Contemporary Strategy & Landpower Asia Pacific: Reassessing ChinaDavid Lai Thomas M. Kane Timothy L. Thomas Christopher Bowen JohnstonMiddle East: Defeating the Islamic StateHuba Wass de Czege Paul Rexton KanA War Examined: Gaza 2014Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht Glenn E. RobinsonCivil-Military Relations & Military EthicsThomas Crosbie David L. PerrySpecial Commentary: Considering Why We LostTami Davis Biddle VOL. 44 NO. 4 WINTER 2014-15
Disclaimer: Parameters Parameters Editorial Board MembersEmeritusSecretary of the Army, Commandant, Editor, Managing Editor, Assistant Editor,
Vol. 44 No. 4 Winter 2014-15 FEATURES Special Commentary7 Considering Why We LostTami Davis Biddle How Should the Army Deal with Unpopular Wars? 11 Chinas Strategic Moves and Counter-MovesDavid Lai Understanding Sino-American Relations27 Chinas Power Projection CapabilitiesThomas M. Kane Appreciating the Reach of Beijings Policy39 Chinas Concept of Military StrategyTimothy L. Thomas Exploring First Principles49 Chinas Military MercantilismChristopher Bowen Johnston Chinas Maritime Adventurism Middle East63 Defeating the Islamic State: Commentary on a Core StrategyHuba Wass de Czege What Should a Core Strategy Look Like?71 Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military StrategyPaul Rexton Kan Exploiting the Criminal Side of ISIS A War Examined81 Gaza 2014: Israels Attrition vs Hamas ExhaustionEitan Shamir and Eado Hecht Weighing Strategys Physical and Psychological Dimensions91 Gaza 2014: Hamas Strategic CalculusGlenn E. Robinson The Strategic Logic of Hamas Military Grammar Civil-Military Relations & Military Ethics105 The US Armys Domestic Strategy 1945-1965Thomas Crosbie Strategic Communications for the Army Mercy-Killings Be Allowed?David L. Perry Ethical & Legal Questions Review Essay135 American Declinism: A Review of Recent LiteratureMichael Daniels Is America Really in Decline?
2 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 DEPARTMENTS 5 From the Editor 195 Article Index, Vol. 44, 2014 141 Commentaries and Replies 141 On Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISISChristopher J. Bolan David S. Sorenson Responds145 On Reforming the Afghan Security ForcesTodd Greentree Daniel Glickstein Responds149 Book ReviewsStrategy & Policy in the Middle East149 Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle EastBy William C. Taylor Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill151 Americas Challenges in the Greater Middle East: The Obama Administrations PoliciesEdited by Shahram Akbarzadeh Reviewed by Robert E. FriedenbergStrategy & Nuclear War154 The Permanent Crisis: Irans Nuclear TrajectoryBy Shashank Joshi Reviewed by Christopher J. Bolan155 On Limited Nuclear War In the 21st CenturyEdited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner Reviewed by Rebecca Davis Gibbons157 Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate WeaponEdited by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes Reviewed by Bradley A. Thayer158 Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and NonproliferationBy Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. Von Hippel Reviewed by Ward WilsonMilitary Ethics161 The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical By Pauline M. Kaurin Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers162 The Morality of Private War. The Challenge of Private Military and Security CompaniesBy James Pattison Reviewed by Birthe Anders164 The Ethics of Interrogation: Professional Responsibility in an Age of TerrorBy Paul Lauritzen Reviewed by Douglas A. Pryer166 A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American RevolutionBy Daniel Krebs Reviewed by Jason W. WarrenWar & The State169 Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence Reviewed by Janeen Klinger170 State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011By Paul A.C. Koistinen Reviewed by Isaiah Ike Wilson III
Content 3 172 Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutio ns of Interstate ViolenceBy Patricia A. Weitsman Reviewed by Russ BurgosInsurgency & Counterinsurgency175 The Thai Way o f CounterinsurgencyBy Jeffrey Moore Reviewed by Marina Miron176 Cross-Cultural Competence For A TwentyFirst -Century Military: Culture, the Flipside of COINEdited by Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands Reviewed by Robert M. Mundell178 The Taliban: Afghanistans Most Lethal InsurgentsBy Mark Silinsky Reviewed by Yaniv Barzilai179 Adapting to Win: Ho w Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign StatesBy Noriyuki Katagiri Reviewed by Robert J. BunkerWar & Technology182 Napalm: An American Biogr aphyBy Robert M. Neer Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker184 Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American ExperienceBy Robert C. Owen Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell185 The Unseen War: Allied Airpo wer and the Takedown of Saddam HusseinBy Benjamin S. Lambeth Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane187 From Above: War, Violence, and VerticalityEdited by Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. Williams Reviewed by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.The First & Second World Wars190 Challenge of Battle: The R eal Story of the British Army in 1914 By Adrian Gilbert Reviewed by Douglas V. Mastriano191 Montys Men: The British Army and the Liber ation of Europe By John Buckley Reviewed by James D. Scudieri
From the EditorOur Winter issue opens with a Special Commentary, Considering Why We Lost, by Tami Biddle. As she examines LTG (Ret.) Daniel Bolgers argument in his sharply critical book, Why We Lost: A Generals Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, she also considers what it means to say we lost, and how that verdict might have been avoided. uses the ancient game Go ing. Christopher Johnstons Chinas Military Merchantilism argues between Chinas merchantilism and its military planning. crisis in the Middle East over how to deal with the radical militant ritorial control and reach. every war and, even with revolutionary advances in medicine, will likely
ABSTRA CT Why We LostD Why We Lost, mea culpa Dragons at War Why We Lost SPECIAL COMMENTARY Considering Why We Lost Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare
8 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Counterinsurgency jus in bello
SPECIAL COMMENTARY Biddle 9 jus post bellum
10 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15
ABSTRaA CT : This article employs two analytical frameworks to put the Go ASIaA-PaACIFIC Chinas Strategic Moves and Counter-Moves T1 Go Wall Street Journal Foreign Policy Washington Post Japan Times Singapore CNN
12 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Go 2 3 4 Go offers a What is Go?Go 5 Go Go Go 6 The Diploma The Guardian The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New Go Weiqi th igo baduk Go Igo Go of Go Go Go play there American Go Association
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 13 Go Go Art of War Go Go Art of War Go Go 7 The Protracted Game: A Wei-Chi Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy 8 th 9 Newsweek Go On China Go 10 Go Go Go Go The Thirty-Six Stratagems Applied to Go on Go Go The Protracted Game: A Wei-chi Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering Chinas Strategic Concept, Shi Go Newsweek On China Wall Street Journal
14 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15The Overarching Game: US-China Relations Figure 1. A Go-game Perspective on US-China Interactions
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 15 Foreign Affairs 11 12 13Battles around China feature of Go Foreign Affairs South Asia Studies
16 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 A Game with Great Potential the Go 16 China-US Focus Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How Chinas Advance in Africa is Underestimated and Africas Potential Underappreciated China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 17US-China Power Transition, Stage II Go why those Power Transition 17 19 World Politics The United States and China Power Transition United States and China in Power Transition The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
18 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 21 th T The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality Asian Survey Asian Perspective China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique The United States and China in Power TransitionFigure 2. US-China Power Transistion, Stage II
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 19 th 22
20 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 The Right Thing to Do, But Not Done Right mainly only
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 21 24 Game Changer: An Assertive China 26 Chinas Assertive Acts Yet it is CNN International Security
22 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 th 29 33 Report to the 18th Party Congress Xinhua Net Decision ( World Affairs, Beijing Review Innovative Interventionthe New Direction for Chinas Diplomacy Innovative Interventionthe Birth of Chinas Global Role Southeast and South Asia Studies
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 23To Go or Not to Go?It is more likely a Go Go Go way Go Go For China Go Go Go Go Art of War This misperception is to a (Study Times ( : ( International Issue Studies : , Sydney Morning Herald VOA The Atlantic The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward
24 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15rising power should continue to pursue a policy of prudence, focusing assertiveness and showdown with the system leader: if the rising power will eventually overtake the extant system leader, why should it ruin 37 China, unfortunately, does not have the luxury to follow this advice. It has many unsettled territorial disputes and time is clearly not on Chinas side, for Japan, Vietnam, and the other disputants have effective control over the dis puted territories for close to four decades; the longer China waits, the less likely the Chinese feel they will be able to recover them.38 That said, it is important for China to see how realistic its territorial claims are and to take a hard look at its strategy.For the United StatesChina has long held that since it has shown signs of rising, the United States has sought to contain China. Many of the US moves around China, especially the strategic rebalance, have been perceived by the Chinese as attempts to encircle China (by the way, encirclement is a signature feature of Go ). Since that is the case, the United States might as well play Go for real and make some well-intended Go moves on China. Moreover, US national leaders have arguably learned much from Sun Tzus Art of War and should be able to apply Sun Tzus tactics to deal with his Chinese descendants. The US strategic rebalance is likely to continue regardless which party is in charge in Washington. To do it right in what may be called the US Strategic Rebalance 2.0, the United States should set the stra tegic rebalance priority straightengaging the emerging great powers, especially China (not including China), should be at the top of the agenda.39 In addition, the United States should follow the Go strategy to put stones inside China as new efforts to engage China. These future moves will take Blacks moves 11 and 13 in Figure 1 as stepping stones. In Go terms, those future (United States) moves will reduce the size of White's (Chinas) posturing. In geostrategic terms, those moves will be enhanced by US efforts to shape Chinas rise. At this time, China is still open to US engagement and persuasion. Washington should seize the opportunity to engage Beijing before that window of opportunity slips away. A Win-Win SolutionWhether China and the United States play chess or Go in the Asiaheavily on maneuver of pieces with different values and capabilities. Moreover, chess is a zero-sum game in that there is usually only one winner (as shown in Figure 3), though it sometimes ends in a draw. The 37 Steve Chan, China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory (New York: Routledge, 2008). This is perhaps the best critique and analysis of the power transition theory since the theory was put forward by Organski in 1958. 38 China has always held that the disputed territories are stolen properties from China by the colonial powers and Japan and China has the right to recover them. Whether China can do so or not is a different issue; Chinese always use the term of (recover) to characterize their position on the disputed territories. 39 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, eds., Pivot 2.0 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2015).
ASIaA-PaACIFIC Lai 25 Go Go Go Go The United States and China in Power Transition Figure 3. Chess and Go End Games
ABSTRA CT Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, ASIA-PACIFIC Chinas Power Projection Capabilities 2014 Thomas M. Kane most recently Strategy: Key Thinkers China and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy
28 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 third. Chinas Power Projection Capabilities Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. Parameters The National Interest
ASIA-PACIFIC Kane 29 USNI News East Asian Strategic Review 2013 The National Interest Naval War College Review China and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy Incident at Mischief Reef: Implications for the Philippines, China and the United States East Asian Strategic Review 2013
30 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 symbolic. China and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy, BBC News Taipei Times Chinas Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach
ASIA-PACIFIC Kane 31 "Empty Fortress" Romance of the Three Kingdoms Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China, 2014 China.org,Chinas Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: Chinas Search for Security Chinas Search for Security Chinas Strategy Toward South and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress
32 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Romance of the Three Kingdoms East Asian Strategic Review 2013,
ASIA-PACIFIC Kane 33 Layers of Chinese Capability article in China Daily East Asian Strategic Review 2013,
34 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 China Daily article is China Daily, China and International Security: History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy, The
ASIA-PACIFIC Kane 35 haiwai huarenYale Journal of International Affairs The Diplomat The Guardian CASS Report: Number of Overseas Chinese Up to 35 MLN Xinhua China.org.cn Armed Forces
36 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 haiwai huaren Conclusion China.org.cn, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power China Quarterly
ASIA-PACIFIC Kane 37 Parameters
ABSTRA CT : Chinas concept of military strategy is very different from that of the United States. This article examines the various components of the strategic thought of the Peoples Liberation Army and how its theory of strategy can be applied in contemporary times. Among other things, the article offers US analysts a template for confronting Chinese strategy. There is an American joke that perfectly explains what Mao referred to as the essence of Chinese military strategy: Vinnie is in jail. His father writes to tell him he wishes Vinnie were home now to dig up the tomato garden. Vinnie writes back not to do that, since that is where he buried the bodies. The next day the FBI digs up the ground Dad, that was the best I could do.Yet very few Americans would recognize in this joke a connection to Chinese military strategy, since the United States view of strategy is so different. Vinnie made someone (the FBI) do something for the agency (look for the bodies) that they were actually doing for someone else (Vinnie and his dad). To get someone to do something for himself that he thinks is in his own interests, but which is actually in your interests, is the essence of strategy, according to Mao. The United States Armed Forces, according to Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.1 more kinetic than potential (the ideas having been generated) and it envisions employing power as the means to achieve an objective. The and economic means as the employment preference. strategy more broadly and analytically than the US military. The PLA internal discussions have surfaced about information-age strategy. As a result, Chinese strategy is now a mix of the old and new and, from this authors vantage point, includes the following: 1. 1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, as amended through January 30, 2011), 350. ASIA-PACIFIC Chinas Concept of Military StrategyTimothy L. ThomasTimothy L. Thomas is an analyst at the Foreign Military TRADOC G-2 element at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He retired from the US Army as a Lieutenant Colonel in the summer of 1993. Mr. Thomas received a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from the University of Southern California. He was a US Army Foreign specializes in Chinese and Soviet/Russian studies.
40 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15nature and use of analytical judgment (planning and the use of strate gic guidelines; remnants from the past play a prominent role) 2. An analytical thought process seemingly more prominently Marxist than before. It examines the strategic environment through the lens of objective reality and applies subjective judgment to manipulate that environment to ones advantage 3. The use of stratagems integrated with technological innovations. intelligence-judgment-decision process to induce the enemy to make decisions as one would expect 4. The constant search for a strategic advantage or shi which is also a goal of the Chinese strategic game of Weiqi or Go Shi is sought every where, whether it be with the use of forces, electrons, or some other aspect of the strategic environment 5. The objective of deceptively making someone do something ostensi bly for himself, when he is actually doing it for you. Each of these items is explained below, along with a few comments various elements of the PLAs strategic template offer analysts a method through which to understand and respond to the Chinese approach to, for example, the cyber environment or the South China Sea. Without the template, analysts are prone to mirror-image Western views of the strategic environment, and thereby develop improper responses to PLA activities. strategic concepts at great length. The 1997 Chinese Military Encyclopedi a, gic cover, strategic concept, strategic target, strategic thought, etc.) some one hundred times.2 No other topic has had as many entries, not even The Science of Military Strategy, even divided strategists into four groups: power and stratagem, technology and skill, dispositions and capability, and yin and yang.3 Western analysts do not consider such subgroups. PLAs historic and focused approach to the topic. is the 1991 science of military strategy and military strategy. The former is the study of the doctrines of the creation and application of rules of stratagems and military strategies in military confrontation.4 It studies how to use ingenuity to gain advantages at the smallest costs.5 Strategy is a general reference for stratagems and military strategy while military strategy is the concrete manifestation of the effect of the subjective activities 2 Chinese Military Encyclopedia (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1997). 3 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds, The Science of Military Strategy, English Edition (Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 5. The Chinese edition was published in 2001. 4 (China: Qingdao Publishing House, June 1991), 197. Dr. Gary Bjorge of the Combat Studies Institute of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas gra ciously made his available for use. 5 Ibid.
ASIA-PACIFIC Thomas 41of people on material strength.6 Subjective guidance, the book notes, plays a decisive role in formulating and implementing strategy.7 The 1997 follows: The general plans for planning and directing war situations as a whole. That is, based on analysis and assessment of the international situation and the of war and its development, formulating strategic policies, strategic principles, and strategic plans, planning war preparations, and all of the principles and methods followed while directing the implementation of war.8Here the international situation represents objective reality, while the proper assessment of the situation and a calculation of a wars probabil ity (risk assessments?) are made, and plans and principles are integrated to produce an outcome. One key aspect of modern Chinas analytical judgment process is its reliance on Marxist thought. This focus even appears to have superseded some historical legacies, if the authors of the 2007 book, On Military Strategy are correct. They write that, despite the extraordinary richness of Chinas ancient strategic legacy, when speaking from a political per spective, the mission and tasks it bears do not represent the interests of the masses of the people. They claim the Communist Party of China has thoroughly altered the political nature of Chinas military strategy of several millennia, making it fully representative of the basic interests of all Chinas people.9 However, as will be noted later, much PLA thought is still invested in Sun Tzu. Chapter three of On Military Strategy is titled, The Objective Environment of Military Strategy. It is perhaps the books most important section, since it directly explains the elements of strategy. ...the important foundation upon which military strategy is dependent for its formulation, the extrinsic conditions upon which military strategy is dependent for its implementation, and the arena upon which the strategic directors are dependent for displaying their talent in planning and skill in directing.10 The strategic environment is comprehensiveit includes politics, eco nomics, military affairs, science and technology, geography, etc. and thus represents objective reality. Authors Fan and Ma state, categorically, The relationship between the strategic environment and military strategy is a relationship between objective reality and subjective guidance. Properly understanding and 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 198. 8 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Volume 3, 699. 9 Fan Zheng Jiang and Ma Bao An, On Military Strategy (Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House, 2007), 43. 10 Ibid., 59.
42 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15analyzing the strategic environment is the prerequisite for properly formulating and implementing military strategy.11 Properly assessing the strategic environment will expose the advantages and disadvantages each side possesses and offer ways for subjective initiatives to implement strategy and create advantages. Strategic decision-making is accurate when the guidelines it formu lates are in line with objective reality, the authors note.12 The size of combat objectives chosen by decision-makers will determine the length of a war, its scale, and its intensity. Favorable strategic situations must be created.13 This is an imperative in wars fought under informatized conditions, in which the tempo of war is accelerating; victory will not come in the later stages of a war, but rather in a wars opening salvo. Whichever side is able to create a key opening engagement in its favor will win the initiative in the overall strategic situation. Therefore, creat ing favorable conditions before battle, such as establishing a tactical or strategic advantage, is extremely important.14 Technology, the authors add, provides new carriers for displaying the true and the false, enabling deception in new forms.15 Thus, strategy, when tied to modern technology, can elevate traditional strategic tricks to new levels. They also claim system-sabotage will continue to be a key characteristic of modern warfare; C4ISR components will continue to be the main targets of attack; offensive operations will be the main measure through which victory is seized; and capturing and maintaining control will remain an overall focus for combat guidance.16 Information operations will enable the achievement of strategic objectives directly met through campaign and even tactical actions in the practice of war. Thus, the authors appear to be altering the Marxist dictum that technology determines tactics, changing it to imply that technology now can determine strategy. For example, this could occur through a massive supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) attack that debilitates a nations electronic infrastructure. Recent testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers, the US Director of the National Security Agency, should concern all Americans. The Wall Street Journal reported:Admiral Rogers highlighted several threats emerging that will become control and subway systems.17 China employs stratagems, which are thought processes designed to mislead enemy perceptions, thinking, emotion, and will, to manipulate an adversary to ones advantage. The PLA relies on the subjective com petency of commanders to properly employ stratagems and manipulate 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 149. 13 Ibid., 251. 14 Ibid., 292-295. 15 Ibid., 290. 16 Ibid., 266, 278, 285. The Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2014, A2.
ASIA-PACIFIC Thomas 43objective reality to its advantage. Interestingly, the PLA studies other nations intelligence-judgment-decision processes and then decides what stratagem could be employed against this process to make the system work to friendly (Chinese) advantage.18 Stratagem developers try to do everything possible to control an opponents method of intelligence processing analysis. US analysts should often ponder how the PLA may The overall goal of this Chinese action (put the stratagem developer in to make decisions the Chinese want. Stratagem development under information conditions most likely will involve complex or multiple stratagems incorporating science and information devices; a separate unit instead of individuals would be needed to do the designing. The variables are so great the unin tended consequences of an action would require gaming. The idea of complex stratagems reminds one of the Chinese book, Unrestricted War The books authors recommended the development of cocktail warfare, which they termed a new concept of weapons (as opposed to new concept weapons, which are directed energy, lasers, etc.) involving the electronic, networks, etc.) at one time.19 Similarly, in 2008 Dai Qingmin recommended the same idea of simultaneously paralyzing an opponents order to introduce deterrence.20 Complex stratagem use would do the same, integrating several stratagems to produce an effect. For example, with information technology, a stratagem such as kill with a borrowed sword (use of a surrogate) could be combined with make noise in the east, attack in the west (fake in one direction with the surrogate, attack somewhere else). Shi is the goal of strategys objective and subjective aspects: to create and attain an advantage over an opponent after evaluating a situation Shi of the ancient Chinese military classic, The Art of War Chapter six notes Michael Pillsbury, one of Americas foremost authorities on the PLA and author of several comprehensive works on Chinese military thought, has uncovered several PLA materials discussing shi He noted: Shi assesses your sides potential, the enemy sides potential, weather, and geography to identify the moment in a campaign when an advan tage can be gained over an opponent. Shi is a certain moment in the campaign when you could take the advantage from the enemy; Shi chology, and calculations. The timing and speed of creating shi in war 18 Li Qi, Campaign Stratagem Application under High-Tech Conditions, in Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems (Beijing: National Defense University, 2002). 19 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Panama City, Panama: Pan American ings, as do the majority of the other sources noted in the text. 20 Dai Qingmin, New Perspectives on War (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2008), 99.
44 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15has changed under conditions of high-tech warfare; Shi is the moment when it becomes apparent one side can win the war ; Shi according to the Tang founder used psycho-shi, geo-shi, and shaping-shi; Shi can be created with stratagems.21A number of other Chinese sources discuss the concept. The Chinese book Campaign Stratagems shi as the combination of the friendly situation, enemy situation, and the environment; the integrated situation that has an impact on the effective performance of military strength; and the sum of all factors impacting the performance of the operational 22 The Chinese Encyclopedia of Philosophical Terms explains shi as availing oneself of advantage to gain control, a natural interest.23 Shi ) in Chinese General Tao Hanshangs trans lation of The Art of War translates shi as posture of the army, which implies that it is seeking advantage. Tao notes that shi is the strategically mobile, and changeable position during a campaign.24 Thus, the complexity of the term shi of power, the alignment of forces, and availing oneself of advantage to shi Whether or not shi is the key Art of War, as Roger Ames contends is hard to shi as strategic advantage. Surely, however, his point is worthy of consideration. Certainly, anyone reading Sun Tzus classic will note he often repeated the concept of attaining an advantage, especially when determining whether or not to act The Chinese strategic game of Go is all about attaining a strategic advantage. David Lai has published one of the clearest explanations of the game and its meaning. He notes, in agreement with the points made above, Both players have tried to develop an advantageous situation that is consistent with Sun Tzus third aspect [which is about developing a favorable situation] of shi .25 With regard to the essence of strategy, Mao would approve of Vinnies response to his fathers letter. Years earlier, Mao provided a similar analogy when he described three ways to make a cat eat a hot pepper: stuff it down the cats throat, disguise the pepper by wrapping it in cheese, or grind the pepper up and spread it on the cats back. In the 21 This information was taken from a slide presentation by Michael Pillsbury, sources cited are as follows: He Diqing, Campaign Course Materials (AMS 2001); Yue Lan, High Tech Warfare and Contemporary Military Philosophy, Liberation Army Daily Press 2000; Guo Shengwei, Deng (Central Party School, 2000); Zhang Wenru, (Beijing University Press, 1997); Li Bingyan, Stratagem and Transformation, 2004. 22 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems. 23 Feng Qi, Chinese Encyclopedia of Philosophical Terms Revised Edition, (Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 2001), 1355. 24 Tao Hanshang, trans. by Yuan Shibing (Sterling Innovation, 2007), 44, 124. 25 David Lai, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 9.
ASIA-PACIFIC Thomas 45latter case, the cat will lick itself, thinking it is doing something for itself when it is actually doing what you want. This is the essence of strategy.26Interestingly, this same concept is in The Art of War yet scholars knowing the enemy and knowing yourself, and other such key phrases are usually underscored. In chapter six, Sun Tzu notes how to make the enemy arrive of their own accordoffer them advantage.27 The enemy thinks it is doing something for itself, but it is actually doing what you want. strategy that are worthy of consideration. In 1994 Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences at the time, noted that the new strategic situation or new objective reality and science of utilizing and strengthening the comprehensive power of a nation to realize long-term political goals. The philosophical thinking of the art of war is military dialectics, or military philosophy.28 In a 2002 article in China Military Science author Wu Chunqiu described grand strategys ties to the objective-subjective process. He noted that objec tive reality, in regard to strategy, is the state of the nation and the world, even cosmic space. This is the context within which the grand strategy decision-makers operate, the strategic environment. The outcome of a war depends not only on the objective material strength of the belliger ents, but also on their subjective ability to employ it. It relates to the art of subjective guidance.29Li later wrote that those who formulate strategy do so against the traditiontherefore, in war direction, understanding the adversarys ideological culture and strategic thinking method is as important as 30 Friendly forces must continue to obtain knowledge about the objective situation [that] not only exists prior to the establishment of the military plan but also exists after the establishment of the military plan.31 Li warns against laying too much stress on previous experience, noting that tradition has a dual nature. It is both valuable for its historical wealth and a danger due to its tendency to exert historical inertia.32 With regard to the art of war, Li writes that the use of stratagems and surprise involves the use of uncertainties that cause the adversary to 26 Li Bingyan, Applying Military Strategy in the Age of the New Revolution in Military Affairs, The Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang (New China Press, 2004), 2-31. 27 Tao Hanshang, 49. 28 Michael Pillsbury, editor, Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy, by Li Jijun, in Chinese Views of Future Warfare (National Defense University Press, 1997), 222-224. 29 Wu Chunqiu, Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy: A Chinese View, China Military Science No. 3 (2002): 146. China Military Science No. 1 (2006): 28-38. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.
46 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15use of uncertainties in strategy.33 Acting in an irregular way and the use of uncertainties are a conscious act of using stratagems.34 Li adds that there is no reason for the PLA to be as transparent as the West. Western nations use transparency as a way to demonstrate strength and impose deterrence. The PLAs lack of transparency is a means of deterrence, since it becomes ambiguous and unpredictable for potential foes.35Shen Weiguang, the so-called father of information warfare in China, has noted that, while information and network security is an issue of technology, it is above all else an issue of strategy.36 Some PLA generals, such as retired General Dai Qingmin, note reconnaissance activities have become the prerequisite for winning victory in war.37 Dai, when he was on active duty and head of an important general staff department with responsibility for communications, noted a thorough reconnaissance strategy helps choose opportune moments, places, and measures not only to establish a strategic advantage, but also to win 38Major General Li Bingyan, an expert in the theory and use of strata gems, compared and contrasted Chinese strategic thought with that of the West; he concluded Easterners have put more emphasis on strategy over the years, while the West has focused more on technology.39 As a result, China must now combine technology with stratagems. He thus appears to support the view that technology now might determine strat egy as well as tactics. Li writes that in ancient China strategists were ( ) and Sun Tzus Art of War Regrettably, in Lis opinion, this reliance led to total emphasis on trickery at the expense of the use of science and technology.40 Li writes that the focus on strategy was related to the cultural traditions of the Chinese people. Stratagems are based on the doctrine of changes and change enables the use of strategy.41 When calculations are made to determine strategy, he added the following method was used: How dangerous or favorable, broad or narrow, etc. the terrain is, make judgments on the use of terrain; based on those judgments about terrain, capacity, estimate the number of troops the two sides could commit. Through these repeated calculations, one can select a strategy.42Under contemporary conditions it would be interesting to apply this methodology to cyber terrain and calculate how a goal could be achieved when factors are adjusted for modern conditions. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Shen Weiguang (Xinhua Publishing House, July 2003), 26. 37 Dai Qingmin, (National Defense University Publishing House, 2002), 96. 38 Ibid., 219-220. 39 Li Bingyan, Emphasis on Strategy: Demonstrating the Culture of Eastern Military Studies, China Military Science, No. 5 (2002): 80-85. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.
ASIA-PACIFIC Thomas 47In 2002, Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li edited the book, Campaign Stratagems In the chapter titled, Campaign Strategy and Objective Conditions, the following is noted:During the process of strategic formulation, the relationship between objec tive conditions and strategies, in terms of philosophy, is the relationship position and strategy is the second position. Correct strategies come out of 43 Colonel Xue Guoan, Deputy Director of the Department of Strategic Studies at the PLAs National Defense University, wrote on the topic of traditional strategic thought. First, Xue observed Chinas agricultural civilization, where many factors were considered to ensure good crops, fostered macro views when considering strategy.44 Second, he claimed experience in war allowed strategic planning to include manipulation and eventually the use of stratagems as the origin of strategic thinking. Xue believes that at the strategic level Westerners appear to focus on power, whereas the Chinese focus on the use of stratagems. Stratagems must function in accord with the overall situation, be planned in advance to supplement limited power, and enable victory. Chinas use of a soft force stratagem enables it to hide its intentions and avoid decisive battles; to ensure steady development and to reverse unfavor able situations; and to make friends with neighboring countries. Chinas geographical location has created a need for stability and tranquility. Further, a soft force can lure an opponent into exhausting his actual strength, thereby changing the overall situational balance. War becomes a rivalry in stratagems (wisdom) over material resources.45 First, it is possible some treasure the classics too much, worshipping sages and imbedding a conservative approach that avoids innovation. Second, some attach great importance to doctrine and pay too little attention to science and technology. Strategists of ancient China almost totally ignored military technological factors. Finally, attaching too much importance to land power has come at the expense of sea power. As a result, China is only now catching up in the area of sea power.ImplicationsIn conclusion, the most relevant recommendation for US analysts is through an appreciation of the PLAs strategic template, to be able to predict and counter their strategies; and second, to learn new ways to understand and apply strategy themselves. Strategy is an ever-evolving concept and should be studied closely for new approaches. Analysts should become familiar with the objective-subjective, stratagem, strate gic advantage, and shi criteria that can be applied to political, economic, of cybers objective reality could be understood as knowing there are no rules and regulations to impede intrusive behavior, surrogates hide 43 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li, Campaign Stratagems. 44 Xue Guoan, Characteristics of Chinas Traditional Strategic Thought, China Military Science No. 3 (2010): 116-122. 45 Ibid.
48 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15sources of reconnaissance, and weak systems worldwide encourage pen etrations. There is no reason to stop reconnaissance activities due to such a lucrative objective reality. Subjectively, packets of electrons can be used as stratagems. Open source Chinese links, for example, note that stratagems such as looting a burning house (and stealing property 46 Many other stratagems work in the same way. Further, there may well be Chinese institutes in existence now which intelligence-judgment-decision paradigm. The United States and its allies must think in terms of the Chinese approach, looking at the stra tegic environment from the vantage point of disruptive stratagems. It is by understanding differences such as these that analysts will make more reasoned assumptions about Chinese and PLA behaviorand avoid mirror imaging. There are several additional conclusions US analysts and strategic thinkers can draw from this study of Chinese strategy. First, how to study other nations approachs to and views of strategy remains undervalued. Such analysis allows for an expansion of our comprehension of strategic thought beyond the concepts of prudent ideas or ends, ways, and means. Expanding our limits of strategic thought enables the absorption of a broader method of analysis. Second, clearly Chinas ancient strategic thought has applicability even in the digital age. PLA strategy is not outdated and only limited to the thoughts of Sun Tzu and Mao. The use of packets of electrons as stratagems, for example, is a method of thought very seldom considered by US analysts. It combines the old with other nations strategic theories is vital to unraveling and identifying their long and short term goals. As in cards, chess, Go or other games, one must know what and how ones rival thinks to develop effective counters. Finally, Chinese strategy is more analytical and holistic, by nomics, military affairs, science and technology, geography, and other issues, resulting in a prism of thought known as comprehensive national Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms is limited to just the four instruments of national power, diplomacy, information, military, and economics. The implication is China does grand strategy, while the US does something far less. Further, the Peoples Republic of China has excelled at how to do strategy. Thus, in summary, there are many sound reasons to study the stra tegic thought of China and other nations. US strategy has worked well through the ages, but as other nations adjust their strategic thought to conform to new input and a different geopolitical context, our strate gists need to be aware of these developments and consider adjusting our thinking accordingly. 46 Discussion with Mr. Scott Henderson, US expert on Chinese hackers and author of Visitor, a book on Chinese hackers. Mr. Henderson, who speaks Mandarin, accessed an open source Chinese link in 2008 to get this information.
ABSTRA CT : The Peoples Republic is a great power in search of a tion of foreign policy, and the coupling of commercial interests with military force. Without effective statecraft, PLA planning could all too easily become national policy. Creative US initiatives would help to salve historical grievances and reconcile Chinas disruptive ambitions with the world order.The future of global security will be largely determined by Chinas response to the established international order. In recent years nationalist rhetoric, revisionist maritime borders and regular confrontation has undermined the party line of a peaceful rise, and threatens to inveigle US forces Why does China menace its neighbors at sea, and what should the United States do about it? Most arguments concerning the role of China in the international view is liberal institutionalist: China might indulge in populist nation alism, but is not historically expansionist. It remains committed to a peaceful rise within the current international framework. The second view is generally realist: China is bent on the aggressive accumulation of wealth, power and natural resources in a quest for regional hegemony a return to the Middle Kingdom. This article will advance a third argument: path to national greatness without yet comprehending what the des tination might look like. In the absence of a comprehensive national strategy or theoretical philosophy, military and mercantilist imperatives the disproportionate weight of state-owned enterprises and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in the execution of foreign policy. Chinese ambitions are often served by increasing chaos and the erosion of international norms. But this course is unnecessarily danger ous, threatening to isolate potential allies, alienate Taiwan, and even States and cripple the global economy, potentially unleashing chaos within China. The Chinese will determine their own destiny, but Washington should encourage Beijing to consolidate, not diminish the existing international system. This article will outline ways in which the United ASIA-PACIFIC Chinas Military Mercantilism 2014 Christopher Bowen Johnston Christopher Bowen at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. In 2014 he graduated with distinc tion from the School of Foreign Service, where he studied the international relations and security of East Asia. Christopher is a Major in the Australian Army, with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. An Indonesian linguist, he is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon and the University of Melbourne.
50 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 tensions.The Liberal Institutionalist Argument Ikenberry the contemporary system is open, integrated, and rule-based; with strong political foundations, meaning China is not compelled to overthrow the United States in order to realize national greatness. Moreover, nuclear weapons have made war among great powers unlikely. Todays world order is hard to overturn and easy to join.1 Chinas interest in adhering to international norms is based on three main principles: 1. The open market China has generated enormous wealth from free trade, 2. The multilateral character of global institutions, which diffuse hege 3. The resilience of established rules and norms, which encourage unprecedented co-operation and shared authority. Zheng Bijian generally endorses each of these points, noting other emerg ing nations have plundered their way to power by exploiting overseas resources through invasion, colonization, expansion, or even large-scale wars of aggression. He writes (in 2005) that Chinas emergence has been driven by capital, technology, and resources acquired through peaceful means, in accordance with the policies of Deng Xiaoping.2This latter point is instructive. Deng shifted China away from Maos outside world. In 1984 he created fourteen special economic zones to welcome foreign investment and advanced techniques.3 He also initi ated joint development projects with neighboring countries adjoining territorial dispute. Parties agreed to postpone questions of sovereignty Yet Dengs co-operative strategy has been overtaken by violence and confrontation. During a limited war in 1988 Chinese gunboats sank a Vietnamese landing vessel in the disputed Spratly Islands, killing 86. In 1992 China passed legislation laying claim to almost the entire South China Sea. Three years later China occupied Mischief Reef, a small atoll less than 200 nautical miles from the Philippines coast. Chinas incre mental aggression led then Filipino President Fidel Ramos to declare the Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 2 Zheng Bijian Chinas Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 October 2005): 18-25. Peoples Daily
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 51Spratly Islands were: a litmus test of whether China as a Great Power intends to play by international rules, or make its own.4 The South China Sea is now a constellation of competing claims. China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei each covet overlapping shares. Yet through extraordinary land reclamation and construction activity China is literally creating a new reality. Unless countered, it will shortly possess the means to station troops, ships, and aircraft across a range of disputed shoals and islets. In due course this will enable the PLA to declare and potentially enforce an Air Defence Chinese vessels now conduct daily patrols of the area, and have breached ing major military exercises on all sides of the main islands.5 of disagreement in favor of a peaceful status quo. Maritime tension has the importation of Filipino bananas.6 Both actions have been linked to territorial disputes. Various parties are engaged in cyber-attack, most notably the Chinese. And in 2013, China declared an Air Defence military aircraft, the message remains clear China is practicing a new and abrasive statecraft at sea. Liberal institutionalists cannot easily counter two other conun drums. First, Ikenberrys concept of the rational transfer of power disregards the incendiary potential of Chinese nationalism. The existing international order is perceived to be a legacy of injustice and exploita tion. When Mao announced the formation of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, he declared the Chinese people have stood up against is founded on a strong and often legitimate sense of historical grievance.7 Beijing seems inclined to use its growing strength to right past wrongs; not reinforce the primacy of international law, maritime boundaries or established norms. Second, the existing international architecture is ill-disposed to accommodate a sense of civilization rather than statehood. Kissinger writes that several societies have claimed universal applicability for 4 Ian Storey, Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, in South East Asian Affairs, 2009 ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 47. Defense Zone, Foreign Affairs New York Times September 22, 2010; and Andrew Higgins, In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute, Washington Post Foreign Affairs 1998): 37-49.
52 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15their values and institutions. Still, none equals China in persisting and persuading its neighbors to acquiesce to such an elevated conception precedents to Chinas contemporary strategic objectives. 8 Can Chinas renaissance be accommodated within the strictures of the existing inter national system? Early indications suggest not. As Pye contends: China is a civilization pretending to be a nation state.9 Either China or the region will need to adjust its expectations accordingly. own greatness. over Chinas vast maritime claims to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). While most expect ITLOS to rule in favor of Manila, it is equally expected Beijing will simply ignore any edict contrary to its interest. has more to gain by undermining the legitimacy of some international accords, or perhaps that Beijing may even regard the collapse of the current order as a fait accompli. While such a prospect is disturbing to the United States and the Asia is engaged in an arms race, underscored by the risk of nuclear 8 Henry Kissinger, On China 9 Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 235. US Army War CollegeFigure 1. maritime claims.
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 53proliferation. East Asian nations are casting about for an alliance network or institutional framework to defend their territorial interests. South East Asian countries are mostly burgeoning in wealth, population, and opportunity; accompanied by unresolved ethnic tension and economic as the authority of liberal institutions and international norms declines. are unravelling. All these dynamics favour replacing an old, potentially crumbling order with a new and powerful Asian hegemon. Chinas size, China is not there yet.The Realist Argument rapid rise in military expenditure seems consistent with classical realism. America dominates the Western hemisphere, dictating the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries.10 According to Green, Beijing is deliberately plotting to chip away at the regional status quo and assert greater control over the East and South China Seas.11 Christensen notes East Asia is destabilized by different political systems across states; limited economic interdependence; weak regional multilateral institutions; vast differences in wealth within and across national borders; cultural and ethnic tensions; widespread territo rial disputes; and the lack of secure second strike nuclear capabilities. The region is unusually fraught with mistrust, animosity, and strategic uncertainty.12 Defensive realism seems the natural, pragmatic response to such circumstances. Chinese military imperatives have been clearly articulated in Colonel Liu Mingfus 2010 book The China Dream .13 Liu rejects the concept of a peaceful rise, arguing China cannot rely solely on its traditional virtues to secure a new international order. Due to the competitive and amoral nature of great power politics, a strong China in a peaceful world or defeat its enemies. China needs a military rise in addition to its economic rise. Andrew Scobell point out the United States is often perceived in Beijing as a hegemon in the classically realist sense. Many Chinese strategists and privilege. US defense posture in Asia is characterized as a strategic China rises, the United States must naturally resist.14 Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160. 11 Green, Safeguarding the Seas. 12 Thomas Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy towards East Asia, International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 87. Reuters February 28, 2010. Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2012): 32-47.
54 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15China has certainly adopted a calculated mixture of bluff and coer cion, repeated over and over to establish more advantageous norms at sea. Through incremental aggression China seeks to advance its territo rial claims and revise the regional boiling point upwards. Beijing also eschews multilateral debate of its actions at forums such as Association China favors direct, bilateral negotiation where it enjoys a comparative power advantage, and can exclude the United States from discussions. This modus operandi is proving successful in South East Asia: states not directly involved in territorial dispute with China appear unwilling to lend active support to their neighbors, who are largely buckling under direct bilateral pressure from Beijing.15 Yet, as Robert Zoellick argued in 2005, China needs to understand better how its actions are perceived. Belligerence is exacerbated by a lack China will pursue a Peaceful Rise, but none will bet their future on it.16 that maritime expansionism is not contrary to Chinese interests. On this point, the realist view is unpersuasive. It is hard to discern Chinese interests being advanced through incremental aggression because it encourages dangerous regional competition, while needlessly International Studies argues sustained Chinese growth requires a stable relationship with the United States. Chinese strategists have a pragmatic sense of their relative strength, and it would be foolhardy for Beijing to challenge directly the international order and the institutions favored by the Western world such a challenge is unlikely.17According to some, Chinese leaders believe they must accommo date the United States while relentlessly developing their own strength. At the end of this period of continued US domination, China will be in a better position to defend and advance its regional ambitions. According to this more convincing realist interpretation, Chinese interests are not served by unnecessary provocation until its relative strength exceeds away. So then, how to account for the current Chinese statecraft at sea? Whatever their intentions, rapidly growing states often appear threat ening to their neighbors, as well as to the established hegemon and its allies.18 Yet neither a liberal institutionalist nor realist perspective can account for Chinas incremental aggression towards its maritime neighbors. Underlying all this tension remains the absence of a clear, articulated national strategy from the Peoples Republic. Community-Building? 10, Iss. 34, no. 4 (August 20, 2012). 16 Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to the 17 Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, After Unipolarity: Chinas Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline, International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 53. 18 Ibid., 41-72.
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 55Line. The United States and neighboring states are lining up to reject the concept with increasing explicitness.19 Why does China articulate such counterproductive objectives, particularly when it lacks the legal grounds or military wherewithal to meaningfully pursue them? Could it be that China has yet to possess any overarching foreign perhaps not. Im increasingly coming to the view that Chinas reputa focused on whatever is in the inbox Their reactions in many places seem designed to shoot themselves in the foot.20 and the role of diplomatic strategy has declined, but McDevitt is wrong Chinas foreign and security policy spheres have fragmented, but two powerful dynamics have emerged with consistent regularity in the South and East China Seas the commercial voracity of state-owned enterprises, and the relentless pursuit of tactical military objectives. Mercantilist and martial imperatives now substitute for Chinese statecraft at sea.The Money State Corporation deployed its deep sea drilling rig HD-981 in disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands, approximately 120 miles off the Vietnamese coast. China deployed eighty ships, including seven military vessels, along with aircraft to support the rig. In response, Hanoi dis patched twenty-nine ships to disrupt the rigs placement and operations, resulting in collisions and a hostile standoff before the rig was ultimately 21 This is a dramatic, but illustrative example of the Coast Guard in strong support. In recent years, growth in the domestic economy has slowed, while this period state-owned enterprises have become an indispensable com politically unstable areas, particularly in search of oil and gas. Stateowned enterprises are encouraged to act aggressively in the acquisition of natural resources.22 This is consistent with Chinas eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which called for the support of companies in explor ing resources overseas in short supply domestically.23 At last years Third Plenum the private sector was given prominence, as the Central Committee undertook rebalance of the domestic economy Asia Times April 3, 2014. Breaking Defense September 24, 2013. 21 Ernest Z. Bower and Gregory B. Poling, China-Vietnam Tensions High Over Drilling Rig in Disputed Waters, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 7, 2014. Policy, London School of Economics 23 Eve Cary, SOEs Declining Role in Chinas Foreign Investment, The Diplomat
56 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 of state-owned enterprises in maritime adventurism, as evidenced by the deployment of HD-981 to the Paracels in May. State-owned enterprises remain the primary instrument for foreign investment in the national interest to secure internal growth, while according to the twelfth Five Year Plan energy remains the highest national priority.24 The Chinese which account for one-sixth of its total revenue.25 A commercial, mercantilist imperative is clearly fuelling incremen tal aggression at sea. However, this could only occur with the active support of Chinas national security structure. The Military StateThe degree to which the PLA operates independently from political decision-making is a question that divides both Chinese and Western experts.26 Unlike the United States, China lacks a public document out lining its national military strategy.27 documents, and military doctrine enables insight into the manner in which military power is employed as a tool of statecraft. Five clear objec maritime security, and regional stability.28 growing recognition of the importance of maritime security. Fravel notes increase the navys budget.29 The Coast Guard is becoming increasingly frigates.30 Two new Coast Guard vessels are currently under construc tion in Shanghai, each with a displacement of around 10,000 tons twice the size of a Luhu guided missile destroyer.31 of traditional Chinese diplomacy. Chinas expanding global role and the complexity of international issues have multiplied policy stakeholders. The powerful Commerce Ministry; state-owned enterprises; the energy 24 Chet Scheltema, Frank Yang, and David Chan, Chinese Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Faces Rigorous Scrutiny, December 31, ment-faces-rigorous-scrutiny-2.html. New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper 26 China Leadership Monitor clm20jm.pdf. Strategic Guidelines, in Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 69-140. 28 M. Taylor Fravel, Chinas Search for Military Power, The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 126-127. eds. Phillip C. Weekly October, 23, 2014. October 15, 2014.
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 57and metals lobbies; the security and ideological arms of the Party, and of course the Peoples Liberation Army all have vested and competing interests.32 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must often rely on other state visits or meetings with overseas delegations the Foreign Minister 33 Security Council. This central decision making body has enabled Xi Xis concentration of power is yet to manifest in a cohesive national strategy. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences a leading think tank was recently directed to lend strategic substance to Xis lyrical Chinese Dream. Their report is still pending.34In the absence of effective statecraft, it is all too easy for outsiders to mistake military planning and capability development for national strat egy. Chinese military expansion is more a consequence of double-digit growth in spending, courtesy of the nations extraordinary economic story. Like any professional military, the PLA is predisposed to evolve to likely competitors in every realm: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace. Unfortunately, in the absence of statecraft, military objectives can all too easily become national policy. nationalism, military priorities and perceived economic imperatives a disproportionate and ill-considered weight in its regional interaction. This may yet prove effective in the South China Sea, where no single country (except the United States) can meaningfully challenge China. However Beijings belligerence is particularly dangerous in the East China Sea, where several major powers are engaged in competition.Danger in North East Asia Historical grievances capable of arousing nationalist sentiment on several fronts, which once unleashed are hard to contain, Clear precedent or formal alliances that could inveigle the United China cannot achieve its objectives through increasing antagonism in Strategy, in New Foreign Policy Actors in China Lowy Interpreter power-in-search-of-a-grand-strategy.aspx.
58 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 interests or territory both possess a sophisticated military, supported by formal alliance with the United States. The potential for miscalculation for all parties, but arguably China has the most to lose. It may indulge some domestic nationalist sentiment, but at considerable risk given the power and freedom of navigation, involving the high-tech destruction of military and economic infrastructure. Tensions could manifest in direct clashes at sea, in the air, space or cyberspace. All parties have a strong, shared interest in averting such a disaster. Proposed US Policy InitiativesResolution of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute unlikely, represents the most perilous security contingency in the territorial design on the other, but would most likely become embroiled over a third country or disputed territory. Rather than remaining reso lutely on the sidelines, the United States should actively encourage the resolution of disputes in the East China Sea. There are greater dangers the Middle East or elsewhere. Resolving the status of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands (or at least diminishing their incendiary potential) should be accorded the highest priority. On Chinas side there is scope to return to the principle of do more to assuage Chinas legitimate historical grievances. And Washington could, in quiet consultation with Tokyo, step back from deferred, or resolved through the sale or demilitarization of the islands and surrounding waters.Recasting the Pivot consequences, not least that the US military has largely assumed the ment of the policy occurred before an assembly of Australian soldiers and US marines in Darwin. The United States has arguably done little since to recast the pivot in diplomatic or economic terms, or empha While this is due in part to a lack of political commitment to free trade in Washington, it reinforces Beijings perception of the pivot as a form of strategic containment. The Obama administrations untimely exit from Iraq and Afghanistan, its ambivalence towards Syria, and haphazard in Asia.
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 59The most common ground between key regional players is their interdependency in trade and investment. However, the proposed terms for its accession have not been made public but are believed to require fundamental changes in Chinas governmental structure, includ ing state-owned enterprises. now working towards the worlds largest-ever regional trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Given heightened competition between the two and its potential to result in competing trade blocs, it clearly is in US interests for China to commit to economic cooperation and shared prosperity.35 Partnership. However, if the Chinese economy continues to increase in relative terms compared to the United States, its incentive to do so will diminish. Australia has just concluded a free trade agreement with China, having already signed similar agreements with South Korea and Washington and Beijing to transform the emphasis and incentive of the TPP. This would help to recast the US pivot away from the perception of military containment towards the principle of collective economic advantage.Encouraging International Law and Civil SocietyIt is clearly in US interests for China to support, not overturn established international covenants. To be seen as an honest broker the United States should also uphold the primacy of international law. When convention is already observed in practice, if not in principle by the US the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea The US Senate should of the Sea to follow its 1994 Agreement on Implementation. The increasing role of civil society should also be considered. The Asia Foundation was recently instrumental in securing a peace agree ment in Bangsomoro.36 Command can afford to be more nimble and engaged with the civilian aspects of Asias evolving regional security architecture.Strengthening Regional InstitutionsThe United States also shares a vital interest in the peaceful resolu tion of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly involving China and the Philippines, a US ally. It would be prudent for the United Foreign Affairs 36 For the background to this crisis, see Steven Rood, Implementation of Bangsamoro Holds Lessons for Philippines as a Whole, Asia Foundation
60 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15dispute resolution, including peacekeeping forces. Given Chinas seat on potentially injurious to Chinese interests. The United States, Australia peacekeeping force. While requiring economic and logistical support, this model would avoid a controlling United States or Australian interest regional stability. Canberras recent rapprochement with Fiji could aid such efforts. could be established in Townsville, perhaps in collaboration with the Australian Civil-Military Centre. Given the strategic interest in the aging the capacity of such an organization. China, the United States, battalion through joint regional exercises, attached to the Regiment as Command could facilitate such an initiative, spanning Asia and the Nuclear and Energy SecurityThe competition for energy and resources is a major factor underly ing territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Meanwhile, transform its energy industry from nuclear to fossil fuels, which will increase carbon emissions and energy competition. This tragedy arose waste, a vexing incapacity shared by most nations with nuclear power, including China. Loose nuclear materials present an unacceptable risk to the environment and regional security. As a leading exporter of uranium, including to the Fukushima reactor, Australia should consider assisting in the safe processing and storage of nuclear materials. Australia is blessed with space and geo political stability unique in the region, and perhaps the world. With expand its uranium industry to provide a cradle to grave service for the safe storage and disposal of nuclear waste. This would diminish the risk of nuclear terrorist attack and further disasters such as Fukushima. Increased use of nuclear power would also mitigate the devastating regional effects of climate change. There are other ways US technology could help ease tension in the by more than 500 million, and is forecast to reach one billion by 2030. Chinese internal security will be determined by the stability of its cities.
ASIA-PACIFIC Johnston 61So will the fate of the global environment. China surpassed America in 2006 as the biggest emitter of carbon dioxide from energy, and is now producing nearly twice Americas level.37 China, the United States, and shared innovation in energy technology. Conclusion but Chinese nationalist military mercantilism is clearly ascendant in the South and East China Sea. This is most injurious to Chinas strategic ing relative to GDP it would in time become the most formidable power, with commensurate economic clout. This trajectory would ensure the is war, in which China could not currently prevail. Yet, this is the very contingency Beijing risks by courting disaster in the East China Sea. This speaks to the fragmentation of Chinese foreign policy, which has in turn allowed state-owned enterprises and the PLA dispropor competing objectives: To set the conditions for a return to civilizational greatness, To erode international norms deemed injurious to China, To secure contested terrain of potential military value, To protect Chinas supply of natural resources and economic growth, and To indulge popular nationalist sentiment. The Chinese people will determine Chinas future. However, there are still tangible steps the United States and its allies can take to dimin ish the risk of confrontation, while strengthening regional institutions objectives have assumed new urgency as the Chinese economy begins to plateau, natural resources subside, the environment and population reach breaking point, and Beijings relative military strength increases. largely depends on the global economy, secured by law and covenant, created and sustained by the United States. If the Peoples Republic can truly reconcile its sense of civilization within the region, and be genu the violence and bloodshed which begot the contemporary international order. 37 Urbanisation: Where Chinas Future Will Happen, Economist April 19, 2014.
ABSTRA CT I 1 secondary aspects of the situation are accounted for separately in sup 2 The Heart of the Matter MIDDLE EAST Defeating the Islamic State: Commentary on a Core Strategy 2014 Huba Wass de Czege an independent policy assistant to the
64 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 IS problem is not a Syrian or Iraqi problem, it is an international problem. And it needs an needs to control ter ritory and to rule a population by strict Sharia 3 The Atlantic Foreign Affairs
MIDDLE EAST Wass de Czege 65 creating stable, functioning, and extremist resistant indigenous communities under a local political regime they consider legitimate. The second is to defend the occupied populations in Syria and Iraq from the armed propaganda to defeat the militant group and its agen cies town-by-town and village-by-village. Winning the Legitimacy to Govern
66 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Defending the Population from Armed Propaganda immediate
MIDDLE EAST Wass de Czege 67 Fighting and Defeating IS Parameters Army
68 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Conclusion Strategic Studies Institute
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ABSTRA CT and extortion, ISIL is one the best funded militant groups the UnitO ISIL 1 In addition, 2 3 4 5 thus The Telegraph The Guardian Foreign Policy New York Times MIDDLE EAST Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy Studies at the US the books, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare and Cartels at War: Understanding Mexico's Drug-Fueled Violence and the Challenge to US National Security is also the author of and modern forms of book is and International Security
72 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 6 he Unites States ISIL and Crime Management Like other insurgent and terrorist organizations, ISIL has had to 9 The Independent CNN The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Associated Press September
MIDDLE EAST Kan 73 11 12 13 14Bandit Rationality and the Villains Dilemma 15 MSNBC Drugs and Contemporary Warfare American Historical Review Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Notes Internacionales The Financial Times September The Independent, American Political Science Review
74 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 16 19 21 Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence Terrorism Codes of the Underworld The Daily Beast Times of Israel yrian Observatory for Human Rights Journal of Peace Research International Organization
MIDDLE EAST Kan 75 22 23 24 25 26 Low Intensity Inside Rebellion Christian Science Monitor, Terrorism and Political Violence Light Financial Times
76 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-1529 Towards an Integrated Strategy there are 31 CNN, DailyMail The Washington Post
MIDDLE EAST Kan 77 32 33 Financial Times 34 35 36 This, too, has Businessweek The Financial Times The Atlantic Council
78 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 39 Colombias Democratic Security and Defense Policy in the Demobilization of the Paramilitaries Military Review
MIDDLE EAST Kan 79 41 Substantial damage to ISILs Recommendations 42 43 CNN RAND
80 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15
ABSTRA CT : While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israels civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies inter acted with each other, assesses the strategic gains and losses on each side, and suggests some lessons relevant for American strategists. A WAR EXAMINED Gaza 2014: Israels Attrition vs Hamas ExhaustionEitan Shamir and Eado Hecht 2014 Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht Operation Protective Edge is the Israel Defense Forces name for its latest military operation against Hamas and other terror ist organizations in Gaza during the months of JulyAugust 2014. This article analyzes the competing strategies of Israel and Hamas in achieving their political ends. By strategy we mean how each side attempted to optimize its physical and psychological use of violence in achieving its political goals. Strategy is the art of deciding what violent acts would best assist in bringing about ones political goal, and then executing them. In some cases, the actions chosen might be synony mous with the political goals (for example, when the political goal is conquest of territory) but often they are only a means of hurting the rival Israels military strikes on Gaza and Hamas were much more destruc tive in terms of loss of life and property than those of Hamas on Israel. carnage and destruction it wreaks on the enemy, but by the achieve ment of political goals and the cost in terms of resources expended and destruction suffered in return. political context of Operation Protective Edge was very different from Cast Lead 2008 and Defensive Pillar 2012. By 2014, Hamas Gaza. As a result, we believe Hamas used force to cause the main actors Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and others to release their strangle-hold on Hamas revenues. This desperation drove Hamas to endure a much higher level of physical damage before agreeing to a
82 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 political goals on the eve of hostilities. In the second section, we describe how each developed its strategy to match its political goals and how the and losses of each side and discuss potential lessons for America and its allies. The Wider Context: Political Goals Prior to Operations Hamas' Political Goal: Staying in Power Jews and Arabs since 1920. Although Operation Protective Edge has with regard to the short-term processes that led to the Israeli decision to initiate another operation the aforementioned start and end dates are for any appreciable period of time. Israels decision to initiate Operation Protective Edge was a response to Hamas escalation of rocket and Hamas ultimate goal, as declared in its charter, is to destroy the state of Israel and establish a Palestinian Arab state based on the Shariya the laws of Islam.1 However, Hamas leaders are fully aware attaining of the Palestinian nation as a whole. Therefore, the medium-term politi cal goal of Hamas is defeating rival Palestinian factions especially the only one roughly equal to it in political and military strength, the secular Fatah. closer to this goal. However, over the following year the Fatah party, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, attempted to undermine the Hamas government. The political rivalry deteriorated largest constituency and source of strength lay in Gaza, whereas Fatahs (helped by Israel) was in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian Authority split into two separate entities with only a tenuous bureaucratic link between them.Hamas Budgetary Crises types of goods, both civilian and military. To maintain the charade of a closed border, goods were transferred into Gaza via numerous tunnels frowning on this import of goods, both Israel and Egypt did little to
A WAR EXAMINED Shamir and Hecht 83worried the Israelis was not the import of civilian goods, most of which could in any case be imported through Israel itself, but the import of weapons and dual-use materials that could be used for military purposes. Trade with and through Egypt reached its peak with the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt. The retaking of power in Egypt by the military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi was disastrous for Hamas. The new regime saw Hamas as an ally of the hated Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist groups army located and shut down hundreds of smuggling-tunnels, and by June 2014 more than 1,500 of the estimated 1,800 tunnels had been shut down approximately halving Hamas annual revenues.2 Irans dona tions to Hamas had already been cut drastically after Hamas supported regime.Hamas immediate political goals were: removing all Israeli and Egyptian control over imports into Gaza by building an international seaport, an international airport, and allowing free travel through the land crossings between Gaza and Egypt and Gaza and Israel.4 Assessing whether Hamas won or lost this war depends on whether it can achieve some of these goals.Israels Political Objectives Containment and Quiet Israels political goal vis--vis Gaza can be summed up in one word containment, that is a quiet border, or at least a reduction in the inten sity of Palestinian attacks from Gaza to a level regarded as no more than an irritation. Political anarchy in Gaza would prevent achievement of these rogue elements within its own ranks or smaller groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Resistance Committees, to prevent Palestinian group, Fatah included, capable of replacing Hamas as this central authority. Therefore, destroying Hamas is considered counterproductive. Better to educate Hamas that attacks on Israel damage its higher priority interests. Thus the goal is to punish it enough to hurt it, but not enough so that it loses control. Israels use of force is not designed to throw Hamas out of power, only to deter it from launching further attacks on Israel. However, there are constraints on Israels use of force: (a) its sensitiv ity to Israeli casualties, (b) domestic cultural aversion to causing civilian casualties, (c) diplomatic and economic dependence on the United States, (d) diplomatic and economic ties with Europe, and (e) danger of a local escalation in Gaza spilling over to other borders. Together, these 2 Eric Trager, Policy Analysis (Washington, DC: Washington Ynet News The Flimsy Palestinian Unity Government, BESA Center Perspectives Paper, no. 4 Ron Tira, Operation Protective Edge: Ends, Ways and Means and the Distinct Context,
84 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15constraints limit the range of military actions Israel can use in support of its policy.A Clash of Strategies Israels Attrition versus Hamas ExhaustionOn 12 June 2014 a team of Hamas terrorists murdered three Jewish teenagers. Israel responded by arresting and interrogating hundreds 5 Initially, Hamas denied involvement, but later admitted the killers were indeed members of the organization, but that its leaders had no foreknowledge of the crime. However, the Hamas leadership immediately sanctioned an increase in daily occurrence and gradually escalated from one to three rockets per day to a few dozen per day.This escalation was portrayed as an act of solidarity with the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria who were being attacked by Israeli forces searching for the teenagers. Israels initial response was minimal a few air strikes each day attempting to hit the launcher teams. Israelis hoped once the bodies of the Israeli teenagers were found and the search 8 That night Israels government ordered a change in strategy. Instead of hunting active launchers and launch-teams, the air force was ordered to attack the military-terrorist infrastructure in Gaza: all known launchers, storage sites, command few per day to 150 to 200.9There was one important difference between the initial strikes of Operation Protective Edge and those of Operations Cast Lead and Defensive Pillar the latter two had surprised the Palestinians.10 Surprise and equipment before the Palestinians employed them shortening their endurance. This time, the Palestinians had the initiative, and the initial strikes by the IDF were less successful. Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Leaders didnt Know, CNN mideast-crisis/index.html. http://www.shabak. Israeli http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20 http://www.shabak. gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20%20July%202014%20docx.pdf. 8 Ibid. 10 Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, Mowing the Grass: Israels Strategy for Protracted
A WAR EXAMINED Shamir and Hecht 85 11 The variance seems to be only slightly connected to the intensity of Israeli air strikes and had more to do with internal Palestinian logistical issues. To increase pressure on Hamas leaders and commanders, the IDF began to destroy collateral damage and protected by the Iron Dome, Israel adopted a strategy of gradual attrition of Hamas military infrastructure. Israel expected a replay of Operation Defensive Shield (2012), be minimal, and Palestinian casualties would be considerably higher, with the Palestinians deciding they had made their point and calling a halt to hostilities. As a palliative, Israel would offer some concessions. However, the Palestinian political goal and its commensurate strat Hamas leaders decided to gamble on instigating a full-scale war in the of their artillery weapons versus Israeli defenses they prepared two complementary strategies:First: Match Israels strategy of attrition with one of psychological exhaustion: Rockets might not cause many Israeli casualties. However, since Israels welfare and economy for some time. Even if no civilians were killed, repeated disruption might damage Israeli morale and exert pres sure on its government. Furthermore, Hamas planned to bypass the Iron Dome and border defenses by using tunnels and amphibious raids on Israeli settlements -ately increasing the collateral damage caused to Palestinian civilians:The Palestinians have been using human shields, hospitals, schools, UN facilities, mosques, hotels and private homes to hide and protect with the permanent embedding of bombs into the walls of many of these Hamas political viewpoint, the more Palestinian civilians killed and wounded the better, as this would be more likely to cause international intervention against Israel.12 However, this strategy has a culmination point since too many casualties break morale. 11 Monthly Summary-July 2014, http://www.shabak.gov.il/ SiteCollectionDocuments/Monthly%20summary%20%20July%202014%20docx.pdf. 12 See captured Hamas doctrinal manual: Bob Frederick, Hamas Disturbing Human Shields Manual, New York Post, August 5, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/08/05/hamas -manual-details-civilian-death-plan-israel/.
86 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15The Impact of Violence on Israels and Hamas Political Will: seems not to have shaken Israels population. In central Israel, people took cover when necessary and then resumed everyday activities. The from Ben-Gurion International Airport. In southern Israel, where the intensity was greater, the economy suffered more, and there were more left no lasting impressions. Both were detected as they reached the shore July caused extreme consternation, despite the fact there were no Israeli casualties. over the past decade had not, even before the introduction of the Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system. It should be stressed the existence of the offensive-tunnels was not a surprise to the Israeli government, the IDF or even the civilians.14 time Hamas fought to defend the tunnel system. Israeli forces search15 While the Israelis searched for tunnels, Hamas conducted more raids via yet undiscovered tunnels. Most of the raiders were killed, but the IDF suffered 11 killed and at least a dozen wounded in these actions. The ground battle did not stop the exchanges average before the offensive.drew and resumed its previous strategy of stand-off air strikes. The due to the expected number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties, and the lack of a clear exit strategy. Aware of this decision, Hamas acted Yochai Ofer, Tzahal Sikel Pigua Khadira Gadol Derech Minheret Terror, (Hebrew), NRG http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/ Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center June 24, 2014, Eado Hecht, Gaza: How Hamas Tunnel Network Grew, BBC July 22, 2014, http://www.bbc. http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollection Documents/Monthly%20summary%20%20July%202014%20docx.pdf. Table, HaAretz
A WAR EXAMINED Shamir and Hecht 87 18Analysis and Conclusions Hamas, this bout was much more costly to both sides. Casualties and between the rivals, and so all numbers should be regarded critically. The Hamas government claims approximately 2,200 people were killed and civilians. Israel claims approximately half the dead were combatants and many civilian deaths were caused by deliberate Hamas use of civilians as human shields.19 from their homes. Thousands of buildings were damaged and will take years to rebuild. Hamas rocket arsenal was drastically depleted (about a sive tunnels destroyed. If published Israeli data is correct, at least 15 percent of Hamas military personnel were killed or wounded, including a number of high-ranking individuals. Also, Hamas plans to raid Israeli villages were foiled. buildings were destroyed and a few hundred damaged, but most only seems Israel was successful. The past seven months on the Gaza border have been the quietest in decades. The reasons Hamas agreed to, and however, indications the Israeli strategy of attrition was working, whereas the Hamas strategy of exhaustion seemed to be failing. Also, there are indications of mounting anger and desperation within the Gaza popula Hamas reportedly executed political opponents under the pretext they were Israeli spies.20 The expected international pressure on Israel did not occur and even some of the Arab regimes, not only Egypt, seemed to support Israel over Hamas. Finally, despite casualties and disruption of life, the Israeli public did not exhibit signs of pressuring its government to concede. The Israeli government apparently fended off calls by some for more extensive ground operations. Israel again lost the media and the propaganda struggle despite criticism of Hamas use of human shields, Israels actions are facing a propaganda and lawfare (hostile UN inquiry) backlash over the number of Palestinian civilians hurt and the damage to Gazas civilian 19 Richard Behar, The Media Intifada: Bad Math, Ugly Truths about New York Times in Israel-Hamas War, Forbes August 21, 2014. I24 News July 29 2014, http:// suspected-collaborators-report.
88 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 throughout the operation, reaching Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and beyond, exposed between the US administration and Israel on many issues. The current view in Jerusalem is toppling Hamas will only lead to anarchy or require Israel to govern Gaza both undesirable outcomes. Therefore, maintaining a contained and weakened Hamas is Israels least bad policy choice but then how does it deter a resumption of harass gain the Palestinians certain achievements presently unforeseeable. In Israel itself, parts of the population especially those living near Gaza ances they can return to their daily lives. To this point we have discussed only the leading protagonists, Israel and Hamas. However, the principal actor, whose actions, shut ting the smuggling tunnels, precipitated this war, was Egypt. As the war progressed Egypt continued to discover and destroy dozens of tunnels. Egypt undoubtedly gained the most from this war Hamas is weakened and beholden to it, American and European attempts to intervene diplomatically were rebuffed as were attempts by the White House to involve Turkey and Qatar (both Egypts regional rivals) in the negotiations. It was Egypts refusal to make any concessions to Hamas tangible return. Egypt holds the keys to the political situation and most of Hamas demands were actually directed at Egypt. The political results of this operation are not clear-cut. Thus, the term victory in the sense of a clear win-lose situation is irrelevant in this case. It is possible both sides gained something each can call a victory. Whatever the perceptions as to who gained more, the principal Israelilevel of violence will continue.Potential Lessons for America and its Allies As shown by the evolution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic extremism cannot be overcome in the traditional sense of eradi cating the enemy, or getting him to renounce his stated political goals. Thus, despite the many differences between the political and strategic contexts of Americas war and that of Israel, both face similar situations. They must develop strategies for conducting protracted theoretically unwinnable wars. Some defense experts have nicknamed Israels strategy Mowing the Grass. The analogy is clear. Operation Protective Edge should not be regarded as an independent event, it is part of a long-term strategy, a strategy that alternates continuous routine low intensity activities with occasional escalations, each in response to an escalation of hostile activity in order to cut the grass back to an acceptable height. Each
A WAR EXAMINED Shamir and Hecht 89 undetermined future date, gradually lead to a cessation of attacks.21 The exact details may be different, but the general concept can be adapted to the needs of the United States. of pain on the enemy. Israels experience has been that the destruction of material assets is not particularly painful to its enemies. Material is easy to replace. What hurts these organizations is the killing of person nel, the higher the rank the better.22 Most of these organizations have a limited number of trained personnel they take longer to replace. Furthermore, although the ideology of these organizations eulogizes suicide-attacks, the leaders are usually less suicidal than the lower-ranks. tion in activity. So searching for, and attacking, the senior commanders of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example, is more effective than killing a greater number of lower ranks. Still, the number of combatants killed, wounded or captured as a percentage of the total accrue, the more effective the tool. However, as shown in Operation Protective Edge, the level depends on a wide variety of factors. What was unbearable for Hamas in Operation Defensive Shield was bearable in Protective Edge, because in 2014. Over the past three decades, Israeli strategists have attempted to tions the main incentive being the reduction of Israeli casualties. In There are tactical reasons why this is so: certain targets are not vulner actions accordingly. However, it seems the most important reason is strategic: air strikes, especially when civilian casualties must be avoided, take longer to achieve the level of damage required to compel the enemy the political context of each escalation. Moreover, the enemy adapts and consistently seeks ways to neutralize Western technological advantages. Thus, destroying the offensive tunnel system required a ground opera tion. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continue to study the tactical 21 On the Israeli concept of Cumulative Deterrence see: Doron Almog, Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism, Parameters Deterrence Beyond the State: The Israeli Experience, 2012). 22 For a discussion of the effectiveness of targeted killings, see Steven R. David, Fatal Choices: Israels Policy of Targeted Killing BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 51 (Israel: Begin-Sadat The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al-Qaida Central: A Case Study,
90 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 One lesson, in particular, emerged clearly during the campaign the need for heavily protected armored personnel carriers and tanks in order to increase survivability and reduce casualties.24 growing set of domestic and international constraints. As a great power, but it must still take these into account. Accordingly, Israels strategic concept, however limited, might suit Americas current policy and organizations.Eitan ShamirDr. Eitan Shamir is a faculty member at the Political Science Department, Bar Ilan University and a Research Fellow with the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center). Prior to his academic position he held a position at Ministry he served as a senior fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies (CIMS) at the IDF General Headquarters. Eado HechtDr. Eado Hecht is an independent analyst focusing on military doctrines and their implementation. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, teaches at various academic institutions and an assistant editor at Learning Process Amongst the General Staff (lecture presented at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center) conference, Operation Protective Edge: Military and Political Lessons, Ramat Gan, Israel, September 29, 2014. 24 Yossi Yehoshua, Yaalon approves addition of 200 advanced APCs for the IDF, YNET News
ABSTRA CT : This article analyzes Hamas strategic and political calcu The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategic calculations 1 2 3 Parameters for Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Hamas: From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistance Hamas: Political Thought and Practice Hamas in Politics Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza Hamas: the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas: A Beginners Guide A WAR EXAMINED Gaza 2014: Hamas Strategic Calculus is an associate professor of defense Middle East Studies He has published and especially on
92 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 its position vis--vis Hamas Rule in Gaza, 2006-2014 4 Vanity Fair Electronic Intifada
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 93 hundreds of armed militants and destroying or rendering useless many of Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research Foreign Policy
94 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 10 11 Hamas Back-Peddles, April 2014 12 regime in Damascus had been Hamass most important Arab ally for Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Chatham House
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 95
96 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Hamas War Calculations 13 14 casus belli to repeat its earlier attacks YnetNews New York Times The New York Review of Books
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 97 Strategic Calculations vis--vis the PA and the PLO Haaretz Gaza Strip: A Reconstruction & Development Plan Al-Monitor Al-Monitor
98 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 muqawama musawama 20 Foreign Affairs
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 99 21 Strategic Calculations vis--vis Israel 2223 Haaretz Wall Street Journal The Jerusalem Post
100 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-1524 than the psychological impact of being able to send commando teams Hamas appears to Mavi Marmara Mavi Marmara vis--vis Haaretz Hezbollah: A Short History Al-Monitor
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 101Strategic Calculations vis--vis Egypt and the Arab World cum Conclusions & Implications vis--vis
102 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 30 31 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington Post Haaretz Al Jazeera America Arab American Institute -east-pressures-and-challenges The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy
A WAR EXAMINED Robinson 103
ABSTRA CT : Post-war drawdowns often include a re-negotiation of the terms of civil-military relations. After World War II the US Ar mys command culture was marked by Army Utopianism, an expansive vision of the Armys place in American society. This article sketches the history of Army Utopianism, noting its contribution to failing strategies in Vietnam, and argues for greater attention to the link between operational concerns and the Armys domestic political strategy. 1The United States Army can boast a distinguished record of inno vation during times of war, when rapid technological advances have been matched by innovations in organizational structure, principles of command, and logistics. But military organizational innovawar, Army leaders are tasked with preserving lessons of past wars while preparing for new challenges with shrinking budgets and fewer personnel. The drawdown period is thus a de facto re-negotiation of the terms of civil-military relations, and accordingly it is a time when domestic political strategy is especially important.2 such a moment of re-negotiation, we would do well to consider how earlier attempts to guide the Armys post-war relations with state and In these moments of re-negotiation, Army leaders may be inclined to agree with Russell F. Weigley that the Army must obviously hold itself in close rapport with the people. What is not at all obvious is what Army leaders should do to bring this about. While domestic political strategy, the capacity to bring about such changes, is limited by law and custom, there is a growing sense that the reality of domestic statecraft should 1 Russell F. Weigley, Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 556. 2 The term domestic political strategy, coined here, encompasses efforts to shape the domes tic political environment. The concept is borrowed in part from Eliot A. Cohen, Are U.S. Forces Overstretched? Civil-Military Relations, 41, no. 2 (1997): 177-186; and from Risa Brooks, Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies, in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2009). Domestic political strategy is not a pejorative term; much of this work is mandated by civilian authorities as a means of maintaining oversight. The congressional liaising done by Legislative (Westport CT: Praeger, 2000). CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS The US Armys Domestic Strategy 1945-1965Thomas Crosbie Thomas Crosbie is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Yale University. His research focuses on civil-military relations, focusing on the degree to which media concerns have contributed to the shaping of military doctrine and practice.
106 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15be acknowledged openly in the current post-war defense conversation.3 For example, Charles D. Allen writes of the need for senior leaders who are strategic assets capable of ensuring relevance of the Army to the nation, a turn of phrase echoed in William G. Brauns recent call for a relevancy narrative to secure the Armys fortunes despite the publics tendency to under-appreciate its peace-time military.4 As with any strategy, the Armys domestic political strategy bears the imprint of underlying attitudes and assumed meanings that form the organizations unique culture. Hints of how this is manifested in the current drawdown negotiation have been noted by Braun and Allen to revert to a rhetoric dominated by the force sizing and prioritiza the military being lesser-included capabilities.5 These are not simple calculations, as there are particular challenges associated with changing the minds of top commanders on fundamental questions of this sort.6 However, the deeper risk is that, faced with navigating this vast institu tion through changing operational and political waters, Army leaders will fall back on bad mental habits and lead the Army to fall ever further out of step with the state and the American public. What follows is a description of a cultural structure, or set of institutionalized patterns, that arose during the post-World War II drawdown and had negative consequences for the institution, con tributing to an over-long investment in the failing strategies employed in Vietnam.7 This was Army Utopianism, a vision of the Army as a central structure of governance, one that was expected to connect a large proportion of citizens to the state and to the world. This cul tural structure is ultimately a manifestation of a deeper well of civic what Samuel P. Huntington would later praise as the military ideal.8 However, Army Utopianism can and should be analytically separated tended to envision civil-military relations at a transitional moment. The existence of this set of assumptions led leaders to make poor decisions that ultimately contributed to the profound alienation of millions of Americans from the Army. tural structure as it was expressed in internal Army documents. Army 3 The legal context is reviewed by Allen W. Palmer and Edward L. Carter, The Smith-Mundt Acts Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy, 11, no. 1 (2006): 1-34. 4 Charles D. Allen, Assessing the Army Profession, 41 (Autumn 2011): 73; Studies Institute, January 17 2014, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/ 5 William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen, Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy: Reconciling Military Roles, 73, no. 2 (2014): 54. 6 Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2013). 7 John R. Hall, Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation, 39, no. 3 (2000): 331-347. 8 Samuel P. Huntington, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957). For a discussion of civic republicanism in American civil-military relations, see Gary Schaub, Jr. and Adam Lowther, Who Serves? The American AllVolunteer Force, in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), (London: Ashgate, 2012).
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 107Utopianism emerged as a consequence of the massive mobilization of the country during World War II and was cultivated by some Army leaders over the next three decades. The second part of the paper notes a major division in the newly-formed Department of Defense over the Eisenhowers New Look policies. Subsequently, when President John F. in the early days of American involvement in Vietnam, the Army was again challenged to justify its special monopoly on conventional ground forces. Together, these pressures led Army leaders to favor a form of involvement in Vietnam that would prove politically disastrous. of 1968, this structure was gradually rejected by Army leaders as an impossible dream. New visions, giving rise to new political strategies, structure, we can sensitize ourselves to one way the Armys leaders failed in the past to keep in close rapport with the public. This example should serve as a reminder as a new generation of leaders attempt to navigate the politics of drawdown and the desire for a peace dividend while also 9 Then as now, the temptation to strengthen civil-military relations by expanding the Armys presence in American public life may well lead to the opposite outcome. While element of the Armys command culture should be recognized as posing a real danger to its future relations with the public. Utopianism as US Army Culture command culture during the mid-twentieth century than George C. Marshall. Described as the principal military architect of the Western democracies ultimate victories over the Axis powers, Marshall was after the president himself.10 As such, he was responsible for setting the ment of Army utopianism. A sense of Marshalls preferred command style can be gleaned from a commencement address at Trinity College on June 15, 1941: This Army of ours already possesses a morale based on what we allude to as the noblest aspirations of mankindon the spiritual forces which rule the world and will continue to do so. Let me call it the morale of omnipotence. With your endorsement and support this omnipotent morale will be sustained as long as the things of the spirit are stronger than the things of earth.11 9 This has been described by Joseph S. Nye as the great power shift of the 21st century. December 8, 2011. See also David A. 67, no. 4 (2012): 1073-1094. 10 Russell F. Weigley, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 421; Ed Cray, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), 402. 11 Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 538.
108 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Things of the earth eclipsed things of the spirit more quickly than Marshall would have hoped: while public support remained at unprec edented levels throughout the war, this quickly dried up after V-J Day.12 At the same time public support was declining, demobilization and drawdown were shrinking the armed services, if not quite back to pre-war levels. Yet Marshall recognized the threat of Soviet power and believed the public needed to maintain its close attachment to the mili tary in order to provide the groundwork for another mass mobilization. to the Eurasian landmass in the mid-1940s while struggling to maintain its funding and capacities, so today it pivots from Eurasia back to the a reduced defense budget. If the problem in 1946 was maintaining public support with less money, without a war to justify that support, and with only a nebulous threat from Russia in its place, the solution to Marshalls mind was Universal Military Training (UMT).13 Described as the most revo lutionary proposals ever made to the American Congress, Universal Military Training would encompass peacetime conscription, military training for young people, a reserve of alumni trainees and refresher training for six years.14 The eminently practical Marshall had little taste for militarism in the sense described by Alfred Vagts, the vast array of customs, inter ests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars yet transcending true military purposes.15 Universal Military Training represented instead a form of militarization, as sociologist August B. ential 1946 special issue of the .16 Whereas militarism is generally used to refer to the celebration of the pomp and circumstance of those elements setting military life apart from the norm, militarization refers here to the attempt to integrate a fundamen tal concern with military affairs into either the individual (as soldiers are militarized through basic training) or into the general public. This preference for broad militarization was a manifestation of Army utopia nism, a set of assumptions about the nature of civil-military relations that places the Army at the very center of social life. Army leaders believed a high degree of militarization was both possible and attainable at relatively little threat to the organization itself, since the public and the media were expected to react favorably to attempts to militarize. While Universal Military Training was an important effort by Army leaders to militarize American society, it was not the only one. American society partly through the work of public affairs. Surveying 12 Adam J. Berinsky, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009), 209. During the Cold War, 5 (2013): 57-74. 14 Charles H. Lyttle, Review of Universal Military Training and National Security, ed. Paul Russell Anderson, 20, no. 1 (1946): 111-112. 15 Alfred Vagts, Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 13. 16 August B. Hollingshead, Adjustment to Military Life, 51, no. 5 (1946): 439-447.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 109the developments in Army public affairs in the early Cold War period, there is a rich sense of how Army utopianism was integrated into the Armys basic messaging with the public. Messaging in general and public affairs in particular were accordingly championed by several top Army leaders in this period, reversing the trend set during World War I, when opinion) was disbanded and its organizational developments lost.17 Shortly after the war, two reports were submitted to the Armys top leadership underscoring the centrality of messaging activities to military success; these helped trigger the relative rise of public affairs. The Page replacing the World War II-era Bureau of Public Relations. The Army Collins was a rising star and would become the chief of staff four years 18Under Collins and Parks, the new departments commissioned the Lockhart Report (1946), which advocated the centrality of the Bureau of Public Relations to the Army and the importance of aligning public relations activities with Army goals, so as to gain maximum public 19 What precisely this meant was spelled out to the corps of in August of 1946. Parks noted, every action dealing with the media of public relations, should be calculated to advance the purpose of the Army as a whole toward the larger objective.20 He followed with a four-paragraph Creed of Army Public Relations, which stressed the transparency of Army information and its public utility function. A tension within Parks article is evident today: how could one expect of Army command and as passive public utility? At any rate, few would have mistaken Parkss own clear preference of the former over the latter. These early documents suggest strongly the belief that if the Army is to exist within the broader society, it must pursue its objectives partly by shaping that society. An indication of what such a process might require can be found in the Presidio in San Francisco for the Sixth Army.21 Sidle and Notestein presented the report to Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsky (who signed it) for distribution among Professors of Military Science and Tactics, Senior s, CRS Report R40989 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2009), 14. 18 Both departments would move through a quick succession of name changes, but would eventually be known as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (Collinss job), and Army Chief of Public Affairs (Parkss job). (M.Sc. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953), 322. 20 Major General Floyd L. Parks, A Creed for Army Public Relations, (August 1946): 3-7. would go on to a distinguished career in Army public affairs and retire at the rank of Major General.
110 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Area). These were, in other words, professors at colleges with an ROTC program who ran summer camps in the San Francisco area. The nine page report spelled out eleven points of advice for tailoring a sequence of news releases to promote each camp. The instructors were encour aged to prepare biographical cards for each cadet; write a release for the cadets home town newspapers and school publications; take an building relations with media in the vicinity of the camp by encouraging press tours and open houses. The authors of the report noted the stories should be based around each campers expectation of being offered a commission, which was viewed as something worth boasting. All of this media work was intended to promote ROTC training programs as valuable to national security, and so gag or humorous stories were strongly discouraged.22 might conceivably give rise to dozens, if not hundreds, of stories spread across local media outlets, summer after summer. The plan, however, was clearly given serious consideration, as a note on the archival copy indicates: CINFO [Chief of Information, Parkss successor] is sending out to all CONUS [Contiguous United States] Armies.23 The Sidlein the capabilities of the Army in actively engaging with press in an overt quest to shape public opinion. This optimistic assessment, their version of Army utopianism, suggests a near-perfect synthesis of military and public interest and a press compliant enough to allow the Army to use it as a mere conduit. Of course, it is unclear how journalists would have reacted to this attempt at shaping their work; it is possible that they would have refused to take the bait. There is also no cause to view this as a sinister or even disingenuous scheme. Rather, it may well simply of Information. In retrospect, this optimism may seem out of step with the imme diate post-war period, when both militarism (in Vagtss sense) and The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 outlawed domestic propaganda, a major Information Agency (USIA). However, what might today look like moral stances taken against the corruption of the democratic process were at the time more like partisan squabbles, the concern being domestic propaganda would be used by one party against the other. Similarly, many Army leaders still believed George Marshalls vision of Universal Military Training may yet come to pass. So while militarism may have been out of season, it was being replaced by a more sophisticated form of militarization. This transition in turn was predicated on a rather 22 It is of course not clear whether this attempt to shape news coverage would have had any effect on editors and reporters. 23 Suggested Public Informational Activities for PMS&Ts, Sixth Army Area, 3 April 1951; Winant Sidle Papers, 1950-1999, Box 2, Folder 4, Miscellaneous Correspondence re. PA; United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 111optimistic assessment of the presss willingness to serve as a conduit for military messaging and of the publics appetite for being militarized. In this context, the Sidle-Notestein report draws from a similar well as other utopian articulations of public information policy.24 On June 4, 1954, for example, Collinss successor as Chief of Staff, General the spirit of Parkss Creed in a letter to all major commanders in the Army, which essentially observed the importance of public affairs for Army life. However, he also focused his comments on an issue at the heart of the Sidle-Notestein report, namely the equal importance of troop morale and local media relations to national media management efforts. According to Ridgway, Only by doing all these things thor of the American people.25 This was not an idle concern on Ridgways part. A few months earlier, on February 8, 1954, he had disturbed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with critical words to the House Subcommittee on the Armed Services, and particularly his concern the Army would lose too much manpower with the New Look cuts.26 Speaking before Congress was one way to pressure Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and President Eisenhower; messaging to the public was another. Army public affairs, and a new understanding was emerging concerning cantly, perhaps, was in their successive turns as the nations top soldier, crucial period of post-war Army reorganization, top leadership support would have been instrumental in allowing the two Army public affairs the Chief of Information and Education) to continue their evolution. To this end, under the incoming chief of staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, three vast analysis of all Army public affairs functions in order to develop a systematic approach for the Armys political strategy. The internal goal of the report was to coordinate what had thus far been four discrete media), troop information (informing, entertaining and indoctrinating soldiers), troop education (courses and training for troops) and com munity relations (engaging with regional media and local governance). The plan, reviewed by the now-retired Parks, was innocuously titled An Army Public Relations Plan, but in fact was a 250-page, 50-point 24 Although the terms are at times confusing, public information and public affairs must be distinguished from one another. Public affairs is the broader category, including not only public information (liaising with the press) but also community relations (liaising with local civilians) and command information (liaising with the troops). 25 An Army Public Relations Plan, March 7 1956, 216; Chief of Information, Programs Group 319; National Archives, College Park, MD. 26 Saki Dockrill, (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 57.
112 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15discussion of how to transform Army public affairs into aggressive public relations.27The tenor of this plan can be gauged in an introductory section public, troops, and Congress. But in the discussion that follows, these three are revealed to be in turn composed of multiple, distinct groups that require separate public relations strategies. Thirty groups in all are singled out as requiring special care, including the press, viewed as both audience and conduit; youth organizations; local chapters of national organizations; female members of Congress; veterans of other services; and many more. Notably, foreign publics, whether those of allies or enemies, were ignored entirely: the goal of Army public relations was to shape domestic and internal audiences.28The spirit of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which prohibited domestic propaganda, would have been sorely tested by this plan. It included extensive discussion of slogans, marketing gimmicks (e.g. work with Zippo, Hallmark, Revlon and toy manufacturers), major public events and other obvious efforts to persuade the American public of the Armys merits. The plan was also pointedly oriented to the internal public of troops (with multiple subdivisions, of course), but there was an important conceptual development. The plan reversed traditional notions of troop information as concerned primarily with maintain ing morale. Instead, troops are viewed much as the press is: both are audiences that need to be persuaded of the Armys message but also con duits through which that message can be spread. In other words, troop information and education were intended to help encourage soldiers to spread positive messages about the Army to their civilian friends and family members, in effect to proselytize for the Army. In an era of mass conscription, when Universal Military Training was still an Army goal, the utopian spirit of this expansive report is a Post-war drawdown was sapping resources. Overt propagandizing was also coming under attack once again. On May 15, 1957, United States Information Agency (USIA) Chief Arthur V. Larson came under intense questioning by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson. The USIAs budget was reduced by $20 million, a major blow to the USIA, partly on the grounds that Larson, in Johnsons estimation, had stepped over the line and begun using the USIA to support Republican Party interests.29 For the Armys been steadily declining even as the rhetoric of its value to the Army was of the plan, the budget was only $832,000authors refer to this number 30 Even if the 27 A fourth element, troop education (job training for soldiers), was at that time housed in the 1956 plan. 28 Army Public Relations Plan, 7. 29 Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, TX, State, Justice and Judiciary Appropriations, 1958, 103 (May 15, 1957): 6968. 30 Army Public Relations Plan, 66.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 113 of the Army to the nation. Justifying Conventional Force in a Nuclear AgeIt is not surprising that Army leaders felt their institution, which had performed so admirably in the war, would remain a highly visible and familiar component of the state. But this line of reasoning inter sected disastrously with the grand strategic vision of civilian authorities, especially the incoming president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his New Look policies. Eisenhowers preference for a slimmer Army supplement ing the deterrence of nuclear weapons had the effect of challenging the Armys monopoly on conventional force, which was going out of style, justifying its continued relevance. At this time, military strategy was still coming to terms with the new place of civilians in war. Some strands of nuclear deterrence strat egy posited large civilian populations as the inevitable target of Soviet aggression. That conceptual shift corresponded to a reimagining of conventional Army strength as a vestigial organ of state power, most attempted to reassert the importance of the full spectrum of Army resources, justifying both conventional and irregular units as important front-line elements in the Cold War, which was in contrast to the New Looks preference for long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. These fought without tipping over into full-out nuclear war. Army utopianism as a political strategy would eventually crash the region must have looked like a tempting showcase for the continu ing relevance of the services unique capabilities in ground warfare. American involvement in the region consolidated in November 1955, with the creation of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (commonly referred to as MAAG). This was part of a broader Cold the Indochina advisory group, and worked alongside similar groups in were ultimately part of country teams that were headed by ambassadors, although a separate chain of command put the advisory groups under simply put, during the MAAG era, the American presence in Vietnam was led by diplomats who worked closely with military leaders. The MAAG era was characterized by extensive, if not entirely suc cessful, efforts to modernize and train the South Vietnamese military services. The effort was undermined by Ngo Dihn Diem, head of the were never so competent as to challenge his rule. This was supple mented by CIA operations.31 By 1961, Diems military capacity was 31 Thomas L. Ahern, Jr.,
114 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15stood by a counterinsurgency plan that would involve MAAG shifting nation-building tasks. The concept was approved but it was understood that it would be implemented by South Vietnamese soldiers, supervised by American soldiers, and aided by both the Armys Special Forces (the Green Berets) and CIA personnel.32 A further complication, the Army had only vague notions of what countering insurgent or guerilla forces might actually entail, and according to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then Chief of Staff, the training actually conducted at MACV was, as late as March, 1960, fundamentally conventional.33Lemnitzer had replaced Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who had been Chief of Staff when the utopian public relations plan was written. Taylor occupied an unusual role. After his retirement as chief of staff, he had campaigned publicly against President Dwight D. Eisenhowers New Look, particu larly its orientation to massive retaliation as the key geopolitical pivot in a nuclear age. In 1959, he published a book advocating an alternative 34 sensibility in his resistance to the New Look doctrine, which he argued was premised on the Great Fallacy that the threat of nuclear weapons would prevent war. In Taylors words, while our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great Wara World War IIIit has not maintained the Little Peace.35 Eisenhowers plan relied on nuclear deterrence and market tools to realize American interests abroad, and Eisenhower himself was happy one historian, to Eisenhowers mind, war was no longer an accept able means to achieve political objectives. The militarys foremost and, perhaps, only mission was to deter it.36 modernized, the Department of Defense could begin accruing savings by cutting frills and make do with a leaner and tougher budget in Eisenhowers words.37 It all hinged on one big question: would nuclear weapons prevent limited wars from being fought due to the risk of trig gering what was then termed general war, a third, nuclear world war? In contrast to Air Force and some Navy leaders, Army leaders rejected this notion and anticipated instead a broad space for what was in essence conventional warfare brinkmanship.38The Armys perspective can be gleaned in speeches by top soldiers during this period. On April 6, 1960, Lemnitzer spoke of Soviet expec tations of a long nuclear war, one that might start with the exchange of devastating nuclear attacks on civilian populations but would still 32 David Hunt, Dirty Wars: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Today, 38, no. 1 (2010): 35-66. 33 David M. Toczek, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 33. 34 Maxwell D. Taylor, (New York: Harper, 2007); see also Donald Alan Carter, Eisenhower versus the Generals, 72, no. 4 (2007): 1169-1199. 35 Taylor, 6. 36 Carter, Eisenhower versus the Generals, 1175. 37 As it turned out, this was not a cheaper option, since the arms race quickly drove the cost of strategic deterrence to unexpected heights. See Dockrill, 259, 262, 271. 38 Carter, Eisenhower versus the Generals, 1181.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 11539 This nightmarish vision was expanded in another talk in August, where Lemnitzer connected the long nuclear war scenario to the resulting by American enemies as a decisive event, and so nuclear power was not decisive. Indeed, Lemnitzer informed his audience that Soviet forces might launch a nuclear attack on American soil simply to gain territory somewhere else. Accordingly, there should be no question of restraint when it came to conventional involvement in seemingly remote theaters; rather, a blend of US forces was needed that could go into any given area and exterminate the rats without destroying the neighborhood.40 Lemnitzer was echoed by his successor, Gen. George H. Decker, who spoke before an audience in New York on March 25, 1961 on the preferred orientation to counterinsurgency, while hedging for the importance of maintaining conventional force. He noted, strategy in these [maritime, aerospace and landmass power], considered in context with political, economic, and other non-military factors.41 The struggle to preserve Army conventional force would continue throughout the period. Three weeks after Deckers speech, Lemnitzer, now the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded to a request from Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to provide joint doctrine that would minimize conventional force in a nuclear war, emphasizing instead diplomatic solutions through the use of less force and scheduled breaks order, noting, we do not have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces of our effort, once a major thermonuclear attack has been initiated such a doctrine, or to declare such an intent, would be premature and could gravely weaken our deterrent posture.42Decker and Lemnitzer were risking their positions when they but they did so because they believed the Armys monopoly on conven tional ground forces retained its central place in legitimating American foreign policy, even in the nuclear age. Maxwell Taylors doctrine in particular and called him out of retire ment to investigate the Bay of Pigs incident. Accordingly, Taylor, along tion in Vietnam. In November 1961, Taylor and Rostow offered the 39 Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Address to the National Association of State and Territorial Civil Defense Directors, 6 April 1960, Box 1, Folder 1, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, 1960-1990, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 40 Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Address to Association of the United States Army, 9 August 1960, Box 1, Folder 1, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, 1960-1990, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 1961, Box 6, Folder 2, George H. Decker Papers, 1959-1962, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 273.
116 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15fateful call for a massive joint effort to guarantee South Vietnamese freedom. Against the backdrop of Lemnitzers and Deckers thoughts secure large-scale geopolitical ends. At any rate, the proposal included 8,000 American ground troops.43 would be needed.44 With this force, the Armys top leaders began the withdraw from the region, its relations with the public in a state of crisis.ConclusionSince World War II, the place of the Army in American politics anticipated they would retain a central role in public life and looked to journalists, then working under voluntary conditions of access and recently freed from censorship, to help the Army tell its story. Most staff), the Army had to justify its continuing monopoly on conventional ground forces. This had been directly challenged by other services and governmental branches, but was also indirectly challenged by a new emphasis on strategic deterrence (led by diplomats and backed by nuclear weapons). Accordingly, at the beginning of American involvement in Vietnam, the Army focused on conventional force displays and antici pated that press coverage would rally support behind the organization. As the Army became increasingly entangled in Vietnam, the impulse to justify conventional force became more pronounced, and counterinsurgency fell by the wayside. In Gen. William Westmoreland, the American forces found a leader dedicated to persistently optimistic messaging and to conventional force. While Army utopianism certainly cannot explain every element of the thinking of the top Army com manders of this period, it provides a pathway to understanding the domestic political attitudes informing military strategic preferences. If the Army was to be a major component of American society, then it had to prove the enduring value of its core competency, conventional ground war. Both the reliance on conventional force and the utopian vision of the Army would decline as the American body count drew increasing public ire. Eventually, Vietnamization (shedding the Armys command responsibility), matched with strategic bombing (which supplanted con ventional force), would allow the Army to withdraw from what would preserve the lessons gained from the Global War on Terror despite the pressure to cut costs and offer a peace dividend; and second, to reorient dilemma is not so different than the situation facing top commanders 43 Graham A. Cosmas, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 20. 44 Ibid., 43.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Crosbie 117following the end of World War II, when a far more dramatic drawdown was paired with a pivot to the Eurasian landmass. In this case, looking closely at the past can provide direct lessons for the present. In both time periods, the link between the political and opera tional realities is provided in part through domestic political strategy. In the words of Russell F. Weigley, one of the foremost historians of the Army, To useand restrainits immense social, economic, and itself in close rapport with the people.45 Some Army leaders in the post-World War II period quite reasonably pursued a strategy of close gross miscalculation of the direction of the broader American political ence and rapport is not straightforward, and simply amplifying the Armys presence in American public life can have the opposite of the intended effect. Lessons/Insights guard against the optimistic and expansive vision of the Armys role of which Army utopianism is just the most extreme expression. Another lesson is operational strategy. It is (and has long been) sold to the public, and this should be acknowledged as both a fact of life and required to liaise with state and society across multiple platforms, and doing so, and this is especially the case when addressing the core compe tencies of the given service. By the same token, the political calculus can interfere disastrously with operational planning. The Armys domestic political strategy is not an epiphenomenon, but rather an intrinsic com ponent of operations and one demanding serious attention and study.46 practitioners of information operations and strategic communication. In sive and wide-ranging strategic plans, attributed in part to competition between the agencies charged with these tasks.47 The case of Army uto pianism reminds that such failures have long dogged the services and may have deep cultural roots. In other words, these may be even less tractable problems than is currently thought. On one hand, recognizing in resolving them. On the other hand, and as Steven Tatham has pointed out in the cases of China and Russia, competitor states have already found workable solutions to these problems, and so there is real value 48 Concretely, to 45 Weigley, 556. 46 A similar point is made by Braun and Allen, Shaping a 21st-Century Defense Strategy: Reconciling Military Roles. 47 Hans F. Palaoro, Information Strategy: The Missing Link, 59, no. 4 (2010): 83-85. 48 Steve Tatham, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 46-57.
118 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15better conduct information and messaging activities, the Army should extensively research the blinding effects of its own cultural traditions, recognizing both the contingency and the stickiness of organizational culture. These lessons can be implemented. It is certainly possible for the Army to guard against a tendency toward exaggerating its role in American social life (lesson 1). Likewise, it is possible to nurture a leadership cadre attentive to its domestic political standing and how it intersects with operational capacities (lesson 2) and how these in turn inform its foreign and domestic messaging (lesson 3). And so, while the case study is intended to make clear how much the Armys culture has shaped its operational strategy, the ulterior motive is to enable the opposite outcome, the strategic shaping of Army culture the Armys characteristic commitment to conventional force. As in the Cold War, so today the Army navigates between Scylla and Charybdis, on one hand doubling down on its core competencies and potentially blinding itself to much-needed reform, and on the other hand leaping without looking at promising solutions while eroding its identity in the rapport with its increasingly global public.
ABSTRA CT : The survival rate of American military personnel seriously wounded in combat has risen dramatically in recent decades. But situations still arise when wounded soldiers cannot be saved, lemmas for their fellow troops. The Geneva Conventions and most codes of medical ethics prohibit direct and intentional killing of wounded, and changing our relevant treaty obligations would have CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Battlefield Euthanasia: Should Mercy-Killings Be Allowed?David L. Perry 2014 David L. Perry Dr. David L. Perry is Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the Vann Center for Ethics at Davidson College in North Carolina. From 2003 to 2009 he was Professor of Ethics at the US Army War College. He is the author of Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), and several articles in Journal of Military Ethics, Military Review etc. He earned a B.A. in Religion University and a Ph.D. in Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School.I have never experienced war directly. But in teaching and writing about the subject for over 15 years, I have tried to imagine vividly what such an experience must be like for combatants and civilians caught up in its destruction. Surely one of the most horrifying aspects of war occurs when soldiers are seriously wounded in combat, grievously suffering, and facing little or no prospect of medical cure or pain relief as their lives ebb away.1 Military historian John Keegan estimates that one third of the 21,000 British soldiers killed in the battle of the Somme in early July 1916 died of wounds that would not have been fatal had the men been evacuated quickly, but the appalling number of casualties overwhelmed the resources and best efforts of military medical personnel.2To be sure, the care available to American and other allied soldiers now is dramatically better than in previous decades, let alone previous centuries. The survival rates of our wounded soldiers rose dramatically between the two world wars, even more during the Korea and Vietnam more during our recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: in 2005 nearly 20 percent of wounded US soldiers died from their injuries, but in 2010, fewer than 8 percent died.3However, situations still arise occasionally todayand could occur as well in some future warsin which the wonders of modern military 1 A previous version of this essay was presented in 2011 at the annual meeting of the International Society of Military Ethics, and at a subsequent colloquium jointly hosted by Richard Schoonhoven of the US Military Academy and Daniel Callahan of the Hastings Center, to whom I am most grateful. I use the terms soldiers and troops here to refer comprehensively to all includes the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The term combatants here will 2 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 274. 3 C. Chivers, In Wider War in Afghanistan, Survival Rate of Wounded Rises, New York Times January 7, 2011, A1.
120 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15medicine are unable to reach all seriously wounded combatants in time miserable condition. The law in these cases is clear: simply stated, no soldiers today (including military medical personnel) are legally authorized to inten tionally kill gravely wounded comrades, nor wounded enemies who no longer pose an immediate threat to them. The Geneva Conventions strictly prohibit killing enemy combatants who are rendered hors de combat 1949 stipulates:Members of the armed forces who are wounded or sick, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and cared upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; they shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military considerations permit, leave with them a part of its medical personnel and material to assist in their care.4(Note these passages assume that humane treatment precludes inten tional killing as in active euthanasia, a position challenged below.) Signatories to the Geneva Conventions (such as the United States) are bound to enforce them in their own military laws and regulations. As an example of their application, the rules of engagement card issued to every member of Coalition Forces Land Component Command in out of battle due to sickness or wounds.5 Soldiers who violate such rules by killing wounded enemy combatants can be prosecuted for murder or other forms of homicide.6Moreover, professional codes of ethics have traditionally prohib ited physicians (military and civilian) from directly and intentionally killing patients under any circumstances. Although some physicians have challenged that strict rule, advocating active euthanasia under day in the codes of ethics of the British and American medical associa tions.7 Furthermore, while physician-assisted suicide is legal in Oregon, Washington, Montana, New Mexico, and Vermont, active euthanasia is 4 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, ch. 2, art. 12 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, August 12, 1949). 5 CFLCC (Coalition Forces Land Component Command), Rules of Engagement for U.S. Military Forces in Iraq, January 31, 2003, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003). disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed. Francis Lieber, General Orders no. 100, promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln, April 24, 1863. 7 End-of-Life Decisions: Views of the BMA (London: British Medical Association, 2009); American Medical Association, Euthanasia, Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.21 (Chicago: American Medical Association, 2009).
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 121illegal in every US state, and in most other nations (apart from Holland, Belgium, and a few others). However, this essay will consider certain conditions under which it diers to kill gravely wounded combatants, either their enemies or their own comrades; in other words, explore whether military mercy-killing is sometimes morally permissible. (In theory, mercy-killing by soldiers might encompass gravely wounded civilians as well, but Ill largely ignore those instances here.) I will also weigh the potential consequences of changing relevant military laws and regulations, which may indicate that after all. of killing in general and euthanasia in particular, and why the inten tional killing of innocent persons is prima facie immoral, but not always or absolutely immoral; second, summarize several illustrative cases of If the strategic relevance of this essay isnt clear yet, note that if euthanasia, doing so would involve much more than simply rewriting our relevant military manuals. Before that could occur, formal changes in our commitments to the Geneva Conventions would have to be made, which would not only require presidential approval, but also two-thirds the Senate, the Geneva Conventions have the same status under the US The Ethics of Killing and Euthanasia and the burden of proof falls on those who would allow it. Now, it is not always wrong to kill persons intentionally. For example, in defense of oneself and other innocent people, it may be ethical (i.e. morally right or But its usually wrong to kill people; most persons in most cases have a prima facie right not to be killed.8 Why is that the case? A usefully straightforward answer to that question has been expressed in only slightly different ways by philosophers Jonathan Glover, Thomas Nagel, James Rachels, Don Marquis, Dan Brock and Jeff McMahan: killing persons is prima facie immoral because it deprives 8 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977); Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-10; James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 4 (1989): 183-202; Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). In David Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), Ch. 1, I explain the distinction between prima facie and absolute moral principles, drawing from W. D. Rosss moral theory.
122 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15them of everything that they currently value and all that they could value in the future.9 As explained by Marquis:What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victims friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of ones life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, proj ects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted ones future. When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to value.10Or, in the plain-spoken words of Clint Eastwoods character William Unforgiven Its a hell of a thing, killin a man. Take away all hes got, and all hes ever gonna have.11 When we grieve for our loved ones killed in war, we not only feel the loss of their companion ship, we regret the fact that, were it not for the war, they might have lived long, rich lives. Death in battle deprived them of future lives as much worth living as our own. But again, the right of persons not to be killed is not absolute: it or are incapacitated by wounds or sickness; second, a right not to be killed can be forfeited by murderous attackers or terrorist bomb-makers, for instance; and third, a right not to be killed can be waived as in cases where competent patients request assisted suicide or active euthanasia.12 As Marquis argued, Persons who are severely and incurably ill, who face a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die will not have suffered a loss if they are killed.13 Dan Brock similarly contended that the right not to be killed, like other rights, should be waivable when the person makes a competent decision that continued life is no longer wanted or a good, but is instead worse than no further life at all.14Normally it is wrong directly and intentionally to kill innocent persons, innocent meaning either not guilty of a capital crime, or not a threat in war, such as civilian noncombatants and wounded combatants.15 fact that a person is innocent in either sense is morally irrelevant Although active euthanasia is illegal in most countries, Im per where a persons illness or injury is terminal, meaning that all lifesustaining treatments are qualitatively futile, or 2) where the severely sick or wounded victim could theoretically be saved, but the needed 9 If there is an afterlife that is objectively valuable for us, then death would not deprive us of that good. But I and the philosophers I have noted here are focusing exclusively on value in this world and this life. 10 Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 189-190. 11 Unforgiven directed by Clint Eastwood, 1992. Strictly speaking they have not forfeited their right not to be killed, yet it is not unjust in war for their enemies to kill them. As Michael Walzer noted, soldiers on both sides of a war have an equal right to kill. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 41. 13 Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 191. 14 Brock, Life and Death 213, emphasis added. 15 Michael Walzers points about noncombatant immunity are important: We are all immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships. That right is lost by those who bear arms effectively because they pose a danger to other people. It is retained by those who dont bear arms at all Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 145.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 123medical resources are unavailable or extremely scarce (as in conditions unrelenting suffering, when sedation is unavailable, or if sedating them to a state of unconsciousness short of death would be pointless, no better than death itself for them. Even under those conditions, one must obviously not euthanize people against their stated wishes! If they still value their lives, then they have not waived their right not to be killed, no matter what they may have indicated previously. Ideally, active euthanasia should only be done with the informed consent of patients, or, if they are no longer competent to reason, in light of their previously expressed wishes. Military personnel sometimes refer to the soldiers pact, an unwritten code that if one soldier is wounded and on the verge of death, another should hasten the inevitable, which could potentially represent informed consent to euthanasia.16 But there are also some instances of non voluntary active euthanasia competent (or never competent) patients, when they can experience little or nothing more than overwhelming suffering, or when it is no longer possible for them (or anyone else in a similar condition) to value their own continued existence.17 Soldiers sometimes sustain wounds so grave sometimes contemplated, I turn now to several brief cases.18Ambrose Bierces Tale of The Coup de GrceBierce served in the Union army through most of the American Civil War, and later became a famous journalist and essayist. In The Coup de Grce, one of many short stories inspired by his wartime expe rience, he tells of a captain in a Massachusetts infantry regiment named Downing Madwell, who discovers a friend gravely wounded in battle:Sergeant Halcrow was mortally hurt. His clothing was deranged; it seemed to have been violently torn apart, exposing the abdomen.... There had been no great effusion of blood. The only visible wound was a wide, ragged opening it was a loop of small intestine.... The man who had suffered these monstrous mutilations was alive. At intervals he moved his limbs; he moaned at every breath. He stared blankly into the face of his friend and if touched screamed. In his giant agony he had torn up the ground on which he lay; his clenched hands were full of leaves and twigs and earth. Articulate speech was beyond his power; it was impossible to know if he were sensible to anything but pain. The expression of his face was an appeal; his eyes were full of prayer. For what? There was no misreading that look; the captain 16 Kathryn Carlson, An Act of So-Called Mercy: Semrau Case Hinges on Soldiers Pact, National Post July 7, 2010. 17 Glover, Causing Death 190-200; Rachels, End of Life 179-180. 18 A few cases included in a draft version of this essay had to be excluded from publication in Parameters due to space constraints. They examined stories of King Saul of Israel, Napoleons army infected by plague, and Jeremiah Gage at Gettysburg. The author will provide those case analyses to readers upon request to him at email@example.com.
124 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15had too frequently seen it in eyes of those whose lips had still the power to formulate it by an entreaty for death.19Capt. Madwell notices wild pigs in the distance feeding on the bodies of dead soldiers. Though Bierce does not suggest Madwell forsees a similar fate befalling his friend, perhaps while still alive, we are led to imagine that horrifying prospect ourselves. Madwell steps away from the sergeant to shoot a fatally wounded horse; then, having used his last bullet, he plunges his sword into his friends chest. The story ends with suggesting perhaps that Madwell may be punished for his decision to kill his friend rather than call for medical assistance.20It is unclear whether Bierce ever committed or observed any actual coups de grce during the war.21 But he later published some of his views on mercy-killing in a newspaper column: animals, putting them out of misery when unable to relieve it, we are barbarians to withhold from our own kind.... Scores of times it has been my unhappy lot to deny the piteous appeals of helpless precious gift by which a simple movement of the arm I was able and willing to bestowthe simple gift of death. Every physician has had the same experience, and many (may blessings attend them!) have secretly given the relief implored.22Bierce indicates here that he had indeed witnessed cases like Sgt. Halcrows during the war, but unlike Capt. Madwell he regretfully did not perform active euthanasia, perhaps out of fear of being court-martialed.Lawrence of ArabiaT. E. Lawrence asserts in Seven Pillars of Wisdom that the Turks did not take Arab prisoners. Indeed, they used to kill them horribly; so in to be left helpless on abandoned ground.23 Unlike most WWI armies, Lawrences Arab forces typically fought guerrilla-style, far from any a military physician. Eugene Sledge memoir, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa he recalls the murderous hatred that the Marines and Japanese felt for each other, which resulted 19 Ambrose Bierce, The Coup de Grce (1889), http://www.classicreader.com/book/1168/1. 20 Ibid. 21 Bierce came upon dead Union soldiers whose faces had been eaten by wild pigs after a skirmish in West Virginia in 1861. Roy Morris, Ambrose Bierce: Alone in Bad Company (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 31. 22 Ambrose Bierce, The Morality of Suicide, San Francisco Examiner, July 5, 1891, in Ambrose Bierce: A Sole Survivor: Bits of Autobiography, ed. S. Joshi and David Schultz (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998), 225. 23 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 363.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 125 reluctant to take prisoners. The Marines were backs on stretchers getting shot by Japanese snipers while we struggled to evacuate them. None of us could bear the thought of leaving wounded behind. We never did, because the Japanese certainly would have tortured them to death. Corpsmen (Navy medics who also accompany Marine units) learned to be extremely wary of treating wounded Japanese, who invariably exploded grenades when approached killing their enemies along with themselves.24One particularly disturbing incident involved a Marine on Peleliu who found a seriously wounded and partially paralyzed but still-con scious Japanese soldier:The Japaneses mouth glowed with huge gold-crowned teeth, and his captor and hit the handle with the palm of his hand. Because the Japanese was kicking his feet and thrashing about, the knife point glanced off the tooth and sank into the victims mouth. The Marine cursed him and with a slash cut his cheeks open to each ear. He put his foot on the sufferers lower jaw and tried again. Blood poured out of the soldiers mouth. He made a gurgling noise and thrashed wildly. I shouted, Put the man out of his misery. All I got for an answer was a cussing out. Another Marine ran up, put a bullet in the enemy soldiers brain, and ended his agony.25John Masters The Road Past Mandalay, he described a wrenching decision he had to make in May 1944 while commanding a brigade in northern Burma that was about to be overrun by a larger Japanese force. His unit had previ ously cared for and evacuated all of its sick and injured men, through extremely challenging terrain and weather. But now it lacked enough healthy men, horses and mules to safely withdraw all of its wounded: some would have to be left behind. So Masters ordered 19 of those in to be put to death immediately rather than abandoned to die of their wounds or at the hands of their captors. All of those men who were still conscious were given morphine before being shot.26Gene WoodleyArthur Gene Woodley, who served in the US Army in Vietnam, had been captured by the enemy, skinned alive, staked to the ground, and left to die. Still conscious, the victim pleaded with Woodley to kill him; he was near death and far from medical care. After about 20 minutes of anxious deliberation, and the mans continuing requests to die, Woodley 24 Eugene Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 34, 283, 130, 118. 25 Ibid., 120. 26 John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), 253-254.
126 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15shot him in the head. A commentator adds, And after they buried him, buried him deep, Woodley cried.27Incident at Goose GreenOn 2 June 1982 during the war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, approximately 1,200 Argentine prisoners of war were detained in a sheep shed at Goose Green on East Falkland Island. Concerned about piles of artillery ammunition near the shed, the prisoners asked for and obtained permission to move it a safe distance away from them. Unfortunately, as several of them did so, some of the ammunition exploded, possibly due to booby traps set earlier by Argentine soldiers. As recalled by retired British Army Col. David Benest, three POWs died and nine others were badly burnt. A British medic at the scene, Sgt. Fowler, assessed one of the still-burning men to be fatally injured and possibly suffering horribly, and shot him to end his misery. (A subsequent military inquiry concluded that no war crime had been committed.) The other Argentines wounded in the explosion were treated and evacuated; one had to have both legs amputated, and died on the operating table.28Roger Maylunet in IraqOn 21 May 2004, US Army Capt. Rogelio Roger Maynulet was commanding a company of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq. While searching for insurgent forces south of Baghdad near Najaf and Kufa, its driver and passenger were shot. As later reported in Stars and Stripes When a medic pulled the driver out of the car, it was clear he had suf fered critical injuries, with part of his skull blown away.29 Although the medic (for unknown reasons) did not thoroughly examine the victim or attempt to treat him, he told Capt. Maynulet that he was dying. Maynulet then apparently aimed his gun at the driver and shot him twice in the head. The incident was captured on video by an unmanned aerial vehicle, unbeknownst to Maynulet at the time.30Defense witnesses at Maynulets Article-32 hearing (a military grand ate vicinity of the crash, so evacuation of the wounded driver was not possible.31 But Maynulet was subsequently court-martialed on charges of assault with intent to commit murder and dereliction of duty.32 in Soldier Talk: The Vietnam War in Oral Narrative ed. Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 190. that Sgt. Fowler acted in the best of motives, so as to alleviate human suffering. David Benest, e-mail messages to author, January 5-12, 2011. See also John Frost, 2 PARA Falklands: The Battalion at War name. 29 Jason Chudy and Kent Harris, st AD Captain to Face Court-Martial in Shooting Death of Wounded Iraqi Man, Stars and Stripes, December 8, 2004. 30 Nancy Montgomery, Maynulet Enters Not Guilty Plea in Mercy Killing Trial, Stars and Stripes March 29, 2005. 31 Kevin Dougherty, Article 32 Hearing in Death of Iraqi Man Concludes, Stars and Stripes, October 16, 2004. 32 Chudy and Harris, st AD Captain to Face Court-Martial.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 127During his trial, Capt. Maynulets attorney claimed that his actions were guided by the part of the law of war that says maximize humanity, misery. It was the right thing to do. It was the honorable thing to do.33 the laws of war permitting soldiers to execute anyone rendered hors de combat by wounds. Maynulet was convicted by his court-martial panel of assault with the intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, a less serious charge than what he initially faced.34 He was subsequently sentenced with discharge from military service, but no time in prison.35Cardenas Alban and Johnny Horne, Jr.Alban and Horne were both US Army staff sergeants deployed in Baghdad, Iraq. On 18 August 2004, according to Edmund Sanders of the Los Angeles Times their unitreceived a tip that militants in dump trucks were planting roadside bombs. So when Alban saw an object fall from a garbage truck in the distance, his company took positions around the vehicle and unleashed a barrage of hired to work the late shift picking up trash for about $5 a night, witnesses said. Medics scrambled to treat the half a dozen people strewn around the scene. A dispute broke out among a handful of soldiers standing over one severely wounded young man who was moaning in pain. An unwounded Iraqi claiming to be a relative of the victim pleaded in broken English for soldiers to help him. But to the horror of bystanders, Alban retrieved have since characterized the shooting as a mercy killing, citing statements by Alban and Horne that they had shot the wounded Iraqi to put him out of his misery. Military attorneys, however, are calling it premeditated murder and have charged the two sergeants, saying the victims suffering was no excuse for the soldiers actions.36I have not been able to determine whether the medics at the scene made any attempt to treat the man who was shot by Alban and Horne, nor if they did not, why not. Why wasnt he at least given a sedating dose of morphine? Perhaps they were too busy caring for other wounded Iraqis whom they believed had better prospects of survival. The two sergeants were later court-martialed, convicted of murder, and sentenced to prison.37 Thing to Do, Stars and Stripes, March 31, 2005. 34 Nancy Montgomery, U.S. Army Captain Is Found Guilty in Shooting Death of Wounded Iraqi, Stars and Stripes, April 1, 2005. 35 Nancy Montgomery and Ben Murray, Maynulet Is Discharged from Service, but Gets No Jail Time in Death of Iraqi, Stars and Stripes, April 2, 2005. 36 Edmund Sanders, Mercy Killing of Iraqi Revives GI Conduct Debate, Los Angeles Times November 5, 2004. 37 Tim Whitmire, Short Sentences, Dismissals Show Wartime Murder Prosecutions Hard, Associated Press, June 5, 2005.
128 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Robert Semrau in AfghanistanOn 19 October 2008, Canadian Forces Capt. Robert Semrau was serving in Afghanistans Helmand Province with an Operation Mentor Liaison Team (OMLET) on patrol with an Afghan company when they were attacked by the Taliban. An airstrike was ordered, and Apache heli gravely wounded in the stomach and both legs. An Afghan army captain decided that the man should not be treated, for reasons unclear. Capt. Semrau apparently agreed, and decided not to request a medical evacu ation either, in spite of the availability of British helicopters at the time, out of concern the area was still dangerous. (This begs the question, are not their pilots trained and expected to land in dangerous places to save wounded combatants and civilians? Were they even consulted on the decision not to evacuate?) A few minutes later, Semrau walked his chest. As a result, Semrau was court-martialed in 2010 on several charges including second-degree murder.38At his trial, witnesses stated Semrau told them immediately after the incident he felt it was necessary the humane thing to do. He couldnt live with himself if he left an injured human being in this condition.39 Semrau also reportedly said he was willing to accept whatever followed on it and that it was a mercy kill, moreover, he hoped anyone would do the same thing to anyone else, even himself.40In the end, Capt. Semrau was acquitted of murder but convicted on a lesser charge of disgraceful conduct.41 At his sentencing hearing a military prosecutor argued, Those incapacitated by wounds are to be treated humanelythis is one of the basic rules of humanity, this is one of the basic rules of combat. Treating a wounded combatant humanely does not mean accelerating his death.42 Semrau was subsequently demoted to second lieutenant and dismissed from military service by his sentencing judge, but not ordered to serve any time in prison.43 has published extensively in military ethics, commented on the verdict in Semraus case:Its a curious resultif he didnt kill the Afghan, then hes not guilty of disgraceful conduct. If hes guilty of disgraceful conduct, then it follows that National Post Hears, National Post April.27, 2010. 39 Commenting on a hypothetical case based on the Semrau incident, retired Canadian Forces wounded enemy is going to die soon. Who knows who is going to die and when? If he is going to die Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 1 (2010): 11. But I think Bradley underestimates the ability of soldiers to make accurate judgments in cases like Semraus. National Post April 28, 2010. 41 Kathryn Carlson and Andrew Duffy, Semrau Not Guilty of Murdering Taliban Fighter, National Post July 19, 2010. 42 Andrew Duffy, Semrau to Wait until September for Sentencing, National Post July 27, 2010. National Post October 5, 2010.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 129the jurors were convinced that he did the deed, in which case he should also be guilty of murder or manslaughter. It doesnt square very easilyperhaps the only way of making sense of the verdict is that the jury was certain that he shot the body, but could not be certain that the body was alive, in which case the disgraceful conduct is mutilation of a dead body. More probably, sympathy for him and didnt want him sent to prison for life so they found him guilty of something lesser to ensure that he got a lighter sentence but didnt get off scott free. Not good law, probably, but could have made sense to the panel. I should add that if the mortally wounded person had been Canadian, I dont believe for one instant that Capt. Semrau would have shot him.44Matt Gurney, an editor at Canadas National Post wrote sympatheti cally of the dilemma that Semrau faced on the ground in Afghanistan:Capt. Semrau may have broken the law, and there are those who could reasonably argue that he has sinned against God. I would not choose to argue those points. But I will say that were I the soldier in that situation, I would not hesitate to shoot, and were I the broken man waiting to die in the dirt, I would welcome the bullet.45Steven SwannIn 1986 the Academy of Medicine of Washington DC awarded its annual prize in bioethics to Capt. (later Col.) Steven Swann of the US Swanns article caused quite a stir among fellow physicians and bioethi cists in advocating active euthanasia in some wartime circumstances. Writing in the waning days of the Cold War, Swann begins with a plausible scenario in a hypothetical war between NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe. He imagines himself in the role of a surgeon near the front lines who is ordered to evacuate in the face of an advancing enemy, but who cannot possibly take all of his wounded with him. He further speculates that the Russians are executing all severely wounded prisoners, so that they cannot be trusted to care for them if captured; in other words, Swann suggests a situation like the actual one that faced Masters and Lawrence above: all types, of many nationalities, and in greater numbers than previously known. Gunshot and fragment wounds are to be expected, but with the lethal and diverse arsenals available to potential combatants, one must expect more severe and incapacitating wounds, such as multiple trauma, multiple amputations, severe burns, chemical casualties (especially from blister and nerve agents), as well as burns, blast injuries, and lethal contamination from nuclear weapons. Many of the wounded being seen with such injuries will not be attended because treatment will not be technically or physically available. The medical support system will be overcome with wounded, will 44 Paul Robinson, e-mail message to author, January 21, 2011. National Post July 23, 2010. The editors of that periodical made similar points after Semraus sentencing, adding that killing someone out of malice is very different from killing someone out of compassion. Its time National Post October 7, 2010.
130 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15not have enough resources, will not have enough time, and will not have transportation ready to bring the wounded to a treatment facility.46Echoing a famous argument by James Rachels, Swann contends (in contrast to orthodox medical ethics) that there is no necessary moral difference between killing and letting-die, meaning that if someones moreover, active euthanasia can actually be more ethical than letting die, if euthanasia will result in less suffering to a mortally wounded or terminally ill patient.47 I concur.Thomas BeamBeam is a retired colonel who served in the US Army Medical Corps, directed a hospital operating room during the Persian Gulf War, and was a medical ethics consultant to the Army Surgeon General. He volume anthology on military medical ethics, in which he commented on euthanasia in wartime.48Beam notes that the normal moral obligation to respect the autono mous preferences of patients is limited in the military context. For example, although competent civilian patients have a right to refuse all life-sustaining treatments (in which case their physicians must allow them to die), soldiers dont have that right to the same degree or scope: military medics and doctors may be obliged to save soldiers lives against tion, a severely wounded soldier might desperately want to be saved, but may nevertheless be placed by doctors in the lowest-priority category in order to devote critically scarce medical resources on salvageable patients instead.49 able nuance and balance, analyzing directly the provocative positions taken by Swann. Considering in turn several relevant ethical principles distributive justice, and utilityBeam concludes points both for and against euthanasia can be made under each one, making him reluctant be construed both to forbid killing and to forbid allowing someone to suffer needlessly, though physicians have tended historically to side with upholding the current military law and policy (in effect) prohibiting euthanasia, out of a concern for potential abuses if it were legally permit ted. But he admits he could not rule out resorting himself to euthanasia under conditions like those hypothesized by Swann.50 Military Medicine 152, no. 11 (1987): 546. 47 James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975): 78-80, and End of Life in Military Medical Ethics Surgeon General, Department of the Army, and Borden Institute, 2003), 367-402. 49 Ibid., 379, 383-384. 50 Ibid., 384-394.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 131Michael GrossGross teaches applied and professional ethics at the University of Haifa and has served in the Israeli military. His many publications include one of the most comprehensive treat ments of the subject published by a single author.51Gross argues that the normal obligation of military medical person nel not to abandon their wounded can be overridden by military necessity in cases where doing so would put an important military mission at risk, such as delay a tactical retreat in circumstances experienced by Masters and imagined by Swann. Gross further claims that soldiers who have been incapacitated by woundsat least if their wounds will prevent them from ever returning to combathave thoroughly ceased being combatants and thus regain all the rights they had as civilians, includ ing a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, which Gross contends military organizations rarely recognize.52 But then, very few civilians anywhere in the world have a legal right to obtain active euthanasia, even where they have the right to refuse all life-sustaining treatments. So the question becomes, do mortally wounded soldiers have a moral right to be euthanized, in spite of legal and professional prohibitions? Like Rachels and Swann, Gross believes there is not always a clear moral difference between passive and active euthanasia, since even passive euthanasia can be immoral if done with evil intent, e.g., to collect on their life insurance. But unlike Rachels and Swann, and consistent with orthodox medical ethics as evinced by Par and Desgenettes, Gross regards the intentional killing of patients as always immoral. So, accord in the face of an overwhelming enemy advance, it would be unethical to use active euthanasia on them (as Masters ordered in Burma), even when those soldiers are likely to die of their wounds in great suffer ing. Curiously, Gross seems to be vaguely amenable to euthanasia in the face of near-certain torture by enemies. But overall, he judges, Commanders may place their soldiers in harms way but they may not kill them. Although he thinks that withholding life-sustaining treat ment on request is not murder, he contends killing on request is still murder.53However, Grosss argument against active euthanasia stumbles in any less horrible from the victims perspective than dying under enemy torture, hence why euthanasia would be clearly wrong in the former case acceding to the request of competent adults to kill them is obviously unlike murder in that respectin other words, Gross ignores the ques tion of whether competent adults can credibly waive their right not to be killed (as Brock persuasively argued they could). 51 Michael Gross, (London: MIT Press, 2006). 52 Ibid., 127. 53 Ibid., 129-134.
132 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Stephen DeakinDeakin is a professor of leadership at the United Kingdoms Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. His 2013 article, Mercy Killing in Battle, is one of the most recent scholarly treatments of the subject. The greatest strength of this essay lies in Deakins rich use of vivid narratives of wartime mercy killing during the past two centuries, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War, both world wars, and recent than civilians have assumed, in part because veterans have been reluc tant to speak or write about it.54However, Deakins ethical analysis is problematic in some respects. are repugnant. Intentionally to take an innocent persons life is a very 55 Legally that is true, it is a war crime, an atrocity; but if Deakin has already concluded that ethically it is murder, then there was no reason for him killing) is unethical. His point would have been clearer had he stated more narrowly that mercy killing is considered murder under the laws Second, Deakin claims because mercy killing is outside of battle (or combat) per se, therefore the ethical considerations of jus in bello do not apply. Here the author makes a serious mistake, since the jus in bello criteria of noncombatant immunity, military necessity and proportional ity clearly bear on whether it is permissible intentionally and directly to kill noncombatants. In other words, jus in bello criteria are obviously relevant to mercy killings. At the very least, Deakin would need to show exceptions to the jus in bello rules, and ideally also to wrestle with what those exceptions would entail in terms of to last resorta jus ad bellum criterion not obviously appropriate in this seems to encompass several ethical principles that ought rather to be distinguished.56 differ from end-of-life choices in peacetime hospital settings, where withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments can occur in light of a patients advance directive, medical prognosis, etc. But, he also rightly hints that domestic euthanasia debates may have increasing 57 This reader wishes that he had explored those connections in more depth, since there can be important similari ties regarding consent (e.g., waiving ones right not to be killed), scarcity or futility of life-sustaining treatments, alleviation of severe suffering, and whether patients/soldiers value extending their lives any further. 54 Stephen Deakin, Mercy Killing in Battle, Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 2 (2013): 162-171.. 55 Ibid., 163. 56 Ibid., 172-177. 57 Ibid., 172, 178.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS & MILITARY ETHICS Perry 133As argued above, as people have a prima facie right not to be killed, it is usually unethical to kill anyone who poses no imminent lethal threat to others, or has not committed a capital crime. However, Im die in agony from wounds or disease. Thus, I am uncomfortable with 58But should we change military laws to permit mercy-killing? Several US Marine Corps lawyer Col. Stephen Shi argues that hard cases make bad law, and concludes that it is better to keep the rule for soldiers very simple: do not kill anybody who is not a threat.59 A similar view is held by retired US Army lawyer Col. Fred Taylor, who also thinks it would be unfair to ask soldiers to bear the burden of making euthanasia deci sions or carrying them out, given all of the other pressures and traumas weighing on them in combat and counterinsurgency operations.60 Retired US Army Col. Robert Knutson, worried about the effects of shock and sedation on seriously wounded combatants, doubts that we could plausibly consider their requests for euthanasia under such condi tions to be rational. He also believes it would be dangerous to allow soldiers to make euthanasia decisions for others.61 These are important concerns, though they might be eliminated by restricting those autho exclusively. for medics to treat wounds and save lives as best they can, and use as much morphine as needed to alleviate suffering, even if the dose required might also suppress the victims breathing. (In the domestic medical context, this is sometimes called terminal sedation.) Some even tougher cases may continue to arise in war, where the numbers of seriously wounded soldiers overwhelm the ability of medics to treat or sedate them, or when military necessity requires the most gravely wounded to be abandoned. In those situations, I fully sympathize with commanders who feel compelled to end their misery directly rather than let them suffer and die of wounds or torture. I confess, though, that I am unable to construct a satisfactory rule incorporated into legal Rules of Engagement, let alone see any possibility of relevant changes being made to our more fundamental treaty obliga tions under the Geneva Conventions. The general rule against directly and intentionally killing anyone who is not a threat is so important in euthanasia is illegal, it therefore cannot uphold Kantian obligations to act only on universalizeable maxims and treat persons as ends and not merely as means. But he ignores questions of whether the law itself should be changed to uphold the right of a competent patient to obtain active euthanasia, and whether respect for human dignity permits nonvoluntary euthanasia, in or out of wartime. 59 Stephen Shi, e-mail message to author, January 21, 2011. (See also Gross, Bioethics and Armed 60 Fred Taylor, telephone message to author, December 29, 2010, and e-mail message to author, January 16, 2011. 61 Robert Knutson, e-mail message to author, December 3, 2010.
134 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 psychological terrors and hatreds that war induces, that it seems unwise of mercy-killing.62 This may seem an anticlimactic conclusion to reach there are previously mentioned precedents for that combination of views suicide, but also prohibit active euthanasia, out of concern that legalizing the latter would lead to regrettable abuses. However, it may be that consideration of the kinds of harrowing dilemmas that I have explored in this essay might at least encourage court-martial panels and convening authorities to impose lenient sen 62 See my book Partly Cloudy ch. 4 on Anticipating and Preventing Atrocities in War.
Review Essay American Declinism: A Review of Recent LiteratureMichael DanielsIs America in decline, yet again? Recent literature suggests some negative trends an erosion of power, legitimacy and authority that bodes ill for the future of American primacy. However, this perspective is not new. At least three other American declinist periods have arisen since the 1950s, and others still earlier in US history. Some pundits say this time rise of the rest, especially China. Others disagree, and contend there are no current ills that cannot be cured. Some claims are overstated, some appear to be repackaged from previous warnings, and others are simply repeating popular conceptions within political, policy, media, and social circles. reviewed below were chosen because they were authored by respected provide the reader a full appreciation of the current debate, and are no single book published to date completely addresses this complicated domestic and international debate.The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Good for the West The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Good for the West by Charles Kenny. Kenny is an economist, and currently a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development. As the subtitle of his book indicates, America and the West may be in decline, but the rest of the world is trending upward, which should be a reason for celebration. Kenny provides a unique argument amongst declinists. He sees global advances in public health, education, and economic opportunity providing oppor tunities for growth and stability. His main argument is the United States and the West must better understand this current trend, embrace this new world economic order. Kenny faults many of the policy pre scriptions proposed by declinists. He views Charles Kenny, The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Good for the West (New York: Basic Books, 2014). 256 pages. $26.99 Colonel Michael Daniels is a US Army and a 2014 USAWC graduate. He is currently assigned as the Chief of Plans and Operations for United States Forces Korea Engineers. Books Reviewed: The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Good for the West By Charles Kenny Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent By Edward Luce The Myth of Americas Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophesies By Josef Joffe The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat By Vali Nasr Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order By Richard N. Haass
136 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15their pessimism as unnecessary and myopic; US leadership cannot reverse this global trend. In this view, he veers away from mainstream decline is not a condition. Decline is a choice. Kenny says we need to accept and prepare for this new world order rather than building an ineffectual bulwark against the inevitable tide of change. He sees increases in global health and prosperity creating a more resilient and level platform on which to trade and interact, which also decreases the amount of resources America has to invest while securing the world. an interconnected world in an era of globalization. In his estimation, since economics is not a zero-sum game there can be no losers, only (BRICSand others in the developing world) generally has a positive ink-spot model has some validity, but it is incomplete in its description in nationalist tensions, especially in South and East Asia. He claims the risk of global misunderstanding and violence will be reduced through these economic linkages, and the potential for clashing civilizations is so far, as the world is starting to observe.Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of DescentKennys glossy reassurances may be uplifting, but they are neither pragmatic nor substantive. Edward Luces Time to Start Thinking offers a much darker outlook. nalistmost recently as the Washington bureau chief for the Financial Times Kennys optimistic description of the current state of affairs is worlds away from that described by Luce, as evidenced by this books subtitle of America and the Spectre of Decline. Luce is not an optimist; nor is he a doomsayer. However, his book paints a stark picture of anti-Democracy in America. Luces description of what ails America is very detailed and thorough, and his list impressive. As such he provides both a width and depth to his argument and main thesis, that America has lost its essential pragmatism but retained its cuts two ways. Luces contention is that creed now trumps both sub stance and action, resulting in a sclerosis from which the United States Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012). 320 pages. $26.00
Review Essay: Daniels 137may not recover. It is a dark work. One reviewer, Jonathan Rauch, wrote Luce has structured his book around the main challenges facing America: an education system in decline, a hollowing out of the middle class, a decrease in investment in research and development and decline in innovation, an oversized and ineffective bureaucracy, and the poison and special interests in a never-ending election cycle. Again, there are very few, if any, positive takeaways from this book. Luce sees America as increasingly divided between camps of cynics and hypocrites, with the Like Kenny, Luce does not believe the rise of the rest is a threat, but rather a trend to be celebrated for its likely and potential positive impact around the world. His critique is reserved for the increasingly dysfunctional US political, social, and economic infrastructures. Luce tionalism overcame past challenges. He believes, regardless of what may happen to a rising China, European Union, or other state actors, America has lost its ability to shape its destiny, perhaps permanently. Luce contends US leaders and policymakers lack the ability and will to pursue policies required to turn the country around. He says most of politically viable. He sees the rise of political risk aversion as one reason for inaction, with the concomitant rise of the tyranny of the minority movement, less for its ideology and more for the corrosive impact it has and suppleness of US government, and as such he cannot envisage action. Even then, as he points out, both Presidents Bush and Obama wasted their opportunities for serious, enduring reforms when pre Luces conclusion is Americas challenges are not unique, either viewed through the lens of history or in the challenges faced by con temporary western nations. However, he believes this time is different, seen events will somehow change the dynamic and stem this negative but cannot see how its leaders can overcome the increasing friction to to the writing of Josef Joffe.The Myth of Americas Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False ProphesiesJoffe is the German publisher-editor of Der Zeit a Hoover Institution fellow and a Stanford educator. He has been a long-time supporter of the idea that is America. In many respects his enthusiasm and posi Joffes latest book is The Myth of Americas Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophesies
138 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15a self-defeating prophecy, and declinists purposefully sound the alarm. Why? Joffe provides a number of post-World War II is falling only so they can be seen to save interpretation is hard to refute given the facts he presents. However, it is a thin argument, particu larly in light of the many issues facing the United States. On this point, Joffe claims, unlike previous empires, no outside power will be the downfall of America; that task can only be accomplished by America. He argues against the simplistic linear interpretations of history many declinist commentators appear to offer. He saves particular invective for Paul Kennedy, whose book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers is described as a doom-saying prophecy, which is hardly the popular view. Luce describes seems dismissed or ignored in Joffes work. Any reader who tackles these books in tandem will wonder if the authors are talking about the same country; their views are that different. It is as though Joffe has written the book to reassure US leaders, as well as key allies and partners. Joffe sees no cause for alarm; the United States will weather this down period, as it has all others. Joffe still views the United States as the worlds berpower (the title of his previous book), and as no state is capable of assuming the is the lack of will (or ability) to act. Again, Joffe fails to address US domestic challenges in depth. As such, he misses the critical correla tion and friction between domestic and international policy. America cannot be the global leader he envisions with its fractious and issueweakens his argument that China will never overtake the United States. As Joffe himself wrote, only America can do in America. According to Luce and others, the United States appears to be well down that path.The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat on the United States role as world leader, and discuss decline relative to others, not necessary to America alone. Vali Nasr, currently the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and formerly a senior advisor to Richard Holbrooke, has written The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat Foreign Policy Begins at Home by Richard Haass, president of the Council The Myth of Americas Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophesies (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013). 352 pages. $26.95
Review Essay: Daniels 139on Foreign Relations. Both authors refute current claims of decline, but each offers a different interpretationNasr focuses on US leadership and foreign policy choices, ences through a domestic lens. Vali Nasrs book is highly critical of the foreign policy decisions of the Obama administration. His view is informed by his disillusion with the political process Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nasr contends President Obama too often fell in line with the destructive policies of his predecessor, and pursued foreign policy. His criticisms are at times the power of diplomacy when backed by to link with and support Nasrs policy prescriptions for China and the Middle East. His descriptions of endless turf battles, and what appears to be unvarnished praise for Ambassador Holbrooke further serve to detract from his overall argument. Nasr supports aggressive involvement in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, the Middle East (especially in Iran and Syria), and with China. Nasr would have the United States engage more in these regions, and believes Washington has not reached out enough. Again, the author neglects to consider domestic political realities and challenges, believing international credibility trumps domestic will. President Obamas prag matism falls short in Nasrs liberal internationalist worldview, which is one reason for his title choice (though he inaccurately attributes the original indispensable nation quote to President Clinton, rather than Secretary Albright). In the end Nasrs book is wanting. His critiques and foreign policy recommendations are either too aggressive and off the mark (as with China), politically untenable (as with Iran), or not in the vital interests of the United States (as with the remainder of the Middle East). Nasrs book is still a worthy addition to the foreign policy debate given its breadth greatest contribution may be in developing a case for future Afghanistan and Pakistan policies. Lastly, his concern that America is now seen inter nationally as dispensable is off the mark. While President Obamas pragmatism can be characterized at times as over cautious, the admin istration has had to prioritize domestic over international policy. Nasr does not understand, or recognize, the political aspects of US leadership. One author who does recognize this dynamic is Richard Haass, as evidenced by his recent book Foreign Policy Begins at Home He admits the title seems a bit strange coming from a longtime foreign policy hand. Haass view of US global leadership in the current environ ment is more constrained than that proposed by Nasr. Haass terms his By Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2013). 320 pages. $28.95
140 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15approach restoration, as in getting the domestic house in order and being more discriminate in international forays. Haass also differs with Nasr on where the United States should prioritize its international efforts. Haass position nests with that of the current administration in terms of an emphasis given to the Middle East. admits he did not write it to suggest pos sible policy options. Haass does not believe America is in decline, but he thinks it is performing suboptimally. His emphasis is on rebuilding at home and refocusing abroad, characteristic of the pragmatism demonstrated by the current administra tion. He provides some detail on how to improve the economy and domestic climate, with an emphasis on domestic spending reforms to reduce the national debt. Haass also modestly outlines requirements for energy security, economic growth, educational opportunity, and sustainable immigra tion policies. His domestic recommendations are sound, but too general and cautious to be of great value for readers wanting more substance. tential threat, and this presents a unique opportunity to refocus at home. However, he is concerned about those who would carry that effort too far, and chart a more isolationist course. His concerns are warranted given current debate and rhetoric. Haass greatest contribution is his emphasis on the need to prioritize US interests abroad. His recommen dations are sound, not surprisingly, given the depth and breadth of his strongly encourages avoiding further wars of choice. He believes the United States will weather this period after a brief respite, but only if it takes this moment in history to get its domestic house in order. place in the world at a time when there are great challenges at home and debate regarding the phenomenon of decline, and its causes and impacts described by Edward Luce, nor as bright as characterized by Josef Joffe. Decline may be a choice or a state of mind, and may or may not apply to the United States currently. Most contemporary writers agree the United transition, and the United States must prepare itself to provide stability, opportunity, and leadership. Richard Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York: Basic Books, 2014). 224 pages. $15.99
This commentary is in response to David S. Sorensons article Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS published in the Autumn 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 3).In Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS, David Sorenson makes a compelling case that the brutal Islamic tenets. Sorenson uses his extensive knowledge of prominent ISIS on other Muslims, minorities within the region, and Westerners falls well outside the scope of even the most conservative interpretathe most legitimate source of Islam, the Quran. Sorenson thus lends the basic tenets and historical traditions of Islam. From this solid base, Sorenson makes a less credible assertion that he notes, the State Departments Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications has been an abject failure in countering the appeal of ISIS. Despite the State Departments best efforts, ISIS has managed to is to mount covert information operations providing funding and support to Muslim voices willing to facilitate an anti-ISIS narrative. To these efforts he would also devote some attention to educating Muslims in a better understanding of traditional Islam. A combined information and education campaign might indeed contribute to the defeat of ISIS and like-minded terrorist organizations. Commentaries & Replies On Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISISDr. Chris Bolan teaches national making, and Middle Eastern studies at a strategic intelligence East Foreign Area as an advisor to Vice Presidents Gore and his MA and PhD from Georgetown
142 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 of Islamic learning in Cairo, characterized the attack as a criminal and condolences to the people of France and the families of the victims. Iranian President Rouhani denounced the attacks as terrorism and people are alien to the doctrine and teachings of Islam. There are no vulnerable to the messages of these extremists? Washington Post colum in fostering and funding partnerships between local law enforcement agencies and Muslim communities in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Leaders, parents, imams, and police in these communities can be sensitized to the warning signs of radicalization. Such programs can provide those most vulnerable to extremist messages constructive alternatives to joining violent organizations (such as participating in with international and national intelligence organizations, these same terrorism, it is remarkable that a strategic approach grounded in intel ligence and law enforcement does not receive more attention. is also correct in arguing a solution to Islamic extremist violence will a US-led covert information campaign alone will make to the defeat of ISIS and other Islamist terrorist organizations.
Commentaries & Replies 143The Author RepliesDavid S. SorensonI information campaign against the Islamic State, though I am a bit marginal progress in the ideological battle with ISIS. I agree; at the conargue for dramatic results in a counter-ISIS information campaign. In combating a determined foe, almost all aspects of the campaign will It took a half militant per airstrike. In war operations, most parts of the overall campaign contribute marginal results, to include information operations. be no more marginal than airstrikes have been. While Bolan argues I overestimate the contribution an informa tion operations campaigns to assess the overall value of such operations, nor does he suggest reasons why narratives condemning violence in the name of Islam, stating, Muslim statements from Muslim leaders condemning violence in Islams reasons why the murders of innocent Muslims, the judgment of Yazadi, Alawi, Shia, and non-radical Sunni as apostates, and the declaration of a caliphate without Muslim consent. Statements declaring shock and horror ISIS belief and praxis, or statements from respected Islamic theorists practices as wonton Washington Post New York Times
144 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Bolan argues partnerships between law enforcement and Muslim communities might be more effective than an information war campaign, but he offers no evidence to support his claim. I agree that such partner 3 But it is critical to note that relations between law enforcement and Muslim communities have been fraught with distrust on both sides, and it will diagnose the warning signs of radicalization, requires that such signs marginal difference. efforts to defeat this terrorist organization. So it has been in all wars; the Gardens in an overall effort to defeat the Axis, and in Vietnam, So it is with the overall campaign to defeat ISIS, but given the danger that ISIS poses American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (Washington, D.C.: Armed Forces & Society
This commentary is in response to Daniel Glickstein and Michael Spanglers article "Reforming the Afghan Security Forces" published in the Autumn 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 3).Daniel Glickstein and Michael Spangler deserve commendation for their combined effort. It is highly gratifying to see an article together about the importance of ANSF force development, achieving some measure of enduring success. expansion of the Afghan Local Police under the mentorship of Afghan accountability and continued international assistance are essential elements of assuring lasting stability and security in Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that, as is so often the case, available budgets drive strat To lend perspective to their proposal, it is important to step back adoption of counterinsurgency and the misfortunately time-bound surge that began in 2009 in reality amounted to compensation for Operation Enduring Freedom relied on effective economy of force that Operation Enduring Freedom should have evolved from that successful method. Instead, indiscriminate manhunting for Al Qaeda terrorists reasonably effective ANSF at a much more sustainable size say 50,000 On Reforming the Afghan Security ForcesTodd Greentree 2014 Todd Greentree Todd Greentree is a the Oxford Changing Character of War Programme. A former political-military advisor to Task Force in Kandahar, and Initiatives Group in 2010-11.
146 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Discard the politically infeasible option of resuming direct intervention, its dubious variants of size and unsustainability. that envisions a long-term partnership for strengthening the Afghan quences, as both 9-11 and the eruption of ISIS in Iraq and Syria signify. the main effort of the surge in 2010-11 experienced surprisingly rapid plan helped mobilize support for Loy Kandahar to link village, district, center of gravity and strengthening the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan state. Our obligation to the Afghans includes sustained light footprint counterinsurgency that integrates political-military strategy and is based
Commentaries & Replies 147The Authors ReplyDaniel GlicksteinW that the incorporation of local defense forces into specially consolidate regime change, seems inherently limited in duration due to the high costs involved. As a result, the effectiveness of a surge appears attempted too many lines of effort, thereby diluting the paramount mission of training and equipping Afghan security forces. Indeed, the retention and building civil society. While more historical data on the surge needs to be examined, this soldier body-counts rose, and the reputation and capability of the Afghan soldiers amidst declining budgets, more resources and attention must be mitigate these threats. focused solely upon the enemy and ignoring the civilian population has been a critical failing of the Afghan strategy and must be avoided in the future.1 US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute,
148 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 claim the Coalition expanded Taliban recruitment in 2005 partly by trying to identify and detain Taliban suspects in the south and east of Afghanistan.2 If true, these actions helped to promote the Taliban resurgence. percentage of hardened extremists constituted the irreconcilable core cal reconciliation over kinetic strikes, the Afghan government can and should pursue local defense programs to co-opt this majority into efforts by localized security forces. This strategy has the potential to end the perpetuation of the insurgency. Moving beyond insurgents, the larger stability of the Afghan state is directly tied to the success or failure of its government. Periodic vio lence seems inescapable, as the current headlines regarding attacks in of Paris. Nigeria, conversely, continues to suffer from corruption and The desired end-state is a strong, legitimate Afghan government remain in chaos and a safe haven for extremists. As Scott Mann argues, Afghanistan requires persistent long-term security assistance combining in setting up localized defense capabilities.3 Only by going local and irrelevant. Global Research, Edited Transcript of a Public lecture at the Small Wars Journal, July 30, 2014.
STRATEGY & POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EEAsST Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East By William C. TaylorReviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War CollegeThe actions of Arab military leadership were overwhelmingly impor tant during the recent Arab Spring uprisings, though they receive less scrutiny than they deserve. The narratives of these struggles are usually dominated by imagery of young people standing up to regime police and hired thugs or outmaneuvering them with social media. These aspects careful calculations before choosing a side, but the latter activities were equally important to the outcomes of the crises. William C. Taylor has of national militaries in the Arab uprisings. In particular, the military leadership of all these countries had to decide whether they would remain decisions were not always easy. and Libya. The author also occasionally mentions the unrest in Bahrain and Yemen, though these countries are not addressed in any compre history and structure of the Arab militaries central to his case studies. Sometimes the authors major points get a bit lost in the details, but in general Taylors methodical approach allows one to understand a great neither do they wish to go down with an unpopular regime. Unsurprisingly, Arab militaries did not respond uniformly to the of defense. The security units vanguard status allowed the military to remain on the sidelines while internal security forces struggled to defeat angry protestors, often using deadly force. Tunisias army, which the regime and carefully gauged the progress of the protestors in their struggle against the detested government. When Tunisian dictator Zein Tunisian Armed Forces, to support faltering regime loyalists, the general In the aftermath of the confrontation, the military dramatically improved Book Reviews New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014 363 pages $100.00
150 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 hero of the revolution. change did not mean it had given up its considerable economic assets across the country or its respected role in society. Nevertheless, many son would run for president until almost the last minute when such promises were viewed as desperate and insincere. Neither Taylor nor any succession in pushing the military away from the regime, but it may neutral for quite some time, balancing statements about peoples legiti mate rights with assertions that looting and criminality would not be tolerated. When it became clear the protestors were gaining the upper hand and the armys inaction was threatening its interests, they decided were relatively rapid and decisive, events occurred in an almost totally opposite manner in Syria. In the years prior to the Assad family rule, Syria was notoriously prone to military coups. This situation changed father) began. Under both Assads, every effort was made to coup proof the regime, which ruled largely by fear and was structured to crush any internal revolt. When a March 2011 uprising occurred in Syria, the regime had both the tools and the will to respond with over whelming brutality. In Syria, the military leadership was dominated by members of President Assads Alawite religious minority who, displayed fervent support for the regime policies, fearing unyielding revenge in government brutality led to new defections among Sunni soldiers, but enough of the military remained loyal, or intimidated, to prevent regime defeat. Although the Assad regime offered limited concessions to the protesters, it relied more heavily upon its security services and the military to implement a policy of unrestrained and indiscriminant use of force. The policies have so far allowed the regime to survive. The Libyan military was different from the other armed services had previously faced a number of coup attempts and therefore treated with informants and peoples commissars. Libya maintained a deeply services, African mercenaries, and elite military units often under the
Book Reviews: Strategy & Policy in the Middle East 151 units remained loyal to the dictator, while many within the neglected, non-elite forces eventually sided with the revolutionaries. Sometimes the non-elite forces remained non-committal until the revolutionar ies seemed to have a good chance of overthrowing the dictator. The NATO decision to use airpower to support the revolutionaries naturally increased the willingness of waverers to commit to the rebels, ensuring London-educated Bashar Assad) showed no inclination to favor demo variety of reasons such as improving communications between US forces and corporate identity. Taylor further supports his conclusions with a participated in US-sponsored training and military education or other discredits views that Arab military cravings for US-style democracy Americas Challenges in the Greater Middle East: The Obama Administrations Policies Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, Levant Division Chief, J-5, Deputy and Defense Attach to Syria. P seven sources of tension between the United States and the Islamic World. In an attempt to draw a distinction between his and the previous development were mutual interests that must be addressed so Muslim countries and the United States to forge a new relationship after the New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2011 288 pages $34.00
152 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 President Obamas Cairo speech is a theme that winds its way through Americas Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Afghanistan, all deal with President Obamas attempt to distance himself from the previous administration and to reestablish a positive that would shape the Obama administrations relationship with the Arab world: the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring, and the attempt to re-draw Americas relationship with Iran. From the vantage point of late tions attempt to force democracy on Arab governments and Obamas non-intervention in internal governance. The interventions in Libya, the in the region and engage these governments in their internal affairs. the Bush administration resulted in a loss of US credibility with Arab attempt to repair that credibility. It is true that Obama has not been as close to Israel as the previous two administrations, but his administra settlements and prosecuting war on Palestinians. Additionally, Sunni tion may be abandoning them in pursuit of what they consider is an ill-advised dtente with Iran. administration and lauding Obama. Chapters on Saudi Arabia, Israel and in other chapters, there is some diversity and insight. Written just after transition will unfold over years, not months. A balanced chapter on chapter on Afghanistan cautions against using the number of US troops on the ground as a metric for stability. Americas Challenges in the Greater Middle East will be more relevant and
Book Reviews: Strategy & Policy in the Middle East 153wonders if such an approach further undermines the United States action against the Assad regime in Syria and its halting intervention against the Islamic State in Iraq, one wonders if in some corners of the region, there is a wistful longing for the interventionist days of his predecessor.
154 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 Whitehall, London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2012 160 pages $25.00 STRATEGY & NNUCLEAR WAR The Permanent Crisis: Irans Nuclear Trajectory By Shashank JoshiReviewed by Christopher J. Bolan, PhD, Professor of National Security Studies, US Army War CollegeT and clearly written analysis does an admirable job of placing Irans contemporary policy debates over how best to deal with Irans growing convergence of American and Iranian interests on regional issues in these early days of the war against terrorism. The Iranian military was actively supporting the efforts of both the CIA and US Special Forces to supply the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Iranian diplomats facilitated successful US negotiations leading to the Bonn Agreement in 2001, and the establishment of a transitional national government in ber the United States and Iran continue to share many of these same ing stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. threat perceptions and seriously undermined prospects for a negoti
Book Reviews: Strategy & Nuclear War 155 istic goal of eliminating all Iranian enrichment activities. In the absence of a negotiated solution, however, Iran has proceeded with the creation against Iranian nuclear facilities the obvious alternative should a strategy grounded in sanctions or negotiations fail. More importantly the international inspections regime in Iran. The third major chapter, The Implications of a Nuclear Iran, of a nuclear-armed Iran while downplaying some of the more alarmist be effectively constrained by more traditional strategies of containment tion in Asia and concludes an Iranian nuclear weapons capability need argues nuclear weapons will have only limited utility to leaders in Tehran primarily as a deterrent to foreign military interventions aimed at Western and Iranian interests even should Iran eventually develop a nuclear weapon. On Limited Nuclear War In the 21st Century Reviewed by Rebecca Davis Gibbons, PhD candidate in International Relations at Georgetown UniversityConsider for a moment that in 2015 a single nuclear weapon has just The twelve authors in the volume On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014 312 pages $27.95
156 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15tensions and opportunities for miscalculation in the South China Sea, ing nuclear weapons, and President Vladimir Putin posting video of be increasing. In twelve distinct and diverse chapters, the authors consider the theory, practice, and implications of limited nuclear war. In contrast to sions: numbers of nuclear weapons used, scope of the area affected, the duration of use, political objectives of use, and the targeting plan. chapters focused especially on the concept of limited war should read section. Century, provides considerations for how limited nuclear war could and far-fetched to readers. Instead, this middle section could have been bases for how nuclear weapons might come to be used in the future and then adding accompanying real-life scenarios for each theory. Theories in crisis, use for war termination, etc.) but a chapter dedicated to ering the scope of possible use and policy-options for addressing such contingencies. be disrupted. Quester touches on the need for the United States to consider how to reestablish this pattern, or tradition, after nuclear use. After an instance of nuclear use the United States and its allies will have
Book Reviews: Strategy & Nuclear War 157 in the 21st Century, includes a useful chapter in which Bruce Blair provides a net assessment of US capabilities for engaging in a limited nuclear war, noting areas where US capabilities may need to adapt. chapters in this volume, a complete reading of the entire volume will provide the reader with a valuable tutorial on a breadth of topics related appreciation of the great and sometimes contradictory nuclear chal lenges facing the United States today: reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in a world where the relevance is increasing for some actors, while maintaining a nuclear arsenal credible to allies and adversaries Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, editorsReviewed by Bradley A. Thayer, University of Iceland/Hskla slandsO proliferation has moved beyond the transatlantic environment to Asia. While there are similarities with deterrence during the Cold War, this nuclear weapons to more states, and to the connection between nuclear Second, the authors evaluate how the Second Nuclear Age impacts the In this short review, it is not possible to give each chapter the atten strategic doctrine. This chapter well captures the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy from the Maoist period until today. In a masterful analy sis, the authors consider Chinese nuclear doctrine and the growth in and one in which the nuclear deterrence mission is incorporated with cause of great concern in Asia and to the United States and could lead to instability in a confrontation with the United States. This is because actions. In this respect, a danger faced in the Cold War might be worse Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012 256 pages $32.95
158 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 The chapter is concise but rich in evaluation of Chinas strategic forces, doctrine and training; hence it should inform analyses of Chinas strategic direction. would go nuclear. While this concern was important in the First Nuclear Age, is has greater resonance in the Second. This change is due to the growth in Chinese power and its consequences, particularly for power after Taiwan. It is also due to the reduced US conventional force struc The study is well balanced and the authors cover their topics concisely. strategy and many of the dangers faced by the United States and the will remain as a useful prism through which to understanding nuclear proliferation, its consequences, and nuclear developments in South and Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation By Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. Von HippelReviewed by Ward Wilson, award winning writer and scholar, director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project, and a Senior Fellow at British American Security Information Council (BASIC)Unmaking the Bomb stays unmade. The faculty of the Army War Collegemany of them veterans of the 1 Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014 291 pages $30.00
Book Reviews: Strategy & Nuclear War 159 ing machines of the 20th century. The authors of Unmaking the Bomb capacity as the crucial element in the problem, rather than numbers. tiveness of nuclear weapons this question is important. But in the long run, it is also important to focus on the larger question of national capacity. Unmaking the Bomb focuses on the process behind all those warheadsthe capacity that underlies an arsenal. Unmaking the Bomb presents, in careful and meticulous detail, a persuasive case that the best way to deal with nuclear weapons, over be feasible to eliminate the worlds arsenals of nuclear weapons, the Unmaking the Bomb which nuclear weaponry could be effectivelyand verilyeliminated. The narration is a model of clarity, which is particularly impressive problems for more than 20 years and two of them have been internation of the authors; this serious problem can only be resolved with careful ground.
160 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 visually representing data is much harder than it seems and the tables and graphs in this volume are models of careful, clear presentation. Its a they might sensibly be controlled and eventually eliminated, there is simply no better source.
Book Reviews: Military Ethics 161 MILITARY EETHICsS The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical By Pauline M. KaurinReviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of St. AndrewsIn The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare such as the question of the moral and legal equality of combatants, drone two are covered in the same chapter, given their moral implications are humanitarian interventions. warfare. A few words on the presentation, before I turn to the more sub abbreviations included. spicuously absent from the bibliography.1 chapter to the reformulation of the distinction between combatants and civilians, in which she opts for a broadening of the range of categories from clear-cut combatants to vulnerable civilians and claims this is The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War University Press, 2009). Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, VT, 2014 150 pages $104.94
162 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15direct participation in hostilities, which addresses precisely this issue.2 More importantly, the latter suggests a completely different approach, which upholds the dichotomy between combatants and civilians, but introduces temporary suspensions of civilian protections for those civil the teaching of military ethics. of the concept of asymmetric warfare. Unfortunately, she comes up attempt to alter the discourse and ground rules about what constitutes teaching of military ethics, which is indeed a worthwhile and oftenneglected topic at staff colleges around the world. The parts in which could have negative moral and unconvincing.The Morality of Private War. The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies. By James PattisonReviewed by Birthe Anders, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, Kings College LondonScholars in war studies have long been concerned whether Private and undermine the democratic control of military force in effect, whether the companies are nothing more than modern-day mercenaries. The Morality of Private War very comprehensive and thorough way. The short answer is, from a moral point of view, PMSCs should not be used. The longer answer is much Pattison, a professor of politics at the University of Manchester, ing individuals, the employment of PMSCs by states and alternative arrangements of military force, as well as the companies effect on the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law University Press, 2014 272 pages $82.50
Book Reviews: Military Ethics 163 of current regulation and proposes how military force should ideally be highlight crucial points in Pattisons argument. Central to the authors analysis is what he calls the Cumulative Legitimacy Approach, by which the legitimacy of the military can be assessed. Pattison argues prominent theories of civil-military relations the morality of force. According to the Cumulative Legitimacy Approach Proper Treatment of Military Personnel, and Communal Bonds. These features are scalar and cumulative. Thus, not doing well on one of the whether it is allowed under just war and human rights criteria. Pattison rightly observes one of the most prominent objections to private mili tary force is that PMSCs and their employees are mercenaries because tests this objection and poses two questions not usually addressed in not necessarily a major objection to private force. It can be permissible jus ad bellum and jus in bello need to be followed. These are same principles determining just wars for states, inter alia just cause, last resort, legitimate authority, and proportionality. It should be noted that Pattisons analysis thoroughness are very enjoyable. is the preferable arrangement of the military as conscription faces a analysis from individuals and companies to the international system
164 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15alleviated by tighter and more effective regulation. Pattison considers of overseeing and enforcing self-regulation by the industry. One could also argue the answer to the question of whether it is service required; logistical support services differ from armed security war and private force and its focus on potential combat roles of PMSCs. a spectrum from logistics to armed security to combat), it has actu ally been many years since PMSCs were last hired by a state for direct combat. Ultimately, the problems with private and public military force laid force. Pattison proposes a reformed UN and especially a restructured a force. It is easy to dismiss this proposal as entirely unrealistic and, indeed, the author concedes this is a valid objection; but it misses Who should read The Morality of Private War use to anyone with an interest in private military and security compa nies, military ethics or civil-military relations. It is a welcome addition PMSCs effect on democratic control of the military and civil-military relations as well as on future regulations. The author does not offer analysis of a practical issue, and one that should be read by anyone The Ethics of Interrogation: Professional Responsibility in an Age of Terror By Paul Lauritzen. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Pryer, author of The Fight for Freedom, May 2003 April 2004.The Ethics of Interrogation An Ethics of Interrogation. What ethics of interrogation and the importance of such debates to our republic during an age of rapidly changing security threats. The result is a Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013 227 pages $26.95
Book Reviews: Military Ethics 165 sionals as servants of the public good is largely dead. In its place has arisen the view of social scientists that professions are centers of neutral hope to show that the professions are where democratic character traits servants of the common good. to justify this participation, effectively stating members could participate even in abusive interrogations if these interrogations were legal. This out of interrogations completely, and failing to account for legitimate national security concerns. investigate Steven Bradbury when Bradbury later signed memoranda and then denying medical personnel participated in any interrogations. remaining unresolved. licensing and oversight boards to regulate their members behavior and how virtue theory relates to professions. When discussing the latter, he and Bagram. Special mission units routinely employed enhanced interrogation techniques, as did many intelligence units supporting the conventional army in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that so many
166 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 real values are something other than advertised. It also undermines character traits. duces confessions, true or not) and cites as authoritative an increasingly unaware of Army doctrine, which has long declared torture to be a poor and unreliable means of collecting intelligencea conclusion supported by the overwhelming evidence of histories and memoirs and, most recently, the senate report on CIA interrogation practices. sionable students. Nonetheless, there remains much to commend it to not comprehensively), and his research not only informs, it directs the debate. A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American Revolution By Daniel KrebsReviewed by MAJ Jason W. Warren, PhD, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, US Army War CollegeA during the war. In his well-crafted new military history, A Generous and Merciful Enemy This commitment of soldiers by the resource-starved tiny principalielites depicted their princes motivations for contributing troops as the reality was more nuanced. Sovereigns, in addition to raising money for objective for royalty. There was also the matter of supporting a British 392 pages $24.95
Book Reviews: Military Ethics 167 supporting Protestant war efforts, particularly after the Catholic French and Spanish joined with the American revolutionaries. varying American treatment of these soldiers by time and place because nity to detail how the Western tradition evolved over centuries in matters ideals of the drawing room. The American revolutionaries deemed Pennsylvania a sound loca Maryland, as well as Virginia and Connecticut. Language and ethnicity Continental Army and militia units. The topic of similarities between A Rabble in Arms Bay also consisted of pressed troops a century prior to the arrival of argues the nascent nationalism of the American and French revolutions troops, therefore, were caught in changing social circumstances, victims Mercenary troops, as contractors in modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan employment of mercenaries, there were no battle standards from this
168 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15from this apocalyptic landscape that mercenaries derived a bad name. of the new military history which sometimes strays too far from what scholars have derided as a drum and bugle approach. The crucible of indeed of humanity itselfno matter how unpleasant the dialogue. It is This criticism not withstanding, A Generous and Merciful Enemy is Commanders series.
Book Reviews: War & The State 169 WAR & TTHE STATE Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War CollegeThe starting point for the author of Failed States shortcoming by providing a broadly comparative approach that tests the engage in political violence. This potentially admirable effort at compari earlier era may have been termed simply the underdeveloped world. struggling to develop economically and is facing internal upheavals. draws on survey data concerning respondents views of governance in of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa). One must wonder if the views the most important problem facing your country today; economic conditions, corruption, authoritarianism, ending the US occupation dents who view authoritarianism as the most important problem are, than respondents who chose another answer. Similarly, the survey data here concludes that, because social movements are antecedents to social political violence. a greater understanding of the origins of terrorism and, therefore, prove methods validate the obvious, that is, people living in a dangerous envi Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co, 2014 222 pages $119.95
170 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15to the authorshe readily admits when the data contradict some of her hypotheses. For instance, in her discussion of sub-Saharan Africa, the survey data suggest the perceived presence of the state increases the probability a person will support violencewhich runs contrary terrorists. relatively harmless, there remains a greater danger from a more philo will not be able to see or admit errors in judgment. What is missing in Kings or People or Barrington Moores, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy to our understanding of the evolution and change in societies.State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011 By Paul A.C. KoistinenReviewed by Isaiah Ike Wilson III, Colonel (USA), Chief, Commanders Initiative Group (CIG), US Central Command, MacDill AFBAprehensive study of the political economy underpinning Americas wars from colonial beginnings, through the great industrial wars of the 20th century, State of War providing a comprehensive, analytical, and interdisciplinary study of the economics of Americas wars. Moreover, through his multivolume economy of Americas state of war and peace: the political and power time, the social patterns of American political life. accounting of the cycles of continuity and change in economic mobi American history, each revealing its own unique pattern of economic relevant to todays challenges in rebalancing defense budget stringencies shows harnessing the economy for war was more readily accomplished strength of economic and political systems is a determinant in not only defeat. Thirdly, and perhaps the most instructive, if not most worrisome Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012 328 pages $39.95
Book Reviews: War & The State 171of lessons gathered, is over time and through these historical cycles, we witness a blurring of distinctions between government and industry, particularly defense industries, feeding and in some instances even cre ating potentially destructive civil-military imbalances. military and business interests, to a degree of integration could cause or logical-military-industrial alliances which were regaining their wartime sition between eras. As a warning for the future it was grounded in perhaps persist as past lessons gathered but unfortunately not yet learned. The basic problem facing the United States today, in what seems could ary but revolutionary change in political-military and economic affairs, at any time since World War II; second, continued recession with slow economic recovery; third, an increasingly aging population which will Medicaid/Medicare) over the long run, absent entitlement reform; compressed timelines for action and pre-election year politics, structur ally and procedurally impeding the ability for compromise. Any three choice, and understanding the bounds shaping and constraining and force and power is vital to Americas rise as a durable and balanced global power, and not merely as a forceful hegemon. This understand ing is all the more imperative at a time of compounding global security challenges and austerity. A renewed American grand strategy would the set of principles and institutions for restraining force have proven in earlier periods uniquely adept at producing abundant prosperity, force,
172 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15and with them unsurpassed power; yet more recently and at present seem mostly impotent. There are at least four critical questions raised in the pages of State of War American grand strategy. First, how will current political realities affect other reason than to return an economy of scale balance to US force and how should our military forces be structured both to confront new areas must be calibrated carefully with political and budgetary constraints. What are our national priorities in the global community, and how can involve the calculated relation of means to large ends. In this sense, the fundamental challenge facing the United States might be put this way: nearly a third of which transpired without a great power rivalcan the United States discover a way to navigate this new era of uncertainty while preserving American dominance as a leading power in, and of, the State of War and his preceding volumes could not have come to us at a more important time.Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence By Patricia A. WeitsmanReviewed by Russ Burgos, Lecturer in Global Studies at UCLAAllies are the most aggravating of people. They introduce considerations of their own national politics, none of which have the faintest bearing on the matter of immediate issue [but] their most annoying characteristic is the astonishing way they seem incapable of recognizing how sound, how wise, how experienced are our views . In Waging War, Patricia A. Weitsman argues our understanding of American way of war needs to be brought into the 21st-century. Weigley Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014 279 pages $27.95
Book Reviews: War & The State 173occupying his capital was the basic American strategy in war. While ing of war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means a necessary limitation for nation-states embedded in a delicate continental balance of peace on our terms. Weigleys thesis cohered nicely with 20th-century tions simultaneously enabling and constraining its power. As a result, Weitsman argues, the American way of war is profoundly multilateral profoundly political. The norm of multilateralism, she writes, is entrenched in the American way of waging war. This means American objectives, and objections of its allies and coalition partners at all stages ers, public opinion, and even the conduct of Americas wars themselves. Waging War tion warfare, though one can glean some insights from Weitsmans case and coalitions within the international relations and security studies disciplines and as a result may frustrate those professionally interested in the operational or political-military dynamics of alliance and coalition warfare. realist institutionalism, attempting to bridge the gap between the two its emphasis on interests, and neoliberalism, with its emphasis on formal and informal international institutions showing military alliances and coalitions not only constrain Americas strategic operations in war but the perceived legitimacy of each of the military operations. Because these institutions of interstate violence matter for the to intra-institutional political dynamics which often include, as Field-Marshal Slim lamented, the domestic political considerations of institution members. Frustrating as it may be, she argues, alliances and coalitions are, in effect, strategic multipliers. As a result, the US has an There is, however, a catch: the more dependent the United States becomes on coalition warfare, the greater its alliance security dilemma constraints on Americas freedom of action imposed by the necessity
174 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15United States will have to go it alone. Weitsman shows balancing those command-and-control relationships which actually diminish military public opinion on military action, maintaining legitimacy has in effect the conduct of operations in Afghanistan became a critical problem for limitations imposed by coalitions has become a critical part of the new American way of war. Waging War United States derives from the web of global coalitions it has created since World War II and into the political and operational costs attendant to maintaining them.
Book Reviews: Insurgency & Counterinsurgency 175 IINsSURGENCY & CCOUNTERINsSURGENCY The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency Reviewed by Marina Miron, Assistant Editor with and PhD Candidate at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales CanberraRecently, the concepts of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency practitioners of counterinsurgency and shows Thailand, albeit slowly counterinsurgency campaigns. The Thai successfully defeated two major insurgencies in recent years: the countrywide communist insurgency ist insurgency in the southern part of the country. In addition, Moores on strategic, operational, and tactical levels. pillars of counterinsurgency political, security, and economic which mation and are topped off by a roof denoting control. Moores pantheon his three pillars of political, security, and economics are covered by an additional layer called insurgent capabilities and intentions. The roof of any counterinsurgency campaign falls upon the strategic dimension and the coordination that should be aimed at winning over the indigenous operational and tactical levels in order to understand how counter insurgency functions. As part of this approach, Moore follows the Arlington, VA: Muir Analytics, 2014 476 pages $20.00
176 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15paramount for insurgent survival and it should also attract the attention of the counter-insurgent. Moore also notes, despite his emphasis on the At the end of each chapter, Moore applies his unique methodologiThompson given the panoply of theorists from which he could have Moores conclusion offers a good summary of practices imple in the ongoing one. Further, he proceeds with an evaluation of Thai principles: counterinsurgent forces should not imitate the insurgents; successful in their efforts. In the introduction, Moore stated the Thai case would have valuable lessons for US COIN doctrine, yet he does not been a valuable addition to what is otherwise a rich, historical narrative of Thai counterinsurgency. Overall, this study designed for readers familiar with counter thorough and he uses a large number of sources including many per us understand the peculiarities of the Thai way of counterinsurgency, rather than instructing us on how to conduct such campaigns in the future.Cross-Cultural Competence For A Twenty-First-Century Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN Edited By Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-SandsReviewed by Colonel Robert M. Mundell, Chairman Department of Command Leadership and Management, US Army War College R on culture in the national defense community, in partnership with a host of social and behavioral scientists and practitioners, provide a comprehensive and convincing analysis of the importance of cross-cultural relevance of 3C given the human-centric and evolving nature of war and st Publishing Group: Lanham, MD, 2012 386 pages $145.98
Book Reviews: Insurgency & Counterinsurgency 177cautioning against the notion of 3C as a niche and temporal capability declining in value as the US military transitions from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-FirstCentury Military is a must read for military professionals and practitioners responsible for delivering education and training programs designed the importance of 3C education and training programs: uncertainty and ambiguity in the international security environment will require operate in partnership with joint interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national forces; and a decade of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan codify the importance of 3C in understanding forward: the challenge of communicating 3C as something other than an enabler; the reliance on sociology and behavioral science in support tional and training outcomes; and the tendency to pair 3C with regional diate, and advanced), strategies for 3C education and training programs, on-going 3C research efforts, and useful ideas and concepts for applying contain data and compelling stories demonstrating the value of 3C for what is required to succeed in cross-cultural environments. Importantly, allowing military professionals to transition cultural training and educa tion from a just in time based training and education methodology to rooted in military culture. of this reviewer, centers on the importance of cross-cultural competence ulation, cultural learning, intercultural interaction, cultural perspective
178 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 ing fact from inference, and suspending judgment in a way which allows current operating environment and its use of Iraq and Afghanistan to operational levels, and provide minimal strategic-level insights. Finally, as with many documents and publications developed over the past tify the concept. The latter does not bode well for a military enterprise The Taliban: Afghanistans Most Lethal Insurgents By Mark SilinskyReviewed by Yaniv Barzilai; US Diplomat and author of 102 Days of War Thirteen years into the longest war in American history, precious could not identify Mullah Omar as the leader of the Taliban by name The Taliban: Afghanistans Most Lethal Insurgents of the history of the Taliban, tactics and strategy the Taliban employs counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban. Scattered throughout the Taliban, adding color and personality to the narrative. Perhaps the strongest aspect of The Taliban is the description of the lence, intimidation, and information operations to achieve its objectives. of what he deems Afghanistans most lethal insurgents. Similarly, his doctrine, is familiar but thoughtful. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International (PSI) Publishing, 2014 263 pages $52.00
Book Reviews: Insurgency & Counterinsurgency 179 his information to news articles. While the information presented is not necessarily wrong, other stronger and more reliable sources including misses some nuances and is at times imprecise in his retelling of the history of the Taliban. swered, such as how the Taliban has changed since its rise to power, Afghan National Security Forces. While each of these topics could merit position to discuss these critical issues further. of cruel and regressive tendencies, is appealing for Westerners but not necessarily supported by historical facts. While most of the world may morally superior opponents in the past. Taliban struggling to understand an obscure enemy in a distant land. Today, The Taliban can serve a similar purpose. While Americas small contingent of soldiers and civilians deploying to Afghanistan as Adapting to Win: How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign States By Noriyuki KatagiriReviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War CollegeAdapting to Win entist, who presently teaches at the Air War College. It is derived tightly designed, and is both well written and innovative. It represents a project to the mainstream body of security studies that until recently Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014 320 pages $69.65
180 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 in which a foreign government intervenes in a civil war on either quite common, only possess one or two stages, and typically fail. The last achieve an orderly combination of three phases: state building, guer oriented. defeat foreign states in war, origins and proliferation of sequencing, how modelIraq War, 2003-2011, Premature modelAnglo-Somali War, analysis, their use is problematic from the perspective of the reviewer. contemporary data, which ignores the fact that the international envi ronment is dynamicnot staticmeaning the host environments in help to show which models are dominant over which periods, with the into the early 21st century have proven themselves very different from illicit economy is pronounced, the Westphalian state system is under increasing pressure, and the preferred non-state actor goal is to create rule). Thus, they are historically dissociative from earlier insurgency
Book Reviews: Insurgency & Counterinsurgency 181 evolution by denying them weapons, and creating a rival political be denied, however, is the sequencing theory may also have potential for utility in other areas of security studies. It would, therefore, be wise form of analysis as it matures and is applied to other internal security phenomena.
182 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 WAR & TTECHNOLOGY Napalm: An American Biography By Robert M. NeerReviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, former Minerva Chair and Distinguished Visiting ProfessorD position changed to a different metal-soap and gasoline-gel formula. The the loop on this weaponry saga. infantry targets throughout the Vietnam War. This weapon also saw weapons, played an incredibly important part in Americas past wars and deserves to have its story told. Vietnam along with the increasing criticism of its use in the later war as and chronicle how both US public and international views on napalm have soured and view use of the weapon as tantamount to a war crime. The many stories woven together and insights provided about the development, history, and use of napalm are not only highly informative but also provide a good read. A compressed weapons systems lifecycle Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013 352 pages $29.95
Book Reviews: War & Technology 183 down various forms of structures, and discussions and analyses of its ill-fated attempt to combine napalm with bats for delivery purposes is also covered along with perspectives on international law and legitimate forms of weaponryincluding increased hostility to land mines and century warfare. This reviewer very much agrees with the authors contention that no mention of this weapon should be made openly in this day and age concerning the use of incendiary weapons in civilian areas allowing attrition-based warfare between competing sovereign states. For this tant US borne-and-bred weapon as well as a commentary on how war has changed over the last seven decades. In many ways, this time was a now face. Todays world is one in which napalmwhose imagery and effects do not play well on global news and social mediahas become writing, and editing and has to be commended for his efforts. The fuel-air and thermobaric weapons. It also provides us with numerous vignettes into the human costs of war and insights into how contentious utility for courses on changing perspectives on international law and civil-military relations during times of national duress.
184 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell, Doctoral Candidate in War Studies, Kings College LondonW ence of air-delivered destruction remains debatable. On the other hand, remembering the term actually includes air mobilitytransport and lift by airargues for that part of the capability to be considered a game Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience gence as a decisive force in war, Owens narrative covers many issues; hardware, personnel and training, organisation and structure, tactics, threads, effecting a comprehensive review of a long historical arc. What methodology, and decisive points in the history that deserve highlightor in a syllabus. Before moving on to the substance of the review, it is worth noting some to pass it by for its unassuming presence. In this age of hype, content. Promised as a brief history, the narrative covers the critical points in the trajectory of air mobilitys rise. This promise might be its such breadth or depth. It is entirely defensible to tell the story primarily rise and one that is well-integrated with the greater 20th century history. The history reads as a biography with a twist. Although roughly chronological, the narrative proceeds as a series of vignettes critical to the growth of air mobility. It is an engaging approach to a biography, because individual chapters can stand nearly on their own, as with those on the Berlin Crisis and the integration of air mobility and combat in of Berlin, provides the substance behind a strategically effective act of military symbolism, captured by the iconic image of Airborne Candy Washington, DC: Potomac Press, 2013 313 pages $45.00
Book Reviews: War & Technology 185 of the allies. The second reveals the innovative application of rotary lift in the Vietnam War to landpowers advantages in battle, giving air mobility its bite and shaping successive American military operations. relatively mild and prosaic events, they are rendered as the hammer and anvil that shaped air mobility and warfare in later decades. Alternatively, the contentious acquisition history of the C-17 highlights the compli cated dynamics ruling the development of critical platforms. Withal, the Finally, for what they reveal about military technological develop scholarly attention. Chronicling the interaction between commercial, civil service, and military activities in the emergence of the aircrafts use to move troops and materiel, Owen depicts the decisive role civilians played in the early years of airborne lift. Such actors as the postal service personnel and materiel when the military used this capability only as support to aviation units. This multi-faceted relationship is important for its role in air mobilitys story, but also for the questions and insights it suggests for the contemporary era of technological transformation in the military. This is a compelling case study, which should inspire inquiry elsewhere in the history of military technology and development. The Box rates highly, especially for bringing attention to a neglected corner of George Marshall, Soldier Statesman of the American Century Battle, which is not a half-bad achievement for a brief history.The Unseen War: Allied Airpower and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein By Benjamin S. LambethReviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education CenterAfter describing the overwhelming 2003 campaign to topple Saddam Air Power pendence having fought so many bitter battles to free themselves from the indignity of providing mere support to ground forces it was on the Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013 480 pages $59.95
186 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 to ascendancy.That quote has caused very lively debates in classrooms at the Army War College, and now Benjamin Lambeth has provided the most thor ough evaluation available of airpowers role in the 23 days of formal conventional combat that began Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lambeth is the most eloquent and enthusiastic writer on American airpower today. Though published by Naval Institute Press, his study was initially not intended just to support the friendly ground force, but rather to destroy the enemys army directly and independently as the overall main about the implications of what he has to say. by joint and combined forces including not only land components but indispensable contributions from virtually the entire spectrum of rectly the air campaign has been underreported in postwar accounts of reporters with air units, but also because the continuing violence in Iraq of air operations in 1991, with the long period of initial bombing before to limit noncombatant casualties and to preserve infrastructure, and by advance and had overrun many areas. As a result, only 39 percent of static operations to prepare the battlespace. Airmen in the No-Fly Zones had already suppressed Iraqi air defenses and gathered a great deal of valuable intelligence. After the full air campaign began on the night of March 21st, the nonstop precision bombardment by ground and carrier based aircraft so resoundingly paved the way for allied ground forces that the entrance of the latter into Baghdad was a virtual fait accompli. for other defending divisions were even more severe, severely reducing possible resistance on every front. Lambeth spends a chapter highlighting the biggest reasons for such overwhelming success. These include improvements in air-ground
Book Reviews: War & Technology 187coordination and force connectivity, more time-sensitive targeting capability, better command and control, contributions from UAVs and some problems encountered. Fratricide still occurred, and the 11th Fire Support Coordination Lines, and some continuing shortfalls in our own ability to evaluate and follow up operations effectively, but also raids. consideration by anyone who desires to understand the current capa high-intensity conventional warfare, he admits the same era also has enduring lesson from OIF about modern warfare surely must be that even the most capable air weapon imaginable can never be more effec From Above: War, Violence, and Verticality Edited by Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. WilliamsReviewed by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Major General (USAF Retired) F And, indeed, much or most of From Above is written for and by academics. The majority of the predominantly British contributors are professors of geography or the liberal arts. They are not specialists in military or strategic matters. intellectual database in a positive and insightful way. Moreover, it allows According to the editors, this perspective has brought about seismic cant moves to understand the view from above within the pathos and London, England, UK: Hurst Publishing, 2014 376 pages $30.52 (paper)
188 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 lenges to creating a coherent narrative as there are, in addition to the triumvirate of editors, thirteen different contributors, each of whom so, the editors divided the writings into three sections, respectively enti just in subject matter, but in style and verbosity as well. dedicated specialist. Others such as one laboriously entitled Project one perseveres long enough to discover them. Still, there are, however, a few gems. The chapter on balloons is fascinating, tracing not just the technical development, but also with the tives had. The author highlights individuals who grasped the military potential of verticality along with the contribution that ballooning made terms as political technology of vision and visuality), but with the operations from World War II bombings through drone operations in innocents on the ground, ultimately concluding somewhat reluctantly Separate chapters address the idea of establishing and maintaining colonial Iraq. The latter, while interesting, slides into a largely unin formed discussion of drone use in contemporary operations. Another chapter with the attention-grabbing title of Targeting Affective Life from Above: Morale and Airpower simply does not deliver much more than a hostile assessment that might have been more effective if it was understanding of targeting in general. mainly because the contributors obvious disapproval of the technology weapons systems as opposed to ones under human control. In fact, in more than one chapter, reference to verticality or the view from above earns little more than a nod from the contributor who will then write something that may only be tangentially related.
Book Reviews: War & Technology 189 effects-based operations than verticality per se. aerial photos to form a more comprehensive view): symbolic function, disutility, unimpeded sightlines and disembodied omniWhatever all that means. Sure, such language may be lucid to pho readers would. In the end From Above does accomplish its mission in the sense that the reader does come away convinced the verticality perspective is fundamentally unique, and impacts perceptions of the ground environ an intriguing addition for the scholarly-inclined servicemember as it is might see very differently.
190 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 THE FIRStT & SSECOND WORLD WARS Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914 By Adrian GilbertReviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy Plans & Operations, US Army War CollegeChallenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914 by Adrian Gilbert is a modern retelling of the experience of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the opening months of the First World War. Corresponding to the Centennial of the Great War, Gilbert wrote the book to offer a realistic assessment of the BEF. Citing distortions in the historic record, the author tried to look afresh at the British Army Challenge of Battle begins with an exciting account of the celebrated Major Tom Bridges of the 4th Royal Dragoon Guards in Mons, Belgium opening engagement of the war between the BEF and the Imperial German Army. After this stirring introduction, Challenge of Battle across France and Belgium. Filled with personal commentary from sol Challenge of Battle offers an interesting description of the tragic retreat of the BEF by poor coordination with the French army, a breakdown in command and control, and lack of situational awareness. This situation, combined with reliance on antiquated tactics, brings the BEF close to destruction the French Army counterattack and force the Germans to dig in. Thus, the next four years. Challenge of Battle 1914. The book concludes the BEF was hampered by lack of command and control, outdated Napoleonic tactics, poor integration of artillery, to compound the matter, its commander, Field Marshal John French, did not trust his counterpart, French Fifth Army Commander, General Charles Lanzerac. Adrian Gilbert says the result of this lack of trust the BEF, demonstrating that personal relationships matter more than we often realize. Challenge of Battle New York, NY: Osprey Publishing, 2012 312 pages $25.95
Book Reviews: The First & Second World Wars 191inadequate use of German sources. One would expect a scholar to accurate history. There is perhaps no better way to offer a fresh new Expeditionary Force. Another issue is Challenge of Battle rehashes some analysis from The Mons Myth This is problematic for serious The Moltke Myth and Inventing the Schlieffen Plan The latter of these was written question his assertions on other topics. For more on this debate, see The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, edited by Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross. With these concerns aside, Challenge of Battle is an interesting book that offers a refreshing look at the performance of the BEF in 1914. tion of that terrible period of history.Montys Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe By John BuckleyReviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, CRGT Research Analyst, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), US Army War CollegeT of the British Liberation Army (BLA) in the Campaign in North West Montgomery and mostly the British troops in 21st Army Group. of key WW II historians includes B. H. Liddell Hart, Max Hastings, memoirs were attempts to demonstrate an apolitical distance from the exhibited great fanaticism. Compulsion in German units, when pun ishments could extend to entire families, not just the soldiers, attained New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013 370 pages $35.00 (hardcover)
192 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15 open question. different operational, strategic, and policy goals. The challenge was describes the army which Churchill launched across the Channel: strengths, weaknesses, preparation, and training. This chapter is impor tant to understand the military culture with its concepts, doctrine, and techniques how best to wield the instrument. The BLA in June 1944 in general was well trained, but largely inexperienced. The remaining chapters describe the campaign chronologically. st the intent of British 2nd Army commander Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey. state of BLA tactics, techniques, and procedures. Chapter 6 analyzes the breakout situation in late July which led to the British execution of later. Chapter 7 concerns the pursuit. It analyzes BLA capability and prominently, and aspects of the broad front or narrow thrust debate. that the concept asked the BLA to accomplish a mission for which it was not mentally equipped. He also addresses the issues of the degree clearance of the Scheldt Estuary to open Antwerp. Buckley also explains crossing to the end of the war, a period still full of action, as the BLA fought on German soil. attention to detail. Continuous assessment explains how the BLA was
Book Reviews: The First & Second World Wars 193 Despite extant biographies, there has been an historical tendency to focus British actions in NWE on Montgomery. This assessment has refreshing balance with meaningful discussion of 2nd th Army commander Lt. Gen Neil Montys Men and secondary, whether the good, the bad, or the ugly. Their juxtaposi tion and interaction were complex. Buckley places the tactical detail in (BAOR) which supported NATO.
Anders, Birthe. Private Military & Security Companies: A Review Essay. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 75-80. Biddle, Tami Davis. Considering Why We Lost . [Special Commentary] Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 7-10. Campbell, James D. The National Guard as a Strategic Hedge. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 95-106. Crosbie, Thomas. The US Armys Domestic Strategy 1945-1965. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 105-118. Essay] Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 115-124. Daniels, Mike. American Declinism: A Review of Recent Literature. [Review Essay] Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 135-140. Deni, John R. NATOs New Trajectories After the Wales Summit. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 57-65. Contractors. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 49-60. El Kurd, Dana. The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 47-55. Evans, Michael. Forking Paths: War After Afghanistan. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 77-94. Field, Kimberly. Whose Breach, Whose Trust? [Of Note] Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 125-126. Franke, Ulrike Esther. Drones, Drone Strikes, and US Policy: The Politics of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. [Review Essay] Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 121-130. Glickstein, Daniel and Michael Spangler. Reforming the Afghan Security Forces. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 91-103. Harrison, Ross. Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 37-46. Iasiello, Emilio. Hacking Back: Not the Right Solution. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 105-113. Johnson, Robert A. Predicting Future War. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 65-76. Johnston, Christopher Bowen. Chinas Military Mercantilism. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 49-61. Kan, Paul Rexton. Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 71-80. Article Index, Vol. 44, 2014
196 Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15Kane, Thomas M. Chinas Power Projection Capabilities. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 27-37. Lai, David. Chinas Strategic Moves and Counter-Moves. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 11-26. Mastriano, Douglas V. The Great War: One Hundred Years Later. [Review Essay] Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 96-102. Milevski, Lukas. Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 23-33. Millen, Raymond. Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 35-47. Morrison, Rick. Reserve Component Costs: A Relook. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 107-111. Allowed? Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 119-134. Robinson, Glenn E. Gaza 2014: Hamas Strategic Calculus. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 91-103. Roskin, Michael G. The New Cold War. [Special Commentary] Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 5-9. Scobell, Andrew and Mark Cozad. Chinas North Korea Policy: Rethink Or Recharge? Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 51-63. Shamir, Eitan and Eado Hecht. Gaza 2014: Israels Attrition vs Hamas Exhaustion. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 81-90. Simn, Luis. Assessing NATOs Eastern European Flank. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 67-79. Snider, Don M. Renewing the Motivational Power of the Armys Professional Ethic. [Special Commentary] Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 7-11. Spangler, Michael. Pakistans Changing Counterterrorism Strategy: A Window of Opportunity? Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 37-49. Spangler, Michael. Rebalancing the Rebalance. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 11-21. Spearin, Christopher. Special Operations Forces & Private Security Companies. Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 61-73. Sorenson, David S. Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 25-36. Terrill, W. Andrew. T. E. Lawrence: Enigmatic Military Visionary. [Review Essay] Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 131-140.
Article Index, Vol. 44, 2014 197Terrill, W. Andrew. The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary Iran. [Review Essay] Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 85-95. Terrill, W. Andrew. Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of ISIS. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 13-23. Thomas, Timothy L. Chinas Concept of Military Strategy. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 39-48. Ucko, David H. and Robert C. Egnell. Options for Avoiding Counterinsurgencies. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 11-22. Ven Bruusgaard, Kristin. Crimea and Russias Strategic Overhaul. Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2014): 81-90. Warren, Jason W. Insights from the Armys Drawdowns. [Special Commentary] Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer, 2014): 5-9. Wass de Czege, Huba. Defeating the Islamic State: Commentary on a Core Strategy. Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter, 2014-15): 63-69. Watts, Stephen and Stephanie Pezard. Rethinking Small-Footprint Interventions. Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring, 2014): 23-36.
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