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Aircraft survivability

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Title:
Aircraft survivability
Place of Publication:
Arlington, VA
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Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO)
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Summer 1998
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1998
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Three times a year
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English

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Aeronautics -- Safety measures -- Periodicals -- United States ( lcsh )
Aeronautics -- Safety measures ( fast )
United States ( fast )
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Periodicals. ( fast )
newspaper ( marcgt )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

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Began with 1998.

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
656541464 ( OCLC )
ocn656541464
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TL553.5 ( lcc )

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Digital Military Collection

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Summer 1999 Published by the Joint T echnical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS)

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 2 Aircraft Survivability is published by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). The J T CG/AS is chartered by the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group. V i e w s and comments are welcome and m a y be addressed to the Editor at the f o l l o wing address. E d i t o r Joseph P. Jolley J T CG/AS Central Office 1 2 13 Jefferson Davis Highway C r y stal Gateway #4, Suite 1103 Arlington, VA 22202 P H O N E : 70 3 6 07 3 5 09, ext. 14 D S N : 3 2 7 3 5 09, ext. 14 E-mail: j o l l e y j t @ n a v a i r. n av y. m i l h t t p : / / j t c g j c t e. j c s. m i l : 9 101 Mailing list additions, deletions, and/or changes may be directed to: A F R L / V A V S / S U R V I A C, Building 45 Attention: Linda Ry a n 2 1 3 0 Eighth Street, Suite 1 W r i g h t P atterson AFB, OH 45433-7542 P H O N E : 9 3 7 2 5 5 4 8 4 0 D S N : 7 8 5 4 8 4 0 E-mail: lry a n @ s u r v i a c f l i g h t w p a f b. a f m i l C r eative Dir e c t o r Christina P. McNemar S U R V I A C Satellite Office 3 1 9 0 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church, VA 22 0 4 2 P H O N E : 70 3 2 8 9 5 4 6 4 E-mail: m c n e m a r c h r i s t i n a @ b a h c o m C o ver Design Christina P. McNemar The cover depicts the real threat posed by M A N P ADS such as the SA-14 Gremlin against U.S. aircraft, including transports, fixed-wing and rotorcraft. The aircraft shown are the Lockheed C-130 H e r c u l e s the McDonnel Douglas F-15 E a g l e and the AH-64 Apache helicopter. Contents Aircraft Vulnerability to MANPADS Weapons 4 by Mr.Ronald M u t z M u t ze l b u r g Losing Low Altitude Battlespace The MANPADS Challenge 6 by Rear A d m i r al Robert H. G o rm l e y,U S .N a vy (Ret) EO/IR SAMsA Pilots Perspectiv e 8 by Major Kevin Iiams,USMC National MANPADS Workshop A Vulnerability Perspectiv e 10 by Mr. G r eg Czarnecki MANPADS Combat History 12 by Mr.Kevin Cr o s t h w aite Low Vulnerability Technologies Building a Balanced Approach 14 by Mr. A n t h o n y Lizza and Mr. G r eg Czarnecki National MANPADS Workshop A ddresses Three Key Topics 16 by Mr. D a ve Hall, M r .T o n y Lizza,and Col. S t e ve Cameron A rt i c les Compiled by Mr. D a ve Legg MANPADS Survivability Depends on Aircraft Design and Type 20 by Mr.Jamie Childr e s s M r R o b e r t T o m a i n e and Mr.Michael Mey e r s Defense Acquisition Deskbook and Aerospace Systems Survivability 24 by Mr.Hugh Dr a k e and Mr. D a ve Hall Pioneers of Survivability James Jim Foulk 26 by Mr.J e ff r ey Foulk Joint Live Fire Program Tests Full-Up Stinger Missile Against F-14 Tomcat 28 by Mr.Thomas Julian NDIA Combat Survivability Annual A w ards 30 by Mr.Dale Atkinson Calendar of Events 31 DoD Photo by SRA Jeffrey Allen, 1ST Combat Camera Sq.

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 3 Editor s Notes Important changes are taking place that affect the J T CG/AS. On 7 June 99, the Secretary of Defense signed an action memorandum transferring, "key test and ev a l uation (T&E) functions" to OSD/DOT&E. Included in the transfer were the JTCG/AS and the JTCG/ME. The stated purpose was to streamline the T&E function and strengthen the role of the DOT&E to support serious T&E with a view toward operations early in the life cy c l e of a program. OUSD(A&T) DTSE&E, which previously had oversight of the JTCG/AS, was disestablished by the same memorandum. W eve also recently experienced personnel changes on the Principal Member Steering Group, in our OSD sponsors offices and in the Central Office. Dr. Steven Messervy is the new Army Principal Member. Dr. Messervy is Project Manager of the $2.4M Tri-Service A dvanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures/Common Missile Warning System Joint Program Office located at R edstone Arsenal, Alabama. Prior to assuming his cur rent position, he served as chief of program manage ment of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile project office. We welcome Dr. Messervy to the JTCG/AS. Col Steve Cameron, OUSD(A&T)DTSE&E/SA, who provided outstanding support to the JTCG/AS, was reassigned in June. His new assignment is Commandant of the Air Force Test Pilot School at E d w ards AFB, CA. In addition, Dr. Al R a i n i s OUSD(A&T)DS&TS/A W another strong supporter of the JTCG/AS, retired in June. Dr. Rainis plans to remain in Northern Virginia for a year. The JTCG/AS acknowl edges the strong support and contributions made b y both Col Cameron and Dr. Rainis and wishes them suc cess in their future endea v ors In the Central Office, we welcome two additions to the staff since our last newsletter. Navy Capt Dale Stoehr is filling the Navy military officer position as a collateral duty. Capt Stoehr is assigned to the Na v al Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland to code AIR-4.10.7, Health of Na v al Aviation (HONA) office. In addition, we are glad to welcome Ms. Phyllis Drum to the staff as Administrative Assistant. This issue of Aircraft Survivability is devoted to air craft survivability against the Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) threat. The focus is on vulnera bility reductiondesigning a more damage tolerant aircraft. We know that MANPADS are highly proliferated around the world, are relatively inexpensiv e difficult to count er, easy to use and highly lethal. The Missile and Space Intelligence Center calls MAN P ADS, The Real Threat. Survivability risks are influencing how and if aircraft are emplo y ed in combat. Battlespace is lost. Avoiding the threat is always preferred, ho w ever, to complement threat a v oidance techniques, vulnerability reduction features designed into the aircraft offer a final line of defense. And history sho w s that MANPADS hits are survivable The JTCG/AS will soon be publishing the results of a study conducted at the request of the OUSD Office of the Deputy for Air W a r f a r e Strategic and Tactical Sy s t e m s (OUSD(A&T) S&TS/AW). The study focuses on aircraft vulnerability to MANPADS threats and assesses combat and test data to determine if aircraft survivability can be enhanced through improved vulnerability reduction design techniques. The articles in this issue were derived from a MANPADS w o r k s h o p held in December last year where vulnerability reduction techniques, methodologies and test facilities were topics of concern. The workshop was a part of the study. W e commend the articles on this impor tant subject to your reading and welcome any feedback.

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ingful fix can save the aircraft, why bother to minimize damage to an aircraft hit by a MANPADS miss i l e ? C u r r e n t l y we emphasize avoiding hits to the aircraft. We are pursuing susceptibility reduction in a variety of way s : Radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR) and acoustic signature reduction to minimize lock-on of the missile sy s t e m Speed and super-agility to outpace a missile Standoff attack capability to minimize opportunities for the threat system to engage the aircraft Countermeasures to spoof the in-flight missile. These are great efforts: dont stop! How e ve r whate v er our smart folks do, other smart folks seek to undo. Maybe we can stay ahead of them, maybe not. I feel that we would be wise not to neglect vulnerability reduction, just in case our aircraft gets hit. Working with the Deputy Director, Resources and R a n g e s I asked the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Surviv a b i l i t y ( J T CG/AS): What can be done, in aircraft design or retrofit, to reduce the lethality of a striking IR missile? 1 The corollary to this question is, are current vulnerability reduction techrather tired word puzzle bears the theme of my article: If a tree limb crashes in the center of a forest, and no living creatures are around, does it make a sound? The answer depends on the definition of sound. The dictionary say s : sound (n) is the sensation perceived by the sense of hearing. Clearly, according to the d i c t i o n a r y the limb that crashes does not make a sound, even though it would if someone were listening. If we are to meaningfully decrease the vulnerability of manned aircraft against Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANP A D S ) w e a p o n s we have to make sure someone is listening, not just in the room when we talk. Oratory and zealotrywhile sometimes n e e d e d h a ve been known to turn off the l i s t e n e r The crash and boom are still there, but no meaningful results. M A N P ADS Threat to Manned Air c r a f t M A N P ADS weapons are becoming the threat of choice against aircraft, but the vulnerability community has focused on bullet and fragment threats to aircraft since the Southeast Asia (SEA) conflictwith good r e a s o n : SEA losses were largely due to bullets and fragments. M A N P ADS testing facilities had not been d e ve l o p e d Methodologies to handle the MANP A D S aircraft damage were inadequate. M A N P ADS aircraft hits were perceived to equal aircraft kills. The last bullet is perhaps the most important. If the threat is so lethal that no meanAircraft Survivability Summer 1999 4 A i r craft V u l n e r a b i l i t y to MANPADS W e a p o n s by Mr. Ronald Mutz Mutzelburg A An A-10 Thunderbolt II and F-16 Fighting Falcon fly in formation. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Rose Reynolds.)

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niques adequate, or are new ones needed given the large kinetic energy of the missile body, or some s y n ergistic effect? The answers to these questions will probably depend on the specifics of a given aircraft or, at least, on the class of aircraftas requested in the tasking memorandum. What Is a Solution? As always, the solution is probably more money and people. We need new methodologies to assess aircraft MANPADS vulnerability, testing data to v a l i d a t e the models, andperhaps most importantdesign guidelines so that the developer can hear what the community is sa y i n g The environment for new programsmoney and peopleis v e r y h o s t i l e Starting a new initiative is v e r y difficult. If the community concludes, in answer to my q u e s t i o n s that appropriate work must be done, the funds will come only at the expense of stopping, or s l o wing, something already under way. The affected function probably has constituents. To overcome the r e s i s t a n c e arguments will have to be strong. How Should We Address the Pr o b l e m ? The expert group convened by the JTCG/AS must d e v elop compellingand concisearguments to expand MANPADS vulnerability reduction efforts, if warranted. The last phrase is important: What is the potential payoff? Why should a resource sponsor care, g i v en his or her other needs in a very constrained envir o n m e n t ? And we must be complete and fair! Options to reduce aircraft vulnerability seldom are without some side effect. The identification of vulnerability reduction design or retrofit options should include the costs of exercising the options. This practice would help the user make informed choices during the tradeoff analyses of cost as an independent v a r i a b l e 2 that accompany a new design or major retrofit. C o n c l u s i o n We must make sure that our results can be communicated, and understood, by folks outside of the technical vulnerability community. Assuming that the study now under way s t ro n g l y justifies more efforts to reduce aircraft MANPADS vulnerability, we must package the results appropriately. The final product of the study must clearly say to nonspecialists What is the benefit (roughly) of reducing aircraft MANPADS vulnerability What is the cost (roughly) to do this? We can work together to make sure that the design process hears our (good!) story. We need buy-in from a variety of folks. P r o vide the good story, and I will walk the briefing trail with you to increase the likelihood that the results are sound. n E n d n o t e s 1 Memorandum for Chairman, Principal M e m b e r s Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Surviv a b i l i t y from Deputy D i r e c t o r Air W a r f a r e February 11, 1998. 2 USD(A&T) Memorandum, Reducing Life C y cle Costs for New and Fielded Sy s t e m s, December 4, 1995. About the Author M r Mutzelburg received a B.S.I.E. from W a y n e State University in 1968 and M.S. in Industrial and Systems Engineering from Ohio State U n i v e r sity in 1974. He is currently the Deputy D i r ector for Air W a r fa r e within the Office of S t r ategic and Tactical Systems, Under Secr e t a r y of Defense for Acquisition & T e c h n o l o g y As such he is responsible for acquisition oversight for the B-1, B-2, C-17, F-22, F-18, JST A R S, numer o u s air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons and numerous other aeronautical pr o g ra m s He may be reached at mutzelr e @ a c q o s d m i l Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 5 A USAF F-117A Nighthawk on its way home. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt. Jack Braden.)

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air support, urgent priority strikes under cloud cov e r armed reconnaissance, helicopter operations? This prospect conflicts with the apparent trend, noted above, of ceding the battlespace, below say 15,000 feet, to the e n e m y during the day. And it brings to mind questions that merit answ e r s : Are our future aircraft to be wholly dependent for their combat survivability on hit avoidance measures such as low signatures, countermeasures, stand-off w e a p o n s and smart tactics? Or should some or all be made more damage-resistant in the event they are hit by enemy fire? Are vulnerability reduction features and technologies being given appropriate consideration during the design of new combat aircraft? If damage resistance is not to be a design imperative and we anticipate only stand-off attacks launched from outside low altitude battlespace, are supersonic speed and agility needed in future tactical fighters? Or should we buy lower cost, subsonic a e r i a l t r u c k s , in essence, long endurance platforms that carry big loads of stand-off w e a p o n s both air-to-air and air-to-surface? What is the impact of the seeming abandonment of l o w altitude battlespace on the manned v e r s u s unmanned aircraft debate? Should unmanned programs be accelerated? What are the prospects in future conflicts for the inherently slow, low-flying rotorcraft on which both A r m y and Marine Corps operational concepts are h e a vily dependent? Can land forces be effective if d a ylight air operations, including troop lift, are sharply constrained by MANPADS and AAA? Are the t w o services facing up to this awesome challenge? And finally, will we continue to own the night at l o w altitudes? Is there any prospect that the no w peration Allied F o r c e the NATO air campaign against Y u g o s l a via, reminded us just how much operational concepts and employment of new weapons technology have ev o l v ed since the 1 9 9 1 Gulf W a r And also, how political constraints on military commanders, combined with the anticipated lethality of an enem y s integrated air defense system and large numbers of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), can dictate U.S. tactics and influence o u t c o m e s The reality today seems to be that, absent a pressing need to risk Vietnam-level aircraft attrition rates (1% in NE Sector) and attendant aircrew losses, we are electing to relinquish daytime air battlespace below 15,000 feet to any e n e m y possessing a significant number of M A N P ADS and rapid fire AAA w e a p o n s This was certainly so during Operation Allied F o r c e W h y? Because low altitude operations were not seen as essential to achieving mission success and, more importantly, support for the bombing by the public in Europe and the U.S. w o u l d likely have eroded sharply had we lost three or so aircraft a day, even for a brief period. F o r t u n a t e l y laser and satellite (GPS)-guided weapons enabled our strike aircraft to remain at higher altitudes and still deal very effectiv e l y with fixed targets, subject, in the case of laserguided w e a p o n s to constraints imposed by cloud cov e r On the other hand, attacks against mobile units and armed reconnaissance patrols seeking targets of opportunity were limited, as were operations of Apache attack helicopters. Only the A 1 0, an old, but nevertheless robust, l o w-vulnerability design, was said to be suitable for flight at lower altitudes during da y l i g h t h o u r s But what about situations where operations in MANP A D S / A A A -protected low altitude battlespace cannot be avoided or, indeed, may be mandated during a critical engagementclose Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 6 Losing Low Altitude Battlespace The MANPADS Challenge by Rear A d m i r al Robert H. Gormley, U.S. Navy (R e t ) O

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ubiquitous daylight MANPADS threat may spread to the night hours? A n s w ers to these and related questions turn on what can be done about the MANPADS threat and how it will e vo l v e. Avoiding a missile hit is clearly the preferable c o u r s e but the solution here is proving to be costly and technically challenging. So, it makes sense to explore what might be done to improve the survivability of aircraft hit by MANPADS missiles. In this regard, the limited combat and test data available suggest that a hit does not always equate to a kill, but that the outcome is heavily contingent on the type of aircraft and its design. Here, the A 1 0 and F/A-18 at the top, and the AV-8B at the bottom, are examples at opposite ends of the fixed-wing vulnerability scale. The Combat Survivability Division of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) has long maintained a position that both susceptibility reduction (hit avoidance) and vulnerability reduction (damage resistance/tolerance) merit equal consideration during formulation of operational requirements and subsequent aircraft design and development. R e c e n t l y in response to worries of some association members about what they p e r c e i v e as a general lessening of appreciation for vulnerability reduction, the Division's Executive Board commissioned a study to inquire into the matter. This study has been completed and its findings will be forwarded to G o vernment officials later this y e a r NDIA has, for some time, been concerned about the increasing MANPADS threat. For this reason, we are pleased to note, and strongly support, the current DoDdirected MANPADS project being conducted by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Surviv a b i l i t y which is looking at how vulnerability of an aircraft to a M A N P ADS missile hit might be reduced. And to give added emphasis to this crucial subject, NDIA's survivability symposium program in the year 2000 will focus on the theme of combat air operations in low altitude b a t t l e s p a c e In summary, the MANPADS challenge is about battlespaceboth using it and losing it! Clearly, the threat is serious and has already begun to degrade tactical flexibility and the overall combat effectiveness of U.S. air and land forces. Erosion of low altitude battlespace must be arrested and lost space restored. Y e s this challenge is indeed formidable, but it is one that must be met. n Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 7 RADM Gormley at recent symposium. He is Chairman of NDIA's Combat Survivability Division and may be reached at 650-8548155.

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exploit these s y stems and to enhance the survivability of the aircraft and aircrew W hereas our aircrew per ception of radar SAM engagement is based primarily on electronic radar warning receivers, our perception of the EO/IR SAM is based mainly on the visual spec trum. As pilots we use our eyes, or our wingmans eyes and situational a w areness to determine our engage ment status. Since current EO/IR systems provide litt l e if any, warning of engagement, it is paramount for the aircrew members to be visually aware of their environment and critical for them to acquire any threats of this type. Visual acquisition combined with a compreh e n s i v e knowledge of the threat will allow the aircrew to accurately assess the status of a threat missile in flight and determine the appropriate response. This, h o w e ve r can be an almost impossible task at times, g i v en the growing competition inside the cockpit for the pilots attention. Tactics against the EO/IR SAM threat vary based on type of aircraft and its capabilities but generally fall into one of three categories: av o i d a n c e maneuv e r or counterm e a s u r e / e x p e n d a b l e s Each of these categories can be further divided into preemptive and react i v e tactics. R e a c t i v e tactics are measures taken by the aircrew to defeat a system that is in flight. These tactics have mixed success. Although a timely response to an acquired threat is typically successful, we know from statistics that it is the unseen shot that will be the fatal one. You cant react to what you dont see, and with cockpit tasking growing with each new heads down w e a p o n or subsystem, aircrews are seeing less and less of what is outside the cockpit. That is where preemptive tacticstactics designed to prevent weapon emplo y m e n t or possibly defeat an engaged systemcome into p l a y. For those critical portions of the flight in which the aircrew are heavily tasked, and thus more likely to s a tactical pilot, I have changed my view over the years of the EO/IR SAM from seeing it as a planning nuisance to seeing it as a formidable, reputable threat. Early versions of the weapon sy s t e m were few in number and did not possess the kinematics or the IRCCM capability to engage a modern fighter attack aircraft. This situation obviously changed, as the EO/IR SAMs capabilities grew and the demand for this inexpens i v e yet highly effective form of air defense caused dramatic increases in production and proliferation. From an attack pilot standpoint, the EO/IR SAM has become, to quote the EO/IR SAM division at DIA/MSIC, The R e a l Threat. An aircrews perception of the threat and their response to it are based on the efforts to Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 8 EO/IR SAMs A Pilots Perspective by Major Kevin Iiams, USMC A Combat loaded F/A-18 Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron Nine Four (VFA-94). The aircraft carries AIM-9 Sidewinder shor t range, and AIM-7 Spar r ow medium range air-to-air missiles, and one laser guided bomb. (U.S. Navy Photo by Lieutenant Steve Lightstone.)

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miss a visual acquisition, preemptive tactics provide a measure of protection. Without a doubt the EO/IR SAM is an extremely potent weapon system. So why would supposedly intelligent aviators purposely expose themselves to this threat? Well, if we dont have to, we wont. How e ve r for the majority of the missions that tactical bombing platforms perform (close air support and armed reconnaissance), we are likely to be forced into a portion of the threat env e l o p e This is inevitable for a number of reasons. When employing ordnance in close proximity to friendlies, or in an u n k n o wn target environment, target acquisition is vital. But given the limits of the human eye, aircrew cannot expect to detect and acquire tactical sized targets beyond about 2 nautical miles (12,000 feet). Target recognition will occur at even shorter ranges. Thus, it would be necessary to get closer to the target than safety concerns alone w o u l d d i c t a t e In addition, the professionalism of aircrews, not to mention real world rules of engagement (ROE), dont tolerate much error or risk of friendly fire casualties. So, aircrews will do what it takes to kill the bad guys and not our Marines and sold i e r s That may mean aircrew members must risk the aircraft and their lives by going into the threat env e l o p ; if so, its time to earn the flight pay. This commitment to the mission is all that much easier to sustain when the aircrew feel that the majori ty of the risk to self and aircraft has been mit igated, and that aircrew performance is the only remaining factor. Against the EO/IR SAM threat, aircrews count on detailed exploitation and s y stem knowledge of the threat to develop viable preemptive and reac tive tactics. We also depend on the robust sur vivability engineering of our aircraft since w e know that we will be engaged, that the likeli hood of seeing every SAM will be small, and that we will take hits n About the Author Major Iiams, USMC is head of the F/A-18 Division of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One at MCAS Yuma, Arizona, and is the EO/IR SAM and AAA Instructor. Major Iiams graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B .S. in General Engineering. He has flown 2300 flight hours in the F/A-18, F-5, and training air craft. He is credited with 41 combat missions in the F/A-18 during Desert Storm, and sustained combat damage due to EO/IR SAM. He may be r eached at iiamsk@yuma.usmc.mil. Editors Note: Major Iiams has recently been reassigned and is attending professional military education in residence. Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 9 Battle damaged F/A-18. This aircraft flew 250 nm to home base and was returned to service in under 48 hours. Post flight assessment of EO/IR SAM damage during Desert Storm.

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2 A MANPADS hit does not equal a kill. For military and commercial aircraft, the probabilities of a kill given a hit (P K/H ) are 51 percent and 70 percent, respec tively. Given hits, most kills result from subs y stem vul nerabilities 3 M A N P ADS survivability lessons learned from Desert Storm include: Fly at night and at very high altitudes K eep flight control h y draulics a wa y from likely hit locations Separate fuel s y stems from likely hit locations Incorporate fluid shutoff mechanisms in the aft portions of engines Use extended nozzles 4 Helicopters ha v e a more difficult time a v oiding detection and outmaneuvering the MANP A D S threat than do fighter aircraft. Pilots must fly at lo w altitudes to identify targets and successfully complete their mission with substantial certainty. Of all factors the engine's location and critical subs y stems redun dancy in current aircraft designs influence survivability the most. Single engine aircraft can be made survivable if vulnerability reduction features are incorporated early in the design stage 5 MANPADS weapons offer an economical means of destroying high-value targets, making them the w eapon of choice in Third World countries and terror ist organizations. Terrorists armed with MANPADS rep resent the number 1 threat to transport aircraft. Large signatures (visual and IR), slow speed, and lack of maneuverability, make transport aircraft easy MAN PADS targets. Vulnerability reduction features are needed to enhance survivability he National MANPADS Workshop w as held 15 December 1998 at the Redstone Arsenal, Alabama to bring the nation's talents to bear on a i r c r a f t M A N P ADS (Man Portable Air Defense System) vulnerability issues. The workshop was cohosted by the Joint T echnical Coordinating Group on Aircraft S u r v i v ability (JTCG/AS) and the Defense Intelligence Agency's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). Workshop objec tives were to: 1) gather and exchange infor mation concerning aircraft-MANP A D S encounters, 2) compile a roadmap of current MANPADS vulnerability reduction activities and 3) identify MANPADS-capable vulnera bility reduction solutions D r Patricia Sanders, OUSD(A&T) DTSE&E, presented the keynote address. Among the workshop highlights were presen tations by three Desert Storm pilots whose aircraft were hit by MANPADS missiles. Each discussed their low altitude operations (required for target identification) and the experience of being hit without w a r n i n g Throughout the 3-day workshop, go v ernment and industry speakers described MANPADS proliferation and lethality, susceptibility reduction limitations, and the need to incor porate a rational measure of vulnerability reduction into aircraft designs. Briefing topics and breakout sessions concentrated on vul nerability reduction techniques, assessment methodologies, and test facility capabilities Whatever the subject, discussions throughout the workshop emphasized the follo w i n g common messages: 1 MANPADS threats are lethal and ha ve proliferated worldwide in large numbers This shoulder-launched weapon s y stem rep resents the most prolific SAM threat to mod ern aircraft. Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 10 National MANPADS W orkshop A Vulnerability Perspective by Mr. Greg Czarnecki T

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6 P articipants in the vulnerability reduction tech niques breakout session called for expanded test databases and impro v ed assessment methodologies to support development of many MANPADS-capable fea tures. In addition, they said vulnerability reduction techniques required input from the susceptibility reduction community to ensure attainment of optimal survivability without detracting from stealth or coun termeasures. They emphasized that all proposed MAN PADS-capable vulnerability reduction techniques offered the prospect of impro v ed aircraft survivability through implementation of currently a v ailable tech nologies. Examples included: Incorporating sacrificial nozzles and structure Locating IR sources in less vulnerable areas Locating flight control systems away from IR sources Hardening or shielding critical components around IR sources Thermally managing engines (having outboard engines run hotter than inboard engines) Thermally managing IR sources to direct seekers to the least vulnerable location Using material s y stems that reduce the probabili ty of a fuse functioning as intended Increasing the engine's compressor stall margin before missile impact Decreasing vulnerabilities associated with ram, fire, and explosion Developing engine rotors capable of rebalancing after sustaining damage Developing fail-safe structure 7 Participants in the vulnerability assessment methodologies session added they needed an enhanced MANPADS test database to support develop ment of impro v ed assessment methodologies. They Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 11 reported that models were incapable of pre dicting surface-to-air missile hit locations and called for specific impro v ements in target IR signature models and threat-in-the-loop soft w are. They stressed that modeling require ments need to drive tests performed and data collected. Participants in the vulnerability test facilities and capabilities session stated that current MANPADS test facilities were general ly adequate and no major investments were required. They noted exceptions relative to shotline control and handling of large, trans port-sized aircraft as targets In summary, MANPADS ha v e become a highly proliferated and lethal threat to all types of aircraft. Countermeasures are diffi cult to achieve and may not keep up with this evolving threat. The prospect of MANPADS hits has curtailed battlespace, particularly for d a ytime and low altitude operations. Nevertheless, all aircraft (even stealth and highfliers) remain susceptible to MANPADS positioned near airfields. To remedy this situ ation and improve overall surviv a b i l i t y M A N P ADS-capable vulnerability reduction features must be integrated into aircraft designs along with countermeasures. Designing in a proper mix of susceptibility reduction and vulnerability reduction fea tures, will ensure aircraft an optimal level of survivability at the lo w est possible cost. n About the Author M r Czarnecki received his B.S. in Civil Engineering and his M.S. in Materials Engineering from the University of Dayton. He is a civilian with the Air Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicles Directorate, Survivability & Safety Branch. Mr. Czarnecki specializes in Aircraft sur vivability, concentrating on impact physics of composites, projectile-induced hydrodynamic ram, and aircraft vulnerability reduction to the MAN P ADS shoulder-launched missile threat. He is a member of the JTCG/AS Vulnerability Reduction Subgroup and Chairman of that organization's Structures & Materials Committee. He may be r eached at gregory.czarnecki@va.wpafb.af.mil.

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A f g h a n i s t a n In 1979, the Soviets inv a d e d Afghanistan with several airborne and armored divis i o n s and were soon able to establish a local puppet government. How e ve r a guerrilla war with native Mujahideen could not be won quickly in the rough mountainous country s i d e despite superior Soviet airp o w e r In 1986, modern MANPADS (Blowpipe and Stinger) were supplied to the Afghan rebels, and it was reported that 340 Stingers shot down 269 aircraft. Although the S o viets employed IR jammers, engine exhaust suppress o r s and flares, the MANPADS threat greatly influenced S o viet tactics. For example, TU-16 and SU-24 bomber pilots had become accustomed to delivering their ordnance from relatively low altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 feet. Considering the new MANPADS threat, pilots began to fly at about 10,000 feet, decreasing their accuracy. L i k e w i s e the Mi24 and Mi25 pilots engaged in direct combat less often, and when they did, they flew low and fast over their targets. Also, to avoid the low-altitude danger posed by MANPADS, Soviet pilots began making high-gradient climbs at takeoff to reach safe flight lev e l s q u i c k l y Although combat losses dropped by using these new takeoff procedures, accident rates rose. Desert Storm In 1991, U.S. air power was used d e c i s i v ely against Iraq. Aircraft were sent on a wide v a r i ety of missions, and overall aircraft losses were much less than expected. Figure 1 shows a breakdown by threat of all aircraft damaged in combat and also the subset of these aircraft that were lost. It is obvious that IR SAMS killed the most aircraft. When the relative probability of kills given a hit is plothe first MANPADS, the U.S. R e d e y e, became operational in 1967. The So v i e t S A -7 followed in 1968. Both w e a p o n s relied on IR tracking, a small warhead, and contact fuzing and were employed by teams of t w o soldiers. MANPADS quickly became a successful new class of air defense threats. Incident Highlights S o u t h east Asia (SEA) Allied operations in SEA relied heavily on air pow e r and the U.S. lost thousands of aircraft of all types. The primary threats were small arms, AAA, and RF SAMS. In 1972, as U.S. inv o l v ement w a n e d S A -7 MANPADS were introduced as a new threat. SA-7s hit and damaged 26 U.S. aircraft, killing 20. Only three of the 26 aircraft w e r e j e t s which gave rise to the theory that SA 7 s could engage only slo w m o ving targets. As a countermeasure against the MANPADS threat, U.S. Forces deployed flares, both preemptiv e l y and after seeing SA-7 rocket plumes. The flares worked effectively against early MANP A D S ; h o w e ve r later versions of the SA-7 used a smokeless propellant, which made the flare method less effective. Y om Kippur In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The Israelis quickly launched a counterattack, but were repelled with heavy losses. Eighteen da y s later, the Israelis pre v ailed. MANPADS caused only a small por tion of the Israeli losses in the Yom Kippur w ar. MANPADS were not a dominant factor in this conflict because of a simple but effec t i v e countermeasure. The Israelis correctly determined that their primary ground attack aircraft, the A4, was the most susceptible to SA-7 attacks. Their simple fix was to attach a tailpipe extension on the A4, which effectiv ely mo v ed the likely SA-7 impact point a way from the single engine and other flight-criti cal components in the aircrafts tail. Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 12 M A N PA D S Combat History by Mr. Kevin Cr o s t h w a i t e T Figure 1. Desert Storm Damage by Threat

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ted, the IR SAMS and RF SAMS stand out as the most lethal threats encountered in Desert Storm. O t h er Conflicts M A N P ADS have also been used in smaller conflicts. The British Blowpipe was credited with killing eight light attack Pucara aircraft during the Falklands w a r MANPADS have been used against U.S., French, and Israeli aircraft in Lebanon. They have been used in Eriteria against Ethiopians, by Kurds against T u r k e y and by all sides in Bosnia. North Korea allegedly used a MANPADS against a U.S. helicopter stra y i n g across the DMZ. Even during Urgent Fury in Grenada, where the U.S. held air supremacy, Stinger teams w e r e d e p l o yed with the U.S. ground forces for additional air defense protection. C i v i l In November 1975, a MANPADS w a s launched at and damaged a Skyvan aircraft over Angola; this was the first recorded engagement of a civil aircraft. The most recent incident was the 10 October 1998 shoot d o wn of a Boeing 727 in Congo. The intervening y e a r s h a ve witnessed 34 such incidents. Twenty four of these aircraft were lost, with more than 585 casualties. Most of these incidents occurred in hot war zones, and the aircraft were engaged in quasi-military missions, such as flying in aid or supplies, evacuating civilians, or transporting troops. These 34 incidents inv o l v ed many types of aircraft and M A N P ADS. SA-7s were the most common w e a p o n s used, but SA-16s and Stingers were also used. Controlled tests in the U.S. have shown that each of these MANPADS is fully capable of tracking and locking onto commercial aircraft at reasonable distances while they are landing or taking off. M A N P ADS have not been used against commercial airline traffic, but this is a real possibility. It is difficult to estimate the tragic consequences that could result if a civil aircraft is shot down by MANPADS. To illustrate, on 6 April 1994 an aircraft carrying the President of Rw a n d a was shot down, killing all passengers. This act ignited a genocidal civil war in which more than 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus w e r e massacred. Several thousand survivors became r e f u g e e s Such awful consequences are a real danger of MANP A D S Combat Data Analysis S U R V I A C has data on each MANPADS incident in SEA and Desert Storm, including aircraft type and serial number, date, time, location, aircraft speed, altitude, mission, and threat engagement geometry. Attack aircraft and helicopters were most often engaged by M A N P ADS during these conflicts because their m i s s i o n s such as close support and air interdiction, brought them to lower altitudes. Because the type of aircraft that perform such missions face the greatest risk of attack by M A N P ADS, these aircraft should be the focus of vulnerability reduction efforts. As Figure 2 shows, MANPADS attacks occurred predominately during the day, although the systems are not technically limited to daytime use. In fact, the IR seeker should work best at night, given the greater contrast b e t w een a hot target and a cool background. The limitation, therefore, appears to stem from the MANPADS teams inability to see their targets at night. In comparing day and night attacks across all threat types during Desert Storm, the aversion to night operations was peculiar to MANPADS. One reason might be that the MANPADS teams were disbursed and isolated, often with only a radio for command and control and early warning. These teams also usually acquire their targets by eyesight, and usually do not have night vision gogg l e s Increasing availability of night vision devices could significantly enhance MANP A D S night operations. How e ve r improved sy s t e m wide command and control and early w a r n i n g might still be necessary for the these teams to reach full effectiv e n e s s To determine the frequency of MANP A D S e n g a g e m e n t s it is important to follow the action on the battlefield. In the early phase of an air campaign, missions can be well planned Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 13 Figure 2. Day vs. Night MANPADS Incidents. c o n t i n ued on page 2 5

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 14 awareness and timely knowledge of the inbound threat. A d v anced guidance systems make the MANPADS threat extremely difficult to detect, allowing virtually no time for the pilot to react. In fact, Desert Storm events demonstrated that most often a pilots first indication of being targeted occurred after the aircraft was hit. In addition, a d v anced missile seekers may detect aircraft once thought invisible to these sy s t e m s Tactical mission doctrine already dictates that combat operations are best conducted at nighton the premise that if you can be seen, you can be hit. D a ytime battle space is therefore being relinquished because ev o l v i n g threats pose unacceptable risks. Extending well above 10,000 feet, the present threat env e l o p e MANP A D S threats have forced air operations to ever-higher altitudes, and made weather and clouds an increasing factor in mission planning. Moreov e r regardless of the threat avoidance measure, aircraft of all types remain highly susceptible to these portable, shoulder-launched, heatseeking threats during takeoffs and landings. The Need for Low Vulnerability T e c h n o l o g y Increasing proliferation and lethality of MANPADS and growing concern that existing susceptibility reduc tion techniques alone may not provide adequate pro tection raise the question, What LV features could enhance aircraft survivability and regain battle space? LV techniques and designs can provide a necessary line of protection and contribute immensely to ov e r a l l s u r v i v ability of aircraft of all types. Unfortunately, before these life saving technologies can be considered, the LV community must overcome two false perceptions: 1) a hit equals a kill, and 2) nothing can lower aircraft vuln e r a b i l i t y Many events prove that aircraft can and do surv i v e MANPADS hits. LV technologies and design features eal world experiences highlight the importance of aircraft surviv a b i l i t y The 5,000+ U.S. fixed and rotary wing aircraft lost during Vietnam made it clear that survivability had not always been giv e n sufficient emphasisespecially during design. In the years since Vietnam, the JTCG/AS and others ha v e made significant progress in developing a host of technologies, from fire detection and suppression to ballistic-toler ant structures. Most of these low vulnerabili ty (LV) technologies ha v e focused on design ing aircraft to survive hits from AAA and sin gle missile-fragment threats Over the same period, the introduction of stealth technology turned the survivability communitys attention to w ard the benefit of susceptibility reduction (i.e., low observables [LO] and countermeasures [CM]). These rev olutionary technologies, so clearly demon strated in Desert Storm, ha v e made it possible for LO aircraft to go virtually undetected dur ing combat operations, significantly reducing the likelihood of hits from RF-guided threats M A N P ADS Thr e a t Yet today, a host of emerging missile threats present new and significant challenges to current aircraft designs. Among them, the MANPADS threatens not only combat aircraft (fighters/bombers/helicopters), but also vital military t r a n s p o r t s tankers, and command-and-control assets traditionally thought to operate out of h a r m s way. MANPADS are a hit-to-kill threat that has now proliferated w o r l d w i d e MANPADS ready availability to all comers with cash in hand increases the survivability challenge. Peacetime survival capabilities are becoming as important as those required in w a r Avoiding the threat through the use of signature reduction, CM, and tactics is the preferred solution. No pilot wants to get hit! Still, t o d ay s CMs depend heavily on situational Low Vulnerability T e c h n o l o g i e s Building a Balanced Appr o a c h by Mr. Anthony Lizza and Mr. Greg Czarnecki Desert Storm A V -8B loss due to MANPADS R

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 15 often contributed critically to a damaged aircrafts successful return. Determining which onboard LV features lend thems e l v es to aircraft survival after a hit requires full understanding of the threat. Hit-to-kill MANPADS w e a p o n s differ greatly from bullet and single missile fragments and the community has yet to fully characterize the diff e r e n c e s Compared with AAA, MANPADS delivers perhaps 20 times the explosive charge weight and orders-of-magnitude more mass. Combined with the large variety of M A N P ADS missile types and fuses av a i l a b l e these factors make it extremely difficult to predict potential damage a critical component in developing LV technologies. S e c o n d l y the community must analyze which zones (structural, fuel system, propulsion, flight syst e m s etc.) are most prone to failure by aircraft type (transport, tactical, rotary) and mission (first strike, air s u p e r i o r i t y and CAS). Desert Storm results provide the opportunity to learn l e s s o n s because some aircraft designs proved less vulnerable than others. What built-in LV techniques prev e n t e d losses? Which features were lacking in aircraft that w e r e lost? This analysis may be simplified by the historically high probability of MANPADS strikes at specific hot-spot l o c a t i o n s Because most fielded MANPADS w e a p o n s incorporate older technologies, the LV community should concentrate its attention on and around the common hit locations. Knowledge of likely hit locations may reduce the need for full LV protection of the entire aircraft. H o w e ve r as improved seekers are developed, they increase the randomness of hit locations. M o r e o v e r the community cannot ignore future threats. D i r e c t e d e n e r g y once tomorro w s threat, is already being used in some applications. As its use ev o l ve s and new threats e m e r g e the community must not limit its view simply to immediate issues. S u m m a r y A combination of susceptibility reduction and LV features optimizes surviv a b i l i t y Susceptibility reduction features reduce the number of potential hits and remain an essential element of aircraft defense. But even if susceptibility reduction techniques work perfectly, hits will still occur. LV features plug holes in the primary defense and prevent hits from being k i l l s LV provides a necessary second line of d e f e n s e and remains viable as threats ev o l v e. The mix of aircraft survivability features is not 5 0 : 5 0. It depends on aircraft type and mission. Achieving the proper mix requires a candid assessment of each features measure of effect i ve n e s s coupled with its cost, weight, and operational penalties. n About the Authors M r Anthony Lizza is a graduate of the National Defense Univer s i t y s Industrial College of the Armed F o rc e s the University of Dayton and Pur d u e U n i v e r sity Schools of Engineering. He has over 18 y e a r s experience in air c r aft survivability and safety related r e s e a r ch. He currently serves as tri-service Chairman of the JTCG/AS V u l n e r ability R e d u c t i o n S u b g r oup. He has authored numerous technical publications and been an invited speaker for a variety of S/V related cour s e s symposiums, and confere n c e s He may be reached at lizzat@afrl.af.mil. M r Czarnecki received his B.S. in Civil Engineering and his M.S. in Materials Engineering f r om the University of Dayton. He is a civilian with the AFRL Air Vehicles Dir e c t o ra t e Survivability & Safety Branch. Mr. Czarnecki specializes in Air c ra f t s u r v i v a b i l i t y concentrating on impact physics of c o m p o s i t e s projectile-induced hydrodynamic r a m and air c r aft vulnerability reduction to the MANPADS shoulder-launched missile threat. He is a member of the JTCG/AS V u l n e r ability R e d u c t i o n S u b g r oup and Chairman of that or g a n i z a t i o n s S t r u c t u r es & Materials Committee. He may be reached at gr e g o r y. c z a r n e c k i @ v a w p a f b. a f m i l Desert Storm F/A-18 survives MANPADS hit.

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 16 in one area of the aircraft may have little or no effect if the aircraft is hit elsewhere. To determine hit point accuracy in modeling engagement dynamics, several issues need attention. Target signature models do not typically have the fidelity required to determine where the missile is likely to hit; very few targets have been modeled as an i m a g e as opposed to a point source. In addition, target infrared (IR) signatures can vary considerably as a function of environmental parameters, making it difficult to predict where final impact of any given shot will occur. A n a l y ses comparing the output of all-digital fly-out simulations with actual flight test data have indicated that the terminal intercept velocities and angles predicted by the models are relatively accurate, but the miss distances and impact points on the target usually are not. The threat Signal Processor in the Loop (SPIL) is a promising technique for predicting hit location for these sy s t e m s and it should provide validation data to i m p r o ve digital simulations. This technique has been s h o wn to predict accurate hit locations for U.S. IRguided missile sy s t e m s Target Vulnerability to MANP A D S Lack of sufficient historical MANPADS combat data is an impediment to determining exact MANPADS damage m e c h a n i s m s Combat data also are inconclusive in addressing the multi-engine versus single engine issue. he National MANPADS W o r k s h o p was held 15 December 1998 at the Sparkman Center, R e d s t o n e Arsenal, Alabama. The w o r k s h o p brought together more than 100 experts for a technical exchange about how to make aircraft less vulnerable to Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) threats. Three breakout sessions addressed vulnerability assessment methodologies, vulnerability reduction techniques, and vulnerability test facilities and capabilities. Dave Hall (NAWCWD), T o n y Lizza (AFRL) and Col. Steve Cameron (OUSD [A&T]) respectiv e l y chaired the sessions. The sessions used open and active dialogue to promote this technical i n t e r c h a n g e M A N P ADS Vulnerability Assessment M e t h o d o l o g i e s M r Dave Hall The MANPADS vulnerability assessment breakout session focused on two areas, one on target engagement dynamics and the other on target vulnerability to MANP A D S g i v en a hit. Both sessions included sev e r a l briefings and followup discussion to answ e r the questions posed in the workshop hando u t s A notional roadmap was developed for each of the two assessment areas. Target Engagement Dynamics T h e purpose of the engagement dynamics assessment session was to determine the capability to predict where MANPADS weapons are likely to hit the target, as a function of launch c o n d i t i o n s countermeasures emplo y m e n t and aircraft maneuv e r s given the environmental conditions at the time of launch. This assessment is critical to evaluating the effect i v eness of vulnerability reduction features for MANPADS hits, because what is effective National MANPADS Workshop Addresses T h r ee Key T o p i c s by Mr. Dave Hall, Mr. Tony Lizza, and Col. Steve Camer o n Articles Compiled by Mr. Dave Legg T A-10 survives MANPADS hit and lives to fight again.

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 17 S U R V I A C conducted a literature search to identify and evaluate previous MANPADS vulnerability assessm e n t s All assessments were conducted manually, using drawings and threat templates. A standard approach to manual assessments is av a i l a b l e and the M A N P ADS project ongoing at SURVIAC is taking that approach to evaluate MANPADS threats to several airc r a f t H o w e ve r MANPADS analysis techniques are only as good as the data available to support them. Inputs required for MANPADS vulnerability assessments include threat characterization data, damage data, and test data to support model verification and v a l i d a t i o n (V&V). Data for V&V activities include static and dynamic tests of actual aircraft structures and critical c o m p o n e n t s Dynamic shots are required to determine damage mechanisms from the kinetic energy in the missile and evaluate combined warhead and kinetic energy effects. The shortage of test data required to conduct vulnerability analyses is critical. U n a n s w ered to date is the question of how accurate the hit point prediction must be for vulnerability assessment. If the choice of vulnerability reduction technique depends on precisely where the missile h i t s then experts probably need to improve the accuracy of engagement analy s e s as well as consider other more robust vulnerability reduction techniques. A requirements analysis needs to be done to determine, for a number of aircraft types, how sensitive vulnerability reduction effects are to the assumed hit point. Those studies could also contribute to dev e l o p m e n t of rules of thumb to estimate vulnerability reduction effectiv e n e s s R o a d m a p Workshop participants proposed the f o l l o wing projects: Perform a hit location prediction accuracy requirements study, based on analysis of vulnerability sensitivity to variations in hit location and orientation, to determine what effect errors in hit location have on the assessed effectiveness of vulnerability reduction features. Use of the SPILs as they are developed to v a l i d a t e the digital MANPADS fly-out simulations for hit location prediction. L e v erage ongoing activities under the A d v anced Joint Effectiveness Model (AJEM) project. Some work in the vulnerability assessment methodology area is already partially funded, mostly as part of the AJEM-funded tasking. These efforts include improved penetration methodologies and component response modeling. Approximate milestones for interim capabilities are available for viewing in the National MANPADS Workshop: A V u l n e r ability P e r spective Pr o c e e d i n g s Volume I, pages 53839. Conduct dynamic and static tests and d e v elop an improved test database to support generation of input data required for MANPADS vulnerability a s s e s s m e n t s This work includes dev e l o p ing data on fuse functioning and missile debris characterization and effects. M A N P ADS Vulnerability Reduction T e c h n i q u e s M r Tony Lizza The session began with sev e r a l G o vernment and industry briefings on classic HEI/API projectile and conceptual MANPADS vulnerability reduction (VR) techn i q u e s The following group discussion explored what VR techniques had w o r k e d what other potential VR techniques existed, and, finally, what should be done to reduce the vulnerability of current and future aircraft to this lethal threat. The group discussion identified additional data sources that might be available to help address the MANPADS threat, known damage mechanisms and typical damage states caused by MANPADS threats, and the certain kill areas on current aircraft from the MANPADS threat. The group then looked at what built-in vulnerability reduction techniques had prevented losses in combat. The principal example was extended nozzles like those on the F / A -18. In Desert Storm, at least four F/A 1 8 s c o n t i n ued on page 1 8

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 18 Vulnerability Test Facilities and Capabilities for MANP A D S Col. Steve Camer o n The purpose of this session was to assess the practi cability and affordability of MANPADS testing b y reviewing the current DoD test and evaluation capabil ities for MANPADS vulnerability testing. The group began by summarizing the desired test conditions in terms of engagement geometry, target realism, and data expected to be required by the methodology group. F or realistic lethality, the group agreed that the MANPADS missile would require a live warhead, natu ral fuzing, and a realistic missile/motor body. A realis tic target would involve target orientation for normal forces (right side up), application of flight loads, air flo w tactical loading of fuel and munitions, pressur ization of the aircraft (most important for cargo air craft), and, finally, a running aircraft. T aking these considerations into account, the group determined that the most important items in conduct ing MANPADS vulnerability testing were geometry v elocity, blast location, warhead function, and test asset reco v ery. The group noted that the last factor explained why actual live firings of missiles at flying aircraft, although important demonstrations, were not the optimum method for vulnerability testing. Control of shot lines and reco v ery of the test asset were para mount, participants emphasized, for gathering the data necessary to construct vulnerability models The group placed aircraft configuration at the next level of importance, with pressurization being more that were hit by MANPADS returned to base. Most returned to battle after engine replacement and relatively minor repair w o r k G e n e r a l l y the group agreed that current VR t e c h n i q u e s although designed to HEI damage effects, had demonstrated some effectiveness against MANPADS threats. A majority argued that two engines would be better than one; how e ve r the group also agreed that a single engine aircraft could survive a MANPADS hit if the hit point on the engine exhaust were well aft of any flight-critical s u b s y s t e m s Other VR techniques believed to h a ve potential were also identified. The session identified the need for MANPADS threat performance characterization data; data on static and dynamic MANP A D S test on actual aircraft; data on current vulnerability reduction technique performance against MANPADS; a low-cost, repeatable M A N P ADS test technique; and models that can assess MANPADS vulnerability reduction t e c h n i q u e s These were deemed essential to support vulnerability reduction technique d e v elopment and ev a l u a t i o n R o a d m a p Workshop participants proposed the following projects: L e v erage ongoing activities under the F16 Joint Live Fire (JLF) Program and other ongoing test programs Undertake a MANPADS JLF Program to assess in detail the vulnerability of current fleet aircraft Perform MANPADS V u l n e r a b i l i t y Reduction, Phase I, testing to assess the e f f e c t i v eness of vulnerability reduction techniques developed as a result of the M A N P ADS Characterization T e s t i n g M A N P ADS JLF, and other related testing Perform MANPADS V u l n e r a b i l i t y Reduction, Phase II, testing to refine techniques or develop additional techn i q u e s c o n t i n ued from page 1 7 Every F/A-18 that was hit by a MANPADS survived and was returned to combat in short order .

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 19 important for civil aircraft and munitions loading more important for military aircraft. Of lesser impor tance were air flo w especially for slow-flying aircraft such as helicopters, g-loading, and the choice of a mis sile that was the actual threat or a surrogate One surprise occurred in discussion of data collec tion requirements. Participants noted the need for the standard information required for vulnerability model design and verification. In addition, a member of the law enforcement community pointed out that infor mation gathered from test sites could aid in the foren sic efforts to investigate future terrorist uses of MAN P ADS. Not only might this information help locate the perpetrator; it might also allow determination of the exact missile used, leading to use of the data to validate vulnerability models The group concluded that DoD facilities had sub stantial capability to conduct MANPADS testing, and only relatively minor investment, depending on the methodology required, might be needed to increase capability R oadmap W orkshop participants proposed the following projects: Some sled track durability enhancements might be required if a large number of shots is necessary and facilities might require modification if more than just sections of large aircraft must be used. Also, if the magnetic induction gun at China Lake is used instead of a sled track, gun modification w ould be required to impart fewer gs to the threat missile Development and procurement of surrogate mis siles would be required if a large number of shots is required, and airflow facilities would require some upgrades for fast-moving targets In summary, the breakout sessions accomplished the chief objective of the National MANP A D S W orkshop by promoting the open and active technical dialogue necessary to develop cost-effective vulnerabil ity reduction techniques for the MANPADS threat. n About the Authors M r Hall has 30 years experience in missile ordnance system design analysis, weapons systems r e q u i r ements definition, mission effectiveness analysis, survivability analysis, technical c o n t r act monitoring and model and simulation verification, validation and accreditation (VV&A). Dave is currently Chief Analyst and Head of the Analysis Branch of the NAWCWD Survivability Division; Co-Director of the Joint A c c re d i t a t i o n Support Activity (J A S A); Chairman of the Methodology Subgroup in the JTCG/AS; and Chairman of the NAWCWD Science and Technology Network for Analysis R e s o u rc e s He may be reached at halldh@navair n a v y. m i l M r Anthony Lizza is a graduate of the National Defense Univer s i t y s Industrial College of the Armed F o rc e s the University of Dayton and P u r due University Schools of Engineering. He has over 18 years experience in air c r aft survivability and safety related r e s e a r ch. He currently serves as tri-service Chairman of the JTCG/AS V u l n e ra b i l i t y Reduction Subgroup. He has authored numer o u s technical publications and been an invited speaker for a variety of survivability/vulnerability r e l a t e d c o u rs e s symposiums, and confer e n c e s He may be reached at lizzat@afrl.af.mil. Col Cameron has served as an experimental test pilot on several programs, most notably the B-2 bomber program, and various staff positions dur ing two previous tours at the Pentagon. As the Principal Assistant for Systems A s s e s s m e n t OUSD(A&T) he provided financial and techni cal oversight of the JTCG/AS and ME, develop mental test oversight of the 2 0 7 major programs on the OSD Test and Evaluation Oversight list, and oversight of the Joint Test and Evaluation Program. He may be reached at camerose@ acq.osd.mil. Editors Note: Col Cameron has been re-assigned to the Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB, CA. OUSD(A&T)D T SE&E/S A was disestablished on 7 June 99. M r Legg has 16 years of experience in air c r aft survivability r e q u i r ements definition and mission effectiveness analysis. He is currently a Senior Engineer with the SURVICE Engineering Company supporting ground and air system survivability evaluations. Dave is also a member of the AIAA Survivability Technical Committee. He may be reached at dave@survice c o m

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 20 Transport Signature Makes Them an Easy Target E n g i n e s Transports have large engines, which p r o vide a correspondingly large thermal signature to IR MANPADS seekers operating in both the 3 to 5 micron and 8 to 12 micron IR bands. The thermal signature of transports is generally more than sufficient to allow targeting of the aircraft w e l l b e y ond the kinematic range of the missile. N a vigation Lights N a vigation lights are excellent IR emitters and can prove very attractive to M A N P ADS from certain angles. Local Hot Spots Transports may have air conditioning or auxiliary power units that operate for the duration of the flight, creating additional IR signature sources. Visual Signature The large size of transports makes them much easier to acquire visually than small fighter jets. This large visual signature allows transports to be tracked and targeted beyond the maximum range of most MANPADS. Tactical Employment of Transports Makes Avoiding MANPADS Difficult Speed and Maneuv e r i n g The limited maneuvering capability and subsonic speed of transport bility to survive attack by the MANPADS varies greatly, depending on the type of aircraft and its design features. H e r e three authorsJamie Childress, Robert T o m a i n e and Michael Mey e r s e x a m ine the MANPADS survivability of large transp o r t s rotorcraft, and fighters, respectiv e l y L a r ge T r a n s p o r t Survivability Against the MANPADS Thr e a t M r Jamie Childr e s s Boeing Phantom W o r k s S e a t t l e WA F or the air c r ews of large military transport airc r aft, the thought of being shot down by a should e r f i r ed, heat-seeking missile while flying at low altitude is probably their worst nightmare Armed Forces Journal International, October 1996 Transports have been the targets of MANPADS missile attacks in the past, and many of those encounters resulted in the loss of the aircraft. Of the thirty-four confirmed attacks by MANPADS on civilian transports betw e e n 1975 and 1998, twenty-four resulted in the loss of the aircraft and its passengers. 1 This is in contrast to four MANPADS hits on F/A 1 8 s in the Gulf W a r without the loss of a single a i r c r a f t 2 If we were to use only this data to d e r i v e the MANPADS Probability of Kill giv e n a Hit (P K / H ) of both transports and modern twin engine fighter aircraft, we would conclude that unprotected transports had a P K / H of 0.7 and twin engine fighters a P K / H of zero. This example shows that transport aircraft are more vulnerable to MANPADS hits than twin engine fighters. The military needs to consider the survivability of all transport aircraft, even those not intended for frontline combat. The follo w i n g list identifies some of the issues inherent in M A N P ADS survivability of transport aircraft. M A N P ADS Sur v i v a b i l i t y Depends on Aircraft Design and T y p e by Mr. Jamie Childr e s s Mr. Robert T o m a i n e and Mr. Michael Meyers A Figure 1. The C-130 Hercules is the prime transpor t for paradropping troops and equipment into hostile areas. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Howard Blair.)

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 21 aircraft provide a very simple firing solution and a high probability of intercept for most MANPADS engagements Airport Operations The time of greatest risk from a MANPADS attack is during departure or arrival at an airport. The transport is lo w slo w and may be flying on a known schedule. A number of terrorist and rebel MANPADS attacks on transports ha v e been launched from uncontrolled civilian areas around airports T ransport Structures Ha v e Limited Redundancy Wings T ransport wings are generally two spar wings and are not capable of sustaining flight after the loss of a spar. A MANPADS impact near a spar could cause severe damage from direct blast or hy drodynamic ram pressures F u s e l a g e M a n y transports are pressurized. T esting has shown that even the relatively small w arhead of a MANPADS can cause catastrophic damage to a pressurized hull, resulting in the com plete rupture of the fuselage. Fortunately, this effect is greatly reduced at lo w er altitudes where MANPADS encounters are most probable Systems Separation and Fire Suppression are K ey to Transport Survivability Engine Redundancy and Separation Multiple engines with wide separation make the loss of all aircraft propulsion an unlikely event from a single MANPADS hit. Ho w ever, this posi tive survivability feature has limited value if an uncontrolled fire or catastrophic structural/s y stem damage ensues from an engine hit. Flight Control R e d u n d a n c y M u l t i p l e hydraulic systems and flight controls pro v i d e impro v ed survivability. Ho w ever, many non-front line transports do not ha v e sufficient h y draulic s ystem separation to prevent catastrophic flight con trol loss if a critical area is hit. Fire and Explosion Suppression The two pri mary kill mechanisms of a MANPADS hit on transports are ullage explosion and fire. Most transports ha v e very limited fire suppression s ystems. A sustained fire would ultimately result in either loss of critical s y stems or structural failure Non-frontline transports do not ha v e ullage inert ing s y stems. An ullage explosion initiated by a fragment or high explosive blast would most likely result in an instantaneous structural kill of the aircraft. Countermeasures on Transports are Limited or Non-Existent W arning Systems F ew transports carry missile launch warning detectors. MAN P ADS missile launches are difficult to detect from the air, especially from the target aircraft. In the Gulf W a r only about 10 percent of the combat pilots hit b y MANPADS were a w are that they were under attack or that a missile had been launched. IR Counter Measures (IRCM) Flares and other active IRCM s y stems are only carried on frontline transports or high v alue aircraft. When IRCM is a v ailable, it is often used proactively, by dispensing flares in a preset schedule during landing or takeoff. Transports have not traditionally receiv e d the attention to vulnerability hardening compared to tactical aircraft. Hardening transport aircraft against MANPADS attacks is no simple task and must be weighed against the aircraft mission, cost, and weight implications of more s u r v i v able sy s t e m s How e ve r the proliferation of these lethal weapons to all corners of the world necessitates that we recognize military transport vulnerabilities. Warfare is changing from the entrenched battlefields of our past, to the remote and vague battle-lines of future c o n f l i c t s If we cant protect our transports we m a y never get to the w a r E n d n o t e s 1. Crosthwaite, Kevin, Combat History in National MANPADS Workshop: A Vulnerability P erspective Proceedings, Vol. I, December 15, 1999, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville AL. 2. Meyers, Michael, Fighter MANPADS Issues in National MANPADS Workshop: A V ulnerability Perspective Proceedings, Vol. II, December 15, 1999, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL. c o n t i n ued on page 2 2

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twin engines, run-dry drive sy s t e m s and ballistically tolerant main rotor actuators are examples of the ballistic tolerance design for the Comanche. These sy s t e m s are examined and tested against specific threat caliber w e a p o n s Analysis and testing against MANPADS w a r heads is seldom performed. It is logical to assume that these measures will provide at least limited protection against MANPADS hits. Historically, analysis and w a r gaming exercises seldom attempt to account for this protection. In terms of analy s i s modeling and design for survivability of modern Army helicopters against M A N P ADS threats, several questions remain. How e f f e c t i v e are classical ballistic vulnerability reduction techniques against MANPADS warheads? Given strict weight and cost constraints, are there feasible additional/unique vulnerability features? Do potential vulnerability reduction approaches provide equal/greater surv i v ability than susceptability reduction features e m p l o yed in toda y s designs? Tactical Aircraft Sur v i v a b i l i t y Against the MANPADS Thr e a t M r Michael Meyers Technical F e l l o w The Boeing Company St. Louis, MO F / A -18 experience in Desert Storm provides v a l u a b l e information for assessing fighter aircraft vulnerability to MANPADS. Additional information is av a i l a b l e from F/A-18 joint live fire (JLF) tests conducted about 1 9 9 0 at China Lake, California. Combining these data p r o vides insight into the vulnerability of fighter aircraft and helps identify potential vulnerability reduction c o n c e p t s R o t o r craft Survivability Against the M A N P ADS Thr e a t M r Robert T o m a i n e Air Vehicle Technical Manager Comanche Pr o g r am Managers Office Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL U.S. Army Aviation doctrine calls for Napof-the-Earth (NOE) operation for all helicopter assets. In addition, Army Aviation missions of close troop support, armed reconnaissance and attack of ground forces and ground vehicles are therefore normally conducted near or within hostile territory. Therefore Army helicopters have a high probability of encountering MANPADS threats. Design philosophy for helicopter survival in this environment is to avoid detection and engagement by providing susceptibility reduction, and ballistic tolerance consistent with the primary threat and considering weight constraints similar to any aircraft, and as a last resort provide crew survival with c r a s h w orthiness even if the aircraft does not s u r v i v e. The Arm y s next generation helicopt e r the RAH-66 Comanche utilizes this design p h i l o s o p h y with an unparalleled emphasis on susceptibility reduction. This includes significant signature reduction in RF, IR, acoustics and visual signatures. Combined with an advanced technology target acquisition system and much improved situational aw a r e n e s s the signature reduction pro v i d e s standoff capability that generally allows engagement of threats before Comanche can be detected. Ballistic tolerance for Army helicopters is directed primarily at the high density individual small arms and threat vehicles with armament ranging from 7.62mm up to 3 0 m m Individual crew protection, parasitic armor for crew and flight critical components, fuel inerting sy s t e m s fire detection and suppressant sy s t e m s design redundancies and structural sizing to withstand ballistic hits are common means of providing ballistic tolerance for these v e h i c l e s Triple redundant fly by wire flight control system, physically separated Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 22 Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche Ar m e d Reconnaissance Helicopter

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In Desert Storm, four Marine F/A-18s were hit by M A N PA D s and all returned to base safely. All impacts were in the engine bay, on or near the turkey feathers of the exhaust section. One aircraft with severe damage to both engines exhaust sections was able to fly 125 miles to a recovery base. Two of the aircraft lost one e n g i n e demonstrating the survivability of a twinengine design. By contrast, four single-engine AV 8 B aircraft were hit, and all four were lost The F/A-18 JLF tests of statically detonated MANPADS warheads showed that aircraft subsystems w e r e the most vulnerable components. Since then, F/A 1 8 s u b s ystems have been designed to meet vulnerability requirements for countering high explosive incendiary t h r e a t s The design separates fuel tanks, flight controls, and hydraulics from the engine bays. Engine design features can also improve survivability against MANP A D S Exhaust nozzle fuel lines can be shut off by using leak detection systems that minimize the fuel feeding a fire. This system is being employed in the F/A-18E/F design. Countermeasures that bias MANPADS impacts to a vertical tail or outer wing can greatly improve the surv i v ability of singleor twin-engine fighter aircraft. A review of F/A-18 midair incidents showed that one of the two vertical tails or a complete outer wing could be severed without affecting get-home and landing c a p a b i l i t y A n a l y sis of Desert Storm incidents and JLF tests s h o ws that the F/A-18 twin-engine design is highly surv i v able against the MANPADS threat. Single-engine airAircraft Survivability Summer 1999 23 This F/A-18 Hornet was damaged by a SAM in the Persian Gulf. craft may also be able to survive, given a hit, but to a lesser extent. n About the Authors M r Childress received his B.S. in A e ro s p a c e Engineering from University of Colorado, Boulder. The Boeing pr o g r ams he has supported include the A-6, F/A-18, AV-8B, and V-22. In addition he has also supported pr o g r ams with the A T F F-22, JSF, A-X, Decoupled Fuel Cells, Composite A f fo r dability Initiative, IR&D, Muzzle Blast, Advanced Composite Armor, Nitrogen Inflated Ballistic Bladder, z-pinned skin fusing, and various classified pr o g ra m s He may be reached at J a m e s. C h i l d r ess@PSS. Boeing.com. M r Tomaine received his B.S. in A e ro s p a c e Engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University and his M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from George Washington Univer s i t y He is currently Chief of the Air Vehicle Branch in the Comanche Pr o g r am Managers Office, PEO Aviation, with technical and pr o g ra m m a t i c responsibility for the design and development of the Comanche airfr a m e rotor systems, flight cont r ol system, environmental control system, and all a i r f r ame subsystems. He also has system r e s p o n s i bility for survivability including low observables, handling qualities, weight, flight performance and system safety. He may be reached at t o m a i n e r @ c o m a n c h e. re d s t o n e. a r m y. m i l M r Meyers has been a Boeing Company employee for 37 years. He is currently leading the F/A18E/F vulnerability team. He is responsible for the p ro g r am vulnerability assessments, trade studies and live fire testing plans and reporting. Pr e v i o u s a r eas of responsibility included vulnerability and survivability evaluations on the A-12, F-15, F/A18A/B as well as advanced design configur a t i o n s M r Meyers is a member of the A d v i s o r y Committee for the Air c r aft V u l n e r ability to MANPADS Study and is a Senior Advisor for the AD HOC Committee on Air c r aft V u l n e ra b i l i t y He may be reached at michael.meyer s @ b o e i n g c o m .

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 24 Chapter 1 of the revision of the Surviv a b i l i t y Textbook is almost completed and is available for review on the Web ( w w w. a i r c r a f t s u r v i va b i l i t y. c o m ) The entire 800-page second edition will be issued both as a compact disk and in hard copy [published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)]. The intent is to hot reference sections of Chapter 1 in the Defense A c q u i s i t i o n Deskbook. The full second edition of the textbook is planned for completion by the end of 2 0 0 0 The Defense Acquisition Deskbook Survivability Section The deskbook addresses what to do in a surviv a b i l ity program, the handbook series addresses how to do it, and the textbook addresses the entire surviv a b i l i t y d i s c i p l i n e The pertinent parts of the Defense Acquisition Deskbook will provide hotlinks to the Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook Series and the Survivability Textbook. These documents will be used by defense acquisition programs that need to d e v elop survivability program plans for the centers, l a b o r a t o r i e s and contractors responsible for aerospace systems survivability project management, engineering, analy s i s and test and evaluation. We will work with the Acquisition Deskbook Joint Program Office (JPO) to determine whether placing the handbook series both in the deskbook's library and on the J T CG/AS Web site ( h t t p : / / j t c g j c t e. j c s. m i l : 9 10 1 / ) is an e f f e c t i v e way to proceed. The Handbook Series The Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook series is designed to document the elements of the sur vivability process, how they relate to other defense acquisition activities, and how the associated surviv ability activities are accomplished. It is being organ ized from a pre-acquisition and program management perspectiv e A work breakdown structure (WBS) format will be used for each technical volume in the series n fiscal year 1999, the JTCG/AS initiated a task updating the survivability sections of the DoD Acquisition Deskbook ( D AD) to address the needs of the T r i Services and industry's survivability commun i t y The existing survivability sections of the DAD are based on MIL-STD-2069, which has not been updated in 16 y e a r s A new approach was established that will p r o vide: 1) an update to the DAD, 2) an Aerospace Systems Survivability handbook s e r i e s and 3) the second edition of Distinguished Professor Ball's Surviv a b i l i t y Textbook (in progress). These products will overlap somewhat, but they basically address the needs of different customers. There has been some activity within the services in the recent past on survivability standards and handbooks. When acquisition reform removed most military standards from the inventory, there were no survivabili ty industry standards for the DoD to fall back on, as there are in other functional areas The Survivability T e x t b o o k In examining the relationship between the DAD, the handbook series and the textbook, along with the role each would play in addressing surviv a b i l i t y it was determined that three elements should be covered: Intellectual construct Examples of design practices S u r v i v ability and the DoD acquisition p r o c e s s The handbook, in conjunction with a modification to the deskbook, will address the third element, walking the user through the bureaucratic maze to develop an effective s u r v i v ability program. The textbook addresses the first two elements, the intellectual construct and examples of design practices. Defense Acquisition Deskbook and Aerospace Systems Survivability by Mr. Hugh Drake and Mr. Dave Hall I

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 25 All activities and functions performed in aerospace systems acquisition, including surviv a b i l i t y fall into one of four major categories 1 M a n a g e m e n t 2 E n g i n e e r i n g 3 Test and ev a l u a t i o n 4 S y stems analy s i s The handbook series will correlate the surviv a b i l i t y process and its activities and functions with all elements of defense acquisition. P l a n s FY99 A version of the deskbook and handbook will be drafted for community review by 30 October 1999. This draft will have holes, but it will integrate rele v ant portions of various existing materials, plus some new material, into the WBS table of contents for the deskbook. It will also have references to sections of Chapter 1 of Dr. Balls textbook. This will be a standalone version of the deskbook survivability section (2.6.6) for review. FY00 Pertinent parts of the DAD will be updated with hotlinks to the Aerospace Survivability Handbook series and the Survivability Textbook. The Handbook Series will thoroughly document current surviv a b i l i t y project engineering, analy s i s and test processes and procedures in a how to format and correlated with related acquisition processes and procedures. n About the Authors Mr. Drake received his B.S. in Mathematics from California State Polytechnic College (Cal Poly) in 1961. He is one of the recognized Pioneers of Survivability and is credited with playing a major role in the establishment of the JTCG/AS and the Survivability Division at NA W CWPNS China Lake, CA. He retired from the NA W CWPNS in 1988 and is presently Vice President of ASI Systems International, a wholly owned subsidiary of SRS Technologies. He may be r eached at 760.375.1442. Mr. Hall currently serves as Chief Analyst and Head of the Analysis Branch of the NA W CWD Survivability Division; Co-Director of the Joint Accreditation Support Activity (JASA); Chairman of the Methodology Subgroup in the JTCG/AS; and Chairman of the NA W CWD Science and T echnology Network for Analysis Resources. He may be r eached at halldh@navair.navy.mil. MANPADS Combat Histor y and paced for surviv a b i l i t y In this phase, Desert Storm pilots operated at higher altitudes and at night to protect aircraft from M A N P ADS. As the ground war grew closer, the Allied forces began to prep the battlefield. Pilots were ordered to fly as low as nece s s a r y increasing the risk. Finally, when the ground war started, close air support of friendly troops was imperative. Figure 3 s h o ws the frequency of MANPADS engagements throughout Desert Storm. M A N P ADS were not a significant threat early in the w a r with an average of one damage incident every 3 days. This frequency increased to one every other day while the battlefield was being prepared. During the ground w a r MANPADS incidents jumped to an average of 2.5 per day. F o r t u n a t e l y Desert Storm saw so few combat incidents that no one type of aircraft r e c e i v ed a statistically significant number of h i t s Although this lack of data makes it difficult to calculate the relative survivability of aircraft types, some observations can be d r a wn from the success of the F/A-18 aircraft. Four F/A-18s were damaged by MANP A D S and all four landed safely, were repaired, and returned to combat. The extended rear tail feathers on the F/A-18 appear to move MANc o n t i n ued from page 1 3 c o n t i n ued on page 3 1 Figure 3. Operational Necessitys Effect on MANPADS Incidents in Desert Stor m

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 26 set about finding practical solutions for the current A r m y fleet. Jim turned the BRL range facilities into a dedicated proving ground for actual gunfire experiments with operating helicopters and components under scientifically controlled conditions. Existing subsy s t e m f l a ws were demonstrated and diagnosed, and candidate solutions were subjected to trial. The results, combined with threat-specific interpretations, formed a compelling case for practical, flight-weight vulnerability reduction (VR) in aircraft, using armor only as a last resort. Jim and his group, in collaboration with other Army s a f e t y / s u r v i v ability activities, organized a relentless, successful effort to lobby the Army aviation specification writers and decision makers. At the same time, these pioneers went to great lengths to show their results to industry dev e l o p e r s traveling to their facilities to educate their designers. Several unprecedented dev e l o p ments occurred: current fleet aircraft began to receive VR m o d i f i c a t i o n s the industry assigned employees to VR i s s u e s VR emerged as a recognized discipline and became a weighted evaluation factor in new aircraft c o m p e t i t i v e programs, and military and industry VR specialists joined together into what is now a permanent, cooperative mode of operations. M a n y innov a t i v e ideas resulted from Jims 12 years of aircraft vulnerability efforts working with other BRL surv i v ability pioneers, such as Don Mo w r e r Walt Vikestad, Walt Thompson, and Branch Chief, Roland Bernier. One keypoint was the need for a vulnerability information center that could sustain and expand on the good w o r k that group accomplished in educating and helping industry to reduce aircraft vulnerability. This idea ev e n tually became Jims vision for a Surviv a b i l i t y / Vulnerability Information Analysis Center. In 1974 Jim moved to Stratford, CT, where he joined the Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United T e c h n o l o g i e s Corporation, as head of the Safety and Surviv a b i l i t y Program. In this position, he planned, directed, and coordinated research on and development of sy s t e m s a f e t y detectability, threat av o i d a n c e vulnerability, and ne of several unheralded pioneers of aircraft survivability is James F o u l k Jim is known today as president of the SURVICE Engineering Company, which he founded 18 years ago to pro v i d e a n a l y sis support to the surviv a b i l i t y / v u l n e r a bility community. Along the path that led to SURVICE, how e ve r he contributed significantly to aircraft survivability evaluation, testing and design. Most notable was his influence and leadership in developing the UH-60A Black Hawk, still considered one of the more s u r v i v able helicopters in the fleet today. Jim graduated from the University of D e l a ware in 1959 with a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. After graduating, he moved to Ohio and went to work for the Standard Oil C o m p a n y, specializing in development and experimental evaluation of fuels and lubricants for automotive applications. In 1962 he took a job as an automotive engineer for the U.S. Army Materiel Test Directorate at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. There he conducted experimental tests of surface v e h i c l e s under laboratory and field conditions, acquiring experience in propulsion, drive sy s t e m s and application of fuels and lubricants. In 1963, one might say, Jims career in aircraft survivability began to take flight. During that year he accepted a position with the U.S. A r m y Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL), k n o wn today as the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). He spent the next 12 years immersed in numerous aircraft vulnerability projects with what is now the Experimental Design, Conduct & Analysis Branch of the Ballistics & NBC Division. Early in this period, Jim and a small group of coworkers collected and carefully studied the increasing volume of aircraft combat damage reported from Southeast Asia and urgently Pioneers of Survivability James Jim Foulk by Mr. Jeffrey Foulk O

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 27 c r a s h w orthiness technology. By 1976 he was promoted to System Engineering M a n a g e r responsible for all UH-60 helicopter system engineering a c t i v i t i e s r e l i a b i l i t y m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y w e i g h t control, aerodynamics, d y n a m i c s acoustics, handling qualities, surv i v ability/ vulnerability, human factors, and sy s t e m s a f e t y At Sikorsky, Jims leadership and innov a t i v e design approaches helped ensure that substantial vulnerability reductions and improved safety features were integrated into the UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter. In 1978 Jim moved to an aircraft survivability start up group at Science Applications, Inc., (SAI) in A l b u q u e r q u e New Mexico. At SAI he set out to build a vulnerability business. After serious marketing and constant travel, he recruited his former BRL boss, R o l a n d B e r n i e r and his own wife Nancy and established a small vulnerability office in Bel Air, Maryland. During this t i m e he performed various vulnerability studies for the A r m y, antiship missile high energy laser weapon vulnerability studies for the Na v y combat damage analyses for the Air F o r c e and a vulnerability study for Agusta, resulting in innov a t i v e VR design solutions for the A129 attack helicopter. After 3 years at SAI, he decided to pursue the dream of his own vulnerability business. In 1981 Jim and Nancy acquired the SAI office assets, m o ved everything to their house, and started the SURVICE Engineering Company. The name resulted from J i m s continued vision of a Surviv a b i l i t y / Vu l n e r a b i l i t y Information Analysis Center (IAC), hence the service with a U in it. Jims vision persisted and with much work and coordination on the part of Jim, even at the expense of his new business, SURVIAC was established, and awarded in 1984 to the team of BoozAllen & Hamilton and SURVICE. In the years that follow e d J i m s dedication and hard work in the field of aircraft s u r v i v ability helped establish both a very successful IAC and a survivability business at SURVICE. Jim is most proud of bringing talented vulnerability experts together with bright young engineers and anal y sts to allow them to grow and mature in the vulnerability field. As a result, SURVICE now offers one of the most experienced group of aircraft s u r v i v ability/vulnerability engineers and anal y sts found an y w h e r e Throughout his career Jim has been a behind the scenes person, participating in a number of professional societies, national coordinating groups, joint working groups, and other organizations. He was one of the founding members of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Combat S u r v i v ability Division. His work on the UH60A Black Hawk was instrumental in S i k o r s k y s earning the American Helicopter S o c i e t y s Grover E. Bell Award for outstanding contributions to helicopter dev e l o p m e n t Without question, how e ve r Jims most important reward is knowing that lives and aircraft m a y be saved as a result of his efforts to enhance aircraft surviv a b i l i t y Jim and Nancy, married for 40 y e a r s have raised three childrenJeff, David, and Cindy. When not working, as occasionally happens, they spend time playing golf, talking about b u s i n e s s and fixing up their home. The recent addition of three grandchildren has also giv e n them the opportunity to babysit occasionally. During this period, Jim was responsible for analytical and experimental studies in ballistic s u r v i v ability of aircraft and related studies for application to surface v e h i c l e s He led efforts to develop design criteria to increase survivability of aircraft sy s t e m s including engine, d r i v e, rotor, control, fuel, hydraulic, electrical, structural, and crew station. He was also responsible for developing new and improv e d analytical methodology for determining and predicting aircraft surviv a b i l i t y M a n y of the military aircraft seen operating t o d a y, new or modernized, are endowed with at least a few tangible products with Jim and his coworkers imprimatur. Some rely on literally dozens of such VR measures to achieve the battle toughness for which they are touted. n E d i t o r s Note: Jim and Jeff are father and son, respectiv e l y Jeff is employed by SURVICE E n g i n e e r i n g

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 28 he Director, Operational Test and E v aluation (DO T & E ) s p o n s o r e d Joint Live Fire (JLF) Program performed a live fire test shot of a Stinger missile against a recently retired F-14 Tomcat on W e d n e s d a y, July 14, 1999. The test was the first in a series of tests with complete aircraft to assess the vulnerability of our aircraft to shoulder-fired, man-portable missiles. The test w a s conducted by the Navy's Weapons Surviv a b i l i t y L a b o r a t o r y at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake. The missile was shoulderlaunched by Marine Corps personnel, flew free flight, guided itself to the target, and detonated on impact with the aft portion of a static F-14 aircraft. Analy s t s who are developing modeling and simulation capabilities for prediction and assessment of aircraft vulnerabilities to M a n P ortable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), are evaluating the damage to the test a r t i c l e R e p r e s e n t a t i v es from DOT&E, the servi c e s and industry witnessed the test first-hand. This test demonstrated that, by working as a team, we have the ability to accomplish sev e r a l different objectives with one test. The U.S. Marine Corps' Third Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, from Camp Pendleton, provided the fire team and basic Stinger miss i l e For them, this test was a realistic training exercise an example of one of the SECDEF themes, namely combining testing and training opportunities. It also served to d e v elop test techniques for JLF, provided realistic lethality data for the Stinger Program Office, and realistic data for aircraft vulnerability assessment and future vulnerability reduction efforts. The China Lake MANPADS program is just one of several closely coordinated activities currently underway in DoD to examine the MANPADS issue. The JTCG/AS, JLF, and the Services are sponsoring efforts in the area, and working as a team to quantify the threat, and dev e l o p susceptibility and vulnerability reduction approaches. Examples of this work include a JTCG/AS MANP A D S study (see Editors Notes on page 3 and A i r c r a f t Vulnerability to MANPADS Weapons on page 4), an Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) evaluation of the lethality of several threat weapons against US sy s t e m s (with testing at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground), and JLF's evaluation of the F-16 vulnerabilities, which is managed at AFRL with testing at Eglin AFB's Chicken Little Joint Program Office. By working as a team, the data, resources, and lessons learned are shared by all the s e r v i c e s In addition to evaluations of aircraft and threat intera c t i o n s work is underway to assess the best way to assure realism in an investigation, yet retain the ability to collect pertinent threat and damage data. China Lake's W e a p o n s S u r v i v ability Laboratory (WSL) has been conducting freeflight autonomous guidance and detonation of actual weapons against complete aircraft. The WSL also dev e l oped and operates, as part of the DOT&E/LFT funded JLF Program, the MIKES gunthe Missile Intercept Kinetic Energy Simulator. MIKES is a gas gun, capable of launching an entire missile, or just the warhead, at realistic velocities and close ranges. This test technique is being d e v eloped to obtain impacts under controlled conditions described in terms of impact location, angle, and v e l o c i t y It also allows a stationary target aircraft to be operating at combat pow e r while positioned in an airflow enviJoint Live Fire Program Tests Full-Up Stinger Missile Against F-14 T o m c a t by Mr. Thomas Julian T INCOMING! Stinger missile fired by US Marines of the Third Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (Camp Pendleton, CA) homes in an F-14 Tomcat in a Joint Live Fir e test at the Naval Air W a rf a r e Center W eapons Division, China Lake, CA.

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ronment from China Lake's High-Velocity Airflow S y stem (HIVAS). An Air Force MANPADS investigation, also sponsored by JLF, inv o l v es launching a MANPADS missile down a sled track to evaluate (and develop the potential to reduce) threat effects on single engine aircraft. The F-16 is being used for this evaluation, with targets salv a g e d from crashed systems or retired aircraft from Da v i s Monthan AFB. AFRL's Survivability and Safety Branch at Wright Patterson is managing the program, with testing performed at a track facility operated by the 46th T e s t Wing's Chicken Little Program Office at Eglin AFB. S e v eral shots have been successfully launched against F16 wings. This MAN PADS rail launch method h a s how e ve r highlighted a fuzing problem that must be solved prior to rail launches against complete F-16's. In free flight testing, the Chicken Little Office recently launched a Stinger missile at an F-16 wing (another effort combining Stinger Program Office o b j e c t i v es with those of the aircraft survivability enhancement community). The Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), located at Aberdeen P r o ving Ground, also has a capability for conducting sled track tests. The ATC recently adapted its track to launch M A N P ADS against aircraft. As part of AFRL's Air Defense Lethality Program, ATC is currently perfecting its methodology for conducting launches of MANPADS missiles against transport and other large aircraft. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) recently completed a study, sponsored by DO T & E / L F T to assess the best way to conduct MANPADS testing. It addressed the Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 29 question: What is the best launch method to use in order to collect realistic MANPADS vulnerability data. The study takes into account cost, realism, target fidelity, attack angles, payload weight, etc. Early indications are that the best way may well be a combination of different approaches, depending on the program's o b j e c t i ve s budget, and required realism. A number of DoD elements are w o r k i n g together to assure our ongoing programs are c o m p l e m e n t a r y sharing resources and data, to assess this threat to our aircraft, and come up with ways to counter it. n About the Author Mr. Julian is a staff action officer in the Live Fir e T esting office of the Office of the Secretary of D e f e n s e working for the Deputy Dir e c t o r O p e r ational Test and Evaluation, Live Fire T esting, Mr. Jim OBryon. Most his 20 year career has been spent working on Live Fir e Programs. The last 7 years he has worked in the OSD Live Fire office at the Pentagon. He was previously with Chicken Little Project Office at Eglin AFB and also Aberdeen Proving Ground working on vulnerability programs for the Army He is primarily a Land Combat Systems expert, but has expanded his area of knowledge into both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. He may be reached at TJulian@dote.osd.mil. DIRECT HIT! Stinger missile warhead deto nates after striking the F-14. The smoke ring came from the warhead detonation. Photographs by Danny Zurn.

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 30 he National Defense Industrial Associations (NDIA) Combat Survivability Division recognizes superior achievement in the combat surv i v ability field through two annual aw a r d s The NDIA is soliciting nominations for these aw a r d s which will be presented at the NDIA Aircraft Survivability 1999: Challenges for the New Millennium Symposium at the N a val Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on N o vember 16-18, 1999. The awards cover the entire spectrum of surviv a b i l i t y including susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and related modeling and simulation. The Combat Survivability Division Awards Committee screens candidates and recommends honorees to the E x e c u t i v e Board for final approval. The criteria for the awards are shown below. S u r v i v ability Leadership Aw a r d This award is presented to an individual who has made major contributions to enhancing combat surviv a b i l i t y The individual selected must have demonstrated outstanding leadership in furthering combat survivability overall or have p l a yed a significant role in a major aspect of surviv a b i l i ty design, program management, research and dev e l o p ment, modeling and simulation, test and ev a l u a t i o n education, or the development of standards. This aw a r d is based on demonstrated leadership of a continuing n a t u r e S u r v i v ability Technical Aw a r d This award is presented to an individual who has made a significant technical contribution to any aspect of surviv a b i l i t y The award will be presented for either a specific act or contribution, or for exceptional technical performance ov e r a prolonged period. Individuals at any level of experience are eligible for this aw a r d Submission of Award Nominations Aw a r d nomination may be submitted by fax, mail, or via the Award Nomination Web page, located at h t t p : / / w w w. n d i a o r g / e ve n t s / b r o c h u r e / 09 4 / 09 4 h t m Submit nominations by mail to Charles Wilkins, NDIA E v ent #094, 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 2 2 2 0 1 30 6 1, via the internet at the address above, via fax to 703.522.1885 or via E-mail to cwilkins@ndia.org. by Mr. Dale A t k i n s o n NDIA Combat Survivability Division Executive Board Member T A I R C R A F T S U RV I V ABILITY 1 9 9 9 Challenges for the New Millennium Challenges for the New Millennium A Symposium in Monterey, CA 16 November 1999 For Information Call 730.522.1820 A I R C R A F T S U RV I V ABILITY 1 9 9 9 http://www.ndia.or g Combat Sur v i v a b i l i t y Annual A w a rd s

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Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 31 calendar of events 1315 Washington, DC A e r ospace Technology Exposition A F A Annual Convention Contact: 800.727.3337 w w w. j s p a rg o c o m / a f a / s t a rt h t m 2830 Albuquerque, NM AIAA Space Technology Conf. & Expo. Contact: 703.264.7500 w w w .vs.afrl.af.mil/AIAA/ 57 Albuquerque, NM Air T a r gets and UA V s Contact: jhylan@ndia.org 2628 Fort W o r th, TX DIME, ESAMS Users Group Meeting Contact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling 710 Arlington, VA DTIC Annual Users Meeting and Training Confer e n c e Contact: 703.767.8236, Julia Foscue 1618 Monter e y CA A i r craft Survivability 1999 Symposium Contact: jhylan@ndia.org 302 Dec Nellis AFB, NV AIR-TO-AIR Meeting Contact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling 1416 Charlottesville, VA RADGUNS, ALARM, BLUEMAX Meeting Contact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling 937.431.2707, Mike Bennet SEP OCT NOV DEC Information for inclusion in the Calendar of Events may be sent to: SURVIAC Washington Satellite Office Attn: Christina McNemar 3190 Fairview Park Drive, 9 th Floor Falls Church, VA 22042 PHONE: 703.289.5464 F AX: 703.289. 5 4 6 7 PADS impacts away from flight-critical components. As a vulnerability reduction technique, this design holds p r o m i s e I m p l i c a t i o n s Combat history demonstrates that aircraft will be hit by MANPADS, in spite of such vulnerability reduction tactics as flying high, flying at night, and using counterm e a s u r e s Operational necessity usually forces pilots l o wer and into daylight as a conflict progresses. Aircraft performing critical missions during the Desert Storm ground w a r for instance, suffered the most from MANPADS attacks. Although MANPADS are lethal, a hit does not equal a kill. Some aircraft survive MANPADS hits; some, like the F / A -18, have survived very well. F/A-18s use features designed originally to improve their survivability against n o n M A N P ADS threats, but these basic survivability features have also helped against MANPADS. A close examination of these vulnerability reduction features should r e v eal the techniques that will best limit MANP A D S d a m a g e History also shows that MANPADS teams have traditionally operated during daylight. As night vision devices become more readily av a i l a b l e MANPADS teams will no doubt use them. U.S. Forces recent demonstrated preference for night operations will surely compel opponents to improve their night operations. If these teams can operate effectively day and night, MANPADS could become even more effective against U.S. operations. F i n a l l y history shows that MANPADS can track, intercept, and bring down civil aircraft. This capability could presage a much wider MANPADS threat if these w e a p o n s fall into the wrong hands. It seems likely, therefore, that vulnerability reduction solutions might appeal to the large commercial market. Across the board, the light, c a p a b l e economic MANPADS have proven to be a real threat. n About the Author M r Crosthwaite is director of the Survivability/V u l n e ra b i l i t y I n f ormation Analysis Center (SUR V I A C). He has worked on s e v e r al technical analyses and test pr o g r ams involving a wide variety of weapon systems. Mr. Crosthwaite has a M.S. in nuclear physics from Ohio State and is a licensed pr o f e s s i o n a l e n g i n e e r He serves on the ADPA Combat Survivability Division Executive Board and on the AIAA Survivability Technical Committee. He may be reached at 937.255.4840. MANPADS Combat Histor y c o n t i n ued from page 2 5

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