Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, Army position and does not supersede any information otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazineContact Information Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-142, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951 Email: email@example.com JANUARY-MARCH 2017 Volume 106, Number 1 PB 7-17-1BG PETER L. JONES Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School RUSSELL A. ENO Editor MICHELLE J. ROWAN Deputy Editor of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Chief of Staff Distribution: Special GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 170590228 INFANTRY ATTACKS AT NTC: P ART I COL Brian J. Harthorn L TC Michael S. FarmerThis article shares some observations gleaned from the authors experiences coaching, teaching, and training rotational units during area slightly larger than the state of Rhode Island. The authors share some lessons learned, best practices, doctrinal discussion, and the opportunities offered at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., the crown jewel of the Army during seven rotational decisive action battles. FEATURES 38 ASSURED ACCESS THROUGH TACTICAL MOBILITY: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM A PROOF OF PRINCIPLE CPT Virgil J. Barnard 1L T Michael M. BouchardThe 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment conducted the Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (LTATV) proof of principle from November 2014 through December 2015. In this article the authors discuss the background, highlights, lessons learned from the tactical employment of these vehicles, list the desirable parameters, and make recommendations for furthering this capability within the Global Response Force.43 BUILDING THE INF ANTRY SQUAD LEADER: COGNITIVE, SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT 1LT Michael P. FergusonIn the interest of identifying a nexus of common denominators leaders may foster such skills within their units, platoon leaders of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry practices. The outcome of this examination is a set of practical guidelines that develop the cognitive, social, and physical domains of military leadership. Check out the U.S. Army Infantry School website at: http://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/USArmyInfantrySchoolFt.BenningGA/
INfF ANTRY NNEWS 2 VIETNAM W AR HERO HAL MOORE DIES AT AGE 94 Army News Service 3 NEW ARMY JUNGLE WEAR GIVES TRENCH FOOT THE BOOT C. Todd Lopez 4 ARMY DEVELOPING NEW PRECISION MORTAR Audra Calloway PROfFESSiIONAL FORUM 5 IMPROVING YOUR POSITION: SECURITY AND THE HUMAN TERRAIN CPT Micah Ables 7 FM 7-0: THE COMP ANY COMMANDERS TRAINING PRIMER William Bosnan L TC Charles Bergman 10 CROSS-DOMAIN OBSCURA TION: MORE THAN A SMOKE GRENADE Andy Yerkes 14 DEMYSTIFYING THE COF CALCULA TOR LTC (Retired) Dale Spurlin L TC (Retired) Matthew Green 18 THE MEDICANIC DEFEA T STRATEGY: HOW SMALL CHANGES CAN MAKE A HUGE IMPACT SFC Ross C. Geller 20 THE PRICE OF THE SALUTE CPT Michael Anderson 22 QRT AIMS TO IMPROVE SNIPER PERFORMANCE WHEN ENGAGING MOVING T ARGETS CPT Nicholas C. Milano TTRAiINiING NNOTES 43 VALIDATING READINESS: A BATTALION COMMANDERS OBSER VATIONS FROM A NO-NOTICE EXERCISE LTC Mark Ivezaj 45 AAR CONSIDERA TIONS DURING MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS MAJ Patrick L. Bryan 49 I AM BASTOGNE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM JRTC ROTATION 16-06 MAJ Rick Montcalm MAJ Joseph Mickley 53 STRONGER T OGETHER: EXPERIENCING INTEROPERABILITY AT JRTC SSG Christopher J. Wheatley CPT Daniel T. Harrison 57 A T FOR A DISMOUNTED RECON TROOP CPT Ryan P. Hovatter LLESSONS fFROM THE PAST 61 WHAT FREE MEN CAN DO: THE WINTER WAR, THE USE OF DELA Y AND LESSONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CPT Rick Chersicla BOOK RREViIEWS 67 ATTACK ON THE SOMME: 1ST ANZAC CORPS AND THE BA TTLE OF POZIERES RIDGE, 1916 By Meleah Hamptom Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMC Reserve 68 THE SPEARHEADERS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF DARBYS RANGERS By James Altieri Reviewed by L TC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon 69 DEVIL DOGS CHRONICLE: VOICES OF THE 4TH MARINE BRIGADE IN WORLD W AR I Edited by George B. Clark Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMC Reserve ON THE COVER:Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Divisions 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, out of Fort Wainwright, AK, participate in a combat exercise on 19 January 2017 at the National Training Center on Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo by SPC Rachel Diehm)BACK COVER:Paratroopers from the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, mission at the 7th Army Training Commands Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, on 28 January 2017. (Photo by Markus Rauchenberger) OOTHER DEpP ARTMENTS January-March 2017 INFANTRY 1
VIETNAM WAR HERO HAL MMOORE DIES AT A AGE 94 ARMY NEWS SERVICELTG (Retired) Harold Hal Gregory Moore, co-author of the book We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, died on 10 February at his home in Auburn, AL. He was 94 years old. Moores book about the exploits of his battalion in the Battle of Ia Drang Valley during the Vietnam War co-written with journalist Joseph L. Galloway was adapted into a 2002 Gibson. Moore graduated from West Point in June 1945 and entered the Infantry branch as a second lieutenant just three months before the end of World War II. While Moore was unable to War and the Vietnam War. Moores heroism during the Battle of la Drang earned him the Distinguished Service Cross. At the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). His unit was dropped by helicopter into the la Drang Valley U.S. and North Vietnamese regulars. During the battle, 234 Americans were killed and another 250 were wounded. Estimates of the North Vietnamese killed range between 600 and 1,200, depending on sources. Distinguished Service Cross Citation During the period 14-16 November 1965, then-LTC Moore, Division (Airmobile), was participating with his unit in a vital search and destroy operation in the la Drang Valley, Republic from an exposed position in his hovering helicopter. Throughout the initial assault phase, Moore repeatedly and expedient deployment of friendly troops. By his constant set the standard for his combat troops by a courageous display of leadership by example, which characterized all his actions throughout the long and deadly battle. Inspired by his constant presence and active participation against an overwhelming and repulsed numerous enemy assaults. On 15 November 1965, the embattled battalion was again attacked by a three-pronged insurgent assault aimed at surrounding and destroying the friendly forces in one great advance. With great skill and foresight, Moore moved from support to the defending forces. By his successful predictions of insurgent attack plans, he was able to thwart all their efforts in conjunction with devastating air strikes against Viet Cong positions and attack zones. As the grueling battle continued into the third day, another large Viet Cong strike was repulsed through Moores ability savage, last-ditch efforts of the insurgents to break through the friendly positions. Moores battalion inspired by his superb leadership, combat participation, and moral support Viet Cong force so decidedly that they withdrew in defeat, resulting in a great victory for the 1st Battalion.2 INFANTRY January-March 2017
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 3The standard issue combat boot most Soldiers wear today the one most commonly worn in Iraq and Afghanistan is great for sandy dunes, hot dry weather, and asphalt. But its proven not so good in hot and wet environments. So the Army has developed a new jungle boot that some Soldiers will see this year. In September 2016, Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Mark A. Milley directed the Army to come up with a plan to teams (IBCTs) in Hawaii, part of the 25th Infantry Division there, with a jungle boot. The Army had already been testing commercial jungle boots at the time with mixed results but didnt have a specialized jungle boot, Soldier, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, VA, had to get a plan together to make it happen. By October, the Army had made was possible, and by December contracts were awarded to two boot manufacturers in the United States to build more than 36,700 jungle-ready IBCTs in Hawaii. This is important to the Army and important to Soldiers in a hot, highhumidity, high-moisture area, said LTC John Bryan, product manager for Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment with PEO Soldier. We are responding as quickly as we possibly can with the best available, immediate capability to get it and improve as we go. Mixing Legacy with Tech Right now, the new jungle boot the Army developed will be for Soldiers with the 25th ID in Hawaii primarily because there are actually jungles in Hawaii that Soldiers there must contend with. The new boots look remarkably similar to the current boots Soldiers wear. They are the same color, for instance. And the boots, which Bryan said are called the Army Jungle Combat Boot (JCB), sport a variety of features drawn from both the legacy M1966 Vietnam-era jungle boot and modern technology. The M1966 Jungle Boot, which featured a green cotton fabric upper with a black leather toe that could be polished, had a solid rubber sole that Soldiers reportedly said had no shockabsorbing capability. The new boot uses a similar tread, or outsole, as the M1966 Panama style to shed mud and provide great traction, but the added midsole makes it more comfortable and shock absorbing, according to Albert Adams, who works at the Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center. The outsole of the new boot is connected to the leather upper via direct attach, Adams said. Thats a process where a kind of liquid foam is poured between the rubber outsole and leather boot upper. [Its] a lot like an injection molding process, he said. The foam layer between the rubber sole and the upper portion of the boot not only provides greater shock absorbing capability, but it also keeps out microbes in hot, wet environments that in the past have been shown to eat away at the glues that held older boots together. So the new boots wont separate at the soles, he said. It provides a high level of durability, and it also adds cushioning. Also part of the new boot is a textile layer that prevents foreign items from puncturing the sole of the boot and hurting a Soldiers foot, Adams said. The M1966 boot accomplished that with a steel plate. The new boot has a ballistic fabric-like layer instead. The new JCB also features a heel with a lower height than the M1966 model to prevent snags on things like vines in a jungle environment. That prevents tripping and twisted ankles. The boot also has additional drainage holes to let water out if it becomes completely soaked, speed laces so that Soldiers can don and doff the boots more quickly, a redesigned upper to make the boots less tight when they are new, an insert that helps improve water drainage, and a lining that provides for better ventilation and faster drying than the old boot. Feedback Formed Final Design The Army didnt design the new JCB in a vacuum. Instead, it worked with Solders to get the requirements and design just right to meet the needs of Soldiers, said CPT Daniel Ferenczy, the assistant product manager for Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment. We take what Soldiers want and need, we boil that down to the salient characteristics, hand that over to our science and technology up at Natick; they work with us and industry, the manufacturing base, to come up with this product, Ferenczy said. This is a huge win, a great win story for the Army because it was such a quick turnaround. Read more about the Jungle Combat Boot at https://www.army.mil/ article/183541/. (C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.) NNEwW A ARMY JUNGLE WEAR GGIvVES T TRENChH FOOT ThHE BOOT C. TODD LOPEZ
The Army has closed its initial solicitation phase for designs to create a next generation precision mortar that will allow Soldiers to put their rounds on target with extreme accuracy. The 120mm high explosive-guided mortar (HEGM) program is intended to replace the current precisionguided HE mortar the accelerated precision mortar initiative (APMI). The solicitation period sought feasible designs from the private sector to create a new smart mortar. While the HEGM round will incorporate state-of-the-art technology, the new round is intended to be a different design than APMI. Precision Strike Capability Precision mortars are necessary when Soldiers cant urban environment where civilians could get hurt or buildings destroyed. With a precision mortar capability youre able to quickly get effects, said LTC Anthony Gibbs of the Product Manager Guided Precision Munitions and Mortar Systems. If counterAPMI has proven especially useful for Soldiers stationed at remote outposts that arent supported by other precisionguided assets like Excalibur, the Armys 155mm precisionguided artillery round. Precision-guided mortars also reduce the logistical burden for troops, because Soldiers dont need to lug as many rounds target, so their resupply needs are reduced. to get effects, we can achieve effects with one, said MAJ reduces required logistical support, which means less fatigue for Soldiers over time, and you can engage a wider array of targets. Improvements Like its predecessor, HEGM will be an all-terrain, allweather mortar capable of incapacitating personnel within or behind structural barriers or light-skinned vehicles, as well as troops in the open, while minimizing collateral damage. It will be compatible with all U.S. 120 mm mortar weapons and combat teams. However, the HEGM will be more accurate and maneuverable than APMI. Many of HEGMs enhancements will come from the requirement that it contain a semi-active laser (SAL), an independent targeting mode that employs laser designation, giving the mortar dual means to guide it to the intended target. It will provide the round with increased accuracy by directing it to its target via a laser beam. (APMI is GPSguided.) Because the laser guides the round to the physical target instead of a GPS location, the mortar will have the moved. The increased maneuverability will allow Soldiers to engage targets that may have moved or repositioned since has moved, you can still hit it if the laser has designated it. The SAL will also make HEGM more resistant to countermeasure threats in GPS-degraded environments. (Audra Calloway works for the Picatinny Arsenal Public Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade 4 INFANTRY January-March 2017INFANTRY NEWS AARMY DEvVELOPING NNEwW PPRECISION MMORTAR AUDRA CALLOWAY Photo by SGT Matthew Moeller
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 5Always improve your position. In a patrol base, conduct reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrols and cover your dead space. In a combat outpost, develop alternate, supplementary, and subsequent defensive positions. In a foxhole, dig deeper. Wherever you are, always improve your position. so we can be better prepared for the next kinetic threat. This is a good thing. Security will and should always be the top priority on patrol. But by focusing exclusively on physical security, we are missing some important pieces of the puzzle. In an urban environment or, realistically, anywhere that your platoon isnt sitting alone in a swamp the human terrain can be every bit as important in preparing for or even preventing the My platoon was deployed as the security force force advise and assist team (SFAAT) in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom XIV and Resolute Support Mission. The bulk of our missions revolved around going to the same locations, day in and day out, as the SFAATs met with the governor, police leadership, or military staffs. While this repetition felt dangerous (the limited routes available, etc., made our travel patterns uncomfortably predictable), it also created opportunities for us to constantly improve our security. After a few days of going to the same locations, we had sector sketches drawn onto their gridded reference graphics. Drivers watched dead space and blind spots for their gunners. We developed procedure words for our guardian angels (GAs) to covertly signal the rest of the platoon if something didnt feel right or if they detected a threat in their meeting. We planned, hostile circumstances at every location. On every mission, I would think back to all the nights spent setting up patrol bases in training. Establish and adjust the IMPROViING YOUR PPOSiITiION:SECURITY AND THE HHUMAN TTERRAIN CPT MICAH ABLES A platoon leader with Combined Task Force Dragoon and an interpreter speak with a local Afghan man at Forward Operating Base Zangabad, Afghanistan, on 12 August 2013.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 6 INFANTRY January-March 2017 develop sector sketches check; distribute alert, evacuation, and withdrawal plans check. A s numerous Afghan civilians and police wandered through the compound and conducted their business, it became clear to me that we were missing out on an essential aspect of our security the human terrain. We knew the Afghan counterparts of our SFAAT advisors, but what about everyone else? What about the guard in the tower overlooking our trucks, the civilian walking in the front gate, or the policemen walking by? How do we improve our position by accounting for them in our security plan? I quickly decided we needed to incorporate a version of R&S patrols. Rather than moving in a T fashion to map out dead space, these mini-patrols would be focused on getting to know and understand the guards and civilians in our area the human terrain. These patrols became a standard part of my battle rhythm. Every day, after our trucks moved into position and our GAs escorted the SFAAT advisors into their meetings, I would take a Soldier and an interpreter with me to conduct my R&S patrols. I would meet with the governors bodyguards, the police quick reaction force, civilians wanting to see the governor, or tower guards along the compound perimeter. I soon learned which guards to expect at which towers, which policemen were trustworthy, and which civilians to be wary of. variety of reasons. One policeman alerted us to U.S. military equipment being taken off the base by contractors to be sold in the downtown market. One bodyguard would tell me the police chiefs travel schedule when the police chief himself was being cagey and hiding information from our advisors. A few times, staffers and policemen would call me at night to alert me to a bomb or shooting in their district long before the normal reporting channels found out. One day, I noticed a new guard was in the tower closest to us. I went to go meet him. After the usual greetings and small talk, I started asking him about his job. I was frustrated that he couldnt answer basic questions like what will you do if someone starts shooting at your tower? or if you see something happen, how will you tell your commander? I quickly realized that this guard had no training, had not been briefed, and had no radio or phone to communicate with anyone else. As I continued to ask these questions, he broke down. Through the interpreter, he unleashed: I dont know what Im doing here. My commander is stupid. He is very mean and he abuses me. He always cusses at me and calls me a dog and hits me and threatens me. I cant work with him anymore. He treats me like a dog and I wont take it anymore. Then, he calmly and clinically told me how he would solve his problem: The next time he comes up to this tower, Im going to shoot him in the face. I hid my shock and tried to lighten the situation while telling him that he cant shoot his commander. He continued. I will shoot him. If I try to escape, the other guards will catch me, he explained as he pointed to the other towers guarding the exit points from the compound. So Ill jump down from this tower over the wall, cross the street, go down that alley, and hide at my cousins house. Realizing that this was a well-thought out, premeditated nervousness and attempted to talk down the guard from his plan. I tried to convince him to talk to his superiors and that he would be caught and killed if he went through with his plan. Eventually, I got a shaky promise that he wouldnt kill his commander today. As I climbed down the stairs from the tower, my mind was racing. What if he shoots his commander while were here? What if some stray rounds hit our trucks or, worse, a gunner? from a green-on-green attack and the ensuing chaos? This situation drove home the importance of understanding the human terrain that was so crucially intertwined with our physical security. Ultimately, the situation resolved itself. The police chief was very concerned to learn about this, the abusive commander was quickly removed from the compound, and the would-be assassin was effusively grateful. The threat never manifested itself, but it forever changed how I developed our security plans. Whether youre in a police compound, a city center, or a sparsely populated village, only by engaging and interacting with the locals conducting R&S patrols of sorts can you see on any maps or imagery. After your physical security arent prepared or equipped for their jobs or which ones are planning a violent attack may just be the key to being ready for or even preventing the next outbreak of violence. The next time youre on patrol and youve gone through your mental checklist of all the principles of security, just remember: always improve your position. Whether youre in a police compound, a city center, or a sparsely populated village, only by engaging and interacting with the locals conducting R&S patrols of sorts the dead space that you wont see on any maps or imagery.CPT Micah Ables studies.
Training is the key task to improve our readiness. Realistic, hard, rigorous, repetitive training increases combat performance and reduces friendly casualties. Read, understand, and use FM 7-0. Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Mark A. Milley This past October, the Army published a new Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World. FM 7-0 uses the operations process of planprepare-execute-assess in a step-by-step approach to help commanders and other unit leaders train their Soldiers. With the FM provides the how-to processes of unit training along with practical applications. The FM includes discussions on how doctrine is supported by web-based enablers of the Army Training Management System (ATMS). ATMS consists of the Army Training Network (ATN), the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS), and the Digital Training Management System (DTMS). With fundamental training doctrine and the resources of ATMS, leaders have the necessary tools to make What does a company commander need to understand about training? First and foremost, the commander and unit leaders need to read FM 7-0, which is available on ATNs website (https://atn.army.mil/ ) and the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) homepage (https://apd.army.mil). FM 7-0s doctrine and processes are transportable and can be applied to any Army unit. So, where does the training process begin for a company commander? As with the operations process, it begins with the receipt of the unit training plan (UTP) from the battalion commander. focus for the command the who, what, when, where, why of training, and the most important collective tasks. Within a brigade, the UTP is provided in an operation order (OPORD). This, along with the associated UTP calendar (longrange planning horizon), provides the company commander the basic information necessary to begin the mission analysis necessary to determine the mission-essential tasks (METs) to battle focus unit training. As a reference, the company commander refers to the standardized mission-essential task list (METL) available on ATN. The standardized METL depicts the capabilities and collective tasks the unit guidance and a lack of time and training resources prompt company commanders to narrow the METs to the ones needed to meet mission requirements. For example, an infantry company commander, as a result of his mission analysis, determines that the company should focus on these METs: 07-CO-1090 Conduct a Movement to Contact 07-CO-9003 Conduct an Area Defense Although the other standardized METL tasks may be a lesser priority, they are still reportable for training readiness purposes. The selected METs, along with other results of the mission analysis, are discussed and agreed to during the mission analysis backbrief between the company and battalion commanders. Following the mission analysis backbrief, the company commander can now begin to develop a UTP. The UTP the selected METs in a crawl-walk-run methodology. By using troop leading procedures (TLPs), the company commander FM 7-0: THE COMPANY COMMANDERS TRAINING PPRIMER WILLIAM BROSNAN LTC CHARLES BERGMAN Figure 1 METL Viewer January-March 2017 INFANTRY 7
begins to formulate how to train the unit. For assistance, the company commander refers to CATS, which are accessible on DTMS. The unit CATS will provide a good starting point to suggest a sound and progressive (crawl-walk-run) methodology to train the unit. The unit CATS will recommend the training events that will the mission analysis. In many units, the company and battalion commanders agree to combine the battalion and company UTPs into a single battalion UTP that addresses both echelons. Through a review of the CATS planning tool options, the commander selects many of the recommended CATS training events. After determining the training events, the company commander determines broad training objectives for each event. From FM 7-0, the commander knows that each training event is placed on the UTP calendar for a reason. To ensure to identify training objectives for each event. At a minimum, training objectives consist of task, condition, standard, and trainings conclusion. The commander may look at the development of multiple courses of action (COAs) to train the unit. Again, following the steps of TLP, the commander determines the best COA that trains the unit and then backbriefs the battalion commander for approval. Once approved, the company publishes the UTP in DTMS to the platoons. Several weeks following approval of the company UTP and within the brigade, battalion commanders brief their UTPs to the G of FM 7-0 provides example slides that show the content of what each commander briefs at the TB. Company commanders do not formally brief the division commander, but the slides can be downloaded from the Unit Training Management (UTM) page on ATN and used for reference. The TB provides the division commander an understanding of how the brigade will execute training and serves as a contract between commanders. The battalion commanders agree to train as briefed, and the division commander commits to provide the necessary resources for training. Following the start of to the division commander to ensure the UTP remains sound All of this meticulous planning must occur months (and sometimes years) prior to the start of training. For subordinate units to develop their own training plans, each headquarters publishes their UTP well in advance. This is done not just for subordinates to plan training, but to allow time for the necessary training resources to be obtained. For training to be effective, the necessary resources must be available at the right point in the training cycle. Prior to the start of training, detailed planning for each training event must occur. The company commander refers back to each events training objectives and uses weekly training meetings to assess the training that has occurred and to coordinate activities for future events. Appendix C of FM 7-0 discusses company training events, and Appendix H provides a rundown of the T-week concept. The T-week concept provides a useful backward planning framework for each training event Figure 2 Training Events from the Company UTP Calendar Figure 4 UTP Publication Timeline for AC Company Concept of Operations: Decisive Operations Using a training strategy, state how the unit will train from the training start date to the end of the planning horizon. Refer to the long-range training calendar. Indicate the major training events and training objectives that the unit proposes to train (crawl-walk-run). Discuss dates of the EXEVAL and CTC rotations, planning, and execution status (as appropriate). Include the time management cycle. Discuss how the command will leverage the integrated training environment. CTC combat training center EXEVAL external evaluation Figure 3 Sample Slide from Training Brief TemplatePROFESSIONAL FORUM 8 INFANTRY January-March 2017
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 9to ensure major activities are completed and accounted for prior to training. As each training event is conducted, the tasks trained are evaluated. As a major part of planning an event, an assessment plan is developed, and the training and evaluation outline (T&EO) of each task trained is T&EOs are readily available from ATN, CATS, and DTMS. T&EOs are absolutely crucial to the The commander needs to use the T&EOs, or the unit will not train to the Army standard. During and after each training event, after action reviews (AARs) are conducted in accordance with Appendix D of FM 7-0. The notes from each AAR, the completed task T&EOs, and observations help the company commander assess the results of the training. Those assessments (T, T-, P, P-, U) are recorded in DTMS. Reading FM 7-0 is an standing how to train Soldiers and units. Effective training comes from detailed and meticulous planning and execution. Understanding training doctrine helps commanders and unit leaders at every level. They learn how to better maximize limited training time and how to make the best use of an installations extensive, but limited training resources. Training, like conducting operations, is hard work and requires leaders to be committed to training excellence. And it starts with understanding the Armys training doctrine FM 7-0. Figure 5 T-Week Concept from FM 7-0 Figure 6 Searching for a T&EO from DTMS Figure 7 Sample T&EO from DTMS Figure 8 Task Assessments Made in DTMSWilliam Brosnan is the author of ADP/ADRP/FM 7-0 and works at the Training Management Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS. LTC Charles Bergman is currently serving as chief of the Training Management Doctrine Division of the Training Management Directorate, Fort Leavenworth.
10 INFANTRY January-March 2017VignetteDuring a training exercise, LTC Clark, commander of the 4th Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized), pulled his company commanders in for a detailed back brief after giving an operation order (OPORD). The company commanders began their initial visualization of the coming engagement. The movement from the assembly area to the assault platforms to synchronize the sequencing and timing of the of the formation to identify any potential enemy threat. begin its maneuver from those positions based on both radio the enemy to accomplish assigned tasks. CPT Key listened intently as CPT Romano described the locate, and target the companies in the battalion. In the assault of combat vehicles had arrived, and as the friendly artillery Cyber NCO from the division, began to list multiple offensive be targeted during Phase II into Phase III in the cyber domain domain (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace) sensors to detect any signature he provides across the electromagnetic communications gave his company an insurmountable edge tactical measures to reduce his signature. CPT Key began to Cross-Domain Obscuration CROSS-DOMAIN OOBScCURATION:MORE THAN A SmMOKE GRENADE ANDY YERKESPROFESSIONAL FORUM
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 11 land 1 air Figure 1 The Electromagnetic Spectrum to Military Applications
12 INFANTRY January-March 20172 cyber space maritime can Figure 2 Cross-Domain ObscurationPROFESSIONAL FORUM
Andy Yerkes January-March 2017 INFANTRY 13 Epilogue put a priority on detecting and targeting any threat electronic got the division headquarters to coordinate for obscuration of threat space and cyberspace sensors to cause further confusion during the movement to attack positions from the line sergeants collect all cell phones and turn them off. Then he best land navigation leader in front in each platoon, and he further spaced the platoon movement over several kilometers. CPT Key changed the movement formations and techniques, Notes12 The Infantry Battalion Figure 3 Cross-Domain Obscuration Focus Area
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 14 INFANTRY January-March 2017A correlation of forces (COF) calculator is a tool used to help planners compare the relative combat power of t wo forces and estimate the outcome of engagements between them. Several versions of COF calculators are in use in the Army today. Most take the form of Excel spreadsheets, but they have been converted into Command Post of the Future (CPOF) products as well.1 Because the Army has not adopted utility of their use. This article describes the development of the COF calculator currently in use with the Department of Army Tactics (DTAC) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). It will address the methodology used to determine the values, suggest appropriate uses of the tool, and suggest some ideas for adding professional judgment to the results.BackgroundThe idea of force ratios (outnumbering an enemy by at least three to one in the attack for example) is found in historical text throughout the ages. When combatants were all armed symmetrically, that math was both easy and intuitive. As weapons became more complex and varied, the ability to measure and compare combat power became more challenging. Two men with a Maxim machine gun were clearly not demand for increasingly complex models and simulations to predict the outcome of battles when leaders lacked actual combat experience. Unfortunately, the tactical planner rarely has time for this complexity and has the need for a simple tool that can give the staff insight. A CGSC student handbook served this purpose through most of the 1980s. The Soviet Union made extensive use of correlation of forces and means (COFM) computations in military decision making in the latter half of the 20th century.2 The Soviets perceived the prediction of outcomes based on for commanders to reduce risk and to allocate forces.3 In 1993, LTG David Hogg, then a major, researched the topic and concluded that the Army continued to rely on several subjective methods for comparing forces. He differentiated the COFM calculator as the addition of intangible factors such as morale, training, terrain, weather, and captured in the COF calculator.4 He proposed that the Army adopt a standardized COF model based on objective data to facilitate staff planning.5 Usage of COF and COFM calculator the need for such a tool. Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, described comparing force ratios in the initial step of coarse of action (COA) development. Both manuals as well as the current manual for deliberate planning, FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations observed that mathematical comparisons are subjective and should be tempered by judgment surrounding intangible factors as well as the number to re-green students on atrophied skills associated with DEMYSTIFYING THE CORRELATION OF FFORcCES CALcCULATOR LTC (RETIRED) DALE SPURLIN LTC (RETIRED) MATTHEW GREEN Figure 1 Example Force Ratios (Microsoft Excel [R] Version)
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 15combined arms maneuver, instructors at the CGSC dusted off the old COF calculator referenced by LTG Hogg. The existing CGSC product proved to formations employed in instructional scenarios. It based unit values on a subjective comparison of Soviet-era forces against U.S. forces with BTRas the base units.6 An updated tool based on modern brigade combat team (BCT) and enemy formations was necessary. Furthermore, unit values needed some objective basis to ensure utility and some degree of validity in anticipating outcomes in construction needed to use data that changes occurred in the future. To get objective values for combat systems, DTAC turned to work done in 2004 by the Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC). The center had analyzed the characteristics of many NATO and threat systems principally tool to aid exercise designers in developing appropriate force mixes for their training audiences. These spreadsheets were the basis for more objective values for systems within the updated CGSC COF calculator. ConstructionWith objective data in hand, CGSC instructors computed new unit values using approved MTOEs from the Force Management System website (FMSWeb) for U.S. forces and decisive action training environment (DATE) opposing force (OPFOR) tables from the Army Training Network (ATN) for enemy forces. The instructors computed a combat potential for each unit from brigade down to company level by multiplying the approved number of systems for the organization against the TRAC-developed combat potential value for the system. Individual and crew-served weapon values multiplied against the TRAC value for each system replicated individual Soldiers in the formation. Company-through-brigade echelons allowed corps operations. All system combat potentials were summed, and the value for each unit was added to the data spreadsheet in the calculator.7The next area for improvement was in the damage tables that estimated results after comparing combat potentials for the two sides. The existing calculator damage table referenced historical loss rates, and losses were given in 5 to 10 percentage point increments. Force ratios ranged from 1:4 odds to 4:1 odds with few subdivisions. This often created situations where change to the result because there was not an intermediate loss level. A CGSC student deduced the formulas for the damage value curves within the older calculator.8 CGSC instructors expanded the odds ratios to provide more subdivisions between ratios and included a 5:1 ratio (principally for deliberate attacks) and then integrated the appropriate damage values. These simple changes gave much more granularity and credibility to the results.ApplicationFM 6-0 carries forward much of the original verbiage (and warnings) from FM 101-5 in using the COF calculator during the military decision-making process (MDMP). In COA development, COF provides an objective ratio of maneuver and artillery forces for an initial assessment of combat power. 9 The whether the type of unit (infantry, Stryker, armor, engineer, etc.) assigned at the end of step 3 is appropriate against the OPFOR-type unit. The strength of the calculator, however, is in the COA analysis step of MDMP. Typical use of the calculator is at the end of the support systems of both sides are entered into the calculator, the appropriate type of operation is selected for both sides, and the results are determined for each engagement. Based on the outcomes, planners might reconsider the allocation of forces to the engagement or tactical task to create a more favorable outcome or accept greater risk by reducing forces when those additional forces result in the same outcome. For example, in a friendly attack, the blue force might determine planning guidance and therefore change the task organization to add another unit to the engagement. The enemy defender in the same engagement might determine that the reinforcing Figure 2 Example Force Ratios (Mission Command Workstation [CPOF] Version)
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 16 INFANTRY January-March 2017 the calculation. By adjusting the forces in the engagement, both sides create conditions more favorable to success and in doing so come closer to the reality of the upcoming engagement. From the outcomes, sustainment planners can anticipate the number of battle losses and casualties within each engagement to validate the maintenance, recovery, and medical treatment plans. Typically, staffs make a screen shot or copy results to a new worksheet within the COF calculator to maintain a record of the outcome for each engagement during wargaming. These products can help describe the outcomes of the wargame should the staff conduct a wargame results brief with the commander. Outcomes from one engagement appreciation for the attrition that will occur prior to the decisive operation. Concurrent with determining the outcomes, planners use the calculator values as a means to determine appropriate for the percentage of combat power remaining in the forces allocated to the engagement. The percentage strength of a unit affects the combat potential applied in the comparison. on assumptions in planning) can identify priority intelligence (FFIRs) where the engagement will result in a loss for the friendly side. For example, the blue side achieved success with an estimated combat power for its formations of 90 percent based on a standard operational readiness rate and the enemy force at 75 percent based on the expectations of higher to shape power below 85 percent results in unacceptable losses or failure to achieve the tactical task, then a friendly unit combat power at 85 percent becomes an FFIR indicating the commander might commit the reserve or allocate additional combat power Conversely, if enemy forces at 80 percent cause the same effects, then enemy forces at that location above 75 percent might become a PIR to again trigger a decision to shift friendly combat power to the engagement or to shape the objective hand, staffs are better able to justify force-related CCIR to the commander and to anticipate probable decision points during wargaming. The calculator can also facilitate decision making during execution. Current operations and future operations cells can use the calculator to compare current capabilities of forces for an upcoming engagement to determine whether the outcomes are still consistent with the plan. Not only can commanders anticipate allocating additional forces (or perhaps reallocating can also anticipate enemy changes in force allocation when the enemy appears to be destined for failure. This can be critical in adopting greater protective measures as an execution decision rather than learning later that a force imbalance caused the enemy to deviate from his plan necessitating an unanticipated adjustment decision for the friendly commander. The Need for Professional JudgmentThe COF calculator can provide valuable insights into an engagement and is very useful in standardizing the results of wargaming. However, it has several obvious limitations include factors such as terrain and weather, asymmetries in the engaged forces, the echelon of formations being compared, the duration of the wargaming turn, and the physical space of the action. First, the COF calculator in its current form makes no attempt to account for the effects of terrain. All units get the maximum value of all their weapon systems regardless of range. Clearly, a marsh or from an infantry platoon in a barren desert. When terrain provides an obvious advantage to one formation or the other, the planner can either subjectively weight or devalue the adjust the outcomes. Similarly, the calculator does not consider the effects of weather or light on operations directly. Combat potential values in the data worksheet include maneuverability and night-vision capability in the total values, but there is no bonus or penalty for restricted terrain or limited visibility operations. One or both sides might have degraded capabilities and therefore fewer effects within the calculator. This typically applies to effectiveness of close air support and attack aviation; by 25 percent to account for limited visibility. Second, asymmetries in weapon system capabilities can cause skewed results. For example, anti-tank platoons or munitions that are only really useful against the targets for which they are designed. While there are formulas to mitigate these asymmetries, the COF calculator does not attempt to account for them.10 Rather, these asymmetries average out when the engagement being modeled is a combined arms engagement, and the results are generally useful. But for an engagement where one side is predominantly one kind of specialized unit, The COF calculator can provide valuable insights into an engagement and is very useful in standardizing the results of wargaming. However, it has several obvious limitations that require sound judgment from the user to mitigate. These include factors such as terrain and weather, asymmetries in the engaged forces, the echelon of formations being compared, the duration of the wargaming turn, and the physical space of the action.
LTC (Retired) Dale Spurlin 1986 and served in a variety of tank battalion leadership positions, as a staff controller at two Combat Training Centers. He holds a PhD in education and has taught tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) since 2007. LTC (Retired) Matthew K Green graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, in 1990. He served as a tank platoon leader and as a National Police Brigade advisor in Baghdad in 2008. He currently teaches tactics at CGSC. January-March 2017 INFANTRY 17 example, a U.S. tank company has a value of 23 while a selfengagement, the tank company clearly has an advantage, and focuses on the close-combat engagement and is not capable of assessing the effects of air defense against aviation or of might have the tools available to determine probability of kill combat engagement), it might be easier to agree in advance to degrade the effects of aviation and artillery by 25 percent if System asymmetries apply similarly when comparing elements of disparate echelons. Because the combat values capabilities within each unit, larger formations have a higher combat potential value than the sum of their subordinate combat units. Whenever possible, only compare elements using the same echelon probably two levels down to be consistent with the doctrinal allocation of forces in COA development. If the planner compared an entire U.S. armored BCT (ABCT) to a single enemy tank battalion, the results would be skewed heavily in favor of the ABCT because it includes planner should break the ABCT into its component battalions and only include the combat power actually committed to the engagement being modeled. This brings us to the fourth concern. It is important to know how long a turn your engagement is considering. If you are modeling a small tactical engagement that would play out over the course of minutes or hours, adding in all the HQ and logistics units should be avoided. If, however, you are working at a higher echelon and you are wargaming the events that take hours or days, the inclusion of HQ and logistics elements combat over time and recover from losses. engagement. A common mistake as planners try to achieve favorable ratios is to keep adding units to one side or the other. This is often done without regard to how much physical space is needed to mass that combat power. When the combat power When a planner spots this happening, he or she should break the engagement into parts and model the engagement into the doctrinal footprint of the unit can help ensure only those forces that can actually engage each other are included in the calculations. The goal for using the calculator is not so much to predict the outcomes of engagements as it is to add some objectivity to the force allocation process and to facilitate staff synchronization the plan. Rules of thumb for calculator shortfalls allow the staff to focus more on synchronization by accepting the calculator outcomes as good enough rather than an intellectual tug of war between the S2 and S3 over whether a system or unit was truly destroyed. Wargaming will progress more smoothly, making the outcomes more timely and synchronized. FutureWith continual changes to Army formations, the CGSC version of the COF calculator will likely go through continued revision. TRAC is developing a stand-alone version of the calculator for use by force developers, but their version will revision will be the addition of U.S. Marine Corps units to create a joint tool for land operations planning. The most current version will always be posted for use by unit leaders Calculations section at Although still a tool and not a simulator to predict engagement outcomes, the CGSC correlation of forces calculator will continue as a means to better anticipate the effects of force allocations in close combat planning and to drive better tactical decision making Notes1 Credit to William Plotner who originally designed the CPOF application for CGSC student use; the tool has since been used throughout the Army.2 1990).3 Ibid.4 5 Ibid, 6.6 Ibid, 16.7 The CGSC version of the calculator has values for British, Turkish, and Azeri units to support the CGSC curriculum. Values for when available and on like type organizations when not.8 Credit to MAJ Brian Merkl who reproduced damage value 9 FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (May 2015), 9-20.10
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 18 INFANTRY January-March 2017What if every infantry platoon in every brigade combat team (BCT) in the active duty Army had a second 68W combat medic permanently assigned? What if an infantry companys casualty collection point (CCP) also had a second combat medic to assist the company senior medic? A bridge too far, you say. But is it? Medicanic: (noun) Term in common use for a 68W combat medic who spends considerably more time in the unit motor pool maintaining evacuation vehicles than actually treating real patients or training perishable medical skills. From October 2001 to June 2011, more than 24 percent (976 potentially survivable during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.1 The above statements are actually linked. One directly important issue and save thousands of American lives in future combat operations. medicanic will substantially increase training time availability. Additionally, two combat medics working a single casualty poly trauma, as a trauma team, is far better than one alone. Many manpower also doubles the Class VIII immediately available for multi-patient or mass casualty (MASCAL) scenarios. moving with the platoon leader and high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) table of organization and equipment (MTOE) cannot support conducting three squad-sized dismounted patrols daily. This is unsustainable with only a single platoon combat medic. With two, they can alternate and every patrol will have coverage. If one is injured and evacuated, the mission continues. Improved platoon-level medical readiness, sick combat lifesaver (CLS) training are all positive by-products. When deploying to combat, what leader would not want twice the combat medics for his or her element? How do we get there? In an airborne infantry battalion, for make this work is 16. The medical platoon has eight ground evacuation THE MEDICANIC DDEFEAt T StTRAt TEGY:HOW SMALL ChHANGEsS CAN MMAKE A HUGE IMPAcCT SFC ROSS C. GELLER Soldiers assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division Resolute Support Sustainment Brigade perform tactical combat casualty care on a mannequin during a Afghanistan on 17 January 2017. Photo by CPL Michael Smith
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 19(FLAs). Every FLA is crewed with three medical personnel. For safety, no vehicles operate without a truck commander (TC). However, the driver and TC positions are not required to be 68W personnel. These two duty section MTOE. By re-tasking these two positions on each FLA, we free additional combat medic resources which were not previously available. platoons and four company CCPs. transportation specialists (88Ms). This would mitigate our medicanic issue of 68Ws logging Motor Pool Mondays and endless motor stables trained to safely conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), fueling, operator-level maintenance, and all vehicle dispatch documentation. The TC position, riding shotgun, is best performed by the unit primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) holders, i.e., navigation, and tactical radio communications. The 16 personnel could be tasked through intra-unit borrowed military manpower (BMM) or by an MTOE change. From a medical perspective, there are four basic prerequisites for these front-seater personnel: 1. Licensed and trained to operate the vehicle safely, 68W, and berth of a medical evacuation platform. These personnel changes will re-focus 68Ws on their primary mission patient care and not vehicle care. Combat medic mission readiness The only certainty in combat operations are casualties. Training saves lives. More training saves more lives; less training saves fewer lives. Notes1 Care, Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 73 (Number 6, Supplement 5, 2012), S431.SFC Ross C. Geller has served on active duty for 14 years. He served three years currently serving as a medical platoon sergeant (PSG) with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. SFC Geller is a former 11B Airborne Infantryman with the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute assignments include serving as medical PSG with the 2nd Battalion, 508th PIR; and medical evacuation squad leader with the 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Battalion. SFC Geller is a SERE (survival, evasion, resistance, and escape) Level C graduate, is registered with the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT), and has served as an instructor for the following courses: Combat Medic Instructor Course, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TC3), Pre-hospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS), and Basic Life Support (BLS). He has completed one deployment to Iraq and two to Afghanistan during which he has conducted 1,275 combat patrols and treated 100 trauma casualties. New CALL Publication Offers Lessons Learned on Mounted CARDuring its recent rotation to the National Training Center (NTC), 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, Sykes Regulars, combined arms rehearsal (CAR). The mounted CAR, when designed and executed properly, adds value to the traditional terrain-model CAR, and of exercising mission command systems.Download the newsletter at: http://usacac.army.mil/sites/ NFTF_CAR.pdf 19 JAN 17 CPT Nick Morton
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 20 INFANTRY January-March 2017To receive the military salute comes with a price a heavy burden. Customarily, a salute is rendered to a but still the Soldier salutes him or her. It is also customary for been summed up with the phrase the price of the salute. see his face as a show of respect. Possibly, it was also done as existed in most European militaries until the 19th century when the brow.1 In any case, the custom remains clear that even as THE PRICE OF tTHE SALUtTE CPT MICHAEL ANDERSON During a memorial ceremony at Combat Outpost Dand Patan in Afghanistan, Soldiers in Company B, 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment, 2nd
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 21 This is unfortunate. annoyance should serve as a reminder to both the one constant reminder of the responsibility inherent and respect therein. It should be seen for what it truly is, and that it is an honor that comes with a price and can carry a heavy burden. forces in a mountain pass resulted in one Soldier from his escorted the wounded to the medical evacuation helicopter a salute from his men and returned it. The price of the salute and the heavy burden it carries is saluted the lieutenant because of his for it. This is a responsibility that is more than just to a mission or an order not for the lieutenants responsibility rendered for his responsibility to them. That is the price the salute carries, of warfare, it is a heavy burden carried they must for the mission and to care for their men. The burden of that salute carries on his platoon saluted the memorial to their fallen comrade at The salute is more than just an act, a ceremony, or an with a price. The price of the salute and the inclusive burden is one of responsibility to the subordinate Soldier for his success, Notes1 and School, posted at http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/ .CPT Michael Anderson
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 22 INFANTRY January-March 2017 QRT AIMS tT O IIMPrROVE SSNIPErR PPErRFOrRMaANCE WHEN EENGaAGING MMOVING TarARGEtTS CPT NICHOLAS C. MILANOIn Kabul, Afghanistan, a known insurgent is hurrying through a populated street preparing to ambush a coalition convoy. A U.S. sniper team has the enemy in their sights, but the insurgent is more than 700 meters away and moving erratically. A missed shot could result in collateral damage and negatively impact public opinion of U.S. forces. the insurgent down? Is the ground commander willing to accept the inherent risk to civilian life to allow his team to make the time-sensitive call in these type situations? To assess a scenario such as this, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Weapons Training Battalion (WTBN) sponsored the Joint Sniper Performance Improvement Methodology (JSniPIM) Quick Reaction Test (QRT). This test was directed on 17 October 2014 by the Deputy Director, Air Warfare, (OSD), Director Operational Test and Evaluation. The QRT was a multi-service endeavor to improve sniper performance when engaging moving targets (via the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTPs]), a skill not practiced except under real-world conditions. Summarizing this critical capability gap, the USMC WTBN stated in its 2015 nomination packet, Sniper teams lack TTPs to engage moving combatants beyond standard engagement distances to the maximum effective range of their weapon systems and in civilian populated areas, which directly impacts employment of sniper teams. This project was nominated by BGen Austin E. Renforth, commanding general of the USMC Training Command, and endorsed by United States Central Command, USMC Forces Special Operations Command, included sniper teams from the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, 82nd Airborne Division, USMC Scout Sniper School, USMC School of Infantry Scout Sniper School, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Development Group, U.S. Air Force Security Forces Center, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Tactical by the U.S. Armys Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort A.P. Hill, VA. During the yearlong test, the QRT team researched existing (or the lack thereof) sniper doctrine and training methods focusing on the engagement of moving targets. The team and Advisory Groups (JWAG) meetings, table top exercises, and risk reduction events. After these developmental events, a TTP was developed and implemented at the testing site for data 26 snipers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army National Guard utilized six different weapons systems were human-like, mobile mannequins embedded with pressure sensors to register lethal and non-lethal hits and mounted on a four-wheeled chassis. This design allowed for realistic size, speed, and mobility for snipers to test the tactic.A group of snipers have data on their shots Methodology Quick Reaction Test. Photo by Sgt Justin M. Boling, USMC
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 23After evaluating the effectiveness of the TTP and conducting another round of JWAG meetings, the TTP was refined and tested again. During the second test, shooters were instructed on and familiarized with the TTP, then performed a more than 8,000 rounds. Surveys were then conducted to and distributed to the participating organizations for eventual implementation at sniper training schools within each service. The TTP developed during the JSniPIM QRT established a set of techniques which apply to and improve upon the third and fourth steps of the four-step engagement process of identify, range, estimate speed, and engage target. It was based on the quantitative data, observation of effective sniper teams, and the consolidation of best practices Ultimately, the JSniPIM QRT TTP cannot replace the many snipers may also not have the range, ammunition, and target resources to practice this type of shooting. The TTP provides the foundation for sniper teams to begin understanding the dynamics of engaging moving targets A QRT provides $1 million of contract support spanning one year with a rapid ramp-up to solve a joint (two or more services) critical capability gap with a non-material solution. The objective is to focus on rapidly solving problems currently following a nomination process that determines feasibility, testability, and urgency. If the nomination is a joint problem project will be considered. Typical test-generated products are materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities more information on the JSniPIM QRT or are interested in nominating a joint project, go to https://www.atec.army.mil/ jte/index.html .CPT Nicholas C. Milano is a Quick Reaction Test (QRT) project manager assigned to the Joint Test Element (JTE)Aberdeen, operating under the operational test agency oversight of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. CPT Milano is an Engineer in 2008. His previous assignments include serving as U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander, a route clearance platoon leader. Photos courtesy of author Infantry Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, and experiences while deployed. We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. For more information or to submit an article, call (706) 545-2350 or email us at firstname.lastname@example.org SSUBMItT ArtRTICLES tT O INFANTRY
24 INFANTRY January-March 2017 INFANTRY A ATTACKS AT NTCNTC COL BRIAN J. HARTHORN LTC MICHAEL S. FARMERAuthors Note: INFANTRY PART I
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 25Battle for Granite Pass: Engagement Area Development Step Zero The Granite Pass complex loomed large to the north. With a daunting ridgeline running east to west with canalizing terrain connecting the northern and central mobility corridors, it consisted of the main pass and three other smaller choke points in the Granite Mountains. The Stryker infantry battalion task force was assigned the mission of defending the pass if the defense was successful, possibly seizing it in the future to support subsequent offensive operations. Due to weather and competing collection priorities across the BCT, the battalion did not have an accurate assessment of the enemy disposition in vicinity of Granite Pass. The commander was concerned that the battalion would not get started with the steps of engagement area development if the enemy owned key terrain in the passes. The battalion treated the operation like a movement to contact. The scout platoon initiated movement at EENT (end of evening nautical twilight). Bravo Company was next in the order of movement using a forward security element-advance guard (FSE-AG) formation. The probable line of deployment (PLD) was drawn up more than four kilometers from the Granite Pass to account for the possibility that the enemy would have AT-5s in vicinity of that key and canalizing terrain. The commander gave guidance to have the Infantrymen dismount from an objective rally point (ORP) shy of the PLD. He believed they would make initial contact and realistically destroy the lead enemy subsequently maneuver Alpha and Charlie Companies against the remaining enemy forces if necessary. If Bravo didnt make contact, then they would continue to secure the pass while the other two companies transitioned into engagement area development. Particular emphasis was given to ensuring the battalion mortars were third in the order of movement right likely event that Bravo made contact. The temperature dropped more than 20 degrees in less than an hour as the sun set that evening. Mountains previously baking in the hot, orange sun now turned purple in the shadows. It was still in the mid-70s, but compared to the mid-90s experienced just an hour prior the men shivered a little bit as they adjusted to the drastic temperature drop while hours the scouts started their movement using the cover of darkness to conceal themselves as they departed the Iron Triangle, inching their way north along the 114-wadi (a system of deep wadis that handrail the complex terrain on the south and eastern side of Granite Pass). They werent able to enjoy (RVs) for very long as they dutifully dismounted at the PLD. Now dismounted on foot, they pulled their vehicles along in overwatch. The Strykers would trail approximately 600 meters The Granite Pass Complex connects the central and northern corridors as viewed from the south. Figure 1 Battalion Movement to Contact (FM 3-21.20)Photos courtesy of authors Figure 2 Maximum Engagement Line (MEL) or unit. This line is determined both by the weapons or units maximum effective range and by the effects of terrain. For example, slope, vegetation, structures, and other features provide cover and concealment that may prevent the weapon from engaging out to the maximum effective range.
26 INFANTRY January-March 2017or one intervisibility line behind their scouts. This facilitated the RVs to enemy anti-tank systems. It also kept their Strykermounted M2 .50 caliber machine guns close enough to provide enemy infantry. Bravo Company impatiently waited until 2330 hours before initiating its own movement. Start too soon and or provide them with information on any enemy that might be scouts a chance to do their job. It allowed the Infantrymen to stay mounted a little bit longer. Fresh legs would be nice if this It was now after midnight, and the scouts were climbing over the boulders separating the main pass and the smaller pass called Granite West. Less than 200 meters away, the scouts noticed movement to their north. Shots rang out; they were in mortars following Bravo Company went into action. The enemy pinpoint locations for two scout teams. Bravo Company had stayed mounted following in trail behind the scout RVs, but now they dismounted their Infantrymen once they received Vehicles (ICVs) to an enemy AT system now that they had a better idea of where the threat was located. They were already within the maximum engagement lines of any existing AT-5 or AT-13 systems. Still it would be another 90 minutes before the Infantrymen could close the distance between themselves and the scouts. The scouts had to survive using their radios and supporting 120mm mortars. Bravo Company transitioned to a company wedge formation with the two advance guard platoons trailing the forward security element (FSE) platoon. The scouts talked the FSE onto their position, and a little after lead platoon got its M240Bs into action. Effective suppressive fires from the medium machine guns allowed the Bravo Company commander to maneuver his other two platoons company-sized force. The battalion mortars were having good effects. Tarantula observer coach/trainers (OC/Ts) clambered across the rocks reporting battle damage assessments (BDA) for both sides. Enemy forces that werent destroyed by the mortars were forced to reposition. Every time they had to reposition meant a missed opportunity to employ their AT-5s and AT-13s against the Stryker vehicles which were now visible in the moonlight. First came the 120mm mortars, then .50 cal. boulders of the pass complex. It was too much, and the enemy infantry force did not have prepared positions. They had been conducting a movement to contact just like the rotational unit. early morning with the remaining enemy forces breaking contact shortly after BMNT (begin morning nautical twilight). The Stryker task force had two platoons worth of casualties that it had to evacuate as well, but it retained control of the pass complex. bounding over and around dinosaur-sized boulders to close with and destroy the enemy. ICVs came forward to resupply classes of supply (water and ammunition) to keep them in gather his company commanders and selected staff members to a point on the ground in the middle of the engagement area and identify it as the location where he wanted to destroy the enemy step three of engagement area development. However, they wouldnt have gotten to step three if they hadnt Observations If friendly forces cannot effectively range enemy positions while outside of the enemy MEL, then they must either: 1) Dismount Infantry outside of the MEL to maneuver to a position of tactical advantage, or 2) Mitigate the distance they must close on the enemy until they can effectively range them similar means. Infantry should dismount for increased survivability and maneuverability when mitigation cannot be achieved.
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 27 of engagement area Defense of the Siberian Ridgeline: Seizing the Dominant Terrain through The sun had just set and it was surprisingly busy for that time of the evening... maybe it just seemed busy. Maybe a better adjective to use would be noisy. The sound of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting of dismounted OPFOR Infantrymen completed their last pre-combat inspections and prepared to cross the line of departure (LD). Temperatures were cooling and an early autumn breeze would make tonights combat loads weighing in the neighborhood of 80 pounds. The rotational units cavalry squadron had established a security zone along the Siberian Ridgeline to facilitate engagement area development by the maneuver battalions to the south. They were feverishly and emplacing triple-strand concertina wire obstacle belts to defend the reverse slope of the ridgeline. They intended to mass the effects of their direct and indirect Wayne foothills in the west to the Schoolbus Wadi in the east. A supporting effort defended a smaller but separate engagement area in the Red Lake Pass, a narrow mobility corridor canalizing could easily defend it provided they covered their obstacles with more critical. high above the John Wayne Pass, destroy enemy forces defending from the western battle position, and create a point of penetration (PoP), setting the conditions for follow-on mechanized forces to exploit the PoP the following morning. The Infantrymen stepped off from the town of Razish shortly after EENT. It was a six-kilometer dismounted movement with little illumination that evening. Illumination is a double-edged sword. Figure 3 Organization of Forces for an Area Defense Contiguous Area of Operations (FM 3-90-1)Notice highlighted security area and security forces. Security proves essential to both offensive and defensive operations. The dark spots of the John Wayne Foothills and the Siberian Ridge beyond the ridgeline in the foreground
28 INFANTRY January-March 2017Good illumination means faster movement but also increases the risk of being compromised. Poor illumination equates to a slower rate of movement but assists with the Infantrymens a rate of approximately one kilometer per hour, the company moved across the Hidden Valley and started trudging its way up the steep slopes of the north side of Tiefort Mountain. Once the Soldiers reached an elevation high enough to overlook the turned east and began creeping their way toward the western mouth of John Wayne Pass. It was tough, slow walking. With 80 pounds of water, PKM machine guns, AT-13s, three AT-5s, tripods, 60mm mortar tubes, and ammunition, the Infantrymen walked with the left foot striking the slope below the right foot to prevent them from tumbling down the mountain. They arrived at their destination two hours before BMNT. The Wayne Pass and nearby foothills below, and most importantly, to observe (and engage) the M1s and M2s tucked into various wadi systems believing they were in a covered position of their weapons squads manned the machine guns, AT-13s, and three AT-5s capable of reaching out to engage a tank at nearly four kilometers. The company commander reminded his squads were in position. The commander moved from one position to the next designating target arrays for his AT gunners so they M1 or M2 was one too many. He wanted every round to count. Then, as the horizon began revealing the faint hint of pink indicating BMNT was at hand, the company commander gave the word to unleash hell. In less than 10 minutes, the outcome was academic. A mechanized company teams worth of combat were fortunate enough to be dismounted during the time of the attack looked upward from what they previously thought was key terrain on the John Wayne Foothills. Now, it didnt seem that way as they watched the puffs of smoke and grenade simulators indicating and AT-13s. Their vehicles were destroyed and there was no place to go except up. They must now attack uphill to destroy the immediate and lethal threat that had occupied the true key terrain the night before. As if to reinforce the point, OPFOR mortars began providing incentive to the rotational units Infantrymen eastern base of Tiefort Mountain. OPFOR AT gunners continued to engage and destroy nearby M1 tanks and M2 BFVs, and now their PKM gunners deployed a wall of steel onto the heads of the approaching Soldiers. It two to three fell as casualties. Surprise had been near complete, and they simply couldnt get their own Figure 4 Defense of an Area of Operations (FM 3-21.20) Figure 5 Engagement PrioritiesEngagement priorities entail the sequential ordering of targets to be engaged. FM 3-21.10
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 29M240Bs in a position to suppress the OPFOR that owned the available because they were destroyed during the initial AT boss; conditions were set for the mechanized force to exploit the newly created point of penetration in vicinity of the John Wayne Foothills. T-80s, BMP-2s, and BRDM-2s began pouring through the Hill 824-781 East gap and down the Siberian Highway. The rotational unit battalion attempted to reposition its M1 Abrams and M2 BFVs from the eastern battle position in vicinity of the Schoolbus Wadi over to the west to block the point of penetration. It was too late. The tanks and BFVs were had to contend with the enemy mechanized force to their north and the OPFOR AT gunners high above on the base of Tiefort Mountain to their west. Another mechanized company team repositioned and was further attrited, contributing to the battalions sequential defeat in detail. The OPFOR mechanized force continued driving south to subsequent objectives. It was a good morning that made up for a long night. Observations Urban Assault on Razish Razish is huge. Consisting of more than 500 buildings and compounds, the city can easily consume an entire brigade combat team. To say that clearing the city is a complex endeavor would be an understatement. The Stryker battalion Infantry Soldiers secure dominant terrain with their most lethal weapon against to move wearing protective gear. The Soldiers in this photo are wearing Joint
30 INFANTRY January-March 2017commander wasnt sure where to start. Gaining a foothold in the city would be tough enough. Then there was the question about how to maintain tempo once clearing operations commenced. How would the battalions actions be synchronized with its adjacent battalion task force that was simultaneously clearing key terrain overlooking Razish from both the west and south. They had nearly 24 hours to observe Razish and report on patterns of life and activity. The good news was that they avenue of approach through Hidden Valley. That didnt mean the enemy was absent. It likely meant that enemy scouts were content with remaining undetected in order to trigger enemy bad news was that the enemy had surrounded the city with protective mine and wire obstacles. It was going to be tough to gain a foothold. On the following night, two platoons of combat power from Charlie Company dismounted their along the southern wall of Hidden Valley. From in order to suppress enemy forces to the north. platoon and a platoon of three weapons squads harvested from across Charlie Company; both platoons were under the control of the company combat power to fight for the SBF position as well as performing its primary mission of suppressing enemy forces in support of the battalions decisive operation. Furthermore, platoons under the leadership of the company commander as an additional maneuver force that could be utilized in a follow-and-assume role during operations in Razish. It was fortuitous that t he support element had the additional contact with six enemy scouts during the approach to the SBF position. After a short exchange of small arms direct were outgunned and broke contact. Second in the order of movement, Alpha Company dismounted its Strykers along the northern wall of Hidden Valley. an SBF position on the key terrain high above the eastern mouth of the valley that had been cleared by the scouts the night before. With their M240Bs, the Soldiers suppressed enemy forces in the vicinity of a prison compound to facilitate the remainder of the company, which was breaching the protective obstacles. a sustained rate for the next six minutes. Once the weapons squad leader observed the absence of enemy figures in the west-facing apertures, he ordered his guns to go into a watch and shoot mode suppressing targets of opportunity while also conserving ammunition. The company had been augmented by attachment of an engineer platoon and a section of Mobile Gun System (MGS) Strykers. The MGS platforms blew holes through the obstacles as well as suppressed any west-facing apertures from the prison compound. Meanwhile targets on the eastern edge of the prison compound provided attached Sappers with their opportunity. The Sappers utilized the obscuration and suppressive effects from both the SBF south. The prison complex is seen at the bottom left with the rock pile to its immediate north. Figure 6 Weapons Control StatusThe three levels of weapons control status (WCS) outline the conditions, based on target adjusts the WCS based on friendly and enemy disposition. In general, a more restrictive WCS WEAPONS HOLD (Engage only if engaged or ordered to engage) WEAPONS TIGHT WEAPONS FREE FM 3-21.10
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 31position and the MGS platforms to move forward with Bangalore torpedoes to breach any remaining obstacles. They just needed large enough lanes for the introduction of infantry for now. They could further reduce the obstacle for vehicle lanes later. to clear the prison compound, establishing a foothold for the introduction of Bravo Company. Bravo Company was patient. They couldnt afford to create was what was essentially happening back at the ORP where the two companies had dismounted their ICVs. The enemy scouts who had remained invisible in Hidden Valley for the on the parking lot of ICVs. Bravo Company lost a platoons worth of vehicles. Fortunately, its Infantrymen were already on the ground, but that was four fewer mobile SBF positions they would have available for the near term. Alpha 6 relayed to Bravo 6 that the prison compound was clear, but he wasnt sure how long he could hold it because he was being effectively suppressed by enemy forces on top of a rock pile overlooking terrain for both sides. Furthermore, the task force scouts to the The 11Cs went into action, and the enemy platoon was soon reduced to a squad by effective 120mm high explosive (HE) toward the peak of the rock pile. The remaining enemy infantry saw the approaching combat power and withdrew into the heart of Razish. Bravo Company quickly established its own SBF position, suppressing enemy forces on the western perimeter of the town. That cued Alpha Company to call its platoon that had established its SBF west of the prison compound forward. Casualties had reduced both companies down to two effective wall was having good effects versus the enemy in the city. Charlie Companys SBF to the south and Bravo Companys SBF to the west on the rock pile. The two SBF positions forced enabling their brother battalion task force to establish its own foothold in the northwest corner of Razish. Now, there were two Stryker Infantry battalions abreast of each other. They would conduct successive bounds from west to east ensuring they could mutually support each other by suppressing west-facing apertures in front of each other. Internally, the battalion bounded Bravo and Alpha Companies in a similar manner. Bravo was on moved in successive bounds, suppressing apertures in front of the other. They were careful to coordinate the lead trace of the adjacent units assault elements. They were also correct in their analysis of the enormous size of the city leading to the conclusion that the linear danger areas to be crossed were mission analysis by requisitioning for handheld smoke grenades and smoke pots. The smoke was received a few hours prior to SP the previous night and now proved to be a tremendous combat multiplier. Smoke was utilized between every cluster previously constructed wolf-tail near-recognition signals. They would use every wolf-tail available, and now these markers paid dividends assisting the M240B gunners in Charlie Companys SBF position with shifting their wall of steel 15 degrees in front of the forward line of troops (FLOT). The Sappers completed reduction of the obstacles west of the prison compound just before BMNT, and now the battalion could introduce Strykers into on Razish, Alpha Company bounded a platoon of ICVs forward along the southern edge of the town. These vehicles were effective in suppressing westfacing apertures with their M2 .50 cal. machine guns. They were so effective that they started to get greedy. Three ICVs bounded forward of the adjacent rifle squads clearing buildings on their northern flank with the platoon sergeants vehicle hesitating behind. Its almost as if he seemed to sense what was about to happen. The three ICVs trace to maintain survivability but has plenty of range extending beyond it.
32 INFANTRY January-March 2017bounded no more than 200 meters forward of the Infantrymen minutes. Alpha Company bounded another platoon of ICVs forward to assume the role of mobile SBF position. These ICVs providing overwatch with their crew-served machine guns. The blinking lights of their brother platoons ICVs served as a hard lesson learned. Charlie Companys support element, still occupying a SBF position south of the town, reported the approach of enemy vehicles from the east. Fortunately, these were in the perfect position to destroy the lead two vehicles from the enemy armored force. The remainder of the enemy mechanized company decided that was enough and withdrew remainder of the morning, but the task force accomplished its still capable of continuing future offensive operations. Observations Machine Guns and Machine Gun Gunnery The Infantrymen from Charlie Company moved forward at a brisk pace. Their destination was Ujen, the second largest city at NTC. It might as well be on an island; it was located terrain. Shortly after EENT the Stryker infantry battalion directed Bravo Company to move to the west of Ujen. It was a feint so they had to move well outside of the four-kilometer range of any defending AT-5 systems but close enough to deceive the enemy forces inside the town into thinking that they were posturing for an attack from the west. Meanwhile, the other Hill 876, which was more than four kilometers east of Ujen. From this location, Charlie Company dismounted its ICVs. These Infantrymen were now moving across the open desert creosote bushes were their only forms of concealment. It would take them nearly four hours to cross the terrain from Hill 876 to attention for as long as possible. If the OPFOR positioned ATGM and crew-served weapon systems to the western side of town, then establishment of the foothold on the eastern side of town would be relatively easy.
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 33 were less than 500 meters from the eastern edge of Ujen. detected, but the element of surprise was still in effect. The OPFOR infantry could not reposition its machine guns fast teams outside the doorway of the easternmost building. The established. The nine buildings along the eastern edge of town were subsequently cleared and seized with little directThe rotational units possession of the nine buildings on the eastern edge of Ujen now eliminated those structures to include their eastern facing apertures and rooftops as options for the OPFOR to employ their AT-5s and AT-13s. With the AT threat to the east mitigated, the battalion commander now ordered Alpha Company, still mounted on the east side of Hill 876, to move rapidly to the Ujen foothold. From there it would coordinate a link-up with Charlie Company to complete clearance of Ujen target just in case Alpha needed some additional obscuration during its approach march. It was nice but unnecessary. The OPFOR, reeling from its loss of the eastern foothold, now simply tried to delay the inevitable. Alpha Company arrived at the foothold, dismounted its from east to west. Charlie Company, relieved to have Alpha Company take off some of the pressure, now focused on clearing its assigned half of the city to the south. The companies cleared from east to west, moving in successive bounds so they could provide mutual support via the suppression of east-facing apertures along the seam between the two companies. Alpha Company began maneuvering a section of ICVs echeloned to the right rear of its assaulting infantry in order to provide Company was now directed to follow and support behind Charlie Company which had cleared most of its objective but had sustained the highest number of casualties during its initial infantry withdrew into a compound on the northwest corner of the city with nowhere else to go. They were still in shock mounted forces it all added up to complete and total surprise. The OPFOR would have to hot wash this one. This was the more than six months. Observations Part IIThe April-June issue of Magazine will feature Ambush at Bravo Pass, and Figure 7 Five Phases of a Raid (FM 3-90.1)At the time this article was written, COL Brian J. Harthorn was serving as an Infantry observer coach/trainer (OC/T) at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. At the time this article was written, LTC Michael S. Farmer was serving as an Infantry OC/T at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin.
34 INFANTRY January-March 2017 ASSURED ACCESS THROUGH TaACtTICaAL MOBILItTY:OBSERVATIoONS AND LESSoONS LEARNED FRoOM A PRooOOF oOF PRINCIplPLE CPT VIRGIL J. BARNARD 1LT MICHAEL M. BOUCHARDParatroopers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conduct training with the Light Tactical All Terrain Vehicle on Fort Pickett, VA, on 26 February 2015.Photo by SSG Jason HullIn order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense1With instability around the world, the decreasing number of prepositioned forces, and the increasing number of adversaries with anti-access and aerial denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the need for a tailorable, scalable, and more mobile Initial Entry Force (IEF) has emerged. The Joint Staff Global Response Force Execution Order (GRF EXORD) delineates that homeland-based mission-aligned forces are assigned the mission of conducting a Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) as an IEF.2 The Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (LTATV) proof of principle conducted by 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR) from November 2014 through December 2015 was initiated with Operational Needs Statement (ONS) trained with 33 Polaris Defense MRZR4s for 14 months. In August 2015 we expanded our trials to include training and tactical employment of the Polaris Defense DAGOR, General Dynamics (GD) Flyer 60, and GD Flyer 72 for three weeks. In this article we will discuss the background, highlights, lessons learned from the tactical employment of these vehicles, list the desirable parameters, and make recommendations for furthering this capability within the GRF. The Need for Enhanced Tactical MobilityThe Joint Chiefs of Staffs Joint Concept for Entry Operations penetrate in and/or across multiple domains at select points of entry to place the enemy at an operational disadvantage.3 specially organized and equipped to handle the unique mission of conducting entry operations with a complement of low signature combat vehicles. These vehicles must be able to be moved by strategic lift and rotary wing assets and land off-set from enemy force concentrations.4
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 35ONS 14-19635 requested an air-droppable enhanced tactical mobility set [of vehicles] because of new operational requirements.5 Specifically, these requirements were for the GRF Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) (Airborne) to counter increased proliferation of the enemys A2/ AD capabilities by conducting an airborne assault at an off-set drop zone (DZ) and maneuvering over distance to quickly seize a lodgment as directed in the JCEO.6 Additionally, increased tactical mobility enhances the 82nd Airborne Divisions critical mission of rapidly expanding lodgments through an expanded security zone and affords the division the option of increased ground mobility to leverage speed to bypass known enemy defenses to seize key terrain or defeat enemy forces beyond the traditional airhead line. The 82nd Airborne Divisions unique requirements and the gap in meeting policy directives presents a critical and timesensitive requirement that should not be delayed while the Army considers a broader program of record.The Army Ground Mobility Vehicle ProgramThe Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), the Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and of mobility platforms to all IBCTs and subsequently conducted a platform performance demonstration (PPD) in June 2014 at Fort Bragg, NC, that sought to validate threshold requirements Combat Support and Combat Service Support (PEO CS & CSS) began to consider a broader program of record for LTATVs beyond the 82nd ONS.7-8 Training OverviewAfter receiving 33 MRZR4s in October of 2014, we conducted extensive training, qualitative and quantitative assessments, and established standard operating procedures for the tactical employment of the vehicles. We logged more than 21,000 miles on the MRZR4s in the wooded terrain of Fort Bragg, snow and icy swamps of Fort Pickett, VA, high mountain desert and rocky terrain of Fort Irwin, CA, and the loose, open terrain of White Sands Missile Range, NM. Over 14 months we completed training ranging from movements at night. We executed both platoon and company use of the vehicles during our multi-echelon training events offset DZ and immediately maneuver to seize a lodgment, seize key terrain, and complete assigned missions at extended ranges.9According to a recent Rand Corporation study titled Assessing Conventional Army Demands and Requirements for Ultra-Light Tactical Mobility, the use of Ultralight Tactical Mobility (UTM) capabilities can be used in the execution of eight basic local patrolling and engagements, coordinated maneuver, immediate pursuit, troop mobility, traveling support, casualty evacuation, and internal/ferry support.10 We incorporated the into our collective training events and tactically employed the MRZR4s and other variants to assess their use as platforms for non-standard casualty evacuation, to emplace weapons Lessons Learned While Validating the Use of In order to avoid heavy concentrations of enemy air would conduct an airborne assault at an offset, lightly guarded and clear the A2/AD threat to enable the introduction of followCombined Joint Operational Access Exercise (CJOAX) 15-01 in April 2014 and a battalion-level JFE exercise in May 2014. B Companys initial mission during CJOAX 15-01 was conducting a JFE with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Battalion of the British During Operation Dragon Spear, paratroopers from the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment conduct a raid after completing a 40-kilometer movement on LTATVs at Fort Irwin, CA.
36 INFANTRY January-March 2017Parachute Regiment and then moving to and securing an offset DZ. B Company conducted a parachute assault onto Holland DZ with the rest of 2nd Brigade Combat Team. After rapid assembly, 90 paratroopers on 24 MRZR4 LTATVs moved on unimproved roads at night under blackout conditions aided by the use of night vision devices. We moved at an average speed of 21 kilometers per hour (KPH) along the 30-kilometer route and secured the northern portion of Sicily DZ. Once all of our blocking positions were established and the conditions were set, a secondary airborne assault brought D Company, 2-325th AIR with eight HMMWVs and 24 paratroopers. Company conducted a JFE onto Normandy DZ and moved cross country, without using improved roads or trails, on LTATVs to clear an A2/AD threat near Holland DZ. This set the conditions for the remainder of the IEF airdrop. We drove the 13-kilometer route at night, during a rainstorm, under blackout conditions, in semi-restrictive woodland terrain. The average movement speed for the company was 5 KPH (compared the paratroopers were not fatigued from the movement to the For both movements, the company moved on one axis of advance instead of dispersing into faster-moving platoon elements due to the limited range of our organic communications equipment. We were further constrained by not having communications with follow-on forces until our higher headquarters was on the ground, which meant we the conditions were set or that potential threats still existed. Distributed mission command equipment that works while moving such as tactical satellite (TACSAT) and the Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) is needed to leverage the range and speed of movement LTATVs provide. The mission to rapidly expand the lodgment and seize key terrain was validated during Network Integration Exercise 16.1 (NIE) at White Sands Missile Range in October 2015. After conducting a parachute assault onto Space Harbor DZ and assembling on the heavy equipment point of impact (HEPI), a platoon from B Company mounted eight MRZR4 LTATVs and moved approximately 5 kilometers to clear a set of rolling hills in order to expand the lodgment and prevent the enemy from of follow-on forces via airlands, the platoon pushed further upon, moved further north to support a company attack. The platoon moved approximately 20 kilometers and conducted multiple missions during the initial six hours of the JFE. The average speed moving through the open desert terrain during daylight was 40 KPH. The ability to move rapidly and be dynamically re-tasked to rapidly expand the lodgment and clear known, likely, and suspected enemy locations to expedite the arrival of follow-on forces makes an LTATV-equipped IEF an asset to the commander during a JFE. The third mission of completing assigned missions at extended ranges was validated during Operation Dragon Spear, a Chief of Staff of the Army-directed JFE exercise, that was conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin on 6 August 2015. During this exercise, B Company headquarters and one platoon conducted a parachute assault onto Grant DZ with the brigade to set the conditions for airlands. Four hours after the parachute assault, two enhanced mobility platoons arrived via airland on two C-130Js. The aircraft delivered six MRZR4s, two DAGORs, two FLYER 60s, and two FLYER 72s to the airhead. Shortly after arriving, both platoons met at the company assembly area and immediately conducted a 40-kilometer movement to extract a downed pilot. This movement was conducted as a company during daylight hours in high desert terrain with easily accessible mobility corridors. The average speed for this movement was 40 KPH. B Company While setting conditions for the assault, B Company a small terrain feature. With conditions set, we moved into a linear formation to minimize the improvised explosive device (IED) threat and mask the size of the formation, increasing protection through dispersion of forces. We then moved rapidly to a piece of micro terrain that would serve as the high, served as cover for the vehicles. Once at the assault position, we rapidly dismounted and conducted a selective Once the downed pilot was located, two MRZR4s drove into the village to serve as casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) casualties were moved to the assault position, we moved back to the lodgment. Conducting this raid during daylight hours would not have been possible without the mobility platforms. The distance roads were easily observed due to the lack of vegetation, and the enemy would have had advanced warning if Soldiers had air assaulted into the closest position that provided cover. The ability to move long distances through semi-restrictive terrain on LTATVs allowed us to attack the enemy from an unexpected direction at a time when they were unprepared. Desirable Parameters OverviewDuring the proof of principle, we conducted a detailed Conducting this raid during daylight hours would not have been possible without the mobility platforms... The ability to move long distances through semi-restrictive terrain on LTATVs allowed us to attack the enemy from an unexpected direction at a time when they were unprepared.
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 37analysis to determine what parameters are most desirable in an air-droppable LTATV for an IEF. We conducted qualitative and quantitative assessments, and we determined our desired parameters based on the experiences of our operators after spending an extensive amount of time tactically employing the vehicles. Our experiences validated most of the Armys GMV Capability Production Document (CPD) assumptions and key performance variables that would have application to IBCTs beyond the airborne GRF BCT and the system characteristics detailed in ONS 14-19635. In order of priority, the parameter Mobility and handling, Allowable cargo load, Strategic mobility (airdrop and airland), by the user without the use of special tools or a forward support representative [FSR]), Auxiliary power generation for mission command equipment, Ease of maintenance, Safety, Ease of recovery, Fuel range, Egress (the ability to get in and out of the vehicle quickly with combat load), and Fire power.11 Rotary wing internal transport and slingloads for UH-60, CH-47, and CV-22 aircraft were not evaluated as part of our proof of principle.Teamvs Squad-Sized CarriersA discussion of desirable parameters is not complete without discussing the size of the element that each LTATV should carry. Team carriers are more maneuverable due to their smaller makes recovery easy. Greater dispersion of personnel allows for risk mitigation by decreasing the number of personnel that would be affected by IED or ambush. Team-sized carriers tend however, those parts can easily be changed on the move in an austere environment. Squad-sized carriers allow for increased command and control as a result of decreasing the overall number of vehicles, maximizing airland capabilities, and increasing the number of leaders in each vehicle. The added space in the vehicle permits the use of larger fuel tanks and increased fuel range. The vehicles are heavier but tend to be more durable. However, the engines and suspension systems are larger and more complex. vehicles, making a unit more adaptable to mission, terrain, and for the greatest number of seats per aircraft. The durability of the vehicle increases vehicle survivability during the airdrop and initial operations before mechanic support and parts can arrive. During the initial operation, risk of enemy contact during movement is mitigated by the overall surprise and speed we maintain. The rapid increase of combat power will catch the Photo by SSG Jason HullParatroopers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment assault an urban environment at Fort Irwin on 11 August 2015.
enemy off guard and mobility corridors will be open, free of IEDs and planned ambushes. For these reasons, the larger, more durable DAGOR is ideal. operations, out-of-sector missions become more common, and mobility corridors begin to close as the enemy becomes more familiar with our routes out of the airhead line or secured area. For these reasons, a team-sized carrier allows more protection as it increases the number of routes available and decreases The Polaris DAGOR, a squad-sized carrier, is effective for the GRF because it increases the strategic mobility of an airborne IBCT more than the MRZR4. A C-17 Globemaster III can airdrop eight of either variant per aircraft via a Dual Row Airdrop System (DRAS) platform. Translated to ground capability, it is the difference between 72 seats (8 x 9-man vehicles) delivered with the DAGORs per aircraft compared to 32 with MRZR4s (8 x 4-man vehicles). If conducting an airland operation, the difference is negated with 90 DAGOR seats (10 vehicles) versus 72 MRZR4 seats (18 vehicles) in a single C-17. The MRZR4 is better suited for traditional light infantry units. The MRZR4s small size and capable off-road design allowed us to quickly traverse wooded terrain and thick foliage, and faster than their dismounted counterparts. The vehicles can travel wherever infantry would typically walk, thereby allowing combat fatigue compared to a dismounted element. Of note, the audibly undetectable one minor terrain feature away from the Recommendations Capability Production Document (CPD) assumptions and key performance variables that would have application to IBCTs beyond the Airborne GRF BCT with two notable recommendations. The power generation for vehicle-mounted Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARs) and beyond-line of sight communications on select leader vehicles is a critical capability not originally MCoE indicate that mission command equipment is now a critical capability. Unaddressed, the lack of mission command systems negates the increased range and mobility we are seeking to create with the vehicles. Additionally, the CPD was originally written for a squad carrier. To achieve the intent of avoiding mobility corridors and travelling in restrictive terrain with dismounted infantry, the Armys program should consider smaller team-sized carriers that can double as a modular medical, mortar, heavy weapons, or logistics vehicle. MCoE and the Army Capabilities Integration Center should apply the 82nd Airborne Divisions lessons learned to their GMV program, but the requirements and operating assumptions for employment and key parameters from the Armys Program of Record and the 82nd Airborne Division ONS. The 82nd Airborne Division, as a designated IEF, will likely be able to leverage strategic surprise while traversing mobility corridors or rapidly repositioning friendly forces. Follow-on forces will not have the same surprise advantages and will need vehicles that can bypass traditional mobility corridors with the current ONS of equipping the GRF IBCTs three infantry task forces with enhanced mobility and providing a training package for the GRF 2 in its Intensive Training Cycle. A second LTATV purchase consisting of 35 Polaris DAGORs (9-seat variant) should be immediately executed, leveraging their demonstrated versatility and durability, strategic mobility for vital mission command systems. The MRZR4 is very cost effective and more advantageous in restrictive terrain. However, we shouldnt continue to invest in MRZR4 motor gasoline (MOGAS) variants when a turbo diesel option will soon likely be available for delivery. Over the next six months, a more thorough proof of principle can be conducted on the DAGOR and completing the ONS.Notes1 2016 at ance.pdf.2 Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations 3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 BG Christopher Cavoli, Operational Needs StatementEnhanced Tactical Mobility for the Global Response Force (ONS 14-19635) (Fort 6 Joint Chiefs Of Staff. 7 Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Ground Mobility Vehicle Integration Directorate, Operational and Organizational Concept for Future of Excellence, 2015).8 Of note, Army G3/5/7 changed the program name to Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV), not to be confused with the AM General SOF Variant HMMWV or the USASOC GMV-R 1.1 program of record.9 BG Cavoli, ONS. 10 Matthew Boyer, Michael Shurkin, Jonathan P. Wong, Ryan Schwankhart, Adam Albrich, Matthew W. Lewis and Christopher G. Pernin, Assessing Conventional Army Demands and Requirements for Ultra-Light 11 Kenneth Burgess, Virgil Barnard and Michael Bouchard, MRZR4 Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2015).38 INFANTRY January-March 2017 CPT Virgil J. Barnard is currently serving as chief of plans for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He previously served as commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR), 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. CPT Barnard earned a bachelors degree in political science from Washburn University. 1LT Michael M. Bouchard for the XVIII Airborne Corps Air Assault School, Fort Bragg. His previous as a platoon leader with Bravo Company, 1-325 AIR. 1LT Bouchard earned a bachelors degree in management from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY.
BUILDING THE IINFANTRY SQUAD LLEADER:COGNITIVE, SOcCIAL, AND PHYsSIcCAL DDEVELOpPMENT 1LT MICHAEL P. FERGUSON During the last 15 years, the roles and responsibilities within nearly every military occupational specialty have been challenged, expanded, and at times altogether revised. The demands placed upon our military service members by the Global War on Terrorism necessitated such adaptation, and we as an Army excelled in every regard. But, in the emerging operating environment that involves both a heightened threat from peer or near-peer states as well as the rampant proliferation of non-state extremist actors, perhaps a reassessment of what platoons expect from their squad leaders is in order. When asked to articulate the desired characteristics of a extracted from the Army Values or one of our various creeds. This is a good thing in that it demonstrates the successful inculcation of these critical concepts within our formations. But such terms do little more than offer an advantage in promotion boards if they are not backed by deliberate courses of action designed to produce Soldiers who embody these traits. In the interest of identifying a nexus of common denominators leaders may foster such skills within their units, platoon leaders of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, examined feedback from their squad leaders after a battalion squad leader course and pinpointed several best practices. The outcome of this examination is a set of practical guidelines that develops the cognitive, social, and physical domains of military leadership. To elaborate, the cognitive domain focuses on how Soldiers learn and retain information, and how that information is used to solve problems and execute complex tasks. The social aspect of leadership is one of the most transformational because it is intrinsically linked to unit cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps. This domain focuses on how Soldiers perceive their organization and its members, thereby allowing them to build cohesive teams through mutual pride and trust. Development of the physical domain pertains sequential, and relevant to the organizations current mission. Before we could assess how an organization develops most commonly associated with the ideal team leader and squad leader.Paratroopers from Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Engineers breached a mine-wire obstacle that allowed the platoon to Photos courtesy of author January-March 2017 INFANTRY 39
Charlie Companys squad leaders agreed uniformly that their team leaders should be trustworthy, inspiring mentors who remain adaptive in austere environments by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. More than one squad leader described this vision as living the Army Values or personifying the NCO Creed. They believed team leaders must learn to balance the roles of enforcer and counselor by knowing their paratroopers and viewing the Army as a way of life and not merely an employment opportunity. It is self-evident that we these conclusions are valid and most certainly true, we must ask as well: What more should we expect from our squad leaders? Quite a bit, in fact. Squad leaders are the conduit between the individual mission. In the absence of the platoon sergeant, a senior squad leader must assume his duties. These duties consist of personnel management at the platoon level (a 400 percent or at the company level, and even problem-solving endeavors in the battalion realm, such as terrain and ammunition resourcing. Young squad leaders may view their role as restricted to the management and training of eight Soldiers, but this could not be further from the truth. The following are those traits most sought after in squad leaders who can remain pivotal assets in to them as the four pillars of leadership. 1. The Ability to Identify and Solve Problems Squad leaders must possess this trait personally, but they also must be able to foster an environment that encourages similar problems and complaints piled upon the platoon and company leadership. This may be the most valued trait of a squad leader a leader who sits one seat away from owning a platoon. Too often, it is the tendency of Infantrymen to lament endlessly the cumulative burden falls on their leaders. Such habits can be hard to break and may perpetuate into the realm of squad leadership. If this is allowed to happen, quality of training, initiative, and morale will suffer. The company training schedule is driven by the platoon and squad leaderships ability to foresee problems and solve them proactively. If squad leaders are not demonstrating this capability, allowing them to assume the duties of a platoon sergeant is counterproductive to their individual careers and the collective welfare of the organization. 2. The Passion to Steward the Profession Squad leaders demeanor directly impacts the warrior spirit and will of their squads. When their dissatisfaction with their life choices becomes evident, it hampers the readiness of those they lead and the morale of the entire platoon. Squad leaders must actively seek ways to build esprit de corps, promote unit cohesion, and usher paratroopers into more rewarding profession or take pride in their organization, rest assured that their squad will follow suit. This is not an easy hurdle to overcome. Stewards of the profession who promote military paratroopers with similar degrees of motivation. Just as toxic leadership spreads like a virus, unit pride, gratifying careers, and leaders who genuinely care about their paratroopers are also contagious. Squad leaders should be living examples of the quality of life that the Army is capable of offering its high performers. 3. The Desire to be a Role Model On and Off Duty of professionalism on and off duty are capable of nurturing environments that serve as fertile soil for growing future leaders of integrity. At any time, squad leaders should be able to say, Get like me, as a response to an infraction within their squad. More often than some may assume, the off-duty example set by squad leaders makes a strong impression. This is particularly true regarding Soldiers who feel they are incapable of maintaining a family in the Army and believe termination of service is the most favorable option. This, again, is a fallacy. It spouse by setting the example for others to follow when the uniform comes off. We are in a serious business, and although of our profession must be intrinsic, not simply an act we perform while wearing the uniform. 4. The Depth of Character to be Hard but Fair Squad leaders must let their paratroopers know that they empower performers, forgive ignorance, and punish dishonesty or dereliction. To be successful, squad leaders must seem approachable to those they are responsible for. If not, the platoons lines of communication will break down, and this numbers. Keep this line of communication open with impartial rewards and punishments that are proportional and creative, and problems will begin to solve themselves. Identifying the most admirable traits squad leaders should of the two halves. We must now develop a course of action by using these four pillars of a squad leader as the foundation for a pathway that instills these pillars within our formations. This course of action consists of four training tools that support the pillars by building on the cognitive, social, and physical dynamics so critical to leadership development and organizational performance. We chose to use anecdotes from Charlie Company to demonstrate how each of these tools can and does reinforce the pillars. 40 INFANTRY January-March 2017
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 41Squad leaders must connect their troops to something outside of this process involves educating our formations about the often unknown heritage they associate with in their daily lives. study guide for team leaders and below that the squad leaders are responsible for promoting. A section of this study guide is dedicated to understanding the meaning behind the names of force socialization and make a physical training session on it also serves as a constant reminder of how much previous result, paratroopers develop loyalty to their organization and its members, thereby nurturing that social bond between Infantrymen that serves as the decisive factor in combat. This tool is nested directly with the pillars of stewarding the profession and solving morale problems. management (cognitive and social Squad leaders are at a decisive point in their careers when they will be forced to make long-term potential for military service. These decisions range from attending professional development schools careers to reenlistments that will likely put them beyond 10 years of time in service. Their experiences and choices during this period are critical to their development and the vitality of our force. The NCO Evaluation Report process. To retain the most capable NCOs, Charlie Company leaders use a NCOER binder for inspiration and reference while counseling and writing their NCOERs. This binder is a collection of well-written NCOERs with removed. Squad leaders may refer to this folder for guidance when writing their team leaders reports, which serves as a professional development tool for both the team leader and the squad leader. Counseling of our squad leaders generally focuses on structuring a realistic glide path for that leaders career, and we strive to personalize the profession of arms by engaging in off-post functions. While maintaining an appropriate degree of professionalism, leaders should get out of the workplace and mold their squad leaders in a comfortable environment that humanizes their leadership position in accordance with the Be-Know-Do trinity. This professional development tool can take the form of a squad leader barbecue at the platoon leaders or platoon sergeants house, or an off-post physical training session followed by breakfast. Some of the best ideas and counseling sessions may be discovered out of uniform in an informal social environment. If squad leaders feel welcomed and comfortable among this new echelon of leadership, they will be eager to excel and earn positions of greater responsibility. Force them out of their comfort zone (cognitive, social, Seek opportunities to expand a company-level training schedule consisting of progressive conditioning events that culminated in a 25-mile road march. inevitable, and they are forced to identify and solve problems A Charlie Company squad leader maintains physical control of his team as he engages targets in a
42 INFANTRY January-March 2017 At the time this article was written, 1LT Michael P. Ferguson was 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), experience includes deployments to Ramadi, Iraq, before the Anbar Awakening, and more than a year as an infantry scout team leader in Afghanistan with the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th masters degree in homeland security, is a graduate of the Maneuver Another part of forcing leaders outside of their comfort zone Company, when we begin our eight-step training model, we try to avoid selecting our strongest paratroopers as primary trainers (following the fourth pillar of being tough but fair). This requires a bit more oversight, but the payoff is immense. Tacit or introverted Soldiers may break through their shell if afforded of instruction that they must present to their peers. Although in the Infantry we spend more time defending democracy than practicing it, senior leaders must avoid the tendency to exclude squads from the planning process. Make squad leaders brainstorm and come up with solutions, develop courses of action, and execute them while the platoon leader and platoon the status quo by breaking through the curse of knowledge so ubiquitous among the upper NCO ranks. Identify aspects of the training calendar or physical training schedule that are redundant, uninteresting, or simply the way weve always done it, and have the squad leaders implement change. Examples of this include Charlie Companys focus on functional strength progression, integration of performance experts into range operations, and our interoperability with the Special came to fruition through initiative and resourcefulness often generated at the squad level. In most cases, squad leaders proposed courses of action based on their skillsets and the recommendations of their paratroopers. This allows squad is a word we often use but rarely transform into a tangible system. Although squad leaders are still capable of change at this point in their life, their growth towards becoming ideal leaders process of building on the four pillars using cognitive, social, and physical development tools should start as early as possible in Soldiers careers. Despite some studies that argue leadership traits are in some ways inherent and often instilled in leaders during early childhood by parents or mentors, based on our experience and the examples of NCOs such as Audie Murphy, we believe superior leaders can be molded. These four courses of action can help build Infantrymen who are capable of fostering lethal, agile, and adaptive teams. In the ever-changing and often unpredictable threat environment within which our troops must operate, building inspiring squad leaders remains
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 43Unscheduled training opportunities test the readiness of a battalion and expose systemic vulnerabilities in a way that planned training cannot. In July 2016, Divisions Global Response Force (GRF) of an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE). The EDRE required the division to send more than 700 paratroopers from Fort Bragg, NC, to conduct an airborne insertion into Fort Polk, LA, within 100 hours and then immediately conduct a noncombat evacuation operation (NEO) alongside world-class role players at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). As the ready battalion the Armys organization designated to rapidly deploy to crises anywhere in the world the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment received the no-notice mission and then immediately launched our N-hour outload, planning, and deployment sequence. The EDRE allowed us to see ourselves and our readiness platforms, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and execution checklists in a realistic, condensed planning timeline. While the event revealed areas to improve, it highlighted the unique Airborne Divisions mission. As in most Army organizations, those opportunities begin at 0630. Every day, we work towards enhancing readiness at the lowest level through the education and application VALIDATING READINESS:A BaA TTa ALION COMMaANDERS OObBSERVa A TIONS FROM aA NNO-NNOTIcCE EEXERcCISE LTC MARK IVEZAJ Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division perform a nighttime static-line jump from a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft over Polk Field, LA, on 17 July 2016 as part of Devil Strike, a joint emergency deployment readiness exercise. Photo by TSgt Sean Tobin, USAF
TRAINING NOTES 44 INFANTRY January-March 2017program Geronimo Athlete Warrior (GAW) focuses on the development of maximal strength to ensure paratroopers bodies are prepared for the physical demands of airborne operations. Additionally, GAW allows us to identify and address individual weaknesses that may contribute to injuries. During the EDRE, this daily focus paid dividends as our injury rate from the airborne entry was less than half of one percent, allowing us to keep our paratroopers in the EDRE is our leadership professional development program, to civilian leaders and professionals. The GRF supports a broad range of missions across the spectrum of human strife, N-hour sequence we have a short window in which to plan Therefore, we instill a sense of intellectual agility in our junior leaders through exposure to best practices in a variety of focused on problem solving and talent management with executive leaders from successful organizations including Red Hat, Inc. in Raleigh and Roush Fenway Racing in Charlotte. These platforms allow us to develop leaders capable of critical thought who are aware of the importance of interdependency, interoperability, and integration. Meanwhile, the lessons acquired from these interactions provide us the tools to improve, encourage, and foster an atmosphere focused on teamwork and clear, constant communication. Perhaps the most important opportunity available to all units within the division is our joint partnership platforms. For the Air Force is a 365-day-a-year mission partner. To sustain point-to-point coordination yielded success when we received the call to mobilize and deploy in 100 hours. During the EDRE, we quickly integrated our air mobility and unit movement teams with Air Force planners and inspectors, allowing us to promptly react to changes in manifest, timeline, and aircraft. Established relationships gave us the ability to anticipate requirements as they emerged in the outload process. Fort Bragg provides proximity and access to our Special Operations Force partners, a relationship that allowed us to quickly plug into Special Forces planners and Operational Detachment Alpha commanders on the ground. These leaders shared their knowledge of the host nation and enemy situation once we inserted. We used this information to plan the rapid evacuation of embassy personnel on Fort Polk. There are many lessons learned from this kind of no-notice process and employment of mission command systems. We realized that we do not have the right liaisons assigned to adjacent units on Fort Bragg to facilitate a rapid outload. We now know that we need to integrate our joint partners into our execution checklist scrub as conditions change, and we must develop a more coherent N-hour sequence SOP for mitigating information leaks from our formation. Through the EDRE we diagnosed vulnerabilities not normally visible within the organization. multilayered readiness focus and joint access allowed us to conduct a no-notice deployment and follow-on mission that improve, and built increased readiness. It is this focus that allows us to support the GRF mission and live at the knifes edge of readiness for our nation. The GRF supports a broad range of missions across the spectrum of human strife, ranging Within the N-hour sequence we have a short Therefore, we instill a sense of intellectual agility in our junior leaders through exposure At the time this article was written, LTC Mark Ivezaj was serving as commander of the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat NC, during an emergency deployment readiness exercise on 16 July 2016. Photo by SSgt DeAndre Curtiss, USAF
[A]after the battle they bring this mobile theater and they do what they call an after action review to teach you what youve done wrong. Sort of leadership by humiliation. They put a big screen up and they take you through everything and then, you didnt do this and you did do this, etc. I walked out feeling as low as a snakes belly in a wagon rut. And I saw my battalion commander, cause I had let him down. And I went up to apologize to him and he said, Stanley, I thought you did great. And in one sentence he lifted me, put me back on my feet and taught me that leaders can let you fail and yet, not let you be a failure. GEN Stanley McChrystal1The United States and its partners are increasingly focusing their efforts on an uncertain future against uncertain enemies. Consequently, Combat Training Centers are exercising multinational interoperability. The after action review (AAR) is a ubiquitous tool within these training environments, yet many multinational forces are entirely unfamiliar with its use as an assessment tool. Further, AARs are not always adjusted appropriately to accommodate international audiences. This article is designed to introduce facilitators to AAR challenges in a multinational environment and to introduce our partners to the process.2 In the spirit of interoperability where trust is paramount we do not want our coalition partners to walk away from our AARs feeling as low as a snakes belly in a wagon rut, as GEN McChrystal once did. In order to avoid that, we need to understand our training audience. Even within the U.S. military a generally homogeneous organization many unique subcultures exist: Marines, airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, support, etc. We are made up of men and women from the north, the south, other countries, and virtually every ethnic origin. By all accounts, we are an organization with many cultures, but our U.S. military culture binds us. Our coalition partners have their own unique military cultures as well, with their own subcultures. To be sure, creating one not impossible. Good AAR practice helps us to build the camaraderie and trust critical to interoperability. AAR Purpose AARs enduring principles and methods have remained relatively unchanged over the years, having only really changed terminology to match the vernacular of the most current 3 At their core, AARs are tools to analyze a units performance in order to improve future performance.4 They are professional discussions guided by a facilitator about a units strengths and weaknesses during a particular training event.5 Conducted effectively, they develop a strategy and assign responsibility to solve those individual or collective tasks that require improvement. AARs are very much a part of the Armys operations process in that they provide critical feedback to the commander so that he can assess his unit. They are necessarily part of the commanders assessment process. They help to build the common framework for exercising mission command. In the same vein, the best way to conduct an AAR (multinational or otherwise) is through the same mission command activities performed during operations plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess. AAR CONSIDEraRA TIONS DUrRING MULTINaA TIONaAL OOPEraRA TIONS MAJ PATRICK L. BRYAN Figure 1 The Four-Step Process for Conducting AARs6 Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operationsJanuary-March 2017 INFANTRY 45
PlanAAR planning is absolutely critical to the effectiveness of AARs. All those providing input to the AAR must know and understand the commanders intent for the training event (i.e., the training objectives), the concept of the operations, and the tasks to be trained.7 Successful AARs, therefore, have effective AAR plans for each training event that include such factors as selecting appropriate observer-coachtrainers (OCTs), scheduling, determining attendance, choosing training aids, and reviewing performance standards. In a multinational environment, reviewing performance standards becomes exponentially more important in order to gain and maintain credibility. During multinational operations, we need to look to sources from outside of our own doctrine so that we can make meaningful and accurate observations and potentially compare and contrast methods and standards. In other words, we need to be learned facilitators rather than instructors. Where we would normally look to training and evaluation outlines to develop training objectives, a multinational AAR requires more research from North Atlantic sources so that feedback is meaningful. Despite our deference toward the familiar, not everybody does things the way the U.S. Army does, nor do they necessarily want to. For example, during a recent training rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany, an Italian-led multinational brigade task force commanded and controlled several multinational (including U.S.) task-organized battalions. Among the Italian brigades could have easily opened Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-03, The Army Universal Task List multiple subsidiary training objectives with well-developed tasks, conditions, and standards. However, the Italians do not use Army Design Methodology or the military decision-making process (MDMP). Instead, they use something more akin to the NATO comprehensive operational planning directive. Further, one of the task forces subordinate battalions used the British Armys Combat Estimate (i.e., the 7 questions) while the other used the MDMP. In order to be effective in helping to assess this brigades training, one must at least become conversant in the subtle differences in those processes and how they are interoperable with one another. In this example, an OCTs working knowledge provided a foundation for the AAR as it pertained to planning operations.PrepareAAR preparation is continuous and bridges the gap between planning and execution. During the preparation phase, AAR facilitators whether internal or external OCTs, or both should review all orders, training objectives, concepts, and tasks in order to make sure everything observed is relevant. In reality, preparing for the AAR mostly consists of observing the training events and organizing the observations appropriately for the AAR. Regardless of the unit being trained or the complexity of the training, training must be recorded with enough detail to make the AAR meaningful. Details should include events, actions, and observations with accurate date-time groups. At the earliest opportunity after the observed event, they should be integrated with other observations (OCT, opposing force, and in order to provide a complete picture of the event. Depending on the size and structure of the OCT network, that resources can be applied to it. For example, if one of the units training objectives is to conduct a passage of lines, then resources have to be in place to observe and record the event as accurately and completely as possible. Perhaps that means observing the event from perspectives of both the moving and stationary unit or at the planned and actual contact points. Preparation can be slightly more multifaceted during multinational operations. Observing a passage of lines between two partnered forces, for example, presents an additional level of complexity new tactical relationships, different languages, unique procedures, different and unfamiliar vehicles. All of the most appropriate resources can be dedicated to observe and document it. Finally, the AAR needs to be organized and rehearsed. The Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment conduct an after actions review with Polish soldiers after engaging in attack maneuvers as part of Anakonda 16 in Poland on 8 June 2016.Photo by SPC Ryan Tatum46 INFANTRY January-March 2017TRAINING NOTES
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 47 and by key event/theme/issue.8 It can be done on a vehicle truck-top, on a terrain model, via PowerPoint presentation, conducted in any useful way imaginable. Since the purpose of the AAR is for participants to selfdiscover strengths and weaknesses, solutions, and courses of actions to resolve weaknesses, the method should be the most appropriate method for the participants. Again, this takes research and understanding of the audience. While a functions might work great for a U.S. battalion, it is likely inadequate for a formation that is unaccustomed to PowerPoint ExecuteRules should be set and expectations managed right up front, regardless of the training audience. Although most American Soldiers have been through countless AARs from the time they enlisted or were commissioned, the rules for each AAR might be different depending on facilitator and/or audience and therefore should be clearly understood and expressed. As a baseline, every AAR should include the basic rule that everyone should participate and the understanding that the AAR is not a critique, evaluation, or grade. Soldier participation is paramount to self-discovery. Among other things, Soldier participation during the AAR is directly related to the atmosphere created by the facilitator. Therefore, the facilitator must foster an environment where Soldiers feel comfortable and free to disagree with one another and give honest opinions. They need to know that it is an open forum, multinational participants. How do we ensure group participation with such a diverse audience? Hopefully, by the time an AAR rolls around, there is relative familiarity and comfort-level among the participants. Regardless, group dynamics will fail if we communicate poorly. Facilitators should avoid idioms, axioms, colloquialisms, and especially acronyms. Despite how much they mean (or do not mean) to us, they often confuse, have no meaning, or mean completely different things to our coalition partners, regardless facilitator might tell his audience to have thick skins in order to facilitate dialogue, a multinational partner might interpret otherwise not absorb what is about to be said. Simple, seemingly unambiguous words might also have U.S. service members tend to use the term leaders almost interchangeably with the term Soldiers, with only commanders enjoying a unique role within military leadership parlance. However, during at least one rotation at the JMRC, leader had unique meaning among the primary participants it meant decision maker. As a result, when the facilitator insisted that leaders provide the input to the AAR, the input came from only a select few. The point is to identify and understand these idiosyncrasies throughout the AAR planning process and consciously execute the AAR around them. Finally, facilitators have to execute the AAR according to the developed plan. Although it does not have to be scripted, having Typically, after a short introduction, the facilitator summarizes right or wrong, and guides the participants to determine how it could be done differently. At its conclusion, the facilitator should summarize and link the conclusions to future training.9AssessRetraining should be conducted immediately for the AAR to have its greatest effect. However, assessment is a continuous process, and the commander can use the lessons learned from the AAR long after the training event. Further, he can build on those lessons to create new challenges for his unit at each successive training event or operation. To help the unit link the conclusions to future training or operations, facilitators often frame the challenge as questions: could be done better?) In keeping with the theme that AARs are an element of the operations process (assessment), facilitators might also consider asking the question: better?) Put in the U.S. operations process context, the former a measure of effectiveness.10 This is distinguishable from front asking the hard questions that will tie the AAR to the next training event or operation and whether we achieved the intended results. It has to be clear and measurable. Once task has been accomplished (or not). For example, during a recent mid-rotational AAR at the JMRC, a battalion command sergeant major referenced a that he has kept the plan simple? Simple according to him? Simple according to the medics? Whats the metric? Linking his proposed solution to a measure of effectiveness would have provided that metric, allowing him and his commander to more clearly assess the planning, preparation, and execution of the next training iteration.ConclusionAARs are important assessment tools to us and to our
multinational partners. Because commanders are conducting simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks and increasingly as part of a multinational effort AARs are as important now as they have ever been. But we have to do them right. AARs help to provide a common lens through which we can assess and improve our multinational interoperability. The conduct of AARs must acknowledge and be responsive to differences in culture and language in order to accomplish this. As a facilitator, the key is to know your audience members and conduct an AAR most useful to them not necessarily what Above all, be humble, be kind, and be adaptive.Notes1 TED Talks Radio Hour episode, Disruptive Leadership, January 2016. Transcript available at http:// www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ transcript.php?storyId=261084625.2 This article is meant to supplement A Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews, not replace it. It should also be noted, the leaders guide is based on Army doctrine not joint, NATO, or partner. Regardless, applying critical analysis to its core will still yield results across formations. 3 See Figure 2 for a brief history of regulatory AAR guidance. 4 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders (August 2012), paragraph 3-73, 3-12. An after action review is a guided analysis of an organizations performance.5 The Leaders Guide to AfterAction Reviews, Combined Arms Center Training (CAC-T), Training Management Directorate (TMD), Fort Leavenworth, KS (December 2013).6 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process (May 2012), Figure 1, page iv. 7 The Leaders Guide to AARs, 7-9. 8 Ibid, 13.9 Ibid, 16.10 ADRP5-0, 5-2 to 5-3.11 Anne W. Chapman, The Armys Training Revolution, 1973 1990, TRADOC Historical Study Series, Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Center of Military History (1994), 29-39.12 Ibid, 44-45.13 TC 25-20, preface. November 1988 Field Manual (FM) 25-100, Training the Force Considered revolutionary in the way the army trains. Battle-focused and based on unit mission essential task list and nested with other doctrinal publications, such as FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 22-100, Leadership. Designed for brigade and higher organization and leadership.11September 1990 FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training Complemented FM 25-100. Designed to apply the doctrine of FM 25-100 and assist leaders in training program development. Designed for battalion and company organization and leadership.12September 1993 Training Circular (TC) 25-20, A Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews Supplemented and expanded the guidance in FM 25-100.13Circa 2000 GEN Eric Shinseki ordered extensive reviews of Army doctrine October 2002 FM 7-0, Training the Force Updated and superseded FM 25-100. Integrated lessons learned from recent military operations. September 2003 FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training Updated and superseded FM 25-101. Integrated lessons learned from recent military operations. December 2008 FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations Further developed the concepts of the 2002 version. Incorporated new training for modular organizations. GEN Raymond Odiernos Vision for the Future: Doctrine 2015 concept published August 2012 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders Superseded FM 7-0. Re-established fundamental training and leader development concepts and processes. August 2012 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders Augments principles discussed in ADP 7-0. Refers to Leaders Guide (see below) for further discussion of AAR. August 2012 The Leaders Guide to AfterAction Reviews (AAR) (Training Management Directorate) Updates terminology from TC 25-20; supports ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0. December 2013 The Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews (AAR) (Training Management Directorate) Update of August 2012 version. May 2014 FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations As part of Doctrine 2015, FMs reduced to total of 50. Most knowledge was transitioned to ATPs, but not AAR concepts AAR is covered in Chapter 16. Figure 2 Modern Regulatory History of the Army AARMAJ Patrick L. Bryan currently serves as the senior legal observercoach-trainer for the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany. His previous assignments include serving as the group judge advocate for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Carson, CO; chief of Military Justice for the U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson, SC; senior defense counsel, Bamberg, U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe, Mannheim, Germany; command judge advocate/trial counsel for the Southern European Task Force; and battery Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. MAJ Bryan earned a bachelors degree in history from Texas A&M University; a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Oklahoma College of Law; and a masters degree in military law from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generals School. 48 INFANTRY January-March 2017TRAINING NOTES
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 49In April 2016, the 1st Brigade Combat Team (-), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Bastogne completed attempt to group our lessons learned into broad themes that From COIN to Decisive Action: Shifting the Training Paradigm MAJ RICK MONTCALM MAJ JOSEPH MICKLEY LESSONS LEARNED FROM JRR TC RROtT At TION 16-06
TRAINING NOTES 50 INFANTRY January-March 2017 radiological, nuclear) capabilities, aviation and unmanned brigade a near-peer threat. schedule. Empowering the Commander to Make Decisions operations, synchronize operations, and enable the brigade ability to produce products that enabled his understanding and Soldiers with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 51progression, the brigade plans standard operating include all associated redistributed across the process. the battle rhythm had to include a complete daily targeting ultimately reduced the positive impact that such predictability could have provided. Leveraging all Capabilities three days remaining platoons or companies the brigade commander had that leveraged liaison the subordinate units in real time and then brigade commander at each evening battle This venue ensured and shared understanding across the board; it also changes as needed. enabling assets, and missed opportunities to gain access to battle rhythm reporting scheduled and distributed standard The Way Ahead
52 INFANTRY January-March 2017 MAJ Rick Montcalm MAJ Joseph Mickley brigade has developed a multi-echelon approach to layering through company level. training environment (DATE) rotation, it remains imperative to arms breach) and distinct DATE battle drills (such as react to Soldiers with 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division,
U.S. Army operations are conducted with multinational partners in every theater, and the need to develop and maintain interoperability expertise is only increasing at all echelons across the force. Tactical maneuver formations in particular need to focus on identifying and neutralizing friction points that will inevitably arise when working with partners from outside our Army. A recent rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, saw units from the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division grapple with the challenges of interoperability. Based on its are likely to face in the future as well as some potential solutions. Topics of interest included integration of multinational partners, mission command systems and communications security (COMSEC) requirements, sustainment, and potential future training opportunities. As part of JRTC Rotation 16-04, an airborne infantry platoon from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) traveled to Fort Polk and exchanged places with a U.S. platoon from the 3rd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment which then participated in a near simultaneous Canadian Army training event. While the experience was an overwhelming success in terms of growth and achievement for all rotational unit participants, some key lessons were learned that can enable other U.S. units to be successful in similar situations.Integration of Multinational PartnersThough some limited email and phone coordination had occurred prior to arrival, leaders in both the Canadian platoon prior in-depth coordination as a key gap in their preparation. The Canadian soldiers traveled to Joint Base ElmendorfRichardson, AK, for familiarization with the T11 parachute prior to the rotation, but neither element shared their standard operating procedures (SOPs) or discussed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) before conducting planning and rehearsals in Louisiana. The leaders of both organizations directed rehearsals and capability briefs upon arrival to create understanding prior to conducting operations. Ideally, the STRONGER TTOGETHER:EXPeERIeENCING IINTeEROPeERABILITY AT JRTCRTC SSG CHRISTOPHER J. WHEATLEY CPT DANIEL T. HARRISON Photo by CPT Daniel T. Harrison January-March 2017 INFANTRY 53
TRAINING NOTES 54 INFANTRY January-March 2017Canadian platoon would have trained with the U.S. company prior to arrival at a crucible training event like a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation; foregoing such an opportunity, deliberate communication between two such organizations could preclude discovery learning during execution. Unit SOPs and service doctrine should be exchanged at a minimum so that key leaders can start communicating from a common knowledge base. This must be a deliberate and formalized exchange of information that enables unity of effort and shared understanding.Common Language, Different DoctrineOne particularly surprising challenge for both the rotational training units and for JRTC observer-coach-trainers (OCTs) was the actual sharing of doctrine. Information security (INFOSEC) practices are appropriately stringent, and acquiring access to the Canadian equivalent manuals required some very deliberate effort by the platoon OCTs while preparing to support the 3 PPCLI platoon. The Canadian leadership expressed their own frustrations in attempting to gain access to U.S. manuals since the latest versions are not readily available to anyone without Common Access Card (CAC) access. Though similar in nature and generally producing the same outputs, the eight American troop leading procedures and the 16 Canadian battle generated when exposed to the previously unseen systems. Being able to communicate with like terms enabled OCTs to more effectively coach the Canadian soldiers as well as provide doctrinal feedback to both organizations. A Center for Army portions of the training recommended that training centers maintain a library of appropriate and relevant doctrine from multinational partners that meets INFOSEC requirements to assist units and OCTs preparing to conduct or coach multinational training. Additionally, the library could share U.S. doctrine with approved leaders from multinational organizations during the preparation phase.Mission Command Systems and Communications Security (COMSEC) are the hallmarks of effective interoperability and partnership. Meeting COMSEC requirements and maintaining communication were serious challenges during this training event and are easy mistakes in a multinational training environment. When brigades conduct the Leader Training Program at Fort Polk approximately 65 days prior to starting a rotation, the requirements to request bandwidth and technical steps to allocate COMSEC for multinational partners are laid out in the division operation order that the unit crafts into a brigade order. The appropriate actions initial planning conference approximately 180 days prior to the rotation, include requesting coalition COMSEC for multinational partners. The unit also advises partner units to bring their internal COMSEC and the critical voice-bridging systems that allow cross-talk with U.S. units while maintaining their internal security. Additionally, planning and utilizing a full primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) plan for cross-talk ensures uninterrupted mission command. The primary form of FM communications should be via coalition COMSEC and the alternate through the voice-bridging systems. The contingency plan should be through an attached U.S. radio operator, and emergency should be through single-channel plain text FM. This ensures that multinational partners can continue to talk with appropriate COMSEC measures in place. During JRTC 16-04, the Canadian platoon had six radios Soldier carrying a squad radio capable of handling internal COMSEC. Coalition COMSEC was not available, and voicestrain on the companys ability to conduct mission command with that platoon. The eventual solution was to provide a U.S. radio operator and forward observer to the Canadian platoon to maintain uninterrupted communications. Though clearly a sound solution given the problem set and assets communications.Sustainment: The Devil is in the DetailsWhile supplying Soldiers with the most basic of needs, Class I (food and water) and Class V (ammunition) were quite simple in part due to NATO standardization of supply systems; the prior to arrival at an austere or limited access location. The parts to repair or maintain weapons systems. This proved to be an extremely sound decision as the Colt Canada C7 Assault maintenance personnel in a brigade combat team would not be able to maintain that weapon. The C6 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), the basic machine gun supporting the Canadian infantry platoon, is functionally the same weapon as the M240 but lacks Picatinny rail systems. These differences onward integration (RSOI) phase of the operation that they did not cause any disruption. Because of the no rail issue, the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) contractors at JRTC attached a bracket to the barrel to enable mounting. These brackets are not normally used and are in short supply, and this could become a larger issue depending on the size of the coalition formation.
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 55Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) equipment is a mainstay of operational issue items, though the differences in power sources can cause consternation. The mine detector systems that the Canadian platoon brought required batteries which the unit was not able to acquire through usual supply requests. This required the issuance of U.S. C-IED equipment and additional training to enable that capability during operations. Additionally, casualty evacuation adequately, and the Canadian platoon arrived without their standard litters due to issues with international shipping; the platoon was also unable to carry this equipment with them The company cross-loaded pole-less and SKEDCO litters to augment capabilities in response. Contingency planning for availability of evacuation equipment for multinational partners must be conducted to ensure systems are on hand to cover gaps resulting from customs or carrier restrictions. The Canadian Army does not issue the Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) for use during standard training events. While the gap the platoon still found itself deploying with around half of the needed kits. When requiring multinational partners to bring equipment considered mission essential, such as the IFAK, U.S. units may need to assist in requisitioning such equipment and most certainly should identify these requirements as early as possible. One tactic that the Canadian platoons place a catch team of Canadian soldiers within the medical support system to provide administrative oversight of evacuated Soldiers. This would enable better care and support to partner soldiers evacuated through U.S. systems during treatment, recovery, and repatriation. events prior to arrival: the sustainment conference or PreDeployment Site Survey (PDSS)-1 at approximately 90 days prior to execution and at a task-organization internal the U.S. and multinational partner. Although many of the all Soldiers were comfortable with and capable of operating the new systems, such as U.S. mine detectors, SKEDCOs, and radio systems. This hadnt been planned for and required planning timeline. Finally, the Canadian platoon brought an M3 Carl Gustaf and supporting logistical elements struggled with requesting and allocating ammunition for that system, driven mostly by the fact that the BCT did not have the Goose in its organic units. The system couldnt be employed during the rotation because ammunition wasnt available. The company commander highlighted this as a key lesson learned since employment of such a capable anti-tank system would have assisted greatly during conduct of the defense. (The Army Photo by SSG Brian Ragin
SSG Christopher J. Wheatley is a platoon sergeant observer-coach-trainer (OCT) with Task Force 2, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA. His previous assignments include serving as a weapons squad leader and platoon sergeant in 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 503rd PIR, 173rd Airborne Brigade; and a team leader in both the 1st Battalion, 509th PIR (OPFOR) and 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment. His operational experience includes three deployments to RC-East, Afghanistan, and one deployment to Iraq; he has worked with Iraqi, Afghan, Polish, Italian, German, Slovenian, Canadian, and Australian forces in both training and operating environments. SSG Wheatley earned an associates degree from American Military University. CPT Daniel T. Harrison is a maneuver rotational planner at JRTC. His previous assignments include serving as an infantry company senior OCT at JRTC; Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and rifle company commander in the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment; the chief of plans for the 4th IBCT, 1st Infantry Division; 4th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. His operational experience includes three deployments: western Afghanistan, eastern Afghanistan, and East Africa; he has worked with Afghan, Italian, Polish, Djiboutian, French, German, Japanese, Burundian, British, and Australian forces in both training and operating environments. CPT Harrison is a 2007 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, and a 2015 University of North Carolina-Institute for Defense and Business Strategic Studies Fellow. has since announced that the Multi-Role Anti-Armor AntiPersonnel Weapon System [MAAWS, M3 Carl Gustaf] will be carried by every Infantry platoon.)1 Familiarity with the system will undoubtedly increase across formations, but the need to identify and coordinate support for unique weapons in partner formations will remain critical to employing all available combat power.Future Training OpportunitiesLeaders, Soldiers, and OCTs need broader exposure to multinational partners operations processes and leader planning to enable future success in planning and execution. If fiscally feasible, exchange opportunities should be explored and expanded between JRTC and the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) in Alberta as well as other key partner training centers. This would greatly enhance partnership and understanding of doctrinal majors) who continue to be the primary mentors to rotational units at the battalion and below level. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, explores interoperability during essentially every rotation. A former senior interagency training advisor to JMRC suggests the best way forward is not to force multinational partners to adopt U.S. doctrine but rather to focus on functional interoperability and allow partners to operate within the familiar realms of their doctrine while still meeting the overall commanders intent.2 In particular, conducting mission command exercises such as operational simulations with multinational partner headquarters prior to attendance of a CTC rotation could greatly enhance the effectiveness of the coalition during execution. Giving U.S .rotational units the opportunity to integrate into a Canadian battalion and conduct large full spectrum operations at the CMTC would also be and interoperability understanding. SummaryAs formations begin to focus training as regionally aligned forces or regionally focused mission sets, training with partners will only continue to increase as demands for coalition operations increase in the complex and unstable global environment. These experiences and insights between U.S. and Canadian forces highlight common focus areas that can and will arise between coalition members, regardless of which region or theater operations are conducted in. By establishing communication early and identifying doctrinal differences and capability gaps, formations can better prepare themselves to conduct partnered operations within any Notes1 Arsenal, Military.com, 20 May 2016, arsenal.html.2 James Derleth, Enhancing Interoperability: The Foundation for Effective NATO Operations, NATO Review, n.d., Photo by CPT Daniel T. HarrisonTRAINING NOTES 56 INFANTRY January-March 2017
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 57Soldiers with the 1st Squadron, 153rd Cavalry Regiment, 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Florida Army National Guard, conducted reconnaissance operations with an attached weapons company during its 2015 annual training (AT) March 11-29 at Fort Stewart, GA. Prior to this event, the squadrons dismounted reconnaissance troop (DRT) C Troop had struggled with figuring out its place within the mounted cavalry reconnaissance squadron and how it could best be deployed.BackgroundDuring AT in 2014, C Troop was the 53rd IBCTs decisive operation for a brigade air assault at Camp Blanding, FL. The troop inserted on the landing zone (LZ) at night and started its zone reconnaissance toward anticipated enemy positions. The C Troop commander drove forward in his command high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and attempted to coordinate reconnaissance missions and submit situation reports (SITREPs) to squadron headquarters. The C Troop scouts were supposed to advance up to 2 kilometers in from the LZ to conduct reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAIs). Once the scouts located enemy battle positions or 24 hours after insertion, the two mounted reconnaissance troops (MRTs) were to ground assault convoy to C Troops left and right and start their zone reconnaissance missions. C Troop would remain between the two MRTs and recon the severely restricted terrain in the middle. The problems were many. First, C Troop packed according to a packing list more designed for deploying than for reconnoitering. They had too much extra stuff. It seems that most scouts had an extra pair of boots, an extra set of uniforms, and many socks, t-shirts, e-tools, water, etc. Second, the terrain they were to move through was severely restricted; the scouts spent three hours chopping at palmetto bushes and tangled vines to advance 300 meters from the LZ. Some scouts had machetes and whacked wildly through the night, which did little except tire the lead scouts. They took turns hacking, making a lot of noise and losing the battle with the Florida swamp. The most effective way to traverse the palmettos was for the lead scout to fall backwards using his rucksack to cushion his fall and knock down some of the palmetto fronds, but this also tired the scouts and created too much noise. Since they inserted at night, the forest. The third issue was communication. The scouts inserted with short whip antennas because they were easier to move with. The problem was that short whip antennas often failed to reach the troop commander, and the troop commander was so far forward that even he had trouble communicating with the squadron tactical operations center (TOC). As a night battle captain in the TOC, I was shocked to hear the C Troop commander report he could no longer move: his scouts were exhausted and they had used most of their water. His troop was going to establish security and wait for daylight. Upon hearing this, the squadron immediately launched the two MRTs to move toward their line of departure (LD) and start their zone reconnaissance. That night the two MRTs passed C Troop and reconnoitered engaging the enemy. The infantry battalions air assaulted into the same LZ the next day and also passed C Troop. C Troop not only failed its reconnaissance mission, but it had little value The avenue of advance was severely restricted and highers expectations may not have been realistic. C Troop was acting like an infantry company, moving as one large unit and making a lot of noise while doing it. After the troops failure to advance of this demoralizing performance, there was talk throughout the Army of either replacing the DRT with a third MRT or disbanding Charlie Troops altogether. All of this was on every Soldiers mind as we prepared for our 19-day AT in March 2015 at Fort Stewart. I took command of C we needed to do differently in order to be successful during our reconnaissance missions: engaged leadership with a special emphasis on encouraging Soldier initiative, improved Soldier load planning, and better communication planning. We needed to focus on reconnaissance at the scout section level. The sections needed to be comfortable with operating separately from the platoon and troop, and they also needed to be able to work and communicate with different commands. I envisioned two ways to employ C Troop. One way would be to assign us battlespace with a zone reconnaissance mission. This is simple for control measures, but the DRT cannot move as fast as the MRTs and this is exactly the way the troop was used during the 2014 AT. The second way would be to give us NAIs across the squadrons battlespace. These NAIs may differ from the MRTs because they are in areas inaccessible to HMMWVs or because the NAIs are further in front and stealth is required. Engaged LeadershipThe troop commander needs to be on foot with the insertion in order to understand the decreasing capabilities of the scouts as they continue their mission. Scouts should be at their AT FOR aA DISMOUNtTEdD RRECON TROOP CPT RYAN P. HOVATTER
TRAINING NOTES 58 INFANTRY January-March 2017peak just before the insertion and shortly after, but prolonged missions wear on their ability to make decisions, adapt, stay commander is not with the scouts. Also, there is a meaningful morale boost when the commander is suffering the same as, or at least a little like, his Soldiers. I knew I had to be there to assess the scouts and to lead by example. During our air assault onto Remagen DZ at Fort Stewart, I inserted with the troop and followed one of the platoons as it set into a patrol base. I carried a rucksack with Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP) radio set to monitor the squadrons command net, a COM-201B antenna to set up when we established our patrol base, and two extra batteries on top of my food, water, and very little personal gear. We had four working vehicles before we left Florida, but by the time the exercise started we only had two: C27 2nd platoons HMMWV and C4 the supply light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV). The platoons had no vehicles and when I joined the rolling command post (CP), I used the vehiclemounted Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). I also brought with me my radio-telephone operator (RTO) and forward observer (FO) which made the rolling CP one truck with 10 personnel total. Most of the headquarters walked, leaving only three personnel in the never had the rolling CP in one location for more than a day. It had to constantly move to best support the scouts. C27 would sometimes drive off ahead or it would wait for us to move and then catch up, depending on the tactical situation. We rarely walked next to the vehicle because we believed it to be a target with a larger signature and it was stuck to roads and trails. C Troop had undergone a fundamental cultural shift in my the Soldiers were ready. The impetus for change started with my assumption of command and new philosophy. I placed focused on the individual scout. We encouraged goal setting and held those failing to meet the standard accountable. We also rewarded Soldiers of any rank with schools based on an appropriate order of merit list. Soldier Load PlanningThe second most important aspect was to concentrate on the Soldiers load. We couldnt just start with a base packing list and then add mission essential equipment. The Soldiers would be too weighed down and become demoralized the longer the mission went on. We spent a lot of time load planning, and the platoons and sniper section rehearsed their packing days prior to the mission. We tried to have everyone use assault packs but realized that certain Soldiers needed to take rucksacks because of equipment and comfort added by having a frame. We planned to rotate rucksacks and assault packs as needed for the mission. For example, radios were assigned to individuals, but frequently passed around the platoon and troop as needed for certain missions. No pogey bait was allowed. I was very serious about this. I only wanted our Soldiers bringing Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs), broken down to cut weight. Leaders monitored their scouts on the amount of food they ate. Two MREs a day was our plan. I An Infantryman with Troop C, 1st Squadron, 153rd Cavalry Regiment, 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, takes aim from a rooftop to suppress enemy soldiers during Vanguard Focus at Fort Stewart, GA, on 23 March 2015. Photo by SGT Joshua Laidacker
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 59was afraid that Soldiers would load up on food they wanted to eat, like beef jerky, cans of tuna or chicken, Vienna sausages, and energy drinks. This was about discipline, carrying the bare essentials, and gaining the calories and nutrients needed to survive our exercise. I also believed that leaders didnt need to spend too much time considering nutrition; and since none of us are dietitians and the Army has invested years of research into MRE development, we did not allow Soldiers to bring their own food. There was one medic attached, however, that I found brought cans of tuna and a three-pound bag of hard candy on the insertion. The attached medics and FOs were integrated late into the platoons, only a day before H-hour, and the scout section leaders responsible for their inspection told me later they were told they could bring anything they wanted but would have to suffer with it. Later, on a long movement behind his back during halts. He was exhausted and needed help. His teammates ended up carrying his rucksack for him. They passed off the ruck between scouts until they reached their pickup site. We quickly sent that FO back to squadron. That FO will never walk with C Troop again. The real lesson learned here was that the platoon leaders (PLs) need to conduct precombat inspections (PCIs) on their attachments and ensure they follow the load plan guidance. Maybe it should go without saying, but we had a no cell phone policy in order to prevent distractions or compromise our positions. I also remembered my time as a night battle captain in the TOC during AT 2014 watching a feed from supporting aircraft that showed Soldiers playing on their cell phones while laying on top of their HMMWVs or in their battle positions. we planned to insert, establish observation posts (OPs), remain unsupported for up to 72 hours, then withdraw, pass through no extra boots or extra uniforms could be taken. We limited t-shirts and socks to one or two each. We carried two broken down MREs in our packs on the insertion. This was to carry us through one whole day and give us time to recover food and water caches. We initially planned to bring cases of MREs and to move and slowed us down, but we wouldnt be carrying it in our rucksacks for days, like the year before. We changed that plan and planted the caches two days in advance. The caches were a huge success. We were able to carry less weight on our when we needed it. The two platoons established two caches each and the sniper section used the same cache as 1st Platoon. One of 1st Platoons caches was raided by wild hogs which ate all of the MREs, left a mess of MRE wrappers, and forced that platoon to cross load food, giving each Soldier a little less than quarts of water per day. There are water consumption tables was impractical and that our scouts would eventually be in static OPs needing less water. We also considered the temperature which ranged from as low as the 50s at night to the high 70s in the day. The Soldier had to carry 5 quarts of water on them or we left the water jugs in place. None were discovered by the enemy, and we recovered them at the end of the exercise. still had enough to operate during the exercise. Since we rucked everything in with us and were not to be resupplied for up to 72 hours, I ordered that Soldiers not might otherwise be wasted on shaving and keep Soldiers from bringing noisy electric shavers to their OPs. The no-shave order was about common sense, although it didnt hurt that it was popular with the Soldiers. CommunicationOur communication plan was certainly more robust than ever before, but it still left room for improvement. Our senior RTO was new to the position and was trained by the outgoing RTO (neither was school trained). Commo is the scouts weapon of choice, and it is every leaders responsibility to ensure they can communicate. C Troop has three ways to communicate SINCGARS (VHF), High Frequency (HF), and tactical satellite had PRC-119 manpacks and PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radios (MBITRs). Our single mission-capable HMMWV had two radios but only one mounted antenna. When the rolling CP stopped, the RTO hung an antenna in a tree and The truck needed two antennas, but at the time we just didnt truck commanders side with a long whip antenna extending out of the door. The soft door easily closed over the protruding antenna and allowed for on-the-move communication with two SINCGARS radios from the truck, one monitoring troop and the other monitoring squadron net. We brought four COM-201B antennas with us. I carried one, my FO carried another, and 1st Platoon and the sniper section each carried one as well. We decided not to use the HF radios for three reasons. First, range for SINCGARS. Another reason we didnt carry the HF radios is that nearly every trooper was already burdened with some form of communication equipment already because we were at 50 percent strength, and we were trying to keep the Soldiers load lighter. (Note: We werent at full strength because of school funding shortages. Any Soldier attending a school went in-lieu-of AT.) I regretted not taking the HF radios, Maybe it should go without saying, but we had a no cell phone policy in order to prevent distractions or compromise our positions.
TRAINING NOTES 60 INFANTRY January-March 2017CPT Ryan P. Hovatter is currently serving as a Combat Training Center serving as commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron,153rd Cavalry Regiment, 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Florida Army National Guard, in Panama City, FL; commander of Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry, 53rd IBCT, in Sanford, FL; commander of C Troop, 1st Squadron, 153rd Cavalry Regiment, 53rd IBCT, Benning, GA. CPT Hovatter earned a bachelors degree in international affairs from Florida State University and masters of public administration from Columbus State University. with squadron and 1st Platoon. HF would have been a good long-range, albeit unsecure, backup in the commo plan. Charlie Troop has two vehicle-mounted PSC-5s which were not used in our operation because those vehicles were nonmission capable and two dismounted PRC-117 with inverted umbrella-shaped antennas. My senior RTO carried one of these and would set it up at every halt. The sniper section had one, too. Two of my RTOs had about an hour of training from a civilian on use of the PRC-117, but it was not enough class time. It has an alternate capability to communicate via SINCGARS, but my RTOs didnt learn how to use it in that a dozen times throughout the exercise, but we attempted to communicate many more times. The takeaway is that C Troop needs a school-trained RTO and needs to spend more time with this equipment. The troops PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan changed slightly throughout the exercise. Each platoon and the sniper section often had slightly different PACE plans because the troop generally didnt own battlespace. We mostly worked in A and B Troops battlespace, which meant that their command net on SINCGARS was part of our PACE. ResultsC Troop had tremendous success during AT 2015. One particular mission highlights the cultural shift and payoff of Soldiers load and commo planning. We were given a mission an NAI which was believed to be the enemy battalions TOC. The mission came after several days of long, tough missions. I decided to create a unique patrol for our mission. My scouts decisive operation for the squadron and understood the positive effects on morale. I was also very aware of the past years failure to accomplish a mission and knew this was a time for engaged and present leadership. The platoon leader (PL) for 1st Platoon was in charge of overall security and maneuver of the patrol while I communicated with higher and provided guidance to the PL. We had one of his organic scout sections and the sniper section. These were the two scout sections most capable for the long movements. I had my senior RTO with a TACSAT, and I had a manpack with long whip antenna to talk to squadron. We planned a route through thick swamps and streams, but instead of inserting at night like the year prior, we inserted several hours before darkness to give enough time to move through areas where we didnt anticipate enemy. We planned to communicate with higher at pre-planned checkpoints so we could preserve batteries and for stealth. squadron TOC, keeping track of C Troops movement while the squadron managed three other maneuver units. Squadron staff got nervous a few times when we didnt respond or communicate as often as expected. The movement was slow and deliberate. When we reached one heavily used road, we waited for a safe time to cross. Before we reached our OP, we waited to cross another road near our planned objective rally point, using darkness to sights, we located a substantial enemy base camp. Two Apache helicopters arrived on scene at nearly the same time generators, and vehicles. We later learned it was actually the opposing forces (4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Divisions) brigade support area (BSA). I called for 155mm artillery on target, and then the Apache team platoon-sized reserve element approached the west side of the the wood line, but they did not know our location. We again called the Apache team, which then destroyed four HMMWVs and one LMTV. The destruction of the BSA and mounted reserve platoon caused chaos in the enemys rear, and more importantly, C Troop templated a movement corridor in which the 53rd IBCT could pass an entire infantry battalion behind the enemys defense. Our success throughout the exercise showed our squadron what a DRT is capable of. At the start of AT, we heard during a previous iteration, one of the other infantry battalions operated in a similar manner that 1-153rd Cavalry did. A major exception was that its C Troop was overrun within hours of the infantry battalions assault. The DRT had acted too centralized found by the advancing enemy. One platoon, we were told, surrendered after being cut off from the troop. It was in this shadow (and that of the previous AT 2014 failure), that C Troop prepared for and conducted the exercise. C Troop has a long way to go to be where I believe a DRT should be, but we had come a long way. The DRT commander must train his scouts to operate independently at far distances without readily accessible support and should above allemphasize initiative. We achieved success by focusing on planning of the Soldiers load and radio communication. We prepared sections to be comfortable operating separately and with some autonomy, and with radio silence for pre-planned periods in order to preserve battery life and keep noise discipline. Most importantly, I put an emphasis on engaged and present leadership and encouraged Soldier initiative. Our success showed the squadron that a DRT is useful and relevant in brigade reconnaissance.
January-March 2017 INFANTRY 61On the morning of 30 November 1939, six Soviet the Karelian Isthmus following a two-hour artillery bombardment, initiating what would become known as the Winter War.1 executed a stubborn defense that traded space for time while 2 The assistance, or failing external support, retain a strong position from which to negotiate.3 concede to harsh Russian demands, the time that was retaining its independence. Thus, the Winter War can be territorial concessions that were made. Defensive operations rarely receive the study and attention that offensive operations typically do. While offensive operations tend to capture the imagination of readers with tales of bold maneuvers and spirited attacks, the defense has seldom received an enthusiastic audience, outside of tales of heroic last stands. Though the Winter War in some ways does constitute the later, that is not why this underStates increasingly refocuses on large unit, combined arms operations, military professionals who have spent the last which to draw inspiration. Given the actions of Russia (and Russian proxy forces) in recent years, a review of the time the Russian Bear may be worth the study for both the Background proximity to the cradle of the revolution Leningrad the political wrangling.4 Known today as St. Petersburg, the city sits at the extreme Western frontier of Russian territory on the eastern periphery of the Karelian Isthmus. Of special concern to Soviet military planners was that at its closest only 32 kilometers.5 Soviet security concerns extended to the sea as well, and their military planners eyed the Baltic islands strategic value, as control of the islands would result in naval WHAT FREE MEN CAN DO: CPT RICK CHERSICLA THE WINtTER WAR, tTHE USE OF DELAY, ANdD LLESSONS FOR tTHE 21StT CENtuTURY Map 1
62 INFANTRY January-March 2017dominance of shipping in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of 6 The Soviets were also keenly aware of the Scandinavian ore that supremacy combined with the assumption that they could rationale for the Soviet invasion.7 Consisting of 400,000 men, the initial Soviet invasion force attacked at nine different points along the 1,600-kilometer 8 Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, had anticipated, the main thrust came across the Karelian Isthmus.9 The realistic Mannerheim, a combat-tested career soldier, embraced aggression. Mannerheim noted in his memoirs that for 20 years active delaying actions on the Karelian Isthmus had become almost a dogma in their training.10 Thus, the overall strategy for Mannerheim and his forces became what modern The Use of the Delay without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged.11 The their government to appeal to Western nations for assistance. the West would lead to an intervention and military assistance in the face of overwhelming odds. In the case that they did not receive external support (which they did not), Mannerheim acknowledged that his best option was to dig in his heels and make the price of invasion too high for even the Soviet leadership to accept. With enough of a delay, coupled with strongly enough to wring a negotiated settlement out of the Russians.12 analyzing the area of operations as two separate regions: the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus and the region north of Lake Ladoga. The wooded terrain north of Lake of 1939-40. While much attention has been paid to the novel, concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. There, with its trenches World War I than the combat experienced by most other World War II participants. With the prescient understanding that any Soviet attack would be focused on an advance up the Karelian Isthmus, defenses. In addition to the obvious proximity to Leningrad, Karelia was only lightly wooded and had several usable roads, two conditions which appeared to favor the mechanized Russian army.13 lakes and marshes, which served to canalize the avenues of approach in the region.14 The topography of the isthmus, coupled with temporary barriers and strongpoints, gave the defenders a distinct advantage. Mannerheim referred to this 45-mile long strip of land as our Thermopylae for its became known as the Mannerheim Line.15 Fighting the Defense force occupied a buffer zone between the Mannerheim Line and the frontier, which was between 12-30 miles deep make contact with the Russian invaders.16 The 21,600-man strong covering force was mobilized on 6 October in order 17 On 11 October, the government authorized the mobilization the frontier.18 army was complete, and the main task of the covering force border.19 With its main duty accomplished, the covering force set to laying mines and booby traps as well as destroying civilian housing to deny the Soviets shelter in the buffer zone.20 The damage done to the Russians by booby traps set by the covering force was both physical and psychological. There were more traditional delaying tactics, such as the destruction of the railroad bridge at Terijoki (which stopped Russian mechanized movement for a crucial 10 hours), but the biggest impediment to Russian progress proved to be the small unit-level engagements and the fear they provoked. Russian soldiers were met by several other nasty surprises. Cheap, trip-wire operated pipe mines were hidden in snow by electronic devices, wooden mines were buried that could blow the tread off of a tank, resulting in Soviet infantry slowly advancing in front of tanks to probe the ground with sticks.21 being submerged in lakes; retaining buoyancy for several days, the mines would eventually surface to blow up the ice of these lake mines led to the Russians avoiding the lakes as thoroughfares and moving into the constricted countryside just as the covering force intended.22 initial delay with the forward zone strategy, but several troops in some sectors.23 Once ground had been given up, his to attempt to dislodge the Russians who had advanced to the recently vacated positions. Within hours of the invasion, LESSONS FROM THE PAST
the lack of modern anti-tank weaponry made itself painfully in the buffer zone, 80 tanks were destroyed by the covering forces wielding little more than satchel charges and bundles and the initial contact with Soviet forces resulting in some of the planned delays, the covering forces displaced to the relative safety of the main defensive line (MDL) and by 6 December were essentially integrated with the positions on the Mannerheim Line.24 Contemporary comparisons of the Mannerheim Line were exaggerated by both creative journalists and Soviet propagandists. Exaggerated reports of the durability of the line served to explain away the failures and slow progress of the initial Soviet invasion.25 In fact, only two out of the 110plus strongpoints of the Mannerheim Line the Poppious Bunker and the Million Dollar Bunker could compare to the complex, heavy strongpoints of the Maginot Line.26 While those two bunkers were nearly forts (complete with barbed wire, and mines), their quality was the exception not 27 The incorporation of the terrain with their manmade defenses proved to be of enormous importance to the landmines had been sown along the natural avenues of approach.28 large, granite rocks had been sunk into the ground in rows to serve as obstacles.29 Some of the lightly wooded areas were selectively cleared as a way to guide unsuspecting 30 Defensive positions, or strongpoints of various design, were located in supporting negotiating ditches, snow-covered swamps, and mud, they awaited the anti-tank rock obstacles, log obstacles, and of defense that the tanks could break through to be inside fanatical bravery of satchel charge-wielding anti-tank teams.31 The major challenge for the Russians remained the cracking of the strongpoints of the Mannerheim Line. The composition of the strongpoints on the Mannerheim Line were varied in their construction. Some strongpoints sandbags.32 Many strongpoints were simply a combination of log-roofed bunkers and earthworks.33 strongpoints were concrete pillboxes.34 The strongpoints were generally connected by trenches of varying depth and quality, depending on the time available to the defenders and the hardness of the ground itself. It was from these generally crushing waves of Russian tanks and infantry.35 the mechanized Russian onslaught for as long as they did two strongest elements tanks and waves of infantry of the Russian tendency to allow tanks to outpace infantry support, they could focus on the dismounted infantry behind the tanks. By positioning their guns behind the armored their automatic weapons.36 became separated from their infantry support, they became vulnerable. Isolated tanks could be engaged with satchel charges and other handheld explosives when approached to disrupt Russian attacks and separate attacking tank and infantry units.37 weakness in coordination as well as their own obstacles and meager artillery assets. By separating the attacking tanks and suited their defense. tanks.38 Russians were not going to be stopped permanently at the defense some much-needed depth.39 The Mannerheim Line withstood the Russian assault from 6 December 1939 until retirement to the Intermediate Line (with the exception of the defenses at Taipale, which became a salient on the northern edge of the isthmus).40 The Intermediate Line varied in strength by sector but was generally of lesser quality than the Mannerheim Line had January-March 2017 INFANTRY 63 As the Finns learned of the Russian tendency to allow tanks to outpace infantry support, they could focus on the dismounted infantry behind the tanks. By positioning their guns behind the armored vehicles, the Finns could mow down Russian infantry with their automatic weapons.36
been.41 While the center of the line was nearly as strong as the Mannerheim Line, the majority of the Intermediate Line was much weaker, typically characterized by some trenches, very few bunkers, and some barbed wire entanglements. Line as little more than a colored line on a map.42 While the Mannerheim Line had held for 78 days, the Intermediate Line would only delay the Russians for 12 days.43 quietly pursue Western support while simultaneously holding line, Mannerheim knew the die was cast and that he had to city.44 45 The defenses in the vicinity of Viipuri were one of two areas on the Rear Line, including the area near Taipale on the opposite end into their defensive plans.46 During the closing days of the Winter War, when the ice was strong enough to support Russian vehicles closing on Viipuri, the coastal guns of the Gulf provided some relief for the beleaguered defenders. to puncture the armor of battleships, to smash the frozen waterways being used to move Russian forces, drowning invaders in company-sized formations.47 The six-inch coasttroops.48 and improvised when necessary, to delay the Soviet invaders in Karelia and buy time for the diplomats.Annihilation in the WildernessWhile the war on the Karelian Isthmus was characterized by trenches, strongpoints, and was in the center and northern limits of the frontier that the ski troops and annihilate entire Soviet divisions in the wilderness. The region of Karelia north of Lake Ladoga, Karelia-Ladoga, was one of With two roads leading from the frontier to the interior within a frontage of between 130-160 kilometers, this region was the back door to the isthmus.49 south, and attack the Mannerheim Line defenses from the rear (or bypass them all together). It was in these heavily showcase their mastery of terrain. The Russian attack north of Lake Ladoga, in the anticipated the possibility and held several war games in the region.50 The overall strategy focused on allowing the Russians to advance before attacking to pin them down, and then attacking exposed supply lines. While this was a logical and coherent plan, it became moot when the Russians attacked with nine rather than the expected three divisions on 30 November 1939. Mannerheim was forced to parcel out the reserve troops that he had been conserving to reinforce the Mannerheim Line to his commanders north of Lake Ladoga to meet the larger than anticipated Russian thrust.51 It was in motti tactics. The term motti was most likely coined by some of the 52 motti refers to a bundle of logs or a pile of timber that is held in place by stakes but will later be cut into more conveniently the term came to describe the physically isolated Russian 53 and their skill in navigating the winter landscape to dissect the larger Russian elements into small pockets that were more manageable for their small units. In these road-cutting LESSONS FROM THE PAST 64 INFANTRY January-March 2017 A Finnish machine-gun crew during the Winter War. Finland: A Country Study, Library of Congress
casualties while stopping the Russian advance.54The terrain north of Lake Ladoga, unlike the Karelian 55 It was not the gently sloping, open approaches of the isthmus, but a heavily wooded region that made off-road movement nearly impossible. The mechanized Russian force had to travel along roads out of necessity, a situation that doomed them to the pain of the motti process. The typical operation was comprised of three encircle the road-bound Soviet troops to prevent further weak points and isolate Russian units into multiple pockets. while the cold and hunger degraded the effectiveness of the larger mottis.56 This tactic was utilized with devastating and on a larger scale at Suomussalmi and the Raate Road.57 1940, a peace agreement was signed in Moscow, and a June 1941, by the end of the World War II they retained their independence.58 The delaying tactics of Mannerheim and the If Winter is ComingWhile there have been obvious advances in military technology and geopolitics since 1939, some concepts remain timeless. Elements of the strategy and tactics of the Winter War are still relevant given the current geopolitical situation. With the increasingly assertiveness of Russia since 2014, the Scandinavian and Baltic states have much to gain delaying operations into their current planning. Beginning with the 2014 annexation of Crimea, modern 59 Increasingly, the Russian military has both overtly and covertly 100 times during 2014 to intercept Russian aircraft. Increasing concerns over Russian intentions have contributed to the including the formation of a joint naval task force.60 Baltic region, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are at particular to even reach the Baltic states before Russian forces reached capital cities like Tallinn in Estonia and Riga in Latvia.61 War. While technology has changed and the weather of the Winter War was a crucial variable that generally helped defender), there remain several lessons to be learned. While none of the Baltic or Scandinavian states could withstand a Russian invasion on its own, by adopting some of the delaying tactics of the Winter War, the defenders could stand to respond. One of the challenges facing modern Baltic and in 1939 the lack of armor or anti-tank weaponry.62 While during the Winter War, it should be noted that their efforts were never enough to either destroy or evict the Soviet army.63 To in the Baltic region as well as a return to the highly integrated 1980s.64 anti-armor weapons and medium-to-heavy armored forces of their own. Modern Baltic states can learn from the oversights in tanks as tanks are not exclusively offensive weapons action in the Baltics would be armored units employed as a mobile reserve, reinforcing units where they were needed but also serving in an anti-tank capacity in their own right.65 with their integration of natural terrain into their defenses, and their engagement techniques (for example, luring Russian tanks onto frozen lakes with fake roads before blasting holes in the ice) is a military concept to be emulated.66 The Baltic states, however, would not have the same relative advantage in their hypothetical defense. Rather than the naturally canalizing Karelian Isthmus, the eastern areas of the Baltics favor the invader more than the defender. While there are still woodlands, the terrain is generally more open and has a 67 What they can do, however, is stress depth in their defensive plans. The construction of a series of heavily manned defensive lines would likely not be effective; without the natural terrain to tie into, any form of Baltic Line would likely lack the stopping positions, in depth, would better serve a delaying Baltic force. While some positions would have to be substantial in their own right, especially those astride major roadways or cities, depth would help the Baltic states attrit Russian forces as they drove westward. of supply trains. While horses may no longer be employed January-March 2017 INFANTRY 65
logistical tail to support their combat soldiers. While it is unlikely that the modern world will see ski-borne troops attacking road-bound columns again, motti tactics can still be several modern military advances that could be factored into motti could feature retrograding, covering forces sowing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along roads to either block key routes with disabled vehicles, or to detonate on key command and control vehicles. These imposed by launching electronic warfare (EW) attacks by jamming voice and digital communications, the invaders would be isolated from their networks and their higher headquarters. Strikes on supplies being moved forward could motti tactics could live on if these tactics were implemented by the Baltic states. study, at least seven brigades (at least three of which being 68 Casting aside whether or not this estimate is accurate, no one can deny that the political process needed to approve and move such a large force is not a quick one. The best strategy for Baltic states is to immediately focus on expanding their capabilities while and the Scandinavian states can draw inspiration for new Winter War. Mobile armored reserves, modern motti tactics, and a focus on depth could serve as short-term defensive solutions for the Baltic and Scandinavian forces in the face of increased Russian belligerency. Notes1 Robert Edwards, The Winter War: Russias Invasion of Finland, 1939-1940 (NY: Pegasus Books, 2008), 113.2 Jonathan Clements, Mannerheim: President, Soldier, Spy (London: 3 William Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-19404 Ibid, 8.5 Ibid, 8.6 Ibid, 7.7Ibid, 8.8 Gordon Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War: Finlands Gallant Stand Against the Soviet Army Kansas, 2013), 49.9 Ibid, 49. 10 Ibid, 82.11 Offense and Defense, Volume I (March 2013), 195.12 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 78.13 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 37.14 Clements, Mannerheim, 241.15 Ibid, 241.1617 Tomas Ries, Cold Will: The Defense of Finland 1988), 76.18 Ibid, 76.19 Ibid, 77.20 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 69.21 Ibid, 68.22 Ibid, 69.23 Ibid, 72.24 Ibid, 73.25 Edwards, The Winter War, 109.26 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 47.27 Ibid, 48.28 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 64.29 Ibid, 64.30 Edwards, The Winter War, 112.31 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 82.32 Ibid, 216.33 Ibid, 64.34 Ibid, 216.35 Ibid, 84.36 Clements, Mannerheim, 249.37 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 139.38 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 82.39 Ibid, 99.40 Ibid, 233.41 Ibid, 24242 Ibid.43 Ibid, 244.44 Ibid.45 Ibid, 63. 46 Ibid, 268.47 Ibid, 259.48 Ibid, 78.49 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 78.50 Ibid.51 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 79.52 Edwards, The Winter War, 164. 53 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 131.54 Clements, Mannerheim, 252.55 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 51.56 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 131.57 Sander, The Hundred Day Winter War, 145.58 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 273.59 Grasp Situation in Russia, The Guardian, 5 November 2014, http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/05/finland-warns-cold-warrussia-eu. 60 The Moscow Times http://www.themoscowtimes. russia-cool/516141.html.61 David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on Corporation, 1 (2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR1253.html.62 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence, 8.63 Edwards, The Winter War, 113. 64 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence, 9.65 Trotter, Frozen Hell, 74. 66 Clements, Mannerheim, 251.67 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence, 4.68 Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence, 8.LESSONS FROM THE PAST 66 INFANTRY January-March 2017CPT Rick Chersicla Infantry Magazine articles, the views expressed in this article are those of
Attack on the Somme: 1st Anzac Corps and the Battle of Pozieres Ridge, 1916By Meleah Hampton England: Helion & Company, Limited, 2016, 232 pages Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, U.S. Marine Corps ReserveIn Attack on the Somme, Dr. Meleah Hampton, currently with the Military History Section of the Australian War Memorial (AWM), presents the Battle of the Somme for 1st Anzac Corps. Popular memory places Australias primary contribution to the Great War at Gallipoli. Pozires Ridge, however, was even analyzes the battles as both an individual campaign and as a learning experience for the Australians. Commanders and their actions, both Australian and British, are assessed using contemporary documents more than retrospective memoirs. These sources, often written on the line during the battle, allow Dr. Hampton to present the Australians successes and failures at the brigade and division levels in near-real time. As a result, the reader gains an appreciation of the friction present during planning and execution for the 1st Anzac Corps. On 23 July 1916, as part of the ongoing Somme Offensive, the 1st Australian Division launched an attack on the village of Pozires that differed from previous efforts to capture the town. The attack, while successful in capturing the town, was hampered from the beginning by a lack of coordination and planning at the army level. General Hubert Gough, commander of the newly-created Reserve Army, called spur of the moment conferences without representation from [neighboring] Fourth Army to begin planning uncoordinated attacks within his sector. Goughs lack of coordination was emulated by his subordinates as the battle continued over the next six weeks. Furthermore, the capture of Pozires was limited by the failure to capture the German defensive lines to the east and northeast. On 27 July 1916, the 2nd Australian Division replaced the 1st Australian Division in the trenches. The 2nd Australian Divisions mission was to capture the German lines. Their approach to that task, however, was markedly different from that of their predecessor, especially with regards to training analysis of the different planning styles. She dissects the application of artillery and its coordination with infantry the involvement of their higher headquarters staff in the matter execution. In the midst of this planning, German defensive reconnaissance opportunities. As a result, the hastily-planned and executed attack on 29 July was a failure. Dr. Hampton places Australian failures within a wider ascribes some of the failures of August and September to the change in British campaign strategy. Previously, attacks in Reserve Armys area of operation were in support of attacks by Fourth Army. After the overall strategy changed on 30 July 1916, the attacks of Reserve Army were to be an end in themselves. With this change in operational design, 1st Anzac Corps began planning and executing a series of actions that were largely in support of II Corps 12th Division to their left instead of predominately supporting Fourth Armys main effort on the right. This change in role, while not tactically changing the nature of the battle, did change the campaign objective for 1st Anzac Corps and made its efforts increasingly in vain. The bulk of Dr. Hamptons work focuses on the change of Anzac operations from one of disrupting attacks and economyof-force operations to one of constant pressure. She relates division after division coming through the line launching nearly six weeks of operations that can best be summarized as displaying initiative but poor judgment. Reserve Armys desire to continuously attack the Germans led to ongoing attacks that were only loosely tied to Reserve Armys concept of operations and attacks were being conducted on such a small-scale that had they not been so costly in lives they would be inconsequential. These uncoordinated attacks sapped Australian troop strength, supplies, and morale, all while being part of the seduction of being able to report a success. The goal of being able to report any success led to the frittering away of combat power with limited correlation frequently displayed a lack of coordination between infantry and artillery, inadequate coordination or liaison efforts between adjacent units, and progressively smaller objectives. By late August, General William Birdwood, commander of 1st Anzac Corps, reduced assault objectives to a distance of 50-100 yards with, at best, limited artillery support on the were 200 yards from friendly troops, resulting in Australian forces frequently having to abandon their frontline trenches during pre-assault bombardments. This, in turn, forced them to retake ground they previously held. Furthermore, even when they could stay in their trenches prior to an attack, Anzac troops frequently received short rounds from their own January-March 2017 INFANTRY 67
68 INFANTRY January-March 2017 loss for minimal ground gained, Dr. Hampton damningly states, there had simply been no purpose in 1st Anzac Corps operations. There had not been for several weeks. Dr. Hampton provides thoughtful analysis of the different planning and training methods used by the Australian division and brigade commanders. To modern American readers accustomed to a prescribed pre-deployment training cycle, the individualized approach available to Australian commanders nearly two years into the war is a fascinating revelation of how armies prepared or failed to prepare to soldier to the staff level as well. She also examines the learning process of commanders examples of lessons learned-type documents in the archives, unfortunately for the men of 1st Anzac Corps, the disseminated lessons learned failed to lead to no practical examples which indicated that what was being written about was actually being absorbed and implemented. As a result, while the information and analysis might have been available to commanders, its incorporation into the planning cycle or in the attacks themselves was absent, a negligence at the command and staff level with costly results. Attack on the Somme is an eminently readable counterpoint to parochial histories that place the Australian divorced from a larger British, or even coalition, effort during the Somme Campaign. Dr. Hampton presents an important critical campaign analysis of one part of the larger Somme Offensive that sheds light on the months the Anzacs fought an increasingly futile sideshow.The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darbys RangersBy James Altieri Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014, 334 pages Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick BaillergeonFor readers of military history, the reprinting of a book is almost always a good thing. It places a title back on the market which was normally last seen decades ago. In most cases, the reprint has been supplemented with some nice extras which distinguish it from the original. The best aspect of a reprint is that it exposes itself to a potentially new group of readers. One recent reprint which should unquestionably be experienced by a new readership is James Altieris superb volume, The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darbys Rangers published in 1960). Before addressing the book itself, it is important to have a succinct background on the authors incredible World War II record. Altieri joined the Army in late 1941 and was subsequently sent to Northern Ireland where he served as an artillerymen with the 1st Armored Division. While stationed there, he was told that volunteers were wanted to form up a new unit structured much like the British Commandos. Altieri completed the demanding training program and became a Ranger in July 1942. For the next two years (plus), he served with the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions in combat missions executed in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. company commander and received two Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts. Spearheaders enables Altieri to achieve three things. First, the book provides him a forum to address events of World War II that clearly weighed on him through the rest of his life. He candidly and emotionally discusses these events. combat with his enemy, taking the life of another man, and He shares the wide spectrum of emotions and feelings that combat brings to every Soldier. Second, Spearheaders serves as an excellent concise history of the formation of the Rangers and their operations in the Mediterranean Theater. Particularly interesting for readers the others went through prior to their deployment in theater. This training was executed by the British Commandos and to say it was demanding is clearly an understatement. Altieri discusses this training as only a Soldier taking part in it can. Finally, Altieri utilizes the book to pay tribute to a Ranger he greatly respected his commander, William O. Darby. By the end of the book, readers will clearly understand why Darby was so admired and loved by his men and why they were called Darbys Rangers. Throughout the book, Altieri places numerous vignettes and accounts of displays of Darbys leadership qualities and technical and tactical competence. The most poignant portion of Altieris praise Darby is killed in combat on 16 April 1945. The clear strength of Spearheaders is Altieris writing ability. He expresses himself in a conversational tone that makes footnotes, endnotes, or long bibliography in his volume. From front to back these are Altieris words and thoughts. Spearheaders is every bit as valuable today as it was volume which highlights the development and contributions Rangers who were part of that force which achieved so much in World War II. A new group of readers have the unique opportunity to read a book that is clearly a classic. BOOK REVIEWS
Devil Dogs Chronicle: Voices of the 4th Marine Brigade in World War IEdited by George B. Clark Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2013, 424 pages Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, U.S. Marine Corps ReserveThe transition of the Marine Corps from its 19th century role as a naval landing force and auxiliary ship crew to a viable second land army occurred surrounding Belleau Wood in northern France, that change occurred as the Marines of the 4th Marine Brigade, part of U.S. Armys 2nd Division, fought the entrenched German army. However, that battle, now part of Marine Corps lore, almost never occurred due to inter-service rivalry. The U.S. Army initially saw neither reason nor need to include the It was only after the Commandant of the Marine Corps persuaded the Secretary of War that the Marines could solve the manpower crisis brought about by the war that they were included. From there, the Marine Corps never looked back. Clark has compiled and edited Devil Dogs Chronicle almost exclusively from primary source material written during or shortly after World War I. It is a thematically and number of unpublished or limited edition works by the Marines offering an immediacy to the account. Furthermore, Clarks hindsight on memory. The book starts with initial recruitment, selection, and training of the Marines. While much has changed in the experiences similar to that of their predecessors, including the emphasis on marksmanship. Today, as then, the pride and emotion-laden event that marks the transition from civilian to Marine. Marines like Pvt Levi Hemrick and Lt James McBrayer Sellers express the deep pride they felt in the exhausting work of earning the title of Marine and preparing for combat in France. Clarks chapter on combat at Belleau Wood, where the Marines assisted in halting the German Spring Offensive of 1918, is his strongest. Clarks sources describe hidden German machine-gun nests and snipers, and of capturing one position only to be attacked from an unseen position on than had died in the history of the Marine Corps to date. Further chapters on combat at St.-Mihiel, Soissons, Blanc Mont, and the Meuse-Argonne take Marines from the critical summer of 1918 to the Armistice. These later battles proved Belleau Wood was far from an isolated example of Marine bravery and skill. Short chapters on occupation duty in Germany and the return home complete the book. Throughout, Clark allows his sources to express the chaos and savagery they experienced, as well as the lighter moments, in their own words. By weaving various authors throughout the text, he creates a holistic picture of the Marine experience in France from induction through demobilization. Devil Dogs Chronicle puts the Marine transition from an auxiliary naval force to a second land army in the words of its participants. In doing so, Clark has given voice to the men who gave rise to the modern day Marine Corps. While the story is about the 4th Marine Brigade, the experiences of the participants in joint warfare (the brigade was commanded by an Army brigadier general and had platoons led by command, the fog of war, and shell shock have applicability to the combat arms Soldier outside of the books historical context. Clark provides a view of Americans in combat in participants. Have you read a book lately that you think would be of interest to the Infantry community and want to submit a review? Or are you interested in being a book reviewer for INFANTRY? Send us an email at: email@example.com or call (706) 545-2350.January-March 2017 INFANTRY 69