T HE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY SEPTEMBEROCTOBER 2018
THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMYSeptember-October 2018, Vol. 98, No. 5 Professional Bulletin 100-18-09/10 Authentication no.1822710 Commander, USACAC; Commandant, CGSC; DCG for Combined Arms, TRADOC: Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army Provost, Army University, CGSC: Brig. Gen. Sco L. Eandt, U.S. Army Director and Editor in Chief: Col. Katherine P. Guormsen, U.S. Army Managing Editor: William M. Darley, Col., U.S. Army (Ret.) Editorial Assistant: Linda Darnell; Paige Cox, intern Operations Ocer: Lt. Col. Andrew A. White, U.S. Army Senior Editor: Jerey Buczkowski, Lt. Col., U.S. Army (Ret.) Writing and Editing: Beth Warrington; Amanda Hemmingsen, contractor Graphic Design: Arin Burgess Webmasters: Michael Serravo; James Crandell, contractor Editorial Board Members: Command Sgt. Maj. Eric C. DostieArmy University; Col. Rich CreedDirector, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate; Dr. Robert BaumannDirector, CGSC Graduate Program; Dr. Lester W. GrauDirector of Research, Foreign Military Studies Oce; John PenningtonChief, Publishing Division, Center for Army Lessons Learned; Col. John HixsonDirector, Center for Army Leadership; omas JordanDeputy Director, MCCoE; Mike JohnsonDeputy, Combined Arms Center-Training; Col. Georey Catle Director, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic; Richard J. DixonDeputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies Consulting Editors: Col. Alessandro VisacroBrazilian Army, Brazilian Edition; Lt. Col. Carlos Eduardo Ossess SeguelChilean Army, Hispano-American Edition Submit manuscripts and queries by email to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx. firstname.lastname@example.org; visit our webpage for author submission guide lines at hps://www.armyupress.army.mil/Publish-With-Us/#mr-submissions Military Review presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. e content does not necessarily reect the ocial U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other ocial U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide. Military Review reserves the right to edit material. A limited number of hard copies are available for distribution to headquarters elements of major commands, corps, divisions, brigades, baalions, major sta agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, reserve commands, cadet command organizations, medical commands, hospitals, and other units as designated. Information on subscriptions may be obtained by consulting Military Review, which is available online at hps://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/. Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the Department of the Army, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing oces. Yearly paid subscriptions are for $42 US/APO/FPO and $58.80 for foreign addresses and are available through the U.S. Government Publishing Oce at hps://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/military-review-professional-journal-unit ed-states-army POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Military Review, Army University Press, 290 Stimson Ave., Unit 1, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293. e Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the department. Funds for printing this publication were approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 25-30. Mark A. MilleyGeneral, United States Army Chief of Sta Ocial: Gerald B. OKeefeAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the ArmyCover photo: Arkansas Army National Guard soldiers with the 1036th Engineer Company from Jonesboro, Arkansas, detonate an M58 Mine Clearing Line Charge 16 August 2015 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Maj. W. Chris Clyne, 115th Mobile Pub lic Aairs Detachment; photo also appears on page 9)
Since the Soviet Unions fal in 1989, the ecter of large-scale ground combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years folowing, the U.S. Army found itself increasingly caled upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to midle tiers of the range of military operations and conict continuum. e events of 11 September 2001 led to more than een years of intense focus on counterterorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders and soldiers were cul turaly imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more capale in limited contingency operations than at any time in our Nations history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shi, and the risk of great power con ict is no longer a remote possibility. While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the Midle East and southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized U.S. military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessile in even the most remote corners of the world, the U.S. militarys competitive advantage is being chalenged across al of the warghting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and agressive Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cava lier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seek to change the world order in their favor and contest U.S. strategic in terests abroad. e chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased, and we must rapily shi our focus to successfuly compete in al domains and across the ful range of military operations. Over the last three years, the U.S. Army has rapily shied the focus of its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual 3-0, Operations dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique strategic roles: shaping the security environ ment, preventing conict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make temporary success permanent.1To enale this shi of focus, the Army is now changing a cul ture shaped by over een years of persistent limited-contingency operations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fuly square with the exponential lethality, hyperaive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the multi-domain baleeld when facing a peer or near-peer adversary. To emphasize the importance of the Armys continued preparation for largescale combat operations, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center has pulished the seven-volume Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Study book set. e intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the U.S. Army faces by taping our organizational memory to iluminate the future. e reader should reect on these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play, evaluate leaders aions, and de termine what dierentiated success from failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intelectual examination of lessons of the past and their aplication to todays doctrine, organization, and training to best prepare the Army for largescale combat. Relevant answers and tangile reminders of what makes us the worlds greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes. Prepared for War! Note1. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce, October 2017), 2.RMLt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms CenterForeword
2 3 4 e Long HaulHistorical Case Studies of Sustainment Operations in Large-Scale Combat OperationsLt. Col. Keith Beurskens, DM, U.S. Army, Retired A summary of the fourth book in the LSCO set that includes elev en historical case studies of sustainment operations drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern large-scale combat operations. 39 Deep Maneuver Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat OperationsJack D. Kem, PhD A summary of the h book in the LSCO set that includes eleven chronologically ordered historical case studies drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern large-scale combat operations. 46 Into the Breach Historical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations Florian L. Waitl A summary of the sixth book in the LSCO set that includes ten historical case studies of mobility and countermobility operations drawn from the past one hundred years with insights for modern large-scale combat operations. 52 Perceptions Are Reality Historical Case Studies of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations Col. Mark D. Vertuli, U.S. ArmyA summary of the seventh book in the LSCO set that includes ten historical case studies and a discussion on the future implications of information operations during large-scale combat operations. 4 Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations Evolution of an IdeaGen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Armye commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command describes why the Multi-Domain Bale concept evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations concept. 10 Weaving the Tangled Web Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat OperationsChristopher M. Rein, PhDA summary of the rst book in the LSCO set that includes historical case studies on military deception operations from the First World War to present day. 18 Bringing Order to Chaos Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations Lt. Col. Peter J. Schierle, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired A summary of the second book in the LSCO set that includes ten case studies wrien by a diverse group of military historians that focus on some element of command and control of combined arms from 1917 through 2003. 26 Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations Lt. Col. omas G. Bradbeer, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired A summary of the third book in the LSCO set that includes ten historical case studies wrien by dierent authors involv ing lethal and nonlethal res from the period 1917 through 1991 with lessons for military professionals who will be engaged in future large-scale combat operations. TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 September-October 2018Volume 98 Number 5 6 0 Ready NowOur Number One Priority Col. Christopher R. Norrie, U.S. Army Maj. omas E. Lamb, U.S. Army Capt. Michael J. Culler, U.S. Army e National Training Center (NTC) ensures that units have their hardest day in the desert so that no soldier goes untrained into combat. e commander of Operations Group at the NTC describes how it is changing to provide the training required to ght and win during large-scale combat op erations in a multi-domain environment. 70 How Has the Joint Readiness Training Center Changed to Adapt to Large-Scale Combat Operations? Col. David Doyle, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Aaron Coombs, U.S. Army e commander of Operations Group at the Armys Joint Readiness Training Center discusses how the combat training center prepares units and leaders for large-scale combat operations by creating a decisive-action training environment with scalable, exible scenarios that challenge and stress leaders and force them to consider operations other than counterinsurgencies. 82 Creating Powerful Minds Army University Education Initiatives for Large-Scale Combat Operations Col. omas Bolen, U.S. Army Vince Carlisle, PhD e authors discuss how the Army professional military education system is keeping pace with current and future needs of the Army and our soldiers. 88 e Rapid Redesign of the Captains Career Course An Example of Agility in Professional Military Education Col. Ken Hawley, U.S. Army William Kuchinski Two senior academics from the Oce of the Provost at Army University explain the redesign of the Captains Career Course common core blocks of instruction to provide greater emphasis on oensive operations against a near-peer threat in a multi-domain environment. 94 e European War Lt. Col. E. M. Benitez, U.S. Army In this legacy article, rst published in Military Review in December 1939, the author identies the need for U.S. forces to prepare for what was to become known as World War II. is sentiment is echoed by Army leadership today as the Army shis its focus to face the threat of large-scale combat operations against peer or near-peer threats. 111 Meeting the Challenge of Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army e commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center nishes the Military Review special issue with a look to the future of large-scale ground combat operations. 119 A reader comments on a previous article. LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Accelerating MultiDomain OperationsEvolution of an Idea is article as oiginay pulished by the Moern Wa Institute at West Point on 23 July 23 2018.1 It has been edited by Military Review fo style.Multi-Domain Bale has a clear origin.2 Stemming from the idea that disruptive tech nologies wil change the charaer of warfare, it recognizes that the way armies wil ght and win wars wil also change. It also reects the desire to replicate the success of AirLand Bale, which is arualy the most sig nicant case of developing a concept and then materializ ing capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership education, personnel, and facilities ectrum. Origin stories ealish the foundation from which lasting ideas emerge. However, for ideas to have a lasting impact they must evolve. For Multi-Domain Bale, there are two things driving the need to evolve the concept. First, ideas must evolve to ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the en terprise they serve. e 2018 National Defense Strategy lays out the missions, emerging operational environ ments, advances in technology, and anticipated enemy, threat, and adversary capabilities that the Department of Defense envisions for the foreseeale future.3 It provides Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army
U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and British Army paratroopers assigned to 3rd Baalion, Parachute Regiment, Colchester, England, shake hands before jumping from a C-17 Globemaster III over Latvia 8 June 2018 during Exercise Swi Response 18. (Photo by Airman 1st Class Gracie I. Lee, U.S. Air Force)
6 direction for how the joint force must evolve to compete, deter, and win in future armed conict. To this end, Multi-Domain Bale must reect this strategy. Second, when I took the reins of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, I was ecicaly directed to operationalize Multi-Domain Bale by building upon the foundation created by my prede cessor and accelerating its aplication. And, what I found was an incredile foundation. Gen. Dave Perkins brought together partners across the joint force, driving development of the concept to an ar ticulated idea and a vision of how the Army ts into it. e key players are al here and are commied to building and improving the concept and nding real solutions. e concept is ready to grow. But for that to hapen, we need to confront some of the prolems others have noted. Over the last eighteen months that Multi-Domain Bale has been out there for debate, there have been four consistent critiques. Some noted that the idea was old wine in a new bole.4 I think the iPhone analogy articulates why that just is not true.5 What the original iPhone did was not al that new, but how the iP hone did it fundamen taly changed not just a market, but peoples behavior. is is exactly what we seek to achieve with this new concept. ough the domains of warfare (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace) are not new, how the U.S. Armed Forces wil rapily and continu ously integrate them in the future is new. Another critique is that this is an Army-only concept.6 However the Air Force and Marine Corps have been part of Multi-Domain Bale from the start, and recent reporting from numerous forums has made clear the Armys desire to listen, learn, and include our joint and multinational partners in the development of this idea.7 Recently the Navy and the Joint Sta have also joined the discussion. Abert Palazzos series of articles in the fal of 2017 laid out a clear arument. To be successful, MultiDomain Bale must translate into radical eects on the U.S. militarys culture.8 e concept must force us to reconsider fundamental tenets, like our industrial-age means of promoting, training, and educating leaders. It must also pul us from the comfort of our taical-level trenches to develop capabilities that inform up to the strategic level of war.9Puing bale into the name both connes the possibilities and limits the result. In bales, combatants can win time and space, and they alow one side to take ground, but they do not win wars. e world we operate in today is not dened by bales, but by persistent competition that cycles through varying rates in and out of armed conict. Winning in competition is not accomplished by winning bales but through executing integrated operations and campaigning. Operations are more en compassing, bringing together varied taical aions with a common purpose or unifying themes. ey are the bridge between the taical and the strategic. In my rst months of command at Training and Doctrine Command, it became clear that the use of the word bale was stiing conversation and growth of the concept. ere are three concrete reasons why MultiDomain Bale evolved to Multi-Domain Operations. First, if the concept is to be truly joint and multi-service, we need clarity and alignment in how we tak. e Air Force taks of Multi-Domain Operations and Multi-Domain Command and Control, while we tak of Multi-Domain Baleoen covering similar, if not the same, ideas and capabilities. To this point, none of the many people I have taked to, including my predecessor, are weded to the use of baleit was what t best in time, place, and cir cumstances. What they are commied to are the ideas of converging capabilities across the joint force with continuous integration across multiple domains. Second, we cannot do this alone. e armed services can win bales and campaigns, but winning wars takes the whole of government. It helps the entire eort if our interagency partners are comfortale with and con versant in our warghting concepts and doctrine. As Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He previously served as commander of 18thAirborne Corps and Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve. His combat and operational experience includes deployments in support of Operation Urgent Fury, Operation Just Cause, Operation Uphold Democracy, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is a graduate of North Georgia College with a Bachelor of Science in psy chology and the U.S. Army War College with a master of strategic studies.
7 highlighted to me by a former ambassador at a recent forum, taking in terms of operations instead of bales brings together those who want to get things done whether they are civilians or the military. And third, it is never just about the ght. When it comes to combat, there is no one beer than the combined weight of the U.S. military and our alies and partners. However, the operating environment is evolving and nation-statelevel competition has re emerged, as evidenced by recent aions by both Russia and China. Our National Defense Strategy highlights the importance of winning the competition that pre cedes and folows conict. However, our use of MultiDomain Bale seems to indicate our concept was only for the conict phase. While there are bales within competition, winning them is pointless if they are in isolation to the larger context of deliberate operations suporting national strategy. Multi-Domain Bale served its purposeit sparked thinking and debate and it created a foun dation. But, what we need now is Multi-Domain Operations, and the next revision of the concept to be released this fal wil reect this change. Lanuage is important. It conveys meaning. is change is not cosmeticit is about growing an idea to its greatest potential in order to change the way we ght today and ensure overmatch against our adver saries of tomorow. To do this we need clarity and alignment across the joint force, whole-of-government inclusion, and perective that reinforces our need to compete eectively outside periods of armed conict. Changing the name does not do this by itself, but it communicates a clear vision of what we need to accom plish and where we are headed. Non-Deartment of Defense works and authors cited in this article are meant to infor the conversation on the topic. ei apearance in this article does not reect the ocial policy o position of, o constitute endorse ment of thei work by, U.S. Ary Training and Doctine Comand, the Deartment of the Ary, the Deartment of Defense, o the U.S. governent. Notes 1. Stephen Townsend, Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations: Evolution of an Idea, Modern War Institute at West Point, 23 July 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://mwi.usma.edu/ accelerating-multi-domain-operations-evolution-idea/. 2. Kelly McCoy, e Road to Multi-Domain Bale: An Origin Story, Modern War Institute at West Point, 27 October 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://mwi.usma.edu/road-multi-do main-bale-origin-story/. 3. Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), accessed 8 August 2018, hps://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 4. Bob Scales, Bale For Armys Soul Resumes: Lessons From Army Aer Next, Breaking Defense, 28 March 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/bale-for-ar mys-soul-resumes-lessons-from-army-aer-next/; Shmuel Shmuel, Multi-Domain Bale: Airland Bale, Once More, With Feeling, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://warontherocks.com/2017/06/multi-domain-bale-airland-bale-oncemore-with-feeling/. 5. Nathan Finney, Integration in Warfare, e Strategist (blog), e Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 October 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ integration-in-warfare/. 6. Dan Goure, Will the U.S. Army Tolerate a U.S. Air Force Bait and Switch on J-Stars Replacement?, e National Interest (website), 10 October 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://nationalinterest. org/blog/the-buzz/will-the-us-army-tolerate-us-air-force-bait-switchj-stars-22662. 7. Mark Pomerleau, In the Move to Multi-Domain Operations, What Gets Lost?, C4ISRNET (website), 11 April 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2018/04/11/ in-the-move-to-multi-domain-operations-what-gets-lost/. 8. Albert Palazzo, Multi-Domain Bale: Meeting the Cultural Challenge, e Strategy Bridge, 14 November 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, hps://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/14/ multi-domain-bale-meeting-the-cultural-challenge 9. Albert Palazzo, Multi-Domain Bale: Geing the Name Right, Small Wars Journal, 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, hp://smallwars journal.com/jrnl/art/multi-domain-bale-geing-name-right.
On 19 February 2019, the Army University Press will release the eighth book in its Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) series, titled The Quiet Professionals: Historical Case Studies in Special Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations, edited by Dr. Robert Toguchi. This collection features twelve articles detailing special operations support to diverse LSCO operations and campaigns in a wide variety of scenarios to include support to the European and Pacic theaters in World War II, the Spanish Civil War, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, British and Arab operations in the Levant, Israeli responses at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, and support to the Coalition 2003 invasion of Iraq.Group of soldiers from Army of the Republic of Vietnam in September 1968 with Sfc. Norman A. Doney, 5th Special Forces Group Airborne, 1st Special Forces in Vietnam. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center) BOOK RELEASE COMING SOON! A U P
The Army is shifting its focus and updating its doctrine to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats. To support the new doctrine codied in Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center commander, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, directed the Army University Press to publish the seven-volume Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Study book set. As he explains in this issues Foreword, his intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the U.S. Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future. To introduce readers to this set, the following special section of Military Review provides an overview of each volume by its author. The downloadable version of the book set will be available online at https:// www.armyupress.army.mil beginning in October 2018.
10 Weaving the Tangled WebMilitary Deception in LargeScale Combat OperationsChristopher M. Rein, PhD A dummy tank being erected in 1942 at the Middle East School of Camouage in Cairo. (Photo by Capt. Gerald Leet, British Army, via Imperial War Museum, HU 59574)
11 Throughout the recorded history of warfare, military planners and commanders have sought to deceive their adversary as to the size, tim ing, or location of an aack in order to gain a decisive advantage. From the famous Trojan Horse to modern eorts to use the electromagnetic ectrum to spoof or jam sensors, deception in some form remains an essential component of military operations. Whether aack ing an unsuecting enemy on Christmas morning, as Washington did at Trenton, or emplacing Quaker uns (logs painted lack to resemle cannons) to provide the impression of strength, U.S. forces have successfuly built on a long legacy of military deception (MILDEC) in order to prevail in the Nations wars. While technology continues to advance at a dizzying pace, threatening to render previous lessons obsolete, MILDEC operations have successfuly withstood previous developments and even incorporated new technologies to continue to form an important part of combat operations. While in some cases MILDEC is potentialy capale of enaling mili tary forces to prevail without a ght, as the theorist Sun Tzu postulated, more oen it confers an advantage that helps the side that successfuly harnesses it prevail, oen at a much lower cost than it would have otherwise.1 us, MILDEC, and its long and successful history, re main an important, even vital, tool for any future leader. Given the voluminous and excelent body of liter ature curently availale on military deception, it is certainly worth asking why we need another volume on the topic.2 Weaing the Tangled Web: Military Decetion in Large-Scale Combat Operations is not intended to displace, even if it could, the deeply-researched and lengthy treatises on the long history of military decep tion operations. Rather, it is intended as a primer and a thought piece for how strategists, operational planners, sta ocers and, ultimately, commanders have histori caly integrated military deception into large-scale com bat operations, focusing on the last one hundred years of conict. e individual chapters, while certainly ex celent stand-alone treatments of the deception aects of the operations and campaigns considered, likewise are of insucient length to become the denitive works on their individual topics. Instead, they build upon the extensive secondary literature and, in several cases, pri mary sources in order to provide a comprehensive but accessile understanding of how military deception has successfuly enaled victory on the baleeld. If principles of war can be sied out of military history, as the master, Carl von Clausewitz, aempted to do with Napoleons campaigns, then these twelve case studies also ought to provide us with some universal truths regarding deception operations.3 Admiely, considering successful deception op erations primarily involving the U.S. Army and its principal alies and antagonists may omit a number of relevant examples. But, these cases are sucient to provide several enduring threads of continuity in successful operations that, most importantly, remain relevant for curent and future praitioners. One of the rst is the importance of coordination in deception campaigns, eecialy since the adition of warfare in the third dimension (air warfare), which co incides with the beginning of this book. Many thought that the airplane, and later radar and satelite imagery, marked the end of successful deception by puling back the veil that had shielded terestrial armies for milen nia. Instead, deception remained a key, if signicantly more complicated aect of many campaigns. While previously deception had to be coordinated between the military and political instruments of national power, now it also had to be praiced in multiple domains simultaneously. In what could be labeled multi-domain deception, these plans required close and careful coordination across the warghting domains to ensure that lapses in one area did not undo eorts in other areas. A heavy bombing campaign focused exclusively on Normandy would have undone the ruse of an Alied landing at Pas-de-Calais, just as beligerent rhetoric from Egyptian political leaders would have undermined eorts to lul the Israelis to sleep prior to the 1973 Yom Kipur/6 October War. With the prolif eration of warfare into space and cyberspace, the diculty of coordinating a Christopher M. Rein, PhD, is a historian with the Combat Studies Institute, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned his doctorate in history in 2011 from the University of Kansas and is the author of one book, e North African Air Campaign, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2012, as well as several articles. He is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and served as a navigator aboard the E-8C Joint STARS during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
13 successful deception campaign has expanded exponen tialy and greatly complicated the eorts of its archi tects, but it has not made their task impossile. Also emerging from the narative is the Magruder Principle, the idea that it is easier to convince an adversary to hold onto a preex isting belief than to convince him or her of a new one.4 is obviously depends heavily on both inteligence colection to understand an oposing commanders estimate of the situation, and cultural com petency to understand what key assumptions command ers, militaries, and nations are likely to hold most dear. Once planners have accurately divined an enemys strongly held beliefs, they can then use this knowledge to achieve their goals. Just as a praitioner of the Japanese martial art of jiu-jitsu uses the mo mentum of an oponents punch or lunge to continue movement in a certain direction but wel past the intended point, deception campaigners can use adver saries assumptions against them by reinforcing those beliefs while simultaneously planning an unexpected operation that catches an adversary o balance or out of position. While dicult to successfuly accomplish, this remains the closest thing to an enduring principle in military deception operations, and it forces planners to miror image themselves and ask what precon ceived notions they have that an adversary might turn against them. One of the most famous of the humorous Murphys Rules of War postulates that e enemy diversion you are ignoring is his main aack, which accurately charaerizes the initial German response to the successful Operation Overlord invasion of Normandy.5Careful readers of the accounts in this book wil notice that weaker powers tend to favor the use of deception to overcome a stronger oponent. Just as jiu-jitsu enales a smaler ght er to use a larger or more power ful adversarys strength against him or her, successful deception operations can enale a weaker force or nation to prevail against a stronger one by diersing eort or creating a tempo of operations to which a less agile oponent is unale to respond. us, smaler nations, or those with smaler manpow er reserves such as the United Kingdom, have historicaly been the most successful devel opers and employers of deception in order to achieve decisive eects. Aditionaly, decep tion might also enale the forces of politicaly fragile, casualty-averse nations to succeed at a much lower cost, preventing an adversary from using arition to achieve strategic aims. In any event, through long experience, some nations and cultures, from China to Russia to the United Kingdom, have become eecialy skiled at military deception and thus oer a wealth of talent and insights for potential alies or warnings for adversaries. Stronger nations that have typicaly relied Previous page: A soldier from the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, also known as the Ghost Army, uncovers speakers mounted on a halftrack that were used as a form of sonic deception during World War II. Sounds that were recorded and mixed to t specic situations to help deceive the enemy could be heard een miles away. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives via Princeton Architectural Press) Ghost Army insignia, circa 1944. e Ghost Army was a 1,100-person unit established during World War II to de ceive German intelligence as to the size, identity, location, and capabilities of Allied military units, especially as forces were massing in Great Britain for the invasion of Europe. e unit recruited members who could contribute to these de ceptions from a variety of backgrounds such as artists, actors and set designers from theater groups, radio broadcasters, design engineers, and architects. e unit successfully mis led German forces in a coordinated eort that included the creation of fake units, complete with shoulder insignia; the use of decoy tanks, trucks, artillery, and aircra made of rub ber; employment of large speakers to mimic the sounds of personnel and equipment; construction of fake motor pools and other buildings; the broadcast of fake radio transmis sions; and the distribution of fake documents. (Image cour tesy of the Institute of Heraldry, U.S. Army)
14 on overwhelming force or less-sophisticated assaults to achieve military objectives through brute arition would do wel to leverage this expertise in their own campaigns and operations. But, these observations are not the sum total of insights within these pages. Readers may identify concepts that escaped the authors or editors, or nd new inspiration from the eorts of earlier campaigns. While the eed, range, lethality, and scale of warfare are constantly increasing, military theorists arue that its fundamental nature is not, though they oen en gage in spirited debate on what exactly comprises the nature of war. Future praitioners must study their cra in order to rst gain and then share their own insights, and the authors hope this book wil provide a useful roadmap for the journey. The book begins with the U.S. Armys first suc cessful deception operation in a major conflict. As Mark Grotelueschen convincingly arues, the Bel fort Ruse successfuly enaled American, and there fore Alied, battlefield success in the First World War by influencing German troop dispositions in France. While relying heavily on its European alies, the U.S. Army demonstrated it was a quick study and incorporated deception operations in almost al of its subsequent combat operations. Brian Drohan contin ues the focus on the First World War by examining British forces in Palestine that leveraged deception operations to first outflank Ottoman dispositions on a weakened flank and then used their adversarys tendency to expect a repeat of this tactic to drive through a weakly held coastal sector. The two oper ations at Beersheeba and Megido remind planners that, like poker players and basebal pitchers, they develop their own tels and tendencies, and, by identifying these and then varying their plans, they can successfuly catch their oponent off uard. Australian troops carry a dummy tank 17 September 1918 that was built to mislead the Germans during the following days aack on Le Verguier and the Hindenburg Outpost Line by the 1st and 4th Divisions. (Photo courtesy of the Australian War Memorial collections database, E04934)
15 Gary Linhart keeps our focus on the shores of the Mediteranean but shis forward in time to examine the intricate British deception campaign at the Bale of El Alamein that enaled Montgomerys defeat of Rommels vaunted Afrika Korps during World War II. While exploring in detail the technical aects of the campaign, Linharts analysis of Operation Bertram also reveals British eorts to use Rommels tendencies against him. Knowing that the Desert Fox would both use, and therefore expect, a ank aack through the desert, Montgomery fed this belief while developing a strong aack on the most likely avenue of aproach that enaled him to break the Axis cordon. e episode reveals the continued British expertise in deception that signicantly enaled the Alied victory in the west. Greg Hospodor extends this analysis to subsequent campaigns in the Mediteranean, demonstrating how an elaborate, theater-level deception enaled construc tion of a ctitious order of bale that far exceeded in scale the forces actualy availale, forcing the Axis powers to distribute forces al along their threatened shore and ensuring that a strong landing at any one point had a much beer chance of success. While the famous, if macabre, eorts of e Man Who Never Was, inspired books and motion pictures, Hospodor reminds us that it succeeded only because it was part of a layered, detailed, and wel-coordinated deception campaign that continualy evolved to maintain a posi tion of relative advantage for the weern Alies.6Alan Donohue shis our focus to the Eastern Front, one of the most signicant theaters of ground combat in World War II. By successfuly reinforcing Soviet perceptions that Moscow remained the focus of German aacks in 1942, Fa Krel (Operation Kremlin) facilitated a German drive that extended wel into the Caucasus and might have cut o Soviet oil suplies had Hitler not become rst distraed by, and later obsessed with, the city of Stalingrad. Kyle Vautrinots analysis of that detailed operation demonstrates that taical, operational, and strategic A worker inates a model of a Russian T-72B tank next to an inat able dummy of a SU-27 ghter jet 8 April 2009 at the compound of the RusBal balloon manufacturer outside Moscow. e small rm produces infraredand radar-reective inatable dummy targets in 1:1 ratio that are designed for the Russian military and the international defense market. (Photo by omas Peter, Reuters)
16 deception played an important role in the counterat tack that rescued the city and destroyed Germanys oensive capability for the remainder of the war. Soviet deception, known as maskirovka continued to evolve through the remainder of the war; most signicantly, as Curt King points out, in Operation Bagration, when successive and overlaping deception operations kept the Germans constantly o uard and unale to respond to sequential Soviet thrusts. is resulted in the destruction of the German Army Group Center and the liberation of Soviet teritory taken by the Germans in 1941. But Sco Farquhars analysis of the D-Day deception plans reveals that the Soviets were not the only masters of deception in the Second World War. By 1944, the Alies had developed the sta and, most importantly, the expertise, to successful ly execute an intricate and large-scale cam paign that ensured the safety of the Normandy landings and the fol lowing breakout and liberation of France. During the course of the war, Germany went from deceiver to deceived, largely as a result of de ciencies in its inteligence aparatus and its vulner ability to codebreaking, demonstrating the enduring importance of superiority in the information domain to enale ground combat. In chapter 9, Geo Bab welcomingly provides both an example from an Eastern adversary and a case in which a Weern coalition succumbed to deception with catastrophic consequences. Babs account of Chinese deception on the Korean peninsula oers a stark warning for future commanders of how their preexisting beliefs and notions, if unchalenged, can lead them to disaster. Tal Tovy folows with another successful case of deception, one that spanned the military and diplomatic arenas, delayed Israeli awareness of an impending Arab aack, and impaed Israels responsethough, fortu nately, without disastrous consequences. It also oers a connection to previous chapters, demonstrating how Soviet sponsors success fuly exported maskirovka to client states, and how they successfuly used a massive training exercise as cover for an invasion, a stil-favored taic in the post-Soviet world. Steven Pagets ac count of the British lib eration of the Fakland Islands brings the study forward into a compel ling case of multi-do main operations requir ing both a high degree of coordination among the military domains as wel as synchronization with the media and other instruments of national power. Operating in an environment with a ubiquitous media presence, some of which may be hostile, presents a new chalenge for military commanders, whether those media are state-based or nationless entities such as WikiLeaks, which has colected and pulished sensitive military information electronicaly.7 Maintaining a successful deception campaign may require the aive suport of sympathetic media and exclusion of hostile me dia, presenting a further chalenge in democracies where freedom of the press has been enshrined in their founding documents. Don Wrights account of the First Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, brings the book into the curent operating environment,
17 highlighting how air, land, and naval forces success fuly cooperated to conceal, or at least delay, recogni tion of the bold coalition strategy to liberate Kuwait. While the coalition was certainly strong enough to overwhelm Iraqi forces in a frontal assault, the de ception plans key contribution was to spare coalition lives, thus maintaining popular suport. In his conclusion, Conrad Crane reminds us that much has transpired in the quarter century since Desert Storm, including leaps forward in technological capabili ties that signicantly increase the diculty of a deception planners mission. Seemingly innocuous advances in per sonal electronics now have the ability to reveal the loca tion of clandestine military operating sites.8 Coordination chalenges have increased exponentialy, while the proliferation of social media makes it dicult to con trol a popular narative, and therefore pulic and global opinion. At the same time, commanders and stas have become highly reliant on systems subject to denial or, worse, false injects, leading to the potential for paralysis or aion based on false information, potentialy easing the deceivers task. He makes clear that military deception wil continue to be a vital part of military operations and an essential area of study for leaders at al levels. is colection of essays seeks to highlight cur rent thinking and areas of doctrinal development to stimulate the study and development of military deception operations. e authors and editor hope that Weaing the Tangled Web: Military Decetion in Large-Scale Combat Operations wil provide a jump ing-o point for professionals new to the topic and a resource for instructors seeking to educate and train the next generation of praitioners of military de ception. While not a comprehensive treatment of the subject, the twelve excelent essays and thought-pro voking conclusion provide ample grist for the mils for those who design military deception eorts and a reminder of the importance of critical thinking for al who uard against the many would-be deceivers weaving their tangled webs. Notes1. Sun Tzu, e Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Grith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41, 66, 77. e master wrote, All warfare is based on deception, and to win one hundred victories in one hundred bales is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without ghting is the acme of skill. 2. Examples include Mark Lloyd, e Art of Military Decep tion (London: Pen and Sword, 1999); Barton Whaley, Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016); addeus Holt, e Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004). 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 4. Oce of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980), 5, accessed 25 June 2018, hp://www.governmentaic.org/18docs/CIAdeceptionMaxims FactFolklore_1980.pdf 5. Murphys Rules of Combat, e S2 Company, accessed 25 June 2018, hp://www.s2company.com/les/readings/murphy.htm 6. For example, see Ewan Montagu, e Man Who Never Was: World War IIs Boldest Counterintelligence Operation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Ronald Neame, director, e Man Who Never Was (1956; UK: Odeon Entertainment, 2012), DVD. 7. WikiLeaks Website Publishes Classied Military Documents from Iraq, CNN, 25 October 2010, accessed 25 June 2018, hp:// www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/wikileaks.iraq/index.html 8. Joshua Berlinger and Maegan Vazquez, US Military Reviewing Security Practices aer Fitness App Reveals Sensitive Info, CNN, 29 January 2018, accessed 25 June 2018, hps://www.cnn. com/2018/01/28/politics/strava-military-bases-location/index.html .
18 Bringing Order to ChaosCombined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat OperationsLt. Col. Peter J. Schierle, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired Soldiers of Headquarters Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division re a 37 mm gun through the Argonne Forest in the fall of 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne Oensive, where American soldiers fought their most dicult bale in World War I and proved that the American Army had come of age. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)
19 Large-scale combat operations are at the fa ight of the conict continuum and asociated with a. Histoicay, baleelds in large-scale combat operations hae been more caotic, intense, and highly destructie than those the Ary has expeienced in the pa decaes. Duing the 1943 bales of Sidi Bou Zid and Kaseine Pas in World Wa II, 5,000 Ameican Soldiers ere kied ove the course of just 10 days; duing the rst three days of ghting the Ary lost Soldiers at a rate of 1,333 pe day. Field Manual 3-0, OperationsTwo days aer the losses at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass, the 1st Armored Division and other elements of the U.S. Armys II Corps began the counteroensive that would destroy the vaunted Panzergrupe Afia (formerly known as the Afia Korps ) and would net several hun dred thousand German and Italian prison ers of war. is green U.S. Army unit, in its rst major combat against a veteran oponent in which it would lose ve thou sand soldiers and then launch a series of coun teraacks, could be a textbook denition of resilience.1Our Army today may not be fuly ready to display this type of resilience or win in this type of combat. As a result, we may need to adjust our cultural values to understand the verities and changes in the nature of conventional operations since 1945, come to grips with the impact of signicant U.S. casualties, and become more comfortale with the sheer violence of modern combined arms bale. e boom line is that we need to alter our perception of future war and embrace the training and readiness requirements of modern conventional opera tions, and we must be prepared to deal with the aendant horors of mass casualties and the likely destruction of entire units along with the eects of air parity and being outunned by the enemy artilery, at best. e last times the U.S. Army conducted joint multidivisional oensive campaigns using combined arms maneuver were in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, which then resulted in seventeen years of the Army aempting to master stability and counterin surgency operations while ghting a dealy enemy.2 ese seventeen years of combat experience, while valuale for our smaler taical unit leaders, have not been without their own chalenges. e denition of combined arms maneuver is the aplication of the elements of combat power in a com plementary and reinforcing manner to achieve phys ical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy to pre serve freedom of aion and exploit success.3 As our Army continues to prepare for an unknown future regarding largescale combat op erations (LSCO) against a peer or near-peer ad versary, we must prudently assume that our combined arms maneuver formations wil most likely be outnumbered, the enemy may be technologicaly more advanced in some areas, andfor the rst time since World War IIthe enemy may have air superiority. Our mindset, our values, and our culture on training, education, and unit readiness must continue to adapt to the changing operational environment. Our path to future victories includes an Army that is a globaly engaged, regionaly responsive force providing a ful range of capabilities to combatant commanders to U.S. Army artillery crew in action February 1943 at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History)
21 Infantrymen of the 27th Infantry Regiment take advantage of cover and concealment in tunnel positions 10 August 1952, forty yards from the commu nists near Heartbreak Ridge in North Korea. (Photo by Feldman via National Archives, 111-SC-410716)conduct oensive, defensive, and stability tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initia tive, consolidate gains, and win.4e second volume of the LSCO se ries, Binging Ode to Chaos: Histoical Case Studies of Combined Ars Maneuve in Large-Scale Combat Operations provides ten case studies wrien by a diverse group of military historians. Al of the chapters focus on some element of command and control of combined arms from 1917 through 2003. ese case studiesranging from multi ple U.S. Army Corps in their rst combat operations to divisions ghting on the far end of culminationprovide strong lessons in the major issue of combined arms warfare whether victory is determined by maneuver or res, or a combination of both. As Richard M. Swain points out in his ex celent history of the ird Army during the Persian Gulf War, theorists, historians, and commentators frequently align themselves in one of two camps of explanation.5 Swain cals them the romantic school and the realist school. Romantics believe that maneuver can be so adroit that a discerning enemy wil ad mit defeat at the hands of an operational mas ter and wil surender to the briliance of the enemys operational art. e realist school occupied primarily by praitioners, eecialy those of an artilery heritagebelieve that the end result of military operations is death from indirect re. e more you shoot, the less damage the enemy can do. Victory hapens not through psychoshock or sik scarves in the air but from 155 mm and larger artilery res. A second major issue, but one beyond the limits of this book to oer sucient case stud ies, is the role of casualties in LSCO and the relative lack of casualties in the last seventeen plus years of stability operations.6In adressing the issue of adroit maneu veror the simple need to kil the enemy in large numbers to gain victorythis book presents two chapters from experi ences in World War I: one on the German experience late on the eastern front; and the other about U.S. V Corps operations, also very late in the war. It then goes on to discuss case studies from World War II in three essays: Buna, crossing the Mosele, and the reduction of Manila. e book goes on to provide two essays on Korea, one that discusses the U.S. aproach to the start of the stabilized period and a second that discusses the Peoples Liberation Army, inclusive of the mythology of Peoples volunteers (in the same period). Finaly, the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom I in 2003 are al explored in single chapters. Each chapter analyzes the necessity of taical and, even occasionaly, operational combined arms in LSCO against peer-threats since 1917. e focus is on the U.S. Armys ap proach, but the German, Chinese, Egyptian, Israeli, and South Vietnamese aproaches are explored as wel. ese chapters are not al strictly chronological since the editors selected particularly noteworthy assessments of U.S. aions in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and at the start of the stabilization period in Korea to start the discussion. From those assessments, a common lanuage emerged; the remainder of the chapters are organized chronologicaly. In al the chapters, the issues of Swains romantic and realist versions of modern combat are debatedgiven the les sons revealed through these case studies, each reader wil make his or her own assessment. Chapter 1 is wrien by retired Gen. Wiliam Walace, former V Corps
22 commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom I in 2003, and retired Col. Kevin Benson, a former J5 (strategic plans and policy) Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planner during the invasion. e authors explain the planning eects leading to the production of the CFLCC/ird Army major operations plan COBRA II and its execution in combat. e focus is on the major developments of the planning eort during wargaming and plan revision, and how the V Corps commander adjusted his execu tion as the combat conditions changed. In chapter 2, Col. Bryan Giby, the military division chief of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, an alyzes the 2nd Infantry Divisions assault on Koreas Punchbowl in 1951 to include the as saults on Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge. He investigates how combined arms af fected the Punchbowl operations through the preliminary aacks to seize Hil 1179 and ealish a forward patrol base, a hasty aack to eliminate the North Korean forces at Bloody Ridge, and folow-on operations on Heartbreak Ridge. Giby also assess es each of the eld commanders on the ground in his analysis of the doctrine and ghting in a large-scale combat environment, and the honest results of the leaders who failed to be adaptive in a large-scale war. Gibys cautionary note primarily adresses the diculty of achieving great things with less than overwhelming resources. His narative should enale further discussions of life under heavy and sustained enemy artilery bombard ment, something we have missed, thankfuly, in most aions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In chapter 3, Maj. Mike Kiser, an instructor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, examines the Chinese use of maneuver to achieve oper ational and strategic objectives of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from October 1950 to June 1951. Kiser demonstrates how Chinese ocers understood their advantages against the United Nations forces and created superiority through maneuver and repower. In chapter 4, J. David Pressley II, a history graduate student from the University of North Texas, analyzes the German utilization of combined arms operations at Riga and the Baltic islands in the nal months of the eastern front during World War I. He discusses several taical and operational innovations witnessed during these German aacks, which were promulgat ed into ocial German doctrine and quickly trans fered to the Italian and weern fronts. is return of movement to the baleeld was actualy based primarily on overwhelming repowerindirect and direct reat the point of penetration, not on some romantic notion of adroit operational art, mystical psychoshock of the enemy command-and-control systems, or geing inside his OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. Todays doctrine writers, senior leaders, and those who would become senior com manders and sta ocers would do wel to read this chapter, eecialy if they believe they have found the magic keys to the kingdom in some new technology. In chapter 5, Maj. John Nimmons, an armor o cer and recent School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate, provides a case study of the V Corps operations in the Meuse-Argonne Oensive, charting the obstacles to adaption as wel as the social and cultural impacts that aected the V Corps aions and decisions. is chapter details the early strugles of V Corps to link their artilery and intel ligence systems at the corps level with the taical in novation of combined arms maneuver at the division level. e chalenge of dividing the multiple tasks on the modern baleeld between echelons to maximize both eectiveness and eciency is rarely the focus Lt. Col. Peter J. Schierle, PhD, U.S. Army, retired, is a professor of military history at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command and General Sta College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a twentyfour-year veteran of the Army, having served in Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Germany, Hungary, and Bosnia, and throughout the United States. He is a veteran of Desert Storm, serving as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment S-4, and of Implementation Force and Stabilization Force in Bosnia as the U.S. V Corps Chief of Plans. He has been a Department of the Army civilian instructor at SAMS since 2000 aer serving three years as the SAMS exercise director. He is an ROTC graduate of Canisius College, Bualo, New York; holds masters degrees from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and SAMS; and a PhD from the University of Kansas.
23 of historians work, but it is a critical component of baleeld competence. Nimmons describes the steep learning curve of the U.S. Army in the fal of 1918 and nishes the chapter with a clear depiction of what victory looks likethe clear coordination of res, maneuver, tanks, combat aircra, eective logistics, and an eective level of coordination from the corps to the divisions. In chapter 6, Dr. Robert Young, a history professor at the American Military University, explains the eect of the just-in-time, or almost just-in-time, suport of el ements of a hastily mobilized U.S. Army division during World War II in the Southwest Pacic Area (SWPA) in 1942 and early 1943. Equiped with only one howit zer of sucient repower to destroy Japanese bunkers, inadequate ammunition for that one artilery piece, initialy no tanks worthy of the name, and woefuly short infantry front-line strength, the early ghting in Buna and elsewhere in the SWPA was not a story of success. Learning, however, did occur, and subsequent oensives, using more artilery, many more tanks, and some Alied combat-experienced soldiers, rapily turned the course of these bale against the Japanese. In chapter 7, Maj. Paul Cheval, an infantry ocer and a recent graduate of SAMS, discusses the 80th Infantry Division that engaged the German army in Auust 1944 at Argentan, France, and again in September 1944 when crossing the Mosele River. His analysis of the divisions ability to employ combined arms reveals that, although it eventualy achieved its objective, the division fought too oen with separate arms. More an explanation of the chal lenges of at taining useful levels of com bined arms than a rous ing success story, this is an important per ective on the diculty of even the sim plest things in combat. In this case, Cheval reminds us of the diculty of anything when engaged in LSCO with an oponent who refuses to give up. In chapter 8, Capt. James Vilaneuva, an instructor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, discusses Gen. Walter Kruegers Sixth Army, which landed 9 January 1945 on the island of Luzon in the Philipines with initial opera tions focusing on the seizure of Manila. He analyzes the adaptive combinations of infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, and mobile artilery that alowed the 37th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division to drive south to seize Manila. A story too infrequently told in our histories, the clearance of Manila may very wel be a forecast of combat in megacities. In chapter 9, retired Lt. Gen. Dan Bolger discusses our operations in Cambodia, from the political reali ties of the Nixon administration to the machinations A Sherman tank passing a burning Japanese medium tank during World War II in Luzon, Philippines. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History)
24 at the four-star headquarters and down to the ghting soldiers, both the South Vietnamese and American. Bolger, a University of Chicago-trained PhD histo rian, a former division combat commander, and a felow instructor at the United States Military Academys History Department, contributed a smoothly narated but incisive history of the operational, sometimes tai cal, incursion into Cambodia that brought powerful strategic results, although not quite as intended. Strong on the assess ment of the South Vietnamese armys contribution and the sometimes sily, but frequently fatal political mi cromanagement of squad-level details, Bolgers piece es talishes the right tone for assess ments of future U.S. Army opera tional art in a com bined arms LSCO environment. In chapter 10, Dr. Tal Tovy, an associate professor at Bar Ilan University in Israel, discusses the Egyptian and Israeli armies in combat during the October 1973 war. Ading signicantly to the relatively wel-known analysis of the 1973 War, Tovy provides a doule-level assessment of the use of combined arms by the Egyptians and the late discovery of this old concept by the Israelis. Tovy then ads to the discussion by linking the lessons learned, or imagined, by the U.S. Army from this war as the Army entered the operational art period of American doctrine. Useful in several aects, he ads apropriate complexity and subtlety to what has usualy been a somewhat ster ile recitation of changes to Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations or FM 100-5, Operations as it was desig nated in the late 1970s. In the con cluding chapter, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, com mander of the Combined Arms Center, presents a vision of the future in combined arms maneuver, and expands the discussion in this set of books, and possile future books, by identi fying some of the unresolved issues of peer-competitor combat operations where divisions and corps are mere taical formations. Our complacency (Lundy does not ecicaly use this word in his chapter), resting on the valorous aions of the last seventeen yearsand a sense of the new culture of the Army inculcated by those seventeen plus years of stability operationsimplies that preparation for more stability operations is enough and is as much the enemy of the future as the Russians, North Koreans, Chinese, or Iranians. Lundy arues that we must ght now to regain our ability Engineers supported by a M551 Sheridan Tank from the Blackhorse Regiment clear mines 31 December 1969 in Cambodia. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)
25 to deter, engage, deny, defeat, and win against any and al competitors. He arues persuasively that the Army needs to reorient on LSCO; it must remember the lessons and the ability to conduct stability op erations but also quickly and drasticaly improve the Armys capabilities for training and prepa ration for LSCO, and deployment into imma ture theatersthese are the halmarks of future conict. Aditionay, I owe thanks to the sta at Ary Uniersity Pres fo puing this book into physical and electronic for as part of the U.S. Ary Large-Scale Combat Operations Seies. Special thanks to Col. Paul E. Berg, the book set general edito (Welcome to Leaenworth and the joys of coodinating instant pulications!). I also wish to thank Donald P. Wight fo senio oversight of the project and its prouction, Robin D. Kern fo graphics, and Diane R. Walke and Lynne M. Chanle Gacia fo thei profesional copyediting and layout. Always reay to help, Ruse P. Rusty Raerty, cief, Clasied Services, Ike Skelton Combined Ars Reseac Library (CARL), has not only reained a fiend ove the la six months of puing these books togeth e but has also broaened an alreay encyclopedic knowledge of internet-based resouces and an unparaeled combination of knowing here that study is in the CARL acies, and being wiing, indeed eage, to go nd it, rerouce it, and send it on to unsuecting authors. A of these profesionals hae mae this book bee fo thei contibutions. As the edito of this olume, I a responsile fo any erors, omisions, o limitations of this work. NotesEpigraph. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce [GPO], 2017), para. 1-3. 1. Peter J. Schierle, Americas School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Ocer Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010). is book takes a dierent view of the Kasserine bales. is view, that it was a minor tactical defeat on the road to operational capability, is shared by Gerhard L. Weinberg in his epic history of World War II, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 443, 1044n104. 2. FM 3-0, Operations, ix. 3. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unied Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, October 2011 [obsolete]), 6. 4. FM 3-0, Operations, 1-38. 5. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: ird Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Sta College Press, 1994), 72. 6. Schierle, Americas School for War, 180, 202n38. For this authors view of combined arms, stabilized fronts, and operational exploitation and pursuit, and the operational similarities of the two world wars, see pages 182.
e burnt wreckage of a Ukrainian T-64 Bulat bale tank sits on a street 13 September 2014 near Dmitrivka in Oblast Lugansk, Ukraine. e street leads to a Ukrainian eld camp that was destroyed during a rocket aack by pro-Russian separatists. (Photo by Jan A. Nicolas, dpa, Alamy Live News)
Lethal and Non-Lethal FiresHistorical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations Lt. Col. omas G. Bradbeer, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired
28 e Rusian rocet aac on Ukrainian foces at Zelenopiya on 11 July 2014 as the rst exaple of Rusias conte porary reconnaisance-stie moel on display. e stie targeted a large Ukrainian asely area here Ukrainian foces ere preaing to uncoil and conduct an orensie. At aproximately 0400 on 11 July, drones ere head overhea; at around the sae time, Ukrainian foces lost the ability to comunicate ove thei tafical raio network. A few minutes late a bevy of rocets and artiery fe on the asely area. e result as carnageupwads of thirty Ukrainian soldiers ere kied and dozens ere severely wounded, hile more than two baalions worth of combat powe as destroyed. Maj. Amos C. Fox and Maj. Andrew J. RossowAccording to Army doctrine, the word res describes the use of weapon systems to create a ecic lethal or non-lethal eect on a target.1 Similarly, the res warghting function, which evolved from the re suport baleeld operating system less than a decade ago, ecicaly deals with the related tasks and systems that colectively provide coordinated use of Army indirect res, air and missile defense, and joint res through the targeting pro cess. Army res systems are tasked to deliver res in suport of oensive and defensive operations to create ecic lethal and non-lethal eects. To accomplish this, the res warghting function must accomplish three critical tasks: deliver res; integrate al forms of Army, joint, and multinational res; and, conduct tar geting.2 Furthermore, res assists operational forces in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and enhanc[ing] freedom of aion and the movement and maneuver of ground forces.3From the evolution of artilery systems such as the catapult and balista used by the Roman legions to present-day cannons, missiles, and rockets, the pur pose of res has remained constant: to be the maneu ver commanders most responsive combat arm and by doing so assist the other arms in accomplishing their baleeld missions. As the Army prepares for the possibility of conducting large-scale ground combat operations (LSCO) against a peer or near-peer adver sary, it must confront the likelihood that U.S. Army and joint reseecialy cannon, rocket, and missile artilerywil be vastly outnumbered and outranged. Aditionaly, for the rst time in nearly seventy years, U.S. and alied air and naval forces may not have air superioritylet alone air supremacyduring the opening engagements and bales of the war. To ensure U.S. and Alied forces do not suer the same fate expe rienced by the Ukrainian army in July 2014, we must take advantage of our intelectual capital throughout the Army and our military to make up for our poten tial technological disadvantages in weapons systems if we are to be successful on tomorows baleelds. Precision and near-precision munitions with stando capability are at risk of losing eectiveness against adversaries that contest our hegemony in the space domain, across the electromagnetic ectrum, and through anti-access/area denial capability.4 Our ability to provide exile response and deterent options to combatant commanders rests in the agregated eorts of the greater res community across the land, air, and maritime componentswith varying levels of buy-in from host-nation, regional, and alied partners. Given these chalenges, volume number three of the LSCO series, Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Histoical Case Studies of Converging Cros-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations, provides a colection of ten histor ical case studies wrien by dierent authors involving lethal and non-lethal res from the period 1917 through 1991 with lessons for military professionals who wil be engaged in future LSCO. e colection provides three chapters focusing on bales from the First World War, three on bales and campaigns from the Second World War, and one each on the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the First Gulf War. e work analyzes the use of lethal and non-lethal res conducted by U.S., British, Canadian, and Israeli forces from 1917 to 1991. e coverage is comprehensive and focuses heavily on the successful use of res in large-scale combat operations against near-peer threats. e twelve authors for this book were asked to provide a concise overview of res as they related to an engagement, bale, or campaign that would be the cen terpiece of their case studies. ey were to present the doctrine the organizations were usingor aempting Next page: Men of Baery C, 936th Field Artillery Baalion, U.S. Eighth Army, re the 100,001st and 100,002nd shells at a Chinese Communist position near Choriwon, Korea. (Photo by Kostner, Signal Corps, no. #8A/FEC-51-39822)
to usetogether with the chalenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as wel as their aions and decisions during the conduct of the operation. Most importantly, the authors were to adress the lessons learned by the leaders in these large-scale combat operations and how they were aplied or ignored. Lastly, they were tasked to identify how these lessons learned are aplicale to U.S. Army leaders today and in the future. ough the chapters range from the First World War through Desert Shield/Desert Storm, they are not organized chronologicaly. is wil alow the reader with time constraints to read and analyze those ecic bales and operations that strike a ecic interest or need. Aditionaly, the concluding chapter, wrien by the commanding general of the Fires Center of Excelence, reviews the future of res and the requirements and expectations for lethal and non-lethal res to accomplish the numerous and complex missions the warghting function wil be expected to successfuly execute during the conduct of multi-domain operations. For the conve nience of readers, a brief overview of each article folows. Chapter 1, provided by Dr. Joseph R. Bailey, the as sistant command historian for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, examines the use of airpower during the planning and execution of Operation Overlord, the alied invasion of Europe conducted in early June 1944. e focus is on how Gen. Dwight D. FIRES
30 Eisenhower overcame parochial and competing inter ests among the dierent U.S. services and alied national armed forces to ensure that airpower eectively suport ed the seaborne and ground assault. In chapter 2, retired Lt. Col. omas G. Brabeer, the Major General Fox Conner Chair of Leadership Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Sta Colege, analyzes the November 1917 British oensive operation against German forces during the rst bale of Cambrai, France, in World War I. He arues that by using the latest scientic and techno logical advancements in unnery, the British Royal Artilery was ale to overwhelm the German defend ers along the Hindenburg Line, enaling the success ful armored assault that folowed. Gen. David M. Rodriuezs 1989 School of Advanced Military Studies monograph in chapter 3 analyzes two campaigns from Midle Eastern wars the Sinai Campaign in 1973 and the 1982 Bekaa Valey Campaign in Lebanonto ilustrate the impact of electronic warfare on operational maneuver. In chapter 4, retired Air Force Lt. Col. Mark E. Grotelueschen, a professor at the U.S. Air Force Academys Department of Military and Strategic Studies, discusses the U.S. Armys 1918 major offensive into the Meuse-Argonne and examines how significant changes made at the army, corps, and division levels affected the way firepower was planned and employed during the battle, result ing in the most successful attack by the American Expeditionary Forces during the war. In chapter 5, Maj. Lincoln R. Ward, a joint plans ocer with the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, describes how the division artilery can A Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye ying radar station at the Is raeli Air Force Museum 19 April 2007 at Hazerim Airbase, Israel. Israel used E-2C aircra extensively as plaorms for electronic warfare to suppress Syrian air defenses during Operation Mole Cricket 19 at the outset of the Lebanon War, 9 June 1982. (Photo courtesy of brewbooks, Wikimedia Commons)
31 FIRESachieve the Army chief of stas objective of readi ness using Operations Desert Shield and Storm as a case study to analyze preparations for deployment and the use of artilery during oensive operations against a near-peer adversary. Maj. Jeffrey S. Wright, an instructor in the Department of Military Instruction, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, analyzes in chapter 6 the February 1943 Battle of Kasserine Pass, the first major engagement between American and Axis forces in Africa during the Second World War. He examines how both the maneuver and field artilery commanders learned from their initial mistakes and were ale to set the conditions to mass, demonstrate flexibility, and effectively synchronize fires to defeat folow-on Axis attacks. Lt. Col. G. Kirk Alexander, commander of 1st Baalion, 31st Field Artilery, Basic Combat Training at Fort Sil, Oklahoma, uses the Korean War as a case study in chapter 7 to examine the principles of re suport in the defense: mass, unity of command, and security. He arues that operational success in the Korean War largely depended upon the U.S. Armys ability to pro vide artilery suport at the decisive place and time to defeat the North Korean and Chinese oensive operations. He also discusses whether our curent doctrine and organizations can execute these principles against a near-peer threat in largescale combat operations. In chapter 8, Boyd L. Dastrup, the U.S. Army Field Artilery School branch historian, ana lyzes the performance of the U.S. Army eld artil lery during the Vietnam War. First and foremost, he arues that the eld artilery demonstrated adaptability and exibility, most eecialy with its shi to incorporate airmobile operations in suport of maneuver forces. However, he also asserts that the Army became too reliant on repower to accomplish its missions. Lt. Col. (retired) Mark T. Cahoun, an associate profes sor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, examines in chapter 9 the use of strategic bombers in close suport of U.S. ground troops using the Normandy campaign in World War II, and ecicaly Operation COBRA in 1944. His chapter contrasts wel with Baileys chapter 1, ensuring that multiple perectives are provided on the role and use of U.S. and British airpower during the inva sion of France in 1944. Lt. Col. omas G. Bradbeer, PhD, U.S. Army, retired, is the Major General Fox Conner Chair of Leadership Studies for the U.S. Army Command and General Sta College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a BA in history from the University of Akron, an MA in adult education from the University of Saint Mary, a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the U.S. Army Command and General Sta College, and a PhD in history from the University of Kansas. His chapter on Gen. Mahew B. Ridgway appeared in e Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell, 2d Edition, and his article General Cota and the Bale of the Hurtgen Forest: A Failure of Bale Command? published in Army History, received the Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award in 2010. His research areas include air warfare, specically the First and Second World Wars, the British Army in the twentieth century, and the Korean War.
32 In chapter 10, David Thuel, a graduate student at Norwich University, and Brabeer analyze how the Canadian Corps aplied new doctrine in the employment of fires and maneuver in World War I to successfuly capture the German-held Vimy Ridge during the Battle of Aras in April 1917. They assert that five of the six tenets of todays unified land operationsflexibility, integration, lethality, adapt ability, and synchronizationwere displayed by the leaders and soldiers of the Canadian Corps during the assault on Vimy Ridge. In the concluding chapter, Maj. Gen. Wilson A. Al Shoner, commanding general, Fires Center of Excelence and Fort Sil, Oklahoma, and Col. Christopher D. Compton, chief, Concepts Development Branch, Fires Center of Excelence, present a vision of the future of lethal and non-lethal res and the critical role they wil serve in ensuring that the combined arms team wil win the rst bale of the next conict against a near-peer oponent. This work would not have been possile without the voluntary time and work of the authors; they are the experts. The authors are a mix of four active and seven retired officers and civilian scholars. Several authors are curent or past Army historians with a significant depth of expertise. Some are scholars who have devoted a lifetime of study to master the sources, understand the context, analyze the breadth and depth of the subject, and develop a skil for presenting each case study in a comprehen sile format. I owe special thanks to the staff of Ary Uniersity Pres fo putting this book into physical and electronic for as part of The U.S. Ary Large-Scale Combat Operations Seies. Special thanks to Col. Paul E. Berg, book set general edito; Donald P. Wight fo prouction; Robin D. Kern fo graph ics; and Diane R. Walke and Lynne M. Chanle Gacia fo the copy editing and layout. Also, Rusell P. Rusty Rafferty, cief, Clasified Services, Ike Skelton Combined Ars Reseac Library, as ell as Kenneth A. Turne and Lt. Col. Daid M. Wad, field artillerytwo instructors from the Deartment of Comand and Leaership, U.S. Ary Comand and General Staff Scooldeserve special praise fo thei willingnes to locate photographs to suport eac of the capters as ell as thei cogent avice and recomenda tions. They hae mae this book bette fo thei contibu tions. As the general edito of this book, I a responsile fo any errors, omisions, o limitations of this work. NotesEpigraph. Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow, Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Land Warfare Paper 112 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, March 2017), 10. 1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce [GPO], 31 August 2012), 1-1. 2. Ibid., 1-1 and 1-2. 3. Army Techniques Publication 3-09.90, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 12 October 2017), vii. 4. Centers for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 18-28, Operating in a Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, CALL, June 2018), 6.
In April 2019, the Army University Press will release the ninth book in its Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) series, titled The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in LargeScale Combat Operations, edited by Col. Paul E. Berg. This collection has twelve articles detailing and comparing features of close combat in diverse LSCO battles and campaigns in World War I, the European and Pacic theaters in World War II, and the Korean War.U.S. Army soldiers on Bougainville of the Solomon Islands 1 March 1944 during World War II. Japanese forces tried inltrating the U.S. lines at night. At dawn, the U.S. soldiers would clear them out. In this picture, infantrymen are advancing in the cover of an M4 Sherman tank. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. National Archives) BOOK RELEASE COMING SOON! A U P
35 e Long HaulHistorical Case Studies of Sustainment Operations in Large-Scale Combat OperationsLt. Col. Keith Beurskens, DM, U.S. Army, RetiredYou wi not nd it dicult to prove that bales, ca paigns, and even ars hae been won o lost pimaily because of logistics. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower ere wi not be a revolution in military arairs unles there is a revolution in military logistics. Gen. Dennis J. RiemerThe praice of logistics has been around since the earliest known standing army of the Assyrians at around 700 BC and has been fundamentaly unchanged for more than two milen nia. Assyrian logistic suport consisted of feeding, equiping, and moving (with horses, camels, mules, and oxen) the force. Noncombatant folowers caried the materiel necessary to provide sustenance and main tenance to the ghting force. Campaign timing was synchronized to occur just aer the harvest to extend the time the force could remain in one place.1Alexander the Great later ealished warfare as a year-round operation; not wintering or staying more than a few weeks away from a seaport or navigale river with his army on campaign. He made extensive use of shiping with merchant ships and horses, and also used his enemys logistics weaknesses against them.2ere was no truly revolutionary aproach to lo gistics until the introduction of steam engines and the railroad. e American Civil War foreshadowed future warfare, particu larly regarding logistics. It was the rst major war in which the railroads played an important part, eed ing up the movement of troops and suplies. To a great extent, the railroads also dictated the axes of advance or retreat, the sit ing of defensive positions, and the locations of bat tles.3 e United States rst two large-scale com bat operations (LSCO) within the industrial age were the two world wars. Both these wars had the traditional logistics requirements, only on a much grander scale, and they both introduced new warfare technology-based logistics requirements.Previous page: A U.S. convoy ascends the famous Twenty-one Curves 26 March 1945 at Annan, China. e convoys operated be tween Chen-Yi and Kweiyang, China, on a section of what became known as the Burma Road. (Photo by Pfc. John F. Albert. Courtesy of the National Archives, no. 531304) Lt. Col. Keith Beurskens, DM, U.S. Army, retired, is the deputy director of Academic Aairs at Army University. Beurskens served as the lead author for the Army University White Paper and the Strategic Business Plan for the Army University, which led to the establishment of Army University in 2015. He has also been featured in Military Review and the Journal of Military Learning. In 2005, Beurskens completed a twenty-four-year military career, retiring as a lieutenant colonel in the Corps of Engineers. He holds a BS from Utah State University, an MS from University of Colorado, and a DM from University of Phoenix.
36 Post-Korean War and throughout the Cold War, the United States, as a superpower and in cooperation with its alies, expanded the concept of logistical planning. e United States began to stockpile military suplies at strategic points around the world, near areas of potential conventional war danger.4 e origins of the modern op erational contract suport praices are from the United States experiences during the Vietnam War.5 Advances in logistical suport to strategic maneuver and in harsh environments occured during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the Midle East. e Long Haul: Sustainent Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations is a colection of eleven historical case studies of sustainment operations drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern LSCO. e book is organized chronologicaly, e-cicaly including World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Faklands War, Operation Desert Storm, and OIF. e commanding gener-al for the Combined Armed Suport Command (CASCOM) presents future sustainment trends to conclude the book. e Long Haul is a work of history intended as a tool for the development of thoughtful reection on past experiencesgood and bada tool to teach situational critical thinking. We asked authors to focus the readers on the lessons learned with chapters short enough to prohibit a com prehensive teling of the story. us, the orientation to the situation in each chapter is brief, and only elements of the situation critical to understanding the major lessons learned are presented. Where the authors felt it was aplicale, they close the chapters with forecasts of sustainment operations in future LSCO. A neo-Assyrian alabaster wall panel relief (865 BC BC) shows Ashurnasirpal IIs chariot and another being placed in a boat for trans portation across a river, probably the Euphrates. Upstream, Assyrian ocials supervise as the army crosses river; some cross on inated skins. (Photo courtesy of e British Museum)
37 In the end, we want readers to have a good, not perfect, understanding of the capabilities and limita tions of at least one important chalenge in each major area of sustainment, the aions taken for adressing it, and the outcome. To gain the ful value from these case studies, readers must reect on what they read; analyze for themselves the cause, eect, and outcome of each situation; and aply the fruit of this thought to their own lives and experiences.In the rst chapter, retired quartermaster his-torian Dr. Leo Hirel examines the maturation of U.S. Army sustainment functions during World War I from vaue notions into a workale organization structure. Dr. Sanders Marle, an Army Medical Command senior historian, focuses chapter 2 on World War Is medical functions and their eect on maintaining combat power in the First Armys area during the Meuse-Argonne Oensive. As the U.S. Armys entry into the west during World War II, the North African Campaign is studied against the framework of AirLand Bale and logistical doctrine by retired Lt. Col. Mark D. Kitchen in chapter 3; and Maj. Cory Campbel identies lessons from the Bale of Metz within todays principles of sustainment in chapter 4. In chapter 5, history profes sor Dr. James A. Huston explores the logistical sup port and chalenges as the United States, the United Nations, and the Repulic of Korea forces transitioned from traditional to cold war. Chapters 6 and 7 arualy do not cover LSCO; however, the case studies explore advancements in sus tainment praices that can be aplied to future LSCO. In chapter 6, Dr. Isaac Hampton II, the Quartermaster Branch chief historian, explores the infrastructure build-up of Vietnam from 1962 to 1967 as the Armys introduction to operational contraing suport. Lt. Col. Michael Gunther represents the only non-U.S. logistics case in chapter 7. Gunther examines the aplication of British joint logistics to expeditionary operations against near-peer forces without the benet of a secure logistical base in the area of operations. Soldiers from the 20th Engineer Brigade shule trucks across the Eu phrates River 16 November 2007 in support of a combat operation near Baghdad. (Photo by Spc. Luke ornberry, U.S. Army)
38 Chapters 8 to 11 represent sustainment operations in the Midle East during Operation Desert Storm and OIF. Dr. James Martin studies the VII Corps logistics op erations in Operation Desert Storm, examining the sheer volume of suport required and the lessons learned from such a major land-combat operation. OIF is examined from three perectives. In chapter 9, Kelvin Crow, the Combined Arms Center historian, and retired Col. Christopher Cro study the strategic maneuver of the 4th Infantry Division from eighteen instala tions in the United States, Germany, and Italy to Iraq and Turkey, and then through the Suez Canal and Kuwait as an example of complex and chaotic stra tegic maneuver. In chapter 10, Richard E. Killane, the Transportation Corps historian, examines the doctrine of on-time deliv ery and the many unfore seen factors that prevent it from the context of the 3rd Infantry Division and its distribution of boled water. Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, the CASCOM historian, completes the study of OIF in chapter 11 by examining the planning, preparation, execution, and results of the instalation and operation of the Inland Petroleum Distribution System as the principle buk fuel delivery mechanism suporting the American forces. Maj. Gen. Paul C. Hurley, commanding general of CASCOM; Maj. Gen. Rodney Fog, the y-fourth quartermaster general; and Ronald Jaeckle, the CASCOM strategic planner, explore the future of logistics decision-making in the nal chapter. e Long Haul would not have been possile without the voluntary time and work of the authors; they are the experts. Several authors are curent or past Army histori ans with a signicant depth of expertise. Some are scholars who have given a lifetime of study to master the sources, understand the context, pon der the details, and develop a skil for narative. e balance of the authors have experience as praitioners who have devised innovative solutions to the inevitale surprises that arise during the fog of war. fanks to the sta of Ary Uniersity Pres fo puing this book into physical and electronic for as part of the Histoical Case Studies in Large-Scale Combat Operations book set. Special thanks to Col. Paul Berg, book set general edito, D. Donald Wight fo prouction, Robin D. Kern fo graphics, and Diane R. Walke and D. Lynne M. Chanle Gacia fo copyediting and layout. As the general editors of this project, e alone are respon sile fo the erors, omisions, o limitations of this work. NotesEpigraph. Bradford K. Nelson, Defeating the reat to Sustainment Operations, Army Logistician 40, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 33. Epigraph. omas J. Edwards and Tick Eden, Velocity Management and the Revolution in Military Logistics, Army Logistician 31, no. 1 (Janu ary-February 1999): 52. 1. Peter Antill, Military Logistics: A Brief History, HistoryOfWar.org, 22 August 2001, accessed 19 June 2018, hp://www.historyofwar.org/articles/ concepts_logistics.html 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. James A. Huston, chapter 5 in e Long Haul: Sustainment Operations in LSCO, ed. Keith R. Beurskens (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018). 5. Rufus Phillips, Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Lessons for Today, Foreign Service Journal 92, no. 3 (April 2015), accessed 19 June 2018, hp:// www.afsa.org/counterinsurgency-vietnam-lessons-today
39 Deep ManeuverHistorical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat OperationsJack D. Kem, PhDDee aac is not a luxury; it is an absolute necesity to winning. Gen. Donn A. Stary A ight Miste, let me te you hat winning means youre wiing to go longe, work hade, gie more than anyone else. Vince LombardiThe terms dee maneuve dee attac, and dee operations have been prominent in Army doctrine for many years. The concept of deep operations relates to extending operations in time, space, and purpose to gain an advantage over enemy forces and capabilities before adversaries can use their capabilities against frienly forces.1Field Manual 3-0, Operations emphasizes this concept of extending operations in time, space, and Residents of Lodz, Poland, greet Soviet tank crews in 1945 as they enter the city. (Photo courtesy of the State Archive of the Russian Federation)
40 purpose to gain an advantage over potential peer enemies in highly conteed, lethal environments to prevail and win.2 Deep maneuver, the employment of forces using the combination of movement and res to gain a position of relative advantage over enemies, is fundamental to warghting.3Deep maneuver for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) at the division and corps level has not been praiced for many years in the U.S. Army. e focus on stability operations and pro traed counterinsur gency campaigns caused a shi away from LSCO and conducting deep maneuver. e curent operational environ ment demands that we, once again, sharpen our focus on the threats that exist today, and that we study deep maneuver as a core competency. So, we turn to the past to study both the successes and failures of deep maneuver in warf ighting. Dee Maneuve: Histoical Case Studies of Maneuve in Large-Scale Combat Operations is a colection of eleven chronologicaly ordered historical case studies drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern LSCO. Included in the colection are case studies from World War II, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. e last two chapters provide perectives on the future of deep maneuver.e authors were asked to look at deep operations regarding time, space, and purpose; the default is to think of deep maneuver only in terms of space, but time and purpose are critical factors to understand the concept of deep operations. We also asked the authors to not only include successes but to also include failures and shortfals. Each chapter is relatively short and is focused on deep maneuver. When possile, the authors provided their insight into the implications of the les sons learnedor not learned. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet cary an element of risk as a result of overex tension. Readers should carefuly review these case studies and reect on the components that stil aply today and in the future as wel as con sider those components that are not aplicale today. e critical role of commanders com municating their vision regarding purpose and end state are enduring; weapon systems and their capabilities are ev er-changing. Balancing boldness and risk are enduring chalenges; geography and weather are situationaly inde pendent. Readers should read, study, and analyze each case study in light of these considerations.Edward P. Shanahan studies the German penetration of the Ardennes in May 1940 in chapter 1s Surprise: e XIX Panzer Corps Lightning Advance into France, May 1940. e Wehrmachts operations took less than one week to shaer the French army; in less than three weeks, the Germans had conquered France and had driven the British army from the European continent. is element of surpriseaacking in a way that was completely unexpectedalowed the German army to accomplish in six days what they had only aempted to complete in World War I. Glen L. Sco adresses operations in northern Africa in November 1941 in Considerations for
41 Deep Maneuver: Operation Crusader. Chapter 2, focused on corps-level operations, details the ac-tions of the British XXX Corps, which had moved deep into Axis teritory to ght the German Afrika Korps. Initialy, Lt. Gen. Erwin Rommels Afrika Korps achieved a taical victory in a series of bales and maneuvers. Rommel then led the Axis mobile forces on a bold, but futile, maneuver designed to encircle the British 8th Army and break their wil to continue the oensive. At the end of the operation, neither side had a conclusive victory. Chapter 3, e Debaltsevo Raid by the Bashkir Cavalry Division during Operation Galop, February 1943, by Robert F. Baumann and Wiliam E. Basse, outlines a 1943 raid by the most-decorated Soviet division in World War II, the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division, which would later be redesignated as the 16th Guards Cavalry Division. e division, which began the operation at only 48 percent strength, con-ducted two successive major operations and months of hard combat against some of the best German divi-sions elded during World War II. e 112th Cavalry Division penetrated German defenses and achieved taical mission objectives but complicated coordinat-ed operations with frienly units over vast distances. Christopher J. Shepherd describes the second invasion of Weern Europe (aer Normandy) along the Southern Riviera known as Operation Dragoon in chapter 4s Creating Operational Depth through Coalition Integration. e objectives of Dragoon were to secure the ports of Marseile and Toulon, which enaled the logistical suport for the Alies continued eorts through France and into Germany. A key consideration for this operation was the integration of U.S., French, and British forces, including the U.S. Seventh Army, the French Arme B, the American VI Corps, the American-Canadian First Special Service Force, the First Airborne Task Force, the French Group of Commandos, and French Naval Assault Group. In December 1944, Adolf Hitlers Fih and Sixth Panzer armies aacked the U.S. First Army in the Ardennes Forest of eastern Belgium, a surprise move that penetrated the Armys front and created a large salient in the Alied lines known as the Bulge. Rather than focusing on the defense in the early days of the German oensive, Dean A. Nowowiejskis chapter, Command Decisions on Counteraack and Deep Envelopment in the Bale of the Bulge, focus-es on the decisions that the Alied generals made to counteraack the German salient to save Bastogne and, most im-portantly, the decisions they made to remove the Bulge itself. Nowowiejski ecicaly adresses the employment of coun-teraacks in the Bale of the Bulge to not only gain a position of tai-cal advantage but also to achieve the larger pur-pose of counteraacking to stop the enemy and to take the initiative away from the enemy through envelopment. Chapter 6, Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Deep Maneuver in 1945, is the nal chapter that adress-es World War II deep maneuver and is wrien by Timothy Heck. By 1945, the Soviet army had pushed the German army back to Polands Vistula River. It then planned a series of front-sized campaigns to defeat the Germans and liberate Berlin. e Vistula-Oder Oensive was the main Soviet ef-fort in these 1945 cam-paigns. e oensive was conducted on two fronts, each consisting of ten armies (aproxi-mately 2.2 milion men), an air army, and four to Jack D. Kem, PhD, is the associate dean of academics and a professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Sta College. He holds a BA from Western Kentucky University, an MPA from Auburn University at Montgomery, and a PhD from North Carolina State University. He previously served as a supervisory pro fessor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations and as a teaching team leader for the Command and General Sta School. Kem deployed as a member of the senior executive service to Afghanistan as the deputy to the commander, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)/ Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). A retired Army colonel, he has authored three books on campaign planning and has published over thirty articles in various publications. Kem has served as a discussant and invited lecturer for een dierent organizations, including the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council of Finland, the National Defense University, the Air War College, the Marine War College, and U.S. Strategic Command.
An Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker and AH-64 Apache helicopters move to secure an area 15 June 2018 during a lethality demonstration for exercise Puma 2 with Bale Group Poland as part of Saber Strike 18 at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland. e exercise tested allies and partners from nineteencountrieson their ability work together to deteraggressionin the re gion and improved each units ability toperformits designated mission. (Photo by Spc. Hubert D. Delany III, U.S. Army)
44 ve corps-sized mobile groups, giving the two front commanders the ability to echelon their forces for breakthrough and exploitation phases. e apli-cation of mass and tempo, along with the necessary enalers, were fundamental to Soviet success when conducting large-scale maneuver in depth during the Vistula-Oder Oensive.We shi away from the case studies of World War II in chapter 7. In Ronnie L. Couss e Israeli Experience: e Apogee of Blitzkrieg, he describes the adoption of the deep maneuver concept in 1967 and 1973, necessitated by the lack of maneuver space by the Israelis and the need to avoid deliberate bales of destruction. In 1967, Gen. Israel Tals Ugda (division) conducted rapid deep maneuver across the Sinai to quickly bring the bale into Arab teritory; and in 1973, Gen. Ariel Sharon gamled by aacking across the Suez Canal into Egyptian rear areasa gamle that was won only due to the piecemeal aacks by the Egyptians. Col. Paul Berg and Ken Tileys chapter, Task Force Normandy: Deep Operation that Started Operation Desert Storm, describes the initial strikes in Operation Desert Storm by Task Force Normandy in January 1991. is operation by Task Force Normandy dis played the eects of dramatic changes in thinking about the dimensional multi-domain baleeld and how to organize and ght in it. Task Force Normandy helped to prove the doctrinal ideas about deep aack operations in LSCO and aviation in the 1990s. In ad dition, this deep maneuver mission also proved the im portance of moving toward joint integrated operations that were fundamental in the thinking of future Army doctrine and the continued concepts of curent LSCO. Initialy pulished in On Point: e United States Ary in Operation Iraqi Freedom Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn describe the unsuccess ful deep strike 23 March 2003 by the 11th Aack Helicopter Regiment as part of Operation Iraqi A CH-47 Chinook with a sling loaded M-777 155 mm howitzer ies overhead as soldiers of 1st Baalion, 119th Field Artillery Regiment, use picks to remove inches of ice 1 March 2014 in order to place their howitzer during a live-re exercise at Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center, Grayling, Michigan. (Photo by Sta Sgt. Kimberly Der ryberry, Michigan National Guard)
45 Freedom in chapter 9s Army Aack Aviation: e 11th Aack Helicopter Regiments Aack in Karbala. In this aack, thirty-one of thirty-two aircra were damagedone aircra was downed in enemy terito ry, and two pilots were capturedwithout decisively engaging the Iraqi Medina Division. As a result, it took thirty days for the 11th Aack Helicopter Regiment to reore to ful capability and cast a shadow over deep-aack operations throughout the duration of major combat operations. Daniel E. Stoltz, Stephen E. Ryan, and Joseph A. Royos chapter, Task Force Viking: Conventional ForcesSpecial Operations ForcesSynergy in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations, outlines the importance of gaining synergy between conventional forces, ecial operations forces, and indigenous forces at al levels of warfare. Using coalition operations in northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the au thors describe how Task Force Viking integrated over y-two thousand-strong Kurdish Peshmerga to secure the liberation of Kirkuk and Mosul in 2003. Brendon E. Tery describes the importance of a critical enaling capability for deep opera tionsdismounted reconnaissancein chapter 11s Maintaining Capability and Options: Dismounted Reconnaissance in the Division and Corps Deep Area. Focusing on the division and corps ghts, Tery describes the evolution of dismounted reconnaissance including long-range reconnaissance, Rangers, and long-range surveilance units. e author also pro vides two case studies on the utility of this enaling capability: Vietnams long-range patrol units, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom Is longrange surveilance units. He concludes that the U.S. Army must maintain this capability for the future. e nal two chapters provide insight into the future of deep maneuver. Maj. Gen. Wiliam K. Gayler, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excelence, discusses e Future of Army Aviation in Deep Maneuver in chapter 12. Maj. Gen. Gary M. Brito, commanding general of the Maneuver Center of Excelence, and Maj. Keith Boring discuss the future of multi-domain operations in chapter 13, Disrupted, Degraded, Denied, but Dominant: e Future MultiDomain Operational Environment. We owe thanks to the sta of Ary Uniersity Pres fo puing this book into physical and electronic for as part of the Histoical Case Studies in Large-Scale Combat Operations book set. Special thanks to Col. Paul Berg, book set gene al edito; D. Donald Wight; Ms. Robin Kern; Ms. Diane Walke; and D. Lynne Gacia fo thei suport. As general book editors, e alone are responsile fo the erors, omisions, o limitations of this work. Notes Epigraph. Donn A. Starry, Extending the Baleeld, Military Review 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 32. Epigraph. Hannah Hutyra, Vince Lombardi Quotes to Use in the Game of Life, Keep Inspiring Me (website), accessed 17 July 2018, hp://www.keepinspiring.me/vince-lombardi-quotes/. 1. Army Techniques Publication 3-94.2, Deep Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce [GPO], 1 September 2016), para. 1-2. 2. Foreword, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, October 2017). 3. Ibid., para. 2-202.
Into the BreachHistorical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat OperationsFlorian L. Waitl A Renault FT tank and other military vehicles cross a stone bridge 28 September 1918 repaired by Companies A and E, 103rd Engineers, 28th Division, near Beureuilles, Meuse, France. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer School History Oce)
Once more unto the breac, dea fiends, once more; O close the a up with ou English dea. In peace theres nothing so becomes a man As moest stines and humility: But hen the la of a lows in ou ears, en imitate the afion of the tige Wiliam Shakeeare, Henry VThe operational environment the U.S. Army faces today has changed signicantly from that of recent years. Emerging regional threats like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have resulted in a need to shi the U.S. Armys doctrine to adress possile future large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer or near-peer competitors. While the U.S. Army has been boged down in coun terinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last seventeen years, our potential adversaries have studied our existing doctrine and ca pabilities with the intent to develop means to counter our once-uaranteed land domain overmatch.1 As a result, for the rst time since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military and coalition forces face adversaries that have the ability to compete and in some instances even outmaneuver and overmatch our forces.
The U.S. Armys recently pulished Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations provides a doctrinal aproach for theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades to adress the chalenges associated with large-scale ground combat. The FM mentions that historicaly, battlefields in large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past several decades.2 Large-scale exercises, as were seen in the 1980s in Europe, have not been conducted for decades. The skils to participate, lead, and fight in such large-scale combat operations as described in FM 3-0 have atrophied and, as a consequence, the Army needs to rebuild itself and foster institutional and cultural changes to successfuly fight tomorows multi-domain operations. Fortunately, the U.S. Army is a learning organi zation that is proud of its history and heritage, and capale of adjusting rapily to meet new chalenges and threats. To achieve the necessary adjustments, we can gain valuale insights through the study of histo ry, which is why Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, com mander of the U.S. Armys Combined Arms Center, ecicaly instructed the Army University Press to produce the Historical Case Studies in Large-Scale Combat Operations book set. e purpose of this ini tiative is to introduce Army commanders and their stas to some of the chalenges one might encounter
in LSCO, to teach situational critical thinking, and to open the discussion of warghting issues of mutual interest to the Army and joint community. Due to the simple reason that without mobility, maneuver forces would go nowhere, the LSCO book set would not be complete without a volume specif icaly adressing mobility operations. As the com mand historian for the U.S. Army Engineer School, I immediately volunteered to lead this endeavor and bring home this project to the Maneuver Suport Center of Excelence (MSCoE) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. MSCoE consists of the U.S. Army Engineer School; the Military Police School; and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School, which al have their place in mobility opera tions in LSCO. Into the Breac: Histoical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations is a col lection of ten historical case studies of mobility and countermobility operations drawn from the past one hundred years with insights for modern LSCO. It is organized chronologicaly to include World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the 1973 ArabIsraeli War, and Desert Storm.Andrew Huebner starts the book with a closer look at the Gorlice-Tarnow Oensive on the eastern front during World War I. Even though the oensive is seen as one of Germanys greatest feats in the war, Trac crossing a treadway bridge over the Rhine River south of Wesel, Germany, in 1945. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer School History Oce)
50 it is stil one of many understudied topics by mili tary historians of the West. Huebner folows a dual perective, considering both sides involved in the maneuvers of pursuit and retreat that charaerized one of the largest frontline shis in World War I. His insights about the staled German advance aer gaining major taical victories time and time again is an eye-opening experience that underlines once again the need to understand the culminating point of victory when planning and conducting mobility operations in LSCO. e next three chap ters shi to the weern front of World War I. Sco Znamenacek takes a closer look at how U.S. Army engi neering eorts ensured freedom of movement to operational and taical forces during the Meuse-Argonne Oensive. In his con clusions, he connects the historical lessons to observations of contemporary opera tions and exercises that have been colected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Even though a ful centu ry has passed since the Meuse-Argonne Oensive, many of the engineer roles, respon sibilities, and capabil ities are stil needed today to ght and win on the multi-domain baleeld. Christy Linberg continues the exam ination of the MeuseArgonne Oensive through the lens of the then newly ealished Chemical Warfare Service. Todays Chemical Corps traces its creation back to 28 June 1918 when the 30th Engineer Regiment (Gas and Flame) was transfered and redesignated as the 1st Gas Regiment. e MeuseArgonne Oensive marked the 1st Gas Regiments baptism by re aer having been created only ninety days prior. Linberg points out the invaluale lessons and insights from how the chemical suport enaled mobility operations during the campaign that stil inuence the Chemical Corps today. Dan Runyon nishes the examination of World War I by shiing the focus to Germanys need to develop new doctrine while at war. He highlights the strategic situation of Germany and examines the importance of being a learning organization similar to what the U.S. Army is aempting today with the introduction of the new FM 3-0 and its shi to peer and near-peer threats in a multi-domain arena. He accomplishes this task by examining the history of the Hindenburg Line from its conception up to its breach in 1918. Paul Munch keeps our focus on the weern front and takes us through the interwar years to Germanys inva sion of France. He chooses to concentrate on the impor tance of terain and compares the aions that took place during the invasion of France through the Ardennes in 1940 to Germanys counteroensive commonly known as the Bale of the Bulge in December 1944. Munchs discussion is folowed by Bre Boyles account of the conquering of the Rhine by the U.S. Army in 1945 in which he discusses the roots of curent doctrine and how ecicaly the lessons of the 1945 Rhine crossings inuenced and shaped curent wet-gap crossing doctrine. Lastly, mobility and countermobility operations in a megacity are explored in Waker Milss chapter when he discusses the lock-by-lock ghting that occured in Berlin in the last days of World War II. Ron Miler focuses on lessons from the Korean War when he examines enemy prisoner of war and refugee control operations essential to sustaining a high level of operational tempo and maintaining a successful bale rhythm while conducting LSCO. Miler is folowed by George Gawrych, who shis the focus to the Midle East and discusses the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, during which Egyptian engineers crossed the Suez Canal and were ale to breach the Bar Lev Line in record time. e last historical study examines the aions of Operation Desert Storm and Florian L. Waitl is the command historian at the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He received his master of arts in military history from Norwich University and has an extensive background in military history, leadership development, team building, and lessons learned programs. He served both as an enlisted and an ocer in the U.S. military and de ployed as an Army civilian on two dierent occasions to Afghanistan. He facilitated leadership seminars at dozens of universities and at various prestigious military leadership institutions such as the U.S. Army Command and General Sta College, the U.S. Army Engineer School, the British Land Warfare Centre, and for the Fhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Military Academy of the German Armed Forces). He has been previously published in several Army publications and military history publications around the world.
51 how engineer suport enaled maneuver units in the -Hour Ground War against Iraq.Maj. Gen. Kent D. Savre, commanding general of the Maneuver Suport Center of Excelence, closes the book with a look at future mobility and coun-termobility developments that the U.S. Army wil face on the multi-domain baleeld of tomorow.is colection of essays seeks to shed some light on the last one hundred years of mobility operations in LSCO. It also highlights several recuring themes and paerns in the accounts that curent commanders and doctrine developers must be aware of when discussing or conducting mobility opera tions. ough this book is by no means a comprehensive treatment of the subject, we hope professionals and instructors alike wil gain a beer understanding of the historical context of mobility and apreciate the importance of history when looking at the future through the lens of the past. fis work would not hae been posile without the ol untary time and work of the authors ho hae ent countles hours reseacing, witing, and taking my constructie citicism to make the olume hat it is toay. fey are the experts in thei indiidual elds of study. I would also lie to thank thei failies, and eeciay my own faily, fo suporting us in this endeao, hic is a work of love fo many of us. Furtherore, the suport receied from MSCoE and the U.S. Ary Enginee Scool leaership has been excetional. I also owe thanks to the sta of Ary Uniersity Pres fo puing this book into physical and electronic for as part of the Histoical Case Studies in Large-Scale Combat Operations book set. Special thanks to Col. Paul Berg, book set general edito; D. Donald Wight fo prouction; Ms. Robin Kern fo graphics; and Ms. Diane Walke and D. Lynne Chanle Gacia fo layout and copyediting. As the general edito of this project, I a alone responsile fo the erors, omisions, o limitations of this work. NotesEpigraph. Henry V, 3.1.1. References are to act, scene, and lines. 1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Multi-Domain Bale: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century (2025-2040), version 1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2017). 2. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Oce, 2017), 1-2.
52 Perceptions Are RealityHistorical Case Studies of Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations Col. Mark D. Vertuli, U.S. Army Top le: e corpse of Glyndr Michael fully dressed and ouied as Maj. William Martin, Royal Marines, in London, just before being sealed in his air-tight canister as the central piece of Operation Mincemeat. Top right: Identity card for Capt. (acting Maj.) William Martin, Royal Marines. One of the ctitious documents created. Boom: Some of the eects included on Maj. Martins person as part of the operation. (Photos courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, United Kingdom)
53 A a is inherently about canging human behaio, with eac side trying to alte the behaio of the othe by foce of ars. Succes requires the ability to ouhink an oponent and ruthlesly exploit the oportunities that come from positions of relatie avantage. e side that best understands an operational environent learns and aapts more rapily and decides to act more quicly in conditions of uncertainty is most liely to win. ADRP 3-0, OperationsArualy, information operations (IO) is one of the most misunderstood and misused terms in Army doctrine, to the point where it has largely become a ubiquitous term of reference that lacks the nec essary clarity of purpose and aplication for the majority of the Army. I am sure that if several Army leaders and soldiers were asked to dene information operations in their own words, one would receive several diering and oen conictinginterpretations. Multiple changes to Army doctrine concerning information operations aer it emerged as a concept from Joint Doctine fo Comand and Control Warfare (C2W) over twenty-ve years ago have contributed to this confusion.1 e de nition of IO has changed three times in the last eleven years alone: from C2Ws focus on ve core capabilities, to information engagement (2007), to inform-and-inuence aivities (2011), to its curent incarnation focusing on information-related capabilities (2016). As the Army shis its doctrinal focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer adversaries, the purpose of Pecetions Are Reality is to help leaders and soldiers visualize and understand IO through the lens of historical case studies. In both joint and Army doctrine, IO is dened as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in con cert with other lines of operation to inuence, disrupt, corupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.2 In more general terms, IO suports the command ers ability to achieve a position of relative advantage through aivities in the information environment (the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions) to inuence the adversarys wil to ght; to disrupt, corupt, or usurp its capabilities to colect, process, and disseminate information; and ultimately to manipu late (deceive) or disrupt an enemy decision-makers understanding of the operational environment. Field Manual 3-0, Operations does a very good job describ ing the broad scope of possile information-related ca pabilities and eects in the information environment. However, over the course of the last seventeen years of counterinsurgency and counterterorism opera tions, IO has become synonymous, in many minds, with themes and messages, psychological operations (PSYOP)/military information suport operations, or strategic communications/communications strategy, and its larger purpose has become lost. ree lessons (dare I say themes) are interwo ven throughout the books historical case studies of information operations during large-scale combat operations: (1) the focus is the inforation, regarless of the capabilities employed to eect it; (2) successful information operations are operationsintegrated, synchronized, resourced, and commander-led from inception to execution; and (3) information oper ations are, at their core, adversary/enemy-focused operations conducted to gain a relative advantage for frienly decision-makers.It Is All About the Informatione title of this book in the LSCO box set is Pecetions Are Reality. Although this could be read as hackneyed phrase, its meaning has great signicance to the aplication of IO in LSCO. Leaders visualize and understand the operational environment through information. As an element of combat power, infor mation enales decision-making, and its transmission aids decisive operations. Today, modern technology has signicantly increased the eed, volume, and access to information. Concurently, technology has enaled signicant means to disrupt, manipulate, distort, and Previous page: Operation Mincemeat provides a classic example of how information operations can support a large-scale combat operation. e British operation in April 1943 involved creating a ctitious military ofcer using the body of a dead vagrant, planting false aack plans on it, and oating it o the Spanish coast, where it was picked up by Spanish shermen. e Spanish government shared the false information found on Cpt. William Martin with German intelligence before returning him back to the British. e deception fooled the Germans, who reinforced Greece and Sardinia in the belief they were targeted for Allied invasion while leaving the actual invasion site, Sicily, relatively unprotected.
54 Close to ve hundred thousand of these leaets were dropped by U.S. Army Civil Aairs and Psychological Operations Command during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. e front of the leaet (above) shows a B-52 bomber dropping bombs with the Arabic text that translates to is is your rst and last warning! e 16th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow! Flee this location now! e back of the leaet ( below) translates to e 16th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow. e bombing will be heavy. If you want to save yourself, leave your location and do not allow anyone to stop you. Save yourself and head toward the Saudi border, where you will be welcomed as a brother. e 16th Infantry Division was on the Kuwait-Saudi border and was smashed by Task Force Muthana of the Joint Arab Command. (Photos and information courtesy of www.psywar.org and www.psywarrior.com )
55 deny information; technology adversaries have already demonstrated a wilingness to use with great eect. In the book Dark Tenitory author Fred Kaplan recounts an anecdote from then Rear Adm. Mike McConnel. While watching the movie Sneakers in 1992, the inteligence chief experienced the revela tion that it is al about the information; that who ever controled the information could dominate com petition and conict.3 In LSCO, this remains as true as ever. Leaders direct resources toward inteligence colection in order to develop the situation and gain the sucient information required to make timely and informed decisions. Just as importantly, measures must be put into place to protect frienly informa tion while simultaneously developing and executing means in al domains to aack the adversarys ability to access, process, and disseminate information. In this way, IO enales an accurate understanding of the operational environment while disrupting or manip ulating that of the adversary. rough IO, the adversary/enemy decision-mak ers reality should be that which best suports achiev ing a position of relative advantage. e doctrinal denition change away from the rather limiting ve core capabilities of C2W to the curent more wide-ranging denition focused on eects is a move in the right direction. at said, more needs to be done to fuly garner the true potential of information as an element of combat power in a LSCO context. Common sense dictates that information absent accompanying aion does not resonate cognitively in the same way when both are present and com plementary. However, the perception of IO as an enaler to maneuver or operations remains. e du ality of relationship between aion and information must become a constant theme of operations in the Information Age of the twenty-rst century.Information Operations are OperationsWhen adressing the idea of conict in space, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Gen. John Hyten, said that there is no such thing as space war or cyber war, for that maer; just a Similarly, I had a recent conversation with a senior leader who remarked that if IO planners had their way, everything would be considered information op erations. I would like to ip that on its head. During LSCO, maneuver in and through the information environment must be given the same aention as has been historicaly given to traditional maneuver on the land domain. Maneuver is maneuver, and whatever form of maneuver is em ployed, it is done through the operational process. Recent changes to joint doctrine are beginning to account for the recog nition of informations importance in conict. Just last year, the secretary of defense and the chair man of the joint chiefs aproved a rapid joint doctrine modication to make information a joint function. More recently, the joint sta issued a directive for operations in the information environ menttitled as such to emphasize the aivity as operations while avoiding the polarizing term infor mation operations.4 is During LSCO, maneuver in and through the information environment must be given the same aention as has been historically given to traditional maneuver on the land domain. Maneuver is maneuver, and whatever form of maneuver is employed, it is done through the operational process. Col. Mark Vertuli, U.S. Army, is chief of Operations Plans (J35) for U.S. Strategic Command. He holds masters degrees in history from Vanderbilt University and in national resource strategy from the Eisenhower School, National Defense University. He has over twenty-three years of military experience and has planned information operations in Afghanistan and in the European Command and Pacic Command areas of responsibility. He served as commander of 1st Baalion, 1st Information Operations Command (Land) from 2012 to 2014.
56 emphasis comes aer observing adversaries wielding information powerfuly on and o the baleeld to achieve decisive taical to strategic outcomes. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaida staged countless engagements against the United States and its partners, less for the physical eects in the im mediate operational environment, but rather to gain an informational advantage around the world. Videotaped improvised explosive device aacks, while devastating, worked wel to promote an image of organizational credibility, bolster aherents wil to ght, radicalize vulnerale populations, and increase nancial suport. More importantly with reect to LSCO, Russian information confrontation aivity preceding, during, and folowing its ilegal annexation of Crimea and inva sion of eastern Ukraine demonstrates the power of in tegrated operations in the information environment, in this case more apropriately termed information war fare. Russia successfuly sowed disinformation, causing the international community to distrust the informa tion it was receiving while also cripling the Ukrainian response through cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. e confusion and misdirection caused by Russian information war fare had a paralytic eect on Weern decision-makers. So much so, that Russia was ale to achieve its strategic and political objectives before Weern leaders could mount a credile response.Adversary Focusedere is one nal lesson or theme that runs through the case studies of LSCO: IO is, at its core, adversary focused. e seventeen years of counterin surgency and counterterorism operations gave rise to Sgt. 1st Class Richard Miller (le ) and Chief Warrant Ocer 2 Larry Elrod of the U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade discuss the response to a simulated cyber aack on the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 6 November 2015 during the brigades rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo by Bill Roche)
57 a population-centric focus for IO while al most completely subsuming the adversary command-and-control elements of the doctrine. Only recently, realy as a result of adversary successes, has this beun to change. Unied land operations occur in an operational environment dominated by civilians; their presence cannot be ignored or bypassed. However, rst, the adversary must be defeated. Warfare is a human endeavor; it is a con test of wils. e focus of IO during LSCO must be on defeating the adversarys wil. is can be accomplished directly, as during Operation Desert Storm where combined bombing and PSYOP dispirited thousands of Iraqi troops and caused their surender. Or more indirectly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States and Alied aplication of deception, electronic war fare, physical destruction, and cyberspace operations disrupted Iraqi command and control, causing an absolute lack of situation al understanding and inability to coordinate a defense by Iraqi leadership. As the quote at the beginning of this article states, e side that best understands an operational envi ronment learns and adapts more rapily and decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is most likely to win.e BookPecetions Are Reality is composed of eleven chapters. e rst ten chapters explore historical case studies of IO during LSCO, and the nal chapter considers the future implications of IO for LSCO. While many information-related capabilities are explored in the case studies, by no means do they present the denitive accounting. Some of the more technical or sensitive capabilities are not treated in as much depth as I would prefer due to considerations of security and classication. e case studies cover LSCO from World War II through recent conicts in Georgia and Ukraine. While the United States is prominent in most of the case studies, other nations operations in the information environment are explored as wel, particularly those of the Russian Federation. In e Logic of Information Operations in Large Scale Combat Operations, Col. Christopher Lowe explores the evolution of U.S. Army IO doctrine from its C2W roots to todays commonly held (mis)perception that IO is a means to inuence civilian populations. Lowe aributes the origin of the United States IO to Cold War Soviet radio-electronic com bat doctrine developments. e United States recognized that it needed similar doctrine, or ganization, training, material, leadership, per sonnel, and facilities solutions to counter the Soviets development and an oset strategy to dominate on the modern baleeld through information. Over the course of several years of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and counterterorism operations, the Army shied focus from a command-and-control empha sis to a more population-centric, hearts and minds aproach. e second chapter contin ues along a similar narative. While Lowe explores IO past, Maj. Justin Gorkowski reects upon the curent state of Army IO in U.S. Information Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Chalenges and Implications for the Future Force. In his chapter, Gorkowski details internal, structural chalenges to Army IO in doctrine, organiza tion, and leadership in juxtaposition to adver sarial advancements in the employment of information warfare in competition with the United States. While Gorkowskis assessment is not positive, it is not without hope for the future. He concludes his chapter with several recommendations to adress the imbalance. e third chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of Russian information warfare. United States Military Academy Some of the patches of fictitious units that the U.S. Army used in a number of World War II deception operations. (Graphics created by various authors via Wikimedia Commons)
58 professors Dr. Lionel Beehner, Col. Liam Colins, and Dr. Robert Person combine rst-hand accounts with secondary research to explore recent historical case studies of Russias systemic, strategic use of informa tion warfare, focusing on the evolution of its military doctrine from the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 to the ongoing Russiabacked campaign in Ukraines Donbass region. is look at Russian strategy of information con frontation oers stark lessons for future large-scale combat operations and the integration of operations in the informational envi ronment to achieve strategic eects. Taking the aproach that one can learn as much from failure as from success, Michael Taylor analyzes one of the lesser-known Alied deception operations from World War II. In Operation Starkey: e Invasion that Never Was, Taylor explores the reasons for the deception plans failure to convince German leader ship of Alied intentions to invade in 1943 in order to keep German forces in the west to relieve pressure on the alied Russian forces in the east. In the folow ing chapter, Branden Riley, Michael Kitchens, and Mahew Yandura use the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to iluminate ways in which information was honed into a weapon by the beligerents and their suporters to achieve desired military, political, and social out comes within the context of LSCO. In this war, the employment of strategic master naratives to uide operational and taical maneuver in the information environment proved decisive. In chapter 6, Andrew Whiskeyman focuses on the use of PSYOP during the Vietnam War. Aer a brief exploration of the doctrinal, leadership, inteligence, and organization underpinnings of Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Whiskeyman details PSYOP employment during the largest ground (Operation Cedar Fals) and airborne (Operation Junction City) opera tions of the war. While PSYOP achieved some success during these operations, signicant chalenges impeded widespread suport and operational inte gration. Many of these chalenges continue to exist today. Turning to more recent operations, the next two chap ters examine IO during the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, Dr. Robert Hil updates the rst chapter of Dr. Dorothy Dennings 1992 book, Inforation Warfare and Secuity Using editorial comments throughout the text, Hil makes contemporary and relevant to todays op erational environment Dennings exploration of what is considered the rst true information war: Desert Storm. In the folowing chapter, Carmine Cicalese provides the only rst-hand account in this volume. As the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC) IO planner from April to July 2002, then Maj. Cicalese played an instrumental role in the design of information operations to suport the CFLCC oper ational intent. is chapter oers tremendous insight
59 and lessons learned into planning and executing IO in LSCO at the highest operational levels. e nal two historical case studies explore ele ments of cyberspace operations during the recent con icts in eastern Europe. While chapter 3 of this book examines Russian Federation information warfare from a strategic perective, Wesley White documents Russian operational and taical integration of cyber space eects in Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine. White arues that these conicts served as test beds cyber crucilesfor Russian forces to fuly integrate cyber space operations into multi-domain bale. In chapter 10, Rick Galeano, Katrin Galeano, Dr. Samer al-Kha teeb, Dr. Nitin Agarwal, and James Turner focus on the employment of social botnets in suport of military operations. rough detailed analysis of botnet use in Ukraine and the Baltics, they arue social botnet can be used to promote naratives, alter perceptions of viewpoint popularity, and ultimately triger behavior suportive to military end states. e book concludes with a look to the future. In the nal chapter, Maj. Gen. James Minus and Col. Christopher Reichart explore the implications of the future information environment across the range of military operations during both competition and con ict. ey oer several important recommendations that touch elements of Army training, organization, doctrine, and leadership in order to provide command ers the informational capability and capacity to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in the future operational environment. e intent of Pecetions Are Reality is to employ history to stimulate discussion and analysis of the implications of IO in future LSCO by exploring past aions, recognizing and understanding successes and failures, and oering some lessons learned from each authors perective. I leave it you, the reader, to determine its success. I ant to thank a the authors fo olunteeing thei time and reseac to suport this eort. Bra Loudon provided tre mendous avice and editoial suport; I could not hae com pleted this without his asistance. Finay, I ant to oe my most heartfelt thanks to the leaers at the Ary Combined Ars Cente and Ary Uniersity Pres fo entrusting me with this project. NotesEpigraph. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce [GPO], 6 October 2017), 1-4. 1. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 7 February 1996 [obsolete]), II-1. e ve elements of C2W are operations security, psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare, and physical destruction. 2. JP 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 20 November 2014), GL-3; Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 6 December 2016), 1-2. 3. Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: e Secret History of Cyber War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 31. 4. Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2016), accessed 25 June 2018, hps://www.defense. gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-inthe-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf .
60 A soldier assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment observes the valley below as a UH-72 Lakota helicopter passes by 13 April 2018 during Decisive Action Rotation 18-06 at the National Training Center, Fort Ir win, California. (Photo by Spc. J. D. Sacharok, Operations Group, National Training Center, U.S. Army)
61 Ready NowOur Number One PriorityCol. Christopher R. Norrie, U.S. Army Maj. omas E. Lamb, U.S. Army Capt. Michael J. Culler, U.S. ArmyIn 2018, a rotational unit at the National Training Cente as simultaneously aaced acros multiple domains within hours of crosing the line of dearture on Training Day 1, starting ninety-six hours of continuous contact. e bigae comande personay observed direct-re contact from multiple directions with eney aac aiation in suport; ceical munitions ere eployed to deny teain; ecial munitions ere used to isolate one baalion; GPS, raio, and Joint Capabilities Release (a fienly tracing syste) ere jaed; fienly foces ere targeted by lethal eney indirect res; and sustainent units ere simultaneously aaced by eleents of a ciminal insurgent network in the icinity of a sma town. As this as hapening, two hundred ciilians alked by the bigae comandes combat rehicle, displacing from one urban cente to anothe as combat operations started, hic caused him to say, If ou Arys senio leaers ere looking fo a jaw-droping, lip-quieing expeience, theyre got itere not previ ously expeienced something so complex, on this scope, and at this pace.Readiness for ground combat remains our number one priority.1 Units must be ready now to win against a near-peer enemy; this requires adaptive leaders who can react to uncertain conditions and make sound decisions, and weltrained units that are procient in decisive-aion mission-essential tasks.2 Military success depends
62 on an organization wiling to learnthe Army must adapt at least as fast as the Nations adversaries change their ways of conducting operations.3Combat training centers remain the cornerstone of our integrated training strategy to win, and they replicate the complexity of a near-peer enemy and operational environment.4 e purpose of the National Training Center (NTC) remains to ensure that units have their hardest day in the desert so that no soldier goes untrained into combat. In 2018, a typical four teen-day NTC rotation was structured as continuous, open-phased, force-on-force and live-re decisive-ac tion operations against a near-peer enemy. Open phas ing is continuous competition across multiple domains, with less restrictive uidance to units on where and when to maneuver, focused on training leaders how to think versus teling them hat to think to reward com manders, both rotational and enemy, who identify and exploit oportunities on the baleeld.5As visualized in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations complexity at the NTC continues to increase.6 e curently replicated operational environment is best charaerized as simultaneous, continuous combat across multiple domains, to include an overwhelming enemy res capability; direct-re, air, and information parity; chalenged lines of communication; ful-ectrum enemy sens ing; hyper chaos; accelerated tempo; and exponential lethality at echelon. e multi-domain operations concept is not only driving change and design for the future Army, but it is also driving change now.7 Replicating the com plexity of multi-domain operations is improving decisive-aion prociency and driving that change. Leaders and soldiers are learning how to continuously synchronize combined arms across multiple domains in an ambiuous and uncertain environment, with a solid foundation in the fundamentals of warghting, Soldiers assigned to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, provide security from their Stryker while waiting for a smoke screen to fully engulf a breach 12 September 2017 during Decisive Action Ro tation 17-09 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. J. D. Sacharok, Operations Group, National Training Center, U.S. Army)
63 at echelon. Units are ariving at the NTC with good habits, grounded in the fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, and sustain. Live-re operations are now continual, and units are not alowed to see the terain they wil ght from prior to execution. Units are consistently issuing eective warning orders, and they are ahering to reasonale planning timelines. Command posts are smaler and more agile. e vol ume of res is increasing, and the use of joint enalers in suport of the brigade close-area ght is improv ing. Increasingly, units are procient in exercising basic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) tasks related to force protection, detection, and decontamination, and fewer logistics resuply missions are unforecasted. Multiple repetitions, at pace and in complexity, have improved our ability to simultaneously compete across multiple domains and win today. While we have made considerale progress building decisive-aion readiness, we must continue to raise the bar. Units are developing multi-domain taics to account for the complexities of multi-do main operations and are starting to sele on tasks that have historicaly been a chalenge: combined arms breach operations; res integration; combined arms synchronization; rigor in planning pro cesses; and command post echelonment. In an uncertain, fast-paced, and ambiuous environ ment, units oen recog nize what is hapening, but oen do not under stand why it is hapen ing. is includes being comfortale operating in a communica tions-degraded environ ment; aively targeting sensors; using physical and digital camouage; further improving res and aviation integra tion; increasing the tempo of combined arms breach operations; and further building a bench of leaders who are masters of the fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, and sustain.What We Are Learning and How We Are GrowingAs previously stated, the multi-domain opera tions concept is not only driving change and design for the future Army but is also driving change now. Units are learning from their experience ghting large-scale combat at the NTC against a replicated near-peer adversary, and combining these lessons with those learned over the last seventeen years to build exceptionaly capale and lethal combat formations. Specic examples of growth and learning, consistent with that visualized in FM 3-0, include the folowing: (1) Units are adjusting to ghting at an excep tionaly fast pace and are comfortale operating in ambiuity and uncertainty. Accelerated tempo requires leaders to understand why things are hap pening or risk losing momentum. Recognizing multi ple forms of simultaneous contact is diculteven more dicult, particularly at pace, is understanding how the enemy is ale to converge capabilities and to understand where ecic vulnerabilities might be targeted. Units are investing in repetitions and visualization, and learning how to operate in a com munications-degraded environment. Oen, simple is bestecient command posts; codied standard operating procedures; cluering the baleeld; Capt. Michael J. Culler, U.S. Army, is a student aending the U.S. Army Command and General Sta ocer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS in criminal justice from the Rochester Institute of Technology. He previously served as a plans team chief and an armor company observer coach/ trainer for Operations Group at the National Training Center. Maj. omas E. Lamb, U.S. Army, is an armor ocer serving in the operations section (J3) of U.S. Africa Command. He has an MA in legislative aairs from George Washington University and a BS in international/strate gic relations from the U.S. Military Academy. He pre viously served as the chief of plans and the cavalry squadron executive ocer trainer (Cobra Team) for Operations Group at the National Training Center. Col. Christopher R. Norrie, U.S. Army, is the commander of Operations Group for the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. He is a distinguished military graduate of Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and holds masters degrees in business administration from Embry-Riddle University and in national security strategy from the National War College. He previously commanded the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and has served in a wide range of command and sta assignments.
65 Soldiers in Stryker armored vehicles assigned to 2nd Baalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, maneuver through a pass 16 January 2018 during Decisive Action Rotation 18-03 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. Esmeralda Cervantes, Operations Group, National Training Center, U.S. Army)
67 and the fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, and sustain at echelon. (2) Units are ariving at the NTC with good habits, grounded in the fundamentals of shoot, move, communi cate, and sustain. e fundamentals maerthere are no shortcuts in decisive aion, just the hard work of doing things corectly and routinely, as a habit. is includes maintenance, orders production, rehearsals, checks and inections, casualty evacuation, boresighting, res distri bution, and bale drils at echelon. Lethal platoons and companies, paired with rehearsed command posts and ecient planning processes at echelon, are very eective in a decisive-aion, multi-domain environment. (3) Units are comfortale operating with infor mation parity. Data is widely accessile to a large audience, whether through electromagnetic detection or social media, which makes it more dicult to gain information advantagecertainly, oportunities are not clear, and there are no easy choices about where to put combat power. Units are creating oportunity through aion, encouraging disciplined initiative, and leveraging positions of advantage to destroy enemy formations, amidst ambiuity and at a very fast pace, in a complex environment. (4) Mass maers. Diluting combat power to account for a range of perceived prolems may elevate risk if there is no single prolem where an adversary is outmatched, and immobility increases the likelihood that units wil be eectively targeted. Units are massing formations that are eectively enaled by res, aviation, close air suport, and sensors to overwhelm the enemy at points of weakness, and they are commiing combat power to get the infor mation needed to quickly enale the synchronization of combined arms at a decisive point. (5) Units are operating on intent. Synchronization of combined arms is a signicant endeavordoing so amidst the chaos of simultaneous contact is even harder. Units are investing in teaching leaders how to think, because the pace of operations is so fast that leaders must solve dicult prolems quickly at their level, and idealy, in ways that do not create larger prolems in the process. Information parity, pace, communications degradation, confusion, and intermingled frienly units mean that information naturaly ows in a fragmented manner. Commanders are simplifying complexity, discerning ecic places where an eect is needed, and alocating resources to achieve that eect. Empowered units that are resourced with assets and intent are making decisions at echelon, oen at the edge of the network, to further ac celerate synchronization while in simultaneous contact. (6) Because a near-peer adversary wil likely make rst contact electronicaly, units are increasingly com fortale operating with degraded communications. (7) Sustainment is moving faster. Units are more fuly enaling sustainment and protection operations through transitions, in an anticipatory way, which is critical to enaling continuous expeditionary oen sive and defensive operations without losing tempo or lethality. Field maintenance is improving. (8) Units must learn faster, and synchronize com bined arms faster than the enemy. is quote by Gen. George S. Paon remains relevant today: ere is stil a tendency in each separate unit to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rieman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artileryman to re at is not the way to win bales. If the band played a piece rst with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hel of a lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music each instrument must suport the others. To get harmony in bale, each weapon must sup port the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you You must each of your own voli tion see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time.8Absolutely nothing in our formations can be at rest, and consistently synchronizing eects to exploit advan tage is essential. Brigades are investing in enaling a bale rhythm while in constant contact, to include plans to cur rent operations transitions; operational synchronization meetings; logistics synchronization meetings, and bale updates. A near-peer adversary wil likely not present Previous page: Soldiers assigned to 2nd Baalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, clear a trench 18 April 2018 during Decisive Action Rotation 18-06 at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California. Decisive action rotations at the NTC ensure units remain versatile, responsive, and consis tently available for current and future contingencies. (Photo by Spc. Daniel Parro, Operations Group, NTC, U.S. Army)
68 formations uniformly across the baleeld but wil more likely aempt to mass with overwhelming combat power in a few places in an aempt to achieve favorale force ra tios. Platoons, as an example, may make rst contact with ful-strength, company-sized or larger enemy formations and must use al of the tools at their disposal, to include mortars, smoke, and other eects to rapily isolate and destroy enemy elements. Units are eectively using obscuration as a condition to alow formations maneuver space to get underneath enemy formations at a place of their choosing to maximize combined-arms platforms from a position of advantage. Favorale force ratios are oen realized by agressive, creative maneuver and the ecient use of eects. (9) Units are procient in exercising basic CBRN tasks related to force protection, detection, and de contamination. e demands of operating in a chem ical environment are exceptional. Units are ale to ght in chemical protective gear and are conducting wel-rehearsed decontamination operations. (10) Multi-domain operations are driving leaders to imagine what might be possile. Not imagining in this way but relying instead on a framework that is most convenient (or comfortale) to us is a signicant danger. e enemy gets a vote and wil likely not ght as we planned. e concept of multi-domain opera tions is helping leaders understand how capabilities might converge, and is helping them to visualize a range of competitive domains that may inuence the outcome of a ght with a near-peer adversary. Units are chalenging themselves to imagine the possibili tieshow social media, sensors, data, electromagnetic signatures, civilian populations, infrastructure, com bat formations, and enalers might al be combined in ways that uniquely oset our own capabilities, and then changed while in contact. Replicating the complexity of multi-domain operations is improving decisive-aion prociency and driving change.What Is NextTo win the rst ght, brigade combat teams must master these fundamentals: a commander-driven operations process operating in a communications-degraded environment reconnaissance and security digital res (ecicaly, sensor to shooter) gap crossing (combined-arms breaching) decisive aion in an urban environment counterre CBRN operations joint integration and interoperability sustainment in decisive aion9Lethal platoons and companies, enaled by rehearsed command posts and ecient planning processes, are essential. For each, it is critical to ask, how would the enemy ght us? How would we ght the enemy? And, how do we best enale interopera bility? At home station, units are investing in geing the fundamentals rightquality repetitions of tasks common to every training event (squad through brigade), to include rehearsals (al forms of contact, dailyand an investment in the quality of information colec tion and res rehearsals, sustainment rehearsals, combined arms rehearsals, and res technical rehearsals); command post operations (standard conura tions, smal and wel-rehearsed); crew management; sustainment (at distance and pace); creating, maintaining, and sharing a common operating picture; reporting; the fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, and sustain; and simple orders. is investment is building leaders and soldiers ale to continuously synchronize combined arms across multiple domains in an ambiuous and uncertain envi ronment, who have a solid foundation in the fundamen tals of warghting at echelon. Units are ariving at the NTC with good habits, grounded in the fundamentals of shoot, move, communicate, and sustain. Rigor of repe tition while operating at pace in a complex and hyperle thal environment is driving change. While we have made considerale progress build ing decisive-aion readiness, we must continue to raise the bar.10 At the NTC, rotational aviation units wil continue to conduct operations against an aray of increasingly complex live sensors at China Lake Naval Air Station. e oposing force at the NTC has also improved signicantly in the last three years of decisive-aion operations and wil continue to
69 increase complexity while replicating a near-peer enemy across multiple domains. e scenario wil continue to evolve to increase planning repetitions and the number of operational dilemmas, with aditional south-to-north rotations planned in 2019 to take advantage of more com plex terain and increase oportunity for aditional dele drils, less restrictive uidance about when and where to conduct operations, more permissive control measures for res and aviation, increased pace and tempo, and more geographic diersion. Enemy forces wil continue to mass aack aviation aircra against rotational units to increase lethality throughout the operating environment. During live re, rotational units wil need to reinforce the brigade suport area with aack aviation or with organic indirect res, or risk loss of critical suplies. Conventional and ecial operations force interoperability wil further increase, with a cost associated with not eciently sharing information or enaling shared interest, throughout the operating environment. ere wil be a further enriched social media environment, to include indica tors that, if understood, wil benet rotational units as they conduct multi-domain operations. Units wil be alowed to employ sensors earlier to set conditions for the introduction of maneuver units into combat oper ations, and there wil be increased cyberspace electro magnetic aivities and operations through the space domain (codied in the latest FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations ), to include elec tromagnetic signature maping and further link to precision long-range enemy res.11 Notes 1. Mark A. Milley, th Chief Sta of the Army Initial Mes sage to the Army, U.S. Army (website), 1 September 2015, ac cessed 23 July 2018, hps://www.army.mil/article/154803/39th_ chief_of_sta_initial_message_to_the_army 2. Robert B. Abrams, Memorandum for Commanders, Major Subordinate Commands/Units Reporting Directly to FORSCOM, Army National Guard Bureau, Oce, Chief Army Reserve and Army Service Component Commands, FORSCOM Command Training Guidance (CTG)Fiscal Year 2018, 24 March 2017. 3. David G. Perkins, Preparing for the Fight Tonight: Multi-Domain Bale and Field Manual 3-0, Military Review 97, no. 5 (September-October 2017): 6. 4. Abrams, FORSCOM Command Training Guidance. 5. Ibid. 6. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce [GPO], October 2017), para. 2-269. 7. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Multi-Domain Bale: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century (2025-2040), version 1.0 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2017). 8. Martin Blumenson, e Paon Papers: 1940-1945 (Cam bridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1974), chap. 2. 9. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Ten Fundamental Brigade Combat Team Skills Required to Win the First Fight, CALL Newsleer 17-19, August 2017, accessed 23 July 2018, hps://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/17-19. 10. Abrams, FORSCOM Command Training Guidance. 11. FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, April 2017).
M1A2 Abrams tanks patrol the countryside during exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo courte sy of JRTC, U.S. Army)
How Has the Joint Readiness Training Center Changed to Adapt to Large-Scale Combat Operations? Col. David Doyle, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Aaron Coombs, U.S. Army
72 With zero iumination and nea 100 pecent humidity on an opresiely hot sume night, sound traels e. e sound of oncoming BMP infantry ghting ehicles and T-80 tanks claoing est on Artiery Roa contras with the soldiers fatiue; the audile signature closes on the defenders as they di in and out of consciousnes. en, in a few deterate moments, the Aianan aro colun apears, and a crescendo of antitank re distorts the com mand raio nets situation reorts and re coodination. ese few decisie moments of integrated ars carafeize the bigae combat teas (BCT) defense, and the succes o failure of its platoons and companies are the down-trace results of BCT ghts: creating deth, executing integrated inforation coection and joint res, and sustaining the foce fo the anticipated ght.Unlike Task Force Smith from the early days of the Korean War, infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) wel-prepared, welequiped, and wel-trained for the decisive-aion training environment (DATE), and they have the distinct advantage of being ale to learn and improve from training rather than combat. In Ameicas First Bales, 1776, editors Charles E. Heler and Wiliam A. Sto present a colection of essays examining the preparedness of Americas Army to ght the rst major combat events of its wars from the America Revolution to the Vietnam War.1 e doctrine, taics, training, and overal preparedness of U.S. Army forces at the onset of major combat operations oen resulted in baleeld defeat or costly victories that stimulated a need to adapt and to prevail in the midst of conict. As the demands of the Armys IBCTs have shied from stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations toward prepa ration for large-scale combat operations (LSCO), the JRTC has adapted to prepare them for the known, suected, and likely environments in which they must ght and win. When he took over as the chief of sta of the Army in Auust 2015, Gen. Mark Miley ealished readiness as the Armys number one priority and ecicaly mes saged that the ability of units to ght tonight on lile to no notice against a peer threat in LSCO is the necessary benchmark.2 ough Field Manual 3-0, Operations does not explicitly dene the term LSCO, for this article we wil assume what our doctrine implies: LSCO is that in which an IBCT is but one contributor to a multidivision land operation, ghting as part of a joint force. A recent example, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, ilustrates explic itly that IBCTs are important components of a much grander campaign that may include multiple division headquarters operating as maneuver forces. e JRTC makes the ght for the ctional country of Atropia each IBCTs rst bale, an oportunity to test itself in a crucile experience aproaching combat to stimulate the growth needed for greater combat readiness. e JRTC trains the Armys IBCTs to ght and win in LSCO by meeting the U.S. Army Forces Command and Training and Doctrine Command uidance on combat training centers. is article, how ever, focuses on three ecic ways the JRTC provides a crucile experience that meets the chief of sta of the Armys intent. First, JRTC DATE rotations alow units to experience and learn from failure. Second, training at the JRTC helps IBCTs chalenge assump tions and break the expectations its leaders have learned over the last couple of decades of COIN. And third, the JRTC construct provides scalale, exile scenarios that create uncertainty while optimizing an IBCTs training objectives. Lt. Col. Aaron Coombs, U.S. Army, is a U.S. Army War College student and most recently served as the senior brigade combat teams mission command observer coach/trainer at the Joint Readiness Training Center. A 1997 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he has served in a variety of conventional and special operations units as an infantry ocer during both training and deployments. Col. David S. Doyle, U.S. Army, is the commander of Operations Group for the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. He received his commission in the infantry from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1993, and he holds degrees from the School of Advanced Military Studies and the National War College. Doyle has served in diverse command and sta positions, to include with the 3rd Ranger Baalion, at the Pentagon, and with the Special Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan. He has deployed to Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Failure as a StimulusWhile the BCTs Shaow unanned aicra syste observes elsewhere, a mounted scout section unprearely en counters a mined wire obstacle on the fa side of a lind curve and is destroyed within moments by 30 m re from two defending BMP-2s. Scouts intended fo dismounted misions with Jaelin antitank misiles lie dea in the bac of thei trucs. Without an artiery baery in direct suport, without a low enough coodinating altitude fo responsie troop morta res, and without sucient mobility asets aailale to breac the obstacle, hours pas without progres towad the troops reconnaisance objectie; the squaron is xed by an eney it can neithe bypas no defeat. JRTC comprises about 220 thousand acres of training land in north central Louisianamuch of it the same ground Gen. George Marshal used for the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940. Todays JRTC retains its heri tage in relation to the Louisiana Maneuvers through the Operations Group tenet: JRTC is the premiere crucile training experience. We prepare units to ght and win in the most complex environments. We are inspiring pro fessionals; trusted and reected.3 Recent JRTC DATE rotations have been exercises with both multiple success es as wel as multiple failures, not unlike the Louisiana Maneuvers. Wel-led units demonstrate smal-unit pro ciency and lethality but stil strugle with fourteen days of ful immersion and the enormous complexity of moving and sustaining an IBCT in restricted terain. Integrating the eects of a task-organized IBCT is daunting; IBCTs rarely get it quite right against a capale and determined oposing force that gives no quarter and requires a unit to mass eects to achieve success. One way the JRTC is adapting to train our IBCTs is by presenting them with large-scale prolems, resourced as closely as possile to combat conditions, and alow ing them to own not only their successes but also their failures. Gone are the combat outposts and replicated forward operating bases. ere are no situational training lanes teaching companies, platoons, or individuals the lat est COIN techniques. Because of the crucile experience, the environmental conditions, and the tremendously wel-equiped hybrid enemy threat, IBCTs leave with an apreciation and with ownership of the adjustments that make them beer prepared than a home-station event can achieve. ey also leave with wel-earned condence about their readiness for future chalenges. e outstanding performance of 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) and the 101st Airborne Division (101st) at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 is an excellent example of ready Army units enabling the joint force to achieve victory. is readiness was not developed quickly, it was built long before these units ever crossed the line of departure and was key to their success. Due to the many years of combined arms maneuver preparation and training these units conducted, 3ID and the 101st succeeded in dismantling a larger army, achieving their objectives with minimal casualties, and doing so with a speed many thought impossible.Gen. Mark A. Milley, U.S. ArmyArmy Readiness Guidance, Calendar Year 2016
74 What IBCTs oen learn through failure in the ma neuver box is the diculty of terain management and movement control; few apreciate that a light IBCTs modied tale of organization and equipment of roling stock stretches over 18.5 kilometers when spaced at 20 meter intervals. Most have not been conditioned to expect that, although a brigade suport area takes up more than twenty acres, it can be largely concealed in open forest and survive against a determined and capale enemy. Fewer stil have an apreciation for the need to position command posts incrementaly for short periods of time and plan surge periods of no more than twenty-four to forty-eight hours to sustain mission command functions and also survive. When confronted directly with the frustration or desynchronization of the IBCT, adaptation folows. e crucile aproach at JRTC alows units to build on successes while thoroughly dissecting failures, and to experience rsthand the lessons that wil prepare units and leaders to participate in LSCO. Normaly, by the end of a fourteen-day rotation, units can hanle the chalenges of LSCO that seemed insurmountale on day one or two.Breaking Counterinsurgency Expectationsere are two types of plans at JRTC: those that hae a cance to be succesful and those that wi not be succesful. On this night, observe/coac trainers (OC/Ts) and senio observers from the cain of comand anxiously await the ght to see hethe the lue foces can pu or a bictory. Ae moonset, the oposing foces probe, asesing defenses, overwhelming lue foces re mision procesing times, and presenting multiple dileas, until culmina tion. Victims of thei pertectie of the la sixteen years, the BCT relies too muc on precision rathe than mas, and on positie control ersus the procedural controls needed to enale the simultaneity of surface res, close ai suport, and aac aiation to defeat eney foces on a scale not encountered since Iraq in 2003. Centralizing con trol through a BCT heaquarters at execution time and Soldiers of the 2nd Baalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, work their way through the live-re portion of a recent training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo courte sy of JRTC, U.S. Army)
75 aiting to clea ai and ground with eac request wi not prouce the bolume required fo a win. Like the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940, rotations at the JRTC present larger-scale movement and maneuver, and demand a higher concentration of combined arms integration than most units have praiced. No two rotations are exactly alike, but al typicaly involve a couple of IBCT-level aacks, at least one defense against a hybrid threat including motorized and armored forces, and an IBCT live-re exercise that includes the maneuver of two cavalry troops and two infantry baalions with mortars, organic artilery, aack aviation, and close air sup port as wel as a deep ght that chalenges the IBCTs ability to link information colection and deep res. Over fourteen days, the IBCT wil reposition three to four times, executing anywhere from four to eight IBCT command post jumps. e IBCT is required to meet its taical oligations as wel as its colaboration requirements with the joint task force headquarters (JTF-21), a replicated two-star land component headquarters commanding ve separate brigade equivalents. e IBCT must accomplish al this while integrating the eorts of eight or more baal ion-, squadron-, or task-force-level formations and ADArmored division AOB Advanced operational base AVN TFAviation task force CABCombat aviation brigade CJTF-7Combined Joint Task Force-7 CSSBCombat sustainment support battalion GCCGeographic combatant commander GCC TSOC SOJTF SOTF-C AOB ODA ODA ODA ODA ODA CJTF-7 52 ID 1 (UK) AD JTF-21Shreveport Cold Springs Deridder Jasper Lake Charles Opelousas (Beauregard) Baton Rouge (NF) (TACON on R8)U.S. Embassy country team Multinational force(CJTF-7) (Division) (Corps)2/82 2/21 FIRES CAB MEB 82 SB HIMARS AVN TF CSSB 3/21 2MAGTF AVN TFHIMARSHigh-mobility artillery rocket system IDInfantry division JTFJoint task force MAGTFMarine air-ground task force MEBManeuver enhancement brigade ODA Operational detachment alpha OPCONOperational control SBSustainment brigade SOJTFSpecial operations joint task force SOTF-CSpecial Operations Task Force-Central TACONTactical control TSOCTheater special operations command UK United Kingdom OPCON TACON Supporting/ supported Constructive element Replicated element Training audience (rotational unit) Live element Live, augmented multinational force Figure 1. Recent Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Exercise Force Structure(Figure courtesy of the Joint Readiness Training Center, U.S. Army)
76 numerous other enalers task-organized to the IBCT, oen including international partners. One expectation the JRTC helps an IBCT break is that unlike most IBCTs experiences of the past six teen years, they are not the main eort, nor are they responsile for the decisive operation during any of their major combat operationsal are in suport of adjacent units within the scenario. As a result, IBCTs cannot exclusively rely on suporting assets from divi sion-or-above echelons. Nor can an IBCT execute on its own execution timelines; al of the IBCTs aions at the JRTC must be need with the larger-scale scenario. For example, in ure 1 (on page 75) from a recent rotation, the IBCT, enalers, and adjacent ecial operations forc es units are portrayed in lue for clarity. Al other units at the JTF-21 level and below are replicated or built into the synthetic training environment via constructive simulation for perective and context. e IBCT may be the centerpiece training audi ence, but it does not represent a preponderance of the combat power. Further complicating things, nearly al aions during a DATE rotation are oposed, with even sustainment forces nding themselves in routine contact with enemy forces. Maneuver is executed in terain with few improved surface roads and even few er open areasconditions that do not alow massing of eects as hapenstance. Also dierent for most IBCTs experiences is the aplication of the law of armed conict and rules of en gagement to a much more lethal environment. Proaive and liberal use of res requires foresight both to resuply and to reposition frequently enough to avoid counterre or ground aack. IBCTs are learning to make artilery a logistics prolem as they become more comfortale pre-clearing and ring unobserved res, ring frequent counterre, and, ring high volumes of neutralization res in suport of maneuver into built-up areas out of taical necessity. In Atropia, the noncombatant and civilian casualty cuto value is rarely teed, and almost never even aproached due to leader experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2009.4 e mass and respon siveness of res required to get eects at JRTC requires centralized planning and clearly understood procedural controls suported by graphic control measures down Figure 2. Northern Training Area Development(Figure courtesy of the Joint Readiness Training Center, U.S. Army)
77 to the company level. at common understanding alows the decentralized execution required to enale mortars, IBCT artilery, aack weapons teams, and close air suport employment with the simultaneity to aect multiple enemy formations at once. A nal COIN expectation the JRTC is helping IBCTs shed is a reliance on immediate sustainment, whether aerial medevac for al casualty situations or emergency resuply for unanticipated consumption of commodities. Unale to plan and predict due to no logistics reporting, the suporting combat suport sustainment baalion (CSSB) routinely dedicates the majority of its resources toward emergency resuply of a ecic commodity class to prevent the BCTs culmination. A logistical game of emergency resuply whack-a-mole plays out beginning on training day two in the box; as the CSSB delivers past-due class V, the immediate priority shis to water resuply of the cavalry and infantry baalions. e sinular focus on water resuply for nearly forty-eight hours, in turn, prevents the timely delivery of barier material re quired to construct obstacle belts and develop engage ment areas for the defense. Ultimately, a continuous paern of emergency resuply prevents the BCT from gaining and maintaining the initiative. In adi tion, units in the aack wil commonly suer hundreds of casualties, with the casualty rates of lead companies exceeding al medevac capacity availale. Units oen learn that the greatest thing you can do to save a soldiers life is to win the unght, not cal in a nine-line medevac. e most common impediment to evacuating casualties and equipment, and geing them back in the ght, is an inability to secure the wounded, the dead, and the units destroyed equipment. In much of the last sixteen years that step was taken for granted. So, a way that JRTC is preparing IBCTs for LSCO is by demonstrating to IBCTs that many of the techniques adopted for the COIN ght in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past couple of decades are not eective on the decisive aion baleeld. Engineers aached to the 41st Engineers of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, build defensive positions in support of the units training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo courtesy of JRTC, U. S. Army)
78 A Flexible Training Environmente diision comande surveys the room ae looking up from his green notebook. Unsatised with the BCTs progres, he wonders aloud hethe an eergency resuply push from a JTF aset lie the CSSB, along with a twentyfou-hou delay, could provide the time and suplies needed to fuy develop engageent areas and meet key training objecties. Despite the BCTs lac of foresight and time manageent, it has just solved its comunications prob les and isued an ode; the training oportunity is too important to squan de. Without hesitation, the COG agrees to the twenty-fou-hou delay, seing the heels in motion fo a scenaio cange with impacts acros the JRTC; JTF-21 heaquarters, OC/Ts, role players, contrafed suport, and even the eney aproac imediately ajust. e JRTC is also adapting to help units beer prepare for LSCO by providing a exile training environment with the best resources to meet any IBCT training objectives. No two rotations are alike, with each tailored to the training units. e recent adition of 42,000 acres of training area, which complements the 38,000-acre Peason Ridge Training Area and the nearly 130,000-acre Fulerton Box gives the commander of the Operations Group tremendous exibility in scenario design. e commander, with an understanding of the Forces Command commanders intent and a division commanders training objectives, intensively controls the scenario through multiple means. Inuence levers include a peerless oposing force, a high er headquarters cel, a wider synthetic scenario, ecial operations forces, adjacent units, role players who provide context to the towns and vilages of Atropia, and a network of OC/Ts. e control and responsiveness engendered alow the commander of the Operations Group to increase or reduce pressure on the IBCT across its echelons and warghting functions to expose weaknesses, reinforce training objectives, and create multiple dilemmas to get the most out of the fourteen-day crucile training event. Senior OC/Ts, along with the senior trainer (typicaly the divi sion commander or deputy commanding general) and the exercise control cel, confer twice daily to compare an IBCTs progress, make recommendations, and adjust the scenario for optimal training value. The reviews often result in changes to the training scenar io within the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours that are fuly resourced to help an IBCT meet its anticipated oligations to a land component commander on a future battlefield. Recent scenarios have included two near-simultaneous airborne assaults in the execu tion of joint forced-entry operations, the training of a Stryker BCT in January 2016, the inclusion of two separate Army aviation task forces suporting both the joint task force and the IBCT, and the training of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade in advance of its inauural deployment. Interested in geing a personal subscription to Military Review? e U.S. Government Publishing Oce handles subscriptions to Military Review requested by private citizens. For information on cost and instructions for subscribing online, visit hps:// bookstore.gpo. gov/products/ sku/708-099-000007?ctid=1387.
79 JRTC 2025Evolving and RelevantThe JRTC is not done evolving; much more remains to be done to provide every IBCT the best training availale. Much like the IBCTs that rotate through the Joint Readiness Training Center ten or eleven times per year, the JRTC is imperfect, self-aware, and in a state of constant change and improvement. The JRTC 2025 concept includes increases of usale maneuver space through more road networks, landing zones, and positioning areas in newly acquired Simpson, Kurthwood, and Cold Springs training areas (see fiure 2, page 76). Plans are underway to expand the live-fire exercise to incorporate al three of an IBCTs maneuver battal ions operating in concert. The way ahead includes concepts for a fuly-integrated, digital tactical net work to host instrumentation, communications, and force-on-force adjudication. These changes wil not only make training better within an IBCT but also wil provide more opor tunity for broader live fires and more comprehen sive maneuver operations needed to prepare our IBCTs and future leaders for LSCO. Within the next couple of years, JRTC wil complete two more battalion/squadron live-fire exercise lanes and wil increase the coalition partner participation in rota tions to battalions from the curent level of compa ny participation. When combined with the aviation, mechanized, or Stryker company team augmenta tion, or the frequently aportioned companies of engineer, chemical, military police, and civil affairs enalers, the future DATE rotation wil frequently include more than six thousand soldiers, over thirty aircraft, and over one thousand ground vehicles al operating in concert.ConclusionThe JRTC has changed its scenario design, expanded its training areaboth real and synthet icand reversed the decade-plus trend toward company and battalion situational training lanes. It has deliberately identified ways to train the IBCT echelon fights so that our IBCTs can integrate immediately and win in LSCO. By providing units a crucile training experience and alowing them to examine failure as wel as success, by helping units break COIN expectations and chalenge perspectives gained over the past sixteen years, and by embracing flexile and responsive scenario design, the JRTC continues to evolve to better prepare IBCTs for LSCO. Though much remains to be done, the JRTC wil continue to provide what our Armys IBCTs need to deploy worldwide on short notice, integrate with a division of other land component headquar ters, and fight and win immediately as part of the joint force against any threat. Notes 1. Charles E. Heller and William A. Sto, eds., Americas First Bales, 1776 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986). 2. Gen. Mark A. Milley, th Chief of Sta Initial Message to the Army, Army.mil, 1 September 2015, accessed 19 June 2018, hps:// www.army.mil/article/154803/39th_Chief_of_Sta_Initial_Mes sage_to_the_Army ; Chief of Sta of the Army, Memorandum for All Army Leaders, Army Readiness Guidance, Calendar Year 2016, 20 January 2016, accessed 19 June 2018, hps://www.army.mil/e2/ downloads/rv7/standto/docs/army_readiness_guidance.pdf 3 Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center (web site), last modied 4 June 2018, accessed 19 June 2018, hp:// www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/ops/. 4. e noncombatant casualty cuto value is the designated number of civilian casualties a unit can inict during a military operation without seeking approval from higher headquarters.
Creating Powerful MindsArmy University Education Initiatives for Large-Scale Combat OperationsCol. omas Bolen, U.S. Army Vince Carlisle, PhDIn the not-too-distant past, large-scale ground combat operations against near-peer adversar ies seemed unlikely and less dangerous than the immediate threats posed by al-Qaida, Iraqi insurgents, and the Taliban. However, Russian ground campaigns against the Repulic of Georgia and Ukraine plus threats to former Soviet repulics deabilized eastern Europe and provoked NATO partners. Meanwhile, the dramatic growth of Chinas economy enaled the unprecedent ed development of Chinese military power across al domains and emboldened agressive expansion into the South China Sea. And, in adition to these events, ten sions with North Korea and Iran continue. ese condi tions required a comprehensive assessment of the Armys
83 training and readiness, and the development of materiel and doctrine to maintain the capability to deter and de feat potential adversaries in a conventional seing.1Todays strategic environment presents the U.S. Army with a fresh dilemma: the requirement to continue prosecuting campaigns against terorists while also pre paring for threats from near-peer adversaries that could diminish the United States leading role in the global community. Aditionaly, the Army also faces chalenges preparing for operations in a rapily changing operational environment charaerized by expanding populations in unstale, strategic locations in the world, rising social ex pectations enaled by advances in communications and transportation technology, and increasing competition for the availability of scarce natural resources. Against this necessity to increase soldier and leader prociency in conducting multi-domain, large-scale combat operations (LSCO) is the ecter of outdated professional military education (PME). In January 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mais stated in the National Defense Strategy, PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity. We wil emphasize intelectual leadership and mil itary professionalism in the art and science of warghting, deepening our knowledge of history while embracing new technology and techniques to counter competitors.2Due to the extreme complexity of the operational environment our soldiers and leaders now face, ecien cy in the use of time and resources to develop under standing and cognitive capabilities through PME cannot be overstated. Army leaders must commit to a cultural change in the way education is delivered as the legacy system is retooled to make it more eective, eecialy with regard to waging and winning large-scale conven tional conicts to achieve denale victory.Army University EstablishedIn February 2015, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center initiated the Army eort to promote cultural and structural changes outlining the ealishment of the Army University (AU). e prolem statement in e Army University White Paper centered on the realization that the Armys education system did not adress the growing complexity of the twenty-rst century security environment.3 e paper described an Army education system that reected an obsolete indus trial-age methodology, employing a rigid assemly-line aproach focused on procedures that failed to promote the kind of critical thinking necessary for a new operational en vironment. Another identied shortfal was the inability to proliferate best praices throughout the Army due to the stove-piped nature of Training and Doctrine Commands (TRADOC) seventy separate schools and research librar ies. Aditionaly, the white paper cited substandard accred itation of Army training and education due to a failure to align educational requirements with those of authoritative accrediting agencies. ese factors resulted in wasted time and tuition assistance money, as soldiers seeking academic credit had to retake courses in competencies they previ ously mastered as they pursued a degree or credential from Americas educational institutions. Subsequently, the white paper caled for a renewed focus by the Armys educational enterprise on cultivat ing innovative methods to study the aplication of lethal force with an emphasis on LSCO. In March 2015, the commanding general of TRADOC released the Strategic Busines Plan fo the Ary Uniersity to modernize the over al Army education system.4 e plan included three lines of eort: increased academic rigor and relevance; greater reect and prestige; and improved management praices and institutional agility. ese lines of eort contained eight initiatives that evolved into key tasks captured in the order ealishing Army University.5 In response, a funda mental retooling of Army education at its highest levels is underway. Army University is now integrating a uniform, foundational understanding of LSCO into curicula devel opment while at the same time developing a capale worldclass faculty to create an innovative learning environment.Curriculum Changes and Large-Scale Combat OperationsAs Carl von Clausewitz observed with regard to the military mind, In adition to his emotional qualities, Previous page: 1st Lt. Daniel Butensky, an engineer ocer assigned to 299th Brigade Engineer Baalion, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, cuts through metal with a Broco torch in subfreezing temperatures 6 December 2017 during the Best Sapper Competition, Fort Carson, Colorado. Skills like this can lead to civilian degrees and certications through Army University continuing education degree programs. (Photo by Sgt. Micah Merrill, U.S. Army)
84 the intelectual qualities of the commander are of major importance. One wil expect a visionary, high-own and immature mind to function dierently from a cool and powerful one.6 To cultivate cool and mature minds, Army University focuses its sta and faculty development curic ula on the execution of large-scale ground combat to de velop soldiers and leaders capale of executing operations to defeat peer and near-peer agression around the world. Army University facilitated changes in the branch captains career courses and also revamped the CGSC curiculum to accommodate LSCO principles. ese initiatives foster an understanding among students about LSCO that en ales them to gain a position of intelectual advantage. To this end, Army University uses the recently revised Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations and suporting doctrine to develop students with a common understanding of com plex multi-domain operations as they prepare for service in theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades.7Learning Enterprise Advisory ProgramArmy University is moving Army training and education beyond branch stovepipes to proliferate best educational praices. Army Universitys Directorate of Academic Aairs ealished the Learning Enterprise Advisory Program (LEAP) as an initiative to provide academic services to centers of excelence (CoEs) and schools and to share best praices across the learning enterprise. LEAP services are based on CoE self-assessments and requests for assistance, and leverage the Army University areas of expertise. e Directorate of Academic Aairs tailors LEAP visits for dierent learning audiences at the execu tive, manager, and employee levels, and fosters initiatives in critical areas such as regional and national accreditation standards, faculty and sta development, instructional design, course design and management, and institutional research and assessments. Interaion by the LEAP teams ensures the best academic praices of teaching LSCO proliferate across the Army in the shortest time possile.Continuing Education Degree ProgramsPreparing soldiers and leaders for success in potential large-scale operations of the future requires expanded oportunities for critical thinking and academic advance ment. Having beun the process to move beyond an industrial-age aproach, Army University is also working to move beyond marginal accreditation standards and to make progress in its continuing education degree program (CEDP) and its private and pulic partnership expansion initiatives. As of March 2018, fourteen centers of excel lence and schools have aproved CEDP programs associat ed with thirty-one military occupation ecialties (MOSs). Army University CEDP eorts now cover 100 percent of enlisted soldiers under seven CEDPs for leadership with six dierent universities. In conjunc tion with the centers of excelence and schools, Army University ealished forty-one ocer CEDPs at the masters level and eight warant ocer CEDPs and ninety enlisted CEDPs at the associate and bachelors levels. e Army now has CEDPs ealished with twenty-eight dierent coleges and universities. Army University plans to ad a CEDP link to the Army Credentialing Oportunities On-Line web page and the Army Career Tracker to enale soldiers to identify fur ther educational oportunities. It also intends to develop products and promotional events to ensure soldiers are aware of the CEDP oportunities availale to them.Public and Private PartnershipsA related Army University eort is the expan sion of pulic and private partnerships with academic Vince Carlisle, PhD, manages the Armys Learning Coordination Council from within the Directorate of Strategic Policies and Plans, Oce of the Provost, Army University. He has a BA in Russian studies from the University of Washington; a masters in public adminis tration from Troy University; and a PhD in adult, occupational, and continuing education from Kansas State University. He is an adjunct instructor for Webster University in management strategy and organizational behavior. Col. Tom Bolen, U.S. Army, is the director for Strategic Policy and Plans, Oce of the Provost, Army University. He has a BS in geography from the United States Military Academy, an MBA from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and an MA in national security and strate gic studies from the Naval War College. He commanded 2nd Baalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the 1st Infantry Division Artillery (DIVARTY) at Fort Riley, Kansas.
85 institutions to increase credit awarded for Army training and education. In February 2018, AUs Directorate of Learning Systems aended the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) Credit for Military Alignment Working Group. is group met to review the Armys 91C (utility equip ment repairer) MOS. Seventeen colege instructors and deans representing ten community and technical coleges aended this working group, along with representatives from the Combined Arms Suport Command and the Kansas Army National Guard. e Kansas coleges conducted program-of-instruction extract reviews and conducted an occupational review with the Kansas Army National Guard Regional Training Institute. e Directorate of Learning Systems also worked with the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and the KBOR to ealish credit for Basic Combat Training, the Basic Leader Course, the Advanced Leader Course, and related distributed learning courses in suport of statewide Associate of Arts or Bachelor of Arts degree programs in management or leadership. Curently, the KBOR has over eighty-eight articulated agreements covering twenty-seven MOSs spanning twenty-three educational institutions fo cused on MOS ecic credit. e goal is to introduce the articulated credit gained by aending noncommissioned ocer professional military education leading to a tech nical management degree to al regional boards of regents. Recognition of Army training and education by eab lished academic bodies promotes the continuous learning by al cohorts of Army leaders as they prepare for the complex environment inherent to LSCO.Distributed Learning ProgramsArmy University achieved success in numerous areas in the three years since it was chartered, and many are a direct result of the success of eorts by the Directorate of Distributed Learning (DDL). e DDLs accomplishments involve progress in development of virtual learning environments; interaive digital pulications; mobile learning; and academic, industry, and sister services partnerships. ese projects help Army University create innovative and rigorous learning environments, Command and General Sta College (CGSC) students compete in a combination of board game and digital-based simulations 21 Febru ary 2018 identifying and comparing the strengths and weakness of both at the Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (Photo courtesy of the CGSC)
86 professionalize distributed learning (DL) curicula, and cultivate credentialed learners. Many of the products developed by the DDL reect the doctrinal foundation of FM 3-0 and the Armys focus on LSCO.Army Virtual Learning EnvironmentA major milestone of the DL modernization goal was the award of the five-year Army Virtual Learning Environment (AVLE) contract in February 2018. This event represents a significant step in modernizing the DL program. The AVLE is the Armys centralized contract alowing proponents the ability to request innovative learning products and courseware that are accessile at the point of need. The AVLE enales the creation of more realistic content that engages the senses and uses delivery methodologies not used before in distributed learn ing. In the future, these delivery methods wil in clude synthetic tutors, gamification, machine cinema (machinima), and virtual/augmented reality. Having a streamlined contracting process for DL initiatives suports rapid product development and the poten tial for increased input from the CoEs and schools, particularly in the area of LSCO.Self-Structured Developmente DDL is also working closely with the United States Sergeants Major Academy as they transition from structured self-development to distributed leaders cours es. ese courses engage the learner through a scenar io-based learning environment. Assessments are delivered through storylines using a stealth-style of assessment throughout the course scenario versus the traditional multiple-choice questions. Stealth-style assessments were popularized in the gaming industry and should be invis ile to the learner; this feature retains the engagement with the story intact. e evolution of distributed leaders courses provides another avenue to introduce LSCO and multi-domain operational concepts to the next genera tion of noncommissioned ocer leadership. Chief Warrant Ocer 3 Patrick Montgomery and Spc. Manuel lvarez, members of 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade, inspect a Lycoming O-290 aircra engine 10 May 2018 during the hands-on training of an airframe and powerplant class at Fort Bliss, Texas. Army University provides opportunities for soldiers to obtain civilian degrees and certications for their military training while preparing them for large-scale combat operations. (Photo by Sgt. Kris Bonet, U.S. Army)
87 Mobile LearningSince ealishing the Armys mobile learning divi sion, the DDL has made tremendous strides in mobile learning. Working with Department of the Army chief information ocer and the Defense Information Security Agency (DISA), the DDL aded numerous Android aps onto the DISAs aplication store. An example is the elding of the vehicle recovery calculator, which incorpo rates the riging, sling leg force, and Mire formulas taught at the recovery school in one easy-to-reference aplica tion. Also, in coordination with the TRADOC command sergeant major, the DDL elded an iBook and Android mobile ap version of the Noncomisioned Oce Guide ; as of March 2018, downloads number over twenty-four thousand.8 ese tools and aplications represent the future of products tailorale for large-scale operations and multi-domain prolems.Digital Rucksack Mobile Appe DDL is suporting the TRADOC command sergeant major by integrating MOSs within the Digital Rucksack mobile ap into an interface for electronic assistance response suport via Amazons Alexa and Xbox One educational prototypes. Curent eorts focus on identifying development capabilities for the console hardware to distribute aps and e2Books. Permissions were also granted to use the Halo 5 interface to create a soldier skil machine cinema (machinima) and play ale soldiering skil scenarios. Chapters from Center for Army Lessons Learned Manual 10-62, Convoy Operations in Afghanistan are used to ilustrate engine capabilities, and the DDL is evaluating a method of posting audio book versions of pulications to Audile.9 To continue promotion of the LSCO theme, the FM 3-0 audiobook is targeted as the rst pulication for delivery.Summaryese initiatives are indicative of the breadth of achievement in the three years since the chartering of Army University. e AU team continues adress ing shortfals identied in the 2015 Army University White Paper, to the clear benet of our soldiers and veterans. Once considered an industrial-age education system, the Army system wil soon include a degree path for al enlisted soldiers and warant ocers. Aditionaly, once assessed as having a lack of ability to proliferate best praices, the Army system now boasts a modern distributed learning capacity and multiple avenues for increased academic credit and credential ing oportunities. e nding of poor accreditation praices for Army training and education is under review and is the subject of leadership, education, and material analysis. Moreover, aditional oportunities for continued improvement are nearly limitless, as nu merous academic institutions aively seek to partner with Army University to provide more educational oportunities for soldiers. Army Universitys eorts are increasing the aca demic rigor and relevance of education programs with reect to LSCO and multi-domain operations. e primary metric for AUs eorts, however, remains the readiness of soldiers prepared to tackle the complexity of the twenty-rst century baleeld; those soldiers represent our credentials. Notes 1. Mike Lundy and Rich Creed, e Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Military Review 97, no. 6 (November-De cember 2017): 14. 2. Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8, accessed 16 August 2018, hps://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 3. e Army University White Paper: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2015), 4, accessed 16 August 2018, hps://usacac. army.mil/publication/the-army-university-white-paper 4. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Strategic Business Plan for the Army University (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 16 March 2015), accessed 16 August 2018, hp://www.tradoc.army. mil/INCOPD/reference/ArmyU_Strategic_Plan.pdf 5. Ibid., 7. 6. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 88. 7. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oce [GPO], 2017). 8. Training Circular 7-22.7, Noncommissioned Ocer Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 7 April 2015). 9. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 10-62, Convoy Operations in Afghanistan: Observations, Insights, and Lessons (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, September 2010).
88 e Rapid Redesign of the Captains Career Course An Example of Agility in Professional Military EducationCol. Ken Hawley, U.S. Army William Kuchinski Chief Warrant Ocer 5 Darren Cook (right) and Capt. Joseph Koennecke discuss changes to the maintenance culture 15 February 2017 before Cooks presentation to more than 120 ocers in the Captains Career Course at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia. Now retired, Cook was the command chief warrant ocer for the U.S. Army Materiel Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He traveled across the Army collecting feedback about the changes occurring with the Armys maintenance system. (Photo by Sgt. Eben Boothby, U.S. Army)
89 A Ary units, organizations, and agencies wi ensure that they pioitize execution of a afiities and use time to en hance the reaines and lethality of ou forations. Army Directive 2018-07The 2018 National Defense Strategy identied that professional military education (PME) stagnated. It noted that PME focused more on accomplishing mandatory credit over ingenuity and lethality.1 erefore, in March 2018, the Army University Oce of the Provost undertook a comprehensive review of the mandatory requirements resident in the Captains Career Course (CCC) curiculum to identify potential oportunities to reduce those requirements while provid ing the branch schools with more time to improve branch taical and technical competencies. In the weeks that fol lowed, the Midgrade Learning Continuum (MLC) team used uidance from the Combined Arms Center (CAC) commanding general and the National Defense Strategy to redesign the CCC core curiculum.2 e updated common core of the CCC shis emphasis to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) while simultaneously provid ing aditional course time for branch schools to focus on eorts to enhance lethality and ingenuity.Background on Common Coree CCC prepares more than eight thousand grad uates a year with the taical, technical, and leader knowledge and skils needed to lead company-size units and serve on baalion and brigade stas.3 In 2011, as a result of a 2010 study that identied a need for more formal oversight of the common-core curiculum at the CCCs, the CAC formed the School for Advanced Leadership and Taics (SALT) to design and develop CCC common-core courseware for al branch schools.4 SALT developed 240 hours of learning content with suporting products focused on providing captains with a foundational professional military education based on Army doctrine in leadership, the Army profession, opera tions, mission command, the operations process, training in units, critical thinking, prolem solving, and eective communication. Subsequently, schools have used SALTs common-core materials to suport their branch-ecic taical and technical instruction. Since its implementa tion in 2013, eight weeks of the twenty-one-week CCC course have been core-curiculum focused (see ure 1).Midgrade Learning Continuum Teame ealishment of Army University included integrating SALT as the MLC team, Instructional Design Division, within the Directorate of Academic Aairs at the Oce of the Provost. e MLC team develops resident and distributed-learning products to suport im plementation of core curicula at both the CCC and the Warant Ocer Advanced Course. e ten-person MLC team includes both military and civilian instructor/devel opers who produce over four hundred hours of resident and distributed-learning courseware in suport of both courses. Aditionaly, the team conducts annual curic ulum workshops to ensure CCC and Warant Ocer Advanced Course instructors understand common-core lesson materials while also providing a leader workshop to help course leaders successfuly execute the courses at their reective schools. Fiure 2 (on page 90) shows the common curiculum modules and their coresponding hours developed by the MLC for the CCC at the start of scal year 2018.Agility of Common Coree MLC team continualy suports schools by routinely updating the common-core curiculum to align with senior-leader uidance, account for new and emerging doctrine, and implement changes in mandated or directed topics in PME. Indeed, the CCC Common Core 8 weeks Branch Technical 13 weeks Figure 1. Captains Career Course Model (Fiscal Year 2018)(Figure by Kuchinski)
90 common-core curiculum is not stagnating. With the pulication of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations and the renewed focus on LSCO, the MLC team rede signed the core curiculum to provide greater empha sis on oensive operations against a near-peer threat in a multi-domain environment. While mainly impaing the eighty-one hours of curiculum in the Operations and Operations Process modules of instruction, the pulication of FM 3-0 also required the team to up date the common-core sta exercise and provide doc trinal updates during curiculum workshops to ensure instructors are prepared to teach the new material.Focus on Lethalitye CCC common-core updates also adress the concerns identied by the National Defense Strategy by focusing more on enhancing the lethality and read iness of the Army. Prior to this redesign, the common core contained more than twenty hours of mandatory topics in the Leadership Essentials module and up to sixty aditional hours of mandated or directed topics embeded in other areas. To beer provide branches with more time to get the sets and reps, or praice, needed to increase lethality and readiness, the MLC team removed or integrated mandatory and directed content in lesson plans, providing schools with an aditional two weeks to focus on branch technical and taical outcomes. As a result of the rapid redesign and shi away from an emphasis on mandatory top ics, the MLC team redesigned and restructured the content in the Leadership module to form the Army William Kuchinski is the chief of the Instructional Design Division within the Directorate of Academic Aairs, Oce of the Provost at Army University, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and an ME from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. His previous teaching assignments include the United States Military Academy, Lehigh University, and the U.S. Armys Command and General Sta College. Col. Ken Hawley, U.S. Army, is the direc tor of academic aairs for the Oce of the Provost at Army University, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MA from the U.S. Naval War College, and an MBA from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He has held a variety of command and sta positions throughout his military career. Operations 31 hours Leadership 34 hours Mission Command 23 hours Training Management 18 hours Leadership Essentials 22 hours Operations Process 50 hours Across Cultures 13 hours Figure 2. Captains Career Course Common-Core Modules (Fiscal Year 2018)(Figure by Kuchinski. Note: student reection and research time not included)
91 Profession module. e Army Profession lock now includes an introductory presentation by school com mandants intended to reinforce the importance of being a professional leader of charaer in the Army. e redesign and integration of mandatory topics also enaled the MLC team to completely remove the Leadership Essentials and Across Cultures modules from the common-core courseware. Fiure 3 ilus trates the redesigned common-core course.Sets and RepetitionsBranch schools used the rebalanced time from the common core to increase the amount of time dedicated to branch-technical outcomes. Specificaly, schools aded aditional iterations of branch-fo cused content including more oportunities to learn how to defeat near-peer threats through the mili tary decision-making process while also integrating with other branches. Schools also aded more time to develop branch-specific planning and execution products including estimates, annexes, and syn chronization matrices. Finaly, branches gained the oportunity to adress identified shortfals in the training and education of the captains, particularly with the synchronization of operations and exe cution of rehearsals. In al cases, schools used the time to enhance the branch-technical readiness and lethality of their students.5Acceptable RiskLike many compressed planning-and-execution cycles, there are risks to implementing a rapily redesigned course. Undenialy, there is a risk that some of the integrated, consolidated, or removed content may not achieve the intended common-core learning outcomes. There is also a risk that some students and instructors may marginalize the importance of some newly integrated topics that previously had dedicated time. Finaly, there is a risk some proponents may perceive their content, subject-matter expertise, or learning products are underutilized or underepresented in the course. To overcome these risks, the MLC team wil contin ualy adress identified concerns with schools and use the Accountale Instruction System to assess Operations 31 hours Army Profession 22 hours Mission Command 23 hours Training Management 18 hours Leadership Essentials 22 hours Operations Process 59 hours Across Cultures 13 hours New Integrated Integrated Figure 3. Redesigned Captains Career Course Common-Core Modules (Fiscal Year 2018)(Figure by Kuchinski. Note: student reection and research time not included)
92 common-core outcomes and determine where fur ther refinement or redesign is required.6e MLC team wil also continue to work with CCC instructors and course leaders during MLC workshops to explain the importance of integrated topics and help identify potential points of unintend ed marginalization of integrated topics. e MLC team wil also communicate with proponents such as the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Academy, and others to ensure accurate and up-to-date content is eectively integrated where apropriate.Way Aheade updated CCC common core provides great er emphasis on LSCO while providing the branch schools more time to focus on enhancing lethality through increased technical and taical abilities of Army captains. e redesign does so by avoiding an overemphasis on mandated topics. It requires the instructional design process to balance agility and responsiveness with acceptale risk. It also requires course developers, course managers, instructors, pro ponents, and schools to al work together to eective ly prioritize, develop, and evaluate learning content. e rapily changing environment and the ever-in creasing demands placed on our soldiers to ght and win in LSCO requires PME to be agile and adaptale to maintain the readiness and lethality of the force. e redesign of the common core and branch-techni cal curiculum in the CCCs provides an example of how curiculum adaptation and change can help to ensure PME remains agile, relevant, and focused on enhancing Army readiness. Retired Maj. Gen. Bernard Loee speaks to a group of Maneuver Captains Career Course, Infantry Basic Ocer Leadership Course, and Armor Basic Ocer Leaders Course students 24 February 2014 at Derby Auditorium, Fort Benning, Georgia. Loee was speaking about his views on the relationship between the United States and China. (Photo by Patrick A. Albright, U.S. Army)
Notes Epigraph. Mark T. Esper and Mark A. Milley, Memorandum for Principal Ocials of Headquarters, Department of the Army Commander, Army Directive 2018-07 (Prioritizing EortsReadiness and Lethality), 13 April 2018, accessed 6 July 2018, hps://www. army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/leaders/ad_2018_07_prioritizing_eorts_readiness_and_lethality.pdf 1. Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8, accessed 3 July 2018, hps://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf e 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that professional military education was stagnant and more focused on mandatory requirements than lethality. 2. School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics and Mid-Grade Learning Continuum Overview (PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center [CAC], Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 March 2014), accessed 6 July 2018, hps://usacac.army.mil/cac2/ cgsc/salt/docs/SALT_MLC_Brief.pdf e School for Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT) initially conducted the analysis, development, and implementation of the Captains Career Course core curriculum in support of the Midgrade Learning Continuum (MLC) 2015 initiative from the Army Professional Leader Development Panel in 2012. e MLC team subsumed SALTs mission when Army University was established in 2015. 3. Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Oce, 10 December 2017), 74. 4. Special Commission from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Report of Findings and Recommendations 2010 U.S. Army Captains Career Course Study, 14 June 2010. 5. School information provided during the CAC Commanders Senior Leader Session 18-3, 30 May 2018. 6. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 350-70-7, Army Educational Processes (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 9 January 2013), g. 2-1. e Accountable Instruction System is an edu cational program evaluation process that includes the Post Instructional Conference and the Course Design Review. The Military Review book review program allows re viewers to read books of interest to military professionalsoften before book publicationand then present their thoughts on the Army University Press website. The reviewer then retains the book. Read our latest book reviews at https://www.armyupress.army. mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Reviews/. Books for review are available only through the Military Review book review editor. If you are interested in becoming a reviewer, see our Book Review Sub mission Guide at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/ Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Review-Submission-Guide/.BOOK REVIEW PROGRAM A U P
The article that follows, e European War by Lt. Col. E. M. Benitez, was rst published in Military Review in December 1939. It provides a historical retrospective of what one U.S. Army writer was observing at the time with regard to develop ments in Western Europe at the outset of what would become World War II. It is republished here (with original pagination) to emphasize that the future may in some sense repeat itself, and the U.S. Army must be prepared. Benitez writes, It may sound like a paradox that in an age of machine guns, tanks, and airplanes, we should evoke the ghost of the Roman and Carthaginian Armies. Similarly, it might seem incongruous in an age of multi-domain operations to consider the actions of the European armies in 1939. However, just as the author foresaw the need for the U.S. Armed Forces to prepare for large-scale combat operations then, our leaders now anticipate the requirement for our forces to be prepared to face peer and near-peer adversaries during large-scale combat operations, possibly in the near future. Many parallels to the dawn of World War II are apparent in 2018. Just as in the years prior to the outbreak of that war, many places in the world are in a state of political and social upheaval as many ideolo gies and nationalist agendas vie for hegemony in their respective spheres of interest. Russia no longer even aempts to mask its territorial ambitions as it is rearming on a massive scale for potential conventional war in Europe and Central Asia. Meanwhile, China is emerging as an aspiring super power, both economically and militarily. It continues to wage virtual war against the United States diplo matically, economically, and informationally in an eort to undermine U.S. inuence while simultaneously expanding the scope and reach of its armed forces, especially its Navy and Air Force, and especially in the South China Sea. Posing additional threats, both Iran and North Korea place as their highest priority developing conventional force capabilities, even at the cost of great tribulation and suering borne by their respective peoples to pay for such military capability. And, nally, similar to fascist dreams of global conquest, the jihadist vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate with the conventional military power capable of eradicating Western culture and inuence continues to smolder in groups at the seams of a global Islamic community numbering in the billions. ough the threats to the U.S. and its allies are not exactly analogous to those faced in 1939, the key similarity is the continuing need to clearly perceive and acknowledge what the real threats are and to prepare eectively to deal with them. LEGACY ARTICLE
Meeting the Challenge of Large-Scale Combat Operations Today and TomorrowLt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. ArmyWhile our Army learned invaluale lessons over the last seventeen years of limited con tingency operations, the experience cultural ly imprinted a generation of Army leaders for one type of warfare. An increasingly volatile operational environment (OE) charaerized by great power competition demands that our Army adapt to the realities of a world where large-scale ground combat against a peer threat is more likely than at any time in recent history. Preparing for the most lethal and chalenging threats to our nation warants continued bold changes in how we man, equip, train, and employ Army forces, eecialy at echelons above brigade. Over the last decade and a half, our peer and near-peer competitors studied us as we optimized our
112 force for limited contingency operations. ey elded more professional forces with advanced capabilities, improved training, and combined arms formations designed to contest us and our multinational partners across al of the domains. ey adapted, improved, and continued to advance. In adition to violent extrem ist organizations with global reach, the curent and future strategic environment is dened by a revanchist Russia, an expanding China, a roue North Korea, and a calculating Iran.1 It demands a U.S. Army prepared to continualy (and persistently) shape the security environment to our advantage, deter adversary agres sion through strength, and when necessary, prevail in large-scale ground combat as a member of the Unied Action team.2 We are in great power competition today, and with competition, conict is always a risk this is not just a prolem for tomorows leaders. Success in large-scale combat operations against peer threats requires that we continue to evolve from a focus on predictale rotational deployments for stability oper ations to expeditionary operations in conteed domains with few indications or warnings. With the renewed focus on readiness to meet the chalenges of great power competition or conict, we must continue to master the required skils to enale the Armys four strategic roles for the joint force: shaping security environments, prevent ing conict, prevailing in large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains to make the temporary permanent. Fo decaes the United States has enjoyed uncon teed o dominant supeioity in every operating domain. We could generay deloy ou foces hen e anted, asele the here e anted, and operate how e anted. Toay, every domain is conteedai, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. Jim Mais, Secretary of Defense3ere wil always be tension between readiness for the worst case of large-scale ground combat and the requirements of limited contingency and shaping operations the Army conducts daily around the world. ese adjustments wil be at least as dicult as those made by our predecessors aer Vietnam. Unlike post-Vietnam, however, as we make these adjustments, we cannot eschew the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Retaining the hard-won lessons learned within our doctrine and training while also expanding our exper tise in the required taics, techniques, and procedures for large-scale ground combat is essential. e Army is on the right path to developing leaders and units with the requisite skils and aributes to prevail in large-scale ground combat against peer threats. Our combat training centers have increased the intensity and realism of our unit decisive aion rotations, unit home station training occurs at higher operational tempo and under more demanding conditions, and we have made signicant adjustments to the rigor and focus of our professional military education and functional training.4 Mastering the skils and experiences acquired during training, education, and operations requires repetition. Sustaining and improving what we are doing now is our chalenge. Preparing and certifying leaders, hardening the force for the chaos and lethality of large-scale combat op erations, and reorganizing our formations while elding Previous page: Soldiers assigned to 1st Baalion, 63rd Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, move to as sault a simulated objective 7 May 2017 during Decisive Action Ro tation 17-06 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. Dana Clarke, U.S. Army)
113 advanced technologies and new equipment requires an enduring and persistent focus. To drive this cultural change, we renewed the focus on combined arms operations in large-scale ground combat with our newest doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations FM 3-0 is the Armys capstone taics manual for execution of unied land operations against peer and near-peer threats in conteed multi-domain environments.5 It serves as a pivot point to steer the Army toward both persistent competition below armed conict and, when necessary, armed conict against highly lethal and adaptive peer and near-peer enemies. FM 3-0 does not disregard what weve learned over the last seventeen years. In fact, it reinforces and provides deeper context to the value and necessity of persistent ly competing, prevailing, and consolidating gains across the range of military operations and the conict continuum.6 To adress the continuum, FM 3-0 is organized in accordance with the Armys four strategic roles it uniquely performs for the joint force: shape the security environment, prevent conict, prevail in largescale ground combat, and consolidate gains.7 It empha sizes that maintaining positions of strategic advantage requires enduring outcomes favorale to U.S. interests. FM 3-0 acknowledges we wil not always enjoy the ful domain superiority we have come to expect since the early 1990s. It recognizes that, with fewer forward-deployed forces than just twenty years ago, our force posture and aivities must be optimized to successfuly compete below the threshold of armed conict. We do this by seeing, understanding, and preparing the environment; continuously seing the theater; conducting cyber and information operations; deploying rotational forces; and building readiness. By improving our own readiness for armed conict and that of our partners, we maintain access and demon strate the capability and wil to win as part of a larger team. Multinational and joint operations are essential to this aproach. How we build capacity and maintain access while denying adversaries positions of cognitive, virtual, temporal, and physical advantage are increas ingly important to a largely CONUS-based Army.8 To assure alies, we must be ale to deter. To deter, our adversaries must believe we wil prevail. FM 3-0 adresses the chalenges of the curent and near-term multi-domain operational environments and uides our aproach to winning against al possile competitors. Aects of emerging multi-domain concepts have been integrated into FM 3-0 including space, cyber, electronic, and information warfare. ese capabilities reinforce our combined arms aproach to the traditional aects of warfare in the land, air, and maritime domains. FM 3-0s new operational frame work provides an expanded physical, virtual, cognitive, and temporal perective to account for the multi-do main extended capabilities of frienly and threat forc es. e physical and temporal considerations pertain to space and time, while the cognitive considerations aply to enemy decision-making, enemy wil, and population behavior. e virtual considerations adress frienly and threat cyberspace aivities, cyber-enaled capabilities, and the entities that exist in cyberspace. Colectively, these considerations alow commanders and stas to beer converge multi-domain capabilities at echelon with the tempo and intensity necessary to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas from posi tions of taical, operational, and strategic advantage.9Central to the chalenge of evolving the Armys culture is reenaling our division, corps, and theater armies to operate and ght as combat formations. Beginning with a perception in the mid-to-late 1990s of a reduced risk of great power conict and exacer bated by ongoing limited contingency operations, the Army transformed from a division-based to a bri gade-based modular force. As a result, echelons above brigade (EAB) trans formed from highly-capa le warghting formations to headquarters that could be force-tailored with warghting modules to accomplish a variety of missions. Over time, the separate modular com ponents were further opti mized for the prevailing ghtcounterinsurgency and other stability oper ations.10 When coupled with heavy reductions during directed downsiz ing, EAB headquarters Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the commandant of the Command and General Sta College on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds an MS in strategic studies and is a graduate of the Command and General Sta College and the Army War College. He previously served as the commanding general of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and he has de ployed to Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Armored elements from Company A, 1st Baalion, 63rd Armor Regiment Dragons, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, conduct convoy operations 2 May 2018 during Combined Resolve X at Hohenfels Training Area, Bavaria, Germany. (Photo by Spc. Andrew McNeil, U.S. Army)
116 became much less capale of suporting anything more than limited contingency operations. While required at the time, the degradation of echelons above brigade formations and their capabilities signicantly reduced the Armys ability to meet the entirety of its primary functionto execute prompt and sustained land combat to defeat any threat throughout the range of military operations. As we adapt todays EAB headquarters into war ghting formations in doctrine, we also keep an eye on tomorow through future concept work. e U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade, 2025-2045 provides the foundation for the experimentation and develop ment of future EAB capabilities. Informed by the Joint Warghting Assessments, Mission Command Training Program lessons learned, the Multi-Domain Task Force pilot, and numerous bale lab and Army level experi ments, the EAB concept has been continuously rened to identify the most critical doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy requirements for future EAB formations. is concept work has revealed key foundational require ments at each EAB echelon to defeat peer threats during both competition and conict in the future.Future eater ArmiesUniquely-tailored future theate aries maintain endu ing operational initiatie e theater army is unique as it is the only persistent Army echelon for a geographic area of responsibility. As an Army Service component command, al theater armies share the same basic set of theater management tasks distiled to ve primary cate gories: seing conditions in the theater for the employ ment of landpower (seing the theater), Army suport to theater security cooperation, Army suport to other services, administrative control over al Army forces in the area of responsibility, and operational control and sus tainment suport of any assigned or aached Army forc es until the combatant commander aaches those forces to a subordinate joint command.11 To shape the security environment, prevent conict, and, when necessary, prevail in large-scale combat operations in peer-adver sary theaters, theater armies require greater operational warghting organic capabilities. ese capabilities include Soldiers of 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division re an M109A6 Paladin howitzer 21 August 2017 during Exercise Combined Resolve IX at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany. (Photo by Sgt. Mahew Hule, U.S. Army)
117 threat-ecic inteligence, surveilance, and reconnais sance; electronic warfare; air and balistic missile defense; cyberspace, space, information warfare capabilities; and hardened command and control. eater armies enale freedom of movement during transitions from competi tion to armed conict and back. In the future OE, theater armies are central to winning in competition below armed conict and ensuring that Army and coalition forces can operate from distributed and protected posi tions of advantage during armed conict.12Future Field Armiesreat-focused future eld aries provide credile dete rence, execute multi-domain competition against pee threats, and enale a rapid transition to and execution of large-scale ground combat operations (LSGCO). While al theaters require an operational capability, some theaters have adversaries that present enough risk of LSGCO that they require an aditional standing echelon to manage ecic operations within the area of responsibility and then tran sition rapily to a land component command. Historicaly, this has been a eld army commanding two or more corps. A eld army is employed to relieve the operational burden on the theater army when aention to a ecic operation in a subordinate geographic area would detract from the theater armys ability to suport strategic objectives in the theater as a whole. e eld army is forward stationed to account for the higher probability of LSGCO or other vital geopolitical considerations that may require partner assurance. It is required in areas of persistent, intense competition with a peer threat capale of rapily tran sitioning to large-scale land combat. e eld army can serve as the foundation for a joint task force, joint forces land component command, or merge into a standing but underesourcedaliance headquarters. A standing eld army alows rapid transition from competition to conict. e presence of a eld army changes the threats risk calculus and helps prevent conict or sets the con ditions for success in LSGCO where multiple corps are required to defeat a peer enemy.Future Corpse future corps is the lincpin of EAB ersatility and agility. e corps of tomorow must be the most versatile echelon in the Army because no other echelon can. Since future theater armies are tailored to their reective the aters and operational suport of Army missions denes their functions, their versatility is limited. Similarly, a future eld army is sharply focused on succeeding in competition below armed conict against a ecic peer threat within the theater and seing conditions to rapily transition to armed conict as a multi-corps land com ponent command. Meanwhile, future divisions maintain an uncompromising emphasis on readiness for the task of integrating multiple brigade combat teams (BCTs) and enaling formations as a highly-lethal, taical formation to win the close ght during armed conict. is limits some aects of versatility at the division level. e future corps, functioning as the link between the operational and taical levels of war, emerges as the echelon that aords the greatest potential for adaptation in response to the uncertainty of both future threats and the environ ment. is agility mitigates the operational risk naturaly found in warfare when predictions of the future OE frequently fail to match reality. We ant a military, acros the boad, to be unbe lievaly lethal and unbelievaly dominant, so that no nation wi eve caenge the U.S. militaily. Gen. Mark A. Miley13Highly versatile, future Army corps are the U.S. Armys intermediate tactical warfighting formations for large-scale combat, assigned with redundant capabilities and capacities to see and understand, decide, shape, strike rapily, and endure. Concept development, experimentation, and lessons learned demonstrate that the most effective future corps or ganizational design includes assigned military intel ligence, multi-domain reconnaissance and security, fires (artilery and air defense), maneuver suport, space, cyberspace, information warfare, electron ic warfare, sustainment, and aviation formations. These future subordinate formations enale the corps to conduct deep operations physicaly, tempo raly, virtualy, and cognitively and enale subordi nate divisions to dominate the close fight.14 While assigned to the future corps, these capabilities can be task organized to directly suport a subordinate division as the main effort.15Future DivisionsTactically-focused future diisions shape, domi nate, and win the close fight. The divisions role of
118 commanding and sustaining multiple BCTs and enaling formations in tactical operations remains its primary focus and is the crux of the Armys ability to gain and maintain contact and defeat an enemy maneuver force in violent close combat. This requires future Army divisions to sinularly focus on lethal, tactical warfighting; it is the principal tacti cal echelon above brigade. Future Army divisions must have assigned reconnaissance and security, aviation, fires, maneuver enhancement, and sustain ment formations in adition to capale BCTs. When properly force-tailored, postured, and positioned, divisionsalong with other echelons above brigade formationsare a powerful, credile, and devastat ingly lethal deterent to any would-be threat.16ConclusionLarge-scale ground combat is more likely today than at any point since the end of the Cold War. And the risk of great power conict wil likely persist into the distant future. While the last seventeen years of limited contin gency and counterinsurgency operations were necessarily brigade-centric, conict with peer and near-peer threats requires a continued culture shi as wel as the optimi zation of EABs into highly capale divisions, corps, eld armies, and theater armies. ese EAB multi-domain ghting formations, coupled with requisite training, lead er development, and modernization, enale the Army to shape security environments, prevent conict, prevail in large-scale combat, and consolidate gains to make taical success strategicaly enduringtoday and tomorow. Notes 1. Oce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1, accessed 16 August 2018, hps://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 2. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Pub lishing Oce [GPO], 2017), 1-14-15. 3. OSD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 5. 4. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsleer 17-18, Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC, Volume XV: Lessons and Best Practices (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, June 2017). 5. FM 3-0, Operations. 6. Ibid., 1-1. 7. Ibid., 1-14-15. 8. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta, June 2015), 9. 9. Stephen Townsend, Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations: Evolution of an Idea, Modern War Institute at West Point (website), 23 July 2018, accessed 16 August 2018, hps://mwi. usma.edu/accelerating-multi-domain-operations-evolution-idea/. 10. Stuart E. Johnson et al., A Review of the Armys Modular Force Structure (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003). 11. CALL Special Study 18-29, eater Army Insights: U.S. Army Europe Operations as a Joint Force Land Component Command: Lessons and Best Practices (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, June 2018). 12. U.S. Combined Arms Center (CAC), e U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade, 2025: Versatile, Agile, and Lethal (unpub lished dra, 14 August 2018). 13. C. Todd Lopez, Army Condent in Current Capabilities Chief of Sta Says, U.S. Army (website), 16 April 2018, accessed 16 August 2018, hps://www.army.mil/article/203942. 14. CALL Handbook, Deep Operations: Lessons and Best Prac tices (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, March 2018). 15. CAC, e U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade. 16. Ibid.
119 Response to Maj. Paul E. Robertss Reconnaissance beyond the Coordinated Fire Line: Division Warghter Trends( Military Review, JulyAugust 2018)In his recent article, Reconnaissance Beyond the Coordinated Fire Line (CFL), Maj. Paul Roberts advocates the estab lishment of a reconnaissance cel as a means of improving reconnaissance planning and synchronization at the divi sionand corps-levels. While estalishing a reconnaissance cel may improve the staffs ability to plan and integrate reconnaissance, Roberts arti cle glosses over the underlying issue: the Army lacks sufficient ground reconnaissance capability at the divisionand corps-level. Over the last fifteen years, the Army system aticaly dismantled its ground reconnaissance formations. Risk aversion in Iraq and Afghanistan frequently led commanders to rely on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and other air-based plat forms rather than deploying smal ground recon naissance formations as a means of answering their priority inteligence requirements (PIR). Between under-employment in Iraq and Afghanistan and To view this article, please visit hps://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2018/Reconnaissance-beyond-the-Coordinated-Fire-Line-Division-Warght er-Trends/ LETTER TO THE EDITOR
120 the Armys growing obsession with brigade-cen tric, modular formations, several divisionand corps-level reconnaissance formations soon faced the choping lock. In 2005, the Army began divesting itself of divi sion and corps long-range surveilance (LRS) de tachments and companies. ese storied units once deployed elite six-man teams days in advance of their parent division or corps to answer their commands PIR and to drive operations. While some LRS units reaged as pathnder companies in combat aviation brigades or dismounted reconnaissance troops in bat tleeld surveilance brigades, this simply postponed their inevitale fate. e last of these elite reconnais sance units inaivated in 2017. Light, infantry-based units were not the only reconnaissance formations sacriced in the name of modularity. e Army also dismantled several cav alry formations. Division cavalry (DIVCAV) squad rons, lethal combined arms reconnaissance squad rons that once served as the eyes and ears for highly mobile armored and mechanized divisions, met their demise in 2005. In 2011, the cavalry saw its coup de grce as the last armored cavalry regiment (ACR), a formation once capale of organicaly screening, uarding, or covering an entire corps with its le thal assortment of armored vehicles, self-propeled artilery, and rotary-wing aircra, transformed into a run-of-the-mil Stryker brigade combat team. The loss of these reconnaissance formations has left our divisions and corps with a notale capability gap. In a conflict against a near-peer adversary, we wil not enjoy the luxury of uncontested airspace. Our UAS and other airand space-based platforms wil not operate with impunity. Our divisions and corps wil rely heavily on traditional ground re connaissance to answer PIR and drive operations. However, due to the Armys shortsighted divesti ture of reconnaissance formations, these echelons are curently forced to piece together impromptu reconnaissance task forces from their subordinate brigades. These task forces lack the specialized training, organization, and, most importantly, the institutional knowledge and experience required to effectively meet the reconnaissance and security demands of twoand three-star headquarters. If the Army truly wants to eliminate its recon naissance capability gap, it wil take more than creating a reconnaissance cel. Instead, the Army must invest in developing competent reconnais sance units specificaly organized and tasked with suporting divisionand corps-level commanders. This does not require recreating the wheel with a new Reconnaissance and Security brigade combat team. Although the grey beret, SOF-like arow head-shaped patch, and Recon tab undoubted ly proposed for such a unit surely look splendid, there is better solution. We need to bring back LRS, Pathfinders, DIVCAV, and ACRs. The tales of organization and doctrine for these formations are tried and true; we need only pul out the old manuals and low the dust off. More importantly, the knowledge and experience needed to rekinle these formations stil resides throughout the force. By reinvesting in our battle-proven reconnaissance formations, we can eliminate this capability gap in a timely and efficient manner. Maj. Kenneth A. Segelhorst, U.S. Army
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