Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, Army position and does not supersede any information otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazineContact Information Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-142, Fort Benning, GA 31905 Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2017 Volume 106, Number 4 PB 7-17-4BG CHRISTOPHER T. DONAHUE Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School RUSSELL A. ENO Editor MICHELLE J. ROWAN Deputy Editor of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Distribution: Special GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 173420122 REVITALIZE YOUR UNITS MARKSMANSHIP PROGRAM BY FOCUSING ON FUNDAMENTALS, EMPOWERING JUNIOR LEADERS CPT Kevin Bright 1SG Matthew Peeler Joseph M. PisarcikInfantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) regularly produces companies of Infantrymen in which more than FEATURES 26 FUNDAMENTALS, ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP, AND MISSION COMMAND: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF EXECUTING MISSIONS IN DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENTS WHILE MAINTAINING HOME-STATION READINESS COL Kevin D. Admiral CSM Bryan D. Barker CPT Paul D. Erickson CPT Dino C. Buchanan deployment to Afghanistan (May 2016 to February for BCTs in the Army deploying with less than half of its assigned force and being spread throughout an execution of its mission offers pertinent lessons to other BCTs which may face a similar set of challenges Check out the U.S. Army Infantry School website at: http://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/USArmyInfantrySchoolFt. BenningGA/
COMMANDANTS NOTE 1 SETTING THE CONDITIONS BG Christopher T. Donahue INF ANTRY NEWS 2 SQUAD OVERMATCH: TRAINING METHODOLOGY INTEGRATES CLASSROOM, VIRTUAL, AND LIVE TRAINING Mike Casey 6 QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL RELEASES PAVPB CPT Matthew Johnson PROFESSIONAL FORUM 7 ENHANCED VIEW WEBHOSTING: A TACTICALLY RESPONSIBLE IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE TOOL MAJ Jerry V. Drew II 11 REBUILDING A CULTURE OF DEPLOYMENT READINESS BG Jeff Drushal CPT Alex Brubaker 14 MAXIMIZING THE HHC IN SUPPORT OF TF MANEUVER CPT Ryan J. Huntoon 19 AN INFANTRYMAN DOWN UNDER MAJ Russell B. Thomas TRAINING NOTES 38 TF NO FEAR AT JRTC: MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITIES WHILE SUPPORTING A COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ROTATION MAJ Al LeMaire 42 A PLATOON LEADERS REFLECTION ON READINESS 1LT Jason R. Lally 44 SMALL UNITS ABROAD: A MODEL FOR STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT CPT Jon M. Voss LESSONS FROM THE PAST 47 AN INFANTRYMANS JOURNEY WITH A MEDICAL PLATOON Tom Rozman BOOK REVIEWS 49 THE STALINGRAD CAULDRON: INSIDE THE ENCIRCLEMENT AND DESTRUCTION OF THE 6TH ARMY By Frank Ellis Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMC 50 TO BATAAN AND BACK: THE WORLD WAR II DIARY OF MAJOR THOMAS DOOLEY Edited and transcribed by Jerry Cooper with John A. Adams Jr. and Henry C. Dethloff Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon ON THE COVER:Paratroopers assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd 81mm Mortar System during a night Grafenwoehr, Germany. (Photo by SSG Alexander C Henninger)BACK COVER:Soldiers assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africas (CJTFHOA) East African Response Force and practice bounding movements on 1 November 2017 during an exercise in Djibouti, Africa. (Photo by SrA Erin Piazza, USAF) OTHER DEP ARTMENTS Infantry Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, and experiences while deployed. We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. For more information or to submit an article, call (706) 545-2350 or email us at usarmy. email@example.com.
BG CHRISTOPHER T. DONAHUECommandants NoteOur Army confronts a complex array of threats across multiple domains and multiple continents. Russia has learned from its interventions in Syria, Georgia, Ukraine, and it is prioritizing the synchronization of cyber, deception, and information operations to confuse and overwhelm its opponents. China is improving its antiNorth Korea has a robust amount of artillery aimed at Seoul, along with special forces, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) capabilities, and an expanding arsenal that could caliphate, we continue to confront serious threats in Syria, this period of protracted competition oriented against multiple adversaries, a major war could unfold with little to no notice. Army forces continue to be engaged in ongoing combat missions, as well as operations to deter adversaries and against any enemy in a multi-domain environment now and in the future. We will accomplish this through multiple initiatives. First, with regard to leadership and education, we are We are also analyzing methods to ensure we produce the Station Unit Training (OSUT). Combat Study, we are providing the necessary input to ensure physically dominant, and that are trained in the basics to master any environment and can close with and destroy any threat. The subterranean operating environment represents a Army for the development of doctrine, a rigorous training plan, win in this very complex environment. Regarding the health a whole, we acknowledge the multitude of manning demands on the force. We are seeking to meet these disruption to the force to the greatest extent possible and highlighting to the leadership how we are mitigating risk. We are also ensuring continuity in key initiatives including marksmanship and the Russian New Generation Warfare ensure they fully understand the results of the study, and with units that are forward deployed in sustained competition with potential adversaries. We are incorporating video respective regions. There is no magic elixir to guarantee success in a multidomain environment it will take leadership, training, education, and rigorous, holistic preparation for combat. The combat force for our nation, always ready to close with and As always, we welcome and encourage your input and collaboration to make our branch even better. Setting the ConditionsOctober-December 2017 INFANTRY 1
2 INFANTRY October-December 2017MIKE CASEY Training Methodology Integrates Classroom, Virtual, and Live TrainingThe air horn blares to signal the start of training. A sergeant shouts, Lock and load. The bolts of 10 M4s click. And the squad moves out. It seems like a typical start to a training exercise, but this one was Division took part in a special exercise Overmatch. methodology that integrates classroom teaching, virtual training, and live exercises to improve resilience, medical skills, advanced situational awareness, and after action reviews (AARs). It stemmed from the Armys with the stresses from combat and multiple deployments. In 2013, the Program Executive the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and other organizations fourth such event at Army and Marine Corps locations. Overmatch had to win over two doubters the NCO and Their misgivings were understandable, particularly the squads successful completion of their missions. When we started, we could see how much they were works. They came together and performed as an expert team, In the Classroom Photos by Mike Casey used information from the role players to conduct patrols as part of a Squad Overmatch training
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 3 PowerPoint slides, training scenario outlines, and other resources to help them become expert instructors. to learn the instruction process. I liked the various portals that allowed you to get additional information, she said. One of the videos showed how another instructor had taught the course. ID instructors used their own experiences in their lectures. In preparing to teach the resilience course, Matthews learned personal encouragement to manage stress. that the weekend before the course started, she was in the With some training, you wonder: Am I ever going to use this? she said. Well, I did use this training. program marked a change from previous exercises when said. We want to pass on the knowledge to a unit so they PowerPoints and videos, but it also included hands-on training. mannequin that simulates blood loss. To stop the bleeding, combat medical care training. In the past, I put a tourniquet on battle buddies, but you cant tighten it enough as you would have to to stop the bleeding because it hurts them, she said. Todays training was more realistic. Virtual Team Building specialties and the other composed of sappers from three gaming program that gave the squads the opportunity to practice for their live missions. leader, looked at a computer screen map for the upcoming mission and selected a casualty collection point. A medic didnt provide much cover. Nelson asked, Where should it The two team leaders in the squad swiftly arranged their teams. Whats your weak side? one team leader asked the other. Right. During the virtual exercises, it took less than 30 minutes for through headsets. The virtual training followed scenarios similar to the upcoming live exercises. The squads went to had information about insurgents terrorizing the town. Other also had avatars in the virtual world. During virtual training, the squad initially had problems coordinating maneuvers. One team was too far from the other team to provide support during a sniper attack. Following that misstep, the squad encountered the same problem. Nelson
INFANTRY NEWS 4 INFANTRY October-December 2017halted the training. In an instant, the squad members avatars returned to the starting point and this time moved out in proper order. The quick reset shows one of the strengths of virtual training. When things go wrong, its easy to begin again as opposed to a time-consuming restart in a live exercise. learned in the classroom such as calling in a 9-line medical evacuation request or recognizing anomalies while on patrol. Most important of all, the virtual training started turning a It helped us correct shortfalls in leadership and communication, Nelson said. It helped us determine our roles and responsibilities. Live TrainingAfter two days in the classroom and the virtual world, the the villages market square, multi-story buildings, and shattered church. tending their stalls to serve food and sell trinkets. One information about the insurgents. After meeting with the priest, the squad members acted on the intelligence and continued their patrols. In all, there were three training scenarios, and all of them could have resulted in a very bad day for an infantry squad. explosive devices (IEDs), snipers, and suicide bombers. casualties and role players shriller screams. i ncreased. As a medic, it was more real than I expected, and it she said. It felt real, said Nelson who has the role players performances raised the exercises authenticity. The realistic performances Michael Phillips taught the advanced situational awareness portion of the course and spent a week preparing the role players. In the classroom, he instructed dangers. Phillips coached the role site meshed with the classroom instruction. The exercise also sparked spontaneous training. After orders, practiced again, and again. training. he said. They recognized a need to do additional training, and they were proactive. in the classroom, virtual environment, and live exercise produced improvements in the squads resilience, team awareness, and AARs. the entire training, they were able to connect the dots. And the improvements showed up in the AARs.AARsAfter each mission, the squads participated in an AAR with the instructors asking open-ended questions to help the them. casualty card said he could treat himself, but one of his had been taught in the classroom. An instructor asked the of him providing assistance when it wasnt necessary. It
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 5 sniper. happened and learn why it happened. Now were asking these questions: What was your questions, we saw improvement happen in the team. Not only faster. 25th ID Reaction said he anticipates conducting similar training with other unit members. for operations, was impressed with what he saw. Today, I witnessed the advancement and growth of a squad as they negotiated multiple live-training scenarios across a multitude of warrior skills, he said. These are exactly the skillsets we need to improve readiness and unit cohesion within todays complex environment. training with live training exercises focused on developing physiological, cognitive, and leadership skills to improve readiness across squads and platoons. building, advanced situational awareness, and the conduct of AARs and tactical combat casualty care. that contains the course outlines, scenarios, role players descriptions, and other training materials. performing teams. It also develops leadership skills for the NCO meets collective and individual skill requirements, said Rob program manager. Wolf said his team is continuing to make improvements to the program and will focus on enhancing the resilience skills in 2018 by working with the Army Resiliency Directorate and Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Overmatch training can contact Wolf at (407) 384( Mike Casey serves as KS.) Soldiers played the roles of
INFANTRY NEWS 6 INFANTRY October-December 2017Quartermaster School Releases PAVPBI Logistics Training Department began work on an initiative a computer-based training resource that promotes property accountability and improves Army readiness. Army leaders have the responsibility to achieve/sustain equipment and Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss (FLIPLs) derived from inventories indicate that the Army is attacking the problem, but that challenges remain with organizations to design and develop an interactive training accountability across the Army. resource that is designed to teach users about property accountability by demonstrating the proper way to conduct a change-of-command inventory. The target audience for commanders to sub-hand receipt holders. inventory to demonstrate proper property accountability techniques because it is one of the most important types of inventories conducted at the tactical level. It is the one time that a company commander will be fully dedicated to property accountability for all the equipment in their unit. The changeof-command inventory is also the baseline inventory from which quarterly, cyclic, and sensitive item inventories are and processes that are encountered during the pre-inventory, inventory, and post-inventory phases of a change-ofcommand inventory. of-command process and work to help ensure property accountability. With the Armys transition from the Property help to familiarize the user with the new terminology inherent and procedures and best practices that have been collected link users to valuable property accountability and Command to assist all who have responsibility for property across the Army. https:// benningnews.org/2017/08/07/the-property-accountabilityvirtual-playbook/. ) 1. http://www.cascom.army.mil/pavpb/pavpb.zip 2. The following options will appear: 3. 4. Once the download is complete, close the current window and 5. Windows 10 Once you have double-click the .zip folder and select Note: with a check mark (it should be by default). Windows 7 Once you have located the select open with -->Windows Explorer. Then choose Extract All and again select a Note: Ensure is engaged with a check mark (it should be by default). 6. click to open. Right click on the with Firefox. Note: Firefox Directions to Download and Run PAVPB
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 7Since the turn of the 21st century, satellite imagery has become increasingly available to the tactical user. Originally the product of highly classified photo-reconnaissance satellites, the advent of the commercial imagery industry combined with improved data distribution technologies has made imagery that was once only available to strategic customers a ready tool for companies and platoons. While an Army unit may request imagery from national satellites, the likelihood that a tactical unit will receive On the opposite end of the spectrum of availability, webbased imagery sources like Google Earth are readily available web-based imagery may be multiple years old. Second, their utilization depends upon access to the internet at the time of need, a capability that may not be available in future operating environments. middle-of-the-road alternative to formal imagery collection through intelligence channels and informal collection at the Soldier level. Unlike many government sources, the imagery to all federal employees. Unlike much website imagery, EV Webhosting allows users to download current products and to perform basic operations within common geospatial intelligence software packages. In short, EV WebHosting provides a valuable tool to supplement a tactical units imagery needs.A Very Brief History of Satellite ImageryTo understand the way that satellite imagery enables the development of space-based imagery intelligence (IMINT). imagery satellites were born out of Cold War fears of Soviet his security advisors feared that the U.S. trailed the USSR in long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles weapons.1 Conventional intelligence collection, including the limited intelligence of the border regions but almost nothing about the hinterland.2 umbrella referred to as Keyhole.3 Corona consisted of a series the atmosphere and parachuted toward a patrolling aircraft, which caught (or attempted to catch) the canisters mid-air. the missile and bomber gaps were nonexistent. 4The imagery from Corona was neither timely nor intended for tactical use. The high cost of the system, advanced technology, select people within the federal government had access to products that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced image was taken to the time it could be interpreted was days to weeks slow by todays standards but adequate for its mission of assessing the bomber and missile capabilities. In the days before digital information, sharing the imagery required distribution procedures. Thus, while Corona ultimately was Enhanced View Webhosting:A Tactically Responsible Imagery Intelligence ToolMAJ JERRY V. DREW II Figure 1 Artists Rendering of the Internal Workings of a Corona Spacecraft 5
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 8 INFANTRY October-December 2017 resolution to be tactically useful the images were not used for tactical purposes.6Between the first successful Corona mission in 1960 satellite in 1999, technology had advanced greatly, hinting at the possibility of wider access to satellite imagery for the tactical community.7 the collection process but also greatly extended the useful life of a satellite. A digital imagery satellite may last for a decade or more whereas the Corona satellites were useless after a of imagery no longer depended on hard-copy photographs. communications satellites, and the expansion of the internet provided new means of transmitting large amounts of data. the earth at resolutions approaching what had previously only been available from tightly controlled intelligence community satellites (ground sample distances of less than one meter), and the information was becoming available to an unprecedented number of users. With large amounts of data and the infrastructure to distribute it, it was only a matter of time before someone assembled the available imagery into a user-friendly, webbased format. The original satellite imagery service website belonged to the Keyhole Corporation of Mountain View, CA, 2004, Google acquired the company and renamed it Google Earth.8 Google Earth format based on Keyholes work remains the most widely used. The capability of Google Earth has overlays, information sharing, and even intelligence analysis. While tools like Google Earth are incredibly useful for many applications, the dependence of tactical users on such imagery may be three or more years old. In Googles case, the company advertises that most of the images are about one to three years old.9 Using imagery for tactical planning that does not accurately reflect the current operational environment can render the plans useless and possibly quite dangerous. Second, and perhaps more importantly, reliance on web-based imagery presumes internet access, a capability an enemy capable of denying, degrading, or destroying a source of satellite imagery that is current, tactically useful, and storable. Current Imagery Practices and the Case for DecentralizationImagine this: an infantry battalion is deployed in support of a humanitarian response mission and needs high-resolution imagery to plan its operations. The designated member of the in a direct request to a dedicated imaging satellite, which captures the imagery and begins downlinking it to a nearby ground terminal. The imagery to begin planning is available within minutes. based collection assets are not so responsive. As mentioned in the overview of Corona, satellites have historically existed as strategic-level assets, and as such, the priority of collection targets remains a matter of great concern. The Armys standard imagery collection process requires that all imagery requests funnel to the unit collection manager. In a division, the collection manager resides within the intelligence section (G2). Any unit may request imagery from a national-level satellite, but even if the request is high enough on the priority list, the image itself may not be sharable with combat Soldiers, coalition partners, Realizing the need for a decentralized approach to obtaining Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) fielded specialized commercial exploitation teams (CETs) later renamed commercial imagery teams (CITs) throughout Bahrain and consisted of six people with expertise in spacebased capabilities, geospatial intelligence, and network communications. While these teams, like collection managers at higher echelons, maintained the capability to request imagery from national assets, they specialized in obtaining commercial imagery and exporting it via a variety of means, including hard copy, email, external hard drives, or the Global Broadcast Service (GBS). In this way, CITs provided a service that freed the customers organic intelligence analysts and supported ad hoc requests from Soldiers and units even units outside of Central Command (CENTCOM) sidestepping the more hierarchical imagery collection process. Despite the teams value-added products and regular training missions to assist coalition forces in their use of commercial imagery, their existence was relatively unknown by the Army at-large. Regardless, the CIT kept steadily busy until the transfer of their mission to a Continental U.S. (CONUS) reach-back node within the SMDC G2. To augment the commercial imagery capability available to the force, Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) provide limited commercial imagery services and the ability to reach back to SMDC. exercises and deployments. Using imagery for tactical planning that does environment can render the plans useless and possibly quite dangerous.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 9While the hierarchical imagery request process and the less formal CIT imagery request process were available, role since 2004 because they are readily available and sharable with everyone. As mentioned, however, such web-based services have their limitations. In an attempt to with the CITs, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) began sponsoring web-based archives for commercial satellite imagery companies. Early interfaces were not user Longmont, CO, combines a timely, high-quality, commercial imagery database that is user-friendly and allows for imagery download, sidestepping the requirement for continuous internet connectivity.EV WebHosting tool for accessing satellite imagery that allows users to obtain current imagery and perform basic operations that a tactical user may require. Among the most important functions provided in EV WebHosting are the ability to create graphics and export the data to other devices or software suites such as Google Earth or ArcGis, the common software suite of allows for the comparison of multiple images of the same area over a period of time to assess any changes. The EV WebHosting user interface is intuitive enough that anyone can make use of the system with a minimal time investment but also expansive enough that more advanced users (for example, intelligence analysts and geospatial intelligence engineers) can use it for their purposes. All of the imagery within the system is commercially of the system exists to allow for the addition of graphics https://rdog. digitalglobe.nga.mil/myDigitalGlobe and on the secret internet https://evwhs.nga.smil. mil linked to the sites homepage, and customer support via email or telephone. is accessible either via common access card (CAC) or via a username and password established during initial account setup. It is important to note that although National Guard Soldiers cannot access the website unless federalized, the Nextview End User License Agreement, the agreement between DigitalGlobe and the NGA that governs the use of EV WebHostings products, states that federal users may share the data with state governments, local governments, foreign governments and inter-governmental organizations, [nonFigure 2 A One-Page Annotated Help Guide Produced by DigitalGlobe
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 10 INFANTRY October-December 2017MAJ Jerry V. Drew II is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies Detachment, 1st Space Company, 1st Space Battalion, 1st Space Brigade, Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar; deputy team leader of Army Space Support Team 6, 2nd Space Company, 1st Space Battalion, 1st Space Brigade, Colorado Springs, CO; and Headquarters Company executive a bachelors degree in art, philosophy, and literature. He has also earned a master of business administration from Webster University, a master of science in astronautical engineering from words, the imagery is intended for widest dissemination, and any authorized user may distribute it at his or her discretion. or deployment when the internet connectivity is still robust, EV WebHosting allows a unit to create its own set of baseline commercial imagery, which can be stored and updated as the mission requires or allows. A useful feature of a region of interest has changed.10 It is worth noting that Google Earths 11 In this way, a Soldier in a company intelligence support team (COIST) or battalion S2 does not need to continuously troll for updated imagery; the system will notify the user. The need for commercial satellite imagery has never been greater, nor success greatly increase, however, when the imagery being used is highquality, current, and easily accessible by the intended users. While the formal intelligence collection process and Google Earth remain powerful tools that are still useful for many applications, as a system for acquiring satellite imagery for tactical purposes, EV WebHosting meets the criteria of being timely, high-quality, sharable, and downloadable. It is therefore a internet.Notes1 History, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, Chantilly, VA, 2011, 9.2 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests3 Berkowitz, 11.4 William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (NY: Modern Library, 1999), 321. http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/corona/imagery.html. 6 Berkowitz, 11.7 See, for example, DigitalGlobe, IKONOS Data Sheet. Accessed 14 April 2016 from .8 Google Acquires Keyhole, Digital-Mapping Software Used by CNN in Iraq War, Wall Street Journal http://www. .9 Google, Maps Imagery Updates. Accessed 14 April 2016 from https://support. 10 DigitalGlobe, My DigitalGlobe with EnhancedView Web Hosting Service https://evwhs.digitalglobe.com/ myDigitalGlobe/login.11 https:// followyourworld.appspot.com. This newsletter consists of 10 chapters focusing on fundamental skills designed to communicate doctrinal solutions to the persistent observations from the National Training Center. The goal is to better prepare brigade combat teams to decisively win the http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/ New Releases from Center for Army Lessons Learned NO. 17-19 AUG 2017 NO. 17-19 TEN FUNDAMENTAL BCT SKILLS REQUIRED TO WIN THE FIRST FIGHT AUG 2017 This bulletin is intended to provide senior Army leaders a concise understanding of knowledge management (KM) and what they can do to improve important organizational processes (e.g., the military decision-making process and operations process). http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 11Rebuilding a Culture of Deployment ReadinessBG JEFF DRUSHAL CPT ALEX BRUBAKERF 1 Atrophied Deployment Skills
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 12 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Six Solutions to Emphasize Deployment Readiness Deployment Narrative Army Policy Adjustments Commanders Actions Collective Training The spectrum of potential missions including direct action, deterrence, security force assistance, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief all have one common thread: the ability to rapidly alert, assemble, and deploy to any known point on the globe. The Army must world. The time to start rebuilding our culture of deployment readiness is now.
CPT Alex Brubaker Build Individual Expertise 2 Army Deployment Rehearsal Conclusion Notes1 Breaking Defense October 2017 from sh.2 An 82nd Airborne Division paratrooper rigs a vehicle during a deployment readiness exercise at Fort Bragg, NC, on 25 July 2017. October-December 2017 INFANTRY 13
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 14 INFANTRY October-December 2017On a moonless, cold night at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, a battalion task force (TF) raced across the Mojave Desert through the Whale Gap towards its assigned mission. The battalions headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) was within doctrinal supporting range and was poised to fully support that mission. The TF ultimately achieved its objectives, but it was a close-run thing. The HHC manned and equipped to maximize assigned and attached combat enablers never received the clear orders that would have assured TF victory. In that imperfect planning vacuum, the leadership of the HHC took the initiative and executed a creative and nested concept of support. If the HHC had received more clarity of purpose and detail in the TF orders, the battalion would have achieved a clear and synchronized victory instead of a close one. We have seen this outcome repeated several times during training rotations here at the NTC; outstanding leaders at all levels are not fully providing the opportunity for their infantry, Stryker, and armored battalion TFs to fully employ the key capabilities of the HHC. There are ways to do this better in training which will have a positive result in combat. In this employed, how it is often utilized in training rotations, and then propose ways to improve its performance during that training to improve the readiness our force needs to best deliver on The HHC is often underutilized in infantry, armored, and decisive action environment. The HHCs roles, responsibilities, and mission sets may not always be maximized to support the battalions training mission for several reasons. These may include that the HHCs role was minimized through the orders process during a rotation at NTC or that there was a misunderstanding of the full combat power of its commonly and best employ the enabling combat power of the largest company in the battalion. For example, the HHCs role in the its battalion a maximum tactical advantage and strengthen its as a fourth maneuver commander. The HHC commander can also marshal the companys assets and enablers to best allow enablers such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachments, are often allocated to the battalion without an assigned headquarters to command them. The HHC command team is the right headquarters to take on that task. The HHC commander is the senior leader solution to command and control that the battalion does not have time to create. Army doctrine should be rewritten Maximizing the HHC in Support of TF ManeuverCPT RYAN J. HUNTOON Photos courtesy of authorAn HHC commander provides the tactical task and purpose to his Soldiers while at NTC.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 15Current Doctrine on the HHCs RoleCurrent doctrine has the HHC commander used as the mission command conduit for the battalion trains. The HHC should provide direct interface and mentorship between the battalion trains operations and battalion command posts (CPs).1 forward support company (FSC) command teams operating the HHC must see itself as a battalion asset, not as a traditional company. In general, the HHC must evolve from an outdated doctrinal position in the battalion trains and lead in the tactical can relieve the weight of the complex tasks with leadership and mission command of battalion specialty team enablers, attachments, and the battalion reserve. The arrival of the FSC in maneuver, security, or mission command-oriented roles, and also lead local area, helicopter landing zone, and route Applications of current Stryker and combined arms doctrine to visiting rotational unit observations at NTC does not always in its direct support of the battalion TF mission. The HHC commander is a maneuver leader and belongs responsibilities, and mission of the HHC and headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) in general terms. Those roles are logistics-focused, less leader intensive, and limit the mobility Combined arms battalion (CAB) doctrine describes the role of the HHC as to provide reconnaissance, sniper, mortar, communication, supply, administration, and medical support for battalion.2 This reference limits the command team to be centralized around the company trains command post (CTCP); it states that the HHC commander has the responsibility of the CTCP and is assisted by the battalion logistics staff officer (S4).3 This reference does note that the primary function of the FSC is to execute battalion sustainment. It states, The FSC in direct support of the CAB provides most sustainment to the battalion.4 Stryker doctrine is almost roles and responsibilities of the HHC.5 There are historical reasons why the doctrine recommends that the HHC commander be positioned at the CTCP. Prior to the FSCs creation, the HHC was wholly responsible for the battalion concept of support and its HHC should not have to position itself permanently at the CTCP or brigade support area (BSA) and be wholly accountable for sustainment coordination. The Problem with HHC Being Tied to Battalion Sustainment What is the major risk with giving the HHC commander too much of a logistical support role? Without established roles and responsibilities, there may be confusion, dangerous assumptions, and failure to complete tactical requirements. If the HHC does what the previously described doctrine states, it usually will become wholly sustainment focused a common occurrence during some NTC rotations. The HHC command team then maximizes its time and energy synchronizing rotations where HHC commanders committed most of their energy to maintaining a 24-hour focus on logistical support operations. Their time was occupied with understanding the CTCPs capabilities and working with the FSC to determine logistical requirements (originating from reporting tools such as expenditure reports and combat slants), shortfalls to support the forward line, and what their mitigation was (managing resources of transportation assets, class of supply distribution, etc.). These tasks derive from a battalion concept of support, one charged naturally to the FSC. During one recent rotation, the HHC led the logistical sustainment mission as part of its oversight of the battalion trains. The FSC commander was positioned at the BSA during the rotation and separated from his company, which then staged out of the CTCP under direct leadership of the HHC commander. Other key logistics planners directly involved with battalion sustainment the S1 and S4 operated from the battalion main CP. Ammunition expenditures were coordinated and synchronized with next available assets A combat trains command post moves into a new position during an NTC rotation at Fort Irwin, CA.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 16 INFANTRY October-December 2017to support the line companies prior to an upcoming battalion defensive operation. A critical, no-fail request for Javelins and AT4s to replenish company combat power was expedited on the next logistics package (LOGPAC). The S4 submitted the requirement to the CTCP via FM and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). The requirement was delayed at the BSA when sent to higher because there were no expenditure reports, a problem that could have been solved early on in the request process with a better system. Each key leader involved the S4, HHC commander, and FSC commander assumed others were accountable to follow up, remedy the issue, and complete the requirement. Is the HHC commander responsible for ensuring assets and resources are allocated to the units? Is it the FSC commander? Or is it the S4 or distribution platoon leader? Once expenditure reports were submitted, the BSA could not support the AT4 and Javelin requests in time, and it took commander involvement to ensure the ammunition was prioritized and the resupply mission completed. Ultimately, the ammunition ended up arriving at the logistical resupply points (LRPs) too late for the companies no later than (NLT) defend time. The failure of timely logistics contributed to their depleted available combat power to support the battalion defensive operation. What is the lesson? When everyone assumes someone else is responsible due to no clear task delineation, no one is accountable. This is apparent in the multiple chains of command the logistical requirements went through and the failed accountability and leader checks at each point. Battalion commanders need to clearly delineate these roles and responsibilities to ensure proper sustainment. The doctrine should be rewritten to give the sustainment mission solely back to the FSC. Otherwise, the HHC will overlap in duties and responsibilities and can create mission failure in logistics.Get the HHC Commander into the FightHHC commanders often have additional tactical experience, maturity, and judgment. They can assist in synchronizing these leaders can take on these elements within the battalion trains. This will release the HHC command team to get into the to direct those positions. Stryker doctrine describes this mentorship as providing direct interface of mission command of the battalion trains and their logistical, medical, and support operations.6 must understand not only the breadth of his authority and responsibility, but also his relationship with, and the role and function of, every leader with whom he interacts.7The HHC commander instinctively takes the role as a where his personnel are and it is what doctrine tells him to do: operate at the CTCP (CAB doctrine) or back at the BSA (Stryker doctrine). For example, CAB doctrine describes the purpose of leadership across the battalion trains; it states that HHC and FSC commanders provide the CAB commander with a degree of command oversight for the battalion trains. A technique for responsibility.8 The overall purpose is to ensure there is senior company-grade leadership at each battalion trains CP and accountability rearward while the battalion commander focuses relies on accountable leaders to provide tactical judgment and direct interface of his guidance rearward to synchronize the role and responsibility and delegated leadership of CP footprints The HHC commander executes the original doctrinal role of direct interface a main conduit of mission command for leaders of the battalion trains. With tactical-level experience and operational understanding, the HHC commander can translate battalion trains leaders. They can then understand it, relay and report, and then adopt the responsibility of direct interface. HHC commander can assess how well mentees report friction to circulate between all mission CPs and develop the right the tactical command post (TAC). For security, as outlined in
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 17CAB survivability, supported by oversight on each nodes security posture, gaps, site selection and use of terrain, and overall contingency and displacement readiness.9 This will allow the CTCP to act as the reserve CP, too. For operations at the CTCP, the HHC commander can mentor the S4 into running the CTCP as he is accountable to report on combat power. The from this footprint. This command and control enables FSC key leaders its most senior logisticians to work freely across the BSA, CTCP, tactical operations center (TOC), TAC, and forward line of own troops (FLOT). During NTC rotations, the HHC commander has been the catalyst to reinforce relationships between sustainment leaders (such as the S4 and the FSC) when confusion develops over roles and responsibilities or miscommunication delays sustainment operations. In other observations, the HHC commander has advised the MEDO on use of terrain, time, space-distance analysis, golden-hour criteria, and security fundamentals to help the MEDO best coaching of those players enables them to get involved in them to operate with tactical perspective and translated junior leader levels. The HHC commanders direct leadership and mentorship across the battalion trains combined with delegating leadership of these elements to the S1, S4, HHC Goal: HHC Commander as Additional Maneuver CommanderHaving the HHC commander as an additional maneuver commander will help reduce tactical weight on the battalion mission. Through strengthened leadership, the HHC commander is freed to support the battalion tactically as an additional maneuver commander. In this capacity, the HHC can reduce the weight of tactical tasks and enablers/attachments that often overwhelm line companies. The HHC commander and 1SG can maneuver the battalion reserve forward at the battalion commanders call. They can also maneuver battalion assets and emergency resupply forward logistics elements (FLEs). Once the battalions tactical tasks have been determined during the military decision-making process (MDMP), the HHC headquarters section can take much of those enabler tasks, to include PSYOP, CA, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and any battalion attachments assigned for the operation. During multiple NTC rotations, the HHC commander was assigned combat power of a section of M1s and a dismounted squad to provide outer cordon security while CA and PSYOP teams were safely injected into the village to conduct their key leader engagement (KLE). In two other rotations, HHC commanders mission-commanded deception TOCs. The TOCs included PSYOP and CA trucks, tents, antennas, and other vehicles in addition to brigade CP node team communications equipment to appear as a mission command node. The TOCs were positioned near a main supply route to be in minimal view for the opposing force (OPFOR) to identify but not obvious enough in an unconcealed or covered environment. The deception TOCs successfully drew and separated OPFOR from the main attack body which had been directed at company defensive positions. Moreover, the HHC commander can also provide the enabler teams a voice during the MDMP process to make sure they get used. Most enabler teams are led by junior company-grade leaders who may have trouble communicating how they are added value in the mission and how they are synchronized The HHC commander can help to translate that guidance to the enabler team leadership. During an NTC rotation, an HHC commander mission-commanded a deception tactical operations center.
The HHC commander can also lead a reinforced reconnaissance platoon combined with any array of infantry or armor to support it. The platoons purpose can be to operate in an intermediate security zone and handle tactical tasks in lieu of a supporting brigade cavalry squadron in the area of operations. who had not previously worked with the recon platoon. The HHC commander is the ideal leader for this mission as he has spent the most time with the reconnaissance platoon supporting their training readiness in garrison. An example of the HHC handling all local outer security, the battalion reserve element, helicopter landing zone and its local security, and passenger screening of evacuated personnel during a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). This enables companies to focus on their primary tactical tasks without becoming overwhelmed with additional assets that the battalion allocates to them before or during their mission.Integrate the HHC Early On to Get It into the Fight placement of their teams during the mission? One way is to position them left of the planning timeline, ideally during the course of action (COA) development step of the MDMP. By then, mission analysis is complete and the headquarters enabling tasks, and those tasks and/or attachments are then ready to be assigned to company headquarters. During COA development, HHC/HHT commanders can redirect enablers and attachments under their headquarters section.The Importance of HHC Command Team SelectionThese recommended roles for the HHC are connected to HHC company-grade leader selection. That selection in garrison is based on criteria of tactical experience, judgment, and 1SGs are almost always prior line company command teams. They are picked on their ability to lead and synchronize scouts, and mortar platoons in garrison. They are charged with leading several mission essential task list training pathways and ensuring combat readiness. In short, selection of HHC commanders should be carefully considered since they are called to manage the most complexity in competing training interests of all company commands. That same experience, maturity, and judgment can be applied in the planning and execution of the battalion mission in combat training. Problems arise due to the absence of battalion TF guidance for the HHC prior to planning and execution. As a result, an HHC command section may adopt a less leader-intensive role across the value to the battalion. The HHC command team should evolve and adapt its roles and responsibilities from the garrison to the combat environment not take the garrison duties with it. Deliberately manned and equipped to best support the TF mission, the HHC is often an untapped battalion asset for key supporting roles. The HHC commander should be placed trains. This commander can become a fourth maneuver commander to mobilize, deploy, and lead key battalion enablers and attachments in support of the mission and to reduce tactical task weight from the line companies The HHC commander is able to leave an outdated doctrinal role and move to support the teams operating throughout the battalion trains. He can also grade levels forward, and delineate roles and responsibilities throughout the battalion CP nodes. The HHC commander is the right person to maneuver additional combat power and combat enablers in support of the battalion, has the maturity and command experience to manage multiple non-standard As warfare progressively becomes more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, the need for more specialized supporting mission sets grows. We require all our leaders to be able to operate jointly with other branches of service and allied formations with little time to adapt. The HHC commander is the best leader who can quickly harness those capabilities and employ them into the battalion TF maneuver plan and ensure its overall success.Notes1 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.21, SBCT Infantry Battalion (March 2016), 7-28.2 ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (February 2016), 1-59.3 Ibid.4 Ibid. 5 ATP 3-21.21, 1-58. 6 Ibid, 7-28. 7 ATP 3-90.5, 1-62. 8 Ibid, 7-21.9 Ibid, 2-26-37. CPT Ryan J. Huntoon currently serves as an observer-coach-trainer with Scorpion Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. His previous assignments include serving as commander of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; rear detachment battalion commander of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum; support platoon leader, Regimental Special Troops Battalion (RSTB), 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, GA; and assistant S4, RSTB, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning. CPT Huntoon has completed three deployments to Afghanistan. He earned a bachelors degree in political science from the University of Washington. PROFESSIONAL FORUM 18 INFANTRY October-December 2017 The HHC commander is the right person to maneuver additional combat power and combat enablers as a battalion asset in support of the battalion, has the maturity and command experience to manage multiple non-standard capabilities and time, and is able to effectively when required by the TF.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 19Conducting military engagements with partners, fostering mutual understanding though military-to-military contacts, and helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the nation relationships before they are needed. It must be a reliable, consistent, and respectful partner to others. Field Manual (FM) 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation1The U.S. Army and Australian Army Military Personnel Exchange Program is one that has remained reliable, consistent, and continued to cultivate positive relations Agreement, Australian Treaty Series 1963 No. 10. The treatys 2The agreement stands today and is the authority by which guidance and policy with respect to security cooperation, Security cooperation with the United States and other Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance partner nations build their own security capacity.3 The document 1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges; 3. Promote universal values, such as good governance; and agreements and organizations. While military personnel exchanges are considered security cooperation versus security assistance, personnel exchanges with partner nations achieve these aims. security cooperation, writing that the U.S. Army must engage themselves.4 Other U.S. Army policy and directives that Cooperation Handbook, operations, and others. is exceptional at achieving our national security cooperation properly placed exchange personnel have the ability to goals at a low cost to the nation since it requires no additional the mutual trust and respect between the U.S. and Australian Army.An Infantryman Down UnderMAJ RUSSELL B. THOMAS MAJ John Taylor, MAJ Russell B. Thomas, and CAPT Cameron Clarke participate in Anzac Day Ceremonies in Singleton, NSW Australia.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 20 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Reconnaissance Team, Sniper Team, Pioneer Team, Direct conducting courses throughout the year based on a directedAustralian Army. At the school, the Specialist Wing instructs home battalion. platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must attend this course. A parallel course does exist in the U.S. the Reconnaissance The Sniper Team provides training to the RAR via the gaining experience as a sniper in a battalion, they then receive long-range precision engagements and advanced sniping Australian MAP is very similar to the U.S. military decisionand in the other Specialist Wing courses, the soldiers depart in every reconnaissance and surveillance platoon. Thus, the The Assault Pioneer Platoon is an organization with no true parallel in the U.S. Army. Australian Assault Pioneers most closely resemble a U.S. engineering sapper platoon, but the has an Assault Pioneer Platoon that specializes in engineering similar to what are used in the U.S., the Australian Army uses at their battalions and then become experts at while at the The tactical courses in the Specialist Wing are very similar to that can arise when partnered with other nations where there The newest addition to the Specialist Wing at the School techniques and enhancing doctrine to increase the lethality addition to the wing. and conducting military-to-military engagement on a daily
MAJ Russell B. Thomas Military Academy at West Point, NY. At a time when the Australian Army is considering incorporation a critical command role, but the assignment is also extremely the armys headquarters down to the tactical battalion level. Assault Pioneers, is very advantageous and has broadened mutual respect between the Australian and American armies is evident to all Soldiers assigned to the school and every soldier who completes a course there. This bilateral respect permeates throughout the Australian Army and cultivates positive relationships that are required between our two partner nations. Every exchange member within Australia and other United States and Australia will continue to provide mutually Notes1 2 Australian Treaty Series 1963 No. 10, accessed 2 March 2017.3 Presidential Policy Directive 23, 4 Win, accessed 2 March 2017. DA PAM 11-31, Australian Defence Force machine gunners with 7th Battalion, Australian Army, demonstrate the MAG 58 machine guns ability to aim at an enemy target in Shoalwater Bay Training Area during Talisman Sabre 2011 in Queensland, Australia on 9 July 2011.October-December 2017 INFANTRY 21
22 INFANTRY October-December 2017Revitalize Your Units Marksmanship Program by Focusing on Fundamentals, Empowering Junior LeadersCPT KEVIN BRIGHT 1SG MATTHEW PEELER JOSEPH M. PISARCIK
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 23 CPT KEVIN BRIGHT 1SG MATTHEW PEELER JOSEPH M. PISARCIK Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) regularly produces companies of Infantrymen in which more than 80 percent of the formation scores sharpshooter or better most stable platform is the ground the further away from reset (or follow through) is deliberately returning the trigger to a common issue especially with Soldiers who are cross the target instead of the clear cutting edge of the front sight arise when Soldiers do not correctly identify the range to the to demonstrate they understand what a proper sight picture
24 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Infantrymen proper sight picture and sight alignment is the the Soldier can see where the target was in relation to his Improper breathing is usually caused by Soldiers trying to techniques that focus on fundamentals of in order to empower their junior leaders to conduct The EST is immobile and requires prior coordination so it diagnostic drill will also ensure space on the range and that A Soldier watches his battle buddy for correct use of the fundamentals.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 25CPT Kevin Bright 1SG Matthew Peeler Joseph M. Pisarcik is an instructional system specialist with the 198th the purpose of these ranges is to build under stress and in positions that are challenged to find a steady position against a window and a wall and adjust are put in conditions that induce muscle conditions force the Soldier to be much enterprise would get the same focus as Infantry OSUT places
26 INFANTRY October-December 2017 The 3rd Cavalry Regiment (CR), a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), has deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan like most BCTs in our Army. However, not until its most recent deployment to Afghanistan (May 2016 to February 2017) did the regiment encounter several unique challenges, many of which now constitute a new norm for BCTs in the Army deploying with less than half of its assigned force and being spread throughout an operational theater. Thus, the 3rd CRs preparation for and execution of its a similar set of challenges in the future. The 3rd CR was successful in spite of the challenges it faced because it focused on developing fundamental skills, encouraging adaptive leadership, and exercising mission command. Strengthening these three initiatives enabled the regiment and its troopers to accomplish a variety of unique mission sets, both in combat and at home station. As future leaders prepare for similar challenges, they should plan and execute a Build warfighting competence through decisive action (DA) training; Integrate specific mission requirements into training events where appropriate; Develop the right training plan to appropriately switch from a DAfocused mission set to missionDevelop adaptive leaders who build teams and solve complex problems; and Continually exercise mission command. This article proceeds in three parts. First, we will analyze the regiments actions within the broader context of the training and operating environment. Second, we will demonstrate how the regiment ensured mission success as they planned, prepared, and executed home-station training and recommendations to the Army going forward. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, operations (ULO) framework as the activities units undertake executed through decisive action, by means of combined arms maneuver (CAM) as well as wide area security (WAS), and guided by mission command.1 Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of terms of decisive battles fought squarely against conventional or hybrid threats, units often revert back to conducting force-onforce training. However, under the new ULO framework, it must be noted that decisive action consists not just of the traditional Fundamentals, Adapative Leadership and Mission Command: Meeting the Challenge of Executing Missions in Deployed Environments While Maintaining Home-Station ReadinessCOL KEVIN D. ADMIRAL CSM BRYAN D. BARKER Army Doctrine Publication 3-0,
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 27 defense support of civil authorities.2Doctrine describes adequately what is supposed to happen. The operating environment greatly affects what actually happens. The regiments squadrons, troops, and small units experienced the full challenges associated with training for multiple mission sets. At Fort Hood, TX, these challenges included personnel turnover, maintenance schedules and conducting a maneuver-centric training path. In Afghanistan, troops worked through force management-level requirements, targeting engagement authorities, and force protection needs. advised and assisted a partner force battling a resurgent Taliban, a persistent al Qaeda threat, and an aggressive Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-K). It is within this complex framework that the 3rd CR would plan, prepare for, and execute its mission in support of Operation Resolute Support (ORS) 2016-17.The primary reason the regiment successfully met the demands of executing the forward and home-station missions is because it focused on training and developing fundamental skills. Having redeployed from ORS in the spring of 2015, the regiment began training for its next mission, which at the time, turnover and re-hauling equipment, the regiments training cycle began in earnest. Initially, squadrons focused on increasing operational readiness, which included the development of individual and collective skills as well as maintaining the focused training would prove extremely important. Not only did it develop the individual and collective skills necessary to further build trained and ready troops and squadrons, but it also laid the foundation from which troopers could later transition to assume the wide variety of skill sets needed in Afghanistan. summer of 2015. Using Army readiness standards as a guide, the regiment and its squadrons ensured that all Soldiers met administrative requirements. To increase the proportion of healthy troopers, physical readiness training was redesigned to focus on strength, agility, and endurance. Additionally, special population physical training (PT) was organized at the squadron level (as opposed to the troop level where typically leaders were inevitably consumed by other tasks). Troops spent close quarters, and advanced progressions. As a motorized brigade, the regiment also needed to emphasize the maintenance and readiness of its Stryker company-level training objectives without incorporating vehicles, SBCTs and armored BCTs (ABCTs) must integrate by the end of ORS 14-15, troopers had not seen their Strykers for months. As a direct result, leaders and troopers lacked experience in maintenance as well as mounted marksmanship vehicle maintenance was performed by civilian contract and Troopers with Lightning Troop, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, tactically move through grassy terrain toward their target on 27 April 2016 at Pilot Knob Multi-Use Range on Fort Hood. Photo by SSG Tomora Clark
28 INFANTRY October-December 2017through proactive leader involvement and adherence to strict maintenance standards, the regiment successfully regained for example, achieved the highest operational readiness rate and by exceeding post-wide commodity shop standards. In this case, leader involvement ensured trooper ownership and care of equipment at the operator level and ultimately contributed to their success. introduced collective training with a focus on developing the of organizational energy, dedication, and in many cases, a willingness to learn (or in some cases, relearn). Beginning in the summer of 2015 and lasting through the regiments decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation (16-04) to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, in February 2016, the regiments collective training experience demonstrated the unique interaction between dismounted infantry squads and reconnaissance teams, terrain, the Stryker platform, and various enabler units. Early on, the collective training period focused on the crew and squad level. Maneuver squadrons conducted team and conducted platoon LFXs which incorporated the use of Strykers. Then, in the late fall, the regiment drastically increased the training exercise (FTX). This exercise replicated NTCs hybrid and conventional threat environment and included both live and constructive iterations in the form of a troop combined arms were controlled by a regimental tactical operations center (TOC) concurrently conducting a fire control exercise (FCX). The CALFEX in their ability to integrate with organic mounted and dismounted squads as they reduced obstacles and seized objectives. The concurrent FTX, on developing the respective squadron and regimental staffs in the conduct of supporting troop movement to contact, defense, and urban clearance. The over a decade not only controlled CALFEX iterations but also simulated command post (CP) activities across multiple domains as leaders reacted to friendly and enemy injects. The completion of all of these collective regiment for NTC. on the fundamentals. The regiments Military Intelligence MI gunnery in more than two years. Unit MI teams focused to mission analysis, operational terms and military symbols maneuver leaders, and lastly opposing force (OPFOR) tactics and defensive maneuver. Gunnery methodology established a regimen of sequenced individual training that would develop the necessary skills for collective training. MI Soldiers of varying disciplines trained on individual systems and programs to hone knowledge of their instrument of war. Many of these systems were a part of the Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy (DCGS-A) family of intelligence systems that provided interconnectivity to other Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). DCGS-A was essential to allow intelligence to feed into mission command. Analysts and collectors trained on their throughout the training cycle. This painstaking process during MI gunnery paid dividends both at the regimental FTX and tool sets and intelligence feeds once deployed. During this training period, our higher headquarters informed us that our mission would change that the regiment needed to be capable not only of conducting pure DA but also security force assistance (SFA) as seen in Afghanistan. Yet, the requirement to conduct a regimental-level FTX as well as a DA rotation at NTC did not disappear. Thus, the regiment faced Figure 2 The Regimental FTX
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 29at NTC would not fully replicate the operating environment in Afghanistan. Indeed, the lack of a simulated partnered force, ORS legal authorities and rules of engagement, and suggested that the regiment would leave its NTC rotation fully After a short but intense mission analysis, the regimental to conduct a concentrated training progression to certify to deploying. Key tasks revolved around critical recertification of drivers and gun crews for usage of sp platforms as well as route clearance and counterimprovised explosive device (C-IED) training for engineers. In order to prepare for Guardian Angel (GA) requirements, t roops would need small arms progressions and advanced situational awareness training (ASAT). The regimental intelligence section, along with its MI company (MICO), would also need to synchronize information collection (IC) platforms with analytical systems being used in theater to ensure maximum input and output of exploitable intelligence products. Additionally, intelligence personnel within the regiment would need to transition their focus from the expansive doctrinal methodology of a conventional near-peer threat to the highly dynamic and diverse counterinsurgency mindset. Squadrons would also need to work with Fort Hood Training Support to replicate expeditionary advisory platform security operations. Finally, with little time to prepare for its upcoming train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission, the regiment reached out to the forward deployed unit (3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division) in Train, Advise, and Assist Command-East (TAAC-E) to prepare an Afghan-centric mission readiness exercise (MRX). In February 2016, the regiment executed NTC Rotation 16-04. This DA rotation trained the regimental commander hybrid threat. This hybrid threat consisted of irregular, special operations forces (SOF), or non-state actors with conventional weapons and maneuver capabilities. As such, this rotation a CAM and WAS environment. During the rotation, the Brave Figure 4 The Road to War
to further develop and enhance the fundamental skills which it had trained during the preceding nine months. Uniquely, 2nd Squadron was on a separate training path and would not participate. Instead, a combined arms battalion, combat service support battalion, aviation task force, and Paladin battery were attached to the regiment. These organizations brought with them capabilities foreign to the regiment. To ensure success, these units integrated with 3rd CR during the FTX, FCX, and Undoubtedly, this DATE rotation thoroughly tested the regiments ability to execute mission command and utilize organic systems in an austere environment. As such, the rotation at NTC exposed and underscored several relative strengths and weaknesses of the regiment. One of the relative strengths exposed was the regiments ability to employ the either during movements or within complex or urban terrain. In completed their stated mission successfully. A second strength exposed during the rotation was the ability of the regiments enemys course of action and employ multiple ISR assets and operations. This included the integration of several systems, such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) or Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) software, with geospatial intelligence and organic unmanned aerial system (UAS) enablers. Ultimately, this provided commanders with a timely and accurate read on the enemys composition, disposition, and courses of action. Their ability to consistently provide intelligence and enable mission command was not founded entirely on systems or on a rigid cycle but, rather, the fundamentals engrained during earlier training events. Finally, the use, comprehension, and display of the common operating picture (COP) using collaborative platforms such as JCR and Command Post of the Future (CPOF) continued to progress during NTC. These systems and capabilities improved the provide intent to his subordinate commanders. In terms of relative weaknesses exposed at NTC, the greatest concerned communications. The vast distances at NTC directly affected FM retransmission (RETRANS) friction concerning the establishment and use of upper and lower tactical internet (TI) hindered horizontal and vertical in communications and redundancies in the approvals process unit level. Additionally, complex terrain and enemy capabilities in this regard and would inevitably retrain security operations prior to deployment. Finally, shortages in manpower continued average mounted reconnaissance section had only three to one echelon above his typical position. Although this presented the regiments leaders with opportunities for growth, it had a direct and tangible impact on combat power and maneuver capabilities in training. After returning from NTC, the regiment conducted brief recovery before executing a short but intense training period to certify newly arrived troopers and all leaders prior to deployment. This period included Expert Infantryman 30 INFANTRY October-December 2017Soldiers from the 3rd Cavalry Regiment identify enemy targets during the units National Training Center rotation on 21 February 2016. Photo by SPC Joshua Wooten
Badge (EIB) training in support of fundamental individual tasks as well as replicate, such as contracting, dynamic targeting operations, or working through host-nation counterparts. Although the squadrons and the regimental staff touched these elements during the MRX, deployed. This was also true in many instances for the troop level and below. For example, although 60mm mortars are not organic to a reconnaissance squadron, during the deployment, 4th Squadron certified these crews and utilized the asset on multiple patrols. Additionally, C-IED and route clearance training, which would prove essential in Afghanistan, was fundamentally constrained at Fort Hood. Dismounted clearance equipment, for example, was not readily available for Soldier use. As a direct result, route Leonard Wood, MO. Other small unit requirements such as sensitive site exploitation (SSE) tactics, SOF support, and to replicate was the impact of terrain and weather on both organic and/or theater-level assets. In addition, typically red targeting were virtually impossible to replicate simply because these processes remained underdeveloped until the regiment actually deployed. By April 2016, the regiment had spent nearly 12 months executing a high operational tempo training program focused on the fundamentals of DA. At key moments, missionregiments leaders helped develop a foundation of skills which of training, both at Fort Hood and at the NTC, instilled a prepared to deploy. Most importantly, the regiments training cycle successfully built a foundation of fundamental skills which demands of operating within TAAC-E. Encouraging Adaptive Leadership and TeamworkThe second reason behind the regiments ability to overcome the challenges associated with this period of concurrent combat and home-station training was the regiments continual emphasis on leader development and team building. Throughout the training cycle, the regiment and NCOs. To compensate, the regiment sought to continually challenge its on-hand leaders through a variety of methods. This enabled the regiment to select the right leaders to serve in the right roles and positions where they, subsequently, could build cohesive teams capable of accomplishing their respectively assigned missions. One of the key ways the regiment challenged its junior sergeants, and troop commanders was through a series of counseling sessions, professional military discussions, and PT revealed unique personalities as well as individual leader strengths and weaknesses. These events, and their results, enabled regimental and squadron leadership to better compare available leaders with the needs associated with future roles and responsibilities. The primary method of leader development outside of training events was through a robust leader professional development (LPD) program to develop the key leaders in This LPD program ensured all leaders were current in Army doctrine, SBCT tactics, and recent lessons learned. Sessions during these LPDs that intelligence leaders and analysts honed their skills in articulating intelligence through multiple IPB briefs, presentations on 11th ACR tactics, and updates on the current enemy situation in eastern Afghanistan. They produced a weekly open-source graphical intelligence summary (GRINTSUM) that broadened the understanding of varying threat actors around the globe. Not only did these projects and exercises develop the fundamentals of the MI team, but they both Donovian and real-world adversaries. Furthermore, sessions always concluded with a practical exercise or tactical October-December 2017 INFANTRY 31
exercise without troops (TEWT). Finally, squadron commanders and command sergeants major subsequently replicated these events for their own platoon leadership. With a clear understanding of individual leader abilities, commanders at each echelon made specific decisions concerning the placement of leaders one to two levels down. important period of cultural training appropriate for the roles they would soon assume. One such event was ASAT. Considered invaluable by many senior leaders, ASAT increased an individuals emotional quotient or self-awareness by exposing leaders to the moods and intentions of host nation security forces. Ultimately, this would enable advisors and troopers locations which were geographically isolated from their higher headquarters were similarly handpicked based on the maturity and experience levels of their leadership. and tasks is certainly not a novel concept. Indeed, the Army expects its leaders to do this routinely. However, the challenges caused by leader turnover, unique manning requirements, and a constrained training timeline compounded as the regiment prepared for deployment. The regiments constant emphasis on leader development throughout the training cycle, combined with an emphasis on decentralized mission command, further enabled subordinate commanders to build teams based on one central principle place the right leader in the right role. remain at Fort Hood during the deployment more than 50 percent merited special consideration and carried important The regiment decided early on that rear detachments, often used by the Armys brigades during deployments, would not be held equally responsible for home-station mission command as they would be for results in combat. Indeed, home-station leadership became as much of an important investment in mission accomplishment as the forward team. Thus, squadrons had to make tough decisions as to who would deploy and who would stay at home. Some squadrons used non-branchcommanders. In the same way that using talented individuals credibility, so too did entrusting home-station responsibility to good leaders ensure success at Fort Hood. It should be noted disciplinary adjudication, assist with orders production and concept approval, and retain an emphasis on maintenance. Exercising Constant Mission CommandPreparing to Deploy meeting the demands of executing concurrent mission sets was a continual emphasis on the exercise of mission command. Undeniably, executing a DA-centric training path developed important fundamental skills and focusing on the development of adaptive leaders helped build and form teams, but the role of mission command was likewise paramount as it ultimately mission command during each training event enabled leaders to gain valuable experience operating within a commanders intent, taking prudent risks, producing mission orders, and exercising disciplined initiative.3 The regiment sought to incorporate mission command as heavily as possible during the execution of current conducted multiple mission command exercises (MCXs) or mission command systems integration (MCSI) exercises. MCSIs are three-part exercises that progressively focus on the installation and maintenance of the network and mission command systems. MCSI1 focuses on internal effectiveness factors, concentrating on TOC setup and baseline systems and procedures. MCSI-2 focuses on system functionality, networking, and the establishment of SOPs and continuity throughout shift changes and battle drills. MCSI-3 is the culmination of the previous phases and is conducted as part of the regimental FTX, prior to NTC. MCSI-3 validates the regimental and squadron functional and integrated cells fusing the commanders subsequent mission orders. NTC fully stressed CPs deployability, capacity, range, and survivability as units countered the moves of a free-thinking OPFOR. For example, 32 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Army Doctrine Publication 6-0,
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 33 the regimental headquarters was greatly tested while using the upper and lower TI. The regiment successfully created COP for the commander. Additionally, the transportation of highly sensitive equipment during maneuver operations support multiple TOC jumps. Although RETRANS training was conducted during all events, it ultimately proved easier to execute during the FTX and MCSI than at NTC due to the nature of the local terrain. The regiments ability to conduct mission command was further honed by the execution of an MRX prior to deployment. Conducted at Fort Hood, the MRX included participants from the forward unit and successfully tested JOC networks, functions, and leaders as they balanced SFA with coalition force (CF) maneuver operations. This exercise was particularly valuable as the regiment was able to at least partially replicate theaterlevel ISR integration, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) use in Combined Joint Operations Afghanistan (CJOA), and unique communication requirements of expeditionary advisory packages for its squadrons. Targeted requests for information were brought back from the forward subject matter experts, a battle rhythm that anticipated frequent interaction between deployed and home-station elements. This required the generation of a unique battle rhythm and orders production model that had to be nested vertically with the 1st Cavalry Division (CD) as well as TAAC-E and HQ Resolute Support. Over time, a useful model emerged, and communication between elements in Afghanistan and Fort Hood occurred regularly throughout the deployment. Horizontally, staff counterparts and command teams communicated at least weekly via VTC. Regimental leadership incorporated routine home-station briefs into their schedules to ensure there was no loss of focus on readiness or family care as units dispersed geographically. Deployed Environment The regiments ability to conduct mission command at regiment deployed to Afghanistan. Initially, four out of the seven squadron commands went forward while three remained at Fort Hood. The 2nd Squadron, one of three remaining at Fort Hood, would later go forward as the situation in Afghanistan changed. As a result, 2nd Squadron needed to conduct an additional training. This presented the home-station regimental and certifying an element of considerable size for combat operations regiment assumed risk by conducting a condensed training path without a rotation to NTC. To mitigate this risk, the regimental CALFEX. The 1st CD ultimately approved this training path, enabling 2nd Squadron to deploy as a trained and ready force. As the regiment deployed, it immediately assumed responsibility for the execution of multiple mission sets across Afghanistan. The bulk of the regiment, to include its Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment provide security during an expeditionary advisory package mission to the Surobi district of Afghanistan on 27 December 2016. Photo by CPT Grace Geiger
headquarters, comprised TAAC-E. Our mission was to provide functionally based security force assistance (FBSFA) to the 201st and 203rd Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps and the 202nd and 303rd Afghan National Police (ANP) Zones. Portions of three squadrons, along with an infantry squadron in (BAF) and helped secure the BAF ground defense area (GDA). Two squadrons, with their subordinate troops, secured their own respective GDAs within TAAC-E. Squadron leadership advised counterparts at the corps level while regimental leadership divided roles and responsibilities with 1st CD leadership for advising senior Afghan leadership as well as non-governmental organizations. In addition, four separate troops provided uplift to NATO Special Operations Component Command Afghanistan across Afghanistan for various disparate headquarters. Fundamentals, Leadership, and Mission Command As the deployment began and both forward and home-station elements became familiar with their respective missions, each soon encountered challenges that had been anticipated but not fully trained for. However, by developing fundamental skills, placing the right leaders in the right positions, and exercising constant mission command, the risks to mission and the force were ultimately overcome. Several unique challenges, as well as the regiments means of meeting and overcoming them, are described in further detail below. systems and capabilities, build capacity across key functions, and communicate vertically and horizontally. This type of SFA requires advisors at the operational and strategic level. In traditional SFA, the partnered force is generally trained at all There, staffs and commanders advise their counterparts across essential functions focused on budgeting, internal controls, civilian governance, force generation, intelligence, communications, and maneuver operations. The key challenges and nuances associated with FBSFA were indicative of the health of the host nation force. There was (and remains) an existential issue with the quality of Afghan leadership, to which there may only be a generational solution. Endemic intelligence weaknesses, a lack of technology, and a Forces response to the increasing threat throughout the country. Conversely, the ANDSF learned to consolidate combat power, coordinate to support maneuver, and in some cases, management, and dissemination dramatically improved the ANA corps and police zones ability to rely less on U.S. partners activities. The regiment continued to move closer to the end state of ANA implementing its own intelligence production models that drive maneuver operations. There has also been some success with train-the-trainer programs as U.S. forces and Western contractors have slowly withdrawn from groundlevel operations and maintenance. Undoubtedly, the majority of leaders conducting advisory operations were executing missions outside of their traditional skill sets. In spite of this, the regiment was successful because of prior leader development and placement. This theme would continue to play out in other ways unique to the Afghan theater.Tactical Nuances in Theater noting that drastically altered our ability foremost, the primary maneuver force in theater is the host nation force. Outside of named operations or kinetic strikes, were directed at enemy groups within non-contiguous GDAs. Furthermore, an unpredictable and well-resourced enemy force provides continuous challenges FBSFA. The enemy composition in TAAC-E is the most diverse and complex in all Afghanistan. More than 1,000 kilometers of shared border with Pakistan serves as a permissive environment for three-quarters of the DoD-recognized insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. The regiments area of operations was expansive, with more than 124,000 square kilometers consisting of 14 provinces, 165 districts, and a population of more than eight million. Stability 34 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Lt. Gen. Muhammad Waziri, the 201st Afghan National Army Corps commander, and CSM Bryan Barker, Train Advise Assist Command-East command sergeant major, discuss collective training in Afghanistans Surobi district on 27 December 2016.Photo by CPT Grace Geiger
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 35ANDSF soldiers and policemen having to battle an entrenched insurgency and numerous violent extremist organizations. In spite of the TAA mission, force protection remained the number one priority. This was maintained through security patrols, terrain denial missions, active information operations, and multiple security shuras with local leaders and ANDSF counterparts. Specifically, GDA operations consisted of combined arms route clearance, perimeter security, or partnered patrols that enable CF to prevent and deter indirect and aggressive as possible in order to maintain a high state of force protection. Intelligence collection and analytical teams at the TAAC and squadron levels provided the necessary focus on each enemy threat network within each GDA. This information drove the maneuver mission and aided in the synchronization of enabler assets to include close air support (CAS), air weapon synchronize enabler use with CF or ANDSF action in order to disrupt or destroy the enemy across TAAC-E. For example, to used in conjunction with IDF or CAS assets to conduct point of origin (POO) site terrain denial missions. decisions pertaining to ANDSF support vice Resolute Support lines of operation. As the CF presence has decreased with the transition to the TAA mission set, so too has the wealth of intel enablers (ISR, human intelligence, signal intelligence collectors, TAAC-E provide intelligence support to our ANDSF partners. convoluted reporting processes from the host nation force. To reduce this impact, extra attention was paid to fostering the intelligence of the ANDSF and creating releasable REL AFG intelligence to enable the regimental FBSFA advisors to ensure Afghan intelligence drove operations. This freed assets to support other Resolute Support priorities. These priorities were subsequently revised and revisited on a bi-weekly basis as part of the green (ANDSF) and red (threat) targeting processes. Finally, even with limited manning, traditional requirements such as the Commanders Emergency Response Program systems, required a unique process that took weeks to conduct. upon arrival.Continuous TrainingRemaining focused on the fundamentals of soldiering was a challenge in Afghanistan. Even so, readiness remained a top priority, and those who could continue to train did so. Physical and Excellence in Armor training remained constants. Other events (such as selections for Ranger School, the Gainey Cup, and the Best Ranger Competition) punctuated security operations. Some locations offered outstanding facilities which enabled troops to conduct collective training such as squad situational training exercises (STXs) and LFXs. The ability to train enabled units to merge with their home-station counterparts seamlessly upon return from Afghanistan.Those at home station continued to work towards accomplishing the commanders vision and priorities. In doing so, they ensured a smooth transition upon the regiments return from Afghanistan. Personnel in the rear provided a massive reach-back capability for the regiment in the event of personnel loss, personal family events, or intelligence support. To support individuals continued to focus on medical readiness, small mission requirements and leader shortages. The majority of the home-station element consisted of the regimental engineer and regimental support squadrons. Through these organizations, along with the squadron forward on Stryker maintenance. Leaders developed a detailed maintenance plan designed to meet the desired goal of an operational readiness rate above 95 percent. Not only did conducting services with limited combat power. Finally, legacy equipment still lingered from the units previous designation as an armored cavalry regiment. In addition to removing excess equipment, squadrons redistributed equipment across their formations. Typically, the majority of unit throughout the entirety of the units deployment. Conclusion and RecommendationsLike that of other Army BCTs, the regiments recent history Figure 7 3rd CR Vision Statement
36 INFANTRY October-December 2017involves the completion of a deployment with less than half of its forces to multiple locations within a combat theater while forces at home station continued to maintain readiness. For the foreseeable future, the Armys BCTs will continue to encounter similar endeavors and all of the associated challenges therein and winning in a dynamic environment while maintaining the right leaders at home to ensure the organization maintains The 3rd CR leadership proactively analyzed the internal strengths and weaknesses of the organization, recognized impending friction points, and applied leadership early in the training cycle to mitigate risk. These same leaders focused on three factors that ultimately contributed to 3rd CRs ability to overcome these challenges. First, a training path focused fundamental skills from which troopers could quickly adjust to emphasis on leader development forged trained and ready teams led by bold and adaptive leaders serving in the right positions. Finally, constant mission command employment and enforcement during both the regiments training cycle and deployment enabled leaders to operate within the intent of their respective squadrons while taking prudent risks and exercising disciplined initiative to accomplish the mission. The combination of these three factors fundamental skills, adaptive leadership, and mission command ultimately contributed to the success of 3rd CR from 2015-2017. As BCTs continue to embark on The Army the return to DATE rotations at our CTCs and simultaneous regional alignments within our BCTs. There is little doubt that we have a responsibility to continue to prepare for the next war. or conduct reconnaissance against hybrid threats may be tested in the near future. Stryker units must purposefully make functions and integrate all service and support into planning, population and garrison or U.S. Army Forces Command As a result, units must recertify the same collective training repeatedly or in a condensed time period. Internal to the BCT, readiness status, such as gunnery and drivers training, can be delayed until after the typical Army manning cycle is complete. Photo by SGT Marcus Floyd
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 37 Over time, it was clear that the CTC did not fully address Admittedly, we exercised WAS and elements of CAM in Afghanistan, but the nuances cannot be ignored. Yet, there is primarily utilizes host nation forces as the maneuver element. TAAC-E requirements such as contracts, SOF support, military or police advisory teams, Guardian Angels, C-IED, and training. For example, establishing a tactical command post during collective training has direct parallels with the expeditionary advisory packages that are currently conducted in Afghanistan. A thorough understanding and training of both analog and regular mission command systems will provide concrete examples to share with our ANDSF partners. Fixedsite security, targeting processes, kinetic strike battle drills, can only add to the quality of training. Conducting defensive security operations in theater. In other cases, some training events, such as C-IED, would be easier to integrate if equipment and subject matter experts were simply more readily available or led by mobile training teams. Time. The incorporation of mission-specific training can alleviate some of the pain associated with a mission pivot. However, there is an appropriate time to focus on missiondecision on the part of regimental leadership. At the operational level, planners must clearly articulate the priority for the unit within the collective training timeline. Conducting MRXs or adjusting task organization early can help build cohesive teams prior to execution. There is no feasible way to safely ignore kinetic strike battle drills, Guardian Angel requirements, theater-engagement authorities, and targeting processes. Even if brief, robust MRXs can mitigate risk by forcing advisory planning, coordination, and synchronization systems prior to element can focus on red-cycle requirements and individual training. Additionally, the time between a BCTs CTC rotation and its MRX and subsequent deployments must be adjusted to give adequate time to prepare. Six to seven weeks is simply systems, and equipment. Develop Adaptive Leaders. We must develop leaders that are not only experts in 10-level tasks but adaptable subject matter experts capable of both CAM and navigating the nuances of unique combat environments. A deliberate and aggressive LPD program will allow BCTs to assume risk where manpower and resources are reduced. Participating leaders must subsequently be carefully placed to enable execution of mission command regardless of geographic separation. As is increasingly acknowledged across the force, we are in an era of continual planning, coordinating, and synchronization. We must continue why we are doing it, and how we are going to get there. To drive towards this clarity, we need to focus on two common points of friction. by enforcing knowledge management, ensuring that proper communication and network platforms are operational, and supporting training on these systems in order to fully enable shared understanding. One way to ensure this occurs is by conducting repetitive command post exercises and FCXs which integration of multiple domains and communications platforms such as high frequency and tactical satellite radios will build a Second, we need to keep our organizations intact. We expect our small unit leaders to utilize a sensible task organization, disseminate a clear intent, and execute simple plans that enable subordinates. Unfortunately, at higher echelons we by muddling our BCT task organizations. There is a tangible when we divide and task units for too great a number of various combat and home-station missions. In the same way we enforce a concept of commander-centric operations, we need to enforce a concept of unit-centric operations. In other words, an organically whole unit BCT, squadron, or even troop leadership and mixed labor.Notes1 ADP 3-0, (2011), iii, 1-2.2 William Shoemate and Benjamin Jensen, Training for Decisive Action, September-October 2016, 102-103.3 ADP 6-0, (2014), iv.At the time this article was written, COL Kevin D. Admiral was serving as the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, TX. He earned a bachelors degree from the University of Kansas as well as a masters degree National Defense University. Prior to arriving at Fort Hood, he was a Senior Service College Fellow at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London. positions. Additionally, he served in Project Warrior as an observer-controller at the National Training Center, CA, and a small group instructor for the Armor Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, KY. At the time this article was written, was serving as the 3rd CR command sergeant major. He earned an associates degree from Excelsior College. CSM Barker is a graduate of Airborne School, Ranger Mountain Leader Course, Pre-Command Course and all levels of the NCO Education System to include the U.S. Army Sergeants Majors Course. CSM Barker has served in various positions as an Infantryman. He has held all major. CSM Barker is also a recipient of the Order of Saint Maurice and the Order of Saint George-Bronze. and are currently serving
38 INFANTRY October-December 2017The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, prepares brigade combat teams (BCTs) to among others: and TF No Fear at JRTC:MAJ AL LEMAIREMaximizing Opportunities While Supporting a Combat Training Center Rotation Task Force No Fear Task Organization
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 39 training program (LTP), and coordinate any additional training Mission Essential Tasks (TLPs), and combined arms rehearsals (CARs) prior to mission command operations, both companies established mission enabled the Alpha Company commander to train on Soldiers from Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhounds) serving as a Geronimo OPFOR element establish a company command post to Photo by CPT Josh Geis
TRAINING NOTES 40 INFANTRY October-December 2017 Additional Training Opportunities During the Rotation Post-Rotation LFX Soldiers from Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, work in conjunction with Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division while serving as a host
MAJ Al LeMaire October-December 2017 INFANTRY 41 Lessons Learned into the battalion planning process and keeping them attached Conclusion Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, suppress an enemy
TRAINING NOTES 42 INFANTRY October-December 2017It was the night of 24 March 2017, though to my platoon it my platoon was not the front line of the battalion. The eerily quiet night was shaping up to perhaps be a full night of rest. only a couple kilometers to my south. Before my company in our area of operations. I began getting my crew together to 1LT JASON R. LALLY Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade discuss possible routes during Exercise Allied Spirit VI at 7th Army Training Commands Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, on 20 March 2017.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 43 lesson here is not that sometimes we lack all the information 1LT Jason R. Lally economics. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment serve as the opposing force during Exercise Allied Spirit VI on 18 March 2017.
TRAINING NOTES 44 INFANTRY October-December 2017Physically dislocated more than 5,000 miles from their battalion and brigade headquarters, the Bulls of B Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 25th Infantry Division, participated in Operation Southern Jackaroo in May 2017 as the sole U.S. Army representatives in the multinational exercise. The exercise was hosted near Darwin, Australia, by the Australian 1st Brigade and also included elements from the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, the Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces, and the U.S. Marine Rotational Force Darwin. Set in the unforgiving outback, the ad hoc of northern Australia. During the two-week exercise, the Bulls partnered Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCPs) Company-level disaggregated operations can (and should) that see a battalionor brigade-sized U.S. contribution. These exercises are unfortunately very expensive and require an equally expensive investment in manpower and resources to plan and prepare. Additionally, the echelon that participates in these exercises must become wholly dedicated to its execution, parent brigade or division headquarters. This was not the case with Southern Jackaroo. The scope of this operation included only one U.S. Army infantry company. This limited footprint was light enough to allow the Bulls to turn around from a training rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, and reset, retrain, and deploy to Australia within 65 days. In truth, from Small Units Abroad: A Model for Strategic EngagementCPT JON M. VOSS A Bull Company machine-gun team practices suppressing an enemy location during training at the Mount Bundy Training Area in Australia.Photos courtesy of the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 45the time the companys equipment arrived back to its home station on Oahu to the time it departed was less than 10 days. More restricting the parent battalion headquarters or the remainder of the battalions combat power from fulfilling a standard load of administrative, training, and planning requirements. a dedicated recovery and leave period, four changes of command (including the battalion change of command), three weeks of Expert Infantryman Badge testing, and redeployment of the majority of the battalion back to JRTC for opposing force (OPFOR) and host nation role-player support. In this sense, the deployment of a single rifle company more directly with the hosting battalion for necessary support. Company-level TSCP operations can thus allow for greater tempo in regional engagement while also enhancing the development of interoperability during those engagements. Bull Company, allowing it to deploy as a complete company as manned by Soldiers who were non-deployable due to medical, administrative, or professional development-related reasons. Second only to the professionalism and competence shown by the Bulls during Southern Jackaroo, this full-force representation spoke most clearly to the multinational participants about American commitment to support the exercise. This prioritization of manpower for Bull Company to support the exercise did not come without a cost. The sister ability to achieve the 85-percent manning standard required by the Armys Digital Training Management System (DTMS) in order to earn a Trained status during training. Similarly, training conducted by the Bulls during Southern Jackaroo did not produce as tangible of an increase in the Bulls DTMSpreventing the Bulls from counting them toward the DTMS standard. So, while the overall readiness of the battalion to deploy and conduct partnered, joint, and coalition operations clearly increased due to the exercise, the technical readiness participating in future company-level TSCPs will have to balance this metric-based readiness with the less-tangible readiness cornerstones of the TSCP. In addition to appropriately tailored manpower, Southern Jackaroo showed how company-level expeditionary operations (especially in northern Australia) can be enhanced with several key non-standard pieces of equipment. The 2nd on feedback from the exercise planners, to include individual tents for protection from particularly ferocious mosquitoes and wildlife, boonie hats, and high-strength insect repellent. These proved vital. The hosts of the exercise, the 1st Brigade of the Australian Army, employed several other pieces of solar chargers and emphasizing the use of HF radio, units can Operation Southern Jackaroo, it bears noting that the brigade headquarters deployed a small mission command element to support the Bulls with over-the-horizon communication and exercise support. This element consisted of two Soldiers to operate a few pieces of brigade-level communication functions, conduct routine reporting, and manage unexpected issues. Led by a captain, the brigade white cell was a small but necessary addition to the manifest. Thanks to the help of this element, the Bulls were able to focus almost exclusively Japanese and U.S. contingent company commanders receive an operations update from the Australian
TRAINING NOTES 46 INFANTRY October-December 2017At the time this article was written, CPT Jon M. Voss was serving as commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. He currently serves as the military assistant to the U.S. Army Pacific on training and integration with their Australian hosts. As part of Operation Southern Jackaroo, each multinational partner at the platoon and company levels. and leader development, but units participating in TSCP operations need to be careful not to assume live-fire training hosted by partner nations will replicate training standards at homestation facilities. In the case of Southern Jackaroo, Australian range control regulations and training management that did not meet the requirements laid out in Army training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for at the company, battalion, and brigade levels need to have an early and open dialog with exercise planners to clearly articulate the U.S. training objectives for the training (per the mission essential task list [METL]) and determine where those objectives line up with the training objectives of the TSCP. During planning and execution, junior and senior leaders need must be prepared to absorb a potential decrease in DTMS objectives of the multinational training deployment. These lessons came along with incredible relationships and in our ability to operate alongside them in the future. The operating dislocated from their parent headquarters and in close conjunction with partnered nations. Training exercises with those nations represent an incredible opportunity to build and reinforce the lessons that will make such warfare successful. To maximize those opportunities, companylevel engagement is the model when applied along with lessons from the Bulls during Operation Southern Jackaroo. Soldiers from Bull Company integrate closely with their Australian partners during an urban engagement as part of Operation Southern Jackaroo. Elements from Bull Company load a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey with their attached Australian Military Police Dog Handling Team during Operation Southern Jackaroo.
October-December 2017 INFANTRY 47One day many years ago, an infantry battalion was deep into its preparation to be validated for its new mission as part of a heavy force element being prepared for enhancing the XVIIIth Airborne Corps contingency capabilities. The separate brigade the battalion was assigned to had been reorganizing as a mechanized brigade and was well along in that process. Its tank battalion, one of its mechanized infantry battalions, and its armored cavalry troop were already in place. Several units were still in progress of reorganizing one of the infantry battalions, the artillery battalion, and the combat engineer company being the most critical. Adding to the array of challenges confronting the battalion in the reorganization, the battalion was informed two months before the scheduled U.S. Army Forces Command two-week platoon leader would not report to the battalion until several been reassigned about a month before. The battalion S1, the very concerned about the medical platoons readiness for the coming evaluation. Gama Goat ambulances (M561the ambulance version was the M792). This was a somewhat amphibious all aluminum magnesium construction vehicle whose cockpit/cab and truck contact with the ground under the vehicle the bed could rotate separately from the cab and the suspension system The number of u joints made for a vehicle that did take some attention to maintain operationally. With the amount of added ancillary equipment for a medical version of the vehicle, the S1s concerns were not unfounded. The platoon hadnt had a platoon leader for some time, had recently received a new platoon sergeant, and was only weeks to give the medical platoon its best chance to do well. The question was how? battalion after having returned from overseas. One had commanded several platoons and had other battalion (XO). The other lieutenant had commanded several platoons, been the XO of three companies, served on a division staff, and had completed the battalion course through the Adjutant Generals School. Both lieutenants were The S1 recommended to the commander that the lieutenant who had not had XO be assigned as XO in one recommended that the other lieutenant be assigned as the battalions assistant adjutant focused on the battalions prehuge personnel management An Infantrymans Journey with a Medical PlatoonTOM ROZMANTwo Gama Goat ambulances sit near a detention compound during Operation Urgent Fury on 28 October 1983. National Archives photo
LESSONS FROM THE PAST 48 INFANTRY October-December 2017requirement for units prepared to deploy on short notice for action administration for the deploying Soldiers pay actions, other items a huge undertaking at the time in an organization of some 1,000 members. The commander concurred with the S1s recommendations. The lieutenant selected as the assistant adjutant had led a provisional infantry platoon for riot control duty and a a mechanized battalion headquarters company, and a tank brigade headquarters company, also at a stateside post, for more than a year. The lieutenant was then an infantry platoon deployed division. The S1 decided he had a possible solution to the leadership allow him to do a crash course on medical platoon operations The S1 informed the assistant adjutant that he would be acknowledged the assignment with a number of misgivings he did not share with the S1, the 12 Gama Goats looming large on the list of concerns. with the platoon sergeant and they mutually developed a plan the most essential individual and collective training needing emphasis. It focused on thorough maintenance of the vehicles with necessary inspections as well as full layout inspections of individual and platoon equipment. The platoon leader then assembled the platoon and mission ahead and outlined the platoons plan to meet and it was a mission the entire platoon was taking on, and each Soldier would be important to getting it done. The medics responded with guarded enthusiasm. They barely knew the platoon sergeant, and the lieutenant was only known as the guy putting the alert folders together and he was an Infantryman. But time was short, and it was made clear was a big deal in establishing that they were the professionals they thought they were. Then preparation began the lieutenant and the platoon sergeant were shoulder to shoulder with every medic in the platoon working through the training, the inspections, and the work-up of the Gama Goats. And Soldiers received feedback on what they were doing well on and what needed improvement, but the direction was always positive. As weeks passed and the alert that would initiate the a short time, the team had not tested itself on a sustained deployment one that would evaluate every aspect of its operations. The alert came and the battalion deployed. Though at a southern post, it was winter and several nights dipped below freezing. Without heaters, the Gama Goats were demonstrated a level of teamwork and cohesion as well as tactical competence in its unique mission during a demanding The platoon conducted evacuation operations from the companies to the battalion aid station, triage, battalion trains operations, engagement with brigade trains, and air evacuation operations with great skill and competence. On some days, the battalion trains displaced as many as three times. The aid station even conducted a real evacuation of an injured Soldier Incredibly, the focus of Gama Goat maintenance both before the vehicles. This was remarkable in its own right given the comment and was rated as one of the top units evaluated in its category. This result did not tend to be a normal occurrence for such units for a number of reasons. But it did verify that engaging Soldiers and making them skilled members of the team will release the best in them. The result was their rather spectacular success story they earned it by ability, determination, dedication, and teamwork. It was their achievement. The platoon leader also gained a valuable insight one he always believed was the case, but the medics proved. Infantry Soldiers when well led and cohesive in their unit can accomplish almost the impossible. The medics demonstrated that they were as capable of taking on the tough tasks and prevailing as their infantry brothers.Tom Rozman graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, the University of Massachusetts Graduate Business School, and the U.S. Army Command a last assignment as the director of the Collective Training Directorate, Virginia Departments of Conservation and Recreation and Labor and military journals and more than 30 manuals, papers, policy documents, and reviews.
The Stalingrad Cauldron: Inside the Encirclement and Destruction of the 6th Army By Frank Ellis Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013, 558 pages Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMC Reserve Stalingrad. The citys name alone conjures images of desperate industrial plants and destroyed apartment blocks, snipers and, ultimately, the long march into Soviet prison camps for survivors of the German 6th Army. Stalingrad, in much of Western historiography, is the turning point for German ambitions in the East and the start of the long, bloody slog back to Berlin. Frank Ellis The Stalingrad Cauldron: Inside the Encirclement and Destruction of the 6th Army sheds new light on the famous battle while elucidating the truths behind our collective understanding and impressions. The Stalingrad Cauldron is, in reality, more a collection of essays than a coherent narrative. As Ellis states in his introduction, my study is more tactical and personal, more concerned with some of the lesser-known detail than with the bigger operational picture. Those looking for a comprehensive elsewhere, like David Glantzs recent Stalingrad Trilogy. Ellis work is immaculately sourced and researched, creating an indepth analysis of life for the 6th Army, Soviet citizens inside the battle zone, and the fate of German prisoners after the battle. He begins with an overview of the battle and the conditions facing the 6th Army. The problems the Germans faced as the battle wore on, he argues, had their genesis in the larger German campaign in the Soviet Union. Ellis explains that most German infantrymen arrived on the Volga River already malnourished, and the encirclement only reduced their already meager energy stores. When coupled with the weather, which on the German failure is clear. He also includes a brief but insightful analysis of recent historiography and discussion of his sources. Three previously unpublished war diaries or operational histories of the 16th Panzer Division, the 94th Infantry Division, and the 76th Berlin-Brandenburg Infantry Division follow the introduction. Written retrospectively by survivors, urban combat on the encircled German army. For todays combat leaders, the war diaries elucidate the decision-making process and actions of a surrounded army facing logistical burnout and dwindling strength that is also battling the cold. NCO as critical in holding defensive positions and maintaining unit integrity during the battle, especially during retreats. Hauptmann (Captain) Rudolf Krell of the 94th Infantry Division remarks that the initiative, the willingness to make decisions, and the skill and boldness of the junior leaders alongside the quality, endurance, and bravery of the troopers were now [in January 1943] more than ever decisive for the deployment of words could as easily have been written by American forces as well and serve as a reminder that the junior leaders are the backbone of all armies. After the three war diaries, the focus on the minutiae of the battle takes center stage in the book. He begins with a chapter on the Soviet and German application of snipers in Stalingrad. His analysis calls into question the popular memory created Enemy at the Gates and Soviet propaganda highlighting the snipers success. While explaining the impact Ellis argues that the German army was more successful than commonly thought in employing snipers. Using released NKVD interrogation documents and reading between the lines in war diaries and memoirs, Ellis synthesizes the role and impact of German and Soviet snipers in the battle. Furthermore, he debunks the Zaitsev-Konings duel at the center of Enemy at the Gates. His next chapter focuses on the role of Soviet ethnic minorities, deserters, and prisoners of war who supported women, numbering between 20,000 and 30,000, provided a large boost to the 6th Army. Their presence and assistance, as both support troops and as combatants, extended the lifespan of 6th Army and prolonged the battle immeasurably. It Ellis concludes his book with chapters on the role of intelligence operations during the battle, the experience of German prisoners in Soviet hands, and the case of Oberst (Colonel) Arthur Boje. The intelligence operations chapter has behind operations like NATOs Gladio program in Europe. The chapter looks almost entirely at human intelligence, leaving an opening for further study in other intelligence disciplines and their place in the battle. The fate of the men of 6th Army in Soviet hands serves as a reminder that even after surrender, the battle continued for many Germans, most of whom were too physically depleted to survive the movement to captivity and the conditions October-December 2017 INFANTRY 49
50 INFANTRY October-December 2017 found there. The need for a prisoner of war code of conduct becomes apparent as one reads Oberst Bojes story. The chapter is based on his captivity narrative and released NKVD documents. It focuses on the role of Soviet intelligence and German collaboration in the Soviet war crimes trial process and eventually concludes with the release of the prisoners in the mid-1950s. The Stalingrad Cauldron is a dense and heavy work full of rigid scholarship and new insights into the life and death of the 6th Army. This said, it is not a book for casual reading for uninitiated readers or to gain a greater sense of the battle, its causes, or ultimate impact. Works like David Glantzs Stalingrad Trilogy and Robert Citinos Death of the Wehrmacht place the battle in its context whereas Ellis narrows his scope to the often-overlooked areas of the battle and reexamines some of the better-known events using new primary source material. Ultimately, The Stalingrad Cauldron should be seen as a detailed companion to broader studies and narratives rather than a stand-alone source. To Bataan and Back: The World War II Diary of Major Thomas Dooley Edited and Transcribed by Jerry Cooper with John A. Adams, Jr. and College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2016, 238 pages Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick BaillergeonThere are times when a books road to publication can be long and winding. Such was the case with To Bataan and Back: The World War II Diary of Major Thomas Dooley. For nearly 70 years, the diary of Dooley was only read by family members and close friends. These written words were contained in six paper notebooks totaling some 500 tiny printed pages. It appeared that these journals would never be seen by the public. However, the change in the summer of 2005. During that time, Jerry Cooper (editor of this volume and a 1963 graduate of Texas A&M University) asked the family if a document of Dooleys could be used in a book focused on a great Aggie tradition the muster. This discussion led to an inquiry about the accessibility of Dooleys diary which Cooper was well aware of. Conversation continued until 2009 when the journals were released to the Texas A&M archives, and then subsequently Cooper received permission from the family to publish them. After substantial annotation and editing, the diary was available to the public in book form in 2016. Before discussing the diary itself, it is important to provide a brief synopsis of Dooleys military career. After graduating from A&M in 1935, he entered the Army as a second lieutenant. When the United States entered World War II, Dooley was serving as aide-de-camp in the Philippines for then-MG Jonathan Wainwright. Dooley was part of the force that fought gallantly (he was awarded the Silver Star for his actions) when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Like many, Dooley was ultimately captured and a prisoner of war for 40 months. He survived this incredible ordeal and continued his military service until his retirement as a colonel in 1969. His career culminated with assignments as Fort Knoxs Armored Dooleys diary encompasses the period from the beginning of the Japanese bombing of the Philippines (8 December 1941) through just after the Japanese surrender in the Philippines (6 September 1945). As you would expect in a wartime diary, Dooley writes on the subjects that were part diary moves into his ordeal as a prisoner of war. Dooley writes of his struggle to survive and details his challenges with the availability of food and water, his relationship with guards and fellow prisoners, and describes his day-to-day activities which included reading more than 200 books (these books are listed as an appendix in the book). experiences which he provides incredible insight. These include the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, his capture by the Japanese, his 40 months as a prisoner of war, and his attendance at the Japanese surrender ceremony on board the USS Missouri. The second is Dooleys perspective on Wainwright. Certainly, Dooley, as his aide, was in a unique position to see a side of Wainwright which most did not experience. Dooley touches on a wide array of areas as they pertain to Wainwright. They include perceptions on his personality, leadership style, decision-making process, and his relationships with other senior leaders. Cooper has done a remarkable job in transforming Dooleys six notebooks into a superb volume. In particular, two decisions he has made will clearly stand out for readers. First, he adds just enough of his own background copy to truly put Dooleys words in perspective. This is refreshing since I have read many books of this genre where an editor seems to want his words to be the focus. Cooper has placed the emphasis where it needs to be. The second decision is the extras he has included within the text. Throughout the volume, Cooper has added numerous relevant photographs, maps, Dooleys own pertinent appendix section which contains documents such as the Japanese instrument of surrender, a comprehensive glossary, a suggested reading list, and the aforementioned list of books Dooley read while a prisoner of war. In summary, we are extremely fortunate that Dooleys words are available to the public due to the generosity of the Dooley family and the diligence of Jerry Cooper. The result is a volume which is a tremendous addition to the body of knowledge. It may have taken some 70 years to add to this BOOK REVIEWS