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Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)

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Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)
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PB
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Journal of the US Army War College
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US Army War College quarterly
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US Army's senior professional journal
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U.S. Army's senior professional journal
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U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
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2 no. a year[ FORMER 1973-1976]
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PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS PARAMETERS Contemporary Strategy & Landpower Rebalancing the RebalanceMichael SpanglerStrategy Versus Statecraft in CrimeaLukas MilevskiEisenhower and US Grand StrategyRaymond MillenPrivate Contractors & Military ProfessionalsScott L. Efflandt Christopher Spearin Birthe AndersSpecial Commentary: Insights from the Army's DrawdownsJason W. WarrenVOL. 44 NO. 2 SUMMER 2014

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Disclaimer: Parameters Parameters Editorial Board MembersEmeritusSecretary of the Army, Commandant, Editor, Managing Editor, Assistant Editor,

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FEATURES Special Commentary5 Insights from the Army' s DrawdownsJason W. Warren Can We Leverage the Cycles? Strategy & Policy11 Rebalancing the RebalanceMichael Spangler Are We On Track?23 Strategy Versus Statecraft in CrimeaLukas Milevski Can Statecraft Prevail?35 Eisenhower and US Gr and StrategyRaymond Millen Process Over Personality? Private Contractors & Military Professionals 49 Military Professionalism & Private Militar y Contractors Professionalism at Risk?61 Special Oper ations Forces & Private Security Companies Christopher Spearin Toward a Global Network75 Private Military & Security Companies: A Review EssayBirthe Anders Past, Present, & Future Research Review Essays85 The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionar y IranBy W. Andrew Terrill96 The Great W ar: One Hundred Years LaterBy Douglas V. Mastriano3 From the Editor COMMENTARIES & RREPLIES 81 On "Predicting Future W ar"Jeff Becker Robert A. Johnson Responds

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2 103 Book ReviewsExploring Strategy103 Strategy: A HistoryBy Lawrence Freedman Reviewed by James MacDougall107 The Directio n of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical PerspectiveBy Hew Strachan Reviewed by Richard SwainPolitical-Military Leadership110 Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at WarBy Robert M. Gates Reviewed by Steven Metz112 PROCONSULS: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America TodayBy Carnes Lord Reviewed by Don M. Snider114 Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and PatriotsBy Dennis Laich Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their CountryBy Andrew J. Bacevich Reviewed by Charles D. Allen116 Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, BradleyEdited by James H. Willbanks Reviewed by David T. ZabeckiChanging Nature of Power119 The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Being in Charge Isnt What It Used to BeBy Moses Naim Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison121 Maximalist: America in the W orld from Truman to ObamaBy Stephen Sestanovich Reviewed by Michael J. DanielsFinancial War123 Treasurys War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial WarfareBy Juan Zarate Reviewed by David Katz124 Planning Armageddo n: British Economic Warfare and the First World WarBy Nicholas A. Lambert Reviewed by Sarandis PapadopoulosCartels & Gangs127 The Cartels: The Sto ry of Mexicos Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on US SecurityBy George W. Grayson Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker129 Studies in Gangs and CartelsBy Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan Reviewed by Jos de Arimatia da CruzStability & Instability132 Where is the Lo ne Ranger? Americas Search for a Stability Force, 2nd edBy Robert M. Perito Reviewed by Gordon Rudd134 Improving the U.S. Militarys Understanding of Unstable Environments V ulnerable to Violent Extremist GroupsBy David E. Thaler, et al. Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker136 Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to IraqBy David Fitzgerald Reviewed by David H. Ucko138 One Hundred Victo ries: Special Ops & the Future of American WarfareBy Linda Robinson Reviewed by Stephen K. Van Riper Women in Battle141 Deadly Co nsequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into CombatBy Robert L. Maginnis Reviewed by Anna Simons, Anthony King, and John C. McKay

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From the EditorThis issue of the US Army War College Quarterly opens with a special commentary, Insights from the Armys Drawdowns, by Jason Warren. Perhaps the most important of his insights is the Army has traditionally mitigated the negative effects of drawing down by emphasizing greater education and professionalization, and can do so again. Strategy & Policy, features three contributions examining strategy at different levels. The lead article, Rebalancing the Rebalance, by Michael Spangler, urges the United States to con sider instituting new bilateral security initiatives with China, and Chinas neighbors. Economic cooperation is proceeding at a rapid pace in the eration. The second article, Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea, by Lukas Milevski, frames Western Europes response to Russian aggres sion in the Crimean crisis as a clash between statecraft and strategy, respectively. The author claims the latter generally has an advantage over former, but his framework may be problematic. Regardless, the comparison raises important questions for contemporary strategists. The third contribution is Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy, by Raymond Millen. Millen contends President Dwight D. Eisenhower made innovative use of focused discussion groups and a re-designed National Security Council to create a consensus for developing a US grand strategy capable of dealing with the Soviet threat. While the process Eisenhower implemented clearly deserves some credit for the coherence of US strategy, readers may ask whether his professional expe rience and personal skill deserve even more. The second forum, Private Contractors & Military Professionals offers three articles addressing an essential aspect of the changing nature of warfarethe composition of contemporary militaries. For some, the increased use of private contractors in (or near) the battle-space marks a return to warfare as practiced prior to the rise of standing armies, when states often contracted for military forces rather than maintaining their Contractors, reviews how the concept of professionalism has changed due to greater reliance on private contractors. In Special Operations Forces and Private Security Companies, Christopher Spearin considers how private contractors might contribute to an ever expanding global special-forces network. Birthe Anders Review Essay, brings readers up to date with the growing body of research concerning private military contractors and security companies. This issue of the Quarterly offers two broader review essays, and one review forum. The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary Iran, by W. Andrew Terrill discusses the leading scholarship explaining both the fall of the Shah and Irans decline. Douglas A. Mastrianos The Great War: One Hundred Years Later, brings four of the most important books on the origins of the First World War into sharper focus. Even in this, the centennial of the wars outbreak, interest in the remain unanswered. Deadly Consequences by Robert L. Maginnis rounds

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4 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 deadly and truly consequential in this highly controversial work. ~AJE

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ABSTRaA CT SSPECIaAL CCOMMENTaARY Insights from the Army's Drawdowns W 11. The drawdown of American forces has been a cyclical part of the nations military experience.

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6 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 2. Competition between the Regular Army and National Guard (militia) has always been part of the American military discourse. 3. The Army has historically focused on education and professionalization as mitigating factors during drawdowns.

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SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Warren 7 4. Drawdowns have frequently resulted in cuts to headquarters elements, enabling forces, and niche capabilities that have been detrimental to future operations.

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8 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014thth 5. Conventional capabilities have been a better investment over past drawdowns than technological panaceas and unconventional forces.

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SPECIAL CCOMMENTARY Warren 9

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ABSTRaA CT : Since late 2011, the United States has pursued a policy of rebalancing toward Asia, taking steps to expand its already sig erect multiple layers of security around contested areas in the South sure security cooperation catches up with economic cooperation in SSTRaATEGY & POLICY Rebalancing the RebalanceMichael SpanglerA career member of the US State Departments is a Visiting Fellow at six years after studying From 1988 to 1992, he was the Deputy the American Institute he was the PoliticalGuangzhou, South If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of AnalectsB intention to rebalance US military, diplomatic, and economic this term was subsequently changed to rebalance, to describe more aptly the repositioning of mainly military assets from a then 50-50 percent to 1 the Australian parliament, he emphasized the US policy goal is to ensure the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping [the 2 deployed to Australia) and an additional US carrier group: one aircraft In contrast to the limited permanent-base approach of the 1980s, the US military rebalance relies upon rotational deployments through 5 In 1 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Shangri-La Security Dialogue, Speech at the Shangri-La Strategic Trends 2013: Key Developments in Global Affairs Stars and Stripes,

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12 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 6 ing strategy as off-shore balancing an attempt to contain the rise of E conomic limitations are pushing the United States to reset priorities, withdrawing and downsizing its forces in Europe and the Middle East B y reducing its military footprint in the Middle East, the United States may decrease the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism those in Iraq and Afghanistan) while projecting power in areas that are challenged by asymmetric means, notably, anti-access and area-denial 8 As she noted: increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom Aviation Week National Interest In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Security Guidance

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STRATEGY & POLICY Spangler 13 9 acknowledges the economic importance of the region, and highlights military spending to project its power into the region in the coming 10 manage the contradictory aims of the rebalancing strategy more effec Phase One: 2011-2012 Rebalancing Perceived as Military From late 2011 through 2012, the United States took the following 11 Foreign Policy The Australian Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger Salon

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14 Parameters 44(2) Summer 201412 Philippines, along with Vietnam, remain embroiled in a protracted, 15 16Phase Two: Defanging the Rebalancing Initiative there were no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences Financial Times, The Hill September National Bureau of Asian Research, Asian Policy Reuters BBC 16 Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, On-line Chinese Nationalism and Chinas Bilateral Relations

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STRATEGY & POLICY Spangler 15 18 aimed at defanging the rebalancing policy by putting in place con a slow accumulation of small incremental changes, none of which in itself constitutes a casus belli of weiqi the popular Asian game of black-and-white pieces in which two weiqi games with the Philippines and 19 presumed underwater natural resources, are becoming hot points of 20Phase Three: 2014-? Uncertainty War on the Rocks February Foreign Affairs

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16 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 inter alia completing a bilat 21 article put in doubt the likelihood most of their policy prescriptions will 22 25 PLA Major 26 States has also decided not to take part in a show of support, according asia-rebalance-us-china-relationship-pollack-bader Media, Defense News China Institute of International Studies Journal Wall Street Journal Wall Street Journal

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STRATEGY & POLICY Spangler 17 28 issues although it constitutes a good start to defusing potential confron 29 enjoiners for the disputants to settle their maritime claims peaceful Rebalancing the Rebalance?Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the East and South delay or slow down the military rebalance in order to accommodate to address seemingly chronic problems in Eastern Europe, the Middle International Studies argues the United States may increasingly focus on New York Times April 28 Anthony Bergin, Maritime Incident s at Sea, Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog, March Washington Post New York Times

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18 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Partnership and promoting military sales, to help sustain a scaled-back At the same time, Liu maintains the United States will increasingly try to control Asian territorial disputes through legal means and multiple Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus and the East Asia Summit into acceptable to promote multilateral fora and international norms as means to work is, so far, rigidly committed to addressing these disputes reasonably leaders also seem adamant about refusing to recognize the authority or expertise of international bodies, such as the international arbitra military or otherwise, are swimming against this tide and calling for a A New Initiative consider encouraging its treaty partner, the Philippines, to take the lead in launching bilateral negotiations with Beijing on the resolution of should no longer insist on multilateral fora and legalistic platforms China Institute of International Studies Journal, New American Security, East and South China Sea Bulletin succeeded in gradually strengthening its maritime claims and altering the international order to its

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STRATEGY & POLICY Spangler 19 For its part, Manila may wish to supplement its ongoing arbitration case with a bilateral negotiation approach to demonstrate its commit will ensure the talks can inform and encourage other countries to ini weiqi -like An information-sharing approach to Sino-Philippine talks would maritime borders and resource exploitation) are worked out consistently, for military and law enforcement encounters at sea to the establishment A and reliable communication mitigates the risk of mishaps, which is in New York Times South China Morning Post Inquirer Global Nation,Yahoo News The Diplomat Art of War

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20 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Managing Blow-Back Does such a bilateral strategy ultimately play into the hands of a rising eschew a bilateral approach and simply stay the course in deterring Beijing by accelerating the implementation of military rebalancing mea front does not undermine, deny, or contradict any multi-lateral or inter national framework, but rather creates new opportunities to bring those organizations and platforms into the talks and to incorporate them into Conclusion States must help bridge the growing impasse between American-led thrust of the rebalance harnessing it to the purpose of "catching up" pace to match international security cooperation with robust economic It is far from an easy task for the United States to persuade the Philippines and other regional actors to enter into a complicated bilateral between Realpolitik by bilateral agreements and the latter by calling for international inte All Politics

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STRATEGY & POLICY Spangler 21 nations are encouraged to conclude inter-locking bilateral maritime allies they risk little -and may make more headway -by acknowledging dangerous: pursuing a waiting game that juxtaposes growing military

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ABSTRaA CT : The March 2014 annexation of Crimea may be interpreted as a contest between Russian strategy and Western statecraft. The respective natures of strategy and statecraft differ substantially, which predetermined the parameters and outcome of the Crimean crisis. This makes an excellent case study of the interaction between strategy and statecraft, and shows why strategy trumps statecraft in direct confrontations. SSTRaATEGY & POLICY Strategy Versus Statecraft in CrimeaLukas Milevski 2014 Lukas Milevski Lukas Milevski will defend his PhD dissertation on The Historical Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought at the University of Reading in early October, 2014, and then proceed to Oxford University's Changing Character of War Programme as a Visiting Research Fellow. Even as Russia continues to undermine eastern Ukraine with provocateurs from within and massed troops from without, it is fair to say the Crimean component of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis has concluded. This clearly important historical event will be mined for further insight into Russian foreign policy, as well as statecraft and international relations, for years to come. Contemporary commentary on the crisis ranges from blame to the vociferous defense by Russias premier international propaganda arm, Russia Today Academics blogged throughout to consider political, economic, and other implications in real time as the crisis developed. With Crimea now annexed by Russia (even though questions about Russian intentions toward the rest of Ukraine continue), it is possible to step back and consider the crisis as a whole. Why and how did Russia so easily impose its will upon the course of events? Why did the statecraft practiced by the Western powers appear so weak and anemic? This article suggests the dynamics and outcome of the Crimean crisis were determined by disparate assumptions and methods of think ing on the part of the West and of Russia. The West practiced statecraft. Russia entered into Crimea anticipating the need for strategy as classi cally understoodusing force to gain its political ends though ultimately strategy dominated the entire affair. To illustrate the importance of this distinction, the respective natures of strategy and statecraft will be explored as lenses through which to examine the crisis. Finally, because post-crisis consequences of statecraft will be considered, even though that statecraft now no longer opposes strategy in any immediate sense.Strategy and Statecraft: Respective NaturesAlthough classical strategy is a subset of statecraft, their natures statecraft, even though both ultimately subscribe to Andr Beaufres pro posal that [a]ny dialectical contest is a contest for freedom of action.1 1 Andr Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 110.

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24 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014However, strategy approaches the question of freedom of action dif ferently from statecraft, a divergence stemming from the fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking which respectively underpin the two, particularly concerning the role of military force. It is because of the sheer difference between the nature of force, on the one hand, and all other instruments of political power, on the other hand, that one must make a clear distinction between the threat or use of force and the employment of all other political tools. This difference renders many between all instruments of power. Strategy, in its classical sense (as a concept solely dedicated to understanding and mastering military force) when employed side-by-side with the wider concept of statecraft, adopts the natures of the instruments available. Force and its political utility are thus the primary concerns of strat the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy .2 Threatened (or actual) violence is, use of force may well be reciprocated by the opposing party, giving rise to the adversarial, reciprocal nature of strategy. Beaufre has similarly the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.3 A strategic mindset focuses on directing violence in a context where the other party is likely to respond in kind. But for what purpose? Clausewitz clearly understood the purpose of force, encapsulating enemy to do our will.4 A strategist uses force to impose an unwelcome situation upon his enemy. The American admiral and strategic theorist J.C. Wylie similarly asserted the aim of war is some measure of control neither so extreme as to amount to exterminationnor should it be so tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to the victory.5 The threat, or actual use of force is meant to be converted to a non-violent purpose or end. [T]his dilemma of currency conver 6 eased when force does not actually have to be used. Statecraft is the use of power in international relations. As the larger idea, it subsumes strategy within it. However, statecraft beyond the realm of strategy rests upon contrasting assumptions and ways of thinking, last analysis, was best assured by agreements that provided mutuality of advantage.7 It tends, therefore, toward persuasive means of achieving political objectives, though as a whole statecraft constitutes a spectrum ranging from persuasion to coercion. Yet, even coercive diplomacy is 2 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. 3 Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 22. 4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. 5 J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1989), 66, 70. 6 Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 136. 7 Gordo n A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 15.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Milevski 25closer to diplomacy than to strategy. Coercive diplomacy needs to be distinguished from pure coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. In contrast to the crude use of force to repel the opponent, coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade him to back down.8 Coercive diplomacy, thus, overlaps with strategy to some extentthe primary difference stemming from how force is understood. One may engage in coercive diplomacy, or at least attempt to do so, without understanding the nature of military force as an instrument, or the nature of strategy. Such use tends to rely on force as bluff. If force must actually be employed in coercive diplomacy, it is frequently ineffective. This is an important distinction because [t]he declaration of war, and more immediately the use of violence, alters everything. From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more than the direction of policy shapes war.9 The reciprocal use of force can and does take on a life of its own which may be mastered only with of all other instruments of statecraft, including diplomacy, economic or The principal differences between strategy and statecraft are the sets of fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking respective to each. is merely competitive and seeks common ground and agreement, even within the coercive use of force. Most writing on strategy assumes the common ground may be found and reached through diplomacy and damentally, giving strategy the advantage due to the respective images is thus at odds with, perhaps even opposed to, the manner of thinking inherent in most of statecraft. Moreover, their mutual interaction has not been extensively investigated. What happens when one political actor enters into a confrontation with strategic assumptions, and his opposite with the assumptions underpinning statecraft? The Crimean takeover of March 2014 makes an excellent case study not only of such a confrontation, but of why statecraft fails in the face of classical strategy.The Crimean CrisisThe Crimean crisis began with a Russian move. Yanukovich ordered snipers to shoot into the crowds at Maidan (Independence) Square. perhaps abducted to Russia. Russian armed forces thereafter moved into Crimea, an invasion that violated the sovereign territory of another 8 Ibid., 189. 9 Hew Strachan, Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, in The Changing Character of War, eds. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 508.

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26 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014state. Together with Russian and pro-Russian paramilitary forces, they besieged Ukrainian army and navy posts and attempted to disarm those inside, limiting their freedom of action. Thereafter, Russian armed forces largely remained a tactically latent threat but one being up by constant reinforcement. Ukrainians did not resist with force, which suited Russian purposes. After all, as Clausewitz noted, [t]he aggressor is always peace-lovinghe would prefer to take over our country unop posedTo prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it.10 The result in Crimea was a foregone conclusion as soon as Ukraine had chosen not to reply to the Russian invasion with armed force. Ukrainians were not willing or able to make war, rightly or wrongly, and so could not prevent the loss of Crimea. The result of the crisis was a foregone conclusion because the Russians understood a basic tenet of strategy: [T]he ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun He is in control. He determines who wins.11 Russia established control in Crimea through its military and paramilitary presence. It is immate established.12 With this move, Russia had achieved two conditions. First, it had unambiguously demonstrated its political resolve by going to the extreme of introducing military force into the situation, a resolve unlikely to be shaken by countermeasures short of force. Second, the end result could not be in doubt as long as Russian forces remained. They would have prevented Ukraine from exercising its sovereignty in the region in any case, with or without bloodshed, much as the United Nations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were prevented from entering Crimea to observe the situation. Having imposed control over the future of Crimea, Russia could allow the slower-acting non-military instruments of political power to guide the peninsula toward its fate. Russia could afford to take its time because it was already in effective control of Crimea, a control which fact also gave the false impression that the crisis could still be resolved through western statecraft in some manner other than that desired by the Kremlin. Russia employed two primary non-military instruments to consolidate its hold on Crimea: propaganda, as conveyed internation ally by Russia Today as well as across large swaths of eastern Europe by pro-Russian supporters in Crimea, who took over the power structure and bent it to Putins will. Russia has disseminated propaganda in Ukraine for years through print media, television, and radio. It has deep roots in Ukraine and many, particularly in the south and east of the country, may read, watch, or listen only to Russian media for all their news consumption. For example, in 2009 Russian newspapers accounted for 66.7 percent of all those circulated. This creates a threat to Ukrainian national security 10 Clausewitz, On War, 370. 11 Wylie, Military Strategy, 72. 12 R ussian forces did slowly assault border posts in Crimea to evict the guards and their families, and gradually assaulted all Ukrainian army posts after the conclusion of the internationally unrecognized referendum.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Milevski 27due to the aggressive informative policy of some Russian TV channels in relation to Ukraine and its citizens.13 This aggressive information ing against joining NATO and promoting the Russian language as an Ukrainian center-right parties of ultra-nationalism or even fascism.14 Russian propaganda, therefore, lent local legitimacy to its invasion of its propaganda. Why else would the Russian armed forces be in Crimea, save to protect ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian government? Russias supporters in Crimea, its second non-military tool, were and areled by Sergey Aksyonov. He illegitimately assumed power in Crimea largely due to the presence of Russian forces. He was allegedly hundred who normally make up the legislature. Yet controversy persists as to whether a physical quorum was reached. A number of the delegates alleged they were not actually presentat least 10 voteswere cast for people who were not in the chamber. The utility of latent force becomes apparent, given that Aksyonov received only four percent of the vote in the most recent election in Crimea in 2010.15 This practice has been the pattern in Crimea throughout the crisis. Gallup conducted a public opinion poll amongst the residents of Crimea in May 2013, which revealed 23 percent of Crimeas inhabitants believed the peninsula should be separated from Ukraine and ceded to Russia. This actually indicated a downward trend, as 33 percent held such views in 2011.16 Yet the results of the internationally unrecognized referendum in Crimea indicate over 95 percent voted for joining Russia. Only the threat of Russian force enabled these results, based in large part on widespread propaganda and further rigging of the outcomes. Ultimately, once Russia had introduced armed force into Crimea, it was virtually impossible for it to fail to annex it, barring an effective armed response from Ukraine or the West. When this move was not forthcoming, the game was upand Russia had won Crimea through non-military instruments whose utility and effectiveness was entirely premised upon the presence of Russian forces. The enabling and strengthening effect that the presence and threat of Russian armed forces in Crimea had on other Russian tools of politi cal power may be contrasted with the weakening effect that same threat of force had on Western statecraft. The Western practice of statecraft throughout the crisis has been primarily based upon rhetoric and appeals to international norms and laws, as well as upon targeted sanctions against individuals in Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia. To a lesser but ever The Humanitarian Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States 14 Ibid., 295. 15 RPT -INSIGHT-How the separatists delivered Crimea to Moscow, Reuters, 13 March 2014,http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-idINL6N0M93AH20140313, accessed 23 March 2014. 16 Baltic Surveys Ltd./The Gallup Organization & Rating Group Ukraine, Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea May 16 30, 2013 (International Republican Institute, 2013).

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28 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014of the easternmost constituents of NATOPoland, the Baltic States, Romaniathrough closer military cooperation. Most of the Wests actions have not, however, had much bearing on the course of the crisis. Western statecraft throughout the early days of the Crimean crisis was variable and evidenced differences of opinion between the United States and Europe, as well as among European countries themselves, on the necessary level of stringency suitable for any response. Responses consisted largely of diplomatic and legal rhetoric, and varying degrees of condemnation. Most spoke out in support of Ukraines territorial integrity and deplored the introduction of armed forces into Crimean times these statements were balanced by calls for Ukraine to respect the minority rights of ethnic Russians. The West largely considered the Russian intervention to be both illegal and against common norms enshrined in international law. Vladimir Putin, however, insisted his actions aligned with international law, in part because he denied the presence of any Russian forces in Crimea, save for those allowed by treaty on their leased naval base at Sevastopol. Moreover, he attempted to contrast this practice with what he considered the Western approach.Our partners, especially in the United Sates, always clearly formulate their own geopolitical and state interests and follow them with persistence. Then, using the principle Youre either with us or against us they draw the whole world in. And those who do not join in get beaten until they do. Our approach is different. We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately...[I]f I do decide to use the armed forces, this will be a legiti mate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties.17Russia rebuffed all of the Wests diplomatic and legal rhetoric. Having already established the facts it desired on the ground, and in doing so having created the crisis, Russia could afford to ignore the Wests rheto ric. That rhetoric could not change the parameters of the crisis unless Putins words clearly indicate, was not likely. Similarly, economic considerations were unlikely ever to deter a territorially and demographically nationalistic Russia. Putin would well have known that Crimea constituted a net cost to Ukraine of $1.1 billion a year and would for Russia as well. Moreover, Crimeas entire infrastructure is geared toward a northward connection with Ukraine rather than an eastward connection toward Russia, requiring further investment.18 In this context of expected economic costs for Russia, the West also raised the possibility of economic sanctions in its rheto ric and, eventually, also in its actions. Economic pressures generally work slowly, and rarely take effect directly against military units in the 17 Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Putin answered journalists questions on the situation in Ukraine, Press Conference, 4 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763, accessed 27 March 2014. 18 Alexander K olyandr, Crimea Could Prove Expensive Acquisition for Russia, The Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304732804 579425110479303926, accessed 29 March 2014.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Milevski 29crisis, unless they swayed Russian political decision-making in Moscow. Their slow pace has begun affecting Russia only after the annexation of Crimea. The presence of Russian forces in Crimea, and the political will behind it, largely muted much of the Wests practice of statecraft. The their respective political wills. Russia had the will to employ force, and therefore also had the will to ignore the anticipated consequences of Western statecraft, though it also attempted rhetorically to mitigate those consequences. The West had no plausibly effective levers with which to pry Crimea away from Russia short of the use of force, but practiced statecraft, even though such a course of action could never change the outcome. If the West had had the will to maintain Crimea as Ukrainian territory, it also would have practiced strategyand war the range of possible outcomes in Crimea, and in ensuring the actual end result as well. Western statecraft, due both to its slow escalation and to the nature of the instruments used and actions chosen, has become more about punishing Russia for its action in Crimea than trying to prevent or reverse what occurred. Actions taken to reassure Poland and the Baltic States are also meant to deter Russia from considering similar interventions. These wider, punishing, effects of the Western reaction with strategy.Post-Crisis Consequences generally cannot overturn the latter due to the natures of their respec tive instruments. Strategy, focused on force, is about consequences and It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent 19 It may also achieve effects quicklyindeed, the rapid achievement of effects is usually supremely desirable, as strategy assumes the mutual imposition of damage. Statecraft, by contrast, usually employs means which take effect only slowly. Economic sanctions mean nothing if implemented for a single day. Statecraft is also, like strategy, about consequences. But unlike strategy, statecraft is less about conclusions than about continuation. The coercive tools of statecraft may come to an end if the policy goal is achieved, but persuasive or rewarding instruments do not necessarily conclude. For this reason western statecraft has taken on the character of imposing punishment after the end of the crisis rather than of pre venting it from reaching the conclusion desired by Russia. Economic pressure and diplomatic isolation are long-term instruments which comprise the major elements of Western statecraft for punishing and restricting Russia, alongside NATOs military reassurance of its east ernmost constituents. 19 Thomas C. Schelling, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 3.

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30 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014One aspect of the Wests diplomacy in both rhetoric and action was the threat of diplomatic isolation. All cooperation between NATO and Russia has been suspended, including a joint mission to escort chemical weapons out of Syria.20 However, diplomatic isolation is not an instrument which can achieve effects quicklyif at all. It impinges upon the targets freedom of action during the time it is in effect and reason, diplomatic isolation must be sustained even to have a chance at actual change in policy. Moreover, not all are in agreement with the aim of diplomatically isolating Russia. Russias fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) members have diplomatically supported it, denouncing the Wests rhetoric and asserting Russias right to attend the G20 (Group of Twenty) summit in Brisbane in November 2014.21 The BRICS are also in the process of establishing institutions whose functions parallel those of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, a sign that Russias ability to practice statecraft has been only par tially damaged. This partial isolation will provide even less possibility for effect. Given its stated foreign policy goals of looking after ethnic Russians beyond its borders, Russian foreign policy is unlikely to be have drawn parallels between Russias actions in Crimea in light of these foreign policy goals and the Soviet Unions old Brezhnev Doctrine.22 Ukrainian and current Russian governments, as well as some oligarchs who support them, although Putin had reportedly already pressured some to repatriate their assets in previous years. To date, the sanctions themselves have not aimed to damage the whole of the Russian economy, commercial activity, such as blocking Bank Rossiya transactions and reinforcing Russias diplomatic isolation. The resulting instability has fallen, causing Russian companies, which hold foreign currency debts amounting to over half a trillion dollars, to struggle to pay their debts.23 Crimea and Ukraine, although outside observers suggest Russia may 24 Of all the long-term results of Western statecraft, the economic consequences in Russia may be among the most important for its future freedom of 20 Adrian Croft and Sabine Siebold, NATO suspends cooperation with Russia, Reuters, 2 with Ukraine, Stars and Stripes, 6 March 2014. 21 Geof frey York, Putins BRICS allies reject sanctions, condemn Wests hostile language, The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ putins-brics-allies-reject-sanctions-condemn-hostile-language/article17638238/. ir, 21 March 2014, http:// www.ir.lv/2014/3/21/putins-krima-brezneva-doktrinas-atdzimsana, accessed 3 April 2014. Telegraph, 24 24 Andra Timu, Henry Meyer and Olga Tanas, Russia Facing Recession as Sanctions Likely to Intensify, 24 March 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-23/russia-staring-atrecession-on-sanctions-that-could-get-tougher.html.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Milevski 31action. Not only do they require Russia to focus more on economic problems than on foreign policy goals, but they weaken Russias ability to maintain its hard power and to fund its soft power. As Paul Kennedy noted in 1989, the historical record suggests there is a very clear con nection in the long run between an individual Great Powers economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire).25 Only time will tell whether the economic conse quences for Russia will be so great or not. Military reassurance of NATOs eastern constituents has occurred through a handful of ways. Its Baltic and Polish air policing contingents aircraft from various countries. Discussion has also begun concerning the opening of a new air base, possibly in Estonia, and the adaptation of one port to suit NATO naval vessels, possibly in Latvia. Poland has also requested 10,000 troops to be based on its territory.26 Explicit con States and NATOs eastern members have increased in frequency and visibility. Although this military reassurance has been an important aspect of the wests statecraft throughout and after the Crimean crisis, it has had no bearing on the course of the crisis itself. Rather, its purpose, besides reassuring the most potentially vulnerable members of NATO, has been to deter potential future Russian incursions into those countries. As with all attempts at deterrence, it is impossible to know whether it will succeed. Whether or not Russia may be deterred from undertaking interventions similar to the one in Crimea, such military reassurance has likely affectedand limitedRussias future freedom of action. Yet, despite this real effect, NATOs military reassurance is the least painful of all the elements of Western statecraft, because it does strength. Although this military reassurance response was fairly muted at the beginning, it has become one of the main pillars of Western state craft surrounding the crisis. Western statecraft has necessarily been practiced even after the end, through fait accompli available to statecraft to achieve effect must be employed over a much longer duration. Because the crisis ended before Western statecraft could possibly become effective, statecraft has taken on a character meant to punish Russia and deter it from taking such actions in the future. This change of character from prevention and resolution to punishment and deterrence was due to the shift in context, as Russia effectively annexed Crimea. This is an almost inevitable result of any tice of strategy by another, because strategy generally achieves quicker results through the threat and employment of force to impose ones will upon the other party. 25 Paul M. Kennedy, 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxii. Troops on its Territory, Telegraph, 1 April 2014.

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32 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Besides statecrafts need for more time than strategy, its practice by the West has also been fuelled by the ongoing activities in Ukraines eastern portions. The crisis and context, however, have changed from the Crimean focus in March. Throughout the spring and summer of 2014 both Western and Russian statecraft have mutually opposed each other, while Ukraine began practicing strategy through military action against the separatists in the east. Russias statecraft-based interventions have failed to restrain Ukraines strategic actions, much as the Wests statecraft failed to overturn Russias strategy in Crimea. Moreover, employing force without regard for Russian statecraft, thereby upsetting Russian policy.ConclusionRussia and the West approached the Crimean crisis from funda mentally different assumptions and modes of thinking. Russia acted strategically, thereby instigating the crisis, and the West responded with statecraft. Russia ultimately won in Crimea thanks to its choice of approachthough this is not to argue they would not have won if the West had acted strategically as well, for the choice of approach also gives insight into relative political will and operational capability. Russia did not practice strategy in its reciprocally adversarial form only because no one actively resisted Russias invasion with armed forcebut it had entered Crimea with the assumptions, ways of thinking, and desire to impose its will upon the other party which characterizes strategy as opposed to statecraft. the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of the entire predicament of strategy .27 The predicament of strategy is the enemy and his independent will and capability to act against ones own purposes. The apex, therefore, is outcomes. Judged by this narrow standard, Russias actions in Crimea represent an effective strategy. Russia did not have an enemy in Crimea. itly discounted the threat, or actual use of force, as publicly announced it could (and can) only impose punishment after the fact in an attempt to preclude any such future interventions by Russia. This latter point, which may become an important factor for Russia in the longer term, represents the only disadvantageous consequence to Russia of its actions de facto accepted. Russias practice of strategy in Crimea was exemplary, but its choice to do so may eventu ally incur crippling costs arising from Western statecraftthough this remains to be seen.28 27 Edward N. Luttwak, Strate gy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4. 28 T he Russians acted much as the elder Helmuth von Moltke preferred, combining a strategic offensive with a tactical defensive. The strategic offensive puts pressure on the other party to act to reverse its losses, but the tactical defensive places the burden of initiating the bloodshed on the opponent.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Milevski 33In any direct clash between a political actor practicing strategy and one practicing statecraft, strategy will always win in the short term. The polity employing force asserts its political will to enforce its political goals unless subsequently out-strategized and outfought. Strategy, through the threat and use of force, also allows for quick action. Statecraft simply cannot achieve effects with the means available to it within the time limit set by an opposing strategy. Non-military instruments cannot directly challenge force in an immediate sense. egy effectively in an immediate situation, one might suggest employing force in Crimea against the Russians would have been acceptable according to one of the tenets of just war theory. The tenet of last resort requires that [w]e must not take up arms unless we have tried, or have good grounds for ruling out as likely to be ineffective, every other way of adequately securing our just aim.29 This is not to argue a war over Crimea would have been a just war. Rather, such an unequal contest as between strategy and statecraft suggests when one side uses force, even if it remains latent, every means and method available to statecraft is likely to be ineffective. The policy question thereafter must be to determine which course of action is most palatable: accepting either the reciprocal employment of force, or a change to the status quo wrought by unilateral force? This time the West has chosen to accept Russias unilateral change to the status quo in Crimea. Will it in the future be faced with a similar choice? 29 Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, J ust War: The Just War Tradition, Ethics in Modern Warfare (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 12-13.

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ABSTRaA CT : Dwight D. Eisenhower infused deliberate planning processes into US grand strategy. Due to lack of consensus regarding how to address the Soviet threat, Eisenhower directed the formation of a six-week exercise (Solarium) to study three alternative strate gies. Upon completion of the exercise, the National Security Council crafted the Basic National Security Policy over a period of three months, reviewing it annually and revising it as the international se curity environment changed.As remarkable as it may seem, the only time the United States has had a formal grand strategy was during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. While some might scoff, recalling the National Security Council Report (NSC) 68, Flexible Response as implemented by President John F. Kennedy, and a host of other doctrines associated with presidents, none of these came close to assessing the strategic environment, developing and vetting various strategic options, and articulating an overarching strategic concept that promoted and protected US interests in a purposeful manner. A product of the US Armys deliberative planning process, President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought a wealth of executive experience, orga nizational skill, and knowledge of strategy development to the White Security Council system to serve his leadership and management style needs. Once the NSC mechanism began to function in March 1953, Eisenhower had a system that provided him and the NSC with inte grated staff work, education on the issues, and meaningful debateall of which cultivated strategic thinking. The development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) was a much more involved process than many consider. It began with a six-week exercise (the Solarium Project), studying alternative policies to counter the Soviet objective of world domination. Upon completion of the exercise, the real work began with the NSC Planning Board and NSC Staff providing drafts over the next three months for NSC discus speculation at the time, the BNSP continued to evolve throughout the Eisenhower administration as the strategic environment changed. The and realities associated with the BNSP. Project SolariumWhile the Eisenhower Administration immediately began work on a SSTRaATEGY & POLICY Eisenhower and US Grand StrategyRaymond MillenRaymond Millen is a with three tours in Afghanistan, the last as a senior mentor to the Chief of Strategic Plans department in the Ministry of Defense. He is currently the Security Sector Reform analyst at the Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA. He is the author of numerous articles, monographs, and books on NATO, counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, and security sector reform.

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36 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014elusive. 1 Of course, similar divisions over national security policy had erupted in the Truman Administration, but Eisenhower initially thought he could avoid this recurrence through NSC deliberations. Still, funda mental differences remained. For example, while Eisenhower was in Republican congressmen opposed it because it implied a large defense the Soviet threat directly. 3 ranted a more comprehensive review of national security policy as well. The death of Stalin in March 1953 created uncertainties pursuant to Soviet designs, especially after the Kremlins rebuff of Eisenhowers The Chance for Peace speech on 16 April 1953. The Korean War continued with no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. The autocratic, populist governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Egypt were candidates for Soviet opportunism. And at this stage of the Cold War, the advance of the Communist bloc appeared to be gaining momentum. Clearly, the United States needed to address these emerging national security challenges through a deliberative process. Accordingly, on 8 May 1953, Eisenhower met informally with key advisers Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]), George Humphrey (Treasury Secretary), Bedell Smith (Undersecretary of State), C. D. Jackson (Special Assistant for Cold War Psychology Planning), and Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) in the White House solarium to discuss the nature of the Soviet threat. During the discussion, Eisenhower proposed the formation of an exercise to analyze competing national strategies for dealing with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower suggested forming three study teams from State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to examine the following alternatives over a six-week period: continuing containment, drawing a line around the Soviet bloc, and diminishing the Soviet empire, particularly in Eastern Europe. Thus was born Project Solarium.4Aside from the general desire to reexamine national security policy, Eisenhower had three ulterior objectives with the Solarium exercise. Foremost, he wanted to provide a counter to his secretary of states pes simism and more unilateralist proposals, in particular Dulless public platform that the United States regain the foreign policy initiative, seek 1 Robert R. Bowie provides the most comprehensive account of the BNSP development. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy opsis of the New Look strategy development. Meena Bose, Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 19-41. 3 R obert R. Bowie, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview by Robert Gerald Livingston, Philipp Gassert, Richard Immerman, Paul Steege, Charles Stuart Kennedy Archives And Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. 4 Bo wie Interview, The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training, March 15, 1988, 15, Shaping and Signaling, Waging Peace

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 37 nist control from Eastern Europe.5 Second, he sought to bring together some of the best thinkers and most experienced individuals to explore dispassionately (and free from public scrutiny) the three most feasible approaches for the desired policy outcome. With access to the full array of intelligence tools, participants could debate among themselves and other teams during the preparation phase and argue their positions in front of the National Security Council. In short, he wanted to educate the participants on the issues at stake.6 Finally,[T]he Solarium exercise served important administrative purposesenabling Eisenhower to learn from and to brief his newly appointed national security tions, a starting point for policy deliberations, and guidelines for action in the event of a crisis.7In addition to these objectives, Eisenhower had a more expansive design for the NSC system: fostering a sense of teamwork among NSC corporate body, rather than succumbing to service parochialisms. As Eisenhower was fond of saying, The plans are nothing, but the plan ning is everything.8 This design was infused in Solarium. With these seeds planted, Eisenhower directed the formation of an NSC working committee (Robert Cutler, Bedell Smith, and Allen regarding the terms of reference, select the members of the three teams, and specify the parameters of each alternative for study.9 Accordingly, each team would study its assigned alternative strategy[W]ith a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law caseand then when the teams are prepared, each should put on in some White House what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and men and world relations. Leslie C. Stevens) drafted the precise and detailed terms of reference for each alternative.11 Since expertise was crucial to team member assign ments, Eisenhower took particular interest in the selection process. 5 Bowie believed that Eisenhower wanted to bury the rollback idea, but it was bandied about during the presidential campaign, particularly by the press. He wanted to make that clearly a thing George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhowers New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Institute for International and 8 As Goodpaster recalled, Eisenhower attributed this quotation to von Moltke the elder. Andrew quote: Rely on planning, but never trust plans. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader 9 Memorandum for the Record by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Waging Peace 11 Memorandum for the Record by the Special Assistant to the President for National

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38 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014He personally enlisted the services of the National War College for its facilities, staff and administrative support, and temporary assignment secrecy complete with a cover story was mandated to give the teams Completing its task on 1 June 1953, the Doolittle Committee provided the teams with National Intelligence Estimate No. 65 (along with supplemental intelligence and studies) and the terms of reference memorandum, which included 15 framework questions, assumptions, and each teams policy alternatives for study.13In the meantime, Eisenhower shaped public opinion on national security policy with a national radio and television address on 19 May 1953. Similar to the themes expressed in his Inaugural Address and State of the Union message (among other speeches), Eisenhower stressed that a long-term strategy rather than reacting impulsively to every perceived threat. He warned that attempts to create complete national security would require substantial mobilization, the effects of which would create a garrison state mentality. In his judgment, a balanced military with suf security for an enduring defense. He concluded that his administration theme which has always resonated with Americans.14From 15 June to mid-July, the three study teams developed their document for analysis, which was a revision of the containment strategy. According to Kennan, the task of his team was to clarify the general outlook of a new political administration and to prod a lot of people in the Washington bureaucracymilitary and civilianinto taking a new look at the things we [the United States] had been trying to do, to see whether they could improve on the previous performance.15According to Robert Bowie (Chairman of the State Departments Policy Planning Board and a member of the NSC Planning Board), Team B under Major General James McCormack was tasked: (1) to complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance without unmistakable way that the U.S. has established and determined to carry out Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all 13 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-65: Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957, June 16, 14 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1952-1956: The White House Years, A Personal Account Eisenhower in War and Peace 15 George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium, 15,

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 39measures necessary to re-establish a situation compatible with the security interests of the U.S. and its allies.16Finally, Vice Admiral Richard Conollys Team C looked at a more assertive rollback strategy, which Bowie summarized: (1) to increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet Bloc.17 The Doolittle Committee informed Team C that it was aware this course of action carried a high risk of igniting a general war, but the team was not to examine a preventive war strategy because Soviet advancements in its nuclear forces made this option problematic.18 The committee might have added that preventive war also contravened American strategic values. a plenary session (that is, a dress rehearsal), which helped the teams 19 Subsequently, the teams made their presentations to the NSC on 16 July, after which Eisenhower expressed how impressed he was by the staff work and the presentations, stating they were the best and most persua sive arguments he had ever experienced. From Bowies perspective, No president before or after Eisenhower . ever received such a systematic possible strategies for coping with them. At the end of the presentations, Eisenhower shared his thoughts in the form of initial guidance: would be no individual freedom after the next global war. T o demand of a free people over a long period of time more than they want to give, one can obtain what one wants only by using more individual liberties and becomes a garrison state (American model). T he American people have demonstrated their reluctance after a war is ended to take the necessary action properly to occupy the territory conquered in order to gain our legitimate ends. What would we do with Russia, if we should win in a global war? T he United States has to persuade her allies to go along with her, because American forward bases are in the territories of US allies. T o obtain more money in taxes, there must be a vigorous campaign to 16 Bowie and Immerman, W aging Peace George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhowers New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium 17 Interview with Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin. 18 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace Waging Peace Shaping and Signaling, 33.

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40 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014educate the peopleand to educate the people of US allies.According to Bowie, Eisenhower made it clear the Solarium exercise was not an end in itself but only "input to making strategy. Accordingly, the President instructed Cutler to have the NSC special staff and the Planning Board integrate the primary parts of all three reports into a draft policy paper as a starting point for NSC discussion. The concept paper titled Proposed New Basic Concept, rendered the three presen A capability for a strong retaliatory offensive, a base for mobilization, C reating strong, friendly groupings centered on Western Europe R estricting U.S. foreign aid to such groupings and designated other T aking selected aggressive actions of a limited scope, involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power in the Satellite periphery. After receiving initial comments on this paper, Cutler returned to the Planning Board, presenting a paper titled "Points for Consideration in Drafting New Policy." Thus, began the policy formulation process in earnest.The Basic National Security PolicyThe development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) Resolving policy splits (irreconcilable differences)in regards to defense spending, threats to the economy, the proper course for reducing the Soviet threat, the question of redeploying US forces abroad, and the issue of reducing foreign assistancewere the central issues of NSC discussions and presidential decisions. Political scientist Mena of containment to resist Soviet aggression and domination of countries outside its sphere, but it would not interfere with Soviet internal political and economic structures. While it rejected Team Bs circumscribed line as a statement of US policy, it did advocate the use of military force, to include nuclear weapons, against Soviet military aggression in Europe. Lastly, it adopted Team Cs use of propaganda and covert actions to exploit Soviet problems and complicate governance in Soviet-dominated continued to arise in discussions, signifying that though the BNSP was Waging Peace, 137-138. Waging Peace 139.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 41accepted policy, the NSC continued to seek improvements through sub sequent security policies and reviews of the BNSP.It bears noting that development of the BNSP coincided with US From his experiences as Chief of Staff of the Army during the precipi tous post-World War II demobilization, President Eisenhower wanted a balanced restructuring of the military forces to meet Cold War challenges, but without incurring exorbitant military expenditures. Unlike previous post-war demobilizations, the size and composition of the US armed forces would be based on a rationally considered national security policy, and not political parochialism or whim. Popularly coined as the New Look strategy, Eisenhower described the policy as a horizontal analysis, aligning national security require ments with necessary military capabilities without regard to service parochialism. The analysis included nuclear retaliatory forces, deployed forces overseas, forces to secure strategic sea lanes, forces to protect the continental United States from air attack, and reserve forces. Eisenhower explained that the assessment called for a reallocation of resources to rationalize national defense. Thus, the administration placed greater emphasis on deterrent forces through improved nuclear capabilities, better delivery systems, and increased air defense capabilities. Active duty combat units would modernize with emphasis on greater readiness and mobility, decreased manpower, and lower readiness for the reserves. In short, the post-Korean War realignment meant an increase in Air Force capabilities, downsizing of the Army, and a slight decrease in the Navy and Marine Corps.The evolution of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and delivery systems required the NSC to review and revise the BNSP annually. As a con sequence of these reviews, supplemented occasionally by outside consultative committees (namely, Killian, von Neumann, and Gaither), strategy as the strategic environment changed. Each BNSP recognized the Soviet and Chinese communist threats, which were devoting mili tary and economic power in support of an expansionist foreign policy. Each BNSP acknowledged the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but underscored the US unequivocal commitment to deterrence as an appro priate response. Each BNSP assessment concluded that the Soviets did not seek to start a general war but were committed to continuing politi as the Soviet regime experienced the slackening of revolutionary zeal, the growth of vested managerial and bureaucratic interests, and popular Waging Peace Shaping and Signaling that Eisenhower placed great worth in covert action and propaganda against the Soviet hold on its like Iran and Guatemala. Covert action was not used against the Soviet Union directly and was used sparingly. CNN Cold War Episode 7, Interview with Bowie: After Stalin Eisenhower: The White House Years Mandate for Change, 449-451.

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42 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014pressures for consumption goods . [as well as] the growing strength of the free world and the failure to break its cohesion and possible aggravation of weaknesses within the Soviet bloc. The overarching expectation was that successful containment would ameliorate Soviet behavior or it would collapse from its inherent contradictions. While rejected preventive war as a means of forestalling parity, implying it contradicted Western strategic values. Instead, the document regarded nonmilitary initiatives, such as arms control, as more pragmatic. NSC countries, so the United States needed an appropriate means to prevent or keep them from escalating. Here, economic and military assistance received greater attention. All three policies formally recognized that maintaining the trinity of a vibrant economy, free institutions, and American morale was a national security imperative.Despite charges the New Look depended overly on massive retalia tion for the Wests national security, the BNSP was actually intellectually agile. Eisenhower intended that massive retaliation apply only to deter rence in Europenot everywhere.31 world would depend on the maintenance of a: massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power . U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication . and a mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general war. Eisenhower recognized the limitations of the US nuclear arsenal, especially once the Soviet Union neared nuclear parity. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke recalled the president addressing the issue with the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Weve got to have a military force that can handle any situation. And that means, in a small situation weve got to have the proper equipment and proper plans to it, and it doesnt mean that we will have to launch for everything.33 with other weapons in the arsenal . to consider them as conventional tive capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.34 Adapting to changes in the strategic environ in which 31 In reg ards to the famous Dulles speech on massive retaliation, Bowie said it was Eisenhower who had written the sentence that caused confusion. He had not intended it to mean massive retaliation would be used anywhere. Nonetheless, it was Eisenhower who wrote it, not Dulles. Interview with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 43US military readiness would serve to counter local threats. If deter rence failed, US expeditionary forces in conjunction with indigenous the incoming John F. Kennedy administration for study. The BNSP placed great value on collective defense and providing economic and military assistance, not only to allies but also to vulner able states in key regions as an alternative to their accepting Soviet aid and entanglement. Another essential element of the security policy was equipment other than prototypes. This approach not only minimized military expenditures, but also ensured the military would have the most modern and sophisticated equipment in the event of sustained hostilities.35 Moreover, the BNSP served as the foundational policy for the development of supporting policies and strategies within the gov ernment bureaucracy (for example, departments, agencies, and bureaus). What is unique about the development, implementation, and revision of the BNSP is the fact that no other presidency has devoted such focused discipline, energy, and thought to US national security strategy.Separating Myth from RealityNot everyone agreed with the policy conclusions of the BNSP, regardless of its rational approach. The most prevalent charge was that military cuts weakened US national security. Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgeway, for one, disagreed passionately with any reductions in the Army, believing anything less than a large standing the size needed to deter communist aggression, but in view of the mil lions in Soviet ranks (not to mention China), a very large standing force in his opinion would be needed for an indeterminate number of years.36 Eisenhower reasoned that alliances buttressed by nuclear forces were allies was based on several forward-based divisions, naval and air power, as well as forward deployed nuclear weapons, the Soviets could never be certain that even minor aggression would not escalate into general war, Eisenhower never revealed under what conditions he would use nuclear weaponsthis uncertainty was the cornerstone of credible deterrence.37 Hence, containment of the Soviet bloc relied on a holistic deterrence of a held at high readiness, a robust mobilization base, and a strong economy. The starkest difference between Eisenhower and Ridgeway (and Ridgeways successor General Maxwell Taylor) was in perspective. ring them. To him, a general war would be catastrophic regardless of who the victor was.38 Ironically, General Maxwell Taylor, was struck 36 Matthew B. Ridgeway and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgeway 37 Evan Thomas, Ikes Bluff: President Eisenhowers Secret Battle to Save the World (New York: Little, 38 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace

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44 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014by the breadth of its [the BNSP] language and the degree of departure from the dogma of Massive Retaliation, writing a supporting paper in October 1955 titled A National Military Program introducing the concept 39 Like Ridgway, Taylor took issue with what he Eisenhower because it undercut deterrence in Europe.Robert Cutler recalled the Pentagons main complaint with the policy as they liked. Cutler countered that this complaint was a ploy to resist policies the Pentagon did not like.41 Cutler had a point, since the mandate of the NSC Operations Coordinating Board was to assist in the tions, and elicit feedback from the government bureaucracy on policy implementation. This was undoubtedly true, but the Pentagon abhorred the budget restrictions imposed by the BNSP, so its argument was decreased military spending meant decreased security. Since the BNSP mischaracterize the contents of the BNSP to further their own agendas. During the period of demobilization and reorganization of the mili tary, criticism was unavoidable as partisans denounced favored service cuts, military installation closures, or lost defense contracts. Eisenhower pointed out that peacetime readiness was unprecedented for all three services, and that his proposed defense budget was three times that of Trumans pre-Korean War budget. The president also counseled critics not to become prisoners of unwarranted fears, demanding large Eisenhower insisted on maintaining an adequate but not extravagant defense establishment over an extended period of time (perhaps, half a century) . that we do our best to create a national climate favorable to dynamic industrial effort. Eisenhower often repeated that, as opposed to the Soviet maintenance of 175 divisions in Europe, the United States Against this correlation of ground forces, two or even ten more US divisions would not make much difference. Hence, a nuclearinstead of conventionaldeterrent would have to serve to prevent a general war in Europe.43Apparently, this ratio was a myth Eisenhower conveniently allowed to perpetuate. The purported Soviet conventional superiority was vastly exaggerated, a fact the president most likely knew but never divulged. 39 General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncer tain Trumpet Eisenhowers Presidency, stating it was doubtful whether either the Soviets or our allies believed that we would use our retaliatory power for anything other than to preserve our own existence. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 61. 41 R obert Cutler, The National Security Council under President Eisenhower, in The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level, ed. Senator Henry Mandate for Change 43 Ibid., 451-454.

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 45Instead of 175 combat-ready divisions, the Soviets maintained approxi 44 It suited the the truth would likely induce the European allies to relax defensive to clamor for conventional superiority and roll-back strategies. Below the threshold of a general war in Europe, Eisenhower reasoned that but also warned that seeing danger behind every tree or bush was an unwarranted fear of threats rather than a national security strategy. He refused to turn America into an armed camp in a myopic quest of absolute security.45The underpinnings of American national security, however, tran scended the parochialism of the service chiefs. Eisenhower waged a multidimensional struggle to curb military expenditures because he understood the multi-ordered effects of large conventional forces. The military-industrial complex (Congress was complicit in this relationship) as articulated in his farewell address needlessly diverted revenues, sci democratic society. If left unbridled, the United States could descend dovetailed with the vision of the New Look by limiting the size of con ventional forces. BNSP publicly because these features were inherently destabilizing. It promising that expansive conventional forces would enhance national security by permitting the United States to counter the full spectrum of aggression. Yet it signaled to the Soviets that the United States might through miscalculation. Greater conventional capabilities incentivized policymakers to gravitate towards military solutions because increased investment in the military clamored for its use, because they promised silver bullet solutions to otherwise complex problems, and because they offered senior political and military leaders with a way to counter lower-level aggression with less risk of escalation. Perhaps, but military solutions tend to gravitate towards adventurism and entanglement in because this was a realm in which the Communists held the initiative. Even a prudent president, following the logic of a military solution, could wrong enemy.46The development of the BNSP was intimately tied to the NSC mechanism, which the president painstakingly organized. The cultivation of 44 Matthew A. Evangelista, Stalins Postwar Army Reappraised, International Security 7, no 3 45 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 451-454. 46 Eisenhower sought a structural solution to the problems of service parochialism and inef remove redundancies, streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control at the Pentagon." H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 14.

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46 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014strategic thinking set the Eisenhower administration apart from other presidencies. Eisenhowers NSC mechanism serviced the president with the information and diverse viewpoints he needed to optimize deci sions regardless of circumstances and obstacles. Like other presidents, Eisenhower devoted his speeches, messages, and addresses to inspire and inform both domestic and foreign audiences, but they were based on a process of staffed initiatives, discussion, and practical feedback. Strategy and policy formulations are often tedious, unexciting work, and while the substance is vitally important, it is unlikely to excite the imagination. However, without a foundation of rationally derived policy, rhetoric can lead a nation to rash policy decisions or even a national disaster, create social unrest as rising expectations are not met, and result in frivolous spending. In short, inspirational speeches do not necessarily translate to good policy. continuity of policies, procedures, and knowledge for successive admin istrations. Through the NSC mechanism, the government bureaucracy could provide an orderly continuity of information and processes on national policies and strategies for new administrations, permitting a seamless transition. Fully acquainted with the system, the government without pause. Through the NSC system, successive administrations could access information on old reforms, initiatives, and studies as a check on new ideas that are bound to crop up in a new administration. Lastly, the new president could adapt the NSC mechanism to his leader ship and management style once he became familiar with it, but keeping the fundamental parts intact.ConclusionThe Solarium exercise was an essential start point for the develop ment of the BNSP. As this article has demonstrated, the exercise was highly organized with the NSC working committee and the Doolittle Committee developing the terms of reference for the three study teams. As a useful insight, such preparations permitted the three teams to study their policy alternatives with the full support of the engaged agencies and without distractions. Solarium also demonstrated Eisenhowers deep involvement in the process and the derived objectives he desired. As Eisenhower stated at the end of the exercise, the process had just begun, with the BNSP formulation phase lasting another three months. Accordingly, multiple drafts of NSC 161 by the NSC Planning Board, deliberative process which epitomized the Eisenhower NSC system. More importantly, the NSC reviewed the BNSP annually and revised it when the strategic environment changed. While the New Look strategy was much maligned and mischar acterized throughout the Eisenhower administration, it did set the foundation for US Cold War strategy. Eisenhower believed avoiding a general war was the surest way to persevere over the Soviet Union in the long term. Accordingly, a balanced military with high readiness and

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STRATEGY & POLICY Millen 47safeguard against Communist miscalculation. Despite the near hysterical claims of Soviet domination, there was no bomber, missile, or industrial gap. American missile and space programs were much more robust than their Soviet counterparts, creating the nuclear triad, intelligence surveillance satellites, and the NASA space program in far greater numbers and sophistication. The administration accomplished these without crash programs and immense budget expenditures. Eisenhowers policy successes were a result of superb organization, the deliberative process, and his cultivation of strategic thinking. Eisenhower weaved his political philosophy into the BNSP. Economic prosperity through the free market, protection of democratic institutions and American morale, and adherence to Western values rep resented the strategic pillars of the US grand strategy which cultivated American prosperity, freedom, and optimism. Hence, these pillarsnot an excessive military-industrial complexeventually paid off with the collapse of the Soviet political system.

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ABSTRaA CT: The post-9/11 use of private security companies in a combat role has credentialed them in the workplace, public arena, and legal system, thus meeting Andrew Abbotts criteria of an emerging profession. Fiscal challenges and global instability will likely perpetuate this condition and in so doing change the US military profession and its associated civil-military relations that underwrite the all-volunteer force.As the United States concludes two long wars while facing increasof reducing military expenditures; however, subsequent decisions as to how the Department of Defense should implement these reductions will become problematic. In this environment political leaders seek to rely on current military overmatch to justify budget cuts that reduce near-term readiness. At the same time, they program the remaining monies against science and technology to achieve future overmatch, all while satisfy ing their constituents. The processes required to make these decisions of contemporary research on the military profession has largely used functional models to examine and evaluate the military profession. By applying Andrew Abbotts established systems model of professions, this paper argues the use of private security companies in overseas combat theaters has changed the scope of the US militarys professional jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction serves as an indicator of the trust relationship between society and the military, this boundary shift could foretell a change in civil-military relations and the associated viability of the all-volunteer force. After establishing the context of the problem private security companies are contesting the US militarys preeminence. It concludes by recommending an expanded view of the risk associated with military budget decisions so as to preserve the all-volunteer force. With the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a heightened risk of perpetuating the historical pattern of post-war social fatigue with war and a desire to reap peace dividends. In the 20th century these combined pressures typically yielded a reduction in the militarys budget, resulting in a degraded force structure and a decrease in quality of the defense establishment. The full effects of such reductions frequently become apparent at the start of the next PRIVaATE CCONTRaACTORS & MILITaARY PROFESSIONaALS Military Professionalism & Private Military Contractors career soldier in the US Army with assignments in North America, Europe, and the Middle East. His previous publications have addressed strategic leadership, orgaeducation methodology. He has taught at the US Military Academy, Naval War College, Army War College, Salve Regina University, and Texas A&M University.

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50 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014with old equipment, and trapped with an ill-suited doctrine.1 Unlike past interwar periods, contemporary actions short of war (such as regional security and mil to mil exchanges) as well as the need to restructure save monies and reconcile these tensions, national leaders will debate how best to fund the competing demands of force structure, near-term a debate about where to assume the risk of under-resourcing. This is not a new conundrum for America; historically, the employment of shortterm contractors mitigated associated risks until resources increased and allowed the military to adjust and negate its need. This pattern was broken in Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractor use in general, and private security companies in particular, did not proportionally decline. military relations, which is the cornerstone of an effective American all-volunteer force. Therefore, identifying and understanding how private security companies compete with the military profession is important for two reasons. First, it adds context from which to assess the ongoing Department of Defenses campaign to increase the profession understand how an unrestrained reliance on private security companies as risk mitigation affects the military professions long-term capabilities, responsibilities, and relationships with society. theoretical and practical knowledge that conducts special training and self-regulates its members and is thus credentialed by society with special authority.2 renew the professions authority and autonomy. Society credentials two agents with the authority to employ lethal forcelaw enforcement and the military. The military profession serves society by molding an institu tioncapable of managing violence toward policy endsthat ensures the members maintain technical currency, doctrinal relevance, a culture strained military profession, and, anticipating the latent detrimental effects from ten years of war, instructed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take remedial action. The resulting campaign encompassed all military departments by calling for a Rededication to the Profession 1 Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., Americas First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1986), ii-ix; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 1st ed. (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2005), 50-51, 115-16. 2 Allan G. Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A Users Guide to Sociological Language, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 216-217.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS of Arms (RPA).3 and preserve the pattern of civil-military relations enjoyed since the advent of the all-volunteer force.4 With a volunteer force, society rep resents the sum authority granted by three groups of actorscivilian chain of command, public at large, and servicememberswith whom a trust relationship must be maintained.5 the importance of these three relationships yet the program follows precedent by addressing just one relationshipthe nurturing of the profession by strengthening servicemembers trust. Peter Feavers application of Agency Theory to recent US civil-mil all three relationships.6 As such, the military (agent) and civilian leader ship (principal) reconcile discreet objectives by aligning their interests. Historically, the dilemmas have centered on how the military profession would dissent with civilian leadership.7 As private security companies become alternative agents to apply lethal force for the state a competitive situation emerges. The presence of multiple agents becomes a disincen tive for civilian leadership to align its interests with the military and in doing so weakens the militarys relationships with civil leaders and the public. In this type of environment, the Rededication to the Profession of Arms single focus on one of three relationships becomes inadequate to strengthen the US military profession.The challenge for military and civilian leaders in the current environ ment is to strengthen the profession of arms to ensure adequate military capacity responsive to the state. Recent scholarship suggests the military profession can be better understood with the application of a systems paradigm. Abbott argued that professions form a complex and dynamic social system in a competitive environment where they will adapt or disappear based on their relative performance of work. This system is and other individual professions which also change in response to the same social and environmental forces.8In contrast to the functional models of Samuel Huntington and and apply abstract knowledge, Abbots systems model gauges the 3 Martin E. Dempsey, America s MilitaryA Profession of Arms White Paper (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), Joint Chiefs of Staff; Jim Garamone, Dempsey Calls for Rededication to Profession of Arms, U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/ news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67307. 4 Dempsey, Americas MilitaryA Profession of Arms White Paper, 3-6; Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Education White Paper (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 4-6. 5 Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 11-13.. 6 P eter D. Feaver, Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations, Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 407-34. 7 Charles D Allen and Breena E. Coates, The Engagement of Military Voice, Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-10): 73-87.; Donald Drechsler and Charles D. Allen, Why Senior Military Leaders Fail: And What We Can Learn from Their Mistakes, Armed Forces Journal 146 (July/August 2009); and Charles D. Allen, Lessons Not Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Afghanistan, Armed Forces Journal 148, no. 2 (September 2010). 8 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 19, 33.

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52 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014strength of a profession by the breadth, scope, and social value of its workthe greater these characteristics, the larger its jurisdiction. In his model, a change of professional jurisdictions results when the demand for the services provided by a profession increase faster than the profes sion can respond. When this happens, either emerging professions or other existing professions complete the work instead. The outcomes of the type and nature of the response of the actors within the system.9 The members as well as its history as part of a larger system of professions.10The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 was a watershed event for the US military profession as the all-volunteer force encountered two undertook peacekeeping missions, and (b) an American desire for a peace dividend that reduced the Army end strength from 780,815 to 495,000.11 To mitigate the shortfall in manpower, the Army developed the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program.12 The consequences of this shift remained masked until the 1990s when the demand for forces in the Balkans resulted in the Army ceding some jurisdiction for base effort to husband resources for combat operations.13The subsequent recognition of an inadequate force structure, as well as a desire to harness a perceived Revolution in Military Affairs Department of Defense to increase military capability without raising end-strength.14 The magnitude of the consequences that resulted from increased outsourcing became evident early in Operation Iraqi Freedom when the contractor-to-servicemember ratio became 1 to 10 (an increase from 1 to 50 for Desert Storm in 1991).15 While the military was arguably the military to train itself and coalition partners, or protect the force on Prior to this expansion of contractor roles and duties, jurisdictional competition over military work was framed in one of three relation ships. First, competition was framed as interservice rivalry within the Department of Defensea condition for resolution by civilian authority 9 Abbott, The System of Professions 225-227 and 267-279. Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 45 (2007), 110. 11 Andrew Feickert, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2013), 7. 12 Often referred to as LOGCAP or AR 700-137. Camile M. Nichols, The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Military Review 13 Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession, in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. eds. Don Snider and Lloyd 14 Christopher Spearin, The Emperors Leased Clothes: Military Contractors and Their Implications in Combating International Terrorism, International Politics 41 (2004):243-64.. 15 Jonathan A. Johnson, Private Security Contractors: The Other Force, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2011), 3, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560096.pdf.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS based on expert knowledge of each service.16 Second, scholars detailed intrastate jurisdictional competition between governmental agencies such as the Department of State.17 Lastly, jurisdictional competition occurred transnationally where the US military competed with other militaries to perform international missionssuch as counterterrorism training.18 As the Global War on Terror progressed, additional second order effects of contracting became more apparent. A fourth competi tive relationship emerged where private companies began to compete with the military for jurisdiction over its core taskthe employment of lethal force. In 2004, Deborah Avant argued that the Armys:. . ready use of contractors for tasks that are crucial to both the development of the profession in the future and to the success of new missions Army and private security companies over who will shape the development of the future professionals and has degraded the Armys ability to undertake successful missions on its own.19The increased use of private security and training companies in a was previously the US military professions sole jurisdiction. Jurisdiction competition occurs in the arenas of legal action, public opinion, or in the workplace, and with each actor when and where they 20 During the period of jurisdiction contest, work and task quality varies as no single profession can fully police the participants. The allocation force resolution of competing jurisdiction claims, but this takes time and is marked by contention and task failure. An analysis of the jurisdictional competition and the settlements related to the use of private contractors indicate the state of the US military profession.During the Global War on Terror, private security contractors comprised roughly 10 percent of the contract workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 Private contractor duties are limited by law to those deemed defensive in nature such as providing security for sites, 16 Richard Lacquement, Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice, in The Future of the Army Profession 17 For example see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with Americas Military, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 11-13. 18 Burk, Exper tise, Jurisdiction, and the Legitimacy of the Military Profession, 50-51. 19 Deborah Avant, Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing? in The Future of the Army Profession 272. 20 Abbott, The System of Professions 59-63. The Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 June 2010), 7-11, www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.

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54 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014convoys, select personnel, and special escort.22 While this scope of work sounds benign, defensive duties placed private security companies at critical points of US counterinsurgency doctrine as it strived to secure local and national governments ability to secure its population and infrastructure. In this environment, US contractors comprise 25 percent of the US personnel killed in action in Iraq.23 An armed security contrac tor was 1.5 to 4.8 times more likely to be killed in Iraq or Afghanistan than US uniformed personnel.24 In 2009, the International Committee tract security personnel who are assigned to protect an embassy from attack would likely be considered combatants, as would private security providers assigned to protect military supply convoys from insurgents because their purpose, although defensive in nature, would affect hos tilities and could require engagement with enemy forces.25In addition to the number of contractors being greater than any time in American history, the duration, and scope of their role is likewise without precedent. While previous force design decisions deliberately after 9/11.26 With the absence of a precedent to govern contractors as combatants and the absence of guidance for the US government to stop using private security companies, there is no reason to expect private and disappear. According to Abbot, this condition where actors perform similar work in the same environment inherently invites competition in the arenas of legal, public opinion, and the workplace.27Allegations of abuse and war crimes by private security contractors during the Global War on Terror have led to a series of Congressional hearings, investigations, and legal measures in an attempt to establish oversight.28 Contracted forces, such as private security companies, work in a contingency area and operate under three levels of legal authority: (a) the international order of the laws and usages of war, resolutions of 22 Eugene Shearer, The U .S. Governments Employment of Private Security Companies Abroad, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 1-2, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/ u2/a562046.pdf. Impact, INSS Strategic Forum, National Defense University, SF No. 260, 3 http://psm.du.edu/ media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/inss_hammes-private-contractors.pdf The Department of Defenses Use of Private Security Contractors 8-12. 25 Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 January 2010), 6, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf. to Inadequate Planning, in How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War, ed. James Burk (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, in press), 8-28. 27 Abbott, The System of Professions 59-60. Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2008), 1.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS the United Nations Security Council, and relevant treaties; (b) U.S. law; and (c) the domestic law of the host countries.29 This condition allows for jurisdictional claims in three different legal systems, whose respec of war were subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the legal authority of the military profession.30The changes in the 2008 NDAA required the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the US Agency for International Development to establish a memorandum of understanding that speci possible violations of the UCMJ or the Military Extraterritorial Judicial Act (MEJA)in the case of civilians.31 The expanded application of the if a civilian employee (to include those of a private security company) is suspected of having committed a felony.32 This 2008 NDAA instituted two changes. First, it removed private security contractors employed in from military oversight and investigation authority. Second, it removed the militarys legal authority to enforce professional standards against those security contractors it employed. By omission, this division of legal jurisdiction moved some private security companies completely outside any US oversight as:. . some contractor personnel who commit crimes might not fall within the diction of U.S. criminal law, even though the United States is responsible for their conduct as a matter of state responsibility under international law.33The websites of private security companies such as Academi (for merly Blackwater, then Xe), DynCorps and Triple Canopy illustrate and their offer of an alternative to traditional military forces. In a free market society, however, the public contests for jurisdiction are often investigations associated with the role of private security contractors in Fallujah and Nisoor Square (Baghdad), Iraq are public examples of the new combat role of private contracting companies.34 The acceptance of news and periodical stories of private contractors as warriors on the front lines provides a third indicator of the ongoing security companies 29 Elsea, Pri vate Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 5. 30 T he John Warner National Defense Act 2007 made provisions for those contractors employed by DOD to be subjected to UCMJ jurisdiction. This authority remained largely untested, as any exercise of this law would likely be challenged as unconstitutional or superseded by subsequent legislation. See Shearer, The U.S. Governments Employment of Private Security Companies Abroad, 23. 31 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 19. 32 Militar y Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Title 18 Part II, Chapter 212, Sec. 3261 (January 3, 2012) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partIIchap212-sec3261/content-detail.html 33 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 18. 34 Contractors The High-Risk Contracting Business, Frontline PBS, 2005 http://www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html; Doug Miller, Blackwater Settles With Families of Nisoor Square Victims, Charlotte Observer, January 7, 2012.

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56 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014public claims for jurisdiction over state-sanctioned application of lethal force.35 Lastly, and arguably most compelling, private security compa nies maintain publicly they are more cost effective (as a result of no long-term obligations to the institution or the workforce) and timely 36 Private security companies pub licly claim immediate cost savings without a counterargument as to the long-term effects on military force structure and capabilities.37Because the eroded US military jurisdiction has not yet produced a crisis, public efforts to restore the military professions jurisdiction have not been compelling and thus are ineffective. For example, national security scholars Fontaine and Nagl concluded: Most experts agree that contracting out logistics and construction activities skilled laborand private security functions in particulartends toward parity with the cost of using federal employees.38 public in a manner that encourages strengthening of the military profession. The use of private contractors and the subsequent erosion of the military professions jurisdiction resulted from the inability of the mili tary to meet an increase in demand for operational forcesnot from an attempted cost savings measure. The debate on the level of resourcing required by the military to protect the professions jurisdiction over its core competencyand sustain the pattern of US civil-military rela tionslacks a public audience. In this instance, the military may be a victim of its own success. The trust relationship between the military and the public is now so strong tactical success is taken for granted, with little regard by civilian leaders or the public for the professions The current military to civilian contractor ratio of 1:1 in the Global within the Department of Defense. It is accepted and expected that civilians now perform tasks previously accomplished by uniformed sonnel performing security operations for the US government. At the end of the Iraq troop surge in 2009, the Department of Defense and the Department of State employed 16,263 private security personnel in Iraq and 5,062 in Afghanistan.39 For perspective, the totals are equivalent to 35 For examples of public acceptance of private security contractors as warriors, see Lee Sharon, Private Security Contractors: Sifting Out the Wannabes, Never-Have Beens and Never-Will-Bes, Soldier of Fortune Magazine of a Private Security Contractor, Security Clearance CNN, Dec 27, 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn. com/2011/12/27/confessions-of-a-private-security-contractor/. Private Security Contractors in Iraq 36. 38 Richard Fontaine and John A. Nagl, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 6 June 2010),18-19, http://www.cnas.org/node/4560. At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 2009), 62.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS six Brigade Combat Teams. With 2010 beginning the operational withdrawal of US forces from both theaters of war, private security company personnel totaled over 28,000 and represented over 10 percent of the total contractors employed by the Departments of Defense and State in Iraq and Afghanistan.40 private contractors into the workplace and that the jurisdictional claim of these contractors has expandedrather than contractedas US Competition between professions requires each to adapt and secure its jurisdiction or become a bureaucracy or occupation.41 Conversely, adaptation by an emerging profession or a challenger produces the means to claim a jurisdiction in legal, public, or workplace arenas. continuum. First, one of the actors can be awarded full jurisdiction in a nated to the other. Third, the claim could be divided among the actors with each becoming a formal profession, independently responsible to society. Midway between a formal division and subordination lies the intellectual settlement, where one profession retains authority and responsibility for the abstract knowledge while competitors operate on advisory jurisdiction. Such arrangements grant one group independent authority to interpret another professions actions as its jurisdiction (i.e., the clergy may interpret and explain the larger meaning of medical conditions to patients).42 Recent jurisdiction settlements resulting from competition in the three arenas illustrate the ongoing challenges to the US military profession.In the 2009 NDAA, Congress expressed that:. . private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments, and that DOD regulations should ensure that private security contractors of combat operations.43This legal directive acknowledged the military had come to rely heavily on private contractors to complete its mission and required the Department of Defense to reconcile the intent of the law with conditions on the ground. It presented a nuanced interpretation that did not pro hibit the use of contract personnel for security, but . limits the extent to which contract personnel may be hired to guard military installations.44 has the authority to decide whether to classify security functions as 40 John P. Carrell, Gover nment Contractors Do We Really Need Them? Strategic Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011) 2, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a553013.pdf, 2. 41 Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 9, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. 42 Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions 69-77. 43 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 15. 44 Ibid., 16.

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58 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014commercial.45 In theory this caveat allows military commanders some degree of authority to protect the US militarys professional jurisdiction contract work. In reality, senior commanders (the agent) met political leaders (the principal) expectations to do more with less, by resorting to private contractors. The increased use of such contractors allowed commanders combat power to achieve the mission. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the numbers of such personnel did not count against force caps or troop level of US involvement.46 Despite the intent of the legislation, senior leaders were placed in an ethical dilemmause private security contractors to meet the workplace requirements for security with reduced troop sionals (as the states sole agent of lethal force) and risk mission failure/ increased casualties.The enactment of the 2008 NDAA intended to give the military oversight of private security contractors but did little to enable the US military profession to defend its jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the military cannot write or execute security contracts for the multitude of other government agenciessuch as the Department of State, and private companies that employ private security contractors in a combat large demand for contractors during the Global War on Terror had the compounding effect of overwhelming the work capacity of the govern capacity to respond to the anticipated demand foreseen in the military reduction of the 1990s.47 Consequently, the military had to hire private legal authority to avoid being forced to outsource its own demise. For example, Presidential Policy Letter 11-01 allows any agency or depart ment to in-source any capability they determine is essential to performing core missions regardless of comparative costs.48 While well intended, the policy does not address the root problem of inadequate Department of Defense capacity to meet a sudden increase in demand. Moreover, to protect the military profession remain subject to interpretation in the workplace. For example, because of the large presence of military and contract personnel working on the same task in the same environ ment, migration from one profession to the other is not uncommon. 45 Ibid., 17. 46 John P. Carrell, Government Contractors Do We Really Need Them? 4-5. 47 Karen L. Coccio, Outsourcing, In-sourcing, and Maintaining the Acquisition Workforce Profession Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 11-12. 48 Ibid., 12.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS The greater the resources or legitimacy of one profession as compared to the other, then the greater the propensity for personnel to join the competing profession, which in this case forces the US military to incur 49 Intellectual SettlementsThe 2011 National Defense Acquisition Act (Section 833) mandated security contractors adhere to standards for operational and business practices (currently under development).50 This legal action moved the authority to conduct lethal force training for combat operations outside the militarys jurisdiction and sanctioned the associated development of abstract knowledge to competing nongovernmental professions. The initial migration of uniformed personnel to private security compa nies made for great congruence of the governing abstract knowledge; however, the demand for contractors drove many companies to meet manpower and cost savings by employing large numbers of people from other nations who have no association with, or training from, the US military profession. For example, in 2004 private security companies in Iraq employed approximately 30,000 personnel from over 30 countries.51 rity companies via the National Defense Act of 2008 which required all Department of Defense, Department of State, and governmental agencies employing these contractors to comply with DOD Instruction 3020-50.52 However, market forces made this settlement brief as other the combatant commanders ability to enforce this law with competing sets of guidance, such as references to an industry standard. An examination of the recent roles of private contracting companies during the Global War on Terror indicates they are actively and pas sively contesting the US military professions jurisdiction over its core taskthe authority to employ lethal force as the agent of the state. The US military profession is under assault in all three arenas: the workplace (predominantly), the legal system, and the public. Since this contest is without precedence it is not surprising that the jurisdictional settlements outcome undetermined. 49 Fontaine and Nagl, 18; also Burk, Expertise, Jurisdiction, and the Legitimacy of the Military Profession, 56. 50 DoD Issues Interim Rule for Contractors Performing Private Security Functions, August 19, 2011, National Contract Management Association at Legislative and Regulator Alerts http://www. ncmahq.org/NewsPublications/LegAlertDetail.cfm?itemnumber=10336. Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 3; also Sarah K. Cotton et al, Hired Guns / : Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010), 20. 52 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 22, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, August 1, 2011)..

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60 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 private security contractors are numerically niche players whose involve these counterarguments is not wise for three reasons. In regards to the cant as are the consequences of their actionsregardless of aggregate numbersas shown by the actions in Nisoor Square. As to the latter, the pattern of private security contractor involvement is not self-correct ing as evidenced by the patterns established in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Lastly, other research on the use of security contractors Recommendations from previous scholarship included increasing military capacity to negate the need for security companies, severely restricting them to locations where rule of law prevails, and increasing Congressional oversight of them.53 While valid structural recommen dations, they are either too narrow or unrealistically broad, and risk repeating past mistakes. In the absence of deliberate effort, the erosion of the US militarys jurisdiction can be expected to continue. At issue here is not the military professions jurisdiction per se, but how to nurture the profession so it can ensure future military effectiveness. The are subordinate to civilian leaders, they cannot be solely responsible for the US military profession in todays environment. Additionally, the United States will almost certainly have to continue to use private security companies. to whether to assume risk with short-term readiness or long-term techno logical superiority is a false dichotomy. The concept of risk in the ongoing build down must be expanded to include an institutional dimension to and future program development timelines do not provide for a military informed by their effect on services core jurisdictions, and implemented with deliberate settlements to protect them. This is a new approach and requires additional research and a larger shared sense of responsibility. 53 Molly Dunigan, Considerations for the Use of Private Security Contractors in Future U.S. Military DeploymentsThe Department of Defenses Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 20.

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ABSTRaA CT : This article examines the potential role of private secu rity companies as part of a global special forces network. It reveals retired special forces personnel moving to the private sector.Western states frequently use the word network to describe contemporary military dynamics. Not only are special forces for it. These forces are ideally suited for networks given their special expensive conventional forces. organizations recognize their quantitative and qualitative shortcom there is a perceived need to develop a network of like-minded actors. and allow others to gain a better understanding on how to become active members of that network. NATO Watch JSOU Report 06-3 PRIVaATE CCONTRaACTORS & MILITaARY PROFESSIONaALS Special Operations Forces & Private Security Companies Christopher Spearin 2014 Christopher Spearin of Canada located at the Canadian Forces College

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62 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014global special forces network speaks both to the seeming ubiquity of the some questions. What are the assumed and actual links between these construct security a hindrance or an asset to special forces? ages and similarities between these two actors. It underscores why one might think private security companies are appropriate for this network. rationales contributing to the rise in prominence of bothothers have 4 zational character and people-centric nature of each actor. It also reveals that although companies are increasingly seen as security experts in their The articles second part is inspired by a recent assessment concern ing how nodal security dynamics have to be imagined before they can 5 beyond replacing military forces with private security organizations as was often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. prospects for independent cooperation and interaction and what private for special forces. particular form of territorial control on behalf of corporate clientsa type of control that differs from the approach of special forces. While rity and welfare of local populations is not its immediate concern. This companies may draw their skillsets and notions of professionalism from appealing to such an audience may reduce the likelihood of private is plain that the movement of military personnel to the private sphere Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means Armed Forces & Society The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 63 similar measures may again be warranted as the fear of special forces burnout grows and the private sphere alternative remains.Organizing for ViolenceSpecial Forces the preferences and actions of both armies and states.7 Conventional feature social dynamics with a lower degree of formality compared to conventional forces. forces have been referred to as private armies because of their relative independence and unique attributes. nology equips special forces; they do not man the technology. Special forces in Iraq and Afghanistan capitalized on technologies characteristic Technology helps them stand out as special and assists them in com pleting their often sensitive tasks. International Security Armed Forces & Society Comparative Strategy Canadian Military Journal Special Forces increasing emphasis has been placed on quality over quantity in the US Army. This comment likely relates to more than doing better with what is left in conventional forces; it speaks to increased professionalization and socio-political rationales about when and how force is to be applied. In this The Combat Solider: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries Journal of Strategic Studies

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64 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014and recognition that humans need machines to operate in austere environments like the sea and air. It is representative of an arma capital-intensive militaries over labor-intensive ones. The formative work to the psychological realm that binds them together. At state beyond merely responding to the capabilities and challenges offered by adversaries. These instruments of violence symbolize modernity; they are indicative of membership in the prestigious club of statehood.The fact that special forces are becoming increasingly important is scholars suggested weaning Western militaries off their baroque mili tary technology would demand nothing less than institutional change trends and developments mentioned earlier underscore change. While companies. Private Security Companies stand outside the structure altogether. While they possess many military to state actors. They also tap into the rationales that other actors should increasingly be responsible for their own security. outside. Current Research on Peace and Violence Special Forces Arms Control Review of International Studies The Baroque Arsenal Contemporary Security Policy

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 65important role in military operations. Acknowledging longstanding to training and equipment and normative shifts regarding who should A bureaucratic notions about the role of the state vis--vis legitimate vio service rather than hardware model to reduce overhead. Some experts describe commercial dynamics this way: Additional personnel and equipment are only procured on a case-by-case basisusually after a their operations with limited capital outlays. opportunities. strategic reasons and to ensure state control over the possession and nomic disincentives and state control; platform availability for private security companies is constrained. Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations European Journal of International Relations The Baroque Arsenal Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence The Baroque Arsenal, War as Business: Technological Change and Military Service Contracting in Maritime Private Security: Market responses to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century Cambridge Review of International Affairs

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66 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014RelationshipsIt is important not to overdraw the distinction between states and security actors often obtain legitimacy precisely from their connections to the state. from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these in their work. Still Serving.Here a number of the organic connections between state-orga Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits, and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU Millennium www.triplecanopy.com/careers/.

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 67This special forces cachet in the private security industry has both small team organization characteristic of special forces translates well in the private security context. It promotes self-reliance in challenging about travel routings and securing their facilities. of contractors reveal that many transfer their professional understand ings and standards to the private sector. industry does possess security expertise and that it is a heralded expertise. place in Western culture and in appreciations of military expertise. They worry that descriptions of these forces as the perfect soldiers advance a mythology rather than an accurate picture of reality. Private Security Companies and Special ForcesControlThough Western states increasingly wish to pursue strategic quently exercise it. In a context in which special forces are less and less more attuned to the development and value of networks compared to conventional personnel. International Herald Tribune Strategy Page Asia Times Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics Special Forces Corpwatch National Defense Magazine

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68 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 the inability of adversaries to secure key personnel and infrastructure. on rather than reducing the heat.When considering how territorial control is exercised in a global ent approach. Firms emphasize the one may subsequently exercise it aspect because of the industrys defensive focus. While private security and nongovernmental organizations. companies between the defensive and the offensive: Operations in which forces await for the approach of the enemy before attacking over Operations in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him. it would mean that they would not be operating too far away from their of territory might be more permanent compared to direct special forces Fortissimus Inter Pares Parameters RUSI Journal Parameters Security Dialogue Law BR1806, Third Edition

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 69 receive the required resources or physical protection. Without other but also those portions of society that cannot afford protection have to with particular targets. These private security companies responsibili ties and techniques arguably equate to a different variant of liddism on their own. In imagining a special forces network that includes private from the perspective of special forces.Contact and development NGOs are among the most sensitive. While surveys licly acknowledge their interactions with these companies. Analysts NGO roles or adopt the humanitarian moniker disingenuously. There is also worry that these companies may impact negatively upon NGO Economic Agendas in Civil Wars The State, War, and the State of War Corporate Warriors Journal of Peace Research Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in MilitaryHumanitarian Relations

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70 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 both in and outside of a country of operations. Counting humanitarian agencies as clients has multiple advantages for market. may be an alternative security solution. winding down and Western governments applying themselves less but states could avoid taking essential political measures. sparked some of the initial interest in NGO and private security company may set limits on the degree to which they would interact with special forces given the tensions inherent in private security company dyna 44 While private security companies may easily move among these worlds and 45 Security Dialogue Small Wars & Insurgencies Organizations and the Law Notre Dame Journal of International, Comparative, and Human Rights Law Washington Post Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Private Security Contractors Millennium Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Millennium

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 71concerns of humanitarians is valuable. action with special forces through a nonclient relationship would lead to closing of the humanitarian space rather than at least contributing to its stabilization.47 The potential for NGO independence to be compro companies would be problematic factors at best in terms of advancing ManpowerWhile one might argue that the recent expansion of special forces forces responsibilities will increase. The growing quality of life issues and They underscore the network emphasis noted at this articles beginning. with them but also conforming to the operational boundaries of indi private security company might be viewed as part of an overall career path for military personnel. evident with personnel movement from special forces to the private security opportunities catalyzed special forces retention efforts. These efforts attempted to deny companies of manpower for the sake of self-preservation; governments were tasking special forces to do more Policing and Society 47 Humanitarian space: an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and Spaces? International Peacekeeping Herald Sun Strategy Page

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72 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 ances with a Special Operations Allowance covering a wider range of were stop-loss years preventing the retirement of certain military per about noncompete clauses in government contracts that would dissuade incentives. potentially part of a larger network implies that the genie cannot be it arguably draws further attention to the industry as an employment and other retention measures. especially given the sky-rocketing costs of conventional military plat networked approach may not necessarily be at low expensea troubling Concluding Remarks range of interests requiring protection is expanding. The augmented This article suggests there are many connectionsalmost genetic linksbetween special forces and private security companies in the larger network. It is increasingly recognized there are social networks among different national special forces that allow for cooperation and integration. Some go so far as to suggest there is a wider special forces USA Today Foreign Affairs

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Spearin 73culture. If private security personnel indeed transfer their professional rity companies are perfectly suitable for a global special forces network. ernance. 54 how the personnel linkages between special forces and private secu rity companies may impinge on the former in an era of austerity and manpower dynamics together highlight a lack of universal congruity vissibility builds upon the opinion offered by one retired US General that 55While there clearly are limitations and challenges in consider ing private security companies as partners in a broader special forces nomena in which the nodes simultaneously cooperate and compete Incorporating private security companies as part of this network should be done with eyes wide open. Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice Review of International Studies Private Security Contractors Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits, and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context

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ABSTRaA CT : Research in private military and security companies has PRIVaATE CCONTRaACTORS & MILITaARY PROFESSIONaALS Private Military & Security Companies: A Review EssayBirthe Anders 2014 Birthe Anders recently completed her PhD at the Department thesis on the relationship and security companies Private Military and P 1 and individual contractors and services rather than state-sponsored conPrior Approaches

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76 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 Discussion typically centered on the rise 6 7 Private Military Companies. Options for Regulation in Private Military and Security Companies Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry Die Privatisierung der Sicherheit: Fluch oder Segen? Postheroische Gesellschaft, berlasteter Staat und private Sicherheitsund Militrunternehmen ; Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics Private Armies and Military Intervention International Security Brookings Contractors Support of US Operations in Iraq Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics Security Studies Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq Contractors & War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Anders 77 9 10 11 After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After IraqWhitehall Paper 66 States, Citizens and the Privatisation of SecurityVictory for Hire: Private Security Companies Impact on Military Effectiveness Outsourcing War & Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs Patriots for Out of the Shadows: The Health and Well-Being of Private Contractors working Millennium Security Dialogue Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century Journal of Strategic Studies Defence Studies Contractors & War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations Security Dialogue The Use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian Operations, International Peacekeeping Small Wars & Insurgencies

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78 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 16 17 Avenues for Further Research three areas: Strife Blog International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 16 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies

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PRIVATE CONTRAcCTORS & MILITARY PROFESSIONALS Anders 79

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80 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014

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This commentary is in response to Robert A. Johnson's article "Predicting Future War" published in the Spring 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 1). Commentaries & Replies On "Predicting Future War"Jeff Becker 2014 Jeffrey Becker Mr. Becker is a Defense Analyst in Virginia, and has worked on military futures for over 15 years. He is currently working and writing on a number of Joint Futures and Future Joint Concept projects for the Joint Staff. Mr. Becker graduated from Old Dominion University with a M.A. in International Studies and has a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Iowa. The Joint Force Must Get Better at Understanding Combinations, Employing Asymmetry, Evaluating RiskThe article Predicting Future War by Robert Johnson provides a compelling vision for the types of challenges future forces will face and the military implications of those challenges. Although tours of the future like those found in the article are important, I believe it is critical the military step back and understand the cultural challenges. Straight-line analysis of trends and their implications may drive us to solutions that are wrong or incomplete. Instead, I would advocate a broader view so the force as a whole can come to terms with these challenges in a coherent way. Strategic competition is always a back-and-forth affair. The US approach to warfare over the last several decades has deeply impressed potential adversaries and is encouraging speedy military innovation around the world. This innovation is confronting the Joint Force with an array of emerging military challenges and threatening to obsolesce, or make irrelevant, parts of the US defense establishment. From antito evolving irregular and insurgent challenges throughout the Middle the Department of Defense, we have to think hard about building a Joint Force (through conscious design) with keen appreciation for evolv ing strategic challenges and threats. The Chairman notes 80 percent of the Joint Force of 2020 is essentially decided. Thus, what we do about the remaining 20 percent can potentially have disproportional impact on the success or failure of our future military. Perhaps even more critical is what we do in doctrine, education, organization, training, and leadership in essence, the mental and social software that orients and orchestrates our military capabilities. To get this software right, the military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic, and occurs on our terms, not an adversarys. Coding this mental soft ware also suggests now is the time to step back from individual weapons three distinct, yet related paths.

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82 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 novel combinations of threats from an array of adversaries. These threats frequently transcend neat or tidy categories, cutting across land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, while which its competence and professionalism are unrivalled. Adversaries, unable to confront superior capabilities within service domains, are cutting across seams or boundaries between services, or avoid them altogether. Second, these novel combinations of challenges, threats, and adver saries require novel combinations of power in response. To encourage a future military capable of such combinations, we have to think about civilian, and military power, which are at once confounding, irresistible, will set the stage for affordable and numerous new capabilities, such as small, swarming robotics capable of taking advantage of the emerg and information technologies. Furthermore, this mental approach will replace capital assets and overcome the potential limitations of a force serve to deter more effectively. During war, it will be central to victory. Third, we must better understand how to evaluate and mitigate risk by integrating vulnerability assessments more comprehensively into all aspects of our thinking. Risk is inherent every time military power is employed. However, we often forget the true measure of power in the international system is the ability to change the behavior of another at reasonable cost our initial assumptions about military problems, and at articulating the lems are dangerous, not all dangers are pressing, not all emergencies are soluble, and not all solutions are affordable. The defense intellectual of uniting strategy and tactics in a world of limitations. In a world char acterized by powerful adversaries and perhaps less ample US military capabilities, it is critical we cultivate a sense of risk management across the future force. such as those I have described above, tends to discount future costs. We default to easy decisions, such as protecting legacy structure, end beyond the point at which they can be optimally solved. The great stra tegic thinker Colin Gray is well known for articulating the idea that war future force development activities will help to position the Department

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Commentaries & Replies 83of Defense and the nation as a whole to seize opportunities rather than as is so often the case be driven by institutional inertia or by reacting to a more visionary, forward-looking adversarys plans. Dr. Johnsons article surfaces a number of challenges the future force will face, some will be right, some will be wrong. Critically, uncertain, and increasingly dangerous, we cultivate the mental agility to prepare where we can, and adjust to unanticipated conditions when we must.The Author RepliesRobert A. JohnsonMr. Jeff Becker advances ideas that are close to my own and I do not detect any fundamental disagreement between us, but rather an injunction to develop our responses to future rightly points out is overused. His observation that it is merely a question ages action across the seams or boundaries between Services; our own novel combinations and the cultivation of mental agility. In this we are on the same page. Mr. Becker urges the armed services to: better order to militate against our tendency to reach the wrong conclusions. I am also a little uncertain if we always get the formula for assessing risk right. Risk is an inevitable facet of war and cannot be avoided, but he rightly enjoins us to assess cost, which, in fact, is a far better metric. Mr. Becker correctly deduces that to get our mental software right, the military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic, and occurs on our terms, not an adversarys. In this, he is absolutely right.

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W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D. is a research professor at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Books Reviewed: Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences By James Buchan Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic By Michael Axworthy The Shah By Abbas Milani Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy By Kenneth M. Pollack Review Essays The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary IranW. Andrew TerrillI and alarmed by the size of the demonstration. Turning to the pilot he pilot refused to answer, but the Shah was badly shaken by the popular apathetic, and withdrawn. In the last days of his regime the Shah realalthough this cancer was not the primary reason for his inability to continue leading the state. Irans Prime Minister later told US Ambassador How Iran descended into this sorry state and then further descended into books, some of the most important of which are considered here.The Rise and Fall of the Palavi DynastyRetired Financial Times correspondent James Buchan begins his study with a good while expanding the authoritarian nature regime, telling a Western diplomat that I with them. Instead, they were much more focused on the Shahs mega James Buchan, Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 432 pages. $27.99

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86 Parameters 44(2) Summer 20141 In explaining the Shahs failure to relate to the Iranian public, Buchan also notes that the Shahs psyche had been scared him to withdraw into a security cocoon. To make matters worse, he was as the Shahs regime headed toward collapse. In last years of the Shahs responsible and attempted to blame the Islamic opposition. The Shah erful example occurred when a 1978 earthquake struck the ancient town quickly began circulating that the regime was allowing the United States to stage underground nuclear weapons tests in the desert regardless of The Shahs faltering response to the uprising also undermined the the air but to do nothing more serious to confront demonstrators, due to Lacking empowerment and mindful of their own uncertain futures, the military command announced that it would remain neutral in the tion Buchan characterizes as a rank absurdity that led to the militarys rapid surrender. With unmistakable contempt, Buchan states, So ended Khomeini did not back away from confrontation, nor was he squeamish ibility as an uncompromising enemy of Israel and the United States, the 1 For a nightmarish account of Savak abuses see Ryszard Kapuscinski, Shah of Shahs (New Y ork: Harcourt Brance Jovanovich Publishers, 1982), 43-51.

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Review Essays: T errill 87latter of which he accused of seeking to steal Irans dignity by treating he stated Let the American President know that in the eyes of the harsh and uncompromising sermons circulated throughout the country. Many of Irans most important early power struggles were played out during the Iran-Iraq War with Khomeini strengthening the regime in of state, with the exception of the prime ministry, were in the hands of Hussein regime in the face of superior Iraqi weaponry. Buchan ends this study with death of Khomeini followed by a brief epilogue on the the challenges it has faced. Waging Revolution and Consolidating the RevolutionMichael Axworthys Revolutionary Iran sistently asking what social groups chose to support the Shah and why they did so. Axworthy also seeks to understand why the regime lost its legitimacy, and how the new regime established its authority and sought support. In some of the most important analysis within this book, Axworthy considers the clash between Iranian self-identity and the American cultural presence in Iran, which some Iranians increasingly thought was brash, presenting itself as indistinguishable from modernization. This challenge was Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 495 pages. $34.95

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88 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 Gharbzadegi Al-e Ahmad did not directly attack the West, but rather expressed treated by many Iranian educators and elites. Al-e also drew upon an was impressed by the elegant way that the other bird walked. The crow repeatedly attempted to imitate the partridge, but did so awkwardly. It central to Iranian history and identity. It was sometimes seen in opposition to the pre-Islamic historical heritage presented by the Shah as the Khomeini insisted that the regimes pre-Islamic symbols and allusions were blasphemy and that monarchy was abhorrent to the Prophet. This when the Shahs supporters were routinely referred to as idol-worship to him in trust, and therefore not as a right bestowed directly by God. Axworthy agrees with Buchan that the Shahs regime had made becoming more authoritarian. As the Shah grew increasingly selfMission for My Country as its statements about freedom and did not go unnoticed by the educated middle classes. Additionally, antiroyalist sentiment grew among bazaar merchants, religious students, and lower middle class workers, who found their economic aspirations Making matters worse, the Shah fundamentally misunderstood the perhaps foreign-controlled. The primary culprit in these conspiracy theories alternated between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Shah and the question of why Khomeini rose out of the myriad of commitment to opposing the Shah. Some Iranian secular liberals were encouraged by the real and tangible concessions that the Shah offered

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Review Essays: T errill 89as the regime faltered, but Khomeini and his followers were implacable. Khomeini consequently treated alliances with moderate oppositionists power were his former religious students, including Ali Akbar Hashemi Khomeini wanted to work with the popular President Bani-Sadr, but but was prepared to tolerate that perception rather than accept actual country in 1981, narrowly escaping arrest. being at war with God and spreading corruption on earth; charges that could mean almost anything. Another crime was eclecticism which responded with mass arrests of leftists and a campaign ruthless enough Hosein Ali Montazeri stated, The people of the world thought our only and guided him to continue the war against Saddam Hussein. According that his mind had become an instrument for the performance of Gods nity to defeat Saddam Hussein deteriorated. In early 1988 it became clear apparently unwilling to grant. In the face of this reality, Tehran leader ship painfully came to the conclusion that the United States would not allow them to win the war. Washington would instead indirectly support Saddam to the extent he needed, while continuing to deny Iran access to modern weapons and spare parts for US military equipment purchased

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90 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 heart attack following surgery for stomach cancer. was entrusted to a number of his key supporters and aides, the most Khomenis death and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the key contradiction was the tension in Islamic Republics constitution between the principles of Islamic rule and democracy. Were the Iranian people children that needed to be guided by the clergy regardless of their own aspirations following the election of reform candidate Mohammed Khatami with candidate Nateq-Nuri seemed to set the stage for serious reform and hardline right for blocking reform, but they also blamed Khatami for to his election. Unfortunately for Iran, his eight years in power led to a series of economic and diplomatic disasters. The Shahs Personality, Values, and MistakesAbbas Milanis brilliantly-written The Shah agrees with many aspects phy considers the monarchs life and personality in much greater depth. authored a number of books on Iran including an excellent biography This powerful study fully captures the tragic irony of a modernizing monarch the Shah felt society owed him a debt of gratitude for the economic modernity, considered such freedoms to be only a small portion of what they regarded as their inalienable rights. Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (Washington D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2004), ix.

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Review Essays: T errill 91 his monarchy could be a powerful force to push a traditional society into the modern age. The Shah promised to build a Great with Iran playing an important role in the world. Milani also agrees with the increasingly authoritarian in the later years of his regime due to a belief he had been politically strengthened by Irans economic the Shahs downfall. The contradiction Milani emphases is that modernity demands a knowledgeable citizenry. The Shah helped to create an Iranian middle class, which then sought some degree of political power. The was unacceptable and did not make much of an effort to offer a serious theory of why monarchy was suited to Irans modern situation. Rather, he made the shallow claim that monarchy is coherent argument that legitimized his rule. stitutional constraints on his power. The Shahs decision to back away from democratic reform appeared to be based on the quadrupling of oil The middle classes that the Shah helped create from petrodollars wanted behind the defeat of the monarchy. The Shah spoke of the clergys little, them to do what he wanted. In this regard, the Shah saw the clergy as an ally against communists and hoped to use religion to retard the growth of domestic Marxism, which he regarded as a greater threat than any the clergy could present. Such policies allowed the clergy and their nimble network of organizations an opportunity to expand and dominate the Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 496pages. $22.00

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92 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014able to organize and mobilize the population in ways that could actu ally challenge the regime. The Shah not only failed to see this problem after it occurred. a conspiracy of outside forces against him. He sometimes changed his masterminded his fall. There was almost no foundation for this belief. Milani maintains the KGB in Iran was a weak and often incompetent organization. tries were prepared to host him and thereby alienate the new Iranian also tragic since the fall of the Shahs regime led to a form of clerical the organizational skills of the clergy and their status as authentically Iranian, Milani sees a brilliant strategy by Khomeini to conceal antigoal and true ideology and took on the guise of a democratic leader. to Iranian readers or critics. Thus many of Khomeinis most extreme ideas were unknown to the people in the streets challenging the Shah in modernity formed an alliance against the Shah and chose as their leader The Threat of Iranian Nuclear WeaponsKenneth Pollack has produced a different kind of book on Iran, but it is also a work worthy of comment. Pollacks book does not address the weapons. This book is of such clear importance that one could desire that all U.S. policy-makers be required to read it before making any decisions on Iran, especially those relating to war. Pollack is a realistic and reasonable scholar who has put together a deeply thoughtful study,

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Review Essays: T errill 93 current Iranian regime, which he considers antistatus quo, anti-Semitic, duplicitous, Iran, although he notes that military mea sures may become a better option in the future as circumstances change. Pollack presents a strong case that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and power. He notes that the Tehran leadership has been unable to explain why uranium enrichment plants are placed in deep under nor why Tehran did not follow the more grade uranium. According to Pollack, this approach is how a military while Tehran has not yet sought to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonsession of nuclear weapons. Rather, he states that such an outcome is to after Iran detonates a nuclear warhead or acquires the wherewithal to allies will face a serious problem if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, but this is a threat that can be managed without war in most circumstances. contained if it approaches a nuclear capability. He suggests that Iran may be seeking a limited breakout capability, whereby the components short notice in time of crisis. This effort would probably take place in dangerous threat is that Iran would withdraw from the NPT and then Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 560 pages. $30.00

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94 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014These systems would then be in place during a crisis, and Iran could use them as a source of intimidation. Still, Pollack understands that the Pollack suggests that at the present time, the least appealing options for dealing with Iran may be military strikes by Israel, the United States, or both countries. According to Pollack, Israel cannot destroy Irans limited, while Tehran would be able to renounce the NPT by using ballistic missiles, although it is unclear what their targets would be and Many of the same problems presented by an Israeli attack on Iran would also be present if the United States launched an air campaign against the Islamic Republic, though there would be key differences. Unlike Israel, the United States has the capability to present a much more serious threat to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, and the outcome enrichment plant may be hardened to the point that non-nuclear ordi Pollack notes that wars are inherently unpredictable and often strikes against Iran could start an escalatory process that ultimately Washington could be faced with abandoning the effort without meeting its goals or expanding the war. US leaders could also be hard pressed to end the war if key Iranian nuclear sites remained intact and Iranian US ground forces would be required to subdue Iran, with its many parathe Iranian regime was ousted and the United States decided to occupy

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Review Essays: T errill 95 million troops would be needed, and that the ability of such a force to create any kind of meaningful future for the Iranian people remains in serious doubt. In contrast to military strikes, Pollack supports a policy of contain expand a nuclear arsenal. He suggests this misunderstanding is unfortu nate, and containment is a strategy to be applied when the United States does not want merely to appease a nation, but is also unwilling to attack sanctions against Iran, though the economy is not in danger of collapse. more countries into the effort. Another building block of containment is deterrence, including extended deterrence to protect US allies. This goal. There is also deterrence by punishment in which Iran is forced to pay a high price for serious acts of aggression. Pollack also notes that it retaliation. indicates that Western leaders may be able to negotiate a comprehen Pollack maintains that for the West to negotiate a solution with Iran we to do away with this capability altogether. Any negotiated settlement should it choose to withdraw from the NPT and refuse to accept inter Iran should suspend, rather than eliminate, the sanctions. If the Iranians cheat on an international nuclear agreement, the mechanisms already Iranians of all fruits of that agreement. Such a recommendation seems reasonable. The Iranian public has already responded with real hope to the limited relaxation of sanctions experienced under the interim tions cannot help but demoralize the country no matter how often the

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96 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014The Great War: One Hundred Years LaterDouglas V. MastrianoT simple. It was marked by almost continuous open warfare on chemical warfare, and tanks. Strategic leaders were faced with a complex all but forgotten by large segments of society. Adding to this dilemma is that many of the books written about the Great War are dry histories this historiographical gap, dozens of books are being published to take July 1914: Countdown to War Sean McMeekins July 1914 is a rare addition to the new Great War Centennial books recently published. In July 1914 McMeekin grapples with the diplomatic and political machinations that led to the outbreak of this tragic war in an understandable and dramatic fashion. The book begins with the fateful assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Crown July 1914 the reader to London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg to hear the discussions, the political discourses, strategy and the hidden agendas McMeekins well crafted scenes. Mastriano, PhD, is part of the Department of Military Strategy Plans Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Books Reviewed: July 1914: Countdown to War By Sean McMeekin The War That Ended Peace By Margaret MacMillan The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 By Christopher Clark The Making of the First World War

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Review Essays: Mastriano 97McMeekin also paints a chilling collision course with war, two of the most Kingdom were distracted by domestic of the July crisis. Throughout the month sex/murder trial that reached to a former notice of the growing political crisis that Meanwhile, across the channel, McMeekin tells us that the UK was con sumed by Ireland and discussions related slow to formulate a coherent diplomatic policy in approaching the July crisis. McMeekin also paints the British as being out of touch and pursu aggression. It was with this goal in mind that Czar Nicholas of Russia and coy about their policy until it was too late. The central theme for McMeekins book is that Germany was not responsible for the war. He sums up this point by saying, far from goes on to place the preponderance of the blame on Russia and its July ship, and assigning guilt for who actually started the war is up for debate, understandable. Adding to this readable prose is that the book con criticisms of American scholarship is the research rarely includes docu Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (New York: Basic Books, 2013) 480 pages. $29.99.

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98 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014story. With this caution, July 1914 is worth reading by strategic leaders personal relationships can make the difference between peace and war.The War that Ended PeaceMargaret MacMillans book, The War that Ended Peace is yet another attempt to understand the factors that led to the out she describes the diplomatic, political, ous and peaceful future. MacMillan uses message each national display at the expo example, we are told that the Austrian the rich history of the Hapsburg dynasty, The War that Ended Peace builds upon the promise and excitement embrace the idea that state-on-state war was a thing of the past on the continent as the nations were economically interdependent. Most experts resulting economic chaos and domestic misery would rapidly force the Rather, imperial interests tended to clash with those of the other powers. Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace (New York: Random House, 2013) 784 pages. $35.00

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Review Essays: Mastriano 99 destined to uproot the UKs role as the dominant seapower. Although at the pinnacle of its power, the United Kingdom felt threatened by the increasing militaristic policies of Germany as well as the bombastic rhetoric of its Kaiser. The War That Ended Peace describes this dilemma: Political scientists might say that the fact Germany and Britain found Despite such brilliant insight, MacMillans book warrants caution. argument. Such forays into fancy detracted from an otherwise excel lent and well-researched book. Another concern is the author tends to policy in the crisis leading up to the war. Arguably, had the British The SleepwalkersThe Sleepwalkers is yet another retelling into the Great War. Christopher Clark does ties leading to the war. Simply put, Clark tells us that there is no easy explanation unleashed a torrent of carnage across the Sleepwalkers a story of intrigue and diplomatic failures Sleepwalkers than trouble in the Balkans. Clark desires the reader understand the Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Collins, 2012) 736 pages. $ 29.99.

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100 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 War. In particular, Sleepwalkers Sleepwalkers to modernize its army and national infrastructure with this, Paris could count on Russian help if it came to another war with Germany. Sleepwalkers Japanese War. The war was a crushing defeat for the Czar, and blunted geopolitical strategy. Clark agrees with most modern scholarship that, had Grey done so, the national leaders still struggle with telegraphing clear foreign policy goals in the face of aggression. The lesson from Sleepwalkers and lack of clarity when facing disturbances to the international order The Making of the First World WarThe Making of the First World War books discussed. Beckett is less concerned with the causes of the Great

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Review Essays: Mastriano 101The Making of the First World War begins Dubbing it a turning point of the war, Beckett brilliantly recounts the circum stances and effects of the Belgium decision and Dixmude. This act, Beckett argues, the channel ports and thereby ensured the early half of the war. Here, the author The Making of the First World War related to the quite fatalistic when he decided to lead his empire to war, saying, If the Htzendorf, the Austrian armys Chief of Staff. Perhaps more than any and nations. This includes a brilliant chapter on Australias identity, the with a British author. The Battle of the Somme Beckett ignores the importance of the Canadian contribution and how their war experience forged a national identity arguably more than the Ian F.W. Beckett, The Making of the First World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 280 pages. $28.50

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102 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Australian experience at Gallipoli. Beckett lost a chance to discuss the British writers downplay their contribution to the war, and Beckett seems to carry on that tradition by completely ignoring them.Conclusion dramatic presentations of the causes and triggers of how the struggle began. To be sure, the public has a great opportunity to grapple with of warfare, that cataclysmic experience has changed the modern world. appreciate how the Great War shaped our world. It is my earnest desire that these books breathe renewed interest on both sides of the Atlantic in this important epoch of world history.

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Strategy: A History By Lawrence FreedmanReviewed by James MacDougall, Ph.D, Chairman, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia.Encyclopedic in scope and inductive in method, Sir Lawrence Freedmans grand volume: Strategy: A History, presents the fruits of a life-long exploration into the meaning and utility of the concept of strategy. In many respects an intellectual voyage of discovery, Freedman begins by describing the evolution of strategy through its pre-Napoleonic history and then, in turns, explores its development and use in three distinct provinces: military, revolutionary-political, and business-corporate. In the grand tradition of his British predecessors who wrote during the age of exploration, Freedman casts a perceptive and discerning eye on the territory he surveys. The result is a trove of keen observations and insights owing much for its success to Freedmans lucid and engaging prose. While acknowledging the word strategy did not come into common usage until the early part of the nineteenth century, Freedman takes the view that strategy in the sense of practical problem-solving is as old as history (72). He thus begins his excursion (Part I) with observations on the interrelationships bordering communities of chimpanzees; proceeds to review examples of strategy in the Hebrew Bible and the world of Classical Greece; reviews the canonical texts of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli and completes his examination of the origins of strategy with a review of Miltons Paradise Lost A clear dichotomy emphasized throughout this opening section and one reappraised to good effect in other sections of the book is the difference between strategies based on force and strate gies based on guile; in other words strategies of strength or strategies of cunning.1 Subsequently, however, particularly after considering the advent of the levee on masse Freedman concludes [o]nce warfare moved to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on force (65). And so in Part II, Strategies of Force, the modern history of military strategy is charted beyond way-points recognized by students: decisive battle; wars of annihilation or attrition; maneuver; the indirect approach; deterrence; guerilla warfare; counterinsurgency and a myriad of others. Here, as well, broader concepts such as geopolitics; continental, maritime, naval and air power; and game theory with its special relation ship to nuclear strategy, are also analyzed. Although the main contours are familiar terrain, the history and theory covered in this section are viewed frequently from a unique vantage point revealing fresh insights. An example is the observation that, while Clausewitz recognized the 1 This dichotomy also is highlighted in Charles Hill, Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) Book Reviews EXPLORING STRATeEGY New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 751 pages $34.95

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104 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014subordination of war to policy, the prevailing assumption at that time was a political victory would naturally follow a military victory and further [i]f the assumption was wrong, then strategys focus on military relevance to modern day strategic challenges. In Part III, Strategies from Below, Freedman chronicles in detail the political strategies of radicals and revolutionaries including Marx, Gandhi, Che Guevara and others. In the American domestic political context he surveys the political strategies of Martin Luther King, the Civil Rights movement, as well as other individuals and causes over the last several decades. While decidedly underdogs in the political process, each individual or group struggled to mobilize political forces in efforts to cause radical change or overthrow existing political elites and make a claim on political power. For most national security professionals, this section represents less familiar terrain made more challenging by the surfeit of biographical detail that at times clouds more salient per spectives on strategy. Nevertheless, some essential points relevant to of marshaling popular opinion in support of an ideological or political strategy, by means of, as Freedman notes (quoting Harold Lasswell) the strategic narratives. Freedman ends this section with some poignant observations about electoral politics in the United States and the party strategies related to the permanent campaign. Above Freedman surveys the extensive literature on business strategy noting the volume of this literature now exceeds that on military strategy. The search for strategy in business, based on the developing science pursuit of optimal solutions based on mathematical precision and cal culation. Strategic planning became paramount in large corporations. Later, when results based on strict rationality proved less satisfactory than expected, a backlash against rigid planning models ensued. In a Electric CEO Jack Welch, who cited approvingly a letter to the editor in Fortune magazine condemning strategic planning as an endless quest by managers for a paint-by-numbers approach, which would automatically the strategic lessons of historys great military commanders to the business environment ( The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun for example) also seemed to deliver less than advertised as the basis for sound busi ness strategies. explored the nature of strategy in three distinct areas, the process of induction moving us from observation to generalization. Referring to 2 Is strategy a rationally calcu 2 Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent, Strategic Management J ournal

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Book Reviews: Exploring Strategy 105lated plan, developed at higher echelons and provided to subunits for by Mintzberg and Waters as a pattern in a stream of decisions[?] Freedmans answer to this question is one of the central themes of the book and is therefore worth tracking in some detail. As early as the books opening epigram, the offhandish quote plan till they get punched in the mouth (ix), the reader is aware of the authors skepticism for likening strategy to a calculated plan. This theme winds throughout the main sections of the book throughMoltkes famous dictum, no plan survives contact with the enemy paint-by-number approach to strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman casts doubt on the idea of strategy as the prescriptive result of a rational calculation and direction. Indeed, titles of several of the books chap ters: The False Science; The Myth of the Master Strategist; and Formulas, Myths and Propaganda, indicate a central objective of Freedmans book: to de-mythologize the idea of strategy as a master plan. By the end of the book, having observed this to be the case in those domains visited, Freedman concludes: The various strands of given the right measures demanding objectives could be achieved on a regular basis. [] In all three cases, experience undermined the founda of the strategic environment, and the role of chance and unpredictability. willful opponents or competitors, predicting how they will act/react tion. Further, as the second point suggests, chance and unpredictability bedevil any future-oriented efforts to plan and act. Taken together, these points call into question the very nature of strategic planning and strategy making. Is strategy then an illusion, not worth an empty eggshell, as sug not fatalism, Freedmans answer seems to be not necessarily. Although strategy, Freedman concludes, is still important and necessary. He counsels: we have little choice but to identify a way forward dependent on human agency which might lead to a good outcome. It is as well to avoid illusions of control, but in the end all we can do is act as (622). In this respect, Freedmans answer to the question of whether strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emer gent (555). Seen in this light, the simple shorthand of strategists: the ends-ways-means construct, appears too linear and must be grounded in a broader understanding of chance, contingency, and uncertainty. We are reminded of Murray and Grimsleys observation on Clausewitzs remarkable trinity (emotion, chance, and reason). Although Clausewitz

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106 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 with equal relevance to the conduct of strategy in peace as well as war.3 The creative strategist is thus free to roam throughout the realms of chance and probability, all the while focused on strategy as an instru ment of policy. Like any good volume on exploration, Freedmans Strategy is full productive route for exploration is Freedmans association of strategy strategy as a political art: the art of creating power (xii). In political science, power is a fundamentally contested concept with understand ings ranging from power over resources to power over outcomes. Freedman recognizes this essential distinction in a discussion of revo lutionary politics (372-373) but a more detailed discussion of power, Indeed, in previous work, Freedman focused on the relationship of power and strategy to good effect. Tellingly, in this work, in addition art of creating power to obtain the maximum political objectives using available military means.5 Given the scope of the book under review, alternately with the words military, political, or economic, would seem criticism that strategy as simply creating power would amount to no more than a purposeless accumulation of resources. Recognizing at an early point the conception of strategy in this book is governed by the starting point, and not the end point (xi), it nevertheless seems that strategy requires both. In fact, Freedman concludes as much later in the book when discussing strategy as a process of managing emerging variables: [t]his does not mean that it is easy to manage without a view of a desired end state. Without some sense of where the journey should central idea of strategy that emerges from the book is one that is part plan, part process a combination of rational calculation and adaptation to evolving conditions. This notion is summarized agreeably in the letter to Fortune magazine quoted by Jack Welch and noted by Freedman: Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances Strategy: A History, is a grand exploration and at times takes the reader through uncharted terrain. The books concluding chapters (Part derived through inductive observation, but rather thoughts on how recent scholarship in cognitive psychology and philosophy might help frame scripts or strategic narratives useful in advancing the process of making strategy. Here, as throughout, the observations are keen and suggest many areas for potentially productive follow-up. Early in the book, 3 Williamson Mur ray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, eds, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honor of Sir Michael Howard eds. Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and

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Book Reviews: Exploring Strategy 107observing that apes were astute when it came to working out power and effective strategic approach. Given his focus on the relationship between strategy and power, additional work on the concept of balance of power, and its importance in strategy particularly, would be useful. For the arm-chair traveler (or arm-chair strategist, as the case may be) Sir Lawrence Freedmans voyage of discovery through the world of strategy is enriching and thought-provoking. One hopes he remains maps. One such important spot that receives increased attention is the province of grand strategy. Should Freedman embark to explore this domain one would be tempted to sign on as a deckhand. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective By Hew StrachanReviewed by Dr. Richard Swain, COL US Army Retired, Lawton, OKThis book, a collection of papers composed over a ten-year period, is subject to multiple legitimate readings. Some British reviewers have seen it simply as a critique of contemporary British and American military policy. However, the theme announced by the author, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is an exploration of strat egy, what we understand by it, and how that understanding has changed Strachan indicts Huntingtons Soldier and the State with corrupting professional-political dialog in both the United States, where he acknowl where he argues it does not (76-77). Indeed, much of the book is engaged with criticism of institutional arrangements for strategy formulation in the United Kingdom and United States. Not surprisingly, the author is better informed about the complexities of the former than the latter; doctrines, while understating the role of the National Security Council system and the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He undergirds his arguments with what he sees as a corrective to an overly Anglophone reading of Clausewitz (5) and Thucydides (257). The most prominent idea in the Direction of War is the argument that the understandings of policy and strategy have become so confused the distinction between them has been lost, largely to the detriment of strategic practice. In part, this confusion has been the result of the critically in the First World War, when the higher direction of war in the form of grand strategy came to comprehend the mobilization of all national (and allied) means in pursuit of military victory. This result was compounded after the Second World War by the speculative theoretical New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013 335 pages $29.99

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108 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014The greatest insight in Strachans argument lies precisely in his sepa policy maker and set strategy in the context of the adversarial nature of war; doing so cor rects for what he indicts as overemphasis on the instrumental function of war derived from Clausewitzs statement that war is nothing but the he reminds us, a statement about the nature of war. It is a statement War Plans. He then expands on this point with the Policy-Politics distinction, more or less glossed by Clausewitzs use of the German term Politik for both. Politics, he reminds us, are inherently adversarial Policy has a more unilateral thrusta policyremains a statement of one governments intentWar, he concludes, is therefore no longer the unilateral application of policy but the product of reciprocal exchanges between diverging policies (13). In short, Strachan restores competitive reciprocity to the practice of national strategy, which, in turn, accounts for the unpredictability efforts but the sum goals. Later, looking back at Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke in World War II, he observes that the policy maker and strategist must be concerned with what to do each day in the light of that days events, Evolving strategic possibilities can require changes in policy even as they conform with it. The effect of this on policy makers should be increased modesty about the predictability of strategic effects; and on strategists, increased attention to the need for continuous reassessment and adjust ment, notably something Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen addressed in his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at Kansas State University6 A collection of related essays does not a treatise make and it is prob ably a mistake to read this one as though it does. Written over time, for diverse purposes, the essays may address common themes, but even reworking does not remove discontinuities in thought that result from new insights or limitations imposed by the essay form. Strachan is surely right to point out that the instrumental use of war suggested in On War has sometimes been misunderstood as a statement of some organic condition rather than a requirement for wars rational use. In a more comprehensive treat as a program or pattern of actions intended to achieve some purpose, associated as it must be with a predictive theory of success; and strategy (-making) as an activity outcome of the clash of opposing wills and actions by multiple actors. 6 Admiral Mike Mullen, Landon Lecture Series Remarks; As Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Wednesday, March 3, 2010. Available at: http:///www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1336. Henry Mintzberg addressed this phenomenon in his book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles

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Book Reviews: Exploring Strategy 109This is the distinction, after all, which creates the contrast the author highlights between On War s Book I and the discussion of war-making American readers should take seriously Strachans critique of Huntingtons half-century old thesis on civil military relations, in light of the quarter-century experience with the results of the GoldwaterNichols Act within the NSC System. Finally, a great deal of thought must be given about whether the notion of strategy can still be limited to the use of military forces, on which Strachan insists, or whether, as a practical matter, the concept has been more expansive for over a century and is likely to remain so because of the requirements of contemporary Strategy, A History (Oxford, 2013) considers the applicability of the idea in business writing, perhaps clarifying the concept by generalizing its use. This collection is in many ways a journal of the authors own journey of learning over a ten-year period in which he moved from the writing of traditional military history to the role of policy advisor. It is a valuable book that succeeds in reframing the idea of strategy and offers numer ous insights into its practice in the direction of war.

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110 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War By Robert M. GatesReviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies InstituteDuty is Robert Gates second volume of memoirs and covers his time as Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works (or doesnt work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the books released caused a major stir, particularly in Washington. Gates anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates indicts Washingtons hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanage rial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection) before country. He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid, resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that Biden presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism) work better than Stan (McChrystal) even though Biden was talking about policy and strategy and General McChrystals expertise was at the operational level of war. Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally but concentrates on explaining Gates position on key issues, particu uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excori ates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one of the worlds largest and most complex organizations left Gates little time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportu nity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary. For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the PPOLITICAL-MILITARY LLeEADeERSHIP New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014 618 pages $35.00

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Book Reviews: P olitical-Military Leadership 111the Obama administrations major review of US strategy. Gates, like the rest of the administration, accepted the idea that without a major American effort, the Taliban would regain control over large parts or all of Afghanistan and again provide a base for al Qaeda; and that al Qaeda wanted to restore its base in Afghanistan, and having this would increase the chances it would pull off another September 11-level attack on the United States or US targets abroad. The failure to scrutinize the basic assumptions of American strategy (or to mention such scrutiny if it did take place) is a puzzling omission since by the time of the Obama strategic review, much of the American public and Congress had begun to doubt whether the security gained by US military involvement justi must grapple with big strategic issues rather than the most immediate ones. This did not happen while Gates was Defense Secretary. While Gates did succeed in holding off congressional pressure and buying additional time for his military commanders, the fact that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are likely to be seen as strategic victories for the United States should send a stark message to the US military. The a war less because doing so was most effective than because the mili tary was the most powerful tool available. This problem has not gone away. Today the United States remains organized to use its high-tech ous campaigns against other conventional militaries. It is not organized al Qaeda or criminal syndicates, even though every indication is that little he could do other than implore the rest of the US government, particularly the State Department, to provide additional resources for Iraq and Afghanistan. Through herculean and even heroic efforts, Gates helped prevent able to turn them into strategic successes or do more than nudge the Department of Defense in a new direction. But then no one else could have, and probably no one could have done more to stave off disaster than Gates did. The Department of Defense and American national security strategy were not demonstrably better after his leadership, but they also were no worse. Ultimately, Duty holds grim but important lessons for the Armys current and future strategic leaders: they will face a hyperpartisan political climate and missions that devolve to the military less because it is designed for them than because it is the least bad option. As they read Gates memoirsand all shouldmost will share his anger and frustration but, like Gates himself, most will also be determined to make the best of it they can.

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112 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014PROCONSULS: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today By Carnes LordReviewed by Don M. Snider, PhD, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US Army War College and Professor Emeritus, US Military AcademyFirst, understand that this is a book about a unique form of leadership at the strategic level, in the words of the author a generic political phenomenon seemingly never to have been systematically studied and which remains a neglected indeed, virtually an unrecognized topic of scholarly investigation and analysis. Thus, as the title states, the authors attempt is to provide such a systematic inquiry into the role of our proconsuls. Skirting scholarly debates about an American empire while using their language, he further shipthat in the best of cases rises to statesmanship; its chief challenge is the coordination of civil and military authority in the periphery and the alignment with political-military leadership at the center. Few authors could attempt such a broad inquiry into uncharted scholarship, (Yale-classics; Cornell-political science), over a decade in the nationalAffairs; Distinguished Fellow at the National Defense University), and inquiry. While the background is drawn from Rome, the focus of the book is clearly on America as a modern democracy and great power an effort has been made to include at least some discussion of all of the the properly functional sense of the term, from Spanish-American War to the present [2012]. The most prominent among them are General Leonard Wood and William Howard Taft in Cuba and the Philippines in the early twentieth century; MacArthur in the Philippines, Japan, General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 [to 2011]. Each era, along with its American proconsuls, is presented in the richly documented detail expected from an eminent scholar and prac titioner of our national security affairs. But to this reader it is not the individual analyses that are most informative for our work today and into the future. Rather, it is the synthesis that Professor Lord brings in sular leadership a good thing? His main conclusion is unremarkable in Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 254 pages $30.99

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Book Reviews: P olitical-Military Leadership 113its barest statementthat delegated political-military leadership had decision-making from the end of the nineteenth century to the present; or more simply stated, that it has made a strategic difference. But when he develops this thesis in two broad directions by drawing from the chapters of research, we see the major contribution of his endeavor in the book. First, with respect to individual proconsuls the author presents what the high caliber of these men and others like them who have served great power. They were more than mere imperial functionaries. Though not lacking in personal ambition, they were both American patriots and change agents who seized opportunities available to them to shape or steer national policy in the best interests of the United States and what it stands for. In this regard they exercised leadership in the proper sense of that term. After enjoying the more recent and familiar eras on that balance sheetClark in Kosovo; Bremer in Iraq; Petraeus in the Middle East and setting them alongside the less familiarMacArthur in the Far the author is a bit too generous in his overall assessment. In contrast, his individual assessments are correctly negative in several cases, welldocumented and convincingly analyzed. But it is the second broad direction in which he generalizes that I of defense reductions and beyond. In his discussion of whether or not the institutions, cultures, and processes of national security decisionmaking and policy implementation, and particularly as they enable the proconsular role, are as functional as they might be, he strongly reinforces the current consensus. He ruefully notes that while procon sular leadership in the proper sense of the term seems to call for unity proconsuls is that political and military decision making have long been institutionally split, and still remain so even after the Goldwater-Nichols skeptical, in his assessment: There is no easy solution to his problem. That said, however he does include a very thoughtful set of ruminations on the urgent necessity to rethink fundamentally the role of our regional While no book can be extended to all of the logical implications of experiences and the richness of the research into individual proconsuls, their successes and failure, it would have been helpful for Professor Lord to have advanced his own ideas on the needed professional development of such future leaders, both civilian and military. To this reader, it is but to say, proconsular leadership, which so plainly offers danger as well as opportunity, is an instrument in need of adult supervision at the imperial center.

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114 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots By Dennis Laich Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country By Andrew J. BacevichReviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War CollegeThese two books approach the same topic, the all-volunteer force, from different analytic perspectives. While the term all-volunteer force is meant to include all armed services, the focus of these works is the service with the largest manpower component, the United States Army. Preserving the nations security is a critical issue in this age of Congress, its political parties, and the executive branch. The challenge is to manage the national debt while providing for the security of American Department of Defense budgets with resulting cutbacks in manpower, percent of the discretionary spending of the federal government. Absent existential threats, it should be scrutinized for funding cuts. Laich retired as a major general in the Army Reserve after 35 years he rose to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Upon military retirement, Bacevich earned a Princeton PhD and recently retired as a professor of history and international relations at Boston University. Ironically, both authors have inherited Smedleys syndrome from War sanctioned truths[a]fter a decade of unquestioning subservience to the national security state (115). all-volunteer force as a highly professional force, vastly superior to the the all-volunteer force in the Persian Gulf War. National security profes nient scapegoats in the civilian and political leaders whom they believe tend to overcommit the forceor with the citizens who go shopping while service members go to war on their behalf. In Skin in the Game Laich offers a simple framework with which to evaluate the all-volunteer force and sustainability. His assessment is presented rhetorically, and he offers the following disclaimer in the Preface: This book is not intended to be a rigorous Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013 192 pages $28.95 New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013 256 pages $26.00

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Book Reviews: P olitical-Military Leadership 115academic product or a reference source. In fact, it could be character ized as a very long op-ed piece intended to promote dialogue (xiii). The reader must keep this disclaimer in mind as Laich provides a brief summary of the development of the all-volunteer force at the close of Nixon. Most informative is his presentation of the rationale conveyed by the Gates Commission, which Nixon directed to examine the alternative to conscription. Along with the objectives, assumptions, and nine objec tions for the all-volunteer force, Laich provides his view of the reality that has transpired over the past four decades since the all-volunteer forces inception. Laich believes that the all-volunteer force is not fair since people across the social economic spectrum do not serve equally (all-volunteer force soldiers are poor kids and patriots). It is also inef competencies to private corporations to conduct its recent operations. Lastly, the all-volunteer force is not sustainable because of prohibitive personnel costs required to recruit and retain active component service members. Those costs include paying for rehabilitation from combat wounds and psychological trauma as well as retirement pensions. Bacevichs Breach of Trust provides a much more scholarly treatment; it continues the arguments of his previous works The New American Militarism (2005) and Washington Rules (2010). Bacevich asserts that the American way of life and its quest for global preeminence has placed the ing US values, national leaders have chosen the military instrument of national power by default, which in turn requires global presence of its force. The establishment and evolution of the all-volunteer force enable this presence. For the US political elite, the all-volunteer force is the the all-volunteer force has become the manifestation of a professional force with the prized autonomy that it entails. To quote Shakespeares Hamlet, ay, theres the rub! Bacevich contends that the Departments of Defense and the Army have aligned with societal views of race, gender, and sexual orientation (most recently with the repeal of Dont Ask, Dont Tell). Thus, the American public has little interest or concern about its military, apart from the feel-good patriotic fanfare at sporting events and occasional encounters with uniformed service members at airports. The all-volunteer force, with its complementarity with the National Guard and Reserve forces, was designed to link US forces with the American people, such that employ ments of the military would be noticed, felt, and supported by the public. Alas, that has not been the case, as Rachel Maddow has documented in Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (Parameters review, Summer 2013). With less than one percent of the US population currently serving, the all-volunteer force has become separated physically and socially from the American people. Repeatedly, the civilian political elite has succumbed to the temptation to assert US preeminence and then used the nations impressive and available military force without constraint or high esteem, Bacevich contends that it has not been effective in winning current wars and has abrogated elements of its professional jurisdiction

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116 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014to private security organizations. He foresees a bleak future character irresponsible political elite; more wars mismanaged by an intellectually decries the warrior-professional who has supplanted the citizen-soldier through the conversion of military service from collective obligation zenry with a breach of trust with American service members. Both authors buttress their arguments on the founding docu ments of our nationThe Declaration of Independence and The US Constitution. They refer frequently to the principle of no large standing forces. They assert that greatly reduced numbers in the armed forces would limit leaders desire and ability to launch military operations. To man the forces needed for peacetime engagement, the authors offer alternatives to the all-volunteer force, but they are equally pessimistic about the viability of military conscription. Laich proposes a hybrid of a draft lottery for the reserve component with the option of enrolling suggests a two-year requirement for national service that would enhance citizens sense of obligation to contribute to their nation. Any form of mandatory service would have to provide safeguards against the inequi ties that have plagued past conscription programs. All citizens must bear equal risk and share the burden of service. It is appropriate to evaluate the viability of the all-volunteer force after its inception forty years agoespecially as we face the uncertainty of future decades. The strategic question remains a philosophical one: What do we want the role of the United States to be in the world? The answers to this fundamental query determine the role of U.S. armed forces, its composition, and the capabilities required to secure national interests. To inform such discourse, national security professionals and military members should consider the arguments and recommendations presented in these two works. Our nation can ill afford a breach of trust between its citizenry and those who serve to secure their collective interests.Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley Edited by James H. WillbanksReviewed by Major General David T. Zabecki, PhD, USA (Ret.), Honorary Senior Research Fellow, War Studies Programme, University of Birmingham (UK)In 2013, the United States Mint issued a set of commemorative coins of the Army. The half-dollar coin features Henry H. Hap Arnold and Omar N. Bradley. The dollar features George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Authorized by an act of Congress that was sponsored by the US Army Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013 262 pages $35.00

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Book Reviews: P olitical-Military Leadership 117Command and General Staff College Foundation, the reverse of all three coins depict designs relating to Fort Leavenworth and the Staff College. Generals of the Army was written as a companion piece to that special set of coins. Edited by Professor James H. Willbanks, the General of the Army George C. Marshal Chair of Military History and Director of the Department of Military History at CGSC, the book contains a been written about each of these US Army legends, and all but Marshall published their own memoirs. Yet, this handy little single-volume refer very different careers. Those careers also intertwined in different and sometimes ironic ways. Douglas MacArthur never really attended a Leavenworth school; nor did he formally serve there as an instructor. He did serve as the commander of an engineer company at Leavenworth, and while there he lectured informally at the General Services School and the Cavalry rank existed in the US Army. George C. Marshall never held a command in combat, but he is the war, he went on to serve as Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Thanks to his foresight, Germany today remains one of Americas staunchest allies in the world. selected to attend the Staff College, and then served for two more years as an instructor in the Staff Colleges Department of Engineering. Although MacArthur was far senior in terms of rank and time in the of Admiral William D. Lahey, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. As Trumans decision to relieve MacArthur from his command in Korea. academy graduate. Dwight D. Eisenhower was convinced that his career was on a dead-end track after he was not assigned overseas during World War the mentorship of Major General Fox Conner, Eisenhower attended interwar years, Eisenhower as a major and then a lieutenant colonel of Staff of the Army, and then when MacArthur went to the Philippines. During World War II, Eisenhowers rise in rank was meteoric, from

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118 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 two days after MacArthur received his, always seemed to be a sore point as Eisenhowers primary competition for the Republican presidential nomination. US Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold also was a semithe school established by the Wright Brothers, Arnold was a life-long advocate for military aviation. He also had the least promising interwar career of any World War II senior general. He received less-than-stellar evaluation reports and, after the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell, Arnold was exiled to a number of make-work assignments in remote places. On top of that, he thoroughly hated his time as a student at CSSC and even considered retiring from the army early because of that experi ence. Yet he persevered and ultimately presided over historys biggest expansion in military aviation. Two years after the US Air Force became General of the Air Force. tions each for the Army and Navy. But with the conversion of Arnolds one allocation left. As the commander of the 12th Army Group during World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower in natural choice. He was promoted to General of the Army in September War I. Unlike Arnold, Bradley valued his time as a student at CGSC, and after graduating he went on to Fort Benning as an instructor at the Infantry School, where he came to the attention of Marshall who was was promoted to brigadier general, seven months ahead of Eisenhower. As Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Bradley supported President years has come through one of the Leavenworth Schools. Those who and politically than we do today, and the institution they served has likewise changed in many ways. Yet there remains a core foundation to much by studying the careers of those who preceded usespecially

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Book Reviews: Changing Nature of Power 119 CCHANGING NNATUReE OF PPOWeER and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isnt What It Used to Be By Moises NaimReviewed by Dr. Joel R. Hillison, Colonel (USA Retired), Faculty Instructor, Department of Distance Education, US Army War CollegeOver the past sixty years, the US military has gotten into the habit of planning in an unconstrained environment, whether in developing budgetary requirements or planning for contingencies. This luxury is no longer feasible. As Winston Churchill is purported to have said, Now that we are out of money we have to think. It is in this context that Moises Naims, The End of Power, should be considered. Moises Naim is an eminent scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former editor of Foreign Policy. His recent book is a thoughtprovoking and insightful examination of the changing nature of power in todays world. As the title suggests, The End of Power suggests that traditional notions (and levers) of power are outdated: power isnt what it used to be. As the extensive literature on globalization has pointed out, power is becoming more diffuse and accessible. In the complex and volatile world today, brute force is often ineffective or counterproductive. Traditional icons in the exercise of power, from presidents to popes, are increasingly constrained in their ability to translate power into desired outcomes. As Robert Zoellick mentioned in his Wall Street Journal review of this book, seemingly powerful actors in societies have a harder time getting things done. Naim begins with a discussion of power, how to conceptualize it, use it, and keep it. He does a nice job summarizing the Weberian conception of power and how bigger became better with regards to the exercise of power. Max Weber, a famous German social scientist, suggested states were those entities that maintained a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a prescribed boundary. He also advocated stronger, hier archical bureaucracies as the mechanisms for states to exert authority and power. Naim explains how this Weberian structure, so successful after World War I, has begun to crumble. Even as the concentration of power is increasing in some sectors, the ability to use it to achieve a desired outcome and the probability of retaining it is more volatile and uncertain than ever. Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the typology Naim establishes to categorize how power has transformed with glo balization and other recent changes. This typology discusses a tripartite revolution against the conventional notions and effectiveness of power: more, mobility, and mentality. The more component expounds upon the growth in actors, ideas, and world population. All of these factors complicate the possession and exercise of control by more traditional actors, such as states. In Webers world, barriers to entry and the New York: Basic Books, 2013 320 pages $27.99

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120 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 sectors such as governance and industry. In todays world, those barriers have been reduced and the same structures that provided economies of scale have often hindered the ability to adapt quickly to changing situations. The mobility revolution refers to the expansion of options. Not only do people and things have greater ability to traverse the globe, so does information. This revolution has contributed to the reduction of the barriers to entry discussed above and has allowed a greater number and diversity of the actors to interact on a local, regional or global level. Finally, Naim discusses the mentality revolution. This development, can proliferate, changing expectations and traditional social contracts. Again, the revolution is antithetical to the hierarchical structures of power touted by Weber. Jeffrey Issac in his classic, Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique. In that article, a distinction was made between the power to and the power over. The three M revolutions have increased the ability of everyone, including nonstate actors, to exert power in ways that were unimaginable in the past (power to). Inversely, these same revolu tions have decreased the ability of traditional power brokers, such as states and armies, to exercise or sustain power over other actors (power over). In addition, power has to be considered within the social struc tures within which humans interact. Thus, the ability to understand and explain is as important as the ability to do something about the physical phenomenon. This context coincides with Naims call for a framework to help make sense of the changes taking place. Overall, this book is well-written and readable. Though much of what is described is well-known, Naim ties it together in an original and thought-provoking manner. For those interested in the role of land power, this book provides some exceptional insights in conceptualizing the roles and functions of the US Army and Marine Corps. If power is so dispersed and the problems more complex, how should the Army other state-based military threats to ensure the nations survival and to promote the vital interests of the country. However, what type of force environment? If you accept Naims conclusions, perhaps the Armys given the more, mobility, and mentality revolutions. This book is also worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop the traditional sources and structures of power decay, senior leaders, policymakers, and strategists have to adapt. Leaders have to be more comfortable with a lack of direct control. Success will reside in the ability to monitor and shape ideas associated with the mentality revolution from the lowest to the very highest levels. Hypocrisy and mistakes will tary should retain those capabilities where it maintains a comparative advantage, such as strategic mobility, it must look for more alternative

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Book Reviews: Changing Nature of Power 121solutions to the problems at hand. Knowing the limitations of military power might be just as important as knowing its capabilities.Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama by Stephen SestanovichReviewed by Colonel Michael J. Daniels, student, US Army War CollegeThe recent spate of writing decrying the decline of American power the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world. Some authors argue these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan Sestanovich, author of Maximalist shows the current challenges of the Obama administration are not new, but part of a cycle that can be traced back to the post-World War II Truman administration. Sestanovich is a former US diplomat, who served under both Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of interna tional relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and thor much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author suc ceeded in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many anecdotes to retell this story with a slightly new twist. It is a worthy addi tion to US foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or craft future foreign policy. The book expands on the authors earlier thesis, regarding the maximalist tradition in US foreign policy, one advanced in a Spring 2005 article in The National Interest. Sestanovich, describes foreign policy and diplomacy in a continuum cycling between periods of maximalism and retrenchment. One criticism of the book is the author The reader quickly summarizes that maximalism equals overreach, with retrenchment the do less corollary that follows when America must pick up the pieces. The author details the approach administra tions have taken cycling between these two extremes: the maximalist Truman followed by a retrenching Eisenhower; who is then followed by maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and period of retrenchment under President Obama. A few unanswered questions linger below the surface of a linear story long on narrative but short on analysis. My central criticism is the cycle is described as far too simplistic. Can any administration be categorized as purely maximalist or retrenching? The author concedes most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014 416 pages $28.95

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122 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to cat egorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations cleanly for these very reasons, and the author notes it was not President George W. Bushs initial intent to be a maximalist. The secondand third-order effects of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The deci sions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black contact with future realities. The author would have been better served to incorporate more of this dynamic into his analysis, and to examine why presidents seem so often to misjudge or fail to anticipate events that shake their preferred interrelationship with the world. Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administra tions to go large or go small when pursuing national interests and exporting American values. This examination is interesting but it is also incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars, fails to account for globally. It is as if the author believes international credibility trumps domestic will. This InnenpolitikRealpolitik interplay and tension best explained in Peter Trubowitzs book Politics and Strategy, is ground-zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events abroad can derail foreign policy, so too domestic challenges will often cause an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovichs argu ment would have been strengthened by acknowledging this relationship and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative. The authors lack of detailed analysis weakens his argument that the United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and be more a maximalist than a retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken by the Obama administration, can be an effective, or at least a suitable course for present realities. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains an excellent history of US foreign policy, and provides yet another lens through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era. Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take note.

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Book Reviews: Financial War 123 FFINANCIAL WWAR Treasurys War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare By Juan ZarateReviewed by David KatzIn Treasurys War, Juan Zarate, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime and federal prosecutor, earnestly presents an insiders view of the US Treasurys response and often contradictory history vital to understanding the contemporary role in national security. Assets Control (OFAC), which is the US governments primary tool for going after the assets of enemy regimes domiciled within Washingtons jurisdiction, as well as prohibiting American citizens, banks, or businesses from transacting with Specially Designated Nationals, (individuals, businesses, groups or entities) sanctioned by law. North Korea, Cuba and Iran were all subject to lawful economic sanctions, administered by Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser, his Deputy George Wolfe and Chief Adviser Bill Fox, crafting the contours of what would become associated with them. Zarate, a Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary Financing and Financial Crimes, which was combined with the Treasury Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. With the stage set, the books second half details Treasurys warfare. Patriot Act (2001), Treasury began administratively designating enablers and associates of sanctioned entities in 2005. Weighing the risk of becoming an associate and losing access to US markets, many banks and insurance companies cut off relationships with sanctioned enti authority or enforcement, designated entities were frozen out of global markets by international actions in what Zarate termed a virtuous cycle of self-isolation. By all accounts, it was highly successful. From there, Treasury was off to the races designating Iranian persons, banks and shipping companies, Lebanese banks, Al Qaeda, Al Shaabab and power projection and the de-facto, but explicit, system administrator for 2013 512 pages $29.99

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124 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Zarates history clearly conveys the intent of Treasurys approach. As such, Treasurys War should be required reading for policy makers. However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation, Treasurys War should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarates Treasurys policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious, yet unspoken, limitation of Treasurys approach is that it does not project ties and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasurys approach maintains the petite operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplo Treasurys War operates on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. Treasurys War describes systemic are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interven tions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between The books last chapter, The Coming Financial Wars, looks at some emerging challenges to Treasurys war and serves as the basis for Zarates Parameters unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to He approaches networked asset creationcompanies such as Facebook, Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network position and not of themselvesas problems to solve not horses to harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate his due, the epilogue of Treasurys War contains nuanced musings on the Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War By Nicholas A. LambertReviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon 9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the NavyNaval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to but Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012 662 pages $47.50

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Book Reviews: Financial War 125this argument goes, blockade predictably weakened Germany slowly, but only four years of land warfare clinched victory. Nicholas Lambert now convincingly argues the Royal Navy instead perceived economic warfare as a way to trigger quick collapse. Drawing Sir John Fishers Naval Revolution Lambert traces the services understanding that a close blockade of German ports would be hope less in the face of new mine, torpedo and submarine threats, but then sought other measures. After evaluating British vulnerability during the central position at the worlds shipping, communications (telegraph cables), insurance (Lloyds) and banking systems offered to deter the Kaisereich Imperial Defence had pre-delegated authority to embargo trade and credit to Germany, allowing initiation of sanctions the day war started Once the world war began, however, market panic worked too well alongside these measures. The July war scare, with Augusts tight wartime British controls, froze credit worldwide with investors buying dollar forced Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to shutter Wall Street for four months as the market for American cotton collapsed weeks before mid-term Congressional elections. Despite government guar antees for London banks payment instruments, bills of exchange, international commerce halted and employers laid-off workers, raising the specter of domestic revolution in many countries. Economic warfare had run off the rails and the British pulled arguments on limited blockade. For Lambert, the adversaries were the Admiralty on one side (albeit with differing views within the service), economics and merchant shipping ministry) generally on the other. Swedish, Danish or Dutch re-export businesses, nor to American oil key ingredient of an off-shore balancing strategy some describe today, To be fair, politics compelled behavior contradictory to waging war. meddling in the free market even to prevent shipments to the enemy. Despite repeated reports of goods being re-exported to Germany, the tarily stop trade with the Central Powers through quotas on cargoes. personnel, which threatened domestic British political stability (332). The Royal Navy intercepted blockade runners, only to see British Prize Courts refuse to condemn cargoes because ownership could not be proven, allowing the merchant vessels to resume passage even when car rying supplies the Kaisereich needed. Atop it all, Asquiths parliamentary coalition could collapse if any these constituencies withdrew support.

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126 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 crisis created the circumstances needed for economic warfare to begin in earnest. Researched to the limits of remaining sources, Planning Armageddon is complex. It needs a close reading to master its myriad issues and many characters, civilian and military, whose roles changed over a decade. Cruiser operations for sanction enforcement are tangential here, more the backdrop to Cabinet debate and international diplomacy. But the armies, but to allow export of Russian wheat to stabilize domestic grain the Royal Navy to win a war quickly, a decisive Schlieffen Plan from the sea, (1) before into France. That neither the navy nor the government it served prop erly calculated the measures needed to make economic warfare work this book and bear such needs in mind.

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Book Reviews: Cartels & Gangs 127 CCARTeELS & GGANGS The Cartels: The Story of Mexicos Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security By George W. Grayson Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College The Cartels written by George Grayson, a noted expert on Mexico and Emeritus Professor at the College of William & Mary, is a noholds barred expose of the criminal violence, corruption, and crisis of governance gripping Mexico. The author has over two-hundred research trips to Latin America, two recent books on the topicone focusing on Los Zetas (2012; with Sam Logan) and the other on narco-violence and Mexican failed state potentials (2010)and three recent US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, monographs concerning La Familia cartel (2010), the rise of vigilantism (2011), and Felipe Calderns policies all of these more specialized works, can see where material has been drawn from them for this new endeavor. This book, in fact, can be considered Dr. Graysons production of a more generalized work on the subject much akin to Sylvia Longmires Cartel (2011), Paul Rexton Kans Cartels at War (2012), and Ioan Grillos El Narco (2012). The work, which was published at the end of 2013, draws upon very up-to-date Spanish and English language works, interviews, and email correspondence providing as current a picture as possible when it went to press. It is composed of preface and acknowledgements, intro duction, ten chapters, thirteen appendices, notes, selected bibliography, and an index. Its chapters can be grouped into four basic themes, each introduction and Chapter 1, is that of the historical era when drug traf Revolutionary Party (PRI) successors through Ernesto Zedillo (ending Nov 2000). The rise of Miguel El Padrino Gallardo and the relation that, if the rules were not followed, enforcer teams would be dispatched from Mexico City to levy PRI extra-judicial justice. The second theme, South Florida, and Mexico when the fortunes of the Colombian cartels waned and the Mexican cartels become ascendant. It chronicles the shift on the Gulf, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), Jurez, La Familia (Knights Templars), and Arellano Flix Organization (AFO) cartels. Also covered is the National Action Party (PAN) policy The resulting second-order effects, along with other factors, inadver tently contributed to the power balance reversal between the cartels and the federal government.Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013 328 pages $63.00

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128 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014The third theme, comprising Chapters 5-6, focuses on the Caldern era (Dec 2006-Nov 2012). It is one of direct confrontation, with the cartels spurred on by the increasing national security threat they repre sented to the Mexican state. This second PAN administrations approach, one with a kingpin strategy focus, reliance on the armed forces, and close coordination with the United States, is highlighted. The experi ences of the Mexican military are also chronicled; as a mission for which they were ill prepared to undertake as well as the impacts, including human rights abuses, this has had on Mexican society. Military engage Chapters 7-10, is on the present administration of Enrique Pea Nieto (Dec 2012-Current). This new administration has engaged in campaign ployslike the stillborn Gendarmera Nacional programand media spin, downplaying the extent of the cartel threat, to further its public again in power. The increasing rise of vigilantism in Mexico is also covered within this theme along with the enablers of organized crime which include elements of the Church, banking and business interests, and Mexican state governors, whom (due to the executive-legislative in political power and wealth, resulting in their either looking the other way or directly colluding with the cartels. Many of components of the work are highly informative and provide great insights into the relationships and animosities of the cartels to the Mexican government under the various administrationsboth PRI and approach to categorizing information in such a way that it is easily digestible. For instance, the table with the Ten Commandments of El Padrino (23) is extremely useful in showing the subordination of the narco-syndicates to the old PRI political machine. Of note from this spillover. Yet, American civilians were not to be kidnapped, extorted, or killed either south or north of the border so as not to incur the wrath of the US government (Commandment 5). Other tables show us the and twenty thousand personnel and beg the question how many of these Criticism, of what is otherwise an excellent overview of the recent history of the Mexican cartels and their interrelationship to Mexican politics, focuses on the fact that quite a few typos can be found within its on analyzing cartel impacts on US security, making that part of the sub title a misnomer. About two pages discuss corruption of US personnel istration has distanced itself, is mentioned in more sections of the book warranted. While it is recognized that Mexico is the major transit point

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Book Reviews: Cartels & Gangs 129taking place in Mexicosuch as loss of territories, ongoing corruption and violence, and regional failure due to cartel activities may have a direct US homeland security impactsome sort of focused discussion of these threats vis--vis Pea Nietos policies in the conclusion would Still, in summation, The Cartels is a well-researched and highly read able work that would make for an excellent college textbook and be makers interested in this subject matter. The various tables and many appendices for organizing information are also useful. The work very much deserves its rightful place in both personal and college libraries next to other general works published on the Mexican cartels over the last few years.Studies in Gangs and Cartels By Robert J. Bunker and John P. SullivanReviewed by Jos de Arimatia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War CollegeStudies in Gangs and Cartels is written by two eminent scholars in the Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; while John the progression of gangs and cartels and their nefarious activities from third-generation or third-phase cartel typologies. Studies in Gangs and Cartels addresses the broader challenges gangs and organized crime can present to states. (1) Gangs and cartels in the mental authorities and law enforcement agencies. Crime and criminally illicit activities have become more global in scope and can destroy the social fabric of a society while also undermining the authority and legitimacy of a state. One only has to think of the current situations in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil to realize the impact of criminal ele ments in society and its detrimental effects. As Bunker and Sullivan als and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to facilitate, enhance, and protect their activities, transnational criminal organizations are emerging as a serious impediment to democratic gov ernance and a free market economy. This danger is particularly evident in Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and other parts of the former Soviet Union where corruption has become particularly insidious and pervasive (63). The traditional view of crime as a localized issue and therefore a concern only to the police on the beat is no longer valid in being viewed only as misguided youth or opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social New York: Routledge, 2013 232 pages $155.00

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130 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014or political agenda, more evolved gangs and cartels are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capabilities (xi). Criminal organizations and cartels are emerging phenomena of the third-generation street gang typology advanced in the Studies in Gangs and Cartels. According to Bunker and Sullivan, third-generation gangs have sophisticated political aims. They operateor seek to operateat the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to gain and activities (3). This proliferation of street-level gangs across neighbor hoods, cities, and countries is partially a consequence of the process of globalization, that is, the greater interconnection of the world due to advancements in transportation, economics, the death of distance facili tated by the internet, and interdependence. In the globalized world of the ing characteristics are present. First, the criminal organization is active and operational in more than one country. Second, criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and con trolled by leadership in another country. Third, criminal organizations are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations. Finally, their criminal class includes those individuals in society, part of the bottom billion, who have lost all hope of a better future and social advancement, and use force to partake in the spoils of society. As Bunker and Sullivan point out, individuals alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of Marin van Creveld points it out in The Transformation of War: The Most future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves (Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War As Paul Rexton Kan noted, drug-fueled ment and steadily diminishing political stability and personal security (Paul Rexton Kan, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare war. Gangs and cartels in the post-Cold War international system, are factors they could well emerge as a true threat to national security (55). but the cases of Sierra Leon, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and Brazil are worth mentioning. Third-generation gangs and cartels are not only proliferating in the post-Cold War inter national system, but their methods and techniques in the war making process are also becoming more lethal and more daring. Gangs and cartels challenge states in several ways. They undermine the rule of law, break the state monopoly on use of force, and foster corruption and

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Book Reviews: Cartels & Gangs 131In conclusion, I highly recommend this work to students and aca military, especially the US Army, which may be called upon to address ommend this work to law enforcement agencies dealing with the new The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world (60).

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132 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014 SSTABILITY & IINSTABILITY Where is the Lone Ranger? Americas Search for a Stability Force, 2nd ed. By Robert M. PeritoReviewed by Gordon Rudd, Professor, US Marine School of Advanced Despite an awkward title, this book makes an indisputable case for interim law enforcement when a failed state is occupied (or liberated) by a military coalition. Robert Perito, a retired Foreign Service Criminal Investigative Training Program, argues that the United States should create a standing constabulary force to manage the disorder and past few decades. He uses four case studies to illustrate the scope of the law enforcement problem: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, he does not provide any detail or design for an American solution. A description of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, and mobilized with cohesion and deployed as para-military formations to provide law enforcement and training. Such forces are normally under the control of each countrys respective Ministry of Interior, for which the United States has no counterpart. The US Department of Interior operates the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forrest Service; it does not have a national police force. When the United States has contributed to an international police component, and highway patrolmen who lack common training, procedures, equip ment, and rank structure. In response to the Bosnian Civil War, a NATO-led Implementation American diplomat who managed the Dayton Accords which led to IFOR, argued for an armed and forceful coalition police force. He was opposed by his European counterparts who did not want an aggressive police component in Bosnia without a new constitution and legal system within which it could work. Ironically, American military planners also objected to a robust police capacity that might compete with the military coalition going into Bosnia. The result was a modest, unarmed, ad hoc police component that arrived in Bosnia six months after IFOR inter vened, with the capacity only to advise the abusive ethnic-based local police forces. The gap between the local police and IFOR occupation forces led to frequent violence and continued ethnic abuses, with IFOR military forces reluctant to take on police tasks. nent (later expanded to 750) to Bosnia based around an Italian Carabinieri cient formation that might have been established earlier. When a smaller Washington, DC: United Institute for Peace Press, 2013 247 pages $24.95

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Book Reviews: Stability & Instabilit y 133 it included a comparable Italian Carabinieri battalion as a base for 350person police formation to serve in the constabulary role. In 2003, the Bush Administration dismissed lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo when it invaded Iraq without a police component to provide in the State and Justice Departments knew better and argued for stand ing up an appropriate police component before the military invasion, but Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration would not provide the funding and believed the Iraqis would use their liberation to reform the police on their own. When that did not happen and Ambassador a perfect storm of violent instability for which it was ill prepared. Not until 2007 were the Italian Carabinieri again called upon to form a paramilitary police component to assist with stability operations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed in 2002 with 5,000 troops and a modest German police demanded more soldiers and police, the American military component quickly formed, trained, and employed additional army and police forces. The large scope of that program provided substantial numbers of Afghan police with limited training, which failed to make it an effective force. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan poor planning for the law enforcement followed by excessive police expansion without limited training produced an inadequate police force grappling with continued violence and instability. Each case study makes a compelling argument for early planning ponent to provide stability, and to help rebuild and reform local police forces. Paramilitary police such as the Italian Carabinieri have proved effective for such a role. Perito laments the reluctance on the part of each coalition to provide military forces with the authority to exercise law enforcement. That seems to argue for the establishment of martial law by the military occupation force. Peritos plea to stand up an American counterpart to the Carabinieri is vague in design and not probable during a period of military austerity. But such a component may exist now in the American military structure. 16 military police battalions; in addition, there are about as many mili tary police brigades and battalions in the National Guard and Reserves. There is a military police training brigade with three training battalions at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Properly packaged, large Army military police formations should be properly it is improbable that the United States would take on such a task alone; thus, the Lone Ranger theme seems inappropriate. Nor is it probable that the Army would stand up a new single purpose constabulary for mation while reducing force structure. It would make more sense to employ the military police formations the Army has now in better ways.

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134 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014The importance of their tasks may be the best reason to protect those military police formations as Army force structure is reduced.Improving the U.S. Militarys Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups: Insights from Social Science By David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa RoshanReviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War CollegeThe research report Improving the US Militarys Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups by the RAND Arroyo Center is a densely packedyet extremely well executedand timely work of great strategic interest to Army thinkers and students of irregular warfare. The Army sponsored this research under contract, and while drawing upon the social sciences, the product is meant ultimately to facilitate practical and proactive application by the United States and her with U.S. ground forces (xiii). Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiativethough not a component of that programand documents the progressive Center for Army Analysis commissioned study Improving Understanding of the Environment of Irregular Warfare from mid-2011 to mid-2012. I was very motivated to analyze and critique this report because its focusthe problematic issue of host environments creating and sustaining violent nonstate actors played prominently in my earlier Parameters ernment is considered illegitimate or ineffective; (3) history of resisting weak, or vulnerable; (6) ungoverned space; (7) multiple violent, nonstate ment; (10) groups perceive faltering government commitment; (11) the capacity, resources, and expertise of violent extremist groups; and (12) social networks. These factors are said to be neither static nor discon case studies, selected by the sponsoring agency due to their familiarity, With the admission that measuring factors related to environ subject matter and social science utility to irregular warfare. More Santa Monica: RAND, Arroyo Center, 2013 116 pages $27.95 paper/Free Download

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Book Reviews: Stability & Instabilit y 135 four action recommendations for the US Army defense community are then provided: In corporate factors and associated metrics into irregular warfarerelated analytic games and models. Ev aluate levels of potential instability and extremist violence using the assessment scheme outlined in this report. Co nduct research to probe and map overlays and interrelationships De velop a prioritization approach based on the factors and assessment scheme that helps indicate where best to allocate analytic and security assistance resources (xv). The report also offers appendices including the Factor Matrix and factor presence in the thirty RAND case studies and the useful My impressions of the research report (written by a very talented and eclectic team of social scientists) are highly favorable. It was a joy to read and the recommendations are timely and well measured. Plenty of time, effort, and resources went into this project and it shows. This form of research is critical to our gaining a better understanding of the unstable environments that create and nurture violent extremist groups and other armed non-state actors. A few impressions really hit the reviewer while analyzing the RAND report. What was found fascinating in the report is the inher ent tension between old and new forms of insurgency. While the thirty detailed COIN case studies used for validation purposes all fall under Mexico and are cartel and gangmostly Los Zetasrelated (Factors 3, paradigm. This is a paradigm considered antithetical to more main stream and traditionalist COIN perceptions. Further, while Factor 1 which addresses external support (eg. money, weapons) may be integral to political insurgencies, criminal actors draw their resources directly extortion, and related activities. This variable is partially captured in Factor 11 concerning resources available to a group, but its importance appears to be understated especially when illicit economies in the tens of billions of dollars help to sustain such criminal actors. Given that criminal entities are growing in strength and capability (as many regions of Latin America attest) it is the impression of this reviewer that follow-on research conducted by the Arroyo Center on unstable environments would greatly increase the relevance and utility of the product. It would be helpful to model the factors indicative to such threat groups along with the more traditional violent (political) extrem ist forms and the hybrid (convergence) entities now rising. Additionally, while the reviewer agrees that the two case studies set in Peru and Nepal were required for proof of concept purposes and were something the sponsoring agency requested, it is pretty clear that applying such analy

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136 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartelshould be considered one option for the next logical step in its development.Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq By David FitzgeraldReviewed by David H. Ucko, Associated Professor, College of International In Learning to Forget Wars legacy on the US Armys understanding and approach to counterinsurgency. Fitzgerald, a Lecturer in International Politics at University to avoid, learn from, repeat, or even recall whatever it was that happened. static nor uncontested, but reinterpreted depending on the dominant context and personalities at any given time. The legacy, thus, remains range of often incompatible arguments. As Fitzgerald implies, this hisover the US Army as an institution. The books strengths include its argumentation and structure; it is counterinsurgency legacy. The last two chapters consider the spectacu lar highs and lows of counterinsurgency during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout, counterinsurgency has most commonly been marginalized as an institutional priority and area of investment, a trend bucked only by major traumatic events, (206) most recently the fear of utter failure during the civil war in Iraq. A second strength of the book is its measured tone and analysis. Fitzgerald has authored a sober and dispassionate study that resists the hyperbole and sensationalism typical of other related works. Perhaps Fitzgeralds distance from the debate, as an Ireland-based academic, affords him the necessary perspective. Nonetheless, the nuanced take on this all-too-often overheated topic is refreshing and, also, necessary. Third, the research is thorough and well documented in over sixty pages of footnotes. It is clear that Fitzgerald has consulted the relevant works, which he applies with due recognition of contending interpreta tions. The eye to detail and fastidious sourcing may be explained by the books origins as Fitzgeralds own doctoral thesis, something evident in the books initial literature review and primer on methodology. This last point relates also to one of the books two weaknesses. Whereas Fitzgeralds analysis is commendably detached, one might wish he more often established his own view on controversial and divisive topics. He cites the dominant voices both for and against Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013 285 pages $45.00

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Book Reviews: Stability & Instabilit y 137counterinsurgencys inclusion as a US military priority but refrains from presenting his own verdict. He covers the Iraq and Afghanistan wars well, but it is never explained why Fitzgerald thinks counterinsurgency succeeded in the former yet failed to produce the tangible results it what Fitzgerald himself, on the basis of his research, sees as the more convincing explanation. Second, with the multitude of works now available on the US militarys engagement, aversion, and re-encounter with counterinsurgency, Fitzgeralds contribution feels somewhat familiar. With the exception of a few added anecdotes and some notable sources, particularly in the differs in no substantive way from previous accounts, be it Richard Downies Robert Cassidys Peacekeeping in the Abyss Richard Lock-Pullans US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, or my own, The New Counterinsurgency Era which covers similar ground and comes to very similar conclusions. Fitzgerald refers to these works in his introduction, but his implicit moving past and building upon the existing literature are not always convincing. The books novelty lies and was affected by subsequent events, but this focus is not consistent throughout and can, at times, feel contrived. discussions appear related to the far more recent traumas of Somalia and the limited US national interests at stake. Going further, the book tions other than war but never fully integrates the point made by Dale and that US strategy had to counter a credible communist army along with a potent insurgent foe. Given this balancing act, how comparable with Afghanistan or Iraq faces serious problems, ones that the book may On the whole, Learning to Forget is a well researched and superbly written addition to the ongoing study of counterinsurgency and the US pretation and the unpredictability of what we actually learn. John Lewis Gaddis sees historians as mandated to interpret the past for the pur poses of the present with a view to managing the future but [critically] without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them ( The Landscape of History 2002). Michael Howards paraphrasing of Jakob Burckhardt, cited by Fitzgerald, is therefore apt: the true use of history, whether military or civil, isnot to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise forever (211). The book is recommended to all serious scholars of counterinsurgency, the US Army, and intervention.

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138 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014One Hundred Victories: Special Ops & the Future of American Warfare By Linda RobinsonReviewed by LtCol Stephen K. Van Riper, USMCDo not pick up this book unless you are looking for a general over view of US Army Special Forces conducting basic Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in Afghanistan. While an easy read with some entertaining stories, the book omits way too much to be of use to serious students of irregular warfare. One Hundred Victories presents two main points as it spins the story initial catastrophic successes in Afghanistan, SOF leadership failed to articulate a solid game plan to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite having the training, doctrine, and experience to do so, it allowed conventional forces, and itself, to focus on combat ops when Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building should have been the strategy. After years of chasing their way and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fought against not only the Taliban, but also conventional units and senior leadership. Robinsons second main idea is that a key reason for failures in Afghanistan was SOFs lack of a staffed, theater-level command capable of interfacing with its own and conventional units. Unable to channel the power of its mature, experienced and intelligent personnel, SOF could not seize the initial opportunity to shape Afghanistans strategy and this mistake hampered special operations throughout the war. This second proposition has merit, but Robinson fails to articulate hensive whole, and tries to convince the reader the only relevant SOF mission is Foreign Internal Defense. By only telling 1/11th of the story (there are eleven SOF critical activities), she misrepresents the challenges towards Green Berets, and their primary mission, is evident and pre vents the reader from gaining a full understanding of the vignettes she uses throughout the book. It is in her thesis that Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building are the keys to success in Afghanistan where Robinsons biases really emerge, and where the book truly misses its mark. Despite repeatedly making the point that stability comes from developing Afghans, all her good tales focus on raids or combat. She gives short shrift to Military Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs, various non-military developmental organizations, and conventional force development ini tiatives. 1 One Hundred Victories leads one to believe only SOF can conduct 1 One line on page 230. 2013 416 pages $28.99

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Book Reviews: Stability & Instabilit y 139Foreign Internal Defense, and the author accomplishes this by neglect ing large swaths of the Afghanistan story while focusing on selected differences between Special Forces and other units. Lastly, it implies SOF leadership took the lead in turning the wars focus from one of cant evidence, both from Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was conventional leaders who had to pull SOF out of its direct action myopia and get it back into Foreign Internal Defense. questions it brings forward. A few examples include: Wh y did SOF lose its way in 2003? What factors, other than the lack of a sizable headquarters, caused it to forget Foreign Internal Defense and focus on direct action? We re the claims that Special Forces personnel became cowboys true? And what actions, other than relieving Major Gant, did anyone take to address this concern? Wh at was the impact of lessons from Iraq toward how Afghanistans Foreign Internal Defense mission was fought? Ho w much of an impact did the establishment of an AfghanistanPakistan buffer zone actually have on the war? One Hundred Victories that prevent a good historical analysis of the campaign in Afghanistan. This book is not worth the time of a professional strategic or operational leader.

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Women in BattleDeadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into CombatBy Robert L. MaginnisWill integrating women into combat units have "deadly consequences" for US national security? Three expertsAnna Simons, Anthony King, and John McKayprovide their evaluations.A Review by Anna SimonsDeadly Consequences is a blister ing polemic that provides plenty those who oppose the idea of women being integrated into direct ground combat units. Maginnis does not mince words: The incremental process by which the United States military decided to put women into directdeceitful. It is the work of political leaders who naively treat ground combat as an equalopportunity issue and of military commanders who know better but are afraid to speak the truth about its adverse effects on readiness (p. 4).Nor is it just the current Joint Chiefs of Staff Maginnis considers to be cowards. Essentially, any man who would let a woman serve in his place deserves scorn. As for why the Joint Chiefs and other senior military leaders merit particular opprobrium: in Maginniss view, they any responsible senior leader has to know are untrue: 2) Women are clamoring for combat duty. 3) Women are already effective at the front. 4) Good leadership defeats eros. 5) Women are perfectly capable of handling the rigors of combat. 6) Other countries put women in combat. updating others work. He then moves on to eight major risks the mili tary will face should women be given direct ground combat roles: 1) Compromised standards. 2) Failure to match capabilities with job assignments. 3) [Womens] Physical suffering. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2013. 244 pages. $27.95. Anna Simons is a professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, and co-author of The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security.

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142 Parameters 44(2) Summer 20144) Destruction of the warrior spirit. 6) Forcing women into combat. 7) Reduction of retention rates and decline of quality. 8) Subjecting women to the draft. Unfortunately, when it comes to the risks vs myths, Maginnis occa sionally shoots his own logic in the foot. For instance, early on in the book he mentions young peoples hookup culture and their penchant for alcohol and drug-fueled behavior. Midway through, he cites various studies that point to pregnancy rates among soon-to-be-deployed and deployed women. Not only does he stress that many pregnancies are in combat zones without using birth control. Yet, eight pages further he writes, Mens inclination to take risks in every aspect of life makes them better combat candidates as if womens willingness to engage I mention this because while I agree with a number of Maginniss For instance, he lambasts radical feminists for wanting to eviscerate the military as a patriarchal institution, yet offers too little evidence for bad. Because if he could offer a chapter (rather than scattered sentences worth) of proof that proponents are more anti-military than anti-male, he might actually win over more people to include anyone who worries about national security or cares about the military as an institution. Equally unfortunate may be Maginniss focus on the nature of combat rather than the nature of combat units. Maginnis invokes past decade may not presage the future, and while both men may well be right that the military had better (re)gird itself to be able to engage in a grimmer, more sustained, high intensity form of conventional combat, this could lead some readers to wonder what young men at outposts like Restrepo endured. Consequently, too, Maginnis misses making the point that wherever the US puts boots on the ground in the future, it is in austere conditions. No question, physical standards will matter in such units. But so will group dynamics. Because meeting physical standards represents a sort of Rubicon for entering the boys club of combat units, standards receive a great deal of attention. However, both sides in the debate may err in pinning too much on them. Opponents believe so long as standards remain high and do not get gender-normed few women will either want to serve in the combat arms or be able to make it through selection. Thus, certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) they hope will remain protected. However, the track recently taken by those who want all billets opened to women is to question the premise behind each stan dard. Proponents increasingly point out tasks are rarely undertaken by individuals alone; instead, every combatant belongs to a team, a platoon, or a squad. This means members in all units shift and share burdens and

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Women in Battle: Deadly Consequences 143 strengths. they, after all, represent the thin line in the sand between all of us and harm they should never be presumed to be immune to casualties. Let a unit suffer casualties, and any burden-sharing that might have worked fall apart. This is inconvenient reality number 1. Inconvenient reality number 2 is that attrition requires members of combat units be consid ered interchangeable, even in the 21st century; thus, every member of a unit has to be capable of accomplishing the same essential tasks. At the introduces a Goldilocks challenge: the group has to be tight, but not so tight it cannot absorb new members and still function. Maginnis prefers to concentrate on the physical and psychological rigors of combat instead. One way he does so is to describe battles in Najaf (circa 2004) and in Vietnam (which is somewhat curious given his earlier dismissal of counterinsurgency). Yet, no matter how graphically he tries the Chosin reservoir), readers who are not already used to (or enamored with) reading about combat sequences are likely to remain unmoved. the real communications gap: how can he and other opponents make their arguments stick? How can combat veterans convince skeptics the presence of women really will be disruptive, and it will take away from rather than add anything to combat effectiveness? One might espe cially wonder how opponents of lifting the ban can make the case in light of the fact, as Maginnis points out, Hollywood and media depictions have helped convince many Americans that women are just as capable as Of course, no movie has yet been made depicting the ways in which a womans presence might actually wreck a unit or doom a mission, let alone what might happen should a female fail to uphold her end in a prolonged battle. Imagine, though, the subliminal impact such imagery could have, particularly if the plot was compelling and the acting real increasingly popular. Or, just consider Kony 2012. Arguably, with the "right" kind of footage it might well be possible to shift public opinion dramatically away from wanting to see women introduced into direct ground combat units. Indeed, at this point in time, one or two well crafted YouTube videos could well have a more profound effect than any book will, no matter how vividly written. Could Deadly Consequences itself be turned into a movie or a docu mentary? Certainly Maginniss book is a very easy read for anyone who

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144 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Maginniss defense, his aim has clearly been to (re)sound the alarm and rally the base. Not only is time running out, but it is hard not to agree with him given the gravity of the militarys mission to protect us all, that Congress has a duty nay, an obligation to treat this issue with far more gravity and ecumenicism than it has thus far. In fact, that may A Review by Anthony KingT restrictions on women serving in the combat arms has been sur prising, but it should not be taken as evidence of approval within the armed forces. On the contrary, informally, widespread dismay has been reported among many male combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. Robert Maginniss engaging book, polemically subtitled "how cowards are pushing women into combat," might be read as a corrective to this silence. Incensed by Panettas decision and the pusillanimity of General Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maginnis rejects the decision as jeopardizing national security. Maginnis is not completely against womens service in the armed win a Silver Star, and numerous other female combat veterans (67): in protecting their units and themselves (68). Yet, Maginnis does not take their combat performance as evidence that, in the future, a small We should celebrate their courage but not abandon logic by pretending that they are case studies of women successfully joining in sustained, conventional combat (68). This is the foundation of Maginniss entire argument. While women may have served successfully in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, these tions, counterinsurgency is best compared to high-intensity police work, not high-intensity conventional combat(40). Since the United States is currently trying to reorient itself to conventional maneuver warfare, the prospect of a return to high-intensity war invalidates all the evidence about women in combat from Iraq and Afghanistan to justify a reprise of the central and long-standing objections to female service. Yet, some of the evidence he discusses is valid and interesting. Predictably, Maginnis focuses on physical capacity. He cites a British military study which showed an increased rate of injury among women of 7.5 times when training to the same standards as men; women could produce a much greater long-term medical bill for the Pentagon than men (132). Problems of female hygiene and pregnancy are dis cussed at length. Anthony King is a professor of Sociology at the University of currently a visiting fellow at the All Souls published widely on the military and has acted as an adviser and mentor to the armed forces for many years, including as a member of ISAF Regional Command South's Prism Cell, 2009-10.

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Women in Battle: Deadly Consequences 145 command did could stop these nightly liaisons (69). As if consensual affairs werent bad enough, our armed forces also face an epidemic of now acknowledges that she was raped and sodomized by her captors (146). Maginniss arguments can be challenged and, in many cases, rebut been endemic to, or universally undermined, the cohesion of combat some women are capable of passing even the most rigorous selection process uninjured: I watched some Olympic-caliber women athletes run through the [SEAL] obstacle course better than certainly many of the SEAL candidates do (112). Yet, Maginniss argument collapses on a more fundamental point. and Afghanistan. Operationally, counterinsurgency campaigns are less intense; they cannot be lost in a day. Yet, at the platoon and company level, Ramadi, Fallujah, Sangin, or the Korengal Valley seems to have been no best evidence currently available on whether women can perform in combat; with important caveats, some of which Maginnis describes, the evidence suggests a small number of women can. Maginniss argument Yet, his work remains useful, not least because it provides an insight into an increasingly strident and radical segment of United States society; the Republican and religious right. Thus, his valedictory acknowledge ment is instructive: Above all, I acknowledge my heavenly Father, without whom this book could never have been written (198). Writing as a Christian, Maginnis is disgusted by a society, corrupted by liberal ism and radical feminism, could have so disastrously ignored the sanctity of the female role as mother and wife and profaned the institution of the family: It is no surprise that a culture that so degrades and devalues women is untroubled by sending them into combat. Americans once held women in high esteem, but, today, chivalry is practically dead. Respect for women went the way of marriage thanks to radical feminists who want to destroy that institution (41). In this, Maginnis perhaps reveals his true objection to female integration. He also shows that perhaps the greatest obstacle to female accession may lie not in their physiologies but in contemporary American culture, which is increasingly polarized into secular and liberal versus conservative and religious factions.

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146 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014A Review by John C. McKayR placing women in front-line infantry units. The author is a West Point graduate, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel with at the Family Research Council. Deadly Consequences effectively synthe sizes much of a debate informed by emotive conjecture, parochialism, and ideologically tainted discourse. An injudicious choice of title and sensa tional dust-jacket blurbs suggest, quite unfairly, that Maginnis advocates a limited perspective. Regretably, they demean the author, misrepresent what he convincingly argues, and are sure to alienate the broad readership the book deserves. His thesis merits considered study. In Maginniss view, proponents of female integration into front-line ground combat units lifting of gender barriers with the indispensability of combat effective ness. The two phenomena are distinct and distinctly incompatible. He behavior on the issue by senior civilian and uniformed leadership within the United States government. He singles out high level military leaders understood topic of placing females in front-line infantry units. Deadly Consequences is an informative, nonacademic, lucid treat ment of an important subject. There is commendable range in this book. An impressive amount of research went into it: Congressional testimony; interviews; pertinent United States and foreign government documents Israeli (past and current) use of females in ground combat formations would have strengthened the books argument. Proponents of placing women into front-line infantry units either conveniently ignore or, in the shrillness of the moment, lose sight of a good deal of that background giving evidence of the increased physical and psychological tolls (and cohesiveness. Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century. to consider the enhancement of combat effectiveness but rather to advocate guardianship under demonstrated diversity leadership, a nonauthoritative reports, omitting even passing reference to the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Colonel John C. McKay, USMC (Ret.) was a Olmstead Scholar, and holds a M.A. from Georgetown University.

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Women in Battle: Deadly Consequences 147 strength and physical capacities between men and women. The issue of pregnancy is completely ignored. Any absence of evidence contradicting ignored in selecting the Commissions membership. Maginnis quotes several individuals who have given long and serious consideration to the issue well above the current level of debate. Further, the Commission Peoples Republic of China and North Korea are not mentioned. Maginnis traces incremental changes in institutional ethos brought about with the increasing integration of women into the military. The fact the all-volunteer force could not sustain itself without female vol unteers, and their critical contributions, cannot be denied. But Maginnis pared to male veterans. impartial, objective airing it deserves. Nevertheless, Maginnis makes sound recommendations for addressing it. Foremost among these is Congressional hearings. According to Maginnis, there have been no full hearings in the House of Representatives on women in combat since 1979; and, none in the Senate since 1991. Deadly Consequences begs for more critical analysis.

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Article SubmissionsThe editor welcomes unsolicited works that adhere to the following criteria: Content RequirementsScope: The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope. Audience: cers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs. Clearance: If you are a member of the US military or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or one of its service departments, Concurrent Submissions: The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.Formatting RequirementsLength: File Type & Layout: Visual Aids: Citations: Document sources as footnotes. Indicate all quoted material by to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy Quarterly generally uses the conventions prescribed in the Chicago Manual of Style .Submission RequirementsSubmit to: Include: E ach author's full name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail address, and curriculum vitae or biographical sketch. (When there are multiple authors, please identify the primary point of contact.) applicable) as attachments. A n abstract. Lead Times: submit it by the following dates: Note: Lead times only ensure the editor will consider a manuscript for recommend a manuscript for publication in any upcoming issue to meet space or topic requirements. Review Process: Contributor's Guidelines

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150 Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014Book Review SubmissionsParameters publishes reviews of books on history, political science, military strat egy, grand strategy, and defense studies. The editor welcomes inquiries for potential book reviews. T he book's title and the name of the author(s) or editor(s).

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