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Aviation digest

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Title:
Aviation digest
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Aviat. dig.
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Fort Rucker, AL
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Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence
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v. : ill. ; 28 cm.

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Aeronautics -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Private flying -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Aeronautics ( fast )
Private flying ( fast )
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Periodicals. ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
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ocm12378726
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TL501 .A8145 ( lcc )
629.13/005 ( ddc )

Related Items

Preceded by:
Aviation magazine (Brookfield, Conn.)

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Mission Command 30 Army Aviation Expeditionary Operations in an Austere Environment 18 Fighting Platoons 6 Modifying Situational Awareness

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Ocial: GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 181003 MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Chief of Sta Commanding General, USAACE MG William K. Gayler DOTD Director: COL Joseph S. Degliuomini https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd Doctrine Division Division Chief: LTC Pete Houtkooper https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/389908 The Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE), Fort Rucker, AL 36362 produces the Aviation Digest quarterly for the professional ex change of information related to all issues pertaining to Army Aviation. The articles presented here contain the opinion and experiences of the authors and should not be construed as approved Army policy or doctrine. Aviation Digest is approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. This publication is available through electronic media only by accessing the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website and is intended for the use of command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. This and all previous issues of Aviation Digest are available on the DOTD AKO web site at https://www. us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd Submit articles or direct comments pertaining to the Aviation Digest to: usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx. aviation-digest@mail.mil. About the Cover: U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, receive and provide guidance for attack operations in the Tactical Operations Center at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, April 16, 2016. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Austin M. Riel, Operations Group, National Training Center)Aviation Digest AprilJune 20182

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Photo by CPT Jessica Tait Managing Editor Amy Barrett Art Director Brian White Contact usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx. aviation-digest@mail.mil Author GuidelinesArticles prepared for Aviation Digest should relate directly to Army aviation or reect a subject that directly relates to the aviation professional. Submit the article to the Aviation Digest mailbox at usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx.aviation-digest@mail. mil. Please note that Aviation Digest does not accept previously published work or simultaneous submissions. This prevents an overlap of material in like publications with a similar or same audience. Please submit articles via MS Word document format. Articles should not exceed 3500 words. Include a brief biography (50 word maximum) with your article. We invite military authors to include years of military service, signicant previous assignments, and aircraft qualications in their biographies. Aviation Digest editorial style guidelines follow the American Psychological Association Publication Manual, 6th edition; however, Digest sta will incorporate all necessary grammar, syntax, and style corrections to the text to meet publication standards and redesign visual materials for clarity, as necessary. Please limit references to a maximum of 20 per article. These changes may be coordinated with the authors to ensure the content remains accurate and reects the authors original thoughts and intent. Visual materials such as photographs, drawings, charts, or graphs supporting the article should be included as separate enclosures. Please include credits with all photographs. All visual materials should be high-resolution images (preferably set at a resolution of 300 ppi) saved in TIFF or JPEG format. For Ocial Use Only or Classied images will be rejected. Non-military authors should submit authorization for Aviation Digest to print their material. This can be an email stating that Aviation Digest has permission to print the submitted article. Additionally, the author should provide a separate comment indicating that there is no copyright restriction on the use of the submitted material. The Aviation Digest upcoming article deadline and publication schedule is as follows: JulySeptember 2018 issue articles due June 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about August 15, 2018) OctoberDecember 2018 issue articles due September 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about November 15, 2018) January-March 2019 issue nal articles due December 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about February 15, 2019) April-June 2019 issue articles due March 1, 2019 (magazine published on or about May 15, 2019) Authors are asked to observe posted deadlines to ensure the Aviation Digest sta has adequate time to receive, edit, and layout materials for publication. 3https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Aviator Perception By CW2 Anya K. Sharman n 2003, David R. Hunter published a paper in the In ternational Journal of Aviation Psychology entitled Measuring General Aviation Pilot Judgment Us ing a Situational Judgement Technique. Hunters article described two studies led to develop and evalu ate a Situational Judgement Test (SJT) demonstrating that pilots who scored higher on the SJT had fewer haz ardous events. The ndings led to an additional study Hunter and his coauthor, John E. Stewart, published in the same journal entitled Safety Locus of Control (LOC) and Accident Involvement among Army Aviators (2012). The additional study further claried judgement ability in terms of internal and external controls. The 2012 study found a higher accident rate among pilots who scored lower in perceived internal control. The bot tom line is that pilots who believe they can maintain control are generally involved in fewer accidents. It is my opinion that Army aviation should consider funding further studies in order to develop quantiable data on each pilot, assigning a score in judgment and decisionmaking ability. Locus of control is dened as a personality trait that re ects the degree to which a person perceives events to be under his or her own control (internal locus of con trol) or under the control of outside forces (external lo cus of control). The benets of expanding the 2012 study and analyzing the results show potential for use in the assessment of the aeronautical decision-making (ADM) process. The ADM process is a systematic approach to the mental process used by pilots to consistently deter mine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances. It is what a pilot intends to do based on the latest information he or she has (Federal Avia tion Administration, n.d.). The analysis results for each pilot could be useful in the implementation of readiness levels, crew mixes, and risk assessments. Army aviation currently evaluates each pilot on judgement and maturity as part of readiness level (RL) progression training (RL3 [uncertied], RL2 [receives mission-oriented training], and RL1 [certied]), for consideration of pilot-in-command (PC), and for consideration of air mission Com mander (AMC). If instructor pilots (IPs) assigned a score to each pilot based on a predetermined guideline and the score combined with the in dividuals locus score, the informa tion would assist the Commander in determining when to assign a pilot as a PC or AMC. This analysis would provide the Commander with a scientic, non emotion-based way of making decisions that could poten tially prevent future accidents. Application of these ndings would give the unit a clearer picture of how the aviator perceives himself or herself, his or her ight abilities, and how to implement his or her own safety controls. Pilot judgment is a combination of several concepts including cognitive ability, task-spe cic knowledge, and personality. For the purpose of both studies, the term pilot judgement was sepa rated into two subcategories: ra tional judgement and motivational judgement. RATIONAL JUDGEMENT is the ability to diagnose an in-ight is sue, specify courses of action, and assess risk associated with each al ternative. MOTIVATIONAL JUDGMENT is the motivation to choose and execute a suitable course of action within the time available. An assigned score in pilot judge ment during an emergency would greatly inuence how crews are bat tle rostered. Pilots lower in perceived internal control tended to experience more hazardous aviation events. The SJT is invaluable at the unit level to show a pilot his or her shortfalls in decision-making and helping him or her to become more self-aware. Hunter endorsed the scale as a selfAN IMPERATIVE SAFETY ISSUE I Aviation Digest AprilJune 20184

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awareness exercise for pilots wish ing to explore potential aspects of their personality that could place them at greater risk for accident in volvement (Hunter, 2003). The idea behind this research was to develop a way to measure and assess LOC, hazardous events, safety-related at titudes, and risk orientation among U.S. Army aviators. Instructor Pilots and Commanders would be able to use this new device to develop ap plicable instruction for pilots with a low SJT score who may be at a greater risk of being involved in a hazardous event. The Commander would have a greater array of tools available when determining how to apply appropriate risk-mitigation techniques. Once all the data are taken into ac count, the Commander would be better prepared to mitigate risk while battle rostering or creating ight schedules. This would allow for tailored and specied crews based on self-awareness, person ality traits, and known habits. I be lieve the Army LOC scale needs im mediate implementation to develop aviator self-awareness of personal risk factors. As Hunter explains, one goal of military aviation train ing is to instill the belief that upon completion, an aviator is able to in uence the outcome of the military situations that they will encounter proactively. Implementation of this evidence-based study into daily as pects of safety and risk-mitigation techniques would enhance crew understanding, accident proles, and further development of a Com manders control base. References: 5https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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MODIFYING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: PERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND PRECISION ARE FANTASYBy MAJ John Q. BoltonArmy mission command, signicantly inuenced by German concepts of mission orders, Auftrag staktik (mission-type tactics), Schwerpunkt (fo cal or center point), and the Truppenfuehrung (the Weh rmachts WWII eld manual), emphasizes subordinate initiative within the framework of commanders intent (Department of the Army [DA], 2012; Hughes, 1986). Combined with the Army Operating Concept, mission command reects a now-codied common-sense ap proach to command in a complex environment. How ever, fully implementing mission command within the Army remains a challenge on both conceptual and prac tical levels. Conceptually, leaders fail to understand how to develop the mutual trust mission command requires while subordinates resent any oversight as microman agement (Hastings, 2017). Practically, Army systems inhibit mission command by demanding precision and instantaneous results. *Though situational understanding is the doctrinal term, situational awareness is more common.Whether a Prussian/German system is appropriate, any army serving a multiethnic, diverse democratic so ciety is another debate; this paper is concerned with our Armys fascina tion with statistics, numerical precision, and Information Dominance. The Armys devotion toward analyt ics, particularly demonstrated by Digital Mission Command Systems (DMCS), like the Command Post of the Future (CPOF), places undue emphasis on data and inhibits the exercise of mission command as de scribed in doctrine (Bolton, 2017). This emphasis leads to overem phasizing data and systems to the detriment of analysis and context. Using DMCS as a panacea, rather than as means to enhance mission command, we expect our digital systems to derive precision from an imprecise, complex world, which in evitably causes frustration and fail ure. Combined with American edu cational heuristics, our systems do not prepare us for battleeld chaos. This paper analyzes how the Armys bureaucratic mindset, educational heuristics, and focus on big data negatively affect developing situ ational awareness.* It argues that the Armys bureaucratic mindset, common throughout the Army and resident in DMCS, presumes an abil ity to quantify the world based on faulty determinative assumptions. After illustrating the challenges as sociated with DMCS, this paper con cludes by describing an alternate framework Soldiers and leaders can use to understand their operation al environment or gain situational awareness. BUREAUCRATIC MINDSETMACHINES DONT FIGHT WARS. TERRAIN DOESNT FIGHT WARS. HUMANS FIGHT WARS. YOU MUST GET INTO THE MIND OF HUMANS. THATS WHERE THE BATTLES ARE WONCOL JOHN BOYD.Aviation Digest AprilJune 20186

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While the Army espouses mission command, its systems for manag ing, tracking, and commanding are overwhelmingly bureaucratic. Sometimes this bureaucracy makes sense, but overall, it is pernicious to leader development. For example, except at the local level, ofcer as signment choices are very limited. The personnel system prescribes career paths, which may actually curtail critical thinking across a ca reer (Ogden, 2017). It also reduces, as a matter of convenience, ofcers to a series of data pointsto be in terchangeably managed by a re volving series of career managers. Precision and exact numbers are bureaucratic tenets. Although Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 acknowledges that hu man, not data exchanges are critical to success, a bureaucratic mindset still permeates both doctrine and operations (DA, 2012). Additionally, the fact remains that the Armys staff training, exercises, and evalu ations are based on [adhering] to processes and doctrine rather than attain[ing] rapid and decisive re sults (Rebuck, 2017). This paradigm inhibits rapid de cision-making by forcing micro management onto organizations yearning for Mission Command. The resulting cognitive dissonance creates resentment because it de stroys the trust that GEN Martin Dempsey called the moral sinew that binds our force together (Dempsey, 2012). Like adherence to deterministic theories, Army pathol ogies foster a fear of uncertainty and a squeamish aversion to risk, each of which is anathema to a true mission command philosophy (Re buck, 2017). Conversely, building im plicit trust, while requiring time, can build self-actuating teams based on a shared understanding (Ferguson, 2017). EDUCATION VS. REALITY: THE NATURAL WORLD DOESNT BEND TO OUR WILLThe need to quantify and codify everything reects a pernicious trait of American education. Americans habitually break everything down into parts, assuming that the parts act as composite elements, working together. We assume we can quantify everything. Americans routinely ignore conrma tion bias and imprint our methods onto adversaries who do not man, train, or equip forces the same (OConnell, 2017). Our metrics focus on what matters to us, not the enemy. The American military focuses on equipment and troops; when the enemy may employ civilians and homemade bombs; we develop hierarchical network charts when the enemy operates along tribal and family circles. This a tenet of the American Way of War and the thesis of the seminal report on that war, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing (Weigley, 1977; Komer, 1972). In Vietnam, analog computers would condently declare a village 35 percent pacieddata that even if somehow accurate, reected a startling lack of understanding about how local conditions and human actors relate (Burns & Novick, 2017). Now, in Afghanistan, we conduct assessments based on remote-sensing, third-party accounts, and often conjecture, in order to validate assumptions (or desires). Americans leave school accustomed to physical models largely developed in the late 19th century. Newton gave us simple rules: Force is mass times ac celeration; gravity is the attraction between point masses. These rules and models are simple, easy, and wrong; our education presumes a determin ism that does not exist. Models work well for mechanical systems because we control the environment, reducing chance and friction. But, with human systems, we dont have this luxury. We may seek to operationalize big data (Smith, 2017), but doing so typically requires environments with predictable conditions and well-dened rulesthink Moneyball (Lewis, 2003)not the chaos of combat. Certainty rarely exists in the real world, particularly against a thinking, adaptive enemy shrouded by the fog of war. The natural world reveals just how quickly simplicity transitions to complex amid real-world friction and imprecision. While a simple spring mass has linear solutions solvable at the high-school level; adding another spring mass to the system creates a much more difcult problem because the interactions between elements are now complex. Likewise, while 16th-century physicists developed ways to predict the motion of two bodies such as the earth and the moon, just adding the sun creates an unsolvable problem. While computers can predict accurate results, interpreting them requires human expertise. Because American education teaches simplied models of the world, we be 7https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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come frustrated when things unfold in an irregular, disorderly, unpredict able manner even though some of our best minds try [to make them] more regular, orderly, and predictable (Boyd, 2017). The Army is accustomed to specics regardless of real-world complexity. Plans often lack context (particularly cultural context) and expect precise results (McLean, 2017). But nonlinearity, chaos, and unknowns combine to make clear that general friction will persist more or less undiminished in fu ture war regardless of technological developments (Watts, 1996). So while Army planners speak of synchronization and the simultaneity of effects, the environment inevitably makes it difcult to do so. We can synchronize me chanical clocks; people are more difcult. In this context, issues with Army DMCS become clear.MISSION COMMAND SYSTEMS: OUR COMPUTERS LIE TO US, AND WE LIKE ITWE KNOW HOW CRUEL THE TRUTH OFTEN IS, AND WE WONDER WHETHER THE DELUSION IS NOT MORE CONSOLINGJULES HENRI POINCAR, FRENCH MATHEMATICIAN .Fundamentally, intelligence in war is inductive; we see only bits of the enemy; we see small units or small effects. This forces us to synthesize the enemys intentions from composite parts and actions, all of which are unclear. But DMCS are deductive: they start from a big picture and work toward smaller details. Digital Mission Command Systems force us to dene the broad conditions, and critically, assumptions about the enemy before we even see him. As a result, we frame assumptions implicitly without evidence. This framing restricts our conceptual ability and limits our imagination with regard to the enemys capacity, intentions, and actions. WE WILL REQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES, CULTURES, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, AND ABOVE ALL HISTORYPRECISELY WHAT TECH NOCRATS IGNORE BECAUSE SUCH KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE QUANTI FIED AND MEASURED. WHAT MATTERS MOST IN WAR IS WHAT IS IN THE MIND OF ONES ADVERSARY (MURRAY, 1997). Emerging data drive immediate action, not analysis, because they convey authority. This situation is opposite of what complex situations require, even though Army doctrine proposes a linear progression from data to under standing. This is problematic because this simple methodology assumes that data are precise, accurate, obtainable, and useful. Field Manual (FM) 6-22 Army Leadership (2006) recommends leaders spend time analyzing situations to determine what the real problem is. Leaders should examine a problem in-depth, from multiple points of view (DA, 2006), without settling on the rst answer that comes to mind. Data may create a picture, but do not generate understanding, just a false sense of knowing. Understanding is more important; developing technology faster than people is dangerous (Miraldi, 2017). Though the Army has always loved data, it evolved into an obsession in the 1990s after the Gulf War. Emerging technology caused some to believe that we could achieve information domi nancein effect, knowing every thing. Military leaders, defense an alysts, and even some scholars let hubris get the best of them, believ ing that technology had rendered history, culture, and the traditional understanding of war irrelevant; serious scholars echoed this ahis torical judgement (Murray, 1997). The scholars ignored history and proposed that new technology had created a Revolution in Military Af fairs (RMA). According to LTG Her bert Raymond McMaster, Concepts with catchy titles such as Shock and Awe and Rapid, Decisive Op erations promised fast, cheap, and efcient victories in future war (HR McMaster, 2014). One of the stron gest RMA advocates was Vice Chair man of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William Owens, who proposed sys tems that would somehow eliminate the fog of war (SourceWatch, 2008; Murray, 1997). Owens echoed the failed technology-driven policies of the McNamara Defense Department that created boondoggles like the F-101 and Igloo White, to say noth ing of the hubris that escalated the war in Vietnam (Bolton, 2015; Cor rell, 2004; Uziel, 2017). During the RMA peak of the 1990s and 2000s, the Army poured billions of dollars into the Future Combat System, CPOF, and other systems, some of which were canceled, and all of which were or are less than adver tised (Drew, 2009).COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE ALWAYS A GAMBLE AND WE NEED TO RELY ON THE GAM BLERS, NOT THE DICECOL. MIKE PIETRUCHA, 2016.In reality, these systems play to our biases, declaring situational awareness when we only know the positions of our own forces with certainty. No matter their actual ef fectiveness, these DMCS speak with authority, giving false condence that the system we are using is the most efcient (A. Steadman, 2014). DMCS concepts rely on the presumption that we can eliminate Aviation Digest AprilJune 20188

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the fog of war and obliterate friction with the seamless application of some new technology (Pietrucha, 2016). As simplifying heuristics fail ing in the real world, our DMCS pre disposes us frustration against the reality of warfare when it shows up, shrouded in smoke, beset by friction, and showered in uncertain ty (Pietrucha, 2016). This emphasis is wrong; the Army is focusing on unproven or undeveloped technol ogy when it should be focusing on training our people with dynamic scenarios that will reveal both their knowledge of the processes and their willingness to think beyond the checklist (Steadman, 2014). Even if achievable, information dom inance was always illusory. Knowing the battleeld does not necessar ily translate into success against an active enemy, because merely possessing information is not actu ally an indication of superiority over an adversary; information is not so much an end in itself as one means among others (Pietrucha, 2016). Our systems rarely addressed the pitfalls of too much data. According to Col. Mike Pietrucha, U.S. Air Force strategist, Machines may help cat egorize what is possible, which is a long way from determining what is correct. Warfare is not an optimization problem (Pietrucha, 2016). Additionally, data overloads actu ally inhibits command by creating more uncertainly or confusion than simpler systems would produce. Our ability to train agile and adaptive leaders, who succeed regardless of technology, is more important than data systems. While the Army rolled through Iraqi defenses in both 1991 and 2003, technology only exacerbated differ ences between American and Iraq forces; what won the day was com petence (Biddle, 1996). Rapid suc cess cemented the supposed pre eminence of American forces, but this was more the exception proving the rule rather than a herald of a new warfare form. Static positions adopted in Iraq afterward cement ed an addiction to data. Operating from xed sites with unlimited band width against an overmatched enemy entrenched a reliance on con nectivity that still challenges Army units (Bolton, 2017). Once the en emy adjusted to American systems, rhythms, and limitations our technical superiority didnt count for much as troops found themselves ghting an ambiguous, lethal enemy hiding among the people.CONCLUSIONITS VERY DIFFICULT TO DISPENSE IGNORANCE IF YOU RETAIN ARROGANCEGEN SAM WILSON.How do we respond to a battleeld where error, incompleteness, entropy, quantum uncertainty, and human ckleness combine with nonlinear, complex systems to cre ate unknowing? To paraphrase former President Ronald Reagan, its a simple answer after all (JohnJ2427, 2007). The answer lies in the principles of Mission Com mand, particularly building teams through mutual trust and creating shared understanding (DA, 2012). Mission Command is not a check list method. It relies on acceptance of an imperfect, unclear world (Ca ligari, 2017). It requires substantial trust and understanding between echelonspersonal, substantive trust. Current systems cannot rep References: 9https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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licate this implicit trustand may often destroy it (Bolton, 2017). Implicit guidance and trust, though harder to develop, can enable unit action much quicker than even the best digital systems. The Army has forgotten that conict is chaos. Uncertainly is warfares preva lent characteristic. The Army must structure systems and relationships to foster implicit guidance and initiative, rather than collect and demand data. Relying on DCMS and rigid paradigms paralyzes leaders when the displayed information doesnt correspond with reality. Like a physics student encoun tering real-world friction for the rst time, we may fail to translate our edu cation to real-world usefulness. The Army must develop a broader conception of situational awareness, which allows for fog and friction, and room for our understanding to change based on conditions, not preconceptions. Making Soldiers perception broader and more deliberate will increase the Armys capability to deal with uncertainty and disorder. Situational awareness is understanding that allows us to re match our perceived understanding with eventsa continuous reorientation process (Boyd, 1976). Commanders create and sustain shared understand ing through collaboration and dialogue within their organizations to fa cilitate unity of effort. Therefore, situational awareness is a uid un derstanding of the environment, reecting less the discrete knowns as opposed to deeper facets of the enemy and human terrain. The Army must stop insisting on precision information at the expense of broader understanding. In short, Army training and systems must be comfortable with not knowing and acting without knowledge. Digital systems can only augment this process, not replace it; too often DMCS hinder command by creating the illusion or expectation of control rather than the reality of chaotic combat (CPT Ty Stephens, personal communica tion, November 10, 2017). The Army should look to x DMCS by eschewing bloated software for traditional, faster, and cheaper analog methods, only augmented when DMCS provide clear benets. Unit training must focus on preparing Soldiers for complex environments where they will make choices with imperfect information and only vague instructions (Pietrucha, 2016). Leader training must require ofcers to build teams and give clearance guid ance so subordinates can act without instruction. We much continually re match our mental/physical orientation with [the] changing world so that we can continue to thrive and grow in it (Boyd, 2017). Through broad ob servations and a continuous reori entation by astute leaders schooled in the principles of Mission Com mand, we can discern the enemys intentions and accustom ourselves (and our plans) to his actions, en abling success far beyond the prom ises of technical solutions. References: Aviation Digest AprilJune 201810

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An Army Attack Aviation Company participat ing in Atlantic Resolve 2.0 is unable to build mission readiness in its training require ments. All exercises are currently ground-focused and aviation supported but not designed to ensure the aviation company is receiving quality training. Over time this leads to degradation in prociency for attack aviation due to the operations tempo (OP TEMPO) requirements of having multiple, large-scale exercises planned back-to-back. This high OPTEM PO prevents the aviation company from conducting after action reviews, rening its training plan, and mitigating the identied training deciencies be tween exercises. One possible x for these decien cies is to train the aviation company in their mis sion essential tasks (METs) prior to deployment as a rotational force and allow them to focus exclusively on enabling the ground force commanders training during the rotation.I took command of an AH-64D com pany in May 2017, after the company had been in Germany for 2 months, as part of Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Two weeks after taking command, our battalion participated in the Com bined Resolve VIII (CBR VIII) exer cise at the Joint Multinational Read iness Center (JMRC) in Germany. Our battalion commanded the aviation task force, supporting a U.S. ROTATIONAL AVIATION FORCE TRAININGBy CPT Timothy A. Hybart armored brigade combat team and two North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion (NATO) allies throughout the 20-day exercise. From my point of view, the JMRC training was entirely ground centric. Obviously, it was acknowledged that the aviation unit was present, but the established training goals were fully focused on accomplishing the ground force commanders training requirements. If the supporting aviation unit was able to receive train ing, then all the better; however, it was not a priority. The ight environment and air defense artillery (ADA) training capability present at JMRC is outstanding, but our ability to fully utilize the capabilities of the resources were hampered by the training goals established from the outset of the exercise. During the course of the exercise, we supported the ground force scheme of maneuver during primarily day missions. The valuable situational training exercise (STX) portion of the rotation was used to conduct joint terminal attack con troller (JTAC) certications and air assault security while the ground force operated independently. As we entered the force-on-force por tion of the exercise, it was obvious an attack aviation company was viewed only as an enabler to the ground force commanders training objectives and not as a maneuver element on the battleeld with its own training objectives. While on the surface this may not seem like a problem, the lack of focus on pro viding quality training for attack aviation meant nothing was organized to ensure my company was trained and ready to ght an actual decisive action ght after JMRC. My platoon leaders and Air Mission Command -photo by Charles Rosemond 11https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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ers needed the opportunity to plan and execute reconnaissance and attack operations against a wellprepared enemy force with ADA, but the missions focused on ground tasks or utilizing our company as an aerial quick reaction force (QRF). I am happy to support the ground force as they train, but enabling my company to train attack aviationspecic tasks is crucial to ensuring our companys ability to conduct operations against a complex en emy safely and successfully. During the course of the exercise (STX and force-on-force), my company was evaluated on just two METs: movement to contact and hasty at tack. Of those two, only the hasty attack was conducted under the requisite conditions necessary for us to attain a T rating under the Objective T standards of evaluation. We planned multiple iterations of deliberate attacks and zone recon naissance missions that would have enabled us to train further METs, but the ground force commanders plan changed so frequently that we were not able to execute those mis sions. If aviation training objectives were incorporated from the start of the exercise planning cyclenot just 2 months in advancethen the over all exercise training plan could be adjusted to allow those tasks to be trained. At JMRC, all of the needed resources were available to enable us to train any essential task on our MET list (METL); however, aviation training was not the focus due to the exercise design. Fifteen days after the completion of CBR VIII we travelled to Romania in support of Saber Guardian 17; a mul tinational training exercise conduct ed across Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. We were in very much the same situation regarding training as our JMRC experience. We sup ported ve different sub-exercises over the course of 30 days: One Fire Support Coordination Exercise, one scripted Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX), two multination al river crossings, and a nal weeklong platoon-level (for the ground commander) CALFEX. As I looked at the initial training schedule for Saber Guardian 17, it appeared that there would be many opportunities to train my company as we supported these exercises. There were multiple live-re events; battalion and company-level deep attacks and multiple missions were to be conducted during periods of darkness. In reality, the lack of ma neuver space and the extremely scripted nature of all of the exer cises negated much of the pos sible training value for attack avia tion. We were able to shoot, which is good training, but the size of the training areas minimized the ben et of using more than two aircraft, and most missions were support able with only one. As a result, while we were able to go through the full planning cycle for two deliberate at tacks, the lack of maneuver space, the range restrictions, and lack of an agreement on acceptable risk (between allied forces) limited the training value to my platoons during execution. Getica Saber, a sub-exercise of Sa ber Guardian 17, was billed as a mul tinational combined arms live-re exercise. My company was to con duct deliberate attacks in support of a U.S. armored brigade combat team, U.S. eld artillery, Romanian armor and eld artillery, and Ro manian attack aviation (rotary and xed wing). The reality was that the company spent 3 days conducting scripted dry and live-re rehearsals in order to participate in a 55-min ute live-re exhibition for visiting dignitaries on the fourth day. There was no maneuver allowed, and no planning was even neces sary on my part as every move ment we made onto and away from the range was scripted down to the minute and controlled by U.S. and Romanian JTACs from the viewing stands. My job as the company commander was to ensure my company trained and maintained prociency in at tack and reconnaissance operations. Specically, my job was to ensure the ability to execute those AH-64 Apache helicopters with C Company, 1-501st Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, y along the shoreline at Capu Midia, Romania, on July 17 during an air defense training event titled Tobruq Legacy. Exercise Saber Guardian 17 is a U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe-led exercise in the Black Sea Region that builds readiness and improves interoperability among the 20 Allies who participate. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Thomas Scaggs) Aviation Digest AprilJune 201812

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operations at night against an ad vanced enemy threat. My company was unable to achieve this level of training readiness while supporting the current regimen of exercises (as currently designed) established for aviation units in the European Com mand (EUCOM) Theater supporting Atlantic Resolve 2.0. From the start of the planning cycle, the training focus for these exercises must in corporate the needs of the aviation unit, as well as the ground force. We will build and maintain more combat power, using the same resources, if both the ground and aviation ma neuver units are able to accomplish their training goals during these ex ercises. There are multiple courses of action (COA) that could x the litany of is sues I have identied. If the exercise design side of the problem is going to be resolved, I believe it will re quire an individual of sufcient rank to attend the initial planning confer ences. I am not sure if that means a Major, a Lieutenant Colonel, or higher; however, it must be some one with enough pull to guarantee that aviation training needs are giv en proper voice and enough backing to make them a required slice of the training plan. A challenge with this COA is that this integration must happen at the initial planning con ference for each exercise. These planning conferences are held ap proximately 1 year prior to the exer cise execution, which is prior to the rotational aviation force being in theater. This schedule does not en able the training audience to have a voice for their proposed training objectives. Instead, it requires the rotational unit currently on ground to lay the groundwork for another units exercises, while still executing the current slate. This is not feasible if the goal is quality training for both the ground and aviation forces. An additional challenge is the cur rent OPTEMPO. During the rst 115 days in command, my company spent at total of 55 days in the eld (JMRC and Romania) and a total of 79 days with at least part of the com pany split away to support training exercisesoften in other countries. Of the 36 days that we were consolidated at home station (Germany), 16 of the 36 days were immediately prior to CBR VIII at JMRC, 15 of the 36 days were in between CBR VIII and Saber Guardian 17, and the re maining days were in between our return from Romania and the start of aerial gunnery. For training pur poses, this OPTEMPO is not sustain able because there was insufcient time to conduct full company recov ery operations between exercises. Those 36 days of consolidation were not adequate to focus on training the company, because our maintain ers and crew chiefs were doing their best to repair the aircraft for the next round of exercises. Our ground vehicles and eld equipment rarely received the full attention they re quired for parts and repairs. There was simply no extra time. Due to the exercise focus and our OPTEMPO while supporting Atlantic Resolve 2.0, the company returned to home station fully trained in only a few collective tasks and individual aviator skills. We gained or main tained prociency in only three of six company METs (deployment op erations, hasty attacks, movement to contact), while on average over the last 4 months, the pilots in my company have only been able to y a night mission once every 45 days. While this does technically meet the regulatory requirements of main taining currency in the aircraft, it barely enables the pilots to maintain prociency in basic ight tasks, let alone plan and execute deliberate attacks in our most complex mission prole. This struggle to maintain prociency makes it more difcult not just to progress junior pilots and enable them to gain valuable ight experience, but it makes every com plex night mission we are given that much more dangerous. Operational tempo drives a com panys training plan. If my company is slated for multiple, large-scale ex ercises supporting various U.S. and NATO forces, I am going to build a training plan based on what I think, or am told, we will be able to ac complish during those exercises. If there is no recovery time between exercises, then there is no room for me to adjust my training plan and attempt to make up training tasks prior to departure for the next exer cise. This creates a situation where a company that is unable to ac complish training goals during one exercise becomes less procient in all tasks because there is no time Photo by SPC Thomas Scaggs13https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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afterward to reinforce the training that does get accomplished. I am not asking for a lot of extra white space on the calendar, but each unit needs planned recovery time in order to recover from training, sufciently prepare for the next ex ercise, and establish what the goals of the training need to be in order to create the most well-trained and mission-ready unit possible. In order to maintain a well-trained aviation ghting force moving for ward, we need to re-evaluate the way we are incorporating aviation assets into the overall training plan. Objective T (the Armys system to better measure a units readiness to deploy) is very specic regarding what is required for a unit to obtain each prociency rating. If this is go ing to remain the standard for eval uation moving forward, we must en sure that every unit participating in an exercise is given the opportunity to execute their tasks appropriately. The resources are available, and the current slate of exercises could be very effective at producing an ex tremely procient and well-trained aviation company. However, I be lieve for this to happen, there must be a joint focus from the begin ning that is geared toward both the ground and aviation commanders being able to accomplish their train ing objectives. A solution for both the current ex ercise design and the OPTEMPO issues would be to treat the incom ing rotational aviation force only as a training enabler for the EUCOM Theater. If the rotational aviation force is complete with required METL training prior to departing for Europe, similar to the requirements for units departing on combat de ployments, this would allow the ro tational unit to focus solely on en suring the ground force is receiving the best possible training to achieve the ground force commanders intent. Each exercise could be designed to focus entirely on training the ground objec tives (no change to the current situation both in the Contigu ous U.S. and in EU COM). Additionally, any training that aviation assets receive while facilitating the exercises would be a bonus. The OP TEMPO could remain high (equipment re covery being the sole concern) as there would be little need to make up training between exercises. The sole objective for the rotational aviation force would be to travel the EUCOM Theater as needed to facilitate training for U.S. and Allied ground forces. Whether through changes in exercise design or an overall shift in the training goals of the rota tional aviation forces in Europe, the situ ation necessitates a change. As it cur rently stands, it is extremely difcult for an attack aviation company support ing a mission (e.g., Atlantic Resolve 2.0) to meet its training needs through ex ercise participation alone, and there is little open space on the calendar to plan anything further. Photo by SPC Thomas ScaggsAviation Digest AprilJune 201814

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SIGNAL SPEED OF ASSEMBLY GETTING A COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE INTO THE FIGHT On the 2nd of Feb ruary 2017, the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Torch party arrived in Nuremburg Airport, Ger many. We were the rst Soldiers on the ground to set conditions for a 9-month rotation in support of Atlantic Re solve 2.0. The core con cept of establishing our footprint in Europe was Speed of Assembly. It meant moving units quickly to their area of operation and efciently building mission com mand and logistical sup port nodes.The initial push into country relied heavily on automationsor in every day jargon, getting people internet access. An interesting question was elded to us in the mad scramble to bring the task force online. Why cant we just plug our Army laptops in and have them work? I thought of several clever respons es, none of them helpful. Keeping the ippant remarks to myself, I delved deeper into the problem. For the rst 14 days on the ground in Europe, we relied on the accepted solution of reimaging laptops from the Fort Drum (New York) image to the European image. This process wipes away the existing operating system and user data. We stopped reimaging after I received guid ance from the U.S. Army Europe G6 about an alternate method. Fol lowing a set of congura tion changes, we would make the Fort Drum laptops work on the European network and keep user data intact. The rst lap top took me 4 hours to complete manually. Our success in the endeavor came up at a meeting a few days later. So, the Brigade S3, said. Ive heard you are making our Fort Drum computers work on the network here in Europe without reimaging. You need to be able to explain that. No problem, sir, I said, my face deadpan. Its a simple 57-step pro cess. Laughter sounded throughout the room from the rest of the staff, while the Brigade S3 rolled his eyes and moved onto the next slide. By CPT Matthew A. SchmiedickePhoto by SGT Victor Everhart15https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Granted, the 57-step process was nowhere near as simple as I made it out to be, but with a script built by the European System Center Conguration Manager team, the process turned from 57 steps to 30, then to 20, and nally 10. The last version of the script converted a computer to work on the European network in 30 minutes. The question lingered on, though. Why couldnt we just take our com puters from the States and have them work anywhere in the world, as long as they plugged into an Army network? This wasnt a prob lem unique to the CABevery mobilized unit in the Army faced similar hurdles. A conversation with the U.S. Army network enterprise technology command (NETCOM) enlightened us to the difculties of trying to get computer systems to work across domains. Each network en terprise center implemented differ ent policies and installed different programs. Investigating the script showed there was a laundry list of changes that needed to be made to the computer requiring removal of unauthorized software, changes to the registry, time zone, system center conguration manager SCCM client, and McAfee antivirus software. The easier solution was to always reimage to the regions standard in stead of nitpicking through the set tings to get one computer to work. Ultimately, NETCOM decided to take a two-pronged approach to a solu tion. One, they continued to develop the script that converted laptops re gardless of the originating location. As a result, a laptop in Fort Drum, New York, or a laptop from Fort Hood, Texas, could be converted to work in Europe. The second so lution utilized a tunneling protocol to establish a connection between the European domain and the North American domain. With the tunnel established, computers could be reimaged and joined to the European domain to provide an automations head start before a rotational unit arrived in Europe. For the rst 3 months in Germany, most of our problems focused primarily on the strategic network. A new set of problems awaited us as we made the 1300 mile journey from Illesheim, Germany, to Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria for Saber Guardian 17a multinational training ex ercises includ ing 30,000 Service Members from 15 nations. Vehicle communication capabilities became the focal point overnight. Not all vehicles were equipped with radios and even less were equipped with over-the-horizon communications. A CAB had never self-deployed over such a vast distance with all of their equipment. Each convoy required host nation radio frequencies, inter nal communication frequencies and over-the-horizon communications. Getting functional joint capabilities releases (JCRs) into each movement required detailed planning and real location of JCR systems based on the needs of 10 separate convoys. For a brigade modication table of organization and equipment (MTOE) of more than 200 vehicles, there were only 30 JCRs allocated to brigade headquarters and the aviation support battalionthe units with the largest ground footprint. The mis sion planning process highlighted the underlying problem of autho rized JCRs vs. actual requirements on the ground. By careful allocation, each convoy possessed at least two working JCRs to synchronize efforts during the complex mission. Once we arrived in Bulgaria, we immediately established a tactical assembly area. Between putting up sleep tents, digging defensive positions, and setting up the com mand post, the concept of speed of assembly proved difcult to keep at the forefront. Our brigade Com -Photo by CPL Austin A. Lewis Aviation Digest AprilJune 201816

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mander, arrived when the main shell of the command post (CP) was con structed. He walked into the largest dome of the CP and whistled. How long did it take you guys to put this up? Well, sir... We looked at one anoth er. About 4 days. We all knew the timeframe was ex cessively long. The mission com mand nodes of the CP did not fare much better. Requiring signicant manpower and effort to put into operation, the Warghter information networktactical (WIN-T) equipment was also badly outdated. For the last 10 years, while brigade combat teams received upgrades such as the tac tical communications node (TCN), the CAB continued to use the older WIN-T conguration. Time was not the only consideration with the WINT conguration. The size and foot print required for all the equipment also presented problems. Requests came from the command group to nd alternate equipment to the WINT-T conguration that kept the same capabilities but had a faster setup time and smaller footprint. The S6 team put their heads to gether and developed an in-house solution using an expandable van, a modular tent, and our current set of WIN-T equipment. During our nal brigade-level exercise in Germany, we tested the command post-lite with great success. With a 2-hour setup time, it addressed many of the issues we faced at Saber Guardian 17. We also researched the possibility of an outside solution. Fortunately, this exact scenario had arisen dur ing Joint Readiness Training Center rotation 16-01, and the research on my part was complete. Unfortunate ly, like most things in the Army, the new solution cost money, and the purchase was never approved. I handed over indepth specica tions on the ground antenna trans mitter and receiver (GATR) system. The GATR seemed the ideal satellite communications solution due to its lightweight and quick setup time. The GATR system only required two cases for transport and could t in the back of a Black Hawk helicopter. Two Soldiers could establish con nectivity on it within 30 minutes and it supported a wide range modems and congurationspeed of assem bly indeed. The Army already had programs in place to eld the BCTs and heavy BCTs with the GATR system, but the CABs were not included. Our cur rent elded equipment did not sup port the rapid deployment posture required by Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Signicant geographical distances separated command from forward elements. An imperative that arose during continuous aviation operations was the ability to quickly and effectively establish communica tions via voice and data anywhere in the world. Mobility, exibility, and modularity for mission command were required, but lacking. The CAB faced varied missions and com peting lines of effort throughout Europewe needed the right com munication solutions to meet those demands. Coming from the Infantry, Ill be the rst to admit: I never fully appreciated the planning, coordination, and maintenance that went into running a CAB. We asked for helicopters and they appeared. Ignoring the ground requirements of the CAB is easy, because they y helicopters. Ac counting for the mechanics, logisticians, signalers, human resources personnel, and vehicles that power the CAB to the furthest reaches of the battleeld requires reliable and varied communication systems. At lantic Resolve 2.0 revealed the com munication challenges that face the CAB as the Army moves into the 21st century. How we address them is up to us. Warghter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) equipment is pictured in preparation for the Armys Network Integration Evaluation 12.1 in November 2011. Second from left is a WIN-T Increment 2 Tactical Communications Node (TCN). (Photo by: Claire Schwerin, U.S. Army)17https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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As the threat shifts from asym metrical warfare to combating nearpeer adversaries, so changes the operating environment in which the Army nds itself ghting. With the shift away from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, coupled with the emer gence of new near-peer adversaries, we nd that tactics, techniques, and procedures are changing, as are the aviation requirements requested from the ground force Command ers. The common combatants encoun tered in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were, on average, typically less skilled and lacked access to advanced warghting technologies that larger near-peer adversaries possessed. Additionally, these same combatants struggled to amass combat power and effects and were frequently less organized than the larger near-peer adversaries were. Therefore, aviation elements were able to operate in small teams with near unlimited freedom of maneuver. Additionally, ground force Com manders rarely needed to amass combat power with any formation larger than a team/platoon-sized el ement. Ultimately, this enabled the company to centrally operate and plan operations, al lowing the Commander to effectively direct ef forts. As the adversarial focus shifts, aviation will no longer enjoy near unlim ited air superiority, and the ground force will demand ex ibility in the form of decentralized execution at the platoon level, with the capability to execute large-scale air assaults to aid the ground force in amassing combat power and in creasing the depth of the battleeld. This new demand for exibility/ca pability will require company Com manders to ght platoons. I believe the Army should consider chang ing the way companies are staffed, equipped, and trained to meet this new requirement. These changes will enable Commanders to ght platoons, ultimately enabling the ground force with greater exibility to ex ecute diverse mission sets over a large area of operations (AO). Adequate stafng is the rst consideration. Currently, platoons are ill staffed to ght and win in the decisive ac tion ght, namely at the aviation mission survivability ofcer (AMSO) position. While supporting Atlantic Re solve 2.0 in Europe (2017), I consis tently found my company divided into platoons supporting two differ ent operations without an AMSO. The AMSO would assist my platoon leaders with current tactics to de feat threat systems in the AO. Pla toons, not just companies, require a dedicated AMSO who can shape aviation plans to help defeat the current threat. They can ensure the best ight routes are developed and utilized with regard to the current threat in the AO and can teach tac tics necessary to defeat enemy air defense artillery (ADA) systems en countered during the mission. If both platoons are decisively engaged, the current conguration will not al low for the company AMSO to be in both places. This leaves one platoon with limited to no assistance. Vital equipping is the second con sideration. Platoons lack the essen tial equipment required to mission command effectively during split company operations in austere en vironments. Blue Force Tracking A Necessity When Combating a Near-Peer ThreatBy CPT Trevor Roberts Fighting Platoons Aviation Digest AprilJune 201818

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(BFT)/Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) systems are necessary for pla toons operating in austere environ ments without command oversight because they allow a method for communicating with higher head quarters, as well as aircraft tracking and information sharing between other units. These systems, essen tially small computers that display icons and statuses, allow leaders to communicate with all other ele ments across the battleeld via a text message function. Leaders can then respond and identify friendly locations and compositions of other units. Another added feature of the system is the ability for leaders to locate their formations during oper ations and communicate with those elements when they are beyond frequency modulation (FM) communication, facilitating battle tracking and mission changes. The current Army modied table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for aviation companies does not list BFT/JCRs as a required item when it abso lutely should be. Additionally, the current MTOE does not allow the same companies to have a satellite radio, which is also a necessity to maintain over-the-horizon commu nication with higher headquarters. At a minimum, one of these mission command systems should be on the MTOE at the platoon level to enable mission command during split com pany operations. Sufcient training is the third con sideration. Aviation companies lack the training required to operate as platoons in an austere environ ment. Current training for aviation units center around combat train ing center (CTC) rotations that can be focused on either a counterin surgency (COIN) or decisive action (DA) ght. The current DA rotations only focus on the company level, where companies rarely execute split-based operations away from the parent headquarters. I propose a multifaceted solution to adjust this shortcoming. The rst solution is to adjust the way CTC rotations are framed to in clude split base operations for both company and platoon. The second solution is to embed ob server/controller-trainers (OC-T) to evaluate how platoon leaders are performing when conducting split base operations. The last and most important solu tion is for the organic unit Com manders to create realistic training that will develop platoon leaders who effectively lead their forma tions while utilizing Commanders intent. Company Commanders must un derstand mission command, which includes clearly articulating their in tent to platoon leaders. This under standing of Commanders intent will enable and empower platoon lead ers to make decisions, lead their for mations, and only reach back when absolutely necessary. However, the only way to build this skill is to re quire platoon leaders to operate in dependently of the company Com mander. This will force the platoon leaders to make decisions, exercise initiative inside the Commanders intent, and develop positive habittransfer in a safe, controlled environment. I believe the Army should build training with these objectives in mind: allow Commanders to build trust in their junior leaders, and al low junior leaders to make decisions in a controlled atmosphere. Building trust and allowing Commanders to shape the decisions of platoon lead ers in training will allow for a smooth transition to what these leaders can expect in a near-peer ght. In conclusion, since the Armys op erating environment has shifted to defeating a near-peer threat, it has become increasingly more important to update the way we staff, equip, and train pla toons. The previously proposed con siderations, while not completely all-inclusive, are a necessary start ing point. By updating the way we ght platoons, especially in Army Aviation, we can provide a more exible and lethal product to assist the ground force Commanders in accomplishing their assigned mis sions. Photos by PFC Nicholas Vidro19https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Imagine a future battleeld, one where large scale Forward Op erating Bases are simply targets to be wiped out. Units cannot congregate in one area to plan or establish a footprint in a foreign country. The only gear and person nel a unit can rely on are its organic assets. The enemy locates your Area of Operations (AO) and begins a lethal preemptive strike to annihilate Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and Aviation assets to diminish your combat power. However, you and your Forward Support Medical Pla toon (FSMP) have prepared for this inevitable assault. All necessary equipment vital to your mission is thrown into your mobile command post set up in the back of your High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Ve hicle (HMMWV) trailer while your aircrews sprint to the aircraft, their adrenaline rushing to get the air craft away from the bombardment of mortars and bullets. Because of the expeditionary nature of your forces, you survive the volatile en counter with the enemy force, and MEDEVAC coverage can resume across the battleeld. This is the mindset we want to have from the moment forward. War is changing and we must change with it. There were many lessons learned within the ranks of the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) through out Atlantic Resolve 2.0 in Europe this past year. Some of the lessons learned are for the best and others have been quite revealing. However, one of the most important lessons that C/3-10 General Support Avia tion Battalion Mountain DUSTOFF learned came during Operation Phoenix Fury 17 at the Grafenwoehr training area (GTA) in Bavaria. With a small complement of personnel and limited equipment, we discov ered a new way to bring MEDEVAC support to the renewed convention al warfare era. An Expeditionary Command Post (CP) was created to help us provide support on-thego to our ground forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Mountain DUSTOFF Com mander, and our operations ofcer (OPSO), CPT Price, established the intent for an expeditionary com mand post prior to Saber Strike 17 in the Baltic Region and Phoenix Fury 17 in Grafenwoehr. The Ofcer in Charge (OIC) for Phoenix Fury and I began the planning process so we had ample time to prepare our equipment and conduct trial runs prior to leaving for the eld. The DUSTOFF Commander and OPSOs vision for this CP was that the FSMP attached to an Aviation Battalion (or other specied unit) could pack up and move at a moments notice in the event that enemy forces com promised the main CP and AO. The idea was brilliant, and we were all excited to try out the new plan. If this worked out, the plan would be incorporated into the new Charlie Company standard operating proce dure (SOP) for future missions and deployments. Preparation for the new CP began almost immediately. The determin ing factor that would decide its pos sibility was if a 5K generator would successfully t into the back of an up-armored HMMWV. Thankfully, it t by a matter of inches. Yet an other positive sign on our journey to the eld. Due to the dimensions and weight of our 5000-watt gen erator we found that a 3K generator would be ideal in size and weight. However, the purpose of this CP was to use only our organic company assets, which meant no borrowing from other companies. Already off to a good start with an expedition ary mindset instilled in our prepara tions, we pressed on and continued making plans for the movement to GTA. As Phoenix Fury neared, we packed up the trailer the CP would be set up in with all the essentials. There EXPEDITIONARY FORWARD SUPPORT MEDICAL PLATOON THE AN EXPEDITIONARY COMMAND POST (CP) WAS CREATED TO HELP US PROVIDE SUPPORT ON-THE-GO TO OUR GROUND FORCES AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) ALLIES.BY 1LT CLAYTON P. BROOM Aviation Digest AprilJune 201820

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were no luxuries aside from the necessary coffee pots for the duty crews. I, along with three other Soldiers in the Company, drove the HMMWV to GTA with the convoy, and thankfully had no issues. Due to the minimal amount of required equipment we ended up bringing, it only took about four personnel to set up the Company AO. Two of the Company Soldiers had communica tion links up before any of the other companies did, and the other had the general purpose medium tent up in less than 3 hours with only three people helping him. This put Charlie Company way ahead of the power curve with the expeditionary mindset. We were learning how im portant it was to keep it simple and basic. We camouaged the vehicle in the woods by parking it under a tree and threw camouage netting across the sleep tent and trailer. We had the workings of a great CP that could be easily collapsed in a short time. Our observer coach (OC) and battalion leadership were quite hap py with what we were able to set up for the exercise. Our OC even sent pictures of the CP itself through his chain of command at the Joint Mul tinational Readiness Center (JMRC) where doctrine is written for future training operations. Charlie Com pany challenged conventional op erational thinking while setting the standard for the rest of the battal ion and the brigade. I was incredibly proud of the hard work our Soldiers put into making this a reality. For the majority of this article, I have discussed having an expeditionary mindset and how important it is. Not only does the Army as an organization need to change, but we, as dedicated Aeromedical Evac uation assets, need to change on a fundamental level. This includes MEDEVAC doctrine, company con guration, aircraft conguration, and changes to the Modied Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The reality is simple. We will at some point face a threat that is more organized and well-equipped than the forces we have fought for the last 17 years. Every year, the MEDEVAC Proponency Division (MEPD) pushed out updates to the DUSTOFF units across the Army about what the future battleeld will look like. Most recently the research has been done to see what patient evac uation would be in a Multi-Domain Battle with an enemy that is comparable to our own. Examples included the Russian Federation, Peoples Republic of China, and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Split-Based Operations would still mirror the way it is laid out in Chapter 7 of Army Tech niques Publication [ATP] 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment as shown in Figure 1 (Department of the Army [DA], 2016). The Area Support Medical Platoon (ASMP) would still maintain its overall control over the FSMPs that it pushes out and maintains fully equipped HH60M Black Hawk helicopters for possible chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events and behind the lines medical emergencies. Fully equipped HH-60Ms would be what Air Ambulance companies are provided via the current MTOE. Litter pans, suction, OBOGs (oxygen capability), and external hoist would all remain equipped with the three ASMP aircraft (Fig ure 2). The FSMPs pushed out to the different engagement zones would be equipped with the proposed mobile CPs and completely slicked out HH60Ms. No litter pans, just the necessary plug-ins for the ZOLLs (debrilla tors) and other medical equipment our 68WF2s would require for a hop from Point of Injury (POI) to the nearest Role 1 or 2 Medical Treatment Facility. Mass casualty events (MASCAL) would be easier to handle with a lighter air craft and the engine capabilities of a UH-60M aircraft equipped with a T-701D engine (and in the future, the new T-900 engines currently in development). Movement from AO to AO would also be easier with the slicked out aircraft, smaller generators for our FSMPs, and the mobile CP units. Many of the changes that are proposed here and by MEPD will require some changes to the current MTOE. The biggest items to be changed would be tak ing away the 5K generators assigned to each FSMP and providing them with a smaller and more mobile 3K generator. The only part of the company that would need a 5K would be the ASMP, which should not be jumping on a regular basis. The largest item change would be changing the 15 HH-60M to 3 HH-21https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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60Ms and 12 UH-60M aircraft. Cabin work space is key, especially when managing patient care. The ports available in the HH; however, offer the ability to use our own calibrated medical equipment. A combination of the UHs cabin space and the HHs ports would greatly increase our battleeld effectiveness. Medics will have more room to treat patients, and the lighter nature of the aircraft will reduce response time to a POI on the battleeld. Smaller changes to the MTOE would be the addition of one-man tents and DRASH tents. These easier to set up tents would make movement between AOs and scatter plans much more effective and reduce the amount of eld losses to crews being unable to break down the AO in time before being overrun. Aside from the much-needed MTOE changes, Aeromedical Evacuation has to change due to the evolution of modern warfare. Space and cy ber-warfare create new and danger ous threats for aircraft, especially helicopters. The MEDEVAC Proponency Division has determined that there will be signicantly more technological threats to the MEDEVAC mission in the coming years. It can be deduced from the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) that they project many problems for Aeromedical Evacuation in the near future. The presence of true Air Defense Artillery (ADA) threats alone show the need to adjust our tactics and tactical ight mission planning. We must be ready to meet them head on and evolve with the battleelds that we see today. The bottom line is that casualties are going to increase. Aeromedical Evacuation is not going to always be the most practical means of saving a patients life. Ground MEDEVAC and CASEVAC (Casualty Evacuation) on the unit level is imperative to hav ing a successful system in place. Individual units of all branches need to have their own CASEVAC plans ready to be integrated with Aviation assets in the eld. The situations we should expect in the future will revolve more around CBRN and large distances between Role I, II, and III facilities in theater. Once again, we see the need to be expeditionary, exible, and most importantly, mobile on the battleeld. Mountain DUSTOFF learned much from the experience of creating a new type of CP. Not only are we bet ter equipped for a more conventional war, we learned that we could oper ate just as effectively with a smaller operation and less equipment. When the time comes for DUSTOFF units Reference: to go to the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, or even deploy to a combat zone, this idea could be utilized to better prepare themselves and make smaller targets for enemy forces. With the mobile CP being such a success, it found its way into our new Company SOP which will one day be a part of the 10th Combat Aviation Brigades Tactical SOP. The goal is that this mobile CP will eventually be the standard for all Air Ambulance companies throughout the U. S. Army and assist the AMEDD in creating new ways to save lives on the battleeld. FULLY EQUIPPED HH-60MS WOULD BE WHAT AIR AMBULANCE COMPANIES ARE PROVIDED VIA THE CURRENT MTOE. Aviation Digest AprilJune 201822

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he past 17 years of coun terinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the chal lenges of force reduction brought on by the Avia tion Restructuring Initia tive (ARI), has left an indelible mark on the Aviation Branch. The collec tive effect has resulted in a current operating picture for Army Aviation that is quite telling. Regardless of Aviations reduced structure, we to day nd a smaller force meeting an insatiable demand for even more. The current estimates of commit ment have approximately 84% of our total assets and personnel com mitted, in support of or preparing for major exercises, all across the globe. In addition to these challeng es, the Branch is also facing effects of increased demand for civilian pilots, an enticing career prospect for many Department of Defense avia tors, as it promises a slower tempo and no deployments. The problem set for Army Aviation is considerable, but it pales in com parison to the new requirements implied by the guidance received via our National Defense Strategy that was further rened by Army Senior Leaders. The new effort in refocusing the Army, and the rest of the Department of Defense for that matter, is toward embracing a ght tonight readiness posture against a potential peer threat. The idea of a ght tonight posture against a peer threat is one that views an engage ment where our collective efforts begin from a challenged position of disadvantage, all the while deal ing with contested environments in all domains. The challenge is best summed up in the all-encompassing term, large-scale combat opera tions (LSCO). Our leaders are sug gesting we maintain our efforts within our current problem set, all the while attempting to conduct a successful pivot toward LSCO. That brings the discussion to the ques tion of how? How is the Branch go ing to maintain current operations and still pivot successfully toward a new future modality of warfare? We as a Branch can make this shift in focus by ensuring that it is doctrin ally driven. The command group at the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) has recognized the chal lenges our Branch is facing, and is making every effort to take neces sary action. One of the ways is to off-burden units from expending intellectual capital on nuanced dif ferences that serve to distract from our ability to master our warghting craft. This effort is centered around nding efciencies within founda tional activities across standardiza tion, maintenance, and training that will enhance the Branchs ability to train and focus on warghting. The desired end state of this effort is that the Branch increases in its abil ity to train and focus on warghting tasks. Enhancing Warfighter Focus: AVIATION BRANCHS IN-STRIDE SHIFT TO LSCO By COL Joseph Degliuomini and CW4 Leonard MomenyTphoto by 1LT Benjamin Haulenbeek;23https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Leaders are driving forward to not only remove unnecessary require ments, but also use the opportunity to optimize training time, improve in teroperability, and codify and share best practices across the force. This conceptual effort has been named the Aviation Warghting Initiative or AWI, and is looking holistically at what can be done to efciently pivot toward LSCO. The suggested main effort to accomplish this pivot in stride is to initiate a standardization of the common planning, practices, and activities across the entire Avia tion Enterprise. This is basically an initiative to collect only the nest intellectual capital with respect to aviation mission execution; rene said information, standardize it, and nally synchronize it across all compos in the Branch. The effort is being spearheaded by the introduc tion of the Army Aviation Handbook and other such publications, there by providing a common language and operating picture that all could draw from the LSCO environment.Understanding the Future Environment:The potential environment of LSCO cannot be underestimated, as it will be a breeding ground for conict and confusion (Department of the Army, 2017). Standardization would help eliminate some of that poten tial confusion. Additionally, the real ity of LSCO demands aviation learn to speak with a single voice regard ing mission planning and execution, across all components to the ground forces we support or integrate with. Ground force commanders locked in battle against a potential peer threat deserve consistency in their opera tions. Also, think of the added ben et common operating procedures provide organizations when being augmented by external units. When everyone starts with the same guid ing publication, everyone thinks the same, and everyone operates the same. In this instance, the potential augmenting unit is not contributing to confusion, but rather, cohesion. This is a potential tactical efcien cy and organizational gain that the Branch cannot ignore.Project Insight, Background, and History:Many of you currently reading this have seen, or at least heard about, the Army Aviation Handbook Around October 2017, the Director ate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) was asked by USAACE to develop a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)level universal tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP). The reasoning was to standardize practices across aviation to create individual and organizational gains and efciencies. If this endeavor were successful, it was reasoned that it would result in an improved ability of our Aviation Branch, as a whole, to better train and ght in support of the ground force com mander. After much deliberation, it was determined a universal TACSOP would be too aggressive, a rst step in force-wide standardization. Avia tion senior leadership suggested smaller, yet more focused steps to ward standardization and do so via a battle book. This would eventu ally evolve into what you see today, an Army Aviation Handbook Think of it as our own version of the Rang er Handbook Not necessarily regu lation or a eld manual, but instead a pocket reference intended to en hance the learning, instruction, and mentorship of our ofcers, speci cally in a tactical environment. The intent and purpose remain similar to the battle book, but initial scope of the project has been scaled appro priately to match a rst effort. The handbook is intended to stan dardize the most common tasks we as a Branch engage in with the hope that efciencies can be gained. What efciencies, you ask? How many of us across aviation are working to rewrite our units SOP? Part of the purpose behind the handbook is to move aviation into a position where units no longer have to worry about drafting, stafng, and rening their own SOP and instead, focus on training. Imagine the benet of starting with an SOP in ight school and then arriving to your rst unit, ready to fall under the same SOP. That same ofcer will be able to PCS in 34 years and not have to violate primacy regarding tactical opera tions and aircraft contingencies and instead, fall under the same SOP at his next duty station. As a peer group, we have to admit our Branch seems to engage in SOP revision constantly. Can you imag ine how many man-hours could be reclaimed for standardization personnel if they no longer had to constantly draft, revise, and if lucky, republish the SOP? How many more hours could be applied toward unit progression, individual training, and eventually collective training? If we are honest, we do not care much for tasks that detract us from our aviation duties. Additionally, there are many commanders who wrestle with the fact that a Multifunctional Aviation Task Force composed of elements from different CABs, per haps even units from different com positions, e.g., Guard and Reserve, struggle to communicate and ef ciently operate when rst brought together. It is an interesting thought when you realize we all y Army aircraft, we all attend the same schools, and we all are partners in the same ght. Codifying and standardizing best practices across the eld brings many benets. It will improve the ability of all within the enterprise to transition toward LSCO, while keeping up with current operational requirements. It will reduce the ad ministrative burden involved in the generation of SOPs, thereby free ing instructors to devote more time toward individual training. Finally, it will enable commanders to focus more on warghting, hopefully go ing deeper with their units mem bers with respect toward their war time mission.Aviation Digest AprilJune 201824

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photo by CPT Brian Harris What is in the handbook?Standardization always feels con strictive in nature, dictatorial, at least at rst, but it is important to remember that is not the hand books intent. Instead, this is to be a marked change in Army Aviation when eld units are able to focus on what matters, not burdened by the administrative requirements of gen erating publications. With that being said, it is also important to remem ber this is not a standalone SOP. So, what is in the handbook? Much of the handbook is assisting avia tors and leaders with common plan ning criteria, brieng format, and other considerations. There are multiple data cards for different airframes encompassing the fol lowing topics: mission preparation, briefings/rehearsals/after-action reviews, mission execution, mission contingencies, etc. What was stan dardized? If its in the publication, it is now the way USAACE prefers the task be executed. Items many of you were probably looking for in the handbook include a standardized communications check, formations, formation changes, lost commo, inadvertent instrument meteoro logical conditions, and the like. As stated earlier, this is a rst step and as such, can easily be considered incomplete in the minds of some. Still, there may be many who feel the handbook oversteps its bounds. Moving forward, it is important to strike a balance between these two perspectives. Closing Comments:The Army Aviation Handbook is the rst step in a larger effort to stan dardize the force. It is not an effort to overreach or subvert the efforts of individual units. Instead, we are offering it and other future refer ences that capture best-practices and aggregate years of experience into implementable and viable pro cedures and solutions. All in an ef fort to allow youthe warghters more time to focus on what really matters, training your units. Still, the eld has a huge role to play in this endeavor. This standardization effort will fail or succeed at one point, the CAB. If the Army Avia tion Handbook needs revision, or fails in some respect, DOTD needs Reference: to know so a change can be made. If someone in your formation has an idea they would like to implement, send it to DOTD. This handbook needs your input, and with an initial 6-month assessment window, fol lowed by immediate rapid revision and publication, it is necessary you put the document through its paces and submit your changes. Again, the Army Aviation Handbook is only the rst effort in a larger move to standardize the force. Oth er forthcoming products include: Planning SOP (P-SOP), Aviation SOP (Standardization or S-SOP), and a Maintenance SOP (M-SOP). There is great value in standardized pro cedures and doctrinal philosophies. Soon, CAB ofcers will not have to worry about as much ofce-related work as they once had and be free to do more planning, training, and ying. In closing, all of us at USAA CE and DOTD who are working on this and other projects do so with only the best of intentions. We sin cerely hope the handbook helps you and your Soldiers execute your as signed missions. We look forward to working with you to make it the best product possible. 25https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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S (trategic) L (eadership) = E (mpathy)2 + S (uperior) C (ommunication) + E (motional) I (ntelligence)AN EQUATION FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS IN THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEMBy COL Gregory S. FortierOn June 30, 1992, my West Point new cadet class mates and I listened intent ly to an instructional message stating that strategic thought was subordinate to the tactical and operational levels of our fu ture profession, regardless of rank and responsibility. The seasoned Colonel added, strategic thought was occasionally needed, but ac complishing the Armys mission required masterful integration of tactics into future joint force operations. Intentional or not, this Vietnam veteran imprinted a theory that took me 12 perma nent station moves, 75 months of Command, 2 combat tours, and 5,727 work hours in the Penta gon to disprove. Indeed, strategic thought must be conceived and understood at all ranks in the tac tical and operational arenas; how ever, leading strategically is an entirely different art form requir ing three core personality traits and a graduate level comprehen sion of their interdependencies. Understanding the systems engi neering depiction requires one to rst acknowledge the nuance and complexity of the strategic set ting. Each of the three individual circles ( Superior Communica tion, Emotional Intelligence, and Empathy ) and their intersections represent key leadership traits and domains where strategic leaders amplify their effectiveness through accurate environmental classica tion (Figure). The diagram assumes impeccable integrity with awless ethical conduct and is optimally em ployed in the time constrained strategic leader domain. SUPERIOR COMMUNICATION Fundamentally, communication is the process of transferring informa tion from a sender to a receiver. While simple in context, the art of conversing effectively requires the dispatcher to broadcast in a clear and under standable way while the recipient interprets the message accurately. Communication is largely dependent on mes sage content, information ow and the impact the idea has on its intended audience. Transmission is only half of the process and does not repre sent a completed communication cycle. Today, strategic leaders rap idly interact verbally, non-verbally, and in written form through email, text messages and social media. Understanding that some of these communication techniques are naturally devoid of emotion and sometimes easily misinterpreted is important. As the means evolve over time, the method information ows in an organization is crucial to the way personnel understand their relationship and seek accountability within their team. Effective commu nicators build Steven Coveys next level trust (Covey, 2006), inspiring creativity when things are going well and stiing unproductive noise when challenges arise. Further, strategic leaders must listen more than they speak, resist ing the Aviation Digest AprilJune 201826

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urge to continually transmit their message. Amplifying both verbal, non-verbal and written communica tion maximizes value and effectively denes success in an emotionally in telligent fashion. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE While analytical and technical skill are required traits for most senior leaders, emotional intelligence dis tinguishes outstanding performers from the status quo. In his book Emotional Intelligence, psychologist Daniel Goleman concludes that truly effective leaders are distinguished by high degrees of emotional in telligence and that the absence of this trait sties leaders progress by degrading incisive minds (Gole man, 1995). Goleman asserts that emotionally intelligent communicators routinely perform accurate self-assessments while continuing to improve the critical soft skills re quired in the strategic environment. Furthermore, emotional intelligence enables self-awareness and facili tates understanding of individual strengths, weaknesses and environmental scans through reective thinking. Once grasped, leaders can better comprehend the indirect ef forts of decision making to reduce risk and shape their teams. Emotion ally intelligent leaders are socially adept, steady in crisis, transparent, and most importantly, empathetic to all they serve. EMPATHY Although empathy represents one of three intersecting circles, it is both superior to and ingrained in the other two traits. During a 2010 ofcer evaluation report (OER) counseling session with then BG Harry Greene, I asked him to iden tify the most important skills for a strategic leader. Without hesitation, he responded, empathy rst, then the rest. He stated that all things begin with understanding and that leaders who express sincere com passion reap multiple benets. A Soldier who exudes genuine care for the well-being of their subordinates, seniors and peers alike is a Soldier who always accomplishes his as signed tasks while safeguarding the institution. When this authentic con cern is internalized, empathy cannot be feigned. Leaders who embrace empathy are naturally more willing to negotiate and compromise so that critical business can be accom plished. Empathetic senior leaders seek to reconcile opportunity and competency, while leveraging diversity within any team. Effectively employing communal aptitude as a combat multiplier displays empathy to a workforce, coalition partner or foe.INTERSECTION #1: SUPERIOR COMMUNICATION + EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE = POWER!Emotionally intelligent, superior communicators represent exponen tially powerful change agents. Most civilian and military leaders commu nicate in three steps, beginning with a description of what they do or what they need a subordinate to ac complish. That message is often fol lowed by instructions on how to accomplish tasks. The purpose, or the why, is usually communicated last because it is time consuming and often an afterthought. One cannot dispute the importance of reminding teammates what they do; however, why they exist stands most critical in mobilizing impeccable teams to accomplish the what in a unied fashion. State ments that detail the what and the how without driving the message of why are incomplete. Rather than communicating in the order of what-how-why, the most effective leaders reverse the order, instead starting with why. Leaders that begin with why display a level of transparency that fosters immense trust while solidifying the organizational vision. By the same token, leading with why renes internal THE DIAGRAM ASSUMES IMPECCABLE INTEGRITY WITH FLAWLESS ETHICAL CONDUCT AND IS OPTIMALLY EMPLOYED IN THE TIME CONSTRAINED STRATEGIC LEADER DOMAIN. 27https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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and external messages, thereby enhancing leader effectiveness. Whether you are leading Soldiers into combat or guiding your child to perform chores, people do not buy what you do, people buy why you do it (Sinek, 2009). In the ever-evolv ing complex world, communicating in reverse order increases speed, sustains acceleration, magnies or ganizational value, and generates power to remove barriers. Strategic leaders operating suc cessfully in Intersection #1 build the guiding coalitions necessary to implement real change.INTERSECTION #2: EXTRACTING EMPATHY AND OVERLAYING IT WITH EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCEEmpathetic, emotionally intelligent leaders place themselves in the shoes of others. They resist the urge to point a nger, instead choos ing to retract a thumb and take collective responsibility for success and/or failure. General (Ret) Colin Powell offers that emotional intel ligence is a prerequisite for leaders to effectively manage conict and inspire positive culture to overcome the inevitable challenge of organizational inefciency (Powell, 2016). In his article, On Strategic Leader ship, General (Ret) Richard Myers references the term intellectual openness, stressing its importance when leaders confront ambiguous and complex problems (Myers & Pierce, 2009). Displaying empathet ic emotional intelligence, or E2I, to a workforce facilitates communication of espoused values such as strategies, goals, and philosophies while simultaneously dening un derlying assumptions that account for unconscious beliefs. Organiza tional perceptions, thoughts, and feelings depict the ultimate source of values and must be understood before culture changes are realized (Schein, 2010). Superior leaders are emotionally intelligent, inspiring empathetic communication to forge an unbreakable workforce.INTERSECTION #3: WHEN COMMUNICATION INTERSECTS WITH EMPATHY While the power to align and change teams outlined in Intersection #1 focuses primarily on the internal aspects of an organization, Inter section #3 addresses shaping a favorable external environment. Empathetic external communica tion builds relationships required for leaders of large organizations. Leveraging associations builds con sensus and enables negotiations to ow easier when accomplishing day-to-day activities. Consensus is a powerful tool within the Defense Acquisition System, and those that communicate effectively and place themselves in the positions of oth ers can masterfully transition complex discussions and hard line stances into action. Before commu nicating externally, strategic lead ers must remember the past, adapt to the present and anticipate the fu ture. Studying the history of organizations to understand the richness of different traditions and positions facilitates success. Internally, Intersection #3 is also essential in the everyday leadership of key teammates serving at the lowest levels of the wire diagram because culture eats organizational charts for lunch. Leaders foster an anticipatory aspect of the future when they successfully dene their vision with the intersection of supe rior communication and emotional intelligence. Every team has a past and a present, and it is critical that strategic leaders look with pride in both directions. THE 7-Ps IN THE CENTER Paralleling Simon Sineks idea of communicating inside-out, the Venn diagram (see Figure) is best under stood by starting at the union of the three circles. As seen in the Figure, the 7-Ps represent the origin from which strategic leaders understand commonality among all three key THE 7-PS REPRESENT THE ORIGIN FROM WHICH STRATEGIC LEADERS UNDERSTAND COMMONALITY AMONG ALL THREE KEY TRAITS. Strategic LeadershipAviation Digest AprilJune 201828

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traits. Although all seven are impor tant, the most effective strategic leaders begin by exuding presence and positive attitude. General Dunford states that virtual pres ence is actual absence and that leaders must be physically pres ent to affect their teams (Dunford, 2016). That presence, coupled with a positive attitude, serves as a conta gious combat multiplier to manage conict. Leaders with the positivity chromosome create a workforce that replaces the no, because cul ture with a yes, if attitude. Once those two components are mastered, leaders must internalize the idea that we are all perfect until we realize that we are not. Even high-performing leaders can recount a humbling moment in their career where they did not achieve perfect resultsa time where they swallowed their pride and placed their ego aside in the interest of learning and mission success. With that said, ego remains an impor tant component in leading others. Coach Mike Krzyzewski, the all-time winningest coach in mens college basketball history, encourages the presence of hubris, stating that ego and humility exist as mutually inclu sive traits (Krzyzewski & Spatola, 2009). However, superior leaders convert their individual condence in metered proportions within the connes of the organization and in dividual duty description. Perfection and proportional ego aside, both the leader and the led must continu ally strive for self-improvement, un derstanding that excellence is not a resting position (i.e., positional excellence). These are the groups that desire transformation from a team of experts to an expert team. Associations with individu References: als who value their organizational patch (logo) more than themselves are teams that inevitably choose to refrain from gossip and the nega tive connotations associated with it, instead generating an impenetrable wave of productive noise essential to conquer any challenge. Lastly, leaders, at any rank, must continue to prepare with humility. No matter the time, place, duty description or mission, humble preparation always leads to condent execution. CONCLUSION On the lonely preparatory days in command, I sometimes nd my self thinking about that West Point Colonels message. While I believe he understood strategic leadership, I am convinced that his Vietnam era imprinting devalued the impor tance of soft skills within senior of cers. As problem sets and solution processes change, next generation strategic leaders must open their aperture toward a new way of lead ing. Now more than ever, the three circles presented in the Figure rep resent prerequisites for strategic leaders to operate effectively in a much more expansive leadership space. The 21st Century strategic leader who infuses superior commu nication, empathy, and emotional in telligence into pre-existing tactical competence and operational acumen will lead the next generation of Americas sons and daughters with distinction. Photo by SPC Thomas Scaggs29https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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How do we dene Ex peditionary Opera tions for Army Avia tion? How do we train, equip, and man our for mations to perform Expe ditionary Aviation Opera tions (EAO) to combat a near-peer threat? Why is it important? Conducting Combat Arms Maneuver (CAM) in a near-peer en vironment is complex and challenging. Achieving the Sweet Spot to maximize survivability, lethality, and extended reach of a Mul tifunctional Aviation Task Force (MFATF) is essential for providing combat pow er to the maneuver com mander.Recommendations from the Holis tic Aviation Assessment Task Force (HAATF) Operational Planning Team (OPT) provided the following recom mendations for dening EAO. Avia tion operations that require rapid deployment of a task-organized force via land, air, and/or sea into austere and/or immature theaters with the requisite mobility, lethality, protection, sustainment, and mis sion command capability to operate as part of the Joint, Interagency, In tergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) team to conduct Unied land Operations (ULO) (Department of the Army [DA], 2017). The sup porting elements from the HAATF review of EAO include; mission sets, duration, unit of employment, speed, frequency, and extent of split operations.MISSION SETS: Full range of decisive action operations from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in a permissive environment to combat operations against a nearpeer/peer threat. DURATION: Units must be prepared to operate with limited external re supply and sustainment for up to 14 days at a rate of 65 ight hours per month per airframe (32.5 ight hours per airframe during this 14 day period). UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT: Lowest echelon company/troop(+), ideal task organization is battalion task force with attack, heavy lift, lift, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capability up to a combat aviation brigade (CAB). SPEED: 7296 hours prepared to load, 2472 hours full operational capa bility (FOC) upon arrival in joint operations area (JOA). Combat Arms Maneu ver may require initial operational capability (IOC) under 8 hours based on threat and friendly force disposition. FREQUENCY: Movement during operationsHA/DR = every 4896 hours; regionally aligned force (RAF) = every 2472 hours; exible DETERRENCE operations (FDO) = 1248 hours; CAM = 412 hours (23 movements/day dic tated by threat/mission). EXTENT OF SPLIT OPERATIONS: All operations are mission and unit employment dependent.ARMY AVIATION EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN AN AUSTERE ENVIRONMENT WHAT IS THE SWEET SPOT?By CSM James Etheridge and LTC Daryl S. von Hagel THERE IS NO INSTANCE OF A NATION BENE FITTING FROM PROLONGED WARFARE. SUN TZU Aviation Digest AprilJune 201830

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Photo by MSG DearloveField Manual (FM) 3-04 (DA, 2015) denes the purpose of an Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade (ECAB) and MFATFs to air assault maneuver forces; position per sonnel, supplies and equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct Personnel Recovery; and enable mission command in support of the combined arms team. When task organized with reconnaissance and surveillance assets, MFATFs also provide accurate and timely infor mation collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and de stroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay en emy forces. Within this construct, MFATFs must remain scalable and tailorable to meet both U.S. and Multinational ground commander mission requirements. As witnessed at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), often times this translates to jumping into a Tactical Assembly Area (TAA), establish ing a Command Post, and operat ing from an austere environment alongside your task-organized, part nered units due to communication challenges and tempo of the ght. MFATF have proven they are more accessible and responsive to the Brigade Combat Team when operat ing from a forward TAA vs. an air eld 60100 kilometers to the rear. During calendar year 2017, every MFATF that came to JMRC for a Combat Training Center rotation has conducted Aviation Operations under austere conditions in a highly contested, near-peer environment. Resulting from our many years of counterinsurgency, Army Aviation lost the fundamental skills for oper ating in an immature theater under austere conditions. This is evidenced by Soldiers being unfamiliar with their equipment, not understanding priorities of work, unable to effec tively perform fundamentals of se curity, and not comprehending the capabilities of the near-peer threat. Army Aviation has become com placent, and JMRC is committed to reversing this trend. We believe there is a Sweet Spot for units conducting EAO equaling MFATF Expeditionary Capability that com manders must rene through train ing. Leaders must decide the size of the MFATF, experience of the MFATF, sustainment requirements, and sur vivability measures. Each of these variables must be prioritized by the commander based off mission, en emy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil consider ations (METT-TC). What is the Sweet Spot? It is the right size organization with the nec essary amount of experience who can conduct multiple missions. It can efciently conduct split-based operations, has the ability to pro tect itself, and can sustain opera tions with limited resupply for up to 14 days. Additionally, Survivabil ity Operations (SO) are imperative in todays near-peer environment. Our adversaries utilize space-based systems, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and electronic warfare (EW) to pinpoint, exploit, and target elec tromagnetic signatures on the bat tleeld. The reduction of electro magnetic signature is a necessary consideration when operating in the near-peer environment. Lessons learned from the Ukraine (Karber, 2016) suggest that we must place a renewed emphasis on camou age, concealment, and deception. We must also train with degraded communications and operate ana log due to the lethality of massed, ranged res when artillery and Mul tiple Launch Rocket Systems strikes cause 85 percent of casualties. According to ATP 3-37.34 (DA, 2013); survivability is a quality or capabil ity of military forces that permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulll their primary mission. There are three general threats to survivability; hostile actions, non-hostile activ ities, and environmental conditions. These categories are described in ADRP 3-37 (DA, 2012). When ght ing in a near-peer environment, the hostile threats will be from regular and irregular forces, and hostile ac tions usually involve employment of weapons as well as the use of sen sors to increase effectiveness. Factors that affect survivability are; 31https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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mobility, situational understanding, and terrain and weather. With Mobil ity, units must have the ability to re position their TAA with short notice. This becomes more difcult with smaller and less experienced units. Leaders must anticipate enemy threat and mission requirements to project and plan for possible repositioning of their units. Environmental conditions, such as the civilian pop ulation, must also be considered. A units ability to reposition increases its overall survivability. The most successful units are able to reposition without disrupt ing their ongoing mis sions. Secondly, Situational Understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant informa tion to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision mak ing (ADP 6-0, DA, 2012). Finally, ter rain and weather leaders need to use natural and man-made terrain to their advantage. Terrain can en hance survivability, and protection from weather can enhance surviv ability. Protection from weather is essential during the rst few hours of quartering party operations. Erecting tents with heat sources is a great tip for keeping your Soldiers protected from unforgiving weather. Other considerations when plan ning for survivability are the use of cover, ghting positions, protective positions, camouage GREAT RESULTS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH SMALL FORCES. SUN TZUand concealment, protection of crit ical assets (helicopters, Command Posts, forward arming and refueling points [FARPs], etc.), special environments (jungle, mountainous ar eas, deserts, cold regions), and en try control points. Army Technique Publication 3-37.34 (DA, 2013) is an excellent source of information for leaders when planning SO. Units that plan for SO are more agile and adaptive, which leads to building trust with our maneuver units. The size of the MFATF is de pendent on the environment and ground commanders requirements. Size is not only the amount of aircraft in the TF, but the amount of personnel that you need to effectively conduct operations. Is your MFATF going to conduct jump FARP operations? How many ground vehicles are required? Does every Soldier have a seat in a vehicle or helicop ter? How big is the staff? Can the staff conduct Photo by LTC Severs Aviation Digest AprilJune 201832

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References: Mission Command for simultaneous operations? Utilizing what Mission Command systems? Are you going to have organic or external Force Protection? The smaller the MFATF, the more experience the TF is going to need. During a recent rotation at JMRC we believed the MFATF had the cor rect size to be effective in the nearpeer environment. Prior to the rota tion, we were optimistic that they would have the ability to conduct simultaneous operations and be ex tremely lethal. The unit had a goal to conduct multiple jumps during the Combat Training Center rota tion while conducting simultaneous combat missions; however, the unit didnt come with the most experienced personnel, which hindered operations. When commanders de cide to reduce the size of the MFATF to provide exibility to the maneu ver units, they must have experienced personnel who can do more than one job. We found that smaller MFATFs with limited experience have difculty conducting simultaneous missions. The staff didnt have the ability to conduct future and current operations at the same time; FARP personnel didnt have the experience to conduct jump FARPs; and logisticians didnt have the experience to forecast logistics to sustain the force. The lack of experience in a MFATF exponentially increases when working with a Multinational Brigade Headquarters. If the same size organization had experienced personnel with the proper amount of motivation, we believe they could have successfully conducted simul taneous operations. The bottom line is that experience matters at all levelsthe smaller the unit the more experienced personnel must be to achieve success. Why is this important? As General Holmes and General Perkins (Ret.) describe, Recent advancements by peer adversaries across the globe, including exquisite ISR capabilities, ubiquitous long-range res, and sophisticated integrated defenses, drive a requirement for the Ser vices to adopt a new framework to achieve a continuing advantage in a contested, degraded, and op erationally limited environment (Holmes & Perkins, 2018). At JMRC, we have found MFATF suc cess stems from mastering the fun damentals; operating from a prop erly established, well-concealed TAA; understanding near-peer ca pabilities and tailoring the MFATFs personnel and equipment to meet the challenges of operating in the JIIM environment; and changing the mindset from counterinsurgency to decisive action. Based off the recommendations from the HAATF, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command will update the denition and implement changes for Expeditionary Operations in Army Aviation (FM 3-04, DA, 2015). Acknowledg ing changes to FM 3-04 and lessons learned from Combined Training Centers, Aviation commanders can structure training events to nd the Sweet Spot for EAO. The ability to nd the Sweet Spot for EAO pro vides exibility, survivability, and lethality in near-peer environments. Photo by SFC Collins33https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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ESTABLISHING PURPOSE FOR A TRAINING ROTATIONSoon after arriving to Wheeler Sack Army Aireld in the spring of 2016, it became very apparent that the 10th Combat Avia tion Brigade (CAB) had a deployment on the horizon. An increased operational tempo, fol lowed by numerous validation exercises, was enough for even a green Second Lieutenant to realize the unit was going to depart Fort Drum, New York and engage in combat operations. The 10th CAB mission overseas, however, was vastly different than what many Soldiers throughout the unit expectedwe were going to mobilize and establish operations under Eu ropean Command for 9 months in order to pro vide stability throughout the continent while exercising traditional, old Army competen cies under the title Atlantic Resolve (AR) 2.0. The nature of a rotation opposed to a combat deployment is abstract and in many ways po litically, not tactically driven. This presented BACKBASICSTODemonstrating Conventional Readiness in a Globalized WorldBy 1LT Adam Weaver Aviation Digest AprilJune 201834

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10th CAB leadership with a highly unique challenge in terms of provid ing a sense of purpose and direction in order to successfully engage a unit for 9 months overseas without measurable benchmarks of success; throughout AR 2.0, battles would not be fought and cities would not be secured. Therefore, it was highly critical that U. S. Army Europe (US ARER) and specically, 10th CAB, provide underlying intent and ultimately a purpose to rationalize the recourses, energy, and Soldiers time spent in country and away from their families. In short, why would a CAB from Fort Drum, New York deploy to some of the most ob scure corners of Europe in the rst place? A POLITICAL PURPOSE FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS Upon receipt of the AR 2.0 assign ment, it was critical that brigade leadership deliberately manage in formation operations in order to in still a sense of purpose throughout the unit for a mission that centered on political, not tactical objectives. Meticulous communication that em phasized rotational training and a real world purpose in Europe pro vided Soldiers throughout the bri gade with a sense of direction that would sustain, or at the very least, initiate movement toward future de ployment operations. These deliber ate communication efforts provided the general basis for the rotation. The 10th CAB mission statement and general purpose for AR 2.0 mir rored that of USARER; demonstrate capability in order to facilitate de terrence while integrating of the Five Pillars of a Strong Europe at the foundation of every tactical ex ercise. Throughout pre-deployment operations, two fundamental char acteristics of AR 2.0 became clear, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) would provide the unit with a highly dynamic training environment that would force the organization to em power junior leaders while operat ing with regionally allocated forces. Additionally, 10th CAB would oper ate alongside Army Reserve, Na tional Guard, and allied North Atlan tic Treaty Organi zation (NATO) part ners to sustain a dynamic presence throughout the continent. In short, the unit was going to improve conven tional competencies and increase joint readiness. A dynamic training environment, how ever, is not signi cant enough in its own right to ratio nalize a 9-month rotation on foreign soil. The second and most crucial purpose for AR 2.0 was deterrence via the demon stration of capability. In essence, to shape the geopolitical climate throughout Europe by military means in order to protect American interests in a seemingly peaceful, yet highly volatile and complex part of the world. Due to the abstract nature of deterrence as a military objective, it is highly challenging to measure its success. Effective de terrence is much more than merely the absence of conict and can be found resonating in the social, polit ical, and economic spheres through out an area of operations. For many junior leaders throughout the brigade, deterrence could be some thing simple like making a positive impact on Bulgarian villagers during convoy operations, or the relation ships formed with Romanian cafete ria workers who continually adopted American culture through interac tion with a professional Army unit. Unity among NATO allies and com bat readiness are highly effective methods of deterrence in a complex world where U.S. enemies are grow ing in terms of inuence and power. Ultimately, the 10th CAB mission to rst develop the unit but most im portantly, deter enemies of the U.S. and shape the geopolitical climate of Europe, was achieved at a time of increased global vulnerabilities. Future European rotations will con tinue to pay dividends to an Army that is rapidly adapting to combat conventional, near-pear threats. CAPABILITY EQUALS DETER RENCE According to USARER Commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges deterrence is all about having the capability to compel, defeat, to force the enemy to change their mind or reconsider what theyre thinking about doing (Vergun, 2017). Deter rence has recently become a funda mental priority for U.S. international relations as the current geopolitical climate rapidly shifts to a Cold War, multipolar system characterized by emerging international superpow ers, notably near-peer countries competing for global power (Clark, 1997). This geopolitical climate, coupled with increasing technological systems in a globalized world have fundamentally shifted the face of potential military engage ments for the U.S. military, which over the past 2 decades has been primarily resourced and trained to execute counterinsurgency opera tions against a nonconventional foe. Therefore, the U.S. military must strategically project force in order to protect foreign interests, bolster global relations, and exercise con ventional tactics in a politically, so cially, and economically contested front. In an effort to actualize this warghting model, while simultane ously deterring legitimate threats, American military leaders have es 35https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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tablished USARER as the premier training environment for rotational forces due to its uniquely dynamic atmosphere, potential for increased harmonization with NATO allies and the real world, and strategic oppor tunity to deter foreign aggression through military capability. URBAN AND TECHNOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES IN EUROPE Due to the heterogeneous political composition of Europes vast urban centers increasingly reliance on technology, security through deter rence has surfaced as an increas ingly vital function of NATO states. In recent years, emerging nations have established economic, politi cal, and military legitimacy, demon strating the capability to threaten NATO security through convention al force. Additionally, the continual modernization of European urban centers has led to increased vulner abilities as networked technological infrastructures are rapidly sus taining every aspect of modern life and can be directly attacked from remote locations throughout the globe (Graham, 2005; Graham & Marvin, 2009). Therefore, it is critical that U.S. forces establish a dy namic presence throughout the Eu ropean continent to primarily deter near-peer aggression in terms of di rect military action and urban war fare through the cyber medium. The concept of establishing security and social stability throughout the Euro pean continent via peaceful projec tions of joint capability presents the U.S. military with a highly dynamic training environment that challeng es rotational units on strategic, op erational, and tactical levels. CONVENTIONAL ENEMIES AND OLD COMPETENCIES In an effort to effectively prepare the force for a near-peer conict, retrain leadership, and enculturate the force as a whole, the U.S. Army has increased European rotational deployments focused on conventional tactics reminiscent of the Cold War era. The loom ing possibility of conven tional warfare implies green suitors must prioritize and retrain Soldier competencies that have been lost in recent military history. Army units, including aviation brigades, must demonstrate compe tency without the privately contracted support so readily available in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. As American security threats begin to shift from isolated nonconvention al extremists to modernized nation states, Army units require a real world training environment that challeng es collective and individual readiness in terms of conventional warfare (Simmonds, 1993). U.S. Army Europe and the European continent itself present the U.S. military with a dynamic atmosphere that provide rotational forces with complex operational constraints, forcing rotational units to empower junior leaders and exercise mission command in an expansive territory. Atlantic Resolve 2.0 has exemplied this training model as the 10th CAB has challenged military perceptions of aviation capability. Through out the 9-month rotation, the 10th CAB seamlessly conducted air and ground operations from area of op erations North in the Baltic region to AR South in locations including Turkey and Romania while head quartered in Illesheim, Germany. Along with an impressive list of joint aviation operations with NATO al lies, the unit conducted a 1,300 mile ground assault convoy through ve countries, forcing brigade leader ship nodes to effectively resource communications systems, main tain a fully mission-capable ground eet, and empower junior leaders to operate outside of the traditional connes of controlled ranges throughout numerous, international locations. JOINT CAPABILITY AND UNI FIED READINESS: Due to the physical proximity of NATO countries throughout Europe, USARER operations reinforce joint capability as participating nations are provided the opportunity to engage in complex training exer cises together improving political, economic, and military relations while demonstrating capability on an international stage. Collective training is the cornerstone of deter rence. It is accomplished through periodic and highly energized multi national exercises supporting tactical readiness in conjunction with a robust information operations-pro jecting presence and enforcing military capability in a contested space. Throughout AR 2.0, the 10th CAB was afforded numerous NATO train ing opportunities allowing the unit to exercise conventional warght ing functions at an astounding scale Aviation Digest AprilJune 201836

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References: throughout Europe. For example, Saber Guardian 17, arguably the cul minating operation of the 9-month rotation, provided the 10th CAB with a highly dynamic training event that culminated with an extensive 34ship Air Assault, including U.S. and Greek aviation assets. DETERRENCE: WHERE TACTICS MEET FACEBOOK Although these accomplishments have been invaluable training ex periences at the tactical level, we must answer the so what that provides the fundamental purpose for the allocation of U.S. resources in terms of manning equipment on the European front. In essence, the political purpose establishing the strategic meaning behind military training that serves to answer why a CAB mobilized from Fort Drum and established an operational footprint in Europe. Ultimately, NATO military operations actively reinforce deter rence via capability alongside highly driven information operations that serve to document broad-scale training exercises through media outlets in an ever technologically based society to disseminate a mes sage of unity and strength. In turn, these training events shape interna tional perceptions of U.S. military presence, preventing near-peer ag gression throughout politically and socially contested locations in Eu rope where anti-NATO sentiment is present. U.S. Army rotational deployments in Europe present rotational Army units with a highly dynamic train ing environment that serves to strengthen the force. This strength ening is accomplished by challeng ing mission command nodes and empowering junior leaders over an expansive territory while reinforc ing joint NATO capability via robust military operations. These opera tions are thoroughly documented and actively disseminated, ultimately deterring near-peer aggres sion. U.S. Army Europe has been re ferred to as the premier leadership Weaver lab of the U.S. Army that serves to sharpen conventional prociencies in a military force needing an opera tional overhaul following a genera tion of combat centered on counter insurgency. The training experience offered by AR 2.0 has not only been invaluable for units such as the 10th CAB, it has also served to push the boundar ies of conventional capability while projecting international legitimacy, setting the conditions for effective deterrence via peaceful operations. 37https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Approximately 12,550 miles away is a constellation of American satellites known as Navstar. It consists of 24 total satellites, each orbiting Earth every 11 hours and 58 minutes. These satellites beam data down to us on earth, which are then received by devices such as your phone, civilian and military navigation units, and many other systems within our infrastructure de pendent on accurate timing. There are however Chinese, Indian, European, and Russian equivalent systems, although Chinese and Indian systems lie in geo synchronous orbit above their own countries, which means they are not global systems such as Russias Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Ac curate real-time positioning data give us the condence to operate vehicles, ships, and aircraft in areas that we are physically unfamiliar with and has led to a complete dependency on positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites. It is this very dependency on global positioning systems (GPS) that has created an opportunity for the enemy to simply ick the off-switch and leave the entire American military in the blind. The time has come to liberate ourselves from the signal by both training and technological re-design. By SFC Tyler Hervey Aviation Digest AprilJune 201838

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So how does GPS work? Global po sitioning system receivers use a process called trilateration to deter mine its position on the earths sur face by timing signals from at least three satellites in the Navstar con stellation. If the GPS receiver is only able to acquire signal from three satellites, you will still get your position, but it will be far less accurate. A GPS receiver needs four satellites to work out your position in 3-dimensions. Once the GPS device has attained distances for at least three satellites, it can complete the trilat eration calculations. These systems use the microwave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to trans mit position and timing information at 186,000 miles per second. Global positioning system is an asset for tactical operations but also comes with a variety of weaknesses. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM CAN BE DEGRADED/LOST BY: 1. METALS AND ELECTRONICS Metals can reect and absorb GPS signals. Avoid operating tactical GPS receivers in areas lled with such items, if possible. 2. MULTIPATHING Multipathing can occur when a GPS receiver lies between taller objects such as buildings, mountains, trees, or other struc tures. Signals from the satellite are reected off of various points before it reaches the receiver, resulting in degraded accuracy in timing and position. If signal is degraded by multipathing, move to an area with optimal loss of signal (LOS) with satellites. 3. THE SUN Solar weather plays a signicant role in satellite per formance and signal degradation of all types. Space events such as solar ares, coronal mass ejections (CMEs), geomagnetic storms, and solar radio bursts can have major detrimental effects on satellites in earths orbit. These space weather events can knock out GPS through natural means. As part of the planning process, check space weather prior to operations. A reliable resource for space weather can be found at https://soho.nascom.nasa.gov/ spaceweather/ (Solar and Heliospheric Observatory, 2018). 4. EARTH WEATHER As the radio signal bounces between the earth and its satellites, inclement weather such as heavy rain could cause signal reduction. Be sure to check weather prior to all operations. 5. JAMMING AND SPOOFING Terrorists, petty criminals, and even hostile enemy nation states can overpower, (jamming), manipulate, (spoof ing) and sow deception through the GPS signal, to include encrypted naviga tion devices. Global positioning system satellites are equipped with extreme ly accurate atomic clocks; however, they are all susceptible to jamming and even far more insidious techniques such as GPS spoong. A GPS spoong attack deceives GPS receivers by broadcasting erroneous GPS signals, de signed to resemble a set of normal GPS signals, or by re-broadcasting au thentic signals taken elsewhere or at different times. Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoong causes the receiver to lie, says consultant David Last, former president of the UKs Royal Institute of Navigation (Hambling, 2017). Global positioning system spoong can be used to trick and re-direct ships, aircraft, and ground maneuver forces into ideal areas of ambush by the enemy. Air-, land-, and sea-related navigation devices should always be encrypted prior to mission start as it assists with jamming and spoong de fense. 6. CYBERATTACKS With GPS and a myriad of communication sat ellites being directly intertwined with the cyber realm, non-state actors and powerful peer competitors seek to disrupt these systems as they control everything from banking systems to power grids. 7. KINETICS Of all the terrifying potential scenarios, kinetics is by far the foulest. On January 11, 2007, China successfully demonstrated an anti-satellite missile on one of their own weather satellites by a kinetic kill vehicle traveling with a speed of 5 miles per second and was launched with a multistage solid-fuel missile from Xichang Satellite Launch Center. The resulting debris also poses a threat to nearby satellites to this day, adding more risk to satellite constellations. Russia is also quite capable of deploying anti-satellite missiles. With the slightest effort of powerful state actors, the entire Navstar constellation could be wiped out, leaving the United States in total chaos. Banking systems, power grinds, navigation systems, communications, internet, poof gone. 39https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Its December 2024, and Sergeant Major Hervey stands atop a small hill on Osan Air Base, South Korea. Hes the CSM of the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade and looks on from a distance as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) maintainers run diagnostics on the latest UAS model purchased by the U.S. Army. Hervey unwraps a cigar, reminiscing of his days as a Platoon Sergeant in Afghanistan, smoking ne cigars with his Noncommis sioned Ofcers on the ight line at dusk. Things were so simple back in the COIN days, he thought. War has come and with it all the familiar sirens, audible broadcasts, and tremors from missile strikes in the distance. It was nearly time for one of his UAS platoons to deploy their system. A young-looking Major with impeccable hair hurriedly approached the Sergeant Major from behind, Sergeant Major Hervey! the Major shrieked. Sir, any GOOD news? Hervey replied with a grin, still clutching the unlit cigar in his mouth. The satellites, Sar Major theyre all gone. All of them. Hervey felt a chill creep down his spine, but they had been preparing for this very scenario for several years. Hervey looked into the Majors eyes and nodded, biting deeper into his cigar, and he made his way down the hill to talk to the young platoon leader and platoon sergeant in charge of the new UAS platoon. Sergeant Major shook hands with the young Lieutenant, Is she ready? The old Sergeant Major smiled. The lieutenant seemed concerned but committal in his response, Were as ready as well ever be, Sergeant Major the Lieutenant replied. Hervey walked into the operations center where the Brigade Commander was on teleconference. The United States had made many preparations since the days of counter-insurgency and adopted new systems that didnt rely on satellites for communications or GPS. This system used rapidly emplaced balloon to retransmit signal. The communications balloons were nearly undetectable and able to navigate and re-position themselves at the discretion of the decision makers. Sergeant Major Hervey didnt want to interrupt the Commander, so he departed to watch his favorite UAS pla toon complete their pre-ight inspections and spool up for take-off. This UAS was new, quiet, deadly, energy efcient, and boasted one advantage in particular that its competitors to the North were not ready for. This UAS has no need for GPS or any type of space-based PNT system. It was semi-intelligent in that, the sensor (camera) on-board could terrain associate its environment against its own maps within the computer. It has maps downloaded for the entire planet and knows its position and altitude simply by looking around. The smart UAS transmits data back to the control station instantaneously by means of quantum-entanglement commu nicators that are un-hackable. This system was totally liberated from satellites and it was absolutely deadly. The UAS was capable of discriminating targets and in-depth decision making. Once close to enemy targets, the belly of the UAS opened, releasing a massive swarm of low slow small UAS (LSS UAS) to conducts short-range attacks on surface-to-air systems. The LSS UAS acted like undetectable kamikazes, ying low beneath radar until reaching their targets and detonating. By 2026, the allied forces were victorious, and the war had ended. Some historians directly attribute the win to the prioritization of U.S. joint military efforts to prepare for operations in denied environments. Sergeant Major Hervey is old now, retired and working in his garden, aching and seemingly slower than he was only 2 years before in Osan. Everything had changed back in America since her satellites were destroyed. Americans were rebuilding and reestablishing line-based communications. There was too much debris in earths orbit to use satellites for another 100 years. But America still had her people, her gardens, and her freedom from op pression. So, will the next large-scale war involve ground-to-space missiles or air-to-space missiles? Probably. In fact, any powerful state actors would be wise to do so. Kinetic weap ons are inexpensive and the tech nology has been widely researched. Its equally as wise to radically reorient the way we train our Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, and allies to ght. As it pertains to GPS and communications, this means get ting back to training military per sonnel to use compasses, maps, sextants, etc. The focus on mend ing training, doctrine, leadership, and technological capabilities gaps should be forefront in the mind of every leader across the force. A new space race has begun with a more terrifying array of weapons sitting in clean rooms across the world at this very moment. Advancements in general physics, quantum comput ing, etc., are changing the game of war. Much of the battleeld of the future will be held on the electro magnetic spectrum. Leaders across the joint force owe it to the future of their country to actively change the culture and train for that worst-case scenario. Train as if there is no GPS and limited to no communication. We must liberate ourselves and our equipment from the signal. By fail ing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. HYPOTHETICAL, FICTIONAL VIGNETTE END VIGNETTE Aviation Digest AprilJune 201840

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photo by SFC Andrew McClureI. THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: The face of combat has changed yet again. Today, the nations big gest concern is not terrorism, as weve obviously developed robust strategies and approaches to deal with the challenges associated with asymmetric warfare through over 15 years of constant engagement. Instead, at least according to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, inter-state strategic competition is now the primary concern in U.S. national security (Department of Defense [DoD, 2018, p. 2). The Na tional Defense Strategy goes on to note that, every domain is con testedair, land, sea, space, and cy berspace, and that domain conten tion occurs as, Long-term strategic competitions with China and Rus sia (DoD, 2018, p. 3-4). We know those same countries to be military peers, potential adversaries that could provide comparable efforts on the eld of battle, essentially a blow-for-blow heavyweight oppo nent. As stated earlier, the face of combat has changed. So, this is not the rst instance that the U.S. has declared a change to threat. There have been numer ous periods of signicant change throughout warfare, and yet things just feel different this time. Largescale combat operations against a peer threat is something that the world has not been witness to in quite some time. This fact alone begs the question, just what can we expect out of large-scale combat operations? Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, provides some level of expectation for large-scale combat operations against a peer threat stating the following, the operations are intense, lethal, and brutal Their conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty (Department of Army [DA], 2017, p. 1-2). The last time the U.S. Army was truly engaged in large-scale combat operations was Korea and World War II, and be cause of this the implications are far reaching. The potential issues as a result of the recent evolution in combat are far reaching, ranging from top ics like placement of aviation as sets within the division area of op erations, to likely reconstitution of aviation units in the event of the worst. There are simply no experiences or lessons learned within the last 15 years of combat experience that could be considered potentially relevant to our future ght. That means we as a branch have to begin to reimagine how we ght, better understand why we cannot continue to ght the same way, and come to the realization that we cannot con tinue to support the ground force in a manner similar to our past experiences. It is the opinion of the author that a general support relationship LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS AND THE ARGUMENT FOR THE FUTURE AVIATION SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPSBy CW4 Leonard Momeny41https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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to the Ground Force Commander is the only possible future solution with respect to successful integra tion of aviation forces in large-scale combat operation against a near peer/peer threat. II. DOES HISTORY HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY? The study of any other situation would require argument and analy sis from the perspective of recent history. Typically, evolutionary steps are scenarios where a building block approach is relevant, with the new version being based predomi nantly on the old and showcasing only a smattering of new changes. In a sense, incremental change is normal in everything we see and do, but every now and again a sig nicant change takes hold. As we will see, there has been no engage ment in the last 50 years that truly embraces the tenets of large-scale combat operations. That means that everything we know about con ducting combat operations is up for revision. CURRENT EXPERIENCES: GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR The last 15 plus years have been dramatic. There have been children born in our country that have nev er known a day when an American Soldier has not been deployed to a combat environment. That fact alone serves to emphasize a great period of combat experience with in the annals of the United States Army, however, we have to ask our selves about the type of ghting we were undertakingdoes it translate to our potential large-scale combat future? What were our large-scale operations during Afghanistan and Iraq, and what level of complexity was experienced during battle? There were of course moments, such as the invasion of Iraq, where large-scale combat operation-like moments occurred, but for the most part we were unchallenged. Think about it, immediate air superiority in Iraq, formations of tanks racing toward Baghdad, unchallenged rota ry-wing ight, and so on. Shortly af ter the invasion, there is a picture of the President declaring victory from the deck of a Navy ship. Then things changed, and the environment took on an Afghanistan-like setting, with American forces in the center of an asymmetric ght. Asymmetric ghts have no frontline, and instead the enemy is all around you. Strat egists and leaders realized this and so we evolved as a ghting force slowly abandoning everything we knew about the old ght. We cannot forget the lessons that we learned, however, we cannot use the major ity of our previous combat experiences to determine how we will ght in this coming future. 30 YEARS AGO: DESERT STORM So, lets take the discussion back just a little further. What about the lessons of Desert Storm? Again, the situation is Iraq, and General Nor man Schwarzkopf is commanding a mighty Army across the desert. Baghdad was enveloped in an Amer ican charge. Air superiority was huge, and unlike during the opening salvos of the Global War on Terror, our Air Force pilots did experience air-to-air combat, being forced to splash enemy MIGs and other as sets. Even still, they did not last longwith air superiority came the charge. However, unlike in the Global War on Terror, we did not stay long, as Hussein eventually complied with American requirements, and so we withdrew our forces. Again, no con tinued chaos, limited complexity, limited if any fatigue, and while the scale of our forces was signicant, this example fails to meet the environment of large-scale combat op erations as described by FM 3-0. 70 YEARS AGO: WORLD WAR II World War II is the only reason able source for relevant lessons on large-scale combat operations. To determine this, you simply have to review the denition/explanation of large-scale combat operations with in the pages of FM 3-0. For example, fatigue does not begin to capture the challenge of the ght in World War II, where battles could rage on for days. Complexity of operations is an understatement, as units had to invade various countries, cover ing continents in order to reach the main objective of Germanyyears after the ght began. Thats right years. Americans did not simply roll over their enemy, and in fact, there were moments in battle that American forces and her allies were defeated, turned back, something many would simply not consider possible today. During World War II we were experts at tactical patience, and when necessary, violence of ac tion, arraying our forces against an enemy peer with great care. During World War II, we knew how to deal with loss, retooling and regenerat ing entire battalions and brigades. World War II and the lessons held within the pages of its history is the necessary Rosetta Stone for study ing large-scale combat operations. III. HOW DOES ALL THIS APPLY AND WHERE TO START? THE THREAT IS REAL Simply put, there are many who do not want to consider either China or Russia as a possible enemy. For many it does not make sense, as China represents one of our nations largest trading partners, and we still man a joint effort with Russia to maintain continuous operation of the International Space Station. However, rising tensions within the Indo-Pacic region and Europe have given our nations leaders pause to reconsider. Again, when we revisit the National Defense Strategy we see the following, that it is increas ingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian modelgaining veto authority over other nations economic, diplomatic, and security decisions (DoD, 2018, p. 2). As a nation and as a military, the consensus is thus, we must prepare for a potential ght against peer level threats. As George Washington said, To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of pre serving peace (State of the Union Address, 1790).Aviation Digest AprilJune 201842

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IMPLICATIONS What does all of this mean to Avia tion? Sadly, we just dont know at this moment, and many are striving to gure out the answer. Field Man ual 3-0, released by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) in October 2017, is the U.S. Armys rst deliberate step to embrace the new reality of future warfare. As far as we know everything changes, from our doc trine to our institutional training. That is not to say that we ush the lessons of asymmetric warfare, but instead it implies we expand upon our understanding of operations and how we, the aviation branch, best integrate in the future ght. As a branch, as expert technicians, ofcers, and non-commissioned of cers, we must begin to reimagine our enemy. The real work starts with every member of the aviation enterprise all working together in concert to grow as a profession. What does that mean? It means that units can no longer conduct collec tive training, at any level, without leveraging realistic threat consider ations that would potentially mirror our potential peer-level adversaries. If you happen to be responsible for such training and do not understand the associated order of battle, visit your Aviation Mission Survivability Ofcers and unit S-2 Intelligence Ofcers, they will help. Another im plication is the necessity to adapt to the expeditionary mindset, also outlined and frequently discussed in FM 3-0. That means living and operating with what we need, not necessarily what we want, tactically emplacing and camouag ing our forces, and staying agile. This will take training. Finally, what does it look like for an organization to undergo reorganization, recon stitution, or regeneration? During training, Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) should be focusing on those considerations every time they en gage in a collective event. Then, and here is the most critical piece, you References: must write about your experiences and share them with the branch. Though it would seem there is much work to be done with respect to de termining our way forward in the fu ture ght, we would venture to say one thing for sure, our support role in large-scale combat operations. Aviation cannot, nor should it be expected to maintain a direct sup port role within large-scale combat operations. General support is the only way forward. If nothing else, the previous discussion has made a tremendous effort to demonstrate a chaotic future battleeld. Avia tion assets cannot be as close to the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) as it would simply be too vulnerable to attack. Could you imagine if the United States Army were to lose an entire CAB? It would be impossible to quickly reconstitute, reorganize, or regenerate a force of that size and cost. Where were aviation assets in WWII? They were well outside of ar tillery range, and that alone starts the conversation regarding aviation employment. Also, bottom line up front, the CAB commander un derstands the 3-dimensional ght and layers of the Joint ght, while ground force commanders typically are more comfortable with and bet ter understand the challenges of the 2-dimensional ght. Additionally, ground force com manders have been so used to wield ing a huge spectrum of support as sets with regard to their piece of the operational environment. Given the vulnerability of aviation within the hostile environment of the future battleeld, and the increased com plexity of these future operations, it does not seem advantageous to attach a CAB to one single ground force effort. Finally, the CAB com manders role with regard to the utilization of his forces has to change. The CAB commander cannot play second ddle, no disrespect intend ed, on the topic of aviation employ ment. In a resource-constrained, highly complex environment, where general support rules the day, the CAB commander represents the se nior aviator of the force, and the only advocate that fully understands the intricacies of aviation forces. Our new model for the CAB commander will be more indicative of Doolittle than anything seen today. IV. CONCLUSION The threat is real, and we need not concern ourselves with near-peer threats, as history shows we quickly deal with such threats, e.g., Grena da, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Instead, we must turn our attention to the peer threat and ready our forces for large-scale combat oper ations. To do this, we must rst be come students of history, students of our profession, and actively par ticipate in the evolution of our doc trinal practices. Finally, we have to realize that this future ght is not similar to any previous engage ment, our role as a direct support asset must be reconsidered, and the maneuver force must embrace the reality of the environmentally dic tated general support role. 43https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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to theLETTERS EDITORDear Editor,I read COL Aults criticism of Aviation ocer development with inter est. Put more than two Aviation lieutenants or captains together in a room and youre certain to hear many of the same complaints. e desire for more time at the company level, more time in the cockpit, and more tactical experience is almost universal. e consequences of too little time and experience are obvious. So its exciting to see a senior leader address this as a systemic issue, but his proposed solu tion is unclear. In particular, I think his diatribe against Masters degree programs misses the mark. Relatively few ocers get to attend such a program: the statistics Ive seen are maybe 20%. For those ocers who do attend school, its almost never in lieu of two more years of tactical Aviation experience, and certainly not two more years in the cockpit. Ocers compete to attend school because they know the alternative, for the 80% who dont, is likely one of a host of branch immaterial assign ments throughout the Army as COL Ault states. Many years in as signments like those (whether actually coded branch immaterial or just treated that way in practice), not two years of graduate school, are what produce the hypothetical underdeveloped battalion com mander. e real problems are bloated stas and mission CREEP. Every ech elon, starting at the battalion level, demands an ever-growing sta of ocers to manage an ever-growing list of reports and projects that neither develop tactical competency nor seem to contribute much to the Armys real purpose. So, we need more and more ocers in total, but the number of ying assignments at the company level is xed or shrinking, resulting in less time per ocer at that level. At least fulltime graduate school opportunities can help to retain good ocers (something that distance learning with Army University, as COL Ault suggests, will never do), while unfullling sta assignments just drive ocers out of the Army completely. I propose the following: Return Aviation units to something like the pre-1983 H Series MTOE in which company commanders hold the rank of major, cap tains serve as platoon leaders, and lieutenants can focus primarily on attaining PC, Flight Lead, and AMC. Stop assigning Aviators to S1, S2 (unless you have a 15C on-hand), and S4 positions; give those as signments to the AG, MI, and LG branches to reduce the ratio of sta Aviators to pilots in the line companies. At the same time, reduce an nual accessions by whatever portion ultimately goes towards lling all the branch immaterial, non-tactical assignments currently held by Aviation captains and junior majors. I assume that vacant ying posi tions at the battalion level would take precedence over higher echelon sta positions that could be lled by non-Aviators, and assignment policies would adjust accordingly. For a wonderfully detailed and still very relevant analysis of this topic, by the way, I recommend the CGSC Masters thesis submitted by Rob ert Quackenbush in 2000. Tim Walsh CPT, AV (26B) USASD Georgetown UniversityAviation Digest thanks CPT Walsh for his letter to the editor. Aviation Digest is always eager to hear the thoughts and opinions of our readers, as well as their recommendations. We truly appreciate our readers taking the time to share view points, comments, concerns, and kudos with Aviation Digest. To facilitate productive conversations on topics, we need your input. Pick up a pen or grab your keyboard and write us a letter explaining your opinion. SEND YOUR LETTER TO THE EDITOR Email: usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx.aviation-digest@mail.mil Mailing Address: Army Aviation Digest Editor | Bldg. 4507, Suite 309 | Andrews Avenue | Fort Rucker, Alabama 36362 DIGEST 51https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Look for the JulySeptember, 2018 Issue: Our Featured Focus Will BeAviation and the NEW FM 3-0... and More Write for Aviation Digest!Scheduled Feature Focus Topics are:OctoberDecember 2018: Tactical Operations and LSCO JanuaryMarch 2019: Aviation Training StrategyPrepare your articles now on these themes or any other topic related to our profession that you would like to share with the Army Aviation Community.