air and space forces, the historical alter service funding percentages since 1970. Therefore, in creased dependency on on-orbit spacecraft aging beyond their place these spacecraft, leads to increased near-term US space power vulnerabilities. es to requirements at the start of an acquisition program, and second, the DoD funds programs continually without consis tently establishing priorities. 13 These two factors explain the root problemtoo many space systems compete for limited funds, with competing contractors submitting proposals that re win the contract. Basing its decisions on these unrealistically low initial cost estimates, the DoD starts more programs than it can afford in the long run. 14 This practice had the cascading effect of promoting negative behavior to compete for funds, creating unanticipated and disruptive funding shifts, increas ing technological challenges, and stretching out schedules in order to accommodate the whole portfolio of space programs 15 If spacepower is increasingly unaffordable, but unavoidable, how can the solvency of spacepower be increased? The key lies in understanding the current paradigm and examining if it is the Figure 2. Historical Service Funding Percentages. for funding suppressed approaches involving substantial leaps in desired capabilities are favored over


39 High Frontier proper approach for the future of military space. Paradigms involve a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the community that shares them. When Thomas S. Kuhn popularized this term by publishing he centered his analysis on intellectual disciplines. The rules of normal science However, Kuhn states that science is often riddled by dogma and a shift in professional commitments to shared assumptions takes place when an anomaly subverts the existing tradition of 16 The existing tradition of spacepower acquisition is characterized by a need for large spacecraft-cen tric force enhancement systems and associated high opportu nity costs due to limited options, high costs of failure, with the need to reinvent entire constellations every 10 to 15 years to keep pace with changing technology. This leads to the pursuit of bleeding edge technology and integrating it on only a hand ful (or less) of spacecraft with no way to test and demonstrate either the technology or the system in its operational environ ment before launch of the production spacecraft. Problem solving is a normal part of any development pro cess, and testing is a proven tool for discovering problems. The GAO has long been advocating more robust DoD test programs. Despite the GAO push, numerous DoD weapon programs still suffer from persistent problems associated with late or incom plete testing. 17 lauded an attempt by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to them in larger numbers. The GAO found this to be a best prac tice used by successful commercial programs, where compo nents and subsystems demonstrate system functionality before investing a greater amount of procurement funds. 18 opment and demonstration phase afforded to other DoD acqui and evaluate advanced technologies among different types of spacecraft in their operational environment. Rather than a off the down-select between spacecraft contractors usually oc curs at some point during the design phase by having some sort of a after launch. Program managers thus expect spacecraft to be 15 years in a paradigmevery booster must successfully launch an operational spacecraft, including the advanced aircraft on paper, choosing the manufacturer based on contrast to the US Air Force aircraft acquisition model. Every aircraft, before it was allowed to enter the Air Force inventoryand a great many that failed to do sowas put through its paces at the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California. The turbojet revolution, the aerospace revo lution, the systems revolution, and now the unmanned aircraft revolution have overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles through a combination of technical aptitude, daring ingenu ity, and skillful management. 19 The same rigorous test before production methodology that has been an integral part of ad vanced aircraft development for over 60 years could be applied to spacecraft and spacecraft systems. In line with this paradigm ed military and civilian personnel with advanced education in space-centric disciplines such as astronautics, materials sci ence, physics, and electrical engineering. This active duty Air Force advanced skill set is essential to test and evaluate emer gent spacecraft and launch vehicle performance encompassing critical communication, sensor, and orbital maneuvering pa rameters, along with exploring optimal ground station capabili mature and critical capabilities can be demonstrated. In other words, the AFSTC would enable the DoD to work out the bugs presented by cutting edge space systems. This should be in a program production and launch issues, which typically include production schedules, launch vehicle integration, and contract execution. hicle aircraft is of negligible (and perhaps even negative) value ployed quickly and easily to augment existing constellations. 20 The performance of the Midcourse Sensor Experiment (MSX) spacecraft underscores the long-lasting utility of experimental spacecraft to operational space capabilities. MSX launched in 1996 as a spacecraft technology demonstrator to identify and proving successful in that role for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA), MSX was transferred to AFSPC in surveillance spacecraftproviding operational space surveil lance observations vital to the AFSPC and US Strategic Com Policy.


High Frontier 40 mand (USSTRATCOM) missions of space control. 21 The shift towards the AFSTC will solve pressing problems that long have evaded solutions. GAO reports have stated for some time that weapon system acquisition programs have taken on technology development that should occur in a science and technology environment. Such acquisition programs have been unable to align customer expectations with resources and thus minimize problems that could hurt the program in its design and production phases. In fact, many of the space programs the GAO reviewed over the past several decades have incurred unanticipated cost and schedule increases because they began without knowing whether technologies could work as intended and invariably found themselves addressing more costly and time-consuming technical problems. 22 Fortunately, many of the pieces of the AFSTC are already in place. Kirtland AFB, New Mexico is uniquely positioned to be the AFSTC. Detachment 12 of the Space and Missile Sys tems Center, recently renamed the Space Development and Test Wing (SDTW), is located in close proximity to the Air Force technology research center. The SDTW currently has a small to medium-lift rocket capability, a spacecraft production capabil ity, and a research and development spacecraft ground station capabilityall encompassed in a responsive contract known as true responsive space option, as responsive spacepower requires responsive contracting. IDIQ bypasses the lengthy source se as needed. 23 is in place for each of their services: An IDIQ for ten years for Minotaur launch vehicle services, a rapid operation support contract in place for spacecraft checkout and on-orbit opera tions, a low-cost IDIQ launcher contract for either the SpaceX Falcon or an Orbital Sciences Corporation upgraded Pegasus launch vehicle called the Raptor, and a recently (March 2006) awarded standard interface vehicle contract that builds small spacecraft with a non-proprietary standardized payload-to-ex periment interface. 24 Launch Program (RSLP), Space Test Program (STP) and Re search, Development, Test and Evaluation Space and Missile Operations (RDSMO)has a long history that helped shape the US military space program. RSLP currently maintains an inventory of 60 Minotaur IV boostersthree stages of stored Peacekeeper missile motors and a fourth stage Pegasusable to launch 2,500 lbs. into a 500 km altitude sun-synchronous orbit for a $21 million recurring cost. RSLP also maintains an inventory of 170 Minotaur I launch vehicles based on the lbs. payload into a 400-nautical mile altitude, sun-synchronous 25 Regarding spacecraft mary provider of mission design, spacecraft acquisition, inte vative space experiments. 26 Notable recent missions include the XSS-10 and XSS-11 spacecraftproof of concept vehicles for highly maneuverable small satellites. As for the ground emulate a wide variety of satellite ground stations. Further, it has the capacity to run multiple on-orbit operations simultane lized to test and evaluate the performance of two experimental spacecraft vehiclesa true spacecraft to select a win ning design for a production run while protecting proprietary operational data. into the AFSTC offers an ability to demonstrate space science and technology investments, enhance institutional and individ ual learning curves, and provide increased and low cost access to space for critical research and development payloads. As of opment payloads made it into orbit, and this number included a heavy reliance on the Space Shuttle. 27 The investment in the AFSTC can counter this trend with an enormous potential pay off in realizing the long-standing goal of responsive spacecraft and launch systems. An important additional aspect of the AF STC is the institutional and individual learning that will take place. As an institution, the Air Force will learn alternative methods and processes to conduct space operations that are not lations. The opportunity to manage smaller-scale experimental fering space professionals the opportunity to better prepare for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions and operations. 28 Additionally, the cost and consequence of failure limited number, high-tech/high cost production run. To reach the potential of this concept, however, the US Air Force must examine new approaches for spacecraft design. As much as 70 percent of modern spacecraft systems are Figure 5. Minotaur IV and Minotaur I.


41 High Frontier similar or, in some cases, identicalincluding power genera tion, attitude control, thermal control systems, communications systems, state of health sensors, mechanical structures, and on board computer systems. Much like a public transit bus that gives various people a ride to where they need to go, these com ponents comprise the spacecraft bus that transports and sup ports a variety of payload systems as they conduct their given mission(s) in the space environment. In contrast to the current is responsible for the acquisition of a spacecraft constellation, a responsibility for developing and procuring the basic satellite 29 This concept, accord ing to Douglas Lee, would free current spacecraft program of as communications, intelligence and early warning. Further, an existing spacecraft bus and a structured design process would for spacecraft much as a computer user can exchange or upgrade components. As payload sensor or cal advances and integrate them onto spacecraft as they mature, even late in the test or production cycle. 30 tions from which payload program managers could pick and or model. If new missions require increased maneuverability, counterspace options or power requirements, for example, it new requirements with off-the-shelf components, the SBPO designs the new component while the payload program man the new component becomes available, the SPBO includes it in its portfolio of options available to all other spacecraft pay load programs. Further, this concept reduces the technology ed technology during its design and production. As technol spacecraft prior to launch rather than restarting production lines for a new spacecraft system or holding launch and on-orbit op erations in abeyance while waiting for a technological leap re tations, and weight and volume constraints for modular and scalable satellite buses is essential. Common standards are operationally responsive space model, and must be a part of our future plans and will allow us to increase the utility mar gin of smaller satellites. 31 Industry provides an example of a common-bus approach for cost utility on select geosynchro nous spacecraft. From Zhongwei-1 (ChinaStar-1), launched in 1998, to the bus for both SBIRS-high and Advanced Extremely High Frequency Communication ( AEHF), Lockheed Martin evolved their A2100 spacecraft series to a modular design that on-orbit reliability, and reduced weight and cost. Lockheed Martin directs much of their research and development toward increasing the power available on the A2100 bus, which is cur tion. Company engineers claim that they can deliver a satellite using the A2100 bus in 18 months after receipt of the order. 32 However, the militarized version (A2100M) has yet to launch, and AEHF and SBIRS-high continue to exceed original cost estimates. We have yet to develop a standard bus with plugand-play payload components, and it is a critical step towards responsive spacepower. The next step is developing responsive launch vehicles, infrastructure, and organizations. The Air Force has touted the need for responsive space launch for over 20 years. Since the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986, the DoD spent over $4.4 billion on af fordable, responsive space launch (National Aerospace Plane, Advanced Launch System, Space Operations Vehicle, and oth ers)with little to show for it. 33 The DoD has further touted the need for small launch vehicles that could be launched in days, if not hours, and lower costs that would better match the small budgets of experiments and quickly launch under 1,000 lbs. to orbit. A 2003 Air Force study determined that EELV would not be able to satisfy these requirements. Building lowcost launch vehicles could create opportunities for innovative companies to compete for Air Force contracts and broaden the space industrial base. However, industry representatives told ment regarding its commitment to these effortsmuch talk but little funding. 34 True responsive space requires an organizational shift away the appropriate changes, the Air Force should establish respon sive space launch as a Air Force mission, formally recognizing that assured and timely access to orbit is the nexus between space acquisition and operations. Without success amount of national treasure in time and resources developing the spacecraft, booster and associated mission support infra structure are wasted. The infrastructure is currently in place for responsive space launch organization at both the eastern and western launch ranges. Space Launch Complex-8 at Vanden berg AFB, California (60-120 degree inclination) and Launch Complex-46 at Cape Canaveral AFS, Florida (28.5 to 40 degree inclination) currently support, and other government pads could be built to support, Minotaur or similar launch vehicles that rely on heritage Minuteman and Peacekeeper missile stages. 35 These stages operate on established Air Force technical orders electronics that result in an operational launch vehicle. Both bases have extensive missile storage capacities, in-place techni cal advisors (such as Aerospace Corporation), experienced con tractors, technicians, and Air Force quality advisors, along with world-class payload clean-room facilities, large aircraft runway


High Frontier 42 and range support infrastructure. This infrastructure can sup port a safe storage of a number of launch vehicles and payloads for a true launch on need capability. As then Brig Gen Robert C. Hinson stated, We have bluesuit maintenance people who never touch a wrench, operations people who never launch a booster 36 While their quality advisor role has been invaluable in mission assurancemoni toring and correcting contractor tasks for large boosters, these personnel could be effective in operationalizing small boost ers based on familiar former intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) platforms. Current missile maintenance training is in place for these systems and active-duty enlisted maintenance personnel (2M0XX Air Force Specialty Codes) are assigned to these bases. Further, a training pipeline is already in-place to nel with proven experience from the northern tier ICBM bases. the mission to continuously train and exercise their mission to integrate, test and launch a standard booster and spacecraft within days of a launch order from USSTRATCOM. As an AFSTC Detachment, this team would prepare and launch experimental spacecraft the same way they would execute their wartime tasking. Routine experimental AFSTC launches would thus validate their training on a periodic basis. both air and ground launched responsive space options. The current air launched Pegasus XL has the capability to launch a 976 lbs. payload into a low Earth orbit (LEO) for $13.5 million using an L-1011 aircraft launch platform. 37 sus on either the Raptor 1 (a winged, three-stage solid rocket vehicle carried to launch altitude and released from beneath a carrier aircraft) or the Raptor 2 (air-launched from a C-17 us ing parachute-based extraction) provides air launched contrac tor based options until US Air Force transport aircraft can be development phase. AirLaunch is designing QuickReach to large cargo aircraft. 38 Air launched options can transit and launch from virtually any orbital insertion point on any launch azimuth. Air launch has favorable incentives of launching directly from the equator, reducing required thrust for easterly launches, and over open tion centers. Further, air launched options bypass local weath er problems such as fog and lightning that can delay ground launches. Ground basing, however, provides a routine low-cost operational capability and, as mentioned above, options cur rently exist to utilize a large quantity of former ICBM boosters. At least two options for launching in each medium are optimal tigation. A tiered approach enables purposeful technology maturation within a determined and continuous approach to spacecraft and booster design, test, evaluation, and innovation. It should do so through standardized interfaces while leveraging and reor ganizing existing organizational processes and products. Tier I should be an integrated research, development, analysis, and testing period that presents a variety of advanced and even el egant technical solutions to long-range problems. Tier I is thus a Concept and Technology Development Phase designed to re duce risk and determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. The initiative should only exit Tier I when an affordable increment of militarily-useful capa demonstrated in a relevant environment, and a system can be developed for production within a short timeframe (normally 39 Demonstration of payload technology in this phase could occur in a space chamber at Arnold Engi neering Development Center, on a unmanned aerial vehicle or balloon platform, on an aircraft, or a test bench. Further, as the Air Force is the DoD Executive Agent for Space, an integrat ed partnership with research laboratories in national and DoD cies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency could be coordinated and led by the AFSTC and AFRL. The call for university research partnerships could thus be much more extensive, with AFRL and AFSTC sponsoring incentives and competitionssuch as a ride to orbitfor award-winning technological demonstrations. hicles in order to demonstrate key performance parameters in their operating environment. In other words, industry builds experimental vehicles leading to a demonstration that results in an end of phase selection of production contractor with an initial production and deployment decision (Milestone tion on large, unique spacecraft with tailored launch vehicles and support platformsand the lack of an AFSTC. The AF STC enables this phase within a reasonable timeline, where prototypes are contractor built, but AFSTC launched, and fol lowed by exhaustive AFSTC development test and evaluation to assess progress against critical technical parameters and ear ly operational assessments. Past successes of the MSX and the before a production and deployment decision. These vehicles met critical on-orbit performance parameters and provided fur ther insight into operational utility before a commitment was made to produce a constellation of vehicles. The absence of this phase for space comprises the major dif ference between space acquisition and all other DoD acquisi captured appropriate knowledge at three key pointsprogram start (Milestone B), design review for transitioning from sys tem integration to system demonstration (where the design performs as expected), and production commitment (Milestone


43 High Frontier C) as a condition for investing resources. 40 With a demonstra tion capability through the AFSTC, the Air Force could apply this model to spacecraft and space systems. The AFSTC de termines the effectiveness and suitability of the system, and completion of Tier II rests on the decision by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to either commit to the program at Milestone C or end the ef fort. 41 As mentioned above, experimental spacecraft can also potentially augment exist ing constellations until joined by production spacecraft or even operate in a stand-alone mode as demonstrated by the MSX spacecraft. Tier III begins with the Milestone C production deci sion. Its purpose is to design a production strategy that meets cost, schedule, and quality targets. Industry will thus have sig risks were shifted to the technology and demonstration phases in Tiers I and II. This process ensures production lines have proven technologies, and a standardized payload interface to a common spacecraft bus allows room for expansion should technological breakthroughs occur during a production cycle. A spacecraft will then be able to proceed through spiral de velopment without major design changes and corresponding delays. This three-tier process provides a purposeful strategy to provide needed spacecraft capabilities on-orbit by lowering the technological, and thus programmatic, risk. This three-tier approach brings space acquisition more in-line with the DoD acquisition cycle and the commercial best practices model ad vocated by the GAO. Space acquisition programs have histori cally attempted to achieve full capability in a single step and serve a broad base of users, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies. 42 Managing requirements, de veloping technology within the science and technology envi ronment while leveraging government, university and industry research capabilities, developing a purposeful and intensive test and evaluation capacity to demonstrate competing capa bilities, and using mature technologies for production and op eration are all encompassed within this three-tiered approach. These factors have been repeated recommendations from the GAO, who advocated these industrial best practices that enable commercial projects to meet cost and schedule targets. Fur demonstrated technology matures by interfacing with common components. Conclusion Overcoming the problem of getting spacecraft to orbit in a routine fashion is crucial to shifting from the current paradigm of large, unique DoD spacecraft and launch vehicles. Launch failuresunsuccessful attempts to place a payload into its in tended orbitare bound to occur in the future, despite the fact of currently touting a success record of 47 consecutive US (com mercial, civil, intelligence, and DoD) launches since the last failure in 1999, and 12 for 12 successful launches of EELV. Even the risk of failure raises the threshold beyond the reach of nearly all potential capa bility suppliers and results in a different acquisition cycle for space systems. However, increasing launch transaction rates coupled with developing standardized buses and plugand-play interfaces changes the risk mitigation strategy. These practices would enable the United States to lower the op portunity cost of placing payloads into LEO and simultaneously increase the ability to put research and development payloads into space. This stands in stark contrast to the current method of attempting to achieve a quantum leap in technological capa bility, which leads to late deliveries, cost increases, and a high consequence of failure. 43 Central to the spacepower paradigm shift is the addition of a true test and evaluation phase by creating the AFSTC. In-depth government expertise at the AFSTC enables proper program start decisions for spacecraft and launch vehicles that are in place for all other DoD program start (Milestone B) and pro duction commitment (Milestone C) decisions. With the AF STC, and a corresponding system development and demon stration phase with robust test and evaluation, the DoD is no longer forced to treat space acquisition as separate and distinct. This recommended three-tier program, similar to the DoD standard acquisition system, allows for production and deployment decisions only after successful demonstration of existing technologies. The proposed demonstration phase Tier IIis therefore the major shift from current practice, combining the best practices model from industry and the ex isting DoD acquisition policy to ensure space system designs perform as expected in their operational environment. These recommendations depend on each other for success. An on-orbit demonstration leads to producing spacecraft as needed within a given technological state of the art, a respon sive launch capability ensures routine access to space, standard ized spacecraft bus versions ensure program managers focus on improving spacecraft payloads, and interfaces enable modularizing inevitable technological advances. To gether they provide the capacity to upgrade systems in a spiral fashion as technology matures during their production cycle in stead of the current method of freezing the system designand the given technological solutionyears ahead of actual opera tional use. The AFSTC enables, and is enabled by, these capabilities. solve these problems. They could in fact, scientist, every engineer, every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil servant gives his personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed space. President John F. Kennedy


High Frontier 44 AFSTC detachments on both US launch ranges should con together with a small cadre of engineer and space operations phase launches in-line with training and exercising, and in fact validating, their mission to integrate, test and launch a standard plug-and-play booster and spacecraft within days of a launch order from USSTRATCOM. In this sense, rather than con tinuing to rely on unproven new contractor starts, the AFSTC directly contributes to a true responsive space launch capabil ity utilizing Air Force people and equipment to their potential. The AFSTC ultimately ensures the United States has a reliable rapid launch capability in the near term. Together, the AFSTC, the SBPO, and the three-tiered approach comprise a paradigm shift intended to increase the solvency of spacepower. This increased solvency will guarantee US political leaders and mil itary commanders can continue to depend on military space power, and that it remains a continuing competitive advantage for the United States. 1 Edward F. Bruner, Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size for the United States? ed. Congressional Research Service (The Li brary of Congress, 2006). Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the US active duty force never dropped below two million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Since 1989, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to now less than 1.4 million. 2 Dr. Loren B. Thompson, Can the Space Sector Meet Military (The Lexington Institute, October 2005 [cited 15 May 2006]), (ac cessed 25 September 2006). 3 Rich Tuttle, Lt. Gen.: AF Space Program Woes Hurting Army Capabilities, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 26 January 2006. 4 Senator Wayne Allard, speech given to the National De fense Industrial Association, Space Policy & Architecture Sympo sium (web site of US Senator Wayne Allard, 23 September 2005) ViewIssue&IssuePosition_id=1601 (accessed 25 September 2006). 5 Marcia S. Smith, Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning (The Library of Congress, 25 No vember 2005) pdf (accessed 25 September 2006). The Nunn-McCurdy act resulted from the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982, when Sena tor Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Representative David McCurdy (D-OK) included language intended to limit cost growth in major weapons programs. Programs that exceed a 15 percent Program Acquisition ceed a 25 percent limit, DoD must notify Congress and certify that the program is essential to national security, that no alternatives will provide equal or greater military capability at less cost, that new cost estimates are reasonable, and that the program management structure is adequate. 6 Jim Wolf, US Delays Pivotal Military Satellite Project, Wash ington Post 6 February 2006. 7 Richard Wolf, How Federal Spending Has Climbed since 2001, USA Today 3 April 2006, ton/2006-04-02-federal-spending-inside_x.htm (accessed 25 Septem ber 2006). 8 Jonathan Karp, Andy Pasztor, and Greg Jaffe, Pentagon Weighs Personnel Cuts to Pay for Weapons, nal 5 December 2005, SB113375156217213824-oPaL6D0OtfBQrfLvKmqwidSnwWE_ 20061205.html (accessed 25 September 2006). 9 10 March 2006, 6. 10 Richard K. Betts, Is Strategy an Illusion?, International Secu rity 25, no. 2 (2000): 9. 11 ing Air Force, Air Force Link 1 September 2005, news/story.asp?storyID=123011549. General John P. Jumper, as out going Air Force Chief of Staff, stated, The thing that worries me the most is the recapitalization of our force. We are now facing problems we have never seen before because of aging aircraft. We are having to deal with these aging airplane issues with an increasing amount of the budget, and we need to get on with recapitalizing. 12 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Rev. ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971). The free rider problem is a product of the behavior of collective ac tion. Once a smaller member has the amount of collective good he gets free from the largest member, he has more than he would have purchased for himself, and has no incentive to obtain any of the col lective good at his own expense. 13 Robert E. Levin, Overcoming Space Acquisition Problems, High Frontier 2, no. 2 (2006): 15. 14 Robert E. Levin, Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems, GAO-05-891T, in testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Repre sentatives (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountabil 15 Robert E. Levin, Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pres sures That Drive Problems Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisi 16 Thomas S. Kuhn, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 6. 17 Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (US General Ac ity Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, July 2000), 13. 18 sile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and Surveil lance System Need to Be Considered (US General Accounting Of Armed Services, 2003), 13. 19 Air Force Flight Test Center, Where We Stand Today, 1 March 2006, html#top (accessed 25 September 2006). 20 F-22 Raptor Flight Test,, http://www. the wingspan was increased, the wing leading-edge sweep was decreased, the vertical tails were reduced in area and moved aft, and 22s built in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) develop technology in general, not lead to operational aircraft. 21 United States Strategic Command, Space Control, fact sheet, March 2004, (ac cessed 25 September 2006). 22 Technology Development: New DoD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Ver sions Need to Be More Robust, GAO 05-155 (United States GAO Report to Congressional Committees, January 2005), 2. 23 Colonel Richard W. White Jr., SMC Det 12 Commander, tele phone interview by the author, 3 April 2006. 24 Ball Aerospace Wins Space Test Satellite Contract, SpaceRef. com, Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp., 1 April 2006, http://www. (accessed


45 High Frontier the Bill for Military Space, August 2003, 56-7. Figure 3. Source: Adapted from Robert E. Levin, Defense Ac quisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems Affecting 2005), 7. Figure 4. Source: Reprinted from Richard W. McKinney, Update and Missile Systems Center, 14 December 2004. Figure 5. Source: Colonel Richard White, Space Development September 2006). 25 Col Richard W. White Jr. 26 SMC Detachment 12, History of Detachment 12, http://www. (accessed 25 September 2006). 27 Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transforma (accessed 25 September 2006). 28 Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs a Department wide Strategy for Pur suing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, GAO-06449 (US GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 2006), 19. 29 Douglas E. Lee, Space Reform, 18, no. 2 (2004): 109. 30 Ibid. 31 Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transfor Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: 2004). 32 Space Page, 27 March 2006, htm? (ac cessed September 2006. 33 Dr. William F. Ballhaus Jr., Successes and Challenges in Trans forming National Security Space, High Frontier 2, no. 1 (2006): 16. 34 Sullivan and GAO, Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs a Depart mentwide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, 6. 35 Orbital Sciences Corporation, October 2004, Guide.pdf (acccessed 25 September 2006. The author does not advo already paid the development, production, and maintenance costs of these missile stages. 36 Tech Sgt Timothy Hoffman, Air Force Space Command Re working How It Gets to Space, 14 May 1998, http:// (accessed 25 September 2006). 37 John Croft, Changing the Low-Cost Launch Game, Aerospace America, February 2004, 42. 38 Jeremy Singer, Responsive Space Launch, Air Force Maga 89, no. 3, March 2006, 0306space.asp (accessed 25 September 2006). 39 Edward C. Aldridge Jr., System, Department of Defense, 5000.2, 12 May 2003, http://www. (ac cessed 25 September 2006). 40 Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Expe GAO-06-368 (US GAO Report to Congressional Committees, April 2006), 23. 41 Edward C. Aldridge Jr., System. 42 Sullivan and GAO, Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs a Depart mentwide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, 15. 43 Ibid., 20. Table and Figure Sources: AFSPC Launch Information Support Network (LISN) Database. Contact AFSPC/A3RS for Subscription Information Figure 1. Source: Reprinted from Robie Samanta Roy and Ray Hall, The Long-Term Implications of Current Plans for Investment Figure 2. Source: Reprinted from Benjamin S. Lambeth, Footing Maj John Wagner (BS, Astronautical Engineering, USAFA; MBA, University of Maryland; MS, Astronau tical Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology) is the th Launch Support Squadron. Canaveral AFS, Florida as the Titan IV heavy launch vehicle propulsion engineer and later responsible for Titan mechan ical systems, payload fairings and payload integration for national security spacecraft. In that capacity, he directed pad operations for the successful launch of tinue to enhance US national security. He also led the successful In 1996, Major Wagner was assigned as a space-based missile warning Flight Commander at the Defense Support Programs European Ground Station. He later served as an Operations Eval uator and the Commander, Operations Support Flight, responsible for training, crew force management, operational procedures, and mission analysis, resulting in 100 percent launch detection and 99.9 percent system availability ratesbest in Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). In 2000, Major Wagner was assigned to the Space Warfare Cen ter as the Chief of Advanced Technology and later as the Deputy Chief of the Wargaming and Simulation Branch. In that capac wargame, Schriever 2001, and Game Director for Schriever II, later served as the speechwriter for the Commander of AFSPC, authoring congressional testimony, posture statements, command priorities, and over 200 national and international articles, brief ings, and speeches. for Space Achievement. He was a distinguished graduate from School, and Air Command and Staff College. He is a 2006 gradu ate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and this article is a small subset of his thesis, Increasing the Solvency of Spacepower


High Frontier 46 Industry Perspective Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Assuring Access to Space Mr. Daniel J. Collins Vice President, Launch Systems, Network and Space Systems Boeing Launch Systems A mericans depend on access to space. We depend upon it for our national security; we depend upon it for our per sonal safety and well-being; we depend upon it for our national economy simple, true, statements. Yet the reality of assured access to space is considerably more complex and elusive. For the past six years, government and industry have worked togeth er to develop approaches to provide assured access through the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. It has to initiate the program have shifted dramatically. But we have never been closer to achieving this goal. A congressionallymandated panel, led by Lt Gen Forrest S. McCartney, USAF, re tired, recently concluded in its National Security Space Launch Report that: The EELV development programs are true suc cesses and are critical to national security. 1 This testimony, combined with a perfect launch record, provides the national security space community with a clear indication that we are on the path to success. In October 1998, Boeing and Lockheed Martin entered into contracts with the US Air Force to develop new families of launch vehicles and provide launch services to the US gov ernment. The contract anticipated that, for the next 20 years, EELVs would be the basis for intermediate and heavy space ac cess for the US national security space community. The Air Force provided approximately $500 million to each contractor to offset a portion of system development cost, and the con tractors agreed to self-fund the remaining development cost and infrastructure. Industry contributions exceeded the government investment several times over. The government also provided a sort of anchor tenancy by procuring a total of 28 launches from the two contractors. Dramatic changes in the launch industry buffeted the incipi ent program well before it cleared the tower. At least two of these called into question the fundamental assumptions of the program. First, a string of launch failures in 1998 and 1999 led to a Broad Area Review (BAR) and prompted questions regard ing the validity of insight versus oversight. Following the BAR, government and industry increased independent reviews and in stituted increased mission assurance activities. The second major shift was the collapse of the commercial launch market. In 1998, Commercial Space Transportation Ad visory Committee (COMSTAC) estimated that there would be over 250 payloads launched into orbit in 2002. The EELV pro gram was initially based on the assumption that commercial de mand would drive down prices and increase system reliability. The prime contractors priced their launch services accordingly. By the time 2003 actually arrived, however, COMSTAC was predicting that the number of satellites launched would hover well under 50 a year for the foreseeable future. With this shift, over a much smaller launch number of vehicles per year. Costs impossible, for EELVs to compete with highly subsidized for eign launch providers. The EELV contractors found themselves launches. Ultimately, this market shift required increased fund ing and led to a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Realizing the current situation was unsustainable, the White House developed a new National Space Transportation Policy (NSTP) which was authorized by President George W. Bush on provide a solid policy foundation for EELV through 2010. The For the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program shall be the foundation for access to space for intermediate and larger pay loads for national security, homeland security, and civil pur poses to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and schedule requirements. New US com mercial space transportation capabilities that demonstrate the ability to reliably launch intermediate or larger payloads will government missions. The Secretary of Defense shall maintain overall management responsibilities for the evolved expendable launch vehicle pro vice providers 2 The resulting Buy III contract converted NSTP policy imple mentation guidelines into sound acquisition strategy. The origi nal requirements for the EELV program were translated into the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), and the System requirements for the EELV program. commercial (FAR Part 12) to a traditional government oversight ways to make the transition work. The importance of operational reliability cannot be over-em phasized. The McCartney-led study stresses this point: Some NSSI [National Security Space Institute] missions have satellite constellations that do not degrade or tolerate satellite outages gracefully. It is, therefore, important to launch these


47 High Frontier payloads when scheduled in order to maintain continued and assured service. These NSSI missions are usually critical to national security, and continued service is a very high prior not readily available, and extended outages result from a failed launch. 3 design requirements which encompassed a wide variety of mis sions. So each member of the vehicle family exceeds the most stressing mission requirements for any mission. The result is higher mission assurance across the vehicle family. Working with the US Air Force and The Aerospace Corporation, we validated our designs through a detailed and rigorous process mission reliability exceeding 98 percent. Practically speaking, we have completed our missions successfully on all six of our launches. The Atlas program has earned a similar level of reli ability. Combined, the EELV program is 14 for 14. This is an exceptional record for two completely new launch systems. US Air Force requirements also called for the capability to launch a broad range of satellite payloads into virtually every conceivable orbit. These requirements included 13,500 lbs. to geosynchronous earth orbit and a range of masses to polar orbit from 4,400 lbs. to 41,000 lbs. No single vehicle or launch range could meet this spectrum of requirements. Translated to hard ware, the ORD meant that EELV providers needed to have an entire family of vehicles and launch facilities on both the East and West Coasts. The Delta IV program meets these requirements with a com pletely integrated launch infrastructure: new vehicles, new fac launch of Delta IV took place only four years from contract awarda remarkable achievement for the Air Force and the Boeing Delta team. The Delta IV family of launch vehicles is a versatile, capable launch system. With payload capacities ranging from the Delta IV medium capacity of just over 9,000 lbs. to low Earth orbit, to the Delta IV heavy capacity of almost 49,000 lbs., the family covers the range of US government payload mass requirements in the intermediate and heavy classes. The Delta IV family also In the late 1990s the US national security community saw quirements meant that as many as 34 Common Booster Cores (CBCs) might have to be produced in a single year. The Delta program responded. The CBC was designed for produceability through design commonality and reduced parts count. The RS68 engine, for example, has only 5 percent of the parts count of the Space Shuttle Main Engine. The Decatur, Alabama production facility was sized to meet these requirements. Designed to produce as many as 40 CBCs a year, it is a state-of-the-art production facility. The facility is arranged with a linear production line, with materials coming in one end of the factory, and rockets exiting the other. Stateof-the-art production techniques are incorporated throughout the factory. While we struggle with the low production rates demanded by the current market, the early results have been im pressive. The Friction Stir Welding facility has performed more defect. The environmentally clean Spay On Foam Insulation process has applied more than 100,000 square feet of insula tion without defects. Certainly, the Decatur plant warrants the moniker: national asset. Mission requirements also necessitated that EELVs have the capability of launch from both Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Florida and Vandenberg AFB, California (VAFB). The Delta program developed launch pad infrastructure which Figure 2. Decatur, Alabama Production Facility.


High Frontier 48 featured horizontal ve hicle integration. Our launch system was also designed with the capa bility of automated vehi cle checkout, off stand, in the Horizontal Integration Facility. The system was designed to minimize the amount of time necessary on stand, with a design objective of eight days. Launch vehicles are transported to either CCAFS or VAFB in the Delta Mariner, a ship spe launch vehicles with the capability to operate in both inland waterways and the open seas. As with every other element of the Delta IV system, the launch and logistics systems were designed with the intent of meeting US government requirements for reliability, avail The ORD also challenged the EELV program to be at least 25 percent less expensive to operate than existing systems, with an objective of 50 percent. The Delta program has met this chal lenge in two ways. First, since the Delta program was largely funded by Boeing, the Air Force avoided the development cost spike associated with most programs. Secondly, the operational cost of the Delta program is projected to be approximately 50 percent of the Titan program. To be sure, there is much work to do in this area, but the Nation should be able to achieve assured access at lower cost. Two factors should always be kept in the front of our minds, however. First, lower cost is not worth any compromise in reli ability. Mission success is overwhelmingly the highest priority. obvious. In 1996, over $4 billion in payloads were launched at a West Coast. in satellites launched at a cost of $1.6 billion. Second, we should bear in mind that both EELV programs are relatively high up the learning curve. The typical launch ve hicle programs run for over 20 years. Atlas and Delta have only been launching for four years. We have considerable industrial experience which indicates we will be able to gain considerable In 1998, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and the US Air Force committed to provide the Nation with assured access. Together we are meeting that commitment. The past few years have been and contractor partnership for EELV is emerging healthier than program and emerged with two very capable launch vehicles, which are poised to meet US government mission requirements for the foreseeable future. 1 RAND National Defense Research Institute, National Security Space Launch Report, XIX. 2 Science and Technology, Assuring Access to Space, sect. I, bullet 4, subbullet A. 3 RAND, 3. Mr. Dan Collins (BS, Civil Engineering, Loyola Mary mount University, Los Ange les) is the vice president of Launch Systems for Boeing Network and Space Systems, a major business unit of Boeing Integrated Defense Systems. In this capacity, he oversees the Delta launch vehicles, Sea Launch payload accommoda tions and Boeing Launch Ser vices, the contract and market ing organization for the Delta and Sea Launch vehicles. Prior to this position, he was vice president and program manager of the Delta program, responsible for overseeing the design, engi neering, integration, production, quality assurance, and program management for the Delta II and IV launch vehicles, and the Titan payload fairing program. Before this assignment, Mr. Collins was the vice president and program manager of the Boeing Evolved Expendable Launch ment and production of the Delta IV family of launch vehicles. Prior to that, he directed program integration activities for the Delta IV EELV effort and was also the program manager for the Delta III launch vehicle. Mr. Collins began his career at McDonnell Douglas in 1990 as a structural analysis engineer on the Space Station Freedom pro gram. Since then, he has held several positions of increasing responsibility and served on the integrated product team for the International Space Stations pressurized elements. Prior to joining McDonnell Douglas, Mr. Collins worked for the Northrop Corporation. He represents Boeing on the board of the Discovery Science Center in Santa Ana, California.


49 High Frontier Mr. Michael C. Gass Vice President and General Manager of Space Transportation, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company On the bitterly cold Florida morning of 28 January 1986, the US space program was rocked to its foundation, and the policy of relying primarily on the Space Shuttle to loft national secu rity payloads into space was shattered with the explosion of the Challenger. The Challenger loss exposed our vulnerability, and was followed in a matter of weeks by two other catastrophic rocket failuresthe loss of a Titan 34D at Vandenberg AFB, California on 18 April and a Delta at Cape Canaveral, Florida on 3 May. The wakeup call had become a nightmare. pendent upon space-based systems for intelligence, communication, and mis sile early warning, and that dependence rested upon something policymakers had come to take for grant ed: routine access to space. As a result, for a breathtak ingly long two-and-a-half superpower was incapable of replenishing its critical space assets. vowed to restore and strengthen the space launch were formulated to address launch architectures and to realize the opportunities for renewal presented by the current crisis. Over much of the next decade the pro posed means for addressing the problem of assured ac cess would advance through several iterationsfrom Advanced Launch System, to National Launch Sys tem, to Spaceliftereven tually culminating in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). Development Overview The EELV program came into being as a result of a report issued in May 1994 entitled the Department of Defense Space Launch Modernization Plan. Headed by then Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., Vice Commander of Air Force Space Com mand, the report evaluated the increasing costs related to the vehicles. This study recommended four possible options to ad dress the issue: (1) maintain the existing systems with minor upgrades, (2) evolve existing systems, (3) design and develop an all new expendable system, and (4) develop a new reusable system. 1 The DoD chose the second option, to evolve existing sys tems, and in November 1994 created an imple mentation plan that would reduce the total cost for mediumand heavy-lift space launches. The EELV strategy envisioned the award of a single produc tion contract that would (1) maximize common systems and components to reduce procurement costs and en hance production rates and (2) decrease the number of launch complexes, launch crews, and support require ments to reduce operation costs. 2 Following a Request for Proposals in May 1995, four companies were awarded 15-month Low Cost Con cept Validation contracts in August 1995, each valued at $30 million, to expand and detail their EELV concepts. The companies were: (1) Alliant Techsystems Inc. of Magna, Utah, (2) Boeing Defense and Space Group of Seattle, Washington, (3) Lockheed Martin Technol Assured Access to Space Space Transportation Perspective Industry Perspective The Atlas V, developed by Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services as


High Frontier 50 ogies, Inc. of Denver, Colorado, and (4) McDonnell Douglas Aerospace of Huntington Beach, California. 3 In December 1996, a downselect to two contractorsLock heed Martin and McDonnell Douglaswas announced. Each received a $60 million contract to complete 17-month indepen dent Pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development stud ies for EELV. In August 1997, Boeing purchased McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and continued to perform the EELV con tract. 4 the US government shifted gears. In November 1997, it was announced that rather than choosing a single EELV contractor both companiesBoeing and Lockheed Martinwould con tinue forward with their development and manufacture of me diumand heavy-lift EELVs, and share the government market when the systems became operational. The government rationale behind the decision arose from the perception that a burgeoning communications satellite market would help defray the costs of maturing two launch systems. But, a robust commercial launch market never materialized. Nevertheless, both EELV contractors continued forward. In 2002, both EELV systems would launch successfully, and have transitioned into the operational phase. The EELV will be the means to achieve assured access to vember 2003, per Public Law 108-136: It is the policy of the United States for the president to under take actions appropriate to ensure, to the maximum extent prac ticable, that the United States has the capabilities necessary to launch and insert United States national security payloads into space whenever such payloads are needed in space. The appro priate actions referred to shall include, at a minimum, providing resources and policy guidance to sustain (1) the availability of at least two space launch vehicles (or families of space launch vehicles) capable of delivering into space any payload desig nated by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central In telligence as a national security payload; and (2) a robust space launch infrastructure and industrial base. 5 Space Transportation Policy, 6 January 2005: Assured Access is a requirement for critical national security, continued space operations, consistent with risk management and affordability. 6 The Atlas Launch System is an integral element of the As sured Access to Space strategic objective of the US Space Transportation Policy. The capabilities enabled by Atlas en security, lead exploration of the solar system and beyond, in crease economic prosperity, and expand our knowledge of the Earth and its environment. The Atlas Program is part of Lockheed Martin Space Sys tems Company (LMSSC) with production operations in Harlin ing, and business operations in Denver, Colorado; and launch facilities at Cape Canaveral AFS, Florida and Vandenberg AFB, California. Atlas provides complete launch services including spacecraft integration, processing, encapsulation, launch opera In June 2007, the Atlas Program will celebrate the 50 th an spacecraft to every planet in the solar system. The Atlas team has demonstrated the ability to adapt to changes in space policy, foreign competition, and market demands. During the late 1980s, the Atlas Program underwent a tran sition from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) management to a commercial program, which was au tonomously managed and operated by General Dynamics (GD). In 1987, GD began marketing Atlas directly to commercial and government customers. In 1993, Martin Marietta acquired the sembly were moved from San Diego to Denver. The hallmarks of the modern Atlas Program are relentless attention to mission success, pre-planned, low-risk evolution ary development, continuous product and process improve ment, and focus on the needs of the customer. This intense focus on mission success and continuous process and product improvement were born from painful experiences at the start of the commercial program during which three of the 11 Atlas I launches resulted in failures. Since 1990, the Atlas team has developed eight new vehicle are the latest evolutionary versions of the Atlas launch system; they were placed into service in 2002. The recent launch of AV008 was the 590 th Atlas launch. It was also the 79 th consecutive success for an Atlas booster with the Centaur upper stage. This record includes 100 percent success for the Atlas II, IIA, and IIAS families and all Atlas III and V vehicles. It also includes launches from four launch pads on two coasts. out in 2004 and 2005, respectively and are no longer in produc tion. The Atlas V vehicle has launched successfully eight out of eight times and is maintaining an annual rate of four to six launches per year with a surge capability of 12-18 vehicles per year. Atlas recently added to its legacy of support to interplan etary exploration, launching back-to-back NASA missions to Mars in 2005 and Pluto in 2006. by the US government, are to: 1. Provide launch services for DoD and NASA payloads at a minimum 25 percent reduction in recurring costs (as compared to heritage systems) while improving reliabil ity, capability, and operability; 2. Provide a minimum design reliability of 0.98;


51 High Frontier 3. Accurately deliver payloads to their required orbits, in cluding geosynchronous transfer orbits (GTO); 4. Provide standardized payload interface capabilities. The Atlas team successfully met and surpassed each of these requirements. Using the launch rates baselined during the EELV competition, the Atlas V family reduced the cost to orbit by 50 percent. The Atlas V 401 (10,900 lbs. to GTO) has a de sign reliability of .995. The Atlas V 551 (19,180 lbs. to GTO) has a design reliability of .992. Demonstrated reliability is 100 percent, system performance requirements have been substan tially exceeded and orbital errors on launches to date have been fewer than 25 percent of the allowable. The Atlas Program is in the recurring or production phase of its lifecycle. However, product and process improvements are implemented on an on-going basis to meet the dynamic needs of the customer community and to ensure sustained mission success. Recent upgrades include a redundant avionics control system and more reliable and producible solid rocket motors. Advanced design work is also being accomplished for the next generation of Atlas to provide even greater performance and tation needs. Assured Access The US government has put into place the necessary legal, policy, and contractual mechanisms to allow for the EELV pro future. As has been described previously, the desire of the gov ernment to have assured access to space and maintain two viable launch providers has required it to establish and fund capability contracts with the EELV providers. This enables the country to maintain the baseline critical skills and capabilities required to meet current and future access to space needs. Once this criti cal baseline has been established through the increased level of insight by the government the next step will be to increase the The United States is approaching a crossroads in the space transportation area. We can either sustain two existing EELV providers until a downselect is required due to budgetary con and the second requires an integrated government and industry plan. I would like to pursue the second alternative and propose some thoughts on how this could be accomplished, as well as be addressing. The second alternative will be made possible through multiple, parallel paths, (1) continuous improvement


High Frontier 52 portunities, and (3) the proposed Joint Venture United Launch Alliance. One of the successes of the Atlas family of launch vehicles has been the continuous incorporation of new technologies and processes into the launch system. These have provided Atlas with new capabilities, increased reliability, and lowered costs relative to earlier versions of Atlas vehicles. This process of continuous improvement also has kept the Atlas workforce fresh, always looking for innovative technologies or processes tion every two years. The last thing that the United States can afford to do is restrain that spirit of innovation and settle for good enough. The second aspect of addressing future challenges is expan sion of the addressable marketplace for EELV launch vehicles. The net result is higher volume at factories and launch pads, cedures and processes. The near-term commercial market out ment for regular International Space Station re-supply missions could provide the EELV production and processing lines with products through the factory and launch processing to preserve skill levels. The last area of discussion is the proposed joint venture be tween Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company, the United Launch Alliance (ULA). This combination, if approved, will provide the potential for future synergies and cost reduction associated with integrated management, manufacturing, and launch operations for both the Atlas V and Delta IV family of vehicles. ULA also maintains the two separate launch vehicle Conclusion encompasses much more than launch, the fact remains that all space assets have to get to space to be effective. Therefore, space transportation is a critical and necessary component of any space architecture. The US government has established the necessary components, legislation, policy, and acquisition strategy, to enable the national security space community to today and in the future. The challenge for the US government is to not become com placent and accept good enough, but rather to continue to im prove the capability that exists today through continued injec tion of new technology and improved processes, thus enabling the use of these space transportation systems to support mul tiple government missions, while taking full advantage of the capabilities the proposed joint venture can provide. This will guarantee that assured access to space continues to be available in the long term, while supporting the management of critical sub-tier industrial base suppliers that without this approach from both the uniformed services and civilian leadership. In deed, our national security depends on such leadership to retain American pre-eminence in space. To leaders like these, the wakeup call of January 1986 became a call to action. We in in dustry must continue to perform and deliver on the promises of assured access to retain our pre-eminence on the high frontier.1 GlobalSecurity, EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Glo, 2005, htm. (accessed 25 September 2006). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Policy regarding assured access to space: national security payloads, Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, US Code: Title 10, Sub title A, part IV, chapter 135, 2273, 2006, uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002273----000-.html (accessed 25 September 2006). 6 US Space Transportation Policy, 6 January 2005, http://www.ostp. gov/html/SpaceTransFactSheetJan2005.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006). Mr. Michael C. Gass (BS, Industrial Engineering, Le high University; MS, Man agement, Massachusetts In stitute of Technology) is the vice president and general manager of Space Transpor tation for Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, re sponsible for the Atlas, Titan, and Advanced Space Trans portation product lines and all space launch activity. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Vehicle (EELV) programs, for Lockheed Martin Space Systems and as vice president of the Atlas launch vehicle program. He was responsible for the Atlas II, III, and V launch vehicle pro grams, and held additional senior operational and management positions. Mr. Gass also served as vice president of Production and Materiel Operations with responsibility for all Lockheed Martin Astronau tics launch vehicle and spacecraft programs. Before this position, tion areas through the transition phase of an accelerating produc tion rate and relocating the operation from San Diego, California to Denver, Colorado. Mr. Gass served in a number of management positions with Gen acquired by Martin Marietta, which merged with the Lockheed Corporation in 1995 to become Lockheed Martin Corporation.


53 High Frontier Sea Launch Providing Assured Commercial Access to Space Mr. Rob Peckham President and General Manager, Sea Launch Company, LCC A cial ports, in Long Beach, California, members of the international Sea Launch team work together to ensure mission success and customer satisfaction. A testament to both the com plexities and abilities of multiple cultures and disciplines work ing synergistically in a cooperative commercial enterprise, Sea Launch optimizes expertise and technology from parties that Company, LLC, manifests a unique conceptthe marriage of marine and rocket technologies, driven by the focused dedica tion of meeting customer requirements. Established in April 1995, Sea Launch is an international consortium of four of the companies. Boeing Com pany (US, 40 percent), RSC Energia (Russia, 25 percent), Aker ASA (Norway, 20 per cent), and SDO Yuzhnoye/ PO Yuzhmash (Ukraine, 15 percent) formed a partner and only, company to launch commercial satellites from a sea-based platform posi tioned on the equator in the With its unique capabil ity of launching at a zero-de gree inclination, Sea Launch maximizes satellite lifetime on-orbit and offers customers the potential for additional transponder revenue. Into its eighth year of commercial operations, Sea Launch has attracted new and repeat cus tomers such as XM Satellite Radio, DIRECTV, Thuraya Satellite Telecommunica tions Company, Inmarsat, Intelsat/PanAmSat, Echo Star Communications, SES Global, JSAT Corporation, KT Corporation, and space craft builders Space Systems/Loral, Boeing Satellite Systems, EADS Astrium, Lockheed Martin Commercial Space Systems, and Alcatel Alenia Spacewho rely on Sea Launch and its world-class service to help grow their businesses. As a result, Sea Launch has emerged as the most innovative, commercially competitive, reliable, heavy-lift launch service in the industry. The Sea Launch partners are fully committed to the longthe potential for global cooperation, for the purpose of serving a global market. In addition to achieving 22 successful missions commercial satellite demand. Located on the Equator at 154 West Longitude in interna solely by Sea Launch and provides the most direct route for spacecraft on their way to geostationary orbit. This site offers maximum lift capacity, which enables customers to launch increased spacecraft lite life on-orbit. Dubbed the doldrums for a lack of in clement weather conditions, the launch site provides a be nign environment as well as launch schedule assurance. The Sea Launch partner ship thrives in its diversity with each of the parties adept pertise, complementing the team as a whole. The ability to optimize its resources is imperative as the Sea Launch system integrates systems and technology not usually designed to work together or technology forms the foun dation of the innovative yssey Launch Platform that is managed by the Norwegians and is home to the launch pad. The Ukrainians design and manufacture the ZenitIndustry Perspective Sea Launch Company


High Frontier 54 sion of the reliable and quick-response system they brought into operation in the early 1980s. The system also incorporates the reliable Russian Block-DM upper stage, which deploys sat ellites into geosynchronous transfer orbit. The Americans pro vide mission design and management, systems integration, and payload accommodations. From the Launch Control Center on the accompanying ves sel, the Sea Launch Commander, the launch team controls the fully automated rocket remotely throughout launch operations, including the assembly of the rocket on the launch pad, auto matic mating of fueling and electrical umbilicals, countdown, some 250 miles away, the 300 personnel at the launch site de pend on the resources of the two vessels for all professional, operational, and personal needs. It is the dynamic Sea Launch teamas well as the launch system itselfthat truly sets the operation apart from other launch service providers. A lean, dedicated, experienced group of professionals, each individual accepts tremendous respon sibilities, as well as the authority to carry them out. Each member is a stakeholder with a personal investment in meet Launch of the Koreasat 5 Satellite, 21 August 2006. Sea Launch Company Mr. Rob Peckham (BA, Cali fornia State University, Chico; MBA, Pepperdine University) became President and General Manager of the Sea Launch Company in June 2006. He is responsible for the leader ship and management of the international team of seasoned professionals who support the commercial launch needs of the international space com munity with the proven and reliable Sea Launch system and its land-based derivative, Land Launch. Prior to assuming his present position, Mr. Peckham was Vice President of Sales and Marketing for Sea Launch, since 2001. He was Manager of Launch Services Acquisition for Hughes Space and Communications before joining the Sea Launch team in 2000, as senior director of Sales and Marketing. Mr. Peckham entered the aerospace industry in 1980, at the Northrop Corporation, and began his commercial space career in 1988, working on the Delta II program at McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company in Huntington Beach, California. Since that time, he has held increasingly responsible positions in the development of commercial space programs. accomplishments. focused solutions, the Sea Launch team works closely with spacecraft end users, manufacturers, and the insurance commu nity to ensure open relationships and uncompromised customer satisfaction. Sea Launch continues to build its legacy, one suc information about the Sea Launch Company is available on the company web site at Sea Launch Company Sea Launch Company


55 High Frontier Enhancing Joint Space Operations Lt Gen C. Robert Kehler, USAF Deputy Commander, US Strategic Command General James E. Cartwright, Commander, USSTRATCOM JFCC SPACE Implementation Directive, 19 July 2006 A New Direction In May 2004, General James E. Cartwright, Commander, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), began implementing a series of dramatic and comprehensive organizational changes. These organizational moves were undertaken in response to di tivated US Space Command, created US Northern Command, nuclear deterrence responsibilities. In essence, STRATCOM became a renewed global command focused on delivering in tegrated strike, space, missile defense, network warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) combat ef fects to the Geographic Combatant Commands. The creation of Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCC) within STRATCOM was a unique approach to accom plish the wide variety of missions assigned by the President. mission organization. The JFCCs are designed to be mutually tlespace. As such, they operate in a distributed and collaborative fashion providing an integrated suite of operational capabilities. The basic concept of operations involves decentralizing opera tional planning and employment, leveraging authorities and ca pabilities in the complementary dual-hat organizations, and increasing operational speed. Initially the USSTRATCOM structure included a JFCC for Space and Global Strike (SGS). General Cartwright tasked the commander of this JFCC with three very important missions space, global strike, and integration across all the JFCCs. In this construct the commander of 14 th Air Force was a subor dinate, supporting commander to the commander, JFCC SGS. This arrangement placed a layer of command between the daily activities of the space mission (conducted by the Joint Space Operations Center) and Commander (CDR) USSTRATCOM, and added a mission to the already full plate of responsibilities for global strike and integration. After one year of operations, CDRUSSTRATCOM and the Warfighter Focus


High Frontier 56 Chief of Staff of the Air Force determined that separating the space and global strike mission areas would better serve US national security interests. They agreed the best way to fur ther integrate space across all USSTRATCOM mission areas would be to establish a stand-alone JFCC for Space. This new construct would also better align Air Force components to sup port USSTRATCOM, streamline the space operations chain of command, and allow the commander of JFCC Global Strike to focus on the critical strike and integration missions. On 19 July 2006, General Cartwright restructured JFCC Space and Global Strike into two separate and distinct organi zations: JFCC Space and JFCC Global Strike and Integration (GSI). This structure is intended to allow each JFCC to more effectively execute its primary mission and to support the ecution and force management for space and global strike operations. JFCC GSI is also responsible for integrating all ele ments of military power as it conducts, plans, and presents global strike effects. The JFCC SPACE is headquartered at Vandenberg AFB, California, and is commanded by Maj Gen William Shel ton. The new construct is intended to strengthen space operations, improve re sponsiveness, and codify command and control of space forces. Elevating space as a stand-alone JFCC emphasizes the growing importance of space operations to our national security. The new JFCC construct also comple presentation of its forces to each combat construct, 14 th Air Force would be the STRAT-SP, and 8 th Air Force would be Strike, AFSTRAT-GS. In keeping with the other JFCCs, Major General Shelton is dual-hatted as the commander of 14 th Air Force. The JFCC SPACE concept as de scribed in the Implementation Directive is as follows: the CDR JFCC SPACE will serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters to plan, task, direct, and execute space operations In close coordi nation with the headquarters staff, and JFCC GSI, JFCC SPACE will conduct space oper ational-level planning, integration, and co ordination with other USSTRATCOM joint functional and service components, other Combatant Commanders [through their Space Coordinating Authority (SCA), and other [Department of Defense] DoD organizations, and when directed, non-DoD partners to ensure unity of effort in support of military, national security operations, and support to civil authorities. The establishment of JFCC SPACE enhances unity of effort and unity of command for joint space operations. It also pro vides a joint focus for space operations and enhances joint and allied participation through the Joint Space Operations Center. Finally, this construct gives the combatant commanders a single point of contact for requesting space effects.


57 High Frontier pursued across the US government. These improved relation ships, using JFCC SPACE as the focal point for military space operations, will provide better employment for our limited space assets and will leverage complementary organizations in support of global and theater operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated essential authorities to the CDR JFCC SPACE for operational and tactical-level plan ning, force execution, and day-to-day management of space forces assigned to STRATCOM. He has also delegated opera tional and/or tactical control of assigned forces to CDR JFCC SPACE along with granting direct liaison authority for work ing with the other combatant commands. Delegation of these authorities will enable an agile response, with desired space effects provided at the timing and tempo needed to support op erational commanders across the globe. We are also formalizing the relationships between JFCC cally, we are enhancing our operational relationship with the ligence Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administra tion, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agen cy. Strengthening these ties will enhance information sharing among the organizations and is expected to provide a more comprehensive decision-making process. In the future, we anticipate increased interaction and col laboration with our international mission partners and with the commercial space industry. Efforts to this effect are already underway among many different organizations. Similar to uni fying space operations for the DoD, this unity of effort is being Lt Gen C. Robert Bob Kehler (BS, Education, Penn sylvania State University; MS, Public Administration, University of Oklahoma; MA, National Security and Strate gic Studies, Naval War Col lege) is Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Com mand, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. As second in command, he is charged with ensuring the com mand meets responsibilities for global command and control of strategic forces and remains ready to provide strategic assets to execute decisive national security objectives. General Kehler entered the Air Force as a distinguished graduate commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels, and has a broad range of operational and command tours in ICBM opera tions, space launch, space operations, missile warning, and space control. He commanded a Minuteman ICBM squadron at White man AFB, Missouri, and the Air Forces largest ICBM operations group at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. He served as Deputy Direc tor of Operations, Air Force Space Command; and commanded both the 30 th Space Wing at Vandenberg AFB, California, and the 21 st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colorado. The generals staff assignments include wing-level planning and tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command headquarters and Air Force Space Command. He was also assigned to the Secre was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the pres ident's ICBM Modernization Program. During an assignment to the Joint Staff, he helped formulate revolutionary changes to nuclear war plan structure and targeting. Most recently, as Direc ties of a number of space organizations on behalf of the Under Undersecretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC. Building.


High Frontier 58 Small Satellite Multi-Mission Command and Control for Maximum Effect Mr. Eric Miller Manager Vandenberg Operations, General Dynamics Lt Col Richard A. Lane, USAF Director, Space Force Enhancement, AF Space Battlelab Mr. Allen Kirkham, et al. Military Analyst Space and Missile Defense Systems, Army Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab A great many advances have been made in small satellite technology in the past 10 years, but two associated ele ments continue to trouble the market: a ride to orbit and ground infrastructure to take advantage of the sensor platform. A great deal of effort has gone into the spacelift side with the emer gence of new launch vehicles, with common spacecraft inter faces, to reduce the cost of getting to orbit. Flight interfaces have been developed out of necessity to limit the number of variables and allow both sides to build to a common interface. The same has not been true for the ground operations infra structure. With notably few exceptions, space platform archi designed to optimize the interface. These stovepipes ensure an side of the stovepipe. In essence current ground infrastructures are not readily adaptable to a new mix of space-based sensor for a customer who is willing to invest in a ground station as well as the sensor platform. Improvements are needed at both ends of the ground in frastructure: the spacecraft ground station operator and the deployed operational or tactical user. Current use of network interfaces for the Joint Space Tasking Order (JSTO) process is limited to email and text messaging to relay requirements inferred by manually reviewing mission logs to identify why a Operations Center (JSpOC) manually derives detailed status of mission assets, such as constellation health, current tasking levels, ground station availability, and impacts due to future op erations. These details are obtained from a variety of systems, in several formats, with no common way to access the required information. Space operations need robust tools that can track current ture mission capabilities, correct for limitations, and automate into mission logs for status. Often JSTOs are generated with out knowing the true status of the assets and whether or not the operations will deliver the required effects to the theater. new sensor technologies that advance operationally responsive space (ORS). Global Apportionment As the sensors and platforms are coming out of the research and development environment, the missions tend to have a multitude of agencies involved. When the sensor platform is delivered and placed into operation, the mission lacks a single to ensure that the new technology is being evaluated within the operational environment it is expected to support in the future. On 19 July 2006, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) created a joint functional component com mand for space (JFCCSPACE) at Vandenberg AFB, Cali fornia. The Commander (CDR) JFCCSPACE is the primary USSTRATCOM interface for joint space effects to the sup ported commander. The CDRJFCCSPACE exercises opera tional control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of des ignated space forces through the (JSpOC). This 24/7 node executes CDRJFCCSPACE missions for joint space command and control. CDRJFCCSPACE is the global space coordinat ing authority; the single authority in USSTRATCOM to coor dinate global space operations and integrate space capabilities CDRUSSTRATCOM does not control. The processes within the JSpOC are based on those used within an air operations center. The tasking of all US space assets OPCON or TACON to CDRJFCCSPACE begins with the JSpOC Strategy Divi sion, collecting the intent and needs of CDRUSSTRATCOM, CDRJFCCSPACE, all theatre space coordinating authorities (TSCA) and all supported commanders. These requirements are prioritized and a space operations directive is produced list ing the effects required during a 24-hour period. These priori tized effects are then balanced against available resources in a joint master space plan that forms the basis for a JSTO. The Warfighter Focus


59 High Frontier JSTO is passed to subordinate units who then have 12 hours to plan how to deliver the effects required and 24 hours to deliver those effects. needs. In the air, land and maritime worlds, recent operations have driven home the recognition that some targets are time sensitive and require effects on target within the normal tasking cycles. Similarly, some space effects are needed within shorter time-scales than the normal process allows; currently these ef fects are directed by issuing changes to the JSTO. Secondly, the single JFCCSPACE can not synchronize its battle rhythm with each and every TSCA and supported commander. TSCA battle rhythms tend to be based on the local time in that theatre. If the JFCCSPACE battle rhythm happens to coincide with that of a particular TSCA, it will certainly not coincide with other fects in the timescale that ORS sensor platforms such as TacSat and JWS will require. A TSCA that has been apportioned an effects in real-timenot tomorrow. It is clear, therefore, that it is necessary to develop a means to rapidly collate required effects worldwide, prioritize these effects and then deliver them. The JSpOC is the appropriate organization for managing the global apportionment of space assets for theater effect, but will require a new set of tools. By integrating key network-centric elements of the Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC), the JSpOC can begin to model and effectively apportion global platforms and sensors for maxi mum theater effect. With this in mind, the AF Space Battle lab and General Dynamics proposed the Space Apportionment For Effect (SAFE) demonstration that provides the JSpOC the relevant environment needed to frame the network-centric, au JSTO tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPS) required to maximize theater space effects. demonstrate space apportionment and VMOCs in a Systems of Systems environment. SAFE will be accessed by the JSpOC, combined air operations center (CAOC), satellite operations the concept of operations that will support ORS deployment. The demonstration provides the CAOC direct access to sen sor platforms and data that have been apportioned to them by the JSpOC. The VMOC tools will enable the JSpOC to model theater effect, generate an automated JSTO, and issue the JSTO to the SOC for implementationall through a standard secure In-theater operations support requests will be made via VMOC web pages in the test CAOCs representing multiple theaters. CAOC-Experimental at Langley AFB, Virginia, will serve as the test CAOC for the demonstration. Within each theater, the Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) will have access to the JSpOC and VMOCs, and through them, will within the theater. As an example, the JSpOC receives a request from Theater A for space-based imagery in support of an Army-deployed unit and a simultaneous request from the Theater B CAOC for space-based imagery and communications support for another deployed unit. The JSpOC will attempt to support operations resources. Once the JSTO is issued, the VMOC will be updated the apportioned sensor platform and required data as directed by JSpOC policy. The JSpOC will use the situational aware ness VMOC tools to optimize the effects to both theaters. Upon review and approval by the JSpOC, the system will automati cally generate and release the JSTO to the VMOC and Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Det 12/CERES as the Space Operations Squadron assigned to 14 AF. Real-time telemetry will be monitored by the VMOC and status will be displayed on the dashboard for the JSpOC and CAOC. Addi tionally, when the JSpOC issues the JSTO, the user permissions are automatically updated in the VMOC to allow the CAOC to manage the direct support given to the Army deployed unit. The JSpOC provides management of the space assets for the mission by prioritizing the allocation of resources between the two theaters. Theater-level management is performed by the CAOC DIRSPACEFOR through appropriate VMOC user priv ileges. The DIRSPACEFOR apportions the access, allotted by the 14 AF, as required to meet in-theater objectives. The SAFE demonstration is designed to follow the standard command and control procedures in place today. The funda mental difference is that it is automated, reacting to changing environments, with situational awareness given via the dash board that provides elements of a single integrated space pic ture. All members of the management chain will have insight into the resource allocation and apportionment, the health and status of the constellation, and the level of support being pro


High Frontier 60 demonstration, multiple scenarios will be tested, including sen sor platform subsystem outages, ground station failures, and real-time reapportionment of assets. While the SAFE demonstration focuses on the automated JSTO and interaction with the theater users, it does not address theater direct down link needed to maximize space-based ef fects. This aspect is covered by the Army multi-use ground station (MUGS) demonstration. MUGS Demonstration BL) MUGS Spiral 2 provides the framework to demonstrate network-centric telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) and develop TTPs for command and control of tactical space assets. The MUGS experiment demonstrates the ability for anyone with secure Internet/Intranet access, and authority, to directly task a low Earth orbit (LEO) or near-space sensor platform and payload from the theater, retrieve the data, and post the data on a net-centric server for retrieval by the requester. Net-centric manager will be critical for theater operation of TacSats and near-space assets of the future. S-band phased array for telemetry, tracking, and commanding (PAT) to provide theater direct up and down link with the Sur rey Space Technologies Ltd (SSTL) United Kingdom-Disaster Monitoring Constellation (UK-DMC) satellite. For the demonstration, the VMOC is located at National Aeronautics and Space Administration Glenn Research Center (NASA GRC) in Cleveland, Ohio and is connected to the Army demonstration location in Colorado Springs, Colorado via the open Internet. In addition, the VMOC is connected to the SSTL ground station in Surrey, UK. The demo concept of operations takes advantage of having two ground stations to maximize return the image by the most effective path. The prioritized SMDBL MUGS demonstration scenarios in clude: 1. Task the UK-DMC from MUGS and receive the image from MUGS. 2. Task the UK-DMC from MUGS and receive the image from the SSTL ground station. 3. Task the UK-DMC from the SSTL ground station and re ceive the image via MUGS. 4. Task the UK-DMC from the SSTL ground station and re ceive the image from the same ground station. A point of concern with a demonstration that utilizes an op erational resource, is scheduling. To ensure the demonstration does not disrupt the UK-DMC operations, a single scheduler will be used. In this case the VMOC will tie to the SSTL Mis sion Planning System for all user requests. Regardless of the both the VMOC and the SSTL databases. The MUGS demonstration lays the foundation for a net-cen Center signed for a network-centric environment that: Adjudicates networked exchanges Centralizes control authority policy Decentralizes execution Uses thin and thick client web interfaces ronment capable of supporting secure distributed mission op erations of heritage and internet protocol-based platforms and multi-mission planning, scheduling, and TT&C gives com mand authorities, analysts, operators, and users unparalleled tools for controlling complex platforms to maximize mission effectiveness. The SAFE and MUGS demonstrations are follow-ons to the successful 2004 VMOC demonstration that was a joint effort among the AF Space Battlelab, Army SMBDL, NASA GRC,


61 High Frontier Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), and General Dynamics that validated the capability to use secure Internet protocols to per form TT&C as well as payload tasking of on-orbit assets. VMOC development to date has focused on asset apportion tionment VMOC ensures the right person has access to the right asset as priorities and mission needs change by rapidly chang ing the mission rules sets that dictate access to the VMOC. The If a platform sensor has be apportioned to a set of users, all priority and scheduling is handled within the VMOC to ensure access follows control authority policy. If a user requests an effect that is out of scope to the current apportionment, the quest is validated, a new mission rule set is sent to the VMOC. Interaction between users and the VMOCs is by simple web Integration of key technologies and architectures like The NRL VMOC Spydr is a net-centric test bed that ex plores advances in multi-tiered systems through continuous operational experimentation. 1 Developed consistent with FORCEnet principles, it aims to pair and co-evolve the latest web technologies with the latest concepts of operations. The impetus for the VMOC Spydr began with the need to task and retrieve sensor data from TacSat-1. TacSat-1 is a LEO microsatellite developed by the NRL in response to a need for quick for operational military commands. VMOC Spydr has matured and is now able to receive data from various sensors, making system. Unlike massive databases, the VMOC Spydr does not host nor maintain large volumes of sensor data. Instead, sensor nodes (e.g., TacSat-1) collect and store data to local data servers called sensor concentrators (SC). The SC perform such tasks as sensor scheduling, data processing, and data feed generation. The data feed generated by the SC is sent to the VMOC Spydr using existing extensible markup language standards (Atom feeds) via open web services. This data feed describes the data contents and its corresponding meta-data. The VMOC Spydr catalogues the various feeds it receives and alerts subscribers of new data. This scalable approach allows a broad user base to access, collaborate, and disseminate data collected from mul tiple sensors seamlessly. The overall intent is to create an envi ronment that enables user collaboration in order to increase in dividual and shared situational awareness across organizational lines. Figure 6 depicts the architecture. The desired effect of this broad based collaboration via this architecture is to increase shared situational awareness amongst disparate and geographically dispersed groups. Figure 7 depicts the process from data collection to action re quired to achieve this effect. The backbone of the architecture This is achieved through various tool sets that collect, process, validate, disseminate, alert, and grant users access to data. A sensor concentrator for the VMOC Spydr. To the users, these systems create an individual mental model of the environment or battlespace. Without the proper tools in place to share in dividual mental models, errors in communication may lead to incorrect action. The second level of situational awareness, as create a common comprehension between players. Within the


High Frontier 62 VMOC Spydr design there is a heavy emphasis on collabora tive tools such as chat, forums, and image annotation that help achieve this level of situational awareness. The third level is projection and decision. After the environment is surveyed and evaluated, and a shared comprehension exists, members of a group can project cause and effect relationships with various courses of action. The last step is action based on decisions. In concept, the VMOC Spydr web site, not including the vari ous SC, is situated between data dissemination and broad scale comprehension. VMOC Spydr is being developed by the NRL with support Transformation (OFT) via a campaign of operational experi ments. Operational experimentation aims to meet the imme ing through the design, build, test, and deploy cycle. Through these cycles, the VMOC has emerged as a test bed to explore and validate the various interfaces that are required to create to conduct operational experimentation in order to determine the changes in mission performance due to the framework in in several exercises with Department of Defense (DoD) and non-DoD players. In these exercises, data from various sen sors were used to evaluate the functionality and utility of the web site, as well as to mature emerging concepts of operations. The VMOC Spydr architecture and design are continually be ing matured and through operational experiments and system improvements will new concepts of operations be enabled via the latest technologies. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Internet Protocol version 6 Demonstration In September of 2003, John Stenbit, DoD Chief Informa transition from Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) by 2008 as IPv4 is considered inad equate and incapable of meeting the long-term requirements of commercial DoD and entities. The achievement of net-centric operations, envisioned as a Global Information Grid of inter connected sensors and systems, depends on the effective imple mentation of IPv6. The DoD goal is to complete the transition to IPv6 for all interand intra-networking across the DoD by a similar transition for all US federal government agencies in cluding NASA. Budgetary realities have moved these dates out a few years. Nonetheless, the transition is taking place. Some of the advantages that IPv6 has over IPv4 include: unique addressing Return of the end-to-end principles of the Internet (no need for network address translation) Improved security provided by Scoped addressing IP security capability as part of the protocol No fragmentation Multicasting instead of broadcasting On 27 September 2003, a Cisco Systems router (Cisco in low Earth orbit [CLEO]), was launched onboard the UK-DMC di saster-monitoring satellite built by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL). The router was used to demonstrate net-centric operations in June 2004 using IPv4 normal and mobile routing. 2 not poses IPv6 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) capability or network mobility code as neither technology was available at the time of launch to orbit. For the next demonstration, the IPv6 capabilities will be enabled and the necessary ground net a space-based asset. Static IPv6 routing will be used as will IPv4/IPv6 transition mechanisms. In the 2004 VMOC/CLEO demonstration, mobile network ing to the satellite from a secure infrastructure was demon strated using IPv4. A number of ground stations where used for that demonstration including an SSTL ground station in Guildford, England, an Alaska ground station owned and oper ated by Universal Space Network Inc. (USN), and a receiveonly ground station operated by the US Army SMDBL. The upcoming NASA IPv6 demonstration plans to use the SSTL and MUGS ground stations, the enhanced DMC interface de veloped by USN under a US Air Force contract, and an S-band ground station owned and operated by the Hiroshima Institute of Technology. NASA will use most of the original network put in place for June 2004 VMOC/CLEO demonstration. Initially, the mo point or anchor router for all IPv6 communications. Static 1 st Action Sensors Access Broad Scale Broad Scale Shared Projection 2 nd rd FeedBack


63 High Frontier host routes will reside in the anchor router. The CLEO will be enabled for IPv6 and multiple host ad with each host route cor responding to a different ground station. In this manner, one can imple ment a predictive routing mechanism such that a controller can intelligently predict which ground sta tion will be in contact with CLEO and transmit data to CLEO via that particu lar, unique host address as proven with MUGS, they can be ported to the SSTL operational terminal as well as others. Besides static IPv6 routing, NASA plans to encapsulate IPv6 packets inside an IPv4 IPsec tunnel thereby demonstrating net work layer security from space to ground. In addition, NASA may attempt to run IPv6 over IPv4 mobile networks. The risk of natural and man-made disasters on a national and global basis are ever increasing. Thus, there becomes a growing need to not only maintain our existing capability, but, more importantly, also expand and improve our coordination and infrastructure to support research, hazards monitoring risk assessment and management, and communication activities worldwide. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) serves as a central coordination point for the acquisition and dissemination of remote sensing data in response to natural and man-made disasters in the US and abroad. USGS EROS designation as the National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive for remotely sensed (satellite and aerial) data, enables the provi sion of historical and pre-event data for disaster response ac tivities. Working with federal agencies such as US Department of Homeland Security, US Federal Emergency Management Agency, and US Northern Command, as well as state and local coordinates the collection and scheduling of new acquisitions during disaster response operations. The USGS is a partner agency in the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, which represents a joint effort by global space agencies to put resources at the service of rescue authorities responding to major natural or man-made disasters. The charter is based on voluntary contributions, by all par ties, of Earth observation satellite data. Each member agency has demonstrated its com mitment to using space technology to serve hu mankind when it is most in need of assistance, in case of natural or techno logical disaster with data providing a basis for an ticipating and managing potential or actual crisis. Announced at UNISPACE III conference held in Vi enna, Austria in July 1999, the charter was initiated by European Space Agency and French Space Agency Spatiales) with the Cana dian Space Agency. Other partners include the Indian Space Research Organization, the US National Oceanic and Atmo spheric Administration, USGS, the Argentine Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Agency, UK-DMC, with the United Na tions as a cooperating body. Since November 2000, the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters has been activated more than 100 times phoons, volcanic eruptions, oil spills, tsunamis, hurricanes,


High Frontier 64 earthquakes, and civil accidents which occurred all around the globe. With a low response of 38 to 48 hours and by facilitat ing high reliability data, the charter proved the effectiveness of space information for emergency management. The charter and its partner agencies played a major role in supporting two of the largest disasters in recent times, the 2004 tsunami and Hurricane Katrina. Teaming with the US Air Force and US Army, USGS EROS will demonstrate how the VMOC can provide space-based as sets in support of disaster response. The intent is to demon strate how: (1) the aggregated access to additional archives and payloads, (2) the capability to task and schedule collections based on changing priorities, and (3) comprehensive views of asset capabilities will provide EROS emergency response per image acquisition missions both nationally and with the Inter national Charter on Space and Major Disasters. The VMOC will be used to view all available assets for an event on a daily basis and will allow tasking and scheduling to proceed with maximum speed and minimum redundancy. During disasters the loss of communications infrastructure can make data delivery very challenging. With the loss of In becomes a necessity. The MUGS framework will be used to demonstrate how it will be possible to maintain communica from the space sensor platform. The MUGS will be used to any remotely sensed data acquired during the exercise. The USGS EROS emergency response program plans to demonstrate that through the use of the VMOC and MUGS, we will be able to provide disaster response remote sensing prod ucts in a timely and proactive fashion by making the data easily and rapidly accessible to the response community. The demonstrations and experiments discussed in this paper will allow operators to examine concept of operations and help determine their future system requirements. Current systems are working but the capabilities are limited and largely stovepiped. Future systems, such as responsive space assets (TacSats and near-space), will dramatically stress current system capabili ties and will require automated machine-to-machine tools for global apportionment, optimized for theater operations. Will these systems of systems can be more easily interfaced and adapted to provide the responsive space architecture notionally Summary The collaborative VMOC demonstrations create the relevant environment needed to frame the network-centric, automated, users. Small teams, working together for an optimum solution, can use a spiral development approach, adding capabilities to enhance operations. These initiatives are inherently easy to ex pand among government and commercial agencies. Programs, such as VMOC, SAFE, MUGS, IPv6, and Spydr, will undoubt edly lay the groundwork for the fundamental change needed to move toward net-centric satellite operations. 1 The term Spydr is a play on the word spider. It is intended to convey the ability to navigate like a spider across the web in order to pull data and users together and form communities of interest regardless of organiza tional boundaries 2 W. Ivancic, P. Paulsen, D. Stewart, D. Shell, L. Wood, C. Jackson, D. Hodgson, J. Northam, N. Bean, E. Miller, M. Graves, and L. Kurisaki, Secure, network-centric operations of a space-based asset: Cisco router in low Earth orbit (CLEO) and Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC), NASA Technical Memorandum TM-2005-213556, May 2005. Additional Authors: Mr. Omar Medina Virtual Mission Operations Center Spyder Program Manager, US Naval Research Laboratory Mr. Will Ivancic Project Engineer, NASA Glenn Reseaarch Center Ms. Brenda Jones Disaster Response Coordinator, Science Applications International Corporation Mr. Ron Risty Disaster Response Coordinator, Science Applications International Corporation


65 High Frontier Space Professional Education: The Next Step Through Continued Education Maj Marc Peterson, USAF Chief, Bases and Units Branch, AFSPC/A8IB R ather than take up valuable space unnecessarily prov ing a point, this article makes the assumption continu ing education for the credentialed space professional is impor tant. Furthermore, this article asserts the possibility of creating more effective space professionals in Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) through the use of hands-on learning techniques. If fective teaching methods, then it seems reasonable to pursue that course of action. The introduction of Red Flag into this effort serves the pur tion outside of combat. In other words, Red Flag showcased the importance of practical application of studied theories. It also provided an excellent example of the bold decisions made by senior leaders in the face of adversity. It is the position of this article that scenario-based course of action development in the those gained in Red Flag. The uninformed reader might attri bute the success of Red Flag to a brilliant idea that simply made sense, and whose time had come. To better understand the mag nitude of starting Red Flag one must understand the environment that existed at the time of the decision. The 12 th Chief of Staff, General Larry D. Welch, USAF, retired, described the era and actions of the then Tactical Air Command commander, General Robert J. Dixon, USAF, retired, as having the task of the most extensive [combat aircraft] conversion in modern times. He had to do it in a Cold War environment that demanded that we main tain our full commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He had to do it with absolute minimum resources and he had to That was an incredibly complex set of tasks. I have character ized the demand as changing your shirt without taking off your jacket. 1 cal constraints of a post-Vietnam military force in the throes of downsizing. In the midst of these challenges General Dixon remained receptive and immediately sought to implement the ment. Maj Gen George A. Edwards, Jr. stated, It should be also noted that, from the outset, funds for Red Flag were taken out of the TAC hide until money could be obtained through the normal funding process. programs for realistic training in other functional areas. 2 The lessons of Red Flag remain as applicable today as they were then. More effective Airmen contribute to mission success. It is my belief that the practical application of theory is equally capable of improving the effectiveness of students in the classroom, and space professionals in their work centers as it is at improving survival rates of combat pilots. Most ideas about teaching are not new, but not everyone knows the old ideas. Euclid, c. 300 BC The Air Force values educated Airmen, and has researched and published volumes of information regarding the education of students. An understanding of the advantages and disadvan tages of different methods of instruction provides the framework application scenarios in continued education. The Air Force re cently published 461 pages entitled Air Force Manual 36-2236, Guidebook for Air Force Instructors, in an effort to provide a fresh rethinking of a complex and not completely understood subjecthow to teach in the academic classroom so Air Force people will be more effective on the job. 3 Students need the opportunity to try what has been taught. Too often, instruction is limited to the delivery of information, either 1 computer-based training. Academic instruction should allow adult learners to practice what has been taught, receive feedback on their performance, and incorporate improvement as they move on to new material. 4 This being the case then the question to ask is what would be the most effective method of instruction to enhance continued education of the space professional. Traditionally, lecturing has been the most popular teaching method in the military. 5 Unfortunately, the lecture method also has its share of critics. Dr. Richard M. Felder, codirector of the National Effective Teaching Institute (NETI), and Hoechst Celanese Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering at North Carolina State University, proposes learning by doing and in his article he wrote, Thanks to some excellent classroom and cogni tive research in recent decades, we know a great deal about how learning happens and how little of it happens in lectures. 6 He over classrooms after even just a few minutes of it. Numbed 7 Some may discount the negative impression of lectures presented by Dr. Felder, and attribute his example to may be closer to the truth than one may be comfortable admit ting. If our beloved lecture is not the most effective method for continued education then what method is the most effective? Space Professional Update


High Frontier 66 od of teaching is to determine how important the information is to remember. As basic as this statement may seem the results may astound you. Retention Rates The National Training Laboratories in Bethel, Maine devel Learning Pyramid was designed to identify student retention rates with various types of instruction. The types of instruction covered in the pyramid include lecture, reading, audio-visual, demonstration, discussion group, practice by doing, and teach proaches to learning along with their retention rates as well as modern, teaming approaches, and their retention rates. Traditional approaches to learning include lecture, reading, audio-visual, and demonstration. The lecture method of learn ing generated a 5 percent average retention rate, and so forth, the method having the worst rate of retention. Learning through reading produced a slight increase, but only achieved a retention rate of 10 percent. Herein lies the crux of the matter. Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and National Security Space Institute (NSSI) curriculum rely heavily on the traditional methods of learning through lecture and reading. Air Force manuals provide insight into the low-retention rates by stat ing, Too often, the lecture makes no provision for student par ticipation. As a result, many students willingly allow the instruc tor to do all the work. Learning is an active processthe lecture method, however, tends to foster passiveness and dependence on the instructor. 8 The teaming approach to learning provided more promising results. Methods of instruction associated with the teaming approach include discussion groups, practice-by-do ing, and teaching others. The teaming approach to learning gen erated much higher retention rates than the traditional approach because teaming involves the student in an active process. Understanding retention rates allows one to consider areas where the greatest improvement can be found in generating more effective space professionals in AFSPC. The most effective lec turer, on average, can produce a 5 percent retention rate at best. Therefore, it seems logical that improvement efforts would bear more fruit through focused attention to the method of instruction rather than on the instructors themselves. Research shows that higher learning is an interactive process that results in meaningful, long lasting changes in knowledge, attitudes, values, and skills. The Air Force position to teaching states, the only acceptable evidence that successful teaching has taken place comes from indications of change in student behav ior. 9 Active or cooperative learning is the instructional use of small groups so that learners work together to maximize their own and each others learning. Creativity Air Force instructors, then, should be creative instructors, to strike out boldly in new directions. AFMAN36-2236 A creative departure from more traditional approaches in cludes more participatory methods of instruction like case stud ies, guided discussion and gaming to name a few. Case studies require student participation when presented with real-life situ ations in a classroom environment. The student can determine various approaches to realistic situations through the application of previously learned concepts. The Learning Pyramid iden proach to teaching and rated this method at 50 percent average retention rate. The guided discussion is especially effective at presenting material where experts on the subject do not always agree. The discussion method is a superior method for teach ing more complex cognitive and affective objectives. Thus, this method is appropriate for promoting the understanding of con cepts and principles and for the development of problem-solv ing skills. 10 practice-by-doing methods could be a more effective approach for continuing education it begs the question of what should be discussed or practiced. Recommendation to suggest a better alternative. Carl von Clausewitz Now, more than ever, US military leaders must develop their ability to think critically. Historically, militaries, their leader 5% 10% 20% 30% 50% 75% 90% Lecture Demonstration Discussion Group Retention Rate Learning Pyramid Traditional Teaming Figure 1. Learning Pyramid. AFMAN 36-2236


67 High Frontier war. Developing the type of forces and equipment for the con procedures has challenged leaders throughout the ages. Since the terrorist attack against the US on 11 September 2001 it has become imperative to understand that the face of warfare has changed. A thinking adversary, and they all are, will not face the seek asymmetric options to capitalize on US vulnerabilities. For the most part the Global War on Terror is not against na tion states, but against organized networks of non-state actors who operate freely and internationally. The US has a military that more than matches the military of any nation in the world but is it equipped with the capabilities to effectively wage war against organizations that have a small footprint, are frequently on the move, and present opportunities as targets for moments at a time then fade into the global environment? Radical change is in order to meet the challenges presented by present day ter rorists. The right approach to continuing education for space profes sionals could very well be the key. Current instruction on space through AETC and the NSSI provides an outstanding baseline space professionals should cultivate an understanding of how to effects through space capabilities in a real and meaningful man ner. It is the view of this author that continuing education could take the form of guided discussions, and practice-by-doing techniques within the work center. It is entirely feasible to post quarterly scenarios on a common web site for space profession als to individually develop a course of action (COA) to resolve the scenario with space capabilities. Then the individuals in the work center could come together for COA comparison with each other and learn from each others perspectives and experiences. Finally, the COAs developed within the work center could be compared with the COA provided on the web site. Activating participative learning techniques through guided discussion and hands-on application would not only increase the reten tion of critical space capabilities, but also advance the devel opment of space strategists. This method of continuing educa professionals wherever they may be. Scenario-based, table top wargames are simple and effective, and do not require millions of dollars of computer assistance, travel expenses or large teams of arbitrators. Developing strategists through the use of table-top COA de velopment dates back to the time of the pharaohs. Unlike the days of great Egyptian armies that ruled a large portion of the known world, US space professionals do not learn strategy sit ting on the laps of their fathers. US military leaders no longer develop out of aristocratic families, but rise out of the population from all socio-economic levels. Strategic thought is not reserved for the elite, but developed in all military leaders. Conclusion Samuel Butler, Notebooks Red Flag did not develop out of convenience, but out of ne cessity, and in an austere economic environment. The leaders of that time did not wait until the funding cycle caught up with the need or until a more opportune time. General Dixon and his staff made the hard call to establish Red Flag because it was the right thing to do. This article challenges Air Force leader ship to consider the value of scenario-based COA development, and its inclusion into all areas of space professional continuing develops our military leadership as individuals. Space professionals who have greater retention of the infor mation taught during the space curriculum have a greater oppor tunity to be more effective than those who retain less informa tion. COA development in the work center allows participants the ability to try new concepts in new situations. It also involves participants in the learning process. More than improving reten tion rates scenario-based COA development will dramatically improve space professional knowledge of applying space capa bilities to real situations. Space professionals must be able to think critically, and develop as strategists to lead the next Ameri can warriors in the challenges of the future. 1 General (USAF, retired) Howard W. Welch, personal letter to Tom Clancy, author of 19 August 1999. 2 Maj Gen (USAF, retired) George A. Edwards, Jr., personal letter to Tom Clancy, author of 7 October 1999. 3 Guidebook for Air Force Instructors, Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-2236, 15 September 1994, 1.6, 4, loadableFiles/AFMAN36-2236.pdf (accessed on 18 October 2006). 4 Ibid., 1.4, 1. 5 Ibid., 13.1, 92. 6 Dr. Richard, M. Felder, Learning by Doing Chemical Engineering Education, 2003, 47(4), 282-283. 7 Ibid. 8 AFMAN 36-2236,, 93. 9 Ibid., 1.4.1, 1. 10 Ibid., 14.2.1, 100. Maj Marc A. Peterson (BS, homa State University; MS, ment, Lesley University, Mas sachusetts; MS, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama) is the Chief, Bases and Units Branch, Bas ing and International Affairs Division, Plans and Programs Directorate, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. He is responsible for leading command-level planning affecting in base realignment actions involving AFSPC space, launch, and missile resources.


High Frontier 68 Book Review Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles, and Policy By John J. Klein. New York, USA: Routledge. 2006. Appendices, Notes, Bibliography, Index. Pp 196. $119.99. ISBN: 0-415-77001-7. Ast ropolitik, Modern Strategy, among others are already familiar to the well-read space strat Space Warfare. Klein, a US Navy Commander and naval avia tor, has published a remarkable work in scope and breadth that, while possibly too self-restricted, is essential reading to all inter ested in space strategy. In Space Warfare, Klein presents his case that space strategy is best served by applying a maritime model to space warfare, rather than the more common air or sea power model (expand ing on his Naval War College Review essay Corbett in Orbit). Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, to add some powerful ideas to space power thought. The ce lestial line of communication (CLOC), the lines of communi cation from, into, and through space used for the movement of trade, material, supplies, personnel, spacecraft, military effects, and electromagnetic transmissions is a deceptively simple but profound idea that elegantly accounts for the unique dual nature of space as a pathway for signals as well as a physical medium. Command of space then becomes the ability to use CLOCs while denying the enemy use of the same, another seemingly obvious summum bonum of space strat egy. ings. Terminology of space concepts in Joint and US Air Force doctrine manuals are often incongruent, leading to as much de bate over semantics as strategy when discussing space issues. Is an action offensive counterspace, defensive counterspace, or space control? By adapting well understood and historical strategic con cepts to space, Klein performs a valuable ser vice by separating the wheat from the chaff of debates over terminology to the doctrinaires. Klein, however, does not stop with simple gic advice also derived from Corbett. Offensive and defensive operations, strategic positions, blocking, and the concept of using space as a barrier are all discussed to advantage. An in triguing assertion, that space forces should be physically dispersed but also retain the ability to rapidly concentrate force and effects, seems a radical departure from the commonly accepted war principle of concentration and will occupy space theorists for a long time. This is as it was every bit then, and is still today, a very controversial topic. debate ahead for many of his ideas. Klein attempts to prove that current space strategy is too preoccupied with the offensive, and one of his conclusions is that defensive space strategy (the stronger form of warfare according to Carl Von Clausewitz, he points out) should be more widely adopted and studied. Though defensive space strategy is important, Klein does not ignore the ment. ing. After completely re-describing space strategy in a clear, consistent model and introducing many new strategic concepts tional. In the majority of his conclusions, Klein presents nothing really new. Meekly advising that we uphold the current space legal regime, proceed with space weaponization only when ab solutely necessary, wait for the inevitable independent space ser vice and focus on the defensive space war seem to imply Klein is more interested in playing it safe rather than following his stra vice previously stated by authors such as Dolman. A broad and bold reinterpretation of strategy defending the status quo is often fate. ly. Klein recommends that a Space War College model be im mediately founded. Klein argues an action like [establishing a Space War College] would indicate to the professional military community that space warfare is a subject that deserves separate and dedicated strategic study [and] such a move would fos ter a conducive environment where more fully developed strate gies for space warfare could be contemplated. Klein does not mention the National Security Space Institute (NSSI). It is unclear whether Klein does not consider this close enough to the Space War College to merit an acknowl edgement or was not aware of it at the time of writing, though one suspects the latter. What is essential is that the leadership of the NSSI em above its current mandate merely to teach and should instead strive to become the center for advanced space thought, where a new breed of strategists will discuss, debate, and forge the space strategies and theories that will ensure free nations will dominate space in service to breaking Space Warfare in hand, the strategists journey. 1st Lt Brent D. Ziarnick, USAF, 50 th Space Wing Tactics.


69 High Frontier Subscribe to High Frontier Electronically Update It's as easy as 1, 2, 3 ... High Frontier, the quarterly High Frontier, please do so by subscribing today to that the journal is available on the Air Force Space 1 enter your name and e-mail address 2 3 You will not receive your subscription If you have any questions or concerns, please notify Nadine Sage, Creative Editor, CONTINUE YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TODAY


High Frontier 70 High Frontier High Frontier High Frontier! General, USAF


71 High Frontier High Frontier