VOLUME 8, ISSUE 1 JUNE 2018
Adopting Anti-Terrorism Measures: en-USExperiences and Lessons in Africaen-USbrings you back to this page 1 en-US9 15 en-USFamiliar Faces: Identity Activitiesen-US 20 en-USThe Importance of Controlling en-US and Preserving Cultural Heritage en-US Sites in Complex Operations AUSA Panel Discussion on AFRICOM: en-US10 Years of Stability Activities Supporting the Peace U.S. Contribu en-US-en-US tions to Peacekeeping Operationsen-US25 Strategic Blind Spot: The Navys Stabil en-US-en-US ity Gap in the Littorals of Vietnamen-US27 30 Book Review on Nadia Schadlows en-USWar and the Art of Governance Also Inside: Women, Peace, and Security Info Paper
en-US1en-USIntroductionen-US PKSOI sponsored a 2017 AUSA panel discussion entitled en-US AFRICOM: 10 years in the making as a model for Stabilen-US -en-US ity Activities, held on 18 September at AUSA. e two en-US panels addressed Whole of Government (WoG) progress en-US in the Peace and Stability Operations environment with a en-US focus on AFRICOM. To kick o the discussion, PKSOI en-US presented their IRP ndings, which were used as a temen-US -en-US plate for comparison with some of the emerging challenges en-US within the AFRICOM theater, while applying a WoG apen-US -en-US proach to fulll national interests. A second panel applied en-US the IRP principles to a Lake Chad Basin (LCB) case study en-US to determine whether they would alter the existing strategy en-US for that region. A third panel explored the opportunities en-US and challenges awaiting AFRICOM and its partners in the en-US coming decade and beyond. e Association of the United en-US States Army (AUSA) held an all-day event on September en-US 18, 2017 to discuss 'AFRICOM; 10 Years in the Making as en-US a Model for Stability Activities'. e event was sponsored en-US by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and en-US had 2 keynote addresses and three panel sessions. en-US e United States has a compelling national security inen-US -en-US terest to promote stability in select fragile and conict-afen-US-en-US fected states. e operating environment is complex and en-US requires a whole-of-U.S. government (USG) response, couen-US -en-US pled with non-governmental and international partners, en-US and supported by the aected nation in order to achieve en-US their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security en-US system has struggled to handle eectively the range and en-US complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities. en-US A paper for the incoming Administrations transition team en-US prepared in November 2016 by the Department of State, en-US the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the en-US Department of Defense (DoD) summarized the issues as en-US follows:en-US e US Government is lacking a number of critical en-US mechanisms to formulate and execute stabilization en-US eorts, and does not systematically empower and inteen-US -en-US grate important capabilities into existing processes. e en-US Fragility Study Group of the National Security Council en-US attributes these performance shortfalls to bureauen-US -en-US cratic politics; the pursuit of maximalist objectives on en-US unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance short-term en-US imperatives with long-term goals; the habit of lurching en-US from one crisis to the next; and missed opportunities to en-US act preventively. Panel Chair Beth Cole Author and expert on civilianmil en-US-en-US itary cooperation, stabilization and countering violent en-US extremism provides opening comments to the AFRICOM en-US (Lake Chad Basin) Panel Members GEN David M. Roen-US-en-US driguez, USA Ret. Former Commanding General, U.S. en-US Africa Command, Chris Runyan Acting Deputy Assistant en-US Administrator of the USAID Bureau for Africa, AMB Dan en-US Mozena, Retired, Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram, en-US U.S. Department of State and Alexis Smallridge Deputy en-US National Intelligence Ocer for Africa.
2 en-USe PKSOI IRP found that a whole-of-Government en-US approach is necessary to achieve US national security goals. en-US Some of the primary frictions to whole-of-government en-US collaboration are the nature of various agencies cultures; en-US resource, authorities and funding mismatches; and dieren-US -en-US ing processes, such as timelines and tools. Some key collaben-US -en-US oration considerations to overcome these friction points en-US are: clear, achievable purpose and vision shared by all en-US stakeholders; operational scope is small, focused, discreet, en-US and empowered by the appropriate resources and authorien-US-en-US ties; and support emanated from the highest levels and was en-US reected throughout the Government. en-US Africas complex environment is a critical continent in en-US which the US Army must selective engage with partner en-US nations. Even aer 10 years of AFRICOM operations, en-US challenges still remain to achieve peacekeeping (PK) and en-US stability objectives. Beth Cole, an author and expert on en-US civil-military cooperation, stabilization and countering vien-US-en-US olent extremism, chaired the second panel on AFRICOM en-US in the LCB. e panel consisted of AMB(r) Dan Mozena, en-US Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram for the Departen-US -en-US ment of State (DoS), GEN(r) David Rodriguez, former en-US commander of AFRICOM, Christopher Runyan, acting en-US Deputy Assistant Administrator of the USAID Bureau en-US for Africa, and Alexis Smallridge, Deputy National Intellien-US-en-US gence Ocer for West Africa at the National Intelligence en-US Council in the Oce of the Director of National Intellien-US-en-US gence.en-US Beth Cole highlighted the importance of interagency en-US cohesion, knitting together the eorts of DoS and DoD en-US in Africa. e rst signicant collaborative eort occurred en-US when then AFRICOM commander GEN(r) Ham asen-US-en-US signed a strategic planner to USAID to further synchroen-US -en-US nize planning eorts. GEN(r) Rodriguez continued these en-US eorts by walking lock step with USAID on Boko Haram en-US (BH) and the ebola crisis. He aorded the USAID senior en-US development advisor complete access to AFRICOMs seen-US -en-US nior leadership, and created the innovative Africa strategic en-US dialogue, bringing together senior leaders from across the en-US agencies to discuss collective response to problems on the en-US African continent. en-US BH was initially composed of robbers and thugs with AK en-US weapons and sandals, but the Nigerian government failure en-US to address political corruption, a common root cause of en-US extremism, fomented BHs transformation into a terrorist en-US organization. BHs power grew in the northeast of Nigeria en-US around Maiduguri by looting banks for money and the en-US military and police for weapons. As BHs activities began en-US to spill over into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, prompten-US -en-US ing the US with the assistance of the French and Brits, to en-US focus on mitigating BHs strengths, in order to stop BH en-US from further eroding the largest economy in Africa. AMB en-US Mozena was critical in bringing together the regional and en-US interagency partners to ensure all eorts were fully aligned en-US with the DoS vision. e four main eorts were theater seen-US -en-US curity cooperation, engagements, exercises and operations. en-US Nigeria was the biggest impediment to assistance and the en-US root cause for BH growth. Cameroon and Chad units were en-US easy partners based on long standing training relationships en-US with the U.S., while Niger was a newly formed unit with en-US a U.S Army War College graduate as a commander, which en-US greatly facilitated synchronization of eorts. When BH en-US abducted the Chibok schoolgirls, the U.S. established an en-US interdisciplinary team in the U.S. embassy in Nigeria to coen-US -en-US ordinate eorts and communication. From an operational en-US standpoint, AFRICOM established a coordination liaison en-US cell in N'Djamena, Chad, at a French long-term base. en-US Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and the African Union en-US established a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in en-US the LCB commission to combat BH. e MNJTF focused en-US on intelligence sharing, an essential part of the operational en-US eort. e US worked with two of the MNJTF units to en-US develop their own intelligence, reconnaissance, and suren-US -en-US veillance capabilities to build their capacity and synergize en-US eorts. Initially, the MNJTF headquarters consisted of en-US only one military ocer. As the mission grew, AFRICOM en-US expanded the communications network and intelligence en-US sharing between all four countries. However, the ght en-US against BH was managed out of the four presidential palacen-US-en-US es because the presidents and senior military stas wanted en-US to remain personally involved in guiding their nations en-US actions. erefore, the U.S. country teams needed to be inen-US -en-US trinsically involved in coalescing the disparate intentions of en-US all four nations. AFRICOM did have BH advise and assist en-US missions at each countrys command center. e stratied en-US advising mission elements maintained continuous contact en-US to understand all of the operational initiatives and mainen-US -en-US tain a common understanding of the BH ght.
3 en-USe U.S. senior BH advisor coordinates with the DoSs en-US African Bureau, the European Union, the Washington en-US interagency, which includes AFRICOM and all the posts en-US in Africa. From a DoS perspective, the order of U.S. eorts en-US should be Diplomacy, Development and Defense, comen-US -en-US monly referred to as the 3Ds. Interagency coordination has en-US never been as cohesive and eective as the eorts against en-US BH. e Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Aairs and Deen-US -en-US fense, as well as development agencies from France and the en-US United Kingdom, have regular coordination meetings with en-US the US on BH eorts, which includes a Disarmament, en-US Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) defections en-US action group. One reason for the unprecedented interen-US -en-US agency coordination is that an imploded Nigeria is not in en-US the U.S. national interests of economic prosperity, diploen-US -en-US matic objectives and humanitarian imperatives. A critically en-US important concept in the counter BH initiative is by, with en-US and through as this is not a U.S. war. Interagency partners en-US agree that bombing is not a way to victory. Any strategic en-US approach must address the underlying drivers of conict en-US in the areas. Decades of discrimination and neglect from en-US the central government, the failure of the civil and religious en-US local leaders, as well as the 2009 security forces campaign en-US of abuse against BH, which killed 7800 followers, led to en-US BHs rise. Other drivers of conict are a lack of investment en-US in the human and physical infrastructure, a female literacy en-US rate of 7%, a global religious zeal movement, and an inux en-US of arms from Libya, and a lack of economic opportunities. en-US BHs aliation with ISIS heightened the threat to the U.S., en-US which led to a Congress mandated strategy to counter the en-US BH threat. Even LCB partners are briefed on the strategy, en-US which is to degrade and contain the BH threat. To achieve en-US these objectives, the military must strengthen partner naen-US -en-US tions capacity, as well as assist in developing a counter naren-US -en-US rative program to encourage ghters to leave the BH ranks en-US through eective DDR and defection policies, while also en-US discouraging the recruitment of new members. e goal of en-US the program is to weaken BH and ISIS in West Africa by en-US cutting o money and ghters. is strategy aords parten-US -en-US ners the ability to bolster success on the battleeld with en-US civilian security, eective governance, delivery of essential en-US services (water, sanitation and education), and economic en-US policies to revive the failed economy. e strategy will also en-US meet the humanitarian needs of almost 2.5 million people, en-US who have been displaced or are suering food insecurity. en-US e military dramatically increased its eorts to enhance en-US security in the region by assisting in police training and en-US rebuilding police facilities. e MNJTF, along with its U.S. en-US partners has greatly reduced the area under BH controls. en-US However, more is needed as BH and ISIS West Africa conen-US -en-US tinue devastating asymmetric attacks against the populaen-US -en-US tion. Nigeria has also succeeded at reducing BH controlled en-US areas, but cannot maintain control of the ground. For long en-US term strategic and tactical successes to occur, it must be led en-US by Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad.en-US e USG legislative branch appropriates discretionary en-US funds with specic earmarks and directives. Due to the earen-US -en-US marks, USAID is unable to prioritize funding for the most en-US important development work, and thus essential projects en-US go unfunded. From a USAID perspective, the USG still en-US has challenges breaking out of traditional and comfortable en-US silos of excellence to truly cooperate and engage bilaterally, en-US especially when determining when and how each organizaen-US -en-US tions should respond. Although much USG collaboration en-US has occurred in LCB, more cross border development en-US initiatives and diplomatic eorts are necessary to bring en-US about the dissolution of BH. e MNJTF should have en-US a civilian equivalent for DDR, as well as defections and en-US deradicalization. However, the LCB countries must desen-US-en-US ignate this civilian equivalent, otherwise the initiative will en-US fail as evidenced by the numerous demarches of US-deen-US -en-US veloped policies. Knowledge management and knowledge en-US transfer at the sub-national level to governors and other en-US civil leaders in order to enhance their understanding of en-US the programs from Abuja is essential for the success of the en-US region. Without a clear demand signals from our African en-US counterparts, it is dicult for the USG to develop eective en-US programs that are acceptable to the LCB governments. en-US Regional Institutions are vital to convene, deconict, align en-US and even compel good LCB eorts with a balanced hard en-US and so security approach. ese regional elements, an en-US oen underdeveloped USG area, require a lot of capacity en-US building support. Focusing on these intertwined problems en-US will increase the likelihood of fully eective, long-term en-US sustainable solution and strategic success. DoD oen is en-US well ahead on strategy, which causing a desynchronization en-US with DoS and USAID, thus hindering a well-balanced en-US and articulated policy approach. LCBs informal Rule of en-US Law process and ineective legal system is a challenge to en-US the reintegration process, where in an individual must be en-US certied as having renounced memberships in an extremen-US -
4 en-USist group. USAID is conducting many community eorts en-US focused on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in en-US hotspots. At present, the sense of political will to energize en-US CVE eorts is absent. BH is an existential threat to the way en-US African states governed these marginalized regions. e en-US population witnessed BHs challenges to the government, en-US and they will force change over years, potentially creating a en-US generational humanitarian crisis. Government response to en-US extremist actions oen becomes the tipping point for many en-US to join extremist groups, thus partners must be synched in en-US their messaging to quell future extremist recruitment.en-US Counterterrorism (CT) targeting and intelligence (intel) en-US sharing are two primary roles of the Intelligence Commuen-US -en-US nity (IC) in WoG eorts. However, the IC is uniquely en-US placed to identify responsible leaders and decisions-maken-US -en-US ers, especially when elected and appointed ocials are en-US only gure heads, which is extremely important for WoG en-US capacity building eorts. In Nigeria, interagency cooperaen-US -en-US tion is limited and intel service operates totally separately en-US from the military on CT cases. e Nigerian military and en-US the Department of State Services (Nigerian intel) needs en-US to regularly share CT intel, which was highlighted by the en-US two agencies recently capturing a West African ISIS operen-US -en-US ative. U.S. assistance is needed to coordinate the eorts of en-US the fractured and unpredictable bureaucracies of the Lake en-US Chad countries. IC intel products and briefs to Washingen-US -en-US ton and policymakers are essential for providing context en-US for decision-makers to understand the BH and ISIS chalen-US -en-US lenges. e ICs framing of the problem focuses on the en-US bigger picture, such as how challenges in Nigeria aect the en-US entire region. IC assessments may be the only time polien-US-en-US cymakers actually focuses on Nigeria, and thus this input en-US inuences the guidance and strategic direction of WoG en-US eorts. e IC conducts largely impartial assessments and en-US examines data from a distance, rather than a eld operators en-US view, as the IC has sucient capability to broadly assess en-US problem sets from a regional perspective. e IC plays a en-US valuable role in small incremental changes in the environen-US -en-US ment, which have a more regional aect, thus potentially en-US precipitating a change in the U.S government approach. en-US e IC has brought a Whole of Intelligence Community en-US (WoIG) eort to bear on the BH problem, for example, en-US Treasury focusing on sanctions and terrorist nance. e en-US U.S. eort pressures Nigeria to follow suit. e MNJTF en-US responses are adaptive to similar conicts in Africa, such as en-US Somalia and Mali, as these responses are distinguished by en-US the forward leaning partners in the region. en-US One question posed by the audience dealt with the cauen-US -en-US sality of BH being restricted to such a smaller location, en-US while Al Shabaab has been more expansive in its reach? en-US BH rose out of the inequities of Nigerian society and is en-US largely ethnically based. Although BH has brought other en-US ethnic groups into the conict, the BH focus is devoted en-US to solving these inequities, which are not of interest to en-US outside groups. ISIS West Africa is likely the longer term en-US strategic threat, especially since ISIS West Africa is focused en-US on recreating an alternative governance structure, so more en-US of a threat to the viability of the Nigerian government. en-US ISIS West Africa also distributes justice and humanitarian en-US assistance. en-US Another question dealt with why the USG decided to en-US ultimately by into the MNJTF concept, and how can this en-US be replicated to create a similar civilian agency? One of en-US the greatest challenge was the capacity of the MNJTF en-US to actually receive capacity building support. MNJFT en-US evolved into a venue for sharing intel and coordination en-US and cooperation. A civilian entity does not have a vested en-US interest from the NCB partners, and focus more on sub-reen-US Panel Session U.S. Interests in Africa: the Next Ten en-USYears Panel Chair COL Ken Adgie Deputy Commandant, en-US U.S. Army War College provides the opening comments en-US to panel members AMB Phillip Carter III, Retired Execen-US-en-US utive Vice President, Jeerson Waterman International en-US and Kate Almquist Knopf Director, Africa Center for en-US Strategic Studies
5 en-USgional dialogue. USAID is focusing on building a regional en-US counter violent extremism (CVE) strategy. Since the en-US civilian architecture is not in place for large scale refugee en-US and displaced person returnees, if catastrophic success were en-US to occur, expectations for essential services would not be en-US met, the grievances grow exponentially. Such an instance, en-US might be the impetus to establish a civilian multi-country en-US task force. en-US Colonel Ken Adgie, the Deputy Commandant of the en-US US Army War College introduced the last panel entitled en-US "US interest in Africa for the next 20 years". is panel en-US expanded on the USG options for the future, based on en-US past accomplishments and programs. USG plans should en-US coincide with national interests, oen dened as security, en-US geopolitical, economic and humanitarian. However, plans en-US could align more functionally like the migrant issues facing en-US our European partners or Chinas growing inuence on en-US Africa. 19 of the top 25 countries in the Fund for Peaces en-US Failed State Index are from Africa, making any strategy, a en-US challenge. e rst panelist was ABM(r) Philip Carter III, en-US former Ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire and current president en-US of the Meade Hill Group, as well as the Executive Vice en-US President of the Washington-based international advisoen-US -en-US ry rm of Jeerson Waterman International. e second en-US panelist was Kate Knopf, the Director of the Africa Center en-US for Strategic Studies.en-US e future of Africa is a challenging topic on its own. en-US e security space will not be shaped by how the African en-US nations will grapple with the terrorist threat, instead it en-US will depend upon the development of infrastructure. is en-US development structure will rely on the continents ability en-US to marshal resources for massive investment in resilient inen-US -en-US frastructure that improves connectivity, such as roads, railen-US -en-US ways, ports, power generation distribution, and ber optic en-US cables. No society can achieve sustained economic growth en-US without investing in their infrastructure. e African en-US governments must implement an aggressive private-sector en-US economic growth strategy for a sustained period in order en-US to create jobs for their burgeoning populations, which will en-US require an urgent and daunting shi in governance and en-US economic policy, as well as regional and continental coopen-US -en-US eration. A major challenge facing Africa is climate change, en-US which has caused desertication, rising oceans aecting en-US the coastline, changing temperature which alters the ora en-US and fauna. Infrastructure development is the only factor en-US for mitigating climate impacts. Climate change will also en-US drive rural to urban migration, and raise the prospects for en-US greater pandemics. e developed world is getting smaller, en-US while the African population grows to encompass nearly en-US 25% of the worlds population. is dynamic increase is en-US compounded by a burgeoning youth bulge with an average en-US age of 22-23 years of age, thus creating the largest labor en-US pool. Millions are moving within the continent to cities in en-US the hope of better economic opportunities and reduced en-US violence, creating the fastest urbanization rates on the en-US planet. Many of the migrants move into slums, where a lack en-US of infrastructure exacerbates the problems. To counter this en-US dynamic, African nations must invest in their own societen-US -en-US ies and neighbors. However the illicit outows currently en-US exceed the development assistance inows. Africa will need en-US to invest 1.5 trillion in infrastructure over the next 10-15 en-US years, but state institutions are currently losing about 100 en-US billion per year to illicit outows, which is a huge goveren-US -en-US nance challenge. Technically, these states have the ability to en-US reinvest in their own infrastructure. e youth migration en-US to cities creates a hyper-connectivity to each other, but en-US there is still limited inter-governmental connectivity. is en-US connectivity is changing expectations, as youth become en-US cognizant of opportunities throughout the world, they en-US demand more services (clean water, electricity, education en-US and jobs), which places a heavy burden on governance. en-US Cities and states/provinces will become the focal point for en-US governance development. For example, a mayor may be the en-US most important political partner over a head of state. e en-US US most focus security and stability eorts at the sub-proen-US -en-US vincial level. Democracy is a culture, not simply elections, en-US as has become the common implementation strategy. e en-US USG must focus on the principles of good governance, en-US where in governments are responsive to the needs of the en-US population. Enhancing state security does not ensure en-US stability, as the administration, police and military may not en-US care populace viewpoints. Enhancing urban security and en-US policing capabilities will be paramount in Africa over the en-US next 10 years. AFRICOM may be the only entity capable en-US of enhancing this civilian security by engaging with DoSs en-US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement en-US Aairs (INL), FBI, Homeland Security and Congress to en-US free up the necessary resources to provide security in urban en-US centers. African nations, whose economies are oil based en-US and not focused on their populations, are more likely to
en-US6 en-USbecome impoverished. erefore, USG solutions must enen-US -en-US sure the eective leveraging of natural resources. e focus en-US for the security sector is inherently Defense Institution en-US Building (DIB), DIB encompasses functional recruitment, en-US retention and retirement strategy, which includes encouren-US -en-US aging African governments to develop their own capacity en-US for interagency, inter-ministerial conversations. e USG en-US had to compel African governments to collaborate on the en-US regional threats, such as BH and ebola. e USGs greaten-US -en-US est challenge is dening the transition point when the US en-US has built sucient resilience and capacity to manage the en-US security sector, while ensuring it is aligned with an iterative en-US transition strategy to partner nation authority in the secuen-US -en-US rity sector. Terrorism has been around as long as humanity, en-US so simply eliminating terrorist elements does not mitigate en-US the threat, and even potentially creates further instabilien-US-en-US ty. As the dominant military force in the region grows to en-US counter the terrorist threat, it becomes disassociated from en-US the population it is designed to protect. Urgency exists, as en-US crises continue to compound at nearly the same rate as the en-US relentless African demographic growth. e US needs to en-US accept risks, and not continue deliberations to ensure every en-US activity is a resounding success. As the networks continue en-US to mature, the US must be postured to enable and enhance en-US good networks over bad ones. Africa is not a high tech en-US solution, basic communication and administration are uren-US -en-US gent requirements to ensure communities truly understand en-US the challenges. AFRICOM is in a unique position to raise en-US the issue of police training to further emphasize the need en-US for citizen security over state security. e US must deal en-US with conict in such a way that it does not derail economen-US -en-US ic growth, and this is a discussion where AFRICOM can en-US show real leadership.en-US Another perspective is that AFRICOM is really not esen-US-en-US sential in Africa as there is little need for armies, where in en-US police forces, gendarmerie and border security, and other en-US forms of citizen security are far more important for mainen-US -en-US taining stability. AFRICOM is not currently designed to en-US meet the challenge of developing police forces and mainen-US -en-US taining citizen security. Looking at megatrends confronten-US -en-US ing the continent, Africa is ill-equipped economically to en-US keep pace with its demographic growth. With Africas en-US exploding population growth, its strategic importance en-US increase exponentially. State to society relationships in Afen-US-en-US rica requires DoS to focus on countries that really do not en-US register on AFRICOMs agenda, as they may pose no direct en-US threat to US interests. ese dierent institutional manen-US -en-US dates and equities creates a disconnect within US priorities en-US in Africa. e annual strategic dialogue at the assistant en-US secretary, assistant director, Combatant Commander-level en-US enables the synchronization of defense, development and en-US diplomacy eorts and determines the ecacy and inadeen-US -en-US quacy of capacity building measures. One recurrent themes en-US is a need for a shared analysis and understanding of the enen-US -en-US vironment, which is a platform that AFRICOM can bring en-US to the interagency to truly look at a comprehensive analysis en-US of national dynamics down to sub and trans-regional issues en-US that are really posing challenges. Nearly 20 million people en-US on the continent are currently internally displaced persons en-US (IDP), with only 1% of those IDPs owing to Europe. en-US e vast majority of the IDPs are handled internally by en-US African states, creating great pressure on the government en-US and the economy. However, the majority of the U.S. secuen-US -en-US rity assistance funds are allocated to partner nations, who en-US are countering direct threats to the U.S. Many of these en-US partners are the least democratic governments in Africa. en-US e 3Ds need to develop a cross cutting strategy to achieve en-US strategic success on the continent. Not all sectors and en-US objectives are mutually supporting, and oen gains in one en-US area, drives failure in another. Democracies need to be the en-US emphasis on the continent as public opinion polls have en-US shown such a representative-style government structure is en-US the desired system, however, currently only 11% live in full en-US or even awed democracies. e population may not comen-US -en-US pletely understand the principles of a democracy, but they en-US want to engage their government ocials and move toward en-US a democratic structure.en-US e panel addressed the issue of AFRICOM not being an en-US acceptable platform for reforming the police, specically en-US due to a lack of authority to do so. Which is in contrast en-US to the African dynamic where policing is conducted by en-US national, not local structure, so why would not the U.S. en-US military be a viable training option? AFRICOM with its en-US leveraging of other interagency assets, when armed with en-US the appropriate authorities would be a viable training open-US -en-US tion. AFRICOM forces could also be leveraged to assist in en-US the training process as a capacity builder for other agencies. en-US African police are national assets, and are the predomien-US-en-US nant security providers in the country, as the military is en-US designed to defend the sovereign state from its own people.
en-US7en-USAFRICOM should be the convening authority to bring all en-US parties together to discuss a way forward for civil security en-US on the continent. However, policing is a civilian function, en-US as highlighted by the separation of policing and military en-US responsibilities in the west. Security forces can compleen-US -en-US ment one another, but should have separate objectives, to en-US include an inherent capability to hand o security services en-US from one force to another depending on the type of threat. en-US States need to dene principal security threats and needs en-US through discussions with their citizenry. e population en-US needs to determine which organization they will trust en-US from a security standpoint in dierent environments. e en-US building of policing institutions must be a long term comen-US -en-US mitment, and AFRICOMs bureaucracy might not supen-US -en-US port such an engagement. e day-to-day daily security of en-US a state largely relies on a policing force, and is therefore not en-US under a military purview. Terrorist threats are not a daily en-US concern, but state violence against the population oen is a en-US primary concern. en-US e audience inquired about the need for increased capacien-US-en-US ty building of police throughout AFRICA for civil security en-US forces. Since AFRICOM possesses the capacity to fulll a en-US police development mission, but does not have the authoren-US -en-US ity to conduct police development, why is AFRICOM not en-US considered a viable headquarters to lead such an eort. e en-US panel opined that the authorities need to be considered, en-US and AFRICOM, with its large headquarters interagency en-US components, should be part of a leveraging process to en-US deal with civilian security. African countries have national en-US police forces focused on civil security, while the military is en-US not focused on protecting the sovereign nation, but instead en-US the government from its people. Police usually outnumen-US -en-US ber military personnel. e African people want to have en-US a democratic style government, but do not know exactly en-US what that means, and are starting to demand more of their en-US government. is change of perspective will likely result in en-US more unrest, and thus more requirements for civil security en-US and policing. AFRICOM is the only U.S. governmental en-US agency that is looking at the continent as a whole from a en-US civilian security perspective, thus they become the natural en-US convening body for such a discussion. However, policen-US-en-US ing is a civilian function, and while the west maintains a en-US separation of military and civilian security responsibilities, en-US these two security elements can complement and support en-US each other. In some instances, there may be a coordinated en-US hand-o between military and policing security elements, en-US depending on the size and type of threat. African states en-US need to have a frank discussion with the population to en-US determine the actual security threats, and popular opinion en-US on which type of security force would be trusted by the en-US population against specic threats. DoD leading such an en-US eort may provide a military perspective for each type of en-US threat. Any long term development policing solution will en-US not likely align with AFRICOMs strategies and objectives. en-US Terrorism is a minor daily concern to the African popuen-US -en-US lation, but state violence against civilians is a signicant en-US threat. In that light, countering violent extremism (CVE) en-US will be largely ineective without developing an eective en-US police force. Intelligence and information gathering is the en-US number one tool to counter the CVE threat. Militaries en-US do not have the level of community interaction and trust en-US to gain that type of information. High-tech interdictions en-US is not a winning CVE proposition. Local police are best en-US suited for this interaction, especially with their intelligence en-US gathering capabilities within the communities. e best en-US strategy for countering terrorist threats is at the grass roots, en-US community-level utilizing local police. e character of PK en-US in urban settings is increasing, commensurate with the roll en-US of formed police units. en-US e question of the US role in supporting UN PK misen-US-en-US sions in Africa arose. International and regional organizaen-US -en-US tions are working to resolve and prevent conicts in Africa, en-US which is echoed in the current UN Secretary Generals en-US theme of preventing violence. e UN Development en-US Programme and the World Bank are producing a report on en-US preventing violence based on recent experience. Ambassaen-US -en-US dor Haley has been very pragmatic in looking at eciencies en-US and eectiveness of UN PK eorts in Africa. PK missions en-US tend to be more focused on stabilizing the region, and less en-US on resolving conict. As political strategy and process are en-US matched with the PK eorts, these missions may actuen-US -en-US ally be prolonging conict. African nations value highly en-US the principle of subsidiarity, in which the UN Security en-US Council defers to the African Union, which defers to the en-US sub-regional organizations involved in or responsible for en-US a specic conict situation. Subsidiarity has limited the en-US UN input into some of these crisis, which has led to sucen-US-en-US cess in the west, and tragic misses in addressing violence en-US against civilians in the east. ere needs to be a pragmatic en-US solution when it is not reasonable for a sub-regional orgaen-US -
en-US8en-USnizations to take the lead because of conicting interests en-US with neighboring countries, such as in South Sudan. PK en-US operations usually last 14-17 years, then restart as the driven-US -en-US ers of conict are rarely addressed through a diplomatic en-US eort to staunch the bloodshed. e US has a humanitaren-US -en-US ian response to stop the ghting and killing of innocent en-US civilians, but in the end, only the political economy of en-US the conict has changed, aer being subsidized by the PK en-US operation. ere needs to be a constant evaluation as to en-US why PK mission continue. Governments become depenen-US -en-US dent upon UN PK operations to provide security for the en-US region, or as something that can be leveraged against their en-US opponents. e Economic Community of West African en-US States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Comen-US -en-US munity (SADC) and the African Union (AU) are hollow en-US organization. e AU is only now developing a formula to en-US pay for itself. Up until 4 years ago, only 4 countries of the en-US 54 AU contributors were paying for their membership, so en-US now they are levying a tax to maintain their Chinese-built en-US facilities. ese organizations are aspirational, but have en-US a lot of political challenges. ese regional organizations en-US are denitely where the U.S. needs to focus their resourcen-US-en-US es. ECOWAS functions well when Nigeria is strong, but en-US falters when they do not understand their resources and en-US capabilities. e U.S. needs to play a greater role in PK en-US operations to eectively enhance their capabilities. Providen-US -en-US ing funding alone is inadequate, and does not connote an en-US ability to be openly critical of the mission without particien-US-en-US pation. e Chinese view participation in such operations en-US as a worthwhile investment, thus to keep pace the U.S. en-US should as well.
INTRODUCTION en-USe Over the last decade or more, terrorism has become a en-US major security challenge confronting most African countries. en-US Although the causes of terrorism may vary from country to en-US country or region to region, they are largely attributed to issues en-US of unemployment, poverty, poor economic opportunities, hopeen-US -en-US lessness, regime repression, corruption, injustice, inequality, and en-US massive violations of human rights against women and minorien-US-en-US ties. e manifestations of terrorism include: suicide bombings, en-US car bombings, kidnapping of humanitarian aid and foreign en-US workers and school children, attacking mosques, churches, en-US transport terminals and hotels among others.en-US1en-US Although en-US state and non-state actors employ anti-terrorism measures, en-US the threat of terrorism continues to undermine the sanctity of en-US most African states, and as a consequence, slows the pace of en-US socio-economic development. is paper examines three issues: en-US intelligence gathering, training, and border security manageen-US -en-US ment. ese issues are perceived as key anti-terrorism measures en-US in Africa and the paper argues that the adoption and strengthen-US -en-US ening of these measures can reduce the threat terrorism poses to en-US the continent. e paper rst employs the theory of greed and en-US grievance as an explanatory model that underpins the recent en-US upsurge in terrorism in Africa. Although Paul Collier and Anke en-US Hoeer have largely advanced the greed component of the en-US theory as an underlying reason for the emergence of civil wars,en-US2en-US en-US it is argued that grievance factors are increasingly becoming en-US motivations for the evolution of terrorist groups in Africa. To en-US understand these issues, the second section of the paper places en-US in context and examines the experiences and lessons learned en-US from implementing anti-terrorism measures aer key terrorist en-US incidents in Africa. e nal section examines three anti-terroren-US -en-US ism measures as a way forward to preventing and responding to en-US terrorism in Africa. en-USGreed and Grievance and Terrorism in Africaen-USCollier and Hoeer (1998) rst introduced the theory of en-US greed and grievance under the title, en-USOn Economic Causes of en-US Civil Waren-US3en-US Essentially, greed refers to the economic opportuen-US -en-US nity of groups to engage in conict which thus makes looting a en-US9 en-USkey motivation for civil wars. is suggests that there is a degree en-US of correlation between abundance of natural resources and the en-US possibility of conict outbreak. For instance, income from naten-US -en-US ural resource predation such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra en-US Leone were cited as important sources of nance for the rebel en-US movements. Earnings from natural resources was a motivating en-US factor for the emergency of many warring factions in the Liberia en-US Civil War.en-US4en-US On the other hand, grievance model examines en-US inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divien-US-en-US sions as causes of conict, with ethnicity being the root cause en-US for conict in Liberia.en-US5en-US However, among the many proponents en-US of these contrasting theories, greed trumps the grievance arguen-US -en-US ment as the cause of conicts. To this end, scholars such as Mats On 17-18 October 2017, Brigadier General (Dr.) Em en-US-en-US manuel Wekem Kotia, Ghana Deputy Ko Annan Interen-US -en-US national Peacekeeping Training Centre Commandant en-US visited the U.S. Army War College & PKSOI as part of a en-US four US institution (National Defense University, Army en-US War College, Air War College AY18 and Kennesaw en-US State University) tour designed to gather facts and inforen-US -en-US mation on best practices and potential lessons learned en-US for the establishment of a new National Defense Unien-US-en-US versity in Ghana. BG Kotia also took this opportunity to en-US strengthen KAIPTC's relationship with PKSOI.
en-US10en-USBerdal and David Malone (2000) argued that measures of social en-US grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic en-US and religious divisions, have little systematic eect on the risk of en-US civil war.en-US6en-US ey assert that it is primarily nancial viability; that en-US is greed, which motivates rebel groups.en-US7en-US en-US Indeed, while the greed factor is largely true in perpetuating en-US conicts such as the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and en-US Democratic Republic of Congo, this paper argues that unlike en-US with civil conicts, social grievances are greater contributing en-US factors to the growing threat of terrorism in Africa. In most en-US cases, an individual or groups frustration regarding perceived en-US deprivation (although relative), fosters aggression within an en-US individual or group, which can then manifest itself in the form en-US of political violence and terrorism.en-US Reecting on the African situation, most religious groups, en-US ethnic minorities, lower and middle income earners and other en-US social groupings feel marginalized relative to the distribution en-US of state resources. In other words, those in authority such as en-US political elites control state resources, and the creation of social en-US classes. For instance, the Touregs in Northern Mali and Northen-US -en-US ern Niger feel marginalized and neglected as they benet little en-US from state resources such as gold and uranium. In Senegal, the en-US Casamance region feels alienated from the mainstream political en-US administration of the state. In Nigeria, the Movement for the en-US Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has persistently waged en-US attacks against the Nigerian state for not beneting from the en-US rich oil resources in the Niger Delta. While the Boko Haram en-US (BH) terrorist group in Nigeria appears to be waging a religious en-US war, part of BHs grievances are the growing inequality, poverty en-US and marginalization perpetuated by corrupt political elites. en-US Libyas uprising in 2011 resulted in the emergence of multiple en-US terrorist groups, which was promulgated by grievances such as en-US lack of democratic space and human right abuses by the Ghen-US -en-US adda regime. ese examples attest to the fact that grievances en-US cannot be downplayed as key motivations that can engender en-US groups to engage in terrorist acts. en-US EXPERIENCES AND LESSONSen-US Experiencesen-US ere is no doubt that terrorism continues to pose enormous seen-US -en-US curity challenge to most African states. Since the 1998 simultaen-US -en-US neously coordinated bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, en-US Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,en-US8en-US a series of deadly attacks en-US were recorded in Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, and recently in en-US Burkina Faso and Cote dIvoire among others. e eects of en-US these attacks have been devastating, killing scores of innocent en-US people and destroying key infrastructure and buildings. is en-US has created panic and fear among the population in Africa. In en-US response, states as well regional organizations made conscious en-US eorts at developing frameworks and devising anti-terrorism en-US strategies. In most cases, however, strategies become obsolete or en-US counter-productive because of the rapidly changing nature of en-US terrorist group strategies and tactics. Admittedly, many terroren-US -en-US ist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), en-US al-Shabaab, BH, Ansar Dine, and Ansaru are operating across en-US Africa with new tactics and sophisticated equipment, which en-US African security agencies cannot match with outmoded techen-US -en-US niques and strategies. It is instructive to note that BH, for en-US example, engaged in proselytization (dawa), which included en-US recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalization of its members en-US before 2009. ese were non-violent approaches to pursuing en-US their ideological agenda.en-US However, in July 2009, the Nigerian military adopted radical en-US counter-terrorism measures, leading to the killing of Mohamen-US -en-US med Yusuf, the BH moderate leader. In response, and to demonen-US -en-US strate resilience, BH adopted rather violent and desperate en-US measures to achieve their political and ideological goals. Nigeen-US -en-US rian authorities failure to prosecute those who were responsible en-US for the extra-judicial killing of the BH leader Yusuf, constituted en-US one of the principal grievances of the members of the sect.en-US9en-US en-US Consequently, the group became more violent and as noted by en-US Campbell:en-US Boko Haram [has become] brutal, fully exploiting the en-US propaganda value of violence. Its murder methods are grisly, en-US featuring throat-slitting and beheadings, which it someen-US -en-US times captures on video for propaganda purposes. Initially, en-US most of its victims were members of the security forces, en-US persons associated with the government, and Muslims who en-US actively opposed the group. Now, however, victims include en-US women, children, and Muslims who merely do not actively en-US support its agenda.en-US10en-US en-US As Nigeria introduces more anti and counter-terrorism meaen-US -en-US sures, including amnesty negotiations, the introduction of en-US emergency law and the massive deployment of security forces, en-US Boko Haram also continues to change its tactics and strategies en-US causing more havoc to human lives and property in North-Easten-US -en-US ern Nigeria.en-US Kenyas role in ghting al-Shabaab in Somalia attracted reprisal en-US attacks in Kenya, resulting in the 2013 attack against the Westen-US -en-US gate Mall in Nairobi that le at least 65 people dead. In April en-US 2015, al-Shabaab killed 147 students in Garissa University in en-US Kenya.en-US11en-US
en-US11en-USLessonsen-USIt is evident from the experiences of anti-terrorism and counten-US -en-US er-terrorism measures adopted against Boko Haram and al-en-US Shabaab by Nigerian and Kenyan governments respectively that, en-US the use of hard security or a military approach will not always en-US be an eective measure in addressing terrorist threats. Kenya en-US has seen reprisal attacks from al-Shabaab from Somalia. BH, en-US originally a less violent terrorist organization, was transformed en-US into a more formidable violent group as a consequence of the en-US unsanctioned killing of their leader Yusuf. BHs operational en-US focus over time has changed from attacks on churches and en-US mosques to detonating bombs indiscriminately, kidnapping en-US civilians for ransom, improving the eective employment of en-US improvised explosive devices and the capturing and retention of en-US territory. e capture of over 200 girls in Chibok, Nigeria and en-US their ill-treatment, including forcing them into sex and forcen-US-en-US ible marriages is a consequence of changes in tactics, arguably en-US emanating from Nigerias hard counter-terrorism measures. is en-US should serve as a lesson to states and regional forces, as well as en-US continental organizations such as the Economic Community of en-US West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Developen-US -en-US ment Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) that, en-US the ght against terrorism should be multi-dimensional, and in en-US some instances, context specic. But more importantly, intellien-US-en-US gence sharing, border security management and training are key en-US elements of anti-terrorism in Africa.en-USANTI-TERRORISM MEASURESen-USAnti-Terrorism actions are defensive measures used to reduce en-US the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts or en-US activities. Anti-Terrorism actions may include limited response en-US and containment of local security forces. Other anti-terroren-US -en-US ism measures include instituting awareness programs for the en-US populations, as well as proactive measures adopted to prevent en-US terrorists from carrying out their activities, and collaboration en-US among security agencies within a particular state and between en-US nations-states in Africa. Anti-Terrorism measures are therefore en-US aided by good intelligence training for security agencies, and en-US sound border security management.en-USIntelligence Gatheringen-USIntelligence is information that is analyzed and converted into en-US a product to support a particular cause. Intelligence is both en-US a process and a product, and has played an important role in en-US diplomacy and warfare throughout history. In the information en-US age and with the emergence of terrorism, intelligence has taken en-US a centre stage of importance. While intelligence alone cannot en-US stop the next terrorist attack in Africa, it is the critical rst step en-US in identifying and possibly preventing one.en-US12en-US en-US Intelligence gathering at the strategic level is used for long-en-US term planning and for assessing the capabilities of potential en-US opponents at the operational level. With good analysis and the en-US production of clear evaluations, security agencies could have an en-US eective tool to use in an eort to identify potential terrorist en-US operations and targets within their community. Good intellien-US-en-US gence has the ability to predict when and where future terrorist en-US operations might occur, based on the probability of their most en-US advantageous targets for their cause. erefore through intellien-US-en-US gence gathering, state security forces are in a better position to en-US successfully preempt future terrorist attack.en-US e use of intelligence in preventing all forms of crimes is very en-US important. However, with regards to terrorism, coordination of en-US intelligence gathering eorts and information-sharing between en-US and among states on the one hand, and the regional organien-US-en-US zations on the other, is absolutely imperative because of the en-US increased movement of terrorist groups across borders. ereen-US -en-US fore, intelligence gathering should not be limited to only a state, en-US but should be coordinated across states, and similarly among reen-US -en-US gional groups and communities. It should be noted that France en-US has already adopted an anti-terrorism strategy in Africa and the en-US Sahel in particular:en-US13en-US Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and La en-US Cote dIvoire also have anti-terrorism strategies. While similar en-US anti-terrorism measures exist in the region, there is a need for en-US the coordination of eorts to ensure eective management and en-US monitoring of terrorist threats and radical groups. However, en-US the eectiveness of these measures will be optimized when loen-US -en-US cals are involved in information gather and sharing through an en-US active monitoring process. Such an eort calls for measures to en-US educate and create awareness among the population on the need en-US for timely and accurate sharing of information on the activities en-US of suspicious groups suspected to be terrorists. en-US e threat of Boko Haram has encouraged Niger, Nigeria, Chad en-US and Cameroon to coordinate eorts to create a multi-nationen-US -en-US al force to ght the threat. Together with Benin, ve leaders en-US within ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central en-US African States (ECCAS) have resolved to speed up the creen-US -en-US ation of a headquarters for the multi-national force and have en-US deployed military battalions "to [their] respective borders". e en-US Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has also been createn-US -en-US ed for the Lake Chad Basin countries supported by the AU.en-US14en-US en-US But the coordination eorts in information gathering should en-US not be limited to the core security agencies alone. Issues of
en-US12en-USsecurity are more complex, broad and interconnected, hence the en-US involvement of other identiable non-core security agencies and en-US local communities is of paramount importance. Perpetrators of en-US terrorist acts in Somalia, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria, for instance, en-US have been identied in local communities. In this regard, Nien-US-en-US geria introduced a community initiative known as the Civilian en-US Joint Task Force (CJTF), which emerged rst as a community en-US eort, and later as a joint eort with the security forces to help en-US detect and combat Boko Haram.en-US15en-US Such an intelligence group en-US may be located within communities, facilitating its ability to deen-US -en-US tect suspicious activities by groups planning to carry out terroren-US -en-US ist attacks. e Civilian JTF members in Nigeria have successen-US-en-US fully prevented many attacks through community surveillance en-US and have assisted the security agencies to arrest Boko Haram en-US members.en-US16en-US is example of civilian and police interaction in en-US Nigeria could be replicated in various countries within Africa as en-US an anti-terrorism measure. Such a construct with proper cooren-US -en-US dination and structures could serve as an early warning system en-US against terrorism. en-US e population should be trained to identify and report anyen-US -en-US thing out of place or out of the ordinary, such as new people in en-US the neighborhood who avoid security agencies, or changes in en-US behavior of people you have known for some time. As terrorism en-US continues to emerge as a security threat, Africa will continue en-US to serve as a critical target. rough patience and vigilance, en-US terrorists continue to further their cause through the cultural en-US understanding of society and known population grievances. It en-US is therefore important to continue to learn about those who en-US choose to attack the peoples freedom and way of life. Security en-US agencies will have to take the lead in this organized war against en-US terrorism in Africa. Security agencies must develop transparent en-US communication and intelligence links. Intelligence collection en-US will prove invaluable in these eorts. en-USTrainingen-USIndividual countries, the AU, Regional Economic Communities en-US (RECs) should invest in training at two levels. e rst level of en-US training would focus on continuous security force training to en-US remain current on the constantly evolving nature of terrorist en-US groups in Africa. It should be noted that the military in many en-US African countries does not have the requisite modern training en-US to confront the evolving threat of terrorists in Africa. In other en-US words, the changing dynamics of terrorists continue to defy and en-US resist conventional, unilateral approaches, counter-measures en-US and classical tactics of warfare. is is manifested in Nigeria, en-US where Boko Haram, on many occasions, has been able to outwit en-US the Nigerian security forces, and put into question the capaen-US -en-US bility of the MNJTF.en-US17en-US e security forces in Africa have not en-US been adequately equipped to confront the asymmetric nature en-US of tactic adopted by modern terrorist groups. Intelligence en-US agencies in various states continue to adopt obsolete methods en-US of intelligence collection and analysis, and are easily outwitted en-US by modern-day terrorist groups. Apart from the intelligence en-US agencies, other security institutions in Africa continue to adopt en-US conventional measures as tactic for anti-terrorism activities, en-US which are always outpaced by emerging terrorist groups using en-US asymmetric tactics. en-US e second training area concerns the AU and member-states, en-US which should focus attention on training the youth, especialen-US -en-US ly Muslim youth on the misconceptions of 'jihad', which has en-US become a springboard for engaging in radicalization and milen-US -en-US itancy across many countries in the region. It has been argued en-US that the concept of Jihad has largely been misunderstood, en-US misinterpreted by some Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and en-US as a consequence "hijacked" and misapplied by extremists and en-US terrorists to achieve ideological and political goals.en-US18en-US Eorts at en-US disabusing the minds of the youth about misconceptions should en-US be comprehensive, including impartial religious, moral, secular, en-US as well as peace education.en-US19en-US en-US To prevent terrorist attacks in Africa, it is important that the en-US strategies of the security agencies are reformed to conform to en-US current emerging threats facing the continent. Training for en-US intelligence agencies for instance will need to be re-focused en-US towards emerging security threats confronting the continent. en-US e recruitment and deployment of intelligence operatives en-US should be re-designed to meet modern challenges of intellien-US-en-US gence gathering. Intelligence as a key element of anti-terrorist en-US eorts could then contribute signicantly to the prevention of en-US terrorism in Africa. e ght against terrorism will fail without en-US the refocusing of intelligence agencies from regional protection en-US to a more progressive and human-centered approach. Equally en-US important, regular security agencies comprised of the Armed en-US Forces, the Police, Gendarmeries and others would need to be en-US re-equipped and retrained to confront well-motivated and well-en-US trained terrorists. In addition, most of the forces in Africa are en-US still adopting conventional warfare tactics while the terrorist are en-US using asymmetric strategies, causing a mismatch of outmoded en-US strategies and training methods. e newly created division in en-US Nigeria was largely unsuccessful in preventing Boko Haram acen-US-en-US tivities due to the type of equipment and tactics deployed in the en-US northeast at the onset of the ght against BH. Africa nations en-US need appropriate equipment and modern strategies in order to en-US combat terrorist tactics.
13 en-USBorder Security Managementen-USAlthough the concept of borders has historically shied in en-US denition due to globalization and increased technology, en-US nonetheless, borders still dene the territorial sovereignty of en-US states and play a pivotal role in global peace and security. Conen-US -en-US sequently, the consolidation of borders remains one of the key en-US factors in building stable states, and more importantly the ght en-US against the increasing threat of terrorism in Africa. is means en-US that, all governments or member-states across Africa should en-US aim at maintaining secure borders, not only as a requirement en-US for national sovereignty, but also as a measure for ensuring en-US terrorist groups do not exploit existing border weaknesses to en-US perpetrate acts of terrorism. In this regard, there is the need to en-US adopt comprehensive normative frameworks on border security en-US management, properly demarcate various borders, and provide en-US adequate infrastructure to enable border managers to be able en-US to detect and prevent possible entry of terrorists. Indeed, the en-US uidity of African borders has facilitated the movement of teren-US -en-US rorist networks across the region, especially with the increasing en-US radicalization and growth of violent extremists groups. en-USWith the possible exception of SADC, the other four regions en-US of Africa continue to grapple with the threat of terrorism. ere en-US is no doubt that the continued destabilization of Libya with en-US multiple terrorist groups operating with relatively impunity, en-US inherently implies that other North African states need to en-US collaborate for eective border security management. In West en-US Africa, the persistent insurgency of BH in Nigeria, and isolaten-US -en-US ed attacks in neighboring states such as Cameroon, Niger and en-US Chad, has called for more collaborative eorts. e establishen-US -en-US ment of the MNJTF within the Lake Chad Basin is signicant en-US in this regard. e repeated attacks of al-Shabaab in Kenya acts en-US as a forcing function for collaborative border security measures en-US among the East African states. Similar eort is needed in the en-US Central African states, with the development of the 'anti-balaka' en-US militia in Central African Republic, which occasionally attacks en-US AU peacekeepers. en-US e AU in part developed the AU Border Programme (AUBP) en-US based on the requirement for collaborative border security. e en-US AUBP was established on four pillars: delimitation and demaren-US -en-US cation; cross border cooperation; capacity and partnership; and en-US resource mobilization. Eorts should be made at implementing en-US this landmark policy document for eective border manageen-US -en-US ment.en-USBorder Security and Terrorismen-USAfrica experienced signicant level of terrorist activities over en-US the past two years. e continent is facing daunting tasks en-US of managing its borders in ways that secures their territorial en-US sovereignty and integrity, ensuring bridges rather than barriers en-US exist between states. States are recognized under international en-US law for their capability to maintain their boundaries, secure en-US their territories, and protect their citizens. e ability to secure en-US national borders is one of the criteria used to classify states as en-US strong, weak or failed. Terrorist have been crossing porous and en-US poorly secured borders in Africa with ease, oen armed with en-US weapons, bomb making material and radical ideology. One en-US particular area of note for the ease of terrorist movements is the en-US Sahel region. en-USCONCLUSIONen-US en-US is paper argued that terrorism constitutes a major security en-US challenge in Africa, notwithstanding the fact that legal frameen-US -en-US works and anti-terrorism measures and strategies exist across the en-US continent. As evidenced in this paper, most measures adopted en-US by states in responding to terrorist threats have been at best less en-US than eective, and at worst, counter-productive. In Nigeria, en-US for instance, the adoption of hard core military anti-terrorism en-US approach emboldened BH, changing its tactics to become en-US even more daring and violent in killing innocent civilians in en-US unimaginable proportions. e AUs coordinated attacks on en-US Al-Shabaab in Kenya precipitated reprisal attacks, killing many en-US people in Kenya. e question then is how do states and reen-US -en-US gional organizations in Africa prevent and respond to terrorist en-US attacks? Intelligence gathering, regular training and eective en-US border security management are all important aspects of an anen-US -en-US ti-terrorism campaign. Regional and continental organizations en-US such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and the AU should ensure there en-US are sustained eorts at addressing governance challenges such as en-US corruption, inequality, marginalization, youth unemployment en-US among others, which are drivers of violent extremism.en-USNotes: en-US1 en-USAndrews Atta-Asmoah, Transnational and domestic terroren-US -en-US ism in Africa: Any linkages?' in Okumu, W. and Botha, A. Eds., en-US (2009) "Domestic terrorism in Africa: Dening, addressing and en-US understanding its impact on human security", (Pretoria: Instien-US-en-US tute for Security Studies:2009). See also Kwesi Aning, (2011). en-US Security links between tracking and terrorism in the Sahel en-US in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Routledge: 20011); en-US Makarenko, T. e Crime-Terror en-US Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Oren-US -en-US ganized Crime and Terrorism, Global Crime, Vol.6, No1, 2004.en-US2 en-USPaul Collier and Anke Hoeer, (2002)Greed and Grievances en-US in Civil War, Centre for the study of African Economics Worken-US -en-US ing Paper.
14 en-US3 en-USPaul and Anke Hoeer, On Economics Causes of Civil war, en-US Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 50, issue 4, 1992, pp 563-en-US 573.en-US4 en-USKotia E., (2015) Ghana Armed Forces in Lebanon and Liberia en-US Peace Operations, Lexington Books, USA.en-US5 en-USIbid. en-US6 en-USBerdal, Mats R., and David Malone. Greed & Grievance: en-US Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner en-US Pub, 2000; Paul Collier, e Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest en-US Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It. Cary, en-US NC: Oxford University Press, 2007; Paul Collier, "Post-conict en-US recovery: How should strategies be distinctive?." Journal of Afen-US-en-US rican Economies 18, no. suppl 1 (2009): i99-i131; Paul Collier, en-US and Anke Hoeer. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford en-US Economic Paper 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595. en-US7 en-USIbid.en-US8 en-USPrinceton, N. L., & Morrison, S. e terrorist threat in Afrien-US-en-US ca. Council on Foreign Relations, 83(1), (2004). 75-86.en-US9 en-USAchimugu J. Omede Nigeria: Analyzing the Security Chalen-US -en-US lenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration Canadian en-US Social Science, Vol. 7 No. 5, (2011) pp. 90-102. en-US10 en-USJohn Campbell US Policy to Counter Nigerias Boko Haen-US -en-US ram, Council Special Report No. 70en-US November, 2014, p.10.en-US11 en-USBBC Report. (April 3, 2015). Kenya attack: 147 dead in Gaen-US -en-US rissa University assault. Retrieved June 28, 2016, fromen-US http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080en-US12 en-USRichard Hughbank,'Intelligence and Its Role in protecting en-US Against Terrorism, Journal of Strategic Studies Number 1, Volen-US -en-US ume 3, No1, March 2010.en-US13 en-USFrench Anti-Terror Eorts in Africas Sahel Region: en-USwww.en-US globalresearch.ca, 6 April 2016en-US.en-US14 en-USMultinational Joint Force: en-USwww.globalsecurity.orgen-US .en-US15 en-USDavid Okereke, How Nigeria Can Overcome Terrorism, Inen-US -en-US surgency and Instability, Vigilance Magazine, ( 2013) available en-US at en-UShttp://www.vigilance-securitymagazine.com/industrynews/en-US terrorism-watch/4542-how-nigeria-can-overcome-terrorism-inen-US -en-US surgency-and-instability en-US(accessed 07 June 2016)en-US16 en-USIbid.en-US17 en-USSee Robyn Dixon, In Nigeria, Distrust Hampers the Fight en-US against Boko Haram, Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2014.en-US18 en-USEmmanuel Kotia & Mustapha Abdallah, An Evolving en-US Security Dilemma: Adopting a Comprehensive Approach to en-US the Changing Dynamics of Terrorism in Africa International en-US Relations and Diplomacy 4(2), 2016, 85-94. en-US19 en-USIbid
Summary en-USe Department of Defense has gathered biometric and biographen-US-en-US ic data on millions of individuals in past military operations, en-US largely, but not exclusively in the Central Command Area of en-US Responsibility. Although named operations may conclude, history en-US and statistical analysis indicate identity data accumulated om en-US each operation will remain useful for decades as unstable states en-US fail to achieve enduring peace agreements, return to conict, and en-US inite international responses. Data om past conicts will assist en-US warghters and peacekeepers with identifying iends and foes in en-US new operations, support international counterterror eorts, and en-US speculatively may deter enrolled members of the population om en-US becoming combatants in a renewed conict.en-US For more than two decades now, United States service members en-US have conducted foot patrols through repetitive urban environen-US -en-US ments and maritime operations in unchanging seas encounteren-US -en-US ing the same individuals innumerable times. Oen, what is true en-US at the tactical level may be true at the strategic one, as well. A en-US brief survey of post-Cold War conicts around the globe will reen-US -en-US veal certain names again and again names like Liberia, El Salen-US -en-US vador, Sudan, Yemen, Mali, or a better-known one like Afghanen-US -en-US istan.en-US1en-US Anecdotally, military operations, from major combat to en-US humanitarian relief, oen cluster in certain regions or countries. en-US Rigorous academic studies of the topic make the same case.en-US en-US If U.S., allied or partner military forces operate in the same en-US countries repeatedly, it is likely they will interact with many of en-US the same inhabitants. To prepare for such future contingencies, en-US armed forces must retain biometric and biographic information en-US about the encountered individuals in order to recognize known en-US threats and vet trusted parties. e burgeoning eld of Identity en-US Activities and in particular, forensics and biometrics will en-US help ensure the U.S. is able to meet this challenge.en-USRecurring Conicten-USDepending on how one organizes the data (such as post-Napoen-US -en-US leon, postWorld War II, between states or within states), rates en-US of conict recurrence range anywhere from one thirden-US2en-US of all en-US conicts to three quarters.en-US3en-US Of conicts in progress today, it is a en-US near certainty at least one will are back up within a few years, en-US with South Sudan as a recent example.en-US4en-USe dominant aggravating factor is a lack of settlement from the en-US initial conict.en-US5en-US If one party declares victory, but other parties en-US remain strong enough to contest it, then renewed war is very en-US likely. e most stable outcome involves an unambiguously en-US stronger side imposing a settlement on its weaker peers.en-US6en-US Howen-US -en-US ever, the very nature of peacekeeping operations implies this is en-US not the case. If a conicts outcome was truly stable, no peaceen-US -en-US keepers would be needed. A peacekeeping requirement implies en-US at least one side is both strong and motivated enough to disrupt en-US the peace, absent the outside force. us, when peacekeepers en-US leave as the United States, United Nations, and other foreign en-US forces almost always do there is a good chance the peace will en-US degrade and conict will return.en-US In fact, some studies put a timetable on the resumption of war en-US from uncertain peace. Stephen L. uackenbush and Jerome F. en-US Verlicher (2008), observed: en-US15 Figure 1: A U.S. Marine biometrically enrolls the irises en-USof an Afghan national in 2014. Enrollment of combaten-US-en-US ants and non-combatants denies anonymity to hostile en-US forces who count on their ability to blend into native en-US populations.
en-USthe predicted duration of peace following imposed en-US settlements/decisive outcomes is about 260 months (over en-US 21 years). is is nearly seven years longer than negotiated en-US settlements/decisive outcomes, with a predicted duration en-US of about 180 months (15 years), and over nine years longer en-US than no settlement/decisive outcomes, with a predicted en-US duration of about 150 months (less than 13 years).en-US7en-USInconveniently, the same study notes the vast majority of en-US interstate conicts between 1816 and 2001 ended in stalemate, en-US the least stable outcome.en-US8en-US ough this study mainly reviewed en-US conicts between states, it hints that the principle holds true en-US within states as well.en-US is supposition is borne out by Barbara F. Walter (2010), en-US who reviews civil conicts between 1945 and 2009, nding 57 en-US percent of all civil wars had at least one sequel.en-US9en-US She adds that en-US by the 2000s, 90 percent of then-ongoing internal conicts en-US had recent precursors. In an earlier paper, Walter (2004) notes en-US that with the growing frequency of recurring civil wars, such en-US conicts not only involve the same territory, but oen the very en-US same people. For a variety of reasons, the soldier who enlists en-US in one war is likely to be the same soldier who enlists again and en-US again.en-US10en-US e propensity of past combatants to become future en-US combatants has clear implications for Identity Activities, and its en-US sub-elds of biometrics and forensic exploitation.en-USIdentity In eateren-US en-US Every one of us is a practitioner of biometrics, whether we en-US realize it or not. Each time we see a familiar face or hear a voice en-US we know, we perform basic biometric functions. e sequence is en-US simple our eyes or ears identify a unique biological characteren-US -en-US istic of another individual, the brain matches that characteristic en-US with our catalogues of acquaintances, and we access contextual en-US information on the individual, such as a name, leading to recogen-US -en-US nition.en-US Modern biometric technology supplements human capabilities en-US by adding extra modalities such as ngerprint, iris and DNA en-US scans and retaining identity information in an electronic en-US form accessible to any authorized individual, so recognition of en-US a friend or foe does not require prior personal acquaintance. en-US Forensic exploitation amplies this by allowing recognition of en-US unknown individuals who le their biological traces generally en-US ngerprints or DNA at a site or on an object. Years may pass en-US between encounters, but the fusion of biometrics and forensics en-US allows any soldier to identify individuals enrolled by other forcen-US-en-US es, even if that soldier was unacquainted with those individuals en-US before.en-US Criminal investigators employ this principle every time they en-US solve a cold case or overturn convictions by analyzing en-US DNA from decades-old evidence. e Department of Defense en-US routinely does the same thing in support of its own missions. In en-US an extreme case, a former Iraqi soldier from Saddam Husseins en-US army, ngerprinted and photographed aer surrendering in en-US 1991, was identied in 2012 by algorithms, not acquaintances en-US from 21 years before when applying to work on a U.S. instalen-US -en-US lation in Iraq. is particular individual was not a threat, but his en-US case highlights the longevity of such biometric records and the en-US value of data going back decades. More routinely, individuals en-US linked to entities such as ISIS or the Taliban today are oen en-US matched to their biometric enrollments from the mid-2000s, en-US providing important clues to their histories and networks. en-US16 Figure 2: Forensic exploitation permits attribution of en-USpast activities to known individuals, even years aer the en-US event or aer biometric enrollment.
From the perspective of force protection and prevention of en-USinsider threats, identity information is an invaluable screening en-US tool. Persons known to have connections to hostile groups or en-US activities can be identied and kept out of positions of trust. en-US If U.S. or Coalition forces return to a country in which they en-US have previous biometric records, they can immediately identify en-US individuals from the past. is will assist in determining who is en-US safe to work with, who should be questioned, and who should en-US be considered hostile. It is likely that some past enemy combaten-US -en-US ants will have risen over the years to positions of inuence, but en-US this time on the side of the government, and vice versa. Identity en-US Activities will assist coalition forces in sorting through who is en-US whom and how loyalties have changed, which can be used to en-US create association matrices to better understanding alliances, en-US and assist in planning stability activities in the theater.en-US A complex interplay of reasons contributes to each individuals en-US decision to ght, while a core goal of peacekeeping and stabilen-US -en-US ity activities is to mitigate those factors. Walter (2010) speaks en-US of the micro-level motives driving scattered individuals to en-US evaluate the potential rewards of ghting as worth the risk.en-US11en-US en-US Civil wars have little chance of gaining momentum to get o en-US the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and workers en-US voluntarily choose to enlist in the armies that are necessary to en-US pursue war, and it is the underlying political and economic conen-US -en-US ditions that make enlistment attractive that are likely to drive a en-US second or third civil war,.en-US12en-US Identity Activities can play a role in en-US revealing these motives at the individual level. If disproportionen-US -en-US ate numbers of combatants hail from certain towns, have ceren-US -en-US tain social connections, or possess some other shared characteren-US -en-US istic, such knowledge may go a long way toward identifying core en-US grievances or nding points of agreement. Identity Activities is en-US not a solution in and of itself, but it could point the way to one.en-US As individuals weigh taking up arms versus staying home, Idenen-US -en-US tity Activities may have a more direct, albeit unexamined role. en-US Here we pose a question: does biometric enrollment reduce en-US the chances of an individual returning to the ght? If a former en-US combatant knows he is enrolled in a biometric database, could en-US this deter him from joining a future ght, or, if he must, to do so en-US on the side of the recognized government? Aer all, the loss of en-US anonymity dramatically changes the risk/reward calculation for en-US a prospective terrorist or insurgent. If this supposition is accuen-US -en-US rate, it would be reected by lower recidivism rates for enrollees en-US compared to non-enrollees, however data is sparse. e recidien-US-en-US vism of former Guantanamo Bay inmates (every one of whom en-US is biometrically enrolled) is known to a degree, but arguably en-US the Guantanamo population is not representative of the typical en-US combatant.en-US13en-US is would make for an excellent future study.en-USIdentity Abroaden-USPeople leave their home countries every day for opportunities en-US abroad. Most are simply trying to make a better life for their en-US families; others wish to cause harm to those whom they blame en-US for their troubles. A country with recurring conict is apt to en-US produce more of the latter than a more stable state. us, idenen-US -en-US tity data from past conicts can protect the U.S. and its allies at en-US their borders.en-US is has been borne out on numerous occasions in recent years en-US as U.S. border authorities have biometrically identied and en-US stopped a slow, but steady stream of individuals connected to en-US terrorist and criminal networks. Source countries range from en-US Colombia to Kosovo to Afghanistan, with many others repreen-US -en-US sented. Further investigation may reveal innocent motives for en-US their travel, as people with unsavory pasts can become benign en-US over time, but identifying these individuals is required before en-US one can even begin to evaluate their intentions.en-US With the coming collapse of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, en-US thousands of former combatants with not-so-innocent en-US intentions will ee Iraq and Syria. Many were former memen-US -en-US bers of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and a large subset of those including en-US their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were once detained in en-US U.S. camps, where they were biometrically enrolled.en-US14en-US As they en-US disperse, some will attempt to continue their struggle abroad, or en-US at least nd a measure of solace in revenge. e post-ISIS wave en-US will continue to validate the need for older identity data, dating en-US all the way back to 2003 and the roots of the Iraqi insurgency.en-US Speaking more broadly, as future conicts end in stalemate, and en-US17 Figure 3: Biometric enrollments have demonstrated the en-USnexus of criminal and terrorist networks, which oen en-US employ the same smugglers for illicit tracking in en-US drugs and weapons.
en-USrenew in still-unstable countries, combatants may nd the best en-US way to gain their desired leverage is to attack their countries en-US neighbors and allies, as opposed to institutions within. Every en-US conict is dierent, but it is not uncommon for insurgent en-US groups to conclude their countries governments would fall en-US without Western support, and that attacking Western targets en-US is the best way to hasten this outcome. In such a situation, an en-US individual known formerly as a domestic insurgent may become en-US an international terrorist. Sharing identity data from the earlier en-US conicts will be vital to identifying such individuals during their en-US travels.en-USConcernsen-USAlthough a conict may recur in a given country, the internaen-US -en-US tional response to it will not necessarily repeat. Dierent states, en-US organizations and coalitions will respond to each crisis accorden-US -en-US ing to their interests. With this degree of uidity, identity data en-US must be shared if information from past stability operations is en-US to assist with planning future ones. en-US Ultimately, the level of trust between partners will determine en-US the level of information sharing. One state may fear sharing en-US identity data with an authoritarian state out of fear it would en-US be used to oppress the enrolled population in some way. Other en-US states might fear losing control over the distribution of their en-US data. Cybersecurity presents another concern; a state known en-US to be frequently hacked may not be able to obtain information en-US from partners fearful of data the. e decision to share or not en-US to share, with its potential eect on military operations and en-US border security, can be interpreted as a subtle, but pointed so en-US power tool in which identity information is analogous to a en-US trade agreement or technology exchange. Sharing of identify en-US data between international partners exemplies the degree of en-US trust between partners.en-US ough they may disagree on policy, international partners are en-US generally stable countries. Host nations with recurring internal en-US conict cannot say the same. Sharing identity data with such en-US unstable states introduces the risk of reprisals, both from the en-US government and the armed opposition. An unscrupulous state en-US may use identity data from its foreign partners to single out en-US minorities or political opponents for unequal treatment. If such en-US a state is toppled and the opposition gains access to the dataen-US -en-US base, it may use identity data to identify former members of the en-US defunct government and exact revenge.en-US As Glenn Voelz (2016) indicates from past U.S. experience, en-US Counterinsurgency strategy called for U.S. forces to help en-US reestablish rule of law and support local governance. is inen-US -en-US cluded the transfer of biometric information and technologies en-US to local partners, as well as training on the utilization of these en-US tools as part of legal proceedings.en-US15en-US Taking full advantage of en-US identity capabilities to this degree requires trust which may not en-US initially exist. e refusal to share may protect the integrity of en-US identity data, but the host nation may interpret such reluctance en-US as a perception of the hosts weakness or incompetence. In fuen-US -en-US ture actions, the host nation may perform down to this level of en-US expectation. However, sharing of sensitive identity information en-US with a host government is not just an operational decision, but en-US a strategic one signaling international political commitment to en-US ensuring stability, thus policymakers must choose wisely.en-USConclusionen-USConict recurrence is not a desired outcome, but history shows en-US it is sadly a probable one for which military planners must be en-US prepared. As such, the absence of a major ground operation en-US does nothing to devalue accumulated identity data. Signicant en-US evidence indicates the conicts of tomorrow will be fought in en-US largely the same places as today, and identity data from those aren-US -en-US eas will be vital for future conicts. at same data provides an en-US additional tool to protect the borders of our own country and en-US those of our partners, and the ability to distribute this data to or en-US withhold it from partners supplements our so power arsenal. en-US Additionally, enrollment in a biometric database may deter past en-US combatants from taking up arms again.en-US While not exactly mature yet, the technological foundations en-US for Identity Activities are far from new. Biometric devices and en-US global information networks are now commonplace in the en-US private sector, and forensic disciplines are well established in law en-US enforcement. Military doctrine though, is still evolving. Todays en-US18 Figure 4: Border authorities can use biometric authen en-US-en-US tication to prevent entry by terrorists and criminals en-US presenting fraudulent documents.
en-USleaders will ultimately determine the place of Identity Activities en-US in military operations of all kinds.en-US en-USNotes: en-US1en-US World Bank, World Development Report 2011, p. 54.en-US2en-US Barbara F. Walter: Does Conict Beget Conict? Explaining en-US Recurring Civil War, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, en-US May 2004, p. 371.en-US3en-USZeev Maoz, Peace by Empire? Conict Outcomes and Interen-US -en-US national Stability, 1816-1976, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. en-US 21, No. 3, September 1984, pp. 227-41. Cited by Paul F. Diehl, en-US Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel, United Nations inen-US -en-US tervention and recurring conict, International Organization, en-US Vol. 50, No. 4, Autumn 1996, p. 687.en-US4en-US Jerey Gettleman, War Consumes South Sudan, a Young en-US Nation Cracking Apart, e New York Times, March 4, 2017, en-US p. A1.en-US5en-US Stephen L. uackenbush and Jerome F. Venteicher: Settleen-US -en-US ments, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conict,en-US Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 6, November 2008, p. en-US 737.en-US6en-US Ibid., p. 725.en-US7en-US Ibid., p. 737.en-US8en-US Ibid., p. 728en-US9en-US Walter, Conict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conen-US -en-US ict Peace, Background paper for World Development Report en-US 2011, World Bank, September 13, 2010, p. 1.en-US10en-US Walter, Does Conict Beget Conict? Explaining Recurring en-US Civil War, p. 375.en-US11en-US Ibid., p. 372.en-US12en-US Ibid.en-US13en-US Oce of the Director of National Intelligence, Summary of en-US the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo en-US Bay, Cuba, March 7, 2017.en-US14en-US Terrence McCoy, How the Islamic State evolved in an en-US American prison, e Washington Post, https://www.washen-US -en-US ingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-en-US an-american-prison-helped-ignitethe-islamic-state/?utm_teren-US -en-US m=.2880336a4b58 (accessed April 11, 2017).en-US15en-US Glenn Voelz: Catalysts of Military Innovation: A Case Study en-US of Defense Biometrics, Defense Acquisition Research Journal, en-US Vol. 23, No. 2, April 2016, p. 190. en-US19
en-US20 en-USAs one might expect, these narratives are not the thorough, en-US evidence-based stories that historians aim to create. Rather, en-US they are selective or fabricated accounts that give insurgencies en-US the legitimacy they desire. erefore, the insurgent groups must en-US eliminate the historical accounts that would invalidate their en-US own evidence by demonstrating the existence of multiculturen-US -en-US al communities in the Middle East. ISISs aim of altering the en-US historical record to eliminate challenges to their legitimacy en-US has wreaked havoc on historical sites throughout the Middle en-US East. Not only is this destruction fullling an ideological goal, en-US but antiquities tracking of artifacts from these sites provides en-US funding and material support for ISIS. e destruction of culen-US -en-US tural heritage sites threatens the preservation of local and world en-US history, and endangers the work of thousands of historians, en-US archaeologists, conservationists, and museum experts who have en-US dedicated their lives to preserving and sharing history. Furtheren-US -en-US more, the destruction of cultural heritage sites hurts the local en-US communities by threatening the memory of their culture and en-US their legitimacy to continue their way of life in their communien-US-en-US ties. As the United States continues military involvement in the en-US Middle East and other areas with rich archaeological identities, en-US we must be aware of the important role that history plays in en-US controlling narratives and legitimacy and work towards preventen-US -en-US ing further destruction. en-USWhat is more important, saving lives or saving stones? In reality, these two are inseparable.en-US -Francois Holland, President of the French Republic, 2016, in reference to the exhibit Eternal en-US Sites: From Bamiyan to Palmyra at the Grand Palais in Paris en-USe destruction that ISIS is perpetrating is not an original en-US tactic. Iconoclasm the destruction of religious icons or en-US monuments has been used for centuries by those who en-US wish to erase evidence for beliefs that contradict their en-US own. In the Byzantine Empire, iconoclasm became a topic en-US of concern during the 8th and 9th centuries. Although en-US iconoclasts cited the Old Testament in their arguments en-US against idolatry, artistic representations of Christ and the en-US saints continued. In 726 CE, Byzantine emperor Leo III en-US publicly denounced the use of icons. His successor, Conen-US -en-US stantine V, undertook a rigorous mission against idolatry. en-US He summoned the Council of Hieria to focus on his ght en-US against idolatry. During the French religious wars of the en-US sixteenth century, the use of icons continued to be a conen-US -en-US cern for followers of the church, particularly Calvinists. en-US e Calvinists Institutes of the Christian Religion specien-US-en-US cally denounced the use of icons, leading to the attacks and en-US destruction of Genevan churches. en-US Europe would see destruction based on religious ideolen-US -en-US ogies again centuries later via the destruction of Jewish en-US temples by Nazis during World War II. e most infamous en-US incident of this era was Kristallnacht, a night that saw the en-US destruction of well over 1,000 German Jewish synagogues before en-USaer By Bernard Gagnon Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, en-UShttps://en-US commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=12153761 By Tasnim News Agency, CC BY 4.0, en-UShttps://commons.en-US wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47994575
en-US21en-USwith the intent of intimidating Jewish communities and erasing en-US any trace of the existence of Jewish people in Germany. Howen-US -en-US ever, Nazi destruction did not stop at objects that represented en-US Jewish religion; even secular art created by Jewish artists was en-US targeted. In 1937, the Nazi party created an art exhibit of deen-US -en-US generate art that was shown across Germany and Austria. e en-US art was divided into categories which included art that was blasen-US-en-US phemous, art by Jewish or Communist artists, art that criticized en-US German soldiers, and art that oended the honor of German en-US women. e exhibit was created specically to demonstrate en-US wrong art. Many of the paintings were crowded together and en-US hung askew, making them unappealing to audiences. e critien-US-en-US cism and ridiculing of this art was an attempt by the Nazi party en-US to claim authority over artistic culture and support the Nazi en-US claim that they were somehow superior to others. Iconoclasm en-US has been widespread not only over time, but also across geograen-US -en-US phy. During the Chinese cultural revolution in the 1960s and en-US 70s, the call to sweep away monsters and demons inspired the en-US destruction of artwork that appeared to be supporting capitalisen-US-en-US tic values. is art was replaced with images of farmers, laborers, en-US and revolutionaries which supported the ruling partys ideals. en-US Since the turn of the century, Islamic extremists have taken en-US the lead in the destruction of historic sites and artwork. ISIS en-US possesses much more ecient means for destroying historic sites en-US due to their employment of modern equipment such as bulldozen-US-en-US ers and high-explosives. In fact, many of the places, especially en-US religious shrines that ISIS destroyed were targeted in the past, en-US such as the Temple of Baalshamin and the Palmyra temple en-US dedicated to Ball, which were targeted by the Romans in 273 en-US AD. However, the most important change in ISISs destruction en-US compared to historical cases of iconoclasm is the cultural aspect en-US of the destruction. Attacks on churches, such as in Mosul, and en-US the destruction of statues of Mary and Jesus follow historical en-US Islamic iconoclast practices, but the destruction of secular museen-US -en-US um artifacts and archaeology sites is dierent. ISIS goes beyond en-US destroying idols, the worship of which is forbidden in Islam, as en-US they also destroy statues that, as Abbas Shouman, under-secen-US-en-US retary of al-Azhar University in Egypt noted are nothing but en-US stone and no one believes they are gods. James Noyes, an en-US iconoclasm expert, discussed another important characteristic en-US of ISISs actions, such that, if these were purely devotional acts en-US of destruction, there would not be a need for the viral videos of en-US the destruction; they could be performed in private. However, en-US these videos demonstrate the eective destructive power of ISIS, en-US provoke international outrage, and, according to Noyes, disen-US-en-US credit their holy principles. While there is certainly still claims en-US of religious ideals behind much of ISISs destruction, the insuren-US -en-US gent group has also molded the destruction into a deliberate en-US weapon of war to eliminate the history of local communities. en-US e list of sites that have been destroyed includes Khorsabad, en-US the Assyrian Lion Statues, the winged bulls at Nineveh, Jonahs en-US Tomb, the city of Nimrud, the Mosul Museum, the city of en-US Hatra, the city of Mari, and the Buddhas of Bamiyan. Many of en-US these sites were thousands of years old and had been declared en-US World Heritage sites by UNESCO as all of them held importen-US -en-US ant pieces of history. e Buddhas of Bamiyan were towering en-US statues, the tallest of which was 55 meters high, carved out of en-US the sandstone clis of central Afghanistan in the sixth century. en-US Initially, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader, wanted en-US to preserve the Buddah statues. Since there were no Buddhists en-US in Afghanistan anymore, he felt that the statues were not icons, en-US but simply historical artifacts. However, Omar was overruled en-US and in 2001 the Taliban declared the Buddhas to be idols and en-US destroyed them. Another example of destruction for the puren-US -en-US pose of cultural cleansing is the ancient fortress city, Hatra, en-US Iraq. e site of Hatra had existed for 2,000 years until ISIS deen-US -en-US stroyed it in 2015. e loss of historic architecture and artifacts en-US led UNESCO to declare this destruction as a war crime. UNEen-US -en-US SCO Director-General Irina Bokova took this stance based on en-US the argument that there is absolutely no political or religious en-US justication for the destruction of humanitys cultural heritage. en-US Another ISIS victim is that of Nimrud, Iraq, founded 3,300 en-US years ago and once the capital of the Assyrian empire. ISIS en-US captured the city in June of 2014 and by March of 2015 most en-US of the citadel, palaces and tombs of Assyrian kings, Assyrian en-US temples, statues, and frescoes had been destroyed with the use of en-US bulldozers and other heavy vehicles. In an interview with Layla en-US Salih, one of the archaeologists who inspected the site aer its en-US destruction, concern was expressed for what remains of the site, en-US since the lack of security amid the destruction made it easy for en-US looters to enter the site and cause more damage before archaeolen-US -en-US ogists and conservationists had time to fully inspect the damage en-US and take measures towards preserving it. Experts frequently en-US have to face the challenge of accessing and protecting these sites en-US aer destruction, a task which can not only be dicult, but also en-US dangerous. For example, many of the sites are rigged with exploen-US -en-US sives, rendering the sites unstable for people to enter. en-US One of the most prominent examples of the damage that ISIS en-US has done to historic sites is found in the ancient city of Palmyra en-US in Syria. Palmyra was an important cultural center during the en-US rst and second centuries A.D, and served to link multiple en-US cultures both in function and design. is grand city served as a en-US meeting place for caravans traveling between Persia, India, Chien-US-en-US na, and the Roman Empire, thus connecting the ancient world. en-US Its architecture also contained multi-cultural inuences, comen-US -en-US bining Greco-Roman architectural and artistic techniques with en-US local Persian traditions. is unique combination of inuences, en-US noted especially in the Temple of Baal, dedicated to the ancient en-US Palmyrene god of the same name, was part of the creation of a en-US distinctive aesthetic and artistic style. is temple started as a en-US mud-brick structure, constructed during the rst millennium. en-US Over time as the city grew the temple was modied and updaten-US -en-US ed. e nal layout of the temple with a stepped platform, main en-US hall, and surrounding colonnade clearly demonstrate Greek en-US inuences and made the temple appear very similar to other en-US traditional Greek temples. However, there were also elements en-US of traditional Palmyrene architecture, such as the o-centered en-US entrance, pedimented windows, and special chambers called en-US thalamus to house divine statues. e rediscovery of this site en-US by European travelers during the seventeenth and eighteenth en-US centuries contributed to a revival movement of classical artistic en-US styles in the West. en-USe artistic and historical signicance of the city of Palmyra to en-US our world history was ocially recognized when it was added en-US to the United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural en-US Organizations (UNESCO) list of World Heritage Sites in
en-US22 en-US2009. is organization serves to protect important cultural en-US sites around the world, but recently Palmyra has lost many hisen-US-en-US torically signicant buildings, monuments, and artifacts due to en-US the Islamic State on a scale much above the control and inuen-US -en-US ence of UNESCO. ISIS rst captured the city in May of 2015 en-US and a month later destroyed two ancient shrines. On August en-US 18, 2015, aer holding him as captive for several months, ISIS en-US killed Palmyran scholar and archaeologist Khaled al-Asaad. en-US Called by some the Howard Carter of Palmyra, Asaad had en-US a leading role in the excavation and restoration of the city of en-US Palmyra, and served as the head of antiquities at the museum en-US there for forty years. When ISIS militants were nearing Palmyen-US -en-US ra, Assad and other Syrian ocials hid hundreds of statues in en-US safe locations to protect them from destruction or being sold en-US on the black market. Asaad was taken by ISIS and interrogated en-US for a month about the location of the hidden artifacts. Aer en-US refusing to cooperate and give away their locations, Asaad was en-US publicly beheaded and his body was hung from a column in the en-US main square of the city. For many people, sacricing your life en-US in the hopes of saving historic artifacts would seem pointless, en-US but this was Asaads lifes work. More importantly, the artifacts en-US at Palmyra held the stories of thousands of years of people who en-US lived there, and they were saved because of his belief in their en-US irreplaceable importance. en-US In September of 2015 ISIS destroyed the Temple of Baal, and en-US in October they destroyed Triumphs Arch (Arc du Triomphe). en-US In March of 2016, Syrian forces retook Palmyra with the aid of en-US Russian air power and special forces. However, ISIS retook Palen-US -en-US myra in December of that year. Over the course of ISISs control en-US of Palmyra, the Tetrapylon, theater, and museum also suered en-US enormous amounts of damage.en-US en-US e destruction of these historic sites occurs at the expense of en-US local populations, who not only facing the destruction of their en-US homes and community infrastructure, but also the destruction en-US of the visual history of their people. UNESCO Director-Genen-US -en-US eral Bokova explained the goal of the Islamic States destruction en-US of historic sites: You deprive [the targeted groups] of their culen-US -en-US ture, you deprive them of their history, their heritage, and that is en-US why it goes hand in hand with genocide. Along with the physien-US-en-US cal persecution they want to eliminate to delete the memory en-US of these dierent cultures. In circumstances where people are en-US being killed and communities torn apart, most people would en-US assume that foreign intervention should prioritize humanitarian en-US assistance and put the task of protecting historic sites as a secen-US-en-US ondary priority. However, in these circumstances, supporting a en-US communitys eorts to protect their heritage is one of the most en-US important types of international support.en-US en-US In order to counteract ISISs advancements in Syria and Iraq, en-US the United States led a coalition of air strikes and ground operen-US -en-US ations beginning in 2015 that continues on today. As previous en-US engagements in the Middle East have shown, the United States en-US military has not always prioritized the preservation of historic en-US sites in war zones. Peter van Buren, former US Foreign Service en-US Ocer for the State Department, who worked with the US en-US Army in Iraq in 2009, recounted that during the 2003 invasion en-US of Iraq, US Marines built a helicopter pad on the ruins of en-US Babylon and lled sandbags with crushed pieces of ancient en-US pottery which are important elements of the archaeological en-US record. He claried that while the destruction caused by US en-US military personnel was much less drastic than the deliberate and en-US targeted destruction at the hands of the Islamic State, it noneen-US -en-US theless contributed to the loss of cultural heritage in the Middle en-US East. Another well-known example is the Iraq National Museen-US -en-US um, which was looted in 2003, supposedly with the knowledge en-US or even support of US military forces. Matthew Bogdanos, a en-US Colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserves, led the investigaen-US -en-US tions into the looting of the museum and has published a book, en-US ieves of Baghdad, detailing his work there. In this book en-US Bogdanos proposes a four-part strategy to combat antiquities en-US tracking. Perhaps the most important part of this strategy is en-US his proposal to increase cooperation between law enforcement en-US and the art and archaeological communities. ere is not a en-US need to re-invent the wheel when it comes to saving historic en-US sites; there are already experts who are familiar with these sites, en-US with their historical signicance, and with methods to continue en-US to preserve them. What does need to happen is for the knowlen-US -en-US edge and capabilities of these experts to be utilized. en-US Many museums played a signicant role in raising awareness en-US for the importance of cultural history and the danger that the en-US preservation of this history is in. An excellent example of this en-US approach was the exhibit entitled Cultures in the Crossre, en-US at the University of Pennsylvanias Cultural Heritage Center in en-US Philadelphia until November 26, 2018. e entrance to the exen-US -en-US hibit explains the signicance of the Middle East to the history en-US of the world, referring to this area as the cradle of civilization en-US because so many important developments such as agriculture en-US and writing originated in the Middle East. e entrance includen-US -en-US ed a quote from Andre Parrot, a well-known French archaeoloen-US -en-US gist and the former director of the Louvre Museum, eloquently en-US explaining the importance of Middle Eastern history: Every en-US person has two homelandshis own and Syria. is exhibit en-US displayed a lot of the excellent work that is being done by the en-US Safeguarding the Heritage of Syria and Iraq Project, which aims en-US to provide training and empowerment to Syrian cultural heren-US -en-US itage professionals, so that they can work towards saving their en-US own heritage.en-US en-US e Penn Museum is not alone in raising awareness about en-US Middle East History to the public. Eternal Sites: from Bamien-US-en-US yan to Palmyra, displayed from December 14, 2016 to January en-US 9, 2017 at the Grand Palais museum in Paris, utilized footage en-US taken from drone cameras to create 3-D reconstructions of en-US Palmyra. In an interview about this museum exhibit, former en-US Chief of Sta for President Hollande of France, Sylvie Hubac en-US discussed the urgent need, For all of us to become aware of the en-US major disasters that have hit our universal heritage over the last en-US few years. is perspective, that the history of the Middle East en-US belongs to all of us, is necessary if there is going to be advanceen-US -en-US ments made in the global community towards stopping the destruction of historic sites. en-USConclusionsen-USUnderstanding the way that the Islamic State has used the en-US destruction of cultural heritage as a weapon of war is essential
en-US23 en-USto our ability to eectively counteract their eorts to intimien-US-en-US date and demoralize a community through the erasure of that en-US communitys history. While experts in archaeology, curation, en-US and preservation make eorts to preserve the historic sites and en-US artifacts that remain, the people who are in the midst of the en-US destruction can help to ensure that there is minimal damage inen-US -en-US icted upon cultural heritage in the future. It is also important en-US and benecial for US military personnel working in these areas en-US to acknowledge and utilize the expertise of local professionals, en-US who are already knowledgeable about the historical signicance en-US of the sites and collections that they work with regularly. en-USNotes:en-US1 en-USSimons, Marlise. Damaged by War, Syrias Cultural Sites Rise en-US Anew in France. e New York en-US Times, 31 December 2016 https://www.nytimes.en-US com/2016/12/31/world/europe/destroyed-by-isis-syrias-culen-US -en-US tural-sites-rise-again-in-france.html?_r=3 accessed: 23 March en-US 2017. en-US2 en-USe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manen-US -en-US ual: U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24, en-US Marine Corps Warghting Publication no. 3-33.5. Chicago and en-US London: University of en-US Chicago Press, 2007: 2. en-US3 en-USe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manen-US -en-US ual: U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24, en-US Marine Corps Warghting Publication no. 3-33.5. Chicago and en-US London: University of en-US Chicago Press, 2007: 25-26. en-US4 en-USHoward, Russel D., Marc D. Elliot, and Jonathan R. Prohov. en-US IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Tracking in the Teren-US -en-US rorist State. Joint Special Operations University. JSOU Report en-US 16-11. 2016: vii.en-US5 en-USe prohibition against worshiping idols appears in Abraen-US -en-US hamic religions. In the Old Testament this appears in Exodus en-US and Deuteronomy: You shall have no other gods before me.; en-US Iconoclastic Controversy: Byzantine History. Encyclopedia en-US Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/Iconoclasen-US-en-US tic-Controversy accessed 3 August, 2017. en-US6 en-USIconoclastic Controversy: Byzantine History. Encyclopedia en-US Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/Iconoclasen-US-en-US tic-Controversy accessed 3 August, 2017. en-US7 en-UShttps://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/icono-cncl754.asp en-US8 en-USNoyes, James. e Politics of Iconoclasm: Religion, Violence, en-US and the Culture of Image-Breaking in Christianity and Islam. en-US London: I.B. Taruris & Co LTD, 2013: 13-14. en-US9 en-USDestroyed German Synagogues and Communities. http://geren-US -en-US mansynagogues.com/ accessed 3 August, 2017.en-US10 en-USLucy Burns, Degenerate art: Why Hitler hated modernism, en-US BBC News, 6 November, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/en-US magazine-24819441. en-US11 en-USJesse Hirsch, ISIS and Iconoclasm: e History of the en-US Museum Smash, Atlas Obscura, 16 March 2015, https://www.en-US atlasobscura.com/articles/isis-and-iconoclasm-the-history-of-en-US the-museum-smash. en-US12 en-USISIS and Iconoclasm. Atlas Obscura.en-US13 en-USISIS and Iconoclasm. Atlas Obscura.en-US14 en-USIconoclasm and Islamic State: Destroying Historys en-US Treasures. e Economist. https://www.economist.com/en-US news/middle-east-and-africa/21645749-jihadists-are-attacken-US -en-US ing-more-regions-people-destroying-historys en-US15 en-USISIS and Iconoclasm. Atlas Obscura. en-US16 en-USBevan, Robert and Emily Sharpe. Iconoclasm reborn with en-US Islamic State fanaticism. e Art en-US Newspaper 23, no. 260 (2014): 6.en-US17 en-US historical sites destroyed by ISIS and why they matter. en-US CBC radio. 13 March, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/en-US episode-224-isis-war-on-history-nazi-royals-mcdonalds-in-deen-US -en-US cline-and-more-1.2990417/10-historical-sites-destroyed-by-isis-en-US and-why-they-matter-1.2990449. en-US18 en-USIconoclasm and Islamic State: Destroying Historys Treaen-US -en-US sures. e Economist. en-US19 en-USBehzad, Nasir and Duad Qarizadah. e man who helped en-US blow up the Bamiyan Buddhas. BBC News 12 March 2015. en-US20 en-USShaheen, Kareem. Isis video conrms destruction at Unesco en-US world heritage site in Hatra. e Guardian. 5 April 2015. en-US21 en-USIslamic State demolishes ancient Hatra site in Iraq. BBC en-US News, 7 March 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-miden-US -en-US dle-east-31779484 en-US22 en-USNimrud: Photos show IS destruction of ancient Iraqi city. en-US BBC News 15 November 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/en-US world-middle-east-37992394. en-US23 en-USJohn Beck. How ISIL destroyed Nimrud. Aljazeera. 1 en-US December 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/en-US isil-destroyed-iraq-nimrud-161129125401265.html. en-US24 en-USe destruction of Palmyra by ISIS. CBS News http://en-US www.cbsnews.com/pictures/palmyra-destruction-temen-US -en-US ple-bel-triumph-arch-isis-before-aer/5/ en-US25 en-USUNESCOen-US26 en-USSometimes this name is written as Belen-US27 en-USColledge, Malcom A.R. e art of Palmyra. London: ames en-US and Hudson, 1976, 26-27en-US28 en-USUNESCO en-US29 en-USUNESCOen-US30 en-USShaheen, Kareem and Ian Black. Beheaded Syrian scholar en-US refused to lead Isis to hidden en-US Palmyra antiquities. e Guardian, August 19, 2015. https://en-US www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-aren-US -en-US chaeologist-syria. en-US31 en-USPalmyra antiquities. e Guardian, August 19, 2015. https://en-US www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-aren-US -en-US chaeologist-syria.en-US32 en-USDavies, Caroline and Kareem Shaheen. Khaled al-Asaad proen-US -en-US le: the Howard Carter of Palmyra. e Guardian, 19 August en-US 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/en-US khaled-al-asaad-prole-syria-isis-howard-carter-palmyra-archaeen-US -en-US ology. Accessed March 23, 2017.en-US33 en-USShaheen, Kareem and Ian Black. Beheaded Syrian scholen-US -en-US ar refused to lead ISIS to hidden Palmyra antiquities. e en-US Guardian, 19 August 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/en-US world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-archaeologist-syria. Accessed en-US March 23, 2017. is case is one of many examples of museen-US -en-US um workers hiding artifacts at the risk of their own personal en-US safety. For more examples see: Rush, Laurie W. Looting of en-US Antiquities: Tearing the Fabric of Civil Society. In Art Crime: en-US Terrorists, Tomb Raiders, Foragers, and ieves. Noah Charney en-US (ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016: 134; Bogdanos, en-US Matthew. ieves of Baghdad. Bloomsbury: New York, 2005; en-US Cultures in the Crossre
en-US24en-US34 en-USShaheen, Kareem and Ian Black. Beheaded Syrian scholen-US -en-US ar refused to lead ISIS to hidden Palmyra antiquities. e en-US Guardian, 19 August 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/en-US world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-archaeologist-syria. Accessed en-US March 23, 2017. en-US35 en-USe destruction of Palmyra by ISIS. CBS News. http://en-US www.cbsnews.com/pictures/palmyra-destruction-temen-US -en-US ple-bel-triumph-arch-isis-before-aer/5/ en-US36 en-USAndrew Roth. Russian drone shows extent of the damage to en-US Palmyras Roman amphitheater. Washington Post 13 February en-US 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/en-US wp/2017/02/13/russian-drone-shows-extent-of-the-damage-en-US to-palmyras-roman-amphitheater/?utm_term=.9569332f1f29 en-US ; UNESCO Director-General condemns destruction of the en-US Tetrapylon and severs damage to the eatre in Palmyra, a en-US UNESCO World Heritage site. UNESCO 20 January 2017. en-US http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1620/ en-US37 en-USMenngqi Sun. Recaptured by ISIS, ancient Palmyra loses en-US two more monuments to antiquities destruction. e Christian en-US Science Monitor, January 20, 2017. Accessed March 3, 2017. en-US http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2017/0120/en-US Recaptured-by-ISIS-ancient-Palmyra-loses-two-more-monuen-US -en-US ments-to-antiquities-destruction; Arraf, Jane. Islamic State en-US seeking to delete entire cultures, UNESCO chief warns in en-US Iraq. e Christian Science Monitor. 8 November 2014. en-US http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/1108/en-US Islamic-State-seeking-to-delete-entire-cultures-UNESCO-en-US chief-warns-in-Iraq en-US38 en-USWhat is Islamic State? BBC News. 2 December 2015. en-US Accessed March 31, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-en-US middle-east-29052144. For April 6, 2017 airstrike, see Senen-US -en-US gupta, Somini, Niel MacFarquhar, and Jennifer Steinhauer. en-US Live Brieng: U.S. Airstrikes in Syria: Fallout Around the en-US World. e New York Times, 7 April 2017. Accessed 7 April en-US 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/en-US trump-syria-airstrikes.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homeen-US -en-US page&clickSource=story-heading&module=b-lede-package-reen-US -en-US gion®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 en-US39 en-USDestroying Cultural Sites: Something ISIL and US Army en-US Have in Common. Sputnik International, November 3, 2015. en-US Accessed May 3, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/middleeen-US -en-US ast/201503111019334234/ en-US40 en-USPaul Martin. US army was told to protect looted museum. en-US e Guardian, April 20, 2003. Accessed May 3, 2017 https://en-US www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/20/internationaleden-US -en-US ucationnews.iraq; Ann Talbot. US government implicated in en-US planned the of Iraqi artistic treasures. World Socialist Web en-US Site, April 19, 2003. Accessed May 3, 2017 http://www.wsws.en-US org/en/articles/2003/04/loot-a19.htmlen-US41 en-USMatthew Bogdanos, ieves of Baghdad, p.274. en-US42 en-USis exhibit was visited by the author on April 9, 2017. Also en-US see Simons, Marlise. Damaged by War, Syrias Cultural Sites en-US Rise Anew in France. New York Times 31 December 2016. en-US Accessed 23 March 2017. en-US43 en-UShttp://www.pennchc.org/page/syria; https://global.si.edu/en-US projects/safeguarding-heritage-syria-and-iraq-shosi en-US44 en-UShttp://whc.unesco.org/en/events/1350/ en-US45 en-USIn cases such as Palmyra, it can be very dangerous for exen-US -en-US perts to be able to enter the site to inspect the damage because en-US ISIS rigged the area with explosives. e drone cameras were en-US sent into Palmyra by a Syrian group called Iconem, founded en-US by architect Yves Ubleman, who is hoping to use the footage en-US to share the beauty of the city with more people as well as to en-US prepare for restoration of the site in the future; e eort to en-US save Syrias Palmyra gets help from a drone and an algorithm. en-US PRIs e World, 03 January 2017. https://www.pri.org/stoen-US -en-US ries/2017-01-03/eort-save-syria-s-palmyra-gets-help-drone-en-US and-algorithm. Accessed 23 March 2017; Simons, Marlise. en-US Damaged by War, Syrias Cultural Sites Rise Anew in France. en-US New York Times 31 December 2016. Accessed 23 March 2017. en-US46 en-USe eort to save Syrias Palmyra gets help from a drone and en-US an algorithm. PRIs e World, 03 January 2017. https://www.en-US pri.org/stories/2017-01-03/eort-save-syria-s-palmyra-gets-en-US help-drone-and-algorithm. Accessed 23 March 2017.
en-USFrom 14-15 November 2017, over 500 delegates from more en-US than 70 countries and international organizations convened in en-US Vancouver for the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial en-US conference. Alongside representatives from the African Union, en-US the European Union, NATO, and the Organisation internaen-US -en-US tional de la Francophonie, these delegates worked to coordinate en-US and improve UN peacekeeping operations, as well as secure new en-US pledges from Member States.en-US While there has been no shortage of commentary about U.S. en-US contributions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions en-US since the transition to the new administration, much of this en-US discussion has been at the level of strategic engagement and goven-US -en-US ernmental commitment to fullling the expectation of the US en-US as a UN member. However, when it comes down to brass tacks, en-US there is less public awareness of who, rather than what, the US en-US dedicates to these peacekeeping missions.en-US e US currently contributes 55 personnel to United Naen-US -en-US tions peacekeeping missions, including 4 UN Headquarters en-US (UNHQ) sta, and 51 peacekeepers from the U.S. Army, Navy, en-US Marine Corps, and Air Force. ese personnel are deployed to 8 en-US countries within 3 Combatant Command AORs, with repreen-US -en-US sentation outside of New York in the Central African Republic en-US (MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSen-US -en-US CO), Israel (UNTSO), Liberia (UNMIL), Mali (MINUSMA), en-US South Sudan (UNMISS), and Tunisia/Libya (UNSMIL). U.S. en-US contributions to the United Nations are primarily supported en-US by two DoD entities, the U.S. Military Observer Group out of en-US Arlington, VA, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations en-US Institute, out of the U.S. Army War College at the Carlisle Baren-US -en-US racks in Pennsylvania. en-US e U.S. Military Observer Group (USMOG) is a joint orgaen-US -en-US nization that provides oversight of all DoD personnel assigned en-US or allocated to the UN and Multinational Force and Observers en-US (MFO) to ensure that mission requirements are met. USMOG en-US provides command oversight and administrative control over en-US all DoD personnel serving with the UN as well as administraen-US -en-US tive and logistical support before and during their assignments. en-US ey also coordinate with the U.S. Permanent Mission to the en-US UN (USUN) to process nominations and coordinate Mission en-US placement, while also providing comprehensive pre-deployment en-US training for all personnel before deploying to their assignments.en-US e Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) en-US has resided at Carlisle Barracks for over two decades. PKSOI en-US promotes the collaborative development and integration of en-US peace and stability capabilities across the United States Governen-US -en-US ment (USG), international organizations, and the community en-US of interest in order to enable the success of peace and stability en-US activities and missions. PKSOI focuses on peace and stability en-US operations (PSO) at the strategic and operational levels, and en-US supports PSO via policy development, the design and review of en-US civilian and military training programs and education, colen-US -en-US lection and dissemination of lessons learned, and advises the en-US development of requirements and capabilities to plan prepare, en-US and execute PSO. With a footprint of 50 interagency personnel en-US25 PKSOI's Dr. Karen Finkenbinder provides policing en-USexpertise to the United Nations African Military and en-US Police Adviser Community (AMPAC). ey visited en-US PKSOI on Friday 4 May 2018. ey belong to their own en-US country's permanent missions to the UN, and are asen-US-en-US signed as military and police advisors for the peacekeepen-US-en-US ing eorts of the UN. e visitors today represent Angola, en-US Botswana, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria Senegal, en-US Zambia and Zimbabwe, headed by BG Reginald Odoi, the en-US Dean of AMPAC from Ghana. is meeting also was an en-US unexpected reunion for PKSOI's COL Brian Foster and en-US BG Solomon Udounwa from Nigeria, AWC grads of 2013
and contractors, PKSOI oers a breadth of subject matter ex en-US-en-US pertise including Protection of Civilians (PoC), Mass Atrocity en-US Prevention and Response, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), en-US Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law, Governance, and Foreign en-US Humanitarian Assistance, amongst other topics.en-US In early 2017, USMOG and PKSOI executed a memorandum en-US of understanding (MOU) to cooperate on a number of eorts en-US to improve the overall eectiveness of the United States peaceen-US -en-US keeping capability. USMOG and PKSOI support mutual en-US leader education development via visits of foreign troop conen-US -en-US tributing countries (TCCs) and UN ocials. ey also cooperen-US -en-US ate on shared training support for UN sta ocers and Reen-US -en-US gionally Aligned Forces (RAF) peacekeeping pre-deployment en-US training. While USMOG focuses on preparing DoD personnel en-US to serve in UN Missions through both classroom instruction en-US and tactical training, PKSOI provides academic and operational en-US resources through the execution of high-level research and the en-US provision of subject matter experts (SMEs). en-US Most recently, USMOG undertook a 4-week pre-deployment en-US training session to prepare 31 future peacekeepers to deploy to en-US the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, en-US Mali, and South Sudan. ese troops including 4 females, for en-US a total of 6 female peacekeepers deployed, just shy of the UN en-US goal for Troop Contributing Countries to eld 15% female en-US peacekeepers within missions are prepared for deployment via en-US both UN-mandated classes and briengs, as well as USMOG/en-US DoD specic training and Mission-specic preparation.en-US In addition to providing subject matter expert Sta Ocers to en-US enhance the eectiveness of UN Missions, the U.S. also oers en-US logistics and technology support to enhance the capabilities of en-US its military trainers and subject matter experts. e U.S. also ofen-US-en-US fered specialized expertise to strengthen the counter-improvised en-US explosive device (C-IED) capabilities of UN missions a paren-US -en-US ticularly valuable oering to the MINSUMA and AMISOM en-US peacekeepers. Further, the commitment of $2 million to augen-US -en-US ment pre-deployment training for African police peacekeepers en-US facing violent extremist threats across the Sahel and the Horn of en-US Africa will help enhance the operational eectiveness of these en-US forces.en-US Contributing more than $1 billion since 2005, the United en-US States is the largest contributor to policing and military capacen-US-en-US ity building eorts in support of international peacekeeping, en-US including both support to the United Nations and other comen-US -en-US plementary training initiatives. In FY2017 alone, the U.S. also en-US funded over $160 million to the African Peacekeeping Rapid en-US Response Partnership (APRRP) and the Department of States en-US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and International en-US Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) programs.en-US ese concerted eorts, represented by Deputy Secretary of Deen-US -en-US fense Patrick M. Shanahan at the Canadian Defence Ministerien-US-en-US al, seek to use all instruments of U.S. national power to contain en-US conict, redress the peace, and shape environments to support en-US reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to en-US legitimate governance. With no shortage of complex environen-US -en-US ments emerging across the globe, the skills and capabilities of en-US the USG in building peace will continue to be a key contribuen-US -en-US tion of the United States to global order. en-US26
en-US27 en-USAmerican soldiers would tell a story during the Vietnam War en-US about the mythical North Vietnamese Army recruit Nguyen-US -en-US en-Nguyen who, aer being draed from the rice paddies of en-US North Vietnam and spending three months in basic training, en-US was assigned the important task of transporting four 82 millien-US-en-US meter mortar rounds to his comrades in South Vietnam. Nguyen-US -en-US en spent four months traveling the Ho Chi Minh Trail suering en-US monsoon rains, malaria, scorpions, leeches, the odd B-52 strike, en-US and artillery barrages, to reach his comrades near Saigon. en, en-US much to his chagrin, he watched as his precious cargo was en-US instantly red o by his new squad mates in less than a minute. en-US Aer which the squad leader turned to him and said Good job en-US Nguyen, now go back for more.en-US1en-US While apocryphal, the dien-US-en-US cult, months long journey it took to traverse the route is historien-US-en-US cally accurate,en-US2en-US and illustrates how inecient the Ho Chi Minh en-US trail was, especially in its early days. While extensive eorts to en-US interdict the trail were a hallmark of the war in Vietnam, with en-US reluctance and even disdain,en-US3en-US the U.S. Navy approached the en-US important task of closing maritime routes into South Vietnam en-US demonstrating its persistent hesitancy to become entangled en-US in the messy littoral and riverine environment that frequently en-US harbors nascent threats. en-US In 1961 North Vietnam established Military Transportation en-US Group 759. Its mission was to exploit South Vietnams unen-US -en-US guarded coast by delivering supplies to the insurgency by sea.en-US4en-US en-US South Vietnam had no capability to interdict this trac, despite en-US having identied the need to its U.S. partners.en-US5en-US Group 759 used en-US small costal junks and ocean going trawlers to deliver supplies.en-US6en-US en-US e manifest of one of these trawlers, captured in 1965, inen-US -en-US cluded 1100 small arms, 50 light artillery pieces, 1,800 of those en-US mortar rounds Nguyen-Ngueyn so laboriously transported to en-US his comrades, and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition.en-US7en-US By en-US comparison, it took a North Vietnamese transport battalion of en-US 500 troops ve months to carry 1,600 ries, 800 knives, and a en-US mere 400 pounds of explosives to the south in 1959.en-US8en-US e land en-US route was very inecient, with up to one third of dispatched en-US supplies being consumed by the transporters in route.en-US9en-US During en-US these crucial early years of the revitalized insurgency, costal and en-US ocean transport was far more eective than the still developing en-US Ho Chi Minh Trail. In its rst 15 months, Group 759 delivered en-US over 1,400 tons of weapons and ammunition to the south.en-US10en-US By en-US 1964, a eet of 20 cargo ships were making twice weekly deliven-US -en-US eries to the south, totaling 4,000 tons that year.en-US11en-US By early 1965, en-US small junks and the trawlers completed hundreds of trips.en-US12en-US Seien-US-en-US zure of one of these trawlers, coming on the heels of a damning en-US report circulating in Washington, became a (too late) turning en-US point in the U.S. Navys involvement in the Vietnam War.en-USVung Ro Bayen-USIn February 1965, a camouaged trawler was found surreptien-US-en-US tiously ooading its cargo in South Vietnams Vung Ro Bay. en-US Airstrikes quickly disabled her and boarders found nearly 100 en-US tons of weapons and ammunition along with documents indien-US-en-US cating this was the vessels 23rd smuggling mission.en-US13en-US
en-US28 en-USDiscovery of the Vung Ro trawler followed right on the heels of, en-US and seemed to validate, what is known as the Bucklew Report. en-US e Pacic Fleet Commander commissioned the study to en-US investigate inltration activity within the Mekong River Delta. en-US e study noted South Vietnams inability to secure its coast, en-US and that Viet Cong operations. can feasibly inltrate peren-US -en-US sonnel and equipment by land, sea or air at times and areas of en-US their own choice.en-US14en-US e report made several recommendations en-US on intercepting costal trac, but stopped short of calling for en-US U.S. involvement in riverine interdiction, noting that ere en-US were many of our top level people who were determined that en-US the Navy would never become involved in muddy-water operaen-US -en-US tions.en-US15en-US en-US With the Vung Ro incident and the Bucklew report coming in en-US quick succession, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam en-US (MACV) and the Pacic Fleet (PACFLEET) stas quickly en-US planned for joint U.S./Vietnamese patrols.en-US16en-US e Navys sudden en-US motivation came, in part, because the Army Chief of Sta knew en-US about the ndings in the Bucklew report and was out raising en-US hell about North Vietnamese ships supporting the insurgency, en-US while also berating the Navy for not doing anything about it.en-US17en-US en-US By April 1966, a Task Force of sixteen vessels, supplemented en-US by patrol aircra, and networked with ve joint coordination en-US centers,en-US18en-US eectively ended voyages by the ocean going trawlen-US -en-US ers from North Vietnam.en-US19en-US But the 5 years North Vietnam en-US exploited this maritime route were essential to sustaining the en-US insurgency. is grace period allowed the overland route, en-US commonly known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to be expanded en-US and improved to the point that loss of the seali support was en-US not decisive. But even this expanded land route owed more to en-US mobilization of labor than eciency. A two month campaign in en-US the summer of 1965 used 140,000 man days of labor to logisen-US-en-US tically support the trail improvement eort.en-US20en-US Also, the lightly en-US referenced river passages continued to be ignored until 1967 en-US and were not fully secured until 1969, allowing North Vietnam en-US to fully exploit that gap.en-US21en-US Estimates aer the war alleged that en-US up to 80% of material delivered to the southern provinces came en-US via the waterways of the Mekong River Delta.en-US22en-US en-USVung Ro Aermathen-USe irrefutable evidence uncovered on the trawler in Vung Ro en-US Bay, reinforced by the ndings in the Bucklew Report, unen-US -en-US masked a blind spot the Navy had refused to acknowledge, but en-US this revelation was only partially addressed and the solution was en-US framed within its strategic priorities. e Navys reluctance to en-US implement a more comprehensive riverine and littoral blockade en-US was inuenced by the Navys larger strategic challenges.en-US23en-US e en-US emergence of the USSR as a developing global naval power, and en-US the threats China posed to Taiwan focused the navy on these en-US blue water challengers. is muted interest in supporting what en-US was assumed to be a land based counter insurgency eort in en-US Vietnam. While the events of 1965 were impossible to ignore, en-US they resulted in using the tools at hand, such as ships and skills en-US developed to operate in the open ocean. is task force did shut en-US down transits by larger ocean going vessels, but development of en-US light cra that could have been so useful in coastal and inland en-US waterways, was put in a much lower category when compared en-US to the modernization and new construction of aircra carriers, en-US their escort vessels and amphibious assault ships.en-US24en-US Without a en-US platform to conduct littoral and riverine missions, doctrine and en-US training on these concepts was similarly relegated within the en-US Navy.en-US25en-US e joint Army-Navy River Assault Force eectively en-US cleared and secured the Mekong river delta, but this occurred en-US aer the strategic turning point of the Tet oensive.en-US26en-US en-USe 21st Centuryen-USe unchecked maritime inltration into South Vietnam en-US during the early to mid-60s allowed the insurgency to ouren-US -en-US ish prior to the full mobilization of the Ho Chi Minh trail. en-US e continued exploitation of river trac throughout the war en-US assured the insurgencies success. is lesson should not be en-US forgotten today. Properly governed littorals are essential to staen-US -en-US bility ashore, and their unique complexity demand specialized en-US approaches. In order to meet these challenges today the Navy en-US must make modest investments in forces specically trained and en-US organized to operate in, and understand, the dynamics of the en-US interplay between land and sea, which is endemic to the littoral en-US environment. If not, current and future insurgencies, extremist en-US groups, and criminal organizations will continue to exploit this en-US environments special attributes with relative impunity.en-USNotes:en-US1 en-USMichael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and en-US NVA (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1992), 65-66.en-US2 en-USIn 1961 a 500 man unit took 3 months to transit the Ho Chi en-US Minh Trail, fully loaded troops could take 5-6 months to transit en-US the 2000 kilometer trail. For more information see, Military en-US History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: e Ocial en-US History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. en-US by Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of en-US Kansas, 2002), 89 and 175.en-US3 en-USBy 1965 General Westmoreland believed up to 70% of the en-US insurgencies supplies were arriving by sea, while the 7th Fleet en-US commander thought less than 2% were, when craing the initial en-US costal surveillance operation, 7th Fleet arbitrarily divided up the en-US coast of South Vietnam into zones designed to demonstrate its en-US validity mathematically to those damned DoD guys in Mcen-US-en-US Namaras outt. Admiral Blackburn later admitted that is
en-US29 en-USis absolute crap, but it was the best we could do. See Schreadly, en-US From the Rivers to the Sea: e United States Navy in Vietnam, en-US 85.en-US4 en-USMilitary History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: en-US e Ocial History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam, 1954-en-US 1975, trans. by Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Kansas: Univeren-US -en-US sity Press of Kansas, 2002), 115.en-US5 en-USCutler, Brown Water, Black Berets: Costal and Riverine en-US Warfare in Vietnam, 93.Problems with this maritime paramilien-US-en-US tary police force were caught up in a larger debate about South en-US Vietnams initiative to establish a Civil Guard, which the U.S. en-US considered a private palace guard loyal to the president and not en-US a legitimate police force.en-US6 en-USMarolda and Fitzgerald, e United States Navy and the Vieten-US -en-US nam Conict: Volume I e Setting of the Stage to 1959, 176.en-US7 en-USCommander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Monthly Historical en-US Summary: June 1966, Appendix III.en-US8 en-USMilitary History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: en-US e Ocial History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam, 1954-en-US 1975, trans. by Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Kansas: Univeren-US -en-US sity Press of Kansas, 2002), 53en-US9 en-USIbid, 456, note 26.en-US10 en-USIbid, 116.en-US11 en-USIbid, 127.en-US12 en-USEdward J. Marolda, Changing Tides, in Naval Coalition en-US Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom en-US (New York: Routledge, 2008), 139.en-US13 en-USU.S. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relaen-US -en-US tions 1945-1967 Book 2 of 12, IV A. 5, Tab 2 (Washington, en-US DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1971), 55.en-US14 en-USCDR R.L. Schreadley, USN (Ret.), From the Rivers to the en-US Sea: e United States Navy in Vietnam, 79-81.en-US15 en-USJohn D Sherwood, War in the Shallows, (Washington DC: en-US Department of the Navy, 2017),en-US16 en-USCommander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Monthly Historical en-US Summary: June 1966, Appendix III.en-US17 en-USSchreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea: e United States en-US Navy in Vietnam, 83.en-US18 en-USCommander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Monthly Historical en-US Summary: April 1966, memorandum for distribution, May 27, en-US 1966, Appendix IV.en-US19 en-USCommander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Monthly Historical en-US Summary: September 1966, 16.en-US20 en-USVictory in Vietnam, 146.en-US21 en-USMajor General William B. Fulton, Riverine Operations, en-US 1966-1969, U.S. Army Series on Vietnam Studies (Washington en-US D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), 182.en-US22 en-USFrank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insiders Account of Saien-US-en-US gons Indecent End Told by the CIAs Chief Strategy Analyst in en-US Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1977), 19-20.en-US23 en-USMarolda and Fitzgerald, e United States Navy and the en-US Vietnam Conict: Volume II From Military Assistance to en-US Combat 1959-1965, 93.en-US24 en-USMarolda and Fitzgerald, e United States Navy and the en-US Vietnam Conict: Volume II From Military Assistance to en-US Combat 1959-1965, 93.en-US25 en-USIn 1965-66 the U.S. Army led development of riverine docen-US-en-US trine and capabilities in Vietnam, based upon the French Dien-US-en-US nassult concept. See Major General William B. Fulton, Riverine en-US Operations, 1966-1969, U.S. Army Series on Vietnam Studies en-US (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), for details en-US on the River Assault Force.en-US26 en-USMarolda, Edward J. "e War in Vietnam's Shallows." Naval en-US History 1, no. 1 (04, 1987): 12.
en-US30 en-USNadia Schadlows book War and the Art of Governance en-US comes with an impressive set of accolades, notably Retired Genen-US -en-US eral, now Defense Secretary James Mattis endorsement on the en-US back cover, and Scholar-General cum National Security Advien-US-en-US sor H.R. McMaster, as a reviewer of the pre-publication dra. en-US Such endorsements make the book not only timely, but notably en-US relevant to anyone wishing to gain insight into the views of en-US todays most senior national security leaders as they relate to the en-US militarys role in governance.en-US Analyzing a range of cases from Mexico in the 1840s to Iraq en-US and Afghanistan in the 21st Century, Schadlow convincingly en-US argues that the U.S. Army must look beyond merely ghting en-US and winning our nations wars. Arguing that in all its signien-US-en-US cant military interventions in the past, the U.S. Army has faced en-US the need to shape the political outcome of the war.(P3) In en-US other words, victory is not assured through signing a surrender en-US document, armistice, or peace treaty; the most important work en-US comes aer that, and the army should be prepared, and tasked, en-US to do the bulk of it initially, as it has done so many times in the en-US past. Nested in this argument is the well supported assertion en-US that successful post conict governance is the role of the entire en-US force, not simply a few specially trained civil aairs experts. en-US Americas enduring debate about the role of the military in goven-US -en-US ernance is a result of what the author terms a denial syndrome, en-US rooted in the countrys founding, where discontent over the en-US use of British troops to control the colonies led to codifying en-US the subordination of the military to civil control in the U.S. en-US Constitution. is manifested itself as a consistent reluctance to en-US embrace the use of military governments in occupied territories. en-US e denial syndrome worked both ways with many in the U.S. en-US Army viewing military government as merely a necessity to conen-US -en-US trol the rear area, so as not to be a distraction to the main eort en-US on the battleeld. Compounding these factors, governance tasks en-US became increasingly pigeonholed under the purview of civil en-US aairs experts, and considered detached from combat. As the en-US author points out, the civil aairs community reinforced this en-US perception, in that it advocated and emphasized how unique en-US these skills were. eir emphasis on the specialness of civil afen-US-en-US fairs strengthened the prevailing view of governance operations en-US as separate and distinct from conventional war and the regular en-US army. (P21) en-US e preponderance of the book details the many governing en-US experiences that the U.S. Army had throughout history. e en-US ve recommendations that track from the cases are all certainly en-US valid, some more feasible than others given current army force en-US structure, scal constraints, and political realities. ree proposen-US-en-US als largely argue the necessity of military control of governance en-US in post conict environments, the other two go to the enduring en-US need for a presence on the ground (which cannot be wished en-US away by leveraging technology) and maintaining intellectual en-US capability (writ large, not simply as a niche capability) to plan en-US for and execute governance tasks.en-US But more surprising are some of the observations that do not en-US directly follow through to the recommendations, for example, en-US a consistent thirst for better guidance from Washington, which en-US was seldom quenched, le commanders in the eld to gure en-US it out on their own. Given adequate authority however, they en-US generally governed satisfactorily. e extent to which the U.S. en-US Army successfully participated in governance tasks beyond en-US public order and security is surprising, as was its eectiveness. en-US For example, the rehabilitation and/or institution of compulen-US -en-US sory education, that oen had to strip away xenophobic or en-US ultranationalist traditions, is consistently demonstrated as a key en-US element to success. Schadlow notes that, in the case of Japan, the en-US ministry of education became one of the most zealous propoen-US -en-US nents of democracy.(P131) e Armys role in rebuilding the en-US local economy is also noteworthy in many occupations. In Post en-US WWII Italy for example, the military instituted price controls en-US to control ination, reformed the tax code, and rebuilt transen-US-en-US portation infrastructure to restore economic activity. (P108) en-US ese aspects get at the fundamental reform and stabilization of en-US a society which leads to true political victory. Noteworthy by its en-US absence, is a Vietnam case study. Perhaps the most salient Cold en-US War experience is only briey touched upon as a step in the en-US bifurcation between winning the conventional ght and the en-US other war.(P274)en-US Also, while the case studies are excellent, there were events, en-US perhaps symptomatic of Army and U.S. Government changes en-US writ large, which possibly shaped the evolution of post conict en-US governance across time. Highlighting and connecting those dots en-US may have better illustrated the system of denial, and better exen-US -en-US plained how we found ourselves with the unsatisfying Iraq and
en-US31 en-USAfghanistan results. For example, the massive reconstruction en-US and development operations involved in occupying Germany, en-US Italy, Japan and Korea, aer which the U.S. shunted much of en-US these capability into the reserves, leading to the Civil Aairs en-US Branch, now with enough critical mass and patrons, to develen-US -en-US op and promote the sense of specialness touched upon earlier. en-US Perhaps most curious, and related to the absence of a Vietnam en-US Case Study, is the selection of the Dominican Republic interen-US -en-US vention of 1965, followed by the 1989 invasion of Panama. e en-US stark dierence between the two leaves the reader wondering en-US if the Vietnam experience caused this system of denial to shi en-US dramatically, not simply from the U.S. Army perspective, but en-US perhaps also driven by the growth of broader U.S. Government, en-US international government, and non-governmental organizations en-US role in supporting post-conict governance. What becomes en-US evident to the reader is a misunderstanding of the roles between en-US and among them as they relate to supporting or reforming en-US governance institutions. Indeed, the author tangentially makes en-US the case of a substantial shi from the 60s to the 90s by citing en-US Panama as the rst example of the Powell doctrine, but this en-US aspect could be more fully developed.en-US en-US is observation notwithstanding, War and the Art of Goveren-US -en-US nance is an excellent read and any national security practitioner en-US would do well spending time digesting it and considering the en-US recommendations made as they relate to issues today and in the en-US future.
Above all, we value the dignity of every human life, protect the rights of every person, and share the hope of every soul to live in freedom. That is who we are President Donald Trump, July 2017. NAP (rev.) 2000 2011 2011 2012 2013 2016 2017 under revision When President Trump signed the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 into law this past October, he led the United States as the first state to enact the United Nations Security Councils Women, Peace, and Security agenda into national law. A WPS Strategy is due by October 2018 1.1 Ensure for personnel. 2.1a 2.1b Provide common 2.1e Mobilize of women related processes and decision 2.1f to advocate for women Assist Increase Support needs of male and female ex lf world
Honor Torture UNSCR 1325 UNSCR 1888 UNSCR 1989 UNSCR 2122 UNSCR 2422 UNSCR 2272 I nd
Please provide your comments / remarks / thoughts / articles / proposals to help us en-USimprove the value of the PKSOI Journal!en-US Please send an email to Chris Browne, en-US firstname.lastname@example.org en-USStaff en-USDisclaimer: e views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the ocial policy or en-US position of PKSOI, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. is journal is published quarterly en-US by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. en-US Content is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to the original author.en-US en-USAny comments?en-US Please let us knowen-USMANAGING EDITORen-US en-USMr. Chrisen-US Browneen-US EDITORSen-US en-US en-US Mr. Scott Braderman en-US Dr. Raymond Millenen-US DIRECTORen-US Colonel Michael Rauhuten-US en-USASSISTANT DIRECTORen-US Professor Bill Flavin
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