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Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)

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Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)
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Journal of the US Army War College
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US Army War College quarterly
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US Army War College Quarterly Parameters 47 Ashburn Drive | Carlisle PA 17013-5010 717.245.4943 strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional of government and academia concerned with national security affairs. Subscriptions: US Army War College graduates who are actively employed by the government as well as select organizations may receive a gratis subscription. For eligibility requirements, visit strategicstudiesinstitute. army.mil/pubs/parameters. Non-graduates, retired graduates, and the general public Address Changes: Submit address changes for unpaid subscriptions to the Parameters For paid subscriptions, submit address changes to the GPO (bookstore.gpo.gov). Reprint Requests: For permission to reprint articles, contact the Parameters Be prepared to provide the articles title, authors name, publication data, intended use, quantity, and means of distribution. Commentaries & Replies: We invite reader commentaries on articles appearing in Parameters. Not all commentaries can be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. For additional information, visit strategicstudiesinstitute. army.mil/pubs/parameters. Disclaimer: Articles and reviews published in Parameters Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Secretary of the Army Honorable John M. McHugh General Raymond T. Odierno Commandant Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III Editor Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II Managing Editor Mrs. Ruth A. Mueller Editorial Assistant Mrs. Tammy C. Miesner Editorial Board Members Colonel Murray R. Clark, USAF Norwich University Dr. Martin L. Cook US Naval War College Dr. Conrad C. Crane, LTC (USA Retired) Military History Institute Mark J. Eshelman, COL (USA Retired) Department of Distance Education Dr. Paul Rexton Kan Department of National Security and Strategy James O. Kievit, LTC (USA Retired) At Large Dr. Janeen M. Klinger Department of National Security and Strategy Dr. George E. Reed, COL (USA Retired) University of San Diego Dr. Andrew C. Scobell RAND Corporation John F. Troxell, COL (USA Retired) Strategic Studies Institute Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich Department of National Security and Strategy Emeritus Leonard J. Fullenkamp, COL (USA Retired) (GPO) at bookstore.gpo.gov. by the US Army War College. The Secretary of the Army has determined that publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with Army regulations. Parameters is indexed in, inter alia, Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals U.S. Government Periodicals Index LexisNexis Government Periodicals Index Worldwide Political Science Abstracts Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature (UK), and PAIS Bulletin Book reviews are indexed in Gale Groups Book Review Index Parameters Periodicals postage is paid at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and additional ISSN 0031-1723 | USPS 413530 | Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.

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Vol. 43 No. 4 Winter 2013-14 FEATURES Special Commentary 7 What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower Francis G. Hoffman American Power in Transition 15 The True Tragedy of American Power Isaiah Wilson Confusing Force with Power 27 Redirecting US Diplomacy James E. Goodby and Ken Weisbrode Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally 35 Rebalancing US Military Power Anna Simons Changing How We Advise & Partner Fighting Irregular Fighters 45 Is the Law of Armed Sibylle Scheipers Delegitimizing Irregular Fighters 57 Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors Robert J. Bunker Optimizing Landpower's Role 67 Confronting Africa's Sobels Robert L. Feldman and Michel Ben Arrous Soldiers by Day, Rebels by Night 77 Waging Financial War David J. Katz Coercing Friends & Enemies 87 The Coming Financial Wars Juan Zarate Retaining the US Advantage 99 Economic Statecraft: China in Africa Douglas W. Winton Leveraging Economic Growth Preparing for Netwars 111 Repurposing Cyber Command Frank J. Cilluffo and Joseph R. Clark Operationalizing Cyber Of Note 119 A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 Kevin C. Benson Policy, Strategy, & War Planning

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2 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 DEPARTMENTS 5 From the Editor 173 Article Index, V ol. 43, 2013 125 Commentaries and Replies 125 On Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as UsualRichard H. Sinnreich The Authors Respond 128 On Strategic Landpower in the Jeong Lee 131 On "Strategic Landpower in the James D. Perry John R. Deni Replies 135 On Imbalance in the Taiwan StraitDavid Lai Dennis V. Hickey Replies 138 On US Options in Syria Nathan Finney141 Book Reviews Armed Nonstate Groups141 Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability FunctionsBy Robert Mandel Reviewed by Jos de Arimatia da Cruz 144 The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric WarfareBy Max G. Manwaring Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker 145 Al-Shabaab in So malia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group 2005-2012By Stig Jarle Hansen Reviewed byRichard J. Norton148 New Securit y Challenges in Asia Edited by Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway Reviewed by Jeong LeePolicy, Terror, & Espionage150 Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama PresidencyBy Daniel Klaidman Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill 152 Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the AnglosphereEdited by Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson Review by Joseph Becker 153 Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947-2001By Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn Reviewed by W. Ross ClarkStrategic Leadership in Wartime 156 The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the EmpireBy Andrew Jackson OShaughnessy Reviewed by James D. Scudieri158 On the Precipice: Stalin, the R ed Army Leadership and the Road to Stalingrad, 1931-1942By Peter Mezhiritsky Reviewed by Stephen Blank159 The Swamp Fo x: Lessons in Leadership from the Partisan Campaigns of Francis MarionBy Scott D. Aiken Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell

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Content 3 New Perspectives on Vietnam 162 Kill Anything That Mo ves: The Real American War in VietnamBy Nick Turse Reviewed by William Thomas Allison164 Vietnam Labyrinth: Allies, Enemies, and Why the US Lost the WarBy Tran Ngoc Chau, with Ken Fermoyle Reviewed by William Thomas Allison165 Losing Vietnam: How America Abandoned Southeast AsiaBy Ira A. Hunt, Jr. Reviewed by David FitzgeraldRevisiting the Great War168 The Last o f the Doughboys: The Forgotten Generation and Their Forgotten World WarBy Richard Rubin Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg169 Winning and Lo sing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918By Jonathan Boff Reviewed by Dean A. NowowiejskiNew Award to Recognize ContributorsWe would like to take this opportunity to announce a new award to recognize the author (or a given volume of the Quarterly. Our Editorial Board will nominate the winner(s) from those articles published by the journal within a given volume year. The award will be presented by More details will be forthcoming in the next issue of the Quarterly.

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R eaders will want to note the edifying, if contentious, exchange between two distinguished soldier-scholars, Charles Dunlap and Conrad Crane. Each holds strong views regarding the assump tions and attendant expectations that have underpinned and continue power, is that policy choices in one region can reduce alternatives in tary and nonmilitary options against the goal of containing the Syrian civil war, noting that the failure of the current containment strategy could lead to dire consequences for the region. In Pitfalls in Egypt, grew during the Morsi presidency, and how America can chart a better may be too soon to avoid a renewal of the Afghan civil war. Dennis recommends combining two of them for a better way ahead. tions to deterring aggression and to promoting security in the region. In both cases, it is clear the strategic application of landpower offers much more than compellence. the latest literature on cyberwar and cyber warfare, a topic of increasing From the Editor

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ABSTRA CT : The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have been completed as of this writing, but will not yet have been pub it is anticipated that the capacity or size of American landpower will be substantially reduced: the Armys end strength could be dec remented to a post-World War II low of just 420,000 to 450,000 soldiers. This article considers the implications of such reductions. T he US Department of Defense (DOD) faces numerous challenges today as it updates US defense strategy in light of a dynamic secu affords landpower strategists an excellent opportunity to step back and think about the future. As the former Pentagon strategist Shawn Brimley wrote, With wars ending, budgets declining, technology proliferating, and other powers rising, a real window of opportunity to reshape US War. 1 However, that window also brings with it great risk. United States must have balanced and versatile forces able to accomplish a wide variety of missions. Urgency is needed to create greater Joint adaptability and versatility to cope with uncertainty and complexity. Although niche capabilities will still be needed, a balanced force design Landpower and Joint Force 2020 Landpowers role in the 21st century was studied by a task force com the human domain and winning the clash of wills inherent in human 2 prevention and the ability to shape conditions in regions to maintain stability through actions highly focused on human factors is also rising The interplay of human and moral factors in war is deemphasize or inadvertently overlook. 4 Defense One 2 Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, Strategic Landpower; Winning the Clash of Wills www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/Strategic. 4 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Innovation The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel SPECIAL COMMENTARY What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower Francis G. Hoffman 2013 Francis G. Hoffman Mr. Francis G. Hoffman currently serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

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8 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 The role of landpower is questioned in some quarters: it is equated to protracted counterinsurgency tasks and portrayed as expensive. Some critics think of the Army and Marines solely in terms of current con missions and nation-building tasks. But after a decade of irregular war, the contributions made by the Army, Marines, and Special Operations gerated concerns about endless wars. American landpower capabilities tion. The tremendous learning curve and combat experience of the last retain the best of that leadership, experience, and lessons. We should realistic appreciation for the world as it is rather than what we hope it may become. As noted by Major General H. R. McMaster: . in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptability and maintain security. The lesson: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, like all wars, were contests of will that unleashed dynamics that made future events impossible to predict. Fortunately, American forces adapted. 5 The US military has not yet studied or drawn adequate lessons about the factors that facilitated this adaptation. Some national security analysts have questioned whether landpower is necessary. Landpower is part of the Joint capability package and heavily counted on to secure decisive results. Whether the debates center on the missions, costs, or effectiveness, one should be wary of those critics pro moting a new Vietnam syndrome, arguing the United States should never again go down the path it did over the last decade. Playing to this syndrome led directly to the problems encountered before, during, and after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Some critics argue for Vietnams or more short wars like Operation Desert Storm. The desire for more Desert Storms and fewer Iraqi Freedoms is understandable. But strategists cannot plan for convenient enemiesleaders who array their forces in open desert terrain, who have no means to defend themselves against US ground and air power, and thereby enable short, decisive 7 But the future does is to harbor dangerous illusions. 8 Technology cannot offset the need for robust ground forces, nor can it guarantee short wars. The policy community may not have fallen for The New York Times The National Interest alinterest.org/commentary/land-power-still-necessary-8544. The New Republic, 8 Allegedly the President has asked for fewer Iraqi Freedoms and more Desert Storms see James National Journal

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SPECIAL COMMENTARY easy wars or been seduced by the lure of strike. 9 However, recent defense studies suggest that the technological optimists are alive and well again. 10 We must be wary of their claims, having fallen for them too many times already, at too tragic a cost. Landpower confers the ability to create and apply control of terrain and populations. When control is central to a strategy, landpower gener ates it. It is both high risk and high reward. Strategic Planning and Landpower region, a theater presumed to have a principally maritime character. 11 The Pentagons guidance is on target in terms of priorities. With the It makes sense to shift resources toward maritime forces. Wars in that region are more likely to be fought at sea than on land. Moreover, if the United States is planning to avoid future stability and counter insurgency operations, like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which require large numbers of boots on the ground over multiple rotations, then the military will need considerably fewer ground forces. 12 But landpower is certainly not irrelevant to negating anti-access chal There is certainly ample opportunity for the Army, Marines, and Special 14 Furthermore, while American geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf may diminish as the United States exploits the shale oil and gas revolutions, no projection of American security interests can ignore the 15 The Joint Force will require land power resources to advance US interests in those regions. Landpower requirements are generated by DODs strategic planning and resource allocation processes. The unpredictability of long-range antidote to the all too common failure to predict. Long-range planning is essential; but the enemy does not have to respect US planning assump 9 One scholar contends that technological enthusiasm has historically led to strategic overreach Parameters Naval War College Review 11 Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Parameters Parameters 42, no. Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security

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10 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 Supposing that tomorrows adversaries will be only elusive guer rillas or that armored forces are pass is risky. 17 Similarly, future crises will require more than special operators. Integrated solutions applying all three elements of the landpower triad (Army, Marines, and Special forcesthe ability to take and hold terrain, operate discriminately in allies and partnerswill be no less vital in the coming decade. 18 Other interventions are not implausible, but US ground forces may need to broaden their capability portfolios. 19 Of paramount concern is the full spectrum of warfare from major combat operations, stability operations, and irregular warfare operations. These require persistent, steady-state contributions from all three elements of the landpower triad. (DSG) regarding stability operations, incorporating one small-scale sta bility operation in its planning scenarios (much smaller than Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom ). Planning for a 12to 24-month, hedging strategy for a global power such as the United States. Something like a Balkans or Libya operation is a rough scale. The current guidance admits that US forces must be prepared for a full range of operations, but it also states that the United States will seek to avoid substantial engagement and prefers nonmilitary solutions. This suggests that train ing, preparation, and readiness for such missions is a low priority and a poor allocation of time and resources. Furthermore, it does not authorize any capacity. 20 This has the unintended effect of retarding the institu necessity of stability operation capabilities by the Army and Marines. Force Sizing To gain further traction with the policy community, landpower leadership will have to present a compelling rationale for both future capabilities and capacity. Fuzzy notions or historical bromides will not 21 From a Total Force perspective, todays 1.15 million person landpower Triad is impressive both qualitatively and in terms of capacity. The sum landpower capacity in this triad includes the active with planned reductions of nearly 100,000 Marines and Soldiers, the United States will still have over a million Soldiers and Marines led by battle-hardened professionals. We should retain a robust force, with the Foreign Affairs (May/June Heavy Armor in the Future Security Environment Occasional Paper, 2011). 18 Nathan Freier, U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020 Strategic and International Studies, October 2011), vii. 19 Nathan Freier, Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM 20 Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 21 Peter Singer, From Fuzzy to Focused, Armed Forces Journal

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SPECIAL COMMENTARY diverse mix of capabilities (armor, mechanized, special operations, and forcible entry) that we now possess. The force-sizing construct the Pentagon used in this QDR is not yet clear. But the DSG suggests the United States is prepared to respond United States will deploy a highly modernized and balanced Joint com bined arms force to obtain decisive results, including full regime change. In the second, the Pentagon intends to punish a country, or to deny it from achieving the fruits of any aggressive action. This second scenario is presumably dependent on strike assets and short on any ground forces for security of allies or for stability operations in support of either the ally or partner, or in any contested space impacted by the kinetic phase of the operation. These shortfalls may be necessitated by sequestration and limited dollars, but they pose risks for force planners to consider and mitigate. basis and adequate training readiness. This rationale might suggest we Army force structure is not simply the sum of these two major require ments. Presumably, some part of the forward deployed force will be challenge for Army leaders and force planners is the requisite reductions in the institutional army, force generation capacity, and infrastructure to reductions in base overhead and civilian personnel will be required, as many as one third of all civilian billets may be reduced over the Future power force. While overall force size is not irrelevant, the quality and readiness of the force matter. 22 There has been too much emphasis on the quantity and size of each service, and not enough on quality and future concepts. It is unwise to retain a larger force structure than one can properly train capacity and drive up strategic and operational risks. Realistic thinking is also needed about what is occurring among traditional US allies and partners. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force reductions need to be factored in as they are announced. As noted by RAND, The result of the anticipated cuts and future to project military power will be highly constrained. This reduced capacity will mean an even greater burden for the United States in allied and partner operations. 22 Frank G. Hoffman and Mike Noonan, Defense Reorganization Under Sequestration, NATO and the Challenge of Austerity The New York Times

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12 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 Total Force Mix The active/reserve force mix presents additional issues with regard to readiness and risk. At present, the US military has a total of 18 divi sions in the Army and National Guard (10/8 respectively), and another reductions will cost the Army approximately two Division equivalents Proposals vary from one think tank to another, but increasing the readiness or size of the reserve component may preserve the capac ity needed within sharp funding constraints. 24 While much progress was made in the last decade, more can be leveraged from a properly 25 In planning for austere times, the United Kingdom shifted toward a higher reliance on its reserve compo nent, and there are calls in the United States to do the same. The QDR must carefully consider how this can be done to preclude a degradation in conventional deterrence or the ability to respond to crises in a timely manner. Moreover, one needs to be realistic about limited reserve train ing time. The complexity of modern warfare suggests the Age of the Minuteman is long gone. 27 Shifting missions and risk to the Reserves may be a smart call to mitigate uncertainty, but it is the wrong way to cut defense. We need a far more rigorous assessment of Reserve and Guard response timelines, and a better idea of what is necessary to place Assessments of risk, readiness, and required response timelines need to be conducted and validated. 28 Allies face unruly neighborhoods far abroad. Simply shifting forces into the Reserve, and expecting warning and mobilization times of six months or nearly a year are not consistent with preserving stability, reassuring our allies, or meeting treaty obliga tions. 29 That is the wrong way to cut defense Special Operations not extend Special Operations capacity. Obviously, US special opera tions forces should be sized to provide their unique capabilities across 25 John Nagl and Travis Sharp, An Indispensable Force, Investing in Americas National Guard and Reserves 27 Julian Tolbert and Stephen J. Mariano, Time for Minutemen is Past, Philadelphia Inquirer ously astray, Armed Forces Journal International 29 Williams, Accepting Austerity. The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces

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SPECIAL COMMENTARY capacity or engagement. Investments are required to ensure this, in the next few years. Modernization for special operators cannot be overlooked. As Admiral McRaven noted earlier this year, Mobility, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of SOF operations. The QDR should ensure these enablers are procured. forces is also desirable. However, our Special Forces will be consumed with Wars of Shadow, and the rest of the triad will have to support missions of long duration, patiently developing long-term relationships for successful partnerships, training and advisory tasks, and capacity building. Human Domain Investments As noted in the Strategic Landpower White Paper, the success of future strategic initiatives and the ability of the United States to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environ exercise control within the human domain. Joint doctrine may not need to institutionalize a Human Domain, but it is one way for the valuable lessons and programs from the last decade of war are not inad vertently shed in the struggle for fewer resources. Key human terrain, educational, and sociocultural programs are being phased out due to and we should continue to exploit them, but we should also try to close the gaps between ourselves and foreign cultures. Conclusion represents a critical opportunity to shape future US defense strategy and tomorrows land component. Policymakers must examine trends possibilities. While technology should be sought to afford US forces a relative advantage, it should not be pursued in lieu of regard for context or in a mistaken belief that it produces decisive results by itself. We need to be more humble about our track record when it comes to strategic foresight. According to some, over-optimism is an enduring Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations Command Before the 113th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee Small Wars Journal October Strategic Landpower, 21st Century Cultures of War (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute,

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14 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 element in the American Way of War. Our record of prediction is actu ally fairly good, we are always optimistic and always wrong. War is a perennial reality, yet one that we must try to prevent and limit in terms of both frequency and consequence. Landpower will continue to play a critical role in this task, as long as we have enough of it. Parameters Small Wars Journal

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ABSTRA CT : American distaste for tragedy has led US strategists and policymakers to mistake mere force for power. Understanding the difference between force and power is vital to Americas rise as a durable and balanced global power, and not merely as a forceful he gemon. This understanding is all the more imperative at a time of compounding global security challenges and austerity. What individuals do is related to what they think. . Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. 1 T The classic tragediesthose of Sophocles and Shakespeare, for instancepresent a noble protagonist, better than we to the through a series of reversals and discoveries. In a typical case, the heros fall occurs in stages: Act I introduces the hero, against whom dark forces align in Act II so by Act III it becomes clear to the audience (and some times to the hero) that his fate will be the opposite of what he hoped; the catastrophe of Act IV exposes the limits of the heros power, and Act V secures our recognition (in a moment of catharsis) of the larger patterns at work in the play. What makes tragedy so poignant is not only how it shows human beings as the playthings of fate, but how it reveals that fate lurking in our own characters, so close to the qualities we cherish as to be indistinguishable from them. The same pride and probity that make Oedipus excel as king lead him to overestimate his strength and compelling individual make him a dilatory and ineffective agent. If these heroes could see their virtues within their proper bounds, they would no longer be the subjectsthe victimsof tragedy. But they cannot and so they are. American stories tend to resemble not tragedies so much as classic comedies, with happy endings and no loose ends. And yet a certain tragic sensibility recently entered into our political discourse. We increasingly sense the limits of not only our budgets, but our power to act as we would like in the wider world. We sense ever more palpably the frustra a tragic hero as the pivotal third act draws to a close, we feel ourselves at Among its myriad manifestations is the want of tragic sensibility in our strategic culture, which persists even as our broader political discourse distaste for tragedy has led US strategists and policymakers to mistake 1 Francis Beer, Meanings of War and Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 6. AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION The True Tragedy of American Power Isaiah Wilson III 2013 Isaiah Wilson III Colonel Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III is a former Director of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy Program at West Point as well as founding director of the West Point Grand Strategy Program. He holds a BS from USMA, MS from Cornell, the National War College, CGSC, SAMS, and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. He has authored many publications, including Thinking Beyond War 2007.

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16 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14mere force for power. I want, then, to show how vital this differentiation between force and power has been to Americas rise as a durable and balanced global power, not merely a hegemon. It is important for us to appreciate this distinction all the more as we rethink Americas legitimate and possible roles as the leading power in the future. Finally, I will suggest what an American grand strategy informed by a sense of tragedyas opposed to a tragic grand strategymight look like.Power and ForceNewton teaches us as much about the tragedy of power as Sophocles power with the following equation: Newton could not account for power without force, but he did not consider the two to be identical. In addition to force, one must account for both time and displacement, the imaginary straight path from the one expresses in the displacement vector. All these variables stand in 2 This is the founda tion for Joseph Nyes dissection of hard and soft power.3 Where power was once based on geography, population, and raw materials, today the basis lies increasingly on technology, education, and economic growth. Hard power, whic physically compels or directs other states to act in a manner consistent with the goals of the state, typically appears in the form of incentives or threats to alter what another state does.4 This hard power assumes various forms: the size and capacity of the economic United States has used these forms of hard power to achieve its goals since its birth, but just as important has been soft power. Soft power, instead of inducement or coercion, co-opts and attracts; it shapes and changes what other states want.5 Quite simply, soft power is getting and the means of soft power are less tangible but no less potent: values, culture, ideology, and institutions. The United States has seen many of its policy objectives achieved in part due to its soft power. American ideals stood in stark contrast to those of Soviet communism and acted as a beacon for citizens trapped behind the Iron Curtain. In considering hard and soft power, where does the discussion of force begin? 2 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1-2. 3 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 25-26. 4 Ibid., 31, 267. 5 Ibid., 267.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Wilson 17 Force, of which military power is only one element, is the most blatant display of power. 6 Power and force have a unique relationship and actions. While military force is an essential element of American national power, it is neither the only essential element nor is it a suf states prestige and capacity to cause or prevent change, and it requires legitimacy, which it derives from those who may be subject to it. True power is self-legitimizing, purposeful, and strategic in securing national interests. As such, power grows when others recognize the capacity, latent or otherwise, a state possesses. Force, on the other hand, consists of the tools that a state employs as an extension of its power, and when employed without legitimacy and strategic purpose, may be very danger ous for the state that does so. Power is the foundation of force; but an excessive employment of forcenot just military, but economic and politicalcan erode the power foundation. Paradoxically, the recogni tion of power comes from the display of force, but when states employ force excessively, it may lead to a decrease in power. The unmistakable link between power and force may, in fact, be found in national will and legitimacy. The longer a state employs force, the greater the potential for a decrease in national will, which may eventually result in the diminu tion of power. Reconsidering American Power For long stretches of US history, the basis of constitutional discus sions centered on how to maximize liberty and prosperity, and how to organize force with a view to preserving them. The goal was suf the minimum necessary to protect and ensure liberty. It was only in a Constitution so conceived that the unionists slogan, join or die, could coexist with the revolutionarys Dont Tread on Me! By using principle to founders understood, the nation could generate true power. Where does American power stand today? From one vantage point, US power seems unsurpassed. The United States is not only a memberstate of a global community of nation-states, but its leader. And the global ian impulses, and other touchstones of American liberalismis itself the American regime writ large. In this sense, the United States is not merely part of the system; it is the system. As a result, US domestic poli tics and policy determinations have widespread consequences beyond American shores. Also as a result, American strategists feel a special responsibility to guarantee the stability of the system as a whole. Seen another way, however, American power not only checks but undermines itself by appearing only in the guise of force. American military force has had a mixed record of success, particularly over the past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq. These and other irregular wars and military-humanitarian operations (MHOs) the United States has engaged in have demonstrated the inability of mere military force to 6 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 134.

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18 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 ment among internal factions, improved capacity in host nation civil governance, and increased economic development. Force of arms can bring down regimes with far greater ease than it can build them up. Partly as a result of the prominence of force in the American disposition toward the world, the persuasive and alluring aspects of Americas soft powerits ability to attract other states through its ideals, ideas, and cultureis also in question. And with good reason, as the United States focus on force led it in many cases to compromise its own core ideals with greater effectiveness than any enemy could have done. This, then, is the heart of the tragic paradox we face: a system of government that generates power by restraining force has produced a nation commanding unparalleled force, and with it the tendency to place force rather than power at the core of its international relations. As the founders knew, military force is an essential element of American power. But this power rests equally on its capacity to effect or prevent change by means of its prestige and legitimacy, which have as much to do with the opinion of those subject to American power as with the opinions of Americans themselves. True power is legitimate, purposeful, and strate gic in securing national interests. The nation founded on such a notion of power, yet bewitched with its own force resembles nothing so much as the tragic hero tilting toward his dramas climax. The United States successful efforts to open markets are partially responsible for its tenuous economic situation, and may potentially lead to political backlash domestically. 7 A worsening economic condition for the United States may result in an inability to garner the necessary will for further uses of economic force. 8 The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have strained the United States politically and economically. 9 Of late, the United States may have experienced a decline in its power due to an excessive utilization of force and the greater use of force in lieu of leveraging its latent power capacity. It has become imperative that national decisionmakers, policymakers, and the American public alike, begin to tackle directly and outright this complex and often paradoxical interplay between American power and American force. 10 Legitimizing American Power as limited power, with an intentional emphasis on balance, durability, 7 Glenn Somerville and Chris Buckley, China and US Each Claim Gains on Yuan Talks, Reuters News May 25, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64M09Q20100525 http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/07/deficit-great-depression-recovery-opinions-columnistsbruce-bartlett.html. 9 The political effects of the United States actions have been the subject of several analyses, including Andrew W. Terrill, Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War Strategic Studies Institute, January Council on Foreign Relations (May 11, 2010); (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2008). 10 The prominent use of its military, international democratization efforts, and uses of economic statecraft in pursuit of national objectives are utilizations of force that may have affected the power/ force equilibrium of the United States.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Wilson 19 certainly energy . but importantly, also modesty. 11 Americas approach to power was originally an enterprise in the construction, constitution, and assurance of a minimalist state of powerjust enough centraliza tion of power to ensure citizens rights and no more than that minimum so as to protect and ensure liberty. The key political considerations in connection with power were to be found not in physical force as an end-all, but rather in the questions of justice and authority, i.e., what is American tradition and to the nations grounding in Scottish Common Sense philosophy, the view of power was/is that it is morally neutral not bad or good in and of itselfthat its goodness or badness depends more on how it is used, when, and for what purposes. In short, American Power, traditionally and to remain consistent with who we are, who we have been, and who we intend to continue to be in the future, as a repub lic, must always be purpose-driven, not ways-and-means determined. useful contemporary commentary on the tenets of power, in his book, Power Rules : 12 Power was never to be considered in soft or hard terms This is actually more a way of categorizing force not power. Power is not fungible and divisible in that way. Power is, and was, essentially the capacity (the ability to . ) to get people to do what they otherwise dont want to do, by pressure and coercion, using ones resources and position. power, but at its core, power is psychological and political pressure. Power equals capacity. Tracing the development of the word from its stood to mean nothing more than ability as a noun and to be able as a verb. Being a Power as a nation, much less a Great Power, is about being able and in a position to compel others to your will; it is psycho logical and political action. In that respect, the description of Power is synonymous to the Clausewitzian theoretical concept of waran act of policy (i.e., what governments choose to do and choose not to do), and as such, a continuation of politics by other means. Power is a grapple. It derives from establishing psychological and political leverage or advantage by employing resources (i.e., wealth, military capability, commodities, etc.), position (such as geographic regional balancer or political protector), as well as maintaining resolve and unity at home. Power, thus, varies with each and every relationship and changes with each and every situation. It has to be developed and shaped in almost each and every situation, and will vary over time and place. Critically, the wielder of power must take great care to be credible to be taken seriously, both at home and abroad. Having a base of Power is much more than a simple adding up of resources. It depends on the kind and nature of those resourcesnamely, a 11 A full and comprehensive review of the Founding and Framing era literature is well beyond in The Federalist Papers Source for this article is Clinton Rossiter, comp., Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961). Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009).

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20 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 begins. For the American republic, the rightful and legitimate base of power is not to be found in any particular process or institution, and surely not in any political party; it should never be allowed to be found in anything other than the people themselvesthe General Will Power shrinks when it is wielded poorly. Failed or open-ended wars dimin power. Mistakes and continual changing of course can also diminish power. the Founders and Framers original intent for the source pool and main sanctuary of American powerthe law; and importantly, not a sanctu ary found in rule by law, but rather in rule of law. on half-way into its second decade, military force has occupied a central place in American foreign policy as the nation has confronted new threats, opportunities, and responsibilities resulting from globaliza tion and other geopolitical shifts in the international environment. Questions about whether and how to intervene militarily have become more important than ever. Since the end of the Cold War, and certainly since the shock of 9/11, the United States has found itself faced with a Goldilocks dilemma. It answer to the operational questions of the daythat is, how to project and exercise military power in a manner that is effective, but just and lawful. It is at the heart of this goldilocks challenge where questions of American power versus force lie. The postCold War period has proven to be a period of widespread have been able to contain. Since 9/11, the international community has had to confront the rise of transnational terrorists. It has also been chal lenged to accommodate developing norms and obligations related to such things as human security, self-determination, and human rights. US military interventions since 1989 have fostered tectonic changes in the international system. They have challenged traditional norms, principles, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that have provided sta bility to the system for the past sixty years. In particular, US interventions have challenged what was once considered largely inviolableterritorial sovereignty. While the 1990s witnessed the beginnings of a decline in inter othershas been the rising call and drive for foreign interventions aimed against sovereign states on behalf of citizens and communities within those states. Thus, the inviolability of state territorial sovereignty has unraveled, in part through a combination of changes in the international security system, but also at the hands of interveners among whom the United States has been and continues to be a lead participant.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Wilson 21 Figure. The Paradox of American Power Indeed, it has become apparent that the United States has had a profound effect on the destabilization of the international system and that it has challenged the traditional legal and normative international just intervention, and the limited and precision uses of force as one (but not the only) application of American power, for a half century. The power dilemma facing the United States and the international com munity today is one of a goldilocks story lineit involves reconciling focused on checking territorial aggressions by asserting near-absolute state sovereignty. In an earlier age, island nations like Great Britain (and to a lesser degree, the United States) could build-down, even decimate, their peacetime armies with impunity, as intervention was typically limited to redressing violations of a sovereign states territory by an aggres sor and a restoration of status quo ante-bellum But since the 1990s, the global security environment demands more from its great powers and especially its leading state. Todays interventions, to be considered right and just, must establish a better state of peace post-bellum 13 The prevail Geneva Conventions, increasingly assumes the more demanding form of a Responsibility to Protect capable of triggering (or at least justifying) uses of military force for humanitarian purposes by an ever-growing 13 Jus post bellum (justice after war) obligations are on the rise, and have been for the past two intervention forces to not only wage just interventions, justly, but also to stay the intervention be JUS POST BELLUM : The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War, Naval War College Review 57, no. 3/4 (Summer/Autumn 2004): 33-52, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/022caef3-60c8-4caa-9153bd08f28387d5/Jus-Post-Bellum--The-Moral-Responsibilities-of-Vic.aspx

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22 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 oftentimes pitting one or more nation-states against roguish regimes making national claims of self-determination, adds yet another illcausus belli. 14 A sustainable security strategy in this day and age must be based on a provision of force and a doctrine for guiding its application capable of attaining viable peace. 15 A sustain able security posture depends on marrying the right capabilities with the right strategic goals (balance) and a capacity for mobilizing and sustaining force that can achieve economies of scale in international interventions (durability). The ability to marry so-called hard and soft power in effective-cost and legitimate ways is the supreme test of secu rity strategy making. This has not, however, been the United States favored mode of intervention. Instead, the history of American intervention reveals an inclination to using martial instruments to cure what are, essentially, instrument has secured its prominence in the minds of American strat egists, and yet the American record in unconventional interventions (dirty little wars) has actually been quite dismal. This is especially so when the United States has found itself an external patron to the coun terinsurgent in intrastate wars and military-humanitarian interventions. Many of the United States experiences in these types of interventions 16 The Vietnam War was a complete war-loss for the United States; it is perhaps too early to tell how Afghanistan and Iraq will be remembered, but the trends do not give much reason to hope these interventions will free the United States from its historical trend. These interventions began well enough, but like a boxer replete with years of bout experience and a reach that outdistances younger, less-experienced competitors, the United States is left facing this tale of the tape: great reach, but poor endurance in the latter rounds. Part of the problem is simply not having enough physical capacity to meet global requirements, but this problem is not easy to address. If ours is a not enough boots on the ground problem, then one simple answer might be to limit the ground on which we send our available boots. We might at the very least resolve not to occupy more ground, as then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it when he said that any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 14 Isaiah Wilson III, Dueling Regimes: The Means-Ends Dilemma of Multilateral Intervention Policy, World Affairs January 2001. operating environment expands beyond traditional physical and material-based concepts of security, i.e., beyond those forms of security typically achievable and sustainable by military power alone. Todays wider concept of security and the threats to it include, but are not limited to, issues of human security (and the provision of basic essential needs), cultural security, economic secu rity, and environmental security. For a full description, see Promoting Sustainable Security, NDC Occasional Paper No. 12, NATO Defense College, Research Branch, Rome, February 2006, and also the research by the Fund for Peace. The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 16 Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars, International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 67-106.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Wilson 23 have his head examined. 17 We might also get rid of ground currently occupied. Neither option, however, is feasible in todays environment. The ground and the threats on it, after all, get a vote, and they sometimes demand an American presence even when Americans would prefer to be elsewhere. While we might wish to withdraw from some of the nearly 130 countries where we perform a variety of intervention tasks ranging from traditional combat to peace operations, to do so would likely desta bilize the world even more than our occasional missteps do. 18 Alternatively, the United States might acquire more boots. We have long known the number of troops necessary for waging and winning unconventional interventions. To defeat the violence of an insurgency, a precondition for stabilization and reconstruction operations, we know every one person in the population. These forces would be a multicom position force bringing a wide variety of skills and knowledge to this side of the counterinsurgency campaign, ranging from skills in major combat operations to city and regional planning expertise. Finally, we should not discount perhaps the most important lesson of all regarding nation is embarking upon (the supreme Clausewitzian warning), some times particular kinds of wars may embark themselves on a nation-state, or community of nation-states. Put more simply, sometimes war is less a matter of strategic choice and more an unavoidable issue of moral imperative. Not having the appropriate quantities of force (simple overstretch) and onto a problem set well beyond the traditional military uses of force (compound overstretch) can foster the illiberal practices that make American intervention seem an exercise in imperialism. There is, of course, a point of diminishing return that all great power nation-states (and empires) must come to face as they attempt to expand or merely to maintain their global status. Nations project their military power according to their economic resources and in defense of their broad economic interests, Paul when new technologies and new centers of production shift economic power away from established Great Powershence the rise and fall of nations. 19 The mechanism that seems to lead a nation-state from liberal towards more imperial forms of intervention is military force itself, and The New York Times February 25, 2011. 18 On troop deployments, see GlobalSecurity.org, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ops/global-deployments.htm. I have focused on the inadequacy of current military force posture from a landpower (US Army) standpoint for two main reasons: (1) lack of space to discuss Total Force shortfalls and (2) the nature of the 21st century security dilemma is namely a landpower and littorals challengeours is an incapacity to sustain force on ground we need to hold to build viable peace and stability for the duration of the intervention. This task is largely and predominantly a core Army function, and consequently from a military standpoint, a landpower shortfall. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Press, 1989), Introduction.

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24 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 particularly the manner in which it is used. For the Roman Empire, it was the legionsthe institution of last resortthat, in their efforts to secure Rome and her empire by means of increasingly authoritarian uses of coercive force, contributed to her decline. Great care must be taken to ensure that the actions our own legions take in defense of liberalism do not have the unintended effect of fostering illiberalism. To turn to our technological preeminence for solutions to vexing human problems of this sort is to confuse the fruit of our success with the cause of it. We do not enjoy power because of our advanced technol ogy; we enjoy advanced technology because of our power. In summary, it is important, essential, that the United States now reconsider its understandings of power and its uses of force for at least two reasons. First, the United States must, as a nation, recognize that it is, in and of itself, a system effect. 20 For better or worse, or perhaps mixes of both, and particularly since its last great power standing rise to global hegemony in the wake of World War II, the choices the United States makes in where and how it intervenes (including those choices of where not to intervene) are not merely US choices, but choices that impact the entire world-system. 21 Having a deep and accurate understanding of and appreciation for differences between force and power is criti cal to liberal, legitimate, and instrumentally effective global leadership; mistaking uses of force, forcefully, for power is a recipe for accelerated decline of America as a great power, with destabilizing consequences for long-term global stability, security, and prosperity. of the implications of our own roles and responsibilities, of our policy choices and actions, into our Power calculations. The United States has had a heavy hand in infusing the current international system with much of its current instabilitythis, in spite of the noble goals and intentions behind those policy decisions and uses of force. The internationaliza counterinsurgency, democratization, and preventive warall uses of American military force that have had destabilizing effects on the stability of state regimes, national ethno-sectarian balances, and stabil ity of the international system in general. We as a nation and global leading power must become a better study of the quality of peace that we promise through our acts of wars, those of short and long duration. We must calculate the power consequences of the peace we ring in through uses of force. Renewing American Grand Strategy Confronting a punishing budget crisis, an exhausted military, reluc tant allies, and a public whose appetite for global engagement is waning, the United States faces an intertwined set of critical questions. Among these questions, three stand out: How will current political realities affect the range of strategic choices 20 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 21 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Wilson 25 available to policymakers? How can the United States government make the best possible stra tegic choices? What role will the existing tapestry of US relationships and regional partnerships play? All of these are political questions. When resources become scarce, the politics surrounding budget decisions escalate. All of these are also the February 2013 sequester, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey summarized the military aspect of budget battles with bracing clarity. What do you want your military to do? General Dempsey asked in testimony to the House of Representatives. If you want it to be doing what its doing today, then we cant give you another dollar. If you want us to do something less than that, were all there with you and 22 they involve the calculated relation of means to large ends. 23 On this plane, the fundamental challenge facing the United States might be put strategynearly a third of which transpired without a great peer power 24 Or can the United States discover a way to navigate uncertainty while preserving American dominance as a leading power in and of the international system? These questions will be at the core of our political debates in the years to come. US strategists need to think of power, to whatever purpose it is put, in relative rather than in absolute terms. The key to their success is the ability to gain the most from their capabilities while their adversaries do not. US strategists also must understand the difference between the power to win battles and the power to win wars. Winning battles is impor tant, but the battles have to count toward winning wars. Understanding which ones do and which ones do not is a purely intellectual exercise. A renewed American grand strategy would acknowledge the nations and institutions for restraining force that have proven uniquely adept at producing abundant prosperity, force, and with them unsurpassed has haunted American intervention by casting war as a matter of mere force rather than an instrument of policy. As they prepare for this spiritual struggle, American grand strategists might recall that not all ghosts are goblins damnd, as Hamlet worried the ghost of his father might be; they are just as frequently spirits of their sense of duty. We should exorcise our goblins while welcoming the spiritual remnants of times when American power prevailed even in the absence of preponderant force. 22 Claudette Roulo, Chairman Outlines Sequestrations Dangers, American Forces Press Service February 13, 2013. 26, 2009, http://tiss.sanford.duke.edu/DebatingGrandStrategyDetails.php. 24 Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, Dont Come Home, America International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/13): 7.

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26 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 The great challenges and opportunities that lie before the statesmen of the United States lie in questions of American Power. Power is about choiceschoices over how to generate force, in different quantities and of different qualities; whether we choose to generate force on our Monroe Doctrine and the American approach to power versus force is instructive to us now and going forward. The Doctrine was issued at a achieved independence from the Spanish Empire and the Portuguese Empire. The United States, working in agreement with Britain, wanted to guarantee that no European power would move in. It was actually mainly through partnership with Great Britain that the United States was able to make credible, with the presence of British military force, the deterrent threat of Monroe. In short, what we see at the time of Monroe, and in the Doctrine itself, is a grand expression of American power (according to most scholars on the subject, one of the grandest expres sions of US power in the country's history) at a time when American force was relatively anemic. This power-force paradox offers the United States great and important lessons for the gathering and learning as America's capacities to generate and sustain force inevitably continue and decline while its global leader responsibilities increase and become more complex. As Sir Isaac Newton taught us centuries ago, the bigger determinant over the strength and direction of power is found in how we displace force over time. Displacement of force, or rather, how we as a nation choose to use our force, and the manner of behavior behind our uses of that force, or rather, how we as a nation choose to use our force, and the manner of behavior behind our uses of that force, independently and in collective actions with others, is a strong determinant of power, just and rightful power, legitimate power. Austerity in terms of dwindling dollars and cents does nothing to deny citizens nor elected leaders in making these power choices. Only a self-imposed austerity of sense and sensibility can deny a great nation like the United States of all the opportunity that rides on the dangerous winds of future times ahead and are, undeniably, ambiguous and ripe with crisis. As in past times, why and how America intervenes will matter.

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ABSTRA CT : The international system of nation-states is evolving into something more complex and indeterminate. One important devel opment has been the creation of regional communities. If these are to thrive in their own distinctive way, national governments, including the United States, will need to support creative policies that harmonize interests, not only within such communities but also among them. Policy planners, therefore, must think globally and act regionally. N ot so long ago, international relations meant inter-state relations. Issues of war and peace belonged exclusively to the governments of states. They ruled the world. This was commonly called the Westphalian system, after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which dictated the principle of independent national sover eignty and laid the geopolitical foundation for the next several centuries. It replaced a more decentralized system that was much like the system now emerging in this age of transition. The Westphalian system has given way to one in which the dominance of nation-states is chal lenged by global and regional entities, as well as subnational ones. 1 National governments no longer have a monopoly over the use of force on a large scale and, hence, over decisions concerning war or peace. Their power is seeping away. Fragmentation, or disintegration, appears to be the inevitable other side of the coin from the integration inherent in the process of glo balization. The reasons for this are not altogether clear. Perhaps the disintegration has occurred because power has been reallocated within the international system. Perhaps global institutions seem too remote. Certainly, the export of jobs and competition with workers in distant countries breed reactions leading to barriers between nations. Probably a mix of all these factors has contributed to this reaction, and we might reasonably invoke the philosophy of Hegel to suggest that a new system of governance will be a synthesis of globalization and affected the Euro-Atlantic region since the end of the Cold War, perhaps even the end of the Cold War itself, has resulted from the ambitions of actors operating below the level of states. Ethnic cleansing, the rise of political Islam, the dissolution of multinational states, over-reaching by correlation with the successes of globalization during this same period is too strong to ignore. appears to be a losing battle. The technologies and tools they deploy to preserve their share of power also undermine it, as individuals and networks have become empowered by information technology. Barriers 1 Rodrigo Tavares, Foreign Policy Goes Local, Foreign Affairs October 9, 2013. AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Redirecting US Diplomacy James Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode 2013 James Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode

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28 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 to trade only serve to weaken that power further. The process of creat ing new forms of governance continues unabated, but in a more or less haphazard fashion. This development does not mean that nation-states are going away or that their powers are permanently lost. In fact, one of the striking things about the history of nation-states is not merely how enduring they have been, but also how successful most have been in adapting to new geopolitical and economic conditions. A European Example The archetype of cooperation is still the European project, despite its many internal tensions. In Europe, a true security community has been constructed, where its members never entertain the thought of war among themselves. But even in Europe, nation-states survive and in a few cases appear to thrive. The half-century of European integra tion has served them well. To use the language of one of contemporary Europes best known historians, the late Alan Milward, supranational ism has served to rescue the nation-state. 2 This verdict is not universally held but nation-states do coexist with other structures designed both to limit and to extend their power. Nation-states today matter more for what they do than what they represent. We need to focus less on whether or not they may cease to represent large communities and more on how they behave toward one another, and toward their own citizens. So long as nation-states exist, so will nationalism. The transition of a system based on one form of national behavior into another is bound How best can national governments mitigate it? For Americans in par ticular, the rule of law, backed by global institutions like the United Nations, was the stock answer. For many nations, it still is the correct answer. And yet global a region-based approach is essential. Indeed, regionalism has emerged as the preferred way in which the middle powers of the world have elected to pool their sovereignty. This approach sustains the viability of the nation-state and reduces the appeal of nationalism. It grants those activities with the most disruptive potential, like economic competition, a stake in a positive process of change. believe that this transition has gone into reverse. The Wikileaks and National Security Agency revelations suggest that national governments are busy retaking control of the global environment with the tools pre viously used to diffuse power away from them. There are rumblings throughout the world of a new round of protectionism, trade barriers and the like. The Economist recently proclaimed the emergence of a gated globalization. 3 2 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge,1992). 3 Greg Ip, The Gated Globe, The Economist, October 12, 2013.

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: : 29 Technology is continuing to change our world, particularly the rela tionship between government and its people. Private organizations are the main generators of this change, not governments, and governments are dependent on them, just as monarchs were dependent on the grand seigneurs in pre-Westphalian times. Surprisingly, the emerging order begins to resemble the tiered system of medieval Europe, with an overarching layer of global institu centers, including nation-states, highly dependent on their ability to mobilize private, very powerful economic organizations. It is a structure in which loyalties easily become divided and diffused. The most effective structural change that could be injected by nation-states into the new forms of governance would be a renewed emphasis on regionalism. Europe may not be the model that nations elsewhere will want to follow, but other, simpler, models already have Latin America, among them. Policies that encourage the further evolu tion of these models would be on the right side of history. Good governance will demand that regional communities not act as blocs, shutting out one anothers members or allowing others to fall through the cracks. Regional communities will only work over the long term if they consistently promote both intraand inter-regional cohe sion. Their paths to regionalism must be their own, but for outsiders it American interests and policies loom large in every regional setting. This is true closest to home. It is seldom mentioned how potentially powerful North America has become. In an article that appeared in The Wall Street Journal last summer, former Secretary of State George Shultz remarked on the integration of the economies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico: The three countries constitute around one-fourth of global GDP, and they have become each others largest trading partners. A 2010 NBER study shows that 24.7% of imports from Canada were U.S. value-added, and 39.8% of U.S. imports from Mexico were U.S. value-added. (By contrast, the U.S. value-added in imports from China was only 4.2%.). This phenomenon of tight integration of trade stands apart from other major trading blocks including the European Union or East Asian economies. 4 global trade and the strengthening of liberal institutions. North America, with the U.S. in the lead, is the worlds center of creativity and innovation, Shultz continues, Any measure will do: new companies formed, Nobel Prizes received, R&D spending, attractiveness to high talent from anywhere, patents issued, and numbers of great universities. 5 This all may result someday in the beacon of a worlds most successful regional community, where armed frontiers are transformed into pros 4 George P. Shultz, The North American Global Powerhouse, The Wall Street Journal July 11, 2013. 5 Ibid.

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30 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 go hand in hand. This moment is still a long way off. But contrast it to where North America was just a couple of decades ago before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A logic of regional peace has appeared in other regions meanwhile. Whether by design or by default, diplomacy, tious, step-by-step path of constructing better neighborhoods without the obvious need for bigger fences. Some developments elsewhere include: The Middle East The Obama administration reportedly is trying to be less hamstrung in the unending struggles there but it is unlikely to succeed, if only because it already is engaged in reinvigorating talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians; has worked with Russia to ing recent turmoil in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. 6 Meanwhile it has forged ahead in helping to reverse the threat posed by Irans nuclear ambitions by exploring ways to reassure both Iran and its neighbors that a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race is neither desirable nor inevitable. Central and South Asia The administration has sought to reestablish a more normal relationship with Pakistan as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops withdraw from Afghanistan, although 7 Economic ties between India and Pakistan, which the United States supports, are the best hope for ending the risk of war between these two key nations. Regional cooperation that includes Afghanistan may also become a possibility, particularly now that Afghanistans northern neighbors, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, are desperate for investment and access to markets following the removal of NATO largesse from their backyard. East Asia The administration has worked with China to stop the cycle of crises coming from North Korea and is seeking multilateral solutions to territorial disputes nearby. A regional organization for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia may become part of a political settlement there. The World Trade Organization As the WTO is stymied in further trade liberalization, the administration has launched the two largest trade a transatlantic free trade area. Some have called this a new backdoor method to global trade, but it promises to be much more than that if 8 Most of these policies are in harmony with the systemic transition underway which is dispersing power to global, regional, and local groups, 6 Edmund Sanders, Anti-Americanism Flares in Egypt as Protests Rage Over Morsi's Ouster, Los Angeles Times July 6, 2013. 7 Shuja Nawaz, A New Honeymoon for the United States and Pakistan? New Atlanticist November 1, 2013. 8 Ana Palacio, The Regional Route to Global Free Trade, Project Syndicate August 1, 2013.

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: : 31 and empowering them with access to information that was never shared with them in the past. more the task of regional interaction rather than of globalization per se. It has taken too long for it to sink in that while globalization by differently and, in some, strengthens rather than diminishes the draw of nationalism. For the United States, still the worlds most powerful nation-state, this reality calls out for recognition and action. In the spring of 2000, we wrote an article called Back to Basics: US strategic interests, beginning with the proposition that the nations main foreign policy goals were the success of globalization and of democracy, but that its means for achieving these goals were unfocused. 9 We spoke of methods for managing regional interests as an important way to bring better focus to them. US policy still is unfocused. President Obama has not embedded his regional initiatives in an explicit long-term strategy that is in tune with historical change. Currently, they are seen simply as a set of disjointed actions that respond haphazardly to local problems, offering headlines for trend lines, as President Clinton liked to say. Obamas response lacks any connective tissue and so it looks pretty meager, especially in regional forums. The president has attended few European Union summits and has never gone to an African Union summit. The only region where some sort of long-term strategy can be discerned in the administrations rhetoric is in the repositioning to Asia, but this has mainly been part of an ill-disguised effort to balance Chinas can bring to a world in transition. near-term regional opportunities. In the two trade negotiations, for example, large global powers like the United States may need to adjust more than they otherwise would to the necessities of smaller, regional states with incomparably more at stake. Or, in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, it could involve devising a common security language and a code of regional conduct while encouraging people in these places military presence around the world continues to ebb. tion but one that has gone relatively unrecognized. The genius of the Marshall Plan, for example, was not so much its generosity toward starv ing Europeans in 1947 or its self-interest in building prosperous new markets for American goods and investment. It was both these things. But most of all, it was a grand political gesture which said to Europeans, if you agree to work together from now on, we are prepared to help you, 9 James E. Goodby and Kenneth Weisbrode, Back to Basics: US Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade, Parameters 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 51-56.

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32 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 but we shall not dictate the precise terms of your cooperation beyond insisting that you do, somehow, cooperate in our Cooperate is in fact what the Western Europeans subsequently did. They took some advice from the Marshall Planners but not all of it. They and starts and reversals, on their own terms but also in consultation and collaboration (and occasional contestation) with outside backers, namely the United States. Regional autonomy is not the same thing as autarky, just as regionalism, internationalism, and globalism need not necessarily be mutually exclusive orientations or recipes for economic and political change. Proposals to replicate the Marshall Plan model elsewhere have long been abundant; however, few have emphasized its basic principle of regional self-help. This principle has the potential to construct more peaceful and prosperous neighborhoods; however, its main effect is representational: that is, to show that even long-established rivals sitting side by side can transform their enmities into patterns of cooperation whose value is much greater than the sum of their parts. This realization in the process, but does require a demonstrable sharing of power among nations and regions. The process has no hidden hand or honest broker, however much the United States has cast itself in that role in the past. It takes continu support. number of his fellow Americans that the United States is a part of the world and has an obligation to listen more often. His next achievement, if the various negotiations succeed, would be to help set in motion workable processes of regional peace so that the United States itself can be at peace and prosper, both at home and abroad. It would mark an important step forward in the remaking of a weary superpower into a credible great power. Power itself has changed. So have the means for wielding it. Today we repeat this almost as a mantra. But the changes have been more gradual and cumulative than most analysts suggest. They do not nec essarily represent a clear-cut shift on the commanding heights, or as others would have it, a new permutation of the balance of power among merchants, soldiers, and sages. Something different appears to be taking place. The currency of power has shifted, namely in the ways in which nations collaborate or compete with neighboring nations, and groups within these nations, to maximize their advantages vis--vis more distant neighbors. The major challenge facing our leaders is to fashion a stable but liberal system for accommodating the many interests and passions of this new era while using the leverage they still have, which is consider able. It would be easy to give in to the lowest common denominator and just muddle through. In that direction lays chaos. Of course, global institutions are essential in terms of pointing the way to a universal system of norms and obligations to support peace

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: : 33 with justice. But for the rest of this century, an active regional diplomacy, not disengagement, will be the best way to manage the fundamental transformation in the global system now underway. James E. Goodby James E. Goodby is a former United States Ambassador. Currently, he is Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at Carnegie Mellon University, a Visiting Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, and nonresident Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution. Kenneth Weisbrode Kenneth Weisbrode is a writer and historian currently working at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey.

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ABSTRA CT : For all the attention paid to partnering, too little goes into what partnering might mean from ostensible partners points of view. In the 21st century, sensitivities and sensibilities matter. So do economic realities. The US military should make better strategic use of military advisors to help foreign security services professional izesomething the United States can only do if foreign militaries are willing to engage in civic action themselves. I n the wake of resurgent terrorism, withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget cuts, defense intellectuals and members of the military alike increasingly discuss the need to shape, partner, and advise foreign forces. 1 Or, as LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Faris write, Americas land forces should look to develop a global landpower network. This network would consist of allies, expedi tionary global and regional partners, and host-nation forces. 2 The goal? To secure US national interests indirectly, inexpensively, and without putting large numbers of boots on the ground. White House, too, underscores security sector assistance. Its aim is to: Help partner nations build the sustainable capacity to address common security challenges. Promote partner support for US interests. Promote universal values. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrange ments and organizations. 3 First, its prescriptions are all about us and US-centric needs, understanding of what partnering might mean to Americas osten sible partnersin fact, it reveals just the opposite. Third, it suggests the United States will continue to pursue the same old strategies that have already served it so poorly. Finally, it diverts the United States from what should be its main goal abroad: other countries development of their own incorruptible, apolitical security servicesa goal that is an either-or (it can or cannot be done) proposition, and not something, as many suppose, that takes decades to achieve. 1 See Jennifer Morrison Taw, Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), for an excellent overview of the promises and pitfalls of stability operations, and debates from various US perspectives. 2 LTG Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Faris, Toward Strategic Landpower, Army, July 2013, 23. Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Rebalancing US Military Power Anna Simons 2013 Anna Simons Dr. Anna Simons is a Professor of Defense Analysis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, and co-author of The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security

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36 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 Because some interagency stakeholders object to the word pro fessionalizein their view it is demeaning and insulting to suggest other forces are not already professionalin this article, the term professional refers to incorruptible, apolitical security services. The argument is that when security services are incorruptible, states hold together. India is an example. Few countries contain more sectarian divides, or have had to wrestle with a greater variety of insurgency. Yet, Indias armed forces have remained apolitical and professional. This is not just a legacy of British imperialism, since other South Asian countries were woven from the same cloth. Rather, India remains a vibrant pluralist democracy thanks to, among other things, the armed forces commit ment to behaving apolitically and according to meritocratic principles. 5 In contrast, regimes in many countries are not just corrupt, but rulers send members of the security services to do their coercing and compelling for them. Unfortunately, all it takes is the collusion of some high-ranking members of the army, police, gendarmerie, or other secu rity services for leaders to engage in venal behavior. Or, to put none too bidding and act as their willing muscle, they subvert the state. On the other hand, when members of the security services refuse to engage in intimidation or coercion on behalf of politicians, and refuse to behave to compel people against their will. Security services that protect rather than undermine the states integ rity are not just vital to a countrys stability, but apolitical, incorruptible armed forces are also essential to protecting those other two institutions that help guarantee responsible, responsive governance: the judiciary and ing the integrity of the armed forces and you will only end up pouring good money after badsomething the United States has been doing abroad for decades. 6 Meanwhile, professionalization is a straightforward proposition. It does not require a whole-of-government approachat least not by Americans. It is neither complicated nor costly, although it also is not always and at the combatant commands have to be willing to take advisors assessments seriously and convey them truthfully to policymakers. Americans make a mistake whenever we underestimate the political acuity of non-Western allies and adversaries. 7 Today, most non-Western ers in positions of authority are more familiar with us than we are with them, a late 20th century inversion that holds profound implications for Lily McGovern, and Tim Baker, comps., Military Professionalism: An Annotated Bibliography on the Nature and Ethos of the Military Profession (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security, Ethics, and Leadership (INSEL), National Defense University Library, December 2010). http://www.usafa. 5 Of course, the fact that Pakistan and China both loom as real threats has also contributed. 6 For more on the effects of aid, see Anna Simons, Joe McGraw, and Duane Lauchengco, Chapter 7 in The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011). 7 For the full argument, see Anna Simons, 21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them (FPRI e-book, 2012). https://www.fpri.org/docs/Simons_21st_Century_Cultures_of_War.pdf

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Simons 37 advising and partnering in the 21st century. 8 Indeed, those who think a 10or 20,000 person advisory corps, or partnering as we conceive it, are suitable counters to terrorism or insurgency display little more their own unsophistication about the non-West. Forget, too, T. E. Lawrence as a role modelhis methods remain shrouded in controversy. What stability and security require instead is working by, with, and through professionalized security services. Advising Consider the history of successful military advisingwith success and it should quickly become apparent that mass-producing advisory skills is a contradiction in terms. 9 Interpersonal chemistry matters. So do manipulation. There is no evidence that any of these are trainable skills, or that such traits are as common as most proponents of advising mis sions seem to think. Instead, their combination is rather rare. The history of successful military advising shows a distinct arc, one that coincides better with the shift in who understands what about whom. This arc is perhaps best described using the default lens of familial relations. Parent-child, sibling, and spousal relations can be considered default relations not only because they are the relations most familiar to most people, but because they also comprise the basic bio-grammar for how we humans interact. 10 In parent-child relations, parents dominate and typically command respect. As children age, authority may chafe and youth might eventu ally rebel, but fealty should endure. When it comes to siblings, older brothers and sisters are in a posi siblings mature, they often attempt to escape their elders thumb or shadow, and what had been respect can turn to resentment. Over time, younger siblings usually expect to be treated as equals, though they never will be equals from their elders perspective. Meanwhile, in healthy marriages, spouses are co-equals despite, if not because of, their differences. Couples share a division of labor (even if unevenly), and though one spouse will doubtless be better at certain things, and will likely dominate in certain areas, in stable marriages neither individual will be judged as superior in all things. 8 This is a literal truism if one just considers the number of heads of state who speak English and at least one other language vs. their American counterparts. 9 Not even everyone in the US Army Special Forces (SF) is suited to be a military advisor, though SF selection comes closer than any other to screening individuals with advisor-like skills. I write this based on extensive discussions over the past 15 years in my Military Advisor class, as well corps might well be capable of training foreign forces. But training is to a standard, and is far easier for young marines, soldiers, and others to accomplish than is advising, which requires contextdependent judgment. 10 I am borrowing and stretching Lionel Tiger and Robin Foxs notion of bio-grammar from The Imperial Animal (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971) Or, as Edward Schein notes, As Freud pointed out long ago, one of the models we bring to any new group situation is our own model of family, the group in which we spent most of our early life, Organizational Culture and Leadership 3rd ed.

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38 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 Advisory relationships often bear a resemblance to one, two, or arc across all three, of those categories, and can morph or evolve (and even devolve) over time. For instance, American advisors in the jungles of World War II actually led more often than they advised, but by Vietnam they commanded less and worked with the indig more. In contrast, tend to expect reciprocity at a minimum. Two obvious points are worth drawing here. First, both parties in a relationship will not necessarily view it similarly. And expectations will differ cross-culturally. For instance, while marriages in the West tend to out how similar advisory relations are to arranged marriages; most advi sors and advisees have no choice about who they are partnered with and have to learn how to accommodate one another if they want the partnership to work. 11 treat those who remind them of parents, siblings, or spouses, there is a strong likelihood that counterparts without deep cross-cultural famil iarity will misread one another, to include misreading one anothers misreadings. 12 Alternatively, too much time spent together can pose dif ferent problems. For instance, sometimes when people know each other too well they bridle at not receiving the respect they feel they deserve. Two examples would be former allies in Eritrea and Ethiopia or Uganda and Rwanda. Over the course of long liberation struggles, leaders and insurgents in both sets of countries developed sibling-like dependencies, with Eritreas Isaias Afewerki relying on but also helping to build Meles Zenawis insurgent forces and Ugandas Youweri Museveni relying on and helping to incubate Fred Rwigyemas and Paul Kagames Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Years later, both ended up in bitter wars with one another. While it seems only human that dependence should degenerate into outright hostility on occasion, the real source of the problem with asym metry is superiority. 13 It may be impossible for individuals in an advisory role not to regard themselves as superior to those they are advising. Not only does the very fact of having something to impart mean one oper ates from a position of strength (if not authority), but the more one has to offer and the more deference one receives, the more special treatment one expects. Another facet of inherent inequality is that treating titular coun terparts as equals is easy when they are liked and admired. It feels more hypocritical and corrosive when they are not. But under either 11 In the wake of Saudi Arabias October 2013 rejection of a UN Security Council seat, consider: Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal is fond of saying that the US and Saudi Arabia no longer have a Catholic marriage, but rather a Muslim one. This is a clever way of saying that Saudi Arabia and the US are not faithful to each other. In the absence of any major-power alternative to the US, for the Saudis in this Muslim marriage, the US may well remain Wife No. 1. Even if she is not about to be divorced, however, the Saudis are clearly declaring a trial separation. See Karen Elliott House, Behind the Saudi-U.S. Breakup, The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2013. 12 Some Americans might insist that talking in terms of family metaphors is ridiculous; the more useful foil is friendship. They would probably suggest this because, in their view, they always try to treat others as friends. Yet, in doing so they may also fool themselves since their advisees are unlikely to share their understanding of friendship, especially since friendship means something quite different, (and counts for less than family) in many non-Western settings. 13 One actually sees this among social animals across the board, not just among humans.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Simons 39 circumstance it can be grossly irresponsible to treat people who are not as good as they think they are as though they are as good as they believe, since this can set themand othersup for failure later. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann fell into this trap in Vietnam. He purposely strengthened the reputation of his counterpart, Colonel Huynh Van Cao. By publicly crediting Cao for operations he (Vann) planned, Vann made it impossible to later point out, even to his own chain of command, that Cao was not as effective as advertised. After sounding optimistic about the war for months, Vann never could get course, cynics might contend that Vanns approach is simply emblematic of what happens whenever wars are subjectively recounted. Looking ahead, it will not just be rhetorical excess that plagues reporting (and analysis). Among the challenges confronting members of the US military is to assess how best to work with forces whose sen sibilities about their capabilities may well outstrip their actual abilities, but who are also hyper-sensitive to any slights. This brings us to the examining what the word partner might mean from current or likely future partners points of view. Washington has not made clear what partnership should mean to foreign governments, or to US servicemem bers or taxpayers. 15 Partnering Here, then, is one formulation: to succeed, a partnership should be grounded in mutual indispensability. Anything less creates a depen Partnerships can come in a variety of forms: In Partnership Type #1 : you are my equal. We are interchangeable, and our forces can be fully blended. In Partnership Type #2 : I trust you implicitly. We can agree on a division of labor. I will be responsible for Sectors A, B, and C; you will be responsible for Sectors D, E, and F. In Partnership Type #3 : we are complementary and operate in tandem. You have skills and capabilities I lack, and vice versa. I will defer to you for intelligence and local knowledge; you can rely on me for logistics and medevac. Historically-speaking, the United States has been involved in all during World War II. Yet, if one asks how many such arrangements the United States is involved in today, the honest answer would have to be that most of its associations are with expedient dependents. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1988). 15 Yet, as COL Alan Shumate notes, building partner capacity is a critical component of 2012 Department of Defense publication, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense. Alan Shumate, Building Partner Capacity in the 21st Century: How the U.S. Can Succeed, Small Wars Journal August 7, 2013.

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40 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 Nor will Washingtons prescription that the US military promote partner support for US interests successfully redress this situation. Just the opposite. Not only does prioritizing American interests put the cart before the horse, it ignores what is needed to keep others interests and US interests aligned for as long as possible, which has always been the hallmark of successful advising (not to mention partnering). Tackling 16 The reason is simple: as a military becomes more capable of address ing its security concerns, it builds its capabilities to address Washingtons fessional bad actors should no longer operate in (or from) that country. 17 Of course, professionalization also means members of security services must be paid a decent wage, receive better than decent conditions of are not something senior leaders are already striving to secure for their forces, then that is an indicator in and of itself that the security services culture is awry, and professionalism does not exist. The inescapable reality, again, is that securing security requires nationally capable apolitical, incorruptiblearmed forces. Stability is undermined by anything less. So is honest partnership. Civic ActionThe Ultimate Indirect Approach One problem with the United States current approach is that Washingtons motivations for working with others are proximate: coun terterrorism, counterproliferation, counterdrugs, counter-you-name-it. US forces concentrate on improving local security forces abilities to shoot, move, and communicate, while also admonishing them to not violate human rights. Washington might hope that these efforts will have additive effects over time, but the truth is nothing the United States does will guarantee stability in someone elses country. That task belongs to them, while the challenge for the United States should be to determine whether its putative counterparts have what it takes before Washington starts investing, rather than after the United States is embroiled. As for how policymakers might make this determination, consider civic action. It is the ideal canary in the coal mine. Countries that can keep civic action alive are countries with which the US military can work. Countries that cannot, or will not do so, are either beyond US help or not ready for it. 16 Here is one of the kinds of things that can happen when local needs are not met: apparently the US did not realize or did not take seriously the fact that the Malian governments chief concern was separatists, not AQIM. The separatists ability to operate then created the space for AQIM to move inand Malis current plight and spillover effects throughout the region are one consequence: Over time we began to realize that the ATT government was focused not on AQIM as a threat but threat and a security threat but not the kind of counter-terrorism threat that we were focused on. I think that kind of mismatch is part of what was starting to unravel the partnership on [counterter rorism] when the coup happened, Yochi Dreazen, The New Terrorist Training Ground, The Atlantic October 2013, 66. 17 What I am suggesting is the obverse of the campaign to get Joseph Kony. The Lords Resistance Army is not a pressing security concern for any of the African governments involved. Rather, it is of keen interest to certain lobbying groups in the US. That makes it the wrong mission to use for helping depoliticize and uncorrupt regional forces since it is a mission that is more important to President Obama than to local heads of state or their militaries.

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Simons 41 This assertion is based on a two-part comparison. First, there is civic action as conceived by Edward Lansdale, advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, Minister of Defense and then President of the Philippines in the 1950s. Second, is the comparison one can make between Lansdales approach with what is done today. Lansdale credits himself with introducing the concept of civic action to Americans during the Huk Rebellion, one of the few 20th century insurgencies the United States succeeded in helping to counter. 18 of those things a national military can (and should) do to protect rather than prey on its citizens. In Lansdales and Magsaysays view, members of the Philippines armed forces needed to prove themselves to be of, for, and by the peoplewhich meant uniformed personnel had to stop extorting people or accepting bribes. They also had to stop allowing politicians to corrupt them. At the same time, to prove their trustworthiness, there were certain things those in uniform could assist with, such as policing the national elections in 1951. By doing so, soldiers did not just demon strate their commitment to protect the integrity of the political system, but safeguarded a free and fair vote. Indeed, many say the Philippines has not had as free or fair an election since Magsaysay was tragically killed in a plane accident in 1957. Two other things noteworthy about Lansdales advisory approach were that he had very few Americans working with him, and he dis bursed very little money. He never bought support. When he did dispense money, it was for doing clever things against the opposition. A third critical factor was, of course, Magsaysay. 19 Magsaysay was a man of the people. He was also a compelling leader. One example: he loved making surprise visits not only to catch slackards off-guard, but to force the entire military to stay on its toes and self-police, all of which helped (re)instill pride. In short, both mens version of civic action consisted of the Philippine military proving to citizens its worth as their national (emphasis on the word national) military. What civic action consisted of and who con ducted it was totally Filipino-centric. Now, compare this to what the United States touts and promotes today. Because Washington likes combining soft approaches and surgi cal strikes, it engages in development assistance. Yet, no matter how good it makes Americans in uniform feel to build a well here, a clinic there, or a school somewhere else, that kind of unilateral civic action by the United States adds up to nothing coherent in terms of strengthening the social contract or the delivery of goods and services by another gov ernment to its people. To be sure, school-building, clinic-construction, 18 William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), suggests that William Howard Taft de serves credit for civic action: unconsciously or at least without attribution, Lansdale took Magsaysay back to the civic action policy of William Howard Taft (51). For Lansdales activities, see his own account: Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An Americans Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991). 19 Magsaysay was also noticed because there were Americans who were paying attention. Paying attention and helping create conditions in which talent has a chance to draw attention early are exactly what IMET money and JCET should be doing.

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42 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 and well-digging can be important local force protection measures. Whenever a base is put somewhere, those inhabiting it should want people in the neighborhood to think well of them, especially since local easiest way to get local residents to think well of them is for those outsid ers to do things for the locals. 20 Americans in uniform, however, should not fool themselves. Any such actions they undertake do nothing to improve the capabilities or image of local forces. Alternatively, where the United States does not maintain a per manent presence, its forces typically support sustainable development instead, a type of assistance that has been fashionable in aid circles for quite some time. Yet, projects that do not require periodic American assistance make little sense for a different reason: after all, if the US governments overarching aim is to guarantee access and placement to counter everything from drugs to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, then surely projects that require periodic maintenance, spare parts, technical readjustments, and so on would be more prudent tary were to treat development projects the way it orchestrates foreign offered by anyone else. Or that, at any rate, is what looking at US stra tegic interests through a US-centric lens suggests. Flip this lens around, however, and one has to wonder what non-Western government in the 21st century would want, let alone allow, the United States to retain this kind of dependence-inducing leverage over it? line some locals pockets, while anything the United States does that is more substantial gets the local government and security forces off the hook of having to provide for and look out for their citizens themselves. Such activities also give the lie to US rhetoric about respecting other countries sovereignty, since if only Washington took that more seriously, their sovereign duty (and not Americas job) to develop their countries themselves, using the means at their disposal and not American taxpayer largesse. In fact, Americans contributing anything that can be pocketed, stolen, or skimmed does nothing but undermine sovereignty, and acts as a solvent that both undoes and corrupts local security services. Any assistance apart from military-to-military training, professional military education, or military exchanges, runs counter to what is needed to secure Americas security, which is that other countries secure theirs. As for why militaries and not civilian agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should be the lead agent for Lansdalian-style civic action, there are at least three reasons. 1. a government and its citizens typically occurs where insecurity has 20 According to population-centric warfare, improving peoples lives helps to keep them from succumbing to others outreach and propaganda. But at least some of what US forces engage in may amount to moral blackmailbut it does (as this author observed in Afghanistan in 2011).

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AMERICAN POWER IN TRANSITION Simons 43 already been rampant or where there is a history of mistrusting those in uniform. 2. Militaries are designed to operate in austere environments and usually possess greater logistical reach than anyone else; even inept militaries have more equipment and can marshal more manpower than other institutions of state. 3. Militaries are the most nationalist institutions there are, and usually draw from all sectors and segments of society; if they do not they should. This makes them bellwethers, which means they also offer the fastest way for a government to prove to its citizens (and concerned others) that it has turned over a new leaf. As for why the United States should want to use military-to-military training to support professionalization: this plays to US strengths. Again, too, as Lansdales and Magsaysays success makes clear, civic action and professionalization cost very little. Civic action is achieved through local sweat equity, thus it aligns well with 21st century economic realities. Even better, once Washington makes a countrys ability to demonstrate a real civic action orientation the new requirement for receiving security sector assistance, that assistance would no longer have to be substantive, since here would be a government and a military that would already be working toward being self-sustaining, which is the hallmark of professionalism. A countrys ability to do its own civic action would also signal it has a military and government the United States can meaningfully partner with and a political economy Americans and others can safely invest in. Getting from Advisor to Partner By adopting the approach that others need to do their own heavy lifting (while the United States technically assists), Washington would not only free the US military from performing all sorts of aid-like func tions but also liberate itself from seeming to preach one thing (equality) while doing something else (infantilizing others). As it is, when the United States helps construct anythingexcept a civic action capability in another countrys militaryit creates nothing but new dependencies, which have a sharper edge of resentment than those the Cold War once had. At the same time, impelling other governments to develop their own civic action capabilities would not just arrest the corruption the United States inevitably funds whenever the Department of Defense undertakes or supports development projects abroad, but there is no better nonkinetic way to compel those in power to remain responsive to their citizens, thus mitigating the grievances that feed rebellion and insurgency. In this sense, civic action represents a critical capability and litmus test rolled into one. Does the country Washington is considering as a partner already possess a civic action capability? If so, good. If not, is it willing to develop one? Again, governments that do not want their mili taries to develop a civic action capability are governments the United States cannot effectively helpnor should it want to. One of the few silver linings to the past decades worth of involve ment in Afghanistan and Iraq is that most US policymakers appear to

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44 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14 agree that partnering with a government that shows no interest in its population makes no sense. However, whose responsibility will it be to make this conclusion stick? The obvious answer should be: general is so well positioned to perform (or exert) this responsibility. If advisors determine that a counterpart military is not interested, or its govern ment is not interested, in civic action, signaling that professionalization let policymakers know that, under current conditions, Country X cannot be stabilized or assisted by the United States. On the one hand, the other, subordinates and citizens alike depend on them to not play hard if the president (who cannot help but be political) insists, since Using civic action as a litmus test, and advisors as assessors, is the most parsimoniousand arguably the only foolproofway to keep the system honest regarding partners. To forge true partnerships and worthwhile strategic networks requires that partner militaries not only be de-politicized and inoculated against corruption, but that those in uniform reorient themselves toward earning their citizens trust. Otherwise, it is hard to see how Washington will ever build reliable partnerships to obviate anti-state and nonstate actors that pose trans national threats. 21 21 For how Washington should interact with states that are not interested in getting rid of transnational threats to the United States, see Anna Simons, Joe McGraw, and Duane Lauchengco, The Sovereignty Solution

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ABSTRA CT T RUSI Journal FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated? 2013 Sibylle Scheipers

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46 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 3 From Lieber to Additional Protocol I Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the Twenty-First Century Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era The Transformation of War The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture and the Law of War The Washington Times

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Scheipers 47 Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War en masse en masse en masse en masse Liebers Code and the Law of War The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy towards Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 Liebers Code Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

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48 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 loyal citizen disloyal citizen disloyal citizen citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy on the disloyal citizens expel, Weltanschauung francs-tireurs francs-tireurs francs-tireurs francs-tireurs francs-tireurs francs-tireurs Hard Hand Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Scheipers 49 francs-tireurs leve en masse The Laws of War on Land en masse en masse Institute of International Law at Oxford Documents on the Laws of War,

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50 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 ex negativo not not of francs-tireurs Civilians in War German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Scheipers 51 Journal of Strategic Studies The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law and History Documents, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law ar and Law since 1945

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52 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Documents, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Documents Documents The Hague

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Scheipers 53 33 Documents Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror Prisoners in War,

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54 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees Targeted Killing in International Law The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib Udenrigsministeriet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Prisoners in War,

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Scheipers 55 Prisoners in War Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA

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56 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Conclusion

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ABSTRA CT : The role of landpower at war is as integral to US de fense needs as landpower short of war. But what about the role of landpower between these two in environments in which violent nonstate actors dominate? In such cases, it is best to devolve oppos ing violent nonstate actors as quickly as possible so policing forces can implement follow-on strategies. Landpower can help provide security conditions under which these strategies can be facilitated. And just like their allies in Al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more of a community of interest than a corporate structure. GEN Stanley A. McChrystal 1 L andpower represents the application of force generated by conventional militariesbe they classical Roman legionnaires, medieval European knights, or modern US soldiers. Such power is generated by land forces, essentially the [p]ersonnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and support elements operating on land to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. 2 Boots-on-the-ground integrated into Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) represents our state-of-the art operational [L]and power. . The abilityby threat, force, or occupationto gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. [It is] the primary means to impose the Nations will on an enemy, by force when necessary; establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the condi tions for political and economic development; . . 3 The integral nature of landpower at war to US defense needs essentially in interstate waris well recognized, as is the role of the United Sates Army as the nations principal land force. 4 The contri humanitarian purposesis also well accepted. More problematic is the relationship of landpower to environments in which violent nonstate actors dominate. Far less obvious is the role of landpower in irregular warfare, intrastate war waged by belligerents who are not statesalong with its attendant organized criminal, illicit economic, and governmental corruption components. 5 The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest 1 Stanley A. McChrystal, It Takes a Network: The New Front Line of Modern Warfare, Foreign Policy (March-April 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/ it_takes_a_network. 2 Via JP 3-31. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02. November 8, 2010 (As Amended Through 16 July 2013): 163, http:// www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 3 U.S. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 19, 2012), 38, 39. 4 Ibid. 5 Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, Strategic Landpower 3. FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors Robert J. Bunker Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. He is also Adjunct Faculty, Department of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate Univ. He has published, coauthored, and edited publications in numer ous venues. He is currently focused on dark globalization and new forms of insurgency.

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58 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 that, while operational successes in such campaigns may be won at a high cost in US treasure, they are not economically sustainable. Further, the strategic goals of those campaignsthe desired results which would While the Baathist and Taliban governments have been removed from powerand more importantly al Qaeda forces decimatedboth states are fragile, suffer from tribal and sectarian violence, and are beset with dysfunctional governments. At best, the campaigns waged in Iraq and Afghanistan can be considered only partial victories, at worst, partial failures. 6 With these perceptions in mind, this article will look at the rela tionship of landpower to violent nonstate actors. In order to do this, attributes. Second, an overview of state policing and military forces will be provided. Third, landpower-related application strategies will be dis cussed. This article will end with some lessons concerning the need for networks when confronting violent nonstate actors and will provide a few cautionary remarks about democratic capacity building in the age of austerity now upon us. Violent Nonstate Actors The threats represented by violent nonstate actors are as old as the earliest states. Bandits, raiders, and pirates have plagued civilized peoples around the globe for millennia. A contemporary view of these actors is that they exist along a threat continuum from that of common criminals to criminal-soldiers (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Violent Nonstate Actor Continuum Criminals are at the left side of the continuum and are characterized as having limited violence and corruption capabilities. Gangs, organized crime, and less sophisticated cartels are representative of these more benign and somewhat less violent actors, as are robbers, brigands, and pirates. Criminals do not openly challenge police forces and have a parasitic relationship with a state; they seek to be left alone to engage in Criminal-soldiers, nonstate soldiers, or illegal combatants, are at the right side of the continuum and are characterized as having high violence 6 For the debate on war ending models vis--vis al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq, see James M. Dubik, Ringing True or Ringing Hollow? Army August 2013, 18-20.

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Bunker 59 and corruption capability. Organized into private armiesas opposed increasingly landpower-like in their attributes. Sicarios (cartel assassins landpower forces to varying degrees. As an example, a Los Zetas com mando unit operating in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, composed of a couple dozen armored sports-utility vehicles with mounted infantry in 7 The major threat criminal-soldiers present is that their relationship to the state is not a parasitic one like that of common criminals. Rather, they can be viewed as challengers and successors to the state. Via one process, the synergistic employment of violence and corruption, plato o plomo (silver or lead in Spanish), results in areas of impunity. These, in turn, lead to de facto shifts in governance by criminal organizations. Via another better known process, insurgents actively create a parallel shadow government to challenge and ultimately replace state institu tions while carrying out targeted violence and assassination campaigns. a private army, it has warmaking capability which, in turn, means it has state capturing or making potentials. 8 It should be noted that terrorists represent a blended case along the continuum as some of them exhibit high violence potentialas in the case of the early al Qaeda spectacularsbut possess low cor ruptive capability. Further, most such groups are considered no better than criminals. Still, the blurred nature of transnational organizations such as al Qaeda brings us to three other facts about these increas been merging and blending for quite some time. Components of the al Qaeda network, and even those belonging to some of the more domi nant Mexican cartels, exhibit gang, terrorist, insurgent, and organized criminal behaviors and patterns simultaneously. 9 Second, violent non state actors are evolving towards more networked organizational forms but can manifest hierarchical, blended, and networked features. When under pressure from competing actors and states, they tend to devolve into networks as a defensive responsewhen dominant in a host envi ronment more centralization becomes evident. Third, their numbers appear to be increasing as an outcome of external stressors placed on states due to the unexpected components of globalization, rapidly evolv ing technologies, and biosphere degradation (e.g., climatic changes). 10 7 See JP 1-02 (footnote 2). 8 Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191. 9 Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2013); Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups ( Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013). 10 The tipping point may have been reached now that at least one security scholar is suggesting an alternative to the state-centric paradigmone in which some armed nonstate groups are now viewed as a positive force for global stability. See Robert Mandel, Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

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60 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 State Policing and Military Forces Police and military forces represent the coercive public agencies role with police utilized for intrastate crime prevention and the military utilized for interstate warfare to protect the state from opposing state militaries. A contemporary perspective on these forces can be seen in Figure 2, State Forces Continuum. Figure 2. State Forces Continuum. Police forces exist on the left side of this continuum and focus on crime prevention and the arrest of lawbreakers. Police utilize criminal intelligence procedures and typically work singularly or in pairs to com plete their functions. While these forces are tactically adept, they have never developed or needed operational level capabilities. Community, patrol, line policing, and detective and investigative police units operate at the municipal, regional, and federal levels and are representative of these anticrime-focused activities. While police possess a low antivio and organized opposition forcesdue to their investigative expertise, they possess a high anticorruption capability, especially within federal policing agencies. 11 Military forces operate on the right side of the State Forces Continuum and are tasked with the mission of defeating opposing state-based military forces. The focus of these forces is that of orga nized destruction and killing under the condition of war between states. Since military forces oppose sentient opponents, they rely on military intelligence to understand enemy intent, capabilities, and futures. Core Army landpower forces are composed of airborne, mountain, and light and heavy mechanized units at the brigade level. While the military to engage in investigative policingit possesses a high antiviolence 11 Of course, when the policing agencies of a violent nonstate actor host country are corrupted, serious conditions result. While in some countries the military is less corrupt than the police, the military does not have the ability to root out corruption so impunity still results.

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Bunker 61 capability far greater than the landpower-like capabilities of the more threatening violent nonstate actors. The middle region of the continuum (Figure 2) represents the blurred specialized police and military forces. Domestic law enforcement has to contend with heavily armed criminals who use barricade techniques, employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 12 Internationally, formed police units are employed. On the armed forces side, military police and explosive ordnance disposal units engage in law enforcement and antiterrorist (and anti-insurgent) activities. Further, infantry units armed with less lethal weapons have been utilized for crowd control and anti riot missions. In turn, Special Forcesrepresenting an unconventional landpower forcehave been heavily tasked since 9/11 to directly engage problems for state forces tasked to contend with these actors is that stovepipes exist concerning our responsesuch as countergang groups work separately from counternarcotics groups who, in turn, work sepa rately from counterterrorism groups. 13 This issue can become even more pronounced at the interstate level between cooperating state forces, especially between the American military and foreign police agencies. In addition to the rise of state-based forces found in the middle of the state forces continuum, we are seeing the proliferation of private security and private military corporations contracting with states much ago. While many of these actors are our alliesat least while the money lastssome of them are amoral parties which can be purchased by the highest bidder while others contract exclusively for threat forces composed of the larger violent nonstate actors. 14 Landpower and Violent Nonstate Actors Landpower may be applied appropriately and inappropriately against violent nonstate actors and in their host environments at the strategic 12 This militarization of the police/bringing military concepts into policing has been both con demned and advocated. See, for example, Radley Bilko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of Americas Police Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2013) and Charles Sid Heal, Field Command (Brooklyn: Lantern Books, 2012) respectively. Further, debates on how to best employ foreign Perito, The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010) and John P. Sullivan, The Missing Mission: Expeditionary Police for Peacekeeping and Transnational Stability, Small Wars Journal May 9, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ the-missing-mission-expeditionary-police-for-peacekeeping-and-transnational-stability 13 Robert J. Bunker, The Mexican Cartel Debate: As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of Security Studies, Small Wars JournalEl Centro February 11, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ jrnl/art/the-mexican-cartel-debate As violent nonstate actor forms increasingly blur and merge, we are starting to see better state forces integration. 14 Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr., Outlaw Private Security Firms: Criminal and Terrorist Agendas Undermine Private Security Agendas. Global Crime 7, no. 3-4 (August-November 2006): 561-582.

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62 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 level. 15 Inappropriate strategic application may result in foreign policy failure and even potentially contribute to diminished US national power on our defense budgets. In violent nonstate actors focused strategies, landpower forces may have a sizeable and direct role; however, the pref erence is to devolve the opposing actors as safely and quickly as possible for policing forces to increasingly take the lead in implementing the more encompassing strategies. These strategies are as follows: 16 Limited Punitive Strategy: Of all of the strategies directed against violent nonstate actors, this is the most limited one. It principally seeks to deter certain actions that these groups are taking or may be planning to take by means of symbolic forms of punishment directed against them. For land forces, this can range from stand-off targeting of assets and personnel for destruction (via supporting drone strikes) through the seizure or destruction of those assets and personnel via raids. An example of this strategy would be engaging in a hypothetical raid against a coastal pirate town on the Somali coast. Disruption and Neutralization Strategy: This can be considered a render safe strategythe intent is to ensure that the violent nonstate actors such as terrorism, outside the host country or to regions of the host country not under their control. Any combination of physical assets; sion; and leader and factional/cell cohesion can be targeted by means of this strategy. While a foreign terrorist organization attrited in this manner has not been eliminated, its capacity to attack US interests will be severely degraded until it is able to reconstitute itself. Co-option and Reintegration Strategy: The intent of this strategy is to rely on persuasion and soft power to either buy off (e.g., via bribes and pay ments) or actually reintegrate personnel into the societal mainstream by means of political enfranchisement, ideological rehabilitation, amnesty, and job training and employment programs. Rehabilitation programs have been successfully carried out in Saudi Arabia and within some other states. 17 The role of land power forces within this strategy is limited with their serving more in an auxiliary security and protection role. Termination Strategy: zation by dismantling it principally by coercive military and policing 15 A separate analysis can also be made of landpower forces applied against violent nonstate actors at the operational level. Inappropriate operational application may result in military failure and loss of indigenous population support. Applying landpower at the operational level should fol low the logic of proportionality, economy of force, and network response integration with policing forces. See Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 10, 1993) concerning the commercial insurgency construct and John P. Sullivan, Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central America, Air & Space Power Journal (Second Trimester 2008), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/ apj-s/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm concerning DIME-P. wide spectrum operations. Proposed strategies extend the CONOPS by unifying military operations with policing operations. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3.0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 16, 2012). 17 See the report prepared by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPTVR) and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR), February 24-26, 2009, Singapore, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ Report/RSIS_ICTR_Report_2009.pdf

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Bunker 63 activities. This requires an ongoing boots-on-the-ground presence and may require years to achieve success. This is also dependent on the size and sophistication of the targeted actor, its penetration into local society, termination strategy resources allocated, and local environmental conditions present (e.g., cross border sanctuaries). A good example was the intent of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to eliminate al Qaeda and Taliban organizations within that host country. targeted actor can move to another location, or is already transnational in nature and exists simultaneously in many locations. Thus, the potential transnational existence of these threats requires the possible Additionally, some violent groups are heavily networked and exhibit limbwhich makes them resilient to targeting. 18 Unintended second and third order effects of these targeting strategies may also result in unwanted outcomes. 19 Another major spoiler of these strategies is the fact that if a targeted actor is weakened or eliminated, a vacuum may develop in the host environment. This condition is readily evident in host environments in lower socio-economic regions in which the illicit economy, lack of gov ernmental authority, and dysfunctional patterns of human organization group simply allows for a competitor, successor, or new organization to of landpower forces is that of a facilitatorthey may help to provide the domestic security conditions under which these strategies can be facilitatedbut are not the primary implementers of state building or strengthening regimes. 20 These strategies, integral to responding to wars among the people and the recognition of the human domain of warfare, are as follows: 21 Stability and Support Strategy: The intent of this strategy is to stabilize the host environmenttypically a fragile or failed city, region, or stateso it does not deteriorate further. Putting an end to sectarian and violent nonstate actor violence by providing peace enforcement activities and humanitarian aid to the local populace to satisfy basic living needs (food, water, clothing, shelter, etc.) are the typical objectives. It should be noted implementation of this strategy will not fundamentally alter the host environment which will remain favorable to violent nonstate actor sustainment. Limited State Building Strategy: This strategy promotes the creation of (New York: Portfolio, 2006). 19 The deportations of Los Angeles street gang members in the 1990s who were illegal immigrants to Central America gave rise to the Maras (MS-13 and M-18) in El Salvador and neighboring countries. risk mission failure. This mission is better left to U.S. Department of State (USDOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and related agencies. 21 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2008) and Charles T. Cleveland and Stuart L. Farris, Toward Strategic Landpower, Army July 2013, 20-23.

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64 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 a functioning and somewhat legitimate state. This result extends beyond just the protection of the indigenous people and providing for their basic survival needs. Other components of modern society will be developed to one degree or another including a functioning civil service, education and schooling, employment opportunities in the formal economy, social welfare, and entertainment and sports programs. No provision for free and democratic elections, the enfran chisement of women, or limitations on state corruption or police excesses exists. Still, the host environment created will be less favor able to violent nonstate actor sustainment than that found in fragile and failed regions. Democratic Capacity Building Strategy: The conceptual model behind this strategy is almost seventy years old and is derived from the American experience with post-war Germany and Japan. In both instances, authoritarian governments were unconditionally defeated and the conquered indigenous populations were societally reengineered over the course of decades into modern democracies. Conceptual extensions of this strategy include the reconstitution of former East Germany and other Eastern European countries into democratic states with the end of the Cold War and its attempted implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last dozen years with very mixed results. 22 Democratic states are viewed as producing fewer and more benign forms of violent nonstate actors than other host environments. Conclusion As this article has explained, landpowerin terms of conventional, general purpose formations (brigade combat teams)is not the primary solution for contending with violent nonstate actors. In fact, given our recent experiences: The application of military force in its current form has limited utility when understanding of forces that includes the military and nonmilitary. 23 While landpower forces may indeed have a sizeable and direct role in some strategies, the better choice is to utilize policing forcesboth specialized and general onesas safely and as quickly as feasible. 24 In some instances, however, specialized US Army constabulary forces may be required as an initial stabilizing force. Further, concerning host envi ronment targeted strategies, landpower may help provide the domestic security conditions under which they can be facilitated, but it should not be the primary implementers of those conditions. In the Iraqi and Afghani campaign theaters, lessons learned include the view that, It takes a network to defeat a network, and The network [our network] needed to include everyone relevant who was 22 Concerning the need to shift from the current strategy of regime change followed by stability operations see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Strategy in a Time of Austerity, Foreign Affairs (November-December 2012): 58-69. 23 Cleveland and Farris, Toward Strategic Landpower, 23. 24 Police forces are not only more appropriate against many violent nonstate actors, they are

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Bunker 65 operating within the battlespace. 25 Such networks have been coordi nated principally by the US military and portray the entrepreneurship and adaptability of our landpower forces in the face of new and evolving nonstate threats. Still, as has been discussed, larger strategic issues are were fertile, such as Afghanistan, or became fertile, such as Iraq, host environments for violent nonstate actor emergence and sustenance. We are also observing these host environments emerge in former autocratic states such as Mexico, Libya, and Egypt, and in potentially transitioning ones such as a Syria gripped by civil war. In a sense, two paths from autocracy now existthe preferable and hoped-for democratic one and governance vacated by former institutions of an autocratic state. The attempted transition of autocratic states is indicative of the major issues at hand. Intervening states deploying land and policing forces are actor is eliminated or reintegrated into the political process, a successor or new actor typically emerges. Host environment alteration strategies, on the other hand, are meant to alleviate the conditions under which these actors breed and grow. These strategies exist at a level beyond the use of land and policing forces and seek to engage in societal reen gineering in failed, fragile, and transitioning states. US governmental programs to facilitate any form of limited statelet alone democratic capacitybuilding have not been up to the monumental tasks required, ing violent nonstate actors and denying them host environments have been mostly studies in failure. This fact brings us back to the contemporary problem we now face. Our recent attempts at democratic capacity building in host environ ments have been far from successful andgiven the age of austerity faced by the United States Army, its sister services, and the United States government writ largewe no longer have the resources nor the political will to engage in such long-term and expensive endeavors. This reality suggests that strategic victory in some of these environments is more cost-effective forms of counter strategiesbased on some form of global violent nonstate actor containment and mitigation protocol should be considered. 25 McChrystal, It Takes a Network. For theory and more information on this topic, see the netwar writings of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.

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ABSTRA CT : While the phenomenon described in this article may appear to be an African problem, the Western world's increasing layer of complexity to US operations as American troops attempt to differentiate allies from enemies. In Africa, sometimes they are one and the same. S obel, a portmanteau of soldier and rebel, appears to have been coined in Sierra Leone during the 1990s. This was a discovered how lucrative it could be to serve as soldiers by day, rebels by night or, as the villagers called them, sobels. On closer examination, it can be observed that the relationship between the soldiers of the Sierra Leonean Army and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group which during the countrys civil war occupied large portions of Unfortunately, the presence of sobels is often an indication that only to amputate peoples hands, but to publicize such mutilations as a way of preventing people from casting ballots and putting a political end to unpolitical brutalities. Though Sierra Leone appears to be where the sobel neologism originated, variations of the soldier-by-day, rebel-by-night phenomenon can be found in many parts of Africa (and, indeed, in other parts of the world). By studying the sobel phenomenon and its variations, it is possi ways to induce them to return permanently to government service. While the sobel phenomenon described within these pages may appear to be an African problem, the Western worlds increasing involve layer of complexity to US operations as American troops attempt to differentiate allies from enemies. In Africa, sometimes they are one and the same. FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Confronting Africa's Sobels 2013 Michel Ben Arrous

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68 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Background to Sobel: The Sierra Leone Civil War Sierra Leones civil war started in 1991, when the RUF, led by Foday 1 Though osten sibly the RUFs raison dtre was to oppose the corrupt government, it morphed more into a group of bandits and less a band of revolutionaries. As for Taylor, who later would become President of Liberia, his interests The war lasted eleven years, during which time both the RUF and the army were responsible for heinous atrocities against civilian popula 2 foreign intervention, in particular the countrys former colonial power, the British, to help end the war. Atrocities as a Contributing Factor There were many factors which led to some of Sierra Leones sol diers becoming sobels, including several socioeconomic ones discussed RUF. The soldiers, when willing to hunt down the RUFan inconsis tent process as the army was sometimes afraid of direct combat with sometimes relocate the population in a program reminiscent of the hated strategic hamlet initiative of the Vietnam War. The soldiers actions generated a great deal of hatred on the part the civilian populace caused the already low morale among the soldiers 3 Socio-Economic Factors Particularly interesting with regards to the sobel phenomenon in Sierra Leone were the socioeconomic differences between the initial rebel recruits and the army recruits: there were none. Both the RUF and army recruited from the same social stratum, the underprivileged prospects, and shared the same revolt. 4 1 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 2 Sierra Leone, GlobalSecurity.org 3 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa 102.

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Feldman and Ben Arrous 69 little esprit de corps there was no mental barrier to breach for the soldiers to see themselves as helping or becoming rebels. in quelling a rebellion with soldiers cut from the same cloth as rebels. played together. To be sure, not all African nations have armies composed of people In instances where they are different, and frequently that difference is human rights abuses, including descriptions of activities bordering on, One must remember that Sierra Leone soldiers were not defending there was no added sense that failure to destroy the RUF would be per for the soldiers to enrich themselves and, in turn, their families. Finally, with regards to the socioeconomic factors leading to the sobel phenomenon, one must remember the long tradition in many African countries of both rebels and governments recruiting, voluntarily who are still quite impressionable, easily swayed by peer pressure, and usually followers rather than leaders, can readily and perhaps even effortlessly switch sides when those around them are doing so. Evolution of the Sobel villages. As these nocturnal soldiers-turned-rebels retreated, they would leave weapons and ammunition for the real RUF rebels who, in turn, now in uniform, would appear, offering protection from the rebels . laden with military equipment. pillaging it, ensuring both were not there at the same time and avoiding the possibility they would accidentally come to blows. rebelswere rebels who conducted raids in stolen army uniforms. GlobalSecurity.org

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70 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 (the sobels), and actual rebels dressing as soldiers. Poor communications tion, probably did little to help clarify which group, soldiers or rebels, From a philosophical standpoint, perhaps this fact can be attributed to the ideological void left by the exhaustion of grand narratives such both the analytical tools to understand their own underprivileged status and a coherent agenda to redress it, they were more prone to extreme levels of brutality than a soldier or a rebel clearly standing on either side. In this regard, the sobel phenomenon could also be read as a product of current ideological disenchantment. Sobels and Sierra Leones Military Junta racy, but could not relinquish power until the RUF was defeated and the country was at peace. Such proclamations created the appearance that in power. The troops, by failing to defeat the RUF and increasing the number of RUF rebels by periodically and clandestinely becoming rebels yet safe for a return to civilian rule. troops can be miserable. Irregular and meager pay contributed to the under pressure, admitted that at least 20 percent of the government troops were disloyal. and the familiarity of troops with the rebels (since they had both come from the same social stratum), it would not be surprising if the percent age of troops serving as rebels was much higher than the 20 percent military was incapable of securing the diamond areas from the RUF, Sierra 7 Largely comprised African Development 23 (3-4): 149-70. New Statesman

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Feldman and Ben Arrous 71 whose success in combating the rebels is described below. From Rebels to Soldiers to Rebels While not quite the sobel description of soldier by day and rebel by night, a related phenomenon is apparent in several other parts of Africa. Former rebels integrate into government armies and then revert to rebels at a later date. An excellent example can be found when examining the recent history of the Tuareg, a traditionally nomadic people who live several Tuareg insurgencies, detailed descriptions of which are beyond such as the Tuareg feeling slighted by central governments regarding sharing of wealth from minerals mined in Tuareg regions. Peace treaties to end these rebellions often included an agreement to integrate the former rebels into government militaries. However, sometimes these rebels-turned-soldiers became disenchanted with the army or the way fellow Tuareg were treated, resulting in many deserting the military and returning to being rebels. 8 This Tuareg changeover between rebel and soldier contains elements of the sobel phenomenon: the possibility exists that whatever staterebel or soldierthe Tuareg or the Sierra Leoneans are in, they are capable of changing; that change can be relatively easy, and when the change occurs, it is frequently removed from oversight by the central government. enon and the Tuareg rebel-soldier-rebel changeover: while the sobels change daily, the Tuareg rebel-soldier-rebel transition can be measured in months. Another difference is the Sierra Leoneans continue to cycle between soldier and rebel, whereas the Tuareg seemingly stopped at rebel, though this might yet change again if there is another attempt to bring more Tuareg into the army. However, these and other differ ences should not obscure the most noteworthy similarity: both can leave governments and foreign analysts guessing as to the true strength and loyalties of the rebels and military forces. Adding to the confusion of estimating the strength of various forces is the contradictory nature of information regarding rebels and soldiers who switch. An infamous but uncorroborated claim of Tuareg defec tions from the army occurred during one of the Tuareg rebellions. 9 The Mouvement des Nigriens Pour la Justice greater revenue sharing from uranium mining, claimed an entire special trained by the American military, defected in 2007. The government, masse. Other unsubstantiated claims have also been made regarding this BBC News IRIN News as carried by GlobalSecurity.Org mil-041007-irin02.htm

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72 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 unit. Such claims and counterclaims in regions where it is hard to docu soldier by day, rebel by night and related phenomena. Private Military Companies as a Possible Solution outsource the army; in other words, hire private contractors to provide security. Indeed, there have been some successes with private military companies, perhaps the most notable one in Africa with the aforemen Further evidence of the superiority of private military companies to at Outcomes, under international pressure, was compelled to leave. 10 capital, Freetown. 11 Outcomes, there is substantial animosity by African leaders and govern ments against the employment of private military companies. Several reasons for this animosity are as follows: The embarrassment that African militaries are incapable of handling internal security issues. The appearance of neocolonialism if troops from another country, even may call themselves a private military company, but to many Africans they are mercenaries, and Africas long and bitter history with merce nariesespecially white mercenariesused by colonial powers is not forgotten. viding a lucrative source of revenue for those countries which furnish the troops. The concern that mercenaries are not bound by the laws of states as private military companies fall outside the normal chain of command. in a non-regulated, wanton fashion. 12 The belief that employing private military companies dissociates the the government. As a result, such companies are unable to provide BBC News Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Feldman and Ben Arrous 73 long-term solutions to problems required by a political process. regarding the use of private military companies, there are others who call not only for their use but also for their compensation based on from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, I even consid 13 Conclusion There appears to be a tradeoff with regards to recruiting soldiers from the same location and social stratum as where the rebels recruit. be less effective at putting down the rebellion and, in fact, may even serve as part-time rebels themselves. The converse also appears true. those who have spent time in Africa can attest to both the close ties within ethnic groups and the frequent animosity among ethnic groups. the soldiers massacre the rebels. greatest impact on preventing soldiers from serving with the rebels is least minimally effective government, one that appears to be trying to serving the nation honorably. Related to the government being effective is the need for it to be ernments of neighboring countries, or which dedicate disproportionate untold numbers of dubious policies, are often an obstacle to developing Unfortunately, there are numerous African governments which are largely corrupt, grossly ineffective, or both. It is hard to be cynical UN Press Release SG/ SM/6613

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74 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 about soldiers who decide to moonlight as rebels when the government is enriching itself at the expense of the people or directing that only somely from government largesse while others receive nothing. their troops will become sobels. These include: Improving pay for troops so there is less incentive to supplement their income. Improving training for troops so there is a greater sense of profession rights. As stated earlier, one of the reasons soldiers became rebels was because they were already battling the villagers whom they had abused. soldiers. Improving command and control of African troops. rebels, and, along these lines, clear rules of engagement. where there might be strong incentives, such as in diamond-rich areas, for soldiers to become sobels. This measure does not guarantee private military company mercenaries will not illegally enrich themselves, but often these companies have better control over their employees than African militaries do over their troops. Stating clearly soldiers are prohibited from serving with the rebels and offering strong, though humane, punishments for those who do. The reader might note that foreign military assistance could be valuable in helping African nations implement some of these suggested the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, to monitor African troops to ensure they perform in a professional manner. These initiatives could need to be weighed against potential costsincluding the possibility of American deathsof US involvement, even if limited to advising. countries but to other nations as well, including the United States. America, especially in helping to decrease abuses by African soldiers, mineral resources but throughout much of the continent. Additionally, more professional African militaries could mean more stable countries, resulting in better investment opportunities for American companies previously hesitant to enter certain regions because of dangers involved.

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FIGHTING IRREGULAR FIGHTERS Feldman and Ben Arrous 75 of pirates launching from their shores and interfering with international pated consequences to interventions are always a possibility, a problem Though some actions to turn the sobel phenomenon around may be fairly easy to implement, such as providing clear rules of engage ment, others, such as improving a nations governance, are far more tary operations to distinguish allies from enemies. As stated earlier, in Africa sometimes they are one and the same. Robert L. Feldman counterterrorism, and human security in Africa. He has published in numer Michel Ben Arrous political geography, cultural studies, and the history of geographic ideas. An African Studies in Geography from Below

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ABSTRA CT I The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Waging Financial War 2013 David J. Katz

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78 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 EJournalUSA Hungarian Revolution Finance and Development Risk Taking in International Politics Working Paper No. 1256

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Katz 79 What is Financial Warfare? The economic system deals with the hard with money and credit , Foreign Policy Research Institute Orbis Social Science Research Network Social Science Research Network

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80 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Waging Financial War The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York : Value at Risk

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Katz 81 daily annual Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers, Number 1014

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82 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Capital Formation Strikes Capital Liquidity Strikes

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Katz 83 Risk Management Strikes Value at Risk Iran Sanctions, , PressTV.com

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84 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Reuters Committee on Payments Systems and Settlement Redbook 2012 The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Katz 85 Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder The New York Times The Ascent of Money The New York Times

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ABSTRA CT : Since 9/11, the United States has waged a new brand of 1 O 2 3 Treasurys War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare Iran Daily Brief October 8, 2012. CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS The Coming Financial Wars 2013 Juan C. Zarate

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88 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 4 6 hawala Treasurys War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare The Washington Post The Diane Rehm Show

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Zarate 89 hawaladars ( hawala

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90 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Challenges to US Financial Power The Washington Post

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Zarate 91 8 9 10 11 Bitcoin Virtual Currency: Unique Features Present Distinct Challenges for Deterring Illicit Activity, 2009 End of Year Second Life Economy Wrap Up (including Q4 Economy in Detail) 19, 2010. Forbes

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92 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 12 Many Directed Threats and Alliances of Financial Rogues 13 Part 14 BloombergBusinessWeek: Lifestyle CNN.com CBS News BBC Congressional Research Service

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Zarate 93 16 Attack on the Dollar? 18 19 Strategic Studies Quarterly Prism The Geography of Money International Studies Review Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System Review of International Political Economy

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94 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 20 21 in these areas. MercoPress Reuters 2009, Enhancing International Monetary StabilityA Role for the SDR?

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Zarate 95 22 23 24 Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis The Ascent of Money : A Financial History of the World The Ascent of Money Currency Wars

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96 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 26 Conclusion Financial Times, 26, 2010.

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Zarate 97

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ABSTRA CT : Chinas investment in Africa is a deliberate policy choice to secure Beijings economic and political objectives. Chinese policies may undermine or discourage US efforts to create better governance and improved standards of living in Africa, but these effects are incidental and do not threaten vital American interests. The United States should encourage Beijings participation in inter national economic institutions, and thereby facilitate US economic strength and promote African development. I n October 2000, China and forty-four African countries established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to vigorously promote further China-Africa cooperation . so as to promote the common development of China and Africa. 1 The subsequent triennial forum ministerial meetings have become elaborate celebrations of deep ening China-Africa relations. Concurrently, the Western media heralded Chinas neo-imperialism, massive investment, and comprehensive strat egy to secure exclusive access to Africas resources. Beijings success in Africa contrasts starkly with Washingtons approach to economic statecraft through the African Growth and Opportunity Act and its annual forums. Congress passed this act in 2000, as China was building the Forum, to assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic relations between the United States and the region. 2 While many extol the positive effects of the act in improving African governance, its annual forums have been lackluster meetings of bureaucrats, and the Western media highlight that most Africans remain disappointed with the amount of US investment. Similarly, President Obamas weeklong visit to three African nations in July 2013 pales in comparison to the seventeen African nations that Hu Jintao visited during one ten-month span of his tenure as Chinas president. This article peers through the public veneer of state Assistance. 3 It argues successful economic statecraft by China does not 1 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation September 25, 2009, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/DOC12009/t606796. htm 2 Vivian C. Jones and Brock R. Williams, U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2012), 15. African nations. However, FOCAC membership and Chinas African Policy published in January 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html provides the context for simplifying the analysis with a continent approach. Although US policy often separates North Africa from sub-Saharan Africa (as in the African Growth and Opportunity Act), Chinas policy does not. CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Economic Statecraft: China in Africa Douglas W. Winton COL Douglas Winton is a candidate for the US Army War College Professor Program. He is pursuing a PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. A previous assignments include deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, battalion command at Ft Sill, OK, and Assistant Professor in Economics at the US Military Academy.

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100 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 threaten any vital American interests, and the United States has several possible responses. 4 Many assess that the increase of Chinas trade, investment, and devel opmental assistance from 2000-10 as a means to secure an economic and political advantage in Africa. While Beijings economic statecraft may undermine US efforts to reform African governance and economics, these effects are incidental; however, Africa would do well to evaluate aid and investment. Recognizing that Chinas economic statecraft in Africa does not threaten vital US interests, America should adopt an accommodating posture toward Beijing's involvement there. As part intensify efforts to increase Beijings participation in institutions to maintain the global international economic system which facilitates US strength. Simultaneously, the United States should review its approach risk to African development inherent in the Chinese approach. Rationale and Scope Beijings objectives in Africa stem from its going out strategy, introduced in its 10th Five Year Plan for 2001-05. This strategy included Chinas decision to join the World Trade Organization and encouraged businesses to invest abroad. 5 The resulting economic statecraft in Africa and concomitant creation of FOCAC support four broad objectives: nomic growth; second, new markets for increased domestic production; third, votes in the United Nations and other international forums to diminish criticism of Beijings human rights record and build support for the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRCs) rise; and fourth, reduced diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. 6 The PRCs reinvigorated economic statecraft is a boon for Africa. After decades of wrangling with western nations and international 4 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). Baldwin argues economic statecraft is economics as an instrument of politics (3). As described by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, US economic statecraft includes making economic objec exports, and building diplomats economic capacity. For more see Hillary Clinton, Delivering on the Promise of Economic Statecraft, lecture, Singapore Management University, Singapore, U.S. Department of State November 17, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/11/200664. htm. In this article, I refer to Chinas trade, foreign direct investment, and development aid as economic statecraft since these are generally considered economic tools that China is employing to achieve political and economic objectives. 5 Greg Levesque Heres Whats Driving Chinas Investments In Africa, Business Insider June 27, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-whats-driving-chinas-investments-in-africa-2012-6; Wang Duanyoung, Chinas Overseas Foreign Direct Investment Risk: 2008-2009 (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, January 2011), 5,9, 16-17, http://www. saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/china-s-overseas-foreign-direct-investment-risk-2008-2009.html; Christopher M. Dent, Africa and China: A new kind of development partnership, in China and Africa Development Relations ed. Christopher M. Dent (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8-12. 6 David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How Chinas Advance in Africa is Underestimated and Africas Potential Underappreciated, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 17, 2012), 1-2, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display. cfm?pubid=1120; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, Remarks by David H. Shinn, Chinas Growing Role in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy, November 1, 2011, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David_Shinn_Testimony.pdf ; Chris Alden, China in Africa, Survival 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005). For decades, the last two political

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Winton 101 organizations about the terms for developmental assistance, African to reject Taiwan 7 In contrast, for countries to participate in Amercas African Growth and Opportunity Act, the President must certify they meet a myriad of economic and political conditions. 8 The simplicity and immediacy of Chinas economic statecraft, when contrasted with assistance from the United States, entices African leaders to overlook international environmental standards, and with poor workmanship. 9 Although the PRCs economic statecraft in Africa since 2000 is historically or massive when compared with economic engagement by the rest of the world. 10 Chinas engagement with Africa is easily mis characterized as new and massive because its relatively opaque systems inhibit complete accounting of previous and current investment and aid. accepted standards, often resulting in poor comparisons with invest ment and assistance from developed economies. Since the PRC joined the World Trade Organization, however, there is consistent and reliable data to evaluate Chinas trade with Africa. China-Africa Trade Trade between China and Africa increased from $10 billion in 2000 to $130 billion in 2010. 11 In 2000, trade with Africa was 3.6 percent of the PRC's total trade; by 2010 it had increased to 15.3 percent. 12 Chinas portion of Africas total trade increased from approximately 6 percent in 2005 to 12.5 percent in 2010. 13 In 2008, the PRC replaced the United States as Africas top trading partner with $100 billion in total trade 14 In 2010, 70 percent of Chinas imports from Africa was oil and 15 percent was other raw materials (lumber, minerals, food, etc.). 15 Consistent with these imports being highly concentrated in oil, 70 percent of them come from only four countries: Angola (34 percent), South Africa (20 percent), Sudan (11 percent), and Republic of Congo (8 percent). Likewise, 7 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report no. 56, More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), 51, http:// www.cfr.org/africa/more-than-humanitarianism/p9302. AGOA if they are determined to have established, or are making continual progress toward estab lishing, the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to US trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat cor ruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational opportuni ties; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices. The International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, African Growth and Opportunity Act General Country Eligibility Provisions, http://trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index. asp 9 Dent, Africa and China: A new kind of development partnership, 12-16. 10 David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 3; Dent, Africa and China: A new kind of development partnership, 5. 11 Shinn & Eisenman, China and Africa 114-115. 12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of Statistics 2011 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Publications, 2011) 2-3. 13 Ibid. 90-91. trade was greater than China-Africa trade for 2009, China resumed its place as Africas lead trading partner in 2010. The European Financial Review (April-May 2011): 11, 17, in Proquest.

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102 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Chinas exports to Africa are highly concentrated with 55 percent in (12 percent), Nigeria (10 percent), Algeria (7 percent), and Morocco (6 percent). 16 and thus lucrative markets for Chinese exports of textiles, machinery, manufactured goods, and communications equipment. 17 Similar to China, American trade with Africa is concentrated in natural resources from a few countries. 18 The increase of natural resource exports from Africa to China has crisis and sluggish growth. These resources have been important to help the PRC meet its booming demand for energy to sustain increases in manufacturing, economic growth, and poverty reduction. The devel oping African economies are natural markets for Chinas relatively inexpensive manufactured goods; however, these compete directly with the nascent African industry and hinder opportunities for development of African manufacturing. 19 a corresponding investment in infrastructure and structural reforms necessary to move their economy from extractive industries to manu facturing and other higher value-added markets. This increase in Chinas trade with Africa does not substantially dis advantage America. Despite recent growth, Africa in 2010 represented for the United States. 20 As developing economies, African countries are not natural markets for US products. 21 Nearly two-thirds of Chinese imports from Africa are oil; however, this represents only 13 percent of Africas total oil exports and only 3 percent of the PRCs oil requirement. The United States and European Union combined receive 25 percent of Africas oil exports. 22 America is projected to be the worlds largest oil producer by 2020 and a net exporter of oil by 2035, making Chinas increased access to Africas oil of no strategic threat. 23 Chinas Investment in Africa While trade data is relatively clear, investment data is ambiguous and subject to interpretation because Chinese state-owned enterprises 16 Mary-Franoise Renard, Chinas Trade and FDI in Africa Working Paper No. 126, (Tunis, uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20126.pdf 17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of Statistics 2011 (New York: United Nations, 2011), 404; David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion, 16. 18 Jones and Williams, U.S. Trade and Investment Relations 7-12. 19 Ali Zafar, The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic,Trade, Investment, and Aid Links, The World Bank Research Observer 22, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 107, in ProQuest. 20 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of Statistics 2011 10-11. 21 Ibid., xii. Thirty-three African nations are considered heavily indebted and thirty-one are considered least developed. Their economies lack the resources necessary to purchase high-end technological goods. Their markets are focused on subsistence goods, textiles, and basic machinery. 23 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012 Executive Summary (Paris, France: International Energy Agency, 2012), 1, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ publication/name,33339,en.html.

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Winton 103 use unique accounting standards which, before 2010, were largely inconsistent with International Financial Reporting Standards. These enterprises often ignore market forces and traditional risk analysis as 24 The PRC establishes the amount and type of investment as a matter of policy; by contrast, western governments set goals and then work with analogous to wealthy nations development assistance, and their com further uncertainty as to the true extent of their investment. One assessment is that Chinas direct investment in Africa doubled from less than $1 billion in 2000 to more than $2 billion in 2010, increas the single largest investor in Africa. 25 Many analysts suspect this level underreports the true amount of Chinas investment. Despite the dis about their investment: it has grown substantially over the last decade percentage of Chinas overall foreign investment ($68 billion in 2010); it is a small portion of global investment in Africa ($55 billion in 2010) leaving traditional investors from the United States, Europe, and Japan and highly concentrated among a few countries. 26 Chinas increasing investment in Africa while western investment African preferences. Investing in Africa provides the PRC with higher returns than the alternative of buying the debt of governments that have forced interest rates to historic lows. Expanding production capacity in Africa also alleviates pressure from excess domestic investment and can facilitate shifting labor-intensive production to Africa as Chinese labor controlled developing economies, they have a higher risk tolerance for investing in Africa than their western counterparts. Chinas increased investing in Africa and determined the risks are too high to warrant substantial investment. Many African countries rely on foreign investment to jump start economic growth, expand employment, and mitigate inherent shortages 24 Duanyoung, Chinas Overseas Foreign Direct Investment Risk: 2008-2009 16-17. 25 Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion, 18; Vivien Foster et al., Building Bridges: Chinas Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009), 3, https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2614/480910PUB0Buil101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1. 26 Simelse Ali and Nida Jafrani, Chinas Growing Role in Africa, International Economic Bulletin (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 9, 2012), http:/m. ceip.org/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-myths-and-facts/9s2g&land=en; Foster et al., Building Bridges, 2.Harry G. Broadman, Africas Silk Road: China and Indias New Economic Frontier (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007), 93, 94, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/Africa_Silk_ Road.pdf; Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion, 19; David Shinn, Chinas Investments in Africa, China US Focus November 1, 2012, chinas-investments-in-afric a.

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104 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 in foreign currency, domestic investment, and tax revenue. Foreign investment can link developing countries to globalized markets, intro duce new technology, and improve productivity. 27 However, Chinas investment is concentrated in retail and textiles, which add little to ity which could result in higher value-added manufacturing. 28 African textiles manufacturing competes with many developing economies for access to saturated markets making this an unlikely industry to achieve substantial growth. Chinas Aid for Africa Understanding development assistance in Africa is also chal lenged by ambiguity and imprecise reporting. PRCs banks provide grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans (considered develop ment assistance by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) to Africa without the transparency of western banks. 29 However, some of Chinas publically announced loan commit ments are at market rates and thus not normally considered aid, adding to the uncertainty of the true scope of assistance. 30 One estimate of Chinas developmental aid to Africa is that it has grown from $600 million in 2001 to $2.5 billion in 2009. 31 Another study focusing on loans highlights an increase in Chinese lending to Africa from $800 million in 2005 to approximately $1.4 billion in 2009. 32 Although there have been many reports of $1.8 billion in aid solely in the form of loans, much of this commitment from the Export Import Bank of China was loans at market rates and does not constitute aid in accordance with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development standards. 33 Chinas estimated $2.5 billion in aid to Africa is dwarfed by OECD aid of $29 billion in 2010. 34 Among all OECD, the United States gives the most development assistance to Africa with $7.8 billion in 2010. The World Banks annual aid to Africa of approximately $4.5 billion also exceeds Chinas contribution. Other multinational organizations contribute a combined $18 billion annually to Africa. While Chinas 27 John C. Anyanwu, Working Paper No. 136 (Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank Group, September 2011), 5, http:// www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WORKING%20136%20 Determinants%20Of%20Foreign%20Direct%20Investment%20Inflows%20To%20Africa%20 1980-2007%20AS.pdf 28 Shinn & Eisenman, China and Africa 142; Dent, Africa and China: A new kind of development partnership, 11. 29 Martyn Davies et al., How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Stellenbosch University--Centre for Chinese Studies, February 2008), v, http://www.ccs.org. za/downloads/DFID_FA_Final.pdf. 30 Shinn & Eisenman, China and Africa 148. 31 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragons Gift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 170. 32 Ali and Jafrani, Chinas Growing Role in Africa. 33 Brautigam, The Dragons Gift ,178. 34 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Development Aid at a Glance, Statistic by Region: Africa 2013 edition, http:// www.oecd.org/dac/stats/Africa%20-%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202013. pdf; http://www.oecd.org/investment/aidstatistics/42139250.pdf.

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Winton 105 resources, and the economic collapse of 2008. 35 Much of Chinas aid to Africa comes as infrastructure projects (railroads, dams, ports, etc.) while western aid is usually intended for improving social conditions (health, education, poverty reduction, etc.) or loan forgiveness. 36 Thirtyinfrastructure. As with trade and investment, the infrastructure aid has been concentrated with greater than 70 percent going to four countries: Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. 37 Many of these projects, however, have been criticized for poor workmanship, abusive labor practices, and disregard for environmental considerations. 38 African leaders whose nations have received Chinese onstrating the ability to deliver infrastructure improvements. However, it remains unclear if this aid will produce lasting economic growth or meaningful improvements in standards of living for their people. Assessment Chinas comprehensive economic statecraft in Africa is consistent with its goal of a peaceful rise enabled by continued economic growth, improved relations with other countries, and greater inclusion in inter national organizations. 39 global power with strategic reach and facilitates forming an international coalition to peacefully adjust the international order. Chinas economic statecraft in Africa not only raises its global standing, it is consistent with the growing need for energy resources and their desire to shift domestic production to higher value-added goods. domestic economic and international political objectives. Its strategy in Africa helped mitigate the effects of the global recession following component of this success. Consistent with this approach, Chinas chief aid instrument, the Development Bank of China, is a subordinate insti tution within the Ministry of Commerce. 40 In contrast, the United States with the Department of State and only coordinates with the Department of Commerce which is responsible for facilitating US exports. 41 The US governments recent emphasis on integrating defense, diplomacy, and 35 Ali and Jafrani, Chinas Growing Role in Africa. 36 Shinn & Eisenman, China and Africa ,150-160; Davies et al., How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa 37 Foster et al., Building Bridges, 3-4. 38 Nathan William Meyer Chinas Dangerous Game: Resource Investment and the Future of Africa, International Policy Digest October 9, 2012, http://www.internationalpo licydigest.org/2012/10/09/chinas-dangerous-game-resource-investment-and-the-future-ofafrica/#comment-4384 39 Zheng Bijan, Chinas Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 18. 40 For a complete description of how China has organized government agencies for economic state craft see Brautigam, The Dragons Gift 107-117. 41 For an overview of the US system of Development Assistance see Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011).

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106 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 development showcases its view that development assistance is primarily intended to achieve national security objectives. and other international organizations built on the one stateone vote principle. At the December 2012 International Telecommunication Unions (ITU) World Conference in Dubai, China and Russia opposed American and European proposals to maintain the Internet as a global common with mostly unrestricted access. 42 nations attending, only three (Gambia, Kenya, and Malawi) voted with the United States, resulting in an 89 to 55 defeat for the US and European interest. 43 As Chinas economic and military power continue to grow, this increased diplomatic clout will facilitate its attempts to restructure the international order built by the United States and its European allies (who have stagnating population growth and sluggish economies) will also grow. Beijings relatively small economic investment in Africa has garnered it substantial political support in this endeavor. Much of the PRCs success in its economic statecraft derives from its view of African nations not as developing countries in need of assistance and reform but rather as equal members of the international community cial for all parties with no expectation for other nations to adjust their domestic standards. Those nations also look to China as a model for development because it has enjoyed historically high growth and raised itself out of the category of least-developed country. While African and increased trade, Beijings model of a state-controlled economy is unlikely to work for most of these nations as they lack Chinas size and access to capital. 44 The nature of Chinese aid and investment, dubious quality of infrastructure projects, accelerated extraction of resources, and undercutting of emerging manufacturing create a long-term risk for Despite Chinas success this approach is not an appropriate model for the United States to secure its national interests in Africa. The United States National Security Strategy lists security, prosperity, values, and international order as its enduring interests. 45 In June 2012, President Obama signed the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa which articulated US interests in the region as . ensuring the security of the United States, our citizens, and our allies and partners; promoting democratic states that are economically vibrant and strong partners of the United States on the world stage; expanding 42 L. Gordon Crovitz, Americas First Big Digital Defeat, The Wall Street Journal December 16, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323981504578181533577508260.html. 43 Mike Masnick, Who Signed The ITU WCIT Treaty... And Who Didnt , Techdirt http:// www.techdirt.com/articles/20121214/14133321389/who-signed-itu-wcit-treaty-who-didnt.shtml 44 Chinas development has been accelerated by its ability to access capital through Hong Kong, Macau, and Shanghai. Geography and history have combined to make these cities natural ports and for African development. 45 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 7.

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Winton 107 atrocities; and fostering broad-based, sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation. 46 While economic statecraft must contribute to securing these interests, ignoring African governance standards would retard African development, contribute to regional instability, and prolong the conti nents pervasive poverty. preconditions for US development assistance or investment. Chinas eco nomic statecraft and success in achieving growth with a state-controlled economy has reinforced the hope they can attract foreign capital and investment to spur sustained economic growth without liberalizing their projects are likely to increase their complaints that Americas insistence on governance reforms is an intrusion in their domestic affairs and resist US leadership in international institutions. Responding China's economic statecraft in Africa provides it with economic and diplomatic advantages without threatening any vital US interests. However, the long-term effects are likely to be negative for African US response to Beijings economic statecraft should address three areas. Africa, avoiding confrontation or competition. Second, the United States should reinvigorate and strengthen the international economic institutions which undergird the liberal economic order essential for US prosperity. Third, the United States should improve African economic development with its Power Africa and Trade Africa initiatives while sustaining efforts to improve African governance. become a key driver of global politics. 47 Accordingly, the United States its Defense Strategic Guidance that Chinas emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have . an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. 48 Thus, any US reaction toward Chinas economic statecraft in Africa must consider implications economic growth and its corresponding increase in military capability, trying to limit this growth is infeasible and inconsistent with US inter ests. Thus, US policy should accommodate Chinas peaceful rise while challenging its attempts to change rules and norms of the international system which favor democratic institutions and US strength in global commerce. America should look for opportunities to cooperate with China in 46 Barack Obama, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The White House, June 2012), 1-2. 47 Hillary Clinton, , Foreign Policy November 2011 57. 48 Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, January 2012), 2.

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108 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 measures as the two nations work through disagreement and potential leading contributor to UN peacekeeping missions with the United States as the leading funder. The United States should facilitate this trends continuation. The United States retains a vital interest in disrupt[ing], dismantle[ing], and defeat[ing] al Qaeda and its violent extremist 49 In Africa, this means denying safe haven in Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel, and helping threatened countries build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance. 50 Although al Qaeda threatens China less globally, this threat will likely grow with it. The United States should eliminate potential al Qaeda safe havens in Africa. with China in Africa, it must remain mindful that the PRC views the current international system as one built and maintained by the United States, based on American values, and serving US interests, and thus an inhibitor to its plans for a peaceful rise. Because the United States uses this system to reinforce its values of democracy, transparency, free-markets, and human rights, the system threatens Beijings view of sovereignty and core interests. China seeks a new international system state sovereignty. 51 China is using its economic statecraft in Africa to build support for this world view. The US response to Chinas economic statecraft in Africa should focus on strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions which preserve the system of global commerce on which the United States relies for sustained economic grow. For the past decade the PRC has managed the risks associated with greater involvement in doing so. The United States should seek to further anchor the PRC into the current system by inviting it to join the OECD or increasing its votes in the International Monetary Fund. 52 Simultaneously, the United States should increase the diplomatic pressure for China to allow the free 49 Obama, National Security Strategy 19. 50 Ibid., 21. 51 Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, After Unipolarity: Chinas Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline, International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 53-57. 52 The OECD maintains a working relationship with China since 1995 when the OECD Council agreed to dialogue and cooperation with China. In 2007 the OECD Council adopted a resolution to strengthen cooperation with China Brazil India Indonesia and South Africa with enhanced engagement and the potential in the future to lead to membership. China and the OECD, OECD Better Policies for Better Lives http://www.oecd.org/china/chinaandtheoecd.htm;. for more about joining the OECD see OECD enlargement, http://www.oecd.org/general/oecdenlargement. htm On December 15, 2010, the IMF approved a reform package which includes realigning quota shares (i.e., votes) making China the 3rd largest member country in the IMF. This package requires Quotas, October 1, 2013 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm. The United States has not yet accepted these reforms. The Obama Administration has not requested additional funding or authorization from the Congress in order to accept the reforms. Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss, IMF Reforms: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2013), Summary.

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CONFLICT BY OTHER MEANS Winton 109 in preserving the system will require discernment to distinguish those changes that can accommodate Chinese desires from those that would erode the systems purpose and effectiveness. Simultaneously the United States must reinvigorate the credibility as contributing to their stagnation. Many of them have implemented changes to their domestic governments and economies as prerequisites for receiving OECD aid, with the assurance that once implemented the compete globally threatens the legitimacy of the current international economic system. America must strengthen and improve its develop ment programs, not because it needs trade with or resources from global commerce so they have a vested interest in sustaining the system that enables it. Supporting African development means charting a path to sustain able growth by moving production from solely extractive industries to manufacturing. The Power Africa initiative to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa can be an important tool in achieving this goal. The United States should expand the Trade Africa program to facilitate the development of African manufacturing for exports. 53 The United States should also push China to modify its investment and develop mental assistance approach by hiring more African workers, improving infrastructure quality, and shifting investment from raw material extrac tion and towards sustainable manufacturing. Conclusion During the last decade, Chinas economic statecraft in Africa has been a critical component of its going out strategy to sustain economic international system. This economic statecraft included increases in trade, investment, and developmental assistance as a means of facilitat ing the growth of its domestic economy and its international power. China and Africa view this new economic statecraft as mutually ben increased access to resources, increased exports, and increased support in international organizations. Because this success does not directly threaten vital interests, the denying al Qaeda a safe haven on the continent. This focus on core interests can yield more cooperation than competition with China. A 53 FACT SHEET: Power Africa, June 30, 2013, ; FACT SHEET: Trade Africa, July 1, 2013 http://www. Possible expansions of Trade Africa could include (1) allowing developing nations in Africa to temporarily trade with protectionist measures (i.e., subsidies and tariffs on imports), (2) allowing developing nations in Africa to incrementally adopt global labor and environmental standards; (3) eliminating protectionism of developed economies (including the United States) agriculture markets; and (4) providing technical assistance to African manufacturing to accelerate its development.

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110 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 direct challenge to Chinas economic statecraft would unnecessarily antagonize China and African nations. Instead, America must reinforce its efforts to preserve the international system by accommodating the PRC as a stakeholder and implementing programs that allow African United States continues its efforts to build good governance, reduce poverty, and improve living standards in Africa, it should also encourage China to adjust its engagement in Africa to facilitate long-term African development. Such an approach is the best strategy for responding to Beijings economic statecraft in Africa in a manner that secures and advances American interests.

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ABSTRA CT : Recent debates about the organizational relationship between Cyber Command and the NSA stress political issues over force employment. This article focuses on the latter, making the case that Cyber Command should be split from the NSA, because nations that marshal and mobilize their cyber power and integrate advantage. Cyber Command provides the best route for develop ing the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for achieving these goals. F or twenty years, members of the United States national security community, including readers of this journal, have debated the potential tactical, operational, and strategic effects of cyber components and capabilities. 1 Recently, these discussions have become intertwined with arguments about the organizational relationships as well as the Title 10 (traditional military) and Title 50 (intelligence Because of this expanding controversy, there is a growing chorus calling for a split between the National Security Agency (NSA) and US Cyber Command. These debates are important. Yet they subsume the pivotal issue how cyber components and capabilities will affect US national secu ritybeneath more transient legal and political issues generated in the wake of Edward Snowden. Furthermore, past and current debates often the product of actual force employment, not theoretical arguments or proving-ground tests. Cyber Command should be cleaved from NSA, but not for reasons of political expediency. Cyber Command should be split from NSA because the United States needs an organizational arrangement that provides for the development and normalization of Title 10 and Title 50 cyber capabilities, while maintaining a focus on how such will affect the use of military force and US national security. Cyber Command should be split from the NSA because nations that marshal and mobilize their cyber power and integrate it into strategy and doctrine will ensure provides the best route for achieving such. 2 Cyber Command should be removed from under US Strategic 1 The debate began with John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Cyberwar is Coming! Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 141-165. The phrase cyber components and capabilities is used to denote computer network attacks (CNA), computer network exploits (CNE), and computer net work operations (CNO), as well as future developments both within and beyond these categories. 2 Frank J. Cilluffo and J. Richard Knop, Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare, The Journal of International Security Affairs (New York: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2009). PREPARING FOR NETWARS Repurposing Cyber Command Frank J. Cilluffo and Joseph R. Clark 2013 Frank J. Cilluffo and Joseph R. Clark

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112 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 represents the most effective means for developing and maturing the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will allow US cyber components and capabilities to be employed for military purposes and to generate strategic effects. Currently, there are two primary reasons why the estab than tasking existing branch and service structures. First, speed is of the essence. Tasking an existing branch or service, or even establishing a new service, would open up organizational and bureaucratic rivalries likely to slow (if not cripple) the development of cyber components and capabilities. Second, in the near term, Title 10 and Title 50 concerns, vagueness in the cyber rules of engagement, concerns about political blowback, and fears that US cyber weapons could be reverse engineered and used against the United States, all highlight the importance of an across the whole of government. In short, the United States needs a combatant command that can do two things: (1) craft the tactical, opera tional, and strategic cyber capabilities US national security will need in the decades to come; and, (2) oversee their application, integration, and execution. Cyber Command is the best choice and now is the time to act. Operationalizing Cyber When Cyber Command was established in 2009, it made sense that Until recently the line between computer network attacks and computer to exploit, you had the ability to attack). The use of cyber was largely constrained to information collection and intelligence. Kinetic effects tion, because of the scarcity of manpower and materials, it made sense that Cyber Command and the NSA be joined by the dual-hatting of their commander, General Keith Alexander. This allowed the two organiza tions to pool resources and avoid redundancy. Today, the situation is different. The kinetic potential of cyber com ponents and capabilities have been demonstrated, attempts to employ them for strategic effect have been undertaken. The use of cyber in support of operational or strategic objectives is becoming increasingly common. Three examples in a growing universe of cases illustrate this point. The 2009 Stuxnet attack against Irans nuclear-fuel centrifuges temporarily halted Tehrans enrichment program. The 2011 distributed denial of service attacks against government and media websites slowed the counterconcentration of Georgian forces in response to Russias military invasion. 3 The 2012 distributed denial of service attacks against American banks, launched in retaliation for the US-led sanctions against Iran, exposed a weak point that potentially could be used to coerce the US government. 4 both the operational and strategic levels. Such is the new reality. Regardless of asymmetries in other capabilities, cyber components and capabilities 3 David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, Small Wars Journal January 6, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008. 4 Richard Davies, Iran Suspected in Bank Site Hacking, ABC News January 9, 2013, http:// abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2013/01/iran-suspected-in-bank-site-hacking/

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PREPARING FOR NETWARS At the same time, there are important differences between the use of tactical and operational level cyber in conjunction with activities on the physical domains, and strategic activities occurring solely within the cyber domain itself. The result is a growing divergence between the mis sions of the NSA and Cyber Commandas well as a growing divergence The increasing use of cyber at the operational and strategic levels creates impetus for all military forces, from those of powerful nationstates to those of weak insurgent movements, to acquire cyber components and capabilities. Cyber is not an instrument of the weak or the strong, it is an instrumentperiod. It is becoming conventional wisdom that the other operational environments and across the instruments of power 5 Americas adversaries are preparing for the operationalization of this conventional wisdom; the United States must do so as well. Still, the acquisition of new technologies is not enough. Stephen ment. 6 Technology makes capable forces more capable. If integrated properly, technology enhances how military units execute or react to actions born out of the principles of war: mass, maneuver, surprise, security, simplicity, objective, offensive, economy of force, and unity of command. Biddle warns, however, that technology is not a substitute for good force employment. It will not make a bad force better. 7 This suggests that if cyber components and capabilities are to have actual strategic effect, careful thought must be given to their application, inte gration, and execution. What is needed is an entity that can: Think through these issues in regard to computer network attacks and the defense of Department of Defense (DOD) systems. Mature the cyber components themselves as well as the tactics, tech niques, and procedures for their use. Cyber Command represents the best entity for accomplishing all of the above. cleaved from the NSA, taken out from under Strategic Command, and established as a functional combatant command. Cyber Command, like US Special Operations Command, should receive direct Congressional funding as a major force program, with the services free to make addi tional investments (as they do with Special Operations Command). 8 Unlike Special Operations Command, Cyber Command should have 5 Franklin Framer, Stuart Starr, and Larry Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2009); Cilluffo and Knop, Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare. 6 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 7 Ibid., 164. Global Security Forum (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012).

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114 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 operational authority and the ability to initiate a request that forces be threats. In short, it is time to let Cyber Command come into its own. At present Cyber Command exists, much as Special Operations Command did in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, in the organizational shadows unable to contribute its full potential to the security of the United States. Establishing Cyber Command as a combatant command would allow it to leverage its existing capabilities and organizational of two missions. One mission would be to act as an incubator for operational cyber capabilities. The other mission would be to act as the designated operator for offensive actions within the cyber domain itself. In its incubator role, Cyber Command should act as facilitator for the development of cyber components and capabilities to enhance modern force employment and integrate cyber components and capabilities into the combined arms framework. In this role, Cyber Command should the services various combat training directorates, academic programs, and other private and public sector entities. Cyber Command would, as the other combatant commands do, task the NSA for information and capa bilities in support of its primary mission. The goal would be to develop, demonstrate, and disseminate capabilities for cyber enhanced combat operations on the terrain of the physical domains. Cyber Command X, which seeks to map enemy networks, develop mission scripts for the use of cyberweapons, and develop techniques for assessing battle damage to cyber components and capabilities. 9 Cyber Command should act as a repository for lessons learned about the operational employment of cyber and the lead for activities regarding how cyber components and capabilities should be folded into the Joint Munitions Impact Modeling System (JMIMs). Cyber Command would then be able to provide war planners with more robust tools for understanding the likely effects of network attacks, as about the use of traditional munitions. Its incuba from the use of cyber in Afghanistanso that cyber is operational ized on the basis of combat experience rather than just theoretical or proving-ground tests. 10 In short, Cyber Command should be charged the principles of war within mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian (METT-TC) constraints. In its operational role, Cyber Command should remain the entity for operations that occur within the networks and systems that make up cyberspace. In fact, Cyber Command ought be designated at the com batant command for the cyber domain. It should own all offensive or defensive cyberborne operations not related to intelligence collection. 9 Tom Gjelten, First Strike: US Cyber Warriors Seize the Offensive, World Affairs (January/February The Hill

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PREPARING FOR NETWARS Making one entity responsible for the use of components and capabili ties in the cyber domain will protect American assets. It will ensure their cautious use, reducing opportunities adversaries might have to copy and reverse engineer them. 11 cyberwarfare teams, like those General Alexander discussed before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2013. 12 Cyber Command, to the one Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) plays in regard and the national command authority makes the decision to act, Cyber Command should pull the trigger. To ensure accountability and should occur through a Title 10 and Title 50 synchronization process similar to that of JSOC. Cyber Command should have responsibility for this process, and then responsibility for implementing computer network attacks. Cyber Command should continue to be responsible for synchronizing and coordinating the actions of the service components: US Army Cyber Command, the US 10th Fleet, the 24th Air Force, US Marine Corps Force Cyber Command, and US Coast Guard Cyber Command. 13 This operational role, in addition to being vital in itself, would support Cyber Commands incubator mission through the con stant development of new cyber components, capabilities, and skill sets. Making the above happen requires a greater division of labor between the NSA and Cyber Command. The use of cyber as an intelli gence asset should be separated from the use of cyber as a military asset. The NSA should continue to be responsible for and have authority to execute cyberborne operations related to intelligence collection. More information from potential or existent US adversaries via computer networks and operations; and support efforts to protect American networks from similar attempts on the part of foreign governments, criminal organizations, and others. In essence, this separation would make Cyber Command responsible for Strategic Initiative 1 and the NSA for Strategic Initiative 2, with each entity taking responsibility The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14, no. 1 (January 2013). 12 Richard Lardner, US forming cyber teams to take offensive, The Boston Globe March 13, 2013. http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/12/pentagon-forming-cyber-teamsprevent-attacks/UcUxkq95wj2FCXTQ3LJsvM/story.html. 13 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Arlington, VA: United States Department of Defense), 5, http://www.defense.gov/news/ d20110714cyber.pdf.

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116 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 for the remaining three as outlined in the July 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace: Strategic Initiative 1. Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that [DOD] can take full advantage of cyberspaces potential. Strategic Initiative 2. Employ new defense operating concepts to protect [DOD] networks and systems. Strategic Initiative 3. and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy. Strategic Initiative 4. Build robust relationships with [US] allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity. Strategic Initiative 5. Leverage the nations ingenuity through an excep tional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation. lar cyber techniques and skills most likely to bring about success within their respective realms. The need to separate Cyber Command from NSA, and to establish it as a functional combatant command goes beyond force employment or operations within the cyber domain onto itself. Cleaving Cyber Command from NSA also addresses the need to balance (and rebalance) Title 10 and Title 50 authorities. The convergence of traditional military missions with intelligence and covert action is not new. General Edward Meyer, Army Chief of Staff from 1979 to 1983, recognized the need for such. General Meyer argued that Americas adversaries were affecting us below the threshold of war, necessitating the development of new capabilities. The result was the birth of special operations as a com munity that could blend combat capabilities, intelligence, and covert action. In response to world events of the last three decadesincluding the Iranian hostage crisis, the rise of Hezbollah and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and later al Qaeda and 9/11this con vergence of military, intelligence, and covert activities has continued. Yet, in some areas, even when operationally necessary, convergence has clouded authorities. It has made it unclear as to which parts of the gov ernment are responsible and accountable for various actions. Given how they permeate modern life, cyber components and capabilities raise new issues. Cyber adds concerns about privacy to those about force employ ment and intelligence. Separating Cyber Command from NSA would support the synchronization of Title 10 and Title 50, where necessary, and alleviate privacy concerns by clarifying the authorities for conduct 14 Three additional issues must be resolved to establish Cyber Command as a functional combatant command charged with maturing the US cyber capabilities and executing operations within the cyber domain. 14 Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of Title 10/Title 50 Debate. Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Number 212 (Austin, TX: The University of Texas School of Law, October 17, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945392; Andru Wall, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action. Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2011), http:// harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3_Wall1.pdf.

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PREPARING FOR NETWARS First, Cyber Command must have budgetary independence to ensure its needs are not squeezed out by bureaucratic competition with the service components, other combatant commands, or weapons systems. For this reason, Cyber Command should receive direct funding from Congress as a major force program. The other services should be free to make investments in Cyber Command, but the command must have a budget insulated from the concerns or needs of the services themselves, the other combatant commands, or the DOD itself. Second, unlike Special Operations Command, Cyber Command must be granted the ability threats. Because of the unique nature of Cyber Commands expertise, especially in the near term, the command is likely to possess greater understanding of the cyber threats and opportunities faced by other input from the receiving command before being decided by the national command authority. Third, Congress and the executive branch must Cyber Command. The size of the cyber work force should be increased, and training of individuals tailored to the missions and requirements of their respective command. It is imperative that Congress and the executive branch supply the resources necessary to accomplish this. The United States must avoid a situation in which Cyber Command and the need to compete with one another for the highly skilled individuals each Today, there are three broad reasons to undertake the above pro posal. First, it would facilitate the integration of cyber components and capabilities into the combined arms framework, and provide an effective mechanism for the crafting of cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures. ing the strategic initiatives outlined in the 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. 15 Third, it keeps cybersecurity discussions, policy, and practice focused on the fact that the central issueseven in regard to the potential for cyberwarfareare inherently To be clear, the establishment of Cyber Command as a functional combatant command does not represent a panacea. It leaves unad dressed important issues regarding the security of the US private sector cyber assets and resources, including jurisdictional issues among the NSA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It also leaves unaddressed important issues about the rights and responsibilities of the US private sector regarding the ability to engage in the active defense of their computer networks and systems from the efforts of organized crime, foreign attacks, and state-spon sored espionage. Still, doing so represents the best means (at present) for developing and normalizing Title 10 and Title 50 cyber capabilities for offensive action and in defense of DOD computer networks and systems. It also represents the logical mechanism for attempting to 15 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace

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118 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 suade, deter, or compel US adversaries. 16 Conclusion It is critically important that the United States act now to integrate cyber fully into operational level force employment. Evidence suggests Americas adversaries are doing just that. Given Americas greater reliance on cyber, and thus greater vulnerability, US national security necessitates it maintain a dominant position in regard to cyber. Dominance comes through application, integration, and execution. At this point, the United States needs to designate one entity to take lead in the development and maturing of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will allow cyber components and capabilities to be employed for military purposes, estab lish dominance, and generate strategic effects. For these reasons, it is time to establish Cyber Command as a functional combatant command. where he directs university-wide Cybersecurity Initiative and the Homeland George W. Bush for Homeland Security. Dr. Clark is a policy analyst at The George Washington Universitys Homeland University. 16 Robert OHarrow and Barton Gellman, Secret cyber directive calls for ability to attack with out warning, The Washington Post June 7, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-07/ world/39817439_1_cyber-tools-president-obama-directive.

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Describe your background and your key duties and responsibili ties in OIF. served in tank battalions, divisional cavalry squadrons and a cavalry regi ment. I also served as a planner at the corps and army level. My key duty and responsibility during the opening stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom was serving as the C/J-5 of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). As such, I coordinated the development of the CFLCC major operations plan COBRA II, our initial plan for the inva sion, and ECLIPSE II, our sequel plan for post-hostilities operations. ence at war, I believe professionals must recognize two key points: (1) before taking the decision to use force we have to advance the discussion of military requirements AND policy guidance so all parties understand what we are doing, and (2) we military professionals must ALWAYS bear in mind that political and policy conditions are going to change in the duration of a campaign. We must keep this in mind because policy will change and war, being an instrument of policy, must match the objec tives of policy. The political object is the real motive for war and thus will determine the amount of effort needed to attain the objective. What kind of policy guidance did you receive, and what were the main sources of your guidance? Benson: I worked for two CFLCC commanding generals: LTG P. T. Mikolashek and LTG David McKiernan. LTG Mikolasheks guidance US Central Command (CENTCOM) and GEN Franks. Mikolashek initially offered the base war plan for the invasion of Iraq, the so-called standing start plan. It was immediately pooh-poohed as old think by invasion. Mikolashek was leaving command as we were developing the rudiments of the so-called running start plan. This plan envisioned starting the invasion with a minimal force and then deploying forces forces on the ground before the start of the war and continue the deploy ment/employment cycle of the remainder of the apportioned forces. The policy objectives at the start of the Iraq war were plainly stated in the Central Command campaign plan, 1003V. They were: a stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact; a broad-based government that renounces weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development and use, and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors; and success OF NOTE A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 A Discussion With Kevin Benson, COL (USA Retired) 2013 Kevin Benson COL Kevin Benson, USA Retired, completed his military career as Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS (2003-07). He was the C/J 5 (Director of Plans) for Third US Army and the CFLCC at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. In October, he assisted in planning the mission transfer in Iraq.

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120 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD. The military objectives were to: destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based govern ment; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq; gather intelligence on global terrorism; detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region. We used these objectives to develop our cam paign and major operations plans. My duties during the development and reviewing written products. LTG McKiernan took command of CFLCC in September of 2002; however, our policy and military guidance remained unchanged. What How often did the guidance change, and how did you adjust your battle rhythm to accommodate such changes? Benson: The best way to answer this is to say the ends of the policy/ strategy did not change. We faced a constant tension regarding the offered his answer regarding the number of troops required for an occu the theater. We had not yet started the campaign and we were engaged in justifying the necessity of follow-on forces. plan, COBRA II, I participated in the daily secure video-teleconferences (SVTC) with the Secretary of Defense and his senior staff. These ses sions produced lots of sound and occasional fury as different people coalition would deal with Baath party members, Douglas Feith stated ally thumped on the table to emphasize his point. He went on to say work in the new Iraqi government. This was counter to my understand ing of the guidance given during planning by Abizaid to the people on the SVTC. During the conference and immediately afterwards, I got a response. Policy confusion did not end with this one secure video-teleconference. 1 1 This paragraph is based on the personal journal I kept while serving as the C/J 5 of the Journal with the associated date.

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OF NOTE Benson 121 Benson: I do not wish to appear taking on too much for myself. I ment, we continued with our work. In mid-May 2003, we received a visit from Mr. Walt Slocombe, the Coalition Provisional Authoritys senior representative in the post-Saddam Iraqi Ministry of Defense. On 18 the establishment of what we were calling the New Iraqi Corps (NIC). LTG McKiernans guidance to me and the planners, based on what he knew Slocombe was bringing with him from Washington, was to bear in mind two what he termed principles: (1) nobody above the rank of LTC will be allowed into NIC, and (2) no reestablishment of any Ministry of Defense organization in the near term. Reestablishing the Iraqi army would require a grass roots, bottom-up approach. Slocombe would listen to McKiernans input regarding the use of former Iraqi process. I was to consider the effect these two principles would have on recruitment, additional anti-coalition effects such as continued armed 2 Slocombe listened to our presentation very closely. Near the end, I asked if we were still acting in accord with policy since we had based our planning on the assumption that we could recall the regular Iraqi army. I asked this twice during the presentation. Slocombes answer was, still unsure of where our operations to reestablish the Iraqi Army stood vis--vis US policy. Later, Ambassador Bremer, acting essentially as proconsul in Iraq, disbanded the Iraqi army and prohibited anyone who held Baath party membership from joining the new Iraqi government. How well did your professional military education prepare you for your role as a planner? Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate, a graduate of a US Army War College Fellowship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Security ence as a planner, was the best preparation possible to serve as the chief planner for a land component. I certainly did not want to take counsel professional military education and my personal continuing studies prepared me for the start of the war planning. I adapted afterward and that, too, was aided by the totality of my preparation. 2 Journal, entries dated 18 and 25 May 2002.

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122 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 kind? Benson: The entire apportioned force was the correct force to serve as an instrument of policy. The joint combined arms team was appro as well as appropriate combat support and combat service support forces. This was the apportioned force. It is a moot point, of course, but we will never know if committing the entire apportioned force for the a year of phase IV would have ended with a different result. Benson: While professional soldiers study war, in the 21st century they must also study policymaking. Soldiers and policymakers cannot afford the risk of talking past each other as happened during the Iraq war. This is more likely now than in our history because policy elites and professional soldiers seem increasingly to come from widely dispa rate backgrounds. 3 Professional soldiers and professional policymakers should accept that they approach the problems of strategy from dramati cally different perspectives. This phenomenon is clearly not associated with one or another party. Military professionals must understand the domestic and foreign pressures on the development of policy. Soldiers, close the gap and reconcile perspectives. To quote Clausewitz, To bring a war, or one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce. The end result of spending a year at CGSC, SAMS, and the War College should be a broader view of the circumstances of war and a shared understanding of that phenomenon. A personal theory of war is useless. What we absolutely require is a shared understanding that history and the interpretation of history through the lens of a theory of warfare on the evolution of Army and Joint doctrine as well as on the relevant policy for which war is waged. This knowledge will enable individual agility of mind required to adapt to the changing conditions of war. This is the essence of the art of strategy. The US armed forces concluded the Iraq war in a manner that must be considered a victory: never defeated in battle, accomplished objectives that led to attaining the policy goal of delivering the security challenge to the Iraqis; and departing in accord with a nation-to-nation Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bushs War Cabinet (New York: Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime (New York: Harper-Collins, 2010); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Vintage Books, 2007); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Vintage Books, 2013); and any of the books written by Bob Woodward. On War edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 111

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OF NOTE Benson 123 agreement in December 2011. This is something never done before in that region of the worldan Army leaving in accord with a treaty and in operational level headquarters. My military and professional educa operational headquarters is to translate the tasks of policy and strategy into attainable tactical tasks. I am also convinced tactics without strategy is noise before defeat. 5 understanding the interrelationship of those two concepts and the role played by the operational level commander and staff is important. Of equal importance is an understanding of how strategy is designed, shaped, and adapted over the course of a campaign, all while maintain ing an eye on accomplishing the initial purpose of the war. 6 5 Attributed to Sun Tzu, this quotation is not in The Art of War. Learned, published at Time.com on 1 April 2013. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Greg Fontenot, COL (USA Retired), Professor Steve Lauer, LTC (USMC Retired), and my wife Kate Benson in the development of this essay.

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On Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual Richard H. Sinnreich 2013 Richard H. Sinnreich This commentary is in response to the article, Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual by Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland published in the Autumn 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2). T he authors of Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual offer a comprehensive and forceful defense of the Armys regional alignment concept, and much of what they write is both enlightening and persuasive. Notwithstanding the familiar conceit of each successive generation of leaders that what they are proposing is A Really New Thing, there is nothing revolutionary about regionally aligned forces. On the contrary, for many who served during the Cold War, especially NCOs, and who spent a good part of their careers bouncing back and forth repeatedly between East Cost installations and Germany or West Coast installa tions and Korea, regional alignment was a fact of Army life. But there is no question that both the scale of the effort described in the article and the manner in which the Army proposes to conduct it differ materially from that earlier experience. The biggest changes are in the diversity of the locations to which soldiers will deploy and the increments in which they will do so. Thus, in contrast with the individual deployment practices of the Cold War and the more recent brigade-based rotations sustaining opera tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the RAF concept visualizes deployments of less than battalion or even company strength, more or less on the model of special forces teams. Indeed, the authors note, While it is desirable to maintain habitual alignment at brigade combat team level, the realities of current defense missions make this aspirational rather able to identify when to send squads rather than platoons. Theres nothing intrinsically wrong with that, and it certainly limits budget costs. Moreover, putting aside marketing rhetoric and the absurd notion that spending a month or two in Mali, say, is going to make its visitors Africa specialists, there is much to be said for exposing soldiers to geography in which they might conceivably have to operate one day addition, giving small unit leaders a periodic taste of operational inde pendence certainly has merit. The costs that really should concern us, however, are not RAFs budgetary costs. They are its opportunity costs. The further the Armys Commentaries and Replies COL. Rick Sinnreich, USA Retired, is the military colum nist of Lawton, Oklahoma's Sunday Constitution His columns have been reprinted by The Washington Post ARMY and other journals, and he has edited or contributed to several recent works on military history, including The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War ; The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War ; and Hybrid Warfare

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126 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 force structure shrinksand right now, it looks as though well be lucky be to satisfy all claimants for incremental commitments while sustaining even a modicum of combat readiness. Anyone who ever has commanded and training readiness in the face of routine local support decrements. Committing soldiers and junior leaders in penny-packets to repeated The authors recognize the problem. Meeting combatant com collective training than do major combat operations, they note, yet For that reason, their all-too-correct lament that, Balancing readi ness for the most likely and most dangerous courses of action has never doesnt do, the RAF concept as described will only make that challenge The Authors Reply Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland C implementing Regionally Aligned Forces. He writes that in a ments while sustaining even a modicum of combat readiness. RAF is largely driven and embraced by former battalion and brigade com manders, but the dialogue about this point continues, centered around all-volunteer service. It is worth reemphasizing that Regionally Aligned Forces include those forces aligned for high intensity major combat operations and crisis response, and not simply security cooperation activities. Forces needs exceed both the capacity and capabilities of Special Operations Readiness has, and will continue to be, a topic of concern to Army senior leadership. Indeed, RAF is predicated on the necessity for decisive critical baseline in underpinning the Armys ability to operate across the full spectrum of operations. Still, we ask, how much readiness is enough to meet the requirements of major combat operations requiring brigade level action, and also for the dispersed activity so in demand by Ground Component Commands? How much do these requirements reinforce number of units required for the most demanding operations plan, from

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Commentaries and Replies 127 company through battalion to brigade collective training? What is the end strength threshold at which we do indeed have to protect almost the entire force for brigade level action? Most importantly, how do we better understand readiness in terms of risk, resourcing, and reporting given current and expected requirements? We need to plan the building of readiness that will, with minimal risk, include missions undertaken by regionally aligned forces. We write that RAF will be fully implemented reason why the full implementation will take time. We assert that only by training in joint and coalition environments, adapt rapidly enough for future operations we cannot even envision and certainly not from Fort Hood. As we stated previously, we see RAF as phase one of implementing the concept of Strategic Landpower. RAF are scouts, the Joint Forces best hope for being able to develop decisive about language and cultural expertise. training to turn a National Guard Brigade Combat Team into a unit equally capable as an active duty brigade. How fast can we add them to In any event, as the Chief of Staff has said, we do not currently have our units are using other dollars to make the gains we outlined in the article and again here.

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128 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 On Strategic Landpower in the Jeong Lee This commentary is in response to the article, Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asiano. 3). I n his Parameters article entitled Strategic Landpower in the Indo-AsiaAir Force and the Navy. traditional role of providing defense and deterrence and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and foster allied interoperability and bolster the strength of less-capable partner militaries better than its Navy and Air Force counterparts, because the US Army can speak Army to its allies. 3 The implication is clear. In the sequestration era, the Army needs to justify its relevance in pursuit of Americas geopolitical strategy in the Armys participation in what he refers to as security and coopera several reasons. First, by arguing that many allies view the United States presence positively because it helps establish capabilities that support the rule America still can and must retain the mantle of global leadership even though its image abroad has weakened considerably. 4 According to the latest survey by the Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project, while the United States retained its favorable image over China at 63 percent, many countries are nevertheless perplexed by Americas uni lateral actions on the world stage. 5 Furthermore, security cooperation activities involving Americas Asian allies may potentially anger the led, and could lead to, greater tensions with China. 6 Parameters 4 Ibid. 5 Americas Global Image Remains More Positive than Chinas But Many See China Becoming Worlds Leading Power, Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project, http://www.pew The Diplomat September Mr. Jeong Lee is a freelance writer and a contributing analyst for Wikistrat's Lee's writings have appeared in multiple online publications, including East Asia Forum the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs the World Outline CIMSEC the Naval Institute's blog, RealClarDefense and Small Wars Journa l. He writes on US defense and foreign policy issues as well as interKorean affairs.

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Commentaries and Replies 129 Second, by advocating that the Army also undertake an active role that the Air Force and the Navy are already performing missile defense and, for this reason, undertaking such missions would prove redundant. better suited for fostering allied interoperability because it can speak Army trivializes the fact other services have proven equally adept at or outmatched the Army in fostering interoperability among our Asian allies. measures will be critical to reverse Chinese perception that it is being without risk, especially given Chinas growing cyber capabilities. Indeed, before Congress in July, China is using its advanced cyber capabilities to conduct large-scale cyber espionage [against the United States]. ideas and resources with other services and Asian allies guarantees Landpower Task Force composed of the Army, the Marine Corps, and Because recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that the line between state actors and nonstate actors has blurred, the Army should selectively target and neutralize threats as they arise. To that in tandem with the Navy and the Marine Corps, operate from remote staging areas to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged without constraints. Surgical SOF strikes will remain limited without escalating. Lastly, the Army must also do what it can to defend the homeland from cyberattacks emanating from China. However, as retired Admiral Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and Technology ,Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Strategic Landpower; Winning the Clash of Wills Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

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130 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 combating them requires full cooperation of the private sector [and other federal agencies]. sequestration era where a leaner and smarter military must offer a wide range of options for the nation, the Army cannot just speak Army to stay relevant. Instead, it must speak jointness to become truly effective The Washington Post

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Commentaries and Replies 131 On "Strategic Landpower in the 2013 James D. Perry This commentary is in response to the article, Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asiano. 3). I to play in this region beyond deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. He noted the Army must prepare to conduct disaster relief operations, engage in security cooperation activities, address transnational security challenges, and build relationships with foreign militaries. Furthermore, with China akin to those conducted with Russia in connection with the did not make a convincing analytical case, as he did not even try to assess the current demands that such missions place on the Army. I believe these demands are not large, and am rather skeptical that these missions number of Army brigades or divisions. The number of soldiers currently doing security cooperation mis any given year might require a few hundred to a thousand personnel per disaster. Moreover, disaster relief often employs airlift and sea-based assets, but rarely involves large ground forces. Indeed, the insertion of ground forces during disaster relief is often regarded as counterproduc to speak Army to foreign militaries? Another important military to military program, the Military Personnel Exchange Program, stations for on-site inspections and treaty compliance is approximately one thou agreements concluded with China. Thus, the Army would be on shaky ground attempting to justify a large force structure on the basis of any of the above missions. The various elements of the US foreign military training program undoubtedly foster good relationships with foreign militaries and received an MA in Security Policy in History from George Washington University. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. After completing his fellowship, he joined Science Applications International Corp, where he analyzed national security issues for US government and military clients. He is currently a Senior Analyst for a major aerospace corporation.

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132 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 cies conduct many of these programs, and many others take place in Army training and educational facilities that will exist even if the Army Finally, the dollar value of foreign military training programs is a small programs cannot support an argument for keeping the Army budget particularly high. for this purpose. Even such a considerable force would be less than are unlikely, after twelve years in Afghanistan, to accept the argument that we must maintain a large Army so that we can do yet another long, exhausting advisory effort sometime in the future. not prove, however, that the nation could not realize the advantages of strategic landpower with a smaller Army. If the Army can conduct security cooperation missions effectively with a smaller end strength, then that is a win for the nation as a whole. The Author Replies J a detailed, worldwide troops-to-task analysis for the US Army. However, such a detailed analysis seems unnecessary to justify one of that the Armys ability to perform its strategic role in the Indo-Asiagreater risk if the Army is forced via unconstrained sequestration to cut personnel precipitously. The very recent history of the Armys experi ence in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to have proved this point, when the US Army units from their deterrence and assurance missions in South Korea, cancel or downsize countless security cooperation events around the world, and even dip into the so-called seed corn by deploying training units based at the National Training Center in California and Perry may believe it will be easier for a dramatically smaller Army to meet the needs of the all combatant commanders around the world for secu rity cooperation, assurance, deterrence, disaster response, cyber defense, homeland defense, ballistic missile defense, counterterrorism, and the

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Commentaries and Replies 133 myriad other operations and missions the Army is responsible for, but up the numbers was certainly not comprehensive, and hence not com pelling as a basis for judging whether the active duty Army should be any chosen end strength. Indeed, a full scope troops-to-tasks analysis That report should, among other things, outline the major missions of this writing, one thing that seems very clear is that if sequestration Outside experts agree that sequestration will likely cause a major cut in active duty Army forces and consequently in the number of active duty BCTs. Obviously, and according to these same experts, this will make how forcesremains to be seen, but the fact remains that a smaller military necessarily increases risk. Currently, it appears the country may be quite willing to tolerate a great deal of risk, at least in the short run, when it comes to its land forces. If so, the Army will be a less effective strategic around the world. Meanwhile, Jeong Lees critique is interesting, although not terribly compelling. At the heart of his commentary lies the mistaken view that I argue the Army is better at building interoperability than its sister services. In fact, I recognized in the article that, air and naval exer cises can build allied interoperability as well, and I used the shorthand speak Army to encompass interoperability in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of land forces vice those of air or naval forces. The issue is not whether the Air Force or the Navy can build interoperability with is most clearly no just as the Army clearly cannot build interoperability missions at sea. This distinction matters because land forces dominate the military NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden-Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army The Army Times strategic-choices-exercise-outbrief/.

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134 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 proves unable or unwilling to engage those dominant bureaucracies and organizations within allied and partner defense establishments, it will Lee also contends that because the United States Air Force and United States Navy are performing air and ballistic missile defense standing of the basic roles and missions of the United States military. Per US law, the Army is broadly responsible for defense from the land, so air and missile defense of assets or potential targets on landthe kind of thing the road-mobile Patriot system or the road-mobile Terminal targets on land that need defending from ballistic missile threats, or his Finally, Lee implies that my proposal for the Army to tap into its not recognizing the risk of Chinese espionage occurring during CSBM activities. In fact, I made this exact point in my article. Certainly Chinese espionage, including through cyberspace, is a risk that must be carefully managed when it comes to CSBM implementation, but as I went on to argue, if the Chinese use CSBM activities to collect intelligence on the United States military, so what? At least in part, that is the very point of CSBMs. The same occurred during the Cold War and its aftermath between US and Soviet/Russian arms control inspectors, observers, and specialistseach side collected on the other during exercise observer were literally incredulous when shown data on the paltry array of U.S. forward-based military forces and biand multilateral security agree against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold Warunderscores the notion that greater transparency with China is necessary to avoid any In sum, Lee is certainly correct that the US Army needs to maintain and build on the jointness it shares with its sister services, particularly in an era of austerity. By the same token, US policymakers need to take advantage of all the tools at their disposal in pursuing American interests preexisting paradigms.

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Commentaries and Replies 135 On Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait This commentary is in response to the article, Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait by Dennis V. Hickey published in the Autumn 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2). T his is a timely discussion of US arms sales to Taiwan. The author has done a great job drawing attention to the evolving security situation across the Taiwan Strait and placing the debates in the US policy and analyst circles about Americas options on this thorny issue in perspective. While well presented, this article would have been better had the mendations for Chinese policymakers regarding predicaments with With respect to this option, the author should have stated that though it is worthwhile to call for the United States to terminate arms sales to Taiwan, there is practically no chance of this happening as long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. As for recommendations, the author could have pointed out that the main driver for US arms sales to Taiwan comes not from the alleged American ill intent and economic interests, as many Chinese analysts have long charged, but from Taiwans need for security. The reason is not want more arms, the United States cannot force Taiwan to buy. The fact is that the Taiwan government, whether under the administration of repeatedly asked for more arms from the United States. Nations seek arms when they are concerned with the specter of the solution to the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan lies in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. China should have a better chance to affect the arms sale the United States to abandon this business is like putting the cart before the horsethe efforts are not going anywhere. Chinas insistence on terminating US arms sales to Taiwan as one of the three preconditions for improving United States-China military-to-military relationship is reconnaissance operations in the Chinese-claimed maritime exclusive economic zones and removing US restrictions on military exchange terproductive and dangerous at a time when the two nations have a Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. His recent publications are New Model for Great Op-Ed, October Strategic Assessment The United States and China in Power Transition

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136 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 understanding of each others operational rules of engagement. It is time to make adjustments. The Author Replies A however, I disagree with others. Let me explain. no chance of this happening. But some do not share this opinion. In organized Congressional hearings in the US House of Representatives because some politicians had begun to pressure the Obama adminis tration to abandon Taiwan. Lets remember that many Americans were would journey to China to meet Chairman Mao Zedong. Millions were also surprised when the Reagan administration announced on August and eventually terminate arms transfers. Such episodes help remind us that anything is possible in international politics. Second, Lai appears to quarrel with the assertion that economic considerations may serve as a driver for US arms sales to Taiwan. He should carefully review the wording of those studies supporting arms sales and the petitions submitted to President Obama. In fact, when commenting on the sale of new warplanes to Taiwan, the September/ The Taiwan Communiqu by Taiwan separatists based in America, contends that it is the eco nomic argument that will be the main reason why Congress will attempt to override the decision and force the administration to go ahead with Third, Lai claims that both major political parties in Taiwan always reversal and opposed such purchases. This explains why a massive arms arms purchases. Finally, Lai suggests that the solution to the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan lies in cross-strait relations. He is correct. In an article entitled Wake Up to Reality: Taiwan, the Chinese Mainland and Peace The Journal of Chinese Political Science Volume the two sides to sustain the momentum in cross-strait relations unless Beijingand to some extent Taipeibegin to recalibrate their relation ship in a more pragmatic way and adopt some new thinking on the

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Commentaries and Replies 137 concepts of sovereignty and the political status of the ROC. In short, and PRC exist. To be sure, it is time for Beijing to wake up to reality.

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138 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 On US Options in Syria Nathan K. Finney 2013 Nathan K. Finney This commentary is in response to the article US Options in Syria by David S. Sorenson published in the Autumn 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 3). I Autumn issues Commentaries and Replies between Major General read the thoughtful and balanced article by the Air War Colleges Professor well on the war colleges. He begins by detailing American interests in Syria and the region, including ending the civil war, reducing the effects of the civil war on allies in the region. While these are all admi rable interests, Sorenson does not discuss whether these interests are vital, important, or only peripheral. He does state that our interests in the region are important and Syria is a pivotal country, but he does not elaborate. Additionally, Sorenson states that, It is also in Americas interest to terminate major internal wars in the region if it has the means and ability to do so, and at an acceptable cost. Why is this the case? I our interests in Syria are peripheral at best and that it is not always in our interest to meddle in internal wars, whether they are in the Middle East or other less strategically important areas like Africa. After describing American interests in Syria, Sorenson discusses US options developed to date by our national security apparatus, most clearly articulated in the memo by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the anticipated ways available to the United States, including everything punitive strikes by stand-off weaponry. Using these options as a framework, Sorenson describes end-state conditions that could be achieved in both winding down the civil war and preventing its violence affecting neighboring countries. His analy sis is a great elaboration on the obstacles that face the development of options to address Syria. In ending the civil war, Sorenson recognizes a limited war to achieve the best outcome in a bad situation. He also recognizes the view that American support is not designed to bring the parties. Why is this a bad approach? As strategist Edward Luttwak stated MAJ Nathan K. Finney, USA, is a member of the Journal 's Special Advisory Group and has written on issues that involve strategy, building partner capacity, security sector reform, and security force assistance. He holds a Master's in Public Administration from both Harvard University and the University of Kansas, as well as a B.A. in Anthropology from the University of Arizona.

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Commentaries and Replies 139 in The New York Times in August, There is only one outcome that the neighboring countries, Sorenson approves of a containment of Syria, recognizing the differences between the Cold War era containment, out, while containment for Syria would require keeping the actors in. This aim would typically call for sealing Syrias borders, threatening regime supporters. Sorenson admirably acknowledges that this kind of the asymmetric value of a peaceful solution, and providing Assad little incentive to give up power. This brings Sorenson to his solution: containment of the violence in Syria through the support of neighboring countries. His ideal approach would be to support neighbor militaries, share info, maintain air and naval forces proximate to Syria, and threaten Assad for any moves we have in the region. In order to create a balance between the belliger ents, our support, or lack thereof, can help ensure each party is balanced, ultimately exhausting all partiesfrom Assad to Iran, or Hezbollah to Sunni extremists. This was the core argument made by Luttwak in The New York Times op-ed referenced earlier. Finally, while Sorenson postulates that our best approach is through the support of neighboring states, he barely addresses one of our most potent military capabilitiessecurity force assistance. He does mention military assistance to Lebanon, but does not address what we should do to ensure the ability of Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Iraq to contain Syria. Granted, most of these nations already have security assistance programs with the United States and possess some capacity to secure their borders, but this is an aspect I think could have used more elaboration. Overall, I was very impressed with US Options in Syria. Sorensons realistic approach to an intractable problem was reinforced with expert region and ways to achieve them, I agree that Containment is in the interests of all countries bordering Syria, and the White House must stress and build on that point in its own policy. This policy should be focused on containing instability and violence from leaving Syria through support to its neighboring states. On this, the author and I are in violent agreement.

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ARMED NONST A TE GROUPS Global Security Upheaval: Armed Non-state Groups Usurping State Stability Functions By Robert Mandel Reviewed by Dr. Jos de Arimatia da Cruz, Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics R obert Mandels Global Security Upheaval: Armed Non-state Groups Usurping State Stability Functions security studies. The authors arguments and recommendations turn the Westphalian state system on its head. In that system, rule or monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force is considered the exclusive domain of the state. Furthermore, the states ability to provide for the welfare and security of its citizens is derived from its presumed social contract between the rulers and the ruled. However, Mandels Global Security Upheaval calls into question the common belief that central governments are the sole source of a nations stability and argues that subnational and transnational nonstate forces are major sources of global instability in an insecure world. According to Mandel, the steady concentration of power in the hands of states, which began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, is over, at least for a while in part because of the ability of armed individuals and armed nonstate groups to undertake physical coercions. In this post-Westphalian system there are diverse sources of rule or monopoly over the use of force rather than just the mighty Leviathan. In addition, armed nonstate groups may enjoy a form of Weberian legitimacy if they step into a power vacuum and provide for critical public needs. Mandel questions the conventional thinking about international stability. His argument rests on four main assumptions. First, states and intergovernmental organizations are the dominant focus of authority in global society. Second, armed nonstate groups are legitimate spoilers disrupting security and triggering political disorder and violence. Third, the public consistently demands state government protection, and private bodies can enhance security only if they do not rely on the threat or use of violence, as with transnational market-based or humanitarian organizations. Fourth, if a state is not providing stability, a strategy of strengthening and expanding governmental capacity would be a sensible Mandel also provides a set of counterpropositions. For example, areas exist where it makes little sense to rely on central state governments for stability; attempts to bolster such governments to promote stability often prove futile; armed nonstate groups can sometimes provide local stability better than states; power-sharing arrangements between states and armed nonstate groups may sometimes be viable; and these changes deviations from standard responses. Mandel believes a state must follow these strategies to enhance its national security. Book Reviews Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013 304 pages $32.95

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142 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Moreover, changes in the global supply and demand for protection are the primary reason for the rise of armed nonstate groups. As the state is an increase in public demand for protection, armed nonstate groups the security of the state and individuals becomes grounded in private enterprise, armed nonstate groups in locales where the state has lost control could become the only viable alternative for stability. Mandel argues that there are areas of the world where it makes little sense to rely on state government for stability. In fact, argues Mandel, attempts to bolster such governments efforts to promote stability often result in the opposite outcome: more violence and less security. Figure 1 sum marizes Mandels argument of supply and demand of nonstate actors for protection. Figure 1. Mandel's argument of supply and demand of nonstate actors for protection. There are several elements in this text that make it unique in rela

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Book Reviews : Armed Nonstate Groups 143 key conceptual points, allowing readers to gain a quick understanding ings across topics and sections. Second, the book contains extensive cross-references allowing readers who want more background on a topic explores the question whether the mighty Leviathan state is willing to coexist with a parallel state or a state-within-states to provide secu rity and stability in the future. Mandels answer is obviously yes. Figure 2 illustrates Mandels vision regarding attitude changes for alternative security governance. Figure 2. Mandel's proposed attitude changes necessary for successful alternative security governance. In conclusion, I recommend this book to anyone interested in global security studies and future military leaders. This text can be especially useful to students at the US Army War College, many of whom will have to face the dilemma raised by Mandel.

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144 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare by Max G. Manwaring Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College T he Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for the Future (2008) and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars (2010) also by University of Oklahoma Press. The authorMax Manwaring, a Professor of Military Strategy at the research) in Latin America along with an in-depth knowledge of numer ous forms of insurgent and post-modern variations of warfare, which leverage psychological, temporal, and other unconventional capabilities. The work is composed of a foreword (by John T. Fishel), preface and acknowledgements, and an introduction; the main section of seven chapters written by Manwaring; followed by an afterword (by Edwin G. Corr) and concluding sections composed of notes, a bibliography, as well as an index. Both former US Ambassador Corr and Professor Fishel (emeritus) are long-time Manwaring associates who have written informative and strategically valuable essays that highlight the works (Chapter 1); Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Chapter 2); vignettes of al Qaeda (in Spain); Cuban popular militias, gangs and organized crime in Haiti, and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in Brazil (Chapter 3); the Russian politicized youth group Nashi (Chapter 4); transnational organized crime, gangs, and corrupted elites in Guatemala (Chapter 5); futures (Chapter 7). Leading into the conclusion, each of the previous six provide key points and lessons as chapter summations. As a colleague of Manwaring, Ive always been amazed at his ability to draw upon unique and esoteric resources in his writings, including personal author interviews. The books references are solid with an emphasis on scholarly works from the last ten years. The author not only has kept up with the literature in this area but also is responsible for shaping it and being one of its more creative contributors. The books main arguments and lessons learned focus on the rise of irregular cepts of warfare. What we are seeing is the blurring of crime, warfare, gang activity, and the like. These are new actorsboth state and non state groupswho may wage war and there is a new center of gravity of victory. Furthermore, our interpretations of power and the purpose and motives of war are changing. The end resultI agree with the authoris that conventional warfare is by comparison much easier to Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012 224 pages $45.00

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Book Reviews : Armed Nonstate Groups 145 multilateral, multiorganizational, and totalan unrestricted, brutal, and more complex form of organized and hypercompetitive political violence. The major policy suggestions advocated to contend with the new organizational imperatives: a) our civilian and military leaders need to learn about subversion and insurgency techniques and understand strategic and political-psychological implications of operational and enhanced and revitalized interagency cooperation, cultural awareness and language training, and combined (multinational) exercises to be effective; c) leaders need to understand that increased intelligence capa bilities are required for small internal wars; d) our peace enforcers must actor conventional and unconventional weaponry; and e) governmental restructuring is necessary to achieve an effective unity of effort drawing upon civilian and military instruments of national power and obtain an Positive aspects of the bookbesides the main arguments and important US defense policy suggestions contained within itinclude the chapter focuses that highlight some very informative case studies. The reviewer found the Sendero Luminoso, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), and Russian Nashi essays of great interest due to a general lack of exposure to those topical areas. The gaining of insights and context for these groups was in itself added value. A negative aspect of the work, if that is even a fair characterization, is that it seeks to peer times with both a hazy vision of emergent forms of warfare and of the opposing forces the United States may be facing. In summation, the workand its two predecessor volumesis of great relevance and value to senior members of the US defense commu nity. While some of the discussions and analysis in the work may not be clear and crisp, even approaching the philosophical, Manwaring offers key mosaic pieces to help us understand the complex puzzlewhich Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group 2005-2012 By Stig Jarle Hansen Naval War College A s the Kenyan government is still trying to piece together what actu ally happened during al-Shabaabs 21 September 2013 attack on Nairobis Westgate shopping mall, this is a most timely book. Al-Shabaab, at least for a time, was the most favored and successful of al Qaedas areas of the Somali countryside, including the capital Mogadishu. This Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 208 pages $31.80

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146 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 to predict the incipient demise of the organization. Clearly, these predic tions were premature. Scholar and author Stig Hansen has put together a remarkably packed accounts of numerous Somali clans and their associated leaders and activities. While this level of detail may seem daunting to some, the book is still of great value to the lay reader. It is of greater utility to those analysts and practitioners who need or want to know about recent Somali history, or the rise of a surprisingly effective terrorist organiza tion that may serve as a model for other such groups in the future. Hansen comes from that small breed of what might be termed adventure scholarsalthough he himself might disagree with being has travelled widely through Somalia for years and is personally familiar with many of the members and leaders of the movement. As a result, his description of events carries a powerful sense of legitimacy. While it is possible to debate what Hansens observations mean, there is no doubting their authenticity. There are surprises in this book. For example, it is easy to forget alShabaabs very modest beginnings. For example, in 2005, the movement southern Somalia. Hansen shows the reader how this happened. In the wish to understand, and to potentially oppose, such groups. The degree to which al-Shabaab used international events and a this broader dimension helped the movements leaders align with dis the United States. At the same time, al-Shabaab had to be relevant on the local clan level, which required them to be responsive to Somali issues that had little or nothing to do with a globalist ideology. Indeed, as al-Shabaab gained support among Somali clans, starting with some who were being sore-pressed by larger, more powerful groups, its leaders found themselves in a position similar to that of some politicians who, having come to power on glowing promises, now had to deliver. This meant al-Shabaab was required to govern. It had to provide areas of stability where none had previously existed, ruling as neither an exploitative warlord nor a corrupt Somali governmentneither of which Hansen argues provided real human security for Somalis in their areas of control. This was never an easy task and was often compounded by such adverse factors as drought and internal clan politics. This is not to imply that the leaders of al-Shabaab were some roman provided a form of justice through strict Sharia courts. They recruited heavily from local clans and established a powerful secret police, the Amniyat. The group relied on assassinations, roadside bombs, and suicide attacks in their rise to power. Interestingly, the majority of the suicide attacks were said to have been carried out by non-Somali members of the group.

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Book Reviews : Armed Nonstate Groups 147 At the same time, Hansen also makes it clear that al-Shabaabs link to al Qaeda was always more than just lip service. Although not centrally directed by al Qaeda, the relationship is important to both organizations. globally oriented ideology remains aligned with the larger group. One point where the local and global are able to be conjoined by al-Shabaab is the ability to blame any adversity on the United States or African actors Al-Shabaab has also displayed a talent for creating a powerful propaganda arm and not above dealing with criminal elementsmost case, al-Shabaab did not go to sea; it simply demanded a piece of the action from those who did. Hansens account also reminds the reader that violent extremist groups embrace terror and irregular warfare as tactics of choice because they are not capable of engaging their opponents in a more conventional fashion. Although al-Shabaab was able to hold its own against the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, it was unable to do so against Ethiopian, Kenyan, Ugandan, and African Union military troops. The success of these forces, whether acting independently or as allies, speaks favorably of their military skill and capability. Al-Shabaabs subsequent defeat cost them territory, created dissen sion among the groups leadership, and led to a loss of credibility and defection by clans that were previously loyal. While not destroying alShabaab, the military victories obtained by other African forces serve as a reminder that violent extremist groups suffer much from loss of reputation and that bombing shopping malls and assassinating opposi tion leaders is what they do when they cannot hold their own against conventional forces. This lesson should not be lost on those who hope to defeat such organizations. But Hansen also reminds us that al-Shabaab is resilient. The Amniyat is still a force with which to be reckoned and a large amount of Somali territory is still under al-Shabaab control. The organization can obvi ously still mount cross-border actions and it is unlikely that its leadership will not seek to regain their former positions of power. It would have been interesting if Hansen had discussed al-Shabaabs military operations in greater detail as to tactics, training, command and control, and so on. This is not to imply that he ignores these areas, just that readers with a particular interest in such things may be left wanting more. One could also wish Hansen had expanded this work to include more analysis to rest alongside his powerful historical account. Given his long and deep exposure to the group, it would be valuable to know what he thinks the chances of integrating al-Shabaab into a legitimate Somali government and what the al-Shabaab story means to Africa and the world. That said, until the distant and unlikely day when something better comes along, Al-Shabaab in Somalia the subject.

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148 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 New Security Challenges in Asia Edited by Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway Reviewed by Jeong Lee, a freelance writer and contributing analyst for Wikistrat's N ew Security Challenges in Asia (eds. Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway) is a collection of scholarly essays arguing that Asian security issues are determined by transnational elements that are shaped as much by external sources as the preferred responses of the actors involved. For this reason, the contributing writers focus on four core aspects of Asian security dilemma: water and food security, responses to pandemics, and transnational crimes, including cyberwarfare and ter rorism. But as Wills and Hathaway concede in the introductory essay, such challenges are hardly new. Indeed, the book shows how complex foreign policy threats manifest themselves as an amalgamation of old and new challenges. The book is divided into ten chapter-length essays. In each chapter, authors examine case studies and follow them with policy recommenda tions for American and Asian policymakers. The editors set the tone for the discussion by laying out factors hampering effective responses to transnational threats to Asian security which may ultimately under mine the legitimacy of the state actors involved. Hathaway and Wills the complexity and the rapid pace with which they threaten the security of the region and the attendant problems associated with integrating the new frameworks of cooperation due to the lack of consistent policy approaches and capabilities. Although none of the essays in this volume explores the military dimensions of security challenges, defense policy mavens and military 2, Kenneth Pomeranz examines how limited access to water can lead to over food and water security concerns. over the Indus River Basin in Chapter 4. Strahorn argues that while the Indus Waters Treaty has been a political success, it ultimately lacks of water usage by China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Strahorn security interests in the region. In Chapter 9, Justin V. Hastings examines how post-colonial legacies in Southeast Asia have combined traditional instability with modernity to give rise to terrorism that continues to bedevil Southeast Asian states. To illustrate how Southeast Asias porous political and economic net works can complicate both economic policies and counterterrorism efforts, Hastings examines two case studies. Each case illustrates how imperfect border control can foster what Hastings calls illicit political Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Press, 2013 273 pages $55.00

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Book Reviews : Armed Nonstate Groups 149 and economic networks. Since terrorism in the aforementioned regions can undermine American interests, Hastings argues that the United States should reshape the security environment in Southeast Asia by aiding its allies at all governmental levels. Adam Segals essay in Chapter 10 examines how cybersecurity threats may undermine the underpinnings of global networks due to identifying perpetrators of cybercrimes. For these reasons, Segal argues that the militarization of cyberspace perpetuates traditional interstate rivalries. To prevent cyber threats from spiraling out of control, Segal tacks. Further, he argues the United States should combat cyber threats by fostering a regional approach to addressing cyberwarfare. For diplomats and international relations scholars, this book may be international relations theoretical frameworks. As if to bear this out, case studies cited by the contributors demonstrate that no traditional international relations theories can easily explain the underlying causes of the challenges and threats posed by the plethora of elements involved nor can diplomats and scholars readily derive solutions from them. chief complaint is the authors do not address the military dimensions of the transnational elements threatening Asian security. For instance, the authors dealing with water security, transnational crime, and cyber threats could have included policy recommendations for how the US armed forces can successfully deal with the new security challenges. Furthermore, the contributors American-centric policy recom mendations fail to address solutions from the viewpoints of allies who supposedly need our guidance. To give a few examples, Robert Pomeroys Chapter 5 entail top-down approaches directed by Washington, whereby the writer believes the United States must play a vital role in fostering sustainable growth and governance. Also, Segals solutions for dealing diplomatic embarrassments wrought by the revelation that the National Security Agency has been eavesdropping on Americas chief allies. The aforementioned shortcomings notwithstanding, New Security Challenges in Asia may serve as an informative guide for how the United States can successfully rebalance to Asia. As the writers of this volume show, where little or no military solutions exist to deal with new chal lenges, the United States can lead from behind by relying upon its soft power.

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150 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 POLICY, TERROR, & ESPIONAGE Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency By Daniel Klaidman Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College D aniel Klaidmans Kill or Capture provides an in-depth examination of the Obama administrations policies on terrorism-related issues including Guantanamo Bay prisoners, harsh interrogations, military commissions, and the use of armed drones to strike against terrorists. According to Klaidman, President Obama had emerged as a foreign policy realist by the time he was elected and repeatedly proved himself to be ruthlessly pragmatic on terrorism issues despite his liberal instincts. An ongoing focus of this book is the legal and policy disagreements enced the internal debate on a range of contentious issues. The two most important factions within the administration were sometimes slyly referred to as Tammany Hall and the Aspen Institute. The bare knuckles realists of Tammany (such as White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel) often won the most important debates, and the Aspen idealists often spent more time than they would have wished nursing their political wounds. The author goes into extensive and sometimes painful detail about and other senior bureaucrats. According to Klaidman, By the midway swung toward Tammany. Rahm Emanuel is portrayed as tough and transactional, focusing heavily on how any action could help the presi dents agenda without worrying about liberal ideals that were politically costly. Attorney General Eric Holder was often his chief foil and at least on one occasion was pushed to the brink of resignation. While Holder is one of Obamas closest friends, the president still tended to side with Emanuel on most important arguments in the belief that pragmatism Holder ultimately chose not to resign because it would have been widely assumed that he had been driven out by Tammany or become disillu sioned with the administration to the point that he could no longer serve it. Holder understood the situation and remained a loyalist. If the president needed any additional push to implement toughminded policies, he clearly received it when on 25 December 2009 a member of the terrorist group al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) barely failed in his mission to destroy a commercial US aircraft with 289 passengers. The consequences of such an action would have been catastrophic for both the country and the administration. In addition, due to an appalling death toll, the attack could have produced serious political pressure to do something dramatic in retaliation and perhaps even undertake some sort of intervention in Yemen, which could have New York: Houghton 304 pages $14.95

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Book Reviews : Policy, Terror, & Espionage 151 President Obama stated, We dodged a bullet, but just barely. It [the attack] was averted by brave individuals [passengers], not because the system worked. Five months later, the Obama administration was lucky again when the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, selected the wrong type of fertilizer for use in a car bomb and was arrested after his car smoked but did not explode. This incident was a second dodged in the administration. Under these circumstances, improving intelli gence and security operations appeared increasingly vital if the United States was going to avoid a catastrophe. After the Christmas bombing attempt, Holder told his staff the increased danger of large-scale terror ist strikes had fundamentally changed the administration debate and they were now in a new world. The Times Square bombing attempt Tammany. A central part of the administrations response to terrorist near misses involved what the author calls Barack Obamas ferocious cam paign of targeted killings through the use of armed drones. While drone strikes, Obama was prepared to escalate their use to end the ter rorist career of Anwar al Awlaki and other individuals like him. Awlaki was the Yemen-based planner of the Christmas Day plot, whom Obama designated as the leading terrorist target for elimination, having priority even over al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Unsurprisingly, Awlaki was subsequently killed in a US drone strike, despite his status as a US citizen. Also, as is well known, the Obama administration continued to make extensive use of armed drones, which Klaidman describes as a seductive tool. In this political environment, some administration intelligence) was no longer a priority when they could be killed so easily. Yet, if President Obama remained a committed supporter of drone strikes, one hard-line policy he did not support was the continued use of the Guantanamo Bay prison to hold terrorism suspects. Rather, he had hoped to transfer these detainees to Supermax prisons such as the ones in Marion, Illinois, and Florence, Colorado, but was repeatedly and effectively thwarted by bipartisan Congressional objections. In sum, this book is a particularly valuable resource since many of the issues it discusses provide important historical context for con temporary policy debates. These controversies include the arguments about privacy versus security involving the National Security Agencys activities. Civil libertarians who maintain the scales have been tipped too far in the direction of security can usefully consider the very close calls with terrorism mentioned in this study, and what kind of political environment would exist if they had succeeded. Likewise, individuals on all sides of the Guantanamo debate will have the opportunity to con in any near-term time frame despite potentially viable alternatives. The issue of drones has also continued to be with us and is likely to remain the seductive tool for not only Obama but also many future presidents.

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152 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere Edited by Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson Reviewed by LTC Joseph Becker, Faculty Member at the National Intelligence University, Washington, DC C ultural analysis is an academic tool that holds considerable potential for understanding complicated issues outside an analysts normal frame of reference. However, within the intelligence community, this tool is often misunderstood or misapplied, producing disappointing results that tend to discredit the discipline as a component in the produc tion of quality intelligence analysis. The authors and editors of Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere provide a different understanding both allies and adversaries. They build their argument by using comparative analysis to examine case studies written by multiple authors about a wide selection of intelligence services from non-Western countries. This book serves as both an example of how cultural analysis might be applied by practitioners of intelligence as well as an insightful collection of case studies about intelligence services that have often been neglected in the body of Western intelligence research. This book devotes four early chapters to examining ancient intel ligence traditions arising from China, the Maurya Empire in India, the Byzantine Empire, and the foundation of Islam. The authors and editors believe these traditions have a profound, but often unrecognized, impact on a swath of modern states and their security services. The book continues to describe individual countries and their security appa ratus in terms of historical layers, each of which contributes a portion to the explanation of their organizations current status. As asserted by multiple authors throughout the text, the study of culture cannot predict what action a country or its leaders will take in any given circumstance, but it can offer great insight into how they will carry it out. Furthermore, even the individual actors themselves may not be fully aware of the The chapter on Russian security services, entitled Protecting the New Rome, is a high point in the book. Russias tilt away from the West since the end of the Soviet Union towards an authoritarian model has culture that underlies this process. President Putins patriarchal behav ior toward the Russian Orthodox Church draws parallels to emperors of a millennium past, but far from being an isolated anachronism, this chapter demonstrates elements of this pattern have perpetuated, even during the Soviet Union. This culminates today in a security culture that has allowed Russias intelligence services to weather extreme political change with surprisingly little impact. Also of note, the authors of this work provide illuminating insight into the security services of both Iran and Japan. In the case of Iran, the chapter describes a shatterbelt of competing tensions, both internal and external to the current Iranian regime. This leaves Irans intelligence Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013 320 pages $34.95

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Book Reviews : Policy, Terror, & Espionage 153 services in a position of crucial importance, while tying their hands so that none individually can threaten the political status quo. A combina culture designed to protect a government whose very foundations seem would seem straightforward by comparison. However, a number of class status in Japan. Furthermore, the traditional value placed upon the attainment of consensus in every major decision means that even the best intelligence information might be brushed aside once agreement has been reached on a course of action or policy. For countries with freely and democratically elected governments, the authors use the term democratization of intelligence as a basis by which to compare and contrast the progress that certain intelligence services are making in their evolution toward supporting the institu tions of democracy and accountable governance in those countries. In several cases, authors trace a given countrys political evolution side-byside with its primary security services. It is interesting to note, as in the case of Argentina, that in spite of major political changes, elements of a countrys intelligence apparatus often have tremendous staying power and seem to run much deeper than the roots of any given organization or personality. This book demonstrates that intelligence culture is a product of history and changes to a given culture take considerable time. Although Intelligence Elsewhere is written by a group of authors, the style is academic throughout. It is well-sourced and precise in its asser of variables and a tendency toward ambiguity. Therefore, in order to scope their arguments, the authors have loaded some portions of the for cumbersome reading, especially for the casual reader. However, for students and practitioners of intelligence, this will be a valuable addition to their collection. It is also worth mentioning that many of these case studies could stand alone as primers or reference material on individual countries and intelligence services. Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947-2001 By Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn Reviewed by Mr. Ross W. Clark, Graduate Student, School of International T he Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) shroud of secrecy allows for its effectiveness in addressing the nations security problems. On 22 September 1947, President Harry Truman created the CIA under the auspices of the National Security Act of 1947. Under this act, the CIA's primary goal was and remains not only to evaluate intelligence related to US national security but also prevent strategic surprises that threaten US national security. The CIAs occasional intelligence failures and the potential reasons behind these inabilities are the topic of this book. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013 375 pages $53.18

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154 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Constructing Cassandra, by Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn, dis cusses the failures of the CIA, including those associated withthe Iranian revolution, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, in at hand for CIA analysts and operatives. In this approach, the book Constructing Cassandra tion that one has been operating on the basis of an erroneous threat assessment that results in a failure to anticipate a grave threat to vital national interests. Explaining the challenges of strategic surprises, challenging the Cassandras (individuals who anticipated the course of events but were ignored), and proposing recommendations are the main points of this study. The culture and identity of an organization determine how it reacts to the environment and what problems it notices and addresses. CIA personnels threat perception and ability to decipher threats from intelligence reports is dependent on CIA structure and organizational culture which, therefore, need to be studied. This approach, called social constructivist, is the process used to examine the social setting of the organization and how it affects its ability to do its job originally established by the National Security Act. Throughout the work, multiple persistent features of the nature of the CIA are outlined, including but not limited to the homogeneity of the personnel, preference of secret over open source information, and the idea of a consensus-driven atmosphere. Until recently, upper-class White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) Americans dominated the CIA as a distorted protective mechanism against betrayal. In addition, there is a preference for only clandestinely obtained information and a belief that its reliability is guaranteed by the secret manner in which this information is obtained. Finally, there is a widespread view that the CIA is a consensus-driven organization and there are social and institutional pressures not to be an analytical outlier. One CIA veteran, Robert George, states, Trying to argue against the current analytical line can be seen as undermining teamwork or even a sign of personal self-promotion. What the above points do not describe in detail is how this identity is maintained and in what ways these aspects impact the decisionmaking process CIA analysts perform. The selection process these analysts must endure speaks to the nature of the work CIA employees must complete. Personnel selection is important because of the intelligence profession and how the CIA trains analysts to gather data. The adaptation of the analysts to the CIA and their training processes play large roles in the socialization of that analyst. Constructing Cassandra reveals that no matter how good colleagues and superiors usher in unexamined social practices, analytical methodologies, and cultural norms. A suggestion the book offers is that along with analysts, the CIA needs intelligence synthesists to evaluate the analytical approach and it is this failure that leads to a misdiagnosis of some analytical problems. Other fundamental failures that may lead to strategic surprises include the widespread cultural norm that the CIA often attempts to satisfy its bureaucratic superiors as opposed to produc ing superior analysis, and that compartmentalization makes it hard to

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Book Reviews : Policy, Terror, & Espionage 155 connect the dots in intelligence work. The failures examined throughout the book do not point to a single fault in the social mechanisms of the CIA or to the cultural norms instilled in its analysts; it rather states that the failures are products of a plethora of different aspects that make the CIA the entity it is today. In conclusion, the book examines the future of intelligence gathering and analysis. It describes the need for a change in the intelligence cycle by establishing a hypothesis, followed by tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. Constructing Cassandra states that adding an hypothesis to the cycle will interject intellect and creative thinking into a process that often becomes too bureaucratic, and would assist the agency when its consumers demand answers. Jones and Silberzahn have crafted an insightful masterpiece to frame the true nature of the CIA. The depth to which their arguments are presented clearly shows the dangers a tight knit intelligence society may have when analyzing intel ligence reports. Their purpose is not to craft lofty goals the agency will never reach but rather to examine the reasons why the agency failed in the past. I recommend this book to anyone with a passion in understand ing the analytical framework of the CIA and who seeks to comprehend the theoretical approach, through the uses of organizational theory, in uncovering its internal mysteries.

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156 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 STR A TEGIC LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire By Andrew Jackson OShaughnessy Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations, US Army War College T his work provides a welcome reappraisal of the British loss of their American colonies, i.e., the American Revolution during 1775-83, in the context of British global strategic decisionmaking. The subject is not new. Author Andrew Jackson OShaughnessy credits Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 of the Acknowledgment, highlighting Mackesys belief that the war was winnable but was lost to poor generalship, among other things. OShaughnessy states clearly that American victory was not inevitable. It is a somewhat harder task to challenge the conventional wisdom that the British loss was due to incompetence and mediocre leadership, both political and military. The author packages the monograph in nine biographical chapters, examining ten British leaders at policy, strategic, and theater strategic/operational levels, in sequence: King George III; Lord North as prime minister; the Howe brothers, Admiral Lord Richard and Lieutenant General Sir William; Major General John Burgoyne; Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, a third Secretary of State created in 1768; Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton; Major General Charles, 1st Marquis Cornwallis; Admiral Sir George Rodney; and John Montague, Earl of Sandwich, as First Lord of the Admiralty. The work features senior leaders wrestling with an unprecedented set of problems, in the authors words obstacles of such magnitude. He explains their decisionmaking in the overall context of the eighteenth century; the nature of the English state, extant political institutions, and their processes; global strategy; and ultimately the nature of the military element of power, land and naval. For example, despite the previously showcased ministry of Sir Robert Walpole in British history, OShaughnessy underlines the as-yet evolutionary nature of English gov ernment at the time, especially the gradual development of true cabinet government with collective ministerial responsibility. His interpretation is not without controversy, at least insofar as extant practice to ensure political survival resulted in conduct for collective shielding. He believes the most fundamental miscalculation of these senior leaders was the belief that Loyalists constituted a majority of the popula tion in America. Moreover, these same leaders did not understand the changes that took place in the wars nature. Its length, seeming without end, increased popular antipathy toward British military presence. seminal document for genuine, revolutionary change: a radical republi can creed which beckoned a better future. Furthermore, in current terms, he sees a serious imbalance in ends, ways, and means. He highlights the major aspects of the post-war draw down after 1748, following the end of the War of Austrian Succession. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013 466 pages $30.00

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Book Reviews : Strategic Leadership in Wartime 157 He concludes that both the Royal Navy and British Army were too small for the task at hand. The latter simply lacked the strength to conquer and occupy the American colonies, especially given the alacrity with which Patriot forces had taken control of established institutions, further underlining Loyalist weaknesses. Multiple demands upon military power exacerbated this imbalance. OShaughnessy repeatedly reminds readers to comprehend Britains global responsibilities. War against the thirteen American colonies occurred with simultaneous concerns for Canada, the Caribbean, India, and Europe itself. These other theaters became ones of pressing urgency with French and others active intervention in the war from 1778. The authors analysis of the daunting logistical challenges to wage global warfare during this period could stand as a case study in its own right. He summarizes and synthesizes a considerable body of primary evidence and historical examinations. The reality that the British Army in America could not sustain itself in theater came as a shock, and drove major aspects of planning. The dissection of such political and military decisions also accounts for the human domain. His ten main characters are not distant eighteenthcentury aristocrats. They are individuals with strengths and weaknesses, and families upon whom they depended and who mattered greatly in their lives. He also shows how personalities mattered in the daily work ings of governmental business and English society at large, including an explanation of the nature and role of the media in eighteenth-century England. He reviews the vocal, politically astute opposition to the war in England. Moreover, he hints at English leaders ambivalence on how to situation was not the same as previous experience dealing with Ireland and Scotland. Perhaps the best manifestation of this doubt concerns the British Army. It never obtained battle honors for any victories in the course of the American War against the colonists. OShaughnessys book does mirror earlier works in several ways. Besides Mackesy (already cited), Jeremy Black, War for America: The Fight for Independence, 1775-1783 (1991) also asserted that American victory was not inevitable. In other words, there are cogent explanations why the Revolution could have failed, or conversely, the British could have won. Yet OShaughnessys core thesis is well beyond the question whether the war was winnable. Herein is the freshness of the work. OShaughnessy does not rest with the mere assertion the British could have won. Indeed, he concludes conditions generally were not favorable for British victory. However, he categorically denies the stereo type of British political and military incompetence, in stark contrast to William Seymour and W. F. N. Watson, The Price of Folly: British Blunders in the War of American Independence (1995). Indeed, he asserts chronic perceptions of incompetence have clouded how close and how often the outcome was in doubt. Moreover, his methodology is of particular interest to this readership. His analysis of leaders at multiple levels, from the British king to

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158 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 and horizontal integration. The author delivers an early pledge to shatter old shibboleths in both the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as to challenge cherished aspects of American, national mythology. as a major contribution with its phenomenal balance of primary and secondary sources and depth of synthesis across a staggering wealth of historiography on the American Revolution from the perspective of the subjects. The Men Who Lost America is an important book. It dissects the seniorlevel sausage making of the British effort to reassert control over its wayward colonies. It provides a case study of especial resonance today. It showcases the misunderstanding inherent in stereotypical and simplistic explanations. Moreover, it does so in terms of special relevance to the readership of Parameters On the Precipice: Stalin, the Red Army Leadership and the Road to Stalingrad, 1931-1942 By Peter Mezhiritsky Reviewed by Dr. Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, American Foreign Policy Council T here is a compelling need for a systematic study of the topic outlined in the title, especially as so much more has been learned about Stalin and the Red Army since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, our efforts to understand Stalin, the Red Army, and the Soviet system as a whole. In the last twenty years as some archives have been opened and Russian historians have enjoyed greater (though not full) freedom to publish about hitherto closed topics, we have learned a great deal about Stalin, his system, and the Red Army. Previously, and especially able information and evidence concerning these subjects. As a result, too much of the literature had to rely on what could fairly be described as rumor, hearsay, andto be blunteducated (or not so educated) conjec ture. Fortunately, for the most part that is no longer the case. Unfortunately the author of this book has reverted to the bad old days and this work is replete with the earlier form of source material and evidence instead of solid research backed by evidence. Page after page is replete with statements like I was told by or X remembers that, etc. Moreover, the lack of evidence causes the author to fail to asklet alone answerfundamental questions. The reader is left with what is essentially a thoroughgoing demonization of Stalin. The issue here is not that Stalin deserves that demonization. That is beyond doubt. But why did his helpers all the way down the line assist him in decapitating the leadership of the Red Army? Why did the Generals mentioned here, who fell victim to the various purges and arrests, not rebel if they were such paragons of bravery and virtue as the author suggests? Indeed, why did the armed forces as a whole not revolt against collectivization, the purges, etc? Absent evidence, it is impossible to formulate answers to England: Helion & Company, 2012 399 pages $59.95

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Book Reviews : Strategic Leadership in Wartime 159 these questions, which are key issues for the study of the Red Army in Soviet affairs. Despite the glossy production virtues of the book, these serious shortcomings invalidate it as a serious and useful account of the period under review and this is a great pity. Recent works by Roger Reese, David Glantz, David Stone, and others have shown the nature of the Red Army under Stalin, and the onset of the militarization of the Soviet economy as a whole. But since the pioneering work of John Erickson, when evidence was scarce, we have not had a systematic analysis of the Soviet High Command to use Ericksons title. Without such an analysis, it really is impossible to answer the questions posed above and others that may be of important analytical value for historians and students of the Red Army. If we take into account the centrality of the army as an institution to both Tsarist and Soviet rulers alike as well as the militarization of the Soviet economy, described by Oskar Lange as a Sui Generis war economy, we cannot understand either Stalin or the system in their totality. Of course, in the absence of such an analysis, it would be virtu ally impossible to determine what expectations Moscow actually had during the thirties of the imminence of a European war, whether it would involve Russia and, if so, under what circumstances. Neither is it possible to guess at, let alone analyze, Soviet war aims without such an evidentiary and analytical foundation. Inasmuch as the Cold War, and possibly Operation Barbarossa, were triggered by Stalins efforts to realize his war aims, these are not purely academic ques tions. Unfortunately for the serious reader looking for evidence or answers to these questions, those things are not found here. And that is everyones loss. The Swamp Fox: Lessons in Leadership from the Partisan Campaigns of Francis Marion By Scott D. Aiken Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell, Doctoral Candidate in War Studies, Kings College London O ne approaches works on military leaders written by their lifelong fans with a sense of dread. Often, these works cannot escape the bounds of hero worship to provide commentary more useful than lau datory. Colonel Scott Aiken has managed to avoid the pitfalls of his General Francis Marions leadership and campaigns. covers the history of General Marion and his role commanding a parti san formation in the campaign to defeat the British in South Carolina. The second argues the relevance of this history to contemporary issues of war. Mastering the primary historical narrative, the work misses excellence for the relative weakness of its attention to the contemporary story. I am at pains to remind readers the critiques and issues brought out in this review are, in part, the result of how deeply engaged with the Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012 384 pages $42.95

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160 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 narrative I felt; because it was interesting and challenging, it made me think. This is not a book for novices to military affairs or the history of is referenced according to technical and professional standards. The second is because the historical content is tightly concentrated in time, place, and type of activity. For the right audience, however, the work is valuable. The book is dense and focused; anything more than a brief syn opsis would exceed the bounds of this review. The primary argument of the work is that the strategic, tactical, and procedural choices made by Marion were successful and bear consideration in contemporary military practice. Taking a methodical approach to Marions military career from the fall of Charleston in 1780 to the departure of the British from Charleston in December 1782, Aiken maintains attention upon this theme. Both independently and in support of the Continental Army under Generals Horatio Gates and Nathanael Greene, Marion is shown to make the best use of the skills and local knowledge of his irregulars against the enemys critical and vulnerable points in South Carolina. The chapters provide detailed narrative, assessment and explication of the relevant concepts of military affairs while exploring the contours and content of Marions campaign and his leadership and direction thereof, and could stand alone as independent case studies for classroom or research. Overall, it is well and interestingly written, relying on compre hensive sources and citations by way of endnotes. One minor problem with the narrative concerns the role and relevance of the militias and partisan formations in the American Revolution. Within recent scholarship there is far greater scepticism regarding the utility of these forces than Aiken acknowledges. That is understandable given his argument relies on opinions attributing deci sive importance to the militias and irregulars in that war. Furthermore, from the experience of Marion and his unit, there is certainly a case to be made for their unique value and effectiveness. However, whether this case can sustain a general assessment on the value of the military forces beyond the Continental Army is debatable. At minimum, the opinions of many senior leaders at the time regarding the reliability and costs of militias and irregular forces should have been a matter for Aikens professional consideration. It would have been better to frame Marions case as an outlier within the universe of the irregular forces in that war, as this would have made more impressive his military and leadership achievements. Reminding readers that I think this is a very strong work and com fortably recommend it, I cannot ignore that the lurking contemporary the book. Although contemporary examples regularly appear, their use too often seems disjointed within the Marion narrative. In most of the chapters these nuggets of information appear as appended to the ends of paragraphs and sections, almost as if bolted on as an afterthought. This is a shame, because they are sound and thought provoking. It is simply the case that they are too often undeveloped, either in detail or analysis. The exception is in the second part, with the chapter on Information Warfare, in which the author examines contemporary

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Book Reviews : Strategic Leadership in Wartime 161 examples in detail. However, there is no explanation for this deviation from his practice in the other chapters, which leaves the reader at a bit of a loss. These are important comparatives, and they deserve the rigorous treatment the author applies to Marions history. A full chapter on the contemporary correlates is necessary because reading the narrative and taking into account the examples Aiken pro vided, one is irrevocably driven to certain conclusions. If it is critical to learn from the positive example of Francis Marion, then the British Army and Loyalist militias offer a negative lessonwhat and how not to be. And, from the American perspective, one must then ask in whose image we have fought the last ten years. Or, concerning the tactics and operations of the enemy, nothing which has confronted American and allied forces in Iraq or Afghanistan should surprise. The means and targets of the insurgency, the use of the weight of our own operations and logistics against American forces, have been predictable and sensible according to the Marion narrative. Do we need to respect the enemy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere more? Can we ever expect to win? And these questions dont even touch on the Vietnam example. The problem is not that these issues must be proven. There is a deeper and more serious relevance to the history of Francis Marion, partisan genius. Rather, one sincerely wants to see the book completed, the entire narrative delivered, and particularly how Aiken would deal with the correlations to contemporary experience. Given that they run contrary to so much of the conventional and comfortable wisdom on the subjects, it would be useful for an author of his background, an reasonable.

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162 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON VIETNAM Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam By Nick Turse Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, PhD, Gen. Harold K. Johnson Visiting Chair in Military History, US Army War College I nvestigative journalist Nick Turse offers a disturbing account of American atrocities in the Vietnam War in a commendable attempt to bring attention to the death and destruction wrought upon South Vietnamese civilians. His purpose is to expose the scale of civilian suffering in Vietnam, while claiming that American command poli the use of excessively destructive conventional technologyestablished a deadly but accepted standard of overkill at the operational level. At the tactical level, this overkill created a caustic atmosphere among US forces, one that encouraged American troops to commit atrocitiesrape, mutilation, murder, mass killingswith callous impunity. This is a very grim and chilling read indeed. Vietnam War Crimes Working Group collection in the National Archives. Collected by a then-secret group in the wake of the My Lai investigations, these records detail approximately 800 alleged and inves tigated incidents and cover-ups of atrocities committed by American military personnel. They range in scale from barbarous individual acts to the body-count mayhem orchestrated by the Butcher of the Delta, Major General Julian Ewell, who with his 9th Division conducted a multi-month mass killing spree called Operation Speedy Express in the Mekong Delta during 1968. Turse takes the reader through example after example of soldiers raping young girls in rural villages, intention ally running down children with deuce-and-a-half trucks, and shooting unarmed civilians, among other incidents. He supplements this material with extensive interviews of veterans and Vietnamese victims; these may be Turses greatest contribution and are a credit to his journalistic skills. A harsh critic might suggest Turse cherry-picked his evidence; a more generous reviewer would criticize his data sample as too narrow. compelling stories of servicemembers who honorably performed their alongside military operations in what was obviously a failed and tragically costly effort to stabilize South Vietnam. Missing is a balanced examina tion of the impact of atrocity allegations on the antiwar movement and Code of Military Justice. To bring attention to civilian suffering would also warrant examination of Viet Cong atrocities committed against Vietnamese noncombatantsthis, too, is absent. The author also ignores the commonality of civilian suffering in all war. For example, did not the way in which American forces fought New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013 370 pages $30.00

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Book Reviews : New Perspectives on Vietnam 163 committed by American forces in France, for example, occurred just as it did in Vietnam (see J. Roberts Lilly, Taken By Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during World War II from Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Turse quotes at length from Michael Herrs seminal book Dispatches (Knopf, 1977), citing the macabre photographs taken by GIs in Vietnamposing with severed heads, showing off necklaces of severed ears, and dragging corpses unceremoniously behind various vehicles. Such acts, vile as they are, are not unique to Vietnam. Has not YouTube alone provided numer ous examples of the same from Iraq? Afghanistan? This is a missed opportunity. The same argument the author applies to Vietnam could this one lens dramatically skews the broader picture. This is not to excuse or condone atrocities with Shermans epithet war is hell. But, war is hell, and atrocities occur despite diligent pre ventive efforts. Turse is certainly correct in that the way a war is fought can affect the occurrence of atrocities. History is replete with examples. While the author should be applauded for taking on such a grim and challenging subject, for exhaustive though narrow research, and for bringing attention to the immense suffering of the Vietnamese people during this awful war, he offers little that has not been previously dis cussed, suggested, or argued. No serious historian of the Vietnam War disputes that the way American forces fought the war contributed to an atmosphere of atrocity. None doubt that command at all levels may have swept allegations under the rug or that incidents went unreported. Few historians argue that My Lai, while an aberration in scale, was an aber ration in practice. Historians focus on My Lai because it is symptomatic of the wider issues that Turse attempts to address. To claim they do so at the expense of the broader suffering of combatants and noncombatants, however, is off the mark. The author states the indiscriminate killing of South Vietnamese noncombatants . was neither accidental nor unforeseeable. This implies that American political leaders and military commanders wantonly pursued a war of mass indiscriminate killing. Turse does not convince that this was indeed the case. That needless deaths and wound ing of hundreds of thousands of civilians, however, was the consequence of the way the United States fought the war has long been the consensus among historians. The books singular value lies in its brutal content. Turse does remind us of the extreme character and tragedy of atrocity. In the end, however, he offers an uneven view of a controversial war.

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164 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Vietnam Labyrinth: Allies, Enemies, and Why the US Lost the War By Tran Ngoc Chau, with Ken Fermoyle Reviewed by Dr. William Thomas Allison, Harold K. Johnson Visiting Chair in Military History, US Army War College E xciting new scholarship on Vietnam continues to expand our under standing of this divisive war. Scholars now apply multidisciplinary approaches to archival sources in Vietnamese, French, and English, revealing fresh, provocative perspectives, and new voices, to give the his toriographic box of Vietnam a much-needed shake. Recent Vietnamese Tran Ngoc Chaus Vietnam Labyrinth is one such memoir. Chaus story is compellingly captivating and valuable. Rare is the story told of a Vietnamese soldier who in 1946 served with the Viet Minh against the French, changed sides in 1950, then became a key member of the South Vietnamese government, was imprisoned by that same govern ment in 1970, then was imprisoned again by the North Vietnamese in 1975, then escaped to the United States in 1979. His story reveals much ment, and perceptions and misunderstanding, among the Vietnamese, the French, the Americans, and even Chau himself. His is a truly distinc tive lens through which to examine the thirty-year Vietnamese struggle for independence. As a young man in September 1945, Chau rejoiced along with millions of his countrymen when Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnams independence, but Chau did so as a nationalist, not a communist. Chau subsequently joined the Viet Minh, perceived by many in Vietnam at the By 1950, however, Chau had become disillusioned with his comrades, as communist dogma resourcefully supplanted nationalism as the prin cipal guiding force behind the Viet Minh. Hos government conducted several mini-purges of nonbelievers while recruiting experienced and skilled leaders like Chau into the Vietnamese Communist Party. Born to a traditional Buddhist mandarin family with distant but deeply-held dynastic ties, Chau could not reconcile his love of country with his fear of what communism would mean for Vietnam. Thus, he made the dif It took time for Chau to prove his loyalty, but through courage, skill, leadership, and some well-placed guardian angels, he overcame his understandable doubters. Chau again quickly moved up the mili tary/political chainlieutenant colonel, province chief of Kien Hoa, mayor of Danang, representative in the National Assembly, and ulti mately Secretary General of the National Assembly. Through his own evolution as a Vietnamese patriot, he experienced the unfolding wars Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2012 480 pages $39.95

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Book Reviews : New Perspectives on Vietnam 165 with Americans John Paul Vann (who claimed Chau knew more about defeating a communist insurgency than anyone in Vietnam) and Daniel Ellsberg (who wrote the foreword for Vietnam Labyrinth ), among others. He was a military academy classmate of Nguyen Van Thieu, who in 1970 as president of South Vietnam had Chau unconstitutionally imprisoned democratization of the South and political negotiation with the North. Chaus memoir provides insight into the inner workings of the Viet Minh, the South Vietnamese government, and the French, then American, presence in South Vietnam. He gives powerful testimony to the trauma of thirty years of war on a small nation caught in the destruc with American military and civilian personnel in South Vietnam. He witnessed their faulty perceptions, lack of understanding, and cultural arrogance that in his assessment undermined South Vietnams chances for independence. The preponderance of the American presence, the American backing of reactionary Vietnamese in high government United States, undercut government legitimacy at all levels, and alien ated the population. While these conclusions are neither novel nor new, the context in which Chau presents them is original and insightful. His memoir, like Nguyen Cng Luans Nationalist in the Vietnam Wars: Memoirs of a Victim Turned Soldier (Indiana 2012), is invaluable to moving beyond an American-centric history of the Vietnam War. Defense professionals should read history, and they should read Vietnam Labyrinth to under stand the other in American wars, be they ally or enemy. Losing Vietnam: How America Abandoned Southeast Asia By Ira A. Hunt, Jr. Reviewed by Dr. David Fitzgerald, School of History, University College Cork, Ireland O ver forty years after the signing of the Paris peace accords, the postwar war in Vietnam continues to be relatively neglected, at least by With L osing Vietnam: How America Abandoned Southeast Asia Ira Hunt adds to the literature by offering an analysis of the collapse of South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic and strives to correct misperceptions about the denouement of the war; instead, he accidentally offers a window into the mindset that contributed to America's defeat in Indochina. Part of the Association of the US Armys Battles and Campaigns series, the book uneasily straddles the line between analysis and memoir. Hunt (who also served as Chief of Staff in the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969) certainly had a unique vantage point on this period of the war. As Deputy Commander of the United States Support Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013 416 pages $40.00

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166 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Activities Group (USSAG) in Thailand during this period, Hunt met frequently with senior military leaders of South Vietnam and Cambodia and had access to all Southeast Asia operational reports. He uses that perspective to produce an account of the efforts of various US military Indochina. The title of the book is something of a misnomer, as only while the rest focuses on the war in Cambodia, with some brief codas on the Mayaguez incident, the insurgency in Thailand, and the war in Laos. Throughout, Hunt argues the lack of US funding for the South Vietnamese and Cambodian war efforts doomed both governments to defeat. Hunt produces table after table highlighting the curtailment of communist onslaughts in the spring of 1975. He argues ammunition in South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces. Somewhat tendentiously, he claims, despite all of this, in early March 1975 South Vietnam was holding its own, making a similar claim with respect to the Cambodians. Hunt is more willing to blame the institutional culture of the Cambodian Army than he is to seriously question the decisionmak ing of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) leadership. Hunts argument is thoroughly informed by his Thailand-based per spective. In many ways, this book is a distillation of various reports that crossed Hunts desk in Nakhon Phanom airbase. While he produces sta tistics for things as diverse as ammunition expenditures, precipitation in Indochina, enemy-initiated incidents, and a won-lost ledger for major engagements in South Vietnam in 1973 and 1974, there is something missing here. These data capture much about the war. The tables and States Support Activities Group headquarters, Hunt completely ignores South Vietnamese or Cambodian perspectives, despite the fact that they, not the Americans, were the wars chief protagonists at this time. For instance, the author does good work in showing the impact of reduced US funding on ammunition supply and expenditure in South Vietnam, but we learn nothing about the origins of President Thieus four nos decision, which committed RVNAF to a static defense of its territory and was a major factor in the South Vietnamese defeat (some thing even Hunt, who is eager to highlight American culpability for the fall of Saigon, admits). Nowhere in the book is there a detailed analysis of the culture of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam leadership or of the Government of Vietnam corruption. Reading Hunts account of the Isaacs point that to acknowledge that South Vietnams collapse had moral and not just material causes was painful [because it] . meant there was no American remedy for Vietnams defeat. While part of this reliance on statistics and focus on material can be ascribed to where Hunt sat during the events he describes, much of this is a symptom of his general view of the uses of data and statistical analysis, which are always privileged over more qualitative assessments of South Vietnamese performance. The narrowness of the perspective

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Book Reviews : New Perspectives on Vietnam 167 Hunt adopts means that those interested in the last years of the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia would be advised to turn elsewhere for more comprehensive analysis. For a complete picture, scholars would do better to read James Wilbanks Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (University Press of Kansas 2004) or even Arnold Isaacs classic journalistic account of the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Johns Hopkins University Press 1998). Hunts book is still useful on two years and as an example of the quantitative-driven worldview that per meated American leadership throughout the Vietnam era. The authors formance through win-loss and combat initiation ratios are efforts of which Robert McNamara would have been proud. In Gregory Daddiss excellent work on the use of metrics in the American war in Vietnam, he pointed out the extent to which a datacentric approach informed US thinking on the war and concluded that in short, there is more to winning than counting. Surely the same applies to losing.

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168 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 REVISITING THE GREA T WAR The Last of the Doughboys: The Forgotten Generation and Their Forgotten World War By Richard Rubin Reviewed by Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, Professor of History, Department of National Security Studies, US Army War College R ichard Rubin travelled around the United States at the beginning I veterans, all of them 100 years old or older. To his surprise, and our good fortune, most of them were more than willing to talk to him and had excellent long-term memories. Rubin has done us all a great service by getting their recollections on paper and recording them for posterity. Their stories are nothing short of astonishing, offering glimpses into a world, and an America, before the great calamity of 1914. For some of these veterans, military service was a highlight of their lives, giving them a chance to see some of the world and to participate in the most important event of their generation; for others, military service was an interesting (and sometimes terrifying) interlude in a life that went on as normal once they returned to the United States. They kept some memories alive and suppressed others, sometimes for decades. Rubin gave them a chance to talk about those memories. Some common themes emerge from Rubins interviews. Few of his interviewees showed much interest in geopolitics, and almost all of them joined the military for the same reasons young men have throughout history: for adventure; for a vague sense of patriotic duty; or because their friends were doing the same and they did not want to be left behind. Virtually all of them use the word lucky or some synonym to explain why they survived while so many others did not, reminding us all of the random and capricious nature of war. They were for the most part modest men, many of whom had not spoken seriously about the war in decades. Between chapters featuring interviews with veterans, Rubin has spliced chapters about the war itself. Some of this material introduces the big concepts of the war to a reader who might be unfamiliar with trench warfare, the Meuse-Argonne, and poison gas. Others deal with elements of American culture in 1917, including a chapter on the most popular songs of the time, another on the books Americans would have been reading about the war in Europe, and one on soldier memoirs. The chapter on music is his best; Rubin collects old music and thus knows the subject well. He has introduced a new generation to the wonderfullytitled Tin Pan Alley tune If He Can Fight Like He Can Love, Good Night Germany! It contained the lyric If hes half as good in a trench/ as he was in the park on a bench . . It wasnt such an age of innocence after all. of the book and distract the reader from the books core theme, the New York: Houghton 528 pages $28.00

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Book Reviews : Revisiting the Great War 169 recollections of the veterans themselves. Rubin is not an historian, and his lack of knowledge about some key components of the war will be transparent to those who have studied the war in any depth. As a result, he repeats several old myths and stereotypes about the war. He also has a tendency to simplify very complex topics into one or two sentences. A greater attention to the actual history of the war would have smoothed off some of the rough edges of these digressions. He might also have chosen to drop most of these chapters altogether, keeping the focus where it belonged, on the veterans themselves. Rubin, a journalist, writes in an informal style that some readers will of the book features the word I no fewer than 33 times. Rubin aimed for a conversational tone, trying to bring the reader along with him into the living rooms, retirement homes, and hospitals where he interviewed these men (and two women). That choice may work for some, but it also distracts us from the people at the center of the book, the best-known of whom, Frank Buckles, was the last surviving American veteran of the war. And those people are the real reason to read this book. We learn about the intense racism and segregation that marked not just the Army but American society in general. We also learn about the complex iden tities of so-called hyphenated Americans; the tensions experienced by Americans in this time of transition from a rural to an urban society; terrible war the world had yet known. The veterans he talked to told stories of comrades, most likely suffering from post-traumatic stress, committing suicide after the war. He also notes a veteran who never cashed the check the Army gave him on separation. He would rather, he said, have had that check (for one dollar) as a souvenir. If not for the work of Richard Rubin, these voices and the stories they told would have been lost forever. His book, therefore, performs an important service to all of those interested in World War I, the experi ence of soldiers at war, and the history of the United States in these years. The criticisms above do not in any way detract from the real value of the book, a chance to listen to men and women who lived through an extraordinary age. Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 Reviewed by Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski, COL (USA Retired), whose dissertation analyzed the performance of the American military governor of the Rhineland, MG Henry T. Allen, who commanded the 90th Division in the AEF before commanding American Forces in Germany during the occupation J onathan Boff takes the readers of Parameters into a different world in this book. Those who are American students of military history get to explore the British perspective. Those who have studied World War I receive a new argument that mines both British and German sources to understand tactics, operational art, and an analysis of the outcome of New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 286 pages $99.00

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170 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 the 100 Days Campaign in the late summer and autumn of 1918. Boff focuses on the hitherto largely unexplored British Third Army defeat of the German Seventeenth and Second Armies, a lens that allows him to use both statistical and cultural terms of analysis. His developed story is complex, but convincing. Jonathan Boff demonstrates mastery of both English and German language sources, and his argument clearly addresses the historians who previously wrote about the British Army at the end of the Great War. In fact, one senses a mastery of the literature in his thorough presentation, and one of the advantages of his book is to connect to the British historiography of the war. His level of tactical analysis resembles Mark Grotelueschens insight ful observations in The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. Both accomplish detailed tactical examination through careful mining of the historical record. Jonathan Boff exhaustively ana lyzes available war diaries of both the British Third and the German Second and Seventeenth Armies to the Corps, Division, and sometimes Brigade level to understand the complexities of tactical result. His explo ration of tactical detail also allows him to dissect the effects of battle on morale and reveal innovations in leadership at that level. Winning and Losing on the Western Front addresses the four prevailing hypotheses (page 15) concerning the result of the Hundred Days cam paign (from 8 August until the Armistice) and offers a clear conclusion that the progressive attrition that took hold earlier in 1918 bore fruit in the Hundred Days campaign as the German Army became progres sively less capable of defense in depth or effective counterattack, and its formations gradually disintegrated as they remained committed and the system of reserves broke down. The Germans also perceived they were at a materiel imbalance, particularly in tanks, and this weighed on their morale. The second hypothesis: German Army morale collapsed. Boff adeptly reveals that this simply did not occur. The Germans may have suffered poor mood but not broken spirit, a construct he develops in the lengthy chapter exploring morale in both Armies. Boff in fact claims that morale inside the German tactical formations was surpris ingly resilient until just before the Armistice. Third, the British by this point in the war were able to defeat the Germans because of superior tactical method. Here, Boffs analysis carefully takes apart the several factors involved in combined arms employment of tanks, aircraft, and signal were not all that effective for the British, that infantry and artillery cooperation accounted for the majority of instances of combined arms employment, and though this exceeded the Germans in combined arms employment by this point in the war. But decline in German combined arms effectiveness accounted for much of the result, too. Fourth, British victory was the outcome of superior operational than previously revealed, and it was German failings in operational

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Book Reviews : Revisiting the Great War 171 command that contributed more to the British success. The failings of the German Army are a surprise emphasis in Winning and Losing The Germans, contrary to popular perception, did not practice mission deteriorated ever more severely as they stumbled toward the end of the war, and their operational commanders tried desperately to exert strong control on events, to little avail. Boffs useful framework of analysis builds on these broad hypoth doing so. To achieve this result, the book explores the four hypotheses as outlined above, taking each in turn through sequential chapter level analysis. Boff begins with a summary of events then offers chapters on manpower and training, materiel, morale, and tactics for both sides. He use of a series of maps at the front as a common reference proves to be effective, and many of the photographs which dress the text are clear, interesting, and relevant. Jonathan Boffs argument is sometimes subtle, often nuanced, and always squarely in the context of existing historiography. You know exactly where he stands on the historical hypotheses of existing literature. His method does not allow for a fast read, because the prose is densely ings in the course of this short book. For those who want a model of tactical, and particularly operational, battle analysis, Winning and Losing on the Western Front offers many valid techniques. His book will be most satisfying, not for the general reader, but for the expert in operational history, World War I battle, and in the character of leadership and of armies. Thus, his book is recommended for many readers of Parameters

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Aftandilian, Gregory. Pitfalls in Egypt. Autumn 2013. pp. 17-28. Bahgat, Gawdat. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: An Assessment. Summer 2013. pp. 67-76. Barany, Zoltan. Revolt and Resilience in the Arab Kingdoms. Summer 2013. pp. 89-102. Benson, Kevin C. A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003. Winter 2013-14. pp. 119-24. Bolan, Christopher J. The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths Than Facts. Summer 2013. pp. 77-88. Brooks, David C. Cutting Losses: Ending Limited Interventions. Autumn 2013. pp. 99-110. Bunker, Robert J. Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors. Winter 2013-14. pp. 57-66. Cilluffo, Frank J. and Joseph R. Clark. Repurposing Cyber Command. Winter 2013-14. pp. 111-18. Crane, Conrad C. Special Commentary: The Lure of Strike. Summer 2013. pp. 5-12. Autumn 2013. pp. 77-86. Dowd, Alan W. Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 7-16. Egnell, Robert. Gender Perspectives and Fighting. Summer 2013. pp. 33-42. Feldman, Robert L. and Michel Ben Arrous. Confronting Africas Sobels. Winter 2013-14. pp. 67-76. Field, Kimberly, James Learmont, and Jason Charland. Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual. Autumn 2013. pp. 55-64. Fivecoat, David G. Special Commentary: American Landpower and Modern US Generalship. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 69-78. Goodby, James E. and Ken Weisbrode. Returning US Diplomacy. Winter 2013-14. pp. 27-34. Greentree, Todd R. A War Examined: Afghanistan. Autumn 2013. pp. 87-98. Haring, Ellen L. What Women Bring to the Fight. Summer 2013. pp. 27-32. Hazelton, Jacqueline L. Drones: What Are They Good For? Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 29-34. Article Index, Vol. 43, 2013

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174 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Hickey, Dennis V. Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Autumn 2013. pp. 43-54. Hoffman, Francis G. Special Commentary: Landpower and the QDR. Winter 2013-14. pp. 7-14. Hooker, Richard D. The Strange Voyage: A Short Prcis on Strategy. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 59-68. Katz, David J. Waging Financial War. Winter 2013-14. pp. 77-86. Kennedy, Greg. Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 25-28. King, Anthony C. The Female Soldier. Summer 2013. pp. 13-26. Mastroianni, George R. Looking Back: Understanding Abu Ghraib. Summer 2013. pp. 53-66. 2013-14. pp. 45-56. Simons, Anna. Rebalancing US Military Power. Winter 2013-14. pp. 35-44. Sorenson, David S. US Options in Syria. Autumn 2013. pp. 5-16. Strachan, Hew. British National Strategy: Who Does It? Summer 2013. pp. 43-52. Tata, Samir. Recalibrating American Grand Strategy: Softening US Policies Toward Iran in Order to Contain China. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 47-58. and Political Costs. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 17-24. Terrill, W. Andrew. Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf. Autumn 2013. pp. 65-76. of Nuclear Weapons. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 41-46. Weitz, Richard W. Transition in Afghanistan. Autumn 2013. pp. 29-42. Wilson, Isaiah. The Tragedy of American Power. Winter 2013-14. pp 15-26. Wilson, Ward. Rethinking the Utility of Nuclear Weapons. Winter-Spring 2012-13. pp. 35-40. Winton, Douglas W. Economic Statecraft: China in Africa. Winter 2013-14. pp. 99-110. Zarate, Juan. The Risks of Financial War. Winter 2013-14. pp. 87-99.

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Article Submissions The editor welcomes unsolicited works that adhere to the following criteria: Content Requirements Scope: The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (www.strategic studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope. Audience: cers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs. Clearance: If you are a member of the US military or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or one of its service departments, Concurrent Submissions: The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet. Formatting Requirements Length: File Type & Layout: Visual Aids: Citations: Document sources as footnotes. Indicate all quoted material by to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy Quarterly generally uses the conventions prescribed in the Chicago Manual of Style Submission Requirements Submit to: Include: Each author's full name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail address, and curriculum vitae or biographical sketch. (When there are multiple authors, please identify the primary point of contact.) applicable) as attachments. An abstract. Lead Times: submit it by the following dates: Note: Lead times only ensure the editor will consider a manuscript for recommend a manuscript for publication in any upcoming issue to meet space or topic requirements. Review Process: Contributor's Guidelines

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176 PARAMETERS 43(4) WINTER 2013-14 Book Review Submissions Parameters publishes reviews of books on history, political science, military strat egy, grand strategy, and defense studies. The editor welcomes inquiries for potential book reviews. The book's title and the name of the author(s) or editor(s).

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The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of landpower. The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our nation's history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act as a "think factory" for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate on ground forces' role in achieving national security objectives. U .S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CENTER forSTRATEGIC LEADERSHIP andDEVELOPMENT The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to military and academia. The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development contributes to the education of world class senior leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national security community. U.S. Army War CollegeSLDRSenior Leader Development and Resiliency The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines. The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program supports the US Army War College's lines of effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being education and support by developing self-awareness through leader feedback and leader resiliency. The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, evaluation, and strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command. The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to support the US Army, educate an international audience, and honor soldierspast and present. The US Army War College