design/print: www.absreklama.cz Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence Newsletter ContentCombined Interoperability CBRN Defence in Air Operations Exercise Toxic Trip 13 Permanent Need Harmonization of the CBRN Content within the NATO Standardization Documents Architecture International Consequence Management Training Course 2013 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reach Back Coordination Element Initial Operational Capability Declaration and Way Ahead Modelling and Simulation (M&S) Cooperation with the NATO M&S Centre of Excellence The Earth Is Not Flat, It Is Spherical NATOs CBRN/WMD Outreach Activities to Asia Trident Jaguar 2014 TEED extended support to NFS1/2014
1 Dear Reader, proven axioms can currently be observed in the JCBRN Defence COE. It is the successful process of organization evolution. This evolution took place in the adoption of a new Annex A of the Operational MOU of the JCBRN Defence COE, most visible in the implementation of the NATO CBRN Reach Back Element. Details on that were displayed in the last JCBRN Defence COE Newsletter. The other evolutionary strand is by far not so visible in the moment but in a long term perspective represents an even more important evolution. This strand is the opening of the JCBRN Defence COE towards the European Union (EU). The JCBRN Defence COE has been created to become an important part of the wider main effort, aimed on enhancement of NATOs ability to evolve in terms of transformation process, which last but not least pays the attention to the external relations, including the cooperation with EU. The JCBRN Defence COE, located in the heart of Europe, hosted by an European Union member state, never interacted isolated from the ongoing NATO-EU developments and relationships. Initiated by the JCBRN Defence COE host nation, the Czech Republic, in autumn 2012, most probably triggered by the maturing ideas of the European Union to establish EU spheres of possible co-operation. The so-called common record of the meeting was a road map for the further co-operation with the EU under the restraint, that future document available. Together with LTC MYNARIK, the second player of the JCBRN Defence COE EU Team, EDA with the aim to clear the scene for the development of bilateral Letters of Intent (LoI), LoI, creating basis for the reciprocal co-operation between EDA and JCBRN Defence
2COE is assumed to be signed afterwards. These two signature acts will open the door for development issues and sphere of CBRN training activities as well. By enhancing the mutual exchange of information several additional EU projects were discovered by the JCBRN Defence COE EU-Team. The European Commission for example has recently set up the EDEN-Project. Not directly in the focus of the task-portfolio of the JCBRN Defence COE, but for sure in the Area of Interest of the JCBRN Defence COE. In the era of shrinking resources for defence purposes, suitable and long lasting ideas CBRN projects are with regard to collective security and defence of outmost importance and interest for European nations and also, for our American fellows. The trace of an EU-orientation within the JCBRN Defence COE serves to these needs as well as to the military capabilities and to ensure greater cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU. Authors: The COE EU-Team: COL Rainer Schulte (DEU), LTC Ales Mynarik (CZE)
3 Combined Interoperability CBRN Defence in Air Operations Exercise Toxic Trip 13 was held in Italian Air Force Base Villafranca di Verona from 20 27 September 2013. This year the exercise was hosted by 3rd Wing (3 Stormo) of Italian Air Force. There were more than 300 participants from 14 NATO countries and 2 Partnership for Peace countries. Observers came from different NATO HQs and agencies as well as from United Arab Emirates. Toxic Trip 13 was another one in the long line of Toxic Trip exercises (organized since 1995) with the aim 1. To train different aspects of CBRN defence related to air operations in a multinational scenario. 2. To train personnel in the deployment of mobile and transportable collective CBRN shelters and use them in conjunction with other nations air assets. 3. To increase the level of interoperability among NATO and partner nations in order to conduct the procedures of donning/ provide technical support. 4. To contribute to the understanding for the need of common procedures. 5. To discuss and analyse the current status of CBRN defence as it relates to present/future requirements and to assess the training implications derived from emerging threats. 6. To sum up events that evolved from the exercise and draw conclusions that will support nations in improving their CBRN defence training methods and procedures. 7. To discuss the effects of wearing CBRN IPE (in extreme conditions) STANAG 2412. 8. To provide inputs to NSA about related STANAGs (COLPRO aircrew and CCA). The scenario put units to multinational joint environment and all incidents played during the exercise required harmonized team work of all CBRN units from 8 nations (BEL, CAN, DEU, FRA, GBR, ITA, USA, and SWE). Incidents included hard landing contaminated air base to own air base, chemical missile attack on own air base, transport aircraft loading with mission essential equipment in contaminated environment etc. There were the following incidents: 1. Day 1 Incident 1 Situation: Hard landing of a helicopter, containing 3 aircrew members and 10 injured and contaminated persons. Aim: aircraft decontamination, extraction of Combined Interoperability CBRN Defence in Air Operations Exercise Toxic Trip 13 CCA, C2, W&R procedures. 2. Day 1 Incident 2 Situation: IED found in a civilian car, later turns out it had contained Anthrax. Aim: EOD handling, SIBCRA, Chain of custody procedure, waste management handling, decontamination, C2, W&R procedures, CCA. 3. Day 1 Incident 3 Situation: Diversion of 4 fast jets from another contaminated air base to our own air base. Aim: reconnaissannce, aircraft decontamination, aircrew extraction, CCA, C2, W&R procedures. 4. Day 2 Incident 1 Situation: Chemical missiles attack on own air base. aircraft decontamination, personnel decontamination, C2, W&R procedures. 5. Day 2 Incident 2 missions from contaminated base pilot insertion. Aim: aircraft decontamination, pilot insertion, C2, W&R procedures. 6. Day 2 Incident 3 and landing). Aim: aircraft decontamination, pilot extraction, CCA, C2, W&R procedures. 7. Day 3 Incident 4 Situation: Cargo aircraft has to leave with mission essential equipment. Aim: Contamination Payload Control Area (CPCA) procedures, CCA, vehicle decontamination, C2, W&R procedures. 8. Day 3 Incident 5 Situation: Incoming wave of aircrafts with 12 pilots, in addition 14 force protection unit members need to be decontaminated at the same time. Aim: aircraft decontamination, pilot extraction, CCA, C2, W&R procedures. JCBRN Defence COE participated with one member as leader of the Lessons team of 12 members from 9 nations generated more than 140 observations. This will be prioritized and passed to NATO JCBRN Defence Capability Development Group Training and Exercise Panel for the future work. Heads of delegations mentioned during AAR that TT13 was a great learning experience due to more realistic combined scenario (in comparisson to TT12), that embedded to exercise play and that force employment (during incidents) should be better coordinated. these: 1. Have an on scene commander during all incidents in order to improve the control of involved elements. 2. Follow procedures in order to avoid major mistakes while under stress and willing to help the victims. 3. Contamination Control Area (CCA) cards needs to be used to allow (better) understanding of each step in CCA for all personnel involved in activities (and avoid language barrier). 4. During CCA activities pay particular attention to the critical areas of aircrews Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) such as neck area, gaps, folds etc. 5. The length of time the aircrew waits to be extracted from the aircraft and processed through the CCA line needs to be reduced. These can be achieved by practice, training, coordination and improvement in technology. At last, it is worth mentioning the excellent host nation support provided by 3rd Wing of ITA Air Force. See you next year in France in Cazaux AFB for Toxic Trip 2014.Author: CPT Gorazd Stergar (SVN)
4ments that are not under the JCBRN CDG responsibilities, related to the ties. Firstly, the entire database with all subject documents is required and subse quently having knowledge about the cur rent, agreed by the relevant body status, CBRN content can be properly and timely incorporated. Since 2013, third part (see picture 4) of the comprehensive database named CBRN related standardization documents matrix has been established. This is still an ongoing process, due to the enormous amount of standardization content. To ensure the harmonization within the NATO documents is one of the most im portant and uninterrupted tasks for each NATO working group / panel. In CBRN do main the Doctrine and Terminology Panel is directly responsible for harmonization of the CBRN content within NATO standardi in the term of references and is also dis cussed in each working panel meeting. The entire activity is divided into four sub tasks: 1. to ensure standardization of the CBRN terminology throughout NATO documents; 2. to review NATO Level 1 general and CBRN defence policy and concepts; 3. to monitor the content of the CBRN de fence standardization documents in order to identify gaps and to achieve harmoniza tion; 4. to monitor the content of the standardi zation documents related to the CBRN defence in order to achieve harmonization within the document architecture. The Allied Joint Doctrine Development Process is currently properly established and publications such as AAP-03 (AAP03 Production, Maintenance and Man agement of NATO Standardization Docu ments) and AAP-47 (Allied Joint Doctrine Development AAP-47) contain provisions and formal procedures to be applied by all Tasking Authorities, Delegated Tasking Authorities and Working Groups. All above mentioned publications are used for the development or revision of the Allied Joint Publications (AJPs). Being supported by AJODWG outcomes all required informa tion regarding the current status of AJP is easily accessible within NATO webpages and forums. In order to meet all requirements regard ing harmonization within CBRN domain, in 2012 the creation of the comprehensive CBRN documents database was initiated. It was decided that without one main and wide-raging tool the harmonization cannot be properly achieved. Currently the docu ment consists of three main parts and can be considered a supportive publication in which easily the CBRN content can be checked. First part of this database is as signed to AJPs. The Allied Joint Doctrine Matrix has been developed with the aim of providing details about CBRN content not only in promulgated AJPs, but also in AJPs that are under development (work see picture 1). Moreover, the Allied Joint Doctrine Architec ture (AJDA see picture 2) supports mentioned AJP Matrix and provides overall scheme of in formation included in it. As far as the CBRN de fence standardization documents, which are un der JCBRND CDG respon sibilities, are concerned, the harmonization of the CBRN content is properly managed and all tasks are divided into subordinated panels. In many cases the harmonization depends on the organizational aspects. The process of reconciliation ily point of view. All the CBRN STANAGs or STANRECs have been compiled into the second part of the da tabase. This part offers a summary of current status of existing and new ver sions of developed CBRN STANAGs/STANRECs and their relations. In addition Allied Tactical Publica tions and Allied Engineer ing Publications covered by the CBRN STANAGs/ STANRECs have been added. In January 2014 a new summary of the CBRN STANAGs/STANRECs, with division of the JCBRND CDG subor dinated panels responsibilities, was set up. The hierarchy is described in the picture 3. The process of monitoring of all docu -Permanent Need Harmonization of the CBRN Content within the NATO Standardization Documents Architecture part of the comprehensive database. Picture 2 Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture (AJDA). Picture 3 CBRN STANAGs/STRANRECs HIERARCHY continued on page 5
5International Consequence Management Training Course 2013In the period of 1 4 October 2013 the Joint CBRN Defence COE Training, Exercise and Education Department (TEED) and Management and Cooperation / National Nuclear Administration Agency (NNSA) / US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted the International Consequence Management Training Course in Vyskov, Czech Republic. The content of the course was focused on Fukushima nuclear power plant accident response scenario. The course provided a great venue for specialists, emergency response personnel and emergency managers giving unique training to develop and execute plans in response to radiological to such events were presented as well as interaction and coordination between respective response elements. Generally, eight students from three countries (CZE, HUN and SVN) participated in the course, each with varying level of previous experience dealing with radioactive materials and radiological consequence management. In students feedback, all the participants appreciated a great value for their current and / or future career. Experienced lecturers shared their knowledge, experience and practical advice. Moreover, there were useful practical exercises after almost each exercise in the end. If only the JCBRN Defence COE would extend the cooperation with NNSA in upcoming years. In the plan there are four courses offered in 2014: Program Training for Emergency Response (I-RAPTER) Basic Course (19 23 May) Radiation Injuries (19 23 May) Course (6 9 October) Program Training for Emergency Response (I-RAPTER) Advanced Course (18 22 November) As such, these courses offer great opportunity for students, who want to broaden their knowledge and acquire quality experience from real world experts.Author: CPT Gorazd Stergar (SVN) continued from page 5Permanent need ...There is a need for permanent update of all above mentioned database-parts. Being properly informed allows relatively easy reaction by providing subject matter advice. Revision of the comprehensive database is regularly carried out and two times per JCBRND CDG meeting. The Doctrine and Terminology Panel Chairman informs au dience on the work done during the last six months. The comprehensive database is very of harmonization of the CBRN content in standardization documents. At present time it can be found on the NSA web page under the JCBRN CDG Doctrine and Ter minology Panel Documents. In close future it will be also part of the JCBRN Defence COE Knowledge Base with the accessibil ity to the wide range of the CBRN commu nity to facilitate their daily work.Authors: LTC Grzegorz Cieloch (POL), CPT Lubos Trudic (SVK) Picture 4 CBRN Related Standardization Documents Matrix example.
6subordinate headquarters or NATO entity is entitled to get Reach Back support when required, including the NRF Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF) and its CBRN Joint Assessment Team (CBRN JAT) when deployed. To ensure proper delivery of fused CBRN expertise in support of Situational Awareness and intelligence analysis, coordination procedures are now under development with the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center. Whilst CBRN Reach Back has been primarily developed in support of NATO, it is intended to progressively extend its support further to the COE Sponsoring Nations and the Member Nations as required. The agreed operating procedure follows the Request for Information (RFI) management cycle, in accordance with the NATO RFI system (Stanag 2149). Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs). A supporting technical and under development as well as ad hoc arrangements ensuring appropriate and permanent CBRN RBCE manning availability. On the way towards the FOC implementation, the JCBRN Defence COE efforts are now focusing on the extension of the CBRN RBCE current capabilities by the draft NATO CBRN RBCE CONOPS, with full support from the NATO Military the importance given to countering the proliferation of WMD by the anti-terrorist community as a whole, NATOs Defence against Terrorism (DAT) programme of work funding is key to establishing the material conditions through a dedicated CBRN Reach Back operations room to be fully completed by this summer 2014. In the course of the coming months the whole COE through its Sponsoring Nations is placing efforts on developing dedicated links to partners in the Reach Back supporting secondary network through the development of related bilateral agreements. continued on page 7 On 1st January 2014, the Joint CBRN Defence COE Director declared the attainment of Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the CBRN Reach Back and Coordination Element (CBRN RBCE) to the International Military Staff Director General. From this declaration, one of NATOs Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats published in September 2009 is now under successful implementation. Before developing on this major COE success, we must clearly understand what CBRN Reach Back is about. From NATOs CBRN Reachback and Fusion Concept (MC 0590) published in May 2010, CBRN which deployed forces may be provided with timely, coordinated authoritative and detailed advice on CBRN and toxic industrial CBRN hazards and defensive countermeasures, drawing upon remote expert sources of information. This means that CBRN Reach Back is to ensure the availability of reliable products for NATO designated commanders on short notice and timely delivery of all source, fused CBRN expertise to support Situational Awareness, intelligence analysis, operational planning and operations. Additionally, an effective CBRN Reach Back should support the whole spectrum of NATO response to WMD proliferation, protection and recovering. The IOC declaration has actually been providing a successful end to a two year period of experimentation, which begun in September 2011 and aimed at informing the further development of the concept with a view to implementing CBRN Reach Back at the COE. In September 2013, the JCBRN Defence COE Steering Committee approved the utilization of the CBRN RBCE in support of the Alliance. To support this decision, considerable structural changes have been made within the COE with extra posts, including established to ensure that the COE can deliver an effective Reach Back capability. The new structure has grouped together the COEs Modeling and Simulation Section with a new Plans Team and a new Reach Back Coordination Element (RBCE), all of which are now part of the recently created Operations Support Department (OSD). In November 2013, the NATO Steadfast Jazz 2013 provided a valuable training venue for the CBRN RBCE in support of both SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) and the deployed CBRN Joint Assessment Team (JAT). Observers from both SHAPE and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) assessed the CBRN Reach Back support as successful and this was further supported by the Steadfast Jazz 13 and CCOMC evaluation reports. In the meantime, considerable progress towards Full Operational Capability (FOC), expected at the end of the year 2015, has also been achieved. The NATO CBRN RBCE Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a Technical Arrangement (TA) between the JCBRN Defence COE Sponsoring Nations, SHAPE and HQ ACT have been Within SHAPE, CCOMC has been primary customer. Also, any designated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reach Back Coordination Element Initial Operational Capability Declaration and Way Ahead
7Development of the interoperability and comprehensive cooperation among COEs is one of the ACTs main priorities. And so, the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE) task number 10.02 named M&S Cooperation, from its program of work 2014, could be recognized as one to support the idea, vision or NATOs way ahead. It has been already more than one year since the Director of the NATO M&S COE and his expert team have visited the the initial platform for future cooperation with regard to M&S areas of work has been established. The relationship between two COEs has been reinforced during the NATO M&S COE visit of the JCBRN Rome in September 2013. This meeting addressed two main issues. Not only common information exchange were prepared and implemented by technical teams from both COEs. The most important parts of experimentation were the real connectivity exploration focused on cooperation of software (SW) tools, terrain databases conversion, updates in the most current NATO M&S standards as High Level Architecture (HLA), distributed interactive simulation (DIS) and standards concerning 3D visualization. Subject matter experts from both COEs are permanent members of NATO M&S Group (NMSG). One of the subgroup is MSG-106 Enhanced CAX Architecture, Design and Methodology SPHINX. As this group is primarily focused in development of SW interoperability, the results of cooperation and conducted experiments were introduced and appreciated during last meeting. The Cloud Generator (one of the modules of the unique CBRN SW called Chemical, Biological and Radiological Simulation Suite) ran by the JCBRN Defence COE took part in the experiment. It has been successfully interconnected with the NATO M&S COEs tactical constructive simulator called Scenario Generator and Animator (SGA). The COEs cooperation and results were successfully presented to the NATO Military Committee in February 2014. In one of the usescases the spread of the chemical warfare effects on population were shown. The cooperation among the JCBRN Defence COE and NATO M&S COE is going to be institutionalized by the signature of a technical arrangement during a COEs The document will cover the following areas of cooperation: gathering of all SKOLKAN data, federation M&S SW to improve its CBRN capabilities, generation of 2D and 3D environment, joint experiment using Combined, Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet)1, CBRN Reach Back support, Information Knowledge Management. conjoint work is now the establishment and maintenance of a permanent siteto-site connectivity using the technology called Virtual Private Network (VPN). This enables both COEs to organize and conduct experiments from remote locations, offering CBRN Defence M&S capabilities as a service through the NATO M&S COE and, last but not least, allowing costs reduction for the further M&S capabilities development.1CFBLNet is a laboratory environment which utilizes a distributed Wide Area Network (WAN) as the vehicle to experiment with new capabilities by conducting Research and Development, Trials and Assessment (RDT&A) on command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) initiatives. Since 2010, CFBLNet has 13 full members: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Italy (all NATO members), the NATO organization and Sweden Author: MAJ Lubos Chylik (CZE)Modelling and Simulation (M&S) Cooperation with the NATO M&S Centre of Excellencecontinued from page 6Chemical, Biological ...The building up of a CBRN Knowledge Base and management system within the JCBRN Defence COE is a key part of the efforts to improve information management which is ultimately necessary for the comprehensive Reach Back and Fusion capability that NATO requires. The two year period beyond IOC is also to be used in particular to complete the CBRN RBCE permanent manning. Ad hoc arrangements and procedures have been established which enable permanent access to appropriate Radiological, Biological and Chemical expertise at Doctorate level. Despite its current IOC limitations, the CBRN Reach Back is already able to respond to requests on a 24/7 basis and can easily shift to operations mode, should the operational situation require. In the meantime, it is expected that both NATO CBRN RBCE CONOPS and TA between the JCBRN Defence COE Sponsoring Nations, SHAPE and HQ ACT will be endorsed. In close cooperation with SHAPE, ACT is now heavily supporting the process by implementing a CONOPS validation experiment which will culminate in the commitment of the CBRN RBCE as a training audience in the US Naval Postgraduate Schools TNT MIO (Maritime Interdiction Operations) 2014 experiment cycle, in May and June of this year. This will ensure the RBCE ability to leverage both COE in-house and external expert support assets. CBRN Reach Back is a capability that has taken time to develop in the conceptual sense but the JCBRN Defence COE is now organized and on the way to deliver valuable specialist support to the planning and conduct of NATO operations. Author: COL Xavier Lefebvre (FRA)
8A two day lecture event on multilateral efforts to enhance CBRN defence took place in Tokyo end of February and evolved from NATOs Secretary General meeting with Japans Prime Minister Peace and Security (SPS) Info day in June last year (see Newsletter 2-2013). Initial discussions at the SPS Info Day showed that both NATO and Japan had much to offer each other in terms of defence against CBRN threats today. Knowledge and information sharing seems to be a particularly strong area for potential practical cooperation, especially for the development of a new NATO CBRN Reach Back (CBRN RB) capability with a view on CBRN trends and threats in Asia. NATO would like to share the lessons learned and best practices in civil-military cooperation in CBRN consequence management and to understand how cooperation might be developed and what capabilities will have to be put in place, including inter-agency and international cooperation. Japan gained a lot experience from the Fukushima disaster and is therefore an extraordinary partner in sharing best practices for the future on disaster response and disaster preparedness. This trilateral CBRN lecture event between the National Institute of Defense (NIDS), Japans centre of policy research of the MoD, the NATO HQ International Staff Weapons of Mass Destruction NonProliferation Centre (WMDC) and NATOs Joint CBRN Defence COE was multifold. It has enriched NATOs knowledge on CBRN different geopolitical environment. It has also enriched Japans knowledge on the framework and constraints of NATO with regard to countering the CBRN/WMD threat to NATO Allies. With a view on long term possibilities to further develop the JCBRN Defence COE capabilities the physical fact, mentioned in the header, might offer an additional solution to provide services on a 24/7 basis. The currently existing restraints and constraints of utilising the new NATO CBRN Reach Back Capability, which must be taken in consideration for the next years to come, directs the following thought more towards the transformational domain. of a spherical earth. The most important fact is that, by using state-of-the-art information and technology infrastructures, which allows a nearly real time exchange of information, it is possible to create at least a 24 hours brain-domain around the world. How to utilise and design this braindomain for a future / long term JCBRN Defence COE enhanced service provision is for sure a challenge. However, this challenge might be tackled by a JCBRN Defence COE led CD&E-Project involving NATO HQ ESC WMDC; NATO HQ IMS, ACT and eventually the JPN NIDS! Author: COL Rainer Schulte (DEU)The Earth Is Not Flat, It Is spherical NATOs CBRN/WMD Outreach Activities to Asiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_Earth Stephan Jacobsen / Rainer Schulte, Multilateral efforts to enhance effective CBRN defense: NATOs Approach, February 2014, S1 ff.
9Trident Jaguar 2014 TEED extended support to NFSUntil November 2013 the Training Exercise and Education Department (TEED) focused its expertise support on NATO Joint Operational Level in order to assist in preparation of the deployable JHQ together with its NRF Components Commands as an NRF force structure for respective rotation. In spite of the fact that TEED has supported the Steadfast/Trident Exercises in many areas and reached sound it would be a big failure to stay stagnant and not to extend the TEEDs support by including NATO Force Structure (NFS). in response to a short notice request for Academics support of NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain (NRDC-SP) in Valencia and the Naval Striking and Support Forces in NATO (SFN) in Lisbon. Generally, Trident Jaguar 2014 (TRJR 14) is an Allied Command of Transformation (ACT) sponsored exercise which aims training and evaluation of NRDC-SP and SFN respectively as Land and Maritime Expeditionary Joint Task Force HQ to plan and conduct a Smaller Joint Operation under the direct command of SACEUR. The goal of the TRJR 14 Academics Exercises (OCEs), including supporting and subordinate commands, key staff members with the latest developments, and best practices as they affect the JTF drawing on NATO experience from recent exercises and missions. This event also provided the opportunity to meet in person with the counterparts at other HQs to discuss issues and to establish a common understanding on the cooperation and interaction within the JTF HQ. As already mentioned, there are two OCEs of TRJR 14 which implies to conduct each item of Exercise Planning Schedule twice and in many cases at both locations in parallel. The TEEDs added value to four-day meetings of presentations and discussions was an enhancement of both OCEs key staff understanding of complexity and dynamism of the NATO CBRN Defence which enables the both entities to take into account, plan and organize CBRN Defence measures at all JTF HQ Command Control levels during the next exercise phases. The JCBRN Defence COE assistance to TRJR 14 and both HQs aspiring to be with the Academics. The TEED stays ready to support both MEL/MIL events and mainly the execution phase of the exercise with the observatory and advisory accomplishments. As the continuation of is foreseen, the TEEDs experience and observations gained from TRJR 14 will surely make the upcoming process easier.Author: COL Jaroslav Borek (CZE)
10CBRN Units Evaluators Course (8 12 SEP)The target is to prepare evaluators responsible for evaluation of CBRN Defence units for NATO Reaction Force Combined Joint Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Task Force (NRF CJ CBRN International Radiological Consequence Management Course (6 9 OCT)The aim is to provide assessment specialists, emergency response personnel and emergency managers with the tools and techniques to develop and execute plans for responding to complex issues related to the release of radiological materials. Established strategies will be presented that cover the response elements required to respond to such events. Additionally, interaction and coordination between those response elements will be explored.CBRN Warning and Reporting Specialists Course (20 24 OCT) incidents and strengthen the foundation for integrity, good governance and management within members of the CBRN Warning and Reporting Centre by sharing experiences, challenges, and CBRN Warning and Reporting exercises in order to enhance professionalism.Crisis Management after CBRN Incident Course (10 14 NOV)The aim is to introduce and describe EU, NATO Crisis Management concept, organization, systems and procedures including Cooperation and Partnership initiatives in Crisis Management to EU, NATO and Partner International Radiological Assistance Program Training for Emergency Response (I-RAPTER) Advanced Course (18 21 NOV) Sign up for CBRN Courses Autumn 2014
design/print: www.absreklama.czThis email address is ready for your comments or questions! firstname.lastname@example.org JCBRN Defence COE Newsletter Team JCBRN Defence COE 682 03 Czech Republic Assistant phone: +420 973 452 805 Fax: +420 973 452 800 Mobil: +420 777 702 858 IVSN: 925 4200 452 805 E-mail: email@example.com Editorial Committee: Mrs. Pavla SKACELOVA, MAJ Elemir KUREJ Photos: COE Archive, 31st CBRN Brigade Liberec Archive, Web: www.jcbrncoe.cz 2013 Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE); www.jcbrncoe.czAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permi ssion of the JCBRN Defence COE. This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within the JCBRN copies bear above mentioned notice and a following citation: [Author(s), [name of the article] x/2013 Newsletter 2013 JCBRN Defence COE Sponsoring Nation(s). Although the JCBRN Defence COE has invested the utmost care in its preparation, the JCBRN Defence COE does not accept any liability for the accuracy and completeness of any information, instructions and advice provided, as well as for misprints. No claims can be made against the JCBRN Defence COE with respect to potential consequences from the reliance on information or conclusions contained in this publication.