U.S. policy toward Cuba

Material Information

U.S. policy toward Cuba Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session ..March 26 and April 18, 1973.
Translated Title:
Política de EE. UU. Hacia audiencias en Cuba, Noveno y tercer Congreso, primera sesión. ( spa )
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations. -- Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Place of Publication:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
c 1974.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (iii, 67 pages) : ;


Subjects / Keywords:
Diplomatic relations ( fast )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Cuba ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Cuba -- United States ( lcsh )
Cuba ( fast )
United States ( fast )
Relaciones exteriores ( qlsp )
Estados Unidos ( fast )
federal government records ( aat )
Registros del gobierno federal
Temporal Coverage:
Interventions in Africa ( 1976 - 1988 )
Intervenciones en África ( 1976 - 1988 )
Spatial Coverage:
United States

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
UF Latin American Collections
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
035612226 ( ALEPH )
681271596 ( OCLC )
KF26 .F697 1973 ( lcc )
327.73/07291 ( ddc )
Y 4.F 76/2:C 89/5/973 ( sudocs )

Full Text
KF 26 1697 1973 G. 2


MARCH 26 AND APRIL 18, 1973
\.OR 10
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

S LIKEN, Vermont
P. CASE, New Jersey JAVITS, New York d)TT, Pennsylvania n PEARSON, Kansas
fH. PERCY, Illinois
*. GRIFFIN, Michigan
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming, Chairman JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D). AIKEN, Vermont
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
PAT M. HOLT, StaffAssistant ARTHUR M. KUm, Staff Assistant
.~ .YAM

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUsL, Chief Clerk
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming, Chairman JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D). AIKEN, Vermont
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
PAT M. HOLT, Staff Assistant
ARTHUR M. KUHaL, Staff Assistant
'.. ",,-,,'^
- "-.50

Hearing days: Page
March 26, 1973 - -------------------------------------------- 1
April 18, 1973----------------------------------------------...... .. 31
Statements by:
Bonsai, Hon. Philip W., former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba ---...------- 33
Higgins, James, Professor of Journalism, Boston University- ........ 44
Hurwitch, Hon. Robert A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Inter-Amnerican Affairs; accompanied by Joseph Norbury,
Acting Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State....... 3 Insertions for the record:
Prepared statement of Hon. Gale W. McGee, U.S. Senator from
Wyoming ....-------------------------------------------------... 2
Prepared statement of Philip W. Bonsal .... ..-------------------------- 36
Prepared statement of Prof. James Higgins......----....... 51
"Large Majority Would Like Nixon to Send Kissinger to Cuba to
Improve Relations," Gallup Poll, March 29, 1973 -... .- ...-. 55
Prepared statement of Frank McDonald, Fellow, Institute of Current
WorldAffairs ...------ ........------------------------- ...-------------- ..62
Prepared stateinent of Prof. John Plank, University of Connecticut- 66


MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1973
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Gale W. McGee [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding,
Present: Senators McGee, Fulbright, and Aiken.
Senator MCGEE. The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs will be in order as we undertake a series of hearings on the status of our relations with Cuba.
Judging from statements that any number of my colleagues have been making in the Congressional Record lately, perhaps the time is ripe, maybe a little late, for a reexamination of what our Cuba policy both is and perhaps should be.
The policy evolved in the early 1960's in that well-known atmosphere, epitomized by the Bay of Pigs. The missile crisis with the Soviets made it much tighter. The line became very sharp indeed. And the aggressive attitudes and activities in some cases of the Cuban Government in the hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean, further aggravated relations.
To sum it up, I think, it would be fair to say that the power politics of the giants in the world almost for the first time, at least in a more forceful way, moved from Central Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean to the Western Hemisphere.
There have been changes, of course, since those very tense days. The obvious and more dramatic ones were the President's trips to Moscow and Peking in the past year and Mr. Kissinger has even been to Hanoi. So there are those who raise the obvious question, if the President can go to Peking and Moscow why can he not go to Havana? I think, it tortures it a bit to suggest they are all on the same plane in the literal sense, but it would seem to me that it does suggest the need for some rethinking about our Cuban relations in both the policy sense and the philosophical sense in light of the improved conditions in our relations with Moscow in particular and with most of the rest of the world in general.
In these last few weeks I have made it a point to visit, very informally about this question with a rather substantial number of people in one way or another suspected of knowing something about the Western Hemisphere, seven or eight Ambassadors, students and

scholars of the subject and a few members of the business community. In general anyone caught in the past entertaining an idea about hemisphere affairs, I have tried to buttonhole without being on the record to try to probe the dimensions of this question.
The hemisphere itself is beginning to change on the matter. Ten or twelve years ago the uncertainties of Mr. Castro and his announced revolutionary designs, at least in the Caribbean, did more than any other single factor to galvanize the Organization of American States beyond wherever it had been, and however it had been galvanized before. Today, one by one, the hemisphere governments are beginning to adjust or modify-and some few of them never did go along withthe total boycott approach in which most of the hemisphere governments earlier joined. I notice, of course, that in addition to Mexico, Chile, and Peru, Mexico having always maintained some kind of connections there, that Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana all have recognized Cuba. Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela have at least a quasi-recognition policy, and Argentina has announced through her President-elect that she is now headed in that direction, although she has not arrived as yet.
So the next question is, who is being isolated- in the hemisphere, Cuba or the United States? That puts it harshly, but I think it does pose a very meaningful prospect that imay appear down the road and, perhaps, not as far as some would wish it were.
I would wrap up these informal opening remarks by saying that at this stage we do not intend to focus on a Specific policy at which we think we ought to arrive. What we want to do is to open up what our options may be and to explore what would be the wise course in the future in terms of our relations with the Castro government.
Our witness this morning is uniquely qualified to discuss the many ramifications of this, as our Government sees it at the present time. 'The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Hurwitch, has the special responsibility for the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America. A career foreign service officer, he
has had long experience with many of the Latin American governmnents, including a tour of duty as director of the Office of Cuban Affairs. Mr. Hurwitch, we will be glad to hear your opening statement now after which I am sure we will have a number of questions to pursue with you.
[Senator McGee's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GALFx W. !cGEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee is meeting this morning to hear the views of the Department of State with respect to United States policy toward Cuba.
It seems to me and-judging from statements in the Congressional Recordto other Senators that the time is ripe, perhaps overripe, for a re-examination of that policy.
The policy evolved in the early 1960's in the atmosphere of the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis, and aggressive Cuban efforts at hemispheric subversion. This was an era which saw the Cold War spread from Europe and Asia to the Western Hemisphere.
The Cold War is now thawing in the frigid climes of Moscow and Peking. Henry Kissinger has even been to Hanoi. Why should tropical Havana continue to be regarded as an arctic wasteland?

Can we dare to, regard the Cuban hijacking agreement as the first robin or is it a false spring?
As I understand it, one of the basic objectives of United States policy toward Cuba has'been to isolate that country from the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Yet if I read the signs of the Hemisphere correctly, this policy which was originally designated to isolate Cuba may now be operating to isolate the United States.
We have with us this morning to discuss these questions the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Robert A. Hurwitch, whose special responsibility is the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America. Mr. Hurwitch is a career Foreign Service Officer who has had long experience with Latin America, including a tour of duty as director of the Office of Cuban Affairs.
Mr. Hiurwitch, we will be glad to hear your opening statement now, after which I am sure we will have a number of questions.
Mr. HURWITCH. Senator, thank you.
Senator McGEE. Will you proceed in whatever way serves your purposes best.
Senator Fulbright, do you have any opening remarks?
Senator FULBRIGHT. No.
Mr. H!RWITCH. Thank you, Senator McGee, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Fulbright, it is a pleasure to see you. May I introduce Mr. Joseph Norbury, who is acting country director for Cuba in the Department of State, whom I have asked to accompany me to assist me.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcomnittee, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the policy of the United States toward Cuba. I am well aware of the interest in this policy and of speculation that it might be changed. In this opening statement I propose to describe the present policy and the reasons behind it.

As it has been since the early 1 based on Organization of Ameri(

iN-Uaons 7ecur1Ly t.ounieIl meeting in ranama, tne uDan iorelg1 minister continued Cuba's scurrilous attack upon us and the Orgamzation of American States.
;N or has Cuba abandoned its goals of subverting other governments in the hemisphere. It has simply become more cautious, more selective, and more sophisticated in its "export of revolution," and has directed its resources to those areas where it estimates the opporunity for interference greatest. While failures have forced the Cuban leaders to be less dogmatic in their insistence on the Cuban model as the only

way to mobut a revolution, they still openly advocate armed revolt. in propitious situations. These long-held views of Premier Castro and his closest associates are not likely to be lightly discarded even though Cuban deeds may not always succeed in matching the belligerence of the rhetoric. To accomplish its objective, Cuba's apparatus for support to subversion is functioning and remains a unique phenomenon in Latin America-which should give pause to any nation prepared to believe that Cuba is now just another state among many. In short, we are convinced that regrettably the time has not. yet arivd when the hemisphere~ can safely regar'd Cuba as niolon~ger
eat to its peace and security or when we can take Cuba's leaders. at esta their wor~d.
Wuba's close military ties to the Soviet Union-ties. tare tight han ever-what we especially mean is Cuba's demonste wl ess to lend its territory for Soviet military purposes.
We obviously do not question Cuba's right to maintain an army, or equip it or to receive training. Every nation has such a right. What concerns us is Cuba's disposition to cooperate in the strategic goals of an extra-he i h. eric "supr-p w r." This was illustrated by the emplacement of offensive missiles in October 1962, and more recently by Cuba's cooperation in 1970 in Soviet efforts to establish a nuclear submarine facility at Cienfuegos which, had it succeeded, could have caused a major disturbance in this hemisphere. Any disturbane, even a slight one, of the balance of military power with the
Sovit Unon, ust ein of concern to us even as our efforts to develop peaceful contacts with that country continue.
The bases for continuing an "arms-length" relationship with Cuba, which I would stress are Cuba's external activities and not its internal political, economic, and social arrangements, would seem, therefore, to be clear.
What, then, would be the advantages to the United States of a closer relationship? Despite Cuba's consistent and flat rejection of the idea of any normalization of relations with the United States, some argue that: (1) to be consistent we should seek the same kind of pragmatic accommodation with Havana that we have sought with Peking and Moscow; (2) Latin American support for the Organization of American States resolutions is weakening: (3) we would realize economic gain from a normalization of relations; and (4) the Soviet presence in Cuba can only be reduced if Cuban suspicion of the United States is allayed by conciliatory steps on our part.
In my view, there is no inconsistency between our Cuba policy and President Nixon's widely applauded overtures toward Peking and Moscow. Both are adapted to the situations we find, both are pragmatic. Apart from the obvious differences in size and importance of the. countries involved and the fact that U.S. policy toward Cuba forms part of a multilateral OAS policy, there is the crucial difference that m the Chinese and Soviet cases we had previous indications of interest in a new relationship with the United States. We have received no such signal from Cuba. Think we have demonstrated our pragmatism with respect to Cuba: where there is no overriding U.S. interest, there are

no grounds for seeking accommodation with an openly hostile nation; on matters of mutual interest, however, we have demonstrated that we can deal with each other. The Cuban refugee airlift negotiated through the Swiss in 1965 is for example. The new hijacking agreement is another and we hope it will effectively deter aircraft hijackings to Cuba, which were contrary to the interests of both countries.
We recognize that over the years some nations have decided that the maintenance of the economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba were no longer warranted. We have regretted these unilateral decisions because the sanctions represent a collective policy and a binding obligation on us and the other member states, to be lifted only when two-thirds of the members determine that Cuba is no longer a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere. By our count it is clear that two-thirds do not think so.
In sum, therefore, we see little, if anything, to be gained and considerable disadvantage in a change ii policy toward Cuba under present circumstances. In our view, Cuba has through its own policies and actions outlawed itself from the hemisphere. Should Cuba demonstrate that it has abandoned those policies and actions, we would, of course, reexamine our posture in consultation with the other members of the Organization of American States and move in concert with them to adapt to the new situation.
That ends my opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and I, of course, will be happy to cooperate in every way I can with your subcommittee in answering questions.,
Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Hurwitch.
The fact that the hijack agreement, to which you have alluded as an illustration that small accommodations were negotiable where there was a mutual self-interest, took quite some time to achieve would raise the question of what similar kinds of accommodations might be possibly weighed as being of that category?
Very little, if any, economic benefit would accrue to the United States from normalization of relations with Cuba. Cuba is heavily mortgaged economically to the Soviet Union for many years to come and there is no foreseeable way it can produce the foreign exchange to again become an important purchaser in the U.S. market. Its aunnal trade deficit, which was running at about $80 million in 1959, is now about $500 million, des pite the fact that prices for its principal export commodities, sugar an nickel, are at peak levels. From Cuba's standpoint, access to the U.S. market would be important. To offer Cuba a significant share of our sugar market, however, would entail an equal reduction in the quotas of friendly sugar-producing countries in the hemisphere that over the past decade have come to depend upon our purchases. Nor do we have real need for the few other Cuban export products available.
Finally, I think that the notion is illusory that we can in time break or at least loosen the Cuban-Soviet link by offering Cuba some palatable alternative to dependence on the Soviet Union. Cuba has,

particularly in the past 4 to 5 years and without any serious reservations apparent to us, locked itself increasingly into a dependent relationship with the Soviet Union in every sense-economic, political, military, and cultural. Undoubtedly, the U.S.S.R. would welcome U.S. participation in sharing the $500 million a year burden that Cuba represents, but it is highly doubtful that the Soviets would lightly see their first foothold in the hemisphere slip. Conciliatory gestures to Cuba would convince Fidel Castro that his course has been correct all along and that his international behavior had been vindicated. Cuba-oriented dissident elements in the hemisphere would similarly be encouraged and we might well be faced with a recrudescence of subversion abroad, without having made any dent at all in the Cuban-Soviet relationship.
Mr. HURWITCH. I know of none that come readily to mind, Mr. Chairman. These accommodations as you have described them, arise out of the situations themselves. Back in 1965 when Prime Minister Castro said in a speech impromptu, as sometimes has been his habit, that anybody who wishes to leave Cuba may do so, there was, as you recall, this great flood of people who took little boats and rafts and rubber tires and tried to come to our country and it was a very chaotic situation which really placed the United States in a very awkward situation to have people come to our shores in this very risky fashion and both countries decided it was in their mutual interest to regularize that situation and it was that which gave rise to a memorandum of understanding negotiated through the Swiss to regularize and bring order out of chaos which has been known as the refugee airlift.
Similarly, the question of hijacking of aircraft was a matter, I think, of some embarrassment to the Government of Cuba to be known internationally as the haven for persons who in many cases were deranged but in all events, had risked the lives of innocent people by forcibly taking aircraft to Cuba, and it was certainly not in the interest of Prime Minister Castro and his Government to appear in the international spotlight; so it was a clear interest on his part t again bring some order out of a situation that was a dangerous and chaotic situation.
I might say when there were a series of hijackings back in the latter part of 1969, the Government of Cuba at that time indicated that it was prepared to reach a bilateral agreement with any country that wished in order to help deter such hijackers. We immediately responded and dealt through the Swiss from October 1969 to September of 1971 attempting to reach an agreement with Cuba on this matter. We did not succeed, and I might say in my own followup and judgment of this matter in following it at that time, in the latter part certainly of these negotiations or exchanges of views with Cuba they seemed to not be as interested as they were in the early part of the discussions in the latter part of 1969. I think possibly one of the considerations there was during that interval a number of aircraft were hijacked to the Middle East and the spotlightwas shifted away and there did not seem to be the same amount of interest.
Also, as we had informed the committee or members of the committee at that time, the Cuban Government insisted upon our follow-

ing, and as they explicitly said, by crossing the "t's" and dotting the "i's", a Cuban law on this matter which, iad we done so, would have forced the United States to engage in extradition practices to Cuba. that we engage in with no other country in the world. It was more farreaching than our traditions and our history and our other similar agreements with other countries permitted or allowed us as the case might be.
When these two hijackings occurred in the latter part of last year,. in, October and November, as I recall, which were very dramatic hijackings, once again the Cuban interest became very keen in this matter and the Cuban Government indicated that we really ought to try to get together on this matter to once again see if we could not resolve it. We have good reason to believe that the Prime Minister of Cuba, Premier Castro himself, was personally interested in this matter.
That, plus the fact that the Cuban Government did not at that time insist on the letter of its law being followed, gave us hope that this indeed, was a very serious and promising development which, as you know, after 3 months of negotiation did succeed in an understanding between the two countries on this matter.
The reason I have gone into this detail, sir, is to indicate that on matters where both countries feel that there is a, mutual interest and that the interest of both countries would be served we are businesslike without polemics, we can get to an agreement such as most recently the hijacking agreement.
Senator McGEE. It has been suggested in some public material that the real consummation of the hijacking conversations was at least partially the result of heavy pressures from Moscow on Havana. Are you in a position to comment on that?
Mr. HURWITCH. The only comment I can make, Mr. Chairman, is I know of no basis for such an assertion. I have not seen any information that has come to my attention through official channels or any other way to provide a basis for that.
Senator McGEE. Would you be in a position to say whether that was a subject of either the Presidential or the Kissinger dialogues in Moscow-one way in which the Soviets might apply some pressure?
Mr. HURWITCH. On the specific hijacking question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator McGEE. Yes.
Mr. HURWITCH. I have seen nothing that would support that either, sir.
Senator McGEE. What is your answer, Mr. Hurwitch, to the obvious fact at the moment that one by one the Caribbean countries and other Latin American governments are reestablishing and normalizing their relations with Cuba, and the implications of that for our own country? It does seem to be steadily.going on rather than at dead center. I can understand its being locked at a given point after the first flurry, but it would appear from the pace of things now

that it is going to increase rather than decrease. Is that a fair conclusion?
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, I think that is fair, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the sources of concern to the Department and, therefore, I believe to the Government, is that, there may be other nations which will flout, if you would like, the binding agreements undertaken within the Organization of American States and unilaterally seek to adjust their relations with Cuba. We think that this constitutes a weakening of the Organization of American States, the fact that these resolutions adopted in 1964 and 1967 under the Organization of American States were also taken within the purview of what is known as the Rio Treaty or the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, that this constitutes a weakening of a treaty which has had and, I believe, continues to have considerable importance for our relations in defense of the Hemisphere. These developments, I would be less than candid if I were to say that they were not a matter of concern to us.
Why some of these nations are taking or have taken these actions and why there may be some others who consider doing so really requires an examination of the politics and attitudes of each one of the individual countries.'
I think, frankly, that one of the reasons that we hear rather constantly from our Latin American friends is that they believe that we are on the verge of changing our policy, and, therefore, they do not wish to be caught short, if I might say. I think they felt or heard that the United States in its shifting of policy on China was abrupt and without all the notice that they felt might have been given or should have been given, and they are, therefore, alert to a similar occurrencefrom their point of view with regard to Cuba.
They, therefore, saySince we are concerned about that, and since we are convinced from perhaps statements made by Members of the Congress or members of private groups or what have you, that the United States will or should change its policy toward Cuba.
They do not want to appear to be sort of the reactor to U.S. policy. If we were to do it then they do not want to follow because it places them in the world image of being subservient followers of the United States policy and they wish to manifest obviously a greater independence which, of course, is their right.
Senator McGEE. The Organization of American States, the Foreign Ministers, will be meeting here when? Is it next week or the end of this week?
Mr. HURWITCH. On the fourth of April, sir.
Senator McGEE. On the fourth of April?
Mr. HURWiTCH. Yes.
Senator McGEE. I suppose it would be fair to conclude that the name of Cuba will come up in the conversations, formally or informally, during that conference. What will be the position of the United States at this forthcoming meeting of the Organization?
Mr. HURWITCH. Well, I believe that my opening statement does really reflect the position of Government, and I do not think I would be saying one thing to you, sir, and something else in another forum.

I believe that we will be consistent along the lines, perhaps not word by word, but certainly in what you would call the thrust of our position which basically, sir, is-we do not revel in this particular situation in which we find ourselves, but our posture-the President has enunciated on a number of occasions, the Secretary of State has asserted it, and for what it would be worth, your witness would say the same thing, were the Cuban Government to alter its policies, we would certainly reconsider the posture which we have.
But, as I said in my opening statement, we see no indications of this, whereas with Moscow and Peking there were indications of a desire to bring about a new relationship. It is, it seems to me, perfectly consistent to say, even with a smaller country, that some indication that it is really not its desire to have this relationship of hostility with the United States would give us some basis for reexamining the situation. But not only the rhetoric-which we do not have to take word for word in every single instance and take it to heart because a number of nations say things publicly which they do for public consumption or international consumption-but the actions as well are clearly such in our judgment, that they do not warrant a change on our part. But we are prepared to reconsider our position should the circumstances change.
Senator McGEE. But does it not raise the obvious question of how best do you get this sort of thing started? As I understand the President's statement on this and Secretary Rogers' explanation of it when asked, there are two things that it hangs up on. One, is the dependence of Havana on Moscow; that is, their being deeply entwined with the Soviet Union. The other is Cuba's revolutionary activities, particularly in the immediate Caribbean area. I would think the seeming willingness of Caribbean governments to establish relations with Cuba does not quite fit the motivation you have just suggested; namely, they could see us changing and, therefore, they wanted to jump on the bandwagon first. If they were really apprehensive about revolutionary activities from Cuba, I suspect they would have been hesitant about reestablishing ties with them in some cases or even broadcasting their ties in more dramatic ways. Is that an unreasonable conclusion?
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, the countries that have felt-have been the objects of Cuban subversive activities have not been limited to the Caribbean, but in talking about the Caribbean in its broader sense, several of the countries of Central America which border on the Caribbean have been the object of Cuban activities and they are not in the vanguard. In fact, quite the opposite; they are among the more vocal opponents to any suggestion of change in the policy.
The English-speaking Caribbean nations which, for cultural and historical reasons, have really not much affinity with Cuba in the sense of being propitious objects of subversion, to my knowledge there have been no attempts made by the Cuba Government in that field and, therefore, their attitude is explained, I think, by that. A number of the Central American nations which have had a quite different experience with Cuba are opposed to it. Take also the example of Colombia. I cannot speak for the Colombian Government at this

moment obviously, but I do refer to President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who was the previous President, when this matter came up before and he was a well-known established liberal in Colombia. When speaking of other countries who were urging a rapprochement with Cuba, he said that they do not have to spend the resources that we do in our country in order to counter Cuban activities, and he was opposed to it. There are a number of countries in South America which are feeling Cuba's subversion, although it would not be tactful, I think, for me to speak of what goes on in other countries. To follow your line of reasoning, and I think it is consistent, the nations who most deeply have felt or are feeling the results of Cuban subversive activities are those in the hemisphere who are most vehement in their opposition to changing policy.
Senator MCGEE. I must say in all candor, sir, in my own conversations now with spokesmen for most of the Caribbean governments, including Central America, With perhaps one exception, they all stress that the threat of subversion from Havana, is measurably less than a few years ago. In other words, whatever their rhetoric may be for home consumption, they felt there had been something of a measurable change in that regard. I want to conclude this very quickly so that other members of the committee can proceed here.
Let me refer to the other hook on which we hang in regard to this question, and that is the influence of the Soviet Union with Cuba.
Would it not seem reasonable to assume that the more that Cuba is isolated and the more intransigent her neighbors are, the greater her dependence would be on the Soviet Union. Some make that assertion. Would you address yourself to that?
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.
I would like to make a couple of things clear. When we are talking about military ties with the Soviet Union-as I mentioned in my opening statement-what we are particularly concerned about are those policies on the part of the Cuban Government which lendwhich find an identity of interest with the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union's strategic efforts to expand its sphere of influence. I alluded to two such instances, and I do not think it would be prudent to rule out forever recurrences of similar kinds of possibilities. I do not know, but I think the track record is there and I think the responsibilities all -of us collectively have are such that it is better to be prudent than to take things for granted.
So the dependence on the Soviet Union is really, as I look at the .historical development of Cuba, a matter of what Cuba has chosen and if it wants to be dependent on the Soviet Union, that is once again its business.
But when that dependence or that arrangement takes the shape of threatening the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, then I think the role that Cuba is playing is one that ,s not conducive to what we would consider a salutary situation.
I would just say, in summary, that over the period, to follow your line of reasoning, sir, over the period of the last couple or 3 years,

there has been an increase in the number of Latin American countries that have recognized Cuba and deal with it. At the same time,.I think it can be clearly demonstrated that during the same period the dependence of Cuba upon the Soviet Union has increased. Therefore, I would just raise that question as to the straight line logicSenator McGEE. This is a self-propelling sort of thing, is it not though? As she acquires less and less flexibility in her own capabilities the more and more she depends upon the Soviet Union economically, leaving the military strategic thing out just for the moment?
Mr. HURWITCH. I think that is correct. I think if you wanted to make a very simple effort at getting at the heart of the matter with regard to dependence, I think you would take into consideration that Cuba has no natural resources with regard to the production of power, has no water power, it has no coal, it has no petroleum, that therefore, in order to turn on an electric light in that country, if I might put it that way, that nation is dependent upon the import of petroleum. So one could say in simplistic terms that whoever supplies petroleum to Cuba in a sense controls Cuba or makes it highly dependent. Needless to say, the present supply of petroleum for Cuba comes from Black Sea sources. I do not see any measures that the United States could take that would really alter that situation unless the Soviet Union has really decided to abandon Cuba in that sense.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Hurwitch, how much does the airlift cost the United States? How much in dollars is given for that?
Mr. HURWITCH. $1 million, Mr. Chairman.
Senator FULBRIGHT. $1 million?
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, as far as the airlift itself is concerned. The Department of HEW is allocated, I believe, in the neighborhood of, the last figure was, $140 million for the social adjustment, if you would like, of the people who come here.
Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I meant.
Mr. HuRWITCH. About $140 million, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. $140 million, and you say Cuba costs Russia $500 million. Is that right?
Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. It used to be a million dollars a day. It has gone up.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.
Senator FULBRIGIT. So you figure it is a good bargain. It costs us $140 million and costs them $500 million. So it is to our advantage to keep Russia paying the bill. Is that what the purpose is?
Mr. HURwITCH. I must ConfessSenator FULBRIGHT. IS it or is it not?
Mr. HURWiTCH. I must confess I never looked at it in those terms.
Senator FULBRIGHT. All right.
Mr. HURWITCH. As an equation between the human lives of people who are coming to seek freedom in our country and the subjugation of Cuba by the Russians, it would not appear to me as an equation.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I jUSt mentioned it. You mentioned it in your statement.

What do you consider the costs to us in the security of our airlines? The security costs are quite large today particularly, are they not?
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes. You mean for checking at airports and that sort of thing, yes, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think they will be materially lessened by the hijacking agreement?
Mr. HURWITCH. It is our devout hope, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. You hope so.
Mr. HuRwITCH. Yes, sir; I hope so, but I cannot guarantee it. But so far since the signing of the agreement we have not had any hijackings, sir, and I hope that continues.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that Cuba is really a substantial or serious threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. HURWITCH. I believe, sir, that in agreement with what Senator McGee has said, and quoting some Latin Americans, that this threat has diminished. I think there was a high point--Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it not a substantial threat?
Mr. HURWITCH. I would just say it is a threat without really being able to qualify it.
Senator FULBRIGHT. To whom is it a threat?
Mr. HURWITCH. In some countries I think it could be a considerable threat and in other countries
Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it a threat to the United States?
Mr. HURWITCH. I would not think so; no, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT.: TO Mexico?
Mr. HURWITCH. Mexico, no, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Colombia, Venezuela?
Mr. HURWITCH. Venezuelans, as you know, Mr. Chairman, on two occasionsSenator FULBRIGHT. Do they consider it a threat now? I know about the past. Do they consider it a threat now?
Mr. HURWITCH. No; I believe less so. I believe Colombians probably do.
Senator FULBRIGHT. You do?
Mr. HURWITCH. I believe so, but I can-really, the Colombians and other nations will have to speak for their ow-i assessment of the situation. That can best come about by votes, I would imagine.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Hurwitch, in your interview with the U.S. News in the issue of the 26th of this month you leave the impression that Cuba is so small and insignificant that you do not want to bother with it. I will quote your statement as quoted in that interview: Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are large and populous areas that offer opportunities for trade and investment. Both of them are also military powers-one a superpower and the other potentially so.
Now look at Cuba. It is small in area and population and it is not as politically important as Russia and China. In fact, Cuba has been pretty much going down-

hill as a political force in the Hemisphere I don't know of any countres in Latin America today, for example, that are seeking to emulate the Cuban model. Furthermore, Cuba is not militarily very powerful.
"Cuba doesn't have much to offer the U.S. in terms of trade. Most of its future exports are mortgaged to the Soviet Union as payment for Russian aid. We nd longer need Cuban sugar. We get along without smoking Cuban tobacco, although there are some connoisseurs, I suppose, who still have nostalgic, twinges for a good Cuban cigar. And, of course, Cuba still has some nickel that it used to sell us. None of these economic interests is very important to us.
It seems to me you are saying it is so small and insignificant it is not worth fooling with, whereas Russia and China are big and important and they are powerful and so we are doing business with them. That is the impression that statement leaves, it seems to me, to a reasonable person. That does not seem to me a very good reason to take this attitude toward Cuba which is a neighboring .country.
I do not see why you are concerned about maintaining this rigid attitude toward Cuba, unless you think it is costing the Russians more than it is costing us. In view of our deficit of payments, it is not unimportant any more that we pay out $140 million for this, is it?
Mr. HURWITCH. Well, as I say-it is hard to know where to pick up what you said. The article which you quote is roughlySenator FULBR1GHT. Is that not accurate?
Mr. HURWITCH. Oh, yes, it is just more in the vernacular, if you like, sir, in the magazine than what I said in my opening statement before this committee. I think what I was pointing out in my opening statement, or sought to, as well as in the article, is that there is the argument that if with the Soviet Union, China, why not with Cuba, and I was attempting to draw a distinction between the U.S. interests in nations that are either superpowers or potentially superpowers who hold trade opportunities which have, I would venture to say, a great deal of importance from the standpoint of U.S. present and future interests. I think it is realistic to say that Cuba does not present those opportunities or affect those interests.
Senator FULBRGHT. You make the point very clearly. I do not wish to repeat it, but it does not seem to me to be a reason worthy of this country that we take it out on this little country because she is small, cannot harm us or anything, is not important. I have not thought this was the traditional attitude of the United States. I would have thought we were interested -in countries even if they were small and insignificant. Here she is right off our coast with about 7 million poor people. You yourself say she is weak and that nobody seeks to emulate her. I agree with every bit of your statement in the U.S. NewsMr. HURWITCH. I am delighted to hear that.
Senator FULBRIGHT [continuing]. Other than that I disagree with your reasoning that we don't want to do, anything about Cuba because she is a little old puny country and the inference that she is probably costing the Russians more than us, so why change. Yet, we go along with the big ones. I had not thought this was a traditional approach of the United States toward other countries. I used to think before the Vietnam war that we had a sympathy with the underdog rather than the superpower, but apparently that has changed now and we have a different approach internationally to countries.

28-199--74- 3

You stress in your statement how antagonistic Cuba is and Castro is to this country. Would you say she has had no reason to be? I mean, have we given her reason to be friendly in contrast to Mexico or some of the other countries or does she have any reason to be suspicious or even antagonistic to this country?
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, if this attitude were something that had occurred and were new since the Bay of Pigs, then perhaps there is a. basis for my statement. But the chairman, who has followed these matters so closely for such a long period of time, is aware, if I may say so, that the United States, since January 1959 when Premier Castro came to power, for at least 18 months maintained a posture of forebearanee and understanding in the light of really very serious vilification of the then President Eisenhower.
As you recall, sir, when Fidel Castro came to power he had asked the American corporations there if they would advance by 1 year their tax payments, because the dictator Batista had robbed the treasury and he did not have the money, and American corporations did that.
You will recall, sir, that when Mr. Castro, Premier Castro, came to New York at that United Nations meeting in 1959 he brought along with him some of his economic and finance ministers. The U.S. State Department at that time asked him if his ministers would come to Washington to meet with our people to talk about economic assistance to the Castro government in 1959. He agreed to do so, but apparently, in conversation with authorities back in Cuba, Prime Minister Castro changed his mind, and the gentlemen who came to, that meeting at the State Department in which economic assistance to Cuba was to be discussed said, "We have no need for economic assistance from the United States and we do not wish any," and that meeting then was abruptly ended.
So I would point, sir, to a documented history of 18 months where this Nation did what it could, in my judgment at least, to try to have a meaningful relationship with Mr. Castro and his government when it came to power. We offered them help. American corporations, rather than-as they are pictured today, you know-being scared to, death of this matter, did offer financial assistance. The United States. did not respond in kind to the vilification' of this Government and its President, and it was only after it became clear to us, after 18 months of this, that the Cuban Government was on a course headed for theta Soviet Union, headed for sugar contracts with China, that this Government began to take action that it felt was necessary in orderto
Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Hurwitch, I do not recall all the facts that you have stated. Of course, it is your business to know this. I do remember that when Mr. Castro came to Washington he was. not received by the Government. The full committee was requested by the Government to receive him, and he came before this committee. I was under the impression that they were very suspicious of Mr.. Castro at that time. That was not too long before he came to power, but I would have to call on the staff to recall all the history of that. period.

I am not particularly interested in that period. It is a little country, and Mr. Castro has said some very objectionable things. So have the leaders of Russia and China and a number of other countries, too, with whom we have done business. There is not any great distinction.
I do not care about'that particularly. I do think that presently a change in attitude is in the interest of everybody, all the Latin American countries and ourselves. As the chairman of this subcommittee suggested, your policy only guarantees a continuing Russian presence and interest in Cuba. If you are going to liquidate what used to be our policy, one way would be to have all the countries normalize relations with Cuba. She would be better off and-so would we, and very likely Russia would lose interest in Cuba-unless you are assuming what I detect as a recurrence in this administration of a revival of the cold war. I notice there have been some very strong articles, one by the spokesmen for the Joint Chiefs this morning, reviving the arms race. There is an article in the Times that suggests that the Arms Control Agency is being dismantled and Mr. Jackson's views about Russia are coming to the fore in the administration.
If we are going to revive the cold war, I guess it is logical to keep this attitude toward Cuba. But many of us had hoped we would get over that. It, has cost us a lot of money and it is not doing anybody much good. That is why I and others have introduced resolutions to reconsider this policy. If regret very much you have not changed one iota since a year ago. I think it was just about a year ago that you testified exactly like you are testifying today.
Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator FULBRIGHT. You are the most consistent member of the administration. Apparently everything else has changed except this policy.
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, what has not changed is the attitude of Cuba toward the hemisphere, toward the United States.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not care if it has not. Our attitude is what I am interested in. We are the big country, and ought to take the responsibility. As the Chairman suggested, the initiative should come from the United States. We are not in any great danger or peril, but itis costing us money and we have problems and it would be to our interest, whether Castro is nice or not. I do not care whether he shaves or not, just so long as we can normalize our relations and quit spending a lot of money on futile pursuance of the cold war. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McGEE. Senator Aiken.
Senator AIxEN. The Senator from Arkansas asked if conditions might have been different. As I recall it, when Mr. Castro came to Washington, he did not come with much formality. I do not think he advised the State Department he was on his way to speak to the Press Club. He certainly did not have any white tails with him or white tie, but inasmuch as the U.S. people had almost wholly been rooting for him to overthrow Batista and since the U.S. Government

had been dragging its feet in delivering material and arms to Batista, Castro naturally expected to be treated as a hero. He was treated as a heel instead of a hero, and he was thrashed around all over Washington. Had the situation been different, I have often wondered whether our position with Cuba would have been different.
But one thing I noticed is that the countries that have formal relations now with Cuba or apparently are planning to have formal relations are, with two or three exceptions, sugar producing ccuntries. Does that mean they are not worrying at all about their sugar quota to the United States being cut?
Mr. HURWITCH. Well, the only country that I know of that is concerned with a Cuba quota and which has taken the step that you :uggest is Peru, Senator Aiken. The others are contemplating action not unilaterally but within the context of the OAS, and I believe .perhaps in the hope that we could go along with it.
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Mr. HURWITCH. The major countries that have been recipients of the repartition of the Cuban sugar quota have been the Dominican Republic, for one, and some of the Central American countries for others as well as Peru-and there may be other ones, I just do not recall.
Senator AIKEN. Well, the Dominican Republic, Colombia
Mr. HURWITCH. Neither of those are contemplating relations with Cuba.
Senator AIKEN. However, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, Equador, and Venezuela produce sugar, too. All but two or three of those that are now making more friendly signs toward Cuba are sugar-producing countries which leads me to believe they do not worry a bit about having their quota cut. I thought they would, but apparently they do not.
You have pointed out that Russia now has such a grip on the Cuban economy through indebtedness that it will take a long, long time for that to be paid off.
However, if my memory serves me correctly, and I think it does, in the fall of 1957, and early 1958, United States corporations owned and controlled 70 percent of the entire Cuban economy. I think you will find that estimate is correct. We did not do so well in collecting on the mortgage.
Senator AlKEN. Do you think Russia can do better than we did?
Mr. HURWITCH. Well, what you are positing, sir, is that the Russians will be thrown out of there, but I doubt very much that our pres,ence with an embassy there would make really any significant difference as far as the future relations between those two countries are
-concerned. I do not really know whether Russia will be a better debt collector than we are, but I think it is hypothetical they will ever be

in that position. I do not think they are ever going to give up Cuba.
Senator AIKEN. You mean, they will :be tougher than we were.
You refer to the fact that last week Cuba made a rather nasty attack on the United States. Was Cuba alone in making this attack?
Mr. HURWITCH. Certainly
Senator AIKEN. It seems to me some of our friends were involved in that, too. Was not Barbados?
Mr. HURWITCH. Cuba was certainly the most vitriolic and there were some Latin American nations, by no means all who were represented there, who did take the Panamanian side on the present status of the Canal Zone. There is no question about that. I think the Cuban was by far the most far-ranging and the most vitriolic.
Senator AIKEN. You said that Soviet military ties with Cuba are closer than ever. Has there been any recent demonstration of this?
Mr. HURWITCH. Well, what we had allusion to is in part some of the modernization of Cuban arms-Cuba has the largest standing army in Latin America, per capita-but also there have been increasing Soviet naval visits to the Caribbean where they engaged in some maneuvers and used Cuban ports. Also, some Soviet aircraft of a military nature.
Senator AIKEN. You also refer to Soviet efforts to establish a nuclear submarine facility in Cienfuegos in 1970.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. What happened to that effort to establish that base?
Mr. HURWITCH. It is my understanding, sir, that an understanding was reached on that matter between the United States and the Soviet Union which resulted in their suspending construction of that facility and, to my knowledge, that is the present situation. It has been abandoned.
Senator AIKEN. Was that agreement reached over the objections of Cuba?
Mr. HURWITCH. I do not know, sir.
Senator AIKEN. You do not know.
Do you know how many Soviet military personnel are in Cuba today?
Mr. HURWITCH. The best guess we can give you, Senator Aiken, is some several thousand.
Senator AIKEN. Several thousand.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. How many American military personnel are stationed in Cuba?
Mr. HURWITCH. Before 1959, sir?
'Senator AIKEN. How many American military personnel are stationed in Cuba today?
Mr. HURWITCH. Today, at Guantanamo?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, we have several thousand,. I do not know .precisely but perhaps equivalent.
Senator AIKEN. Including the naval personnel just offshore. Do 1_you think it is as many as the Russians have stationed there?
Mr. HuRWITCi. I do not know. They are there for a completely ,different purpose. They run, I would say that, as a guess that, neither group exceeds 5,000.
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Our personnel are stationed there by agreement with Cuba, really.
Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct; we have a treaty, Senator.
Senator AIKEN. And the Russian personnel are also stationed by agreement with Cuba.
Mr. HURWITCH. Of course.
Senator AIKEN. Of course.
I guess that is all. I believe you say somewhere that the OAS is disintegrating. I agree with that.
Mr. HURWITCH. I do not think the record will show that. If I said that, Senator Aiken, I did not intend to say that.
Senator AIKEN. I got in here late. I had a railroad situation relating to the Penn Central in the Northeast and that delayed me. At present, that seems to be a little more important to us geographically than Cuba.
Mr. HURWITCH. What I had intended to say, Senator Aiken, and hoped that I did, was that nations of the hemisphere continue unilaterally to take action with respect to Cuba and, in that sense, flout the collective resolutions that were taken. I think this will have a debilitating effect upon both the OAS and the moral force and importance of the Rio Treaty.
Senator AIKEN. Do you think our relationship, with Cuba has anything to do with or casts any reflections on the Monroe Doctrine?
Mr. HURWITCH. No, sir, I must say, we really sort of regard the OAS and Rio Treaty in some sense as successors to the Monroe Doctrine and I tried to emphasize we do not revel in this situation, and I really would like to clear up an impression that I think Senator Fulbright, may have left that we sort of enjoy having a situation Where there is this little nation we can kick around and we have nothing else to do and we will vent our frustrations by going around kicking Cuba. That is really far from the truth and I would like to have the record show that. We do not revel in the situation but we do believe that Cuba, like the other nations of the world that wish to have good relationships with the United States, demonstrate in one fashion or another that it so desires to have and we are quite prepared to review the situation. I think it is a perfectly ethical position to be in.
Senator AIKEN. The reason I asked that question is that 6C the time Of the Monroe Doctrine ships were propelled by sails and wind power rather than nuclear power.
Mr. HURWiTCH. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know how many Cubans are employed at the Guantanamo Base?
Mr. HURWITCR. I believe about 300.
Senator AIKEN. About 300. It used to be about 2,000.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, they have been replaced in large part by Jamaicans.
Senator AIKEN. By Jamaicans.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes sir.
Senator AIKEN. Wait a minute, JamaicaMr. HURWITCH. They have relations with Cuba.
Senator AIKEN. Jamaica just recognized Cuba, too.
Mr. H-URWITCH. There are a number of Jamaicans living in Cuba, sir, and actually when Jamaica joined the OAS an exception was made in permitting Jamaica to maintain consular relations with Cuba at the time it acceded to the charter. Because of a number of Jamaicans living in Cuba and the desire on the part of Jamaica to protect its citizens, an exception was made theie, but apparently for Jamaican reasons this did not prove sufficient and you are quite right, they recently established diplomatic relations.
Senator AIKEN.- As I understand it, Cuba did not break relations with us, but told us we would have to limit our diplomatic personnel to three.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. Which would limit them to handle the visas asked for during those days.
Mr. HURWITCH. My recollection is the number was down to 11, but that included all the custodial personnel as well. By calculation we brought it to, perhaps, three American officers, you are quite right,
-and the rest are people to keep the floors clean and that sort of thing, cleaning people so that this placed the United States in an undignified position and we had no guarantee that having acquicesced in that absurd demand, the next week they would have said five people and then we would get all the way down to nothing, and so the United States took that occasion rather than acquiescing in an undignified posture, to say, "Well, under those circumstances we just Will not maintain relations with you."
Senator AIKEN. It has been suggested that I ask how many do the 'Swiss haye representing us there? I do not know that that is too important.
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, the total number of the Swiss Embassy I do not know, but they have what is called a foreign interests section which represents the United States and a Iumber of other countries in Cuba but we would guess that Swiss personnel, plus Cuban local personnel run in the neighborhood of a dozen or 15 maximum.
Senator AIKEN. OK. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McGEE. The authorization request that is before this committee now contains in it an item for the State Department for $200,000 to refurbish the old American Embassy building in Havana. One of the explanations given for it is that Cuban people might be impressed to see a nice spruced up establishment there in the midst of other difficulties that they are having. Would you comment on this request? Are they anticipating maybe a new resident or something? [Laughter.]
Mr. HURWITCH. I have not been to Cuba since 1956, but I am told that life is pretty drab there and it is quite, possible that a newly painted building, if that is what is involved, might relieve some of the monotony but that is not the major reason; our building there is occupied by the Swiss. They work there, and it just hasSenator McGEE. That is the point they left out and that is the reason I wanted you to underscore that it is being used.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, it is being used.
Senator McGEE. Not necessarily in anticipation of a new American tenant.
Mr. HURWITCH. I would not read anything into that, sir. I think it is just good maintenance, our concept of good maintenance. It is not an important property. One never knows, it is quite true, what might happen.
Senator McGEE. What I am suggesting is that in the submission of this request about as bad a reason for it as one could think up was given.
Mr. HURWITCH. I agree with that.
Senator McGEE. Namely, we wanted to look shiny and bright amidst all of the drabness in Havana. I am not sure that is necessarily good psychological warfare, however else you add it up. But because of the questions that were pursued here in regard to the size of the embassy staff at the end of our relations there and all I thought maybe that might be propitious.
Senator AIKEN. Will the Senator yield? I am advised the Swiss Embassy has between 12 and 15 people there, including Cubans. We thought we could not get along with 11, including the Cubans. I thinkSenator McGEE. I think the point was made.
Senator AIKEN. I do not think that is too important.
Senator McGEE. I do not think so either. It is obvious you are not going to run an embassy with three official people. That was a busy place in those days and I would think it would take substantial personnel. I do not want this to sink into quibbling about the number of people the Swiss work with and the number we had there at the end of our stay. I do think we ought to get back to the major question.
Let me get back to another question you were discussing with Senator Aiken and Senator Fulbright. I am no great expert on Cuba,

but I was exposed to the Cuban vitriol when I was at the U.N. all fall. Their Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Alarcon, invented rhetoric that the Russians did not have command of in the old days of the cold war, and the Chinese have not used yet. It really was wild, wild, insulting stuff. The difference is nobody either believed him or took him seriously. Whenever we could get him to sound off against the United States, we put him up to it for the reason that he galvanized everybody else in the U.N. including those who recognize Cuba and those with whom she traffics. He was a constant embarrassment to the Soviets and, I am told, to the Chinese as well. We read the newspapers too much, with all due respect to our communications colleagues here, and we watch TV too much to keep it all in balance. Any head of state is going to have a pretty harsh tongue. So do a few Senators. Heaven help us when the rest of the world reads what we say in the Senate these days about the rest of the world. 'But you cannot make policy on that basis, and I have the very curious feeling here, Mr. Hurwitch, that this almost gives one the feeling of this is where we came in once before in history. I recall our long, long dialogs over China, over a very long period of time when all the rest of the world was changing around us and we were almost on a self-S constructed pedestal of our own.
It was commonly said rather loosely I will admit, that the lowest common denominator on our China policy was the Senate of the United States. They were imprisoned by the politics of Taiwan and the generalissimo and all these things that were residues from the war. I felt it was a great sense of some kind of moral obligation in the wake of the war for the events during the war in China.
But you get the strange feeling that here is a minicapsule of the same thing in regard to Cuba. There is almost a state of intransigence because Castro is still calling us names, still saying he is doing everything he can to overthrow the hemisphere.
Our legitimate concern in one way, I think, is a very, very basic one and that is the strategic implications of the Cuban question for us in world politics and very clearly the Soviets have been involved. How do you exploit that situation? Do you exploit it by freezing up and leaving no alternatives or do you try to take advantage of it? I would rather think we might emulate our policies in Eastern Europe where very steadily we have chipped away at trying to establish a contact, first by cultural exchange or a little bit of trade or just a visitor. That did not endanger us, but it sure made the Russians nervous when these little cracks in the wall began to appear. I think, if we use imagination, we have a capability there that we are failing to utilize because of our having nailed ourselves down.
Once in a while I had the feeling you were trying to leave us with a suggestion that it is "either/or." There is no "either/or" in this. It is all those areas in between that I think give us our flexibility. It would seem to me that if we could, with our eyes open and our heads screwed on, exploit that situation in small but reasonable ways that would do more than by keeping this very rigid stance that you, in all fairness, do seem to suggest to us.

I worry about what is going to happen to us in our own hemisphere because an even bigger question than Cuba is our hemisphere position in a very broad way. The hemisphere is splitting right now and they are split up, among other reasons, over Cuba. That split is not narrowing; it is widening, however we want to talk about the countries with the key basic interests there still hanging together. The whole base of the world was crumbling away from the old China position a year ago. I think the parallel between Cuba and China inflates the Cuban issue out of all proper dimensions. I do not think it is a China, and it is not a Russia in the significant sense of the politics of power in the world, although our security interests are affected because of the presence of the Russians. I find it very difficult to accept rigidity as the wise way, to wait for something else to happen.
I asked you earlier what you would suggest in the way of very small approaches that we ought to be pressing into that might compare with the hijacking agreement where a quid pro quo was possible. Surely there are other areas. You said you could not think of any. That is very disturbing to me. You ought to be thinking of them every day and posing them. You might then decide in your own judgment you cannot do that one, but there must be a hole range of possibilities, some limited tourist connections, some loosening of the economic flow in very tiny ways, getting the driblets going. There must be any number of things that would suggest that regardless of what Castro says, the rhetoric in the Cuban press, or Ambassador Alarcon's statements at the U.N. or down in Panama, which was his old professional and obsolete line, that we are laying out a policy that protects our options and our flanks and our maneuvering position as we seek to approach a firmer understanding ourselves of the policy questions in the hemisphere. I think we may be guilty of isolating ourselves still more.
I am not blind to the problem Cuba poses strategically, but I think we have many options between the two extremes of embracing her and shoving her off at arm's length and having nothing to do with her. I do think it is going to take a great deal more imagination than we have been getting evidence of to put those small pieces of this great puzzling problem together for starters. I do not see any considerable
evidence that we are doing that, that we are even getting it knocked down by having it rejected. I do not know, of course, all that goes on down there in the bull sessions you have, in the coffee hours and the second thoughts in the middle of the night. But I think we have to do more in posing more sharply than we have some other alternatives or I think we are going to have supplied a changing Cuban circumstance that will galvanize, perhaps more than any other single factor, a great many of our friends in this hemisphere in a negative way in regard to our position. If things turn out to be much worse than we ever suspected, they are inside Cuba; we have not betrayed our basic national security concepts in that process.
So you do not grab me with this suggestion that we have to wait this out a while longer, rather than begin to push out a bit. Let us defuse the Cuban question or it is going to blow up in our face.
I think we can defuse it without dismantling the whole thing.

I did not mean to make a long speech like that, but we have been listening to this very carefully here hoping for other suggestions.
Mr. HR rWITCH. Mr. Chairman, thank you 'very much, and I do want to assure you that your words and your thoughts are helpful as we continue to focus on this problem.
I think, sir, one of the problems we feel we are confronted by is the very, if you like, tightness or interrelationship of the policy in the sense that-to use the vernacular-it is all one ball of wax and when you pull one string you really do unravel the entire policy or, you run a very serious risk of doing so.
With respect to your observation that there is some middle ground between going all the way and where we are nowis, as'desirable as this may be, in one way of looking at it, we see the policy,: and how it has evolved over the years, as all so interrelated that I really doubt that you can take the kind of steps you are talking about without really going, in a sense, allthe way.
So I think one ought to be very clear
Senator McGEE. Can we not do them, not to succeed necessarily? Who are we to make the decision in advance that Cuba does not want to make an effort to grab an option and do something? Certainly, we ought to make them nervous and restless in'turning our approaches down. That is where I think the shade of difference is between what I am trying to say to you here and your thinking, because you are a realist, looking for an agreement like the hijacking agreement. I am looking for a probing operation. It might even be turned down again and again, but we should not turn them down beforehand. I think it puts the other group on something of a defensive of a type that does not have to solidify as our present posture of no contact seems to.
Mr' ITHURWITCH. I understand, sir, and I seethe subtlety and the sophistication of the approach.
One additional aspect. When you talk about trickles of trade: You are probably more aware than I that there is a body of congressional legislation which puts out sanctions as far as our policy is concerned toward other nations who engage incertain trade activities with Cuba.
Now this, I might say, is in itself a constraint. As you think it through as to what the United States might do, you also have to be prepared obviously. Supposing, instead of the Cuban Government rejecting, as you suggest, supposing in one instance they accept, and you ar~e placed ina position where you are engaging inactivities Where U.S. legislation provides sanctions for other 'countries doing exactly the same thing. d .c
Now, would my understanding be correct that it is the intention 'of the Congress or this committee to take the leadership in removing these sanctions. on countries engaging in the Cub~n trade?
Senator MCGEE. As you would appreciate, 'those do not happen to be our bills here.
Mr. HURWITCH. No, sir.

Senator McGEE. But our whole point is that it is going to lead to worse than that in the Congress if we cannot really take a more realistic approach as we reexamine this question and seek to defuse it. It is its explosiveness by its very dimension that threatens us both at home in terms of doing some fool thing in a reckless and irresponsible way, on the one hand, or, of dividing our fellow member states in the OAS even more so than they are. We seem to be doing nothing to try to ease that circumstance either way.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that my policy would be that if something is worth doing, go ahead and do it and do not clutter up the situation with alibis or explanations or excuses or, as Mr. Hurwitch calls them, pragmatic accommodations, whatever that may be. Go ahead and do it if it is worth doing.
Senator McGEE. It is a good point. I know what pragmatic accommodations are, but we do not want it on the record. [Laughter.]
Mr. HURWITCH. I think the phrase is well illustrated by the attitudes and postures and initiatives we have taken with regard to China and the Soviet Union and that is what was intended, sir.
I have lost the train of where we were. I guess there were two things I wanted to say: In the OAS, sir, the most popular kind of idea that is floated is that every country should deal with Cuba as it sees fit. Now, it would be my best judgment that if such a resolution were adopted by the GAS, there would be probably an even split among the countries concerned as to whether they did or did not decide to have relations with Cuba. Now, somehow you seem to feel through the policy you are suggesting, we will change reality in the hemisphere. There are a number of independent countries who just do not think alike. Some are in favor of relations with Cuba and others are not, and you seem to feel sir, that this is somehow the Machiavellian doing of the United States and, somehow, if these countries were all free to do whatever they wanted, they would all go in another way. I do not think that squares with the facts.
Senator MCGEE. No; not quite. I just sit here and look at the list of those who have changed in the last few years. These are not the ones who stuck by their relations with Cuba from the very first like
Mexico did.
Mr. HURWITCH. No; that is correct.Senator MCGEE. These are the ones who joined in this rather strongly worded American States resolution back at the beginning of the crisis and now they are beginning to switch away.
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, four of them-you are talking about seven nations, four of which did not participate in that meeting, so you are talking about three now.

Senator McGEE. At the time.
Senator McGEE. Now we are talking about those who have recognized and those who now are on a quasi-recognition course, who have changed their stance and their posture.
Senator MCGEE. And the latest being the intimation from the President-elect of Argentina that they are exploring that road now. What this says to me, and it obviously does not say this to you, is that this is already happening. Next year we will sit here and we will look over the same article and the same answers again and we will find that there will be 10 or 12 while we have stood firmly where we stood 10 years ago. This is really a matter, I think, of proper concern to us. I do not think we have to leap. What we ought to be doing is to be preparing a chipping away, as I called it for want of a better phrase, at the old intransigence, the rigidity of a posture position. That will not jeopardize our security if it is done with our head screwed on. We are risking almost nothing except the prospect of adapting to change, and adjusting to a new reality that is starkly in contrast to the old realities.
If we have learned anything out of these last 20 years, it surely is the inevitability of change, and sometimes the awkwardness of not having adjusted in responsible ways to the hard facts of change as we went along. This is what I fear the most here. I think we have gotten stuck on this, plus the great pressure that comes to us anyway. We are going to have some witnesses in here from Florida. We have some Congressmen and Senators who want to testify personally. They have a very particular problem. We have gone a long way on that question and it is a tough one. We know that. But there are things that can still be done to test, to push, to probe without embracing it.
Mr. HURWITCH. I understand the thrust of your remarks. I really think that when change has occurred, when the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China indicated that they were willing to have a new relationship with the United States, I think it is certainly evident on the record that this country moved with imagination and with forcefulness and the President himself personally directed the diplomacy in such a manner. So there is no question, when we wish to do so we have the ability to adapt to change. All we are saying here is, should a similar change occur with respect to Cuba we would respond in the same responsible manner.
Senator McGEE. It is like negotiating with an ant, on the one hand, and an elephant on the other. They both cross the bridge at the same time. The bridge will shake and it is a question of which one will make it rattle. We were moved by the whole thing of reality in regard to China.
Mr. HURWITCH. That is right.
Senator McGEE. A third of the human race there.
Mr. HURWITCH. That is right.
Senator MCGEE. One of the great power factors there in terms of the balance of power in Asia.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MCGEE. We are in a bipolar world. The pole runs straight from Moscow to Washington and back again. There is very little that flows from Washington to Havana, and I fail to see any kind of a parallel in that context---Mr. HURWITCH. I agree.
Senator McGEE [continuing]. Between Cuba and the great powers that were the proper targets of Presidential visits this past year.
Mr. HURWITCH. We agree. fully
Senator MCGEE. Therefore, for us to sit waiting for noises from Havana as we got signals from Peking and Moscow seems to me to be ridiculous, to put it ently, to be ridiculous.
I think we have tie capability to take advantage of this situation without giving away anything, and all we are doing is sitting tight like somebody scared us stiff. I think we are the ones in the position to try. If it fails we have at least been caught trying and it is time somebody tried.
We do not have to jeopardize our strategic position in the hemisphere. Al] of us want to keep this as realistic, as pragmatic as reality requires. But there is so much, I am persuaded, around the fringes of that that never endangers its underpinnings that can change the climate. A slight change min a climate is a better chance at finding a new quid pro quo like the hijack agreement. I think there is less chance for them to hoist a signal in Havana and say, "Now, Brother Castro has decided that he would like to talk to us about a matter."
I think he ought to be assaulted with so many chances to talk that his real problem is going to be how he is going to sort through them and how is he going to say no to all of them. Let him say no to all. At least youmade that contribution instead of saying, no, in Washington.
I think we can keep the ball in our court and control the game to a very large degree. Instead, we are not.
Mr. HURWITCH. Sir, I respect your views and I think if all the evidence before you is that the initiatives that you are talking about are going to be rebuffed and quite probably publicly taken advantage of with certain consequences, I am not persuaded that it is prudent when the evidence before you is that when you make some gesture of trying to bring about some better relations you are going to be not only unsuccessful but also exploited to your disadvantage. One wonders whether, is it other than scratching an itch that, "Gee, we ought to be doing something so let us do something for something's sake," or is it really a clear assessment of where are you going and what are you leading to.
If you say, "Try this and maybe that will lead somewhere," that is certainly the mystic high road but you can also take the view which, I believe, is more realistic, that you try this and you are going to get clobbered and you are going to lose. Now, it is really based on the facts and realities as we see them, whether you make that decision or not. But to say, "Try something and see if it works because it might lead to something else," is not prudent, but perhaps I am too well trained as a State Department officer to play.with the future and the destiny of this country.
I think when you have the Soviet Union-

Senator McGEE. There you go again, you know. You have our future and destiny at stake all of a sudden. I was talking about a tourist visa; I was talking about a press exchange, in Ahich I fail to see the destiny and the future of our country at stake, unless VVe fail to try to make these modest moves that do not have any kind of a security factor involved. There are moves that can be tried that are not looking for answers. You know the answer to them. That is, we ought to do more of these things. We ought to exchange people; we ought to have economic connections, this sort of thing. But we have a special circumstance here primarily because of the conduct of the Soviet Union in injecting power politics into the Caribbean, and primarily because of the revolutionary agenda spelled out in, the Castro regime. Those are very real problems.
But at the same time that you find both of those circumstances somewhat changed, one perhaps more than the other, you ought to be trying those approaches that have no connection whatsoever to those real crunchy issues.
Mr. HURWITCH. Will you do that unilaterally outside the OAS?
Senator McGEE. That is what we want you to tell us-whether the OAS ought to do this, whether: there are small things like the exchange of persons, like the things that we have ultimately hammered down with the Chinese, with no big quid pro quo.
In Southeast Asia, there probably were some real things exchanged, but this is simply to see if you are going to get a nibble because you are going to get a nibble on it sometime. It is not fishing without the prospect of making a connection. It is fishing for the time. It is going to happen. It is a matter of timing, and suppose we miss the time because we did not try. That is the thing. You can always wrap up your fishing pole, and go home if you do not get a bite. It would not be the first time many of us have. But you would hate to have it said that you did not try. I think that is really all I am trying to suggest here.
Mr. iluRWITCH. I understand, Mr. Chairman, and I do not really wish to appear argumentative because
Senator McGEE. Let us say we are discussing.
Mr. HURWITCH. We are discussing, yes. But, sir, we have agreed as part of the Organization of American States to seek the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. And that is pretty all-encompassing. The kind of steps that you are suggesting, it seems to me, if you were to do them unilaterally would mean, in effect, that you have abandoned those agreements. It seems to me, therefore, that you have to do them within the framework of the OAS, and what, in effect, you are suggesting, in practical terms, practical international political terms, is that either at this General Assembly or at some other future date that the United States take the lead in removing these sanctions from the GAS, and say that we want to have, in effect, a different policy with regard to Cuba, and that implies you no longer consider it a threat.

Senator McGEE. I will still buy your sanctions until you negotiate them out through the OAS because that is what was imposed, but then we are right back where we were a moment ago, either/or. Sanctions are real tough stuff. We tried to get them kept in Asia and lost that because of some difficulties here at home.
Mr. HURWITCH. I understand, sir.
Senator McGEE. But that is a tough, tough policy, and there is no room between economic sanctionsQUESTION OF UNRAVELLING ENTIRE POLICY SUGGESTED
Mr. HURWITCH. It is all one ball of wax. What I tried to say to you, SenatorSenator MCGEE. You have to be kidding.
Mr. HURWITCH. I wish I were. I am glad you make these suggestions and you are kind and generous enough to think we do have some bull sessions and coffee talk on matters that might not be quite as formal as this hearing, and
Senator McGEE. This has been quite informal.
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes. I agree.
But, to my knowledge, there is nothing that you can touch with Cuba. As I say, this is all one ball of wax, and if you pull one string you have to be prepared to see your entire policy unravelled. Now, that is really the issue. I mean, if it were such as you suggest, take one little initiative on tourism, in order to do that you have to go really to the OAS. The entire thrust of the OAS resolution was the isolation of Cuba. What you really have to be prepared for is the unravelling of the entire policy. In fact, you really should decide first to take the leadership in changing OAS policy and then perhaps start to implement it through a minor matter such as tourism. The question really
-is do you want to have the entire thing unravelled?
Senator McGEE. No. The question is, is there really a more realistic posture we ought to take on that question before opening the meeting a week from now. I gather from all we can collect that there is no great disposition to do that. Batten down the hatches and ride it though another time around. That is why it is disturbing and that is what this session is all about here.
Mr. HURwITCH. I understand.
Senator McGEE. To see if we cannot probe with our colleagues in the OAS ways in which we might test this a little more. How did we do the hijack agreement? I have forgotten. The OAS negotiated it.
Mr. HURWITCH. No, we did that through the Swiss. It was done through the Swiss, yes, sir.
Senator McGEE. Did that shatter our relations in the OAS?
Mr. HURWITCH. No. But we had to be very careful.
Senator McGEE. I am sure, I would hope you would always be very careful, but, nonetheless, it was done.
Mr. HURwITCH. Yes, sir.
Senator MCGEE. And I can fervently imagine how somebody was saying 'before we ever tried, "You have to remember we have a diplomatic isolation on Cuba and let us go easy on this. We do not want to start it unravelling because if you pull that first string it sure is going to."
You see, you have to pick and choose.

Mr. HuRWITCH. That is right, sir.
Senator McGEE. You do not have to be stupid about it.
Mr. HURWITCH. We did pick and we did choose and we were correct in our assessment it would not unravel.
Senator McGEE. And I deeply suspect there are one or two others of those little gems working in there if we can prod you.
Mr. HURWlTCH. We will go back and mine the Earth, sir, and see if we can find those gems.
Senator McGEE. That is what we are looking for. I do not want to keep you here longer. I have enjoyed the chance to visit with you about this.
We will recess this hearing. Thank you.
Mr. HURWITCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]


The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 6202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Gale W. McGee [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding.
Present: Senator Mc Gee.
Senator McGEE. The committee will come to order. The only reason we meet here is because we have a gavel with which we can rap the hearing into order, but I don't find it at the moment so consider yourself rapped into order. We will proceed to the business at hand.
At the end of March, we opened the first of these hearings on the status of our relations with Cuba and its relationship to the general policies of the United States in that hemisphere. At that time we heard from Mr. Robert Hurwitch, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. He presented the views of the State Department, views that it seemed to me were pretty clearly detailed and had been many times over. The concern, at least of the chairman of the subcommittee, was whether they were fixed so deeply in cement that we might miss an opportunity to improve the situation in the whole hemisphere. The present conditions for improved relations were laid out in very much the same rigid patterns as before. I allow for those patterns and that policy position given the event, that brought the Castro regime into, power and the severity of the issue for a number of years.
But time changes many things. Therefore, it seems to us to be in the national interest of our country to reexamine where we are in the Caribbean, in the hemisphere in particular, vis-a-vis Havana in the light of the Presidential trips to Peking and Moscow.
We have wondered whether we ought not simultaneously to be reexamining our relations in the hemisphere. I would not be among those who have said that now that Mr. Kissinger has gone to Peking and Moscow he ought to be sent to Havana. I don't happen to agree with that. I think that distorts the problem in relative terms. That is a quick and cute way, however, to remind us that Havana is still there and that the historic geographic as well as person to person relationships between our country and the other governments of the hemisphere requires that we not shove all of this aside because we are obsessed with Peking and Moscow and pretend that nothing is happening or that there are no changes taking place.

As it was developed in that opening hearing, many of the Republics in this hemisphere and certainly spokesmen in the OAS are themselves reexploring their positions. For us not to reexplore would seem to be the height of folly. That does not say, however, that we ought to come out suddenly with a 180 degree reverse in policy, nothing like that at all. We are exploring in order to surface as much that is relevant as is possible to enable us in more Imeaningful ways to assess the policy position and post-Lre of our Government in thiis hemisphere as well as to suggest, if it indeed emerges that way, possible lines of exploration for an improvement in the whole profile of American policy in the Western Hemisphere.
So we collected a kind of seminar of sorts, I guess we would say, here in which we have the reverse of the usual situation. We have in effect four expert professors who are going to concentrate on apparently one student. And that is pretty high-powered boring in from the academic point of view.
When I was a professor, we all thought about four students was an ideal seminar; five was getting to be numerous; and six was outlandish. With the reverse in order here, you are on your own.
I would suggest by way of procedure that we might launch individually and then collect for a free interchange among the panelists and whatever 2 cents worth can come from me, largely in the form of questions.
I want to identify our witnesses this morning and then suggest how they proceed in turn.
The first of the members of the panel and the opening expert on this question is Hon. Philip Bonsai who was the American Ambassador to Cuba shortly after Mr. Castro came into power in 1959. He stayed there until we broke off relations a couple years later.
Mr. Ambassador, why don't you move~ to the~ front there and pull up. one of those microphones. Ambassador Bonsai has had a distinguished career in the Foreign Service and, among many other endeavors with the pen, he is author of a perceptive book, "Cuba, Castro, and the United States."
Before you proceed with your informal remarks, I will introduce the other witnesses who will join you a little later at the table. Mr. James Higgins is a professor of journalism and former editor of the York, Pa., Gazette and Daily, an independent writer and lecturer who has visited Cuba five times since 1967. Professor Higgins is currently preparing a book, I am advised, on Cuban youth.
The third expert this morning is Dr. John Plank, professor of political science, University of Connecticut, formerly Director of Research and Analysis, American Republics', in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Finally there is Mr. Frank McDonald, fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs, specializing in the Caribbean. He has lectured at the University of Havana and visited Cuba extensively. .The prepared statements that have been submitted have been examined by the committee. They will be printed in the record in full and intact. I thought we might expedite things by having each witness in turn present the sum of what he wants the committee to

hear in an informal manner. Mr. Ambassador, with your prepared remarks already on the record, proceed in whatever way that appeals most.
Mr. BONSAL. Thank you, sir.
I am delighted to be here. I retired from the Foreign Service about 8 years ago and my remarks here are those of a private citizen who has been interested in this problem and has, as you very kindly said, gone to the trouble of writing a book about it.
I believe that a rational relationship between Cuba and the United States is a desirable thing, and by rational relationship I do not mean the restoration of what existed pre-Castro. I believe that such a relationship would be a good thing for the United States. I think it is vitally important for Cuba. For the inhabitants of that island to have been isolated for 12 years completely from this country and to have heard only the outpourings about this country from their eccentric and extravagant leadership has been a great hardship and is warping their development. So, I am completely in agreement with the desirability of searching for a formula under which what I would describe as a rational relationship can be established.
Now, U.S. policy toward Cuba has not been static and, in fact, has evolved a good deal over the years. We spent the first 15 months or so of Castro's regime in an attempt, an unsuccessful attempt, to reach an accommodation. with him. We then adopted a policy of trying to overthrow Castro through economic means and through various other means.
Senator McGEE. Like the Bay of Pigs?
Mr. BONSAL. Well, I will-not get into that. But at the present time our policy, as I understand it, for a normalization of relations involves only two points. The question of the military alliance with Russia to the extent, I assume, that it affects our security, and the matter of the export of revolution. It seems to me that both of those points should be subject to further definition and possible negotiation.
Our policy has been from time to time reappraised; it has been from time to time modified. I have detected no sign whatever of any change at the Cuban end. The remarks that they make about us are identical with those they have made in the last 10 years or so. Their Foreign Minister's performance at the recent unpleasantness at Panama was, as far as I know-I haven't seen the text-practically identical with what he said when he took himself out of the foreign minister's meeting in San Jose in Costa Rica in 1960.
Mr. Castro consistently takes the position, and he has told this to American newspaper men, that his people are to learn only the worst thins about the United States and very rarely will anything be published at all favorable or constructive about us.

He says that that is because we don't publish anything favorable about him, but the truth is that people interested in Cuba in this country can read a wide spectrum of material, going all the way from the ludicrously laudatory to the ridiculously condemnatory. There has been some very important and objective woik done in the academic field in this country about the present situation in Cuba.
But we find an entirely closed mind in the Cuban Government at the present time.
I believe that Castro regards his concept about the United States, that is to say that the unrepentant imperialists are just about to jump him again, as an essential factor in the maintenance of his absolute personal dictatorship. I believe that he considers it vital that his people remain armed to the teeth, blindly united around him, and listening only to what he tells them about the world outside of theft borders. That does not offer a great possibility of forward movement in Cuban-American relations.
Now, there are,, I think, signs that Castro's personal dictatorship is being somewhat eroded. The management of his economy after all of his fumbling, eccentricities, and failures is, I think, being taken over more and more by the Russians. There have been some changes down there in the local administration that would indicate that the Russian dissatisfaction is shared by a number of Castro's own people.
However, that is for the future and I must say it is very difficult to estimate how quickly change is taking place.
Now, this is not a very hopeful prospect. There are, however, excellent channels of communication between us and the Cuban authorities. We do not have formal diplomatic relations, but our interests in Havana are taken care of, have been taken care of, by a succession of very able Swiss Ambassadors who are in touch with the situation, who have done a grand job on such matters as cases of American prisoners, hijacked planes and the negotiation of the recent hijacking agreement. I am sure the Swiss are fully aware of the gratitude with which we view their efforts but I would suggest at the same time that they must be wishing to find other uses for the diplomatic resources which they are devoting to this and that, though this is only a speculation of mine, they would be peculiarly sensitive to any sort of change at the Cuban end which would indicate that perhaps their mission could be concluded and we get back to something more normal.
Our delegation sits in the United Nations not far from the Cuban delegation. There are many capitals where the Cubans have embassies and we do, too. We express, ourselves officially and publicly about what we think of each other. I think Castro does it somewhat more often than we do. But we do too. There is communication there. And American views axe made known through all sorts of unofficial channels though, of course, they don't have unofficial channels in Cuba. We have given a great number of evidences in recent months of the moderate, flexible, friendly feeling of Americans for the inhabitants of the island of Cuba.

A prominent Senator recently published a lengthy article on the subject. Distinguished academicians and journalists have written about it. There have been Gallup polls, there have been editorials, there have been all sorts of indications. Communication is not the problem at all. Communication exists as to what we think and as to what they think.
I am afraid that under present circumstances an initiative on our part would reflect a judgment about the unilateral power of our country in its international relations no longer justified by the facts of life.
I just don't think that the situation is such that by any conceivable American initiative we can rectify or change it.
Now, sir, I may. have taken up too much time but I would like to say one word about the Organization of American States. .Next to the United States, this is the prime whipping boy for Castro. The minimum expression he and his public relations people use about it is that it is the Ministry of Colonies of the imperialist government and that all of its members are our puppets. This is in line with Castro's well-known statement that any Latin American government which is friendly to the United States is betraying its own people.
The GAS did pass resolutions a number of years ago to the effect that Cuba be suspended from -membership in the Organization because of the export of revolution and the incompatibility of the Communist system with the Hemisphere and so forth. Well, a lot of water has gone under the dam since then. There is no question'that circumstances have changed; this happens not only to OAS resolutions but also to resolutions of other bodies. The resolutions get passed and circumstances change. I don't think in all 'cases you have to rescind a resolution particularly when, as in this case, one country never observed it at all, several have changed their stance without benefit of collective action and there are a number that still adhere to the resolution.
I think the best thing to do is just to let this ride, particularly as the question of relations between Cub 'a and the other Latin American countries is nct really a terribly important question for those concerned.
Pre-Castro, the United States had the most intense relations in a great variety of fields with Cuba. Two or three of the other countries had minor trade relations. Nothing like the sort of relationship Canada had, for instance. The other countries had what could be described as a nonrelationship except in some cases for the exchange of diplomats who were among the least hard worked members of their profession. The question for the Latin American countries of recognizing the circumstances of change and of restoring the nonrelationship which they previously enjoyed is very, very simple.

On the other hand, our problem of establishing relations with Cuba, constructive relations with Cuba, again involves a number of very difficult questions which will only be solved if there exists good will, good faith, and a desire to find solutions to such problems as the acceptance at least of the principle of compensation for American properties taken without any payment whatever and some way by which we can once more get Cuban sugar into the American market. This latter is not easy, particularly since Castro is only producing slightly over half the amount of sugar which for years he exhorted his people to produce and which he used all of the resources of his absolute personal power to get them to produce. But it can be done if the time comes when both. countries wish to achieve it.
In my final statement I have suggested one possible approach. It is not the sort of thing that you can do just by a stroke of the pen or by a policy declaration.
Well, I am sorry to give such a pessimistic view on this but this is the way I feel under the present circumstances. Desirable, a rational relationship, very desirable; possible of achievement by any American initiative at this time, no.
Thank you, sir.
[Mr. Bonsal's prepared statement follows:]
I am grateful to Senator Fuibright for his invitation to appear before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign* Relations Committee and to discuss current United States policy toward Cuba.
My retirement from the Foreign Service of the United States took place in 1965. 1 am now a private citizen with views on the subject under consideration. Those views and an account of my service in Cuba in 1959 and 1960 are set forth in my book "Cuba, Castro, and the United States" published in 1971 by the University of Pittsburgh Press.
Cuba and the United States have had no formal diplomatic relations for over twelve years. The establishment of a rational relationship between the two countries would, in my opinion, be to the advantage of both peoples.
Such a relationship would terminate the isolation of the, Cuban people from this nation of over two hundred million people that begins just ninety miles from their capital. It would be in line with the evolution of American foreign policy during 'the past two years.
Since the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis there have, been considerable
cagsin American attitudes and policies toward Castro's Cuba. Unhappily, hoecthere has been no alteration in the fanatically hostile and often knowingly fraudulent view of the United States, its institutions and its leading personalities poured forth by the Castro regime almost since its earliest days in power.
In the absence of a change in Castroite attitudes toward the United States I see no prospect of an improvement in the admittedly unsatisfactory situation that confronts Americans nnd Cubans mindful of the mutual interests of their respective countries.
It is beyond the scope of this statement to define in detail the bipartisan changes that have taken place since 1961 in American attitudes toward Castro's Cuba. I respectfully submit, however, that Mr. Nixon's positions on Cuba-first as Vice President, then as a leader of the opposition to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and finally as President-furnish an instructive if not comprehensive indication of those changes.
Mr. Nixon tells us in his book' "Six Crises" that he was one of the earliest advocates of the arming and training by the United States of Cuban opponents of Castro, an operation that eventually culminated at the Bayr of Pigs.
Mr. Nixon was also presumbly a supporter of the economic measures of the Eisenhower administration in 1960 designed to speed the fall of Castro but which,

-in my judgment, actually accelerated the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution and left Khrushchev with no option other than to furnish arms and economic aid
to Castro and Guevara.
In an article published in Reader's Digest for November 1964 during the presidential campaign of that year, Mr. Nixon reported that immediately following the Bay of Pigs fiasco he advised President Kennedy to find a "proper legal cover" to invade Cuba presumably with American forces. (It must, however, be noted here that responsible American policy has never envisaged the use of American forces in Cuba except at the time of the Missile Crisis of 1962 when the confrontation was with Khrushchev and not with Castro.)
In the same Reader's Digest article Mr., Nixon, stated that "Castro is a dangerous threat to our peace and security-and that we cannot tolerate the presence. of a communist regime 90 miles from our shores." He regarded "Cuba along with Vietnam . as the major foreign policy issue of the 1964 Presidential campaign, as it was in 1960."
In the Presidential campaign of 1968 nothing memorable was said by either candidate about Cuba. The steam had gone out of the issue. But Cubans who had acquired American citizenship were urged in the Spanish language press by some of the exile leaders in Miami to vote for Mr. Nixon on the basis that alleged statements either by Mr. Nixon or on his behalf implied that a Nixon victory would in some unstated fashion lead to favorable developments for Castro's Cuban opponents.
In early 1970 President Nixon sent to the Congress the first of his annual foreign affairs messages. He described the document to the press as "in my view, the most comprehensive statement on foreign and defense policy ever made in this country". The message's forty thousand words did not include any mention of Cuba though there had been no change in the communist regime ninety miles from our shores which Mr. Nixon six years earlier had said we could not tolerate. On the face of it, the omission was evidence of a basic change in attitude.
Our current policy 'toward Cuba no longer contemplates the overthrow of whatever internal regime the people of Cuba may support, accept or tolerate-or even oppose when the regime evolves to the point that opposition no longer involves prison or worse.
The United States has stated only two conditions for the normalization of relations with Cuba, namely, that Cuba should cease exporting revolution and abandon its military alliance with the Russians presumably to the extent that our security and that of the region are threatened thereby.
A normalization of relations would permit a rational examination of the claims and counterclaims arising from the actions, reactions and overreactions in which both governments indulged in 1959 and 1960 and which resulted in the destruction of their previous very close ties. (It should be unnecessary to state that the restoration of those ties to their former state is judged neither feasible nor even desirable by most of those who have occasion to consider the question.)
In marked contrast to the evolution of American attitudes toward him, Castro's attitude toward the United States has remained rigid. Castro's current utterances about our country could have been made at any time in the past decade. The same is true of the statements of his principal aides, Osvaldo Dorticos and Raul Roa, who have since the summer of 1959 occupied at Castro's pleasure what are in Cuba today the comparatively insignificant posts of President and and Foreign Minister respectively. Dr. Rloa's rhetoric at the Security Council meeting in Panama last month appears to have been quite similar in spirit to that which he displayed just before he withdrew from the Inter American Foreign Ministers meeting in Costa Rica in the summer of 1960.
Castro himself in a statement to an American journalist (Lee Lockwood) some years ago said "It's true everything we say about the United States refers essentially to the worst aspects and it is very rare that things in any way favorable to the United States will be published here." He attempted to justify his position by alleging that the truth about Cuba as Castro sees that truth is not published in the United States. The truth of the matter is, of course, that Americans interested in Cuba can read a gamut of material going all the way from the ridiculously laudatory to the unrealistically condemnatory.
Ever since the Bay of Pigs, Castro, neglecting all contrary evidence, has maintained in his public utterances the concept that the "unrepentant imperialists" are still plotting the overthrow of his revolution, that consequently the people of Cuba, armed to the teeth, must remain blindly united around their Maximum

Leader, knowing only what he chooses to tell them about the outside world and especially about the United States. The handfull of brave men who landed at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 are stillreferred to in the rhetoric of Castro and company as "'the mercenary hordes of American imperialism."
In spite of our changed attitude toward him, Castro still regards hostility to the United States together with the fradulent view of our country which he provides his subjects as bulwarks of his own personal dictatorship. The only Ameri,cans who get a good word from him and sometimes more than a good word-are those -at the lunatic fringe of our political spectrum who advocate the destruction .of our institutions.
For the present the conclusion seems to me inescapable that as long as Castro ,continues as the absolute ruler of his country the outlook for the establishment of ,a relationship between the two countries that would permit a rational examination of the very real problems they share seems remote indeed.
There is, however, reason to believe that Castro's absolute power is being somewhat eroded. Russian dissatisfaction with the whimsicalities, fumblings and failings of his economic operations has led to an increase in Russian management of the economy. A similar dissatisfaction on the part of his own countrymen is per-haps reflected in recent administrative changes that would appear to dilute the authority Castro as Prine MipAister has wielded since 1959.
Although the current tide of common sense in the foreign policies of a number of (countries has not yet reached Havana, communications between the governments of Cuba and of the United States are adequate so that any change in the situation-could at once be revealed. The two governments are informed as to each ,other's attitudes and have channels through which to make known at once either
-confidentially or publicly any changes that may take place in those attitudes.
The Swiss Government has for many years maintained in Havana extremely ,ompetent Ambassadors to represent American interests. While I am sure that government must be fully aware of American gratitude for the services performed 7by these missions it cannot wish to continue indefinitely using its own diplomatic ,resources in this manner and would hence be particularly sensitive to any indication that conditions for a normalization of relations between Havana and Washington were developing.
The United States and Cuba have missions at the United Nations; both have Embassies in many world capitals. Opportunities for direct communication of an informal character are numerous.
Nor are expressions of American views confined to official channels as is the case with Cuban views since unofficial channels are unavailable in that country. In recent weeks there have, for example, been articles by a well known Senator, by Distinguished academics and journalists, proposals by legislators, Gallup pollsal1 reflections of'moderate and flexible Americhn. views on the Cuban situation. Castro's intransigent hostility toward the government of the United States is maintained in the face of the important changes in,.American attitudes since the days when the overthrow of Castro was indeed a goal of American policy,.
Much is made by Castro, by Castro's propagandists and by misinformed people in this country and elsewhere of the trade embargo or so called "blockade" said to have been imposed by the United States on Cuba. It is true, of course, that the
-suspension of the import of sugar from Cuba and the embargo on the export of most American gbods to Cuba were originally imposed as responses to Castro's plundering of American interests and as part of a program for tastro's overthrow.
Today, however, these measures are hardly pertinent to the Cuban economy. To the degree that Cuba is capable of earning funds with which to pay for imports
-from abroad the United States embargo is not a significant factor; the Cuban problem has not been the embargo but the inability of the Cuban economy under Castro's management to produce adequately either for export or for domestic consumption,
These American economic measures must today be considered as elements in what I have earlier described as the actions, reactions and overreactions of the two governments that led to the destruction of the once flourishing economic ties between the two countries. Renewed trade relations, presumably at a reduced level, would depend on the willingness of both parties to envisage the solution in good faith of the problems created in the course of the destruction of the former relationship ,

Among those problems is the recognition of the principle of compensation of the Americans whose properties were taken from them in 1959 and 1960 without any payment whatever. And I would anticipate that when the Cubans come to the bargaining table they will have claims on. account of actions alleged to have been taken by us.
If a rational relationship is to be established between two such close neighbors it will be necessary for Cuban sugar once more to move into the American market. In recent years Cuba has ,failed to meet its sugar commitments to its Russian patrons. Low Cuban production is in part responsible for the present high price of sugar on the world market. (It is worth recalling that world market sugar which currently has a spot price of around nine cents a pound went begging at less than a cent and a half a pound as recently as mid-1968.) Furthermore, 'Cuban sugar production is currently running at only slightly more than half the level to which Castro for several ye-ars pledged himself to raise it.
For its part the United States is currently obtaining the sugar formerly supplied by Cuba from the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and others. These countries havecome to.rely on the resulting dollar earnings. It would hardly seem equitable to contemplate, when the time comes, depriving them of a part ,of their share in our market in order once more to make a place for Cuban sugar.
Perhaps an eventual solution lies in correcting some of the anomalies in the present international movement of sugar. For example, while Cuba sells no sugar to the United States it sells over a million tons a year to Japan. The United States, while taking no sugar from Cuba, buys over a million tons from the Philippines. If Japan were to buy all or most of what it now buys from Cuba from the Philippines, the United States could buy the same amount from Cuba without any increase in Cuban production and without diminishing American takings from other countries. An adjustment along these lines might prove feasible though it would encounter complications of price and marketing arrangements.
Next to the United States, the Organization of American States (OAS) is a major target for denunciation by Castro and his mouthpieces. A typical expression is that it is in effect the Ministry of Colonies of the imperialists in Washington and that most of its members are, servile puppets of the United States.
Some years ago the GAS passed resolutions suspending Cuba from membership and telling its members to cut off diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba because the communist government on the island was considered incompatible with the Inter American system and because Castro was endeavoring to export revolution to various countries in the Hemisphere.
In the changed conditions of today the fear of the export of revolution from Cuba, even in those Latin American republics most threatened with social upheaval, is much less than it was at the time these resolutions were adopted. One of the members never did .accedeto the resolutions.,. Others have in recent years disregarded them. There is still, however, a substantial number of member states that believe the resolutions should be kept in force because while there is no doubt of Castro's limited capacity for trouble his intentions have not changed. In effect it would seem that a degree of freedom of action regardless of the continuing of 'the resolutions in force has been achieved.
Under present circumstances the OAS is not a suitable agency for this type of resolution-either for its adoption or for its rescission; the problem varies so much in importance for the different members. Pre-Castro, the United States and Cuba had highly significant relations in a number of fields. Two or three of the other republics had minor trade relations. The rest had purely nominal contacts involving in some though not even in all cases merely the exchange of diplomats who were among the least hard worked members of their profession. 'The restoration of that type of relationship is simple; the problem for the United States is of quite a different order of magnitude and complexity.
In my view the best outcome for us would be to leave the matter as it is with individual members free in the future as they have in fact been in the past to consult their own interests in determining their conduct.,
Since Castro came to power over seven hundred thousand Cubans have fled Cuba. Most of them now live in the United States. To most of them, United States relations with Castro are anathema. Representative elements among them have bitterly criticized the recent anti-hijacking agreement negotiated through the Swiss between the governments of Cuba and the United States.

American public opinion has the very deepest sympathy for these Cubans driven from their home land by the way of life Castro has imposed. Cuban society has been tragically mutilated by their departure. They have been cordially and helpfully received in this country. But prevailing opinion here is to the effect that the United States is under no obligation to facilitate their activities on American soil against the government of their country and that the United States should not play any role in attempting to interfere in the politics of Cuba on their behalf.
Perhaps the more realistic of these sorely tried people will in time come to favor an approach to a more normal relation between the United States and Cuba because they will perceive that such a relationship might be a step in developments that would permit some of them once more to make a contribution to the political life of Cuba. But understandably enough this is not a line of argument that could be expected currently to have much appeal.
To summarize: a rational relationship between Cuba and the United States. would be a good thing for the people of both countries. The American attitude toward such a relationship has greatly changed over the years but Castro's stance is strongly averse to any such relationship under conditions we could conceivably accept. Channels of communication exist between the two governments and are in good order. Any modification in the position of either government has been and would be promptly transmitted to the other.
Conditions are adverse to any formal initiative on our part at the present timeThe assumption that such an initiative would almost automatically correct the. present admittedly unsatisfactory situation seems to me wholly unrealistic
Senator MCGEE. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Ambassador. Your long experience lends a sense of perspective to this whole problem which we sometimes forget and often obliterate with Senate resolutions. or repeal of Senate resolutions. We are great for quick and simple solutions to problems by setting out policy by resolution. I don't think that lends itself to the reality of the kind of question that you lay before us here.
I think you put your finger on part of it, but I gather that you would tend to agree that our criteria ought to be less whether the Castrogovernment will accept such an approach as much as to keep probing and pressing a bit and let them make the decisionMr. BONSAL. Well, I certainly think that we should keep on listening, yes. I think we should keep on listening and we do have many contacts, of various kinds and have had for a long time.
The point is I think that there is no way for us to break down this. Castro attitude because I believe that he considers this attitude to be a major bulwark of his personal power.
Senator McGEE. But there are very informal and very minor ways of going around and under and through and maintaining some kind of contacts.
Mr. BONSAL. There are all sorts of contacts, Senator.
As I say, the Swiss have had excellent people there who have achieved a very fine position in their relationships with the government there.. There is no lack of communication. That is not the problem. The

problem is one of the Cuban revolutionary government attitude toward us and of what it considers, or at least the only man who
-counts in that government considers vital to his personal survival.
Senator MCGEE. The shortcoming in one sense, I guess, has been a characteristic of many governments. It is certainly one of ours. I felt on many occasions that we arrived at too many answers for the other government, bailing them out of the necessity of having. to make such a decision. Probably for many years China wasn't interested in any kind of relations, but instead of making them face up to that and take the consequences of it, why we bailed them out by saying we wouldn't have it.
I felt many times that all we did by our reluctance to establish informal contacts with Eastern Europe in the earlier days of the so-called cold war was make it easier for the Eastern bloc by not pressing for these things because often it was an embarrassment to them if you did open up something. I think we sell ourselves short if we become too rigid. I think we ought to be constantly exploring and probing, but rationally.
Mr. BONSAL. Well, I believe that that is what has been done in the Cuban case. I do not wish to detract at all from the significance of the breakthrough with China, but it does us no harm to admit that such people as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai deserve a good deal of 'credit also. They too have changed attitudes. They have gone through a lot of soul searching. I believe that the breakthrough with China was not a unilateral American achievement. I believe that it represented a movement of sensible though ideologically separated men toward a .common goal and that is the way these things have to be done in the world today.
Senator McGEE. How rigid is the Organization of American
States institutionally as a factor of restraint in, let's say, whatever initiatives we might be able to apply in a case like this?
Mr. BONSAL. Senator, I honestly don't know. I served as our representative on the Council of the Organization for a few months in 1961 and since then I have had very little contact with it. I would rather not express myself about the Organization at this time. It is going through a period of soul searching. Some people even go so far as to say it is searching for a soul, but beyond that I can't comment.
Senator McGEE. The present conditions that we attach to our policy, the Cuban relations with the Soviets, the policy of exporting revolution in the Caribbean-could you share with us your thoughts a bit more in both of those categories in terms of any possible changes as you see them? We hear it said, and it has been said before this committee, that, for example, the Soviets may be having second thoughts about their relations, that they might have gotten stuck with a lemon and are sorry they got so deeply involved and it is a very expensive.

Mr. BONSAL. Well, I think it would be infringing a bit upon the testimony of the State Department people for me to comment on that. I have friendly relations with people down there who were contemporaries of mine and served with me, but I have no substantive relation with them. I think the important thing about it is that our policy today does not involve the question of the sort of government which the inhabitants of the island of Cuba will either support, accept, or tolerate or even oppose when opposition becomes possible without. fear of prison or worse. I think that is the important element of the, change which has taken place since the early years of the sixties.
Senator McGEE. We have some modest relations, I guess, of sorts. You have referred to a number informally. As I understand it, we have some very small cooperation on weather information.
Mr. BONSAL. Yes.
Senator McGEE.-overflights by aircraft on prescribed paths. Are there other areas such as those that could be usefully undertaken?
Mr. BONSAL. There is still telephone, and mail service (the latter indirect) and up until recently thousands of people who desired to leave Cuba were able to come on the "freedom flights". There may be other things that could be done. All of them, however, depend upon the possibility of a meeting of the minds. They are not things that we can dream up and say now we do this and expect the people at the other end to agree because they are not that way; they are not working in that way.
Senator MCGEE. I recall when I was at the United Nations in the past session, the 27th assembly, that the intransigence of the Cuban delegation there and the harshness of the rhetoric was always automatic and very considerable.
Mr. BONSAL. And this has not changed in a dozen years. This is the thing we should not overlook when people use words like "stagnation" and "no change" and "re examination," to describe our policy. We have changed, but there has been no change at the other end whatever.
Senator McGEE. You are suggesting to us that we ought to understand that there is not likely to be a change in, let's say, rhetoric and harshness and that sort with the Castro regime. There are other things outside that context that we could be open to or at least be exploring rather than counting on a change in rhetoric as a signal that there is a new day dawning?
Mr. BONSAL. Yes, I would agree. I would agree that we must continue to make clear what our own attitudes are and hope that eventually there will be a change at the other end.y
My personal view is that the man in charge at the other end, though he has changed in practically everything else, is incapable of changing, on this particular item.
Senator McGEE. Do you attach anything at all to the circumstan e of the highj ack agreement?

Mr. BONSAL. Well, yes, I think it was a case in which there was a mutual interest. Castro had gotten tired of being a sort of reception point for these criminals or revolutionaries or whatever, who were highjacking planes to Cuba and he made a deal with us in which we recognized that he also had interest in people homn he considers criminals trying to get out of his country. It was a deal something like the one we had a dozen years ago when Castro decided he wanted to, sell the Bay of Pigs prisoners and he dealt with President Kennedy's. representative on that. There was that interest. But I submit that that is a very limited thing.
Senator MCGEE. Is it your observation that some of the Latin American countries have shifted their positions in regard to the export of revolution concept or policy that was a second condition of our policy?
Mr. BONSAL. Senator, I think that at one time the potential for the export of revolution from Cuba was regarded a great deal more highly than it is now, a great:deal more fearfully than it is at the present time.
I would say that, even in the countries which may be threatened with social upheaval, the currents coming from Cuba are considerably weaker than they were some years ago. Cuba is a distant country to most of the other republics. The Cubans are just not the people who are going to overturn the governments of these countries at the present time.
Senator McGEE. Our concern leaves two present conditions, particularly the relation of Cuba with the Soviets. It seems to me that finds us pursuing our own tail in a vicious circle. I mean the more completely we insure the isolation of Cuba, the higher the necessity of their dependence on the Soviets. Without any expertise on it, I would think that anything that would tend to ease that dependence would be to our selfish national interest. Any kind of an erosion of that dependehce would be in that category. Would you agree with that? Mr. BONSAL. Yes; I think I would agree with that. I think it is to our interest to have a rational relationship with Cuba and when we get one the relationship of the Russians with Cuba will be diluted to some extent. That seems to me to be self-evident statement, yes.
Senator MCGEE. We have had a curious record on that in other parts of the world. We used to have a great anti-Communist crusade. If a government didn't suddenly turn and say it was a democratic government or pro-American government or ally, we were still suspicious. We failed to recognize the greatest defense there is is dignity of independence.
Mr. BONSAL. Yes, sir.
Senator McGEE. Without any specification as to the political philosophy or methodology or that sort of thing. It is up to those people.
Mr. BONSAL. Yes; and I think that more and more Cubans will begin to realize that the revolution has moved them from an undesired though I think rather maligned dependence on the United States into a very thorough dependence on the Russians for many, many things.

That is one of the disillusions they are undoubtedly becoming more aware of.
Senator McGEE. That is all the time I will take for the moment, 'if you don't mind hanging around a little bit. There is a filibuster on the floor of the Senate and it is a filibuster against my bill. I am trying to stand guard on that while it is all going on. We are trying to register more voters and some Senators are afraid how those voters are going to vote; so we are in that impasse but we intend to continue .here.
Mr. BONSAL. I would be delighted to come another time.
Senator McGEE. We will keep going here.
Let's turn to Mr. Higgins for the moment.
Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Senator.
Senator MCGEE. If you can proceed in the same way, we will put your full statement into the record. Any way you want to summarize it for us and hit the highlights will be fine.
Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Senator, as you described me in your opening remarks, I am a professor and I am not very good at summarization. I am very longwinded.
Senator MCGEE. Automatically 50 minutes. We all have that
Mr. HIGGINS. I was interested in your remarks on seminars in having an optimum size of four persons. I lectured for approximately 3 hours yesterday to 25 students and, therefore, I may not be as longwinded today as I normally might be, because 3 hours of talking with 25 students is, well, that is a considerable expense of energy and effort.
You know I was also interested in your remarks on dignity of
-independence, especially in relationship to what Ambassador Bonsai had to say about vituperation, invective, and bitterness flowing from the Cuban Government, and I would just suggest, although I am .a professor of journalism and not of history, that a re-reading of the Declaration of Independence for invective, vituperation, and bitterness against what we then considered an imperialist power might offer some means of contrasting and perhaps exploring how revolutions come about and what kind of language is used by revolutionaries ID aDDroaching the former dominating power.
Senator McGEE. The American Declaration of Independence has been used by more new independent governments around the
Senator McGEE [continuing]. As articles of faith and sense of Direction.
Mr. HIGGINS. That is quite correct.
Senator McGEE [continuing]. Than the manifesto has by many times over.

Senator McGEE. We forget.
Mr. HIGGINS. I am really suggesting the language, the list of abuses which were recited by the American revolutionary people at that time.
Senator MCGEE. A list of 27, I think.
Mr. HIGGINS. That is correct.
Senator McGEE. Many of them invented by Mr. Jefferson.
Mr. HIGGINS. Many of them invented?
Senator McGEE. That is not one of the substantive parts of the Declaration of Independence we like to remember historically.
Mr. HIGGINS. What was your field?
Senator McGEE. You hit it right there.
Now, I am going to speak somewhat personally. But I hope with the references I make that they will have a bearing on aspects and phases and contexts of our relationship with the Government of Cuba.
I should say that I am very happy, very pleased to be able to come here and speak in a forum of my Government, a representative forum of my Government, about my views and attitudes and approaches and to assist in the explorations which you are conducting. Because on several occasions when I have attempted in public to discuss this question with groups of the American people I have been prevented from doing so by groups of former Cubans, Cubans who exiled themselves from their own land and came here with many privileges. We may be happy to have them here as political exiles, but nonetheless on two occasions, one at a university and one at a church, I was absolutely prevented from delivering in one instance more than 5 minutes of my prepared remarks as a visiting lecturer and in the other instance, which took place last November 19 in Boston, I never got to say word one.
A hundred fifty former Cubans rose up in wrath and disrupted the meeting and took it over. This was a church service, by the way. And I had a very interesting conversation with the police who escorted me home on both occasions.
Senator McGEE. That is one of the ironies of our time, that that sort of thing happens on the campuses. It happened during the last few years where academics themselves performed the same misdeed when they didn't agree on Vietnam. It is one of the great casualties on the campuses; it may be one of the biggest casualties historically.
Mr. HIGGINS. I disagreed with the interruptions on both counts. I would have to say being personally involved as a person that was born here and respects the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, the first amendment, I could not help but have some, individual resentment at those who came from another land preventing me from exercising my constitutional rights.
Senator McGEE. I suppose only those at Wounded Knee would have any prerogatives. The rest of us have come from somewhere else,. We have come from immigrants.
Mr. HIGGINS. Right.

Now, I am going to make -a very few remarks about the origins of my interest in Cuba.,
I was a newspaper editor in Pennsylvania for many years. The major overseas news story in late 1958 was, of course, the approach 'of the rebels under the command of Fidel Castro toward Havana. It so happened on the morning of January 1, 1959, when the newspaper .I edited, the Gazette and Daily of York, Pa., didn't publish, there was ,a prominent story on Cuba in the Baltimore Sun and the Washington 'Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, papers which I read. It said that the rebels
-were in full retreat and that Batista would remain in firm control.
And then when I came to my newspaper office later in the afternoon
-I discovered the exact opposite was the case.
Now, as a professional newspaperman, this interested me highly, that this development could be reported so inaccurately up to the last minute. Perhaps it was something I might interest myself in. This is
-when I began to become, I would say, an amateur student of Cuba land the Cuban revolution and I talked with many people that had
-,been to and from Cuba, read as much as I could, and eventually in 1967 out of a clear sky received a telegram from Havana saying as a newspaperman I had been granted a visa to come to Cuba.
I had not applied for it, although I had written editorials which I must say were sympathetic, particularly to the attempts of the 'Cuban revolution to improve the educational and health lot of the 'people there.
I discovered also I was no special person. There were people there from the L.A. Times and Christian Science Monitor and New York 'Times, et cetera, and so forth.
But at any rate, now in order to go to Cuba, I had to approach the State Department, the Passport Division, for permission to go. I must say that I very much resented this as a free American citizen having to go to my Government and ask permission to go somewhere else.
However, I did it. And in order to secure the passport permission I had to sign at that time a paper that I would take part in no public forums, and no discussions in Cuba whatsoever, and being somewhat innocent-I had never been outside of the United States before except
-once to Montreal-I signed a paper and I went to Cuba and I found myself once in Cuba in a very humiliating situation. Because I was
-asked by' a young Cuban in charge of a radio station on the Isle of, Youth along with several other journalists from several other countries if I would g-o on the air and explain what I felt to be my impresSions, of Cuba, and I told him I couldn't do that, I had promised my 'Government I wouldn't speak in Cuba.
He says, "But I thought you came from a free country."
Now, you see I felt this was a very great embarrassment and humiliation and made it difficult for me to explain to him what a free country was as far as the United States was concerned. And I must say I would challenge, although I am not a lawyer, and I don't have constitutional grounds, but I would challenge the confinement of the American people by the regulations of the passport division of the Department of State

for requiring authorization from them for any citizen of the United States, newsmen, scientists, professional, whatever he may be or she may be, to go to Cuba. This is one I think of. I am not speaking here as a matter of fact in terms of what this means as far as what Cuba is or how Cuba would respond; I am speaking principally of the relationship between the U.S. Government and the people of the United States which this Government represents.
I regard the travel restriction as a confinement, as an intrusion upon the constitutional rights of Americans to travel. And it doesn't seem to me that it would take any negotiations with Fidel Castro or the Government of Cuba to lift the travel restriction. It is unilaterally imposed; it could be unilaterally lifted.
I think the same thing would hold true with the trade embargo. I cannot understand why economic considerations should play a prior or a paramount part in the determination of our relationships with any foreign government. I think they are a part of consideration, but I don't think that they should play a major part and I have no question, as Ambassador Bonsal said in the beginning, we hoped to eliminate the new revolutionary government in Cuba, as indicated in the Bay of Pigs enterprise. I think that these means of policy adopted at this particular time had a very direct reference to the private economic interests of certain American elements, private American elements- in Cuba. Considerable investments in sugar, in banking, in oil, telephone, and so forth. Well, that is all very well. I think that these people have a right to complain to their Government and they have a right to compensation, but I don't think that this should be the determining factor in establishing a trade embargo upon Cuba.
On one of my returns from Cuba, I believe this was in 1969 or 1970, I went to the State Department and asked them if they would like to ask me any questions about my experiences in Cuba, how I felt there, what I had observed? They were highly uninterested, I must say, in asking me any questions whatsoever. T have visited the State Department twice on returns from Cuba. On the first occasion the person who took me out to lunch asked me if I knew what would happen in Cuba if something happened to Fidel Castro.
And I said, "What?"
"Oh," he said, "You know, accident, illness, and so forth."
"Well, yes;" I said, "I think I do know." And I said, "The revolution would go on. I have been all over Cuba and I have met maybe 500 or 1,000 young people in their twenties who I think are perfectly capable ,of carrying on the revolution just as well as Fidel Castro is carrying it on." At this point this officer of the State Department seemed to lose complete interest in me and didn't ask me any more questions.
On the second 'occasion that I went, I was asked no questions at all; so I asked some. I asked-this was 1970, I believe, or 1969-I asked if they would give me an outline of what the State Department thinking was on Cuba at this particular time "Oh," he said, "It is all in the little red book." '' '

I said, "What little red book is this?" It happened to, be a speech that George Ball made in 1964 and it. outlines the policy of economic denial, and this is our policy in 1070. So, I said, "OK, that answers one question, there hasn't been any change since 1964. You still have the same policy." He suggested I read the book, which I did. And I must say I found the policy of economic denial most unworthy of a free, independent, democratic, humanitarian country because the essence of the policy of economic denial was to starve the Cuban people and to punish them to the extent that they would be unwilling or unable to carry on their revolutionary development.
That was my reaction to that particular policy.
Now, let me address myself to the two repetitive conditions which the United States has continually set down as preconditions for any kind of restoration or normalization of relations with Cuba. And I am not speaking with relation to how Cubans would respond or what they mean to Cuba but what they mean to the United States people, the people of the United States.
These questions are subversion by Cuba or support of revolutionary movements and changes in the Caribbean and other-Latin American countries and to Cuba's close military ties with the Soviet Union.
My position from all the study of history, limited as it may be Senator, that I have done, is that these have nothing to do whatsoever with the determinations of U.S. foreign policy. I do not see how it is any of the business or interest of the American people to. whom Cuba chooses to relate itself economically or militarily. I do not see that it is the business or interest of the American people whether Cuba supports or does not support, or to what extent it supports revolutionary movement for change in Latin America, which is going. to come about with or without Cuban support in any event.
I am saying this. That if Cuba is subversive in Venezuela, in Bolivia, wherever, that is up to you, the Bolivian Government, the Bolivian people, and it has nothing to do with our determination of our relationship with, or our foreign policy toward, Cuba. The same is true, I say, with the Soviet Union. If we establish these criteria for our relationships with other people, with other governments on the face of the Earth, I am afraid we would drastically reduce both our diplomatic trade, cultural, and so forth, relationship with these countries.
For example, with the developments that are underway at the present time with the People's Republic of China and also with the Soviet Union.
Now let me address myself at this point to the memorandum on hijacking. This is not as narrow a memorandum as press, radio,
television, officials of the State Department, and the executive branch of the Government have made it out to be. It does deal with the hijacking of aircraft and of vessels but it also mentions other offenses, and it has an introduction in its title which I think is extremely significant. The memorandum begins, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, on

the basis of equality and strict reciprocity now this is a statement of what I would call normal bilateral relationships on an equal basis between one country and another.
I think this is very significant that in this memorandum, the title to this memorandum, we have, in effect, recognized one of the Cuban desires, if not demands, for recognition of their independence, their sovereignty, and their self-determination.
There is another section of that that deals with these other offenses and these other offienses are described as expeditions which are prepared on the territory of one country and launched against, employed against, the territory of another.
Insofar as these would pertain to the adventures of certain former Cubans in this country, they also tend to eliminate one of the present conditions which Cuba has continually laid down for any kind of development of normalization of relationships with the United States.
I would now like to move on to the question of the changes in the world to which you referred, Senator, in your opening remarks. And as a matter of fact, I can use the words of President Nixon himself ,shortly after election when he gave a great deal of credit for the vote which he received from the American people, to the desire of the American people for change, particularly significant change in foreign affairs. He spoke of the Peking summit, he spoke of the Moscow summit, and he said he thought that the American people desired on this basis of the vote that he had received continuing imaginative change. And Ambassador Scali at the recent Security Council meeting in Panama, at the end of Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's remarks, said let us leave this cold war-I am paraphrasing Ambassador Scali here-let us leave this cold war language to one side, we are entering a new era of peace and harmony of relationships with other areas of the world regardless of differences of ideology, et cetera. So let us leave this aside and let us leave it behind.
Well, all right, if this has been said by President Nixon and by Ambassador Scali, what is the problem of leaving it aside as far as ,Cuba is concerned?
Now, I do not think that we need to look very far for signs from Cuba as to how they would respond. These signs are on the record. There were five of them between 1962 and 1965. A.nd last July in Havana I heard, standing 20 feet from Prime Minister Fidel Castro, I heard him say that We are perfectly willing to wait 5, 10, 15, or 30 years to have normal relationships with the United States. But also he said we will deal with any realistic and rational government that approaches us in the way in which they respect our sovereignty, our independence, and our right to be free, our right to deal on equal terms with any other government.
I might say that no government elsewhere in any hemisphere in any part of the world, that has approached Cuba on this basis has been turned down by the Cubans.
I might~say that also on the question of compensation, they also
-expropriated French and Swiss properties in the early 1960's, Canadian

also. Compensation agrements have been worked out and signed in March of 1967 with rance and with Switzerland. Full payment has been made by the Cubans I understand, from an article written bya friend of mine, who is a professor at Harvard, a Cuban-born person. The negotiations with the Canadian Government are presently proceeding. It seems to me that this trade embargo that the U. S. Government has imposed upon Cuba is discriminating against those, who might be able to claim compensation for expropriated properties. which they cannot realistically hope to do under the present, situation and also discriminating against other firms which might, wish to trade with Cuba.
Now, to go back to my remarks about Ambassador Scali and President Nixon.
That their sentiments about change and about leaving the cold war behind and about moving into a new era of peace and harmony throughout., the world, relationships between all nations exclusive of' none, regardless of their ideology, their system of government, that, this was followed up only, I think; about a month ago by a Harris. poll. I do not know, by the way, how accurate in terms of commonsense these polls are.
Senator MCGEE. They are accurate if you agree with them, but, suspect if you disagree with them.
Mr. HIGGINS. I am not going to say whether I agree or disagree with these particular ones I am referring to. There was one, though, made by Harris in 1971, early 1971, in which a majority of the. American people or of those polled expressed themselves as in disfavor of normalization of relationships with Cuba. However, in a poll conducted a month ago, 51 percent of those approached by the Harris people felt that such approaches should be made to Cuba, that Cuba should not be left out of the new initiatives which the United States. was taking elsewhere. There were 33 percent opposed and 16 percent, undecided. It seems to me the significance of this is that the Americanpeople would welcome and would hail any initiatives taken by the United States toward a normalization of relationships with Cuba.
And I would simply conclude by saving that I do not think it makes. one damn bit of difference how the Cubans respond to these initiatives,, that I think we should take them and that the only criteria on which we have to base hope is not rhetorical invective or bitterness or the' language of denunciation of Fidel Castro, but how the Cuban Government has related to other governments which have approached it on the basis of respect for its sovereignty and its independence
I think we cannot leave out the record that between 1898 and 1959, U.S. private economic interests and the U.S. Government played a very, very large influential, not to say dominant, role in Cuba. This cannot be left out of the record, and one of the difficulties in adjusting and improving relationships since that time has been the record of the United States in Cuba from 1898, to January 1, 1959-

I will conclu de, Senator, by saying simply this. In my five visits to, Cuba between 1967 and last year, 1972, my overwhelming impression is that the majority, the high majority of the Cuban people, would welcome meetings, relationships with the United States, the people, of the United States, on terms of equality, on terms of friendship, on terms that would b6 mutually beneficial to both peoples. But mymain argument is that I see no reason why the people of the United States should be any longer isolated from, confined from relation-. ships with the people of the Republic of Cuba. Thank you very much.
[Mr. Higgins' prepared statement follows:]
The present attitudes of the federal administration of the government of the, United States toward Cuba and Latin America-two inseparable questionsrun counter to recent trends in patterns of international relationship which this administration has helped to initiate and expand. In other areas of the world,. the administration has acknowledged both in word and performance a shift away from the period of intense cold war antagonisms, the several hot Wars to which such antagonisms gave rise and has, at the same time, entered constructively into the formation of new understandings founded on emergent realities ratherthan on old formulas.
Not so with Cuba in the context of Latin America. There, the framework erected as part of the cold war global outlook of post-World War II administrations in Washington continues to serve, for the most part, as a base for reactions, snap judgments and expedients that are ineffective at the least and dangerous at the most. These words are appropriate for describing the U.S.-Cuban process since early 1959, when groups which participated in establishing a new social' order in Cuba were struggling with the forms and procedures for the development of the economy of Cuba and the improvement of the lives of the large majorityof its people.
The basic question raised for the people of the United States by the sequence. of responses to events in Cuba on the part of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations is whether or not these responses have corresponded' with the general interests of the American people. And whether or not the economic, political and military approaches adopted by various administrations. toward Latin America since the late 1940s have contributed constructively to the relationships of people here with people there.
To the extent that such approaches can be defined as reflecting a policy, it has been at best a policy *of strategems dictated by what were determined to be. over-riding cold war considerations, which there are now substantial reasons for assessing as never having been wise, prudent or conducive to the domestic tranquility and the common defense of the people of the United States. The cost of these in blood and treasure has been phenomenal, a cost which surely has played a part in motivating innovative contacts of a broadening sort with the, Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.
Other costs are apparent in the executive devices invented to deal with the challenges presented by the Cuban Revolution to those in charge of the foreign policy of the United States. Two such devices clearly restricted the constitutional and private enterprise freedoms of citizens of this country. The Passport Division of the Department of State assumed the prerogative of deciding what citizens. would be granted official authorization to travel to Cuba and what citizens would not. At the same time, an embargo on trade with Cuba by U.S. companies, while predicated on the damage done to the formerly privileged position of certain private U.S. investment and business elements in Cuba, discriminated against any other firms which might have wanted to enter upon, under the new Cuban conditions generated by the Revolution, trade exchanges with Cuban enterprises.
In this sense a comparison may be made with the achievements in liberating U.S. business and industry from cold war limitations on dealings with the Soviet. Union and the Peoples Republic of China. The economic systems upon which these countries operate are fundamentally the same as that which Cuba has chosen for its development process. Since, in the Soviet 'Unaion and China, these systems.

-pparently no longer offer insuperable impediments to favorable trade, it is difficult to discover why that should still be considered so in regard to Cuba. And why, therefore, U.S. businessmen are prohibited from exercising their rights to economic exchange with the Cubans.
. From a charitable point of view, it is possible to speculate that the present federal administration has not yet had time to get around to removing cold war confinements placed upon people, U.S. citizens, who might wish to travel to or trade with Cuba, even though such prospects are being discussed publicly by officers of the Department of State in respect to another small country, Albania. But there are few if any signs on which to base such a charitable point of view, especially when statements emanating from the executive branch of government, in their contradictory nature, are more puzzling than clarifying.
For example. At about the same time, after last November's elections, that President Nixon was saying he foresaw no change--"no change whatever"-in the relationships between the United States and Cuba, he was also saying that "the American people, in voting . for the present Administration, were not voting to stand still but to go ahead With that kind of change" demonstrated "'by a year of very significant change." He was referring to what he described as "the Moscow summit, the Peking summit."
Further, while Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert A. Hurwich of the Department of State testified before this committee on March 26, 1973, that "we see little, if anything, to be gained and considerable disadvantage in a change in policy toward Cuba under present circumstances," on March 16, 1973, another officer of the executive branch had placed the Cuba problem in another light. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Scali, at a Security Council meeting in Panama, responding to remarks made by Foreign Minister Raul Roa of Cuba, said:
"I have no desire to prolong a useless debate with the representative of Cuba. His past accusations and the invective and bitterness with which he has dressed them are outdated as well as false. A new more peaceful world is dawning, a world of promise where cooperation and friendly discussion are the order of the day. My President, with a series of important diplomatic initiatives, has played a major role in creating this new atmosphere of understanding and hope. So I would suggest that there be an end to the outmoded tiresome language of the cold war. I suggest he lift his sights from the dark subterranean world of plot and counterplot. Let us reason together . as responsible men and women who are worthy of this new search for peace and harmony in every part of the world."
A sample of the language characterized as being dressed in "invective and bitterness" is Worth quoting from Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's observations, for the purpose of gaining insight into problems which the Republic of Cuba, from its experience since 1959, views as relevant to the question of relations between the United States and Cuba-as wellas between the United States and a Latin America in the process of confronting overall and common problems of underdevelopment and poverty of masses of people. Said Roa:
"If peace and security are desired in Latin America, the rights to full independence, sovereignty and self-determination must be respected, and, therefore, the power and right of all States to carry out structural changes and select their roads to development without foreign interference, whether these be called economic blockade, trade embargo, coercive action in the international credit associations, diplomatic pressures, direct or indirect reprisals, ideological frontiers, the Hickenlooper amendment or open or veiled aggression, of the kind that has occurred and is occurring in so many different modalities. The hour has already struck when all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Latin America must be wiped out . 21
A question posed for the people of the United States by the substance of the exchanges between Ambassador Scali and Foreign Minister Roa is simply this: How can Mr. Scali's objectives of "peace and harmony" in that "part of the world" which is Latin America be squared with the conditions for "peace and security . in Latin America" advanced by Mr. Roa? In the case of Cuba, the answer given by the Nixon Administration-as Secretary Hurwich reiterated on March 26 before this committee-is that Cuba must abandon "actions and policies" involving "support of subversion in other countries of Latin America and its close military ties with the Soviet Union." No other reasons for isolating the people of the United States from the people of Cuba have, to my knowledge, ever been put forward by representatives of the U.S. government. Also, it has been pointed out from time to time that the government of Cuba has not only

failed to abandon the "actions and policies" proscribed by Secretary Hurwich but has never indicated how it might respond to initiatives from the United States aimed at improving the state of relations between the two countries.
If we assume that such "actions and policies" do constitute practices of the Republic of Cuba-and it is a matter of record that Cuba supports revolutionary movements and changes in Latin America, while receiving on a large scale from Soviet Union arms and equipment for the Cuban military forces-it is still not easy to justify on these premises the separation of the people of the United Statesdiplomatically, economically, culturally, in terms of travel and other forms of contact-from the people of Cuba.
Such matters as Cuban "subversion" or support for revolutionary movements and change in Latin America are not, strictly speaking, matters of direct concern to the people of the United States, although they may well be of concern to special U.S. private interests with profitable investments in Latin America, aggregating at latest count about $14 billion. Nor is the Cuban choice of friends among other nations, from whom it obtains economic and military assistance, a valid criterion for determining the manner in which the people of the United States, and the people of Cuba, may relate to one another. If the same criteria were emIployed by U.S. administrations in determining the nature of our relationships elsewhere in the world, they would drastically reduce the number of countries with which full relations are maintained or are in process of being shaped.
As for indications from the government of Cuba concerning the possible character of response to initiatives from a U.S. administration, these have appeared so often and been so luminous that it would seem U.S. representatives, 'eveball to eyeball"-if only with binoculars-with a country ninety miles away from our continental shores, have not only blinked but kept their eyes shut. In an article published in the Spring 1973 issue of Foreign Policy, written by Assistant Professor Jorge Dominguez of Harvard University and research associate in that university's Center for International Affairs, several of these indications are enumerated.
Between October of 1962-the period described in the United States as the "Cuban missile crisis" and, by the. Cubans, as the "Carribean crisis"-and the 1965 "Johnson escalation" of the U.S. military commitment in Indochina, there were, Professor Dominguez writes, "at least five separate instances of Cuban conciliation offers to the United States, all but one of which were publicly stated for all to hear." One of these, "a favorable response in April 1964 to Senator Fulbright's proposal aimed toward rapprochement with Cuba . allowed for renewed trade and compensation for hationalized property."
Later evidence of the Cuban government's recognition of the principle of Compensation for nationalized properties formerly belonging to non-Cuban citizens
-or corporations is cited by Professor Dominguez in the agreements Cuba signed with France and Switzerland in March of 1967. These provided, in the case of France, full settlement of all existing claims for properties nationalized in the early years of the R volution-and, in the case of Switzerland, for the settlement of claims made to that date as well as for the establishment of a mechanism by which future claims could be presented to the Cuban government.
The claims were uncomplicated, Professor Dominguez points out, because "neither country ever subscribed to the punitive policies against Cuba." He
goes on to say thiat it would not be "suprising if Cuba were to present counterclaimis for economic damages inflicted as a result of U.S. policies" in the event that such negotiations occurred at some future time, Nevertheless, it is obvious that official U.S. attitudes toward Cuba, rather than those of Cuba to the United States, have so far restricted the freedoms of U.S. citizens and companies to approach the Cuban government with realistic hopes of securing compensation for nationalized properties. "Punitive policies" have stood in the way.
These policies are so well known, and have been for many years so candidly discussed both by those who like them and those who don't, that there is no reason to clutter this statement with their details. In general, ever since the failure of the direct effort to overthrow the Cuban Revolution by force and violence at the Bay of Pigs in April of 1961, they have followed a design of "economic denial"spelled out in 1964 in a speech by then Under Secretary of State George W. Ball and released as Department of State publication 7960-of raids and infiltrations upon Cuban soil, of surveillance by diverse means of Cuban territory, of endeavors to disassociate Cuba from all ties with other Latin American countries, of pressures upon governments and firms of non-socialist nations to curtail dealings with Cuba,

and so forth. All in all, as the phrase "economic denial" denotes, these "punitive policies" had as their goal the infliction of such hardship upon the Cuban people that they would become unable or unwilling to carry forward the revolutionary development of their country. Just as the U.S. government has demanded that the Cubans abandon certain "actions and policies" as a pre-condition for better relations, so have the Cubans been insistent that normalization of relations remains out of the realm of possibility so iong as the punitive policies persist. One can make a judgment on which nation has the better case by studying the initiatives taken by that party which has moved directly, in its punitive policies, upon the other.
These policies, however, have in the past few years been withering away, in part because of changes occurring in Latin America, where seven nations-in disregard of sanctions voted by the Organization of American States in 1964-have established comprehensive relations with Cuba, while other countries, such as Panama, are on better and better terms with the Cuban people and government. In addition, the U.S.-Cuban February 16, 1973, "memorandum of understanding on hijacking of aircraft and vessels and other offenses," although narrow in scope, is not so narrow as has been made to appear by the U.S. government and by reports and comments of U.S. press, radio and television. In effect, its opening words not only reflect a change in the equilibrium of U.S.-Cuba relations since the present revolutionary government headed by Fidel Castro in January 1959, but since the year 1898, when by virtue of the dispatch of U.S. military forces to Cuba during the struggle of the Cubans to remove themselves from the rule of Spain, U.S. economic and political interests became dominant in the life of Cuba.
The memorandum begins: "The Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, on the basis of equality and strict reciprocity . ." Such language represents, beyond question, a settlement between equals, aimounting therefore-wholly apart from the dimensions of the agreenent-to a statement of respect by the United States for the "full independence, sovereignty and self-determination of Cuba," to repeat the phrases used by Cuban Foreign Minister Rooa in reference to all of Latin American nations at the U.N. Security Council meeting in Panama. But the dimensions themselves are also interesting.
The "other offenses" mentioned in the memorandum's title have to do with measures for dealing with persons who, on the territory of one of the two countries, prepare "an expedition" against the territory of the other country. To the degree that this pertains to expeditions or raids which former Cubans now resident in the United States have been conducting against the country from which they elected to exile themselves, the agreement eliminates a long-standing obstacle to the development of further exchanges and understandings between the United States and Cuba. It is pertinent to insert here that Secretary of State William Rogers offered the comment that, in negotiating the agreement through Swiss intermediaries, the Cuban approach was "constructive and businesslike."
The remaining major obstacles are the general U.S. policy of "economic denial" and the presence of the United States Naval base at Guantanamo, on the eastern tip of Cuba, established in 1902 in a somewhat different era of U.S.-Cuba and interAmerican relations, not to say of world conditions and the political balance of international forces. Since both of these are matters for unilateral U.S. decision, having been so in origin, the references made by Ambassador Scali to "important diplomatic initiatives" undertaken in recent years by President Nixon-initiatives creating "this new atmosphere of understanding and hope"--would seem to indicate that opportunity for similar initiatives on the Cuban question is available. Perhaps it should be said, too, that there is no reason to expect an eventual settlement of the Guantanamo issue would prove movie of a handicap in the improvement and broadening of exchanges with Cuba than has Taiwan in the case of the Nixon initiatives toward the Peoples Republic of China.
Moreover, the November 27, 1972, remark by the President on the desire of the American people not to "stand still but to go ahead with... imaginative changes," are supported, in regard to U.S. initiatives toward Cuba, by a Harris public opinion poll of March 22, 1973. This poll, noting an almost complete reversal, since early 1971, of public opinion on U.S. relationships with Cuba, reported that fifty one percent of those polled favored improved relationships, with thirty-three percent opposed and sixteen percent undecided. Major icasons given by those who favored change in U.S. attitude toward Cuba included the sentiment that the American people can benefit by maintaining contacts with all nations-even those whose policies are disagreeable; that tensions would thereby be eased in the Carribbean and Latin America; that it is just not possible any longer to isolate

the people of the United States from communism and communist countries; that an agreement on hijacking suggests other agreements, as on trade, are also possible; that if understanding can be reached with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, why not with Cuba?
Polls are not precise instruments for measuring common sense. But the weight of the figures of this particular poll, the change in public opinion shown, the views elicited by the poll-takers, provide strong reasons fQr concluding that the people in whose interests the government of the United States formulates and conducts foreign policy-the people to whom under our constitutional system the government is ultimately responsible-would welcome initiatives aimed in the direction of correcting the abnormal conditions that have for twelve years kept the Cuban people and the people of the United States apart. I might add that my five visits to Cuba as a writer and journalist since 1967 have convinced me that the great majority of the Cubau people would also welcome the correction of such conditions that they would be more than ready to meet on.equal, friendly and mutually beneficial terms with people of the United States.
Senator McGEE. Thank you very much, sir, for your report on your judgments and assessments, many of them in the light of your personal visits there since 1967, five of them in fact.
You were referring to the Harris polls that suggested that many Americans wanted to lift the travel ban.
Mr. IIIGGINS. Yes, sir.
Senator MCGEE. I have in my hand a somewhat later Gallup poll.
Senator MCGEE. It is marked the 29th of March. It suggests that there is a very heavy majority disposition to try to apply some of the same changes in policy to Cuba as have been applied 'to China and the Soviet Union on the part of our Government. It puts it in a very easy, casual way for measurement purposes, but I think it does reflect a disposition.
It says that 71 percent of the people think the President ought to send Mr. Kissinger to Havana.
Mr. HIGGINS. Yes; that is rather a simple way of putting it.
Senator MCGEE. They do not say what for.
Mr. HIGGINs. No. It does not even say whether Premier Castro would accept the visit.
Senator McGEE. That is right. And that, I think, brings up a point.
We will make this Gallup poll survey here a part of the record, if there is no objection, and I hear no objection from the other members of the committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
[From the Gallup Poll, March 29, 1973]
Tourism Could be Strong Bargaining Point
(By George Gallup)
Copyright 1973, Field Enterprises, Inc. All rights reserved. Republication in whole or part strictly prohibited, except with the written consent of the copyright holders.
Princeton, N.J., March 28.-In the aftermath of the administration's successful efforts last year to improve relations with Communist China and Russia, a large majority of Americans today would like to see President Nixon send his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to Cuba to try to improve our relations with that country.

if Kissinger were to go to Cuba for this purpose, hie would have a strong bargaining point for renewing relations in light of a survey Which shows that mrillioias of Americans would like to visit Cuba. Tourism would likely give the flagging Cuban economy a much-needed boost.
The latest survey shows that 31 percent of U.S. citizens would like to visit Cuba if travel restrictions with that country were lifted. This percentage can be projected to approximately 42 million individuals.
The proportion who would like to visit Cuba is highest among key tourist groups-the young and upper-income people.
Seven in ten Americans (71 percent) favor Kissinger going to Havana to help improve relations with this island country. Support for a thaw-, of U.S.-Cuba relations exists even though the public is not favorably disposed toward Cuba's chief of state, Premier Fidel Castro.
*Shortly after the survey was taken (in mid-February), the first serious, friendly diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba occurred when the two nations signed a mutual anti-hijacking pact.
The current widespread inte-rest among the American people in improving relations-and the interest on the part of many in visiting Cuba-would seem to indicate a change in the public's thinking regarding foreign policy alternatives in dealing with Cuba. Only 10 years ago, as many as 20 percent of the public favored an armed invasion of the island as a means of overthrowing Castro.
Cuba, a nation of an estimated 8,660,000 people, is only 93 miles off the Florida coast. Its area is 44,218 square miles (about the size of Pennsylvania). The capital is Havana. The form of government is a dictatorship. The chief industry and export is sugar.
The U.S. and Cuba broke off diplomatic relations in 1961. And in February 1962, President Kennedy ordered an embargo of all American goods going to Cuba, an action that earlier had been approved by a majority (63 per cent) of the public.
Premier Castro has not been highly regarded by Americans during the last decade and a half. Only seven months after Castro's rebel army forced dictator ~Fulgencio Batista into exile in Portugal in January 1959, more than twice as many Americans held unfavorable as held favorable opinions of Castro.
American disenchantment with Castro grew and a survey the following year showed 8 in 10 Americans with unfavorable views of the Cuban leader. The survey was conducted at a time of the nationalization of Cuba's industry, of which $1 billion worth was U.S.-o-wned.
Just last fall, in October, nearly 9 out of 10 Americans gave Castro an unfavorable rating.
This was the question asked in the current survey: "As you know, President Nixon sent Henry Kissinger to China and to Russia to try to improve our relations with those countries. Would you favor or oppose President Nixon sending Henry Kissinger to Cuba to try to improve our relations With that country?"
Heavy support for sending Kissinger to Cuba is found in all major groups, but is greatest among the college-educated, persons in business and the professions and among Republicans. Those persons interviewed who express an interest in visiting Cuba are far more likely to favor improving relations than are those who indicate no interest in going to that country.
Following are the national results and by key groups:

In percent
Favor Oppose No opinion
National ----------------------------------------------------- 71 19 10
College background ------------------------------------------ 75 18 7
High schol ----- ------------------------------------------ 69 229
Grade school ---------------------------------------------- 69 14 17
Professional and basiness-------------------------------------- 77 18 5
Clerical and sales -------------------------------------------- 70 20 10
Manual labor ---------------------------------------------- 69 20 11
R e ub i an -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -79 15 6
Repmblcas------------------------------------------------ 65 23 12
Independents ----------------------------------------------- 72 20 8
Would like to visit Caba --------------------------------------- 83 11 6
Would not------------------------------------------------- 65 ~ 24 11
This question was also asked: "If travel restrictions with Cuba were lifted, would you like to visit that country, or not?"
Interest in visiting Cuba is highest among men, persons with a college background, younger persons and those in the professions and business. The national results and by groups:
National------------------------------------------------------- 31
Men ---------------------------------------------------------- 38
Women-------------------------------------------------------- 25
College background---------------------------------------------- 37
High school----------------------------------------------------- 30
Grade school --------------------- ------------------------------- 28
Under 30 years-------------------------------------------------- 42'
30-49 years----------------------------------------------------- 31
50 and over ------------------------------------- 24
Professional and business ------------------------------------------ 36
Clerical and sales------------------------------------------------ 28
Manual labor--------------------------------------------------- 35
The findings reported today are based on interviews withl a total of 1,517 adults, 18 and older, interviewed in person in more than 300 scientifically selected localities across the nation during the period Feb. 16-19.
Senator MCGEE. But it does put a finger on the line to be drawn here. That is the difference between those possibilities that might be
-unilaterallyv undertaken by the Government of the United States alone and those policies that would necessarily have to be undertaken in a nation-to-nation negotiation.
Mr. HIGGINS. I think Guantanamo, which I did not mention, is
*one of the latter issues.
Senator MCGEE. That would be in the bilateral category and I would assume subj ectMr, IGGINS. Not necessarily bilateral, but I am afraid realistically so.
Senator MCGEE. I think of other complications there; the number of Cubans involved, also would make it a little more complicated.
Mr. HIGGINS. Right.
Senator MCGEE. I think that distinction is of some relevance for
-us here and you have laid it out.

Now in terms of broad policy, I might say, Mr. Higgins, that it is also difficult with this broad sweep of the brush to lay out a broad policy for our outlook toward the rest of the world and apply that same principle in Cuba. I can think of two illustrations. You gave us one, the trade embargo proposition. I find a 'great many people who are interested in lifting the trade embargo on Cuba are the very same people who petitioned me to impose the trade embargo on Rhodesia. You cannot play that game two ways if you are going to apply it as policy. What it seemed to say was if it was a left wing goNernment in power they wanted the trade embargo lifted, but if it was a right wing government in power they wanted it squeezed tighter. I think you do not dare apply the generalization. You have to apply it to cases. The Rhodesian embargo for which I carried the ball in trying to get that tightened was a United Nations operation. Therefore, it should have been sustained by us, but it was lifted.
Mr. HIGGINS. I think that is a very important distinction, that this was a United Nations vote to which we apparently as a member of the United Nations should subscribe, but I am talking about a unilateral action which I think is a different case.
Senator MCGEE. I was quoting from some of my own cronies in the academic world who want to impose unilateral sanctions on Mr. Franco in Spain as an illustration in point.
Mr. HIGGINS. With whom, incidentally
Senator MCGEE. I think we have to spot apply it on the circumstances that obtain. The Cuban circumstances are unique to begin with not only because of the history but because of the proximity and other factors that are mutually independent.
Mr. HIGGINs. Yes; I would agree the geography plays a large part.
I might mention now that you have brought Spain into our conversation, this is one of the countries, of course, with whom Cuba has the most, I will not say amiable but most normal of economic, cultural, and diplomatic relationships. Also, Israel. Cuba plays no favorites, all they ask for really, you see, I think what has to be understood about Cuba, that they are now-whether they were previously or not, I was never in Cuba before the revolution and not until some years after, so I cannot say-but I have discovered the Cubans to be a very, very proud people who want to be treated as equals. It seems to me that in terms of the United States one of the real questions here, serious questions is like a child growing up within a family-I have my 13-year-old son here with me today, his first visit to Washington. He is growing up.
Senator MCGEE. I hope it is Easter vacation rather than truancy.
Mr. HIGGINS. Exactly. And he is growing up, you know, and eventually he is going to have to be let go and deal with me on equal terms. He is coming pretty close to that now, I might say. Cuba is growing up, Cuba is independent now and wants to be treated as an independent and as an equal nation. You know, our policy in a sense has been a policy which has really not been reflective of our desire

to treat Cuba as an equal and sovereign nation wholly regardless of the road that they have taken toward the development of their economy and .their culture and their people.
Senator MCGEE. But I was not through with my Rhodesian parallel yet.
Mr. IGINs. I am sorry.
Senator MCGEE. I want to pursue that parallel in Cuba. If I recall it accurately, the embargo of Cuba was a multinational action on the part of the members of the OAS.
Mr. HIGGINS. I think there was a prior unilateral trade embargo by the United States and perhaps Ambassador Bonsai would know this, in 1961 or 1962, and I think it was in a sense ratified within the OAS in 1964.
Senator MCGEE. Again, I am a little rusty on that, but it was my recollection that this was an OAS initiative as a matter of policy and it is that policy that obtains. I would suppose that that would in itself lend some complications to a unilateral change on the part of, say, the United States. If it were decided the policy ought to be relaxed, it would have to be moved through the OAS. Either that, or announce that insofar as the OAS is concerned we do not believe in multinational efforts and international organizations, as we did concerning Rhodesia.
Mr. HIGGINS. There were nations, as you know, in the OAS, such as Mexico, which never regarded the OAS vote as binding. Chile no longer does. Peru no longer does. Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, Guyana, all recognize and deal with Cuba. So does Panama, in the absence of diplomatic relationships. Ecuador and Venezuela have expressed an interest in dealing with Cuba. The newly elected administration campaigned on that basis, among others. So that this in a sense becomes a matter, it seems to me, of U.S. State Department hypocrisy, having really imposed the trade embargo by its influence over the GAS in 1964, now saying we are bound by it because everybody else has voted for it. Whereas these other countries who voted for it in the beginning are now changing their attitude toward Cuba. As late as last December the United States within the OAS was still opposing a motion-I believe made by Peru-which would not have abandoned the 1964 resolution but would simply have said that the independent states of Latin America should be permitted to make up their own mind as to how they would deal with Cuba. So I do not think the OAS thing, although I believe it would be much better to repeal the resolution, I do not believe it should realistically stand in the way of at least a statement on the part of the United States that it is interested in lifting the trade embargo.
Senator McGEE. Something like that would be far more modest. I may be overly sensitive on the question, but I happen to believe very strongly in getting caught trying in international organization to achieve some kind of a better reality in international politics. I hate to see the United States, one of the giants on the Earth, being the one responsible for shattering what preciously vulnerable efforts have been made, whether it be the United Nations or OAS.

Mr. HIGGINS. I totally agree. I would simply suggest that within the OAS the United States is not only a member state but a very powerful member state, that it would be very possible for the United States to propose the kind of elimination of the trade embargo and all of the other restrictions that the resolutions imposed upon relationships with Cuba,.
Senator MCGEE. One other factor, about which I have some mixed feelings and some uneasiness is where one draws the line on the export by force of what you call revolution, what others would call the overthrow of governments. Again it is a little uneven.
Mr. IGGINS. Ko mean, like what we tried to do at the Bay of Pigs?
Senator MCGEE. Exactly. That sort of thing ought to be outlawed. That ought to be no part of our policy. I would be prepared to listen to the contention that if you have an OAS that is viable, there is a real case to be made for trying to prevent by whatever means the export of violence, particularly to small governments that have difficult times at the very least. But again we come to the same split personality. The export of some revolutionary movements is more tolerable among some of my cronies in the academic world than the export of force on the part of some other types of governments. I think of the Portguese Government and Angola and Mozambique. Again it is a two-way operation, in a sense. I think it ought to be discouraged, although the Portuguese would claim to have a handle there because those are so-ca lied colonies. Even so, it becomes a mixed kind of thing. I would be more cautious about being inattentive to the deliberate export of revolution. I do not reject revolution as an idea. Let us have all the ideas. If youi cannot beat an idea with a better idea, you are in trouble. I am talking about the injection by transport and bodily involvement in attempts to overthrow governments from the outside. It does raise some very serious questions.
Mr. HIGGINS. Allow me to make .a comment on that. When you said before you would very much not like to see the United States within regional or within the international organization of the United Nations take the lead in abrogating decisions made by these organizations, I totally agree with your statement in that regard.
Let me say, however, that in the world of the past 25 years, that the United States has set a very poor example in exactly the direction in which you are pointing that it should go. I will refer only to some of the actions of the GAS.
In 1954 in Guatemala, in an action which we now admit that the United States not only participated in but contrived, the GAS took no action whatsoever. In 1961 at the Bay of Pigs, in an action which again the United States contrived and conducted, the GAS took no position whatsoever. In 1965, 'when President Johnson sent marines into the Dominican Republic-in what I hope is the last LatinAmerica piece of gunboat diplomacy in which we will ever engage-the GAS again took no action.
Now, on this whole question of subversion of direct export of revolution. What I am saying is

Senator McGEE. You left out Mr. Castro there. We also had a hand in bringing him in.
Mr. HIGGINS. I do not know how much we had to do with bringing in Fidel Castro.
Senator McGEE. We applauded it.
Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. I must say, if you wish, I must say that even though professionally on January 1, 1959, I became interested in the Cuban Revolution, also like many other Americans I was very romantically inclined in late 1958 to the developments in Cuba which Fidel Castro headed. But what I am saying is that if we are going to accuse the Fidel Castro Government in Cuba of exporting revolution, that perhaps we had better take a~ look at our own record and repair that first. I do not see any evidence at the present time of the Fidel Castro Government in Cuba, exporting revolution in the way we did in Guatemala or in the Dominican Republic or we attempted to do at the Bay of Pigs. The Fidel Castro Government in Cuba, as a matter of fact, having attempted to export revolution in the early periods of the sixties and up into 1967, when Che Guevara was in Bolivia, has really changed a great deal its attitude. For example: In its relationship with Chile, which is moving toward a process of socialism through democratic means. In its relationship to the Government of Peru, which has a military dictatorship. In its attitude toward the Catholic Church, the left and liberal elements of the Catholic Church in Cuba, I mean, in Latin America. Likewise, in its relationship with Panama, and so forth and so on. I do not think it is any longer valid-I do not think it ever was valid-for us to make this a condition for our relationship, our direct United States-vis-a-vis-Cuba, relationship.
However, let us assume that you are right and that it should be considered. I do not think that there is any present evidence that the Republic of Cuba is interested in exporting Cuban revolution per se into Latin America. I think they are perfectly willing to help to what degree they can, help the forward movement of revolutionary change in Latin America which, when you have 70 percent of 300 million people living in poverty, when you have 80 million illiterates, when you have 30 percent of the people dying under 40 years of age, when yo have 5 percent of the people with 30 percent of the wealth in Latin America, if you are not going to have some kind of revolutionary change-and I am practically quoting Bobby Kennedy and Frank Church and a number of other people-if you are not going to have revolutionary change, then there is no logic on the Earth. You are going to have it and Cuba, I do not think, has to export it. What they do is support it and encouiage it and they have never made any secret of that whatsoever, any more than they made any secret naturally of the amount of military aid that they get from the Soviet Union, which is very, very considerable.
Senator McGEE. The change that you refer to and the obvious difference between Cuban policy in this regard in the early sixties on the one hand, and more recently, is probably the relevant thing for our consideration here. However, one interprets the criteria of changing on this question, our task here is to examine the degree to which that.

may have changed or whether the attitude of those against whom it was addressed may have changed.
Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir.
Senator McGEE. Those are the things that we seek to sort out in order to try to determine whether we should not be posturing on another set of criteria or present conditions. That is what we are exploring here.
I just got the note, incidentally, that I am due at 11:30. Let me make a quick announcement here that we will resume this hearing. I hate to leave right in the middle of our colloquy, but we will resume this. We will resume at 2:30. 1 am free by that time because this vote that I now haye to protect is coming up at 12.
Thank you very much and I want to compliment your son for coming down here.
Mr. HIGGINS. For sitting through this.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., 'the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., this day.1
[Committee staff note: The hearing was unable to resume. Statements of additional witnesses who were to have testified follow:]
Twelve years ago, almost to the day I think, the United States Was stunned by the realization that the Cuban Revolution -wasn't going to be toppled by force. The invasion of 1500 oversold anti-Castro Cubans, trained and equipped by the C.I.A. collapsed before it had even started, on the beaches Cubans call Giron.
I've seen those beaches (a school for fisherman marks the site now) and watched films of the fighting. In the Cuban documentaries, there is always a shot of Fidel Castro, his field glasses hung around the neck, sitting astride a tank and pointing somewhere ahead where one imagines the action to be. Then he's jumping off the tank into a crowd as hundreds of rifles are raised into the air. It's a very popular documentary with Cubans, and records a very momentous day for them. "That was the day the presence of socialism was consolidated in Latin America", says Fidel. Indeed, it could be called Latin America's Dien Bien Phu.
For me, however, an American who's spent several years as an observer of the Cuban Revolution, that aborted invasion is symbolic more of our misconceptions, suspicions, hostility to an underestimation of the Cuban Revolution.
First, some of the misconceptions: Throughout the 1960's I think the view Americans had of Castro and the Cuban Revolution was obscured by too much cold-war rhetoric. [Neither the press nor Hollywood has helped in this regard. Do you recall the color version of "Che" with Jack Palance playing a cynical Fidel Castro living in splendor, dressed in pink silk pajamas, guzzling wine straight from the bottle? Left to Time or Newsweek, Cuban society appears to be anemic, hungry and dressed in rags.-e.g.'s from Time, etc.] There is a need to cut away the rhetoric and the images to see Cuba for what it is, a small, underdeveloped nation of 8.5 million people undergoing a unique social revolution, a revolution that is in part inept, in part repression, in part idealistic and egalitarian.
Indeed, contrary to much reported about Cuba, there are positive aspects to the Revolution. Impressive gains have been made, particularly where social change has occurred over the past fourteen years. Cubans have all but eliminated illiteracy, universalized free education, made tremendous advances in health care and most significant, eradicated institutions that prior to the Revolution created vast inequalities between the rich and poor, white and black, urban and rural sectors of the Cuban population.
As for ineptness, Castro himself, rather honestly I'd say, admits there has been economic mismanagement, poor planning, lack of productive discipline and bureacratic inertia. These are conditions, however, that result as much from a

legacy of underdevelopment as from a lack of organizational skills. And in time this will change.
As for injustices, these exist as well. Writers are silenced if too critical, sometimes even arrested, while cultural bureaucrats determine what works are to be published. The press too is controlled, its function to form rather than inform the Cuban people. Then there are the arbitrary arrests, followed by tribunals that respond to political precepts rather than due process.
Unfortunately, such acts are not only inherent in a political system with one party rule, but are also a result of the siege mentality produced by the blockaded and what Cubans view as C.I.A.-backed infiltration of the revolution.
[The remarks of America's leadership haven't helped them to overcome that paranoia either:
Castro is a dangerous threat to our peace and security. We cannot tolerate the presence of a Communist regime 90 miles off our shores. It is time to stand firm move forward in Cuba, in Vietnam and anywhere freedom is denied or threatened by the forces of world communism."-Richard Nixon in the Reader's Digest of November, 1964.1
Suspicions: From what I can gather from recent statements made by the President, the United States has two major reservations about normalizing relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union's military presence there and the Cuban Revolution's continued subversion of the hemisphere, what the President calls "exporting" the revolution.
" .. As far as Castro is concerned he has already drawn the line. He is 'exporting revolution all over the hemisphere, still exporting it. His line is against the United States not only inside but outside of Cuba. As long as Castro is adopting an antagonistic, anti-American line we are certainly not going to normalize our relations with Castro . ." (President Richard Nixon, April, 1972)
As to the first point, there is no doubt about the mutual commitment the Soviet Union and Cuba share. In economic terms, about 60% of Cuba's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union. (In 1971, Cuba imported $644 million worth of 'oil and machinery from the Soviet Union, while exporting $517 million worth of sugar in return. Ecotass) More than 6,000 Russians, half of them technicians, the others military advisors, are in Cuba monitoring an estimated $700 million in aid the Soviets provide annually to the revolution. Half that amount, averaging a million dollars a day, is devoted to defense costs, funds Castro has used to build the most well equipped fighting force Latin America has ever known. Presently, these forces number 200,000 men and women, and these in turn are backed by an armed militia of 300,000. Never before has Cuba been so well defended; and never better characterized than by Maceo's words, "Who ever dares grab Cuba will only gather the dust of its bloodstained soil-If he doesn't die in the attempt." [Note: According to the testimony of numerous Department of Defense intelligence experts-among them Paul F. Wallner, western area analyst, Major General Richard R. Stewart, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Commander John P. Halkin, Soviet area analyst-these forces and weapons are defensive in nature only, "posing no offensive threat to the United States." House Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 26, 1972.]
But, is this reason enough to continue trying to isolate and blockade Cuba? After all, that is what spurred Castro to align himself so deeply with the Soviet Union in the first place. The wiser course might be to ease the tensions that exist so that the Cubans can get on with the arduous tasks of development. [The burden of these military expenditures is very great for the Cuban Revolution. Nearly 6% of their total GNP is channeled into defense. That's roughly $1,500 expended annually on every Cuban wearing a uniform. World Military Expendiures, 1,971; U.S. Arms Control Agency.]
As for the argument that the military presence of the Soviet Union in Cuba is a threat to the United States, I would suggest that such a threat is meaningless when there are I.C.B.M.'s and missile launching submarines that can approach closer to our shores than the 90 miles that separate us from Cuba across the Florida Straits.
With respect to the issue of "subversion", I agree with those who suggest that the Cubans have reduced in number their commitment to armed revolution. I wouldn't attribute this exclusively-or even in large part-however, to Soviet pressure, although the Soviets for many years have advocated a low profile route to revolution. Leftist coalitions have become their favored method of assuming power.
My view nevertheless is that Fidel is just as committed to socialist revolution in the Americas as he has always been, perhaps even optimistically more so these

days given the Chilean experience and the emergence of nationalist movements throughout the Southern Hemisphere. It's just that he has analyzed conditions as they are and accepts the fact that there is more than one route to revolution.
But is Castro's commitment to revolution a valid reason to refuse to normalize relations with him? China has been actively supporting North Vietnam throughout the decade we've been at war in South East Asia, a war that has cost dearly, and yet we've now had t~he President raising toasts to better relations with the Chinese. The training programs Cuba organizes for Latin American revolutionaries somehow don't seem in any way comparable, particularly when they are so few in number. [Note: According to D.J.A. analysts, It is difficult to determine either the amount or type of support for any particular group. Insome cases, Castro's efforts are limited to propaganda attacks against the existing government or in favor of a, particular organization. In other cases, 'hie may train selected insurgents in Cuba, or provide financial assistance . . At the same time, however, it is clear that Cuban support for Latin American insurgents is at a low level."]
The point I think that needs to be made here is that by trying to isolate Cuba, the United States isn't going to prevent revolution, either of a nationalist and/or Socialist variety; the notion that revolution can bie exported is a falacy, one that even Fidel Castro has learned by now.
No, revolution will comec to Latin America because internally conditions there are so bad, the poverty, unemployment and inequities of the population so great, that the Cuban class on Molotov cocktails isn't going to make that much "f a difference.
Hostility: For 12 years now, the United States has enforced a policy of economic, political and diplomatic isolation of Cuba, the imposition of a blockade its defenders have called the "denial policy". Essentially it was supposed to have achieved four objectives: To curtail subversion throughout the hemisphere; to create economic hardship so as to defuse support for Castro's leadership;, to discourage other Latin American states from identifying with the Cuban Revolution or Socialism; and to increase the cost of the Soviet Union's support of Cuba to the point where it became nonproductive or impossible to continue.
[Those goals, as announced by George Ball while Under Secretary of State in a speech at Roanoke, Virginia, on April 23, 1964, were as follows:
"The objectives of the blockade, the economic denial policy, is first to reduce the will and ability of the Cubani regime to export subversion and violence to other American states; second to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests; third, to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere; and fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere."
Robert A. Hurwitch has reaffirmed the "Isolation" policy on several occasions before the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. Note: 8 July 1970; 20 July 1971; and again on 4 April 1973.]
How successful has the "denial policy" been?
If subversion has been curtailed in the hemisphere, it is much more likely due to the counter-insurgency, O.P.S. and A.I.D. programs that have been designed to cope directly with revolutionary movements rather than the blockade itself. If anything, isolating Cuba has made the United States appear even more objectionable to the revolutionaries operating throughout Latin America.
Internally the "denial policy" has strengthened rather than weakened the revolution, Castro having skillfully (who could blame him?) employed the blockade to rally the Cuban people behind him. Indeed, if anything, the "Colossus of theNorth" has made Fidel more popular with the masses than he might otherwise have been, had the United States allowed events to take their own course.
The external threat posed by the blockade has also provided the impetus for strengthening the armed forces, the committees for the defense of the revolution and the security apparatus, all armed, competent and loyal to the leadership.
And economically, while conditions are not good, the exasperation that exists about them is more apt to be directed toward the United States rather than at the party or administrators who would otherwise take responsibility for their own mismanagement, maintenance problems, or poor organizational ability. Meanwhile I might add, Cuba's economy is limping along, slowly improving, far from a state of collapse as often reported.
lApart from the massive injections of Soviet aide, another reason for the ineffectiveness of the "Policy of economic denial" is the trade Cuba freely carries-

on ,with Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain aid France. As a result, one boards British-made Leyland buses in the streets of Havana, tours in the Italianmade Alfa Romeo, consumes fish caught off the Spanish-built fishing boats, and wears a shirt knit by an Irish-made textile machine.]
Now, what of the objective to isolate Cuba diplomatically from the rest of the hemisphere?
Clearly the cracks have 'begun to show. Within the past two years we've witnessed Cuba establish diplomatic ties.with six Latin American nations (Chile, Peru, Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, and Trinidad). Three, perhaps four more are likely to follow within the next year (Ecuador, Panama, Argentina and Venezuela).
In six major speeches over the past few years, Fidel Castro has stressed the major importance of these links for the revolution.
"We are far from being impatient. We are in no hurry whatsoever. We will wait and watch as, one by one, those countries break away from the past; as, one by one they make their revolutions. And, to the extent that truly revolutionary states come into being, so will the natural, indispensable ties between them and us develop.
" And so we wait, because we will see, one by one, the countries of Latin America breaking their chains, tearing down the old structures as our country did-and taking the road to revolution, the road to progress.
"How long will we have to wait? We will wait as long as it is necessary: 10, 20, 30 years if necessary. Of course, nobody should be misled into believing that we will have to wait that long.
We can say that, as far as relations are concerned, our country has followed, is following and will continue to follow a policy based on strict principles. In the statements we made in July, 1969, regarding what our attitude would be in conneetion with various processes and governments, we said that trade relations had a relative importance for us, that the important thing was the process, that we were more interested in the development of revolutionary processes in Latin America, that we were interested in the development and establishment of independent governments and that we were interested in governments that would defend their national interests and'their national wealth and that would act independently of Yankee imperialism."
As for discouraging the Soviet Union from establishing a toe hold in the Western Hemisphere, that too has not been very successful. The Soviet leadership apparently thinks the benefits to be derived from continued support of Cuba outweigh the costs.
[Benefits: Cuba's support in the Sino-Soviet split; long term political and economic gains to be made through Cuba in Latin America; naval anchorage or bases in the Caribbean; alteration of the strategic balance of power vis-a-vis the United States.
Cost: to date, '$4 billion in credits and military aid; long term commitments to support Cuba's development until 1986, with interest free loans plus aid for a project list that reads like a full scale blueprint for development.]
Conclusion: If therefore the diplomacy of isolation and! embargo has been a failure, clearly a new more realistic policy must be initiated, one that not only shapes our attitudes and actions toward Cuba, but Latin Ameripa as well, Underlying such a policy should be an acceptance of ideological pluralism in the hemisphere, an acceptance of economic and political systems different from our own.
With regard to Cuba, the United States should move to normalize relations with the following intentions:
First, to end the economic and diplomatic blockade we've imposed upon Cuba; Second, to discuss an end to restriction on travel, commercial air service between Cuba and the United States;
Third, to speed the reunification of refugee families and the possible release of .political prisoners now held in Cuba;
Fourth, to offer to renegotiate the U.S. Navy's lease of Guantanamo, with the possibility that both the United States and the Soviet Union would mutually ,Tedue their military presence on Cuban soil; and
Fifth, to seek settlement claims for those individuals or corporations that have
-not already taken tax writeoffs for expropriations.
,Fo Fidel Castro, normalization would mean an end to both tbe diplomatic ,and economic blockade with, one hopes, its consequent security and reduction of military spending. Such savings as there would undoubtedly be could then be

diverted into economic or social development programs. Normalization would also provide Cuba access to badly needed development loans from the I.D.B. as well as techiical assistance for mechanization of the Cuban sugar crop.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to appear before you and your committee.
Let me very quickly make my principal points.
1. I believe that it is no longer, if ever it was-and I doubt that it ever wasin the national interests of the United States to pursue an exclusionary policy toward Cuba.
2. I believe that the interests of the more than eight and one-half million Cubans who are on the island of Cuba would be best served by an end to the United States-sponsored OAS program of political ostraxism and economic
3. I believe that the interests of hemispheric harmony and world peace would be advanced by a radical change in United States policy toward Cuba.
4. With regard to the interests of the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees, I believe that those interests are not well served by the maintenance of present policy: if the refugees axe to receive satisfaction, redress or compensation at all, those can come only through a policy of negotiation if not accommodation. They cannot come through a continuation of the present policy of hostile confrontation.
5. With regard to the interests of United States citizens and United States corporations adversely affected by the actions of the present Cuban government, I do not see those interests being protected or advanced by present United States police.
These are not novel beliefs. I have been expressing them for years as have many of my colleagues in the university community, the community of the press, the community of the foundations, the community of business, and, to a quite surprising extent, the community of the Cuban refugees. Evidently, if the-historical record is an accurate guide, these beliefs have not been shared by those who have controlled official Cuban policy during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations. Or, if they have been shared, they have been overridden by countervailing beliefs, among them perhaps the following:
1. That a big power (i.e., the United States) is not to be intimidated by a little power (i.e., Cuba).
2. That a Marxist-Leninist government in the Western Hemisphere is by its totalitarian nature incompatible with the professed democratic values of the states of the region.
3. That the present government of Cuba, allied as it is with the Soviet Union poses a direct and serious strategic threat to the military security of the United States.
4. That the present government of Cuba, through the pronouncements and acts of its leader, has sought to undermine and destroy-the bases of cooperative interaction between the United States and the other states of Latin America.
5. That public opinion in the United States is adamantly opposed to a shift in United States Cuba policy.
Gentlemen, frankly I don't know how to answer those arguments. I can see that in the five-polar world in which Dr. Kissinger moves, Cuba is weak and insignificant and that, therefore, the kinds of accommodations and adjustments which he-and the President-see as being appropriate vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union need not, on the grounds of effective international power, be taken into account in our dealings with Cuba. But I had always believed-and I continue to believe-that the United States could not survive as the United States we know and love with no firmer base than respect for power.
I cannot understand why a Marxist-Leninist government in the Western Hemisphere is intrinsically so much more despicable than a Marxist-Leninist government in China or in th- Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe-and this administration at least is dealing comfortably with such regimes in all those areas.
I cannot see, in this era of int-rcontinental missiles, of incalculable underseas capability, and of critical competition for scarce economic resources around the world, that Cuba is the site of a major strategic threat to the United States.

And I cannot see that the windy rhetoric and the dismal insurrectionary performance of the present Cuban leader in his efforts to promote revolutionary violence in Latin America really have a great deal to do with current Latin American dissatisfaction with the United States in the matter of hemispheric relations. Let me go further: I do think that if I were a Latin American peasant, I doubt that I would take seriously the rhetoric of either Fidel Castro or that of our staunch allies there like Stroessner in Paraguay, Medici in Brazil, Somoza in Nicaragua or Balaguer in the Dominican Republic.
As for United States public opinion, is it not the task of the President to inform and guide that opinion? And is there any evidence at all to indicate that the public would not follow the President without important dissent were he to announce that a change in Cuba policy was called for?
I had not until a moment ago mentioned Premier Castro's name. The reason should be clear. I do not believe Castro should determine our Cuba policy. I think our present policy suits Castro's purposes almost perfectly. He would have a very great deal to lose and comparatively little to gain should we change it.
Take, for instance, the matter of Guantanamo Bay. To whom is it of greater usefulness: to Fidel as the symbol of imperialist domination? or to us as a warm water haven of only very marginal usefulness? Take this economic denial program: Whom is it helping? Castro is now trading with our major allies as well as with other countries around the world, and with the passing of every month the Cuban economy--both its markets and its resources-becomes more remote and difficult of access to our producers and traders. Take the policy of political ostracism; it is being eroded here in the Western Hemisphere before our eyes. Whose interests are we serving? Ours or Fidel Castro's?
My judgment is that we, the United States, should take the first steps to ease our relations with Castro's Cuba. Let Castro refuse our initiatives-which he very likely would do. But let us at least make the effort to shift Vhe onus for those many aspects of failure in Castro's revolutionary effort from our shoulders to his.
Should we fail to do this, I am almost certain that we will find ourselves increasingly isolated in this hemisphere and badly out of phase with political and economic currents in the rest of the world.

U.S. policy toward Cuba. lac
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