Citation
Aircraft survivability

Material Information

Title:
Aircraft survivability
Place of Publication:
Arlington, VA
Publisher:
Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO)
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1998
Frequency:
Three times a year
regular
Language:
English

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Aeronautics -- Safety measures -- Periodicals -- United States ( lcsh )
Aeronautics -- Safety measures ( fast )
United States ( fast )
Genre:
Periodicals. ( fast )
newspaper ( marcgt )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

Notes

Dates or Sequential Designation:
Began with 1998.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
656541464 ( OCLC )
ocn656541464
Classification:
TL553.5 ( lcc )

UFDC Membership

Aggregations:
Digital Military Collection

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Aircraft Survivability is published three times a year by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Ofce (JASPO), chartered by the U.S. Army Aviation & Missile Command, U.S. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, and U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command. JAS Program Ofce 735 S. Courthouse Road Suite 1100 Arlington, VA 22204-2489 http://jasp-online.org/ Sponsor Dennis Lindell Editor-in-Chief Dale Atkinson Views and comments may be directed to the JAS Program Ofce. To order back issues of Aircraft Survivability, send an email to contact@dsiac.org On the cover: The Combat Rescue Helicopter, designed by Sikorsky, will perform critical combat search and rescue and personnel recovery operations for all U.S. military services (Artist rendering courtesy of Sikorsky). AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 NEWS NOTES by Dale Atkinson 5 JCAT CORNER by MAJ Ronald Pendleton 7 BASICS OF THE HH-60W LFT&E PROGRAM by Samantha Block The HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1C program based at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). The U.S. Air Force program of record calls for 112 helicopters to replace the Air Forces rapidly aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters, which perform critical combat search and rescue (CSAR) and personnel recovery operations for all U.S. Services. The HH-60W is on the Ofce of the Secretary of Defenses (OSD) Oversight List for Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). Due to the considerable amount of test and combat data available on Black Hawk variants, however, the program developed a Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)-approved Alternative Test Plan (ATP) to meet Live Fire Test (LFT) statutory requirements and obtain a full-up, system-level (FUSL) LFT waiver. This article presents an overview of the HH-60W aircraft and the LFT&E program and team. 11 EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY: TORGER ANDERSON by Joel Williamsen The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) is pleased to recognize Torger Torg Anderson for his Excellence in Survivability. Torg has worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for 14 years and has served as lead for the Fixed Wing and Anti-Air Live Fire task since 2010, where he leads IDA staff in analytical and test efforts to evaluate the survivability of new xed-wing platforms in support of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). 13 AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY: NEW CHALLENGES FOR A NEW GLOBAL CONFLICT (WORLD WAR II) by David Legg On 4 September 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) recorded its rst losses of World War II when ve Wellingtons of No. 9 Squadron were shot down during a raid on German warships in the Elbe estuary [1]. Three months later, a force of 24 RAF Wellington Mk 1a medium bombers (such as those shown in Figure 1) attempted a daylight raid against the German port of Wilhemshaven. These bombers ew in a spread formation to avoid anti-aircraft re. However, German Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radars tracked the bombers and vectored a formation of single-engine BF-109 and twin-engine Bf-110 ghters onto the bombers. A total of 12 RAF Wellington bombers were shot down for the loss of 2 Luftwaffe ghters [1]. In addition, a total 56 of the 65 bomber aircrew who set off on this mission were killed.

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Mailing list additions, deletions, changes, as well as calendar items may be directed to: DSIAC Headquarters 4695 Millennium Drive Belcamp, MD 21017-1505 Phone: 443/360-4600 Fax: 410/272-6763 Email: contact@dsiac.org DSIAC is sponsored by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and is operated by the SURVICE Engineering Company under Contract FA8075-14-D-0001. DSIAC Program Manager Ted Welsh Copy Editor Eric Edwards Art Director Melissa Gestido Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, per DoD Ofce of Prepublication and Security Review, Case No. 17-S-2327. 3 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL 21 EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY: RICHARD HUFFMAN by Mark Couch The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) is pleased to recognize LTC Richard E. Huffman Jr. for his Excellence in Survivability. Rich is currently on assignment as the Chief of Information Operations Plans and Assessments Branch at Headquarters U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Additionally, he is an adjunct assistant professor of aerospace engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). He has also served in the Air Force for 23 years as a developmental ight test engineer, working envelope expansion, avionics, and survivability testing on numerous weapon systems. 23 BLAST-TOLERANT COMPOSITE STRUCTURE FOR ROTORCRAFT by Mark Robeson, Clark Andrews, and Lisa Chiu Military rotorcraft structures may be subjected to high-energy ballistic events in combat situations. Ballistic threats characterized by an advancing shockwave created by an explosive blast, alone and in combination with high-speed fragmentation, typically result in signicant structural damage for both metallic and composite structures. To address this vulnerability, the U.S. Armys Aviation Development Directorate (ADD) and The Boeing Company have collaborated to develop and integrate specically designed composite sandwich components into large primary aircraft structures, which have shown good success at mitigating catastrophic damage caused by explosive ballistic events [1]. 28 THREAT CHARACTERIZATION: SMALL PROJECTILES, BIG IMPACT by Jonathan Marshall The global proliferation of assault ries, machine guns, and other man-portable weapons has increased both the frequency and intensity of modern conict. These weapons, classied as small arms (which typically include up to 23 mm in caliber), are easily obtainable on international markets and are effectively used by untrained personnel. There are an estimated 100 million to 500 million military-style weapons in circulation, in addition to hundreds of millions designed for police or civilian use. In addition, of the 49 major conicts that have occurred since 1990, small arms and light weapons (such as those shown in Figure 1) were the primary weapons used in 46 of them. Only the Gulf War predominately used heavy weapons [1, 2].

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 4 NEWS NOTES By Dale Atkinson OLDENBURG LEAVES JASPO After 6 years as the Susceptibility Reduction Deputy Program Manager of the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Ofce (JASPO), Mr. Tim (TO) Oldenburg is joining Booz Allen Hamilton to support weapons integration on the F-35 program. A retired U.S. Air Force (USAF) lieuten ant colonel, TO had a varied and interesting military career, including supporting the Joint Strike Fighter avionics integration, training, and systems engineering; supporting F-15 avionics upgrades; and serving as a Royal Australian Air Force/USAF exchange ofcer for stores clearance, as a B-52H ight test engineer, tri-Service missile lethality analyst, and USAF/U.S. Army (USA) wargame modeling and simulation specialist. A graduate of the University of Arizona (with a B.S. in aerospace engineering) and of California State University (with an M.S. in mechanical engineering), TO also worked for McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corporation before joining the Air Force and for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency after his Air Force retirement. Please join JASPO in wishing TO and his family all the best. NEW VERSION OF BRAWLER RELEASED Version 8.3 of the BRAWLER air-to-air combat model is now available. The model simulates combat between multiple ights of aircraft in both the visual and beyond-visual-range (BVR) arenas, incorporating value-driven and information-oriented principles in its structure to provide a Monte Carlo, event-driven simulation of air combat between multiple ights of aircraft with real-world stochastic features. BRAWLER can be used to analyze the effectiveness of new hardware; illuminate issues in campaign/mission models; extend the results of other methodologies; examine tactics or command, control, and communications (C3) issues; and serve as a high-delity component of a distributed simulation or manned simulator target generator. BRAWLER 8.3 includes Air Force Research Laboratory-funded directed energy enhancements, generic sensor objects, National Air and Space Intelligence Center-funded enhance ments, and JASPO-supported small projects. These enhancements include: Directed energy weapon (DEW) duty factor model DEW calibration utility New DEW Rmax envelope type Generic sensor interface Missile multi-band radar cross section (RCS) Single-shot egmain JAAM lightweight interface JASPO-supported small projects DLD/communications jamming Infrared (IR) cueball aircraft dataset Vulnerable-area check for MD gun model Time-space-position information (TSPI) data input for scripted players Comma-separated values (CSV) output les Fixes for multiple messages Table-based missile light artillery rocket (LAR) (Type 6 LAR) COBRA RULES enhancements Uplifts Missile characteristics Mental model Expendables Avionics: radar warning receiver (RWR), missile approach warning, helmet-mounted sight (HMS), and helmet-mounted display (HUD) To request a copy of BRAWLER 8.3, visit the Defense Systems Information Analysis Center (DSIAC) website at https://www.dsiac.org/resources/ models_and_tools/brawler. Questions can be directed to the BRAWLER Model Manager, Mr. Dale Johnson, at 571-2562120 or dale.r.johnson3.civ@mail.mil. NEW VERSION OF ESAMS RELEASED Version 5.3 of the Enhanced Surface-toAir Missile Simulation (ESAMS) is now available. This simulation provides a one-on-one framework used to evaluate air vehicle survivability, estimate effectiveness, set requirements, and develop tactics. Detailed data have been abstracted from intelligence information and incorporated into the model to provide comprehensive representation of radio frequency land-based and naval-based surface-toair missile systems. The user can specify the threat site layout in various ways, including rectangular grid site arrays, circular site arrays, or

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5 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL semi-circular arrays, or by specifying specic sites one-by-one. Missile re control, guidance, aerodynamics, and movement are also patterned. The model details the characteristics of both ground and missile seeker radar. ESAMS models aircraft from their signature data and optional vulnerability data. ESAMS latest enhancements include: New models Pedigree documents A Chaff Model overhaul A new Generic Fuze Model that allows fuzing on all entities for endgame evaluation (which is useful for systems without detailed signal-based fuze models) Detonation evaluation for all entities in the air New target assignment code in the generic track model, which allows user to select primary target for cueing the re control radar (cue to the fastest target, target closest to site, etc.) and added kill removal for legacy towed decoy. To request a copy of ESAMS 5.3, visit the DSIAC website at www.dsiac.org/ resources/models_and_tools/esams. Questions can be directed to the ESAMS Model Manager, Mr. Benjamin Vroman, at 937-904-5607 or benjamin.vroman@ us.af.mil. JCAT CORNER by MAJ Ronald Pendleton The Air Force (AF) component of the Joint Combat Assessment Team (JCAT) has recently experienced some person nel changes. LTC Arild Barrett (pictured in Figure 1), a valued team member for 5 years, retired from the AF on 1 July; and LTC Chuck Larson (pictured in Figure 2), who has been with the JCAT program since 2005 and the Ofcer in Charge of the AF component since 2011, will be retiring on 1 November. JCAT thanks LTC Barrett and LTC Larson for their service and wishes them well in their future endeavors. At the same time, AF JCAT has gained two new valuable team members, 1LT Dan Adducchio and CPT Lindsay Cain. 1LT Adducchio transferred from the Air National Guard and has been working for JCAT on the side for approximately 1 year while his transfer paperwork was being processed. On the civilian side, he is Deputy Chief for F-15 Operations at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). CPT Cain transferred from the active force and spent her last tour at the Air Force Research Laboratory at WPAFB as a research engineer and an executive ofcer. In the civilian capacity, she is currently a machine learning engineer at Riverside Research in Beavercreek, OH. Training continues to be an ongoing JCAT need, and work has been under way to improve the JCAT training area located at WPAFB. JCAT is collaborat ing with the School of Aerospace Medicine, which manages the site. Currently, the site contains only a wrecked T-6 and C-130 aircraft, although other aircraftin particular, a rotarywing assetare actively being sought. A joint Navy-Air Force JCAT assessment training event was conducted at the site last March, and another is planned for September. This is a great opportunity for the JCAT cadre and others to refresh assessment skills on a regular basis. Figure 1 LTC Barrett Performing an Assessment While Deployed in 2013.

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 6 Collectively, the dates for the 2018 JCAT training curriculum have been nalized. Phase I is planned for 2226 January 2018 at Fort Rucker, AL. Phase II is planned for 59 March 2018 at China Lake, CA. Phase III, also known as the Threat Weapons and Effects (TWE) training seminar, is planned for 1012 April 2018 at Hurlburt Field, FL. More information regarding the TWE will be announced at a later date. In addition, the AF JCAT has joined forces with the aircraft structural engineering community to maintain a JCAT presence in the area of responsi bility. To address the dearth of JCAT capability down range after the withdrawal of assessors from Afghanistan in October 2014, JCAT has to date sent three Depot Liaison Engineers (DLEs) to the JCAT training courses at Fort Rucker, China Lake, and Hurlburt Field. The great benet to using DLEs is that they are already trained in aircraft battle damage repair, which includes docu menting the hostile re damage to aircraft, a skill common to JCAT. DLEs operate from several bases, including Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Ali Al Salem, and Bagram, providing on-site aircraft structural engineering support and depot coordination, as well as JCAT support as an additional duty. LT Andrew Logan pioneered the combined DLE/JCAT role during his tour and successfully established lines of communication with mishap reporting, maintenance, and safety personnel and in providing JCAT training to the other DLEs. CPT Michael Macchia has now taken his place and continues the standard of excellence. Air Force JCAT intends to have at least one JCATtrained DLE in theater at all times to respond to any hostile re incidents. Though the JCAT mission has been around a long time, it unfortunately is not well known in Air Force circles. To remedy this situation, we are striving to give JCAT orientation briengs as often as possible. In May, LTC Barrett briefed the 10th Air Force Combat Planning Council held at the Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base in Fort Worth, TX. The audience was com posed of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel, who were briefed on the JCAT mission using the EXTORTION17 incident as a real-world example. Figure 2 LTC Larson (Standing Third From Left) Mentoring New JCAT Cadre Members During a Trainging Exercise.

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BASICS OF THE HH-60W LFT&E PROGRAM By Samantha Block COVER STORY The Combat Rescue Helicopter, designed by Sikorsky, will perform critical combat search and rescue and personnel recovery operations for all U.S. military services ( Artist rendering courtesy of Sikorsky).

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 8 BACKGROUND Sikorskys HH-60W CRH is built on the reliable and battle-proven UH-60M Black Hawk and customized to the rescue mission, making it the most affordable option for the Air Force. The aircraft will have signicantly improved combat radius, an expanded weapons suite, and a modern, state-of-the-art integrated mission systems and self-protection suite. The $1.4 billion engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract includes development and integration of the aircraft and rescue mission systems, delivery of nine HH-60W helicopters, and a training system. The training system includes: A weapon system trainer (full-motion simulator) An operational ight trainer An aircraft system trainer An avionics desktop trainer A landing gear part task trainer A hoist part task trainer Type 1 training Courseware. CRH PROGRAM MILESTONES Notable past and future milestones for the CRH program include the following: Air Vehicle Preliminary Design Review (PDR) April 2016 Training Systems PDR August 2016 Air Vehicle Critical Design Review (CDR) May 2017 Training Systems CDR September 2017 (planned) First Flight Fall 2018 (planned) EMD completion/Required Assets Available to Support the Customers Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Summer 2020 (planned). LFT&E OVERVIEW The overall goal of the CRH LFT&E program is to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the systems survivability (aircraft, aircrew, and passengers) to expected ballistic and advanced threats while completing its mission. The CRH team is capitalizing on applicable previous LFT&E activities to the greatest extent possible, incorporating the results of previous testing, verica tion activities, and analyses (vulnerability combat data, qualication tests, system safety, crashworthiness, existing models, and other tests) in its determination of the additional testing and analyses required to support the LFT&E program. The LFT&E strategy presents an approach to determine the system-level survivability (susceptibility and vulner ability) of the aircraft, as well as assess the occupant force protection. The initial strategy was approved shortly after contract award and was updated following Air Vehicle PDR. The strategy continues to be reviewed at LFT&E Working Group meetings at least quarterly to address any necessary changes/additions as the program moves past Critical Design Review and into qualication testing. The LFT&E Working Group was estab lished prior to the Air Vehicle PDR and meets quarterly to review the status of the air vehicle and training systems design and qualication efforts, to review draft vulnerability and suscepti bility assessment efforts, and to plan upcoming activities. LFT&E TEAM AND APPROACH The CRH LFT&E team is led by the LFT&E Manager at WPAFBs Helicopter The HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1C program based at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). The U.S. Air Force program of record calls for 112 helicopters to replace the Air Forces rapidly aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters, which perform critical combat search and rescue (CSAR) and personnel recovery operations for all U.S. Services. The HH-60W is on the Ofce of the Secretary of Defenses (OSD) Oversight List for Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). Due to the considerable amount of test and com bat data available on Black Hawk variants, however, the program developed a Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)-approved Alternative Test Plan (ATP) to meet Live Fire Test (LFT) statutory requirements and obtain a full-up, system-level (FUSL) LFT waiver. This article presents an overview of the HH-60W aircraft and the LFT&E program and team.

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9 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL Program Ofce and the Survivability lead at Sikorsky. Members of the team include the: Helicopter Program Ofce Sikorsky Aircraft Company DOT&E/LFT&E 704 th Test Group Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) Combat Effectiveness and Vulnerability Analysis Branch (EZJA) Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD). The approach for the CRH LFT&E program is divided into several catego ries of analysis/assessment, which are detailed as follows. Modeling and Simulation (M&S) The CRH LFT&E program is using M&S to investigate questions related to the vulnerability and susceptibility of the aircraft. Programs used include COVART, AJEM/MUVES, MOSAIC, RADGUNS, ESAMS, and RPG Engagement Model. Initial LFT&E Survivability Analysis The initial LFT&E survivability analysis is dening susceptibility, vulnerability, and force protection issues; identifying sources of ballistic vulnerability and susceptibility data to support the program; determining more detailed analysis plans and timelines; clarifying LFT&E threats of interest; and coordinating efforts between all LFT&E team members. Ballistic Vulnerability Analysis (BVA) The CRH statement of work (SOW) and the associated contract data requirements list (CDRL) state that Sikorsky will execute ballistic vulnerability analyses to verify the CRH System Specication. Sikorsky began this effort by conducting a detailed Survivability Analysis Plan, followed by iterative submissions of a Vulnerability Analysis Report. Because this analysis focuses on specication threats only, it is necessary to supplement it with an LFT&E-led ballistic vulnerability analysis that includes threats of interest outside those noted in the specication document. The Final BVA will consider three levels of kill: attrition, forced landing, and mission abort; as well as three ight modes: high and fast, high and slow, and low and slow. Integrated Survivability Assessment (ISA) The major activities supporting the ISA are susceptibility studies evaluating the likelihood of threat engagements in realistic combat environments. In assessing CRHs susceptibility to the chosen threats, the intent is to use mission proles, aircraft congura tions, and ight paths representative of the CRH in a combat scenario. The goal of these studies is to evaluate the anticipated engage ment timelines (i.e., detection of the threat by the CRH, as well as detection and engagement of the CRH by the threat) and threat footprints and to determine the probability of kill given an engage ment (P k|e ) for the aircraft with respect to the selected threats. Occupant Casualty Analysis The occupant casualty analysis goes beyond direct injury from a threat and will include casualties caused by indirect effects, crash, or hard landings. The injuries and resulting casualties are consolidated and analyzed, along with relevant combat data or other data, to identify trends and help determine any mitigation options. Recent analysis or testing affecting crew survivability on rotorcraft and the ongoing Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) Crew and Passenger Survivability study is being moni tored for useful information. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Threat Analysis The LFT&E team is leveraging any relevant analyses or assessments of the CRH (or comparable platforms) to evaluate the effects of NBC threats against the system. The data will verify the ability of the CRH to operate and be maintained following exposure to NBC threats and the ability of the CRH to be decontami nated using standard decontamination procedures. Laser Threat Analysis The LFT&E team is leveraging any relevant analyses or assessments of the CRH (or comparable platforms) to evaluate the effects of low-power laser threats against the aircrafts sensors. The role of each sensor is being evaluated through Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis or Damage Mode and Effects Analysis and mission essential equipment list. The analysis will include a description of the susceptibilities and vulnerabili ties of the sensors of the aircraft to laser threats. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and High-Power Microwave (HPM) Analyses Per MIL-STD464C, the CRH shall comply with EMP/electromagnetic emissions/ electromagnetic interference requirements and shall be capable of operating from and near Navy surface ships. The LFT&E program is leveraging analyses or assess ments of the CRH performed elsewhere in the program to

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 10 evaluate the effects of EMP and HPM threats. QUALIFICATION AND OTHER TESTING Early component qualication testing on the program includes the complex testing of the newly designed fuel cell, an HH-60W-unique component (see fuel test stand setup shown in Figure 1). Qualication test activities include those detailed in MIL-DTL-27422D and MIL-STD-810G. The Phase I test series provides a foundation for Phase II and LFT&E test activities planned for late 2017 through 2018. This challenging test series will ensure the fuel cell materials and design are robust enough to withstand the combat environment in which the HH-60W is designed to operate. The LFT&E program is leveraging the qualication test activities as a foundation for the LFT&E testing of this mission-critical component. Other focuses of LFT&E testing include ballistic characterization of the cockpit seats, cabin and cockpit armor, refueling lines, and any other vulnerability or susceptibility reduction features on the aircraft. Items of interest in the occupant casualty assessment include the primary aircrew seats, rescue team seats, isolated personnel litter system, and emergency egress systems on the aircraft. The LFT&E team actively monitors all program risks that may potentially impact the timeliness of the LFT&E efforts, or design trades that may have an impact on system-level or occupant survivability, and reports concerns to CRH leadership. The status of LFT&E efforts is presented by the LFT&E lead at the programs quarterly Program Management Reviews. All developmental test, LFT, M&S, and analysis results will be incorporated into a nal LFT&E consolidated report submitted to DOT&E LFT&E. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ms. Samantha Block is the CRH LFT&E team lead for the AFLCMC/WIHT Helicopter Program Ofce. She is a graduate of Michigan Technological University and was commissioned through the Air Force Reserve Ofcers Training Corps (ROTC) program. She was formerly an active duty contracting ofcer before becoming a civilian Program Manager. Figure 1 Fuel Test Stand. Fluid collection buckets Celotex back stop Test article Velocity screen (2 nd screen not shown) Fluid collection pans

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11 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL Torg jokes, I knew that my plastic airplane model-building experience as a kid and throughout my life would somehow benet me. And indeed it did. Torgs most notable achievements have been in leading the Pentagons Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) of the F-35 Lightning 2, P-8A Poseidon, EA-18G Growler, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, and the E-2D Hawkeye, as well as coordinating the efforts of other Pentagon analysts in two dozen other aircraft and air-to-air weapons systems. Early in the life of a program, Torg and his staff coordinate the development of a Live Fire Strategy that outlines the scope and resources needed for testing, modeling, and evaluating aircraft survivability and weapon lethality. Then, as programs develop, he monitors the testing and modeling performed by contractors and begins sculpting a nal report to Congress to support a Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) decision. Torg takes an active part in helping programs consider survivability enhancements in light of mission requirements, potential threats, and operational tactics, including specialized survivability equipment, such as dry bay re extinguishers, fuel protection systems, crashworthiness, egress, etc. Aircraft systems are somewhat unique in how they survive, Torg said. Their lightweight designs limit their ability to tolerate threat hits, so preventing hits (susceptibility-reduction) is often the most signicant part of the survivability strategy. Although the Live Fire law places the primary emphasis on testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties, it has to equally consider the susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the system. So understanding the susceptibility becomes a major part of the effort. To gain this understanding has required Torg and his fellow researchers in IDA and DOT&E to expand their efforts beyond traditional (vulnerability-ori ented) live re testing and analysis to follow developmental and operational test activities, as well as broaden the DOT&E BLRIP reports to provide comprehensive descriptions of xedwing aircraft survivability. After his graduation with a B.S. in aerospace sciences from the University of Minnesota in 1974, Torg gained 5 years of operational experience as a U.S. Navy ight ofcer, ying A-6E Intruders as a bombardier/navigator with the USS John F. Kennedy. This applied experience helped give him a well-balanced view of the roles of operations and equipment in enhancing aircraft survivability. He then worked for the next 24 years at United Technologies Research Center (UTRC) in Hartford, CT, becoming a senior research engineer. That research experience Torg said, gave me a lot of knowledge in testing a wide range diverse systems and evaluating differing types of physical problems, from aircraft gas turbine combustors and fuel systems to scramjets, hydrogen fuel cells, and high power lasers. I gained expertise in the The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) is pleased to recognize Torger Torg Anderson for his Excellence in Survivability. Torg has worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for 14 years and has served as lead for the Fixed Wing and Anti-Air Live Fire task since 2010, where he leads IDA staff in analytical and test efforts to evaluate the survivability of new xed-wing platforms in support of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY TORGER ANDERSON by Joel Williamsen

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 12 types, capabilities and limitations of many instrumentation techniques, and much of my career was dedicated to understanding and implementing, then developing, optical and laser-based diagnostic tools for combustion and other measurement applications. The greatest emphasis was the develop ment and use of a Coherent Anti-Stokes Raman Spectroscopy (CARS) system that could make temperature and species concentration measurements in realistic aero propulsion systems. It was for this work that, in 1990, Torg received the UTRC Special Achievement Award for CARS measurements in a full-scale hydrogen scramjet combustor as part of the National Aerospace Plane program. Also during this time, he authored three patents for designs for a solar air conditioner system, a fuel cell power plant inlet, and a novel pulse detonation engine concept. Torg also earned a Ph.D. in mechanical engineer ing in 1992 from the University of Connecticut (while working full time at UTRC). His dissertation addressed the understanding of planar gaseous detonation waves using Rayleigh images generated by a high-power pulsed ultraviolet laser. Based on my prior career at UTRC, I recognized that there is a lot of test, measurement, and analysis technology residing outside of the LFT&E commu nity that could be brought to bear to solve LFT&E problems, Torg said. I felt that the LFT&E state-of-the-art could be signicantly enhanced if the community could understand and employ some of this knowledge. Torg has worked throughout his career to try to infuse this understanding in the community. From 2005 through 2007, Torg held Instrumentation Roundtables at the JASP Program Review meetings, bringing in outside technology experts to describe the capabilities and potential for instrumentation in several areas. The community was informed about laser-based measurement techniques for temperature and species concentrations, high-frequencyresponse pressure sensors that had capabilities beyond those being employed in LFT&E at the time, and advances in high-speed video imaging that could improve our understanding of LFT&E test results. These meetings were successful in linking the technolo gists with LFT&E testers, resulting in improvements in the communitys test techniques and measurement results. Torg also recognized that the under standing of the science of combustion outside of the LFT&E community was well beyond the tools we use to evaluate the potential for ballistically induced re, and he developed an approach for incorporating that under standing into our survivability assessments. A more scientic approach was encouraged, and LFT&E analysts were coupled with technolo gists from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to bring in their understanding of the mechanisms that control the likelihood of re to our problems. And that effort is still ongoing. Based on his LFT&E experience at IDA and his operational Navy experience, Torg also led an effort to support DOT&E in establishing an Integrated Survivability Assessment approach, evaluating aircraft systems for overall survivability (susceptibility and vulner ability). This approach was shoehorned into the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft assessment, but its rst real trial came with the assessment of the P-8A in support of the Full-Rate Production (FRP) decision. IDA has subsequently endeavored to use this approach on every aircraft platform on DOT&E LFT&E oversight. In 2008, Torg also organized and led a round-table event at the JASP Program Review meeting to discuss and begin developing an approach for better assessing aircrew casualties, consistent with the wording of the Live Fire Test law. This meeting initiated efforts that led to the current aircrew casualty assessment approaches. Finally, as a private pilot, Torg has accrued 1,200 hours of ight time in light aircraft and earned certications as an instrument and a commercial pilot. Encouraging kids in math and science has also been a long-time interest of his, and while in Connecticut he started an initiative called FlyingKids, giving inner city kids a chance to y airplanes at his ying club. In his spare time, he also tutors local middle schoolers in math and science and leads them in IDAs annual Minnie Howard Math Day. Congratulations, Torg, for your Excellence in Survivability and for your many contributions to the Department of Defense, the survivability community, and the Warghter. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Joel Williamsen currently serves as a live re analyst for IDA and a senior advisor for JASP. He has more than 35 years of experience in aircraft/ spacecraft survivability and weapons lethality. For his many efforts in the eld, he received the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Survivability Award (AIAA) in 2012. Dr. Williamsen holds a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Nebraska and a Ph.D. from the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

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13 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL [EDITORS NOTE: This article is the second in a series of historical aircraft survivability articles. The rst, which covered pre-World War I through World War I, was published in the spring 2017 issue of Aircraft Survivability.] On 4 September 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) recorded its rst losses of World War II when ve Wellingtons of No. 9 Squadron were shot down during a raid on German warships in the Elbe estuary [1]. Three months later, a force of 24 RAF Wellington Mk 1a medium bombers (such as those shown in Figure 1) attempted a daylight raid against the German port of Wilhemshaven. These bombers ew in a spread formation to avoid anti-aircraft re. However, German Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radars tracked the bombers and vectored a formation of single-engine BF-109 and twin-engine Bf-110 ghters onto the bombers. A total of 12 RAF Wellington bombers were shot down for the loss of 2 Luftwaffe ghters [1]. In addition, 56 of the 65 bomber aircrew who set off on this mission were killed. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY: NEW CHALLENGES FOR A NEW GLOBAL CONFLICT (WORLD WAR II) by David Legg Figure 1 Aircrews of No. 149 Squadron RAF and Their Vickers Wellington Mk las at Mildenhall, Suffolk ( IWM [C 423])

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 14 The post-mission debriefs uncovered that several of the aircraft caught re when hit, and the recommendation was made that the aircraft be equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks. The RAF also noted, based upon these and other missions, that the bombers could not defend themselves against ghters during daylight missions. This conclu sion eventually led the RAF to embark upon its night-time bombing campaign against Germany. RELEARNING THE LESSONS OF WORLD WAR I During the years between Word War I and World War II, the air forces of the world soon forgot the costly lessons learned over the trenches of France in World War I. Unfortunately, these lessons would have to be quickly relearned (by the previously mentioned RAF Wellington bombers, for example) in the early years of World War II, prior to the involvement of the United States. During this time, Britain freely trans ferred the lessons learned to the U.S. government and aircraft manufacturers. And in relatively quick order, U.S. manufacturers were including survivabil ity features due the requirements stipulated by the RAF. For example, when the U.S.-produced Curtiss P-40A Tomahawk ghters arrived in England, the RAF restricted its use to units deployed in England until these aircraft were equipped with armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. These deciencies were corrected in the P-40B, which the RAF used to good effect in North Africa. In contrast, the North American P-51 Mustang was developed based upon RAF require ments, which included armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. Later, this U.S.-manufactured aircraft would become arguably the best escort ghter aircraft of the waronce the British replaced its Allison engine with a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. While attempts were being made to reduce the vulnerability of their respec tive aircraft, the Allied and Axis air forces soon learned that their aircrafts armaments required improved lethality. Early versions of the RAFs Supermarine Spitre Mk I and II and Hawker Hurricane ghters were each equipped with eight .303-caliber machine guns. As aircraft equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks and armor became much more common during 1940, it proved neces sary to concentrate machine gun re at much closer ranges to the target aircraft. The RAF quickly discovered that these .303-caliber rie bullets could not carry enough incendiary or explosive to guarantee success and had insuf cient penetration capability to defeat armor reliably. During one documented encounter between a Luftwaffe Dornier DO-17Z bomber and an RAF Spitre, approxi mately 200 rounds were required to down the bomber. This encounter also highlights the robust design (excluding re prevention) of military aircraft of this era. Later versions of the Spitre Mk II and subsequent Mks included a mixture of 20-mm cannon and .303or .5-inch machine guns. Early versions of the Luftwaffes Bf-109, including those involved in the raid on Wilhemshaven, already included a mixture of 20-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine guns. Like the Spitre, later versions of the Bf-109 also included heavier armament, including a mixture of 12.7-mm machine guns and 30-mm cannon. Likewise, the Allied and Axis tactical air-defense artillery units soon learned that they also required improved lethality. In the early phases of World War II, German ground forces were typically protected against ground attack aircraft by either xed or mobile 20-mm anti-aircraft cannon. In the mid-to-late years of the war, these would be replaced or augmented by more lethal singleor multi-barrel 30-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft cannon and single-barrel 40-mm anti-aircraft cannon. This increase in threat caliber was primary driven by the increased robustness of the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) P-47 Thunderbolt, the RAF Typhoon, and the Soviet Air Force IL-2 ground attack aircraft designs. However, it was not uncommon for these aircraft to return to base after being impacted by even these rounds. These were the types of lethal defenses with which Allied ghter-bomber pilots had to contend throughout most of the war. THE P-47 The Republic P-47 is representative of U.S. aircraft manufacturers attempts to keep pace with evolving wartime requirements for performance, lethality, and survivability. The P-47 would evolve to become arguably the best close air support ghter-bomber and one of the best ghters of World War II. In 1939, the XP-47A aircraft was originally conceived as a lightweight, high-altitude interceptor. It was powered by a 1,150-hp liquid-cooled inline engine, was armed with two .50-caliber machine guns, had a top speed of 415 mph, and had a gross weight of 4,900 lbs. However, reports from Europe indicated that more repower, armor plate, and self-sealing fuel tanks were required. But the XP-47A had insufcient power to bear

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15 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL the additional weight, which resulted in a signicant redesign of the aircraft. The resultant XP-47B design included a 2,800-hp air-cooled turbo-supercharged radial for additional power, an armament of eight .50-machine guns for increased lethality, a top speed of 400 mph at 25,000 ft and 340 mph at 5,000 ft, self-sealing fuselage fuel tanks for survivability, cockpit armor for aircrew protection/survivability, and a 11,500-lb gross weight. Although the engine change was made to improve perfor mance, it would also later prove to be a signicant vulnerability reduction feature. Due to the additional weight, one of the main P-47B shortcomings was that it had insufcient range to permit deep penetration and bomber escort into Germany. This deciency, however, was addressed by mid-1943 with the introduction of the P-47C, which included the capability to mount external fuel tanks for increased range and a longer fuselage to improve maneuverability. The follow-on P-47D was the rst version of the Thunderbolt to undergo large-scale production and would undergo many block improvements. The D-25-RE Block included a bubble top canopy with improved all-around visibility, and the P-47D-40-RA Block was the rst P-47 to include tail warning radar equipment. Subsequently, the P-47M, based on the P-47 D-27 to D-30 series, was a pure ghter version with increased power. Vulnerability features of the P-47 included: Self-sealing internal fuel tanks, which shielded the pilot from below and the front 9-mm-thick armor plate to protect the pilots back A separate plate of bullet-resistant glass installed behind the wind screen for pilot protection on the P-47D Razorback An integral bullet-resistant glass incorporated with the windscreen for pilot protection on the P-47D Bubbletop The air-cooled engine, which eliminated the vulnerable liquid cooling system and shielded the pilot from the front. Susceptibility reduction features of the P-47 included: Incorporation of the bubbletop canopy for increase threat awareness Tail warning radar equipment Increased power. The P-47N was the last version of the P-47 to be produced. It was a longrange (2,200 miles) version designed specically for service in the Pacic theater. The improved range permitted the aircraft to escort B-29 bombers from the island of Saipan to Japan. The P-47N was powered by the same R-2800-57 engine as the P-47M. While the fuselage was essentially unchanged from the D series, the wing was completely redesigned to include four self-sealing fuel tanks per side. On 26 June 1943, LT Robert S. Johnson would push limits of the P-47Cs survivability. While on patrol, his squadron was jumped by a formation of FW-190A ghters. His aircraft (which he called Half Pint) was hit by 20-mm cannon and 7.9-mm machine gun projectiles, which resulted in a re and an uncontrolled spin. After the aircraft lost several thousand feet in altitude, the re self-extinguished, and LT Johnson regained control of the aircraft. His vision was impaired by a hydraulic uid leak, he had two bullet fragments in his right leg, another bullet had nicked his nose, and part of the windscreen had been shattered. He tried to bail out, but his cockpit was jammed (due to a 20-mm projectile impact). Under these dire circumstances, LT Johnson headed back toward England. Somewhere over France, unable to maneuver his damaged aircraft, he was attacked by another FW-190A. Luckily, this aircraft had expended all of its 20-mm cannon rounds in an earlier engagement. The FW-190A pilot, Luftwaffe ace MAJ Egon Mayer, made several attacks and red every remaining 7.9-mm machine gun round into LT Johnsons aircraft. After exhausting all of his aircrafts machine gun rounds, MAJ Mayer then ew alongside LT Johnson for almost 30 minutes, amazingly escorting him to the English Channel to make sure he made it. LT Johnson continued on and landed safely at his home aireld in England. Upon inspection, it was determined that the aircraft (shown in Figures 2 and 3) had more than 210 holes in it, with at least 20 being inicted by 20-mm cannon rounds from the initial attack. LT Johnson would survive to become one of the top American aces in World War II, with 27 aerial victories [2]. In addition, his plane would later be repaired and reissued to the 9th Air Forces 36th Fighter Group, before being permanently destroyed in August 1944. Ironically, MAJ Mayer was shot down and killed in action by a P-47 pilot near Montmdy, France, on 2 March 1944. He was ofcially credited with 102 aircraft victories in more than 353 combat missions.

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 16 THE P-51 The P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang were both robust designs capable of absorbing signicant structural damage, and they both included self-sealing fuel tanks and armor for pilot protection. However, the P-51 had one signicant vulnerability not shared by the P-47 the P-51s liquid-cooled engine. And this vulnerability became more critical as the aircraft was used in the close air support and aireld strang role toward the end of the war. Edgar Schmued, chief designer of the P-51, explained that using the Mustang for ground attack was . . absolutely hopeless, because a .30-caliber bullet can rip a hole in the radiator and you y two more minutes before your engine freezes up [2]. The Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command at Eglin Field, FL, also documented this vulnerability in its December 1942 Final Report on Tactical Suitability of the P-51 Type Airplane, which states [3]: The coolant and oil radiators are combined into one (1) assembled unit and are located in the belly of the aircraft just behind the cockpit. For the reason that most hits on an airplane in combat are to the rear of the cockpit, it is believed that this radiator installation may prove to be quite vulnerable. It is recommended that the designer of the subject aircraft make a study of the possibili ties of incorporating a sheet of armor plate to protect the radiator from re from the rear. The recommended armor plate was never incorporated in the P-51 design. During World War II, the combat loss rate per sortie for the P-51 was 1.2% (vs. 0.7% for the P-47). Another World War II study indicated the P-51 was three times more vulnerable to ground re than the P-47. OTHER AIRCRAFT In addition to the incorporation of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks typical of USAAF, U.S. Navy (USN), and RAF ghter aircraft, several Soviet ghter aircraft designs included a form of fuel tank ullage inerting. Portions of the inert gases that formed the engine exhaust were collected, cooled, and pumped into the fuel tanks of the Yakolev-1 and 9, Mig-3, and Lavochkin (LaG)-3, 5, and 7 ghter aircraft. Soviet ghter ace Ivan Kozhedub stated [4]: Later on, I had many occasions to admire the strength and staying power of this plane (LaG-5). It had Figure 3 Detailed 20-mm Projectile Damage to LT Johnsons P-47C (Photo Credit: http://www.littlefriends.co.uk CPT McGarrigle via Chuck Zarkis) Figure 2 LT Robert Johnsons Damaged P-47C Half Pint, Which Was Later Repaired and Reissued for Service (Photo Credit: http://www.littlefriends.co.uk Donavon Smith Jr.)

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17 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL excellent structural mounting points and an ingenious re-ghting system, which diverted the exhaust gases into the fuel tanks, and once saved me from what seemed certain death. Ivan Kozhedub would later become the top scoring Allied ace of WWII with 62 victories, including an Me-262 jet ghter. Although not commonly known, the Japanese also included vulnerability reduction in their aircraft designs. The Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero/Zeke entered service in 1940 and quickly became known by the Allies for its inherent overall vulnerability. This vulnerability was corrected much later in the war with the introduction of the A6M5b Model 52 version in 1944. This version includes a CO 2 -based dry bay re extinguishing system and windscreen armor [5]. Additional vulnerability reduction improvements followed. The A6M5c Model 52 added armor plate behind the pilot and a fuselage self-sealing fuel tank, and the A6M6c Model 53c added wing self-sealing fuel tanks [5]. In another case, the Japanese observer reports from the European conict were acted upon by the designers of the Kawasaki Ki-61 Tony ghter. The Ki-61-I Ko (1942) included self-sealing fuel tanks as well as pilot seat and headrest armor. The Ki-61-I Otsu (1943) added thicker self-sealing fuel tanks, thicker pilot seat and headrest armor, and radiator armor (the Ki-61 was equipped with a liquid-cooled engine). The Ki-61-I Hei (1943) and Tei (1944) versions added a CO 2 -based dry bay re extinguishing system [6]. The heavy bombers of the USAAF (e.g., the B-17 and B-24) and RAF Bomber Command (e.g., Lancaster, Halifax, and Stirling) were, like their ghter counter parts, of robust design and incorporated armor protection for the aircrew and generally self-sealing fuel tanks. Thus, they could, on occasion, survive the severe damage inicted by near-by bursts of German 88-mm, 105-mm, and 128-mm anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) projectiles (provided that no re was initiated). However, a direct hit by any of these projectiles would mean almost certain catastrophic loss. Because the RAF bombers ew at night without escort ghter protection, they were particularly susceptible to ghter attack. These radar-equipped night ghters could inict severe damage in a matter of seconds due to their heavy armament of multiple 20-mm and 30-mm cannons. Some of these cannon were mounted upward in the night ghters fuselage to enable attacks unobserved from beneath the bomber. In an attempt to stem the losses, some versions of the Lancaster, Halifax, and Stirling were equipped with fuel tank ullage inerting systems. The engine exhausts of these bombers were also equipped with ame dampers to hide the glowing exhaust from night ghter crew observation. ELECTRONIC WARFARE: A NEW TYPE OF BATTLE The aforementioned survivability features could be considered a natural progression of the improvements implemented in World War I, but World War II became the catalyst for the development a whole new kind of battleelectronic warfare. During the closing stages of World War I, and in response to German Zeppelin and bomber raids, the British implemented the rst Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Designated the London Air Defense Area (LADA), this IADS brought together units composed of coastal and inland observation posts, sound locators, searchlight and AAA stations, balloon aprons, and ghter aircraft. This IADS was reconstituted during the late 1930s with the addition of the Chain Home early warning radar system and was key to the RAFs Fighter Command success over the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. In parallel, the Germans also developed a similar IADS to defend Germany against aerial attacks. This system included Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) directed night ghters and radar-directed 88-mm, 105-mm, and 128-mm AAA. Freya radar, operating at 120166-MHz and with a range of ~200 km, provided early warning of incoming Allied aircraft. Wrzburg-Riese radar, operating at 560 MHz and with a range of ~70 km, would be used to direct the AAA and/or night ghter aircraft. Early Luftwaffe night ghter aircraft were equipped with a Lichtenstein FuG 220 radar operating at 33/82/91/118 MHz with a detection range of ~4 km. Later aircraft were equipped with FuG 240 Berlin radar operating at 3.2503.330 MHz with a maximum detection range of ~ 9 km. In the case of night ghter aircraft, GCI would typically guide them to within a few kilometers of the target aircraft. At this point, the radar operator onboard the night ghter would guide the pilot to within visual acquisition or ring range. Understandably, these developing capabilities led to an ongoing game of cat and mouse over the night skies of Germany and occupied Europe. To counter these radar-directed threats, British scientists developed a variety of

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 18 countermeasures, which were employed selectively by RAF Bomber Command aircraft. For example, the Airborne Cigar (ABC) radar jammers jammed the German VHF communications and navigation aid frequencies. A Germanspeaking operator on board the bomber would monitor the German communica tions to make sure all frequencies were jammed and could also provide false commands to German night ghter crews. The Mandrel jammers (such as those shown in Figure 4) jammed the Freya early warning radar. These jammers periodically stopped transmitting for 2 min to prevent night ghters from homing in on the Mandrel transmission. Window strips (the invention of which is credited to Joan Elizabeth Curran of the Telecommunications Research Establishment) were strips of coarse, black paper with thin aluminum foil stuck to one of the sides. These strips (known in the United States as chaff) were cut to be either a 1/2 or 1/4 wavelength of the frequency of the target radar. As the bundles of Window were dropped from an aircraft (such as shown Figure 5), they separated to form a vast cloud of metallic strips. These clouds would send back an exceptionally strong echo, and when dropped in great numbers, they swamped the enemys radar. One of the main targets of Window was the Wrzburg-Riese anti-aircraft gun laying radar. Monica was a tail-mounted radar that entered RAF service in early 1943. It provided audible bleeps as a warning of an aircraft approaching from the rear. However, a German night ghter could hide among the bleeps generated by reections from other bombers ying in trail. By March 1943, the Germans had examples of Monica from shot-down aircraft. So, in the spring of 1944, they German night ghters were equipped with the FuG 227 passive radar receiver to detect and track the Monica emis sions. The FuG 227 range was ~62 miles. Luckily for the British, on the morning of 13 July 1944, a FuG 227-equipped German Ju 88G-1 night ghter mistakenly landed at the RAF base Woodbridge. After examining the FuG 227, the RAF ordered Monica to be withdrawn from all RAF Bomber Command aircraft. Monica was replaced by the Boozer passive radar warning receiver (RWR). This RWR would provide bomber crews warning when their aircraft were detected by German Wurzburg GCI or FuG 202/212 Lichtenstein airborne interception (AI) radars. It was intro duced into service in the spring of 1943. A display was mounted on the pilots instrument panel and the radio opera tors position, and lights warned if the aircraft was being tracked. A yellow light indicated the aircraft was illumi nated by a FuG 202/212 AI radar, and a Figure 4 Three Mandrel Jammer Blisters on the Bomb-Bay Doors and an ABC Jammer Antenna on the Top of the Fuselage and Lower Forward Fuselage Nose of the RAF Bomber Jane (Australian War Memorial) Figure 5 Bundles of Window Released Over a Target in Duisburg, Germany, During Operation Hurricane. Note the Large Aerials on Top of the Fuselage, Indicating the Presence of an ABC Jamming Device as Well ( IWM [CL 1405])

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19 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL red light (hence the name Boozer) indicated that the aircraft was illumi nated by a Wurburg GCI radar. The Handley Page Halifax (which produced the Jane bomber in Figures 4 and 6) is representative of British aircraft manufacturers attempts to keep pace with evolving wartime require ments for bomber survivability. Notable vulnerability features of the Halifax included the following: 12 self-sealing fuel tanks (fuel containment and re reduction) Fuel pumps inside fuel tanks (compo nent shielding) Fuel tank cross-feed (component redundancy) 2 self-sealing oil tanks (containment and re reduction) Fuel tank nitrogen inerting for all fuel tanks (re/explosion reduction) Air-cooled engines (component elimination liquid coolant) Engine re extinguishing system (re reduction) General rugged construction (critical component redundancy). Likewise, notable susceptibility reduc tion features of the Halifax included the following: Monica active tail warning radar or Boozer passive RWR ABC, Mandrel, and Window counter measures incorporated on special-mission aircraft Engine exhaust dampers. STRATEGIC BOMBER LOSSES IN THE WAR OF WESTERN EUROPE Despite the RAF Bomber Commands decision to y in what was originally calculated to be the relative safety of night and the implementation of the previously mentioned (and other) electronic warfare countermeasures, the Bomber Commands losses ultimately surpassed those sustained by the USAAF during daylight operations. According to the Bomber Command Museum of Canada [7]: The successes of Bomber Command were purchased at terrible cost. Of every 100 airmen who joined Bomber Command, 45 were killed, 6 were seriously wounded, 8 became Prisoners of War, and only 41 escaped unscathed (at least physically). Of the 120,000 who served, 55,573 were killed . . Of those who were ying at the beginning of the war, only ten percent survived. It is a loss rate comparable only to the worst slaughter of the First World War trenches. Only the Nazi U-Boat force suffered a higher casualty rate. And the USAAF Eight Air Force did not fare much better. Reportedly [8]: During World War II, one in three airmen survived the air battle over Europe. The losses were extraordinary. The casualties suffered by the Eighth Air Force were about half of the USAAFs casualties (47,483 out of 115,332), including more than 26,000 dead. USAAF battle casualties in all overseas theater of operations include 40,061 killed and 18,238 wounded [9]. LESSONS TO BE RELEARNED Immediately following World War II, the emphasis for airpower was placed on the delivery of nuclear weapons. The unprecedented demonstration of the uranium bomb Little Boy on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and then the pluto nium bomb Fat Man 3 days later had instantly changed how the military (and the world) viewed warfare. Such weapons seemed to make major conventional conicts unthinkable, at least for a time. Unfortunately, this situation would not last long. And as with the survivability lessons learned during and forgotten after World War I, the same cycle would be repeated in subsequent conicts in Korea and Vietnam. Figure 6 A Window-Dispensing Chute Just Aft of and Below the Opened Rear Fuselage Hatch of the RAF Bomber Jane, Which Is Also Equipped With Exhaust Dampers to Hide the Glowing Engine Exhaust From Visual Detection by German Night Fighters (Australian War Memorial)

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 20 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. David Legg is currently the FixedWing Aircraft Branch Head of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division. With 33 years of experience in the aircraft survivability discipline, he has also served as the Survivability Team Lead for many U.S. Navy aircraft and weapons programs, and he assisted in the rapid development and implementation of tactical paint schemes for in-theater U.S. Marine Corps helicopters during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Mr. Legg was named a NAVAIR Associate Fellow in 2011 and holds bachelors degrees in mathematics and mechanical engineering from Saint Vincent College and the University of Pittsburgh, respectively. [EDITORS NOTE: The on-again-off-again effect described herein caused most of these survivability efforts to dry up between wars, which was the reason we established the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) in 1971. One of the main missions of the JTCG/AS was to establish survivability as a design discipline so that it would continue as a major player when no one was shooting at our aircraft. The JTCG/AS (now the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program [JASP]) was successful in doing that, and survivability programs have continued over the years. Look for an article in a future issue, on how this mission was accomplished.] References [1] Royal Air Force. RAF Timeline 1939. https:// www.raf.mod.uk/history/rafhistorytimeline1939.cfm, accessed May 2017. [2] Wagner, Ray. Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990. [3] Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command. Final Report on Tactical Suitability of the P-51 Type Airplane. Eglin Field, FL, 30 December 1942. [4] HistoryNet. Aviation History: Interview With World War II Soviet Ace Ivan Kozhedub. http:// www.historynet.com/aviation-history-interview-withworld-war-ii-soviet-ace-ivan-kozhedub.htm, accessed May 2017. [5] Juszczak, Artur. Mitsubishi A6M Zero. MMP Books, 2015. [6] Wieliczko, Leszek. Kawasaki Ki-61 / Hein Ki-100. Kagero, 2014. [7] Bomber Command Museum of Canada. Bomber Commands Losses. http://www.bombercommand museum.ca/commandlosses.html, accessed May 2017. [8] Eighth Air Force Combat Losses. http:// personal.psu.edu/kbf107/Losses.html, accessed May 2017. [9] Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II. Second Printing, Ofce of Statistical Control, December 1945.

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21 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL Rich was plugged into the survivability community after inheriting the weapons design and aircraft survivability course sequence as a new faculty member at AFIT in the fall of 2007. For many years, the only school that taught aircraft combat survivability was the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at Monterey. However, in the early 2000s, through some interchanges between NPS and AFIT, aircraft survivability was added to the AFIT program as well. As the third instructor to teach the course in 4 years, Rich took the opportunity to revamp the curriculum and integrate it into the survivability research programs running at WrightPatterson and Eglin Air Force Bases (AFBs). Thanks to Richs efforts, the class now includes hands-on demon strations and tours at Sensors Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, and the survivability ranges of the 704 th Test Group. Additionally, the class travels to Eglin AFB to participate in the Threat Weapons Effects Seminar. In 1994, Rich received a B.S. in aeronau tical and astronautical engineering from Purdue University. While at Purdue, he was also a cooperative education student with the Foreign Technology Division, now known as the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. After graduation, he received a commission from the Reserve Ofcers Training Corps Program and entered the Air Force. His rst assignment was to AFIT as a graduate student. Rich graduated from AFIT in 1995 with an M.S. in aerospace engineering. His thesis, which was given the departments Best Thesis award, was titled Mach 2.9 Investigation Into the Flow Structure in the Vicinity of a Wrap-Around Fin. The follow-on assignment for (then) 2LT Huffman was to the Demonstration Branch in the Air Vehicles Directorate of AFRL. The ight test bug bit him in that assignment, having to miss graduation from AFIT to support test planning at Edwards AFB. Rich worked primarily on the Advanced Fighter Integration Technology (AFTI) F-16, which was a research testbed managed in Dayton but own out of Edwards in collabora tion with the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations Dryden Flight Research Center. Despite Richs two aeronautical engineering degrees, the Air Force tried to turn Rich into an electrical engineer as he developed antenna, navigation, and ight control systems. His favorite demonstration program to be involved in from this assignment was the Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (AutoGCAS). This system, which was installed into the F-16 in 2014, overrides pilot control of the aircraft at the last minute to prevent imminent collision with nearby terrain. The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) is pleased to recognize LTC Richard E. Huffman Jr. for his Excellence in Survivability. Rich is currently on assignment as the Chief of Information Operations Plans and Assessments Branch at Headquarters U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Additionally, he is an adjunct assistant professor of aerospace engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). He has also served in the Air Force for 23 years as a developmental ight test engineer, working envelope expansion, avionics, and survivability testing on numerous weapon systems. EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY RICHARD HUFFMAN by Mark Couch

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 22 Richs next assignment was to the Air Force Test Pilot school as the Chief of Instrumentation, where he was responsible for the calibration and maintenance of the special instrumenta tion systems on the eet of test aircraft for training test pilots and ight test engineers. Rich also applied to be, and was accepted as, a student at Test Pilot School while at the schoolhouse, graduating with class 2000A. Next, he was assigned to the 411 th Flight Test Squadron, where he executed test missions on the F-22 Raptor as a test conductor and test director. He spent the next 4 years as part of the Secretary of Defense-directed test acceleration program, testing the airframe, avionics, envelope clearance, and weapons separations of the aircraft. In 2004, Rich was accepted into AFITs faculty pipeline program, which sent him to the University of Illinois with a follow-on requirement to teach at AFIT. In 2007, he completed his doctorate in aerospace engineering, with a disserta tion titled An Experimental Investigation into the Effect of Plasma on the Flow Features of an Axisymmetric Jet. Following his time at Illinois, Rich became an assistant professor of aerospace engineering at AFIT. In his 4-year teaching tour, he was the deputy department head and advisor for 19 masters and 3 doctorate students. He taught aircraft combat survivability to more than 150 students and continues to serve as adjunct assistant professor as well as one of the lead instructors of the JASP-sponsored annual aircraft combat survivability short course (for the past 8 years). In 2011, Rich competed, and was selected, for command. He was assigned to Detachment 1 of the 586 th Flight Test Squadron at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM. Rich was in charge of the team that provided planning and support for weapons testing on the sprawling WSMR test complex. The team supported numer ous programs, including the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, F-35 Lightning II, F-22 Raptor, Joint Direct Attack Munition, Small Diameter Bomb I and II, and the Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Following this assignment, he was chosen for a back-to-back command tour, taking command of the National Radar Cross Section Test Facility at WSMR. Rich left New Mexico in 2016 for a staff tour at Headquarters AFRICOM, where, as mentioned previously, he currently serves as the Chief of the Information Operations Plans and Assessments Branch, which focuses on integrating nonkinetic activities such as electronic warfare into the Theater Campaign Plan. Rich is also an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and a member of the Antenna Measurement Techniques Association. In addition, he has authored or coauthored more than 40 articles and papers in aircraft survivabil ity, navigation, uid owelds, and measurement techniques. Rich currently lives in Stuttgart, Germany, with his wife of 13 years and their three children. Congratulations, Rich, for your Excellence in Survivability and for your distinguished contributions to todays and tomorrows aircraft survivability community. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Mark Couch is currently the Warfare Area Lead for Live Fire Test and Evaluation in the Operational Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Prior to joining IDA in 2007, he enjoyed a 23-year Navy career ying the MH-53E helicopter. He has a Ph.D. in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School and has taught numerous courses in aircraft combat survivability.

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23 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL by Mark Robeson, Clark Andrews, and Lisa Chiu BLAST-TOLERANT COMPOSITE STRUCTURE FOR ROTORCRAFT Military rotorcraft structures may be subjected to high-energy ballistic events in combat situations. Ballistic threats characterized by an advancing shockwave created by an explosive blast, alone and in combination with high-speed fragmentation, typically result in signicant structural damage for both metallic and composite structures. To address this vulnerability, the U.S. Armys Aviation Development Directorate (ADD) and The Boeing Company have collaborated to develop and integrate specically designed composite sandwich components into large primary aircraft structures, which have shown good success at mitigating catastrophic damage caused by explosive ballistic events [1]. To address small-volume, enclosed aircraft structure, ADD and Boeing collaborated to develop subscale composite sandwich panels, which were shown to mitigate advancing shock waves from representative explosive ballistic events at close proximity [2]. This damage-mitigating sandwich structure has been developed by engineering the core with tuned characteristics covering (1) compression and tension strength, (2) density, and (3) compression load-deection curves with progressive failure mechanisms. Now, successfully integrating the shockwave mitigating sandwich structural concepts into small-volume primary structure, via full-scale test articles, is shown to improve composite structure ballistic/ blast tolerance. The full-scale test article conguration (shown in Figure 1) was designed to be representative of small-volume primary aircraft structure. The assembly consists of a metallic spar, carbon/ epoxy spar box, and fastened doublers that reinforce holes in the spar box. The spar box is made of carbon/epoxy face sheets with crushable core engineered with specic characteristics (strength,

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 24 density, and yield behavior) to mitigate the explosive blast shockwave. Assembly of the structure is accom plished with riveted fasteners. Test articles (shown in Figure 2) were fabricated with varying spar box laminate denitions, metallic spar congurations, and hole doubler congurations, but with the same core conguration. FULL-SCALE BALLISTIC TESTING Ballistic testing was conducted at the ADD range (in Fort Eustis, VA) to evaluate the structural response of the full-scale test article when subjected to the pressure environment created by the specied high-energy (explosive) threat. Data gathered during the full-scale test included high-speed video and photogra phy. The objectives of the test were as follows: 1. Evaluate the damage tolerance and blast-mitigating effects of the candidate structures against the ballistic threat. 2. Collect performance data (via observed damage, high-speed video, and photography) for analytical model correlation. Two rounds of ballistic testing were conducted, with the rst used to correlate with the analysis. Using data and observations from the rst round, the analysis was modied to better represent the pressure environment created from the ballistic threat and improve correlation with the damage observed. The second round of testing (shown in Figure 3) was then executed to demonstrate the accuracy of the improved analysis. BLAST ANALYSIS The overpressure environment on the interior of the structure, resulting from the explosive event, was modeled analytically by Boeing (Mesa, AZ) using two approaches: an empirical approach and an Arbitrary Lagrangian Eulerian (ALE) approach. ALE combines both Lagrangian (where each individual node of the computational mesh follows the associated material particle) and Eulerian (where the computational mesh is xed in space and the continuum moves with respect to the grid) formulations, such that the computa tional mesh may be xed in space or move with the continuum. Both analysis methods were executed with the nite element (FE) code LS-DYNA. The empirical explosive approach denes the pressure environment using curves that are t to test data. The structure of interest is modeled using the Lagrangian FE formulation, and a unique pressure-time history is dened for every element subjected to the blast. The time histories are dened by peak pressure, pressure pulse duration, and pulse arrival time, which were derived from empirical test data and depended on the charge characteristics and distance between the element and the charge. The explosive source is dened by the user, including location, mass, round casing (if applicable), and shape. The pressure-time-history for an element is calculated as a function of distance from the dened explosive source and user inputs. For the present ALE approach, the explosive material and air domain are modeled using an ALE formulation while Hole Doublers Fasteners Composite Spar Box Blast-Attenuating Structure Metallic Spar Figure 1 Full-Scale Test Article Conguration Figure 2 Fabricated Test Articles Figure 3 High-Energy Ballistic Testing

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25 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL structural components are modeled using a purely Lagrangian formulation. The interaction between the ALE domain and the Lagrangian surfaces is simulated with denitions of Fluid Structure Interaction (FSI). The pressure environ ment and resulting pressure-time history due to the explosive materials are a function of the resulting FSI. Due to the complexity of the ALE approach, it is signicantly costlier (up to 40 times the simulation clock time) than the empirical model. However, compari son of the approaches resulted in sufcient condence in the empirical approach for it to be used for correlation with test results. More detail on the analytical models can be found in Andrews et al. [3]. BLAST RESULTS AND CORRELATION As stated previously, the rst round of ballistic testing was used to correlate and improve the analysis. The pre-test damage predictions for the second round of testing were generated with the improved empirical analysis, and they agreed favorably with the damage observed (as shown in Figure 4). High strains, predicted between the aft spar holes and along the inner face sheet of the composite spar box, indicated a risk of moderate cracking. Some cracking at these locations was observed in test. Signicant damage to the metallic spar was not predicted and was not evident in test. The only notable damage to the metallic spar was due to cracking between shrapnel penetrations. RESIDUAL STRENGTH TEST Following the ballistic testing, residual strength testing was conducted at the ADD Structures Laboratory (in Fort Eustis, VA) to evaluate the post-ballistic capability of the full-scale test articles. The test setup is shown in Figure 5. Each of the two test articles was fastened to laboratory structure, and test loads were applied by a single actuator to simulate ight loading. Data acquisition included load, strain, and displacement. Strain was measured by four axial strain gauges, two on either side of the test article as shown, to verify the applied loads. Displacement was measured at the upper corners in the lateral direction by string pots on the right-hand side of the test article. First, cyclic testing was conducted at load levels ranging from level ight to enhanced limit design loads. Several test blocks of progressively increasing magnitude were dened from a baseline level ight to an enhanced limit design load, corresponding to a full unrestricted ight envelope. The full test schedule provided 6,600 cycles of representative ight. After successful completion of the cyclic test, a static test was executed, including static test to failure, in which failure loads exceeded ultimate design loads. Figure 4 Analytical Predictions Corresponding to Damage C r acking i n aft sp ar I M L F acesh eet C r acks Ov er p r essu r e I M L F acesh eet M ax Str ai n M ax Str ai n B ase F i xtu r e Load A ctu ato r D i sp l acemen t Str i ng Po t D i sp l acemen t Str i ng Po t Str ai n Gaug es Load F i xtu r e Figure 5 Residual Strength Test Setup

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 26 RESIDUAL STRENGTH ANALYSIS Residual strength FE analysis was conducted on the full-scale test article. Maximum and minimum principal strains are shown in Figure 6 for the composite spar box at design limit loading. Extreme compression strains were predicted to be relatively low. Failure was predicted when the local peak strain at the damage hole reached the materials ultimate compression strain. Running loads were extracted from the analysis for the bays in the metallic spar, assuming crack propagation between shrapnel holes. A panel buckling analysis was also conducted for each of the remaining bays. All pre-test predictions, including failure modes in the composite spar box and metallic spar, predicted no failure during cyclic testing. More detail on the analysis can be found in Andrews et al. [3]. RESIDUAL STRENGTH RESULTS AND CORRELATION The full-scale test articles were subjected to the cyclic loads without failure or observable damage growth. With cyclic loading complete, the full-scale test articles were statically loaded to failure (as shown in Figure 7). For the measured test loads (Table 1), yield load is where strain response rst deviated from linear, and is due to either a failure in the composite or yielding or failure of the metallic spar. The rst specimen initially indicated yield behavior at 155% of design limit load when a crack in the composite spar box grew between the spar box holes. Ultimately, failure occurred when the composite spar box separated from the metallic spar along the rivet line at 209% of design limit load. For the second specimen, the initial yield behavior occurred at 172% of design Predicted Residual Strength Test Response M in Str ai nIncreasing Strain Figure 6 Residual Strength Analysis for the Composite Spar Box Test Article Measured Predicted Yield Load Predicted Yield Mode Yield Failure Metallic Spar Composite Spar Box 1 155% 209% n/a* 167% Composite Spar Box 2 172% 191% 163% 197% Metallic Spar Table 1 Measured vs. Predicted Failure Loads as a Percentage of Design Limit Load Spar Crack Propagation and Buckling Spar Rivet Line Spar Box Crack SPECIMEN 2 SPECIMEN 1 Figure 7 Residual Strength Test to Failure

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27 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL limit load, when cracks in the metallic spar began to grow, and quickly resulted in ultimate failure at 191% of design limit load, when the metallic spar buckled. The analytically predicted failure (yield) loads correlate well with those mea sured in the testing (Table 1). For Test Article 1, composite spar box yielding at 155% of design limit load was within 20% of predicted yield at 167% design limit load. For Test Article 2, initial buckling and crack propagation in the metallic spar at 172% of design limit load was within 10% of predicted buckling yield at 163% design limit load. The specimens generally hold more load than predicted. Residual strength test loads are summarized in Figure 8, with the ballistically damaged test articles loaded cyclically to 105% of an enhanced design limit load and loaded statically to 209% and 191% of enhanced design limit loads before failure. These cyclic and static strength results demonstrate the exceptional durability and damage tolerance of this design. CONCLUSION A specically engineered structural core solution was developed and integrated into a full-scale test article, representa tive of small-volume rotorcraft structure, for evaluation of ballistic/blast tolerance and residual strength. FE analysis predicted resulting damage and residual strength of small-volume aircraft structure when subjected to a ballistic event. After two rounds of ballistic testing, post-test correlation demon strated that empirical analysis is suitable to accurately predict structural response and damage modes for ballistic events of this magnitude. Specically, high strains predicted in the composite face sheets were shown to correlate to cracks resulting from the extreme overpressures. The test articles were then subjected to residual strength testing. Both specimens exhibited cyclic, yield, and ultimate strengths in excess of design require ments, clearly demonstrating the capability of the engineered structural core solution to mitigate the damage due to the ballistic event while contrib uting to the strength of the candidate rotorcraft structure. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Mark Robeson is an aerospace engineer with the U.S. Army Aviation Development Directorate. With more than 27 years of research and development experience, he currently serves as a U.S. Army Aviation Missile Research Development and Engineering Center Experimental Developer (designated technical expert), with expertise in aviation structures and vulnerability reduction. He is also active as a structures and materials technical expert in the Joint Aircraft Survivability Programs Vulnerability Analysis and Reduction Subgroup. Dr. Robeson has a B.S. in mechanical engineering and an M.S. and Ph.D. in engineering mechanics from Old Dominion University. Mr. Clark Andrews is a mechanical engineer with The Boeing Company. He has 7 years of industry experience, including a multidisciplinary focus on the development of ballistically tolerant structures, aircraft conguration design, and, most recently, production support of drive systems. He holds a bachelors and a masters degree in mechanical engineering from Northern Arizona University and Arizona State University, respectively. Ms. Lisa Chiu has worked as a structural analyst for The Boeing Company for 10 years, focusing on analysis, simulation, and testing of composite structures. Currently, she serves as the principal investigator for several research and development programs focusing on survivability, durability, and damage tolerance. She is a Boeing designated expert in ballistic structural analysis and ballistic test execution for composite structure. Ms. Chiu holds a B.S. and M.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Massachusetts Lowell ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was partially funded by the Government under Agreement No. W911W6-11-2-0014. The authors thank the U.S. Armys ADD and the Boeing AH-64 Modernization Ofce for their nancial and technical support of this research. References [1] Chiu, L., D. McCarthy, C. Andrews, A. Harris, and M. Robeson. Durable and Damage Tolerant Composites Aft Fuselage Technology. Proceedings, AHS 71st Annual Forum, Virginia Beach, VA, May 2015. [2] Chiu, L., D. McCarthy, and M. Robeson. Blast Attenuating Aircraft Structure, Proceedings, AHS 69th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ, May 2013. [3] Andrews, C., L. Chiu, and M. Robeson. Analysis and Test of Composite Rotorcraft Structure Subject to Ballistic Events, Proceedings, AHS 73rd Annual Forum, Fort Worth, TX, May 2017. 105%105%209%191% 1 2 Cyclic T e st Max Load Ul mate S ta c Fai l ure St eady F or w ar d Fli gh t Base li ne Desi gn L im itE nh anc ed Desi gn Li mi t Figure 8 Residual Strength Test Loads

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 28 The global proliferation of assault ries, machine guns, and other man-portable weapons has increased both the frequency and intensity of modern conict. These weapons, classied as small arms (which typically include up to 23 mm in caliber), are easily obtainable on international markets and are effectively used by untrained personnel. There are an estimated 100 million to 500 million military-style weapons in circulation, in addition to hundreds of millions designed for police or civilian use. In addition, of the 49 major conicts that have occurred since 1990, small arms and light weapons (such as those shown in Figure 1) were the primary weapons used in 46 of them. Only the Gulf War predominately used heavy weapons [1, 2]. THREAT CHARACTERIZATION: SMALL PROJECTILES, BIG IMPACT by Jonathan Marshall Figure 1 Marines Unearth Several Large Weapons Caches Several distinguishing features of small arms make them suitable for modern conicts. First, their previously mentioned wide proliferation makes them easily obtainable. This availability is attributed to new production, remnants of downsizing militaries, or recycled weapons from previous conicts. Additionally, the rapid-re capability of small arms (often of 300+ rounds per minute) allows a single individual to pose a signicant threat to military systems. The simplicity and low maintenance of small arms also greatly increase their use in conicts involving untrained combatants, as these weapons require little training to use effectively as well as little logistical support. Finally, small arms and light weapons can be carried by an individual soldier or light vehicle and are easily transported or smuggled to areas of conict. Not surprisingly, these combined characteristics of small arms have made them particularly attractive to the paramilitary and irregular forces that have played such a prominent role in recent conicts. In addition to the signicant threat they pose to personnel, small arms projectiles are designed to penetrate airframes and disable ight-critical systems. Armor piercing-incendiary (API) projectiles are designed to release incendiary material into a dry bay when the projectile jacket is stripped. This incendiary material can

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29 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL burn and linger in the dry bay long enough to interact with fuel and initiate res, which can be a large contributor to aircraft vulnerability. Small arms threats also have limited countermeasures as they are point-topoint munitions guided by optics that have no sophisticated acquisition or guidance systems. The primary counter measures are concept of operations (CONOPS) and tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs). For example, low-visibility conditions, (e.g., night operations) help to conceal an aircraft from engagement. Operators can also avoid engagement by ying outside of the effective range of small arms weapons. However, many military platforms are often used for low-altitude operations within the threat engagement range (e.g., helicopters, such as the Russian one shot down by ground re in Figure 2, often y low and slow during certain mission points). If countermeasures fail or are unavailable, vulnerability enhancement features can be used to minimize the risk of small arms. Examples of vulnerability enhance ments include increasing redundant systems or adding armor; however, both actions increase cost and impact performance metrics. Aircraft vulnerability and the benets of vulnerability enhancement features are measured and quantied using modeling and simulation (M&S) and test & evalua tion (T&E). The purpose of M&S and T&E is to develop a specic understanding of component-, system-, and aircraft-level vulnerabilities. A detailed vulnerability analysis data set is developed and combined with a representative threedimensional geometric model to conduct computer-based simulations to quantify vulnerabilities. Simulations and testing can assess the impact of vulnerability reduction features and are often used for specication compliance. THE IMPORTANCE OF THREAT CHARACTERIZATION Threat characterization has an important role in vulnerability analyses. Damage inicted to components in an analysis is measured using specic threat param eters, such as projectile physical characteristics, incendiary mass, and incendiary functioning potential. Every threat used for a vulnerability analysis must be fully characterized to properly assign lethality and probabilities of damage or kill. Over the years, M&S tools and models have improved in delity and accuracy. As these analyti cal tools and techniques evolve and improve, our understanding of threats must follow suit. The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) recognized this need and funded efforts to fully characterize and evaluate the most signicant dry bay re parameters. Also, ProjPen and FATEPEN developers continuously investigate and eld advancements in threat simulation tools. Ballistic testing and data collection techniques have also improved in recent years. For example, an increase in the depth and use of high-speed video cameras has allowed analysts to decipher minute differences in the effects of small arms projectiles. Recent efforts have identied that these differences have statistical signicance. It is imperative to understand the differences between threats, as these data are repeatedly used for verication against program specication requirements. Accurate threat data must be captured to perform an accurate vulnerability analysis. These threat data include physical characteristics and incendiary function data for API projectiles. It is critical to ensure the physical properties and functioning of a projectile are under stood, as these factors can signicantly alter expected T&E results. Correlation between T&E and M&S can also be difcult to track and understand if different projectiles are unknowingly being used. Threat physical characteristics include projectile dimensions and material data. Projectile dimensions such as length, diameter, and core length and diameter are important to accurately measure across projectile lot samples to identify variations. These variations primarily stem from the wide proliferation across multiple countries, the number and quality of manufacturers, and the circulation of multiple threat types and designs, of which many pre-date the Cold War era. Variations in projectiles can be hidden from exterior appearance (as noted by the variations in identical caliber threats illustrated in Figure 3). Figure 2 Ru ssian Helicopter Shot Down by Ground Fire

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AS Journal 17 / FALL jasp-online.org 30 Differences in core material, hardness, and tensile strength are important to accurately sample. Projectile dimen sions and material data are crucial to precisely capture penetration capabili ties and characteristics. For example, length and diameter affect hole size, whereas core hardness and tensile strength affect penetration and threat break-up. Specic to APIs, function data include incendiary mass and location within a projectile as well as function cloud size and duration. The amount of incendiary within a projectile determines maximum function cloud size and duration and can vary greatly between threats, which can cause a large variance in function cloud size and duration. Small-caliber threats may have an incendiary mass on the order of 10 grains, whereas a large-caliber threat may have an incendiary mass of 70 grains or more. In addition, the location of the incendiary may deter mine a threats function occurrence rate. Differences in incendiary mass location can affect how the incendiary material functions as the projectile jacket is stripped away. CHARACTERIZATION METHODS Several characterization methods are used to measure the projectile characteristics that play a signicant role in survivability. Computer tomog raphy (CT) scanning, physical exploitation, and ballistic characteriza tion testing are often used in conjunction to build a thorough data set for a specic projectile. These data sets detail variations or dene the physical properties of a specic round. CT scanning combines a series of X-ray images taken from different angles to produce cross-sectional images. Computer processing is used to generate a three-dimensional image of the inside of the projectile from two-dimensional radiographic images taken about a single axis of rotation (as shown, for example, in the variation in the lead jackets pictured in Figure 4). CT scanning is nondestruc tive evaluation (NDE) and allows a detailed view of the inside of a projectile. The scans can identify the density of objects constructed of metal, ceramic, and composite and can provide accurate measurements to build three-dimensional geometric models. CT scanning is cost-effective and can scan multiple projectiles at the same time. Physical exploitation, or threat dissection, is the process of creating cross sections of a projectile by mounting samples in epoxy and then cutting or grinding and polishing the mount for imaging and testing. Threat dissection is destructive in nature; however, it is the only means to physically sample the interior of a projectile. Material testing, such as core hardness, can only be conducted on an exposed surface. Additionally, incendiary masses can be examined for specic compositions. Ballistic characterization testing is used to analyze penetration, projectile dynamics, and function characteristics. Typical characterization testing res projectiles from a sample lot into mounted panels (pictured in Figure 5). Several input factors are varied to accurately capture variations in projectile dynamics. These input factors include initial velocity, initial yaw, panel obliquity, panel material, material thickness, and the airgap between panels (if testing multiple panels). High-speed video cameras are used in ballistic testing to record function type, cloud size, duration, and mobility. These high-speed cameras are capable of image exposures in microseconds. The images are then played in slow motion to determine function type (front face function and back face function), cloud size, and duration. Figure 3 Variations in Identical Caliber Cartridges (Wolfganggross) Figure 4 Projectile CT Scan

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31 jasp-online.org AS Journal 17 / FALL CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFORTS Currently, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Centers Combat Effectiveness and Vulnerability Analysis Branch (AFLCMC/EZJA) maintains Pedigree documents that provide the analytical foundation for weapon system survivability and effectiveness analyses. The Pedigree Document Guns [3] report provides threat-based input les for vulnerabil ity models used throughout the community. The data were primarily derived from intelligence sources and were reformatted to be compatible with the vulnerability models. The Pedigree documents detail several commonly used threats for M&S vulnerability analyses. As new data (e.g., new physical exploitation or CT scans) are received, the data are reviewed and summarily updated within the Pedigree documents. Recently, several threats have had function characterization testing completed. These data were used to statistically analyze each threat to determine the probabilities of each function type. The Pedigree docu ments are currently one of the best sources to identify and characterize a threat to be used for analyses. Looking to the near future, threat characterization will play a large role in upcoming prediction models. The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) has funded the Next Generation Fire Model (NGFM), which aims to improve re prediction capability by improving penetration, energy deposition, fuel deposition, and ignition. The threat data quality is of primary importance to enhancing the predictive capability of these models. Detailed threat characterization begins with the development of acquisition program survivability requirements. With so many countries and manufac turers of small arms projectiles, there are several variations for threats of the same caliber. Although recent programs have been more specic in the threat designation, it is imperative to be as specic as possible when dening projectiles to be evaluated (i.e., 7.6239mm BZ M1943 API), as these specics will drive the M&S and T&E requirements. Even minor variations in projectile designation can inuence vulnerability analyses results, which can be enough to alter speci cation requirement compliance. It is also recommended that any future ballistic test program conduct a full threat characterization to quantify the important parameters that can inuence vulnerability results. Whenever a new lot of projectiles is procured, a physical exploitation should be conducted to characterize the size and materials of the projectile. In addition, CT scanning should be conducted to characterize volumes and identify anomalies not easily identied in physical exploitation for use in vulnerability analyses. This projectile characterization information should then be compared back to existing threat data to ensure that the size and compositions are similar. If there are variations, then ballistic characterization testing should be completed to evaluate the penetration and/or functioning potential of the projectile. These data would then be used to update and enhance the vulnerability M&S tools. Small proactive investments to understand and characterize threats prior to a signicant LFT&E series can prevent ambiguity due to variations and can ensure proper integration of results for verication of key performance parameters and specication compli ance. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Jonathan Marshall is a vulnerability analyst at the SURVICE Engineering Company. For the past 4 years, he has supported aircraft survivability testing and modeling for multiple rotorcraft and xed-wing programs. Mr. Marshall holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from Wright State University. References [1] Boutwell, Jeffrey, and Michael Klare. Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War. Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/ mkas98, 1 August 1998. [2] Federation of American Scientists. The Global Threat of Small Arms and Light WeaponsA Primer. https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/ primer.html, accessed June 2017. [3] Air Force Life Cycle Management Center and the SURVICE Engineering Company, Pedigree Document Guns: Non-Exploding Vulnerability Threat Data. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, June 2017. Figure 5 Live Fire Panel Testing

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DSIAC HEADQUARTERS 4695 MILLENNIUM DRIVE BELCAMP, MD 21017-1505 CALENDAR OF EVENTS Information for inclusion in the Calendar of Events may be sent to: DSIAC Headquarters 4695 Millennium Drive Belcamp, MD 21017-1505 Phone: 443/360-4600 Fax: 410/272-6763 Email: contact@dsiac.org To update your mailing address, fax a copy of this page with changes to 410/272-6763 or scan and email it to contact@dsiac.org. PRSRT STD US POSTAGE PAID BEL AIR MD Permit N o 50 DSIAC HEADQUARTERS 4695 MILLENNIUM DRIVE BELCAMP, MD 21017-1505 CALENDAR OF EVENTS OCTOBER Defense Innovation Technology Acceleration Challenges (and SBIR/STTR Innovation Summit) 35 October in Tampa, FL www.defenseinnovation.us 34th International Test and Evaluation Symposium 35 October in Reston, VA www.itea.org/share/workshops/35-share/ conferences/415-34th-international-test-andevaluation-symposium-2017.html 3rd Annual Cyber Electromagnetic Activity Conference 1619 October in Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD http://www.crows.org/event/192-aocconferences/2017/06/06/83-3rd-annual-cema.html MILCOM 2017 2325 October in Baltimore, MD http://events.afcea.org/milcom17/public/enter.aspx 20th Systems Engineering Conference 2326 October in Springeld, VA www.ndia.org/ events/2017/10/23/20th-systems-engineeringconference Rotorcraft Structures and Survivability Technical Meeting 2426 October in Hampton, VA www.vtol.org/structure 22nd Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference 2426 October in Annapolis, MD www.ndia.org/events/2017/10/24/ewc17 Precision Strike Technology Symposium 2427 October in Laurel, MD www.precisionstrike.org/Events/8PST/8PST.html Gulf Coast Chapter 43rd Annual Air Armament Symposium 31 October to 1 November in Fort Walton Beach, FL www.ndia.org/events/2017/10/31/ c113-gc-chapter-air-armament-symposium 2017 MSS Battlespace Acoustic and Magnetic Sensors 31 October to 2 November in Springeld, VA www.sensiac.org/external/mss/meetings/ list_meetings.jsf 55th Annual SAFE Symposium 31 October to 2 November in Orlando, FL https://www.safeassociation.com/index.cfm/ page/symposium-overview NOVEMBER NDIA Aircraft Survivability Symposium 79 November in Monterey, CA www.ndia.org AAAA Aircraft Survivability Equipment Symposium 1314 November 2017 in Huntsville, AL www.quad-a.org 49th Combined Light Armor Survivability Panel 1415 November 2017 in Albuquerque, NM Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation & Education Conference 27 November to 1 December in Orlando, FL http://exhibits.iitsec.org/2017/Public/MainHall. aspx?ID=34981&sortMenu=101000 54th Annual AOC International Symposium and Convention 2830 November in Washington, DC www.crows.org/conventions/2017.html DECEMBER Winter Simulation Conference 2017 36 December in Las Vegas, NV http://meetings2.informs.org/wordpress/wsc2017/ Defense Manufacturing Conference 2017 47 December in Tampa, FL www.dmcmeeting.com JANUARY AIAA Science and Technology Forum and Exposition 812 January in Kissimmee, FL http://scitech.aiaa.org/