DNN sentinel

Material Information

DNN sentinel defense by other means
Alternate title:
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation sentinel
United States -- Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation ( issuing body )
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C.
National Nuclear Security Administration
Publication Date:
Three times a year
Physical Description:
1 online resource (volumes) : ;


Subjects / Keywords:
Nuclear nonproliferation -- Government policy -- Periodicals -- United States ( lcsh )
Nuclear nonproliferation -- International cooperation -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Nuclear nonproliferation -- Government policy ( fast )
Nuclear nonproliferation -- International cooperation ( fast )
United States ( fast )
Online resources.
Electronic government information. ( lcgft )
Electronic journals. ( lcgft )
Periodicals. ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
periodical ( marcgt )
Online resources
Electronic government information ( lcgft )
Electronic journals ( lcgft )
Periodicals ( fast )


Dates or Sequential Designation:
Began with vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2015).

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Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
971021343 ( OCLC )
2017230509 ( LCCN )

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Digital Military Collection


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en-US3en-US Reducing Terrorism en-US Risks in New York City en-US by Replacing Medical en-US Tools Using Radioactive en-US Materialsen-US 4en-US Joint Exercise with en-US Army Tests Mobile en-US Facilities to Package en-US and Remove Nuclear en-US Materialsen-US 6en-US DNN Focus and en-US Capabilitiesen-US 8en-US Improving Investigative en-US Tools to Identify and en-US Convict Nuclear en-US Smugglersen-US 9en-US New Publication en-US Sheds Light on Years en-US of Experience in en-US Monitoring the Earth for en-US Nuclear Explosions en-US 9en-US Searching Cities for en-US Terrorist Devices with en-US Speed and Accuracyen-US 10en-US en-US Argentinaen-US 12en-US Bilateral Physical en-US Protection Visits From the en-USActing Deputy en-US Administrator en-USSince the last issue of the en-USDNN Sentinelen-US, many changes have occurred en-US within the Department of Energy and NNSAs Office of Defense Nuclear en-US Nonproliferation (DNN). However, the work that the DNN team is leading, en-US the work of the extraordinarily brilliant men and women, continues at en-US DOE and the national laboratories. We maintain, as evidenced by the FY en-US 2018 budget request to Congress, strong support from Secretary Rick en-US Perry for our mission and activities. I am confident that we will continue en-US to demonstrate our ability to go change the world, and we have been en-US working hard with Secretary Perry and his team to keep our vital work on en-US track.en-US One way that DNN meets our mission of enhancing U.S. national en-US security by reducing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and en-US nuclear proliferation is by embracing interagency and interdisciplinary en-US approaches to solving problems and making progress. The stories en-US in this issue of the en-USSentinelen-US highlight these partnershipswith local en-US governments, international partners, academia, and civilian and military en-US end-users of our innovations. In a time of transition, it is important to en-US remember that our success depends on our ability to work diligently, en-US together with our partners, to support national and global security.en-US Our mission is enduring and the news about world events reinforces the en-US need for our constant vigilance and focus on addressing nuclear threats. en-US I want to thank the entire DNN team for their support and continued hard en-US work that makes our success and strengthening global nuclear security en-US possible.en-US David Huizengaen-US en-US Acting Deputy Administratoren-US en-US Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 6 7 DNN FOCUS AND CAPABILITIESThe Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation strengthens U.S. security by reducing global dangers posed by nuclear weapons, material, and technology.NON-STATE ACTORSMinimize Nuclear and Radiological Materials Remove Dispose Reduce DemandCounter Nuclear AmbitionsNUCLEAR ARMED STATESCounter Nuclear Smuggling Land Borders Seaport Airports Mobile Secure Nuclear Facilities and Radiological Materials STATES SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DNN CAPABILITIES Detect Proliferation Nuclear Explosions Materials and Warheads Material Production Weapons Development Back to Table of Contents Back to Table of Contents FAQ s


DNN SENTINEL: en-US en-US DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANSen-USVOL. III, NO. 1en-US en-US en-US Editor-in-Chiefen-US Corey Hinderstein en-USEditorial Board en-USSid Bartletten-US Andrew Brownen-US Erika Hunsickeren-US Evan Thompsonen-US John Wengleen-US Meghan Woolen-US Editorial Advisor en-USAndrew Hallocken-US Editor Elaine Specht en-USGraphics en-USMike Crewen-US Sarah Kaukeinenen-USVisit us! en-USEmail us aten-US en-US to request to be added to the en-USmailing list.en en-US2en-USJoin Our en-US Mailing List! en-USen-USen-USen-USen-US DNN QUICK LINKS en-US Follow the links below to learn more about recent NNSA and DNN activities.en-US Press Releaseen-US NNSA Spearheads International Effort to Convert Ghana Reactor to en-US en-US LEU Fuelen-US en-US international-effort-convert-ghana-reactor-leu-fuel en-US Nuclear Security Training Center Opens in Kazakhstanen-US en-US center-opens-kazakhstanen-US Blogsen-US NNSA and Turkey cooperate to combat nuclear smugglingen-US en-US smugglingen-US U.S. and Poland host international nonproliferation workshop for law en-US enforcement personnelen-US hen-USttps:// workshop-law-enforcement-personnelen-US WSU program sponsored by NNSA leads to safeguards solutionsen-US en-US safeguards-solutions en-US NNSA and PONI partnership grows next generation of nuclear security en-US expertsen-US en-US generation-nuclear-security-expertsen-US NNSA and IAEA sponsor training on nuclear material accounting for en-US international partnersen-US accounting-international-partners National Nuclear Security Administration en-USBack to Table of Contents


en-US3 Reducing Terrorism en-USRisks in New York City en-US by Replacing Medical en-US Tools Using Radioactive en-US Materialsen-USBy Lance Garrisonen-USNen-USew York City is home to many en-USfirstsen-US that have paved en-US the path for Americas development: the first U.S. en-US capital from 1789 to 1790, the first U.S. pizzeria en-US in 1905 (Lombardis Pizza), the first commodity market en-US (the New York Cotton Exchange), and the first steel wire en-US suspension bridge (the Brooklyn Bridge), to name a few. en-US Now, it is first in the field of radiological security: New York en-US is leading the first city-wide initiative in the United States to en-US replace cesium-137-based irradiators with alternatives that en-US do not contain radioactive sources. en-US New York medical facilities and universities are partnering en-US with DNNs Office of Radiological Security (ORS), the New en-US York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the en-US Nuclear Threat Initiative to replace the vast majority of the en-US citys irradiators containing high-activity cesium-137 sources en-US (around 4% of the U.S. cesium-137 irradiator inventory) over en-US the next few years. Using alternative technologies, such as en-US X-ray irradiators, eliminates the risk of cesium-137 sources en-US being misused in acts of terrorism, such as a radiological en-US dirty-bomb. en-US ORS is playing a pivotal role in this replacement effort en-US through its Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP). en-US Through CIRP, qualified sites that choose to replace their en-US cesium-137 based irradiators receive money toward the en-US purchase of the new irradiator. In addition, ORS removes en-US and disposes of the cesium-137 based irradiator through the en-US Off-Site Source Recovery Project at no cost to the site, given en-US the lack of commercial disposition options for these sources. en-US (For an overview of CIRP, see en-USCesium Irradiator Replacement en-US Preserves Health Benefits, Promotes Radiological Safetyen-US in en-US the en-USDNN en-USSentinelen-US Vol. II No.1en-US.) en-US Irradiators are primarily used by hospitals and blood banks en-US to treat blood products prior to transfusion; and by medical en-US researchers to perform biological studies. To ensure the en-US change in technology does not negatively impact current en-US or future patient health, ORS only partners with volunteers en-US who are confident that the non-radioisotopic alternative en-US technology, such as X-ray irradiators, will meet their current en-US and future performance needs.en-US New York has a history en-US as a national leader in en-US radiological security. A en-US terrorism target in the en-US past, the city continues en-US to be considered a en-US major target now and en-US for the foreseeable en-US future. As a result, en-US the New York Police en-US Department (NYPD) en-US has taken a proactive en-US approach to secuen-US-en-US rity against terrorism, en-US including radiological en-US terrorism, earning en-US recognition as one of en-US the best law enforceen-US-en-US ment organizations en-US dealing with radiological en-US threats in the country. In addition to the CIRP initiative, New en-US York City users of high-activity radioactive sources, the New en-US York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the en-US NYPD have partnered with ORS over the past eight years to en-US increase the physical security of the sources and ensure that en-US law enforcement is prepared to respond to any attempted en-US theft or malicious use of the material. en-US ORS continues to work with other sites around the country en-US to replace cesium-137 irradiators through CIRP and will use en-US the New York City initiative as a model for engagement in en-US other regions.en-USLance Garrison manages the Domestic Alternative Technology en-US Portfolio, including the Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project, in en-US en-US en-US Fellow.en-US en-US instead of cesium irradiators in en-US our new building. Mount Sinai is en-US proactively looking at alternative en-US technologies and will, hopefully, en-US phase out all radioactive material as en-US time goes by. en-US Dr. Jacob Kamen, en-US Mount Sinai Medical Centeren-US. en-USBack to Table of Contents


en-US4 en-USJoint Exercise with Army Tests Mobile Facilities en-US to Package and Remove Nuclear Materials en-USFen-USor two months between April and June 2017, the DNN Office of Material Management and Minimizations (Men-US3en-US) en-US Emerging Threats program exercised two mobile facilities in support of a critical national security capabilityto en-US expeditiously package and safely remove nuclear materials in the event of an urgent need outside the United States. en-US The exercise, named en-USCorvina Locoen-US, tested the Mobile Plutonium Facility (MPF) and Mobile Uranium Facility (MUF) at Naval en-US Air Station Key West, Florida, to simulate operations in a subtropical climate. Each facility can be quickly deployed wherever en-US the need should arise. en-US Under DOE/NNSA leadership, personnel from the Savannah en-US River National Laboratory (SRNL), Oak Ridge National en-US Laboratory (ORNL), and Y-12 National Security Complex en-US (Y-12) mustered at Naval Air Station Key West for the en-US deployment and exercise of MPF and MUF. Transportable en-US by air, land, and sea, the facilities comprise connected, en-US self-contained, customized shipping containers that can en-US be operated in austere environments with limited infraen-US-en-US structure. Each mobile facility has been carefully designed en-US and optimized to handle specific nuclear materials safely en-US and securely, while maintaining the capability for rapid global en-US deployment.en-US The genesis of the Emerging Threats program came after en-US Y-12 teams were sent to Kazakhstan and Georgia in 1994 en-US and 1998 to remove highly enriched uranium (HEU) on short en-US notice and then again in 2004 and 2008, when Y-12 and en-US ORNL teams were deployed to Iraq to remove tonnes of en-US HEU and uranium oxide (yellowcake), along with thousands en-US of radioactive sources. These events made clear to DOE/en-US NNSA the need to have the right equipment and personnel en-US trained and ready to quickly remove materials. SRNL deen-US-en-US signed and built the MPF, while teams from Y-12 and ORNL en-US used their operational expertise from the previous removal en-US efforts to develop the MUF. The resulting facilities allow en-US experts to characterize, stabilize, and package plutonium, en-US and uraniumincluding HEU, low-enriched, natural, and en-US depleted uraniumin all forms.en-US Corvina Locoen-US was notable as the first full-scale joint exercise en-US with the U.S. Armys Nuclear Disablement Team. The MPF en-US and MUF used surrogate materials to practice processing, en-US packaging, verifying, and shipping activities during multiple en-US exercise scenarios. To better simulate the circumstances en-US en-USen-US en-US simulated materials. Back to Table of Contents


en-USin which the facilities could be deployed, Army personnel en-US delivered the nuclear material to the technical personnel, en-US who then managed material movements within the MPF en-US and MUF facilities. Once the MPF and MUF teams received en-US material, technical personnel analyzed X-rays, reviewed en-US non-destructive assay data, verified certain technical en-US characteristics, and held pre-operations briefings, all while en-US central operations centers monitored and controlled every en-US aspect of the process. en-US The MPF and MUF are en-US key components of en-US NNSAs full spectrum of en-US capabilities to respond en-US to nuclear threats. en-US The Emerging Threats en-US program works with en-US other organizations en-US within NNSA, including en-US verification, emergency en-US response, and conseen-US-en-US quence management en-US teams. en-US Corvina Locoen-US follows en-US in the tradition of en-US testing in new environen-US-en-US ments and adjusting en-US capabilities based on en-US lessons learned. Previous en-US exercises were held at en-US Nevada National Security en-US Site to test a desert en-US environment, in Alaska to test a cold environment, and en-US now on Key West to test a subtropical environment. Each en-US preceding exercise introduced additional complexity, building en-US up to this combined exercise with the U.S. Army. It was en-US the culmination of months of hard work and coordination en-US among SRNL, ORNL, and Y-12 personnel. Naval Air Station en-US Key West provided incredible support as the hosts for the en-US exercise. en-US en-US During en-USCorvina Locoen-US, MPF and MUF team members logged en-US more than 18,000 training hours, while collecting nearly 40 en-US pages of formal lessons learned and implementing countless en-US informal improvements throughout the exercise. However, en-US the biggest take-away by far was the value of increased en-US coordination between the Army and NNSAs Emerging en-US Threats Program.en-US Corvina Locoen-US demonstrated to all participating agencies that en-US NNSAs MPF and MUF are ready to respond. The Emerging en-US Threats team will continue to maintain proficiency by having en-US small-scale exercises and trainings until the next mock en-US deployment exercise. The next exercise will build on the lesen-US-en-US sons learned during en-USCorvina Locoen-US and will be fully integrated en-US with the military in an international location.en-USRead the NNSA blog about en-US Corvina Locoen-US at en-US en-US en-US en-US.en-US To learn more about the MPF, see en-US Operation SputnikFirst Remote en-US Deployment of MPFen-US in the en-USDNN Sentinel, Vol II, No. 2en-US.en-USExercise Tests Mobile Facilities en-US Continued en-USen-US en-US en-US test for external contamination on en-US simulated materials. en-US5 en-USBack to Table of Contents


en-US6en-US en-US7 DNN FOCUS AND CAPABILITIES The en-USOffice of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferationen-US en-US strengthens U.S. security by reducing global dangers en-US posed by nuclear weapons, material, and technology.en-USNON-STATE en-US ACTORSen-USMinimize Nuclear en-US and Radiological en-US Materialsen-USen-US Removeen-US en-USen-US Disposeen-US en-USen-US Reduce Demanden-USCounter Nuclear en-US Ambitionsen-USNUCLEAR en-US ARMED en-US STATESen-USCounter Nuclear Smugglingen-USen-US en-USLand Bordersen-USen-US en-USSeaporten-USen-US en-US Airportsen-USen-US en-USMobileen-USSecure Nuclear en-US Facilities and en-US Radiological en-US Materialsen-US en-USSTATES SEEKING en-US NUCLEAR WEAPONS DNN CAPABILITIES en-USDetect Proliferationen-US en-USen-US Nuclear Explosionsen-US en-USen-US Materials and Warheadsen-US en-USen-US Material Productionen-USen-US Weapons Development en-USBack to Table of Contents


en-US8 en-USBack to Table of Contents en-US8en-USen-USImproving Investigative Tools to Identify and en-US Convict Nuclear Smugglersen-USAen-UScritical component of an effective national nuclear en-US detection architecture is a countrys ability to en-US coordinate interagency partners when investigating a en-US nuclear smuggling seizure. Understanding jurisdictions and en-US missions of all relevant agencies is critical when gathering en-US nuclear trafficking evidence that can help identify suspects en-US and lead to convictions.en-US To help partner countries Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and en-US Moldova identify good practice in interagency coordinaen-US-en-US tion, DNN hosted the Nuclear Forensic en-US Scenario Exercise (NUFORSE) in Germany en-US earlier this year. This tabletop simulation en-US brought law enforcement, regulatory en-US officials, and technical experts from each en-US partner country together with facilitators en-US from DNNs Office of Nuclear Smuggling en-US Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) to en-US discuss nuclear forensics activities within en-US their own countries and identify areas en-US for improved communication among en-US agencies. en-US Participants respond to realistic nuclear en-US smuggling incident scenarios, which are en-US introduced and unfold in real time over en-US the course of the exercise, said Liz Dallas, NSDD exercise en-US facilitator. They must work together and share information en-US with their interagency partners to be successful.en-US NSDD, the European Commission Joint Research Centre, en-US and subject matter experts from Argonne, Lawrence en-US Livermore, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories designed en-US the exercise. Representatives from the State Department en-US observed to gain insights for future development of nuclear en-US forensics exercises.en-USen-US smuggling scenario. en-USen-US nuclear forensics work in their own countries as well as ways to improve sharing en-US information across borders. en-USBack to Table of Contents


9 en-USNew Publication en-US Sheds Light on Years en-US of Experience in en-US Monitoring the Earth en-US for Nuclear Explosions en en en-US Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has published en-US a monograph, en-USTrends in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring en-US Research & Development A Physics Perspectiveen-US, en-US (en-USDOI:10.2172/1355758en-US) that comprehensively collects en-US research from 1993 to 2016. This overview is an en-US incomparable resource for next-generation researchers en-US working on the challenge of detecting nuclear explosions en-US anywhere in the world. The document has prompted en-US thoughtful consideration by DNNs Office of Research en-US and Development of future research directions that can en-US complement and supplement work already conducted or en-US underway.en-US Dr. Monica Maceira, Associate Professor of Physics at en-US the University of Tennessee stated, Nuclear explosion en-US monitoring is critical to our national and global security. en-US Researchers have spent more than a half-century en-US studying the science behind nuclear explosions and en-US developing tools, techniques, and systems to monitor en-US them. This monograph provides an in-depth look at en-US the fruits of that labor and, in doing so, shows just en-US how advanced and complex this field has become. en-US The authors discuss trends in source physics, signal en-US propagation, sensors, and signal analysis, highlighting en-US recent publications that advanced the science and can en-US motivate promising research and development efforts. en-US LANL produced en-US the monograph in en-US collaboration with en-US Lawrence Livermore, en-US Pacific Northwest, en-US and Sandia National en-US Laboratories and en-US the Naval Research en-US Laboratory. Searching Cities for en-USTerrorist Devices with en-US Speed and Accuracyen-USScanning cities for raen-US-en-US diological and nuclear en-US (RN) devices requires en-US an approach that en-US includes both unique en-US expertise and specialen-US-en-US ized technologies. In en-US coordination with both en-US NNSA end-users and en-US other government agencies, DNNs Office of Research and en-US Development has developed the Optimization Planning en-US Tool for Urban Search (OPTUS). OPTUS improves both en-US the efficiency and effectiveness of RN searches in urban en-US environments by increasing the probability of finding en-US dangerous materials while simultaneously reducing search en-US time. The OPTUS tool works by creating a map along en-US with directions that end users can use to navigate urban en-US areas. Some of the tools features include: en-USValidated models of radiation transport and en-US detection algorithms en-USEfficient search patterns en-USAbility to increase probability of detection if given a en-US set period of time for search en-USBuilding data that can cause false alarms en-USCurrent traffic patterns and driving data en-USPrior radiation background measurements en-USModification of threat specifications and available en-US detection assetsen-US The model combines these features to guide a more en-US efficient search or increase confidence in the absence of a en-US RN device in an urban area. en-US The OPTUS project began in April 2014 and is a collaboraen-US-en-US tion between Lawrence Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, and en-US Oak Ridge National Laboratories along with the Remote en-US Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base.en-USA sample of the optimized urban en-US search plan produced by OPTUS. Back to Table of Contents


en-US10 en-USJoined the International en-US Atomic Energy Agency en-US en-US First commercial en-US power reactor en-US began operatingen-US Converted last en-US research reactor to en-US en-US uraniumen-US Became free of highly en-US enriched uranium en-US1957 en-US1974 en-US2016 en-USArgentinas en-US Nuclear en-US History en-US en-US in Brief en-USJoined the en-US Australia Group en-US1992en-USJoined the Missile en-US Technology Control en-US Regime en-US1993 en-US2008 A significant milestone in nuclear en-USsecurity was achieved last year as en-US a result of cooperation between en-US the United States of America and en-US Argentina. At the 2016 Nuclear en-US Security Summit, Argentina en-US announced the completion of a key en-US Summit deliverable: the successful en-US down-blending and disposition en-US of its remaining highly enriched en-US uranium (HEU), a goal on which the en-US United States and Argentina jointly en-US collaborated for many years. Upon en-US successful completion of the down-en-US blending, Argentina became the final en-US country in South America to dispose en-US of its HEU, making the entire continent en-US free of HEU. en-US Over the course of many years en-US of partnership between the U.S. en-US Department of Energys National en-US Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/en-US NNSA) and Argentinas National en-US Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), en-US more than 40 kilograms of HEU en-US were removed from Argentina. This en-US left approximately four kilograms en-US of HEU that could not return to the en-US United States due to its form and en-US composition. As a result, DOE/NNSAs en-US Office of Material Management and en-US Minimization (Men-US3en-US), CNEA, the Y-12 en-US National Security Complex, and en-US Savannah River National Laboratory en-US cooperated to down-blend Argentinas en-US remaining HEU in-country. Despite en-US technical and regulatory challenges, en-US CNEA remained committed to down-en-US blending its remaining HEU, and both en-US sides collaborated extensively to find en-US creative solutions. en-US Argentina was the first country in en-US South America to use nuclear power, en-US and today has three operating nuclear en-US power plants with another under en-US construction. Argentina also has five en-US operational low-enriched uranium en-US (LEU) research reactors, two of which en-US were converted from HEU fuel to LEU en-US fuel with U.S. support (in 1987 and en-US 2008).en-US Argentina is a regional producer of en-US molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). It uses LEU en-US in the production of this important en-US medical isotope. In fact, it was en-US Argentinas conversion to using LEU for en-US Mo-99 production in 2002 that helped en-US move the country closer to eliminating en-US HEU. en-US DNN has a long history of bilateral en-US cooperation with the Republic of en-US Argentina. In addition to CNEA, en-US other partners include the Nuclear en-US Regulatory Authority (ARN), Argentinas en-US customs agency, and the Ministries of en-US Foreign Affairs and Energy and Mining en-US (MEM). en-US Nuclear and Radiological Security en-US Cooperationen-US In 2015, the Argentine government en-US established MEM, our newest en-US organizational partner. MEM en-US defines, organizes, coordinates, and en-US streamlines all government activities en-US related to energy, including nuclear and en-US radiological security. en-US In October 2016, DNN and en-US MEM signed a Memorandum en-US of Understanding (MOU) that en-US complements existing NNSA en-US cooperation with Argentina and en-USHEU Free and Continuing to Leaden-USAcceded to the Nuclear en-US en-US en-US weapons state en-US1995 en-US1994en-USJoined the Nuclear en-US Suppliers Group COUNTRY PROFILE: ARGENTINA Back to Table of Contents


11 COUNTRY PROFILE: ARGENTINA 11 en-USfacilitates further collaboration on en-US nuclear and radiological security en-US and nuclear forensics. Additionally, en-US it allows for advanced discussions en-US on the requirements, design, and en-US development of a nuclear security en-US support center, currently focused on en-US training protective force personnel. en-US MEM and DNN already have begun en-US these efforts by conducting a training en-US needs analysis.en-US Earlier this year, the two organizations en-US partnered to conduct a nuclear en-US forensics workshop, the first formal en-US collaboration between the United en-US States and Argentina on the subject. en-US Additional activities conducted to date en-US include protective force trainings and en-US nuclear security culture workshops. en-US Most recently, the sides met on the en-US margins of the meeting of the U.S.-en-US Argentina Joint Standing Committee en-US on Energy Cooperation in August en-US 2017 at Lawrence Livermore National en-US Laboratory to take stock of the en-US cooperation so far and plan for future en-US collaboration.en-US Additionally, pilot site physical en-US protection assessments and upgrades en-US at civil sites with International Atomic en-US Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 1 en-US radioactive materials are scheduled en-US to begin in early FY 2018. This will be en-US coupled with material theft response en-US training for Argentine law enforcement en-US agencies and site security inspections en-US training for ARN. In May 2017, DNN en-US held a transportation security course en-US for nuclear and radiological materials en-US for representatives of ARN, CNEA, en-US customs, federal law enforcement, the en-US coast guard, and airport security. en-US In addition to the MOU and en-US cooperation with MEM, DNN continues en-US to collaborate with ARN. In May 2017, en-US DNN held a transportation security en-US course for nuclear and radiological en-US materials for representatives of en-US ARN, CNEA, customs, federal law en-US enforcement, the coast guard, and en-US airport security.en-US Export Control Cooperation en-US DNNs Office of Nonproliferation and en-US Arms Control (NPAC), in cooperation en-US with the U.S. Department of States en-US Export Control and Related Border en-US Security Program (EXBS), has worked en-US with the Government of Argentina en-US for more than a decade, including en-US longstanding collaboration on NPACs en-US Commodity Identification Training (CIT) en-US Program. Formed in 2007, Argentinas en-US CIT Working Group (Capacitacin en-US para la Identificacin de Mercaderas en-US Estratgicas Sujetas a Control, en-US Spanish acronym CIME) represents en-US 12 governmental agencies and serves en-US as an instructor cadre for Argentine en-US and regional CIT outreach, including en-US cooperation with Chile and Peru.en-US NPACs future collaborations will en-US include export control technical en-US exchanges in Argentina and across en-US the region to share best practices on en-US licensing, enterprise outreach, and en-US enforcement implementation. en en en-US Nuclear Safeguards Engagementen-US In the area of nuclear safeguards, en-US NPAC sponsored a workshop last en-US year with ARN to consider technology en-US approaches for containment and en-US surveillance during and after the en-US transfer of spent fuel from pools inside en-US a facility to new dry storage silos. en-US Representatives from ARN, the facility en-US operators, the dry storage facility en-US designer, and the Brazil-Argentina en-US Agency for Nuclear Accounting and en-US Control (ABACC) participated. The en-US outcome was a list of technologies that en-US could be considered for use during en-US each phase of the spent fuel transfer.en-US In addition, NPAC has worked with en-US ABACC for several years to develop en-US software that can be used with the en-US IAEAs neutron counter at Argentinas en-US Atucha 1 power reactor spent fuel en-US pools. In October 2016, NPAC worked en-US with ABACC, the IAEA, ARN, and en-US the facility operators to field test the en-US software, which is planned for transfer en-US to ABACC next year.en-USen-US Continueden-USA nuclear forensics workshop held in en-US Argentina earlier this year is among the en-US collaborative activities made possible en-US through an MOU between DNN and en-US Argentinas newly established Ministry of en-US Back to Table of Contents


en-US12 en-USFAQs: Bilateral Physical Protection Visitsen-USNen-USuclear technology has numerous beneficial uses, en-US including in research, medicine, and commercial en-US enterprises. If an international partner requests en-US nuclear material from the United States to support its en-US peaceful activities, the United States is legally required to en-US determine that adequate physical security measures will en-US be maintained for the nuclear material. The United States en-US assesses whether physical security requirements are en-US met by conducting periodic government-to-government en-US consultations and physical protection visits to sites that en-US hold, or are requesting to receive, U.S.-obligated nuclear en-US material.en-US What provides the legal basis for the visits?en-US Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, as amended, en-US requires that the United States ensure all U.S.-obligated en-US nuclear material provided under an Agreement for en-US Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States en-US and a foreign partner (also called a Agreement) en-US has adequate physical protection. In addition, Nuclear en-US Regulatory Commission (NRC) export regulations en-US require that license reviews include NRC determinations en-US on whether physical protection measures in recipient en-US countries provide protection at least comparable to en-US International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendaen-US-en-US tions outlined in the publication Information Circular 225/en-US Revision 5 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).en-US What is meant by U.S.-obligated nuclear material?en-US en-US U.S.-obligated refers to nuclear material that is located en-US in another country and subject to a 123 Agreement. en-US Obligations (sometimes referred to as flags) are the en-US terms and conditions that are applied by the supplying en-US government to nuclear material when it is transferred. en-US Obligations that are placed on nuclear material transferred en-US by the United States often include that: en-USthe recipient will en-en-US use the material only for peaceful purposes; en-en-US provide adequate physical protection; and en-en-US apply IAEA or fallback safeguards, as appropriate; en-US en en-USthe recipient may not conduct the following without en-US United States consent: en-en-US retransfers; en-en-US enrichment to and beyond 20%; and en-en-US alteration in form or content of nuclear material en-US en-US (e.g., reprocessing). en-US What is the purpose of physical protection visits?en-US The goals of the visits are to exchange information on en-US good practices for physical protection and discuss the en-US physical security measures for U.S.-obligated material en-US to ensure that it is protected against potential theft and en-US sabotage. If necessary, the team will recommend security en-US enhancements that a foreign facility should consider en-US implementing.en-US How does the U.S. Government define adequate en-US physical security measures?en-US Physical security measures are deemed adequate if they en-US provide a level of protection at least comparable to the en-US current version of IAEA recommendations outlined in en-US INFCIRC/225.en-US What is DNNs role?en-US Staff in DNNs Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control en-US (NPAC) lead the U.S. interagency team that conducts en-US physical protection assessment visits. The mission of the en-US U.S. team is to make and document a consensus decision en-US regarding the adequacy of the physical security measures en-US for U.S.-obligated nuclear material in a host country, based en-US on a visit to that country and its relevant nuclear facilities, en-US and considering all available information.en-US What other agencies participate in the visits?en-US The NRC, Department of State, and the Department of en-US Defenses Defense Threat Reduction Agency all send en-US representatives. Experts from DOE National Laboratories en-US also are critical contributors to the teams.en-US How many visits are conducted each year?en-US NPAC conducts at least six site visits per year. Since 1974, en-US the U.S. Government has conducted nearly 200 visits. en-USGo to Table of Contents