Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence Newsletter

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Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence Newsletter
VaÅ¡íčková, Pavlína, 1980-
Skácelová, Pavla, 1979-
Å ír, Miloslav, 1951-
Place of Publication:
Vyskov, Czech Republic
Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic - Military Information and Service Agency (AVIS)
NATO- Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence
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63 s. : barev. il., mapy ; 21 cm


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Ozbrojené síly -- ÄŒesko ( czenas )
Bezpečnostní politika -- ÄŒesko ( czenas )
Boj proti terorismu -- ÄŒesko ( czenas )
Protichemická ochrana -- ÄŒesko ( czenas )
Ochrana proti jaderným zbraním -- ÄŒesko ( czenas )
Armed forces -- Czech Republic ( czenas )
Security policy -- Czech Republic ( czenas )
Terrorism control -- Czech Republic ( czenas )
Antichemical protection -- Czech Republic ( czenas )
Protection against nuclear weapons -- Czech Republic ( czenas )
Vyškov (Česko) ( czenas )
Vyškov (Czech Republic) ( czenas )
Informační publikace. ( czenas )
Information publications. ( czenas )
serial ( sobekcm )
handbook ( marcgt )
Informační publikace ( czenas )
Information publications ( czenas )
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[work team Pavlína VaÅ¡íčková, Pavla Skácelová, Miroslav [i.e. Miloslav] Å ír].

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University of Florida
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9788072783908 ( ISBN )
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Content Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reachback and Fusion a New Capability for NATO Capability for NATO Joint CBRN Defence COE Hub for CBRN Education and Training Discovering Transformation Through Experimentation Training Exercise and Education Departments Amenable Action on the JFC HQs Requirements JCBRN Defence CoE supported NATOs Science for Peace Programme with Japan JCBRN Defence COE and its First Step to Contribute to The Science for Peace and Security Programme Lets Talk Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) A Popular Science Oriented Essay A Web-Based Semantic Knowledge Base to Support the Future JCBRN Defence COE-Knowledge Management I-RAPTER Training of Military Students Enhanced by JCBRN Defence COE M&S Capabilities Modeling and Simulation in Support of the MIO Experiment & BIOSAFE 2013 Lessons Learned And Its Future At The Jcbrn Defence Coe Head of WMD Non-Proliferation Centre Visited JCBRN Defence COE Sign up for CBRN Courses Autumn 2013 2/2013 Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence Newsletter


Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence Newsletter 2/2013


2 Dear Reader, This second COE newsletter of 2013 reports on a period marred by the sudden and unexpected demise of our much respected and widely popular Hungarian colleague, the efforts at the COE are carried on by his former colleagues nonetheless and we are It has been a turbulent period in many respects for the COE following the decision to forge ahead with an ambitious programme of restructuring which was completed on July 1st, even as the experimentation period which led to the concept for the new structure to provide useful and effective support to NATO operations in addition to continuing following another important day in the history of the JCBRN Defence COE, 23 July 2013 when the Republic of France became a new member, increasing the number of in his opening speech declared that he was honoured that France decided to join the Through the coming months as the new structure beds in the main focus for the whole COE to improve information management which is ultimately necessary for a comprehensive people throughout NATO that have supported the JCBRN Defence COE so enthusiastically order for the new structure to become fully effective and all NATO nations and eligible


3 The requirement for NATO to have access to its own dedicated CBRN Reachback NATOs Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats published in September 2009 that work to begin in earnest to implement such a capability. That policy acknowledged that comprehensive information gathering and consistent assessment is an essential aspect of WMD intelligence and CBRN Reachback which together encompass operational or tactical detection and characterisation of a CBRN threat, characterisation of WMD facilities and forensic attribution. When the comprehensive policy was published it was widely acknowledged that an effective CBRN Reachback process provides an essential contribution to the whole spectrum of NATOs response to WMD proliferation, protection and recovery. Thus the next step towards implementation began with the publication of NATOs CBRN Reachback and Fusion Concept (MC 0590) in May 2010. By this time the Czech Republic, drawing on its long experience and acknowledged already volunteered to act as host nation for the emerging capability. By March 2011 analysis carried out by the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Def COE) based in Vyskov, Czech Republic had outlined a possible method that, given some structural changes and an uplift of capability, the COE itself would be an effective option for the location of the facility. The synergy between the COEs mission and tasks and the required deliverables of Reachback was clear and thus in September 2011 the JCBRN Def COE Steering Committee approved a two year period of experimentation aimed at informing the further development of the concept with a view to implementing CBRN Reachback at the COE. The hypothesis behind the ACT-led experimentation was that a CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reachback and Fusion a New Capability for NATO Reachback and Fusion capability at JCBRN Defence COE could enable the CBRN related issues within the NATO Crisis Response Planning Process at NATO HQ, SHAPE, JFCs and other operational headquarters to be supported effectively. This hypothesis was tested with some rigour, not least in a Maritime Interdiction Operations experiment with C2 provided by NATOs Maritime Ops Centre in 2012 which demonstrated clearly that the JCBRN Def COE was able to handle Requests for Information, outsource them where necessary and subsequently respond. During this key part advice was provided by the USAs National Nuclear Security Administration, already a committed partner to the NATO CBRN Reachback effort. The importance of a secondary network of such partners diagram below illustrates how the network might look when developed to the full. 2 THE CBRN REACHBACK NETWORK SHAPE IOs, NGOs EADRCC WMDC SSCs NHQs Mission HQs JFC HQs Open Sources National Sources Nat MIL CBRN centres National MIL CBRN Responce NATO CBRN RB CE CBRN Def COE Supporting Virtual Environment Collection / RFI Information sharing C2 Relationship CBRN TF NRF NIFC Operational Tactical IMS Politico military ACT Allied National CBRN JAT


4 In April 2013 the JCBRN Def COE Steering Committee made a decision to forge ahead with an ambitious programme of restructuring which was completed on July 1st, even as the experimentation period for Reachback was still ongoing. These of the COE to start to provide useful and effective support to NATO operations in addition to continuing the long-standing programme of work in support of NATOs transformation. The new structure has grouped together the COEs Modeling and Simulation Section with a new Operations and Plans Team and a new Reachback Coordination Element (RBCE), all of which are now part of the recently created Operations Support Department (OSD). Through the coming months as the new structure beds in the main focus for the whole COE will be on developing links to partners in the Reachback network whilst also building a CBRN Knowledge Base, a key part of the efforts to improve information management which is ultimately necessary for the comprehensive Reach Back and Fusion capability that NATO requires. External partners continue to be sought and added to the Reachback network (the supporting virtual environment in the above diagram) for the outsourcing of Requests for Information where necessary and this extensive network of partners is being established formally, through MOUs and Technical Arrangements, in order to share information and advice on all aspects of CBRN. As the network develops the coordinating element at the COE will become better advised and informed and thus migrate towards maximum effectiveness. Full Operational Capability is planned for the end of 2015. In the interim period, an initial capability is to be established at the end of 2013 by when the set up within the COE will consist of a Chief of NATO CBRN Reachback who will coordinate the activities of a staff consisting of operations and intelligence all important specialists one chemist, one microbiologist and one radiological / nuclear scientist. With these personnel in place the embryonic capability will begin to deliver support to its primary customers, Group and Estimate and Options Group. The contribution of these two groups within the crisis decision cycle is illustrated below. in particular will often require specialist CBRN support to enable effective decision-making. There is already SACEUR s Crisis Operations Decision Cycle facilitated byCCOMC Crisis Identification Group (CIG) Estimate & Options Group (EOG) Response Directions Group (RDG) Operational Management Group (OMG) Crisis Review Group (CRG) JCBRN Defence COE CCOMC = Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Centre an established Request for Information (RFI) process and the Reachback element at the JCBRN Def COE will follow these common NATO procedures. To help facilitate the Reachback operations centre which is currently being established at the COE, NATOs Defence against Terrorism (DAT) programme of work has already agreed to contribute funds as part of its annual round of allocations which followed a bidding process that took place in London, UK in April 2013. This decision the proliferation of WMD by the anti-terrorist community as a whole. Considerable structural changes have already been made within the COE and extra posts, not already named are necessary to ensure that the COE can deliver an effective Reachback capability. The DAT money is to be established at the COE. In short, the space whilst the DAT funding is used to equip the operations room in order to get the capability up and running. Contractors from three different countries are already engaged in the bidding process to provide communications infrastructure and a situational awareness suite. CBRN Reachback and Fusion is a capability that has taken time to develop in the conceptual sense but the JCBRN Def COE is now poised to begin to deliver valuable specialist support to NATOs planning and conduct of operations. ACT has provided unstinting support and advice through a lengthy period of experimentation and development to bring the capability to this point and the COE acknowledges this major contribution. The JCBRN Defence COE is situated on often acknowledged as Napoleon Bonapartes most masterful victory. It is apt then to remember what has been achieved with CBRN Reachback to date but also to be guided by the words of Le Petit General; Take time to deliberate, but when the time for action comes, stop thinking and go in. Author: LTC David Cooper (GBR)


specify its core functions and related performance objectives; and clarify the Depth of Knowledge levels required. This will be carried out by the JCBRND CoE when appointed as DH for CBRN defence. Finally, CBRN defence is a complex issue and, therefore, it can only be successful if handled jointly involving NATOs partners, the UN family and other IOs and NGOs. The JCBRND CoE wants to play the proactive role and be the engine looking into its future role and NATO expectations. With that, the aspiration for the role of DH and the leading role in the area of CBRN training is a great challenge short in terms of time to complete but long in terms of tasks to accomplish. Author: COL Vratislav OSVALD (CZE) 5 NATOs Smart Defence and its initiative for the new concept for Centres of Excellence anticipates a more proactive role within the E&T Programme Framework. The need for changing the system and synchronizing the effort is driven by: More strategic approach Increasing number of Training Institutions Increasing number of E&T events Alignment with international educational standards New Training Management Tools As of 1 December 2012 the responsibility for executing collective training was transferred from ACO to ACT. Therefore, ACT prepared a new coherent, integrated and globally programmed range of education and training for the militaries of Allies and Partners. In parallel, both strategic commands SACT and SHAPE presented NATOs WMD/CBRN Education and Training Plan as a tool for training NATO Deployable Forces ability to defend against CBRN threats and prevent proliferation of WMD. The Joint CBRN Defence COE (JCBRND CoE) has been involved in the entire spectrum of the E&T program since its recognition in 2006 and, thus, it has great experience and a long tradition in E&T. Therefore, the JCBRND CoE welcomed this new approach and analysed ways to support the new concept in the most has offered to become the Department Head (DH) for CBRN defence working closely for ACT Joint Force Trainer and the Requirement Authority (RA). By assuming this role ACT sent the request for support to the JCBRND CoE in collecting information about CBRN/ WMD in E&T Global Programming activities and organized a Training Requirement Analysis workshop on 8-12 July 2013 in Vyskov (CZE). This very successful workshop orchestrated by ACT JETE/SPP and supported by the JCBRND CoE, NATO HQ IS WMDC, SHAPE, JFC Naples, NMIOTC and NSO Oberammergau analysed individual and collective training needs and prepared the CBRN/ WMD Training Audience Analysis combined with existing training opportunities for individual and collective training. When approved, those two documents will serve as a driver to implement training requirements through the dedicated T&E plan. Although many important steps have been completed it is fair to say that many steps are still waiting in a queue. Assuming the TRA is an approved next step seems to be the Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and the decision on future NATO courses. The subsequent TNA Joint CBRN Defence COE Hub for CBRN Education and Training Organizational Structure RA DH STPTRA TNA International Educational Standards QA E&T Framework Roles & Responsibilities STP Holistic view Broad and general TRA 1st Analysis Outcome: Programme TNA In Depth Analysis Outcome: Course Strategic Training Plan Training Requirements Analysis Training Needs Analysis New E&T Framework Organizational Structure RA DH STPTRA TNA International Educational Standards QA E&T Framework Roles & Responsibilities STP Holistic view Broad and general TRA 1st Analysis Outcome: Programme TNA In Depth Analysis Outcome: Course Strategic Training Plan Training Requirements Analysis Training Needs Analysis New E&T Framework


6 The primary mission of the JCBRN Defence COE is to support NATOs CBRN defence. Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is one of the tools by which the COE carries out this task. In particular from 2010 up until now, the COE had a key role in: Countering Hybrid Threat Experimentation 2011 led by ACT; Four experiments exploring the Reach Back & Fusion (RB&F) Concept: o the Maritime CBRN Detection, Field Trial, led by ACT ; o the Tactical Network Testbed Maritime Interdiction Operation (TNT-MIO) Experiments (since 2010) led by the US Naval Postgraduate School; o The RB&F experiment 2012 led by ACT; o A JCBRN Defence COE led RB&F Experiment which started in 2011 and ended in June 2013. These experiments enabled the COE as NATO and Multinational shortfall solutions, and identifying Minimum Capability Requirements (MCRs) of future CBRN defence capabilities. It is important to mention an adaptive capability development trend which is ongoing in our COE because of its commitment to these experiments. In April 2013 this evolution, ended up in the establishment of a Reach Back Coordination Element (RBCE) within a brand new Operational Support Department (OSD). Additionally, the COE created a dedicated Multinational Experimentation Section under the Transformation Support Department (TSD). However these results are not an end itself, in fact the COE proposed to develop two new CD&E experiments in the period 2014-18: The WMD Disablement Functional Concept and Discovery Experiment; Specialist CBRN Defence Sampling Using Forensic Methods to Support Site Discovering Transformation Through Experimentation Exploitation: Validation Experiment. These issues represent today the key areas of Capability Development in the CBRN domain for the 2020s, the current knowledge borders to prevent, protect and recover against CBRN threats. Effective experimentation will certainly lead to effective, responsive, and resilient capabilities. This is a key mission for our COE Quotation It doesnt matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesnt matter how smart you are. If it doesnt agree with experiment, its wrong. Richard P. Feynman Author: LTC Stelian Radulescu (ROU) Many recent articles in the JCBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) Newsletters were dedicated to our support to the NATO Response Force (NRF) reader should have a sound generic idea about overall exercise processes and the COE supportive role in them. Such a type of exercise was always described as a subject of the long preparation and extensive planning process not only for various NATO Staffs but also for the COE personnel backing numerous exercise preparatory steps. Spring 2013 tested the COE Training Exercise and Education Department (TEED) capability in response to a last minute request for support of JFC HQ Naples One-level MEL/MIL and CAX driven Battle Staff Training (BST) Naples Vision 2013 (NAVN 13). The goal of this and train NATO forces in planning and conducting crises response operations. The BST was an eight day event in March 2013 and the TEED supported the MEL/MIL Scripting Workshop and Execution Phase. During the scripting in February 2013 at the JWC Stavanger, the TEED representative was responsible for scripting and injection into the Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) with all the CBRN related incidents in close coordination with other functional areas. During the Execution Phase at the new JFC Naples facility in Lago Patria the TEED representative (as a part of EXCON) coordinated all CBRN related incidents from the position of CBRN SME and participated as a member of the NAVN13 Training Team in order to observe the quality of CBRN C2 activities within JFC HQ Naples during the exercise and operation itself. It is important to mention that NAVN 13 differed from common the training audience (TA). All scripted incidents were adaptably tailored during execution phase according to the TAs needs. For the duration of BST only minor shortcomings were reported mainly related Training Exercise and Education Departments Amenable Action on the JFC HQs Requirements to coordination within EXCON caused by dynamic storyline development. Based on the results of NAVN 13, TEED presence in Stavanger and Lago Patria will bring added value to future NATO exercise support. The COE was able to accomplish two missions at the same time. First, they ensured assistance to the JFC Naples and NATO requirements by maintaining NRF Second, they maintained TEED capability during MEL/MIL scripting and working in the training team. Surely, experience gained by TEED in the both NAVN13 tours will be utilized during the upcoming Steadfast Jazz 2013. Author: LTC Jaroslav Borek (CZE)


7 The Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) is a policy tool to enhance international security, peace, and technical expertise to deliver solutions for issues of mutual concern to NATO Allies and Partners. It is a NATO programme which offers grants for projects, workshops and training involving scientists and experts from NATO Allies and partner countries. It is not just for the area of CBRN Defence, but CBRN Defence is one of the security challenges of high interest within NATO and Partner Nations. Since the JCBRND CoE conducted very successful a CBRN First Responder Course with Mediterranean partner countries (Vyskov, June 2013) NATOs WMD Non-Proliferation Centre invited the CoE to another of the NATO Secretary Generals visit in April 2013, a Kick-off SPS Info Day was held on 27 June and some of the goals laid out in the Joint Political Declaration for strengthening NATO-Japan relations from April 2013. Japan has in the past contributed to building peace in the Balkans and in high seas. While NATO has no ambition to take on a permanent role in Asia, they see very clearly the advantage of working with like-minded partners like Japan. Japan and NATO spell out their shared strategic interests in promoting global peace, stability and prosperity, through pursuing a rules-based international order that promotes peaceful settlements of disputes. The Info Day in Tokyo was jointly hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) of NATO Headquarters to which the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre belongs. Approximately 80 subject matter experts and various representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and national embassies attended the event. Prior to the event, Japan had expressed an interest in two main topics: 1. Defence against CBRN agents and 2. Cyber Defence. As a result, the event was divided into an overview on SPS Programmes and two sessions with a session discussed potential cooperation opportunities available on the topic CBRN defence; the second session discussed possible cooperation related to cyber defence. The sessions included speakers invited from both NATO and Japan. In his opening speech, the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Minoru Kiuchi, welcomed the new era of cooperation between NATO and Japan the intensive relationship with the EU and that Asian and Euro-Atlantic security could no longer be separated because of the interconnectedness of many threats today. The CBRN defence session was moderated by Mr. Matthew Wall from the US Delegation to NATO and opened by LtCol Stephan Jacobsen from the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre who outlined NATOs broader WMD/CBRN policy and current CBRN Defence concepts. Colonel Rainer Schulte from the CoE gave a presentation on the work of the CoE, including cooperation activities with NATOs partner nations. Mr. Masaki Takeda, Head of the CBRN Defence System and Detection Technology Section of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) as part of the Ministry of Defense highlighted in his presentation JCBRN Defence CoE supported NATOs Science for Peace Programme with Japan some of the research in the area of biological threat detection systems and CBRN hazard prediction software to be used in urban terrain. The bilateral meeting showed that both NATO and Japan had much to offer each other in terms of defence against CBRN threats today. Knowledge and information sharing seems to be a particularly strong area for potential practical cooperation especially for the development of a new CBRN reach back capability with a view on CBRN trends and threats in Asia. NATO would like to share the lessons learned and best practices in civil-military cooperation in CBRN consequence management and to understand how cooperation might be developed and what capabilities will have to be put in place, including inter-agency and international cooperation. Japan gained a lot experience from the Fukushima disaster and is therefore an extraordinary partner in sharing best practices for the future on disaster response and disaster preparedness. The way ahead for future CBRN defence projects will be thoroughly discussed between ESCD, the JCBRND CoE and Japan. NATOs ESCD is targeting a future workshop focusing operational (military) views on CBRN defence and preventive technologies aimed at comprehensive and timely response to CBRN threats and incidents. In conclusion, the NATO and JCBRND CoE representatives visit step to enhancing the information sharing between both partners in the area of CBRN defence. This cooperation will enrich NATOs knowledge on CBRN technology solutions and will provide a platform for experience management. Author: LtCol Stephan Jacobsen (NATO HQ IS WMDC)


8 The Science for Peace and Security Pro gramme, or SPS, is a policy tool for en hancing cooperation and dialogue with all partners, based on civil science and inno vation, to contribute to the Alliances core goals and to address the priority areas for new partnership policy. The SPS Programme funds collabora tive activities on topics that are relevant to NATOs strategic objectives. Support is given for multi-year projects, techni cal workshops and training courses. Re cently, NATO decided to support the SPS Programme by offering the services of the JCBRN Defence COE to the partners from the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). The JCBRN Defence COE then decided to develop and offer a course related to CBRN First Responders for three nations from MD (Kingdom of Jordan, Egypt, Sau di Arabia). It was approved by NATO and an appropriate budget developed so this JCBRN Defence COE and its First Step to Contribute to The Science for Peace and Security Programme course could be organized for the NATO SPS Programme. The JCBRN Defence COE conducted the CBRN First Responders Course from 17 to 21 June 2013. 17 total participants from the Kingdom of Jordan (7), Egypt (7) and Saudi Arabia (3) took the course at the JCBRN Defence COE to enhance their tasks. It was designed to provide an over international environment. Lecturers from various countries were invited to the JC BRN Defence COE to provide their high quality theoretical lessons. An integral part of most training is the practical exer cise. The practical exercise for this course was organized in cooperation with Mili tary Academy at Vykov, the 31st Brigade of CBRN Protection in Liberec, and the Population Protection Instiutute located in institutes executed the training profession ally and increased the quality of this train The course was considered by participants a success and highly valuable for their fu Also, all of them recommended this course to others. This course was a great challenge for the JCBRN Defence COE. Thanks to the posi tive attitudes of all the organizers it was sucessfully accomplished and shows the JCBRN Defence COE capabilities in the incidents. We can proudly state that the JCBRN Defence COE did a great job and proved its ability to contribute to NATO as Author: WO Marek Nemec (CZE)


9 Lets Talk Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) A Popular Science Oriented Essay ITERATION 1 ries of WMD related articles, is to provide and some basic understanding when talk ing WMD. It is also to better understand the idea of the articles which will be pub lished in the upcoming JCBRN Defence COE newsletters. Why talk about WMD? First, because ba sic knowledge about WMD is an integral and necessary part of the professional skill well as other military and civilian personal working in the CBRN domain. Second, WMD covers and touches a huge variety of neighboring domains which are of inter ences national security policies, trade ef forts and well-being in general. For fruitful dis cussions it is useful to start tion of WMD. Unfortunately there is not only there are several understandings available. Within NATO, agreed by the NATO mem A weapon that is capable of a high or der of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, in frastructure or other resources on a large scale.(AAP 6) it contains two ambiguous terms. One is of high order and the other one is large erational purposes in the political, civil and military areas of responsibility or interest within the NATO Engagement Space. The tioned is from WIKIPEDIA: A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is harm to a large number of humans and/or cause great damage to man-made struc tures (e.g. buildings), natural structures (e.g. mountains), or the biosphere in gen eral. ( on_of_mass_destruction) might lay the ground for all general dis cussions beyond the NATO Engagement Space in the public arena and the strategic communications, though. Therefore this eration as well. can be found. The UN approaches the term WMD via a teleological or canonical meth odology. That means that the UN tries to its use for military purposes, and its politi cal understandings and implications. The UN SC Resolution 1540 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction stands as an example for that. This complex methodology which allows the development of a hybrid WMD under standing, based on the interactions be use and political implications of weapons, can be made clear with the following quote: Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold mis ery brought by war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weap ons of mass destruction? (Cosmo Gordon LANG, Archbishop of Canterbury, in reference to the aerial bombardment of Guer nica, Spain) Using the current NATOuse of WMD took place in after WWII. Whether the use of Agent Or ange and NAPALM must be judged as a use of WMD needs more analysis and might be tackled in a follow on article. Especially after the development and use of nuclear bombs the term weapons adaptable to mass destruction has been communique, dated 15 November 1945. After the fall of the iron curtain, the break down of the Soviet Empire and the emerg ing security issues like network-based terrorism, failed states, or social develop ments, e.g. the Arabic spring, the risk of a potential use of WMD for NON-MILITARY These developments were acknowledged by NATO in its 2010 Strategic Concept very well: This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalcu lable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, prolif eration will be most acute in some of the worlds most volatile particular if terrorists were able to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capa bilities develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against bal listic missile attack further develop NA TOs capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction In follow-on documents to the Strategic Concept the WMD related risks were also mentioned: Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose serious risks and challenges to the Alliance and to international security. A primary aim of the Alliance is to pre vent the proliferation of these weapons or, should proliferation occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Allies have taken a comprehensive set of prac tical initiatives to defend their popula tions, territory and forces against potential WMD threats.( SID-8D5F4F7F-2294FACE/natolive/top ics_50325.htm?selectedLocale=he) These basic WMD related threats and risks have been reiterated at the NATO Summit in Chicago 2012. Two new terms were mentioned here: RISK and THREATtwo more ambiguous terms. ons of Mass Destruction a nearly 100 Center for Study of Weapons of Mass De struction, offered more than a dozen differ forcement domain up to National Security Strategy domain. The following quote is from the concluding remarks of that paper: The confusion resulting from the adoption lems with use of the term. Ideally, those who use the term should rely on the origi UN and now enshrined in international law. It is unlikely that the U.S. Congress or the law enforcement and defence communi ties will follow such a path. For that rea ing intended is evident whenever the term is used. This provides a good line to use when the term WMD needs to be operationalized. Before discussing WMD-Disablement at any stage or for any purpose, the achieve ment a common understanding about WMD is of utmost importance. ITERATION 2 will provide ideas on how to engage the two terms threat and risk for operationalization in the current politi cal situation when Talking WMD. Disclaimer: All thoughts displayed in this article are national positions. Author: COL Rainer SCHULTE (DEU)


10 A Web-Based Semantic Knowledge Base to Support the Future JCBRN Defence COE-Knowledge Management relevant information at the right time is crucial in order to put people in a position to quality. To achieve this, all members, the organizational structure, the entirety of procedures and the applied IT-technology of the JCBRN Defence COE have to be understood as a whole; more precisely as a system of systems (SoS). This implies the understanding, that adjusting one parameter within this constantly interacting socio-technical COE-SoS will Seen from a more technical point of view, all of this leads to the question: Which user-requirements must be met by a future COE-Knowledge Management System in order to support the COE-Knowledge Management? Please note: To increase the readability of the text, the term JCBRN Defence COE will be referred as COE, the term COEKnowledge Management System and accordingly COE-Knowledge Base as KB. Initials status Limitations and Challenges: Looking at the various facets of daily COE-work, it quickly becomes clear that here all characteristics of knowledge work are present: Work which is sometimes very complex and which is not always determinable. Individual workproceedings are highly people-dependent and require mostly a high level of communication. In addition to this, factors like distributed working environments, high turnover-rates and different individual To make things worse, information, available in large numbers, different level of abstraction and in an unstructured form. As more IT-related limiting factors nontransparent database structures, a lack of data representation and easy to use data retrieval techniques have to be mentioned. A Knowledge Base in General: A KB must be designed as a framework providing a means for information to be collected, organized, shared, utilized and searched. The KB is not to be understood as a traditional database, but as a tool, which allows its attributes to be structured and visualized. This has to be done in such a manner also, that allows it to adjust to its users needs. In summary, a KB has to be more or less comparable to an expertsystem with information/facts, sources, evaluations, and structures for problemsolving purposes for example the Request for Information-Management. Vision and Options: From the perspective of a KB-architect, the KB must support potential users with unknown issues and questions for a particular working-situation with appropriate information. This all together sounds like squaring the circle. But after analyzing the requirements in more detail, the following manageable 1. Even in small knowledgedomains information is often available in a huge, unstructured or unmanageable manner. 2. Users often dont know what they are exactly looking for. 3. A search will be processed by IT-systems without considering the of the meaning. This may lead easily to an excessively long list of hits without any information about the completeness or accuracy of the results. 4. Despite steadily improving statistical search-algorithms, full-text queries are still based on just the text strings. That means searches containing ambiguous words, entries in a different language or entries with incorrect spelling will always lead to an incorrect or rather no result. 5. The data-representation is primarily designed for humans as users. information regardless of whether it is text, image, video or audio. This information can then be transformed into a different form and/or replaced into relation to other information; machines currently cant do this. There are strategies available to help solve these problems. A few years ago the idea that information is not only understood by people, but also interpreted and linked together (cross-linked) by machines, was inconceivable. But around the turn of the millennium, the idea of the Semantic Web was born. Today Semantic of Natural Language Processing (NLP), Technologies already offer the possibility of deriving meanings out of information. This can be achieved through the use of Semantic Web Technologies in the form of algorithms, solutions and programs. For example, ontology-languages are one of those possible tools with which a semantic cross-linking of the respective knowledge domain can be implemented. Ontologies (as a blueprint or model of a knowledgedomain) then form the basis for using different visualization techniques, to allow a new form of knowledge-representation and/or knowledge-exploitation. The future usability of the semantically linked data within the KB depends directly applied information visualization. The tool currently used in the KB is able to reduce complex correlations down to their essential characteristics and display them then in a variety of views (Fig 1). The compilation of visualizations includes explorative, partial and aspect-oriented approaches. They range from the navigation Fig 1: Usage of semantic key-technologies within the COE-Knowledge Base


11 in hierarchies to overview of complex structures. The exploratory approach is appropriate to explore partial unknown data, the search for new structures and and previously unknown interrelations. The partial approach is mainly used for the visualization of search results or for tasks without the necessity of displaying the complete data-structure. The aspectoriented approach is targeted to reduce the complexity of the information space. All three approaches are utilized within the KB-Demonstrator in the current state of development, sometimes in combination depending on the individual use-case. The COE-Knowledge Base in Principle: (NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reach Back & Fusion Concept). Based on this, the design of the current KB-approach is derived and additionally optimized according to the TNT MIO Experiment 2013. Prior to this Experiment a four-step-implementationplan (Fig 2) to build the future KB was agreed by the COE-Directorate. The plan covers the time period from Jan 2013 to Dec 2014. Each of the four steps also has a list of its key activities and decision points. These activities and scheduled. In addition to the technical the KB, internal working-rules for the further modus operandi were described. And these rules shouldnt only be seen as a funny buzzword list, but as an appeal to the attitude / philosophy towards ones work: 1. Use one big conceptual picture from the (and therefore change the course of action only in case of absolute necessity). 2. According to this, basic work activities should be carried out only once. 3. Work from simple to complex to ensure a progressive learning curvea smooth path to success. 4. Keep things transparent to ensure a proper Change Management. 5. Involve people as often and as early as possible to assure a constant staff motivation. 6. Consider the power and effectiveness of people working together through connections and collaboration, taking responsibility individually and collectively (rather than relying on strict traditional hierarchical status). With regard to content, the KB is subdivided into 6 sections: 1. Library, 2. Supporting Network, 3. COE-Products, Projects and Services, 4. Toolbox, 5. Interaction like semantic queries, generic search, data repositories, Glossaries, etc. and 6. Admin. During experimentation, initial were collected and are currently under evaluation. Conclusion and Way Ahead: Data-representationand retrieval-techniques have been successfully tested so far. Tests have shown that by search queries, all results fully meet or even outperform all expectations. The upcoming time-period may be seen as a preparationand test-phase for the operational implementation of the KB within the COE in the term KB-goal settings includes 1st the extension of the current semantic model to include aspects from WMD, geology and meteorology and 2nd the integration of (external) SQL databases into the semantic model. The long-term vision is related to topics like the usability of social network-data and the usage of linked datatechnologies in the CBRNknowledge domain. Author: Staff Cpt D.Trees Fig 2: The four-step-implementation-plan of the COE-Knowledge Base


12 In accordance with the approved 2013 Program of Work (POW) the JCBRN De fence COE in conjunction with the United States Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) conducted the pilot program for the In ternational Radiological Assistance Program Training for Emergency Re sponse (I-RAPTER), Basic Course from 13-16 May 2013 at the COE in Vyskov, Czech Republic. This three and a half day course was also organized in cooperation with the Czech Republics NBC Defence Institute of the University of Defence. The primary aim of this course was to provide guidance on how to conduct op erations where a radiation hazard might be involved. The course consisted of a vari ety of instructional and theoretical training combined with a robust hands-on portion utilizing a variety of radiation detection de vices. After only the minimum number of hours of practical training the students fa miliarized themselves not only with instru ments and devices used for measuring ra dioactive energy but also with procedures and principles for determining how radio logical sources and their emissions occur in man-made and natural environments. The practical training was divided into two parts. The instructors split the class par ticipants into three monitoring teams. The logical Laboratory of the NBC Defence Institute where students measured differ ing ranges of radioactive emissions from a variety of known sources. After training on known radioactive sources, students received a task to search and determine types of radioactive emissions present in the vicinity of the laboratories. In the meantime the second and third monitoring teams conducted radiological reconnaissance within the barracks com pound under a DoE instructors supervi sion. The students successfully discovered the position of an x-ray device in a local military hospital and during patrol search ing they discovered the storage of various radioactive sources as well. For mobile detection the students utilized the Spec tral Advanced Radiological Computer System (SPARCS) mounted in two vans. The SPARCS is a versatile multi-platform radiation detection system designed to be used for both ground and aerial detection. All theoretical and practical training was conducted by the eight instructors from the Department of Energy (DoE) of the United I-RAPTER States of America, who have countless years of practical experience with radiation protection programs. Many of the instruc tors have more than 17 years of experi Eleven students from three countries (CZE, ITA and ROU) participated in the course. They came from both the military and civilian domains and each had vary ing degrees of previous experience deal ing with radioactive hazards. Based on the student input to the comment forms dis tributed for the course, all the participants stated that the course has a great value for their future career deployment. The next course is tentatively scheduled during the period 10-15 May 2014. This course offers twenty free slots for students who want to broaden their knowledge and acquire qual ity experience from real world experts who routinely deal with the detection of radio active materials on a global scale. Author: WO Pavel David (CZE)


13 Recce team reports detection of hazard material BRAVO1this is BRAVO21 FLASH OVER This message among many others was frequently heard during Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) Instinct 2013 which was held at the JCBRN Defence COE M&S Classroom from 29 to 30 May 2013. This CAX was created for University of Defence Brno (CZE) CBRN students. This CAX was the students last activity before their The preparation for the CAX started at the beginning of January when LTC Petr Neuer (JCBRN Defence COE M&S Section of Defence Brno teacher) prepared the initial scope of the exercise. The detailed plan with the main topic of the exercise, necessary documents and MEL/MIL scripting were prepared between February and May. Set-up of the M&S network to include hardware and software was also an important part of the preparation phase accomplished by MAJ Lubomr Chylk and WO Kamil estkthe JCBRN Defence COE M&S Section subject matter experts. The simulations used for the CAX were Battle Command for tactical events with the Federation of Chemical and Biological Simulation Suite as the simulator of CBRN events. The topic of this exercise was CBRN Recce Platoon Commander Decision Making Process and Command of Platoon during CBRN Reconnaissance in the Battle Situation. The main goal of the CAX was to train students in commanders skills, improve their ability to make right and timely decisions, and to command subordinate CBRN reconnaissance teams with support of M&S capabilites. The training was divided into two periods: 1.Planning recce routes and creating overlays, creating the order of battle for CBRN reconnaissance, and platoon preparation; and 2.Commanding reconnaissance teams during CBRN reconnaissance, receiving and transmitting CBRN messages using the warning and reporting system, command of subordinate squads via radio communication means, and the Company commander about results of CBRN reconnaissance. Apart from common CBRN issues students had to solve unexpected situations as attacks of enemies, diversionary groups, or the loss of one CBRN recce team. Those situations in accordance with MEL/ Training of Military Students Enhanced by JCBRN Defence COE M&S Capabilities MIL demonstrated the students ability to make appropriate decisions. The exercise showed on the one hand a good education in theory and on the other, a knowledge of a platoon commanders duties even with their minimal experience with leadership. They understandably had low practical skills concerning command of subordinated teams (e.g. the use of radio communication means to command, timely orders to recce teams). levels of the chain of command. Training with constructive JCBRN Defence COE M&S tools allows students to develop appropriate commanders skills, provides knowledge of practical leadership of subordinate units, and improves their ability to make commanders decisions. The students appreciated M&S tools as a modern form of education and training which can enhance their leadership skills and the leadership skills of young CBRN Author: LTC Petr Neuer (CZE)


14 Modeling and Simulation in Support of the MIO Experiment & BIOSAFE 2013 Military simulations, also known informally as war games, are simulations in which theories of warfare can be tested and hostilities. Military simulations are seen as a useful way to develop tactical, strategic and doctrinal solutions. Additionally, nonmilitary uses of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) covering a wide range of areas such as homeland security, transportation, environmental impact, communication, energy, intelligence, interagencycoordination, training for emergency response, consequence management planning number of other possible applications are being developed on a daily basis. Recently, the JCBRN Defence COE M&S Section supported the Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) Experiment 2013 and BIOSAFE 2013 Field Exercise. During both exercises their main objectives were demonstrating their potential role in the JCBRN Defence COE Reach Back Element, developing use cases and appropriate Courses of Action (COAs), and demonstrating the use of various simulations and the capabilities associated with them. The MIO Experiment 2013s main objective was to explore feasibility and major constraints associated with networkenabled detection and interdiction of maritime-sourced nuclear radiological threat to the U.S. and NATO installations in foreign countries. The main portion of the MIO 2013 was divided between the activities in Poland and San Francisco Bay. The simulation used during this experiment was the Battle Command with CB Sim Suite (BC-CBSS). The two use cases developed are as follows: Use Case I Vehicle Intercept. A vehicle with suspected radiological material departed the Port of Kiel and it was involved in an accident in a populated (COA1) and less populated area (COA2). As a result of the wreck, an explosion of small (See Figure 1) and large radiological material were released. Use Case II Maritime Vessel Intercept. A small fast boat with suspected shielded radiological/nuclear material approaches the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco Bay. The two COAs used were detection inside and detection outside the bay. Patrol teams received a warning message from the sensor buoys and Explosions occured releasing unknown amounts of radiological material. (See Figure 2) BIOSAFE 2013 Field Exercise The Forensic Sampling Decontamination Workshop and Field Exercise (FSD WFE) was the primary Transatlantic Collaborative Biological Restoration Demonstration (TaCBRD) event for collecting data to support the assessment of forensic and sampling capabilities and resilience during a biological incident. The goal of the DTRA program is to enhance the US capability for interagency response and coordination in foreign consequence management. The Use Cases developed during this exercise were: Release Terrorist Lab in a Refugee Camp Additionally, the simulations used were Battle Command CB Sim Suite (BC CBSS) federation, HPAC, and EDMSIM. M&S tools and applications were used in the MIO Experiment 2013 and BIOSAFE 2013 to enhance a common operational picture (COP) (See Figure 3) to assist decision makers in examining complex problems and allow for opportunities to develop solutions. M&S was used to conduct a series of what-if questions and analysis utilizing real-world capabilities. M&S can be used to assist in driving a training scenario for the Reach Back Center staff and SMEs at a variety of locations. M&S tools and applications provide a suite of capabilities to assist commanders and staff in their decisionmaking processes. The M&S Section looks forward to providing these capabilities for future exercises, operations, and the Reach Back Element. Authors: Mr. Jiri Pail WO Kamil Sestak (CZE) Figure 1, Explosion of small Radiological device in Kiel-populated area Figure 3, EDMSIM-COP of BIO event Figure 2, Explosion of Radiological device inside and outside the bay


15 As you may know, the Lessons Learned capability of JCBRN Defence COE was moved from the Transformation Support Department (TSD) to the Training, Exercises and Education Department (TEED). Lessons Learned capabilities were incorporated into a new section called Lessons Learned and Exercise Support. The reason for this was to fully realize the evaluation abilities of the former Lessons Learned, Evaluation and Analysis Section. This article will inform you about the future steps for the LLES section. It will use the 5W method: What? When? Where? Why? How? We will begin by reviewing LLEAS previous activities in support of NATO exercises focusing on NATO Reaction Force (NRF) preparation particularly in the CBRN Defence and Force protection (FP) space (What). We would like to transform into lessons learned through analysis (How). These lessons learned could help avoid common mistakes (Why) both in the preparation process and during the mission. The When and Where are a little more complicated--all observations are more accurate and effective on the spot at the exercise or operations area. This must be taken into consideration Lessons Learned And Its Future At The Jcbrn Defence Coe limitedan experienced lessons learned analyst can record and publicise the lessons learned of an exercise saving time and money for the exercises next training audience. the lessons learned process: tool to support commanders at all levels in making the necessary decisions to remedy and communicate best practices; (BiSC Directive No. 80-6). Lessons learned are not just focused on the negative experiences. phenomenon (event) prior to analysis, diagnosis or interpretation. observation for which a remedial action has been developed and an action body to carry out the remedial action proposed A result from the implementation ofa remedial action that produced an improved performance or increased capability. The LL Process works generally as follows (illustrated in Figure 1): a) Initiation An observation from an event triggers the LL process; It is complete when the effects of the actions are recorded; Quality of observation deter mines the overall quality of LL. b) Analysis Used to thoroughly understand the potential for improvement; Result possible courses of action are proposed to redress the causes of the observed effects; One course of action is selected LIs are the desired outcomes of analyses. d) Endorsement and Tasking An appropriate command approves the LI and takes the necessary (remedial) action or forwards the LI to next higher level / designated Action Body. e)Implementation, Monitoring and Validation The Action Body implements the Action Plan while the tasking authority monitors its accomplishment. f) Lesson Learned (LL) process validation proves that the Remedial Action (RA) on LI works and the problem really was solved. The overall LL process is also described in the COEs SOP 2000 issued in February 2011. Please feel free to review it remember, the lessons learned process is not just a topic for senior leaders, it should be of interest for all of us as we should all strive for improvement. The lessons learned process is here for you! Please contact us for assistance and questions. Author: LTC Adolf Labak (CZE) Figure 1: Model of LL process for our COE in conjunction with NATO LL process guaranteed by Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)


16 On 27 August 2013 the JCBRN Defence COE hosted a rare visit of Director of Nu clear Policy Directorate and Head of WMD Non-Proliferation Centre Mr. Fred S. Fred erickson. The Ambassador was accompa nied by the delegation led by the Director of Defence Policy and Strategy Division of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Re public Mr. Jan Havranek. Ambassador was informed by the Direc tor of JCBRN Defence COE COL Jiri Ga jdos about all achievements and current activities of the JCBRN Defence COE. The meeting continued with presentation Head of WMD Non-Proliferation Centre Visited JCBRN Defence COE focused on the future and the way ahead for CBRN support to NATO conducted by the JCBRN Defence COE. COL Jiri Gaj dos introduced the proposed changes in organizational structure that would allow JCBRN Defence COE to be more pro active to meet the expected challenges. He stressed importance of CBRN Reach Back Coordination Element, Department Head and Quality Assurance ambitions. by overview of COEs Modeling and Simu lation Capabilities with small demonstra tion of possible M&S outputs. After lunch CBRN RBCE and Information Knowledge Management (IKM) update was provided to Ambassador. Final point of the agenda of visit was dis cussion about future cooperation between the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre and the JCBRN Defence COE and the resulting draft of the Technical Agreement. Authors: MAJ Elemir Kurej, Mr.Zdenek Hybl (CZE)


Sign up for CBRN Courses Autumn 2013 17 1. International Consequence Management Course (1 4 OCT) The aim is to provide assessment specialists, emergency response personnel, and emergency managers with the tools and techniques to develop and execute plans for responding to complex issues related to the release of radiological materials. Established strategies will be presented that cover the response elements required to respond to such events. Additionally, interaction and coordination between those response elements will be explored. Through discussion and practical hands-on applications, students will gain knowledge and experience with prioritizing response need; monitoring and sampling strategies; and data assessment methodology to assist in determining protection actions. At the conclusion of the course, students will understand the methods and coordination necessary to respond, gather radiological data, and assess the consequences of the release. Responders will have an understanding of how plans and response actions change as a response transitions from emergency to recovery phases and what actions are required to move that transition forward. 2. CBRN Warning and Reporting Specialists Course (14 18 OCT) The aim is to train students in warning, reporting and hazard prediction of the CBRN incidents and strengthen the foundation for integrity, good governance and management within members of the CBRN Warning and Reporting Centre by sharing experiences, challenges, and CBRN Warning and Reporting exercises in order to enhance professionalism. System. 3. Crisis Management after CBRN Incident Course (11 15 NOV) The aim is to introduce and describe EU and NATO Crisis Management concept, organization, systems and procedures civilian equivalents. Through discussion and practical hands-on applications, students will gain knowledge and experience of Crisis Management after CBRN attack in relation to current national and international security concerns. The course is developed for key civil defense (if applicable), emergency management authorities, public information, and specialist teams such as counter terrorist units or investigation For more information or initial registration, visit, where you can also download the Registration Form. Registration must be done 4 weeks before the course starts. Author: CPT Petr Valenta (CZE) Sign up for CBRN Courses Autumn 2013


design/print: This email address is ready for your comments or questions! JCBRN Defence COE Newsletter Team JCBRN Defence COE Vta Nejedlho Vykov 682 03 Czech Republic Assistant phone: +420 973 452 805 Fax: +420 973 452 800 Mobil: +420 724 605 020 IVSN: 925 4200 452 805 E-mail: Editorial Committee: Carin Smith, MAJ Elemir KUREJ Photos: COE Archive, 31st CBRN Brigade Liberec Archive, Mr. Andrej Lukac, Stephan Jacobsen Web: 2013 Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE); All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permi ssion of the JCBRN Defence COE. This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within the JCBRN copies bear above mentioned notice and a following citation: [Author(s), [name of the article] x/2013 Newsletter 2013 JCBRN Defence COE Sponsoring Nation(s). Although the JCBRN Defence COE has invested the utmost care in its preparation, the JCBRN Defence COE does not accept any liability for the accuracy and completeness of any information, instructions and advice provided, as well as for misprints. No claims can be made against the JCBRN Defence COE with respect to potential consequences from the reliance on information or conclusions contained in this publication.