Aircraft survivability

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Aircraft survivability
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Began with 1998.

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University of Florida
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Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 2 Aircraft Survivability is published by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). The J T CG/AS is chartered by the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group. V i e w s and comments are welcome and m a y be addressed to the Editor at the f o l l o wing address. E d i t o r Joseph P. Jolley J T CG/AS Central Office 1 2 13 Jefferson Davis Highway C r y stal Gateway #4, Suite 1103 Arlington, VA 22202 P H O N E : 70 3 6 07 3 5 09, ext. 14 D S N : 3 2 7 3 5 09, ext. 14 E-mail: J o l l e y J P @ n a v a i r. n av y. m i l h t t p : / / j t c g j c t e. j c s. m i l : 9 101 Mailing list additions, deletions, and/or changes may be directed to: A F R L / V A C S / S U R V I A C, Building 45 Attention: Linda Ry a n 2 1 3 0 Eighth Street, Suite 1 W r i g h t P atterson AFB, OH 45433-7542 P H O N E : 9 3 7 2 5 5 4 8 4 0 D S N : 7 8 5 4 8 4 0 F A X : 9 3 7 2 5 5 9 6 7 3 E-mail: surviac@wpafb a f m i l C r eative Dir e c t o r Christina P. McNemar S U R V I A C Satellite Office 3 1 9 0 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church, VA 22 0 4 2 P H O N E : 70 3 2 8 9 5 4 6 4 E-mail: m c n e m a r c h r i s t i n a @ b a h c o m N e w sletter Design Christina P. McNemar About the cov e r : The new century coincides with new leadership for the JTCG/AS under Mr. James F. O B r y on. See his article, Looking to the Future of the JT C G / A S C o n t e n t s Looking to the Future of the JTCG/AS 4 by Mr.James F. O B r yon Supporting the Warfighter Delivering 21st Century Aviation Solutions Enabling Dominance from the Sea 6 by VADM John A .L o c k a rd USN NDIA Aircraft Survivability 1999 8 by Mr. D a vid H.Hall A Wizard for Hydrodynamic Ram Modeling 10 by Ms.Susan L. C a s a bella and Mr.J A .H a n g en Decoupled Fuel Cells Program A Story of Success 12 by Mr.James J. Ja m i e C h i l d r ess R educing Next-Generation Engine Vulnerabilities 14 by Mr. C h a r les E.Fr a n ke n b e r ger CF 3 IA Summary to Date 16 by Mr.James E.T u c k er WPAFB Engineer Receives NDIA Combat Survivability Leadership A w ard 19 R e c i p i e n t : M r .Ralph W. L a u z ze I I by Mr.John M.V i c e SpacecraftSurvivabilitys Next Frontier 20 by Dr.Joel D.Williamsen and Dr.J e f f e r y R. C a l c a t e r ra The Modeling & Simulation Information Analysis Center 24 by Mr.Phil L.Abold Pioneers of Survivability Dale B. Atkinson 26 by Distinguished Pr o f essor Robert E. B a l l MANPADS Study: A Brief Synopsis 30 by Mr.J o s e ph P.J o l l e y Calendar of Events 31


Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 3 Editor s Notes Our focus for this issue of A i rc r aft Survivability is aircraft vulnerability reduction. Included are four articles that report on JTCG/AS-sponsored projects related to aircraft vulnerability reduction. In addition, you will find two articles on the survivability symposium sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) and held annually in M o n t e r e y California, at the Naval Postgraduate School. This y e a r s event took place 1618 November 1999 with the theme, "Aircraft Survivability 1999: Challenges for the New Millennium." In the first article, VADM John Lockard summarizes his keynote address, Supporting the W a r f i g h t e r. . D e l i v ering 21st Century A v i a t i o n Solutions Enabling Dominance from the Sea. The second article provides an informative report on the s y m posium by its chairman, Mr. Dave Hall. In the last issue of A i rc r aft Survivability, we reported the transfer of sponsorship for the JTCG/AS within the Department of Defense to the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Ev a l u a t i o n / L i v e Fire Test, Mr. James F. OBryon. In this issue, Mr. OBryon presents his insights and vision in the article titled Looking to the Future of the JT C G / A S By the time you read this, the JTCG/AS will have completed its comprehensive study on the manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) missile threat. Titled M A N P ADS Threat to Air c r aft: A V u l n e ra b i l i t y P e rs p e c t i v e the report responds to an OSD tasking to the J T CG/AS to investigate whether viable opportunities exist for increasing aircraft survivability against MANPADS through improved vulnerability reduction design techniques or technologies. The report represents the work of many individuals over the last 18 months. Mr. Greg Czarnecki from the Safety and Survivability Office of the 46th Test Wing at W r i g h t P atterson Air Force Base, Ohio, was the project l e a d e r Mr. Al Wearner from the Naval Air W a r f a r e Center (NAWC), China Lake, California, was the project c o l e a d e r Others, including Dr. Kristina Langer, Dr. Jeff Calcaterra, and Lt. Stephanie Masoni from W r i g h t Patterson made significant contributions. Substantial work was also performed, under contract, by the S u r v i va b i l i t y / V ulnerability Information Analysis Center ( S U R V I A C) team led by Mr. Kevin Crosthw a i t e Other S U R V I A C team members were Mr. Gerry Bennett, Mr. D a ve Legg, Ms. Donna Egner, and Ms. Linda Ry a n The MANPADS report has spawned related efforts, including a MANPADS Joint T e s t and Evaluation (JT&E) nomination called JASMAN (for Joint Aircraft Survivability to M A N P ADS), which is currently being prepared for submittal through Air Force chann e l s Another significant effort to begin this fiscal year will be executed under a contract award to The Boeing Company to conduct a multitask examination of innov a t i v e ways to reduce aircraft vulnerability to MANP A D S Funded by the JTCG/AS, this contract is the result of a Broad Agency Announcement ( B AA) issued last y e a r In addition to J T CG/AS-funded research on reducing aircraft vulnerability to MANPADS, the Joint L i v e Fire office under Mr. OBryon is sponsoring a series of coordinated MANP A D S t e s t s The JTCG/AS has formed a joint ad hoc technical committee to help coordinate these efforts, ensure that service interests are represented, and leverage related work within the services. Next, I draw your attention to the article on space survivability by Dr. Joel Williamsen of the University of Denver R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e Denv e r Colorado and Dr. Jeff Calcaterra from the 46th Test Wing at W r i g h t P atterson AFB, Ohio. A topic of interest here is assessing the application of traditional aircraft survivability analy s e s tools to space platforms. F i n a l l y our survivability pioneer selection for this issue is Mr. Dale Atkinson. And we are pleased to have the article about D a l e s career authored by Distinguished Professor Bob Ball, who has known and worked with Dale for many y e a r s As always, we welcome your feedback. Our E-mail address in on the inside front c o v e r


Looking to the Future of Having o v ersight of the JTCGs within the DOT&E will also help to assure that o v erall platform surviv ability assessment, whether aircraft, tank, or ship is done in the o v erall context of susceptibility to attack, vulnerability from attack, and o v erall combat effectiv eness as the legislation establishing LFT&E requires Our goal now is to set the proper vision and priori ties, strengthen the management of the JTCGs, and support their programs and budgets at the highest lev els. We must also assure that the models and simula tions being promulgated by the JTCGs are indeed rep resentative of reality, and if not, alert the communities now relying on them of their limitations and to correct those that are fla w ed. Another issue which will require much more JTCG attention, is the growing number of helicopters, their numerous upgrades, and changing missions and threats. In fact, at this point, there are more different helicopter LFT&E programs (12) than fixed wing LFT&E programs (8), plus the V-22, which is a combination of both. I would like to see an activ e JTCG/AS Operational Users Group (OUG) to assure that the JTCG/AS keeps a constant eye on its end-con sumerthe warfighter Combat aircraft and the weapons and equipment w e place on these aircraft consume nearly 53 percent of the entire DoD procurement budget. Aircraft are clearly an important (and expensive) commodity. As w e continue to build aircraftsome of whose costs exceed their weight in pure goldwe must be about realistic testing through our Live Fire Test program, and for fielded s y stems, the Joint Live Fire Test program. R ealistic Operational Testing will also provide added information vital to the generation of their method ologies We also need to further invigorate the S u r v i va b i l i t y / V ulnerability Information Analy s i s Center (SURVIAC) to not only capture combat data and LFT & JLF data, but also accident/incident data, which would also serve the aircraft design community As we look to the future, we must begin to look seri ously at not only ballistic threats but also other less traditional, but nonetheless important, directed energy threats. Electronic miniaturization, fly-by-wire aircraft, I w elcome this unique opportunity to share with the readers of A i rc ra f t S u r v i v a b i l i t y some personal thoughts regarding recent events in the Pentagon and their implications on the Joint T e c h n i c a l Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability The recent reorganization of some of the test and evaluation functions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has had a significant and positive impact on the discipline of survivability within the Department of Defense (DoD). The disestab lishment of the office of the Director, Test S y stems Engineering and Ev a l u a t i o n (DTSE&E) and the subsequent reassignment of several functions formerly administered b y the DTSE&E provides a unique opportunity to bring together many of the relevant nonnuclear surviv a b i l i t y / v u l n e r a b i l i t y / l e t h a l i t y activities in OSD. Among the actions was to m o ve the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) and Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) to the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), with management ov ersight from the Deputy Director, OT&E/ Live Fire Test. This, in a w ay is a homecoming for these programs. They had been under the o v ersight of the LFT&E office prior to the passage of the F ederal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which m o ved oversight of the LFT&E from the USD(A&T), OSD to the DOT&E some fiv e y ears ago. This mo v e has also helped to fulfill some of the recommendations of the National A c a d e m y of Sciences study of LFT&E Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft, published in 1993. Among other things it recom mended expanding the charter of the LFT&E program beyond simply testing, to include vulnerability analyses methodologies as well. This can now become a reality Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 4 by Mr. James F. OBryon


the JTCG/AS composite structures, high g-maneuvering aircraft, the growing reliance on U A Vs, all present growing chal lenges to the JTCG/AS community Another unique opportunity for the JTCG/AS organ ization to serve the nation is in its activities examining not only military aircraft vulnerability, but also com mercial aircraft vulnerability, to terrorist activity The various other ongoing activities of the Live Fire T est Office, including serving as Secretariat of the T arget Interaction Lethality Vulnerability (TILV) activi ty providing a venue for the Services to assemble and prioritize their V/L 6.1-6.3 investments into a TIL V Master Planthe Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) LFT&E Modeling and Simulation ini tiative with the Department of Energy, the Joint Liv e Fire Test Program, and sponsorship of periodic Lessons Learned workshops will all serve the o v erall survivabil ity community In fact, let me take this opportunity to invite the readers of this magazine to attend our National Liv e Fire Test and Evaluation Conference, May 8-12, 2000 at the University of Texas at Austin. Again, I invite all members of the DoD V u l n e r a b i l i t y / S u r v i v ability communityboth inside and outside of go v ernmentto join with us and make the JTCG/AS all that it can be. I look forward to work ing with you. n Jim OBry o n Deputy Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, Live Fire T e s t i n g Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 5 N a t i o n a l Live Fire T e s t & Evaluation ( L F T & E ) C o n f e re n c e S p o n s o r ed by the Office of the Secr e t a r y of Defense (OSD) Contact Mr. Tracy Sheppard at 2 0 2 9 5 5 9 4 7 2 T r a c y. S h e p p a rd @ i a t u t e x a s e d u 812 May 2000 University of T e x a s Austin, TX


The following is a synopsis of the keynote address given by VADM John A. Lockar d C o m m a n d e r Naval Air Systems Command, at the Aircraft Survivability Symposium in Monter e y California, 16-18 November 1999. t i v e information flow inherent in Network Centric W a r f a r e The future challenges we must overcome will require system solutions and i n t e g ra t i o n of div e r s e technology adv a n c e m e n t s Our survivability design must exhibit a robustness that is consistent with our transition to multimission aircraft. This multimission capability dictates an ability to face potential threats throughout the entire electromagnetic spectrum. Our robust design must also reflect the realities of maintaining our full force struct u r e Technology solutions must satisfy a threat-driv e n requirement and at the same time, must be affordable. Opportunities for designing new platforms will be limited in the future. We will expect 30+ years of service life from our platforms, requiring built-in gro w t h p r o visions and new system integration to respond to Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 6 S u p p o r ting the W a rf i g h t e r by VADM John A. Lockard, USN V ice Admiral John A. Lockard, U.S. Navy I n the new millennium, we must ensure our future Navy and Marine Corps combat aircraft are designed for surviv a b i l i ty with a systems solutiona balanced approach. The simplicity of design and ultimate success of some of our earlier combat aircraft provide valuable lessons that should not be lost. While the A-4 Skyhawk I flew ov e r Vietnam as a junior officer is certainly outdated today, the lessons we learned then in r e d u n d a n c y vulnerability reduction, and simplicity should not be ignored. We must m o ve from individual platform-specific solutions to integrated system solutions that capture the benefits provided from the cooperaDelivering 21 s t C e n t u r y A v i a t i o n S o l u t i o n s E n a b l i n g D o m i n a n c e f r om the Sea


the evolving threat. Cost as an Independent V a r i a b l e and A n a l y sis of Alternative studies must consider full life-cycle supportability costs, as well as initial procurement costs, to ensure we obtain the best v a l u e for our limited investment dollars. For Naval Aviation to fulfill its mission of flexible response and dominant power projection, we need a balanced approach to surviv a b i l i t y Electronic signature reductioncombined with standoff jamming, electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM) to degrade threat effectiv e n e s s and platform vulnerability reduct i o n p r o vides an affordable, proven solution. T a c t i c s smart mission planning, and standoff weapons allow our strike forces to stay outside of lethal threat zones. Shifting the cost of stealth to precision-guided munitions provides high lethality with limited risk to aircrew making it an attractive tradeoff. R e a l t i m e Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) connectivity allows us to win the Information W a r and concentrate our striking force on the enem y s most vulnerable defensive node. All of this drives us to a balanced approach as the most cost-effective solution to achieving our Na v y s primary objective of Dominant Power Pr o j e c t i o n . F r om the Sea. The 21 s t century U.S. Navy and Marine Corps must be equipped to exploit the vast array of information warfare assets in a real-time fashion. The concept of N e t w ork Centric Warfare will provide the w a r f i g h t e r with an unparalleled ability to concentrate firepow e r in the most effective way. We will keep our adv e r s a r i e s off balance by reacting to the changing battlefield inside their decision loop capabilities. Thus, real-time information in the cockpit will enhance our surviva b i l i t y The new millennium will undoubtedly bring unique challenges to our survivability design process. Our solutions will ev o l v e as threat capabilities increase but we will strive to maintain the proper balance among susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and countermeasures. Survivability must be designed for toda y s threat with adaptability for the undefined future where we may be faced with the threat of directed energy weapons and high-pow e r e d Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 7 lasers on the battlefield. Network Centric Warfare enablers will ensure our technological superiority is the deciding factor in this new environment. We must find the affordable system solution that provides us the ability to respond to any threat, in any environment, anytime and an y w h e r e The true meaning of survivability is clear to our valiant young men and women who risk their lives daily when performing their m i s s i o n s They want to be able to do their job time and again, returning safely with their equipment ready to answer the next call. We owe them no less! n About the Author Vice A d m i r al Lockard serves as Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, an or g a n i z a tion of over 33,000 people located at ten major sites across the United States. VADM Lockar d s office phone number is 30 1 7 5 7 7 8 2 5


straight days as the largest wing in the history of both the U.S. Air Force and NATO. Only two aircraft were lost ov e r Serbia (both pilots were quickly rescued) out of more than 9,000 sorties. Aircraft survivability was a major factor in this success, which included training, command and control, rules of engagement, aircraft technology, w e a p o n s self-protection hardw a r e intelligence, and tempo management. An issue to be resolved in future conflicts of this nature is a need for combined operational orders, among the air assets of the various countries inv o l v ed. The symposium was divided into several sessions, each addressing different issues and challenges facing the s u r v i v ability discipline. The issues addressed and summaries of the session results are presented below. Meeting the EO/IR Thr e a t What operational lessons have we learned from recent conflicts? H o w can pilot situational awareness of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) threats be improv e d ? H o w effective are Infra-Red Countermeasures ( I R CM) techniques? What can be done to reduce the loss of aircraft hit by MANP A D S ? There was considerable interest in this session, particularly in the MANPADS threat. This interest w a s fueled in part by a MANPADS tutorial presented by Mr. Rodney Ratledge from the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), Huntsville, Alabama, and the presence of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/MSIC IR threat system van, which pro v i d e d excellent displays of MANPADS. This session demonstrated that situational aw a r e n e s s is a critical, very difficult problem when dealing with EO/IR threat sy s t e m s R e a c t i v e IRCM techniques can be very effective, but only when employed at the appropriate time. A possible technique for making preemptive I R CM effective was described. The JTCG/AS is dev e l o p ing solutions to ballistic vulnerability of aircraft to M A N P ADS threats; a hit by a MANPADS is not necessarily a kill if the aircraft is designed properly. T he NDIA Combat Surviv a b i l i t y Division symposium, held 168 N o vember 1999, provided a forum for exchanging information and advancing ideas that would enhance aircraft combat surviv a b i l ity in the next century. The symposium examined issues and challenges to surviv a b i l i t y posed by infrared (IR), electro-optical (EO) and radar guided (RF) missiles and nontraditional threat systems and the technological solutions to these challenges being pursued in new aircraft and subsystem designs. Before delving into the sessions focusing on these areas, two service briefings were presented addressing aircraft survivability in the future. VADM John A. Lockard, Commander of the N a val Air Systems Command and Chairman of the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group, presented a joint-Service view of aircraft survivability in the new millennium. VADM Lockard described the approach to survivability in current Navy and Marine Corps programs, and he predicted that a balanced approach to survivability would be required for new platforms to meet emerging threat challenges. M r Terry Neighbor, Director of Plans and Programs at the Air Force Research Laboratory, presented Air Force science and technology init i a t i v es in aircraft surviv a b i l i t y The Air F o r c e science and technology investment strategy is dedicated to the timely discov e r y dev e l o p m e n t and integration of affordable warfighting technologies for our armed forces. The focus for the future will be in susceptibility reduction and l o w vulnerability technologies, as well as associated cost and performance improv e m e n t s Colonel Jeffrey W. Eberhart, USAF, presented a special report on the air war in Operation ALLIED FORCE. Col Eberhart is Commander of the 31st Operations Group at Aviano Air Base in Italy. During Operation Allied F o r c e the 31st Expeditionary Wing conducted around-the-clock combat operations for 79 Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 8 NDIA Aircraft Survivability 1999 Challenges for the New Millennium by Mr. David H. Hall


Countering the RF Missile Thr e a t H o w effective are reduced signature aircraft in comb a t ? What new electronic warfare (EW) technologies are applicable to low observable (LO) platforms? The briefings in this session demonstrated the combat effectiveness and survivability of low signature aircraft, such as the B-2. The session also introduced and demonstrated the application of new EW technologies (such as towed decoys) to reduced signature aircraft. The session showed conclusively that electronic countermeasures (ECM) and reduced signatures are complementary in a combat environment. There are tactical operational implications of having LO aircraft operating in concert with conventional aircraft. These complications are felt primarily at the combat operations cent e r especially in multi-national conflicts. How e ve r the benefits of using LO vehicles where appropriate outweigh those complications. The Army also demonstrated the effectiveness of RF signature reduction for v e r t i cal takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft in a low to moderate clutter environment. Reconsidering Nontraditional Thr e a t s Nontraditional threat systems include high-pow e r m i c r o wav e s lasers, and other directed energy sy s t e m s This session addressed the following issues: H o w real are these threats? Can pilots detect their p r e s e n c e ? What can be done about them? Although the high-power microwave threat is still years in the future, it is nonetheless coming, and should be considered during the design process for advanced air vehicle sy s t e m s There appears to be limited ability on the part of aircrews to detect the presence of directed energy weapons before their effects are felt. The shielding of pilots eyes with goggles and of weapon sensors is e f f e c t i v e against low-energy lasers, but the optical shielding must be designed for very specific wav e l e n g t h s F o r high-energy sy s t e m s techniques are available to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft structures. S e r vice Perspectives on Future S u r vivability Challenges A series of briefings by service requirements offices was intended to address the following issue: What are the service operational views on requirements for aircraft surviv a b i l i t y ? BG Joseph Bergantz, Comanche Program Manager, described the Armys perspectiv e. The MANPADS threat is seen as the primary e v olving threat to Army aviation. R e a r A dmiral James Robb presented the Navy s view of survivability challenges for fixed and rotary wing aircraft and unmanned vehicles The Navys thrust is for a balanced approach to survivability among susceptibility reduc tion features, such as stealth, ECM, situation al a w areness, and vulnerability reduction. Mr Harry Disbrow co v ered Air Force survivability concerns. Stealth, standoff, and suppression of enemy air defence(s) (SEAD) are the pri mary capabilities for Air Force survivability with future emphasis on Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD). BGen James Cartwright explained the Marine Corps view of survivability requirements. These require ments are driven by a significant period of transformation for the Corps in developing the Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) concept. Survivability is key in this transformation. To summarize the disparate service views on survivability requirements, the Marine Corps concluded that aircraft programs should emphasize vulnerability reduction to p r o vide the best surviv a b i l i t y whereas all other services opinions were weighted tow a r d susceptibility reduction. For the Air F o r c e that meant stealth; for the Army, the emphasis w a s on IRCM; for the Na v y a balanced approach b e t w een reduced signature and ECM improvements was preferred. This seemed to reflect the varied roles and missions that each service p l a ys in air w a r f a r e Integrated Survivability: Assessing S u r vivability Design T r a d e s What are the tradeoffs between ECM and signature reduction? H o w should we trade vulnerability and susceptibility design features? What metrics have meaning for the w a r f i g h t e r ? H o w should we define surviv a b i l i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s ? Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 9 c o n t i n ued on page 2 3


modeling of ballistic events and dynamic structural response, making them more reliable. These tools, however, are not easy to use. Ram Design Methodology (RamDeM), a JTCG/AS activity led by the 46th Test Wing, considers industry's needs and lessons learned and enables the latest ram-modeling software with a graphical user interface (GUI). This front-end "wizard" will be designed to advise users throughout the ram modeling process and greatly improve the ease and reliability of results. RamDeM will supply unique data for ballistic analysis (see Table 1) that structural designers are not accustomed to using. Because users must otherwise supply their model with so much information (much of which is outside the user's knowledge-base), unsatisfactory results are produced. The RamDeM project seeks to resolve this issue. The software tools of choice for ballistic analysis often called hydrocodesare finite element-based nonlinear transient dynamic analysis codes, which incorporate structures, fluids, fluid-structure coupling, detonation equations of state, and penetration mechanics, andThe U.S. military has long hardened aircraft against threats. With today's threats, live fire test laws, and highly optimized structures, our military needs effective tools for survivability design that can be used in the early development phase of new aircraft. Design changes are not easily achieved late in the development cycle. The aluminum planes of the past have demonstrated reasonable ballistic resistance; however, composite materials, which are less ductile than metals, have not fared as well in live fire testing. With the increased use of composite materials on next generation aircraft, the challenge to make them survivable is more difficult and requires greater attention. The design and analysis community needs a robust and reliable method of analytically evaluating aircraft survivability. Design and assessment of aircraft structural survivability often revolves around the phenomenon of hydrodynamic ram, an intense fluid pressure pulse generated by a penetrating projectile. Hydrodynamic ram becomes particularly acute when fuel tanks are full and the projectile is a high explosive incendiary (HEI) threat. Until recently, the prediction of a structure's response to ram has been considered more art than science. As a result of the lack of an acceptable analytical tool, the design community was forced to take an experimental approach of building costly components, performing ballistic tests, redesigning, and retesting. With more advanced software and modeling techniques, we now can effectively simulate ballistic events in aircraft structures, dramatically reducing the amount of destructive testing needed. Historically, ram analysis has been slow and unreliable, inadequate to meet live-fire laws and specifications demanding survival and residual strength. Recent advances have improved computer hardware, software, andAircraft Survivability Spring 200010 by Ms. Susan L. Casabella and Mr. J.A. Hangen ITEMVARIABLE Threat Data Warhead velocity Warhead charge material and mass Warhead total mass Charge detonation properties/ equation of state Structural Modeling Finite element analysis (FEA)structural mesh density guidelines Fluid Modeling FEA fluid mesh guidelines Fluid-Structural Arbitrary Langragian-Eulerian Coupling Coupling Guidelines Structural Material Elastic-plastic stress strain for metals Properties and Laminate strain allowables for composites Allowables When to use notched versus unnotched Bolted joint strengths Pull-through strength for composites Bonded joint strengths Including effects of through thickness reinforcements in composites such as stitching and Z-pins Strain rate sensitivity Table 1. Variables Addressed Through RamDeM Knowledge Database" W W i i z z a a r r d d "Afor Hydrodynamic Ram Modeling


account for structural failure and failure progression. Two such codes of interest are Dytran and LSD Y N A 3 D RamDeM software links into these hydrocodes through a Patran interface. RamDeM software has two modes of operation, a design mode and an analysis mode. A description of each is shown in Table 2. The RamDeM software operates in conjunction with the user-selected hydrocode and provides advice at each step of the ram modeling process. Users are instructed to simply log onto Patran and click the RamDeM button. As shown in Figure 1, the Patran PCL-based GUI then walks each user through a series of questions and o p t i o n s A knowledge base will assist the user by providing answers and selections. After selecting "Submit," the ram analysis begins. Stage 1 is analysis through the first millisecond (ms) time frame. Results then transfer to Stage 2 for compleDESIGN MODE ANALYSIS MODE Survivability rules Preprocessor for full Hydrocode of thumb analysis Patran environmentusing Patran Command Language (PCL) Look-up tables T arget Analysis SolverDYTRAN Expert system guidelines Threat data from knowledge-base Preliminary joint loads Structure modeling guidelines Recommendations for Fluid modeling guidelines spar/rib/frame spacing Automated fluid structur e coupling Full transient dynamic analysis with failure progression Design dos and donts tion of the static nonlinear analy s i s Stage 3 is used for damage assessment. The benefits of RamDeM are as follow s : Reduced design cycle time and expense I m p r o ved accuracy of simulation leading to increased confidence in achieving a s u r v i v able design Reduction of design development tests including subcomponent live fire tests I m p r o ved survivability of military aircraft Enhanced consistency and traceability of the analysis and design. The RamDeM program began in A u g u s t 1998 and runs through October 2 0 02 Demonstrations and user workshops will be conducted. The software has expandable modules to work with new target codes and to incorporate new lessons learned into the k n o wledge base and expert sy s t e m n About the Authors Ms. Casabella received her B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Rensselaer P o l y t e c h n i c Institute. She is an engineering specialist and the N o r t h r op Grumman Corporation (NGC) R amDeM Program Manager. Ms. Casabella has a background in aircraft structural design and com puter hardware/softwar e She is currently the Program Manager of the FAA/Air Force sponsored Repair Assessment Pr o c e d u r e and Integr a t e d Design (RAPID) pr o g r am and for NGC's S t r u c t u r es Center of Excellence (CoE) initiative to modernize structural analysis methods within NGC. She may be reached at Mr. Hangen received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering fr o m L a f ayette College and M.S. in Mechanical Engineering fr o m M.I.T. He specializes in the full r ange of analysis, testing and certi fication of aircraft structures with background in R&D and production, covering metallic and com posite materials. He can be reached at hange Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 11 T able 2. Description of Design Mode and Analysis Mode F i g u r e 1. Sample RamDeM T emplateAnalysis Mode


Preliminary Concept Testing First, we built and statically tested joint concepts for both high payoff designs. F o l l o wing that, we built and ballistically tested small hydrodynamic ram test articles for both high payoff concepts (30-mm HEI, full fuel hydrodynamic ram). Based on test results, we do w n selected to the cellular wing concept as the lightest weight and lowest cost design. Cellular Wing Refinement and Validation O v er 100 joint tests were performed as the cellular wing z-pinning techniques and joint designs w e r e refined. We built and ballistically tested a small hy d r o dynamic ram test article for the refined cellular wing design (Figure 1) (30-mm HEI, full fuel hy d r o d y n a m i c ram). In addition, we developed appropriate fuel system and systems installation concepts. In preparation for large scale testing, we developed tooling and rib insertion concepts for a large cellular wing ballistic test a r t i c l e The large scale test article had eight light spars and an intermediate rib line and was the largest zpinned structure ever constructed. Ballistic tests (3 0 mm HEI) were conducted with full fuel for hy d r o d y namic ram (Figure 2). Complex Manufacturing and Damage Detection System Significant effort was expended on the DFC program to ensure that we were developing technology that w a s capable of transitioning to a real aircraft. Complex T he Decoupled Fuel Cells (DFC) program began as a small research study contract in 1995. The goal was simple: i n v estigate concepts for a lightweight, low cost, fighter wing that could survive a 3 0 m i l limeter (mm) High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) hydrodynamic ram event. That small contract ultimately resulted in a series of three DFC programs funded jointly by the Air F o r c e and the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). The DFCs technical direction came from Bill Baron and John Riechers of the Air Force R e s e a r c h Laboratory (AFRL). DFC developed and demonstrated an innov a t i v e wing design that exceeded all the weight, cost, and survivability goals of the program. DFC met its goals on time and under budget in each phase of the program. The total DFC program cost for all phases w a s only slightly more than $1 million, yet the program designed, developed, and produced more prototype composite hardware than programs exceeding $50 million. Therefore, what did the DFC program do, what was the p a yoff, and why was it successful? Our Accomplishments Preliminary Development We brainstormed 48 hydrodynamic ram tolerant wing designs and refined those designs into two high payoff concepts. The first concept was a composite cellular wing design. (The cellular wing design is an all-composite co-cured wing design composed of co-cured tubes with a cocured skin on the upper and lower skin s u r f a c e s. ) The second concept was a composite tubular truss spar design. We performed detail design and sized both high payoff concepts to meet modern twin engine fighter aircraft loads. Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 12 Decoupled Fuel Cells Pr o g r a m A Story of Success by Mr. James J. Jamie Childr e s s Figure 1. Small-Scale Cellular Wing Ballistic Test Article


tapered wing geometry and fuel systems installation were two of the most critical issues that needed to be s h o wn before cellular wing technology would be ready for consideration by future aircraft programs. To prove that cellular wings were a viable production concept we d e v eloped the tooling for a highly tapered all composite cellular wing with a 45-degree wing sweep (Figure 3). Next, we developed a method to install ultrasonic fuel gauges into the co-cured section of the wing box (Figure 4). Finally, we showed that these new ultrasonic fuel gauges provided an additional survivability benefit by proving that we could detect damage by monitoring their output during hydrodynamic ram ev e n t s Ballistic damage detection tests were conducted that s h o wed the ultrasonic fuel gauges could detect and estimate the location of the ballistic impact with an accuracy of under two inches. This information could be g i v en to the pilot in real time to help him assess the damage state of his aircraft. What was the Payof f ? The cellular wing design demonstrated an ability to exceed the live-fire test requirements of modern fighter aircraft for hydrodynamic ram tolerance. This design can meet twin engine fighter flight loads, yet is 15 percent lighter than state-of-the-art production designs. This wing design has fasteners only in access cov e r areas and selected rib locations, resulting in a 98-percent fastener count reduction for some design cases. And from a cost perspective, the cellular wing design is about 40-percent less expensive than an equiv a l e n t bolted design. In addition to the new fuel cell design, a new low cost, lightweight, highly reliable, ultrasonic fuel gauge Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 13 was investigated and tested. The fuel gauge demonstrated that it was capable of being cocured into the structure and detecting ballistic wing damage in real time. This potential dual use capability of the fuel gage has possible applications to improve situational aw a r e n e s s and vehicle surviv a b i l i t y The Decoupled Fuel Cell program resulted in a lightweight, low cost, and highly surviv able technology solution that will be a v ail able for next-generation flight vehicles. In fact, this technology is already paying off with current new aircraft programs and other research contracts Why was the Program a Success? The goals of low weight, low cost, and i m p r o ved survivability were ambitious, but we were given wide latitude in the design process to meet those goals. Also, we remained focused on developing concepts that could actually fly in a production aircraftnot just be laboratory curiosities. We stayed aware of manufacturing considerations to ensure that the concepts developed could be produced e f f i c i e n t l y We also remained aware of real aircraft requirements to ensure needed aircraft systems could be installed and flight load requirements could be met. From the administrative side, we held v e r y few formal meetings, but numerous small, Figure 2. Large-Scale Hydrodynamic Ram Test Box After 30-mm HEI Impact see Fuel Cells on page 2 9 Figure 3. Cellular wing with 45 degree wing sweep and high taper


Engine ControlsNext-generation engine controls will take full advantage of the computer age, no longer a digital replacement of past generation mechanical controls. These controls provide increased performance, improved stability, and health monitoring. The controls also compensate for component performance deterioration to provide level thrust over the life of the engine. Engines are subject to ingestion damage during peacetime and ballistic damage in combat. Taking advantage of these advances, engine controls can be used to increase the engine's survival after damage. Adaptive controls monitor the engine performance and adjust the engine controls to improve performance. Extending this theory, survivability enhanced controls will be capable of detecting and mitigating the effect of damage. Engine damage is detected by monitoring changes (shifts) in performance trends. By adjusting the control schedule real-time, the control can mitigate the effect of the damage. The objective of this detection and mitigation strategy is first to keep the engine operating, in a degraded performance mode if necessary, and second to regain as much of the performance as possible to increase the pilot's chances of returning home. Anew generation of turbine engine will be powering the next generation of fighter aircraft. These engines utilize the latest in control technology, including Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) and adaptive control logic, and will provide significant advances in health monitoring. Through these advances in the FADEC, advanced control algorithms provide an opportunity to reduce the engine's vulnerability without adding weight or reducing engine performance. Implementation of these techniques was unavailable previously as a result of limitations in the pure mechanical control system of the past. A vulnerability assessment was conducted on a single engine aircraft to better understand engine component contributions to the aircraft's vulnerability. The study used a modern airframe with an advanced engine. Results of the study indicated the following: The engine was a large fraction of the aircraft's vulnerability Loss of engine operation results in aircraft loss Engine lube and fuel systems were the larger contributors. These findings provided support to two JTCG/AS efforts (Single Engine Improvement and Engine Control Vulnerability) aimed at addressing the issues of loss of thrust and fuel system damage. Loss of thrust, whether caused by ballistic damage or peacetime circumstances, results in the loss of the aircraft. Aircraft Survivability Spring 200014 Reducing N N e e x x t t G G e e n n e e r r a a t t i i o o n nEngine Vulnerabilitiesby Mr. Charles E. Frankenberger


S u r vivable Contr o l s Utilize adaptive engine control theories that: A l l o w real-time adjustments to engine control schedules Optimize engine performance (thrust or SFC) Compensate for deteriorating engine Are tolerant to loss of sensors Detect damage to the gas path Mitigate the effect of damage to controls (loss of variable geometry actuators and loss of nozzle c o n t r o l ) Engine Fuel System V u l n e r a b i l i t y Engine fuel system contributions to the aircrafts vulnerability include component dysfunction, fuel l e a k a g e and fire. Eliminating fuel system leakage will reduce the chance of fire in the engine bay and eliminate fuel starvation as a potential kill mechanism. T h e r e f o r e providing leak detection and shutoff to the engine fuel system will prevent several hazardous conditions to the aircraft. Techniques to eliminate fuel and oil system leakage include excess flow v a l v es (EFV), smart v a l ve s ,and selfsealing lines. EFVs are passive devices that are similar to hydraulic fuses in concept. They detect flows above nominal flow conditions and are pre-sized to pro v i d e protection against large leakage flows. To pro v i d e a c t i v e control of leakage flow shutoff, smart v a l v es are used. Smart v a l v es use control logic to determine whether a leakage condition exists and closes a solenoid to shut off the flow. Several techniques have been used to determine whether a leak condition exists: f l o w or pressure devices, feedback from actuators, or combinations of the above. Older engines were quite vulnerable to minor damage to the control system. Damage to the hy d r a u l i c system powering variable geometry components ( s p e c i f i c a l l y the perforation of fuel transfer tubes b e t w een pumps and actuators) often leads to the loss of control of the engine, resulting in unstable engine operation and engine shutd o wn. New pump capabilities and adv a n c e d controls make the engine more tolerant of this type of damage. State-of-the-art fuel pumps provide large volumes of fluid (fuel) to the actuation systems to keep the control system operable. Damage to this system (fuel transfer lines) results in large quantities of fuel leaking into the engine bay introducing other vulnerability concerns, such as fire and fuel starvation. The JTCG/AS has been exploring methods to reduce engine vulnerability, using leak detection and shutoff devices, and adv a n c e d controls to detect and mitigate the effect of engine damage. Bench testing was conducted on several EFVs to evaluate their operating c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Limited engine testing w a s conducted on an F414-GE-400 engine to e v aluate the v a l v e characteristics during typical engine operation. The Engine Control Vulnerability project is expanding the capability of the current a d a p t i v e engine control logic. Damage detection and mitigation will reduce future engine vulnerability to ballistic threats and improve aircraft safety by increasing the engines tolerance to bird and ice ingestion ev e n t s General Electric is now under contract to the N a val Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, to develop detection and mitigation strategies and implement them using an a d v anced F414 control system. Verification of this capability is planned in FY00. n About the Author M r Fr a n k e n b e r ger has worked in the pr o p u l s i o n field at NAWCWPNS for 12 years, including 8 y e a r s in missile propulsion on pr o g r ams including Tomahawk, Harpoon/SLAM and Advance Air-toAir Missile. He has worked Engine V u l n e ra b i l i t y issues for the past 4 years conducting ballistic tests on turbine engines under JTCG/AS, JLF and LFT eff o r t s He may be reached at 7 6 0 9 3 9 8 4 1 1 Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 15 General Electric F414-GE-400, F/A-18 E/F Propulsion


full-scale testing at Wright-Patterson AFB. In smallthrough full-scale fire testing, CF3I demonstrated superior fire extinguishing performance over other candidates being tested. Despite the excellent fire-extinguishing performance of CF3I, the chemical transitioned from the Halon Replacement Program for Aircraft Engine Nacelles and Dry Bays was HFC-125. Outstanding issues in toxicityin particular, cardiac sensitizationalong with uncertainties in other areas, resulted in CF3I being dropped from further consideration. The program was under a stringent time line that forced the decisionmakers to reach a conclusion without the benefit of further investigation to resolve the outstanding issues. However, since that decision, additional data has emerged that addresses many of the issues related to CF3I. As shown in Table 1, CF3I is environmentally friendly. CF3I has a global warming potential (GWP) of five (5) and an atmospheric lifetime of days. CF3I breaks down in the troposphere as a result of the blue component of sunlight, and little if any reaches the stratosphere. CF3I does have an Ozone Depleting Potential (ODP) of 0.0002 with the greatest potential damage coming with discharges above 25,000 feet. Historical numbers of halon discharges show this to be an infrequent occurrence. At the time of its initial inclusion in the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP), the low probability of discharge combined with CF3I's low ODP, did not represent a concern to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Other important characteristics for measuring the performance of a fire-extinguishing agent are long-termWhenever CF3I (Trifluoromethyliodide, Triodide¨, halon 13001) is mentioned as a halon replacement, the response is usually polarized to one of two camps: CF3I is a drop-in replacement for halon 1301 (CF3Br), or it is the fire-extinguishing equivalent of sarin gas. Each side at some time has made erroneous statements based on inaccurate or outdated information. This article is not intended to advocate either position; rather, it illuminates the subject with the facts known to date. There is no attempt to sway a single manager to make a decision one way or anotheronly to ensure that when a single manager or policy-maker makes a decision about CF3I usage, it is an informed decision. CF3I was "rediscovered" about a decade ago. The chemical, which has been synthesized in small quantities for decades, was one of the chemicals originally examined in a late 1940's Purdue University study that focused on brominated halons as fire extinguishers. The Montreal Protocol, which later led to the 1 January 1994 production ban on brominated halons, renewed interest in CF3I because CF3I is molecularly analogous to halon 1301(CF3Br). CF3I compared very well volumetrically with CF3Br in initial small-scale fire tests. Industry, government, and academic researchers participated in an ad hoc working group to examine other important areas, including materials compatibility, and toxicity, to accelerate the knowledge base building effort. CF3I was brought into the triservice/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Halon Replacement Program for Aircraft Engine Nacelles and Dry Bays. It underwent a battery of small-scale tests at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Building Fire Research Laboratory. It became the leading candidate after Phase IIAircraft Survivability Spring 200016 C C F F3 3I IA Summary to Dateby Mr. James E. TuckerTrifluoromethyliodide Trifluoromethyliodide Trifluoromethyliodid e Table 1. Environmental Properties of Common FireExtinguishing Agents CF3I 5days0.0002 Halon 1301 560050 years10 to 14 HFC-125 280033 years0 GWP Atmospheric Lifetime ODP


storage and materials compatibility. The most w e l l k n o wn storage and materials compatibility data w e r e generated by the National Institute of Standard Technology (NIST) (Gann, 1995). The statistically significant changes in stability observed during the 52week storage tests occurred only at 150 degrees C ( 3 02F). Tests conducted at 23 degrees C (73.4F) and 100 degrees C (212F) showed no statistically significant changes. The NIST report further elaborates: Ev e n though some of the areas at 150C are showing statistically significant differences, the actual loss in agent is probably quite small and poses no problem to the fire extinguishing capability of the CF 3 I The materials compatibility data contained in the same report demonstrated that like HFC-125, HFC227ea, and halon 1301, CF 3 I is compatible with a wide variety of seals and elastomers. In long-term liquid storage tests, problems did appear with titanium. These problems are of concern if titanium bottles are e m p l o yed for CF 3 I storage. The short-term gas phase materials compatibility tests, representing CF 3 I discharge during a fire, indicated no concerns and v e r i f i e d that CF 3 I was a clean agent with no residue. C F 3 I toxicity fits within the range of fire extinguishing agents and refrigerants commonly used within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the commercial sector (see Table 2). A battery of toxicological tests has been run to ascertain acute and chronic toxicity effects. An important acute toxicity endpoint for CFCs and their replacements is cardiac sensitization, which is the sensitization of the heart to adrenaline and similar c h e m i c a l s CF 3 I has a cardiac sensitization No O b s e r v able A d v erse Effects Exposure Lev e l ( N O AEL) of 0.2 percent and a Low O b s e r v able A d v erse Effects Level (LOAEL) of 0.4%. This is of the same order toxicity as halon 1211, CFC-11, and halon 2402, which are an order of magnitude lower (more toxic) than CF 3 Br and HFC-125. In addition to the acute toxicity endpoints, much information has been learned from genotoxicity test results. Some interpreted the p o s i t i v e results in the Ames bacterial test system (which is an initial screening test) as an automatic flag that CF 3 I would pose chronic toxicity problems. How e ve r like the positive results that were seen with halon 1211, during its developmental testing, this indicated only the need to perform higher fidelity genotoxicity tests. Since that initial test series the foll o wing additional tests to determine chronic toxicity have been performed: in vitro mammalian cell assay, in vivo micronucleus assay, short-term repeated exposure, 9 0 d a y repeated e x p o s u r e and developmental and reproduct i v e toxicity. (A 2-year bioassay has not been conducted, and it is unlikely that it ever will be because there are not enough indications to justify the need.) These test data for establishing chronic toxicity were evaluated by the E P A and resulted in their recommendation for an 8-hour Time Weighted Average (TW A ) exposure limit of 150 ppm with a ceiling of 2,000 ppm. As shown in Table 2, these numbers are of the same orders as halon 1011 and 1 2 02. These halons are still used on C1 3 0 model aircraft (except the C-130J). As with any potentially hazardous chemical, all efforts should be made to minimize or p r e v ent personnel e x p o s u r e The potential user must take into account the hazAircraft Survivability Spring 2000 17 T r i f l u o r omethyliodide T r i f l u o r omethyliodide T r i f l u o r omethyliodide T r i f l u o r omethyliodide c o n t i n ued on page 1 8 Table 2: Toxicity Endpoints for Common Fir e Extinguishing Agents and Refrigerants


1 3 01 (a Mil-Std 882C study has not yet been conducted). This body of information will be incorporated into a contingency plan to be implemented if the current halon 1301 stockpile were to be no longer av a i l a b l e Much information is available on CF 3 I. How e ve r some outstanding science and technology issues still exist, including: low temperature performance (CF 3 I has a boiling point of 9 degree F, whereas halon 1301 has a boiling point of 72 degrees F), and additional full-scale experiments to determine sizing criteria for other applications (e.g., aircraft engine nacelles and dry b a ys). Each existing or future platform considering CF 3 I (or a n y fire extinguishing agent for that matter) must w e i g h the pros and cons for its application. It is only in the context of usage that the risks can be understood completely and an accurate, informed decision made. n About the Author Mr. Tucker received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering and his M.S. in Fire Protection Engineering from Worcester P olytechnic Institute. He has worked in the arena of halon r eplacement and aircraft survivability both as an Air Force officer and now as an employee of Applied Research A ssociates. He has served as co-chair of the JTCG/AS V ulnerability Reduction Group Fuels committee. Currently he works in support of the Aerospace Survivability Flight, 46 OG/OGM/OL-AC specializing in fire/explosion RDT&E. He may be reached at R e f e re n c e s Bennett, J. M., Caggianelli, G.M, Kolleck, M.L., Wheeler J.A. (1995). Halon Replacement Program for Aviation Aircraft Engine Nacelle Application Phase II Operational Comparison of Selected Agents Flight Dynamics Directorate, Wright Laboratory, WrightP atterson AFB OH. WL-TR-95-3 0 39, SURVIAC TR-9501 0. Dodd, D.E., and Vinegar, A. (1999). T oxicity Data Comparison of CF 3 I With Currently Used FireExtinguishing Agents and Refrigerants of Interest to the Military In Halon Options Technical Working Conference: HOWTC-99 (pp. 233-241). New Mexico Engineering Research Institute Gann, R. G. (Ed). (1995). Fire Suppression System P erformance of Alternative Agents in Aircraft Engine and Dry Bay Laboratory Simulations: SP890 Vols. 1 and 2. W ashington, DC: U.S. Go v ernment Printing Office Harper, G. and K ay M. (1999). P otential CF3I DeploymentAn Airframe Perspective In Halon Options T echnical Working Conference: HOWTC-99 (pp. 222229). New Mexico Engineering Research Institute V an Horn, S.R., and Vitali, J.A. (1999). Fuel Inertion Live Munitions Testing Using CF 3 I. In Halon Options T echnical Working Conference: HOWTC-99 (pp. 428435). New Mexico Engineering Research Institute ards of chemical exposure and the probability of such an exposure. A Boeing examination of t w o widely deployed USAF fighter/attack aircraft found no reports of accidental agent disc h a r g e whereas a similar review of a USN fighter/attack aircraft showed 50 discharges per 1,000 aircraft per y e a r The hazard is the s a m e but the risk is different. It is the ov e r a l l risk that must be assessed. Only by examining the application and understanding the sy s t e m can the potential user fully appreciate the risk. The only U.S. platform to date that has performed application specific work on CF 3 I is the F-16. Fuel tank inerting tests against ballistic threats were conducted at the Aircraft S u r v i v ability Research Facility (ASRF) at W r i g h t P atterson AFB to size the CF 3 I sy s t e m required to achieve halon 1301 equiv a l e n c e The F-16 System Program Office sponsored tests showed that a CF 3 I system could be designed to fit within the same v o l u m e but with a 30 percent increase in weight. Tests are still ongoing to determine CF 3 I solubility in JP-8, long-term gas phase materials compatib i l i t y required system modifications, and approximate implementation costs. An examination of the fuel tank inerting application demonstrated no increase in risk versus halon Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 18 c o n t i n ued from page 1 7 T wo F-16C's fly in formation during a mis sion in support of NATO Operation Allied Force. DoD Photo by: SRA Greg L. Davis.


M r. Ralph W. Lauzze, II, 46th T e s t Wing Aerospace Survivability Flight, W r i g h t P atterson Air Force Base ( W P AFB), Ohio, received the National Defense Industrial Associations (NDIA) Combat S u r v i v ability Leadership Award at the Aircraft S u r v i v ability 1999 Symposium held recently at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The award is presented annually at the NDIA Combat Survivability Divisions Aircraft Survivability symposium, and it recognized Mr. Lauzzes superior performance ov e r m a n y years in positions of leadership in the aircraft survivability community. Through his e f f o r t s significant achievements were made in d e v eloping vulnerability reduction technologies, in live fire testing, and in joint service cooperation. The Aerospace Survivability Flight, an operating location of the 46th Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, w a s recently activated at W r i g h t P atterson Air Force Base by transferring aircraft survivability expertise from the Air Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicle Directorate. M r Lauzzes contributions to the enhancement of aircraft survivability were manifest throughout his tenure as Test Team Leader, Group Chief, and Branch Chief at the Air Force Research Laboratory. With his g u i d a n c e the laboratory developed new applications for fire and explosion suppression foam, Halon fire suppression sy s t e m s alternative agents to Halon, nitrogen inerting systems for fuel tanks, and surviv a b l e a d v anced composite structures for aircraft. In addition, he aggressively led efforts to improve the realism of aircraft vulnerability testing through upgrades to the Air Force Aircraft Survivability Research F a c i l i t y In furthering joint service cooperation, he performed with distinction as Test Director for the Joint Live Fire (JLF) program and as Chairman of the Principal Members Steering Group of the Joint T e c h n i c a l Coordinating Group on Aircraft Surviv a b i l i t y ( J T CG/AS). The JLF program, which is credited as being the original project validating the benefits of live fire testing, continues to push the state of the art in realistic vulnerability and lethality testing. A d d i t i o n a l l y the J T CG/AS remains the recognized authority on aircraft survivability in the Department of D e f e n s e as affirmed recently by a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the group to identify survivability enhancements for aircraft subject to attack by manportable air defense sy s t e m s M r Lauzze has demonstrated notew o r t h y leadership in the aircraft survivability field, and he clearly exemplifies the level of superior performance that the Leadership Aw a r d r e p r e s e n t s n About the Author Mr. Vice is President of Skyward, Ltd., a small business located in Dayton, OH, providing pr ofessional services to the DoD and DoD contrac tors in Modeling & Simulation, Weapon Systems Analysis, Test Planning and related areas. Mr Vice may be reached at 937.427.4261 or by Email at Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 19 W P AFB Engineer Receives NDIA Combat Sur v i v a b i l i t y Leadership A w a r d Ralph Lauzze (center) shown receiving the NDIA Combat Survivability Leadership award with Awards Committee Chairman, J e r ry Wallick (left) and NDIA Combat Survivability Division Chairman RADM Bob Gormley, USN (Ret.). by Mr. John M. Vice


S p a c e c r a f t the interruption of satellite information flowing to the Armed Forces could ha v e catastrophic consequences From the beginning of the space age, satellite designers ha v e been faced with a variety of hazards to satellite survival from the natural space environment. These early hazards could be thought of as either elec tromagnetic or kinetic. Electromagnetic hazards include cosmic ra ys solar flares, and trapped particles from the Van Allen radiation belts. Kinetic hazards include meteoroids (ice and dust particles impacting spacecraft as Earths orbit crosses ancient comet tails at tens of kilometers per second) and atomic oxygen (molecules from Earths extreme upper atmosphere impacting spacecraft surfaces). In recent years, ho w ever, these natural hazards to spacecraft ha v e been joined by additional man-made threats (see Figure 1). Additional electromagnetic threats may include lasers, high-po w ered micro wav es and radio frequency (RF) jamming. Additional kinetic threats include orbital debris (man-made particles crossing the orbits of satellites) and kinetic energy antisatellite (KE-ASAT) warheads with fragments that impact spacecraft at speeds from 5 to 15 kilometers per second. These threats are similar to air combat threats in that they are often highly directional (usually T he importance of satellites to our mil itary and economic infrastructure can not be o v eremphasized. One of the U.S. Air Forces core competencies is informa tion superiorityand this future is predicated on the development of space, the "high ground" for command, control, and commu nications, observation, weapon guidance and other important military functions. It is esti mated that space s y stems were the primary means for more than 85 percent of intrathe ater and intertheater communications during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Contrary to popular opinion, military dependence on space does not only include m i l i t a r y A recent study by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) pre dicted that the U. S. Air Force would depend on commercial space s y stems for more than 3 0 percent of its remote sensing and 60 per cent of its communications requirements b y the year 2 01 0with an even larger percentage of dependence (60 percent and 90 percent, r e s p e c t i v ely) during times of w a r Consequently, the remo v al of a satellite could cause severe damage to our militarys infra structure. This was best exemplified by the loss of the Galaxy IV satellite on 19 Ma y 1998, which stopped pager service to 90 per cent of the 45 million pager users nationwide If such a satellite were lost during wartime Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 20 S u rv i v a b i l i t y s Next Fr o n t i e r by Dr. Joel D. Williamsen and Dr. Jeffery R. Calcaterra The U.S. will spend more than $ 2 5 0 billion in space by the year 2 0 0 0 and another 1,800 satellites will be on orbit by the end of the next decade. This skyrocketing investment must be p ro t e c t e d f r om natural and manmade thr e a t s accidental and intentional thr e a t s. G e n e r al Howell Estes C o m m a n d e r U.S. Space Command P r otecting U.S. Assets in Space, ISIR, June 8, 1998 Figure 1. Spacecraft environment includes hazards and man-made threats (in bold face).


approaching from the front, sides, or bottom of the spacecraft), inflict predictable levels of damage to the target, and affect different spacecraft subs y stems with v arying levels of success In their construction, satellites ha v e many design features in common with military aircraft. Both s ystems are designed to maximize performance while minimizing weight. Both ha v e intricate and redundant g u i d a n c e pow e r communications, cooling, and propulsion subs y stems that are distributed throughout the airframe. Both are able to maneuver out-of-the-w ay of threats. Ho w ever, differences also exist. Spacecraft operate at longer ranges from directed threats than air craft, are less maneuverable, and are much more pre dictable in their mo v ements o v er enemy territory Despite these differences, ho w ever, it is clear that the classic tenets of aircraft survivability methodology reduction in susceptibility (probability of hit) and vul nerability (probability of loss given a hit)ha v e a direct application to spacecraft. Some air combat vul nerability reduction methods and tools ha v e already been applied to selected spacecraft. The National Aeronautics and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s (NASA) BUMPER and MSCSurv computer codes utilize limited aspects of vulnerability modeling methods to deter mine the probability of spacecraft penetration by meteoroids and orbital debris (see Figure 2). Years ago, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) modified the F astgen/Co v art computer code to model laser damage effects on spacecraft (now referred to as the Satellite V ulnerability Assessment code). Finally, NASA man agers are busily testing on-orbit repair techniques for the International Space Station. These techniques are based largely on advanced aircraft battle damage repair techniques (see Figure 3). H o w e ve r additional improvements to spacecraft s u r v i v ability are possible through the extension of better vulnerability assessment tools (such as A d va n c e d Joint Effectiveness Model [AJEM]) to the spacecraft r e g i m e Currently, satellite designs are predicated on d u r a b i l i t y which means that there is redundant circuitry to perform critical functions, but these redundant circuits may all be located in the same area, e n c l o s u r e or wire bundle. Designers might achieve a significant increase in satellite survivability by simply separating critical redundant components into different areas. Mo v es ha v e been made to bring air and space vulnerability communities closer t o g e t h e r Members of the Joint T e c h n i c a l Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability ( J T CG/AS) and American Institute of Aeronautics (AIAA) and Astronautics S u r v i v ability Technical Committee (AST C ) ha v e approached not only the Air Force s Space Command, Research Laboratory, and 46th Test Wing, but also NASA and other diverse go v ernment agencies to explore ho w aircraft combat survivability enhancement methods and tools may be applied to enhance spacecraft survivability. These organ izations ha v e joined with the University of Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 21 Figure 2. NASA s BUMPER computer code models the probability of orbital debris pen etration on a proposed reusable launch vehicle. Figure 3. NASA workers perform a zer o gravity KC-135 test of an external repair patch prototype for the International Space Station. c o n t i n ued on page 2 2


Space & Air S u r v i v a b i l i t y W o r k s h o p 124 June 2000 U.S. Air Force Academy Colorado Springs, CO US SECRET/NORFORN Contact: Dr. Joel Williamsen 3 0 3 8 7 1 4 5 0 2 j o w i l l i a @ d u e d u Sponsored by: Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 22 Denver to participate in the Space and Air Survivability W orkshop 2000 (jointly sponsored by the AIAA and the Department of Defense [DoD] JTCG/AS) for June of next year. The purpose of the workshop is to (1) summarize space environment hazards and directed threats to commercial and military spacecraft perform ance, (2) discuss spacecraft survivability analysis meth ods, tools, and test techniques, and (3) explore ho w aircraft survivability methodologies and enhancement techniques might be applied to impro v e spacecraft sur vivability. The workshop will be held on 12 through 14 June 2000 at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. For more information, please check out the workshop Web site at survivability.html. See you there! n About the Authors Dr. Joel Williamsen is currently serving as the Director of Space Systems Survivability at the University of Denver R esearch Institute, where his responsibilities include space vehicle survivability and lethality analyses, system simula tions, hypervelocity impact testing, and damage modeling in support of NASA, Air Force, and commercial spacecraft clients. Prior to joining DRI, he was lead engineer for the design, analysis, and repair of space station meteoroid and orbital debris protective structures at NAS A -Marshall Space Flight Center. Dr. Williamsen is currently serving as the s e c r etary of AIAA Working Group for Survivability T echnical Committee, and as the chairman of the AIAA W orking Group for Spacecraft Survivability. He will serve as the Chairman of the Space and Air Survivability Workshop in June 2000 and may be reached at Dr. Jeff Calcaterra is the lead spacecraft survivability engi neer for the 46th Test Wings Aerospace Survivability Flight. His responsibilities include spacecraft vulnerability analysis warhead lethality studies and system level damage charac terization. Dr. Calcaterra has extensive experience in the damage mechanics, fatigue behavior and reliability analysis of advanced materials and structures. He has authored over 2 0 conference and journal publications in these areas. He is the Technical Chairman for the Space and Air Survivability Workshop in June 2000. He may be reached at


Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 23 are essential to success in the battlespace of the f u t u r e The application of conventional air v e h i c l e s u r v i v ability approaches to spacecraft is in the offing, but it remains to be seen how much of air vehicle survivability technology and methodology actually will be applied to space. There will certainly be a place in the future for aircraft vulnerability assessment methodologies and ballistic vulnerability reduction technologies to support spacecraft design. To explore that interaction, the JTCG/AS and AIAA are sponsoring a workshop addressing Space and Air Surviv a b i l i t y from 12 June 2000 at the U.S. Air Force A c a d e m y in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Recent conflicts have highlighted the lethality of the MANPADS threat. Innov a t i v e techniques for improving situational aw a r e n e s s susceptibility reduction, and especially vulnerability reduction will be required to counteract this widely proliferated class of t h r e a t s Poster Session M r Ron Dexter (SURVICE Engineering) organized an excellent poster session. Tw e n t y t w o poster papers were presented on v a r i o u s s u b j e c t s ranging from Tri-Service MANP A D S vulnerability activities to recent changes in Russian (Commonwealth of Independent States) Integrated Air Defense Sy s t e m s The award for best poster paper was presented to the Tri-Service MANPADS entry, authored by M r Leo Budd (NAWCWD), Mr. Alex K u r t z (46th Test Wing), and Mr. Mark Mahaffey (USARL). n About the Author Mr. Hall is Chief Analyst of the NA W CWPNS Survivability Division; Co-Director of the Joint A ccreditation Support Activity (JASA); Chairman of the Methodology Subgroup of JTCG/AS; JSF Survivability IPT Analysis & Modeling Lead; and Chairman of the NAWCWPNS Analysis R esources Science and Technology Network. He may be reached at 760.927.1297. During this session, numerous techniques were discussed that addressed reduced radar cross-section (R C S ) for IR suppression and countermeasures sy s t e m s S u r v i v ability metrics that were meaningful to the warfighter were developed to support the F/A 1 8 E / F operational readiness review, such as situational aw a r e n e s s threat performance (e.g., detection range and number of exposures), aircraft vulnerability, and threat engagement surviv a b i l i t y It was apparent from the session that a balanced approach to survivability (among s i g n a t u r e s countermeasures, IR, RF, and vulnerability) is crucial to air vehicle design. An integrated surviv a b i l ity assessment process is required to adequately ev a l u ate survivability design tradeoffs. Ultimately, how e ve r affordability will be the final arbiter of the success of a n y air-vehicle system-acquisition program. F u t u r e Platforms: Meeting the Challenge A variety of issues surrounding emerging threat init i a t i v es were raised during previous symposium sess i o n s This last session looked into how those previous issues were being addressed by current and future aerospace programs: H o w are current and advanced air vehicle programs addressing these challenges? Are innov a t i v e techniques being proposed or i m p l e m e n t e d ? Do special issues exist regarding maintenance, training, safety, battle damage repair, and afforda b i l i t y ? Are operational lessons from recent conflicts affecting future acquisitions? Current and advanced air vehicle programs are addressing the challenges posed by the evolving threat through well-balanced designs for surviv a b i l i t y P e r h a p s i r o n i c a l l y affordability as a driving factor in sy s t e m d e v elopment has forced newer acquisition programs to eschew a single-point survivability solution as too costl y Balancing some signature reduction with improv e d c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s situational awareness tools, and a measure of vulnerability reduction appears to provide a v i a b l e minimal cost solution. Innov a t i v e techniques such as uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) are being pursued to support manned air sy s t e m s Integration of assets, including support assets, in mission planning and maintaining information superiority c o n t i n ued from page 9


t o m o r r o w. Our goals are your goalsto take M&S problems off your plate, help you explore emerging t e c h n o l o g i e s assist with reuse and interoperability, and support M&S throughout the community. Our mission at the MSIAC focuses on Being a center of excellence for M&S knowledge and operational support Increasing productivity through promoting reuse and interoperability Supporting M&S across all lifecycle phases Facilitating interface of real-world systems with M&S technology P r o viding operational support to increase operational effectiv e n e s s Offering a contracting vehicle for technical area tasks (TA T ) The M&S community reaches across hundreds of d o m a i n s each focused on specific areas within M&S: from the defense program manager debating next y e a r s budget and how it will affect his plans for training t r o o p s to the contractor searching for the most coste f f e c t i v e solution to building computer interfaces. W h a t e v er the question or challengethe MSIAC holds the resources, key play e r s and kno w h o w to tackle e v ery situation. Listed below are some of the projects were w o r k i n g on as part of the MSIAC support provided to the comm u n i t y Joint Experimentation F o r ce Experiment (JEFX)-99 JEFX-99 w a s by design, the U.S. Air Force's most ambitious large-scale experiment in scope, complexity, and sheer numbers of system and process initiativ e s As such, JEFX-99 consisted of a myriad of dependent and independent variables requiring coordination across experiment design, control, and assessment functions to test the experiment h y p o t h e s i s In concert with the 1995 Four Star Summit's New Vector and the C2 T a s k Force visions for M&S, the AFC2ISRC requested for the first time, that the MSIAC conduct an assessment of the M&S architecture supporting JEFX-99. The MSIAC I n early 1999, the Defense T e c h n i c a l Information Center and the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) combined the Modeling and Simulation Operational Support Activity and the Defense Modeling and Simulation T a c t i c a l Information Center to build a complete, technically advanced, and expansive information centerthe Modeling and Simulation Information Analysis Center (MSIA C ) With the draw d o wn in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the impact of far-reaching budget cuts in all areas of the defense industry, we find ourselves at a crucial juncture within the world of modeling and simulations (M&S). The MSIAC is a tangible and intangible placeit is a Web site, a help desk, or a telephone conversation with a subject matter expert (SME). It is research on emerging conflicts; and it is right now, y e s t e r d a y, and Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 24 The Modeling & S i m u l a t i o n I n f o r mation Analysis Center by Mr. Phil L. Abold


Assessment Team recommended that the JEFX-99 M&S architecture be baselined and placed under configuration management, that a transition plan be dev e l o p e d that the Air Force take advantage of future collaboration opportunities with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFC) and the other Services, and that the Air F o r c e implement Enterprise Model Initiative, and establish an Enterprise Operational Architecture Modeling and Simulation Resour c e R e p o s i t o r y (MSRR) The MSRR is a program designed to facilitate sharing of resources among M&S community members. DMSO sponsors a repository node, located at the MSIAC, that p r o vides repository services for resources sponsored by the joint M&S community, and for those resources considered to be DoD enterprise level resources. The MSIAC MSRR node is affiliated with other systems throughout DoD. These systems provide users with access to a broad spectrum of information on M&S. The following organizations operate MSRR n o d e s making the MSRR a system of sy s t e m s : A r m y N a vy Air Force Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Defense Intelligence Agency Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) C3Is C4ISR Decision Support Center Master Environmental Library (MEL). Impact Assessment R e c e n t l y the DoD and M&S Industries called for finding the value of M&S as it relates to manufacturing, training, and budgeting throughout the community. This is where impact assessment figures into the M&S game plan. The MSIAC Web site hosts the only DoDsponsored special interest area (SIA) for impact assessment that includes areas for threaded discussions, news u p d a t e s and breaking information about measuring and gauging the impact of M&S. MSIAC Ser v i c e s Our robust help desk is staffed with highly experienced personnel who will either solve your problem t h e m s e l v es or find someone who can by capitalizing on our extensive cadre of SMEs. The help desk is a central meeting point for other people across the M&S community who are working on similar issues and facing identical challengespeople who can not only provide you with added insight and opportunities to share capabilit i e s but also promote reuse and interopera b i l i t y Our M&S technical support staff, along with the help desk, can provide planning, execution, and assessment support, or at least get you moving in the right direction. This staff has extensive experience in planning, conducting, and assessing M&S ev e n t s such as e x e r c i s e s experimentation ev e n t s w o r k s h o p s and conferences. The MSIAC is an unbiased source of M&S n e w s and community support, including our a l l i n c l u s i v e M&S calendar that lists DoD and non-DoD related ev e n t s and the MSIA C s M&S Journal Online, a quarterly journal replete with M&S technology updates, current Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 25 c o n t i n ued on page 2 9


find (there wasnt much) and planning some laboratory activities. In 1966, Dale led an AFFDL team that conducted an infield study of U.S. Air Force (USAF) combat aircraft losses in SEA. He briefed the results of the study to the USAF/AFSC R&D Council, and all the teams recommendations were endorsed as action items by the Council. As a result, AFSC Project 5105 was initiated to conduct vulnerability analyses of several aircraft. The project resulted in survivability modifications being made to the F05 and F4 and eventually to other airc r a f t After his success in determining the causes of many of the USAF loses in Southeast Asia, Dale was appointed Chief of what eventually became the AFFDLs S u r v i v ability Branch. He started with just himself and a s e c r e t a r y and when he left several years later the Branch had grown to almost 40 people. He established the Air Force Survivability R&D Program and developed what was later called the Air Force Aircraft Surviv a b i l i t y Research F a c i l i t y This facility included the first v e r t i c a l firing range with airflow. It was used for realistic, inhouse testing and research to help understand the very complex phenomena that occur when an aircraft is hit by a warhead and to develop techniques and technologies for reducing aircraft vulnerability. Dale and his people were also inv o l v ed in supporting numerous aircraft survivability programs, and he played a major role in establishing survivability programs for the A0 and F5 aircraft. In 1967, Dale led a team that performed a second infield study in SEA and again presented the results to the USAF/AFSC R&D Council. He received the C o u n c i l s approval for additional survivability prog r a m s The data collection techniques developed by the AFFDL infield teams were used by the Air Force Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting Team (BD A R T ) which was formed as part of the triService Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting Program established by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME). The establishment A ccording to the American Heritage D i c t i o n a r y a pioneer is an innov a t o r or one who participates in the dev e l opment of a new field. The gentleman we are honoring in this issue, Dale B. Atkinson, is truly a pioneer in survivability in both meanings of the w o r d Dale graduated from high school in K a n s a s in 1953 and became a coop student at White Sands Proving Grounds while enrolled at New Mexico State Univ e r s i t y He then joined the Air Force and became an aircraft mechanic with the 3 0 6 t h Bomb Wing, Strategic Air Command (SAC), at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Florida. In 1955, he married Caroll Jones, and a year later, their son Douglas was born. In 1961, Dale graduated from the University of Kansas with a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering. After graduation, he worked at the Air F o r c e Flight Dynamics Laboratory (AFFDL) at W r i g h t P atterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio. His first assignment was with an inhouse scientific team conducting research on electromagnetic influences on hot gases in propulsion sy s t e m s where he designed and supervised the construction of a small wind tunnel and a hot gas tunnel. This hands-on laboratory experience helped prepare him for his future contributions to research in surviv a b i l i t y Dale then moved to the Structures Division, where he managed a project to d e v elop techniques to protect spacecraft from meteoroid impact. During this time, U.S. aircraft losses in the war in Southeast Asia (SEA) began to mount. Because Dale understood impact phy s i c s he was asked to help determine why these aircraft were being shot do w n This was his introduction to surviv a b i l i t y and he began reading all of the literature he could Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 26 Pioneers of Survivability Dale B. Atkinson by Distinguished Professor Robert E. Ball


of a long-term data collection effort had been one of the recommendations of Dales team. Another recommendation was to establish a permanent repository for this type of information. This recommendation resulted in the creation of the Combat Data Information Center (CDIC). In 1968, Dale was instrumental in establishing the AFSC Non-nuclear Survivability Technology W o r k i n g Group (NSTWG), which included all the Air Force laboratories and other Air Force organizations inv o l v ed in conducting survivability R&D. The group was to i m p r o ve coordination and communication among the various Air Force organizations inv o l v ed in surviv a b i l i t y to prevent duplication, and to make scarce resources go further by joint planning. This group was composed of several subgroups that addressed all areas of surviva b i l i t y including the Observables Subgroup. Dale conc e i v ed the organizational structure of this group, which significantly improved the coordination and communication among the laboratories. Dale was also actively inv o l v ed in several ad hoc interService committees devoted to coordination of s u r v i v ability activities across the three Services. He w a s a strong advocate for a permanent organization that could accomplish this coordination in a more authoritative manner. Dr Joe Sperazza, Chairman of the J T CG/ME, formed a Surviv a b i l i t y Committee under the JTCG/ME. This Committee provided the survivability advocates a forum to lobby for a per manent group for the survivability a r e a E ve n t u a l l y the JTCG/AS w a s established in 1971. Dale was a member of the committee that wrote the charter By 1972, Dale had been living in D ay t o n s sinus valley for 11 y e a r s and he began to have year around sinus infections that doctors couldnt cure. F u r t h e r m o r e he had always w a n t e d to own his own business. So he and his family, which now included daughters Lisa and Laura, moved to Belen in the New Mexico desert, to help his sinus problem, and started a Western Auto Store. Six months later, after deciding that owning a Western Auto Store was not really his lifes calling, Hugh Drake (another pioneer) arranged for Dale to get a job at the Naval Weapons Center (NW C ) China Lake, CA, heading up the Surviv a b i l i t y Technology and Test area. A year later, this area was designated as a Branch, and Dale w a s named Branch Head. Hugh and Dale then lobbied to merge Dales Branch with Hughs Warhead Analysis Branch into the S u r v i v ability and Lethality Division. This Division included survivability technology, a n a l ys i s and test functions, and Dale became the Associate Division Head. By 1975, Dales sinus problems seemed to be under control, and Caroll wanted to move back to the East where all her family was located, so Dale took a position at the Naval Air Systems Command ( N A VAIR) in Washington, DC. From 1975 to 1990, Dale helped establish and later headed the Combat Surviv a b i l i t y Office at NAVAIR. He continued to play a major role in establishing the combat survivability design discipline as part of the acquisition process. Dale and his people supported Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 27 Dale Atkinson with his wife, Caroll, and RADM Bob G o rm l e y USN (Ret.), after receiving the NDIA Combat Survivability Lifetime Achievement Awar d presented at the NDIA 1999 Aircraft Survivability Symposium. c o n t i n ued on page 2 8


other person in that position. Dale was a source of inspiration and innovation that revitalized the J T CG/AS. These years became known as the golden y e a r s , during which many of the survivability handbooks and military standards were completed; the N av y J T CG/AS Survivability Short Course at the Nav a l Postgraduate School was developed by Dale, John M o r r o w from NWC, and the author; the AIAA S u r v i v ability textbook was completed; the Joint Live Fire Test Program was initiated; and the S u r v i va b i l i t y / V ulnerability Information and Analy s i s Center (SURVIAC) was established in cooperation with the JT C G / M E Dale has received numerous awards over the y e a r s but is particularly proud of receiving the first AIAA S u r v i v ability Award in 1994 for Pioneering efforts in establishing survivability as a recognized design discipline and the NDIA Survivability Lifetime A c h i e v ement Award presented at the 1999 Aircraft S u r v i v ability Symposium in Monterey last Nov e m b e r In addition, he received a letter from Secretary of Defense Richard (Dick) Cheney in 1992 recognizing his efforts and stating, As evidenced by our Desert Storm successes, your efforts helped to provide our aircrew members combat aircraft that could survive battle damage and return to fight another day Dale has asked me to express his appreciation to all of the people he has worked with over the years who helped establish survivability as an integrated design discipline and who helped foster coordination, communication, and cooperation across all the Services. Dale said there were too many people who helped to list in this short article, but they know who they are, and he thanks all of them and appreciates their efforts. Dale said that collectively we have all made a difference. Dale singled out his wife Caroll, who has supported him in e v erything he tried to do for the last 45 y e a r s and his f a m i l y Dale said that without such a supportive wife and family, he could not have accomplished ev e r y t h i n g that he did, and he is forever grateful to them. The author would like to express for all who have worked with Dale over the years our appreciation for all that he has done for us and for our discipline. He has selflessly advanced the cause of aircraft combat surviva b i l i t y always sharing his knowledge with others and ensuring that his colleagues received recognition for their accomplishments. Dale is truly a pioneer in surv i va b i l i t y n weapon system program offices, such as the F/A18, V22, and other sy s t e m s and he s e r v ed as the A d v anced Development Project Officer (ADPO) for the Naval Air Combat S u r v i v ability R&D Program. He was the original survivability project engineer on the F/A, which proved to be a survivable aircraft in Desert Storm. D a l e s last government assignment was in 1 9 9 0 as the first Staff Specialist for S u r v i v ability and Battle Damage Repair for Tactical Systems within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for A c q u i s i t i o n T h e r e he was responsible for overseeing the s u r v i v ability programs for tactical sy s t e m s such as the F22, and providing a formal ev a l uation of the survivability of major w e a p o n s systems to the Chairman Conv e n t i o n a l S y stems Committee. Dale retired from gov e r n ment service in 1992 after over 34 years of dedicated service. He has continued to provide leadership through his work with the J T CG/AS, the Institute for Defense Analy s e s and other organizations. During his career, Dale attended a number of schools, including the Program Managers Course at the Defense Systems Management College in 1976; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1979, where he also obtained an M.S. in Administration of National Security Affairs; and the Harvard Senior Officials in National Security Course in 199 1 Dale has been a strong proponent of teamwork for the good of the survivability design discipline and a strong supporter of the J T CG/AS. Over the y e a r s Dale served in numerous roles in the JTCG/AS, including Cochairman and then Chairman of the Technology R&D Subgroup (now the Vulnerability Reduction Subgroup), T e c h n i c a l Advisor and Director of Assessments and Methodology for the JTCG/AS Central Office, member of the JTCG/AS Planning A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e and Navy Principal Member from 1 9 8 1 to 1990. Dale was Chairman of the J T CG/AS from 1981 to 1988, longer than any Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 28 c o n t i n ued from page 2 7


Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 29 short, and informal ones. We solicited advice from shop technicians because, since they h a ve to build it, they understand what is required. We made decisions based on technical merit alone, with no political agenda. We used a simple design review process: If it w a s nt working in the shop or in the test laborat o r y we changed it at once(and documented the change later). And last but not least, we were not micro-managed by the higher a u t h o r i t i e s In the final analy s i s the DFC program w a s a success for a very simple reason: it had a s t r a i g h t f o r w ard goal and a flexible approach. The program was allowed to proceed, dev e l o p and change as needed to reach its goal of l i g h t e r cheaper, and more surviv a b l e That was the DFC programs recipe for success. n About the Author M r Childress received his B.S. in A e ro s p a c e Engineering from University of Colorado, Boulder. The Boeing pr o g r ams he has supported include the A-6, F/A-18, AV-8B, and V-22. In addition he has also supported pr o g r ams with the A T F F-22, JSF, A-X, Decoupled Fuel Cells, Composite A f fo r dability Initiative, IR&D, Muzzle Blast, Advanced Composite Armor, Nitrogen Inflated Ballistic Bladder, z-pinned skin fusing, and various classified pr o g ra m s He may be reached at J a m e s. C h i l d r ess@PSS. c o n t i n ued from page 1 3 Fuel Cells Figure 4. Ultrasonic Fuel Gauge/Damage Detector t r e n d s and objective articles written by and for the M&S community. In summary, the MSIAC is a one-stop shop for M&S information, technology, support, and management. It is a knowledge source that will help M&S dev e l o p e r s u s e r s managers, and decision-makers conserve funding by locating M&S assets that already exist and putting those assets within reach. Whether you have a simple question about high-level architecture or a complex challenge meeting exercise requirements, call on the M S I A C for help in M&S. n About the Author Mr. Phillip Abold is the Director, Modeling and Simulation Information Analysis Center, IIT Research Institute. He has held this position since 1 June 1999. From August 1993 to May 1999, he was the Vice President for the Modeling and Simulation Group at AB Technologies, Inc. Mr. Abold was awarded a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1967 and an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1968. He undertook Postgraduate Studies in Artificial Intelligence at the University of Dayton. MSIAC Contact Infor m a t i o n Phil Abold, Director p a b o l d @ m s i a c d m s o m i l ( 7 03) 933-3302 Ron Hale, DTIC I A C Program Manager r h a l e @ d t i c m i l ( 7 03) 767-9 1 2 0 M S I A C Help Desk 1 8 8 8 5 6 6 7 6 7 2 Mailing address: M S I A C 1 9 01 North Beauregard Street, Suite 400 Alexandria, VA 22311 Web site: w w w. m s i a c d m s o m i l M&S Calendar: w w w. m s i a c d m s o m i l / c a l e n d a r M S I AC s M&S Journal Online: w w w. m s i a c d m s o m i l / j o u r n a l c o n t i n ued from page 2 5


F i g h t e r large transport, and rotorcraft air vehicles be addressed Industry input be included Major Conclusions Conclusion #1. While MANPADS are a highly lethal threat, MANPADS hits do not necessarily result in aircraft kills. O v er 110 MANPADS combat incidents were reviewed, spanning several different conflicts. These data showed the probability of kill given a hit (PK/H), for aircraft hit by MANPADS, ranged from 0.5 0.8. While the PK/H varies as a function of aircraft type and specific threat, some aircraft platforms are more capable than others of surviving MANPADS hits. Conclusion #2. Substantial deficiencies exist in data and analysis tools needed to improve aircraft vulnerability reduction design against the MANP A D S threat. Results of the study revealed a lack of detailed understanding about MANPADS threat characteristics and damage mechanisms. Test data are required to better understand these phenomena. Conclusion #3. Future advances in vulnerability reduction design, focused on the MANPADS threat, can best be achieved through incremental improvements and adaptation of existing techniques and t e c h n o l o g i e s Examples of possible opportunities to d e v elop improved vulnerability reduction techniques against the MANPADS threat are in the areas of biasing M A N P ADS hit points away from flight-critical compon e n t s ultra-light weight armor techniques, and active fuze shielding concepts. Systematic progress, how e ve r depends on solving the data and analysis deficiencies cited above. Major Recommendations Recommendation #1. Conduct MANPADS tests to g a t h er data needed to characterize the threat, define damage and kill mechanisms, support dev e l o p m e n t of vulnerability reduction techniques, and perform aircraft vulnerability assessments. Specific kinds of tests needed are; (1) Ground tests against actual aircraft to assess damage and kill mechanisms, (2) Fuzing and time delay tests, (3) Free field arena blast pressure tests, B a c k g ro u n d Shoulder-launched Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) missiles rank as one of the most effective and economical antiaircraft weapon systems in existence today. The infrared (IR) guided MANPADS threat, being highly mobile, hard to detect, and difficult to s u p p r e s s has influenced how aircraft are used in combat. Air commanders have become increasingly reluctant to conduct combat operations in low altitude battlespace, effectiv e l y relinquishing its use except in situations of absolute necessity. Avoidance is clearly the preferred option for surviving the MANP A D S threat. How e ve r this option is not always successful in combat. Aircraft continue to be hit by MANPADS. In a February 1998 memo, the Deputy Director Air W a r f a r e Strategic & Tactical Sy s t e m s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and T e c h n o l o g y tasked the JTCG/AS to conduct a MANP A D S s t u d y The task was to collect and assess combat and test data to determine what adv a n c e s m a y be achieved in vulnerability reduction that might mitigate aircraft losses or result in a reduced probability of kill. Study Appr o a c h The study was conducted in three phases Phase I, the Data Collection phase, compiled data of interest related to encounters betw e e n M A N P ADS threats and aircraft. Phase II, the Data Analysis phase, included threat definition, an evaluation of vulnerability reduction t e c h n i q u e s and an assessment of vulnerability assessment methodologies. Phase III w a s Report Preparation. As part of the data collection phase, and to raise awareness of the importance of aircraft vulnerability to the M A N P ADS threat, a workshop was held in December 1998 at Huntsville, Alabama. Important considerations guiding the execution of this study were that: The needs of all Services be addressed Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 30 M A N P ADS Study: A Brief Synopsis by Mr. Joseph P. Jolley c o n t i n ued on page 3 2


Aircraft Survivability Spring 2000 31 2000 calendar of events 2024 Fort W o r th, TX Joint Interim Mission Model (JIMM) Contact: 937.431.2712, Paul Jeng 2427 Dayton, OH JMASS Conference and Users Group Sessions Contact: 407.282.6400, John Davis 24 Albuquerque, NM Halon Options Technical Working Confer e n c e Contact: 505.272.7250, Leanne Oliver 812 University of Texas, Austin, TX National Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) Confer e n c e Contact: 202.955.9472, Tracy Sheppard 1618 Wright Patterson AFB,OH IAC A w a r eness and Business Meeting Contact: 937.255.4840, Donna Egner 1214 Colorado Springs, CO Space &Air Survivability Workshop 2000 Contact: 303.871.4502, Joel W i l l i a m s e n or 303.871.4049, Shirly Good 1416 Colorado Springs, CO JTCG/AS Model Users Meeting Contact: 937.431.2712, Paul Jeng 2022 V i r ginia Beach, VA T h r eats, Counter m e a s u r es, and Situational A w a re n e s s : Teaming for Sur v i v a b i l i t y Contact: 812.854.3611, Norm Papke 1316 Monter e y CA NDIA Aircraft Survivability Symposium Contact: 703.247.2583, Joe Hylan 1416 Charlottesville, VA BLUEMAX, ALARMS, and RADGUNS Users Group Meeting Contact: 937.431.2712, Paul Jeng 2830 Nellis AFB, NV B R A WLER Users Group Meeting Contact: 937.431.2712, Paul Jeng 2830 Nellis AFB, NV EJAMS Users Group Meeting Contact: 937.431.2712, Paul Jeng MAR APR MA Y JUN NOV Information for inclusion in the Calendar of Events may be sent to: SURVIAC W ashington Satellite Office Attn: Christina McNemar 3190 Fairview Park Drive, 9 th Floor Falls Church, VA 22042 PHONE: 703.289.5464 F AX: 703.289. 5 4 6 7


COMMANDER NA V AL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (4.1.8 J) 47123 BUSE ROAD PA TUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547 Official Business BULK RATE U.S. POSTAGE P AID P AX RIVER MD Permit No 22 M A N P ADS Study guide should be structured for program managers as well as design engineers. S u m m a r y In summary, the study highlighted the fact that M A N P ADS are a serious worldwide threat to which the military aviation community must give increased e m p h a s i s Improved vulnerability reduction techniques are achiev a b l e and will result from innov a t i v e application of the current knowledge base in vulnerability reduction design. How e ve r deficiencies in data and a n a l y sis tools must be remedied. Future air combat operations will continue to face a M A N P ADS threat. Assuring the optimal combination of vulnerability reduction and susceptibility reduction characteristics early in the design of new aircraft, or major upgrades, will allow aircraft to better withstand M A N P ADS hits, minimize operational risk, and help regain lost battlespace. n For Further Information Contact: M r Joseph Jolley, JTCG/AS Central Office 70 3 6 07 3 5 09 x14 or DSN 327-3509 x14 E-mail: jolleyjp@nav a i r. n av y. m i l M r Greg Czarnecki, 46th Test Wing 9 3 7 2 5 5 6 3 02 ext. 203, DSN 785-6302 ext. 203, E-mail: g r e g o r y. c z a r n e c k i @ w p a f b. a f m i l M r Kevin Crosthw a i t e SURVIAC 937.255.4840 or DSN 785-4840 E-mail: crosthw a i t e k e v i n @ b a h c o m (4) Confined bay blast and damage tests, (5) Warhead fragment and missile body characterization arena tests, and (6) Propellant effects t e s t s To the extent possible, data should be captured in a centralized database accessible to a n a l ys t s designers, testers, and intelligence a g e n c i e s Recommendation #2. D e v elop improv e d a i r c r a f t M A N P ADS modeling meth o d o l o g i e s Methodologies must provide information on target acquisition, hit-point prediction, and vulnerability assessment. Recommendation #3. I n v estigate promising technology areas for new vulnerability reduction techniques against MANP A D S including cost-benefit assessments. Areas for a d v ancement include, hit-point biasing, lightweight armor, and shielding. Concepts should h a ve application to major redesigns of sy s t e m s as well as new designs, and address the needs of fighter, large transport, and rotorcraft platf o r m s Recommendation #4. D e v elop an Aircraft M A N P ADS Survivability Design Guide. T h e guide should include synopses of v a l i d a t e d vulnerability reduction features and relative a d v antages and limitations of each feature. The c o n t i n ued from page 3 0