Citation
Infantry

Material Information

Title:
Infantry
Series Title:
P.B
Abbreviated Title:
Infantry
Creator:
Infantry School (U.S.)
United States Army Infantry School
United States Army Infantry School -- Editorial and Pictorial Office
United States Army Infantry School -- Book Department
Place of Publication:
[Fort Benning, GA
Publisher:
U.S. Army Infantry School
Publication Date:
Frequency:
Quarterly[-Oct./Dec. 2013]
Frequency varies[ FORMER Apr. 1957-<winter 2004>]
quarterly
regular
Language:
English
Physical Description:
volumes : illustrations ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Infantry -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Military art and science -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Infantry ( fast )
Military art and science ( fast )
Genre:
Periodicals. ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

Notes

Numbering Peculiarities:
In 2009: Mar./June (v. 98, no. 2) combined; July (v. 98, no. 3) published separately; Aug./Dec. (v. 98, no. 4) combined; described as bimonthly in masthead.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
04741952 ( OCLC )
53051672 ( LCCN )
0019-9532 ( ISSN )
ocm04741952
Classification:
UD1 .I56 ( lcc )

Related Items

Preceded by:
Infantry school quarterly

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Digital Military Collection

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Full Text

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, Army position and does not supersede any information otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazineContact Information Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-142, Fort Benning, GA 31905 Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951 Email: usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@mail.mil APRIL-JUNE 2018 Volume 107, Number 2 PB 7-18-2COL TOWNLEY R. HEDRICK Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School RUSSELL A. ENO Editor MICHELLE J. ROWAN Deputy Editor of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Distribution: Special GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1813001 COMMANDANTS NOTE 1 ENHANCED LETHALITY: TODAYS INITIATIVES, TOMORROWS SUCCESS INFANTRY NEWS 2 ARMY TO EXTEND INFANTRY OSUT TO BOLSTER SOLDIER LETHALITY Devon L. Suits 4 ARMY TO FIELD SDM-R IN SEPTEMBER Devon L. Suits 5 NEW SMET WILL TAKE LOAD OFF INFANTRY SOLDIERS C. Todd Lopez 6 ARTB TEAMS WINS 2018 BRC Bryan Gatchell PROFESSIONAL FORUM 7 EFFECTIVE OPSYNCS = ENABLED OPERATIONS AT JRTC MAJ Richard E. Eaton MAJ Curtis J. Unger 10 CYBERWARFARE IN THE TACTICAL BATTLESPACE: AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS PERSPECTIVE CPT Stephanie J. Seward 15 THE NEW LEGIONNAIRE AND MODERN PHALANX: MODERN BALLISTIC ARMORS ROLE IN RETURNING HEAVY INFANTRY DOCTRINE TO THE BATTLEFIELD CPT Matthew Allgeyer DEP ARTMENTS

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ON THE COVER: U.S. Army Paratroopers with the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, communicate via radio during a 7th Army Training Commands Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany on 21 March 2018. (Photo by Markus Rauchenberger) BACK COVER: A Soldier with the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division provides security during an air assault movement s Training Area, HI, on 15 May 2018. TRAINING NOTES 24 ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT IN A COMPRESSED TIMELINE CPT Kyle E. Frazer 31 NO SECOND CHANCES, NO EXERCISE PAUSES... LESSONS FROM CASEVACS DURING EXERCISE RUBICON CPT Thomas G. Ankenbauer LESSONS FROM THE PAST 35 THE ARMYS RIO GRANDE CAMPAIGN OF 1859: A TOTAL FORCE CASE STUDY MAJ Nathan Jennings 39 COLD REGIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON MILITARY OPERATIONS, PART II BG Peter W. Clegg COL Robert H. Clegg BOOK REVIEWS 4 5 PERSHINGS CRUSADERS: THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IN WORLD WAR I By Richard S. Faulkner Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon 45 THE HUNDRED DAY WINTER WAR: FINLANDS GALLANT STAND AGAINST THE SOVIET ARMY By Gordon F. Sander Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMC 46 ARDENNES 1944: THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE By Antony Beevor Reviewed by 1stLt Walker D. Mills, USMC 47 ON TACTICS: A THEORY OF VICTORY IN BATTLE By B.A. Friedman Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon Infantry Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn submit an article, call (706) 545-2350 or email us at magazine@mail.mil

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Commandants NoteThe last Commandants Note highlighted marksmanship one of the Armys top six modernization priorities as We will remain a leader among the family of nations arms team. Enhanced Lethality: Todays Initiatives, Tomorrows Success INFANTRY 1

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2 INFANTRY April-June 2018 DEVON L. SUITSArmy to Extend Infantry OSUT to Bolster Soldier Lethality Photos by Markeith HoraceSoldiers in training with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, road march to a land navigation training site on 13 February 2017 at Fort Benning, GA. In 2019, the Army will extend One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for Infantry Soldiers from 14 weeks to 22 weeks. Changes to the program are meant to increase Soldier Townley R. Hedrick, U.S. Army Infantry School commandant. The new OSUT program will include expanded weapons training, increased vehicle-platform familiarization, extensive combatives training, and a 40-hour combat lifesaver during both day and night operations and include an increased emphasis on drill and ceremony maneuvers.A Needed ChangeFor the past 44 years, Infantry Soldiers were trained in a 14-week program of instruction. Ten weeks were allocated to basic military training, and an additional four were reserved total force. Discussions about changing OSUT began shortly after re-establish readiness and build a more lethal Infantry force, Hedrick said. And the Army Vision, recently published by Army GEN Mark A. Milley, reinforces the defense secretarys priority. Extending OSUT is about increasing our readiness and preparing for the future, SMA Daniel A. Dailey said. This pilot Army of 2028. With more time to train on critical Infantry tasks, well achieve greater lethality. In response to the increased focus on readiness, Army Infantry School approached the 198th Infantry Brigade, which trains all Army Infantry forces, and asked what could be done to make better Infantry Soldiers. We asked them if they had a longer training pipeline, what could they do with it, Hedrick said. In turn, the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and Infantry Brigade and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop an improved 21-week however, the combined OSUT team was directed to extend the new program to 22 weeks and include combat water survival training, he said.2 INFANTRY April-June 2018

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 3 The preliminary 21-week OSUT pilot program began this July with a graduation date scheduled for December, the commandant added. The new 22-week OSUT should begin in 2019, sometime between July and October. With the July new Soldiers will be part of the improved training, Hedrick said. U.S. Army Recruiting Command has already gone back execute a new and improved training program, Hedrick said.The New ProgramUnder the new OSUT program, Soldiers will get more with the M240 machine gun and the M249 squad automatic weapon. So across all the Infantry weapons, they will get more bullets, Hedrick said. And they will also shoot more at night, In addition to increased weapons training, Soldiers will training repetitions that focus more on squad formations during day and night operations, he said. The goal is to help We looked at land navigation and individual Soldier skills, Hedrick said. Under the new course, a Soldier will do an individual day and night land navigation course on their improves the mental and physical toughness of Soldiers coming through the Infantry OSUT. Additionally, the Infantry School has added six days of vehicle platform training to the new program. Under the 14week program, Soldiers only received one day of training with their assigned vehicle. During the new course, Soldiers assigned to a Stryker or Bradley unit will learn how to drive and perform maintenance on their assigned vehicle. Furthermore, built into the new curriculum. It is all about conditioning, following commands, and working as a unit, so you will see an increasing level of discipline through drill and ceremony, the commandant said. We think this gets us to the objective of a more expert and Changes to the program create an extended and more gradual training process to help decrease injuries caused by lack of nutrition or poor conditioning, Hedrick said. Weve developed a set of metrics with the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Science Solutions to try and evaluate how the Soldiers are doing during the 22week pilot program versus the 14-week program, Hedrick said. Weve got an evaluation plan to try and look at ourselves like we think it will.Manning and Future OSUT ChangesWith an increased time of training, the Infantry School Soldiers. Fortunately, resources and facilities are available at Fort Benning to support the new program, Hedrick said. Additionally, the Infantry School has been working with TRADOC to ensure they have enough drill sergeants in place to meet the 2019 launch date for the new 22-week OSUT. Under the current 14-week program, three drill sergeants are responsible for training a platoon of 60 Soldiers. For the 22-week program, the Infantry School is looking to augment OSUT companies with six additional Infantry instructors. Overall, the additional instructors provide a better studentto-instructor ratio during certain aspects of the course, the commandant said. At the conclusion of the pilot, the OSUT team will review the results and determine what parts of the program need to be re-sequenced. The pilot will also be used to determine the list of tasks assigned to each instructor, Hedrick said. In addition to the changes to the Infantry Schools curriculum, the Army is looking at extending other OSUT programs. Currently, the U.S. Army Armor School and U.S. Army Engineer School are performing internal analyses of their curricula to determine what resources will be needed to extend their own programs. Extending Infantry OSUT will allow us to allocate more time to honing the necessary skills to provide greater capability to our commanders, Dailey said. he said, we are investing in future Army readiness, which will wars when called upon to do so. (Devon L. Suits writes for the Army News Service.) Soldiers in training with Bravo Company, 1-50th IN, complete a land navigation exercise on 13 February 2017 at Fort Benning.

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4 INFANTRY April-June 2018INFANTRY NEWS Army to Field SDM-R in SeptemberDEVON L. SUITS T The new SDM-R is based on the Heckler and Koch G28EThe Army is working to equip each squad with a and barrel twist than the CSASS model and carries a base The CSASS is smaller, lighter, and more ergonomic, as [Additionally,] the CSASS has increased accuracy, which Were currently working on drop-in replacement (Devon L. Suits writes for the Army News Service.) Courtesy photo

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 5 Infantry Soldiers often carry an array of supplies and gear that together can weigh anywhere from 60 to 120 pounds, said CPT Erika Hanson, the assistant product manager for the Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET). But the SMET vehicle, which the the Soldier, Hanson said. Our directed requirement is to carry 1,000 pounds of the Soldier load. one Soldier, of course, but for an entire Infantry squad typically about nine Soldiers. The contenders for the Armys SMET program are four small vehicles, each designed to follow along behind a squad of Infantry Soldiers and carry most or all their gear for them, so they can move to where they need to be without being exhausted upon arrival. Im not an Infantry Soldier, Hanson said. But Ive carried a rucksack and I can tell you I can move a lot faster without a rucksack on my back. Not having to carry this load will make the Soldier more mobile and more lethal in a deployed environment. The four contender vehicles are the MRZR-X system from Polaris Industries Inc., Applied Research Associates Inc. and Neya Systems LLC; the Multi-Utility Tactical Transport from General Dynamics Land Systems; the Hunter Wolf from HDT Global; and the RS2-H1 system from Howe and Howe Technologies. Each was loaded down with gear representative of what they would be expected to carry when one of them is Nine ruck sacks, six boxes of MREs, and four water cans, Hanson said. This is about the equivalent of what a long-range mission for a light Infantry unit would need to carry. Hanson said that for actual testing and evaluation purposes, the simulated combat load also includes fuel cans and ammo cans as well. These small vehicles, Hanson said, are expected to follow a squad of Soldiers as they walk to wherever it is they have been directed to go. The requirement for the vehicles is that they be able to travel up to 60 miles over the course of 72 hours, she said. Three of the vehicles are pivot steered, Hanson said, to so that they can follow Soldiers even when there isnt a trail. One of the contenders for SMET has a steering wheel, with both a drivers seat and a passenger seat. So if a Soldier wanted to drive that vehicle, he could, Hanson said. Still, the Army requirement is that the SMET be able to operate unmanned, and all four vehicles provide that unmanned capability. Read more at: https://www.army.mil/article/206619/new_ (C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.) Infantry SoldiersC. TODD LOPEZ U.S. Army photosThe RS2-H1 system from Howe and Howe Technologies, top left; the Hunter Wolf system from HDT Global, top right; the MRZR-X system from Polaris Industries Inc., Applied Research Associates Inc., and Neya Systems LLC, bottom left; and the Multi-Utility Tactical Transport, or MUTT, from General Dynamics Land Systems, bottom right, are all vehicles the Army is

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6 INFANTRY April-June 2018INFANTRY NEWS Photo by Markeith HoraceF GA. April. about our entire country. ARTB Team Wins 2018 BRCBRYAN GATCHELL The winners of the 2018 Best Ranger Competition, SFC Joshua Rolfes (left) and SFC Anthony Allen of the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade, pose at the Ranger Monument on 16 April at Fort Benning, GA.

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 7We know it as the operations synchronization meeting or more commonly called the OPSYNC. It representing both brigade and its subordinates acknowledges Trends A common trend at the Joint Readiness enabled battalions and companies/troops/ Purpose subordinate units and attachments and array assets to increase

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8 INFANTRY April-June 2018 or recommended changes to the current order 1 not limited to:2 h. Subordinate units 5. Recommended changes to the current order Input requirements are task Input requirements are engineer Input requirements are retrans PROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 9 tasks to subordinate units 96 hours out. synchronization meeting outputs throughout the day to create subordinates. During this phase their success. coordinating instructions are issued with the supporting and process and then updated during the wargame. are tailored to what is required to continue the planning process 1 Command Post Organization and Operations2 Ibid.

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10 INFANTRY April-June 2018PROFESSIONAL FORUM The United States recently entered a new era of aggressive competition with an old rival, Russia. Russia previously pioneered the development of ever bigger and better atomic and hydrogen bombs in a race to gain dominance. Both the U.S. and Russia participated The emerging competition analogously still involves proxy focuses on the technology that now permeates every aspect of our lives. The U.S. is involved in a new era of cyberwarfare used its economic and military prowess to overpower the Soviet Union. Throughout the current clash, military might is as important as ever. As such, the U.S. Army must arm itself to overcome cyber threats from the strategic to the tactical level. In this competition, the Army must synergistically integrate cyber awareness, capability, and capacity to the pinnacle of tactical operations. Russias cyber capabilities and expose its motives. Both Russia socially, ethnically, and diplomatically. Before Russias Background: Cyber Component of INFOWAR collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the... ability to employ the same.1CPT STEPHANIE J. SEWARD Cyberwarfare in the Tactical Battlespace:

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 11 2 attitudes towards its actions during peaceful operations, both within and outside of the cyber realm. In fact, Russias [want] to achieve.3 even individual soldiers.4 initiated before its invasion of Georgia in 2008. In response, 5 Regardless of the strong evidence for Russias involvement saying its enough for a criminal court, to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt, she said.6 7 level. Russia demonstrated in Georgia that, regardless of the action.8 Correlative activity matters to the military at the tactical level while attribution matters to strategic and national players. Thus, analysis here focuses on how Russias conceptual and Cyberattacks as Indicators of Kinetic Action in an Integrated Attack Initial cyber operations in Georgia focused on discrediting the government and validating Russias actions. Before Russia actors targeted news and government websites that spread information for the area that Russia would later inundate with to protect civilians and spread information.9 Hybrid Threat, provides commanders and Russian adversary. TC 7-100 illustrates tactics a hybrid threat The Armys shared understanding of threat operations detailed in TC 7-100. 10 In operations, demonstrated these capabilities. Russia initially targeted large-scale media outlets and 11 In the days and hours and communications in the areas they subsequently invaded. planes got there.12 cyber reconnaissance capabilities. Afterwards, Georgia could occurred at a strategic/operational level; Georgia did not have cyber assets at tactical levels.13 to local tactical assets and local media assets. Georgian combat systems. Georgia simply did not have enough advanced technology to allow Russia to exploit vulnerabilities systems. Cyber actions in Georgia were relatively simplistic 14 illustrate lessons learned for the U.S. Army before graduating commanders operating in theater should understand that they government websites begin occurring against a nation. As in lines that facilitate civilian movement to safety. Additionally, area. In other words, if commanders begin receiving reports that their cyber warriors are defending against a sudden

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12 INFANTRY April-June 2018PROFESSIONAL FORUM national level and lost its capability to respond to or anticipate Cyberattacks and Irregular Warfare: The Ukraine as testing grounds for cyber strategies and to demonstrate cyber capabilities.15 16 Additionally, and stronger than the former counter-propaganda section 17 paramilitary operations which are normally of long duration and usually conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.18 use asymmetric warfare techniques.19In this case, Russia engaged in or encouraged irregular, of strategy with an overall threat structure in the irregular warfare theater is somewhat more challenging than in the conventional context. As a result, the enclosed analysis anecdotal examples of cyber capabilities before drawing broad-scale conclusions. Background on Fancy Bear and the GRU government or military; however, its actions correspond with intelligence agency.20 Tactical Danger of Cell Phones: Anecdotal Examples devices. The application uses basic algorithms to mimic our artillery piece from minutes to under 15 seconds. Around 9,000 artillery personnel used the application.21 read messages sent via the application and the phone used to potentially identify chain of command within the unit, unit composition and disposition, as well as future operations. identify the location of the D-30 artillery pieces. As a result, 22 phone numbers from exploited phones. In some instances, encouraging them to defect.23 cell phone numbers through nefarious and normal means. call rosters stored on phones. The GRU and other agencies then send targeted soldiers messages to defect, propaganda, or even impersonate another soldier or family member to distract the new battlespace. If forced to allow cell phones, commanders use it on numerous applications.24 Social Media Attacks and broad sweeping. Unconfirmed reports demonstrate allege nonexistent family issues to distract the soldier from 25 and therefore are not related to cyberwarfare. Russia views Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations which are normally of long duration and usually conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.18 As such, irregular forces incite kinetic violence and use asymmetric warfare techniques.19

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 13it is hard to distinguish between the two.26 them via cyber means. Additional Tactical Considerations Commanders should practice full analog days during tactical training exercises. intimately associated with targeting and electromagnetic warfare considerations. Though not discussed above, Additionally, the enemys ability to target computer systems may deny commanders use of mission command systems. U.S. Army forces need to train accomplishing all mission-essential systems for all operations. Then, without warning, commanders and all communications must occur through other means. Concurrently, the commander might disable all computer systems within the CP. Such an exercise would force leaders and Soldiers to use high frequency communications and vehicleThis training would also limit the effectiveness of nodes, reducing the enemys willingness to invest resources Commanders should advocate for real-world cyber training and take full advantage of that training Intelligence, cyber, and maneuver Soldiers need to train against an social media, and cell phone applications. This exercise allows commanders and s to train and to suggest a new generation enemy.27 This provides Soldiers experience with potential they can d from legitimate information in real time. Additionally, such to potential exploits. Cyberattacks are generally a support element for Cyber enables other operations. Generally 28 Physical and electronic security is of utmost importance. Commanders must remember that if an enemy more.29 computer when required, the enemy can gain access to the Photo by Steve Stover

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14 INFANTRY April-June 2018 Remember that anything that uses signals or connects to a network is vulnerable. Recent reports demonstrate that Russian electronic warfare assets can predetonate or dud incoming artillery and mortar rounds electronic fusing.30 As commanders identify potential electronic assets to deploy in tactical operations, they need to consider each assets The enemy can monitor a commanders communications at all times. can detect all electromagnetic emissions, including those which can then be pinpointed with unmanned aerial systems and targeted with massed artillery.31 As demonstrated by and communications. Additionally, Russia can monitor unencrypted communications from mission command systems. Commanders must encrypt their communications while ensuring that Soldiers guard those encryptions and practice also note that the enemy may monitor their communications and locations without exploiting them for intelligence value. As such, commanders should change encryptions as required by the operating environment and limit long periods of Commanders must integrate cyber enablers at all levels. commanders need to ensure they understand what cyber enablers can drive requirements at all levels. Commanders must also accept that as cyber integrates with the force, they will to build relationships and integrate these individuals as the Army develops multi-domain capabilities.32 down things made of... silicone... and those things are easy have been that bad lately... because no one has died yet... days, when Americans have not yet started dying [from these 33 threats, increasing our understanding of the current threat operating environment prepares the tactical Army for potential Notes1Hybrid Threat, 2010.2 3 Breaking Defense August 2017 from 4 Ibid. 5 Wired from 6 Ibid.7 Ibid. 8 Small Wars Journal (15 9 Small Wars Journal. Accessed from temp/639-hollis.pdf. 10 TC 7-100. 11121314 Accessed from 1Rev.pdf. 15 Ibid.16 for Cyberwar, Wired 17 BBC News, world-europe-39062663. 18 TC 7-100.19 Ibid. 20 Crowdstrike (12 com/blog/who-is-fancy-bear/. 21 Artillery Units, Crowdstrike from 22 Crowdstrike. Accessed from 2324 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 2627 cyber-warfare-21st-century-threats-challenges-and-opportunities.28 2930 10 July 2017 from generation-warfare. 31 Ibid. 3233 At the time this article was written, CPT Stephanie J. Seward was currently assigned as the incoming 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment S2 with a bachelors degree in philosophy, minor in applied statistics (nuclear PROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 15 The invention of modern body armor that allows Armor and Load Carriage: More Than Just an Endurance Problem 1 The Soldiers Load and The Mobility of a Nation, was 2 3 The New Legionnaire and Modern Phalanx: Modern Ballistic Armors Role in Returning Heavy CPT MATTHEW ALLGEYER

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16 INFANTRY April-June 2018 4 Body armor 6 the thermal strain problem seriously enough that they are 7 8 All of these For 10 11 The loads and 12 13 Military Medicine that through 14 A 2014 study of an infantry brigade returning from Afghanistan 16 17 18 Body armor 20 With the advent of the ceramic strike plate, Soldiers have effective protection from small arms PROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 17 Heavy Infantry as a Solution 21 22 23 Heavy infantrymen would be something new on the 24 26 That 27 will guide our understanding of the potential of the use of heavy infantry to the modern reader systems types of troops than their heavy infantry Illustration from A Short History of War: The Evolution of Warfare and Weapons by

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18 INFANTRY April-June 2018 28 Heavy infantry deployed in advantageous terrain against an 30 The transportation needs of heavy infantry lead were also famous heavy infantrymen who rode to battle and 31 The heavy infantry is properly employed with 32 33 34 During the 36 37 I is not limited to western military tradition but a near-universal Illustration courtesy of the National Endowment for the HumanitiesPROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 19 Heavy Infantry Adapted to Today 38 Soldiers with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, dismount a Bradley Fighting Vehicle during the battalions April-June 2018 INFANTRY 19

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20 INFANTRY April-June 2018 40 formation would be able to move more readily through open Heavy Infantry: A Developing Solution to Developing Problems 41 The PROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 21 has problems and maneuver through terrain that would otherwise be very between heavy and light would of the light infantry will be Another developing problem that the heavy 42 to have various proposed programs based on the remnants of 43 44 This power limitation may meet It also plans to integrate multiple 46 infantrymen and therefore would not be adopted by the Army 47 They are also very vulnerable 48 The realities The Soldier Protection System Personal Protective Equipment tailorable system designed to defeat

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22 INFANTRY April-June 2018 our heavily armed and armored mounted platforms into the Conclusion armored platform to dismount into this environment with nothing more than a in how it goes about dismounting infantry or bringing infantry into an engagement environment will allow for greater freedom Soldiers from A Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, clear a courtyard during PROFESSIONAL FORUM

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 23 Notes1 Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps Journal of the United States Infantry Association2 The Soldiers Load and The Mobility of a Nation 3 Load and Carriage in Military Operations Parameters4Load and Carriage, Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise6 European Journal of Applied Physiology 7 8Operations 10 Load and Carriage, 11Foot Marches1213 14 Military Medicine Stars and Stripes 16 JAMA Internal Medicine17 18 20 Operator Manual for Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) and Improved Outer Tactical Vest GEN II (IOTV GEN II) Army Times 21 On Armor 22 A Warrior Dynasty The Rise and Fall of Sweden as a Military Superpower 1611-1821 23 Warfare in the Ancient World 24 War and Technology Journal of Ancient History Mons Graupius and the Role of Auxiliaries in Battle 26Mons Graupius27Warfare in the Ancient World28 The Complete Roman Army30The Complete Roman Army31 Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World, AD 500-AD 1500 Equipment, Skills and Tactics 32Warfare in the Ancient World3334Mons GraupiusThe Face of Battle 36 The Journal of Hellenic Studies 37 Ashigaru 1467-1649 38 Stars and Stripes Janes Tank Recognition Guide 40 41 42 Wired,43 44 46 Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 47Tank Platoon48 Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations The Infantry BattalionUrban Operations CPT Matthew Allgeyer

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24 INFANTRY April-June 2018 I n 2015, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, transitioned the focus of its crucible training event from a mission readiness exercise (MRE) to a direct action training environment (DATE). This transition moved the focus of brigade combat teams (BCTs) away from stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations within a nodal defense construct out of combat outposts to an intelligence-driven, intensive permissive training environment focused on hybrid has been the necessity for doctrinal defensive operations, engagement area development (EA DEV). Light infantry formations typically struggle to conduct EA DEV suited for an armored/mechanized near-peer threat in a compressed timeline. The compressed timeline presents unique challenges and requires a change to the methodology by which we conduct our planning processes and how we execute the defense. From my observations as an observercontroller-trainer (OCT) at JRTC, the challenges primarily lie in three areas: 1) Our military decision-making process (MDMP) is not conducive to supporting of EA DEV due to the extensive time requirements. 2) Organizations do not effectively utilize collaborative and parallel planning defense. 3) Company troop leading procedures (TLPs) do not have the requisite systems to effectively conduct EA DEV; junior leaders are not experienced in the field craft-intensive requirements of the defense; and company TLPs are truncated so much it is nearly impossible for companies to effectively conduct planning. The focus of this article is to propose a djustments to assist in streamlining we as an Army are still improving our organizational knowledge base for defensive operations in this environment. I will not be addressing tactics of the defense for company and enabler capabilities but rather focus merely on our systems processes to facilitate subordin ate commanders MDMP One of the largest issues is the requirement of our MDMP for the development of operation orders (OPORDs). If we merely look at the one-third/two-thirds rule that we espouse into our orders process, it is nearly impossible for companies to be successful in the defense. Although this will not always be the case, an organization must prepare for the most probable Engagement Area Development in a Compressed Timeline CPT KYLE E. FRAZER Figure 1 Parallel Sequences of MDMP and TLPs Field Manual (FM) 6-0,

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 25 and dangerous course of action (COA), and more frequently period to establish the defense. Let us examine the current four-day model at JRTC (for the sake of ease, I will round out MDMP for the issuance of an order; we are now down to three days. A battalion takes just over a day to conduct its MDMP; we are now down to two days. The company takes up to 12 hours to conduct company TLPs. As a result, we are now less than 36 hours out from the execution of the defense. Nearly all parties involved would agree this is not enough time to deliberately establish a defense within a DATE and at the very least is substantially less than optimal. A few caveats to this analogy, this is assuming that higherAdditionally, this does not account for enemy action within the assigned area of responsibility and the potential reallocation or time to account for friction as described by Carl van Clausewitz. So, in a perfect system with no friction, company teams have less than 36 hours to conduct a deliberate defense against a superior enemy armored force. If you look at this issue by itself, it makes an already daunting task nearly impossible. We routinely observe companies at JRTC receiving their planning from the warning orders (WARNOs) or OPORD the day of execution. This leaves companies with less than a day to reposition forces, conduct EA DEV, physically emplace their companies and with adjacent units, and somewhere during this frenetic time conduct an EA rehearsal. numerous adjustments. The primary improvement is information timely manner. There are three WARNOs programmed into a Throughout my tenure as a company commander and certain information requirements company commanders need to execute their EA DEV. The following is not an all-inclusive list of information, but it addresses the primary information requirements companies need in order to nest within their Information Requirements (Proposed): No later than (NLT) defend time Location of company defensive position Enemy situation (at a minimum the following) o Situation template (SITEMP) o Most likely course of action (MLCOA) o Most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) Engineer assets available Reconnaissance assets available Counter-reconnaissance plan Class IV available Resupply method Battle position guidance is why we have a structured MDMP. The following are some improvements, which I believe are both feasible and necessary and below. During my tenure at JRTC, a primary issue is the tendency 70-percent solution allows for initiation of movement earlier and have to adhere to the constraints within our doctrine, which are there to protect planning timelines for subordinate leaders. Regarding the structure of our MDMP, if we can prioritize the dissemination of the aforementioned information requirements, and facilitate our junior leaders. I believe we can achieve this by provide any information regarding the following it will drastically increase the time available. MDMP Outputs (Current): o Initial allocation of time Additional Information Output (Proposed): NLT defend time (if available) Location of defensive position(s) (if available) Enemy situation (anything available) Engineer assets available Reconnaissance assets available For engineer and reconnaissance assets available, this does not mean describing the task organization, task and purpose, or the higher headquarters. This will help companies determine the scope of their defense. For example, if the battalion only has one Improved High Mobility Engineer Excavator (IHMME) team, the company commander better understands the availability of this asset to his formation and the amount of protective obstacles he can feasibly request. It would be his entire company and its vehicles (requires D7 or Armored planning and provide expectation management for their organic capabilities. The location and battle array are also very important as they allow the companies to orient their battle positions and start necessary movement for establishing battle positions and individual protection positions. Notice that we have yet to

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26 INFANTRY April-June 2018 TRAINING NOTES key information for the company, but it is not essential at this be tied to the obstacle plan. After mission analysis, this is where the higher headquarters key outputs are still conceptual, but at this point there should be a basic understanding of the operation. If there is a commanddirected COA, this becomes even more feasible. MDMP Outputs (Current): o Mission statement o Initial planning guidance (CCIRs) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) and running estimates o Assumptions Additional Information Output (Proposed): NLT defend time Location of defensive position(s) Reserve organization and type (armor, heavy weapons, light infantry, etc.) IDF assets available Resupply method (tailgate vs. service station) To reiterate, most of this information shapes and frames a general understanding of the overall task and purpose of defensive SoM is paramount to success. The next WARNO is after COA approval. This is where a company during a compressed timeline. The recommendations I provide become more ambiguous because the situation will heavily dictate the mode and timeline for dissemination. At this point, companies routinely wait on the word as most of the completion of COA approval. However, as demonstrated in the one-thirds/two-thirds rule analogy, this does not provide a brigade had more than a week, our systems would be conducive to this planning timeline, but rarely do we train organizations in combat. At some point before the COA approval WARNO (the sooner the better), the companies need the following information to of parallel planning with their higher headquarters. Additional Information Output (Proposed): Enemy MLCOA and MDCOA Battalion battle array (locations of forward, left, right, rear, and reserve forces) Battle position guidance (task and purpose nested against battalion decisive operation and any constraints or requirements mandated from the battalion commander) Counter-reconnaissance plan (which should be developed during IPB with the scout platoon leader and S2 to address battalion priority information requirements [PIR] with reconnaissance assets initiating movement sometime between COA development and approval) Engineer support plan (assets available and prioritization of support) Class IV allocation by company (even a conservative estimate will allow the company to execute some level of initiative in establishing its obstacles) defense against a near-peer threat when there is abundant time available. Intrinsically, the issue with our MDMP is that to effectively disseminate information to maximize time the defense is a more labor-intensive operation requiring position development, key weapon emplacement, counterFigure 2 MDMP Steps Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0,

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 27 reconnaissance, etc.) before executing the actual defense against an enemy force. This process takes time, which we need to maximize for subordinate commanders. The primary way to execute a defense in a condensed timeline is to execute a level of collaborative and parallel planning with subordinate commanders. Collaborative and Parallel Planning Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0 The Operations Process Collaborative and parallel planning is an integral aspect of our planning processes. It allows for shared understanding at multiple echelons and allows commanders to inject requirements and changes to the proposed plan before the publication of the OPORD, decreasing wasted planning time. Company commanders are generally the best planners commander because they have experience (having served the best situational awareness regarding the capabilities of their organizations. The planning process would be faster and are numerous shortcomings regarding our utilization of these aspects: Enabler management First, from my observations during DATE rotations, many planning. There are numerous reasons for this, which include: 1) The dislocated nature of our formations in a DATE environment is a major contributing factor; and of including subordinate units in the planning process (e.g., increasing shared understanding, utilizing commanders to planning until they have a briefable product to push the companies rather than tying them into the planning process early and often ultimately wasting time. thing. There are a myriad of reasons for this, but if a commander can incorporate his junior leaders into the planning process, it allows for multitasking, decentralized execution, and most measures (DFCMs), graphic control measures (GCMs), arrayal this issue is utilizing true bottom-up practices. friction points and requests changes to mandated constraints GCMs and DFCMs developed by the lower command to (COP) and further facilitates battle tracking through routine and priority reporting. We commonly misuse the term bottomlacks requisite detail and GCMs to control the maneuver of subordinate organizations. Routinely, we have altered the term as a cover for our inadequacies in detailed maneuver planning, as opposed to seeking subordinate input on an executable and developed plan. This issue is not isolated to the battalion level. This is a problem from brigade to battalion, battalion to company, and company to platoon. However, at the company level, far too frequently, commanders are waiting on the word from their higher headquarters. More disruptively, company commanders fail to identify SoM. The top recommendation I provide to commanders is to over but to gain an understanding of the defensive techniques their company and battalion will utilize, assist the S3 with any planning shortcomings or requirements the company may awareness on the enemy and friendly situations. All of these would allow commanders to execute disciplined initiative and start necessary movement with their formations. Enabler integration is a routine friction point in the planning efforts of units generally because units are not properly integrating enablers into their organizations immediately upon arrival. There needs to be an inculcated process for when an enabler arrives; units need to have a routine or standard operating procedure (SOP) for reception, integration, and involvement within the planning process and subsequent maneuver. Our enablers are the subject matter experts on their particular skillset. For the defense, units frequently mismanage engineers at multiple echelons. It is common practice for sapper understand the requisite needs to resource, plan, and control a battalion obstacle plan. The Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) teaches our commanders how to manage engineer assets, and the key is through a detailed sync matrix. This is hit or miss if battalions create this synchronization measure, but more frequently, a poor sync matrix is due to a lack of planning or the inability to enforce this planning tool. This generally is a hand over and reception of the enabler and maximization of engineer support). Simply put, we need to plan for the initial

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28 INFANTRY April-June 2018 integration of enablers and who is responsible for this integration, which the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander. There are numerous examples of enablers we struggle to integrate: short range air defense (SHORAD), heavy weapons attached armor assets, reconnaissance assets conducting forward and rearward passage of lines (FPOL) for counterreconnaissance, attached sustainers for resupply operations, and the list goes on. The integration of enablers is no with your subordinate commands. One should involve them in the planning process, ensure they have a shared understanding of the COP, and conduct integration. Most importantly, companies need these systems since they are most likely to receive and utilize these enablers. This leads to the next aspect of EA DEV inhibiting units within a compressed timeline. Company TLPs A collaborative session at the company level can be simple and still retain control over the operation. For example, enemy angle of attack, determine enemy COA in the EA, and determine where to kill the enemy) and describe this information to their platoon leaders in a group setting; they will achieve a basic shared understanding on the situation. Following the description, commanders can array their formation and allow platoon leaders to reconnoiter the location and report back occupy their positions and report when set, and the command team (1SG, XO, and commander) can survey each site and key weapon system emplacement. At this point, commanders have set conditions for their platoons to establish their defense and start executing individual tasks. This frees the company up to focus on the obstacle plan and overlaying direct and indirect weapon systems. This is not a complex concept, but in a compressed timeline plan in one sitting by themselves thinking this will save time. In all actuality, it undermines a shared understanding, prevents disciplined initiative, wastes more time in the end, and prevents commanders from focusing on the key aspects of the plan and minutia within the plan. Far too frequently, companies come to JRTC with minimal systems in place, especially for an operation as technically complex as a defense. Platoons and companies would greatly improve their ability to execute the defense with nested products to be overly complex fundamentally, but they simply need establish a standard for execution, and allow subordinates the Decision making tends to get centralized to the platoon leader and commander levels; this causes a substantial stove pipe, wastes time that could be used to further conduct planning and Expounding on this concept of systems establishment, we can boil the defense down to a battle drill. This requires TRAINING NOTES Figure 3 Figure 4 Building an Engagement Area

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 29 commanders to analyze reoccurring tasks, identify who is responsible for execution, and decide the standard to which and one we are familiar with, but the key to battle drills is that the process of the defense, you can provide a framework and establish a sequential battle drill for the defense. Another key fundamental I observed in the effective initiate movement and priorities of work (PoWs) immediately. This, much like a battle drill, has a structure and only needs does not need to be complex; PoWs are similar to those we the emplacement of key weapon systems against an obstacle into their PoW quickly, the structural (labor intensive) tasks of detailed planning. These all create more time for commanders within the defense through simple systems and products within their SOP. Command Post (CP) Operations Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-0.5 Command Post Organization and Operations at JRTC consistently has been the inability of companies to conduct CP operations and maintain a COP. I realize this is address CP operations at the company level; it only addresses out. If platoons are sensors for a company and a company is a sensor for the battalion, all should be nested. As such, company and platoon CPs and systems should be small-scale versions of their higher headquarters, and this is one of the even worse than companies at nesting against their higher headquarters; their MC systems are often nonexistent. CPs do not have to be complex. They need to be tailorable to the environment, but this does not mean minimizing CPs so much they become nonexistent or pocket litter. Commanders need to maximize their headquarters Priorities of Work Security (Continuous) slope) Withdrawal Plan rendezvous point/procedures Communications Plan and all subordinate elements at all times Mission Planning and Preparations and inspections (PCC/PCI), and prepare deliberate positions Water Resupply Platoon has equipment and resources as additional equipment. PL/PSG ensure communications are maintained at all times and contingencies are planned for. Mess and Rest Plan Figure 5 Priorities of Work Squad Leader Priorities of Work Establish local security: Ensure wire is laid to squad (if available) Ensure Soldiers manning observation posts (OPs) have a position to return to: o Issue Soldiers a contingency plan with azimuths and tentative grids to current location and black/gold plans Draw a sector sketch and submit a copy to platoon leader and dead space by getting into each position and sighting weapons Coordinate with left and right squad and adjacent units Have Soldiers begin digging after platoon leader checks position Issue rations, water, ammunition, pioneer tools, and barrier material Pass additional information and changes to plans Supervise wire and mine teams Give warning order for planned patrol missions Set up squad alert and security plan Reconnoiter alternate and supplementary positions, routes, and counterattack plan with the platoon leader, then brief team leaders Designate squad urine areas Post and brief OPs Rest and conduct personal hygiene Figure 6 Example Squad Priorities of Work

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30 INFANTRY April-June 2018 TRAINING NOTES personnel with additional duties. To be frank, the default for most company headquarters (outside of the command team and fires personnel) is to hang out near the company trains watching the vehicles. Companies need to have administration and logistics operation be the only ones tracking this. Company CPs need to continually update themselves when the commander is busy running missions or trooping the line. A company cannot have its CP press pause every time the commander does something. You can build redundancy at the headquarters (orderly room clerk and supply sergeant as the primary persons doing S1 and S4 functions), but this implies that you take the time to build the system and trackers. You need current operations (CUOPs) and future (FSO) and radio-telephone operator (RTO) running CUOPs. This would free the commander to focus on FUOPs. You can but companies do not force the function. Companies do not rehearse CP operations, ensure routine updating, codify them into SOP, and violently enforce them. A CP is a central location where a commander can quickly ascertain the current situation and COP to make sound tactical decisions. If a company does not use or enforce CP operations, maintain an updated COP, it CANNOT make sound tactical is the simplicity of a COP. Although vague in its description, fundamentally a COP is paragraph one of an OPORD (weather, light, terrain, enemy, and friendly forces) that is continuously The best aspect of a CP is that the commander is not the only one who can quickly understand the COP from a functioning numerous ways: it helps them maintain their own COP and CP, provides updates (especially when you are not there, preventing the pause of operations), and receives updated tasks and priorities (multitasking). More importantly, the CP allows for a central location for the commander to get subordinate updates and conduct routine battle rhythm events (commanders should only have to publish information once rather than three times at three locations). This does not mean it has to be elaborate with large tents and massive display boards, but it needs form. Commanders need to develop them against a standard, and leaders must actively support and enforce that standard. In summary, the primary way to execute a defense in a condensed timeline is to execute a level of collaborative and parallel planning with subordinate commanders. I typically do not see companies with proper MC systems or TLP SOPs in maintaining a COP (companies are even worse at disseminating the COP to platoons), do not have SOPs established for PoW, and struggle with organizational experience and knowledge information down to companies as early as possible to allow them to start necessary movement. Companies need to do the MDMP. Tailoring the WARNOs within the MDMP will allow companies to get key information for the defense to start timea higher headquarters and their subordinates. Inclusive planning at all echelons will only improve initiative, and allow commanders more avenues to accept prudent risk. Company and platoon systems are paramount to their success. Companies need to establish detailed MC SOPs for the defense focused on their CP, creating minimum defense checklists/SOPs and execution products for the defense to allow platoons to start necessary movement and display the same initiative company commanders so aggressively seek for themselves. Photo by SSG Daniel Love Platoon leaders in C Company, 3rd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, plan the defense of an urban center during the units Joint Readiness Training Center rotation on 20 February 2016. CPT Kyle E. Frazer serves as a company senior observer-controllertrainer with Task Force 1, Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. His previous assignments include serving as commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; assistant S3 and rear detachment commander with 1-508th PIR; and S3 Air, assistant S3, battalion S3, personnel security detachment platoon leader, mechanized platoon leader, and scout platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 172nd Infantry Brigade, Grafenwoehr, Germany. CPT Frazer graduated from the University of Utah in 2008 as a Distinguished Military Graduate with a degree in political science.

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 31 From 12 to 25 November 2014, C Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, conducted a bilateral training exercise as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve with the Romanian Mihai Viteazul 6th Special Operations Brigade in Cmpia Turzii and Cincu, Army training exercise of Operation Atlantic Resolve conducted in Romania and for the crash of a military helicopter which killed eight Romanian soldiers. During this time, I served as the platoon leader for C Companys 3rd Platoon and conducted the casualty evacuation of four of my Soldiers during the exercise.BackgroundOperation Atlantic Resolve began in late April 2014 when 1-503rd IN to Poland and the Baltic States in a demonstration of continued commitment to its NATO obligations following Operation Atlantic Resolve grew in scope with an expanding deployed to multilateral and bilateral training exercises across to its home base, Caserma Ederle, in the small town of Vicenza deploy again in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, this time I arrived in Italy as a second lieutenant and reported to the 1-503rd IN on 8 October 2014 after graduating from the Infantry at Fort Benning, GA. Following in-processing, my battalion minutes serving as a platoon leader, 1-503rd IN leadership activated my platoon on an emergency deployment readiness exercise and deployed my platoon to San Giorgio di Brunico Training Area in northern Italys Dolomite Mountains, where I quickly got to know my NCOs and assessed my platoons readiness.1 No Second Chances, No Exercise Pauses...Lessons from CASEVACs During Exercise RubiconCPT THOMAS G. ANKENBAUERParatroopers from the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment and Romanian 6th Special Operations Brigade conduct a combined parachute operation at the beginning of Exercise Rubicon at Luna Drop Zone in Romania on 14 November 2014. April-June 2018 INFANTRY 31

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32 INFANTRY April-June 2018TRAINING NOTES The last time my company had conducted a continuous, multiple-day, was three years prior in Hohenfels, Germany, during pre-deployment training for its upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. By the time I arrived in October 2014, most of the platoons Soldiers and NCOs with combat experience from the previous deployment had left the unit. My Soldiers lack of among the junior NCOs and privates, was exacerbated by the absence of the platoon sergeant, who was attending Ranger School at the time.DeploymentDuring late October and early November 2014, C Company conducted exercise planning and preparation for a two-week deployment in mid-November to central Romania to conduct Exercise Rubicon in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. The exercise would consist of one week of airborne operations and troop leading procedures at the Romanian Air Forces 71st Air Base in Cmpia Turzii, followed by a week of marksmanship ranges National Training Center in Cincu. C Company would conduct the exercise with an ad hoc company assembled from airborne and mountain platoons of the Romanian Mihai Viteazul 6th Special Operations Brigade. By 7 November, the company was ready to deploy, its weapons and equipment packed in shipping containers. On 12 November, C Company along with the battalions sniper section, mortar section, and S6 communications section deployed to the Romanian air base in Cmpia Turzii. immediately met their Romanian counterparts and began preexecution planning and coordination for scheduled training.Airborne Operations and PlanningC Company and the Romanian Special Forces Company conducted pre-jump training on 13 November and then Zone on 14 November. Immediately after the parachute jump, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta held a press conference and Romanian forces in formation. On 16 November, both companies moved all personnel and equipment to the Cincu midday on 19 November after weather forecasts projected rain original plan to conduct an airborne insertion into the exercise via a combat equipment parachute jump. The commander of the Romanian Special Forces Company led Team Griffin, which comprised two Romania Special Forces platoons and C Companys 2nd Platoon. My company commander, CPT Teddy Borawski, led Team March or Die, which comprised C Companys 1st and 3rd Platoons and a Romanian airborne platoon.Field Exercise dismounting, Team Griffin marched towards Objective march northeast towards its assigned objective, OBJ Sword, which consisted of three separate platoon objectives, each approximately one kilometer apart. My platoon reached the company release point, separated from the companys main body at about 1800, established my platoons objective rally waited for the order to attack. By 1900, both 1st Platoon and the Romanian platoon had successfully completed their attacks on their respective objectives, and at 1930, CPT Borawski ordered 3rd Platoon to attack the remaining objective. A Romanian 6th Special Forces Brigade soldier gives guidance to a paratrooper from C Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, on the operation of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher prior to a combined arms range on 18 November 2014 in Cincu, Romania, as part of Exercise Rubicon.

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 33 My platoon successfully conducted a raid on OBJ Sword at 2000 and then retrograded one kilometer to the platoon ORP. My platoons movement was slowed due to the dense underbrush and steep terrain, conditions which worsened under steadily my security team at the ORP at 2030, collected ruck sacks, the night to rejoin Team March or Die at the company patrol base, which was located in a bunker complex a half kilometer northeast of the ORP through a hilly and dense forest. Just prior to 2100, my platoon cold, wet, and fatigued from the raid and the retrograde to the ORP departed the the movement, one of my Soldiers in the rear of the formation my acting platoon sergeant and my platoon medic removing unconscious from heat stroke. He had failed to remove his waterproof jacket during our 30-minute rest in the ORP and had overheated, despite the rain and freezing temperature. The medic explained to me that the Soldier required brain damage. As the platoon sergeant and medic prepared the Soldier for movement, I immediately assessed possible evacuation options from my current location. The weather and dense forest precluded the possibility of using the Romanian road to our position to conduct a non-standard casualty hand microphone, I sent a 9-line MEDEVAC request on his radio over the company net for a truck CASEVAC. organized the evacuation detail, which consisted of my platoon sergeant, platoon medic, RTO, and six Soldiers to rotate carrying the Soldier on a folding litter, along with my best team leader to navigate us to the road. I ordered the team leader of 2nd Squads Alpha Team to my position, and we hastily created light for either NVDs or headlamps to quickly and reliably terrain associate, and our global positioning system devices lacked signal in the poor weather. I needed a certain path out of the woods, even if we had to push through harder terrain. I placed the squad leader of 2nd Squad in charge of the rest of contingency plan. The evacuation detail immediately began movement, and I suppressed my urge to take point when movement slowed as we passed through the dense brush. I maintained contact between the team leader and the litter team, double checked that the CASEVAC truck was en route and that the aid station was prepared to receive the injured Soldier. As movement further slowed heading uphill and forcing a path through the brambles, I decided to replace the team leader and take point to maintain speed. I ordered him to keep me from moving too far in Romanian 6th Special Forces Brigade soldiers and paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade conduct a patrol together on 20 November 2014 in Cincu, Romania, as part of Exercise Rubicon. April-June 2018 INFANTRY 33

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34 INFANTRY April-June 2018TRAINING NOTES CPT Thomas G. Ankenbauer MD. His previous assignments include serving as a platoon leader in C Infantry Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Vicenza, Italy. CPT Ankenbauer located at Fort Benning, GA. He holds a Bachelor of Science in International System (OES) schools have neither the time nor ability to cover every scenario a new platoon leader (PL) or platoon sergeant (PSG) may face after assuming duties. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, in conjunction with serving and former PLs and PSGs, has compiled lessons learned and best practices for PLs and PSGs and those who aspire to these positions to improve themselves and their units. The purpose of this handbook is to provide these lessons learned and best practices to PLs and PSGs to help Download the handbook at: front of the littered casualty, told my RTO to stay at my heels to maintain radio contact with the CASEVAC, and continued to dead reckon. I broke through the tree line and into the clearing of the road at the pick-up site, just as 1st Platoons platoon leader crested the road leading the MEDEVAC team the CASEVAC truck, which evacuated him to the Romanian aid station. The evacuation detail and I then moved back through the woods to link up with the rest of my platoon, and together next morning at approximately 0400, I evacuated my platoon medic, who discovered upon waking that his cornea had been severely scratched by a branch the night prior while evacuating 0730, another Soldier in my platoon experienced a severe by a nasopharyngeal airway, initially inserted as a precaution, drive from the training area to the Romanian aid station. After stabilizing the Soldier at the aid station, the Romanian medics evacuated him to the closest hospital in Sibiu via the also evacuated a fourth Soldier in my platoon as a low priority due to immersion foot. After the Romanian MEDEVAC helicopter dropped the one at approximately 1040. Members of my company closer to the suspected crash site and their Romanian counterparts immediately formed a search party, which eventually found the wreckage near the Romanian town of Malancrav and evacuated the two surviving passengers. The crash killed eight Romanian soldiers on board and prompted the decision by the Romanian military to cancel the remaining portion of the Company conducted a farewell ceremony and a memorial service for the eight Romanian soldiers on 24 November. C Company and its attachments redeployed as scheduled to our home station in Italy the following day, 25 November.ConclusionMy experiences during Exercise Rubicon facing real-world emergencies and casualties reinforced several lessons with and leader. The first lesson is that leaders must quickly grasp the situation they are facing, rapidly form a plan, and then aggressively execute, often under adverse conditions. The second lesson is that there are no second chances, no exercise pauses, no one, or nothing that will save Soldiers or the mission in combat or training except for the actions and decisions of leaders. Soldiers cannot learn leadership in warfare from a textbook will be executed in the mud and cold and darkness, weary with exhaustion and weight, and confused by the sounds, and it truly prepared me for the trying situations my platoon faced in the cold and rainy conditions in Romania in November 2014.Notes1 Emergency deployment readiness exercises are no-notice training exercises designed to test the ability of a unit, usually airborne infantry, to deploy without warning into a combat zone CALL Releases Platoon Leadership Handbook NO. 18-24 MAY 2018 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS10 Meade Avenue, Building 50 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED18-NO. 18-24 THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF PLATOON LEADERSHIP MAY 2018

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 35Total Force cooperation between the U.S. Armys active, Guard, and Reserve components has long been a by patriot volunteers in the American Revolution to the societal mobilization for World War II, Americas primary landpower institution has habitually integrated a wide range of Soldiers that has included professionals, reservists, militia, draftees, and both state and federal volunteers to conduct expeditionary campaigns of mass and scale. These types of multi-component theaters, have allowed the nations oldest military service to, as required by U.S. joint doctrine, be synergistic... with the sum greater than its parts.1 American military history is replete with instances of the Army Operating Concept, integrate the unique civil-military expertise of citizen Soldiers across military, government, economic, and social spheres into a Total Force approach that complements and enhances the active components capabilities.2 While tectonic wars like the Civil War and World Wars garner the most attention, the littleknown Rio Grande Campaign of 1859 along study where an infantry task force of Army regulars joined with state mounted forces, in the form of para-military Texas Rangers, to defeat a hybrid Tejano adversary. This minor campaign, where professionals and volunteers complemented strengths, resulted in restoration of relative, though ethnically biased and temporary, stability along a troubled section of the U.S.-Mexico border. The Rio Grande FrontierThe First Cortina War exploded along the Rio Grande in South Texas in the summer of 1859 as an ethnically driven political confrontation between the emerging AngloGermanic majority and the long-standing Hispanic residents. Rising tensions between aggressive white settlers and resisting Tejano trans-nationals, which exacerbated centuries of discontentment amongst isolated and disenfranchised Rio Grande border communities, seized lucrative properties and resources from vulnerable owners. The rapid transfer of local political power across South Texas began in earnest following the United States crushing followed catalyzed social discontentment and ultimately an armed uprising. Tejano militancy exploded on 13 July 1859 when Juan Nepomuceno Cortina, a prominent Hispanic-Texan rancher and Mexican army veteran of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, killed a Brownsville constable who was subjecting a The Armys Rio Grande Campaign of 1859:A Total Force Case StudyMAJ NATHAN JENNINGS BrownsvilleMap of Texas, 1859

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36 INFANTRY April-June 2018Hispanic ranching hand to harsh treatment. Cortina then escaped across the international border to Matamoros while angry Tejanos and Mexicans along both sides of the Rio Grande hailed him as a hero. Texas Ranger John Salmon Ford a former soldier, newspaper editor, and physician who would lead the state military response later complemented the possessed, and cunning while noting that he acted decisively and promptly.3 As a strong leader who intuitively understood hybrid warfare, Cortina would soon demonstrate a remarkable ability for combining guerrilla and conventional tactics with acts of terrorism. On 28 September, the revolutionary militant exacted his revenge. Cortina led approximately 75 horsemen to attack Brownsville directly. In order to maximize political impact, he former ranching partner, Adolphus Clavaecke, in addition to rescuing several Tejano prisoners. With surprise and shock the raiders, popularly called Cortinistas, descended upon the unsuspecting town and, according to Fords admittedly biased account, killed whomever they wished, robbed whomever they pleased. Cortina then set up camp seven miles away and on militia called the Brownsville Tigers. The brazen rebels legend was expanding across the Rio Grande Valley and threatened to engulf the region in violent chaos.The events at Brownsville, though relatively minor in scale, sent political shockwaves across the region. George Woods, Mexican-American Wars, distrusted the dispersed U.S. Army garrisons to respond quickly and immediately authorized an improvised expedition of state-funded Texas Rangers to counter the militants. He appointed William Tobin, a former Marshal of San Antonio, as commander and dispatched the company south to break the ongoing siege at Brownsville. Despite the Texans aggressive intentions, on 20 November Cortinas force defeated a detachment of the rangers while killing three in the mutilated and left to rot in the sun. For many Texans who yet retained ethnic enmity over atrocities at places like the Alamo 5Combined Arms IntegrationSkirmishing continued over the next two weeks as both sides mustered additional forces to the Rio Grande. By midgarrisons to suppress the uprising. Major Samuel Heintzelman, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Regiments in various frontier assignments, assumed command of both federal and state he created a task force comprising two infantry companies, one artillery company, one cavalry troop, and several companies of fast-moving, though indisciplined, mounted rangers. The 6The combined force of 165 regulars and 125 state volunteers marched down the Laredo road with, according to Heintzelman, appreciation of the Texans strengths in speed, agility, and environmental familiarity on the Southwestern frontier. The advance scouts soon discovered that the Cortinistas had support from captured cannon in a dense chaparral farther down the road. Upon making contact, the major, sought to immediately overwhelm the rebels by neutralizing their cannon with his own and then charging their position with his infantry. However, when the soldiers arrived they discovered that the wily Cortina had displaced again.7 Library of Congress Prints and Photographs DivisionSamuel P. Heintzelman, pictured here as a major general during the Cortina rebels. Major John Rip Ford, a MexicanAmerican War veteran, led the Texas Ranger volunteers during the First Cortina War. LESSONS FROM THE PAST

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 37Rangers and federal cavalry pursued the Tejano rebels discovered that Cortina had left a rear guard in a dense brush, allowing their inspirational leader to escape. Tobin dismounted his men and cleared the position with intense close-quarters Heintzelman who held undisciplined volunteers in low regard admitted that the Rangers, supported by the foot, soon routed them again. Despite the commendation, later reports by Tobin rebels to withdraw. In actuality, a combination of indecision and challenging terrain conspired to slow the task forces advance. 8Simultaneous to the escalation at Brownsville, the Texas governor in Austin had dispatched Ford with another company of 53 volunteer horsemen as reinforcements. The rangers, who rode horses acclimatized to the arid Texan environment, rode 350 miles at maximum speed to reach the scene of battle. Ford later wrote that his men reached Major Heintzelmans and that the two commands went into camp. Much to Tobins disappointment, Runnells had also appointed Ford as the senior commander of all state troops at the rank of major.9 On 20 December, after several days of reconnaissance patrols and collaborative planning between Ford and Heintzelman, the improvised battalion once again marched against the Cortinistas. Far to the east, the New York Times sensationally reported that Cortina was burning the ranchos as he went and had declared his intention to plunder and burn Edinburgh, Rio Grande City, and Roma.10 Seeking to make a stand in complex terrain, the revolutionary leader had established a new defensive position in Rio Grande City with 11 Ford described the events that led to the culminating battle of the campaign from his perspective: About the twentieth of December a forward movement was made. The main body consisted of regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Tobins and Tomlinsons companies followed the road leading from Brownsville to Rio Grande City... the third days march brought to light many acts of burned, property destroyed or carried into Mexico... Cortina had committed these outrages upon citizens of the United States regardless of race and upon Mexicans suspected of being friendly to the Americans.12The federal-state task force halted on 26 December, 18 Federal-State CooperationUnder mounting political pressure to rapidly defeat the rebels and stabilize the region, Heintzelman elected to attack with an by killing or capturing its ringleader. Ford, after conducting night reconnaissance of the disposition of the defenses, discovered that Cortinas position was sound: his right was protected by the river, the main road in the center by two light infantry companies and cannon, and his left by infantry and cannon held limited cavalry in reserve, perhaps revealing previous training with the Mexican army.13 Despite the Tejanos readiness, Heintzelman launched a broad assault with simultaneous attacks against the rebel perimeter at daybreak. While the rangers commenced a dismounted assault against Cortinas center and left positions, Texan commander recalled how they rode to position for an infantry-style assault: Our mounted men advanced at a brisk gallop, and left the road by an inclination to the right at less than a hundred yards from the enemy artillery. Cavalry halted, I now instructed them to advance under cover of chaparral and Cortina launched infantry and then his mounted reserve to reinforce his crumbling front. The rangers in the center immediately assumed a hasty defensive line and shattered Tobin, in command of the task force right, then turned back the an empty saddle; Cortinas bold riders were left on the ground. infantry conducted an echeloned advance on the enemys volleys, and ultimately bayonets, the foot soldiers then defeated and scattered the remaining rebels.15Despite the decisiveness of Heintzelmans victory, Cortina envelopment and retreat up the road towards a small town called Roma. After moving several miles and realizing that they could not outpace the pursuing task force, they set blocking positions with light cannon support. The rangers, relying on their cavalry mobility, again led the task force advance and, upon making contact, charged through scattershot to reach the Cortinista position. Ford recalled that the matter of nationality was decided right there. A furious charge scattered Cortinas bodyguard and left one of his pieces in our possession. The ranger recalled how the enemy attempted no further resistance and seemed panic-stricken, and abandoning the 16Heintzelman, moving up with the task force infantry and artillery, feared that Cortina would move to the nearby town of Roma to rob it for supplies. The major accordingly launched another rapid pursuit up the river valley with his mounted contingent of cavalry and rangers. The fear turned out unfounded; Cortina had appreciated the scale of his tactical The horsemen then continued to Roma where Ford, as the

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38 INFANTRY April-June 2018MAJ Nathan Jennings is currently a FA59 Strategist serving in the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous positions include strategic planner in Resolute Support headquarters, Afghanistan; assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY; headquarters and cavalry troop commander in the 1st Cavalry Division; security force platoon leader in the 1st Infantry Division; and 19D Cavalry Scout in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) with combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jennings, who earned a masters degree in history from the University of Texas at Austin, is a graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program. In 2015, he won the U.S. Army Armor Schools Starry Writing Competition. He is also the author of the book, Riding for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865. protection. They then rode east to rejoin the slower elements under Heintzelman as the task force began to consolidate their wounded and dead.17 The U.S. Armys victory over the Cortinistas was complete, if regrettably temporary. Ford later assessed adversary killed. We afterwards ascertained it was much greater.18 As the task force commander, Heintzelman likewise boasted of distances marched against the rebels: We marched yesterday about 20 miles & this morning 20 more & then 9 in pursuit. Near is ended.19 Despite the severity of Cortinas defeat and the majors sincere hopes for peace, the Tejano rebellion would survive. Federal and state forces scoured the Rio Grande on both sides of the international border for the next three months as Cortina shifted to guerrilla methods in the form of vicious strikes and raids against civilian communities. Texan volunteers under Ford continued to support Heintzelman with dispersed and long-ranged patrolling to clear the area. The combined team, known as the Rio Grande Squadron, again defeated Cortina at La Mesa on 17 March. Though the revolutionary icon survived the engagements and suspended his activism, the onset of peace would be illusory due to continued ethnic inequities between Anglo and Tejano residents.20 In the summer of 1861, even as Texas mobilized against the might of the Union Army, Ford would lead the 2nd Texas Cavalry Regiment, CSA, in the last time. Total Force UnityThe First Cortina War, though virtually unknown in American military history, caused the deaths of an estimated 151 combatants, 80 Hispanic civilians, and 15 Anglo residents.21 Throughout the campaign, federal and state forces united, with varying degrees of friction, to balance each of their particular combined arms team. While the U.S. Army contingent provided command and control, legitimacy, infantry mass, and responsive mobility, frontier experience, and local political legitimacy. This integration in large part achieved by cooperative planning and execution between Heintzelman and Ford eventually allowed government forces to defeat, pursue, and again defeat Cortina and his rebels. These lessons, centering on the imperative for task force commanders to appreciate and integrate both traditional and innovative contributions, have withstood the test of time. Now, just as in 1859, the U.S. Armys active, Guard, and Reserve components contribute optimized capabilities that make the Total Force successful. As emphasized by the institutions 39th States of America to go to war today without bringing Main Street without bringing Tennessee and Massachusetts and Colorado and California.22 This fact will not change and will likely become more acute as the nations primary landpower force conducts expeditionary operations with more modestly along the Rio Grande, their heirs will do so again across equally challenging frontiers in the 21st century. Notes1 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013, I-2. 2 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World3 John Ford, edited by Stephen Oates, Rip Fords Texas, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 261-262; Jerry Thompson, Cortina: Defending the Mexican Name in Texas (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 15-16, 37-39.5 Frederick Wilkins, Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 1848-1861 (Austin: State House Press, 2001), 106-107.6 Samuel Heintzelman, edited by Jerry Thompson, Fifty Miles and a Fight: Major Samuel Peter Heintzelmans Journal of Texas and the Cortina War (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1998), 136, 138.789 Ford, Rip Fords Texas, 267.10 The New York Times, 13 January 1860. 11 Thompson, Cortina, 77.12 Ford, Rip Fords Texas, 270.13 Ibid, 271. Ibid, 270.15 Ibid, 273; Heintzelman, Fifty Miles, 155; Thompson, Cortina, 78-80.16 Ford, Rip Fords Texas, 273; Thompson, Cortina, 81-82.171819 Heintzelman, Fifty Miles, 155.20 Thompson, Cortina, 83-85; these engagements were closer to skirmishes than actual battles. 21 Darren Ivey, The Texas Rangers: A Registry and History 22 GEN Mark Milley, There is Only One Army, Army National Guard News, 22 September 2015. While the U.S. Army contingent provided command and control, legitimacy, infantry mass, and LESSONS FROM THE PAST

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 39 Editors Note: This article was first published in the September-October 1992 issue of Infantry Magazine. It is the second in a two-part series on the environment in cold regions conditions and the terrain found in these regions and discussed In cold climates, survival rapidly becomes the major concern. Even with the soldiers survival assured, cold upon them and impairing their psychological stability as cold conditions allows them to take certain precautions. The cold kills. During Napoleons withdrawal between Berezina and Vilna, 40,000 soldiers perished from the cold in four days. A fresh division numbering 15,000 dispatched to assist lost 12,000 to the cold in three days. At the same time, Russian losses to the cold numbered 83,000. During their winter war with the Soviet Union in 1939-1940, using harassing operations on skis, isolating groups of forces From 1 January to 31 March 1942, the Germans sustained 14,236 casualties from frostbite. During Operation Barbarossa, the Germans lost some 100,000 soldiers to frostbite, including 14,000 who required amputations. In November and December 1950, U.S. units in Korea (35 cases per 1,000 soldiers in the combat zone). Cold injuries peaked when the intensity of enemy activity increased; soldiers had to leave sheltered positions, lie on the frozen ground, and stand guard at night. On the Koto-ri Plateau in early November, temperatures dropped to -8 degrees Fahrenheit. Winds were 30-35 miles per hour, and U.S. soldiers experienced their colder (-25 degrees Fahrenheit) as the winter progressed, days, more than 200 men in a single regiment collapsed from the cold. Stimulants had to be used to counter depressed early as 23 November. (Americans in Korea learned that the hot temperatures, characteristic of cold regions in the short for example, temperatures reached 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and the heat prostration cases were six times the number of It is the cold of the long winter, however, that presents the major challenge. In the plains of Russia, the temperature regularly drops to -60 degrees Fahrenheit in winter, and in Korea -30 degrees is not unusual. Those temperatures are also routine in Canada and Alaska. Frostbite, the major threat, can occur at temperatures below 32 degrees. Keeping the blood circulating is a preventive measure, as is proper clothing. Layers of clothing must be worn loosely, and head gear is imperative since much body heat is lost through an uncovered head. With warmer temperatures of up to 50 degrees and wet conditions, trench foot becomes a problem because feet perspire more readily than other parts of the body. Changing : BG PETER W. CLEGG COL ROBERT H. CLEGG

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40 INFANTRY April-June 2018socks regularly to keep feet dry is the preventive measure, and leaders must ensure that this is done. Other concerns, such as dehydration, hypothermia, fatigue, poor hygiene, and lack of nutrition, all lead to reduced performance and susceptibility to heat or cold injuries. In below-freezing temperatures, contact with liquids is hazardous. Fuel spilled on a bare hand leads to immediate frostbite. Falling through ice on a lake or stream can result in hypothermia, another killer. Water does not have to be freezing cause loss of consciousness in two hours. In water up to 40 degrees, a soldier may lose consciousness in only 15 minutes. During the Korean War, for example, men of Company L, 3rd that they would be frozen almost immediately, they were called back. Their clothes had to be cut from them, and the abortive crossing resulted in 18 frostbites cases. Cold injury results from unpreparedness. Both the likelihood and the extent of injury can be reduced if soldiers are active and properly clothed. (It is better to be slightly cold than overdressed since perspiration can become excessive and speed up heat loss.) Dryness causes perspiration to go unnoticed, so water intake becomes as important as in desert climates. (See Robert H. Clegg, May-June 1992, pages 28-34.) Lack of activity, which may be unavoidable in combat situations, can be a prime cause of cold injury. Sitting in foxholes vehicles, increases susceptibility. Soldiers must be kept moving. Division in Russia occupied open terrain in temperatures of -50 degrees. The division sustained 800 frostbite cases daily. When the soldiers found hand tools useless for digging foxholes, they blasted craters into the ground and built improvised shelters, thus reducing frostbite cases to four a day. Personal hygiene is another preventive measure. Sanitation critical. Nutrition is also critical. Troops burn up a lot of energy working in cold temperatures. In the Korean War, soldiers ate candy for energy at alarming rates (six or seven Tootsie Rolls in 10-15 minutes). Logistics requirements in cold regions (for food, water, fuel, and clothing) are more than twice the requirements in warmer climates. This places an increased workload on soldiers, who can easily be burdened with more than 90 pounds of clothing and equipment. The depth of snow or mud also makes foot movement exhausting, and fatigue makes soldiers more susceptible to injury. Rotation and rest periods are required. Sleeping in vehicles, however, is just as unsafe in cold regions as anywhere else because of the danger of carbon monoxide from heaters. And unheated vehicles are colder than tents. Many other aspects of cold-region operations cause solar energy and produce snow blindness as well as sunburn. In Arctic summers, when the ice and snow melt, the abundant distract the soldiers attention and cause discomfort, which can lead to mistakes and injuries. from short days, long nights, persistent cloud cover, and cold temperatures. This ailment is characterized by passivity, low morale, depression, insomnia, claustrophobia, and suicidal tendencies. In below-zero temperatures, these states of mind are killers because they lead to personal neglect, inactivity, and carelessness. Fear of isolation and freezing to death can get out of control. German accounts during World War II reported their will to survive. -20 degrees Fahrenheit with a wind of 25 miles per hour, the an open vehicle moving at 20 miles per hour into a wind of 10 miles per hour with a temperature of 15 degrees Fahrenheit, will freeze in one minute. The blast from propellers and rotors creates the same situation. Strong winds such as the williwaws of mountainous coastal regions kick up debris that can cause injury to soldiers. Trees and structures blown down by strong winds also cause injuries. Winds are responsible for blizzard conditions that can disorient soldiers, isolate positions, and lead to life-threatening situations. The terrain in cold regions can also be a source of injury. The rocky surfaces of volcanic mountains lead to foot and ankle injuries. On steep slopes of Alpine-like mountains, rock falls and avalanches occur regularly. During the Korean War, the bare 60-degree slopes of the Naktong Mountains, coupled with 100-degree temperatures, caused more U.S. casualties than enemy action. Glaciers are dangerous because they move, have disappeared into crevasses and have been crushed.During World War II, the Soviet commander of the Southwestern Front encouraged his comrades by saying: big change in the weather will knock out all their motorized Cold injury results from unpreparedness. Both the likelihood and the extent of injury can be reduced if soldiers are active and properly clothed. (It is better to be slightly cold than overdressed, since perspiration can become excessive and speed up heat loss.) Dryness causes perspiration to go unnoticed, so water intake becomes as important as in desert climates.LESSONS FROM THE PAST

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 41 equipment. We must hold out as long as and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the forces. This backbone consists of the tanks and motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature As the Germans approached within nine miles of Moscow, winter struck with -40 degree temperatures. The soldiers were so numb they could no longer aim their German General Heinz Guderian later complained that his tanks were breaking down in the cold while the Soviet tanks kept running. The cold obviously affects the performance and durability of military equipment and facilities. Temperature, precipitation, and wind cause equipment failure and become brittle; gauges, dials, and linkages stick; brakes blocked; protective paints chip and lead to corrosion; train breathers and vents clog from slush; and windshields crack easily, especially when hit by warm air. During the Korean War, troops complained that their vehicles froze up on the move, brakes grabbed, and challenge when the cold is intense enough to halt them; add a few feet of snow, and engines and transmissions are taxed. In mud, engines and transmissions can burn up if a vehicle is improperly driven. It is important to operate in low gear to preclude stalling. Deep snow tends to pack under the hull, which can lift the vehicle and reduce traction. Soviet drivers are taught to shift immediately to reverse when tracks lose their bite and spin. They are also taught to accelerate gradually and smoothly on ice and snow. It is best for a driver to avoid the tracks of the tanks in front of him and plow his own course over fresh snow. Artillery has unique problems in frozen environments. Aside makes it dangerous to touch with bare hands, it cannot be stabilized because the ground is frozen and the blades cannot dig in. The gun tubes expand and contract with temperature Projectiles may not penetrate the ground. If snow is deep in and absorbed. The frozen ground reduces the penetration of all munitions. During the Korean War, aircraft munitions actually types of variable time-fuzes malfunction at 0 degrees and the ground, but wet snow may cause premature detonation. Point detonating fuzes can get buried in the snow and not detonate at all. Illumination rounds tend to malfunction because of the many moving parts and the parachute. Cold, dry conditions inhibit the development of smoke plumes. White phosphorus is most A positive result for artillery is that exploding rounds send out frozen clods, stones, and chunks of ice, which are as deadly as shell fragments. Small arms have problems as well. weapons jam as the lubricants freeze. Cold also changes the rockets and missiles, propellant burn is slower, which reduces weapons causes ice fog, which obscures visibility and reveals Communications equipment especially antennas, ground on antennas can reduce range and increases noise. Antennas get out of tune, especially at higher frequencies. Setting up antennas is a problem because the stakes cannot be driven into the frozen ground; mountain pitons might be used to correct this. Wires and poles break from the pressure of ice and wind.Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

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42 INFANTRY April-June 2018Since water expands by 10 percent when it freezes, warm, but they can be noisy when temperatures drop and can alert the enemy. Protective clothing, particularly masks and gloves, becomes brittle in extreme cold, and placing them on skin can induce injury. Decontamination presents particular problems because it requires water. Temperature, snow, and strong wind affect facilities. Alternate freezing and thawing buckles asphalt and cracks The change from frozen ground in winter to moist ground in roads, and buildings. Bridges and port facilities sustain damage downstream hitting abutments and docks. The weight of compacted snow and ice can collapse buildings, tents, and hangars. Heavy winds associated with extreme variations in air pressure create hurricane-like conditions, damaging structures, downing utility poles, and disrupting transportation centers. Steep slopes can be a source of danger for facilities because unstable rock in mountains can cause landslides, rock falls, and avalanches. Structures should be sited only after these have been considered. Finally, the mountainous areas are subject to earthquakes and volcanic activity. An army does not go far in any environment without a wellcoordinated and complete logistics system, but such a system is even more critical in cold regions. A logistical system depends upon a base and its ability to move personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the base. In the far north, there are few sites suitable for a logistical base. In the moderate, urbanized cold regions, many locations are available. In severe cold areas, however, there are limited transportation and communication networks, and such networks are not well developed. Few structures are available for storage. Because of these limitations, the base, once established, becomes a likely enemy target and may even be the ultimate objective. Combat forces must therefore be dedicated to defending the base. Logistics planners determine what supplies and equipment are required and in what quantities. For cold regions, special equipment is required plows, clothes, drills, cross-snow faced subfreezing temperatures in Russia, and thousands died soldiers attacked Attu was their inadequate clothing and gear. The soldiers had little protection from the rain and wind. Their high-topped leather boots were not waterproof, and they had been trained in California for deployment to North Africa and were not prepared for the rigors of cold and wet weather. (The division later deployed to Leyte in the tropics.) They had not been issued their equipment until they were on board the ship. Their cold, wet feet were rubbed raw, leading to hundreds of cases of frostbite, trench foot, and gangrene. Because summers can be warm in cold regions, both This increases the variety and quantity of material required, and thus the complexity of logistical task. The extreme cold, deep snow, and mud reduce the durability of equipment, and larger stocks must be on hand than in more temperate areas. Food, water, and fuel consumption is higher in cold regions. base and then issued to units, and this can be hampered by and time-consuming. Aircraft are subject to all the restrictions previously discussed, and their number and load capacities are limited. Getting material to the soldier may be the biggest challenge. Once supplies reach the base, storage is the problem. Warehouses must be warmed; highly perishable supplies such as medicines require special handling. Water-soluble medicines will freeze. In Korea, for example, medics had to keep morphine inside their clothing so it would be usable when needed. Plasma had to be warmed for two hours before it could be used. Water and fuel require special storage. In temperatures below 14 degrees Fahrenheit, high charges of static electricity can make fuel-handling dangerous. Food, including MREs heating. Because facilities for issue are likely to be limited, warm shelters must be established for waiting areas and break areas. Facilities for maintenance must be warmed; little maintenance can be done in the open. Maintenance demands are greater because the stress on the equipment is greater and repairs take longer. During winter, in the arctic regions, the hours of daylight are shorter, and electrical lighting is required. Not getting what and potential disaster. cold regions requires frozen, dry conditions. Cold temperatures freeze marshes, lakes, rivers, and soil, and dry conditions the accumulation of deep snow, but as temperatures rise, the marshes. As temperatures hover around the freezing point, predict. The freezing usually occurs at night, which means movement must also be at night or early in the morning. In October 1941, for example, the German Operation Barbarossa came to a halt because of impassable Russian roads. Three panzer groups were spread out over 30 miles, terms. The Russian T-34 tank, with its wide tracks and higher hull-to-ground distance, came into its own. In January 1942, near Kursk, heavy snowfall stopped the German tanks while LESSONS FROM THE PAST

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April-June 2018 INFANTRY 43the T-34s, having greater ground clearance and lower ground German tanks. Also in January 1942, Company G of the German 464th movement, escaped encirclement by the Russians when they withdrew from a village in three feet of snow over a path they had trampled beforehand. As another example, on 16 April 1952 in Korea, a hard rain turned the ground into a sea of mud. In July, six days of rain moisture-laden soil blocked some roads and washed others away. Swollen rivers and treacherous roads restricted support and delayed movement into the Punch Bowl area until August. Earlier (in July 1950), such conditions created landslides that To facilitate movement in deep snow, soldiers must travel on skis or snowshoes, or use aircraft. The Finns, experts on skis, achieved great success against the Russians in their 1939-1940 war. During World War II in the far north, each side Mountains slopes in northern areas are usually too steep for vehicles in Korea, Scandinavia, Alaska, Canada, and much of Siberia. The thick taiga forest limits movement because the trees are too close together for vehicles to pass and too thick for them to run over. Drainage also impedes cross-country movement. When crossing frozen lakes, ice thickness and vehicle spacing are critical. To support wheeled vehicles weighing four to 10 tons, ice should be from 24 to 39 centimeters (9 to 15 inches) thick, and allowable distances between vehicles should increase from 15 to 35 meters. For tracked vehicles weighing to 31 inches), and vehicle spacing should be 40 to 45 meters. should be steady without gear changes. For foot soldiers, 10 centimeters (4 inches) is advised, with intervals of 20 meters. In northern areas, land navigation is difficult, which complicates combat operations. Compasses provide less accurate readings because the farther north, the greater the declination. The northern reaches are not well-mapped, and positioning system, however, can alleviate these concerns. Reconnaissance is particularly critical. Delays due to unforeseen circumstances can spell disaster during ground reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance is easier, but weather can current conditions along a route. For example, fog limited the ability of the U.S. Soldiers to reconnoiter the island of Attu in the Aleutians during World War II; they thought only 500 Japanese soldiers held the island when, in fact, 2,300 were there. Similarly, on Kiska, another Aleutian island occupied by the Japanese, a U.S. force of 34,000 with three battleships attacked only had evacuated the island. In cold regions, reliance on aircraft alone is risky. Aircraft obviously provide the high-speed movement required for offensive operations, but in winter, as well as transitional seasons, thick fog can engulf vast areas within minutes. Helicopters need at least one-half mile of visibility during daylight and one mile at night, and twice these distances. Fog makes airborne operations hazardous because it conceals drop U.S. Army photo

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44 INFANTRY April-June 2018zones. Such operations require 900foot ceilings (1,250-foot for training) while air assault operations can go on or 500 in hills. Fog was a continuous hindrance to operations in the Aleutians where in the fall of 1942, the U.S. lost 69 planes, 63 of them to fog and only six to the enemy. The enemy can also use fog to conceal a ground attack. On the morning of 10 July 1950, ground fog over the Korean rice paddies concealed the North Korean advance. U.S. soldiers shot blindly into the fog. Men on the ridge could hear tanks but could not see them. The next morning four enemy soon in the area of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry. The U.S. command post was destroyed. One thousand Koreans enveloped the battalion and reduced it to 40 percent strength by using fog to conceal their attack. Other problems for air operations are ice and wind. High winds can preclude airborne operations. Cold temperatures around. A positive note is that the denser air associated with cold temperatures allows for better lift and therefore bigger payloads. Runways can also be shorter than in hot areas. large-scale successful operations in cold climates because ground movement is just too slow and too vulnerable. and air defense guns, threaten air operations and must be suppressed. Amphibious operations are restricted by wind because wind increases the height of waves, which is the primary limiting factor. Water temperatures also limit amphibious operations; the water in arctic regions is too cold, even in the summer. In cold regions, the environment favors the defense because a unit that moves is vulnerable. The battle cannot be must be lightning quick with limited objectives. A recommended strategy might be to build a solid defense, attempt to draw the enemy in, and then counterattack. If the enemy can be induced to attack, he is likely to exhaust his resources. On 15 November 1941, the Germans used such a plan when the Russians exploited a snowstorm to conduct a surprise attack on a hill in the glaciated East European Plain. The Russians had not been issued winter uniforms, and the temperature fell to 16 degrees Fahrenheit. Promises of vodka and the use of stimulants resulted in initial success. However, cold exhaustion made the Russians vulnerable, and Another strategy might be to cut lines of communication, since forces will quickly succumb without fuel and food. Wide sweeping envelopments are too grandiose for this environment. The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation in October 1944, the largest arctic combat operation ever, demonstrated solved. The Russians created and maintained a road network. This network, along with properly clothed and equipped troops, brought victory. outcome of combat in cold regions. The side that best adapts in cold regions have been among the most brutal in history knowledge, and training are the requisites for success. Commanders who plan operations in cold regions but live elsewhere must understand the environment into which they are sending and leading their soldiers. The U.S. Army will continue to train in these cold areas because we do not know where and when the next war will be. But if it is in the north, our Army must be ready. Infantry Brigade, based at Fort Devens, MA. He was previously deputy chief graduate of the University of Massachusetts and hold a masters degree from Harvard University. commanded the U.S. Army Central Security Facility at Fort Meade, MD. He was previously the director, Joint Imagery Production Complex, U.S. Central Command, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He is a 1969 graduate of the University of Rhode Island and holds a doctorate from the University of Maryland. Photo by SGT Kent RedmondLESSONS FROM THE PAST

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Pershings Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War IBy Richard S. Faulkner Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017, 758 pages Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon As you might expect, the recent 100th anniversary of the start of World War I has spurred the release of many books tied to the war. Some of these are commemorative in nature while others strive to add to the body of knowledge. However, I believe none will be more important to our understanding of the U.S. Soldier during WWI than Richard Faulkners Pershings Crusaders. appeal for years to come. Within Pershings Crusaders pages, Faulkner focuses solely on the doughboy. The author addresses this focus in his initial chapter with readers. He states, This book attempts to be a travel guide to the Soldiers experience as well as an anthropological study of their world and their world views. They combine to produce a volume which clearly highlights what it meant to serve as a doughboy in the Great War. Let me address each of these below. As a travel guide, Faulkner takes readers through a doughboys entire World War I experience. He systematically and seamlessly moves through a doughboys induction into the Army through the end of the war and the demobilization process. In between, he discusses Soldiers training in the United States and abroad, their deployment overseas, and obviously, their combat experience. There are very few aspects of a doughboys day-to-day life that Faulkner does not explore. As outstanding as the travel-guide treatment is, I found the authors anthropological study superior. Faulkner delves into the human dimension of the doughboy as well as any historian I have read. Within this discussion, he superbly analyzes many facets of this human dimension. These facets include a doughboys motivations, his feelings toward the Army, his fellow doughboys. He also addresses a doughboys thoughts and emotions on combat. Faulkners ability to articulate this in for any author. I believe there are three key factors which make Pershings Crusaders such a superb book. First is the exhaustive research Faulkner has conducted in the development of the volume. You just dont put together a book of this magnitude and subject matter without extensive research. For the author, that meant squirreling away soldier accounts, documents, and records for more than 20 years. It is supplemented with unit histories and unpublished manuscripts. This research is clearly on full display within the pages of Pershings Crusaders. The second factor in the volumes success is the from reading this because of its sheer size (well over 700 pages); however, these pages turn very quickly. Faulkner writes in a very conversant style, and his words also exhibit the passion he has for his subject matter. This conversational writing style and passion combine to engage a reader from the books beginning until its end. Finally, Faulkner has inserted numerous photos throughout the volume. These pictures are from his own collection, which as mentioned earlier, he has collected over the course is his decision to craft a detailed caption underneath each. Faulkners photographs are very valuable in telling the story of the doughboy. In summary, other wars each possess that seminal work which provides readers with a true understanding of the critical void with Pershings Crusaders. It provides readers with an appreciation and knowledge of the doughboy unlike any other book published in the past. It is a special book which is a valuable addition to the scholarship of the Great War. The Hundred Day Winter War: Finlands Gallant Stand Against the Soviet ArmyBy Gordon F. Sander Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013, 402 pages Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve The Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40 holds a special place in modern military history. The war, lasting a little more than three months, has been the subject of a disproportionate number of books given its length. Furthermore, an aura of myth surrounds it. The war has the drama of David versus Goliath, complete with diplomatic machinations, foreign volunteers, and an adoring press corps looking for excitement as combat between Germany and the Allies was at a standstill. Finland, it seemed to contemporary journalists and commentators, was not just another Poland April-June 2018 INFANTRY 45

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46 INFANTRY April-June 2018 which would be quickly swallowed by its larger neighbor. Finlands defensive war against the Soviet invaders thus took Sanders comprehensive history of the war expands beyond traditional narratives of hopeless and inept Russians being cut to ribbons by a handful of Finnish troops in arctic forests. Against this mythical backdrop, Sander weaves social, military, diplomatic, and cultural history into The Hundred Day Winter War, giving life to the complex interplay of national and international politics that drove the war. For the military reader, Sanders analysis of Finnish defensive operational maneuver against a numerically superior foe is insightful. The treatments of the battles around Suomussalmi are Sanders best combat writing. These battles, which saw an undermanned and underequipped Finnish force trap and nearly annihilate two Soviet divisions, are presented as a classic military double victory with few if any precedents in the history of modern warfare. While the sections on Finnish attacks against Russian troops do read like the traditional narrative of ghosts on skis, Sander does cover small unit tactics, logistics, and the impact of combat on the Finnish soldiers in the protracted battles. Sanders inclusion of the human element strengthens the narrative and helps demystify both the Finns and the Soviets. Readers looking for a more analytical approach to the battle should see Allen F. Chews Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, issued by the U.S. Army Command and General purges of the late 1930s who suddenly found themselves regimental and division commanders, were relieved and some executed. The battles around Suomussalmi led Stalin to continue the war after the requisite period of retraining and reorganization, including the appointment of Semyon Timoshenko as the commander. Under Timoshenkos command, the Red Army adapted and changed its tactics to become an army that was indeed capable of learning from past mistakes. As a result, the Soviets were able to break the Finnish defensive positions and destroyed the nations ability Sander is unabashedly pro-Finnish in his writing and use of sources. This said, he does attempt to explain Soviet He was able to locate several Soviet veterans whose stories are included. Overall, the lack of Soviet equivalence or parity in writing does detract from the balance of the book though, as the subtitle implies, Finland is the hero of Sanders narrative. Overall, Sander presents a history of the war using a plethora of primary and secondary sources in a clear manner. The book is largely a social history of the war heavily military operations.Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge By Antony Beevor NY: Penguin Books, 2006, 451 pages Reviewed by 1stLt Walker D. Mills, U.S. Marine CorpsThe Battle of the Bulge, known to the Wehrmacht as Operation War. Hitler himself planned an operation intended to seize the port of Antwerp and cleave the Allied Western Front in two. The German divisions were able to achieve complete surprise and penetrate more than 40 miles into the Allied front before they were halted just short of the River Meuse in what became their last gasp. In his new book Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge, Antony Beevor narrates the story of the battle from all perspectives general, private, German, and American. The book is a masterwork and a must read for anyone who has interest in the battle itself or World War II. Beevor again proves himself a master of the operational-level Ardennes 1944 is Beevors ninth book and a worthy inheritor of his legacy of prize-winning World War II writing. Beevor has won major awards for almost all of his previous works. He shows us again that he can take a well-known story, Hitlers desperate gamble over the Christmas of 1944, and make well-researched history page turning. The book lacks a little of the cataclysmic nature inherent to some of his previous work like Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 and The Fall of Berlin 1945, but Beevor keeps the reader from noticing. Emboldened by success on the Western Front, the Allies moved quickly across northern France to the German border after breaking out of Normandy. Allied intelligence predicted 1944, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-2 published an analysis that said, The August battles have done it, and the enemy in the West has had it. Hitler had other plans, however. In September, he summoned his plan was to smash the Allied lines in the Ardennes sector in order to break through to Antwerp. He predicted the ensuing disaster would create another Dunkirk and strain the AngloAmerican alliance to the breaking point. Preparations were made in almost total secret and went undetected by the Allies. tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The initial thrust threw some Army units into headlong retreat south toward the River Meuse. But slowed by weather, poor roads, and lack of fuel, the German divisions were unable to exploit their initial success. The Americans were able to use their immense logistics capacity and herculean motor-lift capacity

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Beevor is the guide as he takes the reader on a journey through the battle, expertly wielding the experiences of combatants on both sides and noncombatants to sculpt his narrative, and even here he is able to keep the text wonderfully free of footnotes. When the occasional voice of hindsight speaks, it is during moments of consequence where it is most valuable. He shows the reader the humor of war when General Bradley is nearly arrested by nervous MPs on the suspicion that he is a German spy and in narrating the romantic and adventurous exploits of a young Ernst Hemingway. But he also shows the darkness of the massacres of civilians and soldiers alike behind the lines. Like the Piper Cub reconnaissance planes that the Allies employ as artillery spotters, the narrative loses sight of the overall picture, giving the reader daily and incessant casualty tallies in men and equipment and placing the battle in the context of the war as a whole. The Battle of the Bulge critically depleted the Wehrmacht, particularly the Panzer divisions that were needed to stop the Soviet advance on the Eastern Front, which probably shortened the overall length of the war by many months if not a year. On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in BattleBy B.A. Friedman Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017, 42 pages Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick BaillergeonIn my experience, the books that have engaged and challenged me the most are the ones with which I did not completely agree. These perspective. One recent volume which clearly falls into this elite category for me is B.A. Friedmans On Tactics. It is a book which I believe will clearly engage, challenge, and make readers think. Within the pages of On Tactics, Friedman focuses on a subject clearly challenging in itself tactical theory. In his the topic is such a test to address. He states, The student of strategy, once he realizes the importance of the concept, his intellectual development. The furrows are straight and parallel, the plow is sharp and ready, and even the fallow easy introduction. He continues, Unlike strategy itself, there is no organizing structure such as that provided by Carl von Clausewitzs On War (1976/1832). This work is an attempt to provide that structure or at least the beginning of one. In providing a structure or the initial groundwork for one, Friedman organizes his volume into two major parts which crafted a group of tactical tenets which he believes provides the foundation for the structure of tactical theory. To set the conditions for his discussion, he emphasizes that the principles of war lack the standardization and discipline to be utilized in tactical theory. In particular, he opines that the principles do not adhere to the three planes which he feels tactics live in physical, mental, and moral. It is these planes which provide the organization for his tenets. Within the physical plane, he has placed four tenets which he believes enable a tactician to arrange forces on the These mental tenets are deception, surprise, confusion, and force the enemy to lose his moral cohesion which is the one tenet under the moral tenet category. For the reader, there is much to think about here. Do the principles of war only have relevance to the strategic level of war? Do tactics live in the physical, mental, and moral planes? Has Friedman selected the right tenets? Does Friedmans path of tenets from physical to mental to moral have validity? Certainly, excellent questions which make for great debate. In Friedmans second section, he builds on the above tenets and addresses a group of tactical concepts that he considers the most important in dealing with the realities of the tactical context. These concepts include the culminating point of and control; environment and geography; and linking tactics in Friedmans discussion on each of these. However, for me personally, I would have liked a bit more discussion early on as to why he considered these the most important concepts and more detail on the relationship between the tenets and concepts. This was addressed in more substance in his if discussed in earlier chapters. Friedman concludes his volume with an interesting collection of essays, which in a common theme with the book, make you think. The subjects he touches on include the center of gravity, principles of planning, the organization of tactically successful militaries, and training and education. Each of these is a stand-alone essay in itself. However, the author strives to tie them in with his past discussion on tactical theory (tenets and concepts). In summary, does B.A. Friedman achieve his primary objective of providing a structure or at least the beginning of one in the area of tactical theory within On Tactics? In my opinion, he has not delivered on providing this structure, but I also contend that may have been too ambitious a goal. However, I feel he has certainly made some valuable contributions in this area. He has accomplished this by crafting a volume that is sure to spark dialogue and debate and challenge and engage all readers. April-June 2018 INFANTRY 47