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Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)
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VOL. 48 NO. 1 SPRING 2018 Contemporary Strategy & Landpower VOL. 48 NO. 1 SPRING 2018 PARAMETERS (USPS 413530) US Army War College ATTN: Parameters 47 Ashburn Drive Carlisle, PA 17013-5010 Periodicals Postage Paid FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT Quarterly The US Army War College Special CommentaryLinell A. Letendre and Martin L. CookIllusions of VictoryRussell W. Glenn Dominic Tierney21st Century Political WarfareJames P. Farwell Timothy P. McGeehan T. S. Allen and A. J. MooreSpecial RelationshipsJames K. Wither Arthur I. Cyr Samir Tata


en-USParametersen-USen-US en-US en-USDisclaimer: en-US en-US Parametersen-USen-US Parametersen-USen-US en-USEditorial Board Members en-USContributing Editorsen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-USen-USen-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-US en-USen-USen-USen-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-US en-US en-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USen-USSecretary of the Armyen-US en-USen-USen-US en-USen-USCommandanten-US en-USen-USEditoren-US en-USen-USManaging Editoren-US en-USen-USAssistant Editoren-US en-US


Vol. 48 No. 1 Spring 2018 5 From the Editor FEATURES Special Commentary 7 Right vs. Right: Personal Beliefs vs. Professional Obligations en-USLinell A. Letendre and Martin L. Cook Illusions of Victory 15 LTG MacFarland: Insights on en-US en-USIllusions of Victoryen-US and Iraqen-USRussell W. Glenn 25 Avoiding Nation-Building: en-USFrom Nixon to Trumpen-USDominic Tierneyen-US 21st Century Political Warfare 37 Countering Russian Meddling en-USin US Political Processesen-USJames P. Farwell 49 Countering Russian Disinformation en-USTimothy P. McGeehan 59 Victory without Casualties: en-USRussias Information Operationsen-UST. S. Allen and A. J. Mooreen-US Special Relationships 73 Brexit and the Anglo-American en-USSecurity and Defense Partnershipen-USJames K. Wither 85 Brexit and T ransatlantic Security en-USArthur I. Cyr 95 US Landpower and an en-US en-US Indo-American Allianceen-USSamir Tataen-US Review Essay 107 Emory Upton and the US Army en-US Paul C. Jussel


2 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 COMMENTARY AND RREPLY 111 On The War in Russias Hybrid Warfare en-US 112 The Author Replies en-US BOOK RREVIEWS Biographies 113 The Life and Wo rk of General Andrew J. en-USGoodpaster: Best Practices in National en-US en-USen-US 115 Our Year of War: Two Brothers, en-US en-US Vietnam, and a Divided Nationen-USen-US en-USArmed Forces and Society 117 Inclusion in the American Military: en-US en-US A Force for Diversityen-USen-US en-US 119 Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to en-USCondemnation of a Weapon of Waren-USen-US en-USStrategy 121 Strategy: Context and Adaptation en-US en-US from Archidamus to Airpoweren-USen-US en-US en-US 122 The Big Stick: The Limits of So ft Power en-US en-US and the Necessity of Military Poweren-USen-US 124 Strategic Theories en-USen-US en-USDefense Studies 126 Organized Violence after Civil W ar: The en-USGeography of Recruitment in Latin Americaen-USen-US 128 Americas Digital Army: en-US en-US Games at Work and Waren-USen-US 130 Humanitarian Econo mics: War, Disaster, en-USand the Global Aid Marketen-USen-US 132 International Law and New W ars en-USen-US 133 Power and Restraint: The Rise of en-US en-US the United States, 1898en-USen-US


Table of Contents 3 en-USMilitary History 136 Elviss Army: Cold War GIs en-US en-US en-USen-US en-UScation and Vietnamization, 1968en-USen-US 139 Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of en-US en-US Americas Special Operations Forcesen-USen-US 141 Creating Japan s Ground Self-Defense en-USForce, 1945: A Sword Well Madeen-USen-US 143 Combined Operations: A Global History of en-USAmphibious and Airborne Warfareen-USen-US 145 American Airpo wer Strategy in World en-USWar II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oilen-USen-US 146 Nine Days in May: The B attles of the en-US4th Infantry Division on the Cambodian en-US Border, 1967en-USen-US 148 My Enemy s Enemy: India in Afghanistan en-USfrom the Soviet Invasion to the en-US en-US American Withdrawalen-USen-US 150 Indias Wars: A Military History, 1947 en-USen-US


From the EditorLinell Letendre and Martin Cook open our Spring issue with a Special Commentary entitled, Right vs. Right: Personal Beliefs vs. Professional Obligations. Ethical choices are easier when military professionals must choose between a wrong and a right. But Letendre and Cook discuss how to choose between two rights. Illusions of Victory features Russell Glenns interview of Lieutenant General Sean B. MacFarland, US Army retired, about what worked in Iraq and what did not. The forum also includes an article by Dominic Tierney, Avoiding Nation-Building: From Nixon to Trump, which explores how the aversion to nation-building has adversely shaped military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The second forum, 21st Century Political Warfare marks what has changed in political competition short of war, a concept that has been with us since at least the 1950s. James Farwells Countering Russian Meddling in US Political Processes introduces a team-of-teams approach to counter information operations aimed at interfering in democratic processes. Timothy McGeehans Countering Russian Disinformation proposes additional strategies for countering a rivals information operations. Victory without Casualties: Russias Information Operations by T. S. Allen and A. J. Moore, sheds light on some of the unique characteristics of contemporary Russian information operations. Our last forum, Special Relationships offers two points of view on the effects that Brexit might have on the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. James Withers Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership suggests the United States should proceed with caution. Arthur Cyrs Brexit and Transatlantic Security offers reason for optimism, claiming Brexit creates opportunities for greater cooperation. Samir Tatas US Landpower and an Indo-American Alliance looks at another special relationship. Tata explores the possibility of using US landpower to build an Indo-American alliance to balance the growing challenge of Chinas pursuit of hegemony over Asia. ~AJE


SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Right vs. Right: Personal Beliefs vs. Professional Obligations Martin L. CookA ethics Joint Ethics Regulation right profession, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)


8 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 The Military as a Profession profession 2 n 4 Societal service Technical knowledge The Future of the Army Profession The Future of the Army Profession


SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Letendre and Cook 9 Discretionary practice Autonomy Public trust Lifelong service what they do is not just their job Army Profession


10 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Orloff v. Willoughby n Parker v. Levy n n United States v. Sterling n in Parker v. Levy


SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Letendre and Cook 11 Greer v. Spock n Constitutional Ethics and The Oath


12 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Rolling Stone Greer v. Spock Putting the Model into Practice n n n Rolling Stone The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations Hearing on the Future Years Defense Program Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Hearing on the Policy concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces Before the Senate Armed Services Committee


SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Letendre and Cook 13 n n n n Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of Dont Ask, Dont Tell


14 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n Concluding Thoughts Linell A. Letendre Martin L. Cook


ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY LTG MacFarland: Insights on Illusions of Victory and Iraq Russell W. Glenn Dr. Russell W. Glenn is the Director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. I n Illusions of Victory author Carter Malkasian describes the cumulative events in Ramadi circa 2007 as comprising a turning point of the Iraq War. 1 He is correct in terms of the war fought by the US-led coalition in Iraq. Iraqis might have a contrary view given theirs has 2003. The turning point from the perspective of the countrys citizenry in consequence: American support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Malikis retaining his position after his loss in the March 2010 election. The internal divides that continue to plague Iraq today are largely due to the overt sectarianism that characterized his tenure. Malkasian recognizes Malikis role in undoing the progress made during the Awakening period (2007), as does Lieutenant General MacFarland, as discussed in the interview below. Both men avoid the common pitfall of overemphasizing a single factor as an explanation for the progress made during and in the aftermath of that too-short span of years. MacFarlands assertion that the surge was less pivotal than others have argued is convincing and well-supported. Other factorsal-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cruelty, the groups deliberate targeting support, fear of the Persians in Iran, and Shia politicians in general refusing to take the higher road after years of suppression under Saddam topics receive attention in one or more of the many, and there are many, other books regarding al-Anbar province during the middle of the last decade. William Doyles A Soldiers Dream Kimberly Kagans The Surge: A Military History Peter R. Mansoors Surge Jim Michaelss, A Chance in Hell and Michael E. Silvermans, Awakening Victory, which is a memoir by a battalion commander in Anbar during this period, cover much of the ground considered in Illusions of Victory from a variety of viewpoints. It is therefore legitimate to question why Malkasians book deserves attention as yet another offering. The answer lies in perspective. His book is at times a broader investigation, one more strategic in perspective, and sometimes counter to the alternative sources on events in Ramadi and alAnbar province during this critical period. Malkasians understanding of tribal dynamics is among the best offered by Western authors addressing support for AQI (and later the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]). His analysis is balanced, recognizing the tribal and individual dynamics 1 Carter Malkasian, Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).


16 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 at play over time. The author similarly, critically, recognizes those dynamics evolved over time. Originally reluctant to employ violence against civilians other than those supporting the Baghdad government, AQI cast that hesitation aside in light of other Anbari organizations passage of time. Why, he is able to ask, did the highly touted progress made prior to the 2014 departure of most coalition forces evaporate with the rise of ISIS? Yes, Malikis (and other Iraqi leaders) malfeasance was a key element in the return to previous levels of internecine violence. Yet that exodus of US forces; consequent loss of moral, political, and resistance were undoubtedly complements to the distrust sown by Baghdad in the rise of ISIS. These positives considerably outweigh any negatives in Illusions of Victory Malkasian could have provided greater depth of analysis after positing that Colonel John L. Gronski, commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, receives too little credit for setting the conditions for the Awakening. Admirable as Gronskis initiatives were, it is questionable that they established the same kind of relationships with sheikhs as did later US leaders or that Gronskis operations involved a level of risk similar to that assumed by subsequent commanders who positioned their forces in more contested parts of Iraqs urban areas. So too, more pointed consideration of what the events in Anbar offer for future counterinsurgent undertakings would have (COIN) that suggest its total relegation to the dustbin of history rather than providing more thoughtful evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of its application in Iraq and Afghanistan. Malkasians primary focus is, by choice, the operational and tactical levels of war. We therefore do not but once hear of the permeating discomfort felt and suspicions held by regional Sunnis at the community level in the aftermath of Saddams fall or the discomfort and suspicions borne of his governments replacement by an Iran-leaning authority. Little wonder that several of these communities tolerated or provided more substantive support to ISIS. He similarly does not delve into Malikis motivations for his sectarianism, which in its rawest form was simply the overt expression of Shia vengeance after decades of suppression under Saddams thumb. Understandably, but perhaps naively, the world has come to expect more of national leaders. 2 Ironically, if we accept that Ramadi was a turning point during the when ISIS forces were defeated in the citya defeat facilitated by a new operational approach introduced by the recently arrived commanding general of the Combined Joint Task ForceOperation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria. Ramadis fall at once shattered the myth of ISIS invincibility while at the same time convincing Iraqi leaders of Americas commitment to the groups ouster. The ability of ISIS to recruit and to maintain those leaders support suffered accordingly. As the past 2 The reviewer thanks Colonel Wade Foote, USA Retired, for his notable insights that underlie the material in this paragraph and that immediately following.


ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY Glenn 17 decade and a half has demonstrated the Middle East is nothing if not extraordinarily complex. Perhaps regional stability rather than ideology should take precedence when selecting Americas strategic objectives. Then a colonel, MacFarlands performance as the commander of 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Tal Afar and Ramadi receives considerable attention in this and many of the other books addressing the war in Iraq. His later leadership of Operation contributed valuable insight on Illusion of Victory during this interview on January 23, 2018. The Interview Dr. GLENN. What is your overall impression of Carter Malkasians book? LTG MACFARLAND. Carters book provided me a bit more texture gaps. Hes right that the success in al-Anbar and elsewhere was due to a combination of factors. An Awakening-type of event requires elements like those needed to operate an internal combustion engine: fuel, air, who were willing to step up. Air was provided by the coalition; we gave it the room to grow. The enemy provided the spark by overplaying their hand and creating the backlash for the Awakening. You cant have an Awakening without all of those three elements present. And then success begets success. Thats why when one tribe looked over at another tribe and saw they had a pretty good thing going, they wanted to keep up with the Joneses. Thats how it spread. It created a domino effect. GLENN. In your experience, what factors were key to abetting US-led coalition progress? Which instead reduced the extent and duration of success? MACFARLAND. I would think the main impediment to progress was, of course, Maliki and his ilk and their natural suspicion of anything to do with arming Sunnis. I saw a very similar reluctance in Baghdad during Operation Inherent Resolve. Some things arent going to change. GLENN. its breakdown on three factors: Malikis government turning against the Sunnis, the tribal systems inherent instability, and the Sunnis strong support for AQI and the Islamic State. Do you agree with his conclusions? Considering more than coalition military capabilities alone, what could the United States have done to prevent ISISs rise? MACFARLAND. The Iraqi government tried to marginalize [the Sunnis] while we were there and then actively turned against them when we werent. [On the second point,] I dont know if I would go so far as to say the tribal system is inherently unstable. After all, it has endured for over a millennium. I think it was destabilized by our actions as well as Malikis . and even Saddams. A series of actors for differing reasons actively sought to undermine or co-opt the tribes. Its going on today in Iraq during Inherent Resolve: Tehran is trying to buy off some Sunni sheikhs to help them achieve their goals, which are really not in the best


18 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 interests of the Sunnis. The MacFarland clan was a Scottish Highlands clan that fought on both sides, against or for the British, depending on the battle. The Sunni tribes are not that much different than a Highland [Regarding the third point,] AQI and then the Islamic State enjoyed a critical mass of Sunni support. This was engendered by Malikis persecution of the Sunnis, driving them into the arms of al-Qaeda. What could the US have done to prevent ISISs rise? Very simply: stay engaged. If we had not pulled out of Iraq at the end of 2010 and 2011, ISIS wouldnt have had the ability to grow because the Sunnis would have felt they had a friendly external power in the United States that they could turn to for arbitration with Maliki and his government. But without us, they had no alternative other than ISIS. Although the Sunnis were very suspicious of ISIS, they probably believed because they had defeated al-Qaeda with the Awakening, they would be able to control ISIS. What they didnt bargain on was that ISIS was a more virulent brand, which they werent able to control. But they were willing to give ISIS a shot to act as a buffer between themselves, Maliki and his government, and Tehran. Unfortunately, they were deluded in their thinking because what had allowed them to defeat al-Qaeda was our support. That wasnt there this time. GLENN. What did your enemy prisoners of war and other sources tell you were the bases for successful AQI and ISIS recruiting? What roles did insurgent intimidation of potential recruits, religion, money, or other factors play? How might a US-led coalition impede an insurgents MACFARLAND \021\003KH\003EDVLV\003IRU\003WKHLU\003UHFUXLWLQJ\003ZDV\017\003\264:H\267OO\003\300JKW\003WKRVH\003 dirty rotten Shia for you. What roles did insurgent intimidation of potential recruits play? Well, they were running press gangs and forcing more desperate. ISISand al-Qaeda to a lesser extentforced people into their ranks. They were not all willing believers. Religion played about as much a role in recruiting as Catholicism did for the IRA [Irish Republican Army]. The Troubles werent really about whether or not my Irish forebears should go to Mass on feast days and honor the Virgin Mary; it was really more about the Protestants representing an external because, to the Sunnis, the Shias also represent a Persian foreign power. They just dont trust them. So religions a factor, but I dont think its the only or the biggest factor. Money? Money had lot to do with ISIS. Once they took over the revenue streams. And that hollowed them out. In fact, I named our counterrevenue campaign Tidal Wave Two, because their money was predominantly oil based and [Operation] Tidal Wave was the name of eastern Syria, and around Mosul, in honor of that operation. We needed to go after revenue streams, because you can have all of the ideology


ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY Glenn 19 The other thing we must do to impede insurgent success is to have an enduring presence in eastern Syria, northern Syria, western Iraq, and northern Jordan to keep it from metastasizing. GLENN. To what extent was there either formal or informal passage of coalition lessons learned and insights between those in-country and from rotation to rotation? Did this occur only internally to a service (Army, Marines) or between services? MACFARLAND. What [then-Colonel] H. R. McMaster did up in Tal Afarand I followed H. R. in Tal Afar before my brigade was ordered our new area of operations. But the problem was that Tal Afar is a ship in a bottle. It is a Turkmen city in an Arab country, so progress there never had the potential of spreading. But because of my engagements there and the opportunity to work with police, army, and so forth, I could see that there were certain things happening in Tal Afar that were not present in Ramadi. One of the things I had to do was [identify] a mayor. The governor was basically the mayor of Ramadi, and there was effectively no governor of al-Anbar. No police or tribal force was present, either. There was the Western Ramadi police station with about 140 cops when I got there, but they Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lechner, stood up the west Jazirah police station, which was actually a pump plant on the Euphrates River. It was police stations where the [US Army] Corps of Engineers or anybody else thought it should be. It was precisely where the tribes thought it should be, however. So thats where we put it, and a lot of former cops who had been trained and were still on the payroll came out of the woodwork with their old uniforms, willing to man that police station. These were guys that were in the immediate area, but not reporting for duty out of fear or intimidation. We had to break that cycle of fear. Putting the police station where they felt strong enough to man it was critically important. The enemy also understood this, which is why they attacked the Jazirah police station with a chlorine bomb, a massive car bomb, and a big fuel truck both US Army MPs [military police] and the Iraqi police. Moments after the attack, I drove over there and talked to the [Iraqi] lieutenant colonel station chief and offered to move them onto [Camp] Blue Diamond while we helped rebuild the police station. He said, No, no, no. We cant let the enemy win. I call it the Iwo Jima moment, Mount Suribachi: the down by the blast, and that afternoon [they] went out on patrol looking for the cell responsible for the truck bombing. . It was part of a series of events that led to the Awakening. Al-Qaeda bombed the police station, but that didnt work. So, they killed the sheikh who was contributing really initiated the Awakening process. But without that spark, and the spontaneous reaction by the sheikhs, I couldnt have done what I did. Timing is everything, right?


20 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 There was no Awakening in Tal Afar. McMaster set up combat outposts, but he overwhelmed the opposition with coalition forces supported by Iraqi security forces. He leveraged the Shia population within southern Tal Afar. Northern Tal Afar was still indian territory when we got there. The Awakening was the sheikhs idea, and I just went with it. Just as you set a thief to catch a thief, the tribal forces were the ideal counter al-Qaeda force because they were truly an indigenous force, even more than some of AQI. To what extent was there either formal or informal passage of lessons learned and insights between those in-country and from rotation to rotation? There was a COIN academy in Taji, but Im not sure how much we got out of that. Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, hadnt been written yet. In fact, General Petraeus, when he got there, asked me if Id read it. And I said, No I havent. Sorry. He said, Well you dont need to. Youre doing everything it says. GLENN. approaches to COIN in Ramadi? MACFARLAND. What I thought was good about Tal Afar was the combat outposts to secure neighborhoods, to lock them down. My idea was to leapfrog and secure neighborhoods in Ramadi, turn them over to Iraqi security forces, and then my guys could move onto the next set of combat outposts (COPs). But I knew I would have to provide the Iraqi Army, and then the Iraqi police. What happened in practice is that we turned COPs over directly to the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi police were relieved of responsibilities outside of Ramadi by tribal auxiliary forces. city. And even during Operation Inherent Resolve they said, Well, you the army stays on the outside. The problem with that way of thinking is that the enemy was in cities like Ramadi, Mosul, and elsewhere and the police cant do it all by themselves. The Iraqi Army has a very strong effective military forces. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, on the other hand, had no such problem, so we relied heavily on them in OIR. GLENN. How do you view the authors analysis of al-Anbar tribal relationships and motivations? MACFARLAND. Abdul Sattar Abu Risha did not start out as the leader of the Awakening. He was the spokesperson. The older sheikhs let this young hothead be the face of the Awakening so that if anybody was going to get assassinated, it was going to be Sattar. He parlayed that into a more powerful role when he became the de facto leader, and we played a role in that. I said, Okay, if youre running all the risks, then you are going to get the rewards. So I funnelled money through him to the other sheikhs which elevated his status and gave him more wasta It was all quid pro quo, a symbiotic relationship. Their sheikhs motivations were, in my opinion, mainly selfpower. They were concerned with two threats. They were caught between the devil and the deep blue sea: the Persiansthe Shiaand


ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY Glenn 21 al-Qaeda. We offered them a way to rid themselves of al-Qaeda by arming them. This gave them the means to defend themselves against al-Qaeda and not have to rely on Persians from Baghdad, who would be just as bad if not worse than al-Qaeda, at least in their eyes. You dont want to invite a vampire into your house if you dont have to. So we said we would help them develop a home guard. They could then secure their own neighborhood and wouldnt need help from Baghdad or al-Qaeda. Its the way things were 100 years ago when the tribes provided their own security. Thats what was so attractive about this to them: it was a combination of economic incentives and the ability to defend themselves. They also hated the Iraqi Islamic Party, the IIPGovernor Mamoun [Sami Rashid] was a member of itwhich they saw as aligned with al-Qaeda because it got money from outside. So, the sheikhs saw the IIP as more part of the problem than the solution and wanted to rid themselves of it in order to become more self-governing. And economically, these sheikhs make money from all sorts of sources, either legal or questionable. Smuggling is historically what Bedouins do. Perhaps thats why there are so many truck companies in al-Anbar province to run back and forth between Jordon and Syria to Baghdad. But the tribes are also into construction. It seemed as though every sheikh has his own construction company. GLENN. Is Malkasian correct in noting, Certain writers later accused the Marines of opposing the [Sattar] movement but this is untrue? MACFARLAND. I would rephrase it. I would say the Marines were leery of the Sattar movement and hesitant to embrace it initially. It took them longer to come around than I would have liked, but I wouldnt say they opposed it. They were just more skeptical. GLENN. You worked for the Marines. Did you being Army give you more slack than if you had been a marine? MACFARLAND better boss than General Richard C. Zilmer. To be honest, if I had been working for an Army headquarters, I dont know that the Awakening would have happened. Thats not a knock on the Army necessarily. But General Zilmer epitomized the tenets of mission command better than almost any boss I have ever had. GLENN. Was Baghdad more willing to support Sunni counter AQI initiatives in al-Anbar than in Baghdad itself? If so, is the author correct in concluding that the key variable was al-Anbars distance from the capital? MACFARLAND Absolutely. I think the mind-set with Maliki was that he was up to his eyeballs in Sunni terrorist crocodiles there in Baghdad. If we could reduce the throughput from Syria in the pipeline that ran through al-Anbar to Baghdad, it was a good thing. There were no real Anbar would stay in al-Anbar. He started to get a little more attentive when the Awakening moved closer to Baghdad, but as long as it remained out west he wasnt too worried. Nevertheless, he remained reluctant to provide any heavy weapons that could eventually be used against Iraqi security forces.


22 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 GLENN. But Fallujah and Ramadi werent really that far away from Baghdad. MACFARLAND Well, Fallujah is pretty close. . And in Baghdad, the Shia see Fallujah as the boogeyman, the number one place they need to worry about. It is astride the historic line of drift of bad actors and is are pretty worried about it and keep an eye on it. So, yeah, Carter was right about that. GLENN. Malkasian wrote, In September 2015, Sean MacFarland, now a lieutenant general, became the commander of US forces in Iraq and Syria. . Even he withheld from rekindling the Awakening. He realized that the movement was too broken and discredited to be resurrected. Comment. MACFARLAND I wouldnt say that I withheld from it. I would say that there was not an opportunity. Some of the old gang was around but ough job of undermining the tribal structure and authority. Al-Qaeda wasnt as focused as ISIS on getting everyone to behave a certain way. As that was good enough for AQI. They would worry about installing their catechismor whatever they call itlater. Not so with ISIS. They were incredibly brutal. Everyone had to walk the talk, or else. People had to live a certain way, which was onerous even by al-Qaeda standards. Sunni tribes could sit on the fence with would often leave the tribes alone. It was live and let live. There was none of that with ISIS. If the Sunni sheikhs felt that if in Operation Iraqi Freedom they were caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, by the time coalition forces returned to al-Anbar in Operation Inherent Resolve they were completely submerged by the deep blue sea and the devil was underwater with them. It would have been too hard; it would GLENN. Ultimately, Malkasian concludes, The people of Anbar would have been better off had the United States stayed out of Iraq in MACFARLAND. Possibly. Under Saddam, that was probably true percent of Iraqis elsewhere in Iraq who were Shia would probably disagree with that. The reality is, Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, could all have gotten along in a federalized Iraq had we stayed engaged after we defeated al-Qaeda. We were in the drivers seat. We could have ensured a good outcome for that country and put it on the road to stability. Instead, we walked away and the country fell apart . much to the advantage of the Iranians. Right now there is a good prime minister in Iraq named Haider al-Abadi. If we work with him I think the people of al-Anbar might modus vivendi with the government of Iraq. But well have to stay engaged. It wont be as good for the Sunnis as it was during their salad days under Saddam. The Anbaris memory of those days is why we


ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY Glenn 23 ones that dont like the Iranians. We dont think much of them either. And the scales then fell from the sheikhs eyes. They also realized we could give them a lot more money than the Iranians ever would. Unfortunately, we turned our backs on them, and they paid the price for their partnership with the United States much as was the case with [the] South Vietnamese. GLENN. Were you there when Maliki stayed in power after being defeated in an election? MACFARLAND. No, but I read about it. That was a strategic tipping point. GLENN. Any concluding thoughts? How does this compare with other books on the Awakening? MACFARLAND. Some of them have a very noticeable slant. Theres the Marine history of the Awakening. I wont render judgment on that. Its a very complicated story. Other people have written about it. I dont know that anyone will get to all the little subcurrents and things that were happening simultaneously out there, most of which I didnt know about, and few of which I controlled. My principal accomplishment was managing to navigate through all those various currents and eddies to achieve my military objectives, riding on top of them without capsizing the boat. I didnt know what was going on beneath the surface, especially with the tribal dynamics. And theres more to them than Carter has written about or that anybody can probably ever write about or know. None of the Sunni sheikhs are writing any books, and if they did they would have their own bias. Its not like the end of the Second World War when we interviewed all the German generals and they told us, You did this and I did that because they kept meticulous records and could cross-reference what happened on a particular day. We cant do that in this war, so well never know. The al-Qaeda guys are all dead or scattered, and so are a lot of sheikhs. But I think Carter does as good a job as any, and better than most, in piecing it together and coming up with some sort of coherent narrative. As my previous remarks make clear, tribal relations in al-Anbar were extremely complex. For example, the chief of police in al-Anbar worked with a sheikh. The chief of police used to be the head of the border patrol, and the sheikh was a smuggler. It was kind of like a Road Runner-Wile E. Coyote relationship, [a] love-hate relationship. They had an understanding of what was allowed, what wasnt allowed. And of course theyre all intermarried with one another. Until you can get to that level of understanding of the dynamics out there, its like walking into a big family argument at Thanksgiving but you arent part of the family. They may be talking about something that happened to a cousins you people talking about? But theyve all got it right there, in their heads. Its as if it happened yesterday to them. Trying to understand how that perspective affected the sheikhs thinking, and how they dealt with one another, was a complete waste of time for me. I just decided, Im just going to back a few sheikhs, and hope the other ones will fall in line to get CERP [Commanders


24 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Emergency Response program] money or whatever. Thats how Im going to play this game. I couldnt learn how to play cricket. It was too for me. A last note . I couldnt have done half of what I did without doors for me. Ambassadors are such important players, and they dont get enough credit. Interviewers Closing Thoughts Despite the claims of some, counterinsurgency is no more dead than post-World War II, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to inform practitioners of the former. And adapt they must. Insurgents evolve, success in urban areas, historically the graveyard of such movements. Well-reasoned additions to the literature and clear-eyed insights, such as those offered by Malkasian and MacFarland, provide guidance for essential counteradaptation and, ideally, innovations that will keep us left of boom in years to come.


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Avoiding Nation-Building: From Nixon to Trump2018 Dominic Tierney Atlantic The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age A n n 2 n 4 Politico America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again


26 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n nationbuilding n Dueling Doctrines The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War International Studies Quarterly


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Tierney 27 must must n n n n Armed Forces and Society n A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq


28 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 to Clinton-era stabilization missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere, which were seen as armed social work. Let me tell you what else Im worried about, said Bush in 2000, Im worried about an opponent who uses nation-building and the military in the same sentence. 15 In 2003, on the eve of the Iraq War, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech entitled Beyond Nation-Building that criticized the drawn-out peacekeeping operation in Kosovo for creating a culture of dependence. 16 The Rumsfeld doctrine tried to reconcile these goals through a policy of transformation that would provide a new generation of communications systems, smart bombs, and stealth weapons, enabling Washington to strike adversaries with shock and awe before quickly passing the baton to local allies or international troops, thereby avoiding the drudgery of nation-building. Armed with this approach, the United States toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 using a few hundred Special Forces personnel, backed by airpower and local allies, and then handed security responsibilities to Afghan warlords, tribal militia, and a modest international force. A year later, just 10,000 US soldiers were engaged in a narrow counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, while 5,000 international troops tried to help the new regime in Kabul stabilize the country. 17 Similarly, in 2003, the United States planned an invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein, stand up a government in Iraq and get out as fast as we can. 18 The Obama administration faced a familiar strategic quandary. On one hand, Barack Obama committed to using force to deter and to guided by the principle of no more Iraq Wars, the president sought the end of long-term nation-building with large military footprints. 19 The Obama doctrine tried to resolve these aims through limited warfare. Military operations would be limited in number (with greater selectivity about intervening abroad), limited in cost (by leading from behind and sharing the burden with international and local allies), and limited in scope (by utilizing raids, cyberwarfare, and drone strikes rather than 20 The Obama doctrine shaped both force planning and military strategy. In 2012 the Pentagon stated, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. 21 Obama 15 Terry M. Neal, Bush Backs into Nation Building, Washington Post February 26, 2003; and James Dobbins et al., After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 91. 16 Donald H. Rumsfeld Beyond Nation-Building (speech, Salute to Freedom, Intrepid SeaAir-Space Museum, New York, New York, February 14, 2003), /dod/sp20030214-secdef0024.htm. 17 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 57. 18 Toby Dodge, Iraq, in Exit Strategies and State Building ed. Richard Caplan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 246. 19 Dominic Tierney, The Obama Doctrine and the Lessons of Iraq (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012); Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review (speech, Pentagon, Washington, DC, January 5, 2012), 20 Ryan Lizza, The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obamas Foreign Policy, New Yorker May 2, 2011. 21 US Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 6.


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Tierney 29 n 22 The Day After New York Times


30 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n 24 What Do We Know about War?


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Tierney 31 day after day before What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush


32 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n civil Foreign Affairs


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Tierney 33 fullest n n n New York Times


34 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Counterinsurgency n Conclusions and Implications in a world where 90 percent of wars are civil wars, using force means nation-building Counterinsurgency


IILLUsSIONsS OF VICTORY Tierney 35 n Parameters


36 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Countering Russian Meddling in US Political Processes James P. Farwell I 2 n 4 United States v Internet Research Agency LLC et al. Russian Roulette National Interest American Interest


38 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 mechanism active defense strategic offense Team of Teams n


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Farwell 39 Harvard Business Review n Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World One Mission: How Leaders Build a Team of Teams My Share of the Task Harvard Business Review Fortune


40 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Interagency Cohesion Department of State. n Department of Defense.


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Farwell 41 Interagency Fusion Cell. n Employ Active Defense Understand Propaganda and the language in which they are articulated Putins Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security Prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations


42 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Recognizing Agents Sputnik News with Ed Schulz Larry King Now Americas Lawyer Going Underground Time n 22 Role of Industry 24 Parameters


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Farwell 43 Improving LegislationEnforcing current laws RIA Global LLC n Expanding restrictions n n n New York Times Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary Atlantic Big Data


44 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 The Madcom Future Realpolitik Propaganda, Reprogram Human Culture, and Threaten Democracy . And What Can Be Done about It New Yorker The Invention of Russia All the Kremlins Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin The Red Web: The Kremlins Wars on the Internet Express Russian Roulette


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Farwell 45 Increase Political Pressure Apply Distractive Measures All the Kremlins Men


46 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Employ Cybertools Washington Post n 42 Washington Post Russian Roulette Survival


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Farwell 47 n Stabilize International Relations Conclusion n 44 Politico


21ST CENTURY POLITIcCAL WARFARE Countering Russian DisinformationTimothy P. McGeehan2018 Timothy P. McGeehan Commander Timothy P. McGeehan, a member of the information warfare community, holds a bachelors degree from the US Naval Academy, a master of arts degree from the Naval War College, as well as a masters degree and a doctorate degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. He was a Director Fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group and has served with the CNO Strategic Actions Group.ABSTRACT : This article proposes three types of strategies for countering information operations campaigns. The author also presents considerations for the military role in these efforts.Technology-based strategic advantages are perishable. In recent years, the accelerating pace of the diffusion of technology has Secure worldwide communications, high-resolution satellite imagery, and unmanned aerial systems were once the purview of nations that had made massive governmental investments in long-term research and development, infrastructure, training, and personnel. Now they are all freely available, and affordable, for private civilians to purchase. Likewise, military hardwaresuch as precision-guided munitions, advanced sensor networks, electronic warfare systems, and cybercapabilitieshave expanded beyond the inventories of a few select nations to become the backbone of adversarial antiaccess/area denial strategies to limit Western military action. In this strategic environment, the advantage lies not with the nation who overtly displays power but with the nation who covertly controls information. Previous offset strategies rooted in industrial-age processes, relied on military technologies few nations could easily replicate. In contrast, a variety of actors now draw many advanced information technologies that may yield competitive advantage, such as big data algorithms To some extent these technologies, and the operational concepts to employ them, have already proliferated. Furthermore, many companies working at the leading edge of emerging dual-use technologies are leery of partnering with Western governments, which frequently insist on owning the intellectual property (the lifeblood of information-age companies), impose export regulations (drastically limiting the market 1 These limitations encourage technology companies to sell their wares to Americas global power competitors as initiatives such as Defense 2 1 John Louth, Trevor Taylor, and Andrew Tyler, Defence Innovation and the UK: Responding to the (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2017); and Robert Hummel and Kathryn Schiller Wurster, Department of Defenses Innovation Experiment, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Policy Studies, June 30, 2016, http://www.potomacinstitute .org/steps/featured-articles/83-department-of-defense-s-innovation-experiment. 2 Damon V. Coletta, Navigating the Third Offset Strategy, 47, no. 4 (Winter 2017 18): 47; and Patrick Tucker, As Pentagon Dawdles, Silicon Valley Sells Its Newest Tech Abroad, April 22, 2016.


50 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n n 4 n n Strategic Communications Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations Military Review Foreign Policy Military Thought Proceedings


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE McGeehan 51 American Psychologist n n


52 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Dissecting the IO Campaign Daily Beast Economist Economist Rethinking the Principles of War The Command of the Air


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE McGeehan 53 n Countering the IO Campaign Command of the Air Command of the Air Washington Post Submarine Review


54 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018Containment and Resilience 22 Education n 24 Time International Journal of Information Management


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE McGeehan 55 Guardian of Democracy: The Civic Mission of Schools Foreign Policy US News The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters Slate Shallows


56 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n Role of the Military The Fake News Machine: How Propagandists Abuse the Internet and Manipulate the Public New York Times Financial Times


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE McGeehan 57 The Way Ahead Proceedings New York Times


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Victory without Casualties: Russias Information Operations R 2 National Security Strategy of the United States of America Military Review Nature of War


60 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 4 n n Foreign Policy RT CSS Policy Perspectives New York Times Magazine Conceptual Views regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space Defence Strategic Communications Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations Handbook of Russian Information Warfare Snapshot Foreign Affairs


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 61 n Origins n Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment Journal of Slavic Military Studies The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB


62 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 22 Decisiveness 24 If War Comes Tomorrow? The Con Sword and the Shield Sword and the Shield Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets Guardian The Red Web: The Kremlins Wars on the Internet Deception: Spies, Lies and How Russian Dupes the West


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 63 n n n Military Thought n Future War Military-Industrial Kurier The Blog Military Thought The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald Analyzing the Ground Zero: What Western Countries Can Learn from Ukrainian Experience of Combating Russian Disinformation Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary Snapshot Foreign Affairs


64 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine, 2013 Russias Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemys Ability to Resist Little Green Men Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 65 42 44 Characteristics continuous activity hybrid force of emotional appeals subverted reality platform control manipulation of the Russian diaspora Military Review New York Times Red Web The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia Handbook of Russian Information Warfare Countering GrayZone Hybrid Threats: An Analysis of Russias New Generation Warfare and Implications for the US Army Intelligence Committee Future is History


66 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Hybrid Force Emotional Appeal International Journal of Communication Foreign Affairs Russian Military Power Russian Military Power Computational Propaganda Science Daily Beast


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 67 Subverted Reality Platform Control n Defence Strategic Communications The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money Russias Firehose of Falsehood Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It Moscow Times


68 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Manipulation of the Russian Diaspora compatriots n Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian Compatriot Policy in Estonia Mapping Russian Media Network: Medias Role in Russian Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Russias Firehose of Falsehood


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 69 Unknown n Conclusion Foreign Affairs Wired


70 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n n Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Joint Force Quarterly


21sST CCENTURY PPOLITICAL WARFARE Allen and Moore 71 T. S. Allen A. J. Moore


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership W n 2 A Special Relationship: AngloAmerican Relations in the Cold War and After U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century America and Britain: Was There Ever A Special Relationship? Alliance Persistence within the AngloAmerican Special Relationship Washington Post Guardian


74 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 4 The Relationship in Context Would a New SDSR Be Needed after a Brexit Vote? New York Times Parameters British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Wither 75 Foreign Affairs National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review n The Military Partnership n Christian Science Monitor World Affairs n Italian Institute for International Political Studies Analysis Foreign Affairs National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom (SDSR) SDSR SDSR


76 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 22 Defence and Security after Brexit: A Snapshot of International Perspectives on the Implications of the UKs Decision to Leave the EU Annual Report and Accounts 2016 Annual Report My Share of the Task UK Defence Journal Decision Time: The National Security Capability Review 20178 and Defence Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003 2009


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Wither 77 n 24 National Security Capability Review Who Does UK National Strategy, Oral Evidence Taken Before the Public Administration Committee of the House of Commons The Military Balance 2018 The Equipment Plan 2016 National Security and Capability Review (NSCR) Telegraph NSCR


78 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Brexit and the UK-US Intelligence Relationship n The Progress of the UKs Negotiations on EU Withdrawal: December 2017 to March 2018 Financial Times Guardian Economist The Indispensable Ally? US, NATO and UK Defence Relations, HC 387, Oral Evidence Taken Before the Defence Committee of the House of Commons Survival The United Kingdoms Contribution to European Security and Defence


SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS Wither 79 in areas within the European Courts competence, which include data sharing and aspects of law enforcement cooperation. 35 Britain has played a prime role in counterterrorism intelligence as the Europol and Schengen Information Systems, as well as judicial cooperation through Eurojust and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 36 During Brexit, the United Kingdom has to negotiate new arrangements for these agencies, possibly through bilateral sharing agreements such as those that already exist for Australia and the United States in the case of Europol. But there is no precedent for a non-EU country to have the same privileged access to the Europol Information System as a member state, and the legislative framework for the EAW exists under ECJ jurisdiction that the United Kingdom will leave. In February 2018, May called for a new security treaty with the European Union and offered concessions on the jurisdiction of the ECJ, but the EU leaders response was lukewarm. 37 Assessing the effect of these developments on Britains special intelligence partnership with the US is hard. At the bilateral level, the probably force the United States to forge closer intelligence relationships with other European allies, such as Germany. 38 President Barack Obamas administration lobbied hard for Britain to remain in the European Union. Previous US governments were equally supportive of Britains full participation in Europe. From an American perspective, the United Kingdom has represented an Atlanticist voice in the European Union, being an advocate of policies aligned with those of the United States, including free trade, EU enlargement, and cooperation on foreign, security, and defense issues. 39 The United Kingdom, for example, worked hard to persuade the European Union to adopt sanctions against Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Russia. diminishes Britains value as a strategic partner. 40 Ivo H. Daalder, a forAmerican diplomacy as the United States would have to work harder 35 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report 2016 HC 655 (London: HM Government, 2017), 59. 36 David Omand, Keeping Europe Safe: Counterterrorism for the Continent, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2016): 92. 37 David Bond and Guy Chazan, May Calls for UK-EU Security Treaty, Financial Times February 17, 2018. 38 Calder Walton, Little Britain: Brexit and the UK-US Special Intelligence Relationship, Belfer Center, August 10, 2016, /little-britain-brexit-and-uk-us-special-intelligence-relationship. 39 Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US-EU and US-UK Relationships, International Affairs 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 554, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12606; and Wyn Rees, America, Brexit and the Security of Europe, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3 (2017): 558. 40 Howard LaFranchi, How Brexit Could Transform Americas Special Relationship with Britain, Christian Science Monitor June 22, 2016; and Matt Spetalnick and Yara Bayoumy, Brexit Threatens to Undermine US-Britain Special Relationship, Reuters, June 24, 2016.


80 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 42 44 Financial Times Tribune-Review New York Times Deutsche Welle CSS Analyses in Security Policy Survival


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Wither 81 Brexit and Nuclear Weapons Dreadnought National Security Relations with France after Brexit Known Unknowns: EU Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy after Brexit, Telegraph Indispensable Ally


82 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Washington Post Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: Could the UKs Nuclear Force be Moved after Scottish Independence? The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating TridentDays or Decades? Guardian Telegraph


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Wither 83 Conclusions Economist Janes Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor


84 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Brexit and Transatlantic Security2018 Arthur I. Cyr T


86 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Economist 2 Economist


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Cyr 87 4 British Roles Guardian Telegraph Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960


88 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Transatlantic Trends Britain: Uneasy Ally Britain and the U.S.A Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance: The Special Relationship on the Rocks


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Cyr 89 The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War The Long War: A New History of National Security Policy since World War II


90 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Washington Post Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War From the Shadows Wall Street Journal Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Cyr 91 Ways Ahead for the Special Relationship


92 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Iraq Study Group The Iraq Study Group Report The Chilcot Report: Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary




SPECIAL RELATIONsSHIPsS US Landpower and an Indo-American AllianceSamir Tata Samir Tata Mr. Samir Tata, the founder of International Political Risk Analytics based in Reston, Virginia, previously served as an intelligence analyst with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a staff assistant to Senator Dianne Feinstein, and a research associate with Middle East Institute, Atlantic Council and National Defense University.ABSTRACT: This article explores the importance of US landpower and an Indo-American alliance to the growing challenge of Chinas pursuit of hegemony over Asia.Landpower is now rarely thought of as the core of American military might. Current US strategic doctrine emphasizes the primacy of maritime and airpower.1 In a pivotal speech to the cadets at the United States Military Academy on February 25, 2011, thenSecretary of Defense Robert M. Gates declared, Looking ahead . the Army must also confront the reality that the most plausible high-end scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. Indeed, to drive home the point, Gates asserted any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or in the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined as General [Douglas] MacArthur so delicately put it. n 2Yet the Middle Kingdom, a quintessential landpower seeking to become Asias hegemon, is systematically shifting the strategic calculus in its favor via its audacious Silk Road initiative unveiled by President Xi Jinping on September 7, 2013. Thus, the only realistic option to keep the dragon at bay might be to overcome the inhibitions of current doctrinal orthodoxy and forge a strategic alliance with India with landpower as the military centerpiece.3Advantages of Facing the Dragon TogetherA mutual defense treaty between the United States and India initiated by China. Hypothetically speaking, such a treaty would not cover territories over which India has asserted sovereignty but does not exercise administrative control: Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Baltistan, and Aksai Chin. Also, the pact would not cover US activities in Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand, which are addressed through separate bilateral security agreements. Accordingly, the proposed bilateral arrangement between India and America would 1 US Department of Defense (DoD), Air-Sea Battle (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle 2 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense Speech (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 25, 2011). 3 President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, September 7, 2013.


96 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018be consistent with the existing US hub-and-spoke security architecture for Asia. Moreover, the explicit inclusion of the military option would mirror the strong security commitment incorporated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreement. Accordingly, the operative part of the treaty might be formulated as follows:In the event of an armed attack by the Peoples Republic of China against the Republic of India or the United States of America in any area under Indian or American administration or international waters or airspace in both India and the United States, and consequently both parties agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other party, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore peace and security.According to Central Intelligence Agency statistics for 2017, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of India, $9.4 trillion, and the United States, $19.4 trillion, amounted to $28.8 trillion, a comfortable margin over Chinas GDP of $23.1. The combined population of 1.6 billion people for India, 1.3 billion people, and the United States, 0.3 billion people, was also greater than Chinas 1.4 billion people during the period.4 As per a recent estimate, the combined active military force of an Indo-American alliance would be 2.7 million servicemembers, with both countries contributing about equally. In comparison, Chinas standing military force is 2.2 million active duty personnel.5By 2037, according to projections prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the US Department of Energy, such an alliance would have an aggregate GDP of $48.6 trillion (India $22.4 trillion and US $26.2 trillion), while Chinas GDP would remain slightly smaller at $47.4 trillion.6 Moreover, the Indian and US economies will be approaching parity by 2037 as Indias GDP will be about 85 percent of Americas GDP. By then, the total population of the alliance would be about 2 billion people (India 1.6 billion and the population which will have plateaued at 1.4 billion people.7 and qualitative edge, will be able to threaten Chinas energy security by cutting off the countrys access to oil and gas imports transported by oceangoing tankers or land-based pipelines. Indias 2,659 kilometer northern border with China, which stretches from the Kashmir region in the northwest to the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast, provides a unique, albeit geographically challenging, pathway for an air attack and land invasion of Chinas western Xinjiang province, the terminus for energy pipelines from Central Asia (and planned pipelines 4 The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed April 9, 2018, https://www.cia .gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 5 018 Military Strength Ranking, Global Firepower, accessed April 24, 2018, http://www 6 International Energy Outlook 2017, Table: World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Region Expressed in Purchasing Power Parity, 2015, US Energy Information Administration, accessed April 9, 2018. 7 International Energy Outlook 2017, Table: World Population by Region, 2015, US Energy Information Administration, accessed April 9, 2018.


SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Tata 97 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2017

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98 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 An Indian Perspective

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SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Tata 99 n Resurgent India

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100 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Can India Pivot to an Alliance with America? 22 24 Washington Quarterly Asia Policy Hindu The Wire

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102 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n n Gandhis Emissary Resurgent India

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SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Tata 103 National Security Strategy of the United States of America Annual Report to Congress the Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

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104 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 n An Alternative Strategic Calculus? National Security Strategy of the United States of America

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SPECIAL RRELATIONsSHIPsS Tata 105 Implications for US Landpower

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106 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 42 Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and Reappointment To Be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services

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T Emory Upton: Misunderstood Reformer The Life and Letters of Emory Upton Journal of Military History REVIEW ESSAY Emory Upton and the US Army War College. Books Reviewed Emory Upton: Misunderstood Reformer Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton: Volume 1, 1857 Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton: Volume 2, 1875

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108 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018en-USBy David J. Fitzpatrick, en-USEmory Upton: en-US Misunderstood Reformeren-US (Norman: en-US University of Oklahoma Press, 2017),en-US en-US 344 pages, $39.95 en-USen-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US

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REVIEW ESSAY Jussel 109 Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton Edited by Salvatore G. Cilella Jr., Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton: Volume 1, 1857 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2017), 406 pages, $58.00

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110 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018Edited by Salvatore G. Cilella Jr., Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton: Volume 2, 1875 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2017), 67 pages, $58.00 en-USen-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US en-US

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CCOMMENTARY AND RREPLY On The War in Russias Hybrid Warfare This commentary responds to Andrew Monaghans article: The War in Russias Hybrid Warfare published in the Winter 2015 issue of Parameters (vol. 45, no. 4).A mobilizatsiya (strategicheskoe sderzhivanie).

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112 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018The Author RepliesM strategicheskoe sderzhivanie strategicheskoe sderzhivanie ustrasheniye sderzhivanie ustrasheniye

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The Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster: By C. Richard NelsonReviewed by Charles D. Allen, professor of leadership and cultural studies, US Army War CollegeThe Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster Unsung Hero: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster BIOGRAPHIEsS Lanham, MD: Rowman & 300 pages $45.00

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114 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 US Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer

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Book Reviews: Biographies 115 Our Year of War: Two Brothers, Vietnam, and a Divided Nation By Daniel P. BolgerReviewed by Mike Perry, Executive Director, Army Heritage Center FoundationL of Our Year of War: Two Brothers, Vietnam, and a Divided Nation Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2017 368 pages $17.99

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Book Reviews: Armed Forces and Society 117 AARMED FFORCEsS AND SOCIETY Inclusion in the American Military: A Force for Diversity Edited by David E. Rohall, Morten G. Ender, and Michael D. MatthewsReviewed by Jacqueline E. Whitt, author of Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War and associate professor of strategy, US Army War CollegeT Inclusion in the American Military: A Force for Diversity Inclusion Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2017 230 pages $95.00

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Book Reviews: Armed Forces and Society 119Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to Condemnation of a Weapon of War By Kerry F. CrawfordReviewed by Dr. Patricia M. Shields, professor, Texas State UniversityF Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to Condemnation of a Weapon of War Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017 224 pages $89.95

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120 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Wartime Sexual Violence

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Book Reviews: Strategy 121 STRATEGY Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower Edited by Richard J. Bailey Jr., James W. Forsyth Jr., and Mark O. YeisleyReviewed by Thomas Moriarty, professor, American UniversityR Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower Strategy Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016 288 pages $39.95

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122 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Power By Eliot A. CohenReviewed by Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies InstituteT The Big Stick New York: Basic, 2017 304 pages $11.99

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Book Reviews: Strategy 123

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124 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018Strategic Theories By Admiral Raoul CastexReviewed by Dr. Lukas Milevski, Baltic Sea Fellow in the Eurasia Program at Foreign Policy Research InstituteA le stratge inconnu Thories Stratgiques Strategic Theories Strategic Theories Strategic Theories Thories Stratgiques manoeuvre stratgie gnrale manoeuvre stratgie gnrale manoeuvre manoeuvre Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017 494 pages $29.95

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Book Reviews: Strategy 125 perturbateur perturbateur perturbateur stratgie gnrale

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126 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 DDEFENsSE STUDIEsS Organized Violence after Civil War: The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America By Sarah Zukerman DalyReviewed by Dr. R. Evan Ellis, research professor for Latin America and the Caribbean for the US Army War College, Strategic Studies InstituteI New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016 344 pages $31.99

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128 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Organized Violence after Civil Wars Americas Digital Army: Games at Work and War By Robertson AllenReviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War CollegeW Americas Army Army Game Project Americas Army Americas Army ( AA Army Game Project is Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017 228 pages $65.00

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Book Reviews: Defense Studies 129 Americas Army Americas Army Real Heroes Americas Army AA: Proving Grounds AA Comic Americas Army Americas Army

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130 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 Americas Army Humanitarian Economics: War, Disaster, and the Global Aid Market By Gilles CarbonnierReviewed by Jill Russell, teaching fellow, Defence Studies Department, Kings College LondonW Primus inter pares London: Oxford University Press, 2015 224 pages $37.50

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Book Reviews: Defense Studies 131 On War Parameters

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132 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 International Law and New Wars By Christine Chinkin and Mary KaldorReviewed by Cornelia Weiss, a colonel in the US Air Force Judge Advocate Reserve CorpsC International Law and New Wars International Law and New Wars International Law and New Wars New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017 608 pages $39.99

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Book Reviews: Defense Studies 133 International Law and New Wars International Law and New Wars The History of the Peloponnesian War International Law and New Wars On War On War Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898 Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M UniversityR Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015 344 pages $104.95

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Book Reviews: Defense Studies 135 not not a American hegemon International Organization American Political Science Review American Journal of Political Science Journal of Politics

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136 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018 MMILITARY HHIsSTORY By Brian McAllister LinnReviewed by Stephen G. Harlan, faculty instructor, Department of Distance Education, US Army War CollegeT Elviss Army: Cold War GIs Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016 464 pages $29.95

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Book Reviews : Military History responses to the change in technical training. Linn provides a no-holdsbarred assessment of US Army chiefs of staff General Matthew Ridgway and General Maxwell Taylor as they introduced training doctrine aimed Leadership promoted a resurgence of public relations to tell the army story and narrow the growing civil-military divide. Linns statement that was unable to agree on an organizational vision resonates today. appreciation of the effects of such a divide. The emerging popular culture, usurped by expanding commercial advertising, connected soldiers with the American public more readily than during the war years. However, the army was unable to co-opt 1950s advertising to pique the interest of recruits prequalifying for the skills necessary for the nuclear army. Scholarly history of the army often overlooks what the casual reader considers mundane and dull as compared to the perceived excitement (2009), Linn provides a well-researched, focused study of the armys peacetime personality crisis at a time of stiff peer competition from the Soviet Union. As a son and nephew of Elvis-era airmen, soldier and sailor draftees, this reviewer appreciated Linns important study on civilians during the Vietnam War years. The themes and narrative arc of continue to resonate today. Military and policy senior and midlevel strategists should include it in their bookshelves. Vietnamization, 1968 By Kevin Boylan Reviewed by J. P. Harris, Senior lecturer in war studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst K is obviously a serious piece of scholarship based on detailed primary reviewers knowledge) in any other published work. Therefore anyone attempting to build a library that covers this war in a comprehensive way parts of South Vietnam at particular periods of the war before it will be appropriate for anyone to attempt yet another single volume history of his militant partisanship for a particular faction among American historians is proclaimed in the introduction, referred to in the main Lawrence, KS: University

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Parameters war in its own right in which members of the orthodox school are locked in combat with their enemies, the revisionists. The orthodox Vietnam was misguided, futile, and from the outset doomed to defeat. The revisionists, by contrast, see some sense in what the American intervention was intended to achieve and suggest another outcome was some variety of views among the revisionists and concedes there are positions. He makes it clear, however, that his personal foxhole is deeply dug on the side of orthodoxy; his monographs a powerful intellectual weapon supporting that creed. to the pursuit of a mature and balanced historical understanding and is greatly to be deprecated. An introduction normally offers an account of the inception of a evidence reinforcing the position that the war was, from the American a remark made towards the end of the introduction that the intention to discredit the concept of population-centric counterinsurgency was nave and old-fashioned view, but should not historians try to keep an open mind when they begin research, allowing the evidence to take an approach, but the tone of the introduction, and much of the rest of the book, suggests otherwise. largest and most populous provinces in South Vietnam, lying in a crucial geographical position between the central highlands and the coast. Until 1968 it was just about the most completely CommunistThe destruction or withdrawal of Communist main force units as a which supported South Vietnamese provincial and locally-based troops. He goes on to contend that such failures were the underlying realities across South Vietnam. and logistical apparatus, the Viet Cong infrastructure, survived in bury evidence that might be used against other aspects of his case.

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Book Reviews : Military History in 19691971 seems to have been done by men from North Vietnam. While South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces were generally Dinhs civilian population. Determined to show they were still a force, the Communists lashed out with indiscriminate terrorism indicative of desperation if not of panic. Studies of other provinces (most notably Jeffrey Races on Long An) show that locally-based South Vietnamese government forces became Party in Long An was in a very weak position; the success or failure of the Communist cause in the South depended almost entirely on the on that side. Yes, facing the massive Communist offensive of 1972, South Vietnamese government troops needed massive US air support to hold their own, but US ground troops had practically never done From the beginning of 1973, American air support ceased. The war did not. Progressively abandoned by their erstwhile allies, the South Vietnamese armed forces fought on for another twenty-eight months, an interval considerably longer than that separating Chancellorsville from Appomattox and slightly exceeding that separating the end of the Vietnamese government forces lost over 50,000 dead in addition to the anti-Communist side it was surely because the American political system, and the American public, could not sustain the will to support the southern state, not because the people of South Vietnam had an underlying collective desire for a Communist government. Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of Americas Special Operations Forces By Mark Moyar Reviewed by Rebecca Jensen, PhD candidate, University of Calgary, dissertation fellow at Marine Corps University S ince September 11, 2001, the budget for special operations forces has increased eightfold. These forces are used in an increasing range of theaters, are considered without equal tactically, and have the capacity to underpin a new strategy for advancing American interests. Despite the origins, evolution, and future of these forces. Mark Moyars Oppose Any Foe who has published on military operations and Special Forces in the which allows him to bring both a command of the literature and theory

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Parameters and contact with the world of practitioners, to this work. The result often complex and ambiguous relationship with policymakers and other elements of the military, and a look at the challenges and opportunities As Moyar acknowledges, while many books have been written on a hagiographic tone and do not attempt to synthesize these individual components of the story into a synopsis that examines broad trends, commonalities, and differences between services, missions, and time Oppose Any Foe traces the development, employment, and often subsequent disbanding of pattern, he points out, is of mixed operational success, with victories saw in well-publicized and successful missions a potential challenge to their autonomy, identity, and resources. warfare, in Moyars telling. From its earliest days, it clashed with the complementing each other, in wars from the Korean peninsula until supporting the Northern Alliance in expelling, or at least marginalizing, the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, counts as a great success in the wars fought there, even if it was not matched by efforts against al-Qaeda near Pakistan in the east. The initial phases of the war in Afghanistan, in which both special and conventional forces achieved great operational success, set the stage for yet more bureaucratic wrangling for personnel, resources, and assignments. Afghanistan, following the publication of Field A widely dispersed presence throughout the theaterin which small units would patrol, live amongst the locals, and establish rapport while providing security wherever possiblecalled for extensive involvement of conventional forces, who often used skills outside those they had mastered in training. These efforts were complemented by the industrial counterterrorism pioneered by General Stanley McChrystal, in which the tempo of operations increased by an order of magnitude, and networks of insurgents were often rolled up before any members were aware that this combination, of retail counterinsurgency throughout the country strategy; nor that it was one that saw great success in its initial phases.

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Book Reviews : Military History At this point, however, Moyar moves to perhaps the most innovative and valuable section of his argument. The acclamation, and adulation, (and occasional formal) codes against publicizing their work. This hubris came to be mirrored, to some extent, by the most senior leaders them from criticism or scrutiny in Washington, DC. Congress ultimately set up the infrastructure to become a de facto separate service. Additionally, the increased emphasis on direct action, raids, and a rapid tempo of deployment, in addition to creating tremendous strain on security force assistance, the training and mentoring of local forces in support of American strategic goals. Such missions require deep knowledge of language and culture, and the establishment of lasting much publicity and admiration since 2001. the broader military community, complementing their efforts rather than competing with them, and working under combatant commanders and and invests in different and often more extensive and costly training, while harmonizing operations and administration with those of the conventional forces of all services. This integration is not likely to succeed, Moyar cautions, without a better understanding of the history, Creating Japans Ground Self-Defense Force, 1945: A Sword Well Made By David Hunter-Chester Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science at the University of Miami D treatment on the development of the Japanese Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF), which like Voldemort, cannot be called by its true name: an army. Drawing on a wide range of sources in English and Japanese, Hunter-Chester guides the reader through the protracted debates that resulted in Article Nine of the Japanese constitution in which the nation renounced not only war but the means to prosecute the author makes clear that there were differences of opinion among the Americans involved in the process on how extreme disarmament should be. As the Cold War between the United States and its former Lanham, MD: Lexington,

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Parameters that a perpetually unarmed Japan, far from assuring peace, would instead undermine international security, began to seem more realistic. The central focus of this important work. only light infantry weapons, the National Police Reserve (NPR) was renamed the National Safety Force two years later, with its current name of the reserve was referred to as mister or superintendent rather than general. To avoid the standard term for soldier, gunjin enlistees were referred to as taiin kanbu meaning Japanese Army, nor should they too closely resemble those of the humanitarian disaster response efforts, lest there be a public backlash. Deftly interweaving an institutional history of the GSDF with policy issues, the author details the tremendous obstacles that impeded the development of the force. Domestic resistance stemmed partly from revulsion against the militarist regime that had brought such destruction on Japan and partly for economic reasons. We see American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging a recalcitrant Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to rearm, with Yoshida arguing that doing so would impede his countrys efforts to rebuild its damaged infrastructure as well as arouse both internal and foreign concerns. Who won may be inferred from the emergence of the Yoshida Doctrine, under which Japan would focus on economic development while the United States would be the guarantor of its security. The doctrine shaped defense policy for decades to come, as American pressure, euphemistically referred to as gaiatsu or foreign pressure, nudged successive governments forward in what might be gaiatsu to rationalize what they wanted to do anyway. Each attempt to expand GSDF functions met great internal resistance, with the most violent being the Anpo riots of 1960 in which otherwise loosely connected leftist forces came together to protest the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. At the same time, a countertrend grew with the of internationally acclaimed author Mishima Yukio, in protest against out, the GSDFs rejection of Mishimas call for it to conduct a coup to restore Japans pride had the opposite result: members pledged to serve the civilian government held fast and demonstrated that a coup was unthinkable. The 1990s proved a tenkanten or turning point, with the combination of a strong prime minister elected in 2001, Koizumi Junichiro, international rising perceptions of danger from North Korean nuclear proliferation as well as the rise of China as both an economic and military threat. Even so, there was resistance: when, in 1992, the Koizumi government

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Book Reviews : Military History submitted a bill allowing the Japanese to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations to the Diet, members of the opposing Japan that involved painfully slow walking into the legislative chamber in and a public backlash punishing the party in the next election. Hunter-Chester places the GSDFs search for identity in the larger context of Japans identity as a nation. A chapter subtitled Reimagining notes, every society needs heroes, and the image of the military in these constitution; at the end, Godzilla is, of course, slain. Although the hero to be a cinematic validation of the GSDF as a whole. modern force now largely accepted by society and even valued for its humanitarian assistance work. Still, barriers to its participation in combat remain and are unlikely to be changed by any event short of a catastrophe. Current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has moved the process forward, albeit slowly, in the face of popular resistance. Though he does not explicitly say so, Hunter-Chester seems optimistic that it will eventually get there, hopefully without the impetus of a major catastrophe. to all those concerned with Americas most important ally. While somewhat peripheral to the authors concern, some discussion of how Japans neighbors viewed the gradual moves toward rearmament would have been useful. This reviewer hopes that Hunter-Chesters publisher will consider a paperback version of the book, since the high price of the hardback may discourage those who should read it. Combined Operations: A Global History of Amphibious and Airborne Warfare By Jeremy Black Reviewed by Robert Bateman, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and former of Defense A number is more than 100, with twenty of them appearing in just the past historian, it is essentially unmatched. Yet such efforts do come with a cost. Usually that is in accuracy, though not in this one, nor to be fair, in most of his works. True, in Combined Operations Washington, DC: Rowman

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Parameters minor, and only specialists will pick up on them. No, here the problem, if one is to call it such, is that for all intents and purposes this book lacks a thesis. Now that does not necessarily mean that the work is without value. to cover the stated topic, encompassing some 3,000 years of history in meaning, or even perhaps some guiding principles extracted from the skeletal framework. This is a recitation. gives one an indication of why this may be. Last year he published Naval as well as Air Power: A Global History These two books, obviously, rely upon the same batch of research that Combined Operations there is at least the slightest thematic twist to make it nominally a separate work. The endnotes also tell part of the story in that his sources for the Ancient period through the 1700s are almost exclusively secondary, a survey of the extant literature. Not until he enters the period in which he started his own scholarship does he begin to use primary sources, and those are All of this means Combined Operations is little more than a reference. utility for those deeply steeped in history because a literature survey can be a wonderfully useful thing. Though there is no bibliography (a curious omission), one can extract volumes from the endnotes. Still, even for the period in which he is an acknowledged primary consider the example of combined operationswhich means more than one service by his formulation and joint to todays American militarythat recounts General James Wolfes multiple landings and eventually successful assault upon Quebec in 1759. Wolfe died, as did his Similarly looking at the massive littoral and riverine operations of the American Civil Wararguably the largest combined operations period of the entire nineteenth century, and the War of 1812included, gets a whopping two pages. This is wrong. More than 300,000 men, at sea and on land, in combined operations from 1861 to 1865 are dismissed in two The best history helps us understand. This principle applies to all areas of history, though usually it is delayed and muted in effect by direct and obvious utility for professionals.

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Book Reviews : Military History There is a horrid tendency among historians writing reviews to things he chooses to cover, and for future scholars it brings together this is an area where a professional needs to study then this book is the obvious starting point, as it marks the trail for where one might go for a deeper understanding. American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil By Conrad Crane Reviewed by Jeremy Black, professor of history at Exeter University A n effective study when it came out in 1993, is an excellent where aircraft turned out to be of great tactical, operational and strategic helps to shift attention from the bombing of civilians as well as ensure crucial for bombing surface and submarine targets at sea. Crane, by focusing on strategic bombing on land, however, becomes far more concerned about issues of morality, and they come to play a major role in his discussion of effectiveness. This aspect is particularly seen in the chapters on Strategic Airpower in Limited Wars and on Legacies, but the issues of effectiveness and morality in effect cover casualties is of limited applicability, and this is especially so if the issue of indirect casualties is considered. notably so, as the power employing such airpower was not similarly from German apologists, ensured there was a degree of symmetry, and practice, that Allied bombing often involved more precision. The situation subsequently has been different, which makes the North Korean acquisition of long-range missiles of interest. Despite the limited for subsequent discussion, as well as the intellectual, legal, emotional, and visual understanding of air warfare. This element was particularly the role of missiles was underplayed, ensuring subsequent shifts in the Lawrence: University Press

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Parameters relationship between bombers and missiles were not approached in an appropriate contexts. Nine Days in May: The Battles of the 4th Infantry Division on the Cambodian Border, 1967 By Warren K. Wilkins Reviewed by Dr. Kevin M. Boylan, history instructor at Emmanuel College T he late Russell Weigley once observed that although combat is the an odd aversion to writing about it. This remains true today, and battle histories that delve into the gory details of tactical engagements are still generally written by veterans, journalists, or amateur historians; often aim at the popular market; and frequently lack objectivity and scholarly rigor. is an example of the genre at its best. The book is exhaustively researched (drawing upon Vietnamese language publications, archival documents, and interviews with dozens of American veterans), well-written, and conveys all the brutality, confusion, and terror of close quarters combat while maintaining its objectivity and scholarly tone. battles in the wilds along the Cambodian border in South Vietnams strategic central highlands. General William C. Westmoreland, the top US commander in Vietnam, sought to keep the NVA as far as possible the lowlands by drawing American troops away from them. Since two border found themselves outnumbered when they ran into the 32nd and 66th NVA Regiments. Another brigade shifted into the highlands, but its battalions were fed in one at a time, and at no point were there more American battalions operated at only two-thirds strength. is organized into three parts, each of which because they were still manned predominantly by originals (i.e., yet seen action against NVA regulars and found them much tougher opponents than the Vietcong they had encountered in the coastal plains. As one veteran put it, We bumped into Mr. Charles in the Highlands, instead of Charlie (295). Francis Marion are gripping, graphic, and highly revealing. For his Norman: University of

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Book Reviews : Military History minute-by-minute dissection of these engagements shows that while the US battalions were cohesive, well-trained, and generally well-led, remote area of operations. They were thus consistently taken by surprise, They were also handicapped by their reliance upon helicopters for resupply and reinforcement, even though landing zones were rare in the border sanctuaries. Since the Johnson administration refused to admit publicly that NVA were operating in Cambodia, absurdly restrictive characterizes Francis Marion as a victory because the enemy suffered disproportionately heavy casualties, as Westmoreland intended, and a planned NVA offensive in the central highlands was forestalled. However, he notes that General Chu Huy Man had also achieved a primary objective by pulling US formations away from the plains, and observes that American casualties were so numerous that the original Marion was a sterile victory because its outcome did little to alter the strategic stalemate in the central highlands. While is good narrative microhistory, analytical issues do not always get the attention they deserve. For instance, he does not delve into the reasons why NVA infantry units were superior Degtyaryova (RPD) machine guns at the squad level while American mentioned. Nor is the vast superiority of the ubiquitous NVA rocketpropelled grenade launchers over the disposable, short-ranged US light antitank weapon. Wilkins also does not explore how the NVA managed 120mm models, when American units found them too cumbersome to carry. Some key macrolevel topics are also given short shrift. For example, Lieutenant General William R. Peers, intended to employ a defense in depth, engaging NVA regulars only after they had penetrated some distance inside South Vietnam and no longer had easy access to their Cambodian sanctuaries. Later he explains that Peers was overruled by his superior, General Stanley R. Larsen, who insisted that the NVA be hit as close to the border as possible. Yet Wilkins never really reaches any if Larsen deserves to be condemned for the heavy losses Peerss troops suffered there. is, nonetheless, a riveting battle narrative that graphically illustrates the cruel realities of how search-and-destroy operations targeting NVA regulars functioned at the tactical level. Since virtually every engagement of note fought during Francis Marion was

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Parameters enemy initiated, Wilkins also demonstrates the futility of Westmorelands efforts to destroy Communist regular units through attrition. None of the May 1967 battles would have occurred if the 1st NVA Division had not wanted them to. My Enemys Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the American Withdrawal By Avinash Paliwal Reviewed by Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana University T however, has been recognized as one of the most effective. Nevertheless in the country strictly to developmental assistance. Americas reluctance unwillingness to rein in support for the Afghani Taliban in the waning Avinash Paliwals book deftly demonstrates, contrary to Pakistans more substantial security presence in Afghanistan. The lack of a consensus stems from the existence of policy coalitions with divergent views within coalitions, for analytic purposes, can be divided into two distinct groups: partisans and conciliators. Partisans wish to pursue a more aggressive set of policies toward Pakistan and are not chary about using Afghanistan as a staging ground for these efforts. Conciliators, on the other hand, are reluctant, if not opposed, to such strategies and would prefer simply to work with Afghanistan to develop friendly bilateral ties. defense, and foreign policy bureaucracies. Proclivities aside, their ability to pursue particular strategies have been either boosted up or hemmed in based upon the preferences of particular prime ministers who have sought to impose their will. The strength of these coalitions, he shows, have waxed and waned and counterintuitive leitmotif, however, that clearly emerges from his refrained from imposing costs on Pakistan even when opportunities have presented themselves. Such self-abnegating choices clearly run counter Oxford, UK: Oxford

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Book Reviews : Military History to the popular assumption that anti-Pakistani animus has consistently on the basis of both political conviction and circumstance eschewed opportunities to create havoc in Pakistan using Afghanistan as a proxy. Paliwal, who has a granular knowledge of the complexities of Afghanistans history and recent domestic politics, also shows the coherent policies because of the existence of a range of political factions faction or group has often risked alienating others. During the time to face this problem in a particular acute fashion. short of Pakistans lurid claims but is nevertheless not entirely untrue. Pashtun separatist movements within the country these have proven to be the logical venues for exploitation. Paliwal also shows how an abiding concern about Pakistani support Afghanistan on particular occasions. For example, despite reservations about the mujahideen led government after the fall of Najibullah, New Delhi chose to reach out to the new dispensation in Kabul. This decision, in considerable part, stemmed from New Delhis concern that Pakistan would exploit the emergence of the mujahideen regime to stir further discord in Kashmir. and reportage and its organization combine to make it a substantial state. Given the paucity of scholarly analysis of this subject Paliwals book constitutes a most useful step in addressing a crucial lacuna in the extant literature.

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150 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018Indias Wars: A Military History, 1947 By Arjun SubramaniamReviewed by Dr. Patrick K. Bratton, associate professor of national security strategy at the US Army War CollegeW Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017 576 pages $40.00

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154 Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018Book Review SubmissionsParameters

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VOL. 48 NO. 1 SPRING 2018 Contemporary Strategy & LandpowerVOL. 48 NO. 1 SPRING 2018 PARAMETERS (USPS 413530) US Army War College ATTN: Parameters 47 Ashburn Drive Carlisle, PA 17013-5010 Periodicals Postage Paid FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT The Quarterly The US Army War College Special CommentaryLinell A. Letendre and Martin L. CookIllusions of VictoryRussell W. Glenn Dominic Tierney21st Century Political WarfareJames P. Farwell Timothy P. McGeehan T. S. Allen and A. J. MooreSpecial RelationshipsJames K. Wither Arthur I. Cyr Samir Tata