Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, Army position and does not supersede any information otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazineContact Information Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-142, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951 Email: email@example.com AUGUST-DECEMBER 2016 Volume 105, Number 3 PB 7-16-3BG PETER L. JONES Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School RUSSELL A. ENO Editor MICHELLE J. ROWAN Deputy Editor of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Chief of Staff Distribution: Special GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 163000636 BATTALION CALFEX AT JRTC MAJ Ryan J. ScottIn 1996, after only three years in operation, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., opened FEATURES 42 BCT WALK AND SHOOT: TRAINING TACTICAL LEADERS ON SETTING CONDITIONS TO ACHIEVE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER MAJ Daniel Ciccarelli LTC Charles Kean COL Brett Sylvia Check out the U.S. Army Infantry School website at: http://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/USArmyInfantrySchoolFt.BenningGA/ COMMANDANTS NOTE 2 A TENACIOUS MINDSET: OUR KEY TO VICTORY BG Peter L. Jones
INF ANTRY NEWS 3 FIRST STRYKER VEHICLE PROTOTYPE WITH 30MM CANNON DELIVERED TO ARMY David Vergun PROFESSIONAL FORUM 4 TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MANAGEMENT DURING UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS MAJ Patrick Bryan 8 INTEGRATING COGNITIVE TRAINING FOR PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION MAJ Thomas A. Whitehead CPT Andrew J. Vogel CPT Jared D. Wigton 12 THE STRATEGIC LIEUTENANT 1LT Maribel R. Brown 14 REACHBACK FOR THE SQUAD Brian J. Dunn 18 OPERATIONAL PHASING LTC (Retired) Jack Mundstock 20 WHAT IS INFORMATION OPERATIONS? MAJ Daniel W. Clark 22 THE DISMOUNTED RECON TROOP: A RELEVANT FORCE FOR THE IBCT CPT Graham Williams 1SG Brian Baumgartner 26 SQUAD OVERMATCH: SOFTWARE BEFORE HARDWARE SFC (Retired) Mike Lewis 31 EAST AFRICA RAF: A VIEW FROM THE GROUND CPT Renee Sanjuan TRAINING NOTES 47 13 ARTICLES: FUNDAMENTALS OF HOSTING A MULTINATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE CPT Shawn S. Scott CPT Kenneth P. Shogry 50 SWIFT RESPONSE 15: EXERCISE VALIDATES JMRC AS CRITICAL PART IN FUTURE OF AIRBORNE READINESS CPT Michael Wallace 54 GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS CPT Sheldon Broedel SFC Christopher Lyon 58 EMPLOYING RECONNAISSANCE IN A MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE CPT Michael Cryer 60 A HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY IN A LIGHT AIRBORNE WORLD CPT Michael F.R. Freeman LESSONS FROM THE PAST 63 TOMAHAWKS AND RED LIONS: THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1-23 INFANTRY AND 1-37 FIELD ARTILLERY 1LT Michael C. Edwards BOOK REVIEWS 66 THE TERROR YEARS: FROM AL-QAEDA TO THE ISLAMIC STATE By Lawrence Wright Reviewed by CPT Sam Wilkins 67 STORMING THE CITY: U.S. MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN URBAN WARFARE FROM WORLD WAR II TO VIETNAM By Alec Wahlman Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon 68 THE WINTER FORTRESS: THE EPIC MISSION TO SABOTAGE HITLERS ATOMIC BOMB By Neil Bascomb Reviewed by CPT Jeremy M. Phillips ON THE COVER:Paratroopers assigned to Baker Company, 3rd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) 25th Infantry Division, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, on 1 November 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo by Alejandro Pena)BACK COVER:A Soldier with Able Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat (Airborne), scans his during Exercise Strong Shield. Paratroopers from Able Company are in Lithuania training with their Lithuanian partners as part of Atlantic Resolve. (Photo by SSG Corinna Baltos) OTHER DEP ARTMENTS
BG PETER L. JONESCommandants NoteThe threats we face today have demonstrated an ability to learn, adapt, and transform. Whether these security challenges are posed by such nation states as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran or by violent extremist organizations like ISIS, they require but who are also tenacious in character and mindset. Nowhere has the dogged tenacity of the American Infantryman and in sparse vegetation over a period of three days. At the end of the bloodbath the enemy of this tough training and leadership philosophy were demonstrated by the actions of such warriors tenacity that allows them to take on any challenge while leading from the front. There can be no other way, and as in the past our Army must be ready now to face the A TENACIOUS MINDSETOUR KEY T O VICT ORY 2 INFANTRY
FIRST STRYKER VEHICLE PROTOTYPE WITH 30MM CANNON DELIVERED TO ARMY DAVID VERGUNT David Vergun writes for the Army News Service. INFANTRY 3
4 INFANTRY August-December 2016A 1 the ROE Tracking TACtTICAL ROE MANAGemeEMENtT DUrRING UUNIFIeED LLAND OPerERAt TIoONS MAJ PATRICK L. BRYAN U.S. and Italian soldiers brief each other before conducting a dismounted patrol during Swift Response 15 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany on 26 August 2015.
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 5 Protection embarrassment.2 an enemy 4 of State.6 ROE Development Soldiers with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division conduct an operation brief as part of exercise Swift Response 15 at JMRC on 29 August 2015.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 6 INFANTRY August-December 2016 8 9 a common ROE template for the full range 10 The of such measures. All supplemental measures ROE Management Recommendations Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, conduct a mission analysis brief during Swift Response 15 on 29 August 2015.
MAJ Patrick L. Bryan August-December 2016 INFANTRY 7 Conclusion Notes1 2 Protection 4 6 8 910Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, provide security during exercise Swift Response 15 on 29 August 2015.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 8 INFANTRY August-December 2016Leaders at all levels now face a dynamic environment where they cannot plan for every contingency, and newsfeed. With that in mind, the ability of Soldiers and leaders to focus their minds and make coherent decisions has never been more relevant or necessary for our military In the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) (White Devils), we recently explored a training approach designed to maximize human performance by helping our paratroopers understand when they are in a coherent state. Our aim was to ensure they knew the difference between being in a coherent or incoherent state, showing them how that knowledge correlates to their ability to accomplish individual tasks from the Paratrooper Essential Task List (PETL).1 We who should deliberately incorporate human-performance experts into all mission essential task list (METL)-focused training. During the past seven months, our battalion integrated performance experts from the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) team into three initial focus areas: airborne, marksmanship, and leader training. Though not yet deliberate mental training can maximize human performance. Moreover, the method we used explored the science of sports teams, to bridge the gap between mental coherence and physical performance. In the resource-constrained environment, this approach didnt add to existing training plans; it simply substantiated techniques previously honed during decades of military experience by NCOs and senior leaders that were previously unintelligible to new Soldiers. The result was new warriors who could make clearer decisions and precisely control physical actions in a complex environment.BackgroundImprovements in technology and techniques during performance in an airborne unit. Paratroopers exiting an aircraft 1,000 feet above a drop zone can no longer simply rely on keeping their feet and knees together three points of performance could cost them their lives or the lives of fellow paratroopers. Likewise, snipers who once were consigned to a novel supplementary mission now bear the weight of strategic relevance with each trigger squeeze. Gone are the days when commanders bore the sole responsibility of decision making. Training must now apply these mental-concentration skills at all levels so that Soldiers can make the right decisions in the violence of a propeller blast, the tension of a hide site, What was needed was a way to use existing resources found within the CSF2 program to maximize INTEGRATING COGNITIVE TRAINING FOR PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION MAJ THOMAS A. WHITEHEAD CPT ANDREW J. VOGEL CPT JARED D. WIGTON Photos courtesy of authorsSoldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment integrate cognitive training into marksmanship training.
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 9performance through enhanced mental concentration. Rather than just relying on physical repetition, we needed a way to promote individual engagement with every training situation.RecommendationThe way ahead begins by understanding the approach we used. Recognizing the potential behind performance science and applying the expertise of performance experts needs to be a deliberate effort by leaders. Since this method simply augments existing training events, executing this approach becomes nearly transparent. The next step dedicates performance experts at the battalion level to coach, assess, and reinforce coherence training using common biometric paratroopers will overcome the cognitive doldrums that restrain them to leverage the capabilities of consciousness and achieve optimal performance.Leveraging Maximum CapabilityParatroopers stand inside the mock-up of a C-130 Hercules the command to go. As they walk toward the door, hundreds of tasks circle through their minds: spacing between the jumpers to their front, covering the rip-cord handle of their reserve parachute, keeping a steady pace toward the door, and so on. When their turn to execute proper exiting procedures arrives, the paratroopers hand the static line to the safety, making eye-to-eye contact, turn toward the paratrooper door and jump. They snap into a good tight body position just as the black hat instructors taught them at Airborne School. After air to simulate controlling the parachute canopy, certain they The jumpmaster then calls some of them back to explain they did not fully turn 90 degrees into the paratrooper door, causing them to exit at a dangerously wide angle. The jumpmaster has the paratroopers repeat the drill until success is achieved. However, this common retraining approach may not fully address the gaps in physical performance when executing in real-time conditions. that are both cognitively and physically demanding is a This approach typically allows leaders and Soldiers to achieve at what he or she does and that the unit can accomplish its mission. It is when a Soldier fails to execute mastered tasks to prescribed standards that leaders are faced with a unique Often, a leaders approach is to ask, Why did you do that? You know how to do this; I have seen you do it correctly. When the response from the Soldier is I dont know, he or she then physically repeats the training until the task standards are met. However, getting that Soldier to understand why he/she failed the task physically and not just retraining the task may prevent failure from happening in the future. This is not an institutionally intuitive approach. Seasoned leaders often forget their anxiety levels are reduced based on their experience level, which allows them to focus, gaining and maintaining an optimal state of coherence. Coherence is what happens when experienced leaders achieve a state of concentration in which they can think clearly, understand their environment, recall their training, and apply their mind to executing a physical task. This balanced application of cognitive and physical ability stands in sharp contrast to the response of the Soldier described in the previous scenario who simply didnt know what happened, functioning in an incoherent state. Therefore, training must be about leveraging maximum physical and mental capability to achieve optimal performance potential every time and in any condition. The ultimate goal to addressing the cognitive component into our training is to prevent any paratrooper from saying, I dont know why I did that.2Airborne InitiativeFor years, with use of the T-10 parachute, leaders emphasized keeping your feet and knees together to prevent serious injury during an airborne operation. This applies to paratrooper makes contact with the ground. Recently, technological innovation with the T-11 advanced average rate of descent and the likelihood of injury during this time, but it has also increased the importance of introduction of pre-mock door training and many revisions of pre-jump enables leaders to ensure proper repetitive training and that paratroopers conduct adequate rehearsals during sustained airborne training to achieve task mastery prior to an actual jump. Reduction of the weight in the paratroopers load training initiatives are additional ongoing efforts to help the 3Our training approach took into consideration all these initiatives and attempted to add in the understanding of the cognitive burden on the paratroopers physical performance. We composed a test group of 25 paratroopers with varied under conditions that are both cognitively and physically demanding is a common Army It is when a Soldier fails to execute mastered faced with a unique training opportunity to truly
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 10 INFANTRY August-December 2016airborne experience, ranging from recent graduates of Airborne School to master-rated jumpmasters. The group had one classroom session about two hours long about various techniques to enhance coherence during an airborne operation. The session focused on the start of the airborne timeline through landing on the drop zone. Civilian performance experts from the CSF2 program initially taught the techniques. These techniques included mental imagery, breathing exercises, and cue words to return to an optimal state of coherence. several mock-door rehearsals, mainly tied to physical training, twice a week for about four weeks. During this mock-door training, paratroopers deliberately conducted mental imagery where they would conduct a cognitive rehearsal of each task from those in the aircraft through landing. The mental-imagery technique allowed paratroopers to focus their minds on each task, preventing them from allowing their minds to wander or increase their anxiety. Next, they received instructions to practice diaphragmatic breathing to prevent them from raising their shoulders, which bear most of the additional weight. This breathing technique maximizes the amount of oxygen in the bloodstream and trigger the bodys normal relaxation response. By doing this, paratroopers were empowered to further focus and continue their mental rehearsals. During the last step, paratroopers used word cueing to help them remain in a focused state during execution of each task rather than solely relying on muscle memory to accomplish them. The use of word cueing during execution is an effective method to help paratroopers coherently execute each task. More importantly, it helps them identify potential lack of technology being readily available to provide feedback to paratroopers who employed these techniques during both training and actual airborne operations. However, we parachutists reported they already unintentionally applied were that we had bridged the gap of experience between new and senior parachutists in a shorter period. This happened through the teaching techniques that our senior NCOs had intuitively employed and learned on their own during the course of their careers.Marksmanship InitiativeWe leveraged the same performance experts (Dr. Katy Turner and Brian Wade) that we used during the airborne initiative to enhance the precision and lethality of our battalion snipers. Our approach to cognitive training for shooting was to integrate the performance experts into the battalion sniper training without adding time or interrupting the training schedule. We also knew that a test group comprised of all our battalion snipers had received training through the Army Sniper Course or from someone who had graduated the course. Therefore, our assumption was that they would not be naturally open to take advice from civilian performance experts with limited marksmanship training. With that in mind, our performance experts had to build a relationship with the snipers for their feedback to be effective. They only worked with the snipers on the ranges while they were shooting. They were able to provide instant feedback on the snipers ability to hit the target based on their level of coherence. Over multiple sessions, the performance experts were able to introduce the same techniques used in the airborne initiative to improve overall performance for the group of snipers. based on the use of combined factors: monitoring heart rates via an electronic tablet while shooting, the accuracy of the shooting, and performance observations by the experts. After a couple iterations that incorporated the techniques, our snipers could articulate their cognitive state and personal coherence with each shot taken. Junior snipers now understood when and why they should them to lose focus, and they had not regained a coherent state before pulling the trigger. What we learned from this was that this focus on the cognitive aspect of training transcends shooting and, over time, it will accelerate the snipers ability to make clear concise decisions and judgments in a complex environment.4Leader Initiative to integrate Turner and Wade into collective training at Range 74 with Alpha Company.A 2-504 PIR sniper incorporates cognitive-domain training into marksmanship, focusing on coherence.
MAJ Thomas A. Whitehead Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C. His previous deputy commanding general for maneuver, 3rd ID, Regional CommandSouth, Afghanistan; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3rd ID, Fort Stewart; and commander, Company B, 2-7 IN. MAJ Whiteheads military education includes the Naval Command Basic Course and Ranger, Air Assault, and Airborne schools. He has a bachelors degree in business administration from Susquehanna University and a masters degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College. CPT Andrew J. Vogel commands Company D, 2-504 PIR. His previous Hawaii; platoon leader in Troop C, 3-4 Cavalry; and platoon leader with Troop C, 3-4 CAV. His military schools include the Maneuver Captains degree in history from the University of California-Santa Barbara. CPT Vogel deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 08-09 and Operation Enduring Freedom 11-12. CPT Jared D. Wigton commands Company A, 2-504 PIR. His 82nd Airborne Division; mortar platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd ID, Fort includes the Jumpmaster Course; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course; Chinese-Mandarin Speaking Course; Maneuver Captains Career Course; Combatives Instructor Course (Level 3); Infantry Mortar Leader Course; and Ranger and Airborne courses. He holds a bachelors degree in history from the University of California-Berkeley. Editors Note: 2016 issue of ARMOR. August-December 2016 INFANTRY 11 drills on entering and clearing a room. The initial reaction, especially from the senior NCOs of the company, was wary skepticism about the value of the skills presented by the performance experts and the potential cost in valuable training time. Fortunately, Turner and Wade went to great lengths to ensure they came alongside our training instead of pulling leaders away for an entirely separate event. During the course of several weeks of intense training, the two performance experts gained the trust of the Alpha Company team by integrating into the training progression for platoon Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), stayed out in the rain, and McKiethan Pond. The only cost to the unit in terms of training review to coach squad leaders on coherence, visualization, and breathing techniques. paid off. The platoons from Alpha Company were incredibly successful, and the mantra of the senior NCOs of the company changed from I dont buy that performance stuff to theyre just coaching us on what we already do. This is the crux of mental-performance training: the most successful leaders in our organization already use these skills that were developed during years of experience in training and combat deployments. Once again, this approach to training allowed us to bridge the time gap between experienced leaders and paratroopers while passing these critical skills on to the next generation. The overall result of this training was improved mentoring by our leaders. Not only did they maintain the level of professionalism as they instructed a task to mastery level, they also were able to identify when a paratroopers anxiety or excitement level was going to hinder successful accomplishment of the collective task. The leader could then move to that paratrooper and coach him or her back into a training was that it also developed leaders decision-making ConclusionWe found the incorporation of the performance experts into levels. Unfortunately, with the focus on Department of the Army requirements, our performance experts are routinely required to pull away from our training to conduct Army Regulation 350-1-required master resiliency training courses as well as unit training. Having the performance experts routinely pulled for other training does not maximize their potential. What do we need? We recommend the number of performance experts be increased to no fewer than two per brigade combat team (BCT), and leaders should deliberately incorporate them into all METL-focused training. Also, we need to increase our performance experts technological capability to enable them with the tools to provide quantitative feedback and training enhancement. The ultimate goal of incorporating the cognitive-domain focus into our training is to prevent Soldiers from saying I dont know why I did that when they make a mistake. Helping them understand why they made a mistake increases their speed of learning and their mastery of tasks. The NCOs of our battalion are masters at training competence. We now need the expertise provided by the performance experts to train coherence to simultaneously improve the performance of our paratroopers.Notes1 The PETL is leader development, physical and mental readiness, smallThe All American Standard (January 2015).2 The cognitive component refers to the mental activity pertaining to the act or process of perception, memory, judgment and reasoning. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept (May 2014).3 assesses individual and unit measures; develop monitoring strategies to detect and prevent decreases in physical performance; identify how to apply requirements to all members; identify training requirements; and identify the desired endstate. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7.4 A complex environment consists of many autonomous factors that link together through diverse, interrelated and interdependent connections. Leaders cannot contain or reduce such an environment into a single rule or description, as it is intrinsically unpredictable.
O PROFESSIONAL FORUM 12 INFANTRY THE STRA TEGIC LIEUTENANT 1LT MARIBEL R. BROWN
INFANTRY 13 1LT Maribel R. Brown The tactical lessons in multinational interoperability contained in this newsletter are not unique to the NATO alliance but are transcendent to any situation in which a military coalition of nations must form, build a cohesive team, and operate seamlessly against a common enemy at the tactical level of warfare. This newsletters collection of articles is intended to supplement and reinforce those lessons described in our publication of the Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide (CALL Handbook 16-18). Thus, the goal is to provide tactical-level insights and lessons gleaned from numerous multinational exercises that military leaders can use to logically approach the complexities of interoperability in multinational environments. 16-29 DATE at the JMRC, VOLUME III SEP 16 http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/news/16-29 CALL RELEASES NEWSLETTER
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 14 INFANTRY August-December 2016 REACHBACK FOrR THE SQUAD BRIAN J. DUNNThe Army should exploit reachback technology to counter the threat to the crews and squads of our with capable and numerous anti-armor weapons poses. and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed.1 Enabled by secure Internet-like connections, we already use reachback as far away as the continental United States that at one manning concept would retain combat power for a smaller but more capable expeditionary Army, help mitigate force to force protection by reducing the actual manned infantry During the Iraq War, I often cringed at the thought of infantry carriers. We were fortunate not to experience more spectrum ground combat capabilities by renewing our forceon-force combat training, we must cope with the reality that a In 2002, while discussing what type of Abrams tank replacement was needed to equip a strategically deployable of sources for force-on-force combat.2 A smaller infantry Today, the idea for fewer mounted infantry remains an according to more current thinking as the Army debates its 3 Indeed, the Armored Multi-Purpose M113, has room for only six passengers in addition to two crew.4 foresee the need for less than a full infantry squad on a future Soldiers with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division move out on a mission as part of Decisive Action Rotation 16-09 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., on 27 August 2016.
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 15infantry is within reach. If we rely on hyper-infantry, yes, a networked force boots[.]5 with fewer boots. What will we do in peace operations, counterinsurgency around the Soldier with a much shorter sight line and additional operations. by striking a balance between mitigating the effects of of hyper-infantry in high-intensity combat, and conducting without losing the full squad by exploiting reachback technology within a battalions battlespace rather than the globe-spanning reachback we use for other types of support. remain in the battalion headquarters where it would operate 6 One who is operating the remote weapon station behind your dismounts. In a perfect mechanized infantry world, you dont slow dropping the rear ramp slab just slow[s] down the whole supporting the tanks without dismounting the infantry?7 combat that requires the full infantry squads on the ground. the remote weapon stations would buy time for rescue and team Soldiers who are incapable of self-defense. headquarters element where it would operate the remote Photo by Katie CainParatroopers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division use Joint Tactical
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 16 INFANTRY August-December 2016weapon stations while gaining some respite from forward operations. troops stationed at the battalion headquarters would not physical location at battalion will keep more infantry at the headquarters capable of local self-defense should the battalion headquarters come under direct ground attack. threats. If remotely operated robotic weapons are part of the future Indeed, if such a manned-unmanned teaming of Soldiers and robotic systems actually increases the number of Soldiers such a requirement for more infantry.8 team that controls or monitors the unmanned systems This expanded full squad team rotation capabilities to extended and continuous combat operations would otherwise allow. Protecting the Soldier by exposure to the enemy is already happening. We are attempting to take the Soldier found that taking high mobility from their exposed positions and putting them under armor Common Remotely Operated 9 operations, send a bullet and not a man.10 Reachback for the concerns carried to the extreme could hamper efforts to win a campaign by excluding certain actions that could be exploited casualties in the short run.11While force protection is a natural consideration for using committed to war. adopting the stylized, tightly controlled methodical battle doctrine, could we paralyze our own Army with casualty12The technology that allows reachback capabilities could allow us to enhance force protection without inducing force A vehicle from the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd
Brian J. Dunn earned a bachelors degree in political science and history Among other jobs, Dunn taught an introductory American history course at in 1991 as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, the position from which he retired in 2010. Other articles he has written include: Military Review Joint Force Quarterly Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles, Autumn 2000. Army August-December 2016 INFANTRY 17 armor for the situations when the infantry needs to dismount Notes1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, http://www.dtic. mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/r/11141.html.2 Military Review 3 Pragmatic Approach, National Defense Magazine http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post. aspx?ID=1752.4 Scout Warrior http://www.realcleardefense.com/2016/12/09/us_ .5 Army 38.6 7 Death Ground: Todays American Infantry in Battle 8Army9 Ibid, 36.10 11 Indeed, it is false compassion for our troops to let a war drag 12 Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Soldiers from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, dismount from their Bradley
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 18 INFANTRY August-December 2016Phasing an operation has for years seemed to PHASE I: SHAPE PHASE II: DETER PHASE III: SEIZE INITIATIVE PHASE IV: DOMINATE PHASE V: STABILIZE PHASE VI: ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY Deter dominate seize the initiative Model General Scenario PHASE I: DEPLOY/ OCCUPY ASSEMBLY AREAS PHASE II: ATTACK TO SEIZE INITIAL OBJECTIVES AND RIVER CROSSING PHASE III: ATTACK TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL BORDER OPERATIONAL PHASING: LTC (RETIRED) JACK E. MUNDSTOCK Example of Combining the Elements of Decisive Action in a Notional Campaign PHASE NAMES SHOULD BE DRIVEN BY ACTIVITY IN EACH PHASE
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 19 PHASE IV: DEFEND INTERNATIONAL BORDER PHASE V: INTERNAL DEFENSE OF ATROPIA PHASE VI: REDEPLOY PHASE I: DEPLOY/OCCUPY ASSEMBLY AREAS PHASE II: ATTACK TO SEIZE INITIAL OBJECTIVES AND RIVER CROSSING PHASE III: ATTACK TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL BORDER PHASE IV: DEFEND INTERNATIONAL BORDER PHASE V: INTERNAL DEFENSE OF ATROPIA PHASE VI: REDEPLOY LTC (Retired) Jack E. Mundstock Check out the U.S. Army Infantry School Facebook page at: https://www.facebook.com/USArmyInfantrySchoolFt.BenningGA/
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 20 INFANTRY August-December 2016Recently, a colleague of mine was asked by a public with reporters because I am an information reporter. The implication was that because I am an IO professional communicators, not psychological manipulators. Information operations is the fancy term that the military to as communications. The purpose of communications do it, and how we can support that has led to this potentially dangerous misunderstanding of information operations. operations as the integrated employment of information-related human and automated decision making while protecting our own.1 the integration of designated information-related capabilities operations to inform United States and global audiences.2 actions of all instruments of national power.3 Taken together communicate a message to key stakeholders that will yield or the unit. Nowhere in any of that do I read the role of the leadership, the press, or the American public. If we can accept that the purpose of IO is to inform desired audiences, then we must also accept that the purpose of seems to cause people a lot of consternation, but it is entirely of resources. Perhaps if I used the word persuade as opposed doesnt change. The U.S. military regularly informs Congress on its efforts for the purpose of persuading appropriators to strategic goals. We inform the public about our ongoing per our honored profession. We inform foreign audiences about important nature of these efforts to our national security, IO capabilities to do their jobs. As would any marketer who were to pick up a book by Dr. Robert Cialdini or Nick Kolenda. of what was formerly called psychological operations (now called military information support operations MISO). IO by the Department of Defense for publicity or propaganda electronic interference). This unfortunate misrepresentation of information operations a host of factors that contributed to this misunderstanding we do and why. In 2011, Rolling Stone an article that accused the former commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan then-LTG William Caldwell of illegally ordering a team of psychological operators to Their source was a Holmes had no military training or education in conducting WHAT IS IO? MAJ DANIEL W. CLARK
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 21 he had been assigned. According to the article, Holmes charges, but none the less asserted that his reprimand was the result of his refusal to comply with Caldwells orders. The be called the U.S. Information Agency. Nowhere in the Smith5 act, Holmes immediately associated IO with propaganda. On 13 July 1972, the act was amended as part of Public Law not be disseminated with in the U.S.... Still the act makes no reference to the Department of Defense or any of the as establishing the prohibition has since been repealed by H.R. 5736 in 2012. It is my understanding that there was an already encountered commanders who eschew employment legend of misrepresented law. psychological manipulation of the minds of the masses. The purpose of those communications is to persuade our audiences mission of the U.S. military is to deter, continuously shape, there is nothing nefarious about that persuasion. While we in ethically employ the capabilities at our disposal, perhaps it is and do our job communicate.Notes1 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (August 2011). 2 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations (May 2012). 3 JP 5-0. Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators, Rolling Stone, 23 February 2013.5 CALL Releases Newsletter Highlighting Company-Level CAM at JRTCMAJ Daniel W. Clark Infantry those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) turned to decisive action training with what was called, at the time, a full spectrum operations (FSO) rotation in October 2010. The shift to a decisive action training environment (DATE) did not lessen the challenges of FSO; it merely placed them inside DATE as a more Regardless of rotational design (FSO versus action a challenge for themselves, their Soldiers, and their units. This newsletter is about company-level combined arms maneuver (CAM), concentrating on basics for company leaders and their units. Download the newsletter at: http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/ 17-02 DATE at the JRTC, VOLUME XIV DEC 16
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 22 INFANTRY August-December 2016 THE DISMOUNTED RECON TROOP:A RELEV ANT FORCE FOR THE IBCT CPT GRAHAM WILLIAMS 1SG BRIAN BAUMGARTNER Over the past three years, there has been much debate concerning the relationship between Cavalry and Infantry organizations as it relates to reconnaissance and the cavalry squadron. The dismounted reconnaissance troop (DRT) is at the heart of this debate, and the troops relevancy is in question. A recent proposed change to the Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) task organization is the disbanding of the DRT and adding additional combat power to the mounted reconnaissance troops. This added combat power is the x 36 concept whereby the mounted troops three platoons are increased to 36 scouts with 128 personnel total in the troop. We believe that the DRT should remain in the IBCT formation as a force multiplier for power to the mounted troop comes with a price. We will support our assessment by showing that the DRT has unique attributes to assist the IBCT by comparing the capabilities and limitations of the dismounted and mounted troops, relaying how mounted and dismounted elements work in conjunction with each other, and highlighting successful employment of a DRT at two culminating training exercises. When manned, trained, and employed properly, the DRT is well suited for reconnaissance and security tasks and allows commanders to make timely and accurate decisions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.1 The aforementioned proposal equates to a degradation of these tasks for the squadron commander and ultimately the IBCT. The DRTs task organization and capabilities allow for close, deliberate, and stealthy reconnaissance to satisfy reconnaissance requirements for the squadron and answer the brigade commanders critical information requirements (CCIR).2 These two aspects are important to note for tactical employment of the DRT and to show that the troop performs different functions than its mounted brethren. A review of the DRT task organization shows how the troop assists the squadron and the IBCT with information collection: The troop has two dismounted reconnaissance platoons. Each platoon has three reconnaissance teams of eight personnel. Each reconnaissance team has a staff sergeant as team leader and a sergeant as assistant team leader. Each subset team had two scouts and a radio-telephone operator. Each team is designed to operate in two separate observation posts (OPs) depending on mission requirements. The DRT has a sniper section of seven with two teams of three snipers. The sniper teams can provide precision direct Soldiers with C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Photos courtesy of author
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 23 M24 sniper weapons system, and the XM 2010 enhanced autonomous teams, but two teams are ideal. The sniper teams can be task organized under the platoons or work independently for the troop or squadron. The DRT has a six-man 60mm mortar section that can work in two sections. The mortar section can be attached to the two platoons or work under the troop headquarters colocated with the command post. headquarters and two for each platoon. All total, minus habitual attachments, a fully manned DRT has around 80 personnel. The DRT has a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that can provide coverage to support the two platoons or separate named areas of interests (NAIs). Recently, the Eye (IE) SUAS and eventually nano-borne sensors. The DRTs task organization leads into some of the critical capabilities the troop provides as stated below:3* Provides all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance and security in complex, close, and urban terrain. Employs small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) to enhance reconnaissance efforts. Conducts stealthy reconnaissance and security operations. Assists in answering the CCIR. Detects threat deception, decoys, and cover and concealment that otherwise would not be detected by singlecapability surveillance means by employing integrated and synchronized reconnaissance. Assists in shaping the area of operations (AO) by Conducts reconnaissance of one zone, two routes, or six areas. Conducts ground, water, and air insertion. for the troop. Supports targeting and target acquisition through team (FIST) and SUAS. trained personnel, the DRT can be used as the squadron and The DRT can conduct up to 12 short-duration OPs for a period of less than 12 hours, up to six long-duration OPs up to 24 hours, or up to six extended-duration OPs beyond 24 hours based on METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) variables. These capabilities are considerations when the brigade and squadron staffs begin the military decision-making process, review mission variables (METT-TC), and conduct 4 The troop is also one of the few formations in the IBCT that has the ability to conduct long-range high frequency (HF) and tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications to relay information to the troop command post (CP) or the squadron tactical operations center (TOC). The DRT is able to successfully conduct zone, area, and route reconnaissance according to the seven reconnaissance fundamentals. While the DRT is better suited for area reconnaissance, the troop can also conduct zone and route reconnaissance in restricted and severely restricted terrain. In looking at the squadron commanders reconnaissance planning guidance, eliminating the DRT limits the commander with regards to focus, tempo, and engagement abilities. The persistent and clandestine surveillance that the DRT and deliberate reconnaissance focused on any type of threat in any kind of terrain. If the commander desires to operate support missions and utilizing the sniper teams for precision air insertions and large-scale landing zone operations. The battalions reconnaissance platoons are the next lower-level they are typically not as forward deployed and primarily operate in the battalion AO. By eliminating the dismounted troop from the IBCT task organization, the squadron commander is limited in the effectiveness and area that the mounted troops can cover with both reconnaissance and security operations. All the troops have similar reconnaissance and security missionessential tasks, but the DRT is used for operations that require deliberate and stealthy reconnaissance.5 If tasked to perform a route reconnaissance, the mounted troops are limited to vehicular avenues of approach and adjacent areas. Because they rely on their vehicles, the mounted troops cannot effectively conduct route reconnaissance on cross-country mobility corridors like the DRT. While it is important for the mounted troops to conduct route recon on alternate and main supply routes (ASRs/MSRs), the infantry battalions most likely use restrictive terrain to move to their objectives. With its capabilities, the DRT platoons can operate autonomously in restrictive terrain and extend further with HF and TACSAT communication. The mounted troops do not operate in this capacity and their ability to extend is restricted due to the By eliminating the dismounted troop from the IBCT task organization, the squadron commander is limited in the effectiveness and area that the mounted troops can cover with both reconnaissance and security operations.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 24 INFANTRY August-December 2016range of FM communication. The mounted troops are also limited with the size of the OPs that they can afford to establish given crew manning. If the squadron requires information to be collected on an objective that is surrounded by severely restricted terrain and the objective does not have avenues of approach leading to it, the mounted troops could not effectively collect on this objective as well as the DRT. While it is widely known that the mounted troops are more than capable of conducting reconnaissance and security without their vehicles, there if tasked to operate purely dismounted. Mounted troops lack the density of long-range communication equipment, have limitations with task organization, and focus primarily on mounted training versus dismounted due to the lack of training time. One could argue that the UAS assets that the brigade and mounted troops have could cover the aforementioned objective. But unlike the DRT, the UAS is limited to two-dimensional collection, doesnt operate clandestinely, cannot maintain constant observation, and is susceptible to the effects of weather. With security operations, the DRT assists the conjunction with mounted elements. The DRT is ideal for conducting a screen in restrictive terrain for early and accurate warning to allow the brigade commander to make timely and well-informed decisions. Once the contact using organic weapon systems. The troop can orient on the force requiring protection while conducting continuous reconnaissance from surveillance sites and report critical information. With clandestine surveillance OPs and security positions, the DRT is critical to defeating dismounted enemy reconnaissance elements. With area and local security, the DRT is unique in that it can provide stealthy protection of friendly forces before and after conducting zone reconnaissance and establishing a screen all while working in conjunction with mounted elements. For instance, mounted and dismounted troops can conduct a mutually supporting zone reconnaissance focusing on severely restricted terrain and vehicular mobility corridors. The troops can then transition into a screen line in the same terrain and orient on mounted and dismounted threats. Since the DRT is an infantry element, the squadron commander also has the ability to conduct troop or platoon offensive operations (such as attacks and raids) and the ability to conduct combined arms operations with mounted and dismounted elements tailored to the threat. This combination of assets allows the commander to extend his level of protection to target enemy dismounted reconnaissance and infantry forces and allows the ability to transition from security to offensive operations. This leads to the question as to which element is capable of replacing the DRT if the squadron requires additional external dismounted assets. The next lower level echelon that can provide similar capabilities would be the infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons. These platoons, which comprise three reconnaissance teams and a sniper section, since they are smaller and are under the infantry battalions task organization. Tasking the reconnaissance platoons to support the cavalry squadron degrades the battalions ability to conduct reconnaissance. Doctrinally, the DRT is employed during the brigades initial planning process to shape preparation activities and execution.6 As parallel planning develops within the IBCT, the battalion scouts are deployed to conduct a reconnaissance handover of objectives, or named areas of interest (NAIs), with the DRT platoons. There exists the possibility of supplementing the cavalry squadron with a are not trained on reconnaissance and security tasks, lack long-range communication systems, and operate with different tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs). During recent exercises, the DRTs performance reiterated the fact that the troop should remain in the IBCT task organization. Lessons learned from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Divisions Mountain Peak 2014 exercise and follow-on Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) decisive action rotation highlighted the effectiveness of mounted and dismounted troops working in conjunction with each other for reconnaissance and security operations. Mountain Peak, a division-run brigade-level decisive action exercise, included a culminating attack on an urban area. During the exercise, the DRT commander was tasked Soldiers with C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment prepare to
At the time this article was written, CPT Graham Williams was serving as the commander of Charlie Troop, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. He had previously served as commander of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Battalion. At the time this article was written, 1SG Brian Baumgartner was serving Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) at Fort Benning under 3-16 Cavalry Regiment. August-December 2016 INFANTRY 25by brigade to act as the chief of scouts by incorporating scouts from all dismounted elements in the brigade such as the infantry battalions reconnaissance platoons. This super DRT was tasked to conduct area reconnaissance on numerous objectives leading to the village and establish reporting from numerous OPs oriented on the military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) site. The DRT deployed the mixed scout and sniper OPs through severely restricted terrain on avenues of approach that the enemy did not anticipate. Each OP successfully observed its objectives, reporting timely and accurate information to the mobile troop CP, which allowed the brigade to relay the information to the infantry battalions prior to their assault. These OPs remained on their NAIs and linked up with the infantry battalions to conduct a handover of the objectives. The result was a resounding success for the brigade due to the dismounted reconnaissance assets ability to utilize severely restricted terrain and to use long range communications for situational understanding and awareness. Had the DRT not been a part of the operation, the brigade and squadron commander would only have the option of utilizing mounted reconnaissance assets. Again, the mounted scouts could have dismounted to establish the OPs, but they would have been limited as to how far they could have extended into the restrictive terrain given their inherent limitations. A few months later, the reconnaissance squadron deployed to JRTC with the lessons learned from Mountain Peak fresh in everyones minds. As the rotation progressed, the brigade continually pushed the mounted and dismounted scouts two steps ahead of the infantry battalions. Daily, DRT OPs linked up with battalion scouts to conduct reconnaissance handover. As the brigade neared the defense stage of the exercise, the opposing force (OPFOR) quickly became aware of the blue forces reliance on using mounted avenues of approach. Anyone who has operated in the JRTC training area knows that the OPFOR habitually uses the terrain to its advantage. In turn, the DRT stuck with its intended purpose, taking advantage of severely restricted terrain to not be decisively engaged by the enemy and to collect on numerous NAIs. deployed troop, was only decisively engaged once, and effectively conducted reconnaissance and targeting focused on key enemy positions. Prior to the culminating attack on Sangari at JRTC, the DRT was tasked to conduct a widespread zone reconnaissance through restrictive cross-country mobility corridors in support of the infantry battalions on their approach march. In addition to the zone reconnaissance, a portion of a dismounted platoon was tasked to conduct infantry battalion, and then establish a screen line for the maneuver battalions to pass through. The information from the zone reconnaissance proved invaluable for the brigade and infantry battalions which were able to conduct a forward passage of line and begin their attack. At that time, the mounted troops were tasked out for security operations in the large area the squadron had to cover. If the DRT had not been in the IBCT task organization, the squadron would have been relegated to mounted assets and SUAS for the zone reconnaissance. The OPFOR anticipated the propensity for units to use mounted assets so they emplaced numerous improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes along the avenue of approach thereby prohibiting these elements from approaching the village. The DRT facilitated the infantry battalions attack by moving dismounted through restricted terrain that the OPFOR did not anticipate. If JRTC scenarios are designed to train for a hybrid threat and simulate the worst case scenario that an IBCT could face, the DRT proved its an asset that should remain in the IBCT arsenal to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and operate decentralized in restrictive terrain. The recent IBCT modernization proposal adds additional mounted combat power to the squadron and eliminates the DRT as an asset in its task organization. In doing so, the squadron and brigade lose a critical dismounted capability, leaving a gap in long-range dismounted collection assets. Adding additional combat power to the mounted platoons and retaining the DRT would be the ideal course of action. However, since the Army is downsizing, this is obviously not feasible. As it states in FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations reconnaissance and security units preserve the BCTs freedom of maneuver over the enemy, and successful reconnaissance allows the brigade commander to initiate combat under advantageous conditions to defeat this enemy. The DRT does this not only with its capabilities but with how well the mounted and dismounted troops work in conjunction with each other in any operating environment. By eliminating the DRT, the squadron commander is limited to mounted and SUAS assets for their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan. Retaining the troop will allow for better opportunities to operate inside the enemys decisionmaking cycle. If the DRT is disbanded, the IBCTs could pass a point of no return, and the capabilities which the troop provides might be needed for future operations against an unanticipated threat. Notes1 FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations (July 2015). 2 ATTP 3-20.97, Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop (November 2010).3 Ibid.4 FM 3-98.5 ATTP 3-20.97.6 FM 3-98.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 26 INFANTRY August-December 2016 SQUAD OVERMATCHSOFTWARE BEFORE HARDWARE SFC (RETIRED) MIKE LEWISMan has fought wars against his fellow man since the beginning of time; this is one of the few constants wars, man has consistently sought better ways to defeat his enemy while avoiding harm to himself. Hands and feet gave way to clubs and sharpened sticks augmented by thrown rocks as standoff weapons, which were in turn defeated by edged weapons and thrown spears. While edged weapons are still in use today, standoff weapons were improved, with spears leading to the bow and crossbow, which were augmented by heavier weapons systems. Although heavier the enemy, another fact has held true; as T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud. This means that as long as warfare exists, the Infantry will be an integral part of the action. the enemy while preserving ones own force is as old as warfare itself, squad overmatch has been the mantra of over the last few years. It is a multifaceted effort involving combat systems, communications platforms, weapons, and training. Materiel solutions have produced highly agile, networked, and lethal capabilities, resulting in a force that is better prepared to defeat adversaries than a decade ago. The reason the term squad overmatch was chosen for the effort is because the squad is the building block of any tactical formation. Squads accomplish missions, operating Oxford Online Dictionary as to be stronger, better armed, or Army Infantryman, and squad by extension, is far from full realization of this goal with regards to lethality.Training Shortfalls not always lead to weapons mastery. Weapons mastery is Paratroopers assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Photo by SGT Lauren Harrah
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 27being able to utilize the weapon to achieve effects downrange through deep understanding. It encompasses knowing the weapons physical and operational characteristics, its operational and mechanical strengths and weaknesses, the ballistic performance and characteristics of its ammunition, engagement techniques and considerations, and being able to keep the weapon in operation while maximizing its Leaders must possess mastery of not only their assigned weapon, but every weapon system under their direct control only the correct weapon but the correct ammunition and engagement technique through intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their elements assigned weapons and an understanding of weapons that may be employed in support, including artillery and aviation platforms. An excerpt of Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad paragraph 1-52, states that the squad leader: Is the subject matter expert on all battle and individual drills. Is the subject matter expert for the squads organic weapons employment and employment of supporting assets. Knows weapon effects, surface danger zones, and risk estimate distances for all munitions. tactical movement effectively... FM 3-21.8 (now superseded by ATP 3-21.8), paragraph 1-45 states: Every Infantryman, from the private enlisted he must be a master of his basic skills: shoot, move, communicate, survive, and sustain. These basic skills into combat power. Further, paragraph 1-46 states: Infantrymen must be able to accurately engage the enemy with all available weapons. Soldiers and their leaders must therefore be able to determine the best weapon-ammunition combination to achieve the desired effect. The best combination will expend a minimum of ammunition expenditure and unintended damage. To make this choice, they must know the characteristics, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of their organic and supporting assets. This means understanding the fundamental characteristics of the weapons lay (direct or indirect), ammunition (high explosive [HE], penetrating, or special purpose), trajectory (high or low), and enemy targets (point or area). Properly applying these variables requires an understanding of the nature of targets, terrain, and effects. However, many Soldiers and leaders never progress beyond the weapons training presented during One Station engagements seldom trained or later tested at home station. Soldier is being trained as a designated marksman (DM) or sniper, training isnt typically conducted at ranges beyond 300 meters, nor is training in adjusted point of aim (holds and leads) routinely conducted. Marksmanship training utilizing night vision devices, thermal weapons sights, or under chemical, biological radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) conditions wearing the protective mask and/or other appropriate protective garments may not be conducted on a regular basis, depending on the organization. Weapons handling skills are a weak point of training, with Soldiers expected to be capable of reloads and simple station training often fails to place appropriate emphasis on these skills through continuing reinforcement drills. Skills in reducing complex stoppages including charging handle impingements or bolt overrides arent typically trained either formally or at unit level, producing weak weapons handling skills. Studies conducted by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), Army Research Institute (ARI), Rand Corporation, and others have consistently found training to be lacking in producing weapons mastery. A contributing factor according to multiple studies is a lack of trained instructors to teach skill at arms. The Rand branch without formal weapons instructor courses to develop unit-level trainers in its 2014 report Changing the Armys Weapon Training Strategies to Meet Operational The newly instituted Master Marksmanship Trainer Course (MMTC), Another major contributing factor is the degradation of training and knowledge presented in training and doctrine beginning of World War I was expected to hit a point target at distances exceeding 600 yards with only rudimentary hit a point target at only 300 meters. The 1954 Leaders must possess mastery of not only their assigned weapon, but every weapon system under their direct control and be not only the correct weapon but the correct ammunition and engagement technique through intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their elements assigned weapons and an
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 28 INFANTRY August-December 2016 acceptable solution rather than producing weapons mastery, illustrated by the statement, Throughout, the aim has been ammunition and training time, utilizing the type and quality of instructors likely to be available in time of mobilization. forms the basis of weapons training to this day. carbine as it is by far the most issued weapon in the Army. weapons in the Army, crew-served weapons including specialty weapons such as the FGM148 Javelin missile or the M3 Multipurpose Anti-Armor Weapon System (MAAWS), known as the Carl Gustav, are even more important to man with properly trained personnel due to their capabilities and employment considerations. While many say shooting is shooting, there is much more than meets the eye with regard to different weapons. Shooting is shooting and the functional elements of employment, ballistics, and the effects of wind and weather are constants, but some aspects change between weapons and ammunition. Employment techniques and considerations may also vary widely; without proper training, this is lost on the end user and the leader. With the 11H military occupational specialty (MOS) being absorbed by 11B, formal training on the tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wireless-guided/Improved Target Acquisition System (TOW/ITAS) at the Soldier level was abandoned. As a result, anti-armor systems are typically manned by personnel that have been trained within their organizations, not necessarily by The machine gun is the most casualty producing weapon in most formations. Analyzing force structure Corps and multiple foreign armies consider machine gunner MOS. Not only is machine gunnery just a duty position within the Army, it is only addressed with a training outside of organizational courses. Machine gunnery is commonly taught in local machine gun Education System (NCOES) courses. Considering the importance of machine gunnery, the Army places The Army requires a paradigm shift concerning weapons training to maximize overmatch potential. Leaders must be formally trained not only how to and in training subordinates. The Army must realize achieve mission success while facing modern hybrid threats. While the Infantry is tasked with closing with any element must be prepared to react to contact at any time. Therefore, all Soldiers, MOS or unit immaterial, must weapons mastery. The Way AheadFormalized training programs are necessary to educate the force and produce unit-level trainers to maximize exists, both as Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) courses and as troop schools conducted by units at home station. A holistic approach to weapons mastery must be undertaken to have maximum impact. The approach requires changes or additions to doctrine, schools, and reportable training requirements under Army regulations. Changes to doctrine are already in progress with Training Circular (TC) 3-22.9, being published in May 2016; other TCs covering other weapons and training strategies are forthcoming. Changes to schools have also begun with improvements to the Heavy Weapons Leaders Course (HWLC) and additional weapons training modules Photo by SGT Paige Behringer
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 29to the Basic Leaders Course (BLC) and Advanced Leaders Course (ALC). However, more is still needed to maximize overmatch through weapons mastery. root problem is a lack of institutional knowledge throughout the Army resulting from a lack of comprehensive training. Implementing courses to build institutional knowledge within the NCO Corps produces mastery at the unit level and across Javelin Gunner Course The Javelin Gunner course should be restructured to include the M3 MAAWS for a mission tailorable Javelin/MAAWS team. It covers the Javelin, the M3 MAAWS, target recognition, M3 ammunition, and engagement techniques. The Javelin/MAAWS Gunner Course is designed for Skill Level 1 Soldiers and is a sevenday program of instruction (POI) producing the 2C additional Master Marksmanship Trainer Course MMTC produces master marksmanship trainers and includes four levels or phases. Level 1 is a two-week POI training weapon (M16/M4) characteristics, cycle of operation, sights and optics, ballistics, the effects of wind and weather, marksmanship fundamentals, and coaching. Level 2 is a one-week POI training short-range marksmanship (SRM) while digging deeper into marksmanship fundamentals by teaching recoil management and teaching weapons handling skills such as reloads. Level 3 is a one week POI training mid-range marksmanship (300-600 meters) and covers concepts including environmental impacts on ballistics, range determination, target detection, moving week POI, producing an at the unit level through training management; training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS); surface danger zones (SDZ); teaching methodology; DA PAM 35038; and competition. The MMTC pipeline produces extremely knowledgeable trainers capable of conducting comprehensive training with the M16/M4. Small Arms Instructor Course (SAIC) SAIC is similar to the Small Arms Weapons Expert (SAWE) conducted under the MCoE. Successful completion of MMTC Levels 1-3 is a SAIC prerequisite. This course focuses on the M320, M249, M9, and adult learning theory Soldiers in employment of squad-organic weapons and should have an ASI attached. Coding at least one squad leader position per platoon within infantry companies and an NCO Corps capable of training squad-organic weapons Machine Gun Leader Course (MGLC) MGLC Successful completion of MMTC Levels 1-3 is a prerequisite. weapons maintenance, machine-gun theory, crew drills, employment of machine guns (M249, M240, M2, and MK19), in employment of machine guns and should have an ASI attached. Coding weapons squad leader positions for the MGLC ASI ensures expert leadership and training at the platoon level with belt-fed weapons systems. Heavy Weapons Leaders Course HWLC is currently conducted and undergoing improvement at the in employment of heavy weapons and produces the B8 ASI. Restructuring should lead to HWLC covering heavy and specialty weapons including the Javelin, TOW/ITAS, MAAWS, and shoulder-launched munitions (SLM); the M2 and MK19 would be moved to the MGLC. Successful completion of MGLC should be a HWLC prerequisite. Coding anti-armor section leaders and senior scouts in the Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) formation with the B8 Photo by Brenda Rolin
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 30 INFANTRY August-December 2016SFC (Retired) Mike Lewis served as the 82nd Airborne Division master gunner from October 2013 to October 2015. His previous assignments include serving with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division; 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; and 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (Air Assault), 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. He has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and ASI provides expert leadership and training at the platoon level with heavy and specialty weapons. Small Arms Master Gunner (SAMG) The SAMG gunners in the IBCT formation and could be accomplished by slightly restructuring the Master Gunner Common Core currently being conducted at the MCoE. It replaces MMTC Level 4 and consists of training management, the Digital Training Management System (DTMS), range development and construction, and SDZ development in a two-week POI. Successful completion of SAIC, MGLC, and HWLC is required to attend the SAMG course. The SAMG course produces master gunner (ASI J3) and Abrams master gunner (ASI K8) are utilized in the ABCT and the Stryker master gunner (ASI R8) in the SBCT, and should be assigned an ASI which replaces all previously earned weapons ASIs. Each infantry company and reconnaissance troop training NCO position within the IBCT should be coded for the SAMG ASI; each battalion/squadron of any type of formation excluding the ABCT and SBCT should have a SAMG-coded position in the S3 section. All SAMGs can be utilized to expertly assist in the planning, conduct, and management of individual weapons The solution that best maximizes throughput for needed courses is a semi-centralized one. Divisions should activate Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) providing positions aligned with and assigned to each division; the battalions and brigades use the nearest division training unit to resource the necessary training seats. All of the above listed courses would be conducted at home station by the divisional training units (as accredited by the MCoE and TRADOC) with the exception of SAMG; within the active component, this increases throughput tenfold over conducting courses only (10 per division), could produce approximately 1,600 MMTC conducting one quarterly instance of each course with a 4:1 student-to-instructor ratio for MMTC and 6-8:1 for all others. Further, divisional training unit cadre will externally evaluate weapons employment during company combined arms livewith objective analysis of weapons mastery levels within their organizations. ConclusionThe Army will and should continue to seek materiel solutions to enable overmatch at all echelons. However, will not be fully realized. In his book The Acts of King Arthur and His Noble Knights, John Steinbeck wrote, The purpose The sword is more important than the shield and skill is more supplemental. Widespread weapons mastery will never be reached solutions less effective than they could be. In order to truly achieve overmatch, the Army must prioritize professional development within the NCO Corps concerning small arms and anti-armor weapons systems.Photo by SPC Patrick Kirby
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 31The Army is globally responsive and regionally engaged; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational [JIIM] environment. As a part of the Joint Force and as Americas Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility, and depth to prevent, shape, and win. Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013BackgroundThe Army has combat-proven, tactical-level leaders who have worked closely with local leaders across Afghanistan and Iraq, but how does the Army leverage such talent and experience to engage effectively on a regional scale? After returning from a deployment to Afghanistan, the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 1st Infantry Division was designated to replace the divisions 2nd Armored Brigade Contact Team as the second Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) for Africa Command (AFRICOM). While small elements throughout the brigade deployed for training events and conferences, the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment served as a forward-stationed capability under the operational control of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn the forward-deployed element although many of the lessons learned can be applied to the remaining RAF force. The battalion received additional capabilities and built a task force (TF) ready and able to engage partner nations (PN) throughout East Africa. TF 2-16 broadened expectations for forward-deployed security elements, providing greater CJTF-HOA. Over the course of a complex mission set, which consisted of two East African response forces, a full training cycle, more than 70 theater security cooperation (TSC) initiatives, and newfound partnerships. This article serves to address challenges and expectations in order to provide lessons learned to future RAF elements. As the Army shifts efforts toward regional alignment, such conversations become critical to the successful employment of capabilities throughout the world.Deployment PreparationForce Structure In order to be an effective RAF, the unit needs to align its structure to cover the mission set, interact with allied nations, and meet the needs of African partners. A reliable projection of missions and a battle rhythm help align the force structure to conduct daily operations, operational missions, and TSC operations. However, in order to create an appropriate force structure and prepare for critical missions, units need accurate information on countries within the area of responsibility (AOR) with regards to not only their structure but also their historical engagements and projected needs. Partnering with our allies at the task force, company, and even platoon level calls for structures closely aligned to both regional capabilities and local force structures in order to make joint training and engagements more rewarding. Furthermore, within the organizational structure, there must be subject matter experts (SMEs) for TSC activities. Communication of growing trends and needs is imperative to provide continuous partnerships rather than a cyclic relationship that starts over with each unit. Mission commanders (MCDRs) typically deploy in support of missions EAST AFRICA RAF:A VIEW FROM THE GROUND CPT RENEE SANJUAN Arta Interservices Military Academy cadets observe a Soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Battalion during convoy training in Arta, Djibouti, on 9 December 2014. Photo by USAF SSgt Kevin Iinuma
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 32 INFANTRY August-December 2016 A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment covers his teammates during a dismounted patrol on 25 September 2014 at the 5th French Marines Desert Commando Course near Arta, Djibouti. Photo by USAF SSgt Dillon Whitefor two to six weeks at a time. This calls for units to continuously improve their force structure and provide a more leadershipheavy organization. To support such efforts based on African nation requests, TF 2-16 recommended to its replacement that it deploy more senior NCOs, particularly in the logistics emphasis on building the JIIM team is helping units develop more in-depth knowledge of other players in the area, but the most critical link is joining scattered information into a more user-friendly, timely, responsive, and easily shared web of knowledge. Pre-deployment training Training must continuously evolve as experience grows. The challenge planners faced was to prepare the brigade for a vast area with complex and different cultures. TF 2-16 attended a week-long block of instruction, which focused on the entire continent of Africa. The focus was too broad for those deploying to East Africa. Identifying skill-focused teams would more sharply target mission objectives in training. Training could then separate teams into areas of interest, and after a regional overview, the unit could split into task-focused working groups with an experienced advisor. Specialty military-to-military (MIL-MIL) teams could even pair with SMEs returning from theater. The 1st Battalion, 77th Armored Regiment the unit which replaced TF 2-16 received an informal version of this concept during their Combat Training Center rotation due to previously deployed leaders conveniently serving as observercontroller-trainers (OCTs). While a relief in place (RIP) should provide similar knowledge, the use of redeployed personnel as instructors for a pre-deployment curriculum could provide a more effective learning environment due to the lack of competing requirements found during a RIP. This example could be captured as a lesson learned and then formalized across the Army. Aside from the general approach to pre-deployment foreign weapons training and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. For foreign weapons training, knowing what weapons our East African PNs use is critical. The opportunity to receive hands-on experience prior to deployment ensures that trainers are better prepared for foreign weapon system after already being deployed. Such an experience highlights the need for technically savvy when teams deploy, they operate in small teams, which is different than what most personnel experienced in previous deployments. To address this experience gap, CJTF-HOA assigned an Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) operational advisor to the task force who had years of experience in that realm. However, resourcing in-depth training, like SERE training, for future MCDRs (or train-the-trainers) prior to deployment would better posture the unit for success and provide a more steady solution. Lastly, upon arrival to theater, forward-deployed units need to conduct follow-on training in all areas with joint circulation throughout East Africa during the pre-deployment
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 33site survey (PDSS) is imperative to establishing and passing off relationships critical to ensuring more productive communication prior to missions. There is no substitute for should not be after our transfer of authority (TOA) but rather counterparts. Challenges and Recommendations The problem set was complex: under a joint headquarters, TF 2-16 deployed small teams in support of TSC activities across East Africa. Young leaders faced the challenge of transitioning from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to TSC activities throughout an unfamiliar region. The scope Innovation and initiative through mission command became the backbone of RAF operations. With the brigade operating from Fort Riley, Kan., a joint division headquarters co-located with the task force as small teams deployed to multiple countries. Challenges that would otherwise seem simple grew in complexity. Most missions developed and came through three main sources: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) staff, PN requests through embassies, and growing relationships/leader initiative. Each mission type required its own approach and produced unique challenges. While the threat was not imminent, the stakes were high: the RAF element had to prevent violent extremist organizations from threatening America, ensuring the protection of the homeland, American citizens, and American interests.1 In order to accomplish that objective, the RAF focused on two key tasks: Teach, coach, and mentor African partner militaries in order to enable them to neutralize violent extremist organizations; and Develop and strengthen JIIM relationships.2 Both tasks needed devoted time, resources, and clear lines of effort (LOEs). The ApproachShortly after taking over the RAF mission in the Horn of Africa, TF 2-16 analyzed the mission set, mission feedback, and AWG reports. Missions focused on MIL-MIL engagements across the area of operation, but the approach was fractured, sporadic, and missed mission analysis. TF 2-16 staffs task was imminent: transform our approach to MIL-MIL engagements by focusing on the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and provide MCDRs with a clear task and purpose. Following a deliberate MDMP, the Fire Effects Coordination Cell then acted as the proponent for an accelerated MDMP for the enduring mission. However, there was a lack of detailed information to conduct a true MDMP. At the very least, MCDRs attempted to conduct reconnaissance missions or video tele-conferences (VTCs) to gather necessary information prior to missions. However, reconnaissance or assessment missions were not effective due to PNs differing expectations, and conducting VTCs with the necessary personnel was unreliable. When a MCDR sent requests for information (RFIs) to PNs for mission planning and analysis, they received incomplete information if any at all. Country team synchronization meetings occurred at the division level, but they seemed more staff focused than MCDR focused. A follow-on working group with key players for the upcoming mission could address RFIs and lead to more effective engagements. This group should require the attendance of an embassy representative and eventually a point of contact (POC) from the requesting unit. If personnel are not able to meet in person, then a VTC would be otherwise be provided by a brigade staff element and provide face-to-face emphasis on critical pre-mission coordination. TF 2-16s C-IED cell achieved success with mission preparation and execution due to the increased need across PNs. This drove the ability to establish continuity by working with the same country desks and at times the same units or schools. Not surprisingly, they emphasized that it is essential to be embedded into the initial planning process for every mission.3 lead trainer to help plan and certify subordinate trainers. At D-30, all the trainers focused on the material and rehearsed the classes until validated by the engineer cell NCOIC. They used the Armys troop leading procedures and the eight-step training model, which were extremely effective and provided Understanding Capabilities With respect to our African partners, we often lack a clear picture of their capabilities. When we plan a mission, we expect comprehensive intelligence products on our targets. Why should RAF missions and supporting MIL-MIL engagements be any different? When we conduct recons prior to MILMIL engagements, we start behind the curve as opposed to truly building off the knowledge collected from previous engagements, particularly when those engagements are conduct by other units. A lack of knowledge and an unclear concept prior to the mission creates confusion on the ground. (LRM) engagement, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) sent a small team to conduct an assessment on Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) sniper capabilities to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the KDF. However, the KDFs expectation differed from that of the mission statement provided to the TF 2-16 MCDR. KDF soldiers attending the assessment were not trained in LRM and instead expected the U.S. team to provide instruction, causing the U.S. team to be less prepared for its mission. The information is out there, scattered amongst different people and organizations. Only when we can effectively synchronize the information and make it easily accessible will RAF elements be able to overcome such challenges. A Partner Nation Data Packet (PNDP) should be provided to MCDRs prior to their departure on a TSC mission. MCDRs need a more in-depth brief on the mission focus to include:
PROFESSIONAL FORUM 34 INFANTRY August-December 2016PN capabilities, previous training, equipment, and doctrine. However, as observed in the Kenya mission, being provided information does not necessarily mean that the MCDR will have an accurate understanding of the PN. According to a June 2014 report by AWG operational advisors assigned to CJTF-HOA, understanding the PN and its culture, language, capabilities, and capacities is important to achieving a seamless and effective mission.4 such expansive and focused assessments. A trainingand operations fusion cell. Thus adding fusion cells to embassy teams would provide an on-the-ground capability to communicate back and forth between MCDRs, PNs, and the Department of State. They could also collect information from MCDRs prior to their departure in order to ensure accurate a collective understanding and effective dissemination of information. Once received, a TF intelligence section can focus on analyzing the information for mission execution. As the Army increases its RAF efforts by providing more resources and larger areas of interest, MCDRs need a place to start their research besides Google or hundreds of after action reviews (AARs) on a portal. According to the civilstep to making information available across the region is to establish a RAF Interactive Information Network (IIN).5 Once developed, the next step is to make the products accessible across the Army. In the digital age where we have access to instant communication, we should have a network with information, assessments, videos, pictures, programs of For RAF missions, the most effective means of organizing all of the data would be by location, with all topics and mission categories searchable across the world. As the Army increases its RAF footprint across the combatant commands, Partner Nation Needs African countries work with multiple nations besides the United States, which illustrates the mission complexity. During a Uganda Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) mission, Peoples Defense Force soldiers received previous training from French, British, Dutch and Italian forces. Therefore, we cannot assume that their doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) will directly mirror ours or that they will choose to use all the TTPs we give them. Additionally, for Eastern Africa, the African Union Mission in Somalia training efforts. Solutions used in our combat experience may not be accessible or practical in Somalia. Furthermore, AMISOM forces receive equipment and training from multiple bilateral agreements as well as UN Support of AMISOM (UNSOA). There are differences between how a given countrys forces operate under their own doctrine and how they operate under the African Union and United Nations. In short, every country operates differently based on its capabilities, and we cannot assume that it operates the same as us. We need to be able to relate to each nations particular challenges. Teaching courses operations helped provide the task force with knowledge to conduct future TSC missions. A growing need for C-IED training drives our efforts to support PNs. The goal of the TF 2-16 C-IED training cell was to enable Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) with internal capabilities and systems to establish their own C-IED training programs. We provided in-depth training for the PNs, but a train-thetrainer approach would be more effective if adequately supported by the PN. massive bleeding on 21 July 2014 at the Arta Interservice Military Academy in Djibouti. Photo by USAF SSgt Dillon White
Training aids need to be focused on what the PN uses. improvised items instead of combat application tourniquets or emergency trauma bandages. After working with gendarmerie (police units) in Djibouti, we received a report that a gendarme used a veil from a nearby girl to make a tourniquet at the scene of a vehicle-motorcycle collision. The gendarme reported, Our intervention was crucial since it helped us to demonstrate the good results of the 48 hours of team. SGT Joshua Morrison, an instructor during the training, responded to the report by stating that knowing that what we teach is actually being used makes being here worthwhile. The main takeaway from that event is that by focusing on the actual capabilities and resources available to local forces, we Other challenges are the funding process and time lag. After going on a mission to conduct an assessment and share best practices under Title 10 funding, MCDRs returned eager with a recommended way ahead. However, the funding process could take years. The friction causes confusion with PNs. Funding delays result in old LOE strategies driving current missions. Commanders should needs and morphing LOEs, especially in regions with ongoing combat operations. Current operation funding requirements tie the hands of those planning missions, causing efforts to slow down or go in the wrong direction. Young leaders are used to combat operations that are end-state focused and produce quick results. The complex and time-consuming funding approval process slows a RAF units ability to effect between nations. JIIM Team Growing in importance, there are countless players involved in TSC efforts. Joint missions require a delicate touch, but efforts continue in hopes of reaching synergy through integrated employment of initiatives. CJTFHOA drove the focus on strengthening the JIIM team and partnerships throughout the region, and Task Force 2-16 took initiative with every possible opportunity. Within months of TOA, the TF created close partnerships with other units in CJTF-HOA like Civil Affairs and Navy Seabees; allied partners such as the French, Germans, and Japanese; and units within Djibouti such as the Joint Military Academy at Arta (AMIA) and Djibouti armed forces. At the battalion level and below, experience working with JIIM environments is limited. Operating without the unifying thread of combat operations against a common threat challenged leaders as they worked to build the JIIM team. Building good rapport and an understanding of what each capability brings to the table helps drive mission success. According to an AWG study conducted to assess the RAF mission, a common theme among all country teams in the region is the desire to limit the DoD signature while still achieving desired operational and strategic goals.6 While understandable that the Army is not the face of efforts as was so in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can be more effective in a synchronized approach. As we passed off our partnerships to the incoming unit, we emphasized the importance of taking the relationships to the next level by synchronizing LOEs with our multinational teammates in a regional approach. The next step in JIIM team efforts is to build strong relationships with our allies and then expand those relationships to host joint exercises.Takeaways The Regionally Aligned Force needs to put efforts towards need to be more targeted and deliberate with special emphasis on enablers such as embassies and Department expands its efforts to effectively align with regions across the world, the AFRICOM RAF serves as a lens by which future missions can be assessed. The missions are uncertain and challenge leaders to be creative in the employment of their capabilities. Focusing on leader development and mission command will ensure that elements are prepared for this unique mission. Lessons learned need to be communicated effectively throughout the Army, providing a robust network of knowledge that can be shared directly between mission force. However, in order to be effective partners, the Army must still maintain its lethality as the most highly trained and professional land force in the world by maintaining skills and conducting challenging training. RAF units need to be more than partners; they need to lead by example by upholding the highest degree of professionalism in both action and ability to teach others to defend their countries.Notes1 CJTF-HOA Vision Statement. 2 Task Force 2-16 mission statement key tasks. 3 Interview with TF 2-16 C-IED Cell OIC. 4 Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Report, June 2014, 13. 5 Interview with CJTF-HOA 6 AWG Report, 28. At the time this article was written, CPT Renee Sanjuan was serving as commander of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division. The battalion completed a nine-month deployment to East Africa where it served under the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Focusing on leader development and mission command will ensure that elements are prepared for this unique mission. Lessons learned need to be communicated effectively throughout the Army, providing a robust network of knowledge that can be shared directly between mission commanders. August-December 2016 INFANTRY 35
36 INFANTRY August-December 2016In 1996, after only three years in operation, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., was on the platoon and company levels.1 force training, enabling units to emerge from the Combat JRTCs goal was to build towards facilitating companyand JRTC has come close to meeting its goal of conducting claim partial success. The closest JRTC has come to on an objective. Between 2004 and 2012, units training core competencies fell to the wayside.2 CTCs were putting than companyand battalion-level maneuver training. After a decade of focusing on counterinsurgency and full spectrum operations, JRTC shifted its focus. In 2012, 01. place at JRTC. And with this change comes the return of a war-like environment, but it also helps condition Soldiers to engage the enemy. In the opening pages of On Killing LTC (Retired) Dave Grossman describes the enormous value will still function with proper conditioning.4 Furthermore, to of their weapons and Soldiers. So certainly, no one will argue Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of leaders have JRTC, much less trained for it at home station. But dont BATTALION CALALFEX AT JRTTC MAJ RYAN J. SCOTT
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 37 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Divisions JRTC JRTC. This article describes the highlights its value global response force (GRF) and regionally aligned forces (RAF) training, and offers a practical framework for home-station .The JRTC CALFEX: The 1990s vs. 2015 environment, optimally from the platoon to battalion level. between 1996 and 2002. During this period, the CTC trained rotational units to defeat a near-peer adversary rather than to time, we must look at three areas: location, organization, and place relatively close to the force-on-force maneuver space. and company movement as well as the logistical planning for of the surface danger zones within Fullerton. Surface danger zones are the ground and airspace safety areas) for vertical and lateral containment of projectiles, launching, or detonation of weapon systems to include 6 on-force training day D-Day.7 In 1996, the JRTC moved its increasing the rotational units planning and logistical In addition to relocating to Peason Ridge, JRTCs model.8 The training objectives determined the design and scenario of each team. Team 1 was a movement-to-contact team for light and heavy forces. Team 2 was the ambush Forces (SOF) team. Team 6 focused on specialized training. Team 7 was the armor and mechanized team. Collectively, In July 2000, JRTC published an update to U.S. Army Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Based on the light and heavy deliberate attack, ambush, movement to contact, trench, raid, and convoy security (see Figure 1). The 9 Provide copies of the most recent tank or Bradley crew Bring the original weapons data card (DA Form 2408-4) for each vehicle. Bring the original weapons data card (DA Form 2408-4) early morning of the third day depending on the scenario consisted of administrative preparation and tactical planning. Units coordinated for food and logistics to sustain the force for a period of 48 hours. This included developing a wish list for the types of ammunition the unit wanted to train during the live considerations as in a combat environment. Simultaneously, the company commanders and platoon leaders would conduct tactical planning. Using the Armys troop leading procedures (TLPs), junior leaders would receive an operation determine how to address the problem. The outcome of their on day 2. Figure 1 Menu of LFX/Unit Participation from FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-2 (July 2000) Event HQsPlatoonPlatoonSquadMortar Battery Aviation Light/Heavy Deliberate Attack Ambush Movement to Contact Trench Raid Convoy Security
38 INFANTRY August-December 2016 and visualize their concept the operation. This also offered only to mitigate risk. Those units conducting the nighttime task From 1996-2002, rotational units that trained as a from the battalion. Additionally, multiple companies an objective followed by Company B attacking a different objective. Thus, only one company was on an objective at a time, and companies did not attack multiple objectives simultaneously. Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF), and 10 training area remains the primary location for conducting sergeant major, supply sergeant, operations section, and includes a single Special Forces trainer and an aviation force-on-force observer-coach-trainers (OCTs). To simplify operations during the battalion-level force OCTs to provide coverage. During the 2nd Battalion, training while the force-on-force 11Issuing the battalion OPORD to Receiving the rotational unit Controlling unit pickup and Controlling unit pickup and return from Peason Ridge. on realistic, rigorous, and safe training within the scope of the force-on-force OCTs as well, giving them a holistic look at the unit they were mentoring. The JRTC still offers units a menu of one or a combination of missions based on the brigade commanders training objectives.12 Similar to the 1990s, units must complete a include:Maneuver Units: under similar conditions in the last 180 days (not a show stopper habitually see units come to JRTC trained one level down). weapons within the last 180 days. All Soldiers must arrive at JRTC with zeroed weapon systems (both iron sights and optics). Indirect Fires: conditions in the last 180 days (not a show stopper habitually see units come to JRTC trained one level down). weapons within the last 180 days. All Soldiers must arrive at JRTC with zeroed weapon systems (both iron sights and optics). Battalion Live Fire: above. Figure 2 The JRTC Live-Fire Iteration Timeline (April 2015) giving them a holistic look at the unit they
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 39 months. Exceptions to Policy: Brigade commander memorandum to the commander, Operations Group (COG). a battalion OPORD from the OCTs. On the second day, battalion OPORD. Soon after, the battalion began movement all its Soldiers on the ground at Peason Ridge and began company OPORD and TLPs.14 Day four was dedicated to the battalion combined arms rehearsal and dry rehearsal. on one objective followed by Charlie Company attacking two conducted AARs and redeployed from Peason Ridge. The description above only scratched the surface on liveThe Value of the CALFEX in GRF and RAF Training It replicates combat conditions, educating leaders on the capabilities of their Soldiers and their weapons. Additionally, concepts without the fear of failure.16The learning begins with a combined arms maneuver live artillery, and aviation. This forces leaders to think through:17 Battles drills Demolition Rigorous and repetitive rehearsals is a core building rotational units receive classes and complete dry rehearsals. starting full dress rehearsals.18 At JRTC, the rehearsals and rehearsals to validate their scheme of maneuver.19In the walk phase, the training unit demonstrates its observers hone their skills in the employment of aviation and 20 The integration of aviation assets is essential to this training. As part of the walk and aircraft under the supervision of the forward observer, thus solidifying the relationship between the platoon leader and forward observer. 21 mortar assets, safety mechanisms are also reviewed.22 Once completed, the training unit receives clearance to start the mission. GRF and RAF must be ready to deploy in an unfamiliar environment at a moments notice. Preparing for uncertainty humanitarian assistance operations. To be successful on JRTC provides this opportunity. The challenge comes when deciding where to put emphasis during home-station training. Home-Station Training: Back to Basics LTC Mark Ivejaz, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Photos courtesy of author
40 INFANTRY August-December 2016and the JRTC trends published in Fiscal Year 2014, homestation training must focus on: Asset management TLPs to be critical to Soldier survival.24 Battle drills are collective actions (or tasks) performed by a platoon or smaller element without the application of a deliberate decision-making process, initiated on a cue, accomplished with minimal leader orders, and performed to standard throughout like units in the Army. Army universal task list, unit training modules, and links to applicable doctrine. human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commanders intent and desired end state.26 understanding mission command helps leaders take disciplined initiative when synchronizing assets. In theory, it A mortar platoon leader is the combat leader and principal advisor to the battalion commander while the company/troop commander is responsible for the tactical employment of his mortar section. For a mortar section to be effective, the and desired end state for what he wants his mortar units 27 command in home-station training. management refers to the synchronization and employment of company FSOs are responsible for planning and coordinating 28 of airspace, integration for aviation assets, and incorporating why the commander must foster this relationship and provide commanders intent. The result will be the appropriate level of guidance and optimal asset employment. During every training event, of course, leaders use TLPs. they wait for higher to issue an order. This wastes time and is counterproductive to effective planning. At home station, units must become comfortable with collaborating with, rather than to begin parallel planning as higher develops the plan or order.29 Photo courtesy of the JRTC Operations Group Public Affairs
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 41At the time this article was written, MAJ Ryan J. Scott was serving as the mission-ready brigade combat teams (BCTs) from three formations in aviator with various command and staff positions, he was commissioned in 2002 and entered active duty in the U.S. Army Aviation Branch at Fort Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. and below become comfortable with parallel planning, it will plans. Lastly, one of the most important areas to focus homestation training on is maneuver. Based on recent feedback suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault.Suppress. to move. This may mean using 60mm mortars as part of Obscure. and most effective breaching obscurant. During training, obscuration training should focus on degrading enemy control. Leaders must also place emphasis on the science of obscuration. This includes considering how many rounds to Secure. Secure is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed because of enemy action.For home-station training, units must practice resourcing the enemy freedom of action. In other words, set conditions for each maneuver element to have overwhelming success. Reduce. Reduction is the creation of lanes through or over an obstacle to allow an attacking force to pass. station training should put an emphasis on determining how to create maneuver lanes that rapidly build combat power. Additionally, redundant reduction methods will improve the combined arms breach. Assault. The culminating event for the breach is the assault. During home-station training, ensure the assaulting force does not neglect to destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle. Failing to do so allows the enemy to place or offense. Additionally, train on the triggers that synchronize: home-station training focuses on the trends listed above, Conclusion highlights its value for GRF and RAF training, and offers a practical framework for home-station, battalion-level liveplatoon and company levels and has now grown to battalion. Notes1 Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (July 2000), 2 4 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society Combat Training Center Program6Range Safety78 Ibid.91011 CPT T.J. Tepley, interview with author. 12 14 CPT T.J. Tepley, interview with author.16 Into the Future, Military Review17 Training Circular (TC) 7-9, Infantry Live-Fire Training1819202122 Ibid, 29. JRTC Live-Fire Division Trends, June 2014.24 https://atn.army.mil/ Ibid.26 ADRP 6-0, Mission Command27 Tactical Employment of Mortars (April 2011), 2-2.28 Ibid, 2-2.29 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations CPT T.J. Tepley, interview with author. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (June 2011), 66a. ADRP 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbols (August Infantry Platoon and Squad
42 INFANTRY August-December 2016In 1997, then-COL David H. Petraeus and MAJ Robert A. Brennan published an article in Infantry Magazine titled Walk and Shoot Training that described the development of a training scenario focused on training company commanders, platoon leaders, and their respective support of the operation. In the article, the authors stated that while there are many cases where Infantrymen should aggressively close with the enemy, maintain contact, and conditions prior to closing with and destroying the enemy. The same lessons that led the leaders of 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division to develop a walk and shoot tactical be seen today, but are compounded by the introduction of a host of enablers available to leaders in the current operating environment. Our tactical leaders often transition from platoon without getting valuable repetitions aimed at training them on the integration of all available assets to set advantageous conditions a leader-intensive task. In February 2016, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division with the objective of training company and platoon leadership in the art and science of employing both indirect and direct synchronized combined arms maneuver. Such training is invaluable to our company leaders as they prepare to lead progressions for maneuver leaders and units. walk and shoot utilized arguably one of the toughest tactical scenarios the combined arms breach to train company-level leaders on setting advantageous conditions in terms of the enemy situation, friendly situation, terrain, accomplishment of mission. This challenging problem set plan for and employ all assets to include organic elements and numerous enablers. Additionally, the scenario drove leaders to understand the use of space and time to synchronize effects to set conditions and inevitably overwhelm the enemy at the in squad leader positions and above valuable repetitions on the tasks they must master to truly achieve synchronized combined arms maneuver. The lessons learned during 2nd BCT WALK AND SHOOT:TRAINING TACTICAL LEADERS ON SETTING CONDITIONS T O ACHIEVE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER MAJ DANIEL J. CICCARELLI LTC CHARLES W. KEAN COL BRETT G. SYLVIA position as smoke comes in beyond the wire obstacle during the 2nd BCTs walk and shoot exercise.Photos courtesy of authors
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 43 formation and leading their Soldiers into combat.Exercise Design to breach a linear mine/wire obstacle and set the conditions to through the obstacle and assault a follow-on objective. The operation focused on setting conditions for a subsequent unit to assume the decisive operation. The company team consisted an engineer squad. The training audience for each element included company leadership, platoon leadership, a heavy weapons squad, company mortars, and the habitually aligned under the company, the order also outlined enablers that would be utilized in the operation. These enablers included battalion mortars, 105mm and 155mm howitzers, air weapons organic Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle. To add realism to the served in a direct support role to the battalion and BCT and were allocated based on the higherin order to employ these assets, company teams were required to utilize battalion and brigade mission command nodes as nets. Not only did this add realism to the scenario, but it also provided a superb training opportunity for command posts (TACs). the lane in three phases. For each of these phases, the BCT (OCs) for the company command team and each of the of the supporting enablers. The OCs were provided training and evaluation outlines that were used to rate the training element on the individual and collective tasks associated with the same terrain and a similar enemy situation that the units would see on the range. Additionally, the unit replicated the same communications architecture and included supporting teams that replicated the enablers. The second phase consisted of a blank iteration on Observation Point (OP) 13 in the Fort Campbell training area. Prior to the blank iterations, companies conducted a combined arms rehearsal (CAR). All systems used either target provided the training audience feedback on the effectiveness vehicular targets that are located just beyond the OP in the cleared area of the range. As you move from east to west in the cleared area of the range, there are three sets of to 155mm artillery can effectively engage the targets in the PERFORMANCE MEASURES: Maneuver GO NO-GO 6. Directed unit reaction to the obstacle. 7. Obtained pertinent obstacle intelligence from unit recon and reports from other units. 8. Developed the breach plan. obstacle. 11. Directed the breach force to reduce the obstacle using the method designated in the order. 13. Directed actions on the objective. 14. Reported completion of the breach to the higher unit commander. Figure 1 Walk and Shoot Exercise Communications Architecture and Clearance Process Figure 2 Example Evaluation Checklist Used by OCs
44 INFANTRY August-December 2016crew-served weapons, M203s, M320s, .50 caliber machine guns, MK-19s, AT4s, Carl Gustavs, and Javelins on the range. The training scenario focused on validating of the obstacle was the decisive point for training units. This drove each element to suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, the lane, each company team received updated intelligence on its area of operations (AO), and the higher-level headquarters would set the conditions prior to allowing the training unit to cross the line of departure. All OCs walking the lane carried a list of lane injects that outlined targets that were safe to engage based on minimum safe distances from each berm and target descriptions that coincided with the play by the training unit. After identifying the targets to the training audiences and providing a description of the situation, OCs only injected themselves if there was a gross error in target location that violated the minimum safe distances for the range used a script to introduce injects into the scenario and drive the training audience to make decisions. Lessons LearnedThe training audience quickly realized that one does not simply walk and shoot. Achieving synchronized combined were volumes of individual and collective lessons learned by each of the maneuver companies that participated in the training, there were four key lessons learned that would First, leaders must understand the mechanics of employing their forces or enablers. Second, leaders must understand the actions required to achieve their desired effects at the decisive time and place. Third, leaders must implement methods that create a shared understanding and allow for disciplined initiative across their formation. Finally, leaders must have the tools and systems to visualize and continually assess all the factors of the mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time available, and civilian training event had some commonalities. All of these similarities became apparent during the rehearsals and manifested associated to maneuver, weapons employment, and enablers. When units understood the time it took to maneuver from one they could then quantify what conditions they must achieve and the duration that they needed to achieve these effects on different methods based on how responsive they needed amount of ammunition with each weapons system and the consumption rates based on how these systems are ammunition for the decisive point in the battle. When units understood minimum safe distances for all weapons systems (or risk estimate distances if used in combat), then they could quantify the risk of employing certain systems to achieve the desired effects. When units understood how long it took to emplace the Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS), they could account for the weapon systems and ammunition that would be required to suppress or obscure the enemy enough to initiate the breach. In order to be that was required to develop a feasible plan and continually this effectively and made informed decisions while those who did not merely guessed. precise calculations across all phases and at the decisive point. concentrating combat power while preventing the enemy to do concentration of combat power at key points in the operation, therefore, providing conditions to keep the desired tempo. In this scenario, the majority of the training units determined that the breach was the decisive point in the battle. Analytical planning and continuously updating statuses ensured the and space so they can mass and achieve the desired effects on the enemy. This, coupled with a clear understanding of During the walk and shoot exercise, a platoon forward observer plots and reports his
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 45 actions, allowed leaders to achieve true synchronization and overwhelm an enemy at the decisive point in the battle. The heart of the walk and shoot is shaping the decisive point. How the leadership estimates, employs, and tracks assets is no small task and provides higher with a valid evaluation of the technical and tactical competence of their commanders. The ability to successfully employ all available assets to achieve chance. If commanders focus too much on organic maneuver capabilities alone, they will lose sight of how to effectively integrate and synchronize everything at their disposal. In effect, it will degrade their ability to maintain the momentum. If they lose sight of the ammunition consumed, they cannot do not truly understand how long it takes to call for, shoot, and build an artillery-delivered obscuration smokescreen, set the conditions for the engineers to breach the obstacle. the actions and knowledge required to synchronize their maneuver elements with the host of enablers available in to create a common understanding amongst leaders. This key tasks, and desired end state provide the foundation for all leaders to visualize the operation in a similar manner. Task subordinate units to understand how their actions contribute to methods in order to maintain a common understanding during checklists to articulate and communicate the actions each conditions required at each step in the process. Detailed contingencies allowed units to change required decisions to triggers. The more decision points that could be converted to triggers allowed units to maintain the tempo of the operation. provided a method for all leaders to understand what was occurring in the operation without clogging up the radio net with unnecessary communications. Companies that created and rehearsed methods to maintain a shared understanding of conditions and triggers were able to decentralize control and maintain momentum. Additionally, when conditions changed in a manner not previously anticipated, the radio net ability to communicate adjustments to the plan. Another method that successful units utilized to create a common understanding that enabled synchronized actions and mitigated risk was the use of graphical control measures and weapons control measures. The BCT developed the scenario with injects that forced leaders to understand air defense threats beyond the CFL set the conditions for allowing the company to cross its line of departure (LD) with supporting AWTs. As the training company crossed the LD, had to clear the ground before the BCT conducted counter lines to track forward progress were quickly able to clear the progress lacked the common understanding to quickly clear the ground. Additionally, units that established common understanding of time and space and their ability to put simple procedures in place to synchronize their actions across the depth, width, and height of their AO. leaders utilized to track the battle. Since all leaders receive and interpret information differently, there was no right answer on how one maintains situational awareness in combat. The bottom line is that leaders must develop a method and create the tools that work for them. Whether it is a certain size map board or tracking charts that outline critical information, information into the knowledge they need to make informed decisions. Additionally, since the volume of pertinent to different personnel on the team to track certain types of information. Leaders must rehearse how this information is tracked and how those tracking the information articulate it to Figure 3 Example Diagram that Outlines Higher-Level Graphical Control Measures and Basic Enemy Situation
those that need the information. What the company commander utilizing his questions need to be addressed prior all of this through and rehearsed it in conditions that simulated the event prior to LD.Conclusion high-yield tools that are invaluable in training and certifying leaders. The 2nd company-level leaders on the actions required to achieve synchronized phase of the event provided the level collective training with their entire formations. Through the use of rehearsals, virtual simulation, and blank and live iterations, the BCT commander was able to evaluate company leaders on their ability to shared understanding, their mastery of setting the conditions to overwhelm the enemy at a time and place of their choosing, and even unit training management. Along every step of the walk and shoot, commanders and subordinates were their understanding and application of mission command. requirements to improve their decision making. From start Clausewitz stated that decision making is the correct making for planning up to and including the combined arms of assets in time and space is still highly relevant. However, commanders and especially subordinates will rely on intuitive decision making using their assessment of the current enemy elements and conditions resulting from the current situation. are either rushed or over thought out. Conversely, it is a test to determine if commanders blend intuitive and analytical decision making to remain objective, or if they are making decisions purely by intuition. As we continue to add enablers down to the lowest echelons our junior leaders to achieve synchronized combined arms maneuver. There is no substitute for a combined arms to train commanders and subordinates on the skills required to achieve overwhelming effects on the enemy at a time and place of their choosing.46 INFANTRY August-December 2016MAJ Daniel J. Ciccarelli During the course of his career, he has served in light units as well as course for seniors that discusses the application of mission command and LTC Charles W. Kean currently serves as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell. He previously served as the deputy commander of the in light, mechanized, and multiple launch rocket system units from the platoon to the division level. He has previously deployed to Kosovo, Iraq, College of Canada. COL Brett G. Sylvia currently serves as the commander of the 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division. He has held numerous command and staff positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C. He earned a Advanced Military Studies Program. during the 2nd BCTs walk and shoot exercise.
Youve just been assigned the responsibility to plan and host a multinational training exercise. Youve read the history of the training exercise. You know what nation you are hosting a military unit from. You may have even partnered with other countries in a multinational training event in the past. All that being said, this exercise will present a whole other set of challenges that you have not yet experienced. So, where do you start? What are some of the important aspects of the exercise you must consider? Who can you turn to for assistance in coordinating with your foreign guests? In September 2015, Blackhawk Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 7th Infantry Division, executed Yudh Abhyas, a training exercise with a company of the Indian Armys 6th Battalion, Kumaon Regiment (a light infantry company). Not every multinational training exercise is the same, however, universally applicable. What follows are observations from collective experiences rooted in the lessons learned during Yudh Abhyas 2015 and can be applied to any multinational training exercise. 1) Planning conferences are exercises in themselves When beginning the planning process of any multinational training exercise with a foreign military, you should plan everything you can together from the start. Senior leaders should collaborate with one another to build a scheme of maneuver or the exercise framework. This framework will be the baseline for the hosting units staff to work. Implementing the foreign units input early in the planning process may training events it wants to conduct or equipment it wants to showcase, some of which may be red line. At a minimum, should be a written order with a synchronization matrix. 2) Success is in the details Like any training event, the success or failure of the exercise will be based on the coordination with adjacent units for assets. Transportation and lodging arrangements will require daily coordination, especially if the exercise encompasses two separate components a staff exercise (STAFEX) and (ROC) drills to discover issues that require prior coordination to resolve. A good example of this is when the visiting foreign unit is using its own strategic lift assets for transportation. To ensure personnel, crew, and cargo are properly received, you where they are going to land. 3) Always maintain unity of command Multi-component exercises that incorporate both a STAFEX and an FTX component should be executed within the same battalion or brigade. If not, the next higher headquarters must 13 ARTICLES: FUNDAMENTALS OfF HOSTING A M MULTINATIONAL TTRAINING EEXERCISE CPT SHAWN S. SCOTT CPT KENNETH P. SHOGRYSoldiers from the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment and Indian Army troops with the 6th Battalion of the Kumaon Regiment stand together during the opening ceremony of Yudh Abhyas 15 at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., 9 September 2015.Photo by SGT Sinthia Rosario August-December 2016 INFANTRY 47
provide unity of command. Just like any military mission, staffs exist to integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force. Failure to maintain mission command of the and de-synchronization between subordinate units. This is especially prevalent during ceremonies or when logistical support requirements change. 4) Everything is a negotiation Always build your training in mind. Whether you have planned too much or not enough training, or didnt plan for something altogether, the plan WILL change. Great ideas happen. Just ensure all leaders remain open-minded working with your counterparts. However, beware of saying yes before determining if requests can or visits from distinguished visitors are likely situations for last-minute changes or requests. Some things like the order of precedence for national anthems or Army songs 5) Protocol and sensitivity The most important thing to remember while conducting a multinational training exercise is to maintain cultural sensitivity and knowledge of foreign military protocol. Ensure cultural or religious sensitivities are clearly understood by all Soldiers always show the same respect to visiting leaders as they would their own. They can also use the visiting units motto or proper greeting, if they have one. It is important here to note that American dietary needs are very different than most foreign countries and thus may require prior planning and coordination. Be cognizant of foreign militaries with a cultural class system as it may cause frustration when attempting to coordinate with lower-ranking individuals. expected standards and work ethic. For us, a standard duty day is 0600-1700, but this might not be the case for your guests. They may be accustomed to a shorter duty day with less emphasis on training and more on team-building or esprit de corps events. Most cultures place great emphasis on exchanging gifts from Soldier to Soldier at the completion of an exercise. However, there are no formal means to fund gifts within regulation. The gifts are usually inexpensive, but nevertheless, usually exchanged in a formal fashion, and some countries 6) Bureaucratic collisions To prevent frustration and bitterness, ensure prior coordination is made with installation support organizations. This is especially true when planning to use foreign weapons and ammunition. Coordinate with range control to ensure all proper documentation is submitted. Failure to do so may halt training before it even begins for something as simple as a memorandum of agreement. Ensure there is a mutual to weapons storage and ammunition control and collection. security regulations and foreign military regulations are both being followed. Again, a ROC drill in the planning phase can identify this issue before it ever becomes one. 7) Teaching vs. sharing Soldiers from 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the Indian Armys 6th Battalion of the 6th Kumaon Regiment bound forward to assault a target while conducting company movement procedures during exercise Yudh Abhyas 15 on 21 September 2015. Photo by SGT Daniel SchroederTRAINING NOTES 48 INFANTRY August-December 2016
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 49 exercises is slightly different from how we should structure a multinational training exercise. Emphasis on the mutual sharing of knowledge and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) should be the focus. Beware of replicating the training based off of your experience with security force assistance missions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Avoid a training structure that may lead your foreign counterparts into perceiving that there is no desire to learn their TTPs. 8) Always plan to have interpreters of their soldiers to understand English, this may be a slight (FAO) of that country to determine if additional interpreters are required. After all, the English language is complicated, especially when you consider the slang and various you should identify your personable Soldiers and plan for them to help bridge the language gap. Foreign soldiers will gravitate more to personable Soldiers simply because they are easier to converse with. 9) Mind the gap the NCO gap the world. However, some countries do not put a strong emphasis on empowering their junior leaders, thus creating a weak NCO corps. This may be due to their class system or centralized command structure. It could just be how they prefer to do business. However, in some cases, it may be 10) Managing the media which should be embraced. In this area, the public affairs the gap between the architects at the tactical level and the policy makers at the strategic level. They will highlight the training to the public and promote the exercise for future support. However, more attention can cause distraction from the training objectives which should be avoided. The exercise should be promoted by the media, but not planned around media interaction. Maintain the exercises authenticity. 11) Social events are key to integration Social events are a great method for creating bonds between Soldiers and building cohesion between two units. Therefore, it is highly recommended that a social event be planned before the training even begins. This will act as an ice-breaker and bring the Soldiers together. Additional social events should be planned both during the exercise as well as at the conclusion of the exercise. Each social event will strengthen relations and solidify the integration of the two units, sealing the bonds built over the course of the exercise. 12) Dont forget the cultural events When planning the exercise, remember that your Time and effort should be placed on planning and coordinating cultural events. Ensure you take into consideration that it and foreign Soldiers. One important note on this subject is that most foreign militaries take pride in their units history. Your counterparts are naturally athletic, so too are the soldiers of most foreign militaries. Many Soldiers, no matter the country of origin, have an appreciation for professional sports. Finally, discuss with your counterparts about whether they would be interested in engaging their diaspora here in 13) Synchronization from the strategic to the tactical level Multinational exercises are directly connected to the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) Theater Security and Cooperation Plan (TSCP). This may not be readily apparent during planning and execution. However, units hosting such exercises should become intimately familiar with the ways in which these exercises contribute to the mil-to-mil relationship with the hosted army and the TSCP. Appreciating this bridge provides vision and purpose for the platoons that are committing their time and energy to the exercise. It informs the way leaders engage. It also with precision. The units best resources to gain this understanding are the FAOs that are liaising on behalf of the may also have contacts within the strategy and policy staffs section of the J5 within the appropriate ASCC can also provide key information about the mil-to-mil foundation of itate to reach out to these points of contact for assistance.CPT Shawn S. Scott is currently serving as a troop/company observercoach-trainer (OCT) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. He was commissioned through ROTC at San Diego 69th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division; a brigade planner (HHC) commander for the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). CPT Kenneth P. Shogry is currently serving as commander of Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment, 198th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Ga. He was commissioned through ROTC at Colorado platoon leader, company XO, and assistant S3 for 1-23 IN, 1-2 SBCT.
TRAINING NOTES 50 INFANTRY August-December 2016In the summer of 2015, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, embraced a new and complex challenge with Exercise Swift Response 15 (SR15). SR15 was a combined airborne joint forcible entry exercise designed to integrate multiple allied nations high-readiness forces to operate as a cohesive team and demonstrate NATOs capacity to rapidly deploy and maintain a strong and secure Europe. The exercise included the largest airborne operation executed on European soil since the end of the Cold War. The success of this operation has set conditions for the combined task forces continued the participants. The exercise presented many challenges, but after working through some friction, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division headquarters and its subordinate multinational battalions accomplished the mission and met all training objectives. Perhaps the most interesting outcome of this exercise was the realization that JMRC should the Global Response Force (GRF). The following are some of the key lessons learned regarding JMRCs role in training future GRF units and some proposals to maximize the use of JMRC to provide the Army more capable readiness forces for geographic combatant commanders. JMRC is the perfect venue to validate the readiness for the GRF because it forces the unit to alert, marshal, and deploy to Europe. The typical mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) for a unit assuming the GRF is a deployment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., or the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Ca. JRTC and NTC offer fantastic training venues to teach the basics determined opposing force (OPFOR). However, due to their proximity to home station, units deploying to JRTC or NTC do not experience the same challenges they face when deploying outside the continental United States for real-world missions. The rotational training units (RTU) ability to preposition personnel and equipment at JRTC and NTC during past validation exercises deprives the unit of the training value of conducting a true outload sequence. A GRF MRE at JMRC can truly test the readiness of the unit prior to assuming the GRF mission. Executing the MRE at JMRC forces the unit to: Move all necessary classes of supply and equipment into a foreign country; and Validate unit movement personnel and overall readiness of the GRF. It also forces the GRF to build a multinational coalition at the intermediate staging base which is a realistic and tough friction point for any unit. JMRC offers the unique challenge of partnering with a myriad of multinational units from across Europe and rapidly building an effective NATO coalition prior to executing combat operations. Most military and civilian alone. The Armys GRF component must have the ability to rapidly build a NATO task force that can work together SWIFT REsSPONsSE 15:EXe E RCISe E VALIDATe E S JMRC RC AS C CRITICAL PART IN FUTURe E Of F A AIRBORNe E R ReE ADINe E SS CPT MICHAEL P. WALLACE
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 51forces all rotational units to develop the three dimensions of interoperability: the technical (hardware, radios, ABCS systems), procedural (U.S. doctrine, NATO standardization agreement [STANAGs], joint NATO doctrine), and human (language, culture). If the GRF units are ever truly going to be a rapid response force capable of global employment for any combatant command, they must develop organizational experience with these challenges. JMRC has the capacity to provide challenging and unfamiliar terrain, a near-peer threat, and enough space to conduct a joint forcible entry (JFE) exercise and build the follow-on forces in order to deploy the entire Army component of the GRF. SR15 validated that the short takeoff and landing (STOL) strip is capable of supporting enough air lands to bring in the majority of the bravo echelon (nonairdrop-capable elements of the GRF). But to do this even more effectively, JMRC needs to develop the ability to allow the JFE exercise to occur on the air-land capable airstrip to allow for a more realistic JFE. The next step should be building for the GRF to use all Air Force and Marine aircraft (C-130, JMRC could improve the ability to certify the GRF by building architecture to more closely replicate most major airports. If it would be a more realistic airborne objective. Having a (OCTs) with JFE experience and expertise, and an OPFOR with experience defending against parachute assaults would increase JMRCs ability to validate the GRF. The Army needs to do a better job validating the GRF during future MREs. As an Army, we currently allow too many prepositioned loads, notional air-land operations, notional heavy drops, and various other ways to circumvent friction when we introduce combat power during airborne operations. Allowing these types of unrealistic methods for introducing combat power does not allow the unit to experience all the challenges they could face when conducting airborne operations as the GRF. If we are to be ready for a worldwide deployment anywhere in the world in 18-96 hours, we must ask ourselves to do more with our airborne units. When conducting airborne operations, we typically grant these types of concessions when resources outside of the Armys control do not match what is required to deliver all of a units equipment and enablers to the drop zone. Most leaders fully understand that this is required during training exercises to ensure that all during airborne operations. However, once it is time to validate our Armys readiness forces, we must resist the urge to solve our problems this way. If we do not restrict combat power to only that which we deliver via parachute assault or what we bring in on air-land operations, we will never be able to execute these missions when the call comes. We must force our airborne units and enablers to plan and execute operations by utilizing existing airborne standard operating procedures (SOPs) such as the use of door bundles with A echelon; the use of Joint Precision Aerial Delivery Systems (JPADS); the use of the Container Delivery System (CDS); the use secondary loads on air-land vehicles; and the proper planning and synchronization of a priority vehicle list (PVL) during JFE exercises in the future as the only methods to bring combat power into the lodgment. This will force our airborne forces to understand the capabilities of all their combat power and make tough choices during the validation exercise when resources fall short. JMRC should become the exchange point to cross-level experience for our airborne forces. Airborne Brigade conducts multiple multinational exercises across Europe almost every month. These exercises are critical to build relationships and interoperability with our European allies, but they do little to build the capability that we expect our airborne forces to have in order to conduct JFE trained on the airborne mission essential As an Army, we currently allow too many prepositioned loads, notional air-land operations, notional heavy drops, and various other ways to circumvent friction when we introduce combat power during airborne operations. Allowing these types of unrealistic methods for introducing combat power does not allow the unit to experience all the challenges they could face when conducting airborne operations as the GRF. A U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft lands at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, on 29 July 2015. The aircraft was used to test the capabilities of the recently resurfaced and extended short take-off and landing strip at Hohenfels.Photo by SSG Jerry Boffen
TRAINING NOTES 52 INFANTRY August-December 2016task list (METL). Executing these complex NATO operations with a combined multinational task force is challenging enough for units that have completed an intensive training cycle through battalion-level training. These exercises are any type of training cycle and had the chance to train leaders and validate unit SOPs. If they have not had the opportunity to validate their organizational understanding and execution of U.S. doctrine, there is no way units will be able to place the requisite emphasis on learning and understanding things like NATO doctrine; STANAGs; culture, combat power, and equipment of multinational partners; and national caveats for different nations. Interoperating at the tactical level is not easy. Even seemingly simple tasks bring a myriad of challenges in blending our operations, our technology, and our cognitive approach to operations. At the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, we work to close these gaps every day. MG Christopher G. Cavoli, Training Command, quoted from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 16-18, Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide Most units in the Army have experienced some level of interoperability in various partnered exercises or operations, but only JMRC due to its location can stress interoperability with a 50 percent or more multinational combined task force. More these challenges on a more regular basis. SR15 has served to highlight numerous challenges, areas of improvement, and potential ways to increase readiness across the airborne force for the future. One way to improve airborne readiness across all of the airborne forces in the Army would be to adopt a similar rotational concept like that currently being conducted headquarters could take ownership of certifying all airborne to the United States on a rotational basis, enabling more time for training on basic core competencies and airborne METL tasks. Once a unit completes the GRF training glide path and validates at JMRC, they become U.S. Army Europes (USAEURs) airborne force. This will allow our European allies to conduct the same security operations across Europe with a trained and validated airborne force. Increasing the training level of our airborne force in Europe will not only increase readiness across USAEUR, but it will allow that unit to place the requisite emphasis on interoperability with our European allies. There are currently three airborne Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT[A]s) at Fort Bragg, N.C., that balance the airborne GRF requirement in nine-month cycles. Allowing at Fort Bragg and conduct an intensive training cycle not hindered by the restrictions they currently face in Italy. They would also build organizational experience and knowledge with JFE exercises. As part of the validation, the other Stryker and mechanized elements of the Army component of the GRF could simultaneously deploy to Europe. This would and conduct passage of lines with the mechanized force to defeat a robust mechanized element in the Hohenfels training area all while balancing the interoperability challenges that only JMRC can provide. This would stress the required relationship building and interoperability required between our airborne, Stryker, and mechanized components of the Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment during Swift Response 15 on 28 August 2015.Photo by SSG Nathanial AllenA Soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, packs up a parachute after an airborne operation as part of Swift Response 15 in Germany on 26 August 2015. Photo by SGT Ian Schell
CPT Michael P. Wallace is currently serving as the aide de camp to the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army Europe. He previously served as the cavalry troop observer-controller-trainer (OCT) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. His other assignments assistant S3 Air with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.; battle major for Regional Command South during the 82nd Airborne Divisions deployment to Afghanistan; and company commander and BCT chief of current operations with the 1st BCT, 82nd University of Richmond ROTC program. August-December 2016 INFANTRY 53GRF and our European allies. Once the GRF validation is complete at JMRC, these forces could remain in Europe for at least one year to conduct security operations in Europe with our allied partners and would assume the footprint in Vicenza and Grafenwoehr. The validated GRF element positioned in Europe would need similar outload capabilities currently only available to the stateside GRF. The Army should look at the feasibility of providing the following: a strategic deployment facility (green ramp equivalent); some type of heavy drop rig site; a location similar to the division ready cage; and a marshalling area like the pole barns at Fort Bragg to conduct the initial issue of ammunition and rigging. If the Army could build the requisite infrastructure in Europe, then the forward-deployed GRF element would have the same ability to alert, marshal, and deploy as the GRF unit at Fort Bragg. Additionally, having some type of the higher headquarters for the GRF element forward would allow USAEUR to employ the GRF in Europe without losing capability in its headquarters. readiness of airborne forces, it must consider the potential strategic impact of a more capable and ready force could provide in Europe. The ability to have a GRF element capable of conducting joint forcible entry already in Europe will have a powerful impact on the national security of the United States and our NATO allies. The Army must place the required emphasis on truly conducting forced entry on a defended air achieving decisive victory for our combatant commanders will continue to be an integral part of our national security. The Army must invest in training, preparing, equipping, and certifying forces that can respond quickly to any situation land operations. just as we have in recent years. If the Army Operating Concept considers multinational interoperability one of the must seize the opportunity to adequately prepare our units to face this challenge and if necessary respond in combat. A German soldier stands guard during a simulated noncombatant evacuation operation on the Hohenfels Training Area during Swift Response 15 on 30 August 2015. SR15 was the U.S. Armys largest combined airborne training event in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Photo by SFC Caleb Barrieau
TRAINING NOTES 54 INFANTRY August-December 2016Graphic control measures are an essential component of a ground tactical plan. They facilitate shared understanding by creating a common language used to depict time and space. They allow a commander to synchronize the effects of combat power while affording among all users, according to Allied Procedural Publication (APP) 6C, NATO Joint Military Symbology (May 2011). Graphic control measures are essential during multinational operations when different languages, doctrine, and terminology constrain communication and shared understanding. They allow a culture and language. Despite the importance of graphic coach-trainers (OCTs) at the Joint Multinational Readiness poor graphic control measures during multinational training dramatically affect the interoperability of multinational task forces by creating shared understanding despite cultural and linguistic differences. a battalion task force composed of four infantry companies, each from different nations. JMRC OCT Observations Prior to Combined Resolve V 1) Little to no use of graphic control measures at the 3) Limited cultural understanding during the operations process. Little to no use of graphic control measures at the company Other units failed to create graphic control measures entirely, a multinational operation, a unit with poor or no graphics especially when communicated across a radio between south of the dark green tree on top of the hill that has a building understanding of the common language used in the operation. The building could be described in a number of ways that the the moment in the battle when speed and precision were most necessary and when communications were most challenging. and instead relied only on graphics produced by their higher in mission command philosophies between Eastern European and below. As a result, companies with no graphics of their language and the military grid reference system. That may GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS CPT SHELDON BROEDEL SFC CHRISTOPHER LYON
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 55The third major trend was that training units failed to account for cultural differences during the operations process. These included language, background, and military training. culture and doctrinal differences created confusion within the misunderstandings hindered interoperability and created organizational confusion. that used detailed graphic control measures communicated with greater speed and accuracy than those that did not. The airborne task force. The battalion staff designated zones as target reference points, named J1 through J8. Although this system did not match the doctrine of each member nation or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, it was easy to understand and All members of the task force, with each other during a nighttime attack. The lesson learned is that simple yet detailed graphics, understood by all, will enhance the interoperability of a multinational unit.Combined Resolve V Test Methodology the hypothesis that sound graphic control measures will enhance the interoperability of a multinational motorized infantry company BTR-60 armored personnel infantry companies, each from a different nation. OCTs trained Combined Resolve V Results clogged with reports once they were in contact with the enemy. Already burdened by a limited communications architecture, from his platoon leaders and lost all situational awareness. Reports sent from the company inaccurate. The confusion caused two instances of indirect the company commander nor supporting artillery had accurate friendly and enemy positions. training, the company again graphic control measures but and mortars. The company and the platoons built poor sector sketches that depicted battle positions and ambiguous measures. Two of the four and none of the platoon sector sketches included pre-planned of graphic control measures constrained the platoon leaders Figure 1 Example Zone Naming Convention Used by a Multinational Airborne Task Force
TRAINING NOTES 56 INFANTRY August-December 2016from accurately and rapidly depicting the enemy situation for into platoon plans, the company commander controlled all based on inaccurate reports from the platoon leaders. The commander managed to rally by repositioning his command post throughout the battle, but clear graphic control measures lines, alphabetical blocks, and numerical buildings. The commander used the graphic control measures to brief the the company rehearsed on a large terrain model using the company did not disseminate graphics below the platoon and the company commander completely disregarded the graphics once the assault began. This drastically disrupted the organization and momentum of the attack, mission failure. the task force. limited graphics that depicted only company battle positions and tactical tasks. All graphic control measures used from the neither obstacles nor adjacent units. They did not establish composition, disposition, and location between adjacent with which companies could communicate, precluding any engagement areas. Designated target reference points, engagement areas, named areas of interest, and other graphic among the companies. After the defense, the company began a steady campaign for planning and preparation. The company continued to rely on graphics from the battalion, which mainly used graphics sent as a shift from the checkpoint were substantially more the companies nor the battalion used the checkpoints to Figure 2 Example Phase Lines Developed by the Battalion (Note: Graphics depict maneuver but are not named control measures that facilitate mission command)Figure 3 Example Graphics for the Urban Attack carried copies of the graphics and they completely disregarded them once the assault began.)
CPT Sheldon Broedel SFC Christopher Lyon August-December 2016 INFANTRY 57graphics below the platoon-leader battalion plan. The marginal application of graphic control measures by both the tested made by OCTs prior to Combined performance when companies from different nations used a common control measure to communicate, the hypothesis that graphic control measures are essential for multinational interoperability because the units were most synchronized when they used the checkpoints to communicate. Recommendations/Best Practices for Tactical LeadersBased on the performance of the tested company and past 1) Graphic control measures are an essential component a multinational unit will use a blend of NATO and national symbols. Leaders should brief graphic control measures in the OPORD to ensure that subordinates understand the function of each. reference for a name they just learned, making it challenging phonetic alphabet, colors, basic animals, etc. which contains a plethora of military symbols and graphic control measures that are standardized across NATO. OCTs conducting multinational operations will foster interoperability closely consistent with Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols understanding of APP-6C by allied leaders will reduce the language, and facilitate communications. 6) Leaders should incorporate the best of each team This not only allows the commander to pick from the best and cooperation. Final Thoughts of interoperability facilitated by graphic control measures graphic control measures are essential for multinational measures is critical for building interoperable multinational teams. Figure 4 Example Company Graphics Developed for the Defense
TRAINING NOTES 58 INFANTRY August-December 2016 EMPLOYING RECONNAISSANCE IN A MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE CPT MICHAEL CRYERMilitaries from across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance train on interoperability at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany in order to respond to regional collection of allies only able to operate independent of one another. Multinational task forces (TF) are frequently organized with battalions and brigades from across NATO serving as the or Partnership for Peace armies. They typically have limited challenge in this situation is integrating unfamiliar subordinate units and quickly making the TF cohesive. Based on JMRC observer-coach-trainer (OCT) integration and employment of reconnaissance units is particularly challenging for newly formed multinational TFs. This article will provide recommendations to a TF commander and staff for how they can optimally integrate a reconnaissance element from an allied nation at the battalion or brigade interoperability until several gaps in capacity and doctrine reconnaissance (recce) element is determining materiel doctrinal methods of employment. and their staffs know the materiel limitations and strengths critical information requirements (CCIR). They will also avoid due to limited or specialized capacity. effectively at night. The soldiers maneuvered in Soviet-era reconnaissance armored personnel carriers that lacked optics and only had night observation devices for their drivers. They also lacked other equipment and had a limited longthey were still ordered to conduct route reconnaissance and named area of interest (NAI) surveillance in limited visibility with full expectation of optimal information collection. In one maintained two observation posts (OPs)without reestablishing communications. A company from an adjacent U.S. battalion platoon did not have the ability to conduct a reconnaissance danger close to the recce platoon. These types of risks can be mitigated if the TF staff takes subordinate-unit capacity into account as it generates combat power. If staff members should cross-load and assign with the recce. The staff must also understand how the newly assigned recce element usually task organizes and how its chain of command is structured to successfully integrate it into the TF. S2 is involved in the planning process. An S2 observed during conduct split-section operations in order to cover more terrain and operated this way during the exercise. This resulted in would probably be comfortable with if he fully understood platoon a section consisted of a single troop carrier vehicle forced to commit resources that he otherwise needed to accomplish the TF mission. interoperability with a recce element. Breaking through that construct and empowering soldiers and leaders to use
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 59 CPT Michael Cryer was serving as the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) observercontroller-trainer on the Warhog Team at the Joint Military Readiness disciplined initiative is critical to interoperability. The nature of reconnaissance missions requires trust in the tactical decisionmaking abilities of Soldiers on the ground and their ability to direct guidance while operating within his intent. OCTs asked in the planning process and attend the TF combined arms rehearsal or rehearsal of concept drills before any major in order to move beyond cultural barriers like this. That same result the commander missed an opportunity to gain a better maneuver and to provide clear guidance. was intended to be employed as a division-level asset for the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and disrupt using joint sites and used its doctrinal methods of surveillance. They went radio-silent until a planned communications window opened the company command post (CP). The information collected answering follow-up questions. Because it was employed element. While the staff is ultimately responsible for doing sales pitch a detailed capabilities brief to the supported commander. The best reconnaissance units observed are the ones that involve themselves in the planning process and aggressively ensure their commander understands what they can provide to the TF. JMRC OCTs regularly observe two consequences of the of reconnaissance never leave recce in the reserve. The strength of the multinational TF is its diversity of assets and capability that the TF commander must leverage through unit into his task force.Romanian soldiers of Delta Company, 191st Infantry Battalion, 18th Infantry Brigade, maneuver toward their objective during exercise Combined Resolve V on 25 October 2015. Photo by SSG Carol A. Lehman
TRAINING NOTES 60 INFANTRY August-December 2016 A HEA VY WEAPONS COMP ANY IN A LIGHT AIRBORNE WORLD CPT MICHAEL F. R. FREEMANWeapons companies have been employed incorrectly for many years. They have the most security. Heading into a training rotation at a Combat Training seen as a burden rather than an advantage. The perceived role. Weapons companies are critical to the battalion because Unique Setup reasons for its success. The leadership ratio generates per platoon and around 26-30 E1-E4s. The smaller platoon Leaders not only are involved and ensure their paratroopers setup is the ability it provides a commander to operate Paratroopers from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division and six NATO nations established and expanded a lodgment after conducting an airborne joint forcible entry during Swift Response 15 at Hohenfels, Germany, on 27 August 2015.
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 61 Another method for employment is found in habitual security detail as needed. Having such relationships greatly increases the shared understanding and facilitates platoon attached. With many varied employment options available to the arms room concept means the sections have the capability Training a Weapons Company company can be challenging. Not only do you have to train 40-man dismounted platoon around the vehicles. landing assault enemy forces strong pointed in urban areas. During force providing security to the ground assault convoy; then of the assault force. reconnaissance of objectives and tactical operation center Soldiers with Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, discuss a mission during Swift Response 15.
TRAINING NOTES 62 INFANTRY August-December 2016 both dismounted and mounted tactics simultaneously. Utilization of the Weapons CompanyA delta company commander needs to be prepared for offense again. fourth platoon as the battalion reserve. With so many engage forces attempting to retrograde or reinforce them; armored threat. arrayed. There are advantages and disadvantages to any performing the defense is that the company is defending in order to transition to the offense. Delta company commanders stay mobile and agile. company to attach a platoon to another company. This deployment status. This leaves the rest of the company forces can arrive. company is really as creative as the commander can be given the environment. Not only does the commander The Way Ahead successful in any theater. Whether deployed or at home to perform any mission. CPT Michael F. R. Freeman is currently serving as the commander technology and administrative management from Central Washington University.
Since the invention of artillery in the mid12th century, militaries have increasingly existing combined arms maneuver formations their battalion headquarters only 50 meters apart Originally constituted as a degraded infantry regiment in served in combat together and created a relationship that 1 2 THE HIST ORICAL RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN 1-23 INFANTRY AND 1-37 FIELD AR TILLERY 1LT MICHAEL C. EDWARDS TOMAHAWKS AND RED LIONS Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division on the march during World War II. INFANTRY 63
5 ni represented the decisive battle that halted Chinese successfully accomplished its mission of digging in perimeter center, and the thin infantry front lines in order to physically the mission in support of driven the Chinese out of Chipyong-ni, the Soldiers them, handed the Chinese missions conducted by collaborated as members mission of quelling Sunni and Shia challenges to coalition 8 both convoy escort operations on the main supply route and represents the early stages of an association that thrives A gun crew with B Battery, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, 64 INFANTRY LESSONS FROM THE PAST
INFANTRY 65 courageous actions undoubtedly deserve credit for both units expressed the relevance of both units history and the Notes1 2 The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge The Battle East of Elsenborn and the Twin Cities 5 Combat Actions in Korea Combat Actions in Korea, accessed 5 October 2015, 8 Between the Rivers: Combat Actions in Iraq 2003-2005 1LT Michael Edwards 2nd Infantry Division, with attached French and Dutch units, while moving forward to attack in advance of the Eighth Army, was Chinese forces occupied the commanding ridges while the American commander, COL Paul Freeman, isolated far in advance of hills within the valley itself for his defensive perimeter. For more than three days in near the fourth day when an American armored smashed out of the perimeter at the lower and with its units and most of its equipment intact, rejoined the Eighth Army.
The Terror Years: From AlQaeda to the Islamic StateBy Lawrence Wright NY: Knopf, 2016, 384 pages Reviewed by CPT Sam WilkinsIn The Terror Years, Lawrence Wright, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Looming Tower, amalgamates searing portraits of terrorists, counter-terrorists, powerful, gritty, and somber narrative of this complex era. Wrights deep experience in the Middle East began with what he describes as an accident in history when, as a conscientious objector during the Vietnam War, he performed alternative service at the American University of Cairo. The Terror Years captures that experience by combining 11 pieces which originally appeared in The New Yorker between 20052015. Taken together, they form an unconventional history of the evolution of the jihadist movement and the parallel actions of the West to attempt to contain it. through the 9/11 attacks and the Wests indifferent and dysfunctional attempts to stop it. The work begins with The Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda. Wright skillfully weaves the tale of Zawahiris path to radicalization with the intellectual birth of radical jihadism under the repression of 1950s Nasserite Egypt. He shares the roots of Zawahiris rage in the torture cells of the Egyptian deep state and while maintaining perspective of the horrible evil of his movement. of remarkable FBI agents, John ONeil and Ali Soufan. The Counter-Terrorist describes ONeil, a legendary but ultimately disgraced FBI agent whose obsession with alQaeda ended with his death in the World Trade Center. The Agent describes the remarkable Soufan, a LebaneseAmerican, and how his investigation into the USS Cole bombings nearly prevented the 9/11 attacks. The Kingdom of Silence and Captured on Film offer portraits into life under repressive regimes that led many young Sunni males to jihad. The Kingdom of Silence is a stunning portrait of life inside Saudi Arabia, informed by Wrights time as an editor with The Saudi Gazette from 20022003. Wright captures the Orwellian contradictions of the kingdom and the resulting anger and depression in its young muted existence under the abusive Assad regime in the how Assads throttling of democratic expression created a culture of suspicion and violence that would explode in revolt in 2012. The next chapter is The Terror Web in which Wright tells the story of the Madrid train bombings, one of the few terrorist attacks to achieve its political objective. The Master Plan shows the evolution of al-Qaeda after 9/11 through the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri and the second generation of al-Qaeda leaders. They despair after 9/11, labeling it a strategic disaster that forfeited alQaedas only safe-haven in Afghanistan. Al-Suri branded the Bin-Laden/Zawahiri model of an underground terrorist movement a failure on all fronts. The invasion of Iraq, Suri noted, essentially saved the jihadi movement from popular defeat. In 2005, Suri outlined a phase of jihad characterized by leaderless resistance that would prepare conditions for the establishment of an Islamic state, the strategic goal of the resistance. Suris blueprint eerily foreshadowed the shift in strategic approach that gave rise to the Islamic State. The Rebellion Within focuses on Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, popularly known by his nom-de-guerre Dr. Fadl. In 2008, AlSharif, formerly a top council to Bin Laden and Islamist author, wrote a lengthy screed denouncing al-Qaedas violence. At the time of writing, Wright and other experts within the Arab world saw the split as a symbol of the group disintegrating. While in many ways they were correct, they failed to foresee that an ultra-violent strand would soon eclipse al-Qaeda and establish a physical state under jihadi control in accordance with The Master Plan. The Spymaster follows a series of interviews between the author and former Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell concerning the balance between security and freedom in the age of terror. Captured tells the tale of Gaza under Hamas, Operation Cast Lead, and the capture and eventual exchange of Israeli army Sergeant Gilad Shalit. Five Hostages represents the books emotional climax. journalists and aid workers captured in Syria. It shares the tale of the families private efforts at rescue, led by mediamagnate David Bradley, owner of The Atlantic Media Company. Bradleys team effectively replaced a puttering U.S. government interagency process. With the assistance of Soufan (The Agent from chapter three) and the Qatari government, they secured the release of Peter Padnos from the organization formally known as the Al Nusra Front. Tragically, ISIS executed the remaining four captives. Wrights unadorned prose transforms his deep experience 66 INFANTRY August-December 2016
August-December 2016 INFANTRY 67 with terrorism and counter-terrorism into powerful but accessible stories. In the best traditions of journalism, he educates without sermonizing or advocating policies. This allows the reader to empathize with the subjects on both sides while simultaneously maintaining a moral perspective on the evils of al-Qaeda and ISIS. In the epilogue, Wright ponders the future of ISIS, how terrorist organizations end, and the costs of the age of terror. Islamic State has provoked will ultimately bring about its destruction, but not without much more havoc and heartache. Wright predicts that this age of terror will end one day. Terrorism as a strategy, Wright notes, rarely succeeds, except in one respect: it creates repression on the part of the state or occupying power. While Wright acknowledges the necessity of the security state created since 9/11, he ponders whether America, at the inevitable conclusion of this era, will even remember the feeling of freedom that once was our birthright... if we fail to keep in mind the country we were before 9/11, we may never steer in that direction again. In that case, the terrorists really will have won. Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to VietnamBy Alec Wahlman Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2015, 368 pages Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick BaillergeonSince the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the interest level in urban warfare has clearly escalated. This in turn has spurred a large increase in the publication of books tied to the subject. In my experience, these volumes have generally fallen into two categories in terms of content and focus. First, there are the volumes in which the author has focused on a particular battle or an aspect of urban warfare. The second are those books which are more general and may address numerous urban warfare battles in the past or provide more wide-ranging discussions. Both types of volumes can have much utility to readers depending on their quality. Alec Wahlman is one author who has crafted a sort of hybrid of these groups. Within his outstanding volume Storming the City: U.S Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam, Wahlman states in his the detailed accounts of single battles and the broad pattern analysis across many battles that lacks tactical detail. I believe Wahlman has clearly achieved what he sought to accomplish. Within his pages, the author has focused on four particular battles between World War II and Vietnam. These are Aachen (1944), Manila (1945), Seoul (1950), and Hue (1968). Within each, he employs the same four-part organization to address the battle. These complementary sections are: 1) The operational context in which the battle took place; 2) The opponent U.S. forces fought against; 3) A concise synopsis of the battle; and 4) An analysis of the tactical performance of the U.S. forces in the battle. Although each section is extremely well written, two clearly stand out in terms of quality. First, Wahlmans ability to concisely provide readers with a synopsis of each battle is very impressive. In complying with his intent, the author does not produce a comprehensive account of each battle. to attain this truly sets the conditions for the author to focus on the clear strength of the volume the analysis of U.S. performance within each battle. In this section, Wahlman utilizes the same organization to conduct his analysis of each battle. He has selected six functions) to dissect U.S. performance: Command, control, and communications; intelligence and reconnaissance; logistics; and importantly, dealing with the population. I found Wahlmans analysis authoritative and sound. Importantly, he offers solid examples to reinforce his statements and opinions. Wahlman takes his analysis one step further in his concluding paragraph. Within it, he compares performance between the battles. He offers areas in which there were he suggests ways in which they were extremely similar. Wahlman summarizes each of the above when he states, And yet, despite the variations in conditions, resources available, and foes, U.S. forces successfully executed their mission to capture the city in every case. He details his rationale on why this success occurred transferable Before my summary, I would be remiss in not highlighting two chapters within the volume which Wahlman has inserted. These two focus on U.S. military thought (doctrine, professional publications, etc...) as they pertain to urban warfare before and after World War II. As you would expect, he has placed them appropriately within the organization of and they provide excellent background as readers move into the battle discussion. In his conclusion, Wahlman states, The central threepart question this study sought to answer was: When the
Have you read a book lately that you think would be of interest to the Infantry community and want to submit a review? Or are you interested in being a book reviewer for INFANTRY? Send us an email at: firstname.lastname@example.org or call (706) 545-2350. how effective were U.S. forces, why, and how did their performance change from World War II to Vietnam? I believe Wahlman has unquestionably answered each more than adequately. In doing so, he has provided readers with a volume which is highly informative and thought provoking. He has also provided readers with a context and background to examine urban warfare in the present and the future.The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitlers Atomic BombBy Neil Bascomb Harcour, 2016, 400 pages Reviewed by CPT Jeremy M. PhillipsIt is sometimes the case that case for the new book The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitlers Atomic Bomb. Neal Bascomb, author of several historical narratives including Hunting Eichmann and The Perfect Mile, conducted unprecedented research into the joint Norwegian and British commando offensive against German atomic research during World War II. Movies like The Dirty Dozen or Inglorious Basterds involved suicide missions against the Nazi war machine, but the ragtag unit at the center of this book undertook many missions where escape seemed impossible from the outset; their exploits would be unbelievable if they were not well documented. The story Bascomb explores is undeniably Heroes of Telemark. About 150 Norwegian expatriates, former soldiers, backwoodsmen, and scientists trained in the mountains of Scotland for weeks learning commando assassination, demolition, and radio techniques. Known as the Norwegian Independent Company No. 1 (or Kompani Linge by its members), these Scandinavian warriors conducted raids, attacks, and covert operations all over Norway, but one The Winter Fortress. at the same point in developing the atomic bomb. The source of heavy water, an essential part of Nazi nuclear experimentation, was the cutting-edge Vemork dam in rural Rjukan, Norway. Luckily for the Allies, two Norwegian physicists, Leif Tronstad and Jomar Brun, who were essential to the design and construction of the power plant built deep into the dam, contacted British operatives once the Nazis took over production. With Tronstad guiding the Norwegian commando unit training in Scotland and the undercover assistance of Brun actively managing the Nazi-controlled heavy water facility, a mission was mounted to destroy the plant. The Winter Fortress breathtakingly chronicles the preparation and hardship of the men involved. Bascomb manages to capture in propulsive detail men like Jens-Anton Poulsson, a 23-year-old Norwegian soldier who was driven from Norway by the Nazi invasion and traveled almost around the world in order to join Kompani Linge, or Einar Skinnarland, a Rjukan local with valuable knowledge of the Vemork power plant who refused anesthetic for excruciating knee surgery because it would delay the ship hijacking that took him to England and his calling as a commando and spy. These men, plus two more trained commandos and a local resistance Operation Grouse, parachuting into the remorseless, broken terrain around the factory during a harsh Norwegian winter to collect intelligence and guide a glider assault onto target. Their struggle began immediately as they fought to survive in the barren snowscape around Rjukan. The Norwegian team bore setbacks with equipment, months-long delays, a ruthless German commanders. Eventually the Operation Grouse team received reinforcements from Kompani Linge and mounted a mission to destroy the plant with explosives from within. which knew Vemork was a target, began with the ascent of an ice-strewn cliff and ended with the Norwegian operators splitting up to variously escape the country by rail, trek to Sweden on skis, or return to the mountains to enable further resistance in the country. The author could have stopped here with a riveting narrative and a spellbinding conclusion, but thankfully he continues the story of the Norwegian Independent Company. The Nazi ordnance corps was determined to harness the atomic energy that the Vemork dam could unlock, and it fell to the British-trained Norwegian commandos to continuously thwart Nazi efforts to rebuild the facility. This book is a must-read for WWII history buffs, students of special forces or commando tactics, and a captivating option for anyone who might not usually enjoy 68 INFANTRY August-December 2016