Aircraft survivability

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Aircraft survivability
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Arlington, VA
Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO)
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Summer 1998
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Three times a year


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Aeronautics -- Safety measures -- Periodicals -- United States ( lcsh )
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United States ( fast )
Periodicals. ( fast )
newspaper ( marcgt )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )


Dates or Sequential Designation:
Began with 1998.

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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656541464 ( OCLC )
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LIVE FIRE TEST AND EVALUATION AND JOINT LIVE FIREJOINT LIVE FIRE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (JLF-AIR)page 06JSF Full Up System Level Testingpage 13CH-53K Live Fire Test and Evaluationpage 16 AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITYpublished by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Ofce12SPRING ISSUE


AS Journal 12 / SPRING http:/ /jaspo.csd.disa.milAircraft Survivability is published three times a year by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Ofce (JASPO) chartered by the US Army Aviation & Missile Command, US Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, and US Navy Naval Air Systems Command. JAS Program Ofce 735 S Courthouse Road Suite 1100 Arlington, VA 22204-2489 Views and comments are welcome and may be addressed to the: Editor Dennis Lindell Assistant Editor Dale B. Atkinson To order back issues of the AS Journal, please visit surviac/inquiry.aspx T ableABLE ofOF C ontentsONTENTS 4 NEWS NOTESby Dennis Lindell5 JCAT C ornerORNER by CAPT Thomas P. Mayhew, USN6 JOINT LIVE FIREAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (JLF-AIR)by Rick SayreThe only systematic live re testing performed on aircraft was the Test and Evaluation of Aircraft Survivability (TEAS) in the early 1970s. TEAS grew out of the Southeast Asia conict in which the large number of aircraft losses made it clear that survivability (i.e., vulnerability reduction considerations) did not receive sufcient emphasis in their designs. TEAS was a tri-service program to evaluate the vulnerability of the F-4, A-7, and AH-1 aircraft, develop vulnerability reduction concepts for those aircraft, and apply the knowledge gained to future aircraft. Following TEAS, funding emphasis moved from evaluation by full-scale live re testing toward evaluation by analysis (i.e., computer modeling) until in the early 1980s when the services recognized the value of ballistic testing as a developmental design tool and started aggressive vulnerability test programs, most notably for the V-22 and F/A-18.13 JSF F ullULL U pP S ystemYSTEM L evelEVEL T estingESTING by Chuck FrankenbergerTo fulll the congressionally mandated Live Fire Test (LFT) activity, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is conducting full up system level (FUSL) testing on one JSF variant, and will conduct variant unique testing on production representative structural test articles. Aircraft 2AA:0001, (AA-1), a Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Air Force variant, was selected as the FUSL test article and was used in conjunction with pilot-in-the-loop simulator testing to obtain an overall assessment of the pilot/aircrafts ability to maintain safe ight after ballistic damage. The test program was designed to evaluate the aircraft systems for synergistic effects.16 CH-53K L iveIVE F ireIRE T estEST anAN D E valuationVALUATION by Marty KrammerThe CH-53K is the next generation, state-of-the-art, heavy lift rotorcraft platform currently under development for the United States Marine Corps (USMC). As a new acquisition and untested system, the CH-53K will undergo Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) to determine its overall vulnerability against threats likely to be encountered in combat. This article discusses aspects of the CH-53K, its requirements, capabilities, survivability features (vulnerability and susceptibility reduction), and the systems engineering approach taken to ensure the CH-53K is the most advanced, effective, and survivable helicopter possible for the war ghter.


htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGMailing list additions, deletions, changes, and calendar items may be directed to: SURVIAC Satellite Ofce 13200 Woodland Park Road Suite 6047 Herndon, VA 20171 Promotional DD ire ctor Jerri Limer Creative DD ire ctor Jerri Limer Art DD ire ctor Michelle DePrenger Technical Editor Christine Ramberg Journal DD esi gn Donald Rowe Illustrations, Cover DD esi gn, Layout Tammy Black Karim Ramzy DD istr ibution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, as submitted under OS DD / DD OT& E Public Release Authorization 128-1077. 22 EX cellenceCELLENCE inIN S urvivaURVI VA B ilityILI TY MAR TIN N. KRAMMERby Joseph ManchorThe Joint Aircraft Survivability Program JASP takes pleasure in recognizing Mr. Martin N. Krammer for Excellence in Survivability. Marty is a project engineer with the Combat Survivability DD ivi sion of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), China Lake, CA. Marty is currently the lead for the CH-53K Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) Program. However, his previous experience as the Lead Range Engineer for the Weapons Survivability Laboratory (WSL) is particularly noteworthy, as he was instrumental in the design of multiple new test capabilities that vastly improved the realism and delity of LFT&E. Throughout his career, he has provided support through the design and development of advanced test xtures for nearly every LFT&E program conducted to date at the WSL, including A-12, P-7, F/A-18E/F, V-22, AH-1Z, UH-1Y, MH-60R/S, and F-35. 24 L iveIVE F ireIRE T estingESTI NG A L egacyEGAC Y W ingING by John Kemp and Lisa WoodsThe C-5 has been subjected to a much needed modernization program in the last decade. One phase of this modernization was the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). BB eca use of this modernization, it was determined by the Ofce of the Secretary of DD efe nse (OS DD ) tha t the C-5M aircraft was a covered system for Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). One of the areas of interest was vulnerability to dry bay res for the C-5 legacy wings. The C-5 RERP program addressed these questions. 33 N DD IA A ircraftIRCRAFT S urvivaURV IVA B ilityILIT Y S ymposiumYMP OSIUM by Walt WhitesidesOn TuesdayThursday, November 13, 2011, the annual N DD IA A ircraft Survivability Symposium, Survivability in a Complex Threat Environment, was held at the Admiral Kidd Catering and Conference Center at the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center in San DD ieg o, CA. Over 300 people attended this years event. Tuesday was devoted to two tutorial sessions Fundamentals of Aircraft Survivability and Radar Cross Section Reduction. That evening, attendees had the opportunity to network at an informal reception hosted at the Hyatt Regency Mission BB ay Sp a & Marina. The formal symposium was held on Wednesday and Thursday, with a Keynote Address on each day. BB G Kev in Mangum, USA, US Army Special Operations Aviation Command and Mr. Paul Meyer, Northrop Grumman Corporation presented their perspectives on the symposium theme. Each address was followed by numerous speakers who provided threat briengs, combat lessons learned, research and development updates, methodologies for countering threats, and future requirements. A Poster Papers and DD ispl ay room was also offered to all attendees during symposium hours. On Wednesday evening, symposium attendees boarded the Lord Hornblower for a dinner cruise of San DD ieg o Harbor.


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 4 N eE W sS N otesOTES by DD ennis Li ndellCH-53K H elicopterELICOPTER S ystemsYST EMS E nN G ineerinINEE RIN G T eamEAM R eceivesECEI VES D oO D T opOP 5 P roRO G ramsRA MS AW ardARD The CH-53K Helicopter Systems Engineering Team won the DD epa rtment of DD efe nse ( DD o DD ) Sy stems Engineering Top 5 Programs Award at the annual National DD efe nse Industry Association (N DD IA ) Systems Engineering Conference Award Luncheon in San DD ieg o, CA on 26 October 2011. The N DD IA p resented the prestigious award to the CH-53K Helicopter Systems Engineering Team, consisting of both Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation engineers, in recognition of excellence in the application of systems engineering practices resulting in highly successful DD o DD pr ograms, as exemplied by their 2010 performance. The evaluation team, made up of senior individuals from across the DD o DD fel t that the CH-53K programs efforts are clearly in keeping with the awards intent to honor programs that demonstrate successful implementation of systems engineering best practices resulting in program success, said Col DD ona ld W. Robbins, chairman of the Top 5 Awards Evaluation Team. The CH-53K Systems Engineering Team worked hard over the past few years, and we are seeing the benets of a disci plined and systematic approach, said Col Robert Pridgen, USMC, H-53 Heavy Lift program manager. The Systems Engineering Team set the foundation for us to deliver a marinized, heavy-lifting helicopter that meets the future war ghting requirements of the Marine Corps, sustains the expeditionary capabilities, and is supportable, maintainable, and reliable throughout its entire lifecycle. Col Pridgen sent his congratulations to his systems engineer ing team, which includes survivability engineers and analysts from both government and industry. Survivability is a key part of the systems engineering effort, which includes two of seven key performance parameters (KPP) and is integrated into the component, subsys tem, and system level design. The program is now moving into the test phase, and planning is underway for a comprehensive live re test program, which will begin in FY13. The Navy survivability team included Rich Gardner, Marty Krammer, Kathy Russell, and Ralph Mattis from NAVAIR. The industry survivability team members include DD ust ee Hata, DD ale H umphries and Alan Coyne from Sikorsky, and Nick Gerstner from SURVICE Engineering. The government team, with SURVICE support, also received two PMA-261 Gold Star Awards for supporting a critical systems armor design for the CH-53E, which was an urgent need program from our warghters. Congratulations to all for a job well done. EX plodinPLODIN G F uelUEL T anksANK S byBY R ichardICH ARD L. D unnUNN Anyone with an interest in military aviation, aircraft technology, pilot safety, or the World War II Pacic air war cannot help but be fascinated by the depth and breadth of information in Exploding Fuel Tanks by Richard L. DD unn. Subtitled the saga of technology that changed the course of the Pacic air war, this book dives right in to the state of the art of aircraft fuel tank protection up to 1940 and then explores developments in fuel tank protection technology and lessons learned in the Pacic during World War II. He devotes a full chapter to a case study of the air war over Midway. Using declassied and extensive World War II research archives, DD unn p rovides an extremely readable and convincing account, according to one reviewer, that fascinates even those who are not specialists, according to one reviewer. Another reviewer praised DD unn s ability to weave seemingly disparate subjects (rubber, synthetics, bullets, engine power, aluminum, steel, etc.) into the central theme of how research in different parts of the world evolved to protect pilots and advance the technology of air combat. Quoting the Army Air Corps hymn (we live in fame or go down in ame!), DD ani el Ford, author of Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 19411942 credits DD unn f or telling the story of how BB rit ain and Germany developed the rst crash proof fuel tanks, and how other countries, including the US and Japan, scrambled to catch up, to save their pilots from death or disguring burns. Through DD unn s research, readers learn that the Soviets developed pilot and fuel tank protection technology as early as 1934, using a 9mm-thick steel alloy plate to protect the pilots head and a system of capturing and cooling engine exhaust gases, then injecting them into aircraft fuel tanks to reduce the oxygen content of vapors left in the tanks as gas was consumed.


5 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGThe Joint Combat Assessment Team (JCAT) continues to support Army and Marine Corps aviation operations in Afghanistan by providing critical forensic analysis of hostile re against US combat aircraft. The team is anticipating a year of change in 2012 as the American forces begin to draw down, turn over operations to the Afghan government, and reconsti tute equipment and personnel after over 10 years of war. This past year marked a signicant time of contribution, transition, and change for JCAT. The forward-deployed team conducted 134 assessments of hostile re damage during 2011. C DD R DD an BB osc ola turned over the JCAT Liaison Ofcer (LNO) role to C DD R Ste ve Mainart in April, and C DD R Mai nart handed over the reins to LC DD R Sha wn DD eni han in November. Each of these ofcers were on their second JCAT deployment, having served in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the 20042007 timeframe. They were assisted in supporting 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) in Helmand Province by LTs Jim Mc DD onn ell, Khanh Luu, and Jason Michaels. The Air Force provided assessor support to the Army 10th and 101st Combat Aviation BB rig ades at BB agr am and Kandahar, respectively, by CAPTs Cody Gatts, DD an Ca rroll, DD avi d Liu, and William Vu. CW5 BB obb y Sebren provided JCAT support and guidance in his role as the TACOPs ofcer at 10th CA BB in BB agr am and will return to Ft Rucker and relieve CW5 BB ren dan Kelly as the Army JCAT service lead. The Afghanistan JCAT operation was supported by a full-time team of two Navy ofcers assigned to 3rd MAW at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, and one Air Force ofcer at WrightPatterson Air Force BB ase, O H. This CONUS team provided predeployment training, mobilization support, analytical reach-back support, and direct links to the aircraft survivability experts at Naval Air Systems Command and Air Force Electronic Systems Command. CAPT Tom Mayhew has served as the NAVAIR/JCAT LNO at 3rd MAW since DD ece mber 2008 and was joined late last year by LC DD R Sc ott Quackenbush, who was relieved by C DD R Cha d Runyon in June. Lt Col Jeff Ciesla served in the Air Force LNO role from late 2009 until this past summer when he was relieved by Lt Col Norm White. The CONUS team supported the annual JCAT assessor training at Ft Rucker, AL, China Lake, CA, and Eglin Air Force BB ase, FL. They participated in making upgrades to the Combat DD amag e Incident Reporting System (C DD IR S) data reposi tory that is maintained by the Survivability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force BB ase. T he team supported the Air Combat DD ata R eporting (AC DD R) in itiative commissioned by the Undersecretary of DD efe nse for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to create a DD epa rtment of JCAT C ornerORNER by CAPT Thomas P. Mayhew, USN DD unn served as general counsel for the DD efe nse Advanced Research Projects Agency, worked for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, practiced law, and served on active duty as a member of the Judge Advocate General corps of the US Air Force. A former senior fellow at the University of Maryland, DD unn h as done extensive research in national security, acquisition issues, private-public partnerships, and contractors on the battleeld. A possibly unanticipated benet for readers is the fascinating look at the technical articles and illustrations from sources as disparate as Flight Through German Eyes, a 1941 translation from the German journal Luftwissen ; illustra tions of self-sealing fuel tank bullet penetration from a US Army technical manual; and photographs of workers preparing tanks for test and production at the BB .F. G oodrich factory. These articles and drawings of the period, supplied not only from US sources but from European and Japanese archives, bring life to the subject and complement DD unn s wellresearched text. Called a must read for all World War II enthusiasts, Exploding Fuel Tanks is available from Perfect Paperback through; http://www.; or from Amazon. com. The rst chapter is available to read as a P DD F. continued on page 32


JOINT LIVE FIREAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (JLF-AIR)Live Fire Testing and Evaluations (LFT&E) Older Brotherby Rick SayreCOVER STORY


7 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRING by Rick Sayre Live re testing in the US goes at least as far back as early WWII, when live re tests demonstrated the M2-series light tanks could be defeated by .50 cal armor piercing (AP) machine gun re. It continued through the 1950s, culminating in the Canadian Armament Research and DD evel opment Establishment (CAR DD E) tri als in 1959. CAR DD Et he last comprehensive series of live re tests on armored targets looked at a number of generic shaped charge warheads in an attempt to assess their lethality against enemy targets. In the 25 years between CAR DD E and t he start of Joint Live Fire (JLF) in 1984, there were only isolated instances of live re testing on armored vehicles (most notably, the GAU-8 lethality tests for the cannon installed on the A-10 Thunderbolt II).On the aircraft side, the only systematic live re testing was the Test and Evaluation of Aircraft Survivability (TEAS) in the early 1970s. TEAS grew out of the Southeast Asia conict in which the large number of aircraft losses made it clear that survivability ( i.e., vulnerability reduction considerations) did not receive sufcient emphasis in their designs. TEAS was a tri-service program to evaluate the vulnerability of the F-4, A-7, and AH-1 aircraft, develop vulnerability reduction concepts for those aircraft, and apply the knowledge gained to future aircraft. Following TEAS, funding emphasis moved from evaluation by full-scale live re testing toward evaluation by analysis ( i.e., computer modeling) [1] until in the early eighties when the services recognized the value of ballistic testing as a developmental design tool and started aggressive vulnerability test programs, most notably for the V-22 and F/A-18.O riRI G insINS I nN C ontroversyONTROV ERSY E nterNTE R T heHE M2 B radleyRAD LEYBB ecause of concerns over the survivabil it y of US weapon systems, the Ofce of the Secretary of DD efe nse (OS DD ) set u p a live-re test program to test the lethality of US weapons against Soviet vehicles and determine the vulnerabilities of US vehicles to Soviet weapons. The Joint Logistics Commanders endorsed this proposed test program in DD ece mber 1983, and the JLF test charter was signed by the DD ire ctor, DD efe nse Test and Evaluation in March 1984. One of the rst and perhaps most controversial live re tests involved the M2 BB rad ley. [2] The M2 BB rad ley live re test was conducted under substantial scrutiny by Congress and the national media. The initial M2 BB rad ley live re tests began as a JLF program (Phase I) with Phase II conducted by the Army with OS DD over sight. In a 1986 report reviewing the Armys Phase I report to Congress, the Government Accounting Ofce (GAO) found the M2 BB rad leys Phase I test results left a number of questions about the BB rad leys vulnerability unanswered. Insufcient information, limited vulner ability information from updated models, and no expected casualties/catastrophic kills for missile or projectile hits on all the BB rad leys vulnerable areas were cited as the factors for their assessment. The GAO further found, the test conditions that the Army established inuenced the outcome of the tests in such a manner that the results indicated less vulnerability than should reasonably be expected in combat. These included avoidance of shots that could have directly penetrated stowed ammunition, simulated threat weapons were not, in all cases, typical of the latest Soviet weapons deployed, and only the cavalry version of the BB rad ley was tested. Since the cavalry version carries fewer troops than the infantry version, casualty rates would have been higher, on the average, had the infantry version been used, given the same number of hits in identical areas.Figure 1 M2-series light tank rolls past the Capitol building in the annual Army DD ay Pa rade. Washington, DD .C. 6 April 1939. Figure 2 Live re testing with a 6-pounder (57mm) anti-tank gun against a German Tiger I tank during WWII. Figure 3 M2 BB rad ley Undergoing Live Fire Testing


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 8LIVE FIRE TESTIN GG TO DAYFast forward 25 years and both test programs emphasize the need for system evaluations based on realistic survivabil ity and lethality testing. Realistic survivability testing means using munitions likely encountered in combat and with respect to a weapon system, loaded or equipped with all dangerous materials (including ammables and explosives) that would normally be on board in combat. The primary differences between the two types of live re testing are the funding source, the point in the acquisition cycle testing takes place, and legislative oversight. This focus on live re survivability testing have benetted our air, ground and sea platforms to where current platforms are able to survive damage levels lethal to earlier aircraft types. Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E)Live re testing is a statutory require ment for new acquisition systems under US Code, Title 10, Section 2366. A statutory requirement for about a quarter of a century, it stipulates covered systems [3] may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until realistic survivability or lethality testing of the system is completed and reported. It further species testing must be carried out sufciently early in the development phase to allow any demonstrated design deciency to be corrected in the design of the system, munitions, or missile before proceeding beyond low-rate initial production. The costs of all tests required under this statute are paid by the system being tested. In the February 2011 DD esi gnation of Programs for Ofce of the Secretary of DD efe nse DD ev elopmental, Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Oversight, 116 programs were listed as having a live re requirement. Tables 1 and 2 show the breadth of systems covered by LFT&E as outlined in the February 2011 Oversight List. Joint Live Fire (JLF)JLF tests elded systems, rather than systems undergoing development during acquisition. Administratively, it is managed according to the domain where the system operates. These domains are ground, sea, and air. Most importantly, it complements LFT&E through testing of systems that pre-date LFT&E or do not have an LFT&E requirement or systems that completed LFT&E, but something changed or was limited in some way. In particular, the goal of the Joint Live Fire Aircraft Systems (JLF-Air) program is to identify vulnerable areas in current aircraft platforms, understand the mechanisms involved in threat /aircraft interaction, and provide this information to the aircraft survivability community to improve aircrew and aircraft survivability. The remainder of this article focuses on how JLF-Air does this and complements LFT&E. „ PRE DD ATE O R NO REQUIREMENT Understand and improve the system Provide baseline for planned upgrades that might require LFT&E DD eve lop test technologies to increase LFT&E realism Evaluate unmanned platforms „ CHA NGE DD OR L IMITE DD Thre at or mission has changed Test articles/threats not available Limited by cost or practicality Introduced vulnerabilities Reduced vulnerability/enhanced lethality veried by testing Table 1 LFT&E Oversight Programs by Service Military Service Programs with LF Requirement of which are an aircraft platform % that are aircraft by Service USAF 18 12 67% Army 48 6 13% Navy (inc. USMC) 49 10 20% Other (M DD A) 1 1* 10 0% *BMDS includes Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB), and Airborne Infrared (ABIR) Figure 4 A P-8A Poseidon ies near the Chesapeake BB ay in p reparation for another test event. (US Navy photo) Figure 5 AH-1Z Cobra


9 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGUnderstand and Improve the SystemUnderstanding the vulnerability of already elded systems has been a primary focus of previous JLF-Air efforts. Many of these systems pre-date LFT&E. Test programs for various full-up or component tests have been completed for the platforms listed in Table 3. Now that LFT&E has been around for 25 years, many of the currently elded systems have already conducted live re testing under Title 10 statutory requirements. As a result, JLF-Air presently does not have any future full-up tests planned and expects to focus on providing LFT&E support primarily through improved test technologies, evaluation of vulnerability reduction Table 2 Selected aircraft programs on the February 2011 oversight list. Selected Aircraft Programs on the February 2011 Oversight List Common Name Service Rotorcraft Attack/Observation AH-6 4 Apache BB loc k III A BB 3 USA AH -1Z Viper (a.k.a. Zulu) AH-1Z USN OH-58 Kiowa Warrior Upgrade KWU USA MH-60S Multi-Mission Combat Support Helicopter MH-60S USN Rotorcraft Transport UH-6 0M BB lac k HAWK UPGRA DD E -Ut ility Helicopter Upgrade Program UH-60M USA MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter Upgrade MH-60R USN CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program CH-53K USN Common Vertical Lift Support Platform CVLSP USAF HH-60 Recap (formerly known as Combat Search & Rescue Replacement ) CSARXX USAF J oint Future Theater Lift Concept JFTLC USA CV-22 OSPREY Joint Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft OSPREY CV-22 USN Presidential Helicopter Fleet Replacement Program V XXXX USN Fi xed WW ing T ransport/Tanker C-13 0 Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program C-130 AMP USAF C-5 Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program C-5 AMP USAF C-5 Aircraft Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program C-5 RERP USAF C-27J (JCA -Joint Cargo Aircraft) C27J (JCA) USAF HC/MC 130 Recapitalization HC/MC USAF KC-130J with Harvest Hawk KC-130J USN KCXX Tanker Replacement Program KCXX USAF L ight Mobility Aircraft LiMA USAF Fixed WW ing C 4ISR E-4B National Airborne Operations Center Aircraft Replacement Program EXXXX USAF E nhanced Medium Altitude Recon Surveillance System EMARSS USA USN Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System USN UCLASS USN P-8A Poseidon Program P-8A USN Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization Program PAR USAF Fixed WW ing F ighter/Attack F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program JSF USAF Fixed WW ing C 4ISR Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System JATAS USN


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 10 enhancements, testing new and emerging threats, and providing base lines for programs with upgrades that may require a live re test. „ PRO VI DD E BB ASE LINE FOR PLANNE DD UPGR A DD ES TH AT MIGHT REQUIRE A LIVE FIRE TEST Under JLF-Air project T-09-13, Large Engine Man Portable Air DD efe nse System (MANPA DD S) V ulnerability, two MANPA DD S were s hot into operating jet engines to investigate engine-nacelle res, uncontained engine debris, and the ability to maintain controlled ight and safely land with damaged engines and airframes. As the extent of the set-up in Figure 8 shows, every effort was made to have the most realistic test conditions possible to include power settings, airow, MANPA DD S imp act velocity, detonation conditions, and shotline selection. This testing will assess large engine vulnerability to MANPA DD S, v alidate engine MANPA DD S mo deling procedures and ultimately provide a foundation for MANPA DD S tes t requirements in future Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMP). It also will improve the credibility of aircraft vulnerability assessments and provide input to the Large Commercial DD eri vative Aircraft program and KCXX LFT&E The PT6 engine is the power plant for a majority of Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft, Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft, and Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) proposals to support the Afghanistan war effort. Currently LiMA is the only one with an LFT&E requirement, but a vulnerability baseline is warranted for this engine due to the fact that most US aircraft that y with PT6 engines have little or no protection from ballistic threats. The PT6 engine was not designed with vulnerability reduction features in mind. There are several potential vulnerability issues, including critical component vulnerability, engine re potential, and the possibility of uncontained engine debris that needs to be evaluated. Starting in FY12, JLF-Air plans to baseline the vulnerability of the PT6 turboprop family of engines and identify those vulnerability reduction measures discovered. Table 3 List of aircraft platforms tested under JLF-Air Fixed WW ing R otorcraft Fighter/ Attack Transport/ Tanker C4ISR Attack/ Observation Transport A-10 AV-8 F-14 F-15 F-16 F/A-18 Foreign C-17 TF-39/CF-6 C-27 C-130 P-3 MQ-1 AH-1 AH-64 OH-58 RAH-66 Foreign CH-46 CH-47 CH-53 UH-60 Figure 7 Ch-53E Tail Rotor System Joint Live Fire BB all istic Testing in 2006. Figure 6 F/A-18 Fuel System Joint Live Fire Testing Figure 8 Large turbofan engine hanging on its test xture prior to MANPA DD S tes ting. Note the size of engine and test xture compared to the two people in front of the engine. Note the size of engine and test xture compared to the two people in front of the engine. (US Navy Photo) Figure 9 Engine maintenance specialists position an upgraded PT6A-68 turboprop engine in a T-6 Texan II aircraft at Randolph Air Force BB ase Texas. (US Air Force photo by Steve Thurow/Released) 091214-F-SS509-001


11 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRING „ INCREASING LFT&E REALISM Su personic Rocket on a Rope (SROAR) is a proposed method of controlling missile impact conditions to allow for precise shotlines in LFT&E and/or JLF testing. Under project T-09-05, SROAR DD ynam ic Impact Testing, the JLF program is funding a series of test phases to demonstrate the viability of this test method, culminating with a demonstra tion shot into a realistic aircraft target. Figure 10 shows a test from earlier this year at Redstone Arsenal, AL. A second JLF project looks to determine the yaw angle inuence on projectile residual velocity and shotline direction. Vulnerability modeling typically does not consider projectile yaw angle when considering penetration and shotline effects. The results will provide immedi ate feedback as to the accuracy of analytical tools used in LFT&E. Figure 11 shows the test xture developed under the JLF project T-10-03, V50 Tests of Yawed Projectiles. The gray disk is the metal target-spinning at a speed to replicate the proper yaw angle for a typical encounter with a xed wing ghter type target. „ EVA LUATE UNMANNE DD PL ATFORMS Many of the ndings from JLF-Air manned aircraft tests are applicable to unmanned platforms, but due to the UAV mission, unique live re survivability considerations exist. These include, but are not limited to, small size means limited separation, low cost means limited redundancy, and unmanned means less stringent design philosophies. Previous JLF-AIR testing looked at the vulnerability of unmanned platforms engine, fuel system, and wing structure. „ THR EAT OR MISSION HAS CHANGE DDB B ack w hen the F-14 Tomcat was just entering the eet as the Navys premier air interceptor, the Tomcat did not need to worry about land based surface-to-air threats since it would never y over hostile land forces. Fast forward thirty years and you had the BB omb cat ying bombing missions over Afghanistan a mission never envisioned during the early days of the F-14 program. With a new mission and the potential for new land-based threats, the F-14, despite having just been retired from service, still serves as a good example of an aircraft with a changed mission/threat that would be considered for JLF testing. The Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) is an example of a threat employed differently than its intended design. Originally developed as an anti-tank or anti-person nel weapon, the RPG is being used as an anti-helicopter weapon by hostile forces in Afghanistan. In a recent incident in Afghanistan, a helicopter was damaged in a manner uncharacteristic of previous incidents. The Joint Combat Assessment Team (JCAT) requested JLF-Air support by providing threat-target Figure 12 An MQ-9 Reaper sits on a ramp in Afghanistan. Larger and more powerful than the MQ-1 Predator, the Reaper is designed to go after time-sensitive targets with persistence and precision, and destroy or disable those targets. (Courtesy Photo) 070931-M-5827M-116 Figure 13 An unspecied threat hits the Predator wing Figure 11 Test xture developed under the JLF project T-10-03, V50 Tests of Yawed Projectiles. Figure 10 Frame from a high-speed lm showing a MANPA DD S mis sile passing through an aluminum target panel. Note the length of the rocket motor plume. (US Army Photo) Figure 14 F-14 BB To mcat aircraft of Fighter Squadron 143 (VF-143), the Pukin DD ogs dropping a Mark 83 1,000 pound bomb over the bombing range. (Photo by LTJG Stephen P. Davis) DD NSC-95-01065 Figure 15 This Afghan Military Forces (AMF) soldier carries this RPG loaded and ready to re. Weapons are a common sight in Afghanistan, less common however are uniforms. Lack of uniforms makes it difcult to determine which group their loyalty is to. (US Army Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Freddy E Gurwell) 020704-A-J XX 47 3-129


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 12 characterization data for their incident investigation to address their concerns about a potential new threat to helicop ters. The results from these tests allowed JCAT to condently understand the engagement condition and provide the proper recommendations to leadership. „ LIM ITE DD BB Y COS T OR PRACTICALITY A current JLF-Air focus is quantifying MANPA DD S dama ge effects against aerospace structures and updating our modeling and simulation capabilities against these prolic threats. MANPA DD S ha ve been a threat since the late 1960s but are seldom included in TEMPs or considered for LFT&E events. Over this same timeframe, we realized great strides in reducing the vulnerability of US aviation platforms to the point that current platforms demonstrate tolerance to MANPA DD S hit s. This damage tolerance along with MANPA DD S in creasing proliferation makes it critical to develop efcient test capabilities and a credible modeling capability to support future LFT&E strategies requiring MANPA DD S. O ne JLF-Air project currently executing is collecting MANPA DD S fr agment/debris and blast data of sufcient quality to improve the accuracy and credibility of MANPA DD S thre at models used by LFT&E to assess and predict aircraft vulnerabil ity. BB last a nd fragment/debris data collection is complete with debris penetration testing occurring this scal year. When all complete, an updated MANPA DD S mod eling and simulation capabilities will be available to support future LFT&E. „ RE DD UCE DD VULN ERA BB ILI TY/ ENHANCE DD LETHA LITY VERIFIE DD BB Y TE STING Historically, re is the largest contributor of vulnerable area in aircraft vulnerability assessments. Reducing re vulnerability observed during Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) LFT&E is a cost effective way to increase its survivability. Under JLF-AIR project T-10-02, DD ry BB ay Fi re Vulnerability, the feasibility of implementing selected passive dry bay re extinguishing technolo gies within the JCA wing leading edge and trailing edge dry bays were demonstrated.CONCLUSIONLive re testing has been around for many years. After its origins in contro versy in 1984, JLF, along with the statutorily required LFT&E, have played important roles in providing our forces the best weapon systems possible. JLF-Aircraft Systems (JLF-AS) continues to play an important role by complement ing LFT&E efforts. Primarily through improved test technologies, evaluation of vulnerability reduction enhancements, testing new and emerging threats, and providing baselines for programs upgrades. References[1] Excerpted from the Report to the Chairman, Su bcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Live Fire testing, Evaluating DD o DD s Pr ograms, August 1987. GAO/ PEM DD -8 7-17 [2] A dar k comedy describing the development of the M2 BB rad ley was made into a movie based on the book by Col James BB urt on, USAF (ret.). The Pentagon Wars released in 1998 by H BB O sta rs Kelsey Grammer and Cary Elwes as James BB urt on. [3] For s urvivability testing, a vehicle, weapon platform, or conventional weapon system that (i) includes features designed to provide some degree of protection to users in combat; and (ii) is a major system as dened in section 2302 (5) of this title; or any other system or program designated by the Secretary of DD efe nse for purposes of this section. Figure 16 Manpads Prior To Fragment/ DD ebr is Test (US Army Photo) Figure 17 Figure Showing the Portion of the Wing Tested DD uri ng These Tests (US Air Force Photo)


13 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGJSF F ullULL U pP S ystemYST EM L evelEVE L T estinEST IN GF35 Flight Critical Systems Testby Chuck FrankenbergerTo fulll the congressionally mandated Live Fire Test (LFT) activity, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is conducting Full Up System Level (FUSL) testing on one JSF variant, and will conduct variant unique testing on production representative structural test articles. Aircraft 2AA:0001, (AA-1), a Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Air Force variant, was selected as the FUSL test article and was used in conjunction with pilot in the loop simulator testing to obtain an overall assessment of the pilot/aircrafts ability to maintain safe ight after ballistic damage. The test program was designed to evaluate the aircraft systems for synergistic effects.As engineers, we do our best to incorpo rate lessons learned from past projects into design of the next program. However, there remain many unknowns even when leveraging this knowledge base. As the trend continues toward highly integrated aircraft systems compared to the aircraft they are replacing, the unknown reaction of these integrated systems to ballistic damage is not well understood. What are the interactions between systems given ballistic damage? DD oes d amage to one system affect the performance of other systems? The primary benet of FUSL testing is the ability to monitor each of the aircraft systems simultaneously to capture transient behaviors and interac tions across systems. DD ur ing aircraft development, components are tested individually, then as individual systems, then as integrated systems. The JSF LFT program has followed this developmental test approach, testing components early on in the program and system level testing on AA-1. Live Fire testing is required at the system level to take into consideration the non graceful degrada tion of components/systems as a result of ballistic damage. DD amag e to one system should not adversely affect other systems. For systems with redundant or backup capabilities, damage should remain isolated and should not affect the ability to transition into backup congurations. AA-1 was the rst produced JSF CTOL aircraft. AA-1 ew to China Lake on 17 DD ece mber 2009, its 91st ight, and had accumulated 125.9 ight hours. AA-1 had started production prior to the program going through a signicant weight reduction effort in 2004 2005. This weight reduction activity resulted in major changes in the airframe structure, which made most of the AA-1 structure non-production representative. The ight critical systems tested in AA-1 are functionally representative of F35 production aircraft. In some cases, there are slight variations in component location and conguration. These variations were taken into consideration during the test program to provide production representative testing. The objective of this test series was to evaluate ight critical systems response to ballistic damage. Flight critical systems include the Flight Control System (FCS), Vehicle System Network (VSN), Electrical Power System (EPS), and the Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS). A secondary objective was to verify component failure modes used previously in controlled damage test scenarios. In these tests, Lockheeds pilot-in-the-loop Vehicle Integration Facility (VIF) and Vehicle System Integration Facility were used to evaluate pilot response and aircraft handling qualities after simulated aircraft damage. Test participants include China Lake Weapons Survivability Lab (WSL) test personnel, Lockheed Martin (LM) LFT team members, LM IPT Subsystem


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 14 experts, Wright Patterson JSF LFT team members, OS DD /LF T&E, and I DD A re presentatives. T estEST A pproachPPROACH This test series was conducted in a way to best represent a combat mission. Test procedures from battery on, engine start, throttle to MIL, gear upto gear down, engine off, were dened in each run plan. Aircraft systems were in a ight congu ration. A critical part of the test program was the ability to move the ight controls and to appropriately load the electrical power system. To do this, surface positions were recorded in the VIF during pilot in the loop testing and used as a ight control script to move the control surfaces at rate during AA-1 ballistic testing. The aircraft was operated remotely using its internal systems. Pilot interfaces were controlled remotely through a Compact Remote Input/Output (RIO) control system developed by China Lake Weapons Survivability engineers. This includes pilot functions such as the battery switch, engine start switch and gear handle. Cockpit displays were provided through a software package developed by Lockheed Martin. This included displaying Integrated Cautions and Warnings (ICAWs). System monitor ing was also provided through software packages used in the design and test of the aircraft during initial ight qualifying check outs. This provided test engineers with a very good view of the aircraft system performance during test events. Systems monitored during test included EPS, PTMS, and FCS. Test sequencing was dened to balance the need to keep the aircraft in a FUSL conguration as long as possible to acquire system level results, and the need to address high priority tests that would take the aircraft out of a FUSL conguration. Early low risk tests were conducted on wire harnesses and cooling ducts that were easily repaired. These early tests veried that the response of the EPS and PTMS systems compared favorably to the response seen in the pilot-in-the-loop simulator tests. Testing progressed to shooting various line replaceable units as part of the FCS and EPS. Spares components were used to reconstitute the test article. High priority tests were conducted after the replace able component shots were completed. These tests include a Man Portable Air DD efe nse System (MANPA DD ) sho t, an HEI shot into a fuel tank, a fragment shot into the integrated power package (IPP) rotating machinery, and a polyalphaolen (PAO) (avionics cooling uid) re test. Close attention was given to the sequence in which the aircraft systems were degraded. Test sequencing was based on system dependencies and facility integration requirements. As an example, to conduct re detection testing on the aircraft, the three Vehicle Mission Computers (VMC) and all RIOs needed to be operational to evaluate re detection capability. The re detector inputs are spread across the RIOs and the RIOs spread across the VMC bus channels, and the detection software housed in the VMCs. These systems were required to be operational until the re detection capability was no longer needed.T estEST R esultESULTBB allistic testing was conducted on AA-1 fr om October 2010 to September 2011. A total of 25 ballistic tests were completed. DD ur ing 16 of these tests the aircraft was in a FUSL conguration: engine on, aircraft operating on internal power. Threats in the test program included surface to air warhead fragments, armor piercing projectiles, high explosive projectiles, and a MANPA DD EPS D esiESI G nN : R obustOBUS T EPS components are well distributed around the aircraft, providing separation, reducing the effect from larger threats. EPS components are electrically protected as well. Seven shots were conducted across various parts of the EPS system. These tests ranged from simple wiring shots to shots into power conversion and distribution components. The EPS testing was conducted to ensure that damage to one part of the system did not propagate to components upstream of the damaged component, or propagate across redundant paths, ensuring backup power modes were sufcient to provide power for continued safe ight. The 270V DD C pow er genera tion and distribution system successfully Table 1 System Tested Number of Tests Electrical Power System 7 Power and Thermal Management System 4 Flight Control System 8 Vehicle System Network 6 Propulsion 1 (shared with FLCS)


15 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGdemonstrated the ability to quickly detect ground faults and isolate damage. The system automatically transitioned to battery ll power, then recongured to backup power modes to allow continued safe ight. VSN D esiESI G nN : N oO C ascadinASC ADIN G E ffectsFFEC TS VSN architecture successfully detects a damaged component or wire harness and recongures to continue communication with other components. BB all istic damage to ight control electronics and wiring was successfully handled by the VSN software error-handling and functional redundancy capability. DD ue t o the nature of the 1394 bus loop, severing a wire or loss of a component resulted in the bus reconguring to reestablish communica tion with the components on either side of the damaged area. Flight control electronic controllers have a further level of redundancy as they pass information on a separate network in the event of bus failures. When components were damaged, the failures seen were benign, with only minor interruption of bus trafc as the bus recongured. BB all istic damage to components did not result in the generation of errant signals, the component typically dropped off line. The VMCs agged the component as failed and recongured the bus. FCS A rchitectureRCHITECTURE : N oO cheapCH EAP K illsILLS One of the newer technologies in the F35 is the Electrohydrostatic Actuators. These actuators contain a self-contained hydraulic system. There are two types of actuators on the aircraft: simplex and dual tandem. The dual actuators have redundancies built in, including dual communication and power paths. The dual actuators were ballistically tested and showed good tolerance to damage. The redundant systems are isolated, and damage on one side did not propagate to the other side. F ireIRE : S iI G nificantNIFIC ANT T hreatHRE AT As with most aircraft, re is the primary vulnerability to the F35. Fire extinguishing is limited to the IPP bay. This system was installed primarily for ground safety reasons. Fuel, hydraulic, and PAO uids are the primary sources of re on the aircraft and are distributed throughout the aircraft. As one would expect, re is a threat to Flight Critical Systems. Ullage protection is provided by an On BB oar d Inert Gas Generating System (O BB IGGS ). Fuel tank inerting proved successful in this test series preventing fuel tank ullage explosions. C onclusionsONCLUSIONS The FUSL testing conducted on AA-1 was very successful meeting all dened test objectives and success criteria. Addressing synergistic effects, the electrical power and ight control systems successfully isolated failures and protected the redundancies built into these systems, allowing continued safe ight. The VSN architecture is robust, providing multiple paths to transfer data. Testing highlighted that re is a signicant threat to ight critical systems. The test team was able to verify that the actual ballistic damage response correlated very well to previous pilot in the loop simulator testing. Over the course of the test program, the LFT team witnessed rsthand the robustness of the F35 ight critical systems, no cheap system kills.


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 16 CH-53K L iveIVE F ireIRE T estEST andAND E valuationVALUA TION The Path Forwardby Marty KrammerThe CH-53K is the next-generation, state-of-the-art, heavy lift rotorcraft platform currently under development for the United States Marine Corps (USMC). As a new acquisition and untested system, the CH-53K will undergo Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) to determine its overall vulnerability against threats likely to be encountered in combat. This article discusses aspects of the CH-53K, its requirements, capabilities, survivability features (vulnerability and susceptibility reduction), and the systems engineering approach taken to ensure the CH-53K is the most advanced, effective, and survivable helicopter possible for the war ghter.The current USMC heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53E, designed in the 1960s and introduced in 1980 as an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to the CH-53 DD has sub sequently developed signicant fatigue life, interoperability, maintenance supportability, and performance degrada tion concerns. The CH-53K is intended to address and satisfy the future needs and requirements of the USMC with improve ments in operational capability, interoperability, survivability, reliability, and maintainability while reducing total ownership costs. The CH-53K heavy lift helicopter is a major systems acquisition managed by NAVAIR PMA-261. The aircraft is being developed by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), is a ground-up re-design that incorporates the latest in helicopter technology, including new General Electric GE38-1 BB 7, 500-hp engines, y-by-wire ight controls, and composite airframe structures. The advanced capabilities of the drive and rotor systems will enable the aircraft to lift and transport 27,000 pounds over a 110 nautical mile mission range. This combined performance is over two times the capability of a CH-47F and MV-22 and nearly three times the capability of its predecessor the CH-53E. The CH-53K is a heavy lift helicopter to be employed in the movement of cargo and equipment, the transportation of troops (29 troops plus 3 crewmembers), and for amphibious assault and subse quent operations ashore. The CH-53K improved performance enhancements provide the USMC the heavy-lift payload, speed, endurance, and greater opera tional reach to support the expeditionary and sustained operations both at ship or ashore. The CH-53K helicopter will be capable of rapidly embarking aboard and operating from helicopter assault ships and aircraft carriers in support of training, contin gency, combat, and non-combat operations. When equipped with approved kits, the helicopter may be


17 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRING used for vertical on-board delivery of cargo and equipment from ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and shore-to-ship. BB y usin g attach points in the aircraft and only minimal extra equipment and rigging, the aircraft will be capable of supporting special missions such as casualty evacuation, airborne command and control, rapid ground refueling, forward arming and refueling points, and fast-rope, rappelling, and parachute operations. S urvivabilityURVIVABILITY R eE Q uirementsUIRE MENTS The CH-53K is designed to be a surviv able platform in a combat environment. The survivability requirements for the CH-53K are derived from the Operational Requirements DD ocu ment (OR DD ). Th e OR DD ide nties seven Key Performance Parameters (KPP), two of which specify the requirements for force protection for the occupants and a level of ballistic tolerance (y-away-capability given a hit by specied threats). In addition to force protection and ballistic tolerance requirements, the OR DD al so identies the need for missile warning and missile jamming or decoying which further enhances the survivability capabilities of the platform. This top level document drives the requirements of the CH-53K Air Vehicle Specication (AVS) where detailed survivability requirements and capabilities (force protection and ballistic tolerance) are specied. These driving requirements ensure a safe and surviv able design that exceeds the current capabilities of the CH-53E, while having similar survivability characteristics to the MV-22 rotorcraft. S usceptibilityUSCEPTIBILITY R eductionEDUC TION F eaturesEAT URES Aircraft susceptibility is the inability of an aircraft to avoid being hit by threat systems. Susceptibility reduction for the CH-53K consists of an integrated survivability equipment suite capable of providing threat situational awareness for laser, radar, and missile threats and deploying appropriate countermeasures. Threat situational awareness by the pilots will improve survivability by providing an awareness of the threat environment and making threat avoid ance possible. The Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) suite consists of: „ Rad ar Warning ReceiverAN/ APR-39 BB (V) 2 (RWR)/Electronic Warfare Management System „ DD ire ctional Infrared Countermeasures System ( DD IR CM) AN/AAQ-24(V) „ Miss ile Warning System (MWS) with laser detection incorporated. „ Coun termeasure DD isp enser System (CM DD S) AN/ALE-47V ulnerabilityULNERABILITY R eductionEDUC TION F eaturesEAT URES The primary threats of interest, identied within the AVS and OR DD in clude various Anti-Aircraft-Artillery (AAA) rocketpropelled grenades (RPG) and Man Portable Air DD efe nse Systems (MANPA DD S). Vulnerability reduction and force protection design features on the CH-53K (Figure 1) include: „ Air frame/Structures Composite structure with redundant load paths and reinforcement of structural elements to limit crack propagation „ Pro pulsion Three GE38-1 BB eng ines (7500-hp class); allowing one engine inoperative (OEI) while maintaining full performance with limited operational capability „ Flig ht Controls DD oub le/Triple redundant, separated y-by-wire control system; increased diameter main rotor pitch rods for greater damage tolerance; ballistically tolerant and jam resistant main rotor and tail rotor servo actuators „ Drive System Aluminum main rotor gearbox with redundant dry sump lube system that reduces oil leak and spray and provides 30 minute operational capability after loss of lube; aluminum intermediate and tail rotor gearboxes with auxiliary lube systems that provide 30 minute operational capability after loss of Figure 1 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 18 lube; large diameter tail drive shafts for improved damage tolerance; damage tolerant ex couplings „ Fue l System Suction feed fuel system with automatic, on-demand fuel boost when required under certain ight conditions; self sealing/ crash worthy fuel cell bladders; fuel cross feed redundancy; ballistic tolerant, light weight self-healing cabin fuel line protective sleeves; OnBB oar d Inert Gas Generator System (O BB IGGS ) for inerting of refuel lines and fuel tanks „ Hydra ulic System Triple redundant hydraulic system with integrated hydraulic isolation systems to reduce the risk of re and prevent uid depletion „ Rot ors 4th generation composite rotor blade designs with elastomeric bearings for reduced rotor complexity which reduces the number of vulnerable components „ Per sonnel Protection Integration of seat and wing armor for the pilot and co-pilot along with cabin oor and wall armor for passenger protection; crash resistant seats for both cockpit and cabin occupants The CH-53Ks survivability reduction features will be evaluated and veried either through ground tests, ight tests, analysis efforts, or LFT&E.V ulnerabilityULNERABILITY A ssessmentSSESS MENT P rocessROC ESS The OR DD survivability and force protec t ion KPPs established the requirements in the AVS for a maximum vulnerability and a required level of personnel protection for the pilots and cabin occupants. The analysis process to evaluate these requirements utilizes the BB alli stic Research Lab Computer Aided DD esi gn ( BB RLCA DD ) geo metry modeling tool and the Computation of Vulnerable AReas Tool (COVART) along with the process detailed in Figure 2. The result of this process is the vulnerability assessment of the CH-53K. The survivability team reviews these results to verify AVS compliance and to identify areas where vulnerability reduction features may be integrated and where ballistic risk reduction tests could be conducted to support renement of the ballistic vulnerability. One example of this review process was the identication of the tail rotor driveshaft and the tail rotor exbeam for risk reduction tests to better understand the vulnerability of these components. The positive result from these tests was then integrated into the assessment. The progression of the analysis results displayed in Figure 3 highlights the integration of these test results and several other renements into the vulnerability assessment. The vulnerability assessment of the CH-53K is a continuous process con ducted and continually monitored to evaluate system, subsystem, and component vulnerabilities integrating methodology renements and live re test data to ensure the platform meets the AVS requirements. Components Pd/h Vehicle PK/d Mission\Threat Analysis Threat Characterization Ballistic Testing A/C Design Government SACSURVICE Aircraft Vulnerabilities MODELTEST Mission Critical Functions Analysis Damage Modes and Effects Test Data FALT Analysis Performance Data Vulnerability Codes and Models Geometric Target Description Material Properties Damage Probabilities Figure 2 Vulnerability Assessment Process Figure 3 CH-53K Vulnerability Analysis Progression 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 01 Initial assessmentsRR testing PDRRisks From CDR Design ChallengesCDR23456789 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536 StatusSpec


19 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGL iveIVE F ireIRE L aA W R eE Q uirementsUIRE MENTS The CH-53K is a new and untested major acquisition program (No. 390) and has been designated as a covered system under US Code Title 10, Section 2366 (10USC2366). The code stipulates that realistic survivability LFT&E be con ducted on a fully operational, combat congured system prior to proceeding beyond the low rate initial production (LRIP) milestone. LFT&E will support the vulnerability assessment in identifying the CH-53K helicopter vulnerability against ballistic threats, which are likely to be encountered in a combat environ ment, providing crucial insight into the performance during complex ballistic events ( e.g., re initiation, and propaga tion, dynamic performance of damaged components and systems, and effects on occupants). In June 2005, prior to the Milestone BB acq uisition timeline, the CH-53K program ofce (PMA-261) submitted the CH-53K Alternate LFT&E strategy, appendix to the CH-53K Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), to the ofce of DD ire ctor, Operational Test & Evaluation ( DD OT& E) and obtained a waiver from full-up system-level (FUSL) LFT&E on the grounds that it would be prohibitively expensive and unpractical. The approved strategy provided a detailed approach for determining vulnerability, including the testing of components, sub-system articles and developmental test assets; performing analysis through modeling and simulation; and utilization of existing combat and live re test data from similar systems. The CH-53K Alternate LFT&E strategy has been updated since 2005 as a result of aircraft design maturation, the most recent being Revision C, approved 21 June 2010. Vulnerability assessments and trade studies conducted at signi cant design milestones supported updates to the Alternate LFT&E strategy and ensured the strategy was in-line with meeting the AVS, KPPs, and LFT&E requirements. The critical components identied within the Alternate LFT&E strategy will be assessed in a series of ballistic tests, with the results being integrated using modeling and simulation to obtain a complete system-level vulnerability assessment at the end of program. CH-53K L iveIVE F ireIRE T estinEST IN GKey focus areas for the CH-53K LFT&E program are to: „ Cap ture collateral and cascading effects during ballistic events „ Ass ess potential crew and passenger casualty „ Ass ess CH-53K battle damage assessment and repair procedures „ Pro vide vulnerability comparison of the CH-53K with the legacy CH-53E „ Ide ntify modications which can reduce the vulnerability of the CH-53K „ Ass ess the ballistic tolerance for every component and subsystem considered critical to ight The CH-53K Alternate LFT&E strategy outlines a system engineering approach to testing, initially conducting componentlevel testing for the purpose of limiting program risk, then transitioning to aircraft representative, full-up operational system-level testing to provide critical data for obtaining a complete and thorough vulnerability assessment of the aircraft. Component-level tests involve ballisti cally evaluating critical components (identied from analysis) using either stand-alone, static load capable test xtures, or when practical, sub-system, spin (dynamic) capable test stands designed to operate components under representative ight spectrum load conditions. All damaged components are then further endurance tested for an additional 30 minutes of operation, demonstrating a return to a safe zone capability. Components tested using the Tail Drive Shafts/Flex Couplings/ Hanger/Bearings Tail Gearbox (TGB) Disconnect Coupling Nose Gearbox (NGB) Main Rotor Gearbox (MRGB) Intermediate Gearbox (IGB) Figure 4 CH-53K DD riv e System


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 20 stand-alone, static test xtures are slated to be endurance tested at SAC with fatigue, cycle-type, test equipment. Components evaluated using the dynamic test stands will be endurance tested immediately post impact. Component-level testing will address the component vulnerability of the: „ Main a nd Tail Drive System (Figure 4) drive shafts, bearings, exible diaphragm and disconnect couplings, and all gearboxes (MRG BB IG BB TG BB ) „ Tai l Rotor System (Figure 5) blades, pitch change shaft, hub, beam, and pitch control links „ Main R otor System (Figure 6) blades, hub, pitch control rod, sleeve, yoke, cuff, shaft, swashplate, and stationary scissor „ Fli ght Control Components (Figure 7) main and tail rotor servos (ballistic tolerance, jam potential, and break away capability) „ Pro pulsion System (Figure 8) GE38-1 BB en gine, 7500-hp class (disk burst cascading damage) System-level testing will address the aircraft and crews response to collateral and cascading damage effects from ballistic impacts to the: „ Main a nd Tail Drive System shafts, bearings, exible diaphragm and disconnect couplings, and all gearboxes (MRG BB IG BB TG BB NG BB ) „ TR Ro tor System blades, pitch change shaft, pitch horn, pitch beam, and control links „ Main R otor System blades, sleeve, cuff, yoke, hub, spindle and swashplate „ Fue l & Hydraulic Systems refuel, defuel, and feed fuel lines; sponson structure, dry bays, fuel cells; primary and utility hydraulic system; O BB IGGS p urge and inerting „ Engin e Bay Fire Protection System sensors and extinguishing systemsFlight Control System ight control computers and wire harnesses, MR and TR servos „ Force Protection Systems cockpit and cabin armor „ Struc ture primary frames, transition folds, and tail structure System-level tests will involve the use of a fully operational, remote controlled CH-53K Ground Test Vehicle (GTV) capable of achieving in-ground hover during test. The test data gathered will contribute towards verifying vulnerability OR DD an d AVS requirements and provide a complete vulnerability assessment, which identies the aircrafts capabilities and limitations for threats likely to be encountered in combat. Figure 9 provides an example of a system-level, full scale remote controlled vehicle (the CH-53E) mounted on the oating hover stand during the Joint Live Fire test program conducted in May of 2006. For budgetary purpose, the LFT&E program was split into two phases. Phase-I testing (20132018) being associated with the current SystemDD esi gnDD eve lopment (S DDDD ) cont ract, addresses all threshold threats dened in the CH53K OR DD an d AVS. Successful completion of the Phase-I test series (Table 1) will satisfy the Title 10 LFT&E requirements for completion prior to the beyond LRIP decision point milestone. The threshold threats are what the CH-53K is designed to. This is the minimum capability the USMC has asked for within the OR DD Phas e-II testing (Table 2) is identied as a Follow-On-Test-and-Evaluation (FOT&E) program effort and is listed in the CH-53K TEMP and capabilities roadmap accord ingly. Phase-II testing (20192021) will address the more challenging objective threats as described in the OR DD an d AVS for the purpose of gaining additional insight into additional system capabilities against more challenging threats to be encountered in combat. Figure 5 Tail Rotor System Figure 7 MR & TR Servo Actuators Figure 8 GE38-1 BB Tu rboshaft Engine Figure 6 MR Assembly (Swashplate, Pitch Control Rods, Scissors) Figure 9 CH-53E Hover Stand


21 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRING BB allistic threats and shot line determina ti on are selected by taking into account component and system criticalities, simulated combat scenarios, likelihood of being hit, damage and system response uncertainties, and lling data voids. Threats that are assessed as over-match ing for the CH-53K will not be tested and will be addressed through analysis or similarity. The US Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons DD iv ision, Weapons Survivability Laboratory, China Lake, CA, is the test agency identied to support LFT&E of the CH-53K. The facilities are fully equipped and staffed to support (plan, conduct, instrument, load, operate, record, and report) LFT&E needs. The CH-53K survivability team reports all planning and test activities to the program manager PMA-261. The survivability LFT&E team consists of the Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR China Lake and Patuxent River), Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), SURVICE Engineering Company (SURVICE), DD ire ctor of Operational Test and Evaluation ( DD OT& E), and the Institute for DD efe nse Analysis (I DD A).S ummaryUMMARY The CH-53K is the US Marine Corps next generation heavy lift platform that includes the latest in helicopter technol ogy to provide the war ghter a more capable and survivable platform than its predecessor the CH-53E. The CH-53K Alternate LFT&E program is structured to determine the aircrafts ballistic tolerance against threats likely to be encountered in battle. The program will provide a complete assessment capability on the aircraft design, verifying the vulnerability OR DD an d AVS require ments. Test data and lessons learned from the CH-53K LFT&E will further assist in identifying critical component and subsystem vulnerabilities and will aid in developing solutions to improving survivability and making the CH-53K the least vulnerable military helicopter. Table 1 Phase-I Live Fire Tests Phase-I Component-Level Tests Year MR Pitch Control Rod 2013 Stationary Scissors 2013 Swashplate 2013 TR BB eam & C ontrol Links 2013 TR BB lade 20 14 Tail DD riv e System (Shaft, Coupling, DD isc onnect, BB ear ing) 2014 Tail & Intermediate Gearboxes 2014 Main Rotor Gearbox 2014 GE38 Rotor Components 2013 GE38 BB alli stic Vulnerability 2014 Phase-I System-Level Tests ( GG TV) Yea r Tail DD riv e & TR Flight Controls 2017 Fuel Feed-Refuel,DD ump s ystems, hydraulics, engine bay 2017 Main Rotor Flight Controls (MR & TR Servos, FCCs), Structure, Armor 2018 Table 2 Phase-II Live Fire Tests Phase-II Component-Level Tests Year MR Shaft 2019 MR BB lade 20 19 MR Hub 2019 MR Yoke, Sleeve, Cuff 2019 TR Hub 2019 Phase-II System-Level Tests ( GG TV) Yea r Tail DD riv e & TR Flight Controls 2020 Fuel, Hydraulics 2020 Main Rotor Flight Controls 2020


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 22 EX cellenceCELLENCE I nN S urvivabilityURVI VABILITY MARTI N N. KRAMMERby Joseph ManchorThe Joint Aircraft Survivability Program takes pleasure in recognizing Mr. Martin N. Krammer for Excellence in Survivability. Marty is a project engineer with the Combat Survivability DD ivi sion of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), located at China Lake, CA. Marty is currently the lead for the CH-53K Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) Program. However, his previous experience as the Lead Range Engineer for the Weapons Survivability Laboratory (WSL) is particularly noteworthy, as he was instrumental in the design of multiple new test capabilities that vastly improved the realism and delity of LFT&E. Throughout his career, he has provided support through the design and development of advanced test xtures for nearly every LFT&E program conducted to date at the WSL, including A-12, P-7, F/A-18E/F, V-22, AH-1Z, UH-1Y, MH-60R/S, and F-35.Marty started his career soon after graduation from high school working for the DD epa rtment of Corrections at Folsom Prison, where he spent two years teaching drafting techniques to prison inmates. Marty received his BB S in me chanical engineering from the University of California in 1989 and was subsequently hired to support the WSL at China Lake as a Range Engineer. In this position, he was responsible for the design and fabrication of unique test xtures that are needed to support live re testing. One of Martys rst assignments was assisting in the design and implementation of the upgrade for the WSLs High Velocity Airow System (HIVAS), completed in 1992. This massive xture was improved from its previous two-engine capability to provide four-engine airow to better simulate in-ight airow conditions for xed wing aircraft undergoing ballistic live re testing. In 1995, Marty was tasked to support the Joint Live Fire (JLF) program through the development of a method to conduct remote-controlled hover ight of helicopters undergoing ballistic testing. This effort resulted in the development, design, and fabrication of special hover xtures that allow test helicopters to safely achieve hover ight while minimizing the potential for entering hazardous ground resonance condition. These specialized xtures also restrict horizontal movement of the hovering helicopter preventing it from wandering from its test pad, thus allowing for the accurate aiming of components on the test helicopter. This method of testing has subsequently become adopted as the standard for helicopter live re testing and has been repeatedly used for testing under the MH-60R/S and UH-60M LFT&E programs, the CH-53E JLF test program, as well as Hostile Fire Indicator (HFI) testing. Its also currently planned for testing under the CH-53K LFT&E program. Marty was also one of the rst to propose the launching of MANPA DD S mis siles for ballistic testing through the use of an airgun. In 1995, under JLF sponsorship, Marty designed and had fabricated what subsequently became known as the Missile Engagement Threat Simulator (METS) Gun. This huge 40-foot airgun is capable of projecting a MANPA DD S mis sile at expected missile/ aircraft encounter velocities. It also allows for extremely accurate impact of these missiles, providing needed data for validation of MANPA DD S vul nerability models. The METS gun has also become the standard for evaluating MANPA DD S vul nerability and has been used for multiple JLF and LFT&E program tests. Figure 1 HIVAS


23 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRING In 2004, Marty received his MS in mechanical engineering from the University of California. The same year, he also decided to pursue new opportunities away from the Mojave DD ese rt and outside of the DD epa rtment of DD efe nse. Marty moved to Minnesota in 2004 where he worked as a senior design engineer developing power trains for motorsport vehicles. While there, he was awarded Patent No. US 7,367,913 BB 2 for t he invention of a new wet brake system for vehicles. BB ut th e call of the desert never left Marty, and he eventually returned to the China Lake Combat Survivability DD ivi sion as a Test/ Project Engineer in 2006. In 2007, the WSL was tasked to construct a new test facility to support a projected increase in testing requirements. This new facility would have vastly improved airow capability over the current HIVAS system, allowing improved support for expected aircraft programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter. DD ue t o Martys previous work in the development of the four-engine HIVAS airow, he was assigned the development of this airow system for this new test site. Marty designed and oversaw the fabrication of what subsequently become known as the Super High Velocity Airow System (Super HIVAS). This nine-turbofan engine behemoth is capable of providing airow in excess of 500 knots over an area of 38 sq ft. It has proven very effective in testing, and has been used for xed wing LFT&E and JLF testing since becoming operational in 2010. Martys latest endeavors have focused on the coordination and execution of the CH-53K LFT&E program. He has performed admirably as the lead for this test program, as he oversees technical efforts for planning of the CH-53K Alternate Live Fire Test and Evaluation Strategy. Through Martys efforts, the program strategy relies on the increased use of dynamic testing over static test methodology, thus ensuring realism and delity of test results. Martys participation and input at numerous design reviews has also led to several design changes that improve the survivability of the CH-53K aircraft. Marty is also a key member of the CH-53K Survivability Engineering Team and has conducted several early risk reduction type live re tests to validate the vulnerability model allowing the CH-53K to meet its very important Survivability Key Performance Parameter (KPP). Away from work, Marty enjoys spending time with family, outdoor activities, hiking, skiing, golf, tennis, y-shing and water activities, and also attending sporting events. It is with great pleasure that the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) honors Marty Krammer for his Excellence in Survivability contributions to the technical community, the JASPO, the Survivability discipline, and the warghter. Figure 2 Helicopter Hover Fixture at HFI Facility Figure 3 Missile Engagement Threat Simulator (METS) Gun Figure 5 Super HIVAS


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 24 L iveIVE F ireIRE T estinESTIN G A L eE G acyACY WinWIN GAssessing Dry Bay Fire Potential in the C-5 Wingby John S. Kemp and Lisa H. WoodsThe C-5 has been subjected to a much needed modernization program in the last decade. One phase of this modernization was the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). BB eca use of this modernization, it was determined by the Ofce of the Secretary of DD efen se (OS DD ) that t he C-5M aircraft was a covered system for Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). One of the areas of interest was vulnerability to dry bay res for the C-5 legacy wings. The C-5 RERP LFT&E program addressed these questions. The C-5 legacy wing was subjected to live re testing as part of the overall C-5 RERP LFT&E program. As a result of past lightning strikes and res, an inerting system was added to protect the wing fuel tanks. The inerting system, called the Fire Suppression System (FSS), was plumbed to the leading edge dry bays of both wings, in addition to inerting the fuel tanks. This added FSS was never evaluated or tested to see if it would prevent or extinguish dry bay res in the C-5 wings. The primary objectives of the current testing effort were to determine the ignition and sustained re potential in wing dry bays, both leading and trailing edges, and assess the FSS in preventing or extinguishing potential res. The secondary objectives were to determine the damage of pressurized hydraulic lines within the wing and assess the extent of damage on the hydraulic systems. Five ballistic shots were performed on this unique, large wing. Three shots were performed on the leading edge and two ballistic shots were accomplished on the trailing edge to collect data for the primary and secondary objectives. The test article selected was a left hand wing section that contained the #1 Auxiliary Fuel Tank and the #1 Main Fuel Tank. This is approximately the outboard half of the overall wing, past the outboard engine pylon. Pre-tests were accomplished to assess and evaluate how long the FSS takes to get below 12% oxygen in the leading edge and how airow travels through the dry bay of the legacy wing. This information allowed better pre-test setup and for the main ballistic testing and better conclusions. Simulated airow, from engine bypass air, was blown over the test article at approximately 250 knots to better simulate airow and ight conditions. The ve shots on the C-5 legacy wing test article resulted in two sustained res and one self-extinguishing re. The damage, due to both ballistics and re, was repaired after each test event to preserve the integrity of the legacy wing for each following test. The data provides insight to the ignition and re potential of combat threats that impacted the C-5 legacy wing during testing. This provided valuable informa tion to the war ghter, making them more informed and allowing for more informed decisions. This effort also exhibited the value of risk reduction pre-tests per formed prior to the live re test events and that such activities were critical to reaching the end goals of live re testing. INTRODUCTION The C-5 has followed through with a needed modernization program. There were multiple phases of this moderniza tion and one was the RERP. BB eca use of this modernization, it was determined by OS DD / DD ire ctor, Operational Test and Evaluation ( DD OT& E) that the C-5M aircraft was a covered system for (LFT&E) under Title 10, United States Code Section 2366. A waiver from Full-up System Level (FUSL) testing was requested, accompanied by an alterna tive live re test and evaluation test plan (ATP). Under Secretary of DD efe nse for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (US DD AT &L) approved the waiver request on 2 November 2001. The ATP identied potential LFT&E areas of interest for the C-5M aircraft. One of the areas of interest is vulnerability to dry bay res. The wing for the newly designated C-5M aircraft is the same as the wing on earlier versions of the C-5 aircraft. Given the wing had not been tested before, in this capacity, an investigation was necessary to determine if they were vulnerable to dry bay re. Also, the wing includes a liquid nitrogen FSS onboard the C-5M. It is used to protect and pressurize the fuel


25 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGtanks by inerting the fuel ullage space. The FSS was also congured to provide re suppression capability in the unmanned zones of the wing leading edge. The FSS is plumbed into these zones or spaces around the fuel tanks; Figure 1 shows the layout of these fuel tanks. These unmanned zones are dry bays in front of and behind the main spars in the wing. To address the C-5M aircrafts potential vulnerability to dry bay res and adequacy of the current reghting system, ballistic data on the effects of projectile penetration into the main dry bays of the C-5M aircraft and re ignition data were generated and analyzed. There were several objectives associated with legacy wing testing. The primary objective was to determine the probabil ity of re associated with the leading and trailing edge dry bays due to ballistic impact. The secondary objective was to evaluate the FSS, which was only plumbed into the leading edge of the wings. Since the C-5 legacy wing had never been evaluated through LFT&E, a tertiary objective was to evaluate the ballistic damage and associated battle damage repairs required after each test. In order to meet these objectives, the capture of large quantities of data was required. Figure 2 shows the planned wing section that will be the test article, between the red and blue lines. Video, both regular and high speed provided visual evidence of re ignition and sustainment. Thermocouples provided a prole of temperature increases within dry bays.APPROACHThe test article was an outboard, left-hand, C-5 wing section. The test article was obtained from the 309 Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (309 AMARG) at DD avi s-Monthan AF BB in A rizona. Permission was obtained to use a retired C-5 asset from which the test article was acquired. The outboard wing section was cut from the C-5 asset and shipped to the 46th Test Group. This outer wing section (between WS 777.275 and WS 1238.728 (O BB WS 20 00.000 O BB WS 57 5.308) contained hydraulic lines, electrical wires and bundles, a bleed-air duct, spars, ribs, slats, aps, and fuel tanks (#1 Auxiliary and #1 Main). Supplying the LFT&E Figure 1 Wing Integral Fuel Tanks Figure 2 Fuel Tank Layout in Legacy Wings


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 26 program with a new production wing to test would have jeopardized the overall LFT&E schedule and been very costly. Not to mention, there are no new production wings available. Re-using a costly test article, for what amounts to a destructive test, is the best option from a scal and schedule standpoint for accomplishing live re testing. Figure 3 shows the legacy wing test article as received from AMARG. The shot matrix for testing planned 6 shots on the legacy wing and it was decided that an outboard section was large and long enough to support those 6 shots. The legacy wing contained production structure and lines in the leading edge. The leading edge slats were obtained and added to the article as well as the trailing edge aps. These items were needed to correctly direct the airow over the test article at 230 knots over the leading edge and 150 knots over the trailing edge, to better simulate necessary ight conditions. Figure 4 shows the nal product of the modica tions and additions for the legacy wing test article in the 46th Test Group Aerospace Vehicle Survivability Facility (AVSF) at Wright-Patterson AF BB Oh io, range 3. The gure shows the wing sitting in front of the airow duct with various support equipment surrounding the wing. While the lines, low and high hydraulic pressure, electrical, FSS, and bleed air, were maintained in the leading and trailing edge, the test did have to supply accurate pressures and supplies for these lines. Internally, the legacy wing was populated with hydraulic, electrical, environmental (bleed-air), and other items designed to represent and operate at the proper conditions (temperature, pressure, ow rate) to recreate an operational C-5M aircraft. Figure 5 shows the larger bleed air duct, which is the lower line in the gure. Above the larger bleed air duct is the FSS line. Above the FSS line, at the top, are the two, low and high, hydraulic pressure lines. In addition to the spar and fuel tank being a target, the hydraulic lines were also a target during the rst shot. All of these lines sit in front of the spar in the leading edge dry bay. The fuel tanks in the C-5 hold over a thousand gallons of fuel. To reduce this amount, somewhat, air lled bladders were added to the fuel tanks to bring the overall fuel gallons, during a test, to 1400 gallons. Figure 6 shows the trailing edge spar along with accurate clutter in the dry bay. The target was the rear spar and the fuel behind it. Again, the C-5M representative parts were left installed in the legacy wing to provide operational accuracy. There were no planned shots, on hydraulic lines, to check the re ignition probability in the trailing edge. The last test in the shot matrix was at a spar location where three hydraulic lines run together, within the fuel tank. The shot determined if a single round could incapacitate all three hydraulic lines at one time. The hydraulic lines were missing from the test article. Hydraulic lines were added, in the fuel tank, with representative parts. These representa tive parts were similar in outer diameter, wall thickness, and internal pressure to the real lines, not part of the original wing shipment. DD ue t o testing results, the last shot needed to be accomplished in range two. Airow was not needed for the last shot, so moving to range 2 was considered acceptable. While the other tests used JP-8 fuel, this last shot did not require fuel in the tanks. Water is considered a good replacement when the intent is not to ignite a re during testing. The specic gravity of water and fuel are comparable, though not exactly the same. The surrogate right hand wing, with attached water reservoir, is shown in range two in Figure 7. The stands shown in the picture above were necessary to orient the wing at the proper angle of attack and hold the article up off the ground.Figure 3 C-5 Left Hand Legacy Wing Figure 5 C-5 Legacy Wing Leading Edge DD ry BB ay Fi gure 4 C-5 Legacy Wing in AVSF Range 3 Figure 6 C-5 Legacy Wing Trailing Edge DD ry BB ay


27 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGTest execution involved airow blown over the legacy wing test article. The goal is to create ight conditions which are as realistic as possible, without leaving the ground. The airow test facility is shown in Figure 8. The bank of ve engines, producing the bypass air, is off to the right in the gure. The bypass air is then placed into a main nozzle system, shown in the center of the Figure 8. While the AVSF range 3 facility is capable of producing airow at 400 knots, the legacy wing test only required 230 knots of airow over the leading edge and 150 knots over the trailing edge. Five engines produce bypass air which is channeled into a main duct, producing the airow for the test range and the test article. While not a wind tunnel facility, the system does a good job of providing relatively clean airow over the test article, for simulated ight conditions. A custom airow duct was designed to reduce the turbulence percent, eliminate any dominant frequencies, and improve the speed of the airow by the time it reached the test article. This customized duct attaches to the end of the main duct system, which is at the start of AVSF range 3 proper. Any customized duct can be attached to the main bypass air duct to give a test of its own type and variety of airow and speed. The custom manufactured duct is shown in Figure 9. The airow duct is the bridge between the bypass air from the engines and test article. It is the one opportunity to improve the air quality before it reaches the test article, creating more ight realistic airow. The limitation for airow is wetted area. The wetted area for the legacy wing test is the width of the duct, which was about ve feet. The ying legacy wing has airow over the entire wing and not just a section of wing. A pre-test was needed to deter mine the airow speed and direction within the legacy wing while airow was being blown over just a section of the test article. Pre-tests are accomplished to reduce the risk during regular testing and to the overall program. Pretests also determine needed test variables and settings which required more than research to deter mine. Two pretests were accomplished before legacy wing testing started. The rst was a Helium BB ubbl e Airow Quantication in the leading edge dry bay of the legacy wing. The goal was to get a feel for how uid owed in the leading edge dry bay and highlight any possible changes to garner the proper mass ow rate and direction. A dry bay simulator was constructed to get basic measure ments and camera calibrations. Figure 10 shows helium bubbles traveling through the dry bay. The helium bubbles were photographed on a high speed digital camera. These images were mapped using an updated piece of software. The output of this software is speed and direction or velocity vectors for the ow elds. The result of the pre-test was to add a ducted fan at the end of the legacy wing test article. This provided an increase in mass ow rate within the test article and better simulated the airow environment. Nitrogen for the re suppression system is driven by the self-generated pressure in the dewars through two master re valves to the 12 zone valves distributed throughout the aircraft. The zone valves control the nitrogen routed to a number of spray nozzles located so that each re suppression zone can be thoroughly saturated with nitrogen when its associated zone discharge pushbutton is depressed. The second pretest was needed to check the time at which the oxygen percent fell below 9%. When the legacy wing test article was placed in the test range and instrumented, a pressure vessel of nitrogen was used to simulate the dewar in the fuselage. The correct line length was used between the source of nitrogen and the test article to get the nitrogen travel time accurately. The time to reduce the legacy wing dry bay to 9% oxygen was determined. This time was then used to offset the inerting time for the dry bays during testing. The potential res were allowed to burn for 10 seconds in order to justify a sustained re. Ten seconds into testing, after the shot, the Figure 7 Surrogate Right Hand Wing with Water Reservoir Figure 8 46th Test Group Airow Test Facility Figure 9 Custom Airow DD uct Figure 10 Helium BB ubb le Flow Field within the Simulator


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 28 nitrogen was in the dry bay was being inerted. BB y sho rtening the time to inert the dry bay, during testing, the FSS system was given every opportunity to put a re out. The pretests were important because the two problems had the potential to invalidate the nal data, in their own way, either by a mismatch in the timing of the nitrogen release or mis-characterizing the general uid ow properties within the dry bay. DD ata a cquisition was accomplished through LabView v8.2.1. The data gathered during testing were thermo couple data (Type K), pressure transducer data, ash detector information, high speed video inside the legacy wing, and normal speed video inside and out of the leading and trailing edge dry bays. The gathered data was able to show where a re was located within the legacy wing dry bays. The thermocouple data illustrated how long the re lasted and the temperature of the re, up to about 2000 deg. F. There were 11 thermocou ples in the leading edge of the wing and 11 in the trailing edge of the wing. The pressure transducer data was showing the pressure within the lines of am mable uids. If the projectile severed a line, the pressure transducers would indicate a uid loss in the line by a decrease in the pressure reading. The temperature and pressure data within the legacy wing was taken at a rate of 4000 Hertz. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the instrumentation in each leading and trailing edge dry bay. The total instrumentation package was designed to track projectile incendiary functioning, re ignition, sustained and self-extinguishing res, and general nitrogen ow all within the dry bays.RESULTSThe results section presented here is an overview or summary of typical test results. While the detailed results in the test report would have dozens of pictures and instrumentation traces and plots, the results here will give samples of the type of data acquired and damage resulting from the ballistic threats. Table 2 is a summary table for the legacy wing testing. It contains test conditions and results for the C-5 LFT&E, legacy wing test. An explanation of the table is necessary to further understand the results as presented. There were eight test events total on the C-5 legacy wing. In the event column, if there is a BB nex t to the event number, then it is a repeated shot because of a minor change made to the original event in the test matrix. To maintain the integrity of data gathered, a repeated shot was necessary to validate results with the minor test event changes. The threat column shows no listed threats used during testing. The test was looking to see how different threats effected damage and re initiation. For purposes of security classication, the specics of the threat are not discussed or mentioned in the paper. What can be said is that different types of threats were used in the current test effort. The azimuth refers to the horizontal angle of the gun used in testing. An azimuth of zero or 360 degrees is pointed at the imaginary nose of the aircraft. The elevation indicates the vertical angle of the gun used for the individual tests. For example, an elevation of 0 degrees means the gun barrel is horizontal, while a 90 degree elevation has the barrel pointing straight up. A number of things dictate the nal azimuth and elevation of the gun barrel. Final range setup and layout was one of those factors that determined the orientation of the gun. The manner in which the projectile enters the target plays a role in the type and amount of damage experienced during a test. It also has an inuence over re initiation. The speed of the projectile indicates the muzzle speed as the projectile leaves the barrel. BB eca use of the proximity of the gun to the target, the muzzle speed is considered the target impact speed. It is important to note, the gun was far enough away from the target to remove any muzzle blast effect on the target itself. The impact speed needs to be more representative of a realistic combat event. Instead of striking the target at service speed, which is very high, the rounds were downloaded to slow them upon target impact. This slower speed simulates a modest amount Table 1 General Instrumentation used for both Leading and Trailing Edges Thermocouples LE/TE Type K (0-2000F) Each Spar Web / Fuel Tank Wall 6 Type K (0-2000F) BB lee d-Air DD uct 2 T ype K (0-2000F) Each Hydraulic Reservoir 1 Type K (0-2000F) Inside Fuel Tank 2 Pressure Transducers LE/TE Kistler Strain Gages (0-5000 psig) Afxed to a rod for moving to bay being tested 4 Sensotech Strain Gage on spars 8 BB ase d Pressure Transducers Each DD ry BB ay 4 O2 S ensors LE/TE Oxygen Sensors 2


29 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGof deceleration experienced by the projectile on its way to a real target, at both altitude and distance. The slats and aps were a way to vary the airow around the test article at the leading edge and trailing edge of the legacy wing. The slats and aps on the test article had two positions, either retracted or extended. The test was designed to examine if slats and aps had an effect on re initiation, because of the different types of circulation produced around the leading edge and trailing edge of the legacy wing. External airow was blown over and around the test article between approximately 150 or 250 knots, to better simulate different ight conditions. Again, the test was constructed to determine if external airow played a role in re initiation. As mentioned before, there were two target bays on the legacy wing. The leading edge dry bays were in front of wing and the trailing edge dry bays were behind. When testing in these dry bays, the shots would impact the bays in a low, high, or at mid-level mode. BB y ta rgeting the dry bays in this way, the results would show if there is any particular position or location that produces more damage and was more likely to initiate a re. The ultimate target was the spars and hydraulic lines in the legacy wing. There were different hydraulic lines and a bleed air line, all under realistic, test pressures and temperatures. The hydraulic lines targeted were the high and low pressure lines routed in front of the spar. One shot was accomplished on a pressurized hydraulic supply line holding hydraulic uid. The pressures within the different lines varied, and modeled what is in the real C-5 aircraft. They were as low as 80 psi and as high as 2,762 psi, depending on the line in question. There were three types of re events recorded during testing. A sustained re would not go out by itself and required external re extinguishing to stop. Also, a sustained re was dened if it lasted longer than 10 seconds immediately after the shot, without signicantly decreasing in size or again going out on its own. A self-extin guishing re goes out on its own prior to the 10 second time increment. It was also possible for no re to ignite during the testing. The nal column in the results table shows the duration of the re. Assuming external re extinguishing, test range CO2, around the test article is unchanged from shot to shot and a constant, the longer duration res are considered to be more robust than the shorter duration res. It can be seen from Table 2, that the eight shots in the matrix are a combination of 5 original test events and 3 repeated tests. The main factor in repeating a shot was projectile functioning. The last test event, number 6, was not a re initiation test. The rest of the test events, 1 through 4, were re initiation and propagation tests. For these series of tests, three were on the leading edge and one was on the Table 2 Conditions and Fire Results Table from Legacy Wing Testing Summary Results Table Test Event Threat Azimuth (deg.) Elevation (deg.) Threat Speed (ft/s) Slats/ Flaps Airow (knots) Fuel Level % Target Bay Target Temperatures (deg. F) Fire Type Fire Duration (sec.) 10 85 1910 Retracted 250 0 Leading Edge Hydraulic Return Line Ambient None N/A 1 BB 0 85 1876 R etracted 272 0 Leading Edge Hydraulic Return Line Ambient None N/A 20 172176 Retracted 275 100 Leading Edge Front Spar Web >100 Sustained +17 30 20 1853 Retracted 161100 Leading Edge Front Spar Web 980 Self Exstinguishing +14 40 35 1542 Retracted 184.5 100 Trailing Edge Rear Spar Web Ambient None N/A 4 BB 0 28 2013 R etracted 181 100 Trailing Edge Rear Spar Web >1800 Sustained +15 60 30.4 1990 Retracted None 100 (water) Trailing Edge Multiple Hydraulic Lines N/AN/AN/A 6 BB 0 44.9 2 126 Retracted None 100 (water) Trailing Edge Multiple Hydraulic Lines N/AN/AN/A


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 30 trailing edge. The FSS system runs through the leading edge dry bay and was given every opportunity to work in extinguishing a re in the bay. The rst event, the hydraulic line shot, did not result in a re, even when it was repeated. The next two leading edge events did result in sustained res. The maximum temperatures recorded during these two res ranged from 980 F to well over 1000 F. The rst trailing edge event was repeated and it was the repeated shot that resulted in a sustained re. The recorded temperature was well over 1800 F and was sustained for well over 15 seconds. After the repeated res, it was decided to skip event 5, because of funding and schedule. Test event number 6 did not succeed in damaging all the hydraulic lines with one projectile. In all the cases of sustained res, range CO2 was used to extinguish the res. In one test event, the re department was called to assist in extinguishing a sustained re on the test range. Figure 11 shows typical damage from event 1, which was the hydraulic return line shot. The damage was pretty typical for a ductile, aluminum line under pressure. On high speed video, the hydraulic uid can be seen misting and spraying out of the line, as a result of the ballistic penetration. The projectile did function as it was supposed to. Again, no re ignition occurred as a result of the shot. Test event number 2 was a front spar shot. The typical damage on the front spar shows the missing area and size of the hole. Under a typical head pressure from the fuel tank, the typical damage size allows a signicant number of pounds mass per minute of fuel, through the opening, in the fuel tank. Figure 12 shows the typical spar damage from a projectile. Note the discoloration of the spar as a result of a sustained re. No post re strength tests or evaluations were performed on the spar. The permanent discoloration on the spar was an indication of a temper change to the material, which implied a loss of strength. While the damage is high on the spar, the head pressure of fuel is still signicant. The fuel dump into the dry bay is almost instantaneous and ready for combustion. Figure 13 shows some typical ballistic damage to the upper surface of the wings. The thick aluminum structure that makes up the lower and upper surfaces of the wing does resist cracking and petaling, when ballistic damage does occur. Figure 14 shows temperature readings in the leading edge dry bay during testing and the sustained re. The reading reaches approximately 1000 F during this re, then drops off to 900 F after about 11 seconds. There is some scatter added to the data, possibly from re damage, during testing between 5 and 11 seconds Figure 11 Typical Hydraulic Line DD ama ge, Event 1 Figure 12 Typical DD ama ge on Front Spar, Test Event 2 Figure 14 Typical Thermocouple Plot for Sustained Fire on Trailing Edge Figure 13 Typical Upper Surface from BB all istic Test, Event 3 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 -10-5 5 101520253035 0Temperature (F)Time (T sec) Maximum Internal CO2Released Sustained Fire Definition: 1000F for 10 seconds or more Ambient Temperature Range (35-46 F) Minimum Average TRange


31 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGinto the test. The airow through the leading edge of the dry bay did provide a small amount of convection cooling during the re. This cooled the thermo couples slightly, but not nearly enough, to reduce damage. The slightly cooler re could have been a result of it being pushed farther down the dry bay, away from the thermocouples. The photograph in Figure 15 shows a picture of the ballistic damage from inside the fuel tank, rather than outside. There was some crack growth discovered about the damage area. Figure 16 shows a very robust re where the temperatures are almost 2000 F. The duration of the re lasted well over 10 seconds before it was extinguished with range re extinguishing. Figure 17 shows the damage to the surrogate test article used in shot 6. The red stick in the picture shows the path of the projectile as it traveled to the test article.CONCLUSIONSLeading and trailing edges were shot ve times, and three of these were spar shots. This does not produce a solid statistical foundation or a DD esi gn of Experiments vetted shot matrix from which to acquire a set of conclusions. However, ve shots do provide a snapshot from which to draw conclusions, based on solid foundation of experience of the integrated test team. The goals of testing are important to re-state here. The primary was to discover the re probability or re potential in the wing leading edge and trailing edges of the legacy wing. The secondary goal was to determine if the FSS, in the leading edge, could extinguish a re in the dry bay. The tertiary goal was to see if a single, well placed shot could severely damage all three hydraulic systems line in the trailing edge. The leading edge shots consisted of two spar shots and one hydraulic line shot. One of the spar shots resulted in a sustained re, and the second produced a self-extinguishing re. For the event with the sustained re, the FSS had every opportunity to extinguish the re but it did not. DD ata f or the self-extin guishing re event did not register evidence of the re wire being triggered. For this test series, the system was hardwired into the AVSF instrumentation system to start automatically at T+25 seconds. The nitrogen was pouring into the leading edge, as in other tests, and had no effect for 14 seconds. The internal video showed ignition and re. It soon appeared to go out on its own. BB ased o n pre-test oxygen concentration curve, the oxygen levels in and around the re location after 14 seconds were increas ing. Therefore it is not surprising that if the re is not stopped in the rst ten seconds, the FSS will be unable to extinguish a re in the leading edge dry bay. Technically this re did go out on its own, but it did last longer than 10 seconds and was 20 degrees away from the 1000 F temperature. It is viewed as a sustained re in many regards. As designed and operated there is no FSS system in the trailing edge. The trailing edge shots were used to gauge the Figure 15 Typical Fuel Tank BB all istic DD ama ge, Inside, Event 4 Figure 16 Typical Thermocouple Plots for Sustained Fires on Trailing Edge 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 -10-5 5 101520253035 0Temperature (F)Time (T sec) Maximum Range CO2Released Sustained Fire Definition: 1000F for 10 seconds or more Ambient Temperature Range (38-44 F) Minimum Average TRange Figure 17 Trailing Edge Spar DD ama ge for Shot 6


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 32 potential for a re in this dry bay. The test article was burned beyond repair on the fourth shot, so a surrogate test article was put together, and the last shot was performed on the trailing edge hydraulic systems, three closely located lines of different system circuit. In testing, the ring of a single shot was unable to severely damage all three hydraulic lines in the trailing edge at once.RECOMMENDATIONSThe FSS system as installed doesnt mitigate or suppress leading edge dry bay res. At this point the recommenda tions are to remove the nitrogen dispersion lines in the leading edge and deadhead them in a strategic location near the wing root. This will preserve the nitrogen inerting capabilities for the fuel tank ullage, which will focus the use of LN2 in the FSS dewars tanks on their original purpose. Second, a sensorless re extinguishing system should be investigated for leading and trailing edges of the wing. A system like FireTrace should be examined and evaluated for size and specic placement location(s). The likelihood of a spar shot, in a combat environment, is a debatable topic. The bottom line is, an incendiary projectile passing through the spar of either the leading or trailing edge has a very high probability of resulting in a re which is unlikely to self-extinguish. Removing this potential vulnerability will go far in supporting the C-5M readiness and reliability. REFERENCES[1] Ball, Robert E, The Fundamentals of Aircraft Co mbat Survivability 2nd Edition, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc., Reston VA, 2003 [2] C5 Modernization Program Live Fire Test and Evaluation Detailed Test Plan, C-5M LFT&E Legacy Wing Test Program, 18 July 2007 [3] C5 Modernization Program Live Fire Test and Evaluation Detailed Test Report, C-5M LFT&E Legacy Wing Test Program, 3 July 2008 [4] Te st and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for C-5 Modernization Program, Revision #2, 25 Mar 2005 This article has been reprinted with the permission of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). AIAA Publications Page: content.cfm?pageid=2 Defense-wide standard for collecting and analyzing hostile re against US military aircraft. As the team heads into the new year, several long-time members of the Navy JCAT are moving on to other assignments, and new members are coming aboard. CAPT Mayhew is leaving 3rd MAW in January to assume duties as the NAVAIR Reserve Program Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower. He is relieved by CDR David Storr, who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2006. CDR Runyon will move to the NAVAIR Rapid Research and Development unit and is being replaced at 3rd MAW by LCDR Pete Olsen, who supported 2nd and 3rd MAW in Iraq in 20062007. CDRs Paul Magic Martz and Joe Toth are leaving to support NAVAIRs Program Executive Ofce for Tactical Aircraft (PEO-T). CDR Pete Rodriguez reported aboard 3rd MAW for predeployment training to replace LCDR Denihan in Afghanistan in April of 2012 and will be joined by LT Calvin Martin. We wish fair winds and following seas to our long-time JCAT members and welcome aboard our new teammates. As we move into 2012, the JCAT begins to look beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan operations to future military operations, wherever they may arise. JCAT C ornerORNER continued from page 5


33 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGNDIA A ircraftIRCRAFT S urvivabilityURV IVABILITY S ymposiumYMP OSIUM by Walt WhitesidesOn TuesdayThursday, November 13, 2011, the annual N DD IA Ai rcraft Survivability Symposium, Survivability in a Complex Threat Environment, was held at the Admiral Kidd Catering and Conference Center at the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center in San DD ieg o, CA. Over 300 people attended this years event.Tuesday was devoted to two tutorial sessions Fundamentals of Aircraft Survivability and Radar Cross Section Reduction. That evening, attendees had the opportunity to network at an informal reception hosted at the Hyatt Regency Mission BB ay Sp a & Marina. The formal Symposium was held on Wednesday and Thursday, with a Keynote Address on each day. BB G Kev in Mangum, USA, US Army Special Operations Aviation Command and Mr. Paul Meyer, Northrop Grumman Corporation presented their perspectives on the Symposium theme. Each address was followed by numerous Speakers who provided threat briengs, combat lessons learned, research and development updates, methodologies for countering threats, and future requirements. A Poster Papers and DD ispl ay room was also offered to all Attendees during Symposium hours. On Wednesday evening, Symposium Attendees boarded the Lord Hornblower for a dinner cruise of San DD ieg o Harbor. A highlight of the symposium was an Awards Ceremony held on Thursday afternoon to honor three worthy recipients. Awards were presented by BB G Ste ve Mundt, USA (Ret), chairman of the N DD IA C ombat Survivability DD ivi sion and Mr. BB ob Pa lazzo, chairman of the Awards Committee. The Combat Survivability Award for Lifetime Achievement was presented to Mr. Frank Cappuccio of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works. Mr. John BB lan ken of Modern Technology Solutions, Incorporated (MTSI) received the Admiral Robert H. Gormley Leadership Award. The third award, the Combat Survivability Technical Achievement Award, was presented to DD r. DD ona ld Kenney of the BB oei ng Company. Conference Co-chairs, Ron DD ext er of SURVICE Engineering and Chad Sparks of BB ell H elicopter Textron, are commended for making this years Symposium a success. DD eta ils of the 2012 Aircraft Survivability Symposium will be announced in a future edition of this magazine.COMBAT SURVIVABILITY A WW ARD F OR LIFETIME ACHIEVEMENT PRESENTED TO MR. FRANK CAPPUCCIOMr. Frank Cappuccio is recognized for his exceptional and sustained contributions to the eld of aircraft combat survivability. His 43 years of industry experience span the gamut of research, development, test & evaluation, production, and sustainment of aerospace systems and technologies, with a special emphasis on transitioning advanced technologies and capabilities into the hands of the war ghter. From his early career as an aerospace design engineer, to his nal industry role as the Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martins famed Skunk Works, Mr. Cappuccio has balanced pragmatic, focused and multi-disciplined development with rapid prototyping and ight demonstration, to accelerate the deployment of a broad spectrum of advanced survivability technologies: spanning aero performance, stealth, and weapons. Figure 1 N DD IA Co mbat Survivability DD ivi sion Chairman Steve Mundt, Frank Cappuccio


AS Journal 12 / SPRING htt p:// 34 He has been recognized for his strategic vision, his passion for innovation, and his demonstrated skill for identifying the needs, and then communicating the art of the possible, to the pilots, commanders and leadership of the DD epa rtment of DD efe nse ( DD o DD ) and t he US government. He successfully executed the JSF Concept DD eve lopment Phase and led the winning JSF EM DD pr oposal team. As the Skunk Works GM, Mr. Cappuccio had responsibilities for LM Aeronautics major programs, the U-2s, F-16, F-117, F-22, F-35, C-130 and C-5, as well as other special platforms. Under his leadership, the Skunk Works elded the rst stealthy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in 2009, supporting operations in the Global War on Terror. He has received numerous company awards for his technical and programmatic leadership: he led the 2001 Collier Trophy winning JSF team for demonstrating the XX -35 l ift fan concept and has been recognized twice by the White House for his accomplishments and contributions to Aerospace and US air prowess. This lifetime achievement award acknowledges Mr. Frank Cappuccios sustained, exceptional, and visionary contributions to aircraft combat survivability, the armed forces, and the nation.ADMIRAL ROBERT H. GG ORM LEY LEADERSHIP A WW ARD 2 011 PRESENTED TO MR. JOHN D. BLANKENJohn DD BB lanken, group lead, Flight Test Gr oup of Modern Technology Solutions, Inc. (MTSI) has over 35 years of experience with aerospace product development and systems integration. He has provided leadership and technical support to ight test and development activities for the USs most critical and advanced aeronautical systems. His specialties include: Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation for Low Observables and Electronic Warfare, Project/Program and Test Management, Aircraft/Missile System DD eve lopment and Systems Integration, and Counter Low Observable Weapon System DD eve lopment and Test. He is directly involved with and oversees engineering services in the areas of operational analysis and ight test support of low observable and electronic warfare programs. He is a recognized nationallevel expert in F-22, F-117, BB -2 Jo int Stand-off Attack Missile and F-16 survivability testing, as well as many other classied efforts. Prior to joining MTSI, he was an active duty Air Force ofcer. Lt Col BB lan ken was Commander, Special Projects Flight Test Squadron of the Air Force Flight Test Center, DD eta chment 3, Edwards Air Force BB ase, C A from 1993 to 1995. From 1990 to 1993, he was the director of Test-Space BB ased I nterceptor program ( BB ril liant Pebbles) Strategic DD efe nse Initiative Ofce (S DD IO ), Washington, DD C. Fr om 1985 to 1989, he served as the Chief, Financial Management for the DD ire ctorate of Special Programs, Secretary of the Air Force/Acquisitions Special Programs (SAF/AQL), Pentagon managing technology, development and production programs totaling $5 billion annually. He also served as the Program Element Monitor (PEM) for the BB -2 pr ogram. Through his superior accomplishments, tireless service and energetic leadership to the aircraft survivability community and to the nation, Mr. John DD BB lan ken is awarded the Admiral Robert H. Gormley Leadership Award for 2011.COMBAT SURVIVABILITY A WW ARD F OR TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENT 2011 PRESENTED TO DR. DONALD KENNEY DD r. DD onald Kenney is a senior technical fe llow at the BB oei ng Company. His area of technical expertise is the development of operational concepts for stealth aircraft and electronic warfare to defeat enemy integrated air defense systems. DD r. Ke nney joined BB oei ng (then Mc DD onn ell DD oug las) in 1980, and during his more than 30-year career, has worked on many advanced weapon and aircraft programs. This work has contributed to improved survivability characteristics of BB oei ng products. His focus has been on the evaluation of survivability in an integrated system construct; balancing reduced aircraft detection, electronic warfare, and lethal and non-lethal defense suppression. DD r. Ke nney is currently the Operations Analysis Lead for BB oei ng Phantom Works. His analysis and survivability approaches are well known to the US Air Force requirements community at Langley Air Force BB ase, t o the Figure 2 N DD IA Co mbat Survivability DD ivi sion Chairman Steve Mundt, John BB lan ken Figure 3 DD r. DD ona ld Kenney, N DD IA Co mbat Survivability DD ivis ion Chairman Steve Mundt


35 htt p:// AS Jo urnal 12 / SPRINGAeronautical Systems Center (ASC) analysis community at Wright-Patterson Air Force BB ase (W PAF BB ), an d to BB oei ngs supplier teammates. He has supported and led many advanced program activities for space, missile, and aircraft systems and platforms with operations and effectiveness analysis. These programs include the Integrated Tactical Surveillance System, Tomahawk, SRAM II, Hypersonic Weapons, Tacit Rainbow, Light DD efe nder JASSM, BB -52 S tand-Off Jammer, J-UCAS Stand-In Jammer, and many other BB oei ng proprietary programs. DD r. Ke nney is well deserving of the recognition associated with the Combat Survivability Award for Technical Achievement. WEVE MOVED!The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Ofce has relocated to: Naval Support FacilityArlington 735 S Courthouse Road Suite 1100 Arlington, VA 22204For more information, contact Darnell Marbury at or 703/604-0387 Visit us online at http://jaspo.csd.disa.milNote the new phone numbers for our staff: Dennis Lindell/604-2622 Robert Lyons/604-5375 Jimmy Choi/604-5765 Mike Weisenbach/604-7118 Ken Branham/604-5762 Tim Oldenburg/604-7116 Joe Jolley/604-2620


PRSRT STD U.S. postaPO STA G eEpaid PAID PAX R IVER MD Permit N o 22 COMMANDER NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (4.1.8J) 47123 BUSE ROAD PATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547Official Business Information for inclusion in the Calendar of Events may be sent to: SURVIAC, Washington Satellite Office Attn: Jerri Limer 13200 Woodland Park Road, Suite 6047 Herndon, VA 20171C aA L endarENDAR ofOF EV entsENT S To change, add or delete your mailing address, please fax a copy of this page with changes to 703/9840756APR2012 AAAA Annual Professional Forum and Exposition 14 April 2012 Nashville, TN tent&view=article&id=31&Itemid=67 Add to your calendar JASP Principal Members Steering Group 1012 April 2012 Tucson, AZ Directed Infrared Countermeasures: Technology, Modeling, and Testing 17 April 2012 Atlanta, GG A htt p:// directed-infrared-countermeasures-technologymodeling-and-testing 13th Annual Science & Engineering Technology Conference / DoD Tech Exposition 1719 April 2012 North Charleston, SC aspx JCAT Threat Weapons and Effects Seminar 1719 April 2012 Eglin AFB and Fort Walton Beach, FL 5th Annual Tactical VV ehi cles Summit 2325 April 2012 Washington, DC aspx?id=679266 2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS) 2326 April 2012 Herndon, VA conferences/conferencedetails/index. html?Conf_ID=19817 53rd AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials Conference 2326 April 2012 Honolulu, HI cfm?pageid=230&lumeetingid=2414 Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) Program Executive Ofcer, LL and S ystems 2012 APBI 30 April2 May 2012 Norfolk, VA aspxMAY2012 MSS Electro-Optical & Infrared Countermeasures 13 May 2012 Laurel, MD 6th Annual SpecOps Warghter Expo WEST 2012 810 May 2012 Joint Base Lewis-McChord Building Survivable Systems and LL eth al Weapons: A Short Course in LL ive F ire Testing ( LL FT) 8 10 May 2012 SURVICE, near Aberdeen Proving GG rou nd, MD 2012 Test Instrumentation Workshop 1518 May 2012 Las Vegas, NV JASP Aircraft Survivability Short Course 1518 May 2012 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA Rotorcraft 68 June 2012 Washington, DC &CFID=92348798&CFTOKEN=77478168 Summer JMUM 2012 12-14 June 2012 Air Force Academy Colorado Springs, CO