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Parameters Vol. 43 No. 3 Autumn 2013 FEATURES Dilemmas for US Strategy 5 US Options in Syria David S. Sorenson Containing Syrias Civil War 17 Pitfalls in Egypt Gregory Aftandilian Balancing Interests and Ends 29 Transition in Afghanistan Richard W. Weitz Bracing for 2014 43 Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait Dennis V. Hickey Leveraging US Arms Sales US Landpower in Regional Focus 55 Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland Explaining the Concept 65 Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf W. Andrew Terrill Enhancing Security 77 Strategic Landpower in the John R. Deni Grounding Air-Sea-Battle Lessons From Limited Wars 87 A War Examined: Afghanistan Todd R. Greentree Rethinking Limited War 99 Cutting Losses David C. Brooks Rationalizing Subjective Calls Examining Warfare in Wi-Fi 111 Review EssayCyberwar to Wikiwar: Battles for Cyberspace Paul Rexton Kan 119 A Book Review: James Jay Carafano's Wiki at War Jeffrey L. Groh
2 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 DEPARTMENTS 3 From the Editor 121 Commentaries and Replies 121 On "The Lure of Strike" Charles J. Dunlap Jr. Conrad C. Crane Replies 125 On Women in Battle Sarah Percy 128 On Women in Battle Megan H. MacKenzie Anthony C. King Replies Ellen L. Haring Replies 133 Book Reviews Human & Inhuman War 133 Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War By Christopher Coker Reviewed by Janne Haaland-Matlry 134 Practicing Military Anthropology: Beyond Expectations and Traditional Boundaries Edited by Robert A. Rubinstein, Kerry Fosher, and Clementine Fujimura Review by James Dorough-Lewis Jr. 136 Virtual War and Magical Death: Technologies and Imaginaries for Terror and Killing Edited by Neil L. Whitehead and Sverker Finnstrm Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker Contemporary War 139 War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years By Carter Malkasian Reviewed by Joseph J. Collins 142 Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq By Ted Spain and Terry Turchie Reviewed by David G. Fivecoat American Power in the New Era 145 War, Welfare, & Democracy: Rethinking Americas Quest for the End of History By Peter J. Munson Reviewed by Nathan K. Finney 146 Confront and Conceal: Obamas Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power By David E. Sanger Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill Networks & Security Strategy 149 Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization Edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker 151 Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection By Blake W. Mobley Reviewed by Ross W. Clark WWI: Strategies & Strategists 153 Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Kennedy Reviewed by F. G. Hoffman 156 Allied Master Strategists: The Combined By David Rigby Reviewed by Bianka J. Adams
R eaders will want to note the edifying, if contentious, exchange between two distinguished soldier-scholars, Charles Dunlap and Conrad Crane. Each holds strong views regarding the assump tions and attendant expectations that have underpinned and continue power, is that policy choices in one region can reduce alternatives in tary and nonmilitary options against the goal of containing the Syrian civil war, noting that the failure of the current containment strategy could lead to dire consequences for the region. In Pitfalls in Egypt, grew during the Morsi presidency, and how America can chart a better may be too soon to avoid a renewal of the Afghan civil war. Dennis recommends combining two of them for a better way ahead. tions to deterring aggression and to promoting security in the region. In both cases, it is clear the strategic application of landpower offers much more than compellence. the latest literature on cyberwar and cyber warfare, a topic of increasing From the Editor
ABSTRA CT : This article considers the military choices for the United States as it seeks both to terminate the Syrian civil war on favorable T he United States has important interests in the Eastern American Interests DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY US Options in Syria Introduction to the Modern Middle East and three other books on
6 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Ending the Civil War No matter which Reducing the Shia-Sunni Divide fatwa Foreign Affairs
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Sorenson 7 WMD Issues Containing the Civil War The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon Text of White House Statement on Chemical Weapons in Syria
8 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Reviewing US Military Options Train, advise, and assist the opposition The letter did not Conduct standoff attacks and assist the opposition Control of chemical weapons Letter to The Honorable Carl Levin
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Sorenson 9 Ending the Civil War on Favorable Terms
10 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 The president indicated that he Required Sorties and Weapons to Degrade Syrian Air Force Excluding Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) , RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy RR-446-CMEPP The New York Times The New York Times
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Sorenson 11 Containing the Civil War Syrias Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant
12 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society Global Security Watch: Lebanon
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Sorenson 13 The New York Times The New York Times The New York Times
14 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Conclusions Al Ahram
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Sorenson 15
ABSTRA CT : The US embrace of President Morsi tended to neglect his authoritarian and pro-Muslim Brotherhood policies, angering secular-liberal Egyptians. When the military ousted Morsi with the but wound up alienating both sides of the divide. This article recommends that the US should continue to use its aid to encour age the new regime to meet its democratic benchmarks and curb its excesses. T he 3 July 2013 ouster of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi by the Egyptian military put the United States in a quandary. The White House did not wish to endorse a military coup, which would make a mockery of US democratization policy and alienate the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypts most powerful political organization from which Morsi hailed. US policymakers also did not wish to alienate either the Egyptian military, which it had cultivated and supported for more than three decades, or the countrys liberal establishment, which sup ported the removal of Morsi. American policy vacillated between tacit support and criticism of the new government, especially after its crack down on Morsi supporters in mid-August, but did not fundamentally change as Washington tried to preserve its equities in Egypt amidst its low standing in the country. In many respects, this most recent episode was symptomatic of US policy toward Egypt since the 2011 revolution country. Before examining US policy since Morsis ouster, it is important to understand why the United States had become so controversial in Egypt before the events of 3 July. The Morsi Presidency After Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as president on 30 June 2012, he was visited in July by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in an effort to show support and ensure the bilateral relationship would continue under his leadership. Prior to these visits, the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi, stated: Egypt will never fall to a certain group . the armed forces will not allow it. 1 However, Secretary Clinton, right after meeting with Morsi and right before meeting with Tantawi, stated the United States supported Egypts full transition to civilian rule and the return of the military to a purely national security role. 2 1 Hamza Hendawi, Egypts Top General Signals Military Wont Give Free Rein to Brotherhood, The Washington Post July 16, 2012. 2 Stephanie McCrummon and Steve Hendrix, In Cairo Clinton Says US Backs Civilian Rule in Egypt, The Washington Post July 15, 2012. DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Pitfalls in Egypt Gregory Aftandilian 2013 Gregory Aftandilian Gregory Aftandilian is an independent consultant and writer who worked 21 years as a Middle East analyst at the Departments of State and Defense, and as a foreign policy advisor in Congress. He is an adjunct lecturer at Boston University, associate of the Middle East Center at UMass-Lowell, and a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for National Policy.
8 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Morsi then used the occasion of a security incident in the Sinaithe killing of some 16 Egyptian soldiers by extremists on 5 August 2012 the head of the intelligence service as well as the chiefs of the navy, air cials, Tantawi and army chief of staff Sami Anan, to retire. 3 He picked General Abdel Fatah Al-Sissi, a younger member of the SCAF and head of military intelligence, to be the new Defense Minister. Al-Sissi evidently reached an accord with Morsi of some sort, and the military essentially returned to the barracks, but probably with the understanding that the new president would not take any further actions against the military. The White House was not alarmed by Morsis actions because Al-Sissi was well-known to the US military (having studied at the United States return to the barracks. 4 Morsis moves against the SCAFs old guard were welcomed by many of Egypts young revolutionaries and liberals. 5 However, his other moves were more controversial. He assumed both presidential and leg islative powers and took action against some of his media critics. The Shura Council (the upper body of the parliament) replaced the editors Many observers believed Morsi was personally involved in this decision. 6 Israel, which tested bilateral US-Egyptian relations. Although Morsi sent his prime minister to Gaza in a show of solidarity with Hamas, Egypt used its connections with both Hamas and Israel to defuse the situation. Morsi did not deal with the Israelis directly but instructed Egypts diplomatic and security services to effect a truce between the two belligerents. For these actions, Morsi received praise from the United States, including a phone call from President Obama. 7 Only a day after winning this international praise, Morsi undertook the most controversial decision of his presidency. On 22 November 2012, he issued a presidential decree declaring his decisions would no longer be subject to judicial review; in other words, he would be above among his increasing number of liberal and secular detractors who were already suspicious of his motives. Demonstrations took place in many of Egypts major cities, leading to clashes between Morsis opponents and the police. The US reaction to Morsis decree was muted, prompting widespread belief among Egyptian secular-liberals there was indeed a 3 Ernesto Landano, Egypt Reacts With Respect to Presidents New Powers, The Washington Post August 14, 201 4 Essam al-Amin, Egypts Military Checkmated, August 24-26, 2012, www.counterpunch. org/2012/08/24/egyptian-military-checkmated/; David Kirkpatrick, In Paper, Chief of Egypts Army Criticized US, The New York Times, August 16, 2012. 5 Quote in Landano, Egypt Reacts with Respect to Presidents New Powers, August 14, 2012. 6 Journalists Continue to Protest Against Chief Editors, Egypt Independent August 15, 2012 7 Peter Baker and David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypts President and Obama Forge Link in Gaza Deal, The New York Times November 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/ middleeast/egypt-leader-and-obama-forge-link-in-gaza-deal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Aftandilian 9 Brotherhood-US conspiracy, and the United States only cared about the strategic aspect of the relationship and not democracy. 8 Although Morsi eventually rescinded most of his controversial 22 November decree, he quickly moved ahead to put the new draft constitution, written primarily by his Brotherhood allies, to the public for a referendum. Secular-liberals objected to several articles in the constitution that appeared to place religion above individual rights, and some articles were so vaguely written as to leave them open to the Brotherhoods narrow interpretation. Many Egyptians outside the Brotherhood believed Morsi and the Brotherhood were intent on creat ing a theocracy as opposed to a civil state. Violent clashes erupted in many Egyptian cities against Morsi and the Brotherhood, and numerous Morsi denigrated the protestors as thugs and holdovers from the Mubarak regime, and he used the police to arrest many of his critics. Reports surfaced of the use of torture. 9 Meanwhile, several liberal and leftist parties and personalities formed the National Salvation Front in an effort to bring more unity to the opposition and compel Morsi to bring it into the government. Morsi only offered a dialogue with this group while he focused his atten tion on ensuring a Brotherhood victory in the parliamentary elections (then slated for April 2013). Shortly thereafter, the National Salvation Front decided on a strategy of street protests that eventually morphed into the Tamarod (rebel) movement (a petition drive against Morsi). The Brotherhood responded by asking the Shura Council to come up with new laws to allow the security forces to control protests and confront thuggery. 10 When John Kerry became Secretary of State in early 2013, there was a slight shift in the US approach toward Morsi. Kerry was cogni zant that US support for Morsi had alienated nearly the entire Egyptian liberal intelligentsia. For example, in early February 2013, a prominent Egyptian human rights activist, Baheiddin Hassan, wrote an open letter to President Obama in which he accused the American president of giving cover to the Morsi regime and allowing it to fearlessly imple ment undemocratic policies and commit numerous acts of repression. 11 Although Kerry stated publicly in early March 2013 upon his arrival in Cairo, I come here on behalf of President Obama, committed not of view, his attempt to reach out to the opposition was highly contro versial because of the lingering perception that the United States still 8 Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, and Ken Sofer, Advancing US Interests and Values at a Time of Change in Egypt, Center for American Progress January 31, 2013, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2013/01/31/51435/ advancing-u-s-interests-and-values-at-a-time-of-change-in-egypt/ 9 Ramy Francis, Reza Sayah, and Laura Smith-Spark, Scores Injured in Cairo Clashes as Crowds Mark Egypts ProtestAanniversary, CNN.com January 25, 2013; Paul Talyor, US Concerned at Climate of Impunity in Egypt, Reuters February 12, 2013; Morsi Says Counter-revolution is Obstructing Egypts Development, ahramonline January 24, 2013; Torture and Impunity Continue in Egypt: Amnesty International, ahramonline, May 24, 2013. 10 Egypts Opposition Says Mursi Responsible for Violence, Al Arabyya, February 1, 2013; Gamal Essam El-Din, Shura Council Discuses Laws to Control Protests and Confront Thuggery, ahramaonline February 3, 2013. 11 Baheiddin Hassan, Open Letter to President Obama, Al-Ahram Weekly February 6, 2013 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/1328/21/Open-letter-to-President-Obama.aspx
10 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 favored Morsi and the Brotherhood. 12 Indicative of this tension, some leading oppositionists declined to meet with him and Kerry expressed frustration that Egypts economy was unlikely to move forward in the absence of a political agreement between the opposing sides. 13 After meeting with Morsi, he announced the United States would release $250 million for Egypt in return for Egypt undertaking economic reforms and negotiating a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 14 Although most of this US aid was for an entrepreneurial fund to help young Egyptians, it had the unintended effect of diminishing Kerrys message that the Morsi government should adhere to democratic prin ciples. The Egyptian liberal intelligentsia focused on the $250 million 15 With seemingly mixed messages coming from Washington, and with the opposition looking weak in advance of the parliamentary elec tions, Morsi decided to take on Egypts judges, which he saw as not only secular-liberals but Mubarak-era appointees. The courts were a thorn in the Brotherhoods side because they had declared in 2012 that the lower house of parliament as well as the original constituent assembly (both dominated by the Brotherhood) charged to draft Egypts new constitu tion, were invalid and ordered them disbanded. Morsi wanted to lower the mandatory retirement age of judges from 70 to 60, which would have resulted in the dismissal of approximately 20 percent of them, allowing him to appoint Brotherhood lawyers to the bench. 16 This attempt was further proof in the eyes of Egyptian liberals that the Brotherhood was attempting to monopolize power. With parliamentary elections postponed from April until October 2013, the Egyptian opposition put its energies behind the Tamarod petition that spring. The National Salvation Front backed this move ment, with the hope it would collect more signatures (calling for early presidential elections) from the citizenry than the number of votes Morsi received in the June 2012 presidential election, thereby delegitimizing his presidency. Economic troublesgasoline shortages and electricity outagesadded to the publics anger at Morsi and the Brotherhood. Polls showed Morsis popularity had eroded. 17 It was against this backdrop that remarks by the US Ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, became a lightening rod. On 18 June, she gave a speech in Cairo in which she tried to explain why the United States dealt with an Egyptian government dominated by the Brotherhood that so many Egyptians opposed. She stated the United States would work with whoever won the elections that met international standards. She expressed skepticism that street protests would produce better results than elections, called on Egyptians to roll up their sleeves and work hard to join and build political parties because there is no other way, 12 Ann Gearan, Kerry Pushes Egypt on Economy; Opposition Figures Keep Distance, The Washington Post March 3, 2013. 13 Ibid. 14 Michael R. Gordon, Kerry Announces $250 million in US Aid for Egypt, The New York Times March 3, 2013. 16 Draft judicial law violates constitution: Egypt Appeal Court, ahramonline May 15, 2013. 17 Ingy Hasseib, Daily Power Cuts Spark New Anger at Egypts Government, latimes.com May 29, 2013; Support for Egypt Brotherhood and Morsi Dwindling: ZRS, ahramonline June 17, 2013
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Aftandilian 11 and added that chaos is a breeding ground for instability. 18 Although Patterson was trying to set the record straight on US policy toward Egypt and to address conspiracy theories of a US-Brotherhood alli ance, the speech had the opposite effect. Many liberal Egyptians saw the speech as a criticism of the Tamarod campaign and as giving the Morsi administration a free pass on human rights abuses. An opposi tion group, the National Association for Change, for example, accused Patterson of blatant interference in Egypts internal affairs. 19 Frustrated by their inability to compel Morsi to change course, the opposition believed street demonstrations were its only recourse. When it was revealed that Patterson also held a two-hour meeting with a Brotherhood leader, Khairat al-Shater, who was not a government 20 Actually, Patterson met with al-Shater to persuade him to convince Morsi to broaden his cabinet to include the opposition as a way of heading off strife in Egypt, but she did not make any progress on this issue. 21 Unfortunately, just occurred was proof of some nefarious US scheme. Patterson was not anti-Morsi demonstrations. On 29 June, a Tamarod member charged America and the Brotherhood have united to bring down the Egyptian people. 22 In late June, the military entered the political fray. On 23 June, Al-Sissi warned there is a state of division in society . . Prolonging it poses a danger to the Egyptian state . we will not remain silent as the 23 Al-Sissi also held a private meeting with Morsi, in which he reportedly urged the Egyptian president to compromise with the political opposition. Morsi responded by giving a televised speech on 26 June that, while acknowledging some mistakes, blamed the opposition for much of Egypts problems. 24 On 1 July, the day after millions of Egyptians started to demonstrate in Cairos Tahrir Square and elsewhere against Morsi, while pro-Morsi demonstrators congregated in other parts of the city, the military issued an ultimatum to Morsi and the opposition to seek a grand political com promise to bring stability to the country. 25 With Morsi not willing to budge, the military ousted him on 3 July and appointed Adly Mansour, 18 Ambassador Anne W. Pattersons Speech at the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, June 18, 2013, http://egypt.usembassy.gov/pr061813a.html 19 Egypt Opposition Group Criticizes Blatant Interference by US ambassador, ahramonline June 19, 2013. 20 See the interesting piece by Dina Guirguis, In Response to US Ambassador Anne Patterson, Atlantic Council June 27, 2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/ in-response-to-us-ambassador-anne-patterson 21 Michele Dunne, With Morsis Ouster, Time for a New US Policy Toward Egypt, The Washington Post July 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/with-morsis-ouster-timefor-a-new-us-policy-towards-egypt/2013/07/04/8075f24e-e423-11e2-aef3-339619eab080_story. html 22 Quoted in Abigail Hauslaohner, Egyptian Group Accuses US of Keeping Morsi in Power, The Washington Post, June 30, 2013. 30 Protests, al-monitor.com http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/06/egypt-army-neu tral-june-30-demonstrations-morsi.html The Washington Post June 27, 2013. 25 Full Text of Egyptian Military Ultimatum, The Times of Israel July 1, 2013, http://www.
12 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 the head of the supreme constitutional court, as the interim president. In a televised news conference that evening, Al-Sissi said the military had no interest in running the country and had removed Morsi because he 26 Since Morsis Removal The initial US reaction to Morsis ouster was measured, as Washington assessed the situation. President Obama met with his national security to restore democracy. The Obama administration was careful not to call Morsis ouster a coup because that would have triggered an automatic cutoff of US aid to Egypt under existing legislation. A White House spokesperson underscored the importance of a quick and responsible return of full authority to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible. 27 President Obama said after Morsis removal on 3 July that the United States would not support particular individuals or political parties. He then acknowledged the legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people while also observing that Morsi had won the presidency in a legitimate election. Obama added: We believe that ultimately the future of Egypt can only be determined by the Egyptian people . . Nevertheless, we are deeply concerned by the decision of the armed forces to remove President Morsi and suspend the Egyptian constitution. 28 The United States was trying to balance its stated policy goals with its strategic and political interests. Having dealt with Morsi as a legiti mate president, based on the fact he was elected in what was deemed a in the face of US democratization policy and subject the United States to criticism that it only supported democracy for non-Islamist groups. Moreover, having courted the Muslim Brotherhood for more than two years because it was the largest and best organized of Egypts politi cal parties, the United States ran the risk of alienating this important constituency. On the other hand, with millions of Egyptians opposing Morsi and welcoming the militarys intervention that ousted him, the US administration ran the risk of alienating an even larger group of citizens if it did not appear supportive of what took place. Furthermore, the Egyptian military, with which the United States had developed long standing and deep relations for more than three decades, was clearly supportive of Al-Sissis ouster of Morsi, and alienating this institution might have serious consequences for US-Egyptian strategic ties. streets of Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood staged two large protest encampmentsone in Nasr City and another near Cairo University that included women and children. In the meantime, the interim government arrested several Brotherhood leaders, including Khairat al-Shater. Some Brotherhood members spoke of their desire for martyr dom and said they would not leave these protests until their legitimate 26 David Kirkpatrick and Alan Cowell, Muslim Brotherhoods Leaders Seized in Egypt, Boston Globe July 5, 2013. Boston Globe July 5, 2013. 28 Ibid.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Aftandilian 13 the ground grew tenser as more than 50 Brotherhood protestors were killed in front of a military building in Cairo where they had gathered in response to rumors that Morsi was being held there. The military said the Brotherhood claimed their supporters were killed indiscriminately by the military. 29 In the aftermath of this incident, some in the Tamarod campaign urged the authorities to ban the Brotherhood altogether. 30 In sides. Secretary of State Kerry spoke frequently with interim vice presi dent Mohammed El-Baradei and interim foreign minister Nabil Fahmy while Secretary of Defense Hagel spoke regularly with Al-Sissi. 31 The US message was to urge the authorities in Cairo not to use force and to create an inclusive government. El-Baradei and the new interim prime minister Hamza El-Beblawi, a prominent liberal economist, both urged the Brotherhood to enter into negotiations for a coalition government but the Brotherhoods bottom line was that Morsi should be reinstated 32 While still not calling Morsis ouster a coup, the United States joined the European Union (EU) in calling for Morsi to be released from custody. 33 including Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, came to Egypt to seek a political com promise between the authorities and the Brotherhood. Two prominent Republican Senators, John McCain and Lindsay Graham, also traveled to Cairo at the behest of the White House, to urge restraint and to argue for an inclusive government. Though McCain and Graham had called Morsis ouster a coup, they had voted with a majority of Senators to oppose an amendment that would have cut off all aid to Egypt. 34 These make any progress. Throughout the initial period after Morsis ouster, the Obama administration decided not to change the US assistance programs to Egypt, and in late July decided not to make a determination of whether a coup had occurred in Egypt. 35 The most it did was delay the delivery of F-16 jets to the Egyptian military, probably as a lever to ensure the interim government would abide by its timetable on elections. But even this small slap on the wrist was criticized by the Egyptian military. In 29 William Booth, Michael Birnbaum, and Abigail Hauslohner, Egypts Military Shoots Protestors, The Washington Post, July 9, 2013. 30 David Kirkpatrick, Egypts Liberals Embrace the Military, Brooking No Dissent, The New York Times, July 18, 2013. 31 In his Washington Post interview in early August, Al-Sissi said he spoke to US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel almost every day since the events of July 3. See Lally Weymouth, Harsh Words for US from Egypt, The Washington Post August 4, 2013 32 Lally Weymouth, An Interview with Mohamed ElBaradei, Who Hopes for Reconciliation in Egypt, The Washington Post August 2, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-02/ opinions/40983074_1_muslim-brotherhood-army-president-mohamed-morsi 33 State Department Calls for Morsi Release, CNN.com, July 13, 2013, http://edition.cnn. com/2013/07/12/world/meast/egypt-coup 34 John McCain and Lindsey Graham, How Democracy Can Win in Egypt, The Washington Post August 11, 2013 35 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney stated on July 8, 2013: I think it would not be in the best interest of the United States to immediately change our assistance programs to Egypt, as quoted in The Washington Post July 9, 2013.
14 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 an interview in The Washington Post published on 5 August 2013, Al-Sissi said the F-16 delay is not the way to treat a patriotic military. He also said the United States had turned its back on the Egyptians, and they wont forget that. 36 Al-Sissis tough words were undoubtedly genuine, but he was also buoyed by the fact that several Gulf Arab countries had given Egypt some $12 billion in emergency funds. At the same time, by not calling the 3 July ouster a coup, the United States was criticized by the Muslim Brotherhood for supposedly giving the Egyptian military a green light to remove Morsi. 37 When Secretary Kerry, during a press conference in Pakistan on 1 August, said the Egyptian military had acted to restore democracy when it ousted Morsi, he was denounced by the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties in the region. Kerry soon backpedaled from this statement, saying that all parties, the military and the pro-Morsi demonstrators, needed to work toward a peaceful and inclusive political resolution of the crisis. 38 On 14 August, the Egyptian military, spurred on by many Egyptian liberals, ordered the security forces to violently breakup the pro-Morsi protest encampments, believing these demonstrators had been given ample time to leave and their continued presence hindered implementa tion of Egypts political roadmap as well as efforts to restart Egypts economy. At least 500 protestors and 42 policemen were killed in the initial confrontation and hundreds more protestors were killed in subse quent days, accompanied by the arrests of many Brotherhood leaders. 39 Both Secretary Kerry and President Obama called this crackdown deplorable, and President Obama ordered the cancellation of the joint Bright Star military exercises scheduled to occur in late September. The US President also suggested that further steps could be taken against the Egyptian military, but he did not order the suspension or cutoff of aid, and he implicitly acknowledged that the situation was complicated. He stated that although Morsi had been elected democratically, a majority of Egyptians had become opposed to Morsis rule because his government was not inclusive and did not respect the views of all Egyptians. 40 Subsequently, the Obama administration ordered a review of US aid to Egypt including the delivery of helicopters for the Egyptian military. 41 The Obama administration believed it had to do something in the face of such high numbers of civilian deaths to send a signal of its dissatisfac tion with the Egyptian militarys actions but not so much as to burn its bridges to the authorities in Cairo. 36 Weymouths Interview with Al-Sissi, August 4, 2013. 37 Jason M. Breslow, Whos Who in Egypts Widening Political Divide? PBS. org July 17, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/ revolution-in-cairo-foreign-affairs-defense/whos-who-in-egypts-widening-political-divide-2/ 38 Muslim Brotherhood Criticizes Kerrys Endorsement of Mursis Overthrow, Reuters, August 1, 2013; Deb Riechmann, Kerry Backpedals on Controversial Comment on Egypt, Associated Press, August 2, 2013. 39 Liz Sly and Sharaf al-Hourani, Egypt Authorizes Use of Live Ammunition Against pro-Mor si Protestors, The Washington Post August 15, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-15/ world/41412007_1_mohamed-morsi-muslim-brotherhood-rabaa remarks-president-situation-egypt 41 Julian Barnes and Dion Nissenbaum, US Weighs Military Aid to Egypt Item by Item, The Wall St. Journal August 20, 2013
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Aftandilian 15 A Way Ahead for US Policy The United States standing in Egypt is at a low point. Indicative calls about the need to exercise restraint and ordered the crackdown on the pro-Morsi demonstrators and the imposition of emergency laws. Most of Egypts liberals are backing the Egyptian military and believe the United States does not understand the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The prevailing sentiment among this faction is that if the United States is upset with Egypts new direction, then so be itEgyptians (by which they mean the non-Brotherhood citi zens)must decide for themselves how best to protect their society. The other factionprimarily supporters of the Muslim Brotherhoodsee US policy toward Egypt as a replication of policy during the Mubarak erabacking the security forces regardless of human rights abuses and against the interests of genuine democracy. The key questions are: How does the United States recover from this situation? Which policies should it pursue? Can it realistically maneuver in this highly polarized political environment to preserve its interests? United States is often a convenient and unfair target for the ills of when he clearly acted in an undemocratic way, particularly when he issued his 22 November decree placing himself above the law. Morsis between Hamas and Israel that they essentially gave him a free pass when he acted as an authoritarian leader. When the United States did increase criticism of the Morsi government in 2013, it had already lost support of the liberals. And when the liberals and secularists settled on the Tamarod campaign as their best vehicle to oppose Morsi, their campaign of street action was criticized by the US ambassador. The United States appeared more interested in stability for stabilitys sake than for meeting the democratic aspirations of a majority of Egyptians who wanted Morsi to resign or at least hold new presidential elections. Enduring three more years of a Morsi presidency, including his poli cies of imposing the Brotherhoods version of Islam on the state and calling for, at least indirectly. As one Egyptian liberal activist told the international media shortly after Morsi was ousted, because Egypt at this stage did not have an impeachment process, the Tamarod campaign and the militarys action against Morsi were the only avenues open to them. 42 The underlying lesson learned is that the United States must be consistent when dealing with undemocratic or authoritarian poli cies of a particular regime, even if that regime has cooperated with the United States on some regional issues. It was proper, therefore, for US have deplored the incitement to violence by some Brotherhood leaders as well as the violent actions, caught on camera, by some elements in the pro-Morsi protest encampments who shot at security forces. 42 Comments by an Egyptian liberal activist in Tahrir Square, as reported by CNNs special program on Egypt, July 3, 2013.
16 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Second, US policymakers must understand that in such a highly polarized environment, it is impossible to please both factions. The most it can do is remain consistent on human rights and work with the winning side and, in that way, try ease the repression of the other side. The new Egyptian government is currently composed of liberals This is the reality now, and the majority of Egyptians support it because they see the Brotherhood as the greater threat. 43 Hence, it would not be prudent for the United States to suspend or cutoff aid because that Egypt, and would not advance the democracy agenda. By continuing this aid, the United States can rebuild its image in Egypt (at least with the majority faction) and urge Egyptian authorities to stick to the timeline to restore the semblance of a democratic government. This timeline involves the rewriting of some controversial clauses in the constitution, a public referendum on the new constitution, and holding parliamen tary elections followed by presidential elections. If Egypt meets these benchmarks with minimal violence, it has a chance to establish a semidemocratic government, and this is the most that can be realistically expected at this stage. A true democratic government is unlikely in the near term because the military is likely to maintain a strong, behind-thescenes role in it. The question about the future of the Muslim Brotherhood looms large over this scenario. As of this writing, it is unclear whether the Egyptian authorities will outlaw the Brotherhood and its political party. At a minimum, the government is likely to bring some Brotherhood leaders to trial for inciting violence. Outlawing the Brotherhood alto gether would certainly please more hardline elements in the new Egyptian government, who have called them terrorists, but it could prove to be counter-productive. Some Brotherhood elements could go underground and resort to violence, posing additional problems for the government. The 5 September 2013 assassination attempt against Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim may or may not have been orchestrated by such elements, but similar actions against the government are likely if the Brotherhood is outlawed and its political party is prevented from con testing elections. Given the prevailing sentiment among most Egyptians who support the new government that the US aided and abetted Morsi, American ties not to support a wholesale outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood. better chance of convincing them that a policy of inclusion, rather than exclusion, would be best for Egypts long-term stability and democratic governance. The fact the Egyptian government is itself divided on this issue gives the United States an opening. Such discussions should best be done behind closed doors lest the United States be accused of interfer ing in Egypts internal affairs, but when word of such discussions leaks out, as is likely, the United States can also use it to show the Brotherhood 43 Sahar Aziz, Egypts Identity Crisis, CNN.com August 7, 2013, http://globalpublicsquare. blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/07/egypts-identity-crisis
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Aftandilian 17 that US policy is not directed against Islamists, and that it supports the inclusion of all nonviolent political entities in the political process. Working with the new Egyptian government and continuing US for more than three decades. Although the Bright Star exercises have been cancelled, they should be resurrected in 2014 if domestic violence Each military establishment still values the cooperation it receives from rights and expedited transit through the Suez Canalboth critically important in case of contingencies in the Persian Gulf. Although Egypt has said it would not cooperate with the United States on possible strikes against Syria, there may be future regional crises in which the two countries can cooperate closely. Moreover, with the hope of renewed Israeli-Palestinian talks on the agenda, the more the security relation ship between the United States and Egypt is maintained and supported, the more Egypt will offer support in these negotiations. Although Morsi brokered a truce between Hamas and Israel, he was personally loath to meet with the Israelis. A new Egyptian president will unlikely have such close ties to Hamas, but he may be more cooperative on peace process interest of securing a Palestinian-Israeli peace deal. rently has in Egypt. Egypt remains a cornerstone country of the Middle East, and right now its nationalist guard is up. American policymakers should best proceed prudently and not take any dramatic action that would harm the relationship. The Middle East remains a dangerous place but cooperation between the United States and Egypt can mitigate these dangers and steer Egypt toward its desired democratic path, even if that path results in a semi-democratic political system.
ABSTRA CT : NATO has made progress constructing the Afghan Na tional Security Forces (ANSF), which have assumed the lead for most combat operations, resulting in declining NATO casualties. The ANSFs ability to suppress the Taliban insurgency, however, place the military intelligence, aviation support, logistics, and other enablers NATO now provides. The Afghan government also needs to improve its performance. Further progress is likely, but a renewal of the civil war that devastated Afghanistan in the 1990s remains a fearful possibility. I n June 2013, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed the lead combat role throughout Afghanistan against the tenacious Taliban insurgency. US combat forces in Afghanistan are scheduled to decrease to 32,000 by the end of the year. 1 After next year, the United States intends to have a smaller Enduring Presence force operating under NATO command and a separate focused counterterrorism mission. If the ANSF performs well in the next year with a declining US military presence, we could see a successful NATO-ANSF transfer. The risk remains uncomfortably high, however, that the Afghan government will eventually succumb to an onslaught of the intensely ideologically groups enjoy sanctuary and support in neighboring countries. Still, the most likely scenario is renewed civil war among multiple armed factions such as Afghanistan experienced during the 1990s. myriad other variables could affect the wars outcome. In his 2012 lines of American effort regarding Afghanistan in coming years. In addition to strengthening the ANSF, these efforts included building a strong Afghan-American partnership; supporting an Afghan-led peace process; enhancing cooperation between Afghanistan and its region; and successfully implementing the 2014 security, economic, and political transition. The latter goal includes transitioning to an ANSF-led war, a private sector-led economy, and successfully holding free and fair elec involving the United States. The prospects for a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban have experienced several ups and downs. However, few expect a meaningful peace deal before most NATO combat troops leave Foreign Policy AfPak Channel July 9, 2013, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/09/ DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Transition in Afghanistan 2013 Richard W. Weitz Fellow and Director of the Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security develop ments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as US foreign, defense, and homeland security policies. He is a nonresident senior published numerous books and monographs.
30 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Obama and visiting NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen did not even mention the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the war. Instead, they announced plans to hold a NATO summit in 2014 that new post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan. 2 Even so, perhaps the most serious problem preventing a peace agreement is the belief among Taliban leaders that, following the withdrawal of NATO, The Challenging Transition to Afghan Lead International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has yet to secure its main objectives of empowering a legitimate post-Taliban prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a terrorist safe haven. 3 The double military surge in Afghanistanwhich saw two waves of tens of thousands of additional US and NATO troops enter the country following Obamas inauguration in 2009helped blunt the Taliban resurgence and restore Afghan government control of the countrys population centers, especially in the south. The Taliban generally ceased its large-unit operations and returned to its earlier focus on targeted assassinations, terrorist bombings, and demonstrations at high-visibility public events. For example, the Taliban swiftly followed the 18 June NATO-ANSF transition ceremony in Kabul with a 25 June attack on the presidential palace and other downtown Kabul targets. 4 Although these attacks are routinely suppressed within hours, they do succeed in challenging Afghan government morale by engendering negative com mentary in the Western media about the ANSFs inability to counter the Taliban without a NATO combat presence. In addition to these tactical gains, the surges provided ISAF time to strengthen and prepare the ANSF to assume the lead role in combat ing the Taliban insurgents. In 2011, NATO formally launched a plan to transition full responsibility for security to the Afghan government, with reduced NATO training and equipping of the ANSF. The ensuing period has seen NATO forces in Afghanistan decreasing in number and shifting to a support role of training, advising, and assisting. Hundreds of ISAF bases have been closed or transferred to ANSF control, while the ANSF has assumed responsibility for ensuring security in increas ing numbers of provinces, cities, and districts. 5 Afghan forces began leading the majority of frontline operations in July 2012 and now take charge of almost all combat missions (though NATO special forces and intelligence are still heavily involved in the concentrated attack on the Secretary remarks-president-obama-and-nato-secretary-general-anders-rasmussen-afte http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm Institute for War and Peace Reporting July 1, 2013, http://iwpr.net/report-news/ tough-job-ahead-under-resourced-afghan-forces. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty July 18, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-us-destroys-unused-base/25042351.html.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 31 Taliban insurgents network). 6 of planning and coordinating the joint Afghan-US patrols in eastern Afghanistan, the last sector to transition to ANSF lead and the main focus of this years counterinsurgency campaign. 7 As a result, NATO casualties in 2012 declined to a level below that of any year since 2008, while Afghan army and police battle deaths and injuries have risen to several hundred per month. 8 where, the ANSF units have thus far been able to maintain overall security in these transferred areas, albeit with substantial ISAF support. territory under Afghan government control, captured or killed Taliban or and corps-level operations). 9 begun constructing a national military education infrastructure, from elite academies to military occupational specialty schools, as well as its 2013, the ANSF assumed the lead combat role throughout the country. 10 Whereas the Pentagon concluded that only one Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade could conduct independent operations in 2012, the US brigades, and 27 battalions capable of independent operations. 11 Strategic Partnership Strategic Partnership Agreement. Under its terms, the United States pledged economic, security, and diplomatic assistance to Afghanistan for ten years after 2014. In return, the Afghan government agreed to improve accountability, transparency, and the rule of law; protect the rights of all Afghans, regardless of gender; and pursue further domes tic reforms and capacity-building programs aimed at addressing the underlying socioeconomic, political, and other drivers of insurgency. 12 Afghanistans cooperation with the United States and its allies will Discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Arundel House, London, July 11, 2013, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events-s-calendar/ the-endgame-in-afghanistan-9bb2. The Hill July 13, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/ operations/310687-us-forces-adjust-to-afghan-lead-in-combat-ops. American Forces Press Service July 11, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120443 Reuters, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/12/
32 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 also continue under their Enduring Partnership Agreement, signed at NATOs 2010 Lisbon Summit. In addition to encouraging further domestic reforms, these framework agreements reassure the Afghan government, as well as other United States and NATO regional part ners, that they will not be abandoned despite the withdrawal of NATOs combat forces. The agreements also provided leverage with the Afghan Taliban, Iran, and Pakistan by weakening their conviction that NATO countries will simply wash their hands of responsibility for Afghanistan after 2014. For this reason, Iran lobbied the Afghan parliament to reject the Strategic Partnership Agreement and Iranian security forces harassed Afghan diplomats following its approval. 13 Nonetheless, the durability of the post-surge military gains remains under question as the United States and other coalition members with draw their forces and reduce their other military support. As of July 2013, there are approximately 65,000 US troops, 30,000 NATO forces, and perhaps an equal number of foreign security and military support 3,250 ISAF members (including more than 2,000 US soldiers) have been killed in action during the Afghanistan campaign. ISAF had 130,000 sol diers at its peak strength in 2011, when 50 countries contributed combat personnel to the mission. Western governments have been gradually from peak levels by 33,000 troops, reaching pre-surge levels. 14 In his January 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama announced that 34,000 US troops would depart Afghanistan within a year. 15 That will lower US forces approximately 32,000 by early 2014, with further decreases likely delayed until after the April 2014 elections. Other foreign military contingents are following a comparably steep drawdown. In an open congressional hearing in early 2012, a National Intelligence considerably greater progress toward their transition objectives. 16 ISAF then experienced a series of challenges in 2012 that included the burning Afghan civilians by one American soldier, and the circulation of pho attacks, when Afghan soldiers turned their weapons against United States or other NATO forces in ugly cases of fratricide. Although these incidents have declined in recent months, the Taliban has some support ers throughout the country. The movement sustains a strong presence in eastern Afghanistan near its Pakistani support bases, but Taliban attacks in north and west Afghanistan have become more frequent now that NATO force levels in these regions have declined. In general, Taliban Agence France-Presse Washington Post February 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-12/ world/37051681_1_afghanistan-afghan-army-troop-level Defense Intelligence Agency, January 31, 2012, www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-01-31.html
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 33 standard employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs remain a personnel. The Talibans growing presence and changing tactics have contributed to higher overall ANSF casualties, more desertions, and the periodic overrunning of poorly commanded ANA units in remote loca tionsthough the ANSF eventually recovers many of these outposts. 17 Furthermore, according to the United States Department of Defense, 18 disturbing regularity over border checkpoints, cross-boundary shelling, and Afghan claims of Pakistani collusion with the Afghan Taliban. For more than a decade, the Taliban have enjoyed an invaluable sanctuary on across the porous Afghan-Pakistan frontiernotwithstanding recur ring American warnings that the Talibans activities redound negatively excuse for Afghan leaders to blame setbacks on Islamabad rather than try to overcome them through needed domestic reforms. 19 Afghan Capability Challenges The ANSF has grown faster than expected, reaching its full comple the ANSF expand by more than 140,000 personnel, to approximately ties, and ISAFs extensive train and equip program, the ANSF still has robust logistics given the countrys weak national infrastructure and challenging geography, and weak management and administrative skills. In particular, the ANA lacks adequate enablers such as aviation, 20 The ANA siveness, and management skills. It also does not have an ideal ethnic balance. Further work is needed to teach the Afghans better gunnery, engineering, and weapons maintenance skills. In terms of morale, ANA units suffer from high desertion and defection rates, aggravated by a 21 The Afghan National Police (ANP), especially the newer Afghan Local Police (ALP) deployed in remote locations as a human-and-physical-terrain-denial The Guardian, January 23, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/23/ taliban-afghan-security-forces-nato] USA TODAY, July 2, 2013.
34 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 and intelligence-gathering force, also needs better equipment and train from returning to areas conquered by the ANA. The ANSF needs a better human capital strategy. Although the ANSF still suffers from high levels of attrition, especially among the locally recruited police, widespread poverty ensures a large number of recruits eager for gainful employment. The main challenge now is to raise the quality of much of the ANSF, ideally to the high level found in the Afghan Special Operations Forces (ASOF). ISAF has focused on imparting skills through training and mentoring, while the Afghan manders and improving its vetting and retention processes. 22 NATOs Security Force Assistance has changed from that of partnering and combat to using its Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) to train, advise, and assist sponsored ANSF units to conduct independent combat with this progress, though some complain about NATOs resistance to their efforts to obtain tanks, combat aircraft, and major conventional weapons systems. 23 The alliance is building the ANSF into a primar ily counterinsurgency force rather than a conventional military given the absence of threats to Afghanistan by other countries conventional armed forces. The concept seeks to address persistent coordination problems between them (especially between the ANA and ANP) by integrating all ANSF elements into a joint defense in depth. This interlocking protection web National Directorate of Security (NDS), and other ANSF elements, control the network as well as disseminate relevant tactical intelligence among its components. ISAF still provides enablers for this layered almost all ANSF personnel. 24 Air Power Problems will not be until 2017 that the Afghan Air Force, whose presence could at least strengthen local pride and morale, will be able to operate without substantial foreign assistance. 25 Aviation has proved to be a key asym metrical advantage for ISAF and Afghan partners since the Taliban lacks any air support. ISAF air surveillance and strikes provide one of the Afghan-Pakistan bordera persistent problem that looks unlikely to be Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/03/25-allen-afghanistan#ref-id=20130325_allen Inside Story, Aljazeera com/programmes/insidestory/2013/06/201361872036451240.html. Stars and Stripes February 22, 2013.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 35 Afghan Air Force from scratch given the countrys austere conditions, bad weather, and remote forward locations of ANSF units that need aerial supply, aerial surveillance, and air casualty evacuations air surveil lance. The greatest challenge is the time required to train enough skilled At present, the United States Air Force (USAF) is pursuing a graduated approach toward transferring missions to their Afghan coun terparts, with a slower pace of drawdown than seen with the US Army such as artillery to compensate for the reduced ISAF combat air sup port. 26 The expectation is that ANSF ground forces will need to adapt tries even after 2014. 27 However, whether NATO governments would order something such as a spoiling air strike in 2015 or beyond against Since the NATO combat withdrawal decision makes it harder for Taliban leaders rely on exploiting their narrative of Western abandon ment of Afghanistan. A common message is that, whereas NATO is remain. To counter this narrative, NATO planners are reconsidering their earlier decision to reduce the ANSF to 230,000 troops after 2015 for affordability reasons. The February 2013 NATO defense ministry formally considered supporting the larger force until 2018 as a means to better ensure Afghanistans security, but perhaps even more importantly as a means to counter the abandonment narrative that NATO plan ners see as a greater threat to the alliances campaign goals than the Taliban. 28 currently planned, despite the continued global economic slowdown date are not going to be sustainable without continued international 29 doubtful, but ISAF and NATO can make meaningful progress toward overall economic development by continuing to combat illiteracy and innumeracy, promoting the recruitment of national minorities within the ANSF, and imparting more dual-use technical skills that have civil ian application, including project and logistics management. aspx?transcriptid=5225. Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2013. The Australian June 15, 2013, http:// www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/afghan-gains-not-yet-sustainable-nato/ story-fn3dxix6-1226664184461.
36 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Overcoming Insider Threats Afghan soldiers turn their weapons on their ISAF advisers, has impeded resent a major problem since they exploit a crucial vulnerability by seeking to disrupt the vital ISAF partnership and training programs with their ANSF colleagues. The highest annual total of insider attacks combat deaths that year (almost one hundred more ISAF soldiers were wounded). Year No. of Attacks No. of ISAF Casualties 2007 2 2 2008 2 2 2009 6 10 2010 6 20 2011 21 35 2012 46 60 Table 1 Afghan "green-on-blue" attacks. Source: International Security Assistance included above. 30 NATO analysts assess that only 10-25% of the attacks are directly attributing most attacks to personal grievances (inter-personal disputes), or spontaneous action (retaliation for some obnoxious act committed by the Western countries, such as burning of Korans or showing anti31 Yet, the Taliban tactic of claiming responsibility for all these attacks unnerved ISAF advisers, who at times interacted less, or under more restrictive conditions, with their Afghan counterparts. On several occasions, NATO removed its advisers from Afghan work posts and suspended partnered operations which killed several French soldiers, to justify the withdrawal of French combat forces earlier than originally planned. The rapid increase in the ANSFs ranks contributed to this insider problem since it led to a relaxation of recruitment and supervisory standards. 32 The surge in the number of ISAF advisers collocated with ANSF personnel also increased the number of targets. At one point, ISAF military and police advisory teams deployed with ANSF units in BBC, co.uk/news/world-asia-19633418. New York Times Magazine January 20, 2013.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 37 the rest of NATO. 33 Even if only one of every 500 Afghan soldiers turns forces had to rely on fellow Afghans to use their superior cultural knowl edge and human intelligence to curtail such incidents. ISAF partnered with the Afghan government to adopt a comprehensive response strat which ANSF personnel attacked their Afghan comrades. Afghan and ISAF personnel took measures to improve vetting and screening of new ANSF recruits; enhance counterintelligence efforts; make ISAF and Afghan personnel more aware of each others cultural sensitivities as well as behavioral traits of potential attackers; designate Guardian Angels to protect ISAF soldiers from insider attacks; and deploy mobile training teams to enhance force protection against insider threats. Furthermore, smaller ISAF advisory units (security force assistance teams) embedded for long periods in only high-level ANSF units reduced the number of attacks do not involve soldiers who serve together on a constant basis. episodic or random contacts. The Post-2014 NATO Mission A critical question remains unresolved: how many United States and other foreign troops should remain after 2014 and what missions should they undertake? The Pentagon and other NATO militaries are assessing numerous variables as they decide how many forces they should recom mend remain (hence the range in numbers): the ANSFs performance this peace and reconciliation process; the April 2014 elections process; and the regional security environment (especially the policies and perfor mance of the new Pakistani government). 34 Determining how many ISAF troops stay after 2014 and how fast other soldiers can leave Afghanistan perform after 2014. In principle, these tasks could include defending the Afghan population; protecting foreign civilian workers; killing and capturing key Taliban leaders; and building the ANSF through further training and advising in accordance with the transition plan NATO The February 2013 NATO defense ministerial discussed how many forces to keep in Afghanistan beyond 2014, what they will do, and how rapidly other forces would depart. The numbers under consideration at that meeting ranged from 8,000 to 12,000 military personnel, with most of these troops coming from the United States and other NATO coun tries, as well as from a few NATO partners in ISAF such as Australia. Testimony of Dr. Peter R. Lavoy before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/Lavoy_Testimony.pdf
38 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 The United States might contribute between one half and two thirds to 35 This presented to NATO last November, but seems less than the US military 36 The larger NATO force would amount to roughly 18,000 to 23,000 troops, while the smallest option discussed in November 2012 was from 3,000 to 6,000 troops. 37 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Stress Afghanistan beyond 2014 depends on the successful negotiations of a SOFA between the Afghan government and various international under negotiation to replace the existing US-Afghan SOFA would have to provide comprehensive legal immunity for US troops in Afghanistan. in the summer of 2013 over proposed peace talks with the Taliban, with was under serious discussion. 38 that such talk was simply a negotiating ploy that neither side could ever accept given their mutual need for some US military presence for both Afghan and regional security considerations. 39 The White House might announce its intent to keep a major troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014 while simultaneously declaring that the United States was prepared to negotiate the SOFA with the next Afghan government as well as the 40 In addition to defusing the immediate crisis, repudiate any deal negotiated by his predecessor. Wall Street Journal February 23, 2013. Chicago Tribune, The Hill July 9, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/ army/309791-us-military-advisers-impasse-wont-stop-handoff-to-afghan-troops. Wall Street Journal February 23, 2013. The New York Times July 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/ world/asia/frustrated-obama-considers-full-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan. html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=asia&pagewanted=all&. Reuters July 9, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hadley_ Testimony.pdf.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 39 The February 2013 NATO defense ministerial discussed the alli ances post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission. NATO is considering establishing training bases in the four main sectors of Afghanistan as well as a central headquarters in Kabul. The training mission might keep the current leading roles of Germany in the north, Italy in the west, and the United States in the east and the south. NATO trainers would work with ANSF units only at the corps level and conduct all 41 soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014 will be assigned to units having at least one of three broad missions: advising and training select ANSF units as part of the post-2014 NATO force; protecting State Department and other civilian personnel on interagency missions; and capturing or killing high-value terrorists in Afghanistan as part of a separate coun terterrorism force under US command. Unlike NATO trainers, this counterterrorism force of several thousand US military personnel would have US Special Operations Forces (SOF) embedded with lower-level Afghan units such as the Afghan SOF brigades. Some of these SOF personnel could be dual-hatted to perform US counterterrorism and NATO training missions. It is possible that these SOF forces might also support high-priority missions in neighboring countries, ranging a Pakistani nuclear weapon) that might fall under the control of a ter rorist group. Concluding Observations The prospects for a peace agreement with the Taliban have risen and then fallen in recent months, with much attention paid to allow of seeking to establish a government-in-exile with American conniv ance. 42 the movement, and leaving much of Afghan society fearful that the government will reach a deal with Taliban leaders and other local elites at their expense. In any case, it seems unlikely that a settlement is achievable before most US combat forces leave. Even if the talks start soon, the experience of other negotiations seeking to end a civil war suggest they will likely fortable working with one another, compromise their initial demands, and then sell any deal to their respective leaderships. On the govern ment side, there will need to be a means to incorporate the interests and demands of many Afghan stakeholders who now feel excluded from the peace process. Regarding the Taliban, its leaders still reject US The New York Times, February 23, 2013. Associated Press July
40 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 43 Another complication is that the Taliban consists of resolved by curtailing the NATO military presence or in peace talks with the central government. Whether the Taliban has a genuinely moderate wing able to induce the rest to support a peace deal remains unclear. Prospects for Success capabilities, but its long-term capacity will be challenged by an expected loss of interest and support in NATO capitals after their troops leave often overlooks that, whatever the military rationale for any troop pres ence, symbolism becomes important. A larger foreign troop presence can better counter the abandonment narrative, though it would be wise to concentrate those troops that remain in few basing facilities to mini pace of any drawdown. A straight-line or accelerated withdrawal to 2014 could prematurely undermine the still vital US training mission of the ANSF. A better strategy would be to keep as many troops as possible in Afghanistan for as long as possible. Not only will this provide the ANSF with better training and the US forces with more combat opportunities, but it would better support the enormous task of moving large volumes of US and NATO defense items out of the country as well as the troops. transnational terrorists to Afghanistan by being able to continue drone strikes in Afghanistan, perhaps using bases in a neighboring country if a new USAfghan SOFA proves elusive. Sustaining some Pakistani support for the US-backed Afghan war effort, as well as for the larger war on terror, will also prove critical. The PakistanUnited States rela tionship is held together by common interests rather than a genuine sense of partnership or shared values. The war in Afghanistan has been a source of tension between them but also helped hold them together. With the US military withdrawal, and the resulting decline in US aid to Islamabad, this source of cooperation will weaken. In addition to the combat issues, a key test for this new arrangement could be Afghanistans April 2014 national elections. In its partnership agreements with NATO and the United States, in the July 2012 Tokyo Afghan government has pledged to make governance and other reforms in return for continued foreign security and economic support. In particular, Afghan authorities have committed to conduct free and fair elections, under international supervision and with independent election commissioners, in which none of the candidates or parties would receive special administrative resources or other inappropriate advantages to tilt Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Dobbins_Testimony.pdf.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Weitz 41 perform as badly as in the 2009 national ballot, if the ANSF fails to decides to renege on his vow not to run for reelection (or cynically orchestrates a close relative or associate as his successor), then inter national enthusiasm for the entire Afghan project would substantially Afghanistan is reducing US leverage in this and other areas.
ABSTRA CT : This study outlines present US policy on arms sales to Taiwan. It also examines options an American administration may wish to consider to address the growing military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. The author argues that some new thinking may be re quired if Washington, Beijing, and Taipei hope to realize a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. A lthough the United States has long recognized the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of all China, it maintains a robust military relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan). Indeed, in 2011, Taiwan was the largest purchaser of US defense items and services in the world. 1 Despite Americas support, however, the military balance across the Taiwan Straitin terms of personnel, force structure, arms, and devel opments in military doctrinecontinues to shift in Chinas favor. This study outlines the present US policy on arms sales to Taiwan; it also examines several options a US administration may wish to consider to address the growing military imbalance between Taiwan and the PRC. Some new thinking may be required if Washington, Beijing, and Taipei hope to realize a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. US Policy On 15 December 1978, the United States announced the establish ment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC, which became effective 1 January 1979. 2 States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA plus the so-called Six Assurances and the Three Communiqus, form the foun dation of our overall approach [to Taiwans security]. 3 In some respects, statements, proclamations, and secret assurances to the mix, American policy appears more confusing. This confusion has contributed to quar rels over policyparticularly arms transfers. The TRA commits the United States to sell Taiwan the weapons and defense services neces 1982 US-China Joint Communiqu, Washington promised to reduce TRA also mandates that the President and the Congress shall deter mine the nature and quantity of arms transfers; however, members of 1 William Lowther, Taiwan Still a Top Buyer of US Arms, Taipei Times December 22, 2011, http://www.Taipeitimes.com. 2 To achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijings three long-standing demands: (1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, (2) abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and (3) removal of all US troops from Taiwan. 3 Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of States Bureau of East Asian Why Taiwan Matters Part II, October 4, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/. DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait 2013 Dennis V. Hickey Distinguished Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies in the Department of Political Science at Missouri State of numerous books, scholarly journal articles, and editorials about Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.
44 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Congress often complain they have not been consulted. 4 Meanwhile, the Six Assurances, a series of commitments made by President Ronald Reagan, appear to abrogate the 1982 US-China Joint Communiqu. lated the pledge not to hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to Taiwan. 5 arms sales. similar statements when discussing which weapons might be sold to Taiwan. 7 the resources for its own defense. Taiwans military budget as a percent age of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has dropped from 3.8 percent in 1994 to 2.1 percent in 2013, and from 24.3 percent of total government 8 A Congressional study decisions was undoubtedly unforeseen at the time of the TRAs enact ment [and] raises potentially consequential questions for Congress. 9 As you cannot defend yourself. 10 Perhaps most contentious is the accusation that America has aban that the United States has cut Taiwan loose. 11 Others quarrel with such claims. One study contends that the Obama administration has been a solid friend of Taiwan in support of this policy, including selling unprecedentedly (sic) large packages of arms sales. 12 Clinton, then US Secretary of State, boasted that weve strengthened 13 Naturally, PRC analysts share these assessments. They charge that 2017) will account for one-third of total arms sales to Taiwan since China and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979. Obama 4 Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, July 3, 2013), 43. 5 Ibid. Taipei Times William Lowther, Panettas Praise of PRC Raises Concern, Taipei Times October 27, 2011, www. taipeitimes.com. 8 Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 23, 2013), 33-34. 9 Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwans Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2009), 4. 10 Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 28. International Assessment and Strategy Center, in Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression in Federal News Service March 28, 2012, in Lexis/Nexis. US-China Relations in an Election Year: Taking the Long View in a Season of Heated Rhetoric Taipei Times March 9, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Hickey 45 is the only US president to twice approve arms sales to Taiwan. 14 Yet, ROC military authorities often express concerns about delays and price increases for various defense programs, and claim Washington is treat ing Taipei like a sucker and a fool by jacking up the prices for military hardware and trying to sell piles of junk. 15 US Arms Sales and the Military Imbalance Relations between Taipei and Beijing have improved enormously since Ma Ying-jeou was elected ROC president in 2008; and US military authorities are encouraged by recent developments. Admiral Robert (PRC and ROC) improve their relationship economically and diplo taking place. combat power across the Strait on mainland China . they continue to improve their capabilities, so in terms of a balance of power, its gen erally one-sided. 17 The US Department of Defenses 2013 report on the Taiwan Strait remains the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA) primary mission despite decreasing tensions there. 18 It warns that preparation dominated Chinas military modernization program. 19 Indeed, the PLA budget has been trending upward for decades. In 2012, the US Department of Defense estimated that Chinas military budget could have been as high as $180 billion in 2011double the 20 In 2010, Robert Gates, then US Secretary of Defense, characterized the military build-up directly opposite Taiwan as an extraordinary deployment. 21 It represents the highest concentration of missiles anywhere on earth, and holds the potential to destroy key leadership facilities, military bases and communication and transportation nodes with minimal advance warning [emphasis added]. 22 The PLA is also boosting its military prowess by developing new anti-ship ballistic missiles, torpedo and mine systems, and combat aircraft. Such considerations led one study to warn that the PLAs air and conventional missile capabilities could now endanger US military forces and bases in the region should Washington decide to intercede on Taiwans behalf. 23 14 Xiao An, US Arms Sales to Taiwan Impede Sino-US Relationship, China.org.cn January 17, 15 Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 Taiwan, China Post news/2010/02/01/243094/US-assessing.htm. China Post March 4, 2012, http:// www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/03/04/333538/US-commander. htm. 17 Ibid. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the Peoples Republic of China (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, May 2013), p.4. 19 Ibid., 57-58. 20 Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 33. 21 Ibid, 30. 22 Ibid. 23 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: US GPO, November 2010), http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_ full_10.pdf.
46 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 shift to an all-volunteer force will mean that a large share of military resources must be allocated to cover personnel costs. Military equipment is growing old and obsolete. Particularly worrisome is the state of the Agency study, many of these warplanes are incapable of operating effectively. 24 25 It is clear that Taiwans defense capability relative to that of the PRC has not been maintained. There is a range of options available to a US administration that wishes to address the growing military imbalance. This study examines the four most obvious options and their consequences: (1) reduce or terminate arms sales and security ties with Taiwan, (2) maintain the present policy of boosting Taiwans defensive capabilities, (3) increase those capabilities with new arms transfers, and (4) broker a deal with the PRC to reduce military deployments in the Taiwan Strait. Option 1: Reduce or Terminate Security Ties Some are calling on Washington to terminate security support for Taiwan. Admiral Bill Owens (ret.), former Vice-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has criticized arms sales to Taiwan as not in our best interest and suggested that a thoughtful review of this outdated legislation [the TRA] is warranted. has argued that the TRA compels US decisionmakers to confront the necessity to choose between the self-imposed shackles of longstanding policy and the imperatives of our long-term strategic interests. 27 Others have suggested the US should consider backing away from its commit ments to Taiwan. 28 Admittedly, terminating arms sales and reducing Americas security point between the US and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. 29 with China would decrease, while possibly increasing the prospects nuclear proliferation. Editorials in the PRC press even laud the increas ing number of far sighted Americans calling for repeal of the TRA. 30 This option would also reduce the likelihood that sensitive US military technologies or weapons systems might fall into the hands of the PRC. 24 See Dean Cheng, Getting Serious About Taiwans Air Power Needs, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 25 Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 23. Financial Times November 17, 2009, http://www.ft.com Beijing, Washington, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, May 10, 2011). 28 Charles Glaser, Will Chinas Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2011, 87. 29 Ibid. 30 Peng Guangqian, US should abolish Taiwan Relations Act, Peoples Daily (Overseas Edition),
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Hickey 47 riskier in an environment of improving Taiwan-PRC ties. 31 important alliesparticularly Japan or South Korea. It could also raise questions about Americas commitment to democracy in other countries or regions of the world. Ironically, the move could raise questions about Americas trustworthiness. As President Ronald Reagan explained in 1984, I myself have said to some representatives of the PRC that we that we didnt discard one friend in order to make another. That should indicate to them that wed be a good friend to them too. 32 Any move to downgrade military links with Taiwan would surely generate domestic political fallout. Even PRC authorities acknowledge the Obama administration is under pressure to sell arms to Taiwan and cannot easily cut off the island. 33 Coming at a time when members of both major political parties are calling for Washington to enhance ties with Taipei, and when public opinion polls show many Americans still hold negative views of the PRC, an administration would have to be pre pared for criticism. Conceivably, terminating Americas security support for Taiwan could cause some independence activists in Taiwan to take more aggressive steps to achieve their goal. In other words, the problem with this option is that there could be many unintended consequences. Option 2: Maintain the Present Policy The Obama administration has no plans to cut defense ties with 2013, President Obama reiterated his commitment to Taiwan under the TRA including providing defensive weapons. 34 military threat to Taiwan. 35 Thus far, Obama has approved two arms sales packages, and his administration has sold over $12 billion in arms to Taiwan, which compares favorably to any period in US-Taiwan relations since the TRA. 2010 included much-needed PAC-3 Patriot missiles for Taiwans air defenses, while the most notable portion of the 2011 package was its explain the upgrade package is extensive and will provide improved 31 Kerry Dumbaugh, Taiwan-Us Relations: Recent Developments and Their Policy Implications (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 7, 2009), 18. Asian Survey 28, no. 8 (August, 1988): 895. The New York Times September 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com Taiwan, Focus Taiwan Urges US to Cease Taiwan Arms Sales, Taipei Times June 10, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 35 Viola Gienger, Taiwan Weighed for US Jet Sale at Risk of Riling China, Bloomberg April 27, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com (Washington, DC: September 21, 2011) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
48 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 pilot training program. 37 Critics limit the political fallout from China at a time when the United States seeks Beijings cooperation on a range of international issues. In fact, 38 Representative ing to China, and has clearly been pressured by the Chinese to control Taiwan and Taiwan policy in every way possible. 39 Senator John Cornyn lation to Communist China. 40 Legislation has been introduced in Congress to compel the administration to sell additional armsinclud the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 and the National Defense Authorization a smart defense policyit makes a real and immediate contribution to Taiwans security. 41 The deal was described as a low-cost alternative and notes that were obviously prepared to consider further sales in the future. 42 was so low-key in Beijing (and Taipei) that Lin Chong-pin, a leading authority on cross-strait relations, speculated that the whole thing sug gested that Washington, Beijing and Taipei in a way all have consulted with each other. 43 While that is unclear, what is clear is that, under the be pulled out of service for extensive periods of time to be upgraded. Option 3: Increase Military Support This option is attractive to those who believe the Obama admin istrations provisions for Taiwans security cannot meet the islands defense needs. Representative Ros-Lehtinen and others are pushing the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 (TPA) in an effort to strengthen American military support for Taiwan. If the TPA (or similar legislation) is passed and signed into law, it would almost provide Taiwan with carte blanche for modern surface-to air-missiles, vertical and short take-off and landing 37 Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of States Bureau of East Why Taiwan Matters Part II, October 4, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ris/rm/2011/10/174980.htm. 38 William Lowther, Taiwan to Receive US Arms Package, Taipei Times September 23, 2011, www.taipeitimes.com. 39 Shaun Tandon, US Lawmakers Press for Jets to Taiwan, Google News US-China Relations in an Election Year, 41 William Wan and Keith B Richburg, Administration Defends Arms Package for Taiwan, The Washington Post September 20, 2011, in Lexis/Nexis. 42 Ibid. Taipei Times October 9, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/10/09/2003515301.
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Hickey 49 (V/STOL) combat aircraft, cost effective submarines, three guided missile frigates, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, global positioning system (GPS)-guided short-range rockets, unmanned air vehicles, radar, and jamming equipment. If the United States opted to provide Taiwan with all the weapons the ROC desires, one of Americas oldest friends might be assured negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength, not weakness. The additional military muscle would also give any potential adversary, including the PRC, cause to calculate whether an attack on Taiwan is worth the risksdeterrence would be enhanced. Should deterrence fail, the new arms would provide Taiwan with a boost during any military campaign. Moreover, American lawmakers and defense contractors massive arms transfers assert that, while Beijing might complain or tem porarily suspend military-to-military contacts with Washington, past behavior indicates that China is unlikely to challenge any fundamental articles or services to Taiwan. 44 The Perryman Group estimates that employment in the US. 45 To be sure, a sharp escalation in arms sales could advance US inter for a negative reaction from the PRC. This response could range from a suspension in US-PRC military-to-military contacts to a break in dip lomatic relations. Beijing might even sell arms to states unfriendly to in 1992, for instance, China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan and reached a formal agreement with Iran to cooperate on nuclear energy, MCTR. In addition, Taiwan may not have the resources to buy the weapons. not make it any easier to pay the bill. 47 Moreover, where will the sub marines and U/STOL aircraft come from? The United States stopped manufacturing diesel submarines decades ago, and it could be a decade 44 US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute, Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 2012), http://project2049.net/documents/2012_chi nese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf. 45 Perryman Group, An Assessment of the Potential Impact of the Lockheed Martin Taiwan F-16 Program on Business Activity in Affected States and Congressional Districts (Waco, TX : Perryman Group, nomic_impact_report.pdf. Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations eds. Ramon Myers, Michel Oksenberg, and Taipei Times May 7, 2012, www. Taipei Times Defense News
50 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Ambassador to China, observed, the political situation in the PRC is very, very delicate. 48 Decisionmakers must consider whether a spike in arms sales might create tremors in Chinese politics, perhaps weakening the position of the present leaders in Beijing. Option 4: Negotiation, Compromise, and Arms Control If a US administration opted to pursue this option, it could use arms sales as bargaining chips. 49 The administration might explore the possibility of reaching an agreement similar to that proposed by thenPresident Jiang Zemin when visiting with President Bush in Crawford, ers, submarines, and other advanced arms to Taiwan in exchange for the removal of the missiles (and their infrastructure) that China has deployed directly opposite Taiwan. According to media reports, Chang Wanquan, PRC Defense Minister, raised a similar proposal when meeting with 50 Beijing would consider this proposal because removal of the missiles would generate goodwill among the Taiwanese, and the weapons could no longer be cited by local politicians as evidence of Beijings hostility. Public opinion polls reveal that a large percentage of Taiwanese believe Beijing is hostile to both the ROC government and the islands popula tion. 51 President Ma has stated the mainland should remove or actually dismantle all the missiles that are targeted against Taiwan, otherwise we wont be interested in making further steps to negotiate a peace agree ment with them. 52 Second, it is clear the PRC will consider removing the missiles as the idea with President Bush. According to Chinese media accounts, the PLA has been debating the question of whether to withdraw the missiles opposite Taiwan for years. On 22 September 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao conceded that the missiles would eventually be removed. Prominent PRC political analysts with links to Beijing have responded favorably to such a proposal. 53 Third, Washington has telegraphed its willingness to reduce arms Taiwan appears more peaceful, it follows logically that Taiwans defense 48 Josh Rogin, US Ambassador: Political Situation in China Very Very Delicate, Foreign Policy January 18, 2012, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/18/ us_ambassador_political_situation_in_china_very_very_delicate. Buy Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Los Angeles Times November 11, 2009, A23. Want China Times August 27, 2013,http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&Main CatID=17&id=20130827000004 51 Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey on the Publics View of Current Cross-Strait Relations (March 30 to April 2, 2012) http://www.mac.gov. tw/public/Data/2579302271.pdf. 52 No Peace Unless China Removes Missiles: Ma, China Post April 7, 2010, http://www. chinapost.com.tw. 53 Xu Shiquan, US Arms Sales to Taiwan: Better to Assess the Costs and Recalculate, China US Focus,
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Hickey 51 requirements will change. 54 Indeed, Mark Stokes, a former Pentagon reduced, of course it would have an effect on arms sales. 55 purchasing so many US arms if the PRC missiles are removed. After all, they claim that arms purchases are linked directly to the threat posed by building measure because it promotes stability and would increase If a US administration chose to negotiate a deal to reduce arms deployments in the Taiwan Strait, it would have prepare the stage. The American armaments industry would oppose such an initiative. Arms sales to Taiwan are viewed by some as an economic stimulus plan, and lawmakers unabashedly describe the weapons transfers in terms of jobs generated for American workers. In short, the arms merchants and their allies will employ a full court press to derail any movement toward arms control in the Taiwan Strait. Some politicians, academics, and media pundits will condemn any discussions between the United States and the PRC about arms sales to Taiwan, a reduction in arms sales, or any concrete moves toward arms control. The fact the United States has repeatedly held such discussions with China is ignored, and there is no mention of the pledge in the 17 August 1982 US-China Joint Communiqu to reduce arms sales. Rather, the administration will be told it cant be done. The fact that a fourth US-China Communiqu might be drafted, the TRA amended, or yet another assurance provided, is likewise ignored. Some analysts claim any agreement is useless because the missiles will not be destroyed. After all, the missiles could be returned to the coast, or the PLA could attack Taiwan with longer range missiles. Some high-ranking PLA military brass agree on this point. As Major General Luo Yuan (PLA-ret.) and other retired high-ranking Chinese military care so much about the withdrawal of missiles from Chinas coastal areas as Chinese missiles are capable of hitting Taiwan even if launched from Xinjiang in Chinas northwest. 57 Another issue associated with removal of missiles from Chinas coastline is where will the missiles will be redeployed. During conversa issue. As one analyst observed, no matter where the Chinese missile bri gades and their infrastructure are sentcloser to South Korea, Japan, 54 Kan, Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales Since 1990 29-30. 55 Missile Move Could Cut Arms Sales, Taipei Times September 30, 2010, www.taipeitimes. com. for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond pdf. Purchases: Chinese General, Want China Times April 9, 2011,http://www.wantchinatimes.com/ news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110409000073&cid=1101.
52 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 India, or Russiayou are going to have some extremely antagonized neighbors. 58 Conclusions In recent years, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has shifted steadily in Beijings favor. In 2011, Taiwans Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that the PLA now possesses the capability to blockade the Taiwan Strait or conquer the ROCs offshore islands. had absolute strength to seize the command of the air over the Taiwan Straits and is also strong enough to blockade the Taiwan Strait with its shore-based long-range anti-ship and ground-to-air missiles. 59 Unfortunately, the growing military imbalance across the Taiwan to arrive at a balanced policy. According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States, will continue to pursue a positive, con structive and comprehensive relationship with China. . [and it] will encourage continued reduction in tension between the PRC and Taiwan. The Obama administration also stated that in the period ahead, we seek to encourage more dialogue and exchanges between the two sides, as well as reduced military tensions and deployments and we have and will continue to meet our responsibilities under the TRA [emphasis added]. Since American policy regarding Taiwans security is based upon a network of laws, joint communiqus, assurances, statements, and secret promises, decisionmakers must take care to ensure this network does not become a system of self-imposed shackles. Sponsoring legislation to amend or revoke the TRA is not the answer to the predicament confronting Washington. The exercise of this option would undermine American credibility and possibly create tension dim, cutting US military support for Taiwan could create opportunities and incentives for Beijings political and military leadership to assume greater risk in cross-strait relations. It might also prompt Taipei to accelerate development of its own anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and ballistic missiles. Even the long-dormant program to develop weapons of mass destruction might be revived. 58 Missile Move Could Cut Arms Sales, Taipei Times September 30, 2010, http://www. taipeitimes.com. Ta Kung Pao BBC October 3, 2011, in Lexis/Nexis National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: US GPO, May pdf. Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and Asia, Testimony Before The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee (Washington DC: March 31, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ rm/2011/03/159450.htm. Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 27, 2010), 25, http://
DILEMMAS FOR US STRATEGY Hickey 53 Similarly, providing Taiwan with carte blanche for procurement of US weaponry is risky. Many of those supporting this option view arms sales as an economic stimulus plan. One newspaper headline even trumpeted, The military imblance in the Taiwan Strait is also employed as a means to launch partisan political attacks. Selling scores of expensive military hardware to Taiwaninclud a wide array of missileswould solve little. As noted, the island is clear whether Taipei really wants these weapons. This option would not encourage cross-strait dialogue and exchanges or reduce military tensions and deploymentsdeclared objectives of US foreign policy. Rather, it would likely do the opposite. both Option 2 and Option 4. The present policy (Option 2) enables Taipei to bolster siles and other arms. It also sends a powerful message to Beijing without being too provocative while retaining the option for future arms sales. imbalance or promoting reconciliation. Washington should immediately seek to negotiate a reduction in military deployments with Beijing (and advanced arms to Taiwan in exchange for the removal of the missiles (and their infrastructure) that China has deployed directly opposite Taiwan. The redeployment would increase warning time and help build ban on short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). the prospects for the development of peaceful relations between Taiwan building measures. To be sure, it would require some new thinking particularly among some US bureaucrats and those in the arms industry. And it would also require new thinking in Chinaespecially among dividends and is worth the effort. The Wall Street Journal September 12, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire. Christian Science Monitor September 22, 2011, in Lexis/Nexis
ABSTRA CT : Few understand the rationale or components of the Re gionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. This article describes the concept and addresses its chief criticisms, namely, how it will ac count for diverse ground force requirements, how it relates to the Armys force structure, and its affordability. T he term Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is widely familiar today; however, few understand the basic elements of the concept, or the goals the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General been on the road communicating the RAF concept to as broad an audi ence as possible. But the concept has drawn its share of skeptics. The most common questions fall into three broad categories: 1) Regional alignment for what? What are the ground force requirements for today? What is the real demand? 2) Isnt this just a way for the Army to justify force structure? Is the Army really doing anything differently? 3) Is the RAF even affordable? Wont it collapse under its own weight due to broad questions and presents the basic concept and rationale for RAF. Why RAF? At its core, RAF is the CSAs initiative for aligning Army capabili ties to an expanded set of requirements for the Joint Forcepost-2014. As General Odierno stated at the Association of United States Army mission command capability by organizing our missions around highly trained squads and platoonsthe foundation for our company, battal conditions. This regional alignment of forces will not only offer combat ant commanders access to the full range of capabilities resident in the security decision-makers. 1 Strategic Landpower, which is the combination of land, human, and cyber activities that make decisive outcomes more likely, and increases 1 General Raymond T. Odierno, Regionally Aligned forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships, Army Live March 22, 2012, http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/ aligned-forces/; General Raymond T. Odierno, CSAs Strategic Intent, February 5, 2013, http://www. army.mil/article/95729/ US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland
56 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 2 RAF is integral to the Army vision of being Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged and it is fundamental to our ability to Prevent, Shape and Win across the globe. It is essential to the US defense strategy and represents the Armys commitment to provide culturally attuned, scalable, missionprepared capabilities in a changing strategic environment characterized by combinations of nontraditional and traditional threats. assigned to or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained capabilities aligned with combatant commands and prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the Total Force, which includes the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. They consist of organizations and capabilities that are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reachback capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. They conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and requirements that are enduring in nature for the combatant commander, from set-the-theater to the most-likely contingencies. Accomplishing such regional missions requires an understanding of the cultures, geog raphy, languages, and militaries of the countries where RAF are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military aligned by virtue of assignment or allocation to a combatant commander. In contrast, Global Response Forces (GRFs) are the designated Joint GRF that maintains a 24/7 global mission to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours, as well as the other service retained units that are required to stay intact and at a high states of readiness. The Army will also provide a strategic forcible-entry package, as well as some of the other capabilities that are low density but required for the initial weeks of a limited or no-notice high intensity contingency operation. 3 enhanced trust and understanding facilitated by enduring engagements. Operationally, it enables better integration between conventional Army forces and special operating forces, as well as between the Army and Teams. In a sense, RAF means forcesmilitary and nonmilitarywith not only the ability to destroy but also the decisive ability to understand the population within the context of the operational environment and then provide regionally aligned, mission tailored forces scalable in size from squad to corps. Its personnel are to be empowered by technology and training to execute operations under the concept of mission forces both regionally aligned in support of combatant command and those maintaining a global Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013, 6. 3 Brigadier General Charles Flynn and Major Joshua Richardson, Joint Operational Access and Military Review July-August 2013.
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Field, Learmont, and Charland 57 the desired outcome. 4 At the tactical level, RAF drives cultural and regional expertise and language awareness training giving US forces an improved understanding of the operational environment. As a result, theaters and better able to gain situational understanding when deployed anywhere, even to a region to which they are not aligned. It also fosters an expeditionary mindset for an Army that is more CONUS-based than ever, while also affording a greater degree of mission predictability and stability. For nearly a decade, the Army had to respond to combatant command requirements, outside Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with personnel from the Total Force who were sometimes minimally prepared. As we reduce our commitment to Afghanistan and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), regional alignment will improve the Armys ability to generate strategically, operationally, and tactically relevant forces for the geographic combatant commands on a broader basis. With the recent availability of forces returning from the CENTCOM area of responsibility and the Armys commitment to provide whatever the geographic combatant commands request, the demand for Army increased requirements registered in the FY14-19 Program Objective Memorandum. The activities range from military police assistance in Africa to an increase in State Partnership activities in South America, to preparing the American contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty forces to its most likely contingency operations. Currently, Americas Army has more than 158,000 soldiers deployed or assigned overseas, with a substantial number engaged in stability operations in Afghanistan or executing missions in Korea, Kosovo, tions around the globe. Even after the drawdown in Afghanistan, on any given day the Army will typically have at least 100,000 soldiers forward deployed. Land forces will continue to be the most engaged and employed of the Joint team, and through constant engagement and assessing the effectiveness of activities on the ground among humans, will be well positioned to continue to evolve direct and indirect options for the use of the military instrument for policymakers. Regional Alignment for What? mission of addressing myriad complex threats in uncertain operational environments. The Army will not be sized for the types of operations it conducted in the last decade. The defense guidance further directed a the Middle East and to other partners and friends around the world. It directed that the Joint Force must be capable of performing 11 primary missions, but left it to the services to determine how: 4 Charles L. Cleveland and Stewart T. Farris, Toward Strategic Landpower, Army Magazine July 2013, 22.
58 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Counterterrorism and irregular warfare Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges Counter weapons of mass destruction Operate effectively in cyberspace Operate effectively in space Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent Provide a stabilizing presence Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations The defense guidance clearly implied that the old ways of conduct ity. The strategic and operational environments are driving the United States and its allies and friends toward an emphasis on shaping mis sions in unstable regions in addition to preparing for existential threats. We anticipate an expanding range of smaller, shorter, rapidly changing missions. These new requirements are compelling the Joint Force and the Army toward superior agility; expanded expeditionary capabilities; precise lethality; enhanced cultural awareness and people savvy; as well as a better ability to integrate with special operations forces and other agencies. Importantly, the concept of partnering with other countries and building the capacity of others is both inherent and explicit in this new paradigm. The bottom line is the Army, as part of the joint force and in con junction with foreign partners, must respond to the requirements of the combatant commanders which are those the defense guidance mis sions outlined. At the same time, it must ensure it can mass to conduct any high-end combat mission anywhere. Accordingly, the evolution of the RAF concept has been grounded in a number of critical principles as expressed by the CSA: The Army, together with the Marines and the United States Special Operations Command, will continue to develop the concept of Strategic Landpower. operations. While maintaining a modular, brigade-centric structure, the Army will increase its agility through leader development at all levels, and world-class training, to include enhanced Combat Training Center rotations for as many brigades as possible. The reduction of forces will be conducted in a way that does not break faith with soldiers and Army civilians and their families and that maintains the most ready force possible to meet Combatant
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Field, Learmont, and Charland 59 Commander needs. Tough choices will have to be made regarding roles of Active and Reserve components in accordance with defense missions, but the Reserve Component will remain an essential part of the Total Army. With the redistribution of United States forces stationed overseas, the Army will be almost entirely based in the continental United States for Embracing these principles will help offset the turbulence of todays strategic environment and underpin the development and execution of Regionally Aligned Forces. Over the past decade, the Army conducted both combat and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. yet prepare for the broader range of requirements of the future environ the current operating environment demands it. Regional alignment is a fundamentally different orientation for the RAF begins to provide for, organize, man, train, and equip operations and activities in the land, human, and cyber domains. Rather than coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan to focus on training as the graphic combatant commands and to prepare forces for those activities. In addition to its decisive action training, an aligned unit is now prepar ing with an eye to the region to which it is focused. More forces will be assigned, allocated, and service-retained-combatant-commanderaligned than ever before for nonwartime missions: this is unprecedented will have at least one brigade, as well as a division or corps headquarters with all the capabilities it provides. which will be dispersed with potentially degraded readiness over time, are both real and in addition to those associated with major contingency operations. But RAF is most centrally about an Army that is committed to meeting geographic combatant command needs, thereby retaining RAF in Execution Alignment of Service Retained forces will provide unit training and education focus if a combatant commander needs more personnel and capabilities than assigned or allocated forces can provide (predictable sourcing). [ARFORGEN] cycle) will occur at Echelon above Brigade (corps and division levels) and we are considering all options in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance for FY15. Full habitual align ment will likely be achieved in FY17. While it is desirable to maintain habitual alignment at brigade combat team level, the realities of current
60 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 defense missions makes this aspirational rather than practicable. As a result, service-retained, combatant-command-aligned forces will rotate annually in accordance with the ARFORGEN process. Alignment is occurring under United States Army Forces Commands FY13/14 Mission Alignment Order (MAO). The FY15 MAO will increase global alignments, made possible largely because of the drawdown in Central Commands area of responsibility. is allocated to Central Command, and the XVIII Airborne Corps is Service retained but aligned to the Global Response Force. These alignments will endure. Formalizing the relationship between corps and ASCCs and tethered brigade combat teams is subject to ongoing will be habitually aligned to provide at least one Joint Force-capable capability the Army is providing to geographic combatant commands, enablers. It is also capable of scaling to provide mission command for missions of various sizes, tailoring as the situations change. These headquarters will lean forward to support combatant commanders, working through the Army Service Component Command, as indica tors and warnings of instability emerge. An example of this is the 1st Jordan as part of the joint exercise Eager Lion, having already coor dinated with Central Command to understand the worsening crisis in Syria. From there, a tactical command post remained in Jordan to assist the Jordanians and other partners with a wide range of activities resulting from the mass humanitarian crisis to the north. Brigades and enabler units. For FY13, units below division are assigned, allocated, or service retained, aligned in varying strengths to geographic combatant commands, and to the Global Response Force. manner. Since March 2013, they have conducted approximately 79 missions in more than 30 countries (as of mid-September 2013). Training The Army will adopt a revised ARFORGEN cycle based on a 24-month Active Component and 60-month Reserve Component sequence. It will cover Reset, Train, Ready (year 1) and Available of T1 level through decisive action training, involving unit maneuver preparation at the Army Combat Training Centers. Fiscal constraints aligned forces will be trained, prior to deployment, to the readiness level required by the combatant commander. Soldiers baseline training will skill acquisition for their assigned missions. This additional training is subdivided into two components to enhance the US Armys ability to work with partners:
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Field, Learmont, and Charland 61 Component Commands (based on combatant command require ments) and organized through FORSCOM. Cultural and regional expertise and language awareness training will be conducted at home station throughout the training year and the year of availability, and and training capabilities will support as required. The 162nd Infantry Brigade, now focused on Security Force Assistance (SFA) training, will provide much of the support in the short-term. Future training support will come from regionally aligned formation headquarters and retained advise and assist expertise. As an example, Armored language, regional expertise, and cultural training at their home station in April 2012. This special cultural and regional orientation within the brigade, African Studies students from nearby Kansas State University, and the 162nd Infantry Brigade from Fort Polk, Louisiana, the week-long training introduced cultural and linguist information work. Based on insights provided by the Africa-born 2nd ABCT Soldiers, as well as the Kansas State University African Studies stu to accomplish complex mission sets. Austere Environments The Armys deployment experience over the past 12 years focused on units deploying into a priority theater and then falling in on established Forward Operating Bases, some more austere than others, for a set period of time. As we focus on the challenges of operating around the globe in support of the national security strategy, which projects more bal anced global support, Army units will develop an expeditionary mindset to ensure they are equipped to train and operate in remote, minimally supported environments. As a result, personnel should be prepared for change to what has been the norm in recent years. The deployment cycle will change from the current 6-12 months with a Brigade formation to a more cyclic tempo of deployments that will be episodic, lasting anywhere from one week to several months, and employing units, teams, equipment and force protection (FP) measures will all be vastly different from the norm. The role of the combatant command and Army Service Component Command in providing basic life support and sustainment will be critical to the success of these deployments. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)-funded training for partner nation security forces. Army Regionally Aligned Forces from 1-18 IN deployed a 22-person multifunctional training team to Oullam, Niger, deployment to Mali as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali missions. Through interagency collaboration with the were accompanied by seven PAE contractors to execute the training
62 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 mission. As a multinational dimension, French Army trainers provided systems. Both the scale (22 people) and the duration (about 10 weeks) of the deployment are indicative of the new operating environment that confronts combatant commands. While conditions on the ground were proved popular as junior leaders were empowered to command. The relative short duration of the mission was popular with a cohort that has grown used to, and weary of, 12-month deployments. For many, the fact that they are operating in a different country with unique cultural characteristics and fresh challenges has energized them and provided a much needed operational and training focus. is a good one and the Army continues to balance requirements inside its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget with most likely and most dangerous missions. While the institution has seen an increase in demand from combatant commanders, much of this demand is paid for by other parties. But there is no real possibility of it collapsing under identify when to send squads rather than platoons. This agility will only increase over time. Some of the direct costs associated with RAF are based on future training strategy, which includes readiness, language training, and the future viability of some training platforms. Costs linked to the actual implementation of regional alignment mostly will come from Title 22, Combatant Commander funds, joint exercise funds, and special authori ties, such as the Global Security Contingency Fund. In fact, the initial alignment of 2/1 infantry brigade demonstrated that there are authori of execution capabilities. With regard to the use of regionally aligned forces in the traditional Title 10 sense where the Army foots the bill, Memorandum for security cooperation activities. Some of this is due to the increased availability of US forces to assist combatant command from elsewhere within the Army budget and the Army is analyzing the feasibility of this. Nonetheless, the servicesthe Army especiallyhave to make tough choices in readying forces for a full range of military operations, ments of new normal in Northern Africa, to major combat operations in the Middle East or North Korea. The Army has to be ready for each of these missions, yet it stays busy every day with keeping theaters set with intelligence, communications, and logistics architecture, support ing counterterrorism activities, and with military engagement with partners across the globe. The funding for both the readiness and some of the activity itself comes from the Armys top line, its Operations and Maintenance dollars. Balancing readiness for the most likely and most
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Field, Learmont, and Charland 63 a lower level of collective training than do major combat operations, yet Conclusion: Business Not as Usual fully. The effects of the reduced budget and the pace of drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan are the key constraints to quicker prog on regional alignment will increase across all combatant commands, to include increasing support to and integration with US Special Operations Command. For soldiers, RAF means real-world missions in exciting places. For policymakers and strategists, RAF means a more agile, responsive, integrated Army. To combatant commanders, RAF means many of the Armys capabilities in the continental United States have, in effect, become a part of their areas of responsibility. And for Americas role as a global leader, RAF offers a very real mechanism to shape the operational environment, on the land and among humans, more consistently and in conjunction with a range of strategic partners. Brigadier General Kimberly Field Joint Staff. Colonel James Learmont British Army Colonel James Learmont, as part of a US-UK exchange program, Lieutenant Colonel Jason Charland US Army Lieutenant Colonel Jason Charland is Lead Strategist in the Stability
ABSTRA CT : In recent years, a variety of threats have become more ominous for Gulf nations, and these countries have sought to strengthen ties to the United States in ways that do not appear to compromise their sovereignty. The US Army has responded through a robust series of military exercises and through the devel opment of regionally aligned forces. Consequently, the Army has played a vital role in meeting a variety of training challenges includ ing preparation for conventional war, counterinsurgency, and mis sile defense. It has also asserted an important landpower presence in ways that reassure local allies and deter potential regional aggressors. T he Middle Eastern strategic environment has been especially dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11 US combat operations in Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the con tinuing rise in sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number of regional countries. In the midst of these developments, the stability of the region remains of central importance to the United States according to numerous presidents who have enumerated the American interests in the region. 1 Most recently, President Barack Obama stated that US core interests in the Middle East include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies exported to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the prolifera tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and (4) the defense of Israel and advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process. 2 Other US leaders have elaborated on the presidents views by noting the Middle East will remain vital to the United States even if Washington moves closer to energy independence. 3 In this regard, America garners freedom of navigation for the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf energy supplies. 4 If the United States relinquished this position, other powers, such as China, could become interested in this role and the global clout it provides. how Washington can best protect its interests in the Middle East and especially the Gulf region. The legacy of the Iraq war will contribute 1 For an overview of past Presidential priorities and policies toward the Middle East see Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). and North Africa, May 19, 2011, http: www.whitehouse.gov. In this speech, President Obama also spoke about the advancement of democracy and human rights but did not explicitly name them as core interests. Press Trust of India March 19, 2013. 4 On the importance of Gulf oil exports for the world economy and the requirement for military forces, see Kenneth Katzman et al., Irans Threat to the Strait of Hormuz The Twilight War: Americas Thirty-Year The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties 28-30. US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf W. Andrew Terrill W. Andrew Terrill is the Strategic Studies Institute's served with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and US Air has published in numerous academic journals on a wide range of topics, including participated in the Middle Eastern Track 2 talks, part of the Middle East Peace Process.
66 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 major ground wars and then engage in long occupations, nationway when he stated, In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as General MacArthur so delicately put it. President Obama underscored Gatess comment by indicating that he will seek to avoid using massive conventional military force except in cases involving US national sur vival interest. American society and is motivated by the administrations concern about developing open-ended military commitments to support secondary or peripheral interests in ways that we can no longer afford. Additionally, according to a variety of polls, the general public is extremely wary of getting involved in new Middle Eastern wars in places such as Syria and Iran. 8 Likewise, Arab public opinion remains deeply concerned about future American military action in the region, although US favorability ratings improved beginning in 2011 as the United States implemented its withdrawal from Iraq. 9 Nevertheless, understanding the dangers of military interven tions does not allow one to reach the conclusion that conventional war and counterinsurgency actions will never again be required. Some challenges to US interests may not be viewed as immediate threats to national survival, but the long-term consequences such challenges could affect both US global leadership and economic future. If vital American interests are strongly threatened, large segments of the American public may consider future military actions as wars of necessity. Some inter ventions may still be required regardless of how conscientiously the United States leadership struggles to avoid them. Moreover, American and allied public opinion may change rapidly in such instances provided Preparing for future wars remains vital, but doing so through actions the Gulf strategic environment through carefully tailored collaboration with Arab partner nations (including non-Gulf Arab allies) presents one through United States and allied defense preparedness. In this environ ment, it is important that Washington has an array of forces to support and reassure local allies and deter aggression so war can be averted. American interests will need to be protected in a number of ways, and the Gulf will be particularly important US strategy. Many Gulf Arab states have critical natural resources, a great deal of infrastructure The Washington Post Confront and Conceal: Obamas Secret Wars and the Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012). 421. 8 Megan Thee Brenan, Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans, The New York Times May 1, 2013. 9 Shibley Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the New York: Basic Books, 2013), 111.
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Terrill 67 wealth, and are concerned about their limited capacity for self-defense. Gulf leaders also consider their countries vulnerable to military pressure or attacks by larger neighbors as well as insurgencies along the lines of recent problems in Yemen and Iraq. 10 To deal with either type of con tingency, friendly states need allied support. Such support should have a landpower dimension while seeking to avoid a large troop presence that may cause resentment. 11 Such strategies will need to be strengthened and and his predecessors. Gulf Arab Threat Perceptions Many US Arab allies in the Gulf believe they have solid reasons to be concerned about their future national security. The potential rise of Iran as a nuclear weapons state is particularly worrisome to a number of Gulf Arab allies. 12 This scenario could develop in a variety of troubling ways. On the basis of publicly available information, Tehran appears to be making the most progress toward a nuclear weapon via the uranium route (in this case using gas centrifuges) rather than the plutonium route. Nuclear weapons using uranium in the physics package for their warheads do not always require testing to assure that they are function al. 13 Consequently, Iran could become an undeclared nuclear weapons power at some point and take advantage of a policy of nuclear weapons opacity. Tehrans progress in obtaining a nuclear weapons option is not inevitable, but even crippling economic sanctions combined with covert action (such as cyberattacks) cannot guarantee the end of the program. A US or Israeli air campaign against Irans hardened and dispersed targets could guarantee severe damage, but such attacks might only delay the Iranian program, and also risk asymmetric escalation and the unravel ing of current sanctions. 14 Moreover, Tehrans regional behavior could become more aggressive even if it only develops an undeclared bomb or a near-nuclear capability. Complicating matters further, the Gulf states have also experienced a decline in political relations with Tehran along with the rise of the Iranian strategic threat. The near cold war between Iran and some Gulf states became especially intense following the March 2011 Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) military intervention into Bahrain and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which also began in the same month. Prior to the GCC move into Bahrain, the Iranians strongly supported the demands of Bahrains mostly Shiite demonstrators, who demanded a greater public role in the governance of the Sunni-led monarchy. Tehran was subsequently infuriated by the Bahrain intervention which propped up an anti-Iranian monarchy just as it was being challenged by at least Securing the Gulf: Key Threats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation 11 Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 123. 12 Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obamas Diplomacy with Iran although the plutonium-based implosion design for the Nagasaki bomb (Fat Man) was tested on Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project 14 Sanger, Confront and Conceal 229-230. Emirates.
68 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 some pro-Iranian Shiite Bahrainis among the protestors. Although the GCC intervention forces never actually fought with the demonstrators, Additionally, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in the same month as sions. At this time, Iran helped prop up the Assad regime, while most Gulf states strongly backed anti-government rebels. Adding to this dete Tunbs as a way of underscoring their physical control over them. The islands are also claimed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Gulf nations are concerned about Irans conventional forces, which are large but have shortcomings. In this regard, a great deal of Iranian military equipment is aging and severely worn by overuse. While the Iranian military should be able to function effectively as a defensive force, these units would have serious problems projecting offensive power. The ability to project conventional military power across the Gulf is also limited by Irans need to circumvent or neutralize United States, British, French, and Gulf Arab naval forces stationed there. Irans ability to provide effective logistical support to its forces in hostile ter ritory is especially doubtful even with countries which can be reached without crossing the Gulf (such as Iraq or Kuwait through Iraq). Iran has been under a highly effective United Nations (UN) arms embargo since 2010 and thereby been blocked from receiving conventional China. 18 Consequently, Tehran has been forced to rely on its domestic arms industry, which is incapable of compensating for Tehrans inability to import modern weapons. These shortcomings have limited Irans ability to project conventional military power. Nonetheless, Tehran maintains a strong capacity for asymmetric warfare with its naval and ground forces. Facets of this approach related within a target country. One of Irans most useful tools in projecting with Shiite and other revolutionary groups in a variety of countries including Iraq and Afghanistan. 19 In both of these instances, they also American forces. 20 While Iran is the most important national security concern for Gulf Arab allies, it is not their only concern. Many Gulf states also view the future of Iraq as uncertain with considerable potential for developments to harm their security. Some Gulf leaders, especially Saudis and Kuwaitis, The Peninsula Iran lawmakers visit to islands, Khaleej Times Securing the Gulf October 11, 2012. The Threat to the Northern Gulf 20 U.S. Blames Iran for New Bombs in Iraq, USA Today Army Times
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Terrill 69 are deeply suspicious of most leading Shiite Iraqi politicians including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whom many view as an authoritarian leader seeking to marginalize Iraqs Sunni Arabs politically. In addition, Kuwaitis do not feel that all of their problems with Iraq started and he was not the only Iraqi head of state to claim Kuwait was part of Iraq. an Arab Nationalist revolutionary. Unsurprisingly, many Kuwaitis are uncertain that Iraqis have truly renounced previous beliefs that Kuwait is part of Iraq. 21 Paradoxically, many Gulf Arabs who are concerned about a strong, overbearing, nationalist Iraq are also worried about an unstable Iraq sliding into sectarian chaos. Gulf Arabs, who are mostly Sunni, often blame the Shiite-led Iraqi government for the increase in Iraqi sec tarianism, but many are also concerned about the continued rise of have become polarized. The July 2013 attacks on two Iraqi maximum the Levant suggests a tough, competent enemy. In this professional prisoners were freed. 22 controlling territory within both Iraq and Syria only adds to the night mare for Gulf nations that fear widening instability. Basing and Military Exercises In addressing current threats, Gulf states must balance domestic public opinion with defense needs. Many Arab states have endured long and problematic histories with Western military bases on their territory, how to organize military cooperation with the United States. Until at designed to defend regional nations against foreign invaders, although ence local client governments. In response to these concerns, as well as changing Western military requirements and economic pressures, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East steadily declined, and a number of major Western bases were evacuated in response to national had been dramatically scaled down. Western combat forces currently retain an ongoing presence at military facilities only in some smaller 1990-91, but these forces were withdrawn in 2003. In general, the Gulf Arab countries do not favor large numbers of ground forces permanently stationed on their territory, and they have Kuwait Times Terrill Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam (Carlisle, PA: The Washington Post July 22, 2013.
70 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 shown a preference for air or naval bases. Western facilities in Bahrain States Air Force to utilize key air bases, although only a limited number of US aircraft regularly use these facilities. 23 Most of the US combat aircraft currently used to protect the Gulf are naval aircraft stationed on aircraft carriers, although the US Air Force presence in the region can be expanded in emergency situations. Conversely, Kuwait has a much more extensive history with hosting both US ground and air forces, with many US troops stationed at Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait city. Currently, Camp Arifjan is an important transit point for equipment being returned to the United States from Afghanistan. 24 At this time, during the last stages of the US military presence in Iraq. Yet, if some Gulf Arab countries display reticence about large numbers of foreign ground troops stationed permanently on their soil, this does not mean they fail to recognize the importance of landpower or they only seek cooperation with US air and naval forces. A number of Arab Gulf states are concerned that negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan will cause the United States to lose interest in the Middle The decision to reduce US Army forces in Europe from four to two brigade combat teams and supporting units also complicated US power projection into the Middle East. Within the Gulf region, many Arab countries are extremely interested in working with the US Army to help them continue professionalizing their armed forces and raising their standards for conventional defense, joint operations, ground intelligence operations, counterinsurgency, and other capabilities. 28 US commitment to support these activities through both training and exercises is deeply reassuring to Gulf Arab states. In this environment, many Gulf political and military leaders, as well as other Arabs, have found US-led bilateral or multinational military exercises to be an exceptionally valuable tool for their security. Exercises, unlike basing rights, do not involve a long-term military presence that can grate on domestic public opinion and provide the appearance of portrayed as a collaboration, in which the United States is showing its support for local militaries by working with them. Another advantage is that during times of domestic Arab political tension, exercises can be rescheduled in accordance with the wishes of the host government. Conversely, at times of regional tension, regularly scheduled exercises can be expanded and the number of US troops participating in the exer cise can be increased to show support for the host government. Such expansions are generally seen in the region as a show of force, although their linkage to previously planned exercises allows the United States Foreign Affairs.com July 2, 2013. Kuwait Times Associated Press July 19, 2012. The National (UAE), April 24, 2013. Army Times August 3, 2013. 28 Sanger, Confront and Conceal, Securing the Gulf
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Terrill 71 and its allies to deny they are being provocative. Exercise Eager Lion, which is based in Jordan, and involves the United States and a number of Gulf Arab allies is an example of this approach. 29 Eager Lion has an especially robust landpower component, and many observers felt the enhanced 2013 exercise could have sent a message of solidarity with Jordan to the Syrian government, which believed Amman was too sympathetic to some rebel forces in the Syrian civil war. The message might have been reinforced by the US decision to leave a Patriot use in future exercises. 30 remained in Jordan to support these systems following Eager Lion 2013, along with approximately 100 already there as a forward headquarters 31 Although Jordan is not a Gulf state, it is an Arab monarchy which works closely with both the Gulf Arabs and the United States on regional security matters. Gulf participation in a large multinational Eager Lion exercise may send an important message of US-Gulf solidarity. The Gulf states are also involved in numerous smaller bilateral exercises with the United States within their own terri tory as well as the GCCs Peninsula Shield exercises. 32 It is vital for Eager Lion to retain its strong landpower component and for the Gulf states to expand their participation in these exercises due to the uncertain status of future Egyptian-based Bright Star exer cises. 33 In many Arab states, including those within the Gulf, the army service. In only a few wealthy Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, has the air force been more favored historically (primarily because air force requires fewer human resources and armies can more effectively conduct anti-government coups). Consequently, military-to-military contacts and navies that function primarily as coastal defense forces. US Navy joint exercises with Arab navies are important and must be continued, but they will probably never involve the level of US-Arab coordination and cooperation as exercises involving landpower. 34 Another reason for a vigorous US-Gulf exercise program with a strong landpower component is Iranian actions. The Iranians frequently engage in large-scale joint exercises, which they use for both training and propaganda purposes. The land component of these exercises is usually defensive, focusing on responding to a US-led invasion of the Iranian homeland, which is, of course, unlikely to occur. The Iranians 29 GCC participants in Eager Lion exercises have included Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, US Central Command Press Release The New York Times United States Department of Defense Press Release, April 18, 2013, http:// www.defense.gov 32 Cordesman, Securing the Gulf 2. 33 Bright Star has been repeatedly delayed or cancelled as a result of the political turmoil in Egypt, but planning for the exercise continues. See Phil Steward, U.S. to Go Ahead with Joint Military Exercise in Egypt, Reuters July 31, 2013. efforts to correct them.
72 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 usually proclaim these exercises to be resounding successes and rou tinely exaggerate the number of forces involved, but the exercises remain meaningful as political theater. Regionally Aligned Forces In addition to military exercises, one of the most effective ways of improving US military coordination with its Gulf allies is through of the Army initiative based on the lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The initiative is still in its early phases and may be subject to con The concept involves US Army maneuver combat units and support part of their normal training program. This concept was initially considered a model for the Army component of the other Geographic Combatant Commands. Units assigned to regionally aligned forces are expected to receive cultural training and language familiarization for areas where they might be expected to operate. By working more closely with regional militaries on a recurring basis, US personnel will more quickly interface with their counterparts during an escalating crisis. Cooperation with local forces from allied nations who have received training and military education in the United States. It is also useful that English is widely spoken by the larger Middle East. aligned with US Central Command and has played an important role in assigned to the exercise. As part of the alignment with CENTCOM, defense, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. A strong working relationship with Jordan is particularly useful since forces operating out of Jordan can move into the Gulf area quickly if they are needed. The presence of such forces at times of crisis in the Gulf could be a restraining Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), about 20 kilometers northeast of Amman, has also proven to be an excellent command and control site for combined US-Jordanian operations. 38 The Twilight War, Partnerships, March 22, 2012. Lion Kick-Off, http://www.army.mil, http://www.army. mil June 3, 2013. 38 See King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, http:// www.kasotc.com
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Terrill 73 Sharing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced the lesson that counterinsurgencies can take years if not decades to resolve. These troops trained in counterinsurgency tactics. Ideally, these troops should be provided by the government being threatened rather than an outside power. Air and naval forces also play important supporting roles in counterinsurgencies, but ground forces almost always have to take the lead. Armed drones have played an important role in countries such as Yemen, but strike weapons can only address certain aspects of the insur gent problem. They can kill insurgents but cannot reassert government authority in contested areas. Therefore, it is important for US Army forces continue to provide practical advice and assistance to friendly nations, while maintaining as light a footprint as possible. 39 Insurgencies currently exist in a number of Middle Eastern countries including US allies such as Iraq and Yemen. While the GCC states view both of these insurgencies as dangerous, they are especially concerned about the future of Yemen. 40 ince until a Yemeni government offensive, heavily funded by the GCC, liberated the territory in May-June 2012. 41 and lost overt control of the contested territory, it remains a strong ter rorist and insurgent force and has not relinquished the idea of creating Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. 42 In the long term, this insurgency can, in all likelihood, be eradicated only by a reformed Yemeni army that troops that are inadequately trained for counterinsurgency can take military to advance their level of professionalization. 43 Fortunately for improving the quality of the force. 44 acts of terrorism against government facilities and institutions as well as Shiite citizens in partial response to Sunni grievances but also to 39 For an excellent discussion of how US troops became increasingly effective at counter Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011). to a more stable government including brokering the departure from power of longtime strong man President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Washington Post June 12, 2012. Jordan Times June 12, 2012. .Aerospace Daily & Defense Report U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Yemen and U.S. Security 44 The author has been consistently impressed by the seriousness, commitment, and integrity
74 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 to make decisions on how to help the Iraqi government with advice and military equipment while pushing it to be more inclusive. A key to any successful counterinsurgency is to place distance between the insurgents and the population where they operate. The Iraqi government cannot do this if it only serves the interest of its Shiite citizens. US Army training and other support must be closely linked to political reform, but military aid is vital once the Iraqi government begins a serious effort at reform and Sunni inclusion. In imparting the lessons of counterinsurgency, the US Army will also need to work with Gulf Arab air forces as well as armies because many of the former own their nations military helicopters. Only a few Arab armies possess attack helicopters like the United States Army. The copters. made extensive use of helicopters during the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and have internalized a variety of useful lessons that can be passed along to friendly states. Air and Missile Defense Surface-to-surface missiles (such as Scuds) have been used exten sively in some Middle Eastern wars, though never with unconventional involving surface-to-surface missiles include attacks made by both sides during the Iran-Iraq war and missile strikes against Saudi targets during by secessionist forces in Yemen during the 1994 civil war, and there Scuds at rebel forces in the current civil war in that country. 48 Friendly Gulf military forces are extremely interested in systems to defend their airspace against air and missile strikes for a number of ballistic missile program and the fear that Iranian missiles will eventu ally be armed with unconventional warheads. 49 In any scenario where that US and Gulf air forces will seek to destroy as many of these systems Trainers, Washington Post Middle East Airpower in the 21st Century (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword, Iran-Iraq War, International Security and Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Comparative Strategy The Washington Post Blamed for Ballistic Missile Attack, The New York Times July 28, 2013. 49 Kenneth Katzman, (Washington Unthinkable: The Gulf States and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran, Middle East Memo of the Saban
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Terrill 75 on the ground as possible. Such actions are indispensable, but there are continuing questions about how long this will take. The last US war against an enemy which was well-armed with missiles occurred in 1991 despite a substantial air campaign to destroy these assets. While US capabilities for hunting missiles have undoubtedly improved since 1991, Iran has a larger and more diverse weapons arsenal than Iraq did. It is also a much larger country than Iraq. Many of Irans longer-range missiles can be located in remote parts of the country and still strike the Gulf Arab countries. The Gulf Arab states, therefore, have an ongoing interest in a strong, layered defense for protecting their territory including land and sea-based systems. The most impor tant components of this layered defense are the Patriot air and missile Many partner countries within the region already have Patriot systems, and are now acquiring PAC-3 anti-missile capabilities for those systems. With so much at stake, they are tremendously inter ested in working with the United States on missile defense. Conclusions US landpower will remain profoundly relevant to defending the Gulf and deterring recklessness by regional powers. Landpower can be espe cially valuable by asserting a US presence and helping local partners. While US national leadership can be expected to avoid large conventional wars, it will also be required to safeguard other vital national interests. These landpower to underscore US commitment to deterrence and defense. A useful approach to the application of landpower in the post-Iraq region and thus establishing a permanent ground presence, the US Army leadership has chosen to emphasize a vigorous military exercise program and extensive collaboration with partner nations through regionally aligned forces. Organizing the timing, scope, and mix of forces for these exercises can be calibrated to meet regional threats while showing appro priate respect for the equality and sovereignty of US partners in the region. It is also possible, if not likely, that US regional partners will need greater reassurance if unfavorable political developments occur in Iran, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region. The development of an Iranian near-nuclear capability would be an especially serious threat requiring US reassurance of Gulf allies, beyond the stationing of air and naval forces. The future of regionally aligned forces will be determined by senior US military leaders, but it currently looks very promising. In the face of growing threats, many partner nations are almost certain to welcome US support in providing regionally aligned forces to help improve their USA Today Securing the Gulf Reuters
76 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 military performance in such skills as air and missile defense, chemical and biological protection, counterinsurgency operations, intelligence, and other important aspects of modern warfare. Nevertheless, there are some issues of concern that bear watching. In particular, regionally aligned forces working with Middle Eastern and Gulf militaries will need to be properly supported with personnel, material resources, and funding for the ongoing training with counterpart militaries. If these both Gulf allies and potential adversaries. The US government emphasis other commands. have soured many American opinion leaders and large elements of the public on the idea of ever again using US ground forces for large-scale lar, can also be contrasted with many of the early projections that the by minimizing the potential contribution of ground troops in defense of the Gulf states risks a possible failure to deter precisely the type of war that both policymakers and public would largely like to avoid.
ABSTRA CT : The US Army has a major, strategic role to play in the I 1 2 3 4 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Foreign Policy US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific as a political and legisla commanders and consulted
78 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 areas, yet not Defense and Deterrence Korean military may continue to deter through denial, the US Army is 6 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Deni 79 all offensive 9 are 10 The Army already Center for Naval Analyses Workshop Center for Strategic and International Studies Foreign Affairs
80 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 11 12 13 14 Strategic Studies Institute Mostly Missile Defense Strategic Studies Institute
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Deni 81 Regional Security and Stability 16 strategic Center for Naval Analyses Workshop Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military
82 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 and ameliorates transnational security challenges such as international 19 20 21 Parameters Center for Naval Analyses Workshop Center for Naval Analyses Workshop
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Deni 83 22 Dealing with the Security Dilemma more, 23 To poten tial 24 In Honolulu StarAdvertiser Foreign Policy Hindustan Times York Times de facto
84 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 26 every American action in the Indo-AsiaDuring a Examples might Quarterly Foreign Policy East Asia Forum Center for Naval Analyses Workshop
US LANDPOWER IN REGIONAL FOCUS Deni 85 ad hoc Conclusion cannot replicate Army-led security cooperation, especially in terms
86 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013
ABSTRA CT : After more than a decade of effort and cost in Afghani stan, the United States is withdrawing from combat without bring ing the war to a decisive end. There are important strategic lessons of limited war to be relearned from the recurring problems of poli cy, strategy, and performance that the United States has experienced in the four largest and most protracted military interventions it has undertaken since World War II. C omprehensive assessments of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan will necessarily have to wait until the undertaking ends. Later, when history passes judgment, things may well come to look different than they seem today. At this point, however, nearly a dozen years after the United States reacted to 9/11 by launching what would become its most protracted direct foreign military intervention, there is scope to outline some strategic lessons that can serve as guide posts in future contingencies. Perhaps it is inevitable that current appraisals tend to emphasize errors of both policy and performance while predicting that the best we can expect in Afghanistan is to muddle through. 1 Still, critical analysis should not be an excuse to ignore important accomplishments. If the costly, long, and trying intervention in Afghanistan has achieved only a rough approximation of success, it cannot be called misfortune or defeat. Afghanistan has remained stable, and despite the sufferings the war has entailed, a majority of Afghans say the country is moving in the right direction. 2 The current drawdown is not withdrawal, and substan tial US and international commitment to Afghanistan is almost certain to continue in some form. Even though the American appetite for overseas expeditions has dulled, the United States military has endured are not inconsequential results. And yet, the sum of these accomplishments has not yielded a deci Why has more than a decade of enormous effort and cost in Afghanistan led to such inconclusive results? A search for the answer at Carlisle or Newport would naturally involve consulting Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and their fellow 1 See, for example: Anthony C. Cordesman, Afghanistan: The Death of a Strategy, CSIS Commentary February 27, 2012, http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-death-strategy; Bob Woodward, Obamas Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2012); Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Matt Waldman, System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-making Errors in Afghanistan, International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 825-843. 2 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People, http:// asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2012-poll.php LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS A War Examined: Afghanistan Todd R. Greentree 2013 Todd R. Greentree Todd Greentree is a member of the Changing Character of War Program at Oxford University. A former US his experience serving in Salvador and Afghanistan. His current research is on the consequences of the Reagan Doctrine Wars in Central American, Angola, and Afghanistan.
88 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 strategists for historical perspective. One way of applying the method to Afghanistan is to reframe the original question: Why has the United States failed to achieve decisive outcomes on its terms in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea, the four major and protracted wars it has fought since World War II? True enough, major differences caution against risking facile com parisons and false analogies. In addition to contrasts in geography and geopolitics, Korea was essentially a conventional war; Afghanistan has been an irregular war; Vietnam and Iraq combined elements of both. War; Iraq and Afghanistan were post-9/11 new wars. After danger ous escalation, Korea successfully restored a tense status quo; Vietnam became a quagmire that ended in disaster; and in Iraq and Afghanistan, regime change provoked virulent insurgencies that persist today. Nevertheless, a fundamental pattern recurred in each of these US about Korea, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy which he updated in 1979 with Limited War Revisited about Vietnam. Others have 3 In all four, US leaders found themselves responding by force of arms to what were perceived as urgent security challenges, and in the process transformed what had been countries of secondary or peripheral interest into centers of national mission. However, the more intractable these interventions became, the more they also became publically controver sial. As the United States struggled to withdraw forces from combat, the level of political intensity declined, even though less than triumphal outcomes disproved the conviction that in war there is no substitute for victory. Rather than explanations based on the complexities of Afghanistan itself or the new character of war in the 21st century, the principal issues stem from the nature of limited war, along with the enduring problems of policy, strategy, and performance that have always accompanied pro longed US military interventions. The emphasis here is on the know yourself half of the strategic equation, although there is not space to offer more than an outline of analysis and recommendations. The Lessons Judging the Nature of War This often-quoted passage from Clausewitz seems a good starting point: 3 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); for contemporary commentary, see Hew Strachan, Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival 52, no. 5 (October-November 2020): 157-182; Etienne de Durand, Stabilization Operations in the Era of New Wars: Addressing the Myths of Stabilization," paper presented at a symposium on the Role of the Military in Peacebuilding, Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), February 3, 2009, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/ symposium/e2008.html.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Greentree 89 mander and the statesman have to make . is the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that it is alien to its nature. 4 Contrary to this basic wisdom, civilian and military leaders have persistently misconceived the war in Afghanistanand Afghanistan itselfas something to be turned into something else. If over-reaction same cannot be said for inappropriate handling of military interven tion and counterinsurgency. The most directly relevant parallels come not from the often-cited British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, but from the American experience in Vietnam. Rather than dismissing comparison between the two as a false reading of history, parallels cation program in Vietnam, concluded, . . the U.S. grossly misjudged what it could actually accomplish with the effort it eventually made. In this sense at least, the U.S. did stumble into a quagmire. 5 Although it does not mount to the same level of tragedy as Vietnam, our misconception of the nature of the war in Afghanistan similarly distorted our approach to policy and strategy. Pashtun tribesmen who join the insurgency (and virtually all of them are Pashtuns) are, in David diers (and most Afghans refer to foreign troops as Americans) because foreign soldiers happen to be in their space, and because they come universally understood cause. 6 By precisely the same logic, US troops Taliban because the Taliban supported the terrorists who got into our space when they attacked New York and Washington, DC. But this war is not an accident that sprang from nowhere; al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts spawned from the mujahedin who fought the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan with US sponsorship in the 1980s. The point is not that the Cold War caused 9/11, but that the United States, through action and inaction, has been a contributing if unwitting protagonist since the National Interest and the Changing Value of the Object The value of the object drives the strategic dynamics of war in Afghanistan. War aims have been determined politically and vary according to perceptions, with the duration and level of effort dedicated to achieving them changing in accordance. The US national interest in dismantling, degrading, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan is, in principle, intrinsically high value. The 4 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. in Afghanistan and Pakistan, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, December 1, 2009; Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972), vi. 6 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
90 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 problem is that this goal has largely been accomplished. Additional intervention to reduce the Taliban insurgency, protect the Afghan people, and build the Afghan state is indirectly linked to counterterror ism. Because these aims are of less obvious value, and therefore vaguer, The level of US (and the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]) effort has consisted of two cycles, both of them reactive. The initial counteroffensive to overthrow the Taliban and expel al Qaeda in 2001-02 saw an area of marginal interest transformed momen tarily into the highest national priority. The value of the operation in Afghanistan declined as the shock of 9/11 receded, the Taliban and al Qaeda appeared to have been defeated (despite missing Osama Bin Laden), and US attention diverted to Iraq. In the second cycle, the shift to NATO command in 2006 signaled renewed interest, which increased as it became apparent that the Taliban insurgency had not only revived but gained the initiative. System lagincluding presidential elections followed by extensive reassessmentconsumed almost another three years before the response came in the form of the surge, which lasted only from 2009-11. Prompted by frustration and fatigue, the current ISAF reduction represents a de facto lowering in the value of the object. The result is a curtailment of effort and duration with correspondingly limited aims of transition to Afghan responsibility by 2014 and negoti commitment to permit residual in-country counterterrorist capability and maintain basic stability. The United States is not Exempt from the Limits of Power and strategy-making to determine war aims and the means to achieve them. The second are external constraints of power in the form of, for example, prevailing moral and ethical norms, international laws, and the preferences of coalition partners or host governments. The third set of limits, and often the most determining, are the demands of war, which result from interaction between political and military effects in 7 There is widespread agreement that overthrowing the Taliban and establishing a new Afghan state was a just, timely, and well-executed response to the 9/11 attacks. 8 Problems arose from the dynamics of war that emerged afterward. In hindsight, elevating the manhunt to eradicate al Qaeda from Afghanistan into a vengeful and single-minded Global War on Terror amounted to an exaggerated reaction to an unfamiliar threat. The subsequent slide into deeper military intervention and coun 7 S.T. Hosmer, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1984); Bradford A. Lee, Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners, in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 8 Stephen D. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for the Army and Defense Policy, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); Henry Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIAs Clandestine Service (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008).
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Greentree 91 terinsurgency warfare did not result from the failings of the Afghan government, nor did the Taliban and their associates demonstrate supe rior political or military competence in the revived insurgency. Rather, the primary reason the experience has been so costly, protracted, and inconclusive rests with the United States. Despite meaningful adapta tion, critical policy contradictions have remained unmanaged and strategy has been largely reactive. Performance in securing and stabiliz subsequently through an over-ambitious yet time-bound surge followed by a hasty and fatigue-induced drawdown. Multiple limits to power in Afghanistan are obvious: Insurgents exploit asymmetrical advantages of irregular warfare to offset ISAFs overwhelming superiority. The Taliban has enjoyed sanctuary and support in Pakistan because the United States cannot afford escalation there. Other constraints are self-determined and include restraining violence, avoiding civilian casualties, and respecting human rights to comply with legal, ethical, and humanitarian norms whether or not they make optimal strategic sense. The legacy of the Vietnam syndrome ensures that minimizing US casualties is an imperative; avoiding casual ties drives even stricter caveats among coalition partners. Time is a critical dimension of power, both in the negative effects of protraction and in the sense of timing embodied in the concept of the culminating point, where power begins to decline once it has reached its peak. The initial culminating point in Afghanistan came with the overthrow of the Taliban when the United States served as the arbiter of power to establish the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Once the government was in place, the United States required the cooperation of the Karzai regime and was unwilling to do anything that might prove destabilizing. As time unfolded, the war continued and intervention dragged on. US pressure to reform clashed with Afghan doubts about commitment and sensitivities over sovereignty. Trust was undermined. As a result, despite Afghan dependence on American and international support, dissention increased over elections, corruption, replacement of in a commitment trap, our leverage declined as our involvement deep ened, as Komer put it about Vietnam. Competing and Contradictory Aims Paradoxes of limited war, intervention, and irregular warfare in Afghanistan have resulted in a pervasive set of contradictions that greatly complicated the relationship of ends to means. These contradic wicked problems, which occur when efforts to attack one problem set give rise to new contradictions. For example: the Islamic Emirate fell in a matter of weeks with rela tively little effort engineered by a few dozen Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, while ten years later over 100,000 ISAF troops and 300,000 ANSF struggled to prevail over perhaps 30,000 Taliban insurgents. Counterterrorism and coun terinsurgency methods have been at odds with state-building goals and sometimes with each other when Afghans hired to mobilize manhunters
92 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 became new warlords or key political leaders became targets on the kill/capture list (Joint Prioritized Effects List [JPEL]). The tactical imperative of force protection separates soldiers from the people they are supposed to protect without necessarily separating insurgents from the population. Poppy eradication has supported counternarcotics goals, but feeds the insurgency by depriving Afghans of their livelihoods, thus undermining counterinsurgency. Rapidly pumping billions of dollars into development programs in one of the worlds poorest countries was trucking, fuel, and private security contracts needed to sustain ISAF. Reliance on Pakistan for counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and over land access to Afghanistan has allowed it to provide essential sanctuary and support to the Taliban without penalty. Short rotation cycles helped in Vietnam, for 12 years one year at a time. Overly Ambitious Aims The US view of war as a transforming mission has guided inter vention in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, strategy has failed for the most part to assess the distance between desire and possibility. Even when ambitions were grounded in reality, performance could never overcome timeframe. Military defeat of the Taliban was never feasible for many reasons, but the primary problem was political. However necessary and reason able it seemed to establish a competent Afghan government, the attempt to turn the country into something that was alien to its nature amounted to a gross form of mirroring by an often over-bearing patron. The tralized state, democracy at the point of bayonets, and governance programs, supplemented with expensive development projects, was based on modern liberal norms and social engineering methods largely disconnected from Afghanistans reality as a diverse and underdeveloped Islamic nation corroded by a generation of war. 9 Even if this ambitious and enormously complex project had been feasible, execution swung from handing off nation-building to COIN by coalition, followed by an intensely compressed US effort that accompanied the surge to connect people to their marginally functioning government. Despite professions of support for whole of government, institutional divisions limited US performance by retarding the integration of political and military strategies, even after the belated embracing of COIN in 2009. 10 down the conventional battlesword, long after it proved to be a disadvan tage, and pick up the rapier of counterinsurgency (COIN). The essence Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 10 Todd R. Greentree, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan, Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (March 2013): 325-356.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Greentree 93 warfare by carefully limiting the employment of force while increasing force levels, balancing enemy-centric operations with population-centric COIN, and giving priority to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development. These measures were all essential elements of an even more important underlying strategic principle: the unity of political and military dimensions. the accompanying surge was not that it was the wrong strategy, but that it was implemented too late. Although successful in stemming the Taliban resurgence, the adjustment was, in essence, a reactive effort that attempted to compensate for strategic errors that had begun to accumu late immediately following the overthrow in late-2001. The signal error was failure to develop the ANSF while the Taliban and al Qaeda were at their weakest. Doing so early on would have made it possible for the ANSF to maintain internal security while remaining a itself with aggressive SOF raiding (often conducted independently under US-UK Operation Enduring Freedom), task forces that conducted clear and clear again operations, and islands of armed development associ ated with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Conducted as economy of The most damaging effect was GEN Stanley McChrystals insurgent math where kinetic actions, especially when they caused civilian casual ties, produced more insurgents than they eliminated. The more sophisticated approach that resulted from the realiza tion that you cant kill or capture your way to victory in Afghanistan amounted in fact to a rediscovery of the basic principles of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. The increase in force levels made it possible to synchronize targeted enemy-centric actions with phased clear-hold-build campaigns conducted under restrictive rules of engage ment, and supplemented by governance and development programs, all intended to secure and protect the population. Underlying the adaptation was the fundamental strategic principle that in war political and military is handled, as Clausewitz put it, at the level of cabinet, in an internal operational, and tactical. 11 However, that adaptation came after the war had become so pro tracted and had suffered from multiple counter-strategic limitations raises a serious question: Is big COIN inevitably a second-best solution? It was evident from the outset that belated embracing of COIN was never going to be sustainable for the length of time it would take to have full effect. Declared by the president in 2009 to be time-bound in the face of low domestic support, the US troop surge and the programs associ ated with it were enormously expensive and came as other ISAF forces had already begun to withdraw. Compounding this problem, allowing a Marine Expeditionary Force to concentrate in Helmand Province forces to an area that contained less than three percent of the Afghan 11 For a brilliant soldiers eye view see Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst & Co., 2012).
94 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 population and was not the insurgencys center of gravity. It was also recognized that the rapid jump in the ANSF to over 300,000 was beyond expected too much of the Afghan government too soon. The so-called civilian surge and accompanying injection of development funds were only was there a failure to break the interagency phalanx, the military remained over-dominant while civilians were never really at war. 12 It is too early to sort out the enduring effects, but the entire approach puts in mind advice from an earlier war, T. E. Lawrences famous 27 Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks in World War I. Of these, the key lesson is contained in Article 15: Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the [Afghans] do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of [Afghanistan], your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. 13 The Most Important Thing About a War is How it Ends most important thing about a war is how it ends. 14 Yet, in Afghanistan, as in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, the United States is exiting its combat mission unilaterally without terminating the war. Even though the United States is not withdrawing altogether from Afghanistan, the Presidents assertion that the tide of war is receding gives rise to several observations about strategy and war termination. success or clear aims, the value of the object declined. As with Vietnam, a principal consequence of Afghanistan (and Iraq) for the United States will be a lack of popular and political will to risk costly and protracted military interventions that is likely to endure, perhaps for a generation. Conversely, the tide is not receding for Afghans, and in fact the outcome may well be another rise in the cycle of war that has continued in one form or another since 1979. This is also the second time around for them with the United States. After the mujahedin forced the Soviets to withdraw in 1989, the US interest in Afghanistan declined and America ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban. The idea of reconciling with the Taliban occurred several years ago, a much more limited aim than victory. Prospects are further constrained when force and diplomacy are misaligned. At this stage, aside from the dubious wisdom of power-sharing with Islamic extremists, attempting to wrangle the Taliban into negotiations at the same time troops are drawing down means that leverage is slipping away. The answer to the 12 Austin Long, On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). 13 T. E. Lawrence, Twenty-seven Articles, Arab Bulletin 20 August 1917. 14 Fred C. Ikl, Every War Must End, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Greentree 95 problem of ending the war in Afghanistan lies irrevocably in the past and in the traditional Afghan view of victory. As soon as the Taliban were ready to align themselves with the victors. The new Afghan government the United States, focused single-mindedly on hunting terrorists, over ruled reconciliation in any form and by doing so failed to exploit the advantage it held at the culminating point. 15 There is additional risk in opting for exit short of ending the war. Bruce Hoffman points out that as a result of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the permissive environment in Pakistan, . . Al Qaeda may well regain the breathing space and cross-border physical sanctuary needed to ensure its continued existence. 16 Conclusion The strategic lessons of Afghanistan, placed alongside those of Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea, resolve into a recurring pattern of problems and challenges that transcend the obvious differences. These lessons are attributable in differing degree to the nature of limited war, foreign military intervention, democracies at war, and irregular warfare, and all are common to US historical experience. On the assumption that Afghanistan will not be the last time intervention becomes a compelling national urgency for the United States, the premium here is on under standing and institutionalizing these lessons so they may be remembered in time. There is a notion that a solution lies in having a unifying grand strat egy. Often implied as nostalgia for the strategic coherence of the Cold War, it is just that, a notion. There may be reasons why the world would be a better place if the United States had a grand strategy. However, it is worth keeping in mind that having one focused so exclusively on con taining communism offered no immediate solutions to the problems of limited war the United States encountered in Korea, while using combat troops to prevent dominoes from falling led to disaster in Vietnam. Likewise, it is not clear how a grand strategy in the high policy sense of engagement or offshore balancing would have helped guide US interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq once they were underway. More useful than a unifying intellectual concept are workable approaches to policy, strategy, and performance that hold out the chance of improving on the historical record. There is nothing revolutionary in Vietnam and are being relearned today. 17 There have been any number Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) Managing Complex Contingency Operations that followed the Black Hawk debacle in Somalia. Our Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History ; Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 16 Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaedas Uncertain Future, 36, no. 8 (June 2013): 635-653. 17 For example, there is more than an echo of Vietnam in the recent re-embracing of the core role and mission of the Special Forces advocated among the Special Operations community. See Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006) and John D. Waghelstein, Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counter -I nsurgency Business, 5, no. 3 (June 1994): 360-378.
96 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 recent interventions have prompted a new round of analyses and reports. 18 Most of their recommendations point in a similar direction, institutions, with the partial exception of the Special Forces and CIA, were designed for purposes other than the complex and intractable political-military situations that prompt intervention. Adaptations that imply new legislation or major institutional reform may be beyond reach, but others are within decisionmaking grasp and a matter of leadership. Probably the most important lesson of Afghanistan embodies the wisdom of Lawrences Article 15 in the current desire to avoid large COIN-style intervention in favor of keeping the footprint small. As always, the problem lies not so much in recognizing what must be done, but rather in actually changing organizations and the ways they do business. Fixing Policy, Strategy, and Performance 1. Build a systematic approach to mission and contingency planning beginning with three basic criteria for making policy determinations: (1) Identify interests, (2) Decide a degree of commitment, and (3) Estimate the probability of success at different levels of cost and risk. 19 2. Develop a strategic framework to establish the basis for matching of political and military success; (3) Describe the desired end state and how it is to be achieved, for example, through military victory, negotiated war termination, international peacekeeping, mediated tinguishing between ends and means as tools of strategy, demands of war such as avoidance of escalation, and self-determined constraints; (5) Use net assessment as a basic tool for analyzing complex political and military interactions among multiple actors at global, regional, and internal levels, further distinguishing among national, regional, and local levels; (6) Assess risks from factors such as contradictions in aims, mismatches between aims and means, separation of military and political dimensions, and consequences of underinvestment; (7) Reassess, adapt, and repeat. 3. Develop a mission or campaign plan based on the strategic framework to include: (1) All instruments of power, using a principle of strategic Align coalition and alliance contributions, including arrangements for leadership, command, coordination, and division of labor; (3) Plan force levels, distribution, and employment; (4) Integrate political and military operational planning that gives highest priority to: (a) statebuilding, including accountability, institutional bureaucracy, and rule 18 Some of the best of these include: Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 66 April 2013; U.S. Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, Special Warfare 26, no. 22 (April-June 2013); James Dubik, Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer , Institute for the Study of War April 2009; MG Michael T. Flynn, CPT Matt Pottinger, and Paul T. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Center for a New American Security, January 2010). 19 This approach to policy determination was originally proposed in Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky, Limits to Intervention, Foreign Affairs 48, no. 2 (January 1970): 245-261.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Greentree 97 of law; and (b) force development (or security sector reform), includ ing police; (5) Design supporting programs and projects; (6) Prepare to manage and mitigate the impacts of limits and risks. 4. Using the strategic framework and integrated political-military cam goals and maximize unity of command; (2) Establish clear civilian or and commitment; (3) Create a corresponding integrated civil-military team based on the Country Team or a Regional Command model; that mirror each other; (5) Strive for maximum continuity through extended assignments, repeated rotations, and maintaining stable lead ership by establishing semipermanent headquarters and commands. 5. Build a cadre of civilians who are trained, equipped, and oriented to operate as part of a civil-military team prepared for self-protection in to conduct political action in addition to program management and related responsibilities such as reporting and analysis. 6. policy study and directive, interagency guidance, and Department together and elaborate a shared civil-military doctrine. Consult the growing body of research on multiple aspects of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the contribution of development projects to COIN, the effectiveness of the surge, and operational assessments. 20 7. Make every effort to obey Article 15 by not trying to do too much. At the same time avoid doing too little. Maximize leverage, but respect the limits to power. Identify local allies and establish relationships of trust, but beware of commitment traps and the dangers of expedi ency. Consult widely. Spend more time listening and less time trying to dictate. 20 Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, Michael Callen, and Joseph Felter, Do Working Men Rebel? Unemployment and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, Resolution 55, no. 4 (August 2011): 496-528; Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007? International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 7-40; and William P. Upshur, Jonathon W. Roginski, and David J. Killcullen, Recognizing Systems in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned and New Approaches to Operational Assessments, Prism 3, no. 3 (June 2012): 87-104.
ABSTRA CT : This article compares three limited interventionsthe Bay of Pigs (1961), Beirut (1983), and Mogadishu (1992-93). Using Clausewitzs idea that the pursuit of military victory must be linked to a political object, this essay focuses on the retreat skill set that allowed Presidents Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton to conclude terventions can instruct todays strategic leaders, who will confront terrorist movements located in the failed states and mega-cities of the 21st century. Once the expenditure . exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced . . Carl von Clausewitz 1 M ost American presidents have committed military force believing the outcome will be successful. Nonetheless, as the past half-century has shown, Americas uses of military force sometimes failed to yield satisfying results. This review compares three US interventionsthe Bay of Pigs (1961); Beirut (1983); and Mogadishu (1992-93)which fell short of the hopes of the administrations that launched them. These three cases, which span four decades and the end of the Cold War, share a number of striking and suggestive similarities. They speak to the problems not only of limited interventions, but also of larger operations, including our dilemmas in Afghanistan and Iraq, and likely challenges in future operations against terrorist actors. Each episode under study here was presidentially driven and used limited mili tary force as a catalyst for political change in a target country. In every case, contained what demographers call a youth bulge, a population curve skewed in favor of the young, which included many military-age males. 2 In all three, the missions outcome shocked the American president who had authorized it. Finally, in each instance, the US chief executive chose to end the operation and cut his losses rather than pursue victory. The president made his decision when, to borrow from the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the operation had reached the crossover point where its growing costs exceeded the value of its original political object. 3 All three were regarded as political disasters in their times. Nonetheless, two of these presidents easily won reelection and in all likelihood John F. Kennedy would have done the same. 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92. 2 Jack A. Goldstone, Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5. 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War 92. LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Cutting Losses: Ending Limited Interventions David C. Brooks 2013 David C. Brooks David C. Brooks is a 20-year veteran of the US Foreign Service. He speaks Spanish, Polish, and Portuguese. He has a PhD in Latin American History from the University of Connecticut and a Master's Degree from the National War College, where he wrote this essay. He has published articles in the International Herald Tribune Marine Corps Gazette and The Journal of Latin American Studies
100 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 This analysis maintains that studies of American warfare are too victory centric. When scholars examine defeats, reversals, or frustrat ing results, they frequently use a victory-tinted lens. They ask, What went wrong? as they try to locate the reason for the absence of victory, a reason that is hopefully reversible in future operations. This approach treats victory as the norm and military frustration as an aberration, an able results. Consequently, while this commentary elucidates certain classic problems in limited interventions it focuses on the loss-cutting skill set, those abilities that enable strategic leaders to accept a tactical reverse to avoid remaining mired in a protracted and likely more costly imbroglio. The cases start when the president received word his mission had gone awry. Historical background follows. 4 Finally, this essay analyzes how three presidents responded to mission failure and relates those responses to recent and likely future political-military challenges. JFK and Playa Girn On 18 April 1961, President John F. Kennedy hosted the annual Congressional Reception. During the event, bad news came in from Playa Girn (Giron Beach), the landing site for the Bay of Pigs inva sion. The president had inherited this enterprise. The scheme provided logistical backing and limited air support to a 1,200-man, CIA-trained brigade of Cuban exiles that would land in Cuba and overthrow Fidel Castro. Kennedy had continued the project, but he prohibited overt US military intervention. By that evening, the Cuban exiles mission was going in the shit house, according to one JFK advisor. 5 Castros pilots had sunk two of the exiles supply ships, stranding them on the beach. After the party, Kennedys advisorsincluding CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell, the invasions chief architect, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burkeurged direct US intervention. Suddenly, the new President faced possible war in Cuba. A Complex Neighbor interior, Cuba had been ruled for four centuries by Spain and, as a con sequence, had become a society that featured sharp divisions of race and rampant corruption blighted the countrys politics. As Cuba entered the 1960s, its society contained something of a youth bulge, with just under a third of the population below the age of thirty. 6 Rebel forces led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara came to power in 1959. Castro then polarized Cuba with a radical communist program. He attracted support from the young, the poor, rural peasants, and Cubas black population. 4 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little Brown, 1971). 5 Kenneth ODonnell quoted in Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 268. 6 On Cubas 1960 demographics, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Pyramids of the World from 1950-2100, http://populationpyra mid.net/Cuba/1960/.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Brooks 101 Simultaneously, Castros leftward lunge alienated middleand upperwith Havana in 1961. 7 JFKs Advisors at Odds guration. The plan divided his advisors, a split represented by Richard Cuban exiles could overthrow Castro. Seven years earlier, the CIA had Arbenz, Guatemalas leftist President. The CIA believed it could do the same in Cuba. 8 Moreover, Bissell and CIA Director Allen Dulles thought that, if the exiles faced defeat, Kennedy would order US intervention. 9 In contrast, JFK advisor Arthur Schlesinger worried the exiles lacked an adequate political program. When the CIA passed the groups draft to banker, the dispossessed property owner, but [it] had very little to say to the worker, the farmer or the Negro. 10 These doubts were compounded by an even greater strategic challenge. Before the exiles had even landed, their foe knew American strategy. Fidel Castros comrade-in-arms, Che Guevara, had witnessed the 1954 coup in Guatemala. Consequently, Castro had purged the army and created large, armed militias that reportedly numbered as many as two hundred thousand. 11 Picking Up the Pieces Pushed to intervene, Kennedy refused. He said later that the CIA and the Joint Chiefs were sure Id give in [and order in the U.S. military] 12 Though proud in private, Kennedy was contrite in public. He held a press conference where he said: Victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan. Later, in response to probing questions, Kennedy stated: I am the responsible 13 Days afterward, speaking to newspaper 7 On Castros leadership style, see Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma relationship with the United States, see Louis A. Prez, Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens: University of Georgia, 2003). 8 The phrase regime change is of more recent vintage, but it appears to apply here. On the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala in 1954, see Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story Of The American Coup In Guatemala (Boston, Harvard University Press, 2005) and Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas, 1983). 9 For Allen Dulless opinion that the President might relax restrictions on the operation, see Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, The Confessions of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs, Diplomatic History 8, no. 4 (1984): 369; for Richard Bissells opinion on the same issue, see Richard M. Bissell, Response to Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, The Confessions of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs, Diplomatic History 8, no. 4 (1984): 380. 10 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: 11 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1977), 142-145; Jorge G. Castaeda, Compaero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf, 1997), 69-71; Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 323. 12 Robert Dallek, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 2003), 365. 13 David Greenberg, The Goal: Admitting Failure Without Being a Failure, The New York Times January 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/weekinreview/14green.html?_r=0; see also: The American Presidency Project, The Presidents News Conference April 21, 1961, http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8077
102 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 United States would intervene against further communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere. 14 scored an 83 percent approval rating in the next Gallup poll. A per plexed Kennedy remarked, The worse I do, the more popular I get. 15 Despite his popularity, the Presidents Cuba tribulations continued. The United States later gave Cuba $53 million in aid to free the men captured at the Bay of Pigs. 16 Ronald Reagan: Bad News from Beirut On Saturday, 22 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan was at the Augusta National Golf Course. 17 At 2:30 a.m., National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane called and told him that a suicide bomber had driven a dynamite-laden truck into the Marine barracks in Beirut, and 241 Marines had perished. 18 How did this happen? US forces had entered Lebanon to forestall to eliminate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Yet Israels attack drew international criticism. The besieged PLO looked for a way out. The United States contributed troops to a multinational operation to extricate the PLO. 19 for Tunisia and the multinational forces withdrew. 20 hit Lebanon. On 14 September, Lebanese President Bashir Gemayal, a Maronite Christian and US ally, was assassinated. From 17 to 19 September, Lebanese Phalangist militia massacred 700 Palestinian refu gees in Israeli-controlled territory. 21 On 29 September, President Reagan returned 1,200 Marines to Beirut to provide an interposition force so the Lebanese government could pacify the country. 22 14 Edward T. Folliard, Bay of Pigs, The Washington Post April 21, 1961, http://www.washing tonpost.com/wp-srv/national/2000/popup0421.htm 15 Dallek, 16 The aid came in the form of baby food and medicine, which was exchanged for the impris oned Cuban exiles. The Bay of Pigs, linked from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx 17 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011). Kindle Edition. 18 Reagan, An American Life. The truck and its cargo exploded with an estimated force of 12,000 pounds of TNT; Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1989), 207. 19 David Howell Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A study in 1987), 173. 20 Ibid., 174. 21 Ibid., 176. 22 Adam B. Lowther provides an excellent summary of Lebanons disintegration. Adam B. Lowther, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 5; accessed April 6, 2013, from Praeger Security International Online database: http://psi.praeger.com.ezproxy6.ndu. edu/doc.aspx?d=/books/gpg/C9635/C9635-538.xml
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Brooks 103 Many Societies, One State Lebanon had a long history of ethno-religious division. 23 The coun trys main groupsMaronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiites, and Druzeall possessed distinct lineages, loyalties, and religious visions. Israels victory in 1948 and Jordans King Husseins expulsion of the PLO in 1970 sent thousands of Palestinians into Lebanon, adding to the vola tile mix. Desperate to control the PLO, the Lebanese government asked civil war erupted and the Christians were pitted against Muslims. 24 In reality, the contest was multisided with both the Israelis and the Syrians supporting local factions. 25 Beirut. Religious division drove the violence, but even more than in of the population under age 30 and fully a quarter under age 20, there were ample recruits for sectarian factions, and this same youth bulge was guaranteed to strain the social systems of any attempt at national governance. 26 A Vision-Driven Mission In returning the Marines to Lebanon, President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane were motivated by a broader vision for Middle East peace. In Lebanons tragedy, they saw possibility. Reagan hoped peace in Lebanon would create a golden opportunity . toward achieving a long-term settlement. 27 The administration launched a plan that would offer the Palestinians a semi-autonomous territory federated with Jordan. 28 Where some saw opportunity, however, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger saw danger. Weinberger did not perceive a US vital interest in Lebanon and opposed the deployment. 29 In the end, the mission went forward, albeit cautiously. About 1,500 Marines took positions at the Beirut airport, and strict rules of engagement governed their operations. Although welcomed initially, the Marines relations with various Lebanese groups soon soured. In the fall of 1982, US forces bolstered ing any notion of the Marines neutrality. 30 On 16 April 1983, a van laden with explosives detonated at the US Embassy, killing scores of Americans and Lebanese employees. 31 Then on 25 October, a second vehicle-borne bomb delivered the fatal blow that destroyed the Marine barracks. The peacekeeping mission had become a massacre. 23 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 173. 24 Lowther, 1-4. 25 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 148. 26 For a graphical representation of Lebanons 1980 population-age skew, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Pyramids of the World from 1950-2100, http://populationpyramid.net/Lebanon/1960/ 27 Reagan, An American Life 28 Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 212. 29 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 146. 30 Timothy J. Geraghty, Years Later: We Came in Peace, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134/10/1,268 (2008): 3. 31 Reagan, An American Life ; Lowther, 7.
104 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Reagan Responds The bombing devastated and angered President Reagan. Nonetheless, he saw little purpose in retribution since, in his words, 32 Reagan spoke to the nation on 27 October 1983. In this address, he had a bit of the luck of the Irish. Just two days before, the United States had invaded Grenada. Years later, Secretary Shultz noted how the images of victory from Grenada balanced the bad news from Beirut. 33 Beyond Grenada, the Great Communicator was at his best that evening. He explained why he had sent the Marines to Lebanon, taking responsibility for the tragedy. Reagan cited Beirut, Grenada, and the Soviet shoot-down of a and he called for continued US engagement in the Middle East. 34 In the following months, the Marines hunkered down at the airport and later moved to ships off shore. The United States undertook air strikes and battleship bombardments against Syrian positions but launched no Syrians captured US Navy pilot Lieutenant Robert O. Goodman and held him from December 1983 to January 1984, when he was released to the Reverend Jesse Jackson. 35 In March, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. As he later wrote: Our policy wasnt working. We couldnt . run the risk of another suicide attack . . [And] no one wanted to commit our troops to a full-scale war in the Middle East. 36 Clinton and Mogadishu President Clinton altered his Sunday schedule for 2 October 1993. Typically, he attended a Methodist church, but on this day he went to a special mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral. 37 While the President lis tened to the sermon, his aides monitored breaking events in Somalia. American troops were in that country as part of a United Nations (UN) mission (UNOSOM II) to conduct famine relief. For some time, the military muscle of the mission, Task Force Ranger (TFR), had pursued Mohammed Farah Aidid, a recalcitrant Somali warlord whose followers had killed twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers. 38 After the service, Clinton returned to the White House and gath ered with his advisors. The reports from Mogadishu turned ominous. Instead of capturing Aidid, Task Force Ranger had encountered a hail of resistance. Somali militia had killed six Americans and combat raged. In response, Clinton exploded, saying: I cant believe were being pushed 32 Reagan, An American Life. 33 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1995). Kindle Edition. 34 President Ronald Regans Televised Address to the United States, October 27, 1983, The Beirut Memorial Online: They Came in Peace http://www.beirut-memorial.org/history/reagan.html 35 See Ebony Update May 1987, http://books.google.com/ books?id=Gp2ts_89clMC&pg=PA124&lpg=PA124&dq=robert+o.+goodman&source=bl&ots= v98SVE95ks&sig=--G2aenqBDNJ8wBvDqJubg110i8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uIRfUf38DYSJ0QHmu 4GgBw&sqi=2&ved=0CE0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=robert%20o.%20goodman&f=false 36 Reagan, An American Life 37 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000). 211. Kindle Edition. 38 Ibid., 212
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Brooks 105 around by these two-bit pricks. 39 George Stephanopoulos, Clintons Senior Advisor on Policy and Strategy, sympathized with the president. The US intervention had saved thousands of Somalis by guarantee ing them access to food aid. Now, instead of providing security, US troops were trapped and taking casualties in the rabbit warren that was Mogadishu. Land of the Clans Somalia was an impoverished society, but not a simple one. Clan 40 The warrior ethos of Somali men powered the clan system. British scholar I. M. Lewis traced the roots of Somali males militant individualism to their history as herdsmen, which cultivated a sense in each Somali man that 41 Somalias history bore out Lewiss reading. In the early 20th century, the country spawned a celebrated hero of Muslim anticolonial resistance: Mohammed Abdullah Hassan. Dubbed the Mad Mullah, Hassan fought the British, the Italians, and the Ethiopians from 1900-1920. For a time, he established a Muslim state in the Somali hinterland. A literate man, Hassan once sent a taunting note to his British pursuers that read like a Somali warrior haiku I like war, and you do not . . The country is of no use to you. If you want wood and stone you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant heaps. The sun is very hot. 42 Eventually, the British broke the Mad Mullahs Muslim state with air power. Even so, they never captured Abdullah Hassan. 43 Since Hassans time, Somalia lurched between anarchy and strongman rule. Nine years after gaining independence in 1960, Major General Mohammed Siad Barre took power in a coup. He governed with an iron hand for two decades. In January 1991, Barre was forced from power by an opposition that devolved into factions with his departure. The resulting chaos led to starvation, and clan leaders used control of food aid as a weapon. By 1992, Somalias suffering had gone global, attracting the attention of the United Nations and the United States. 44 Despite bulge of the cases under study here, with about a third of the popula tion under age 20, an ominous statistic in a country with strong clan and 39 Ibid., 214. 40 Ioan Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994). 41 John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, and Peacekeeping (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 4. 42 Andrew Cockburn, Somalia: A Failed State? National Geographic Online July 2002, http:// ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0207/feature3/ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, The Failure of The Daraawiish State The Clash Between Somali Clanship and State System, (Paper Presented at the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies December 1993, Thames Valley University, London, UK) http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivemar03/040629602.htm 44 Joshua L. Gleis, Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insurgencies (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 62.
106 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 military traditions. 45 Pressure grew on the United Nations and the Bush administration to respond to the unfolding horror in the Horn of Africa. Negotiation and Disarmament Lite 1992) failed because its military forces could not handle local warlords like Mohammed Farah Aidid. (UNOSOM I never had more than 1,000 personnel on the ground.) In the wake of the UNs failure, a reluctant Bush administration pondered its options. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft expressed the skeptics case best when, during one meeting he said: Sure, we can get in . . But how do we get out? 46 Nonetheless, Washington yielded to international pressure and by the UN, that went ashore on 5 December 1992. UNITAF contained 37,000 soldiers from 14 countries, including 25,000 Americans. The task forces muscled-up military was matched with a method heavy on diplo macy. President Bush sent Ambassador Robert Oakley to Somalia. He negotiated with clan warlords, in particular Mohammed Farah Aidid. Oakley saw such talks as a pragmatic necessity. The warlords were hardly models of statesmanship, but they were not necessarily ideologically anti-American. No effort was made to forcibly disarm the clans. 47 This and disarmament litebrought relative peace to Mogadishu from March to June 1993. 48 Mission Creep or Mission Leap? With conditions stabilized, UN Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGali wanted the United Nations to assume an expanded mission that included: full disarmament, resettling refugees, and restoring law and order throughout Somalia. 49 Toward this end, UNOSOM II took over in May 1993. A Turkish general headed the operation with US Admiral Jonathan Howe acting as Boutros-Galis special representa tive. UNOSOM II was far smaller than UNITAF, with a maximum of 12,000 troops. 50 Relations between the UN and the Somalis, particularly Aidid, plunged under UNOSOM II. Aidid did not respect the UN, while Boutros-Gali and Admiral Howe saw an outlaw in the Somali clan 45 For Somalias population pyramid in 1990, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Pyramids of the World from 1950-2100, http://popu lationpyramid.net/Somalia/1990/ 46 Gleis, Withdrawing Under Fire 63. 47 Ibid. 48 Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 90. 49 The UN Refugee Agency, Resolution 814 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3188th http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f21143.html; for BoutrosGalis and Admiral Howes conviction that Somalia required a comprehensive disarmament, see Robert. F Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the World, US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 100-101; for a diplomatic perspective on the gear-shift from UNITAF top UNOSOM II, see Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 101-114. 50 Gleis, Withdrawing Under Fire 67.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Brooks 107 leader. 51 After an abortive 5 June 1993 raid on Aidids radio station, UN forces attacked several of his power centers. 52 Days later, the UN command published a wanted poster that put a $25,000 bounty on Aidids head, in effect making him Public Enemy Number One as far as the UN mission was concerned. 53 While the UN/US forces pursued Mogadishus most-wanted warlord, the Clinton administration sought to trim its exposure in Somalia, withdrawing heavy weapons and, in the early fall, denying requests for armor and AC-130 gunships. As frustration over the Aidid manhunt mounted, US commanders got help in Task Force Ranger. On 4 October, TF Ranger raided Aidids headquarters in an operation remembered as Black Hawk Down. 54 The story of the Battle of Mogadishu is well known. 55 For this study, only key features that contributed to US defeat are relevant. First, the US airmobile tactics did not surprise the Somalis, who had seen the United States use such an approach several times before. 56 Second, the Somalis, likely with Islamist assistance, put timers on rocket-propelled grenades to use against helicopters. Employing this tactic, Aidids mili tiamen downed two of TF Rangers Blackhawks. 57 Finally, Task Force Ranger confronted a sociological challenge. Once the shooting started, armed Somalis attacked from all sides, using children as spotters and women as human shields. 58 Although American marksmanship skewed the casualty balancethe United States lost 18 soldiers, with 1 captured (helicopter pilot Mike Durant) while the Somalis lost between 500 and 2,000when global media broadcast Somali mobs dragging a US sol diers corpse through the streets, the mission was seen as a failure. 59 Clinton Responds On 6 October, Clintons national security team met. The command ers in Mogadishu wanted to hunt down Aidid. 60 Nonetheless, Clinton refused. He feared that, even were Aidid captured, Washington would own Somalia, and there was no guarantee that we could put it together . . 61 Clinton sent Ambassador Oakley to negotiate to free Mike Durant, which the Ambassador did after eleven days of talks with Aidid. 62 US forces increased and the Clinton administration imposed a 6-month deadline for withdrawal. On 7 October 1993, Clinton addressed the 51 Aidid harbored a personal grudge against Boutros-Gali, an Egyptian diplomat whom Aidid suspected had supported former Aidids old foe, Somali dictator Siad Barre. See Baumann, Yates, and Washington, My Clan Against the World, 118. 52 Baumann, Yates, and Washington, My Clan Against the World 125. 53 Frontline Interview with Admiral Jonathan Howe http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/ambush/interviews/howe.html 54 The term Black Hawk Down is the title of the classic book on the Battle of Mogadishu by Mark Bowden. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999). 55 The best tactical account is Bowden, Black Hawk Down 56 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu 94. 57 Baumann, Yates, and Washington, My Clan Against the World 144. 58 Ibid., 147. 59 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu 94-95; Gleis, Withdrawing Under Fire 73. On bodies dragged through the streets, see Bowden, Black Hawk Down 398. 60 Bowden, Black Hawk Down 379-380. 61 William Jefferson Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 551. 62 Bowden, Black Hawk Down 401-402.
108 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 nation. He pledged the United States would leave Somalia on our terms. In concluding, he said, Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength . bring our soldiers out, and bring them home. 63 By March 1994, all American forces had left Mogadishu. Beyond Traditional Lessons The three interventions examined share certain patterns. First, in no case did the president drill down and rigorously question the missions plan prior to its execution. All three chief executives were hands-off leaders, something that Kennedy and Clinton regretted and swore they would never repeat. In Cuba and Somalia, US opponents understood the strategies and tactics employed against them and, thus, could thwart the same. Both Beirut and Somalia fell victim to mission creep (or, better said, mission leap) as political goals expanded without the means to accomplish them. In every case, sociological factors upended US plans: Castros militia and the urban combat arenas in Beirut and Mogadishu favored local forces. Finally, each president was bedeviled by a hostage crisis: Kennedy had to ransom the Cuban exiles; Reagan had to rely on Jesse Jackson to free Navy pilot Goodman; and Clinton had Ambassador Oakley negotiate Robert Durants recovery. None of the above are offered as traditional lessons in the sense of constituting easily correctable tactical errors that, but for their com mission, victory would have ensued. Instead, they represent classic (and perhaps fatal) symptoms of limited interventions gone bad. In the view of this author, each of these interventions had entered what economists call the area of diminishing returns. Even a perfect amphibious assault would not have overcome Castros militia at this early, militant stage in the revolution he led. Even a better defended Beirut barracks would not have permitted the Marines to control Lebanons surging sectarian groups. And had Clinton continued after Mohammed Farah Aidid, his capture was hardly assured and the ensuing combat, while almost cer tainly featuring a kill ratio in favor of the United States, would also have likely multiplied enemies among Mogadishus teeming militias. While the three presidents can be faulted for launching these operations, they deserve credit for recognizingbelatedlythat the interventions had entered the operational phase where rising costs had rendered their original political objectives either too risky or beyond reach. 64 point, all three presidents cut their losses. In the aftermath, all proved great communicators who wove effective retreat narratives wherein they explained their decisions to withdraw and took responsibility for at their enemies and in two cases added forces even as they made plans to bring the troops home. The record suggests presidents must take care when considering interventions long on promise (a new Cuba, Middle East peace, an orderly Somalia) and short on means. In all three cases, a youth bulge guaranteed that the shaky states or political entities the United States 63 Clinton, William Jefferson, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, The Miller Center), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4566 64 Carl von Clausewitz, On War 92.
LESSONS FROM LIMITED WARS Brooks 109 hoped to support (all of them long shots: a Cuban exile-dominated government, stabilized Lebanese/Somali regimes) would have had a plethora of clients to satisfy and, more importantly, their enemies would have had an ample recruiting pool. In two cases, the urban context In Beirut and Somalia, Americas adversaries appeared indifferent to casualties. Lebanese radicals obliterated themselves with their bombs. And in Mogadishu, years later Mohamed Farah Aidids son publicly cel ebrated the Somalis 1993 victory over the United States (despite the casualty skew and despite his being a former US Marine). 65 These experiences are worth remembering because limited inter ventions are unlikely to disappear. The continued struggle against terrorismcombined with the fatigue factor resulting from the recent long wars in Afghanistan and Iraqcould create conditions where oper ations of the type described here come under consideration. (Indeed, as this is being written, France is intervening against Islamists in Mali.) The cases described remind us how such operations can bring on a host rorism. In fact, in a world where population growth is fueling rampant urbanization, these factors could return with a vengeance. role speaks to possible future limited interventions, is Ambassador Robert Oakley. His pragmatic approach to peacekeeping in Somalia, which involved maintaining constant dialogue and close vigilance over a tough adversary like Aidid, while also keeping Aidid in the dia logue loop, along with the other Somali warlords, reduced violence and improved the situation. 66 Later, when the subsequent UN mission and its American authorities designated Aidid public enemy number one (when he was but one of many Somali warlords), the situation deteriorated into confrontation, combat, and hostage-taking. Oakleys pragmatism in Aidid deserves more scrutiny than this paper can provide. Nonetheless, in future operations, Oakleys work could provide a template for the sort of ground-level facilitator adapted to the warlord demimonde; one who could bring about good enough results that might enhance the possibilities for the likely limited successes a limited intervention could produce. 67 Though the interventions here were discrete and small in scale, their stories also throw light on problems that affected much larger operations. For example, mission creep (or mission leap/mission morph) factored heavily in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as operations origi nally dedicated to a short-term concept of regime change morphed into decade-long, multiagency efforts at nation-building. Likewise, in 65 Ron Kampeas, From Marine to Warlord: The Strange Journey of Hussein Farrah Aidid, Associated Press February 11, 2002, http://www.boston.com/news/daily/11/somali_warlord.htm 66 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope 157. 67 Much of diplomatic training involves learning the protocol of state-to-state relations governed by the Vienna Convention. Doing diplomacy with substate/nonstate actors (militias, an excellent example.
110 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 those cases, the initial military forces deployed proved too small for the multiple tasks at hand, requiring subsequent military surges in both countries. 68 Moreover, strategic leaders in large-scale interven tionsas with the presidents under study hereoften confront the problem of diminishing returns and have to decide when the result is good enough to bring the troops home. 69 Just as this paper considers JFK, Reagan, and Clinton, a larger such study could also consider and compare Presidents De Gaulle (Algeria), Nixon (Vietnam), and Obama (Iraq, Afghanistan) as strategic leaders who also faced the hold em or fold em dilemma at a far higher level of military scale and political import. In the end, the decisions made by Presidents Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton proved sound. Their stories should instruct future leaders who, while they may plan on victories, will likely also have to manage rever sals, particularly in a world with more mega-cities and potentially at least partly radicalized populations. In undertaking intervention in turbulent societies, a strategic leader must know, in Brent Scowcrofts wise words, not only how to get in, but also howand whento get out. 68 On the Iraq surge, see Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, Random House, 2009). On Afghanistan, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 69 The phrase good enough is derived from Afghan good enough, an appraisal that the United States and its NATO allies reportedly were making of the possibilities in Afghanistan in The New York Times May 17, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/world/asia/
ABSTRA CT : National leaders warn of a cyberwar and cyberterror ism that may lead to a potential cyber Pearl Harbor. To prevent such an occurrence requires cyber defense or even some sort of cyber deterrence. Some policymakers even want cyber arms con physical domain to describe violent acts and responses to them. Do these concepts help policymakers, national security professionals, A injured. The Dow Jones Industrial lost nearly 150 points; $136 billion loss in national wealth was short-lived as stocks recovered their value within three minutes. How do we place a context around what happened within those three for comfortable and familiar approaches. Cyberattacks are a daily, or more accurately a nanosecond-after-nanosecond, occurrence that requires cyber security. National leaders warn of a cyberwar and cyberterrorism that may lead to a potential cyber Pearl Harbor. To prevent such an occurrence requires cyberdefense or even some sort of cyberdeterrence. Some policymakers want cyber arms control domain to describe violent acts and responses to them. Do these con cepts help policymakers, national security professionals, and scholars Richard Clarke in his book, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It believes these concepts are not only rel EXAMINING WARF ARE IN WI-FI Cyberwar to Wikiwar: Battles for Cyberspace Paul Rexton Kan Paul Rexton Kan is Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson the author of the books Drugs and Contemporary Warfare and Cartels at War : Understanding Mexico's Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to US National Security His recent article, Cyberwar in the Underworld appeared in the Yale Journal of International Affairs
112 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 of cyberwar perpetrated most notably by the Russians, North Koreans, and Israelis. These episodes are now well-knownthe system in 2007; the suspected Russian dis in 2008; and the North Korean botnet these episodes, he derives four maxims: cyberwar is real; cyberwar happens at the the core of his book as he presents more accounts of the cyberwarriors in the battlespace and how the United States should prepare, defend, and retaliate. on cyber-controlled systems and its inability thus far to create national cyber defenses, the United States is currently far more vulnerable to cyber war than Russia or China. The US is more at risk from cyber war a cyberwar is problematic. Do the myriad events he details really con physical world, one act could be interpreted as vandalism and the other may be viewed as malicious destruction of property. Without a coercive Cyber War Will Not Take Place is espe the disruptive acts perpetrated via cyberspace do not constitute war or warfare, nor are they even particularly violent. No cyber offense has ever caused the loss of human life. No cyber offense has ever injured a is violent, instrumental and political, then there is no cyber offense that attacks in history that meet only one New York: HarperCollins, 2010. 320 pages. $17.58.
EXAMINING WARFARE IN WI-FI Kan 113 national security professionals such as Clarke fall into one or more cat obesity than the Second World Warit has more metaphorical than consolidate the discussion, attenuate some of the hype and adequately and Subversion are powerful tonics to some of the more alarmist cyberspace, fewer personnel are needed to conduct such activities in the physical world. Where at one time special forces would have been sent to destroy a facility, spies would have been dispatched to steal secrets of early airpower theorists who predicted that the airplane would make casus belli for the outbreak of wars in the past. be overlooked because another question of a state-sponsored patriotic hackers, an ated collective of some kind, the cyberwar London: C. Hurst & Company Publishers, 2013. 256 pages. $27.95.
114 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 countries does not occupy all the space in the debate, much like interstate This demonstrates a uniqueness of the cyber domain. Due to the ease of entry into cyberspace, hacktivists have committed the same online see themselves as combatants in a war to book, Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of Internet this belief comes into sharp focus. The book takes its name from the cypher state surveillance. The book is a compila tion of discussions of fellow believers in weak, transparency for the powerful. The founder of WikiLeaks, while he was under house arrest in the United at the Ecuadorean Embassy in London where he continues to reside. The Jeremie: State-sponsored surveillance is indeed a major issue which chal there is also private surveillance and potentially private mass collection of beliefs. New York: OR Books, 2012. 186 pages. $9.99.
EXAMINING WARFARE IN WI-FI Kan 115 The rhetoric of the conversations can be overly dramatic; labels like States. In short, not all hacktivism serves human liberation; it can cut While Cypherpunks We are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous and the Global Cyber Insurgency, is a richly detailed, journalistic account of the history and acts forward with its cyberattacks. Unlike the chronicles the rise of a hacktivist collec tive that is now more like a social cyber super hackers. In fact, only a few in the collective were hackers and the rest were rored that of the cypherpunks, information wants to be free. sine qua non sine qua non of New York: Back Bay Books, 2012. 528 pages. $16.00.
116 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 church member and actor Tom Cruise. Such pressure exerted by the covers in her chapter Civil War, these characteristics have proven trou who wanted to undertake operations in accordance with the hacker popular audience, an academic work, a collection of discussions and a journalistic The Pirate Organization: Lessons from the Fringes of Capitalism is an essay written by Rodolphe Durand and Jean-Philippe exclusively on the cyber domain, they do the state, especially when the state claims to be bases located outside this territory, over which Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2013. 208 pages. $22.00..
EXAMINING WARFARE IN WI-FI Kan 117 18th century buccaneers, radio DJs at sea, cyberpirates on the Web, and seen in the four previously reviewed books, cyberspace is the ultimate cyber domain than nation-states. state is a useful tonic for those like Clarke who see hacktivism as a that it is a more complex activity, which in fact supports their thesis. and resilient to detection and elimination. malicious online actions. Policymakers, national security professionals, and scholars often dismiss hacktivists or cyber pirates as collections of environment back into the nation-state box is easy, but to do so would be Even today, after more than a decade of the War on Terror and wars in
118 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 rate people, transform complexity into rubble and erect walls, like an self-defense and who then strike out unexpectedly and in unanticipated ways only to our surprise and detriment. this new domain and how to act within it. The debates include who sets the boundaries of cyberspace; how should online information be controlled; to whom should information be available; can hierarchies and networks of people coexist in cyberspace; and what is the difference between war and crime in cyberspace. 1 In the reviewed books, it is evident that each cyber attack or cyber assault not only adds to these The paradox will likely become ever more acute with the advance internet with our daily lives. With the advent of the wearable web like Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1
By James Jay Carafano D r. Carafano constructs a compelling narrative examining the impli and warfare. The authors general thesis is that engaging in the war online is not optional. The book begins an investigation of the history of social networking. The author takes the reader on an interesting course starting with the importance of language as technology. Language provides the medium to build relationships, culture, knowledge, and as a tool to share judgments. He effectively uses vignettes to demonstrate how the legacy of tribal language formed the basis of early social networks throughout history. The intriguing stories of how language played a key role in con and the great hunt or the nerge the Iroquois League during the American Revolution, and the early-nineteenth-century Zulu kingdom in southern Africa, set the tone for the power of social networking. The journey continues to describe the power of myth and storytelling to transfer knowledge within and across social networks. The evolution of sharing information by messenger systems dating back four thousand years to the optic telegraph in the Napoleonic wars through todays digital systems revolutionized how humans communicated in peace and in war. The historical portion of the book does an excellent job establishing the importance of the message, language, and story enabled by the technol ogy to enhance the concept of social networking. The author moves to contemporary history with a chapter describ ing the birth of the computer age and Web 2.0. The invention of the social networking as well as communication in warfare. Dr. Carafano argues that the invention of the computer sets the stage for creating many kinds of machines enabling communication. Think about todays smart phones, digital music players, personal computers, and tablets. The cate in the context of social networking. The next piece of the puzzle was to create architecture for computers to communicate. Carafano spends tion creating a communication system linking computers to share data is a fascinating story of technological innovation that ultimately evolved surrounding the birth of the computer and the World Wide Web. This section provides a much deeper comprehension of the people and tech nology leading to the advanced social networking tool available today. The remaining chapters in the book travel through the implications of social networking today. The author points out that social networking EXAMINING WARFARE IN WI-FI
cymakers, military leaders, and planners. The nature of the adversary online is extremely diverse. Dr. Carafano provides a useful framework to consider several varieties of adversaries. There are state actors, enabler states, and slack states that have lax laws and enforcement means to allow nefarious actors to operate. Understanding the complexity of this domain continues with a detailed dialogue of the combatants. There are and rule-based regimes. The problem planning operations is that lawful and unlawful combatants use similar techniques to achieve objectives behavior. The author provides convincing evidence to the challenges from Chinas hacker army to military operations and civilian networks. potential danger. The interesting analysis of the loosely connected for military planners at all levels. Dr. Carafano conducts an interesting examination of the US gov ernment and military struggle to leverage cyberspace to achieve goals. He points to early successes using the grassroots movement of a few com to share ideas about company command; however, scaling this idea by the US government became a challenge. The United States con tinues to improve its ability to create a Web 2.0 environment to connect with the American people. Whitehouse.gov and USA.gov are examples of the push to use the power of the Internet to share public information with US citizens. There are military examples demonstrating the value of cyberspace in military operations. The Department of Defense has clearly declared cyberspace an important domain of warfare by creating The book closes with a serious warning in the epilogue. Winning the web will not happen by happenstance. Carafano outlines some cyberspace. Next, empower people to leverage Web 2.0. This will take is for leaders to develop a vision and strategy to win in cyberspace. A criticism of the book is the recommendations and conclusions in the epilogue provide only a broad framework of a strategy to leverage cyber space and address the challenges of social media. Future research should expand on the recommendations to develop a more holistic strategy for operating in the cyberspace domain. The book is an easy read that provides ample evidence to support the notion that there is an ongoing competition in cyberspace using social networks to advance security objectives. Wiki at War expands the Carafano provides excellent analysis for military planners and senior networking in national and military strategy development as well as operating in the cyberspace domain.
This commentary is in response to the special commentary, The Lure of Strike by Conrad Crane published in the Summer 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2). A s an admirer of Dr. Conrad Crane, it genuinely saddens me to see his new essay, The Lure of Strike. Here we have a distinguished historian becoming, in essence, an interservice hit man, and chief spokesperson for the Armys small but burgeoning neo-Luddite wing. Regrettably, his essay sounds too much like that of a 1930s cavalryman fulminating against the internal combustion that was Dr. Crane starts by expressing the belief that because of what he seems to think is a nefarious Air Force, America suffers from the delu sion that technology inevitably produces what he calls short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments. Where he gets this notion isnt ment marked by hundreds of Iraqi anti-aircraft engagements between that way. Nor does the general public, whose rejection of stand-off strikes against Syria is ample evidence that it has no illusions about the potential unintended consequences of any use of force. Regardless, defending Army force structure is plainly the raison dtre of Cranes piece. Indeed, The Lure of Strike is reducible to a simple syllogism: if technological developments allow for short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments then that will inevitably mean (in his thinking) a smaller Army. To him, a smaller Army is, ipso facto, bad. Ergo, technology is bad. Classic Neo-Ludditism. Exactly why Dr. Crane is not advocating that the Army develop its own method for conducting short, tidy wars with limited landpower risk to Americas most precious resource: her sons and daughters and, a weary Army is just emerging from exactly the opposite: long, untidy wars with massive manpower commitments that produced results most charitably described by Army Colonel Gian Gentile as unsatisfying. Unfortunately, Dr. Crane does not attempt to bring to bear his formidable skills as a historian to address some of the very questions that have spurred the nations search for the technology-based alterna tives that he rails against. For example, why is it that the best-trained, best-equipped, and most valorous army in the history of warfare was, nevertheless, unable to fully defeat the largely uneducated and lightlyMoreover, why did the Army, as it implemented its manpowerintensive strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, ignore a fundamental lesson of COIN history, that is, that the most powerful insurgent recruitment Commentaries and Replies On The Lure of Strike Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Major General, USAF (Ret.) Major General Dunlap served 34 years in the United States Air Force before retiring in 2010 to become the Executive Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke Law School where he is also a Professor of the Practice. His many publications include Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Perspective on FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine, Air University (2008).
122 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 tool is not, as some narratives would have it, the use of high-technology means (such as stand-off strike), but rather the physical presence of (or Iraqi) people when the actual assignment was about protecting the American And even among those Soldiers who did grasp the true mission, why did so many think that the way to go about it was to try to turn infantrymen armed with high school degrees into soci al workers, civil engineers, nurses, schoolteachers, and boy scouts as Dr. Cranes COIN doctrine importuned nd then give them the Sisyphean task to trans Instead of grappling with those substantive questions of recent history, Dr. Crane launches a lengthy and startlingly venomous attack on Americas most high-tech force, the United States Air Force. According to Crane, not only does airpower fail at every turn, it is Airmen who are disingenuously and deceptively corrupting the national security dia logue. Of course, these hackneyed myths have been rebutted repeatedly, tion is actually unnecessary. In fact, his essay amply illustrates the limits of the historians art when it comes to the technology of war. It really doesnt matter, for example, what airpower could or could not do during World War II or, for that matter, yesterday, as the only thing that really counts is what it can do today. And that is plenty. As the President and others have come to learn from material found in bin Ladens lair and elsewhere, what Americas most dangerous enemies fear the most is not chai-drinking soldiers, female engagement teams, or even masses of infantrymen lumbering about in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, but rather being relentlessly hunted by high-tech surveillance and strike platforms. Of course, no one believes that stand-off, precision strike is always the answer, butsometimesit can be. As Tom Rickss book Fiasco reports, 1998s Operation Desert Foxa few days of air and missile strikeseffectively ended Iraqs nuclear weapons program. David Kay, the former United Nations arms inspector, said that after the strikes the Iraqi weapons programs withered away, and never got momentum again. America is a technological nation, and the Army ought to embrace robotic ground vehicles told The New York Times there is a resistance to new technologies being introduced in and around soldiers. Although infantrymen are hardly obsolete, their numbers and employment strat egy isand should bereevaluated because of what technology can now offer. The Army needs to calm itself. Everyone whose opinions anyone should care about knows America needs a robust and dominant Army. There is, in fact, a powerful case to be made for such an Army, but it
Commentaries and Replies 123 is not one premised on denigrating another service, orespecially suggesting that technology does not and cannot change the calculus of The Author Replies Conrad C. Crane I assume that MG Dunlap, like myself, was under a time crunch to get his submission into the journal, so I will accept the possibility that he might not have had time to read my article thoroughly. After acknowledging the important role of airpower in the American Way of War, my intent was to ensure policymakers do not expect too much of it. They must retain the full range of capabilities of the joint force to keep all military options open. As has been apparent in recent Congressional testimony by the service chiefs, they are all concerned that precipitous cuts in force structure will threaten capabilities necessary to preserve national security. I am equally concerned about exorbitant claims that cyber capabilities will be able to plug the gaps. I was rather appalled by MG Dunlaps assault on the Armys record in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is not enough space in this issue to allow me to address that in much detail. While that might be a topic worth a full issue of the Quarterly in the future, it will also be debated in a wave of historical works to come. Much of his opinion is rooted in his wellknown opposition to FM 3-24, and the counterinsurgency operations it proposed. He makes the common error of attacking the tool of COIN, rather than the strategies and policies it supported. Decisionmakers need to have a full toolbox to address security interests. Sometimes necessary approaches will be highly kinetic, but MG Dunlaps disdain for nonkinetic solutions is apparent. He remains convinced you can force presence always has a self-defeating backlash, ignoring the fact that the Afghan presidents most vociferous complaints to commanders were about the perceived excesses of airpower, not too many Soldiers or Marines. No topic causes more concern among the international students at the Army War College than the issue of drone strikes, which might be good counterterrorism for us, but are often detrimental to counterinsurgency efforts in targeted countries, and can create more enemies in the long run. I must agree with MG Dunlap that the widespread reluctance to engage in air attacks against Syria is a positive sign that the limitations of technology are being considered by decision makers, though the full scenario has still to unfold. At the same time the complexity of that the necessity for a wide range of options to be available for policy makers. Meaningful land force commitments are obviously a last resort, but having that capability reassures allies, gives adversaries pause, and especially as potential allies also reduce their military force structure
124 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 an important part of that national security equation, and America has to retain that asymmetric edge. Sometimes a few bombs or a few electrons will be enough to accomplish national objectives. But when they are not, there must be other tools in the military toolkit. Sometimes boots on the ground will be necessary.
On Women in Battle Sarah Percy This commentary is in response to the featured articles The Female Soldier by Anthony C. King; What Women Bring to the Fight by Ellen L. Haring; and Gender Perspectives and Fighting by Robert Egnell published in the Summer 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2). T he thought-provoking Summer 2013 issue of Parameters examines the integration of women in combat roles. The essays by Ellen Haring, Anthony King, and Robert Egnell make a number of valuable contributions to our understanding of the challenges of placing women in combat. As always, there are areas that could be further explored, and I would like to offer three. First, it is worth considering that the decision to put women in combat roles came about gradually, but is still extraordinary. It differs from decisions to integrate other types of previously excluded groups. Examining how and why this revolutionary change took place at an evolutionary pace leads us to two more interest areas for further research concerning the relationship between gender and the military, and the changing nature of war. War and Gender (Cambridge 2001), reveals that, across culture and across history, women have never century; even during the World Wars, they performed limited combat roles. In short, states have developed a tradition and history of warfare that has excluded women, and by placing women in combat roles states are reversing hundreds of years of history and cultural practice. In this way, the integration of women into combat roles differs considerably from racial integration and the gradual acceptance of open homosexuality in the military, discussed by all three authors. Every race in the world has fought wars and been in combat. Racial integration may have caused (or been perceived to have caused) issues surrounding unit cohesion but both historical evidence and the practical experience of not an obstacle to effective combat. Likewise, the increasing acceptance of homosexuality in the American services differs from female combat integration. Homosexuality has never been a bar to effective combat (and famously in some cultures homosexuality is part of the warrior ethos). There have always been gay and nonwhite troops, but quite simply, until recent years there have almost never been women. King discusses how women may still chal lenge unit cohesion because of problems created by sexual relationships between soldiers. This, of course, has also been true of homosexuality. While women will face broader challenges because they have rarely been used as combat troops, the ways in which sexual challenges have been dealt with in the case of homosexuality may be helpful. Interestingly, Sarah Percy is Professor of International Relations at the University of Western Australia. She has published widely on military and security issues, and is particularly interested in unconventional combatants (including piracy, mercenaries, and private security companies); how military change; and the impact of international law on international relations.
126 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 there is some historical evidence suggesting that the prevalence of sexual relationships in mixed units has not always been problematic. The intro duction of women into British anti-aircraft batteries in World War II was but to the surprise of many skeptics, it was a nonissue (D'Ann Campbell, Women in Combat, The Journal of Military History 57, no. 2). In researching how it became possible to reverse the almost universal that two things had to change: the way civilian society viewed gender and the way the military viewed gender. Clearly, the interplay between the two is essential in explaining how US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was able to make his momentous announcement in January 2013. A promising avenue for future research is, thus, considering this question from a comparative perspective. Other inquiries along these lines include: Is it possible to maintain all-male combat forces in soci To an extent, gender integration in the military in Western societies has been an inevitable consequence of the onward march of gender equal The nature of contemporary combat has rendered the divisions although designated combat positions remained closed to women, women have been engaging in combat, and have been casualties of combat, as all three authors correctly note. Another question for future to obscure reality for so long. Why make the pretense that women were interesting answers to these questions, and the absence of this scholar ship is one of the few faults in such an interesting collection of articles. King discusses the association between concepts of masculinity and the military. Without understanding the way the military has evolved as a positions to women. This is especially true because the reality of physical testing means very few women will enter some combat roles. Engel, however, makes the interesting point that perhaps these physical tests also ought to change, as physical strength is not the only useful requirement for a soldier in a world where combat, particularly counterinsurgency, requires other skills. Haring and King also point out that women will bring different skills to the table and these skills may be essential in conducting the types of war militaries now face. But are these something we already know about the effectiveness of mixed gender the ability of states to open combat roles to women. The blurring of lines between combat and noncombat roles, and the necessity of using women in certain types of counterinsurgency operations, forced the
Commentaries and Replies 127 hands of policymakers. The idea that a woman could be a combat soldier would be unthinkable without advances in gender equality; however, the reality that women were already acting as combat troops in all but name brought the change to fruition.
On Women in Battle This commentary is in response to the featured articles The Female Soldier by Anthony C. King; What Women Bring to the Fight by Ellen L. Haring; and Gender Perspectives and Fighting by Robert Egnell published in the Summer 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2). T hree questions dominate the articles by Haring, Egnell, and King on women in combat: Will the inclusion of women impact military cohesion and Can and should women be required to meet the physical standards While the authors raise important points related to these questions, there is plenty of room to push the discussion further and to move beyond can they and should they questions towards a more frank discussion of womens current and historical contributions to warfare, the drawbacks to military cohesion, signs of the need to revise military culture, as well as gender issues within the military that the removal of the combat exclusion will certainly not solve. All three authors address what has become a central concern related to women and combat: physical standards. The authors cover the most women will need to prove themselves against existing standards just as ethnic minorities and gay men have, while Egnell and Haring point to both the gendered nature of the standards and their potential anti quatedness given the changes to modern warfare. Haring makes an often-overlooked point that should make this debate mutethere are, in fact, no established set of occupational standards for combat. In terms of military cohesion and culture, it is encouraging to see Egnell and Haring question both the nature of military cohesion and the presumption that current military culture requires preservation rather than revision. King ascribes some of the most disappointing arguments relevant to this discussion. In particular, King gives credence to van Creveld and Kingsley Brownes position that the military is an inher ently masculine institution that has, and will continue to be, corrupted and weakened by the inclusion of women. It is perplexing that Martin van Creveld continues to be called on as an expert when it comes to women in combat. Van Creveld established his position on women in 2000 when he stated that war was an assertionthe supreme asser tionof masculinity and that women inherently diminish the core qualities of an effective military (Martin van Creveld, "Less than we can be: Men, Women and the Modern Military" Journal of Strategic Studies 23, no. 2). Since then, van Creveld has cherry picked research to support lecturer in the Government and International Relations department at the University of Sydney. Her research on female reconstruction bridges security studies, feminist theory, and critical development studies. Her recent publications include her book Female Soldiers in Sierra Reconstruction University Press and a lead essay in Foreign Affairs, Let Women Fight: removing the combat exclusion for women.
Commentaries and Replies 129 this opinion. Scholarship based on the premise that women are inher ently inferior to men in any other venue would be described as sexist; of the content trending towards sexist polemic. There is extensive research indicating that women do not nega tively impact military culture and cohesion ( Women Content in Units: Force Development Test [MAX WAC]). Moreover, Egnell and Haring hint that current military culture may require revision rather than preservation. In doing so, they raise an important question: would it necessarily be last decade of US war operations has included low points such as the Abu Ghraib abuses, images of soldiers urinating on corpses, record suicide rates, and a rampant sexual violence epidemic, the negative aspects of group cohesion and the potential need for cultural evolution within the forces should be taken more seriously. When it comes to physical standards and military culture, there is a potential to talk in circles. This stagnation is particularly surprising long before the restriction was lifted. Women have been going through combat training since 2003 and by January 2013, more than 280,000 women had served in Iraq and Afghanistan, with hundreds receiving for women in combat in the form of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) combat pay to some of these women. Among the women who died in evidence that women are putting their lives at risk in war. In addition to acknowledging womens existing contributions to war, it should be remembered that the United States is certainly not breaking new ground by including women in combat; as such, rather than blind speculation, important lessons can be learned about women and combat and gender integration from countries that have already opened combat positions to women. Finally, those focused on women in combat should be reminded there are other important gender issues to be addressed within the military. Opening combat positions to women will not solve broader gender concerns such as discrimination, hyper masculine culture, or the sexual violence epidemic. Any discussion of gender equality or womens empowerment within the US military must include a frank discussion of sexual violence within the forces. In addition to sexual violence, the military must address the macho culture of the military and its historic problem with retaining continue to serve as obstacles to full gender integration (it is interesting to note that these issues are only ever obstacles for women, though they tend to involve both a man and woman). Such assertions indicate we the forces. The argument that men and women cannot control their that the US military is unable to maintain professional standards in its
130 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 swear to celibacy is confusing and inappropriate for current discussions about pregnancy in the forces. Women get pregnant and this is a fact that has been dealt with in other occupations; moreover, both sexes in the military can become parents and still do their jobs. Celibacy has yet to be considered for male troops. Like it or not, women have been and will continue to serve in combat positions. What remains to be seen is whether the US military can learn from its international peers and accept that gender integration should challenge the core identity and culture of the institution. The Author Replies Anthony C. King I t is widely acknowledged that the only people whom revolutionar ies despise more than their political enemies are rival radical groups with ostensibly similar goals. Some of Lenins most acidic vitriol was directed not at Tsar Nicholas and the Whites but at the renegade Karl been interpreted as a masculinist opponent of female integration into the combat arms because I sought to engage with the polemical works of issues which female integration over the past decade has raised. I and that I ascribe [to] some of the most disappointing arguments. To of female integration which now exists and to suggest some conditions which should be met to ensure it is successfulfor the female soldiers who choose combat roles and for the armed forces. It was not intended to oppose Panettas decision to extend full accession to women but to facilitate it. Nevertheless, the misunderstanding is useful in that it provides comments on physical standards and sexuality. She complains that my observation that women have to pass the same physical standards as men to serve in the infantry may be a surreptitious attempt to exclude them. On the contrary, both female and male soldiers who have served in professional credibility depend upon it. Crucially, although only a small minority of women are likely to meet the criteria for ground combat duties, the fact that objective standards apply to both men and women has been found liberating by female soldiers. The institution of generic professional standards ensures they are no longer prejudged as women but assessed by what they can do as soldiers.
Commentaries and Replies 131 examples when male soldiers have not been able to apply the same pro fessional standards to men and to women. Female soldiers are regularly discriminated against so that performances, which would be judged as entirely competent if the soldier were a man, are unfairly denigrated. for, might identify arbitrary forms of discrimination like this with a view to eliminating it. This research, however, is unlikely to disprove the need for equal standards. On the contrary, it appears predicated on an assumption that standards should be genuinely universal and are the route to less gendered military. She raises an important point about which I seem unwittingly to have undermines cohesion in combat units, women (having apparently intro maintains, it is as muchif not normally morethe fault of male sol armed forces which allows women, and only women, to be blamed and, article and concluded that a divisive double standard is at work which female soldiers, that heterosexual relations between serving personnel in the same combat unit tend to undermine discipline and cohesion. Sex alters the relations between the males and females involved and between them and the rest of their unit. My article was not then an argument against integration, as are addressed coherently and honestly so those women who are willing and able to serve in the combat arms are able to contribute fully to those services. The purpose of my article was to make some small contribution to that end. The Author Replies Ellen L. Haring B little empirical research in the area of women combatants. This is extraordinary given that most of the literature in the 1990s predicted that the distinction between front lines and rear echelons would largely disappear. Over the last decade, in fact, women were consistently engaged in combat operations. While individual research efforts have been enlightening, they have only been able to scratch the surface of what should have been a series
132 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 of research studies on this topic. Presently, the military departments are conducting research relative to validating or establishing gendercommentators have highlighted a number of fruitful avenues for future research, and the US military would do well to support those avenues by increasing its funding opportunities for researchers and by permitting greater access to test populations.
HUMAN & INHUMAN WAR Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War By Christopher Coker Reviewed by Dr. Janne Haaland-Matlry, Professor, the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Defence University College T Abolition of Man : Brave New World Book Reviews London: Hurst & Company, 2013 317 pages $37.50
134 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Practicing Military Anthropology: Beyond Expectations and Traditional Boundaries Edited by Robert A. Rubinstein, Kerry Fosher, and Clementine Fujimura Review by Dr. James Dorough-Lewis Jr., Senior HUMINT Instructor for the Department of Defense and former Social Scientist for Human Terrain Systems F Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2013 153 pages $24.95
Book Reviews : Human & Inhuman War 135 Practicing Military Anthropology Practicing Military Anthropology Practicing Military Anthropology Practicing Military Anthropology Practicing Military Anthropology
136 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Practicing Military Anthropology Practicing Military Anthropology 's Virtual War and Magical Death: Technologies and Imaginaries for Terror and Killing Edited by Neil L. Whitehead and Sverker Finnstrm Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College A Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013 200 pages $24.95
Book Reviews : Human & Inhuman War 137
138 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 de facto
Book Reviews : Contemporary War 139 CONTEMPORARY WAR Afghan Frontier By Carter Malkasian Reviewed by Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor, National War College, and author of Understanding War in Afghanistan (NDU Press, 2011) T War Comes to The Washington Post War Comes to Garmser War Comes to Long An New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 321 pages $20.29
140 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013
Book Reviews : Contemporary War 141 Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan
142 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq By Ted Spain and Terry Turchie Reviewed by LTC David G. Fivecoat, US Army, former Infantry Battalion Commander in Afghanistan, and veteran of three tours in Iraq S Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq Breaking Iraq Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2013 310 pages $28.95
Book Reviews : Contemporary War 143 Blind Into Baghdad
144 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 On Point I and On Point II Patrolling Baghdad: A Military Police Company and the War in Iraq Breaking Iraq
Book Reviews : American Power in the New Era 145 AMERICAN POWER IN THE NEW ERA War, Welfare, & Democracy: Rethinking Americas Quest for the End of History By Peter J. Munson Reviewed by Major Nathan K. Finney, US Army, strategist and veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a current student in the Basic Strategic Art Program at the US Army War College I War, Welfare, & Democracy The Logic of Violence in Civil War Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2013 240 pages $29.95
146 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 War, Welfare, & Democracy Confront and Conceal: Obamas Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power By David E. Sanger Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College I n Confront and Conceal The New York Times New York: Random House, 2012 496 pages $28.00
Book Reviews : American Power in the New Era 147
148 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013
Book Reviews : Networks & Security Strategy 149 NETWORKS & SECURITY STRATEGY Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization Edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College M PRISM Crime and Terror The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus Studies in Gangs and Cartels Convergence Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations (NDU), 2013 298 pages $29.95 (Paper)/Free (PDF)
150 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Deviant Globalization
Book Reviews : Networks & Security Strategy 151 Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection By Blake W. Mobley Reviewed by Mr. Ross W. Clark, Graduate Student, School of International C Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection New York: Columbia University Press, 2012 340 pages $36.00
152 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 Terrorism and Counterintelligence
Book Reviews : WWI: Strategies & Strategists 153 WWI: STRATEGIES & STRATEGISTS Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Kennedy Strategic Studies, National Defense University I Engineers of Victory Great Powers and New York: Random House, 2013 416 pages $29.95
154 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013
Book Reviews : WWI: Strategies & Strategists 155 Engineers of Victory Military Innovation in the Interwar Period during Military Adaptation in War: Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007
156 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013 World War II By David Rigby of Engineers W Allied Master Strategists Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012 270 pages $29.95
Book Reviews : WWI: Strategies & Strategists 157 Allied Master Strategists Allies in War: Britain and America Against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945
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