Renewed concern for democracy and human rights : special Bicentennial program, Washington, 1976 : report on the tenth me...

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Renewed concern for democracy and human rights : special Bicentennial program, Washington, 1976 : report on the tenth meeting of Members of Congress and of the European Parliament, September 1976
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Issued Dec. 1976.
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pursuant to H. Res. 315 authorizing the Committee on International Relations to conduct thoroughstudies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the committee.

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Full Text


f
94th Congress COmTTE PRINT
2d Session O
7l- e-./.3


RENEWED CONCERN FOR DEMOCRACY


AND HUMAN RIGHTS


Ii


Special Bicentennial I

Washington: 19'


REPORT


ON THE


TENTH MEETING OF MEMB


CONGRESS AND OF THE EURO"PE-AN-----
PARLIAMENT
SEPTEMBER 1976
PURSUANT TO
H. Res. 315
AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVESTI-
GATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COMMITTEE


DECEMBER 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


WASHINGTON : 1976


/ 4~',~Zti


IL~1.


/ :P3


I


v


79-039



























COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THOMAS E' MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman


CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS. Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Pennsylvania
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California


JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff
CLIFFORD P. HACKETT, Special Consultant
JEANNE M. SALVIA, Staff Assistant


(II)












FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., December 27, 1976..
This report has been submitted to the Conmfittee on International
Relations by the members of the committee who participated in the
meetings in Washington, with an official delegation of the European
Parliament on September 21-23,1976.
The findings in this report are those of the committee members and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Com-
mittee on International Relations.
THOM3AS E. MORGAN, Chairman.
(Mi)















LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., December 27,1976.
Hion. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Repre-
sentatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MIR. CHAIRMAN : We are submitting for consideration by the
Committee on International Relations a report on the meetings held
in Washington on September 21-23, 1976, by members of the com-
mittee, and other Members of the House with an official delegation of
the European Parliament.
We hope that the report will be useful to the committee in its
consideration of legislation relating to U.S. relations with Europe.
PAUL FINDLEY.
DONALD M. FRASER.
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL.




















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013














http://archive.org/detaiIs/rconcernfo00unit














CONTENTS

Page
Foreword --------------------------------------------------- m-
Letter of transmittal--------------------------------------.-- v
Preface ------------------------------------------------------- Ix
Participants ---------------------------------------------------- 1
Congressional program for European Parliamentarians-------------- 3
Papers and summaries from working sessions:
I. A. Question and answer period:
Questions of European delegation------------------
Questions of American delegation---------------------- 6
B. Multinational enterprises:
Summary of discussion----------------------------- 11
Paper by Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Lange------------------ 15
II. Political discussion:
Summary of discussion----------- ---------------------21
Paper by Mr. Hougardy------------------------------- 25
Paper by Mr. Crane------------------------------- 27
Paper by Mr. Fraser---------- ------------------------32
Paper by Mr. Broeksz ------------------------------- 36
Paper by Mr. Schuijt--------------------------------- 38
Paper by Mr. Stewart--------------------------------- 40
III. A. Political discussion (continued):
Summary of discussion------------------------------ 43
B. Economic and social discussion:
Summary of discussion----------------- ------------- 45
Paper by Mr. Tsongas------------------------------ 51
Paper by Senator Pell------------------------------ 55
Comments by Mr. Gilman on Senator Pell's paper-..- 57
Paper by Mr. Biester----------------------------- 61
Paper by Mr. Coust -------------------------------63

APPENDIX
Biographies of participants---------------------------------- 65
Previous documents on U.S. relations with the European Community -- 72
(VII)














PREFACE


The 10th meeting of delegations from the European Parliament
and from the Congress, recorded in this report, is significant for two
reasons: the achievement, in the American bicentennial year, of 5
years of these meetings, an occasion marked by the presence of the
President of the European Parliament, Mr. Georges Spenale, as head
of the European delegation; and, the commitment by the two delega-
tions to concentrate their efforts in future meetings on democratic
development and the protection of human rights.
Each of these aspects of the September meetings deserves comment.
When in January 1972 an American delegation arrived in Luxem-
bourg, seat of the European Parliament, for the first meeting, neither
American nor European participants could foretell the course of their
relations. The European Parliament, at that time, represented the
aspiration of the Community for political unity but with few of the
attributes of a real European parliament. The Congressmen, while
more confident of their roles within the American Government, were
uncertain about the need for ties with the new European institution or
the proper form for those ties.
From the hesitation and uncertainty of that first meeting, our mu-
tual interests in closer ties have been both broadened by events of the
past 5 years which have spurred both legislatures and made more
specific through the diverse topics our delegations have studied to-
gether. The movement toward political unity in Europe has naturally
enhanced the role of the Parliament, whose direct elections in 1978
are now the principal focus of the Community's political develop-
ment. The 1972-76 period in the United States has seen an emphasis
on congressional actions in both foreign and domestic affairs.
As the respective roles of the Parliament and the Congress grew
in these 5 years, our need for organized discussions grew also. From
the casual encounters in Luxembourg, we have progressed through 10
meetings to consider in detail the entire range of economic and politi-
cal matters which constitute American-European relations. We have
considered not only trade matters, with their obvious importance, but
also the role of multinational enterprises, most of which originate
in the 10 countries our legislators represent. We have studied not only
our own economic and political ties but those which bind us to the
rest of the world, including our responsibilities for development as-
sistance. We have discussed our respective ties to the eastern European
countries, including the Soviet Union. We have not avoided the deli-
cate questions of U.S. military forces in Europe, or of political de-
velopments in southern Europe.
(IX)


79-069-76-----2







Our discussions on democratic development throughout the world
and on respect for human rights, summarized in this report, are a
further and most significant elaboration of these common interests.
As one of the papers presented in Washington stated: "A nation, or
group of nations, which does not believe in itself and its ideals will not,
in the end, survive." We believe that our shared support of political
development which emphasize individual rights is relevant through-
out the world. We intend, in our coming meetings, to reassert and to
redefine this relevance with vigor and candor.
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL.
DONALD MA. FRP.ASER.












PARTICIPANTS


MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT1

George Sp6nale, President of the European Parliament, France.
Pierre-Bernard Couste. Progressive European Democrat, France.
James Scott-Hopkins, European Conservative, United Kingdom.
Gerard Bordu, Communist, France.
Jan B. Broeksz, Socialist, Netherlands.
Ernest Glinne, Socialist. Belgium.
Roger Houdet, Liberal, France.
Norbert Hougardy, Liberal, Belgium.
Hans-Edgar Jahn, Christian Democrat, Germany.
Sir Peter Kirk, European Conservative, United Kingdom.
Thomas Nolan, Progressive European Democrat, Ireland.
Luigi Rosati, Christian Democrat, Italy.
Willem J. Schuijt, Christian Democrat, Netherlands.
Michael Stewart, Socialist, United Kingdom.

ACCOMPANYING STAFF


President's Cabinet:
Ren6 Bruch, Director.
Roland Bieber, Adviser to the President.
Secretariat of the Delegation:
Karlheinz Neunreither, Director.
Th6o Junker, Principal Administrator.
Liz Foreman. Assistant.
Committees and Interparliamentary Delegations:
Michael Palmer, Director.
Axel Stahlschmidt, Head of Division.
Information and Public Relations:
Guy Vanhaeverbeke, Head of Division.
Protocol:
Maurice Mestat, Head of Protocol.

INTERPRETERS


Ursula Padberg.
Herman Leroux.
Bernard Heidelberger.


F',



1


-- .. 7


Giancaro Macario.
Susan Guest.
Caren Baviera-Betson.


. . ..


MEMBERS OF CONGRESS'1
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Donald M. Fraser, Democrat, Minnesota, Cochairman.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat, New York, Cochairman.
1 See biographies, p. 65.
(1)







Paul Findley, Republican, Illinois.
Leo Ryan. Democrat, California.
Edward G. Biester, Republican, Pennsylvania.
Chlarles Whalen, Republican, Ohio.
Benjamin Gilman, Republican, New York.
Stephen Solarz, Democrat, New York.
L. H. Fountain, Democrat, North Carolina.

WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
Sam Gibbons, Democrat, Florida.
Bill Archer, Republican, Texas.
Philip Crane, Republican, Illinois.
James Martin, Republican, North Carolina.

BANKING AND CURRENCY CO3IMLTTfEE
Henry Reuss, Democrat, Wisconsin, Chairman.
Paul Tsongas, Democrat, Massachusetts.
Thomas Rees, Democrat, California.
J. William Stanton, Republican, Ohio.
Millicent Fenwick, Republican, New Jersey.

AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE
Richard Nolan, Democrat, Minnesota.
Floyd Fithian, Democrat, Indian.
James Johnson, Republican, Colorado.

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
William Hungate, Democrat, Missouri.

SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Claiborne Pell, Democrat, Rhode Island.

STAFF

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Clifford P. Hackett, Consultant.
Robert B. Boettcher, Consultant.
Jeanne M. Salvia, Staff Assistant.











CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM FOR EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1976
Arrival of European delegation.
Informal dinner by Ambassador Spaak.
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1976
Morning-Sightseeing in Washington.
1145-Mary Lou Burg, Democratic National Committee.
1300-Luncheon and briefing at State Department.
1800-Reception by Ambassador Spaak.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1976
Congressional discussions-Room 2172, Rayburn House Office
Building:
Morning:
0930-Question hour.
1030-Coffee break.
1045-MNE presentation and discussion.
1045-Capitol reception EF 100.
1300-Congressional lunch-Gold Room RHOB.
Afternoon: Executive branch program.
Evening: Informal congressional dinner by Mr. and Mrs. Fraser.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1976
Congressional discussions-Room 2172, Rayburn House Office
Building:
Morning:
0930-Political discussion-What steps can, or should, the
United States and the European Community, take,
through their foreign policies, to encourage demo-
cratic development and the observance of human
rights in other countries?
1030-Coffee break.
1045-Discussion continued.
1215-Depart for luncheon by Dutch Ambassador.
Afternoon: Executive branch program.
Evening: Formal congressional dinner, Arts and Industries
Building, Smithsonian Institution.
(3)







THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1976
Congressional discussions-Room 2172, Rayburn House Office
Building:
Morning:
0930-Economic and social discussion-What steps can, or
should, the United States and the European Com-
munity take through their trade, economic and so-
cial policies to encourage democratic development
and human rights in other countries?
1 Assistance programs review.
{2 Bilateral and multilateral trade relations.
(3 Monetary problems.
(4) Cultural and exchange programs.
1045-Coffee break.
1100-Economic and social discussion continued.
1130-Summary discussion and conclusion.
1200-Press conference.
Afternoon:
1355-Depart for Springfield, Ill., via Chicago (lunch en
route).
1642-Arrive in Springfield, transfer to Holiday Inn.
1900-Reception, State Museum.
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1976
Morning:
0915-Depart by bus for New Salem.
0945-Tour with guide of restored village.
1115-Depart for Stone farm.
1130-Tour of farm and discussion with farmers, county
agent etc. Informal lunch at farm.
1400-Depart for Springfield.
1430-Tour of Lincoln Home.
1.30-Depart for Holiday Inn.
1545-Panel Discussion with Illinois Press Association (to
1715)
1900-Reception and dinner with Illinois Press Association.
SATURDA.\Y, SEPT'rEMBER .25, 1976
0900-Depart hotel for airport via Lincoln tomb.
110,5-DT-M'i%,rt for Chicag'o and trans-AtlAntic connections.












Tuesday, September 21, 1976


SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

SESSION I. A. QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD
Mr. Glinne introduced the European Parliament delegation's first
question addressed to the U.S. Congress delegation. The question read:
The Conference on International Economic Cooperation (The North-South
dialogue) between industrialized and less developed countries is considered by
the European Community to be of fundamental importance for the future devel-
opment of the world economy. The second phase of the dialogue has begun 14
September in Paris, after the first phase had ended in partial disagreement in
July.
What is the opinion of the delegation from the U.S. Congress on the possibility
of agreements in the four discussion areas, energy, raw materials, development
and finance?
What opportunity does the American delegation see for joint policies and
ventures between U.S. and EC interests in the furtherance of economic develop-
merit in the Third World?
Mr. Trees replied that the United States (lid not yet have a definitive
policy towards the Third World. In some areas, however, the United
States was working towards such a policy. For instance the House of
Representatives had pressed for changes in the articles of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) approving the removal of IMF
resources from the gold standard, selling gold and using the proceeds.
Countries with serious balance of payments problems could borrow
from the fund, and also from a compensatory fund dealing with ex-
port earnings of developed countries. Greater leadership by govern-
ments and parliaments was required to force the IMF, which often
takes a banker's attitude, to develop its potential for helping the poor
countries.
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT MISSING
The United States was not increasing its bilateral aid partly because
of waning congressional support and increasing public cynicismin
concerning the use o"aid wile
concerning the use of aid which had been given over such a lona period
by the United States. The United States was also remiss in its obliza-
tons to seval intenatic.al financial institutions. Aid was. regretta-
bly, used by the United States more as an instrument of foreign policy
than. one of help to the countries which needed aid most.
At the most recent UNCTAD Conference, the developing countries
came up with a number of good proposals to which the United States
and the European Community had nothing of substance to offer in
return. The speech made by Secretary of State Kissinger at UNCTAD
was "an inch deep and a mile wide." Secretaries lKissinger and Simon
had blamed the Communist countries for the lack of reaction to the
U.S. Common Fund proposal, but the fact was that this proposal was
made too late and without sufficient preparation.
(5)







PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS A PROBLEM
HIe noted that much of the aid and loans for developing countries
was raised privately. A different approach towards the indebtedness
of less developed countries from that of public debts needed to be
found.
Stabilization of commodity prices-short-term price fluctuations-
could 1)be helped by a common fund, but on a case by case review.
Because some of the biggest exporters of raw materials were developed
countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada and
Australia, fixing high prices for raw materials exports would not
necessarily help the developing countries' economic situation.
Loans and private investment could be of great help to the develop-
ing countries but under Secretary Simon the U.S. Treasury attitude
to loans to the developing countries had not been helpful. The main
need of the poorer countries was private capital. It would be helpful
if guarantees could be worked out and provided for investors in the
Third World. Some form of investment code and protection for in-
vestors was necessary.
DIRECT ELECTIONS
Mr. Gibbons introduced the U.S. Congress delegation's first question
to the European Parliament delegation:
Will the beginning of direct elections to the European Parliament have imme-
diate effects on the Parliament's responsibilities or will these changes come only
gradually as direct elections affect the political life of the Community?
Mr. Stewart replied that there would be no immediate effects on
Parliament's powers and responsibilities. These would come gradu-
ally. The only immediate change in law would be in the method of elec-
tion of members. In fact, however, the authority of directly elected
Members of Parliament would be greater and extensions of Parlia-
ment's powers would probably follow. At present, all members had a
dual mandate. After direct elections many members would probably
sit only in the European Parliament. They would be full-time mem-
bers. This was bound to build up pressures for increases in Parlia-
ment's powers. Sir Peter Kirk was rapporteur of a report on this
subject, which was at present before Parliament's Political Affairs
Committee and which pointed in particular to the need for increased
powers concerning the Community budget, the appointment of Mem-
bers of the Commission, and in the field of external relations. As
important as any formal increase in powers would be the probable
increase in Parliament's political influence.
Mr. Gibbons asked whether the final documents concerning the di-
rect elections were now ready.
Mr. Stewart said that the agreement between the governments had
been signed the previous day in Brussels. The probable date for the
first direct election was spring 1978. But Britain and other countries
might have problems concerning parliamentary ratification and the
date for elections might have to be put back. He personally believed
that elections would probably be held in May or June 1978.







MONETARY DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Coust6 introduced another question addressed by the European
Parliament delegation to the U.S. delegation. The question read:
What proposals does the U.S. delegation suggest for the further development
of the International Monetary System?
Mr. Stanton replied that the United States had been trying to legiti-
mize parities which existed already. The United States has tried to
help realine currencies. It had decreased the value of gold and also in-
creased SDR's. The primary concern of the United States in the im-
mediate future was to strengthen the role of the IMF. The present
deficit problems had to be ended or reduced. Three possibilities exist:
One approach would be to declare a debt moratorium, but this would
be unwise and could lead to the collapse of the banking system. An-
other would be for the IMF to print money, but this would cause in-
flation and would also lead to the collapse of the banking system. Third
is a search for ways to bolster the IMF in covering deficits.

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Martin introduced question No. 2 addressed by the U.S. dele-
gation. The question read:
During the coming GATT negotiations, what does the European delegation
foresee as the major agricultural issues confronting the United States and the
European Community. For example, are equitable solutions possible on dairy
products, vegetable oils, and feedgrains?
Mr. Houdet, in reply, said that the United States and the Com-
munity had discussed agricultural questions together in the past and
had agreed on some issues. Both sides had to agree on medium-term
and long-term agricultural policies which would insure stability and
supplies. It should be remembered that U.S. agricultural exports to the
Community were very much greater than those in the reverse sense.
Milk products posed special problems but the problem here was not
just an agricultural one but also social in nature in view of the com-
paratively high number of Europeans still engaged in agriculture.
The Community had always respected GATT rules on agricultural
trade. It should be remembered that the Community had, in the past,
urged world agreements concerning certain products and also urged
the creation of world stocks of certain products.
Mr. Fraser invited participants to broaden the discussion of issues
covered in the four questions.

TOO MANY MEETINGS
Sir Peter Kirk commented that there seemed to be unnecessary du-
plication in the dialog between industrial and developing countries.
There had been four UNCTAD meetings, the North-South dialog,
and others. "We are over-talking" and not getting results on these
problems. Could not the dialog be concentrated in one forum, and
could not the OECD countries find a common position?
Mr. Stanton said that in his view the main problem was that the
West had not done its homework properly in preparing proposals


79-069-76---3






aimed at the developing world-notably at the recent UNCTAD Con-
ference. On this front nothing could be done until January 1977 when
the new administration would take office.
Mr. Bordu said that "complementarity" was a big problem for the
developing countries. New technology was needed in these countries.
The question should be raised of whether the "rich" countries could be
considered absolute masters of "their own wealth". Were not the enor-
mous debts of some of the developing countries only indications that
the industrialized countries had found new ways of putting pressure
on the poorer countries? The question of redeploying industry to the
developing countries was an urgent one.
SIGNIFICANCE OF LOME CONVENTION
Mr. Couste wondered what was the role and interest of the U.S.S.R.
and Eastern European countries in relations with the developing
countries. It was important to recall that the Lom6 Convention had
stabilized receipts of the developing countries concerned for 12
products. The United States and Canada seemed to have reservations
concerning this, but these receipts had a social as well as economic sig-
nificance for the Lome countries.
Mr. Glinne wondered whether the emphasis that had been placed on
private investment, as opposed to state aid. reflected an ideological or
political preference. Were the development plans favoured by the
United States linked with reforms of the internal political structures
of the developing countries concerned?
Mrs. Fenwick asked whether the methods which had been used in
organizing the world tin market-which seemed to have been very
successful-could be applied to other products. She also asked whether
it was wise to give loans to the developing countries in a way which
only seemed to cripple the recipients by leading them into enormous
debt problems. Mr. Stanton said that the questions raised in the general
discussion had been most intriguing though he suspected that at some
times questioners had themselves attempted to answer their own ques-
tions. The point made by Mr. Couste about Soviet involvement was of
course an important political question. Mr. Rees had probably been
right in stressing the significance of the involvement of the private
sector.
FORD, CARTER FOREIGN POLICIES
Mr. Jahn asked what differences were there likely to be between the
foreign policies of President Ford and those of Governor Carter were
he to become President.
Congressman Archer considered that if Governor Carter became
President there would not be serious changes in foreign policy, though
hlie would almost certainly carry out a review of U.S. foreign policy.
Such a review could make Europeans nervous, particularly on troop
levels, but he did not think that there would be any significant
changes, though minor cuts might perhaps be made to U.S. forces in
Europe and in Korea. Middle East policy would remain the same.





9

Mr. Fraser agreed that no major changes would occur in foreign
policy if Governor Carter became President though there could be
shifts of emphasis. In particular, Mr. Carter might wish to step up the
consultation with Europe and Japan concerning relations with the
Soviet Union, etc. He thought that Mr. Carter would be interested in
increasing aid and would also place more emphasis on the importance
of human rights in foreign policy.
Mr. Martin said that he thought Mr. Carter would be concerned in
the United States playing a more important role in international
conferences.















SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION


B. DISCUSSION OF DRAFT CODE ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1
Mr. Gibbons briefly reviewed the events over the last few years
during which participants in these meetings had cooperated in pro-
ducing the draft code of principles on multinational enterprises and
governments which had been drafted by Mr. Lange and himself. The
draft had been circulated both in the U.S. Congress and in the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Unfortunately Mr. Lange was unable to be present
in view of unexpected and pressing electoral commitments in
Germany.
Mr. Gibbons drew particular attention to the recent addendum con-
taining paragraphs 48-54, and also the corrections to paragraphs 19,
21 and 32, and invited discussion of them as some members had not yet
seen them.
In view of Mr. Lange's absence it would not be possible to hold an
indepth discussion on the paper on this occasion, but he hoped that
he would be able to reply to any questions put by members of the two
delegations and expressed the wish that suggested amendments or
changes should be sent in writing to Mr. Lange or himself so as to per-
mit full debate of the revised draft code, and possibly a vote on it,
at the spring 1977 meeting.
Sir Peter Kirk asked what relationship there was between para-
graphs 7 and 52.
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS
Mr. Gibbons said that paragraph 52 was not limited by paragraph
7. A U.S. subsidiary would be affected by paragraph 52 when acting
anywhere in the world. lie then discussed provisions of the revised
U.S. Tax Code recently passed by Congress which dealt with disallow-
ing as a tax deduction any illegal payment by a U.S. corporation.
Mr. Couste said that he had been asked by Mr. Lange to convey his
apologies to the two delegations. He had been obliged to accept unfore-
seen commitments in the German electoral campaign. Mr. Lange main-
tained his full interest in moving ahead with the code on multina-
tionals and hoped that the two delegations would be able to agree on a
final text at the next meeting on the basis of suggestions sent in by
participants.
APRIL DISCUSSION NOTED
Mr. Hougardy remarked that comments made by Mr. Archer and
himself at the Dublin meeting in April 1976 had not been taken into
account in the revised version of the code as presented. He understood
that written amendments could be submitted to the two draftsmen. He
wished to remind those present that at the OECD ministerial meeting
held on June 21-22,1976, important decisions had been taken on inter-
national investment and on multinational enterprises. Besides the Nine
1 See working document, p. 15.
(11)







and the United States, the OECD included countries such as Austria,
Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland and Sweden. Both employers
and trade union consultative bodies had already expressed satisfaction
that tlhe OECD text had been agreed. Would it not be dangerous to
]hli ve several texts dealing with the same subject?
lie emphasized that most companies quoted on the U.S. stock ex-
chlange already hlad to )provide very detailed information in their
annual report to shareholders.
He asked for clarification of the concept of transfer prices and costs.
TrlIe Lange /'Gibbons Code hardly mentioned governments. A code of
gRood conduct was just as necessary for governments as for multina-
tional enterprises. Questions like retroactive legislation and "first in
first out" taxation should be covered. Should the code include only
some or all industrialized countries? Should it be voluntary or obli-
gatory? Many points still had to be clarified.

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS
Mr. Archer referred to the objections he raised in Dublin, and ob-
served that the changes made since theawere simply matters of detail
and procedure, and did not answer his substantive objections. In par-
ticular he criticized:
(1) The draft's lack of specificity, in particular with regard to
reports of investment, the capital market, and transfers of
technology;
(2) The lack of detail on the control body, in particular who
was to form it, run it, how it would relate to existing bodies.
Mr. Archer felt that powers of such magnitude should be reserved
for elected officials;
(3) The lack of protection of individual rights, and the lack
of confidentiality of information given to the control body;
(4) The irrelevance of the tax section, because such matters
should be covered by national legislation, or official international
agreements; and
(5) The naivete of the draft, since it duplicated the OECD
draft.
Mr. Bordu raised questions concerning competition. Would the con-
trol body in fact control the free movement of capital and tech-
nology transfers. In particular he asked whether the exchange of
know-how would benefit large MNC's at the expense of smaller ones.

BASIC DISAGREEMENT
Mr. Gibbons, replying to the discussion, said that lihe appreciated
the clarification of Mr. Archer's point of view. Quite frankly, Mr.
Archler and the draftsmen of the Code seemed to be in basic disagree-
ment. What Mr. Archer was really asking was "Do we need this
Code?"
The OECD text did not exist when the two delegations had started
work on their own draft code, but it should be remembered that the
OECD Code was merely an expression of good faith and was not in-
tended to be binding or to be executed.






13

He looked forward to receiving written comments and hoped that
Congressman Archer, Mr. Hougardy and others would send Mr.
Lange and himself their observations. Mr. Lange and himself would
submit a new text at the next spring meeting.
Before concluding the discussion for the first day, Mr. Fraser re-
layed Mr. Findley's invitation to the European Parliamentarians to
attend a "Soybean Fair" later in the day. He also announced the news
that Orlando Letelier, former Chilean Foreign Minister and Am-
bassador to the United States, had just been killed in a car bombing
incident in Washington.

















PAPER

A DRAFT CODE OF PRINCIPLES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND GOVERNMENTS

Paper by: Erwin Lange and Sam Gibbons

PREFACE
We, as representatives of the European Parliament and the United States
Congress, urge agreement to the principles embodied in this Code.
We do so with the knowledge that other groups and organizations have under-
taken useful work in this area, but that little progress has been made toward
establishing a framework of law and responsibility for multinational enterprises
and governments.
We hope that this Code will prove to be a fruitful effort toward that end, and
that it will serve as the basis for needed changes in national laws, government
practices, international agreements, and the policies of multinational enterprises.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1. The internationalization of production is a logical consequence of the devel-
opment of our economies. As such, it is a positive phenomenon, contributing to
economic growth and increasing prosperity.
2. Nonetheless, the organization of operations beyond national borders by
multinational enterprises may lead to undesirable concentrations of economic
power and to conflicts with national policy objectives.
3. Therefore, it is appropriate to seek to encourage the positive contributions
which multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress and
to minimize and resolve the difficulties and problems which may arise from their
operations.
4. Just as it is normal for firms increasingly to carry on activities beyond the
frontiers of their own country, so it is normal and necessary for an international
framework to be set up for these international activities, obliging the firms in
question to respect certain basic rules and at the same time offering them the
necessary legal security.
5. Economic integration, as embodied in multinational enterprises, has stolen
a march on politics, for which in most cases the national frontiers remain the
relevant framework. Although far-going economic interdependence can be a useful
stimulus toward political integration, it is nevertheless, essential in international
relations too for public policies to take precedence over economics; that is. the
framework in which the multinational enterprise operates must be under political
control. This condition is not being met at present. Accordingly, certain rules
need to be laid down in an international agreement.
6. The problems connected with the activities of multinational enterprises can
no longer be dealt with only in a national context and cannot yet be solved on a
world scale. Agreements on multinational enterprise activity among industrial
nations would represent a great step forward. The delegations of the United
States Congress on the one hand and that of the European Parliament on the
other can in the first instance help to bring about an agreement between the
United States and the European Community, to which Japan, Canada, and other
industrial countries may later accede.

GENERAL FRAMEWORK
7. International agreements are to be concluded initially between the United
States and the European Community. Subsequently, the agreements are to be
expanded to include all world nations.
(15)


79-069-76----4





16

S. The agreements are to have the force of law in all nations which are parties
to them and are to impose legally binding obligations on firms based in or oper-
ating in those countries.
9. For purposes of this Code, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are defined
as companies of private, state, or mixed ownership established in different coun-
tries and so linked that one can exercise a significant influence over others.
10. These international agreements are to be implemented and enforced through
the mutual cooperation of the governments which are parties and through exist-
ing institutions of international law.
11. If mutual cooperation and existing international institutions fail to ade-
quately implement and enforce the agreements, an international secretariat may
be established to administer these agreements. In establishing a secretariat, due
regard is to be given to the population and economies of the government parties
involved.
12. The agreements are to bind all firms so as not discriminate against multi-
national enterprises and in favour of national enterprises.
13. Multinational enterprises are to obey national and international laws and
to respect the national policy objectives of parent and lost countries.
14. Governments which are parties to these agreements are to treat multi-
national enterprises according to international law and are to deal with conflicts
of national laws as they affect multinational enterprises. When necessary, in
cases of disputes over investments and other matters, governments are to use
international dispute mechanisms. Where such mechanisms fail to resolve
disputes, host countries are to prevail.
15. During the time prior to the completion of these agreements, the govern-
ments which are to be parties shall enter into temporary agreements under
which the provisions of this Code are to be followed. These transition agreements
shall provide for efforts toward harmonization of national legislation to reach
compliance with the provisions of this Code in anticipation of the permanent
agreements.
Explanatory note.-From the outset, the governments which are to be parties
to the international agreements should consult and conclude agreements on i\d-
ministrative aid and on the mutual recognition and enforcement of court judg-
ments. etc.. in order to acquire a measure of control over the international
activities of these enterprises until effective international agreements have been
worked out. Better cooperation among government authorities in this transition
period will do much to prevent the circumvention of national lawv's and policies.

INFORMATION
16. Every multinational enterprise is to publish a yearly repopnrt disclosing
the scope and nature of its activities, the financial situation of the enterprise,
andi the connections between it and other enterprises. Comparable national enter-
prises are to publish this same information.
17. The following information, broken down by specific operations (lines of
business) and countries of establishment, is to be published :
(a) The financial and operational structure of the enterprise.
(b) The financial and personal links with other concerns.
(r) The funds invested, reinvested, and transferred to the home country
of the enterprise.
(d) The origin and composition of capital, existing and new.
(e) The number of employees, jobs created, jobs abolished, and host
country nationals working at various levels of the enterprise.
(f) The balance sheet and profit and loss account, including gross sales.
(g) The total amount of taxes paid. broken down to show the amount of
each type of tax paid and the amount of each type paid to each individual
taxing authority.
(h) Expenditures on research and development.
() Income from royalties, licenses, and management contracts.
(j) Such other reasonable information as is requested by government
authorities.
Due regard is to be givenn to legitimate reasons for firms to preserve the con-
fidentiality of certain business information. Governments are to agree on safe-
guards and penalties to prevent the inappropriate and indiscriminate use of
information provided by multinational enterprises and other enterprises.






17

18. Multinational enterprises of significant size are to use a system of stand-
ardized annual accounts and reports. This system is to be established pursuant
to international agreement.
COMPETITION
19. All information relevant to the operation of a multinational enterprise,
including information in the hands of its establishments abroad, shall be acces-
sible to antitrust bodies. National antitrust bodies are to exchange information
and mutually support each other in investigations of restrictive practices, and
are to be able to take joint action against restrictive cartels and against abuses
of power.
Explanatory note.-Multinational enterprises, like other large enterprises,
frequently have technical or financial advantages over their competitors, giving
them a certain position of power. Competition policy should be aimed at checking
abuse of this position. To achieve this, much more intensive cooperation is
essential between antitrust authorities of the United States and the European
Community. Controlling multinational enterprises is made more difficult by the
problems of implementation than by shortcomings in national legislation. The
antitrust bodies are frequently unable to prove abuse by a multinational enter-
prise because the necessary evidence is in the hands of another of its establish-
ments abroad, creating the need for free access to information.
20. The international agreements are to provide safeguards and penalties to
prevent the inappropriate or indiscriminate use of antitrust information for
purposes such as the creation of a competitive advantage for another firm.
21. Multinational enterprises are to avoid action which would adversely affect
competition, such as price fixing, restricting the freedom of operation of subsidi-
aries and licensees, acquiring interests in competitively significant enterprises,
or engaging in restrictive cartels or agreements. They are to cooperate with
government competition enforcement authorities and to provide information
requested by these authorities.
22. Governments are to enforce antitrust laws against the various enterprises
objectively and are to treat all enterprises in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Explanatory note.-There appears to be a trend toward increased involve-
ment of governments in enterprises, including direct ownership of firms. If
this trend continues, it can be questioned whether such governments can con-
tinue to remain objective with regard to the enforcement of antitrust and other
laws against enterprises in which they are involved, as opposed to other
enterprises.
INVESTMENT POLICY
23. Multinational enterprises are to report planned investments to govern-
ment authorities in the countries where the investments are to be made. These
government authorities have the right to regulate investment in their countries.
24. The governments of nations that are parties to these agreements are to
promulgate regulations governing open bids for total or partial takeovers of
existing firms. Such regulations are to provide that adequate prior information
he given to government officials, to officials, workers, and shareholders of the
firm to be taken over, and to trade unions.
Explanatory note.-More than half of all direct investments abroad involve
takeovers of existing firms rather than new, direct investments. Po!cy consid-
erations dictate greater restrictions over such takeovers of existing firms.
25. The international agreements are to harmonize existing national invest-
ment regulations, including guaranteeing, in the event of foreign takeovers of
firms, protection of jobs, investment policies, maintenance of national manage-
ment, maintenance of research activities, and a certain share of exports. The
agreements, while recognizing national policy objectives, are to minimize distor-
tions to trade and investment, to harmonize incentives and disincentives, and to
avoid discrimination based on country of origin.
Explanatory note.-Regulations currently in effect in Canada, Belgium. and
Britain provide certain guarantees in the event of foreign takeovers of firms.

FISCAL POLICY
26. Multinational enterprises are to provide government tax authorities with
the information necessary for a correct determination of taxes due. Multina-
tional enterprises may not use the distortion of transfer prices and other prac-
tices which alter their tax base or contravene national tax laws or policies.






18

27. Accounting practices of multinational enterprises and tax policies of gov-
ernments are to reflect the principle that taxes are to be paid in the country
where the income is earned. Dividend and interest income are to be taxed to
shareholders and investors by their respective governments. Government au-
thorities may disregard third party holding companies and other entities used
to hold income and thereby avoid taxation by taxing this income directly to
shareholders as though it were received currently.
28. Government authorities are to:
(a) Upgrade present efforts to facilitate the enforcement of national tax
laws and policies by entering into tax treaties or other international agree-
ments providing for the comprehensive mutual exchange of information and
assistance. Adequate staff support is to be provided for these efforts. Tax
authorities of several governments may engage in simultaneous or joint
audits of selected enterprises.
(b) Seek to harmonize the withholding tax on portfolio investment in the
various countries.
(c) Seek to harmonize other national tax laws, especially those affecting
foreign investment.
(d) Take steps to combat the abuse of agreements for the avoidance of
double taxation.
29. International agreements are to provide for common actions against en-
terprises that misuse tax havens. For purposes -of this paragraph, tax havens
are defined as countries or areas with many or all of the following character-
istics: low taxes, little or no exchange control, bank secrecy, no exchange of fiscal
data with foreign authorities, a developed banking system, and political stability.
The agreements are to provide for coordinated international action against such
enterprises, such as denial of the right to open new facilities in the countries
that are parties to these agreements, or denial of tax deductions for payments to
tax haven countries in computing tax due to any of the countries which are
parties to the agreements, or elimination of the withholding tax on portfolio
investment for all investors except those giving tax haven countries as their
residence.
30. The agreements are to provide for establishment of effective international
mechanisms for the settlement of tax disputes.
31. The agreements are to provide safeguards and penalties to protect against
the inappropriate and indiscriminate use by governments of tax information
provided to them.
32. The agreements are to provide for the elimination of undue secrecy sur-
rounding reporting of income by banks and others in all countries.
Explanatory note.-Such secrecy is not justified and is harmful to the legiti-
mate revenue interests of all countries.
33. The agreements are to provide for coordinated action by government tax
authorities instead of unlateral corrective action. Such coordinated action may
include penalties for violations of principles established by the agreements and
by special agreements among the various countries.
Explanatory note.-Unilateral corrective action in tax areas such as financial
secrecy, determination of transfer prices, or action against tax haven holding
companies could result in flights of capital to other countries. This provision
envisions coordinated action under these international agreements to prevent
adverse consequences which could result frem unilateral action and to effec-
tively eliminate the non-taxation of income.
34. Measures for corporate or shareholder tax relief or integration of corporate
and personal income tax systems currently being implemented or studied are to
be modified or reconsidered so as to prevent discrimination against foreign
shareholders.
Explanatory notc.-Tax relief or integration measures which discriminate
against foreign shareholders are not compatible with the free flow of invest-
ment, and thus should be modified or reconsidered.
35. The agreements are to provide for the elimination of discrimination in tax
treatment against foreign-based enterprises by governments using any method of
tax assessment, including the unitary method.
Explanatory note.-Under the unitary method, a multinational enterprise is
taxed on the basis of its consolidated profit, and the profit assigned to a particu-
lar firm by government tax authorities is based on the firm's sales in a country
or state and its assets and employment there. There are some indications that






19


this method of taxing is being administered inequitably with regard to foreign-
based enterprises.
36. Transfer prices are defined as the prices applied in transactions which take
place within an enterprise. The following provisions applicable to transfer prices
of goods apply equally to transfer prices of services, including financial services
and payments for the use of technical know-how, trademarks, and patents.
37. Government authorities are to supervise transfer prices and act against
enterprises employing transfer price practices directed at avoiding taxation.
Explanatory note.-Transactions within multinational enterprises (between
subsidiaries of the same enterprise or between a subsidiary and the parent com-
pany) constitute an important part of international trade. Fixing the prices for
these operations gives multinationals possibilities that firms with establishments
in only one country may not have, and may put multinationals in a position to
make more profit. A multinational enterprise can have various reasons for set-
ting a transfer price different from the price applicable to a sale from the firm to
another independent firm. An enterprise with operations in various countries
seeks to declare the highest possible profit in countries with low taxation levels
and to keep declared profit low in countries with high taxation levels. Multi-
national enterprises may also seek to set transfer prices such that more profit
goes to wholly owned subsidiaries than to firms in which they have only part
interest. Multinationals may use transfer price setting to achieve low profits or
losses in countries where subsidiaries face important wage negotiations. Stability
of currency in the country of establishment, exchange control, and risk of na-
tionalization are also factors here.
38. The agreements are to provide for establishment of rules for transfer pric-
ing and a mechanism for determining appropriate transfer prices.
Explanatory note.-Such rules can be based on the arms length principle, the
cost-plus basis, a comparison of reported transfer prices with prices of similar
goods delivered during a recent period of time or goods delivered at another lo-
cation at about the same time, or a comparison of the profit or loss margin on
the goods with average profits and losses on similar goods sold by other firms.
39. Governments must apply whatever taxing methods are employed to tax
various enterprises on an equitable basis, so as not to discriminate.
Explanatory note.-Governments may sometimes tax firms which use transfer
pricing by taxing at a figure higher than reported profit where the latter figure
is judged too low. Whatever method is employed must be applied in a non-dis-
criminatory manner.

CAPITAL MARKET POLICY AND MONETARY POLICY
40. Multinational enterprises are to respect the balance of payments and the
monetary and credit objectives of parent and host countries.
41. Consideration is to be given to requiring banks in countries which are par-
ties to these agreements to regularly inform the central banks of their countries
of domicile of their forward exchange positions. Information is to be supplied
monthly and is to cover all capital movements within the enterprise. These regu-
lations are to be expanded to apply to all countries of the European Community
and the United States and to all enterprises of significant size.
Explanatory note.-It is desirable for monetary authorities to have accurate
data on international capital movements. The procedure set forth here follows
that currently used in some European countries.
42. Government authorities are to avoid unduly restrictive capital controls and
are to consult and cooperate in doing so.
43. Enterprises are to allow residents of host countries to acquire their shares.
Agreements can provide that a foreign enterprise having recourse to the capital
market in the host country must do so partly through an increase in its equity
capital available to host country nationals.

SOCIAL POLICY AND LABOR MARKET POLICY
44. Multinational enterprises are to afford representatives of the workers the
opportunity to hold consultations with management responsible for the policy of
the firm. Group works councils or other appropriate labour representatives must
be allowed to negotiate directly with the central management. Alternatively, the
management of the national firm is to provide the workers with all information
relevant to their well-being and working conditions and to act with the necessary
autonomy.







20


Explanatory notc.-This paragraph focuses on the situation often present
where trade unions of a country have to deal with management having only lim-
ited powers.
45. As a rule, at least one host country national is to have a seat on the man-
agement board of a firm that is part of a multinational enterprise.
46. Enterprises are to inform and consult with workers in good time on mat-
ters affecting them. In the event of mass layoffs, workers are to have an impor-
tant voice in drawing up the labour phase-out plans. Enterprises involved in
znergers are to guarantee retention of pension and other acquired rights. In
cases of industrial labour disputes, operations carried out in some parts and
branches of an enterprise are not to be taken over by other parts or branches
of the same enterprise in order to thwart the legitimate and legal objectives
of workers.
47. Multinational enterprises are to recognize trade unions, workers' bargain-
ing units, direct representatives of the staffs (work councils), or other duly con-
stituted workers' organizations as contractual partners in negotiations on wage
agreements and the fixing of work conditions of the workers employed in a firm.
Steps are to be taken to establish the framework for internationally valid col-
lective bargaining agreements.
48. Multinational enterprises are to observe national and local employment and
industrial relations laws, standards, and practices.
49. Multinational enterprises are to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex,
age. religion, race, ethnic or national origin, or political activity.
50. Firms are to provide jobs in the host country for host country citizens.
Local nationals are to have seats on the management bodies of firms or
subsidiaries.
TECHNOLOGY
51. Multinational enterprises are to add to local scientific and technological
capabilities and are to permit the dissemination of technological know-how on
reasonable terms.
PERNICIOUS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
52. Multinational enterprises shall not make or be solicited to make payments
in money or other items of value to host government officials, other than for
manifest public purposes. Multinational enterprises shall not contribute to po-
litical parties or candidates in any way unless such contributions are lawful and
details on the amounts and beneficiaries are disclosed in a timely manner.
Explanatory note.-This provision is aimed at preventing multinational enter-
prises from attempting to exercise undue influence over host country policies.
53. Governments are to adopt strong penalties for violations of the foregoing
prohibition. Penalties may include any of the following: denial of a business tax
deduction for any such unlawful payments; heavy fines and/or prison sentences,
and the denial of normal business tax treatment and benefits to any business
income connected with such unlawful payments.
54. Member governments which have concluded an international agreement
covering pernicious political activities are to assume an active role in sharing
with other governments involved any information they have on any such activity
perpetrated by officials of an enterprise or by government officials.












Wednesday, September 22, 1976


SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

SESSION II. POLITICAL DISCUSSION
(Working Documents by Mr. Hougardy, Mr. Crane, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Broeksz,
Mr, Schuijt, Mr. Stewart)1
General Theme: "How can the United States and the Euro-
pean Community, through political and economic relations
with other countries, try to promote democratic development
and respect for human rightss"
Mr. Findley welcomed Mr. Georges Spenale, President of the Euro-
pean Parliament.
Mr. Spenale informed members about the important decision of the
Council of the EC of September 20, 1976, concerning direct elections
to the European Parliament to be held in May/June 1978. He under-
lined the historic importance of this long awaited step toward Euro-
pean integration. "The European Parliament is from now on a parlia-
mentary assembly in transition preparing the structure for the
growing tasks of the future," he said.
Summarizing his prepared paper, Mr. Hougardy emphasized that
if the United States and EC are confident that democracy provides
the best guarantee of human rights, that belief should be reflected in
external economic policy. In an interdependent world, however, politi-
cal Jifferences should not be allowed to disrupt trade. Economic devel-
opment assistance should not be confined only to loyal allies but also
to countries critical of Western society provided they demonstrate a
commitment to human rights. Where there seems to be a reasonable
chance of success, economic pressure might be used towards achieving
the release of political prisoners as well. as the furthering of emigra-
tion for example. The United States and EC could encourage progress
towards democracy by showing that they were generous in economic
relations with poor countries and that they were able to adapt readily
to changes in the world economy.

NEW ORGANIZATION PROPOSED
Mr. Crane, in a discussion paper entitled "Promoting Free Insti-
tutions in the Postwar World: The U.S. Role," proposed the forma-
tion of an Association of Freedom-Loving Nations, organizationally
patterned along the line of the Council of Europe but with a world-
wide geographic base. Characterizing the United Nations as an in-
effective and unacceptable vehicle for promoting democracy, Mr.

1 See pp. 25-42.


(2-1)





22


Crane suggested the Association as an alternative with a more re-
stricted membership. It would be committed to the promotion of
human rights and limited self-government and support of the free
world against the forces of communism. There would be two categories
of membership: full membership for nations with a proven record of
guaranteeing individual rights; and associate membership for those
nations who do not meet the requirements for full membership but
which are nonaggressive and anti-Communist.
Mr. Fraser referred to his prepared paper as background material
and distributed two additional sheets-a record of congressionally
initiated legislative acts concerning human rights in U.S. foreign
policy, and eight proposals for promotion of human rights for the
European Parliament and U.S. Congress. He then made several
points:
In the present-day lexicon of international policies, the term "demo-
cratic government" cannot be equated with the concept of full enjoy-
ment of human rights. In a number of non-Communist one-party
states, for example, there are strong limitations on free expression. The
United States and EC cannot presume to instruct these nations on
democracy, since this can develop only through an evolutionary proc-
ess. The United States and EC can, however, demonstrate to them
that democracy can work and help them build their economies so that
nationhood can survive.
GRADATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS
There are gradations of human rights with some rights more widely
accepted than others, such as rights against torture, arbitrary arrest
and unreasonably prolonged detention. Many governments are willing
to concede that they place restrictions on press freedom, for example,
but none will admit to the practice of torture. This at least shows
that they regard torture as an unacceptable practice in the world,
even though they may engage in it themselves. Congressional efforts
have set guidelines for U.S. policy which concentrate on such funda-
mental violations.
The United States and EC should work together with others to reach
common views as to how to proceed in protecting these fundamental
human rights. He referred to the list of eight proposals he had dis-
tributed and made specific mention of two: a proposal for an interna-
tional parliamentarians' newsletter on human rights for the exchange
of information and coordination of parliamentary efforts in defense of
human rights worldwide; and a proposal for facilitating active coop-
eration among democratic political parties by convening an annual
world continuance on human rights, and establishing a permanent sec-
retariat. Regarding the latter proposal, he reported that meetings have
been held among some of the major world organizations of democratic
parties, and that another meeting is scheduled for December 4 in New
York for the purpose of planning the first world conference in spring,
1977. He also proposed establishing some kind of international pro-
tective organization for parliamentarians who fall victim to govern-
ment repression.





23


EXAMPLES OF GREECE
Mr. Broeksz complimented Mr. Fraser's statement, voicing agree-
ment with its emphasis on the worst violations against the person. lHe
asserted that one must be willing to pay, economically, if one is to fight
violation of human rights, and noted that the EC had indeed done so
in the case of Greece under the military junta when the EC "froze"
the implementation of economic agreements with Greece. He expressed
the hope that by concentrating on a few of the worst human rights
violations, more progress might be achieved. He laid special emphasis
on the necessity of fighting against the application of torture in Chile,
Arogentine and Uruguay.
Ir. Stewart noted that although many nonalined nations suspect
that industrial democracies are latently racist because of policies in
southern Africa, the western democracies should not be shy proclaim-
ing their democratic convictions. Next year's Belgrade conference to
review the progress of the Helsinki agreements might be a good op-
portunity to contrast these democracies' adherence to human rights
with the double standard employed by repressive governments who
criticize the democracies in international forums such as the United
Nations.
REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
He argued for efforts by the industrial democracies to bring about a
redistribution of the world's wealth through increasing aid and trade.
He emphasized importance of a settlement for majority rule in Rho-
desia, and in response to points made by Mr. Crane. asserted that Rho-
desia is an opportunity for the free world nations to promote freedom.
Speaking in more general terms Mr. Stewart stressed the need for
joint action by parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic to put
pressure on their governments to act in these areas.
iMr. Schuijt proposed that for the next meeting, a joint U.S.-EC text
be prepared on the promotion of human rights and democracy and that
as of now we should start talking of practical problems. The text, to be
worked out by four or five American and European Parliamentarians
should contain specific proposals for both the long and short term. He
generally agreed with the Fraser proposals, noting that while they
cover action by parliamentarians, political parties and governments,
perhaps the possibility for most rapid action is in parliaments.

AN APPROPRIATE THEME
Mr. Couste said that emphasis on human rights and democracy is a
most suitable theme for the 10th U.S. Congress-European Parliament
meeting. Human rights should not be viewed in theoretical terms, but
must be considered in the political and economic context.
First of all, Europeans and Americans must insure that human
rights are respected in their own countries, and that whatever sacri-
fices may be made for European union, that union must always protect
and promote freedom; nor should Eastern Europe be forgotten-the
Soviets fear freedom in Europe.


79-069-77-5





24


He complimented Mr. Fraser's proposals and the example set by the
U.S. Congress in international human rights legislation. The Helsinki
agreements should not be ignored, but should be a permanent point of
reference. The proposals made by Mr. Fraser should be followed up by
the European Parliament.
Mr. Nolan expressed the hope that Secretary Kissinger's diplomacy
in southern Africa would succeed and signal a reversal of the Ameri-
can tendency to spend great efforts on security but not enough on
democracy. He spoke favourably of Mr. Fraser's proposals but hoped
that success against the worst violations of human rights would not
divert attention from other violations.
He judged that military aid could only support continued repres-
sion in offending regimes, and that such aid should be opposed for
these cases. He discussed the possibilities of and limits to politico-
economic boycotts, and considered that such action could be effective
when carried out with the support of international organizations such
as the United Nations, and the support of regional groups such as
the European Community.
He asked which rights should we seek to protect, and how should
we determine when these rights have been violated. He agreed with
Mr. Broeksz's suggestions, and supported efforts to protect human
rights worldwide, not only by moral leadership but also by practical
actions.
Mr. Johnson pointed out the differences between diplomatic rela-
tions, support and intervention, and cautioned against acting as if "we
are God's chosen children."
THE SECURITY DILEMMA
Mr. Solarz spoke on the dilemma between security interests and the
defense of human rights. If the survival of a regime is not vital to the
West, then it should be isolated politically and economically, but if
its survival is vital to the West then some special leverage should be
used. He noted that the impact of leverage on human rights practices
is often limited and the United States does not have a record of
effectiveness.
He cited South Korea as a particular dilemma, and stressed military
balance of power considerations in human rights questions. Geo-
political interests, he said, sometimes need the support of repressive
regimes.
Mr. Jahn welcomed the Fraser proposals, stressed the need for joint
action by the Western democracies, both in general and specifically
in regard to implementation of the Helsinki agreements. He urged
that there be a group to report regularly on human rights for the
meetings of the European Parliament and U.S. Congress. He speci-
fically treated the aspect of the implementation of "basket III," of the
Helsinki agreements and expressed his deep concern about the state
of affairs in this field.
[Discussion continues next day.]













PAPERS

THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Paper by N. Hougardy

If we are confident that, despite its shortcomings, democracy provides the best
guarantee of fundamental human rights, our belief should be reflected in a
sector as important as our external economic policy.
The United States and the European Community would certainly be wrong to
attempt to "export" their particular form of democracy, for it may very well not
meet the specific needs of countries with different economic and social struc-
tures. It would also be a mistake for industrialized democratic countries to
refuse to trade with countries whose form of government does not accord exactly
with western concepts of democracy.
However, it would be just as dangerous to advocate strict separation of politi-
cal and economic affairs. Firstly, because we cannot profess our commitment to
the principles of democracy whilst abandoning them in the trade policies we
pursue towards other countries. Secondly, because it is in the interests of the
United States and the European Community that as many countries as possible
adopt democratic institutions. In a world characterized by an increasingly close
interdependence among nations, the fact that a great many countries have simi-
lar political systems-although no guarantee in itself-could, perhaps more than
anything else, do much to prevent serious conflicts and sudden disruption of
trade through arbitrary political decisions.

DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMICS
It is thus perfectly legitimate and indeed necessary for the United States and
the European Community to make every effort to promote wider acceptance of
democratic ideals throughout the world and harness their trade policies to the
achievement of this objective, especially since in doing so they are likely, in the
long run, to serve their own economic interests.
Once we are agreed on this general principle, we have to give it substance, for
its practical application, far from tolerating any dogmatism, often calls for
delicate judgment. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to formulate certain guide-
lines for the policies of the United States and the Community in this area
(bearing in mind that the Community-an economic giant but a political dwarf,
as the well-known saying has it-still does not always act as one) :
(1) Our countries should beware of restricting aid to unconditional allies (cf.
the United States' experience during the Dulles period). There is no reason at
all why we should not cooperate closely with countries that are very critical
of our types of society and that have chosen a different approach, provided their
systems are based on respect for human rights.
(2) In instances where closer economic ties between the United States or the
Community on the one hand and a third country on the other have far-reaching
political implications for our countries, much more rigorous criteria must of
course be applied. This is a topical issue in the Community, since several Mediter-
ranean countries have expressed the wish to join it. The Community cannot afford
to accept as new members countries with shaky democratic institutions. Such a
policy would not only jeopardize its reputation in the world, but might also slow
down the democratization of the decision-making process within the Community
and endanger its cohesion.
ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACY
(3) On the other hand, our countries should not fall into the error of isolating
countries in which a tendency toward a more democratic system is beginning to
(25)





26


emerge. We must give active economic support to such countries, which often
undergo difficult periods of transition between the collapse of a dictatorship and
the construction of a more or less solid democratic foundation.
(4) In some specific cases, economic or commercial pressure can bring signif-
icant results in human terms (for example release of political prisoners). Our
governments should use such methods wherever they stand a reasonable chance
of success. By the same token, they should, as a rule, refrain from concluding
trade agreements with governments that do not respect fundamental rights and
they should not hesitate to "freeze" the implementation of existing agreements
if the partner resorts to political repression.
(5) However, it is clear that the United States and the Community should
concentrate their efforts on a policy which systematically promotes economic
interpenetration in the world and consequently growing interdependence. As it
is, Europe already has to rely to a very large extent on the developing countries
for its supply of raw materials; the United States' dependence is less pronounced,
which explains their different attitude at UNCTAD IV. But it is in the interest
of both that dependence should give way to interdependence.

TWO PROPOSALS
How can we encourage progress in that direction? There are basically two
ways:
First and foremost, by showing that our democratic systems are capable of
bringing about a fairer economic order and a more equitable distribution of
wealth. The West will only be able to sell its political institutions to other coun-
tries insofar as it shows generosity in its economic and commercial relations with
deprived countries (in the long run, such a policy can only benefit the wealthy
countries as well).
Secondly, by showing that our democracies are flexible and capable of reacting
quickly to changes in the world's economy. Thus our policy of cooperation will
have to be adapted to the changing contexts of underdevelopment. Too often the
developing countries are still thought of as a monolithic block, whereas in fact
their standards of living and rates of growth differ quite significantly. The
economies of many countries which fifteen years ago undoubtedly belonged, with-
out a doubt, to the developing world, have progressed to such a degree that they
are now more or less self-sufficient. I am thinking of countries such as Iran,
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, China, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Mexico,
Brazil, Morocco and Malaysia. They alone account for approximately 45% of the
population of all the developing countries. The problem of underdevelopment
actually breaks down into a number of separate problems-raw material costs.
energy, food supply and national debts-which divide countries into a series of
interest groups, the composition of which varies from one case to the next.














PROMOTING FREE INSTITUTIONS IN THE POSTWAR WORLD:
THE U.S. ROLE

Paper by Philip M. Crane
Since World War II, United States efforts to promote liberty and free insti-
tutions have earned it everything from the title "leader of the free world" to
the sobriquet "policeman of the universe." Actually, while well-intentioned, it
has vacillated between idealism and pragmatism, frequently forgetting idealism
alone is often self-defeating while pragmatism alone goes contrary to American
ideals.
Actually, this vacillation has deep historical roots. On the one hand, Ameri-
cans, having sponsored their own revolution for freedom and independence and
having prospered under a republican form of government for 200 years, are
deeply committed to the idea that freedom is preferable to tyranny and self-
government superior to dictatorship. On the other hand, Americans, as a result
of being first a weak nation and then simply an isolated one. cultivated the
philosophy of "live and let live." Thomas Jefferson reflected the early view in his
first inaugural address when he said that the United States was interested
in ". . peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling
alliances with none." Later generations simply said, "if we can do it on our
own so can others and there is no reason for us to get involved." But these two
somewhat disparate tendencies merged at a time of crih-is; once a consensus
developed that U.S. security was threatened, then idealism and experience conm-
bined to produce the axiom, "if you are going to fight, fight to win as quickly
as possible." Americans have never been ones for long, drawn out conflicts with
ill-defined goals.
TUE AMERICAN CHARACTER
These elements of the American character can clearly be seen in the U.S.
Civil War and in U.S. involvement in the two world wars. The Civil War was,
above all else, a clash between ideas and ideals with slavery being the catalytic
issue. As Abraham Lincoln put it in his famous "House Divided" speech of
June 16, 1858, ". . This government cannot endure, permanently half slave and
half free." By 1861, enough people either agreed or disagreed strongly enough to
plunge the nation into a war that ended not in compromise but in victory for
the anti-slavery forces. But, in the aftermath, the victors, rather than sticking
with one consistent approach, vacillated between conflicting policies with the
result being the worst of both.
In World War I, the United States did not get involved until it believed
its security threatened, but then it justified its intervention "to make the world
safe for democracy" rather than on more pragmatic grounds. Yet, once having
helped win the war, the United States again lost taste for involvement, opting
out of the League of Nations and, more importantly, standing aloof from the
ineffective efforts to halt aggression in the 1930's.
As for World War II, the United States remained true to form by (1) waiting
until its security was truly threatened before becoming involved, (2) invoking
the "Four Freedoms" to justify concentrating on Hitler, (3) insisting on victory
instead of a negotiated settlement, and (4) once again proving itself less capable
of winning the peace than the war. With regard to the last, historians may well
marvel a century from now at how a nation, at the time omnipotent, could let
the opportunity of achieving lasting world peace slip through its grasp. By
failing to insist on Soviet compliance with agreements governing the postwar
world, the United States not only set back the cause of peace but encouraged
the development of an ideological dichotomy similar to the one that had prompted
the holocaust in the first place.
Warnings of that dichotomy were not long in coming. Speaking in Fulton,
Missouri, March 5, 1946, that renowned freedom fighter, Sir Winston Churchill,
pointed out that an "iron curtain" had descended from the Baltic to the Adriatic
(27)






28

*and called for both a fraternal organization of English-speaking nations and a
"new unity in Europe" to promote the cause of peace and democracy. Elaborat-
ing later in a speech at Zurich University, in September 1946, Churchill urged
the creation of some kind of a "United States of Europe", and warned that
"time may be short," if another holocaust were to be prevented. As before, his
counsel was wise.
S AGAINST ISOLATIONISM
As we know, events in Greece, Turkey, and Eastern Europe, plus the closing
off of Berlin, helped convince the United States, albeit reluctantly, to counter
its return to isolationism and to move to protect freedom in those European na-
tious where it had not already been lost. The Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift,
and timely aid to both Greece and Turkey not only forestalled further communist
advances in Europe but laid the groundwork for NATO. The latter, I think
most will agree, has been effective-both as a military deterrent to communist
aggression and a political tool for the promotion of democratic ideals. The
development of the European Economic Council and the Council of Europe would
have been less likely had there not been a degree of security upon which to
base their efforts.
A fair reading of history suggests, however, that much of the credit given
to the United States for protecting European democracy should be at least
shared with the Europeans themselves. True, the United States provided mili-
tary protection and economic assistance but, acting on both the advice of
Churchill (and others) and a common commitment to the principles of demo-
cratic government, Europe staged a political and economic renewal unparalled
in recorded history. By contrast, many other nations receiving U.S. aid but
lacking the same commitment to democratic institutions, have made less progress
while coming to take the aid for granted and their benefactor for a ride.

MORAL BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY
From the combination of circumstances, one might argue that either the U.S.
got too involved or not involved enough. But, for a country whose foreign policy
historically has been based on morality rather than power politics, both argu-
iments miss the mark. The key factor in postwar history is not just the extent
of U.S. involvement but the objectives and rationales for it. Thus, any U.S.
postwar policy which did not have, as an ultimate objective, the triumph of free-
dom over totalitarianism, was not only limited in what it could expect to accom-
plish but was subject to an erosion of domestic support. Unfortunately, neither
the "policy of containment," nor the more recent policy of "detente" met these
twin tests. The former, by settling for something less than victory, failed on
one count; the latter, by downplaying both the concept of victory and the sig-
nificance of ideological differences, failed on both counts, with predictable
results. What happened, or did not happen, in Angola is an excellent case in
point.
As long as the United States continues, or is encouraged to continue, "detente"
as we now know it. the prospects are that the nation will become less rather than
more involved in the effort to promote freer institutions. Richard Rosecrance,
writing in the April 1975 issue of "Foreign Affairs," explains it best this way:
"Whatever the merits of the detente policy, the political costs it imposes
cannot ultimately be borne. Congress and the American public can understand
and support a policy which clearly discriminates friend from foe. They can
accept a policy of non-intervention and reliance upon allies. But they can neither
understand nor fully accept a policy that switches back and forth; now balanc-
ing for one state, now for another . ."
:ILLUSION OF DETENTE

The real irony of all this is that, while the United States thronuh detentee"
is putting ideology second to pragmatism and losing ground, the Soviet Union
is interpreting and using'the samnie policy to further its ideology throughout the
world. For these trends to change, the United State.s. and its free world allies will
have to realize that. given the current Soviet disposition, promoting freedom and
pursuing detente are mutually incompatibe. The first requires a commitment to
the cause and recognition of its foes; the second suggests the absence of both.






29


The policy of detente has, likewise, had another unsettling effect. By mini-
mizing communism as a threat, and treating it as just another economic system,
the United States and others have ever more frequently allowed themselves to
be put in the hypocritical and paradoxical position of treating enemies of the
free world as friends and friends of the free world as enemies-all in the name
of human rights. It makes absolutely no sense whatever to support sanctions or
penalties against Rhodesia, South Korea, or South Africa at the same time onie is
supporting most-favored-nation status for Romania or improved relations for
the Soviet Union. Imperfect as conditions may be in Southern Africa or South
Korea, insofar as human rights are concerned, they are far better than in places
like Cuba, Red China, the Soviet Union or some of the third-world nations such
as Uganda. Moreover, we should not fail to remind ourselves, or those nations
clamoring loudest about majority rule and human rights, that of the 38 "Black
Majority" governments in Africa, 33 are actually one-party states and many
are out and out dictatorships. It is not the U.S. and its free world allies that
should worry about a double standard; it is those raising the issue for their own
political advantage.
This is not to condone certain practices of certain free world nations or to
suggest that they not be urged to open up their institutions to permit fuller
participation by all their citizens. Quite the contrary. Rather, it is an effort to
put the matter in its proper perspective. If, by miscalculation or malappreciation
of the principal threat to human liberty in the area and in the world, we aid
or abet the takeover of these governments by those even less democratic or more
communistic, we will ultimately defeat ourselves. No matter how noble or well-
intentioned, such a policy can only benefit the Kremlin and not those people
it is intended to help. In this context then, idealism, to be meaningful must be
tempered with a certain amount of realism.

AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Nowhere is the aforementioned double standard more frequently urged or
applied than at the United Nations. Regrettably, universality of membership
(with a few exceptions) has not meant universal adherence to the principles of
human rights as called for in Article I of the U.N. Charter. Instead, the way
things are working out, human rights are something for communist nations to
advocate but never practice while in free nations they must be scrupulously prac-
ticed but never advocated. So, while the organization has a certain limited use-
fulness as a debating forum, we must look elsewhere for institutions that can
promote freedom and combat threats to it simultaneously.
What sort of an institution? Well, from the standpoint of encouraging U.S.
participation, it should meet three criteria. First, its primary objective should
be the ideal for which the United States has fought so often in the past-the
promotion of self-government and the protection of life, liberty, and property.
Secondly, to allay popular fears about entangling foreign alliances and to avoid
many of the problems that have plagued the U.N., membership should be selec-
tive and voluntary. Thirdly, the goal should be the triumph of the ideal, not co-
existence with a contradictory philosophical system. Adherence to these criteria
should not only provide a vehicle for the United States and its European friends
to promote self-government and human rights but should provide a ray of hope
for people in communist and third world nations where the very mention of the
word "freedom" is likely to land the speaker in a prison camp or worse.
Realistically speaking, an organization based on these criteria should have
appeal for European and other pro-western nations. In fact, the Council of
Europe, with its voluntary but restricted membership and its proven commit-
ment to human rights, may well prove to be a useful model for creating what I
would call, for lack of a better term, "An Association of Freedom-Loving
Nations."
ASSOCIATION REQUIREMENTS
In practice, such an association should only include those nations who want to
join and who have a form of government that (1) protects freedom of speech,
press, association and religion; (2) guarantees the right to a fair trial, prefer-
ably by jury; (3) holds elections for public office holders; (4) protects the right
to property; and (5) ensures its citizens due process and equal protection under
the law. A preliminary but inconclusive survey suggests that member nations, if
they wished to join, would include the U.S., Canada, most Western European na-






30


tions, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan and perhaps Venezuela but would
exclude, for the time being at least, South Africa, South Korea, India, Rhodesia,
the Philippines, Spain, and most Latin American nations and the third world
dictatorships in Africa and the Middle East.
Since, to be effective, the focus of the organization cannot be restricted to pro-
moting limited self-government but must extend to its corollary, the combatting
of aggressive dictatorships that seek to extend their influence over other parts
of the world, I would also propose another class of membership-associate mem-
bership-for those nations which do not fully meet the tests outlined above but
which are not aggressive and which support the free world against the forces of
communism. Not only would such a category enable active member nations to co-
operate, in the common interest, with those nations which may be opposed to the
spread of communism but may not meet all membership requirements, but it
would give the latter an extra incentive to speed up their efforts to meet the re-
quirements. As an aside, I might note the incentive factor works both ways; the
more effective the Association is the stronger the incentive to join.

A COMMISSION AND COURT
If nations must meet standards to obtain admission then it stands to reason
that, under threat of suspension or expulsion, they should have to maintain those
standards to keep their membership (or associate membership) in good stand-
ing. Perhaps the best way to handle this would be in a fashion somewhat to that
employed by the Council of Europe which has, as a prime goal, the protection and
promotion of those rights I have previously mentioned. A Commission. consisting
of elected representatives from Member states, would be assigned the responsi-
bility of investigating allegations and filing charges which would then be referred
to a Special Court which, in turn, would have the responsibility for adjudica-
tion and recommendation of penalty. The exact manner in which the Commission
and the Court were established would, of course, be something the charter states
would have to resolve at the outset.
As for the rest of the mechanics, the basic operating premise would be that of
voluntary cooperation rather than any compromise of national sovereignty
(which is neither desirable nor workable). Decisions would be made on the basis
of a majority vote of the member states, but an individual state would not be
bound to participate in the implementation of the decision. And, while the em-
phasis would be on persuasion rather than compulsion, there would be a basik:
understanding at the outset that an attack against one member nation by the
forces of totalitarianism would be viewed as an attack against all. This would help
establish the parameters of decision-making, discourage aggression, and focus
attention on the principal threat to freedom in the world today-imperialistic
communism.
Obviously, there would be certain difficulties in establishing effective organiza-
tion of this nature but, in theory at least, the common philosophical bonds
between member states should go much further than geography or universality
in promoting concerted action in the face on continuing challenges to free
institutions. Once established, the Association would be able to mobilize world
opinion on behalf of basic democratic values on a scale heretofore unknown.
As Winston Churchill so eloquently put it in his Fulton, Missouri, speech:
"* * the people of any country have the right and should have the power
of constitutional action by free unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose
or change the character or form of government under which they dwell; that
freedom of speech and thought should reign, that courts of justice independent
of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have
received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and
custom. ** Let us preach what we practise-let us practise what we preach."

BEHIND IRON CURTAIN
Given the alternative we see before us, do we dare not pursue any avenue that
might help us protect those institutions we hold so dear? Regardless of the out-
come, the effort will not go unnoticed. At the very least, the self-appointed critics
who claim free world nations are guilty of a double standard on human rights
will be effectively rebutted and, with God's help, we can do much more. Not
only can pressure be brought to bear on behalf of those systematically denied
basic human rights behind the Iron Curtain but, as previously mentioned, those








governments in the free world not fully committed to individual liberty and self-
government for their own people will be encouraged to refine their position.
Of course, there is always the possibility that an Association of Freedom-
Loving Nations would succumb to the temptation of dealing only with infractions
of human rights occurring in free world nations, despite the provision for asso-
ciae ,m ebsh ips whjih 1is designed to deal with just such a situation. One can
0q4t~npeo tn14 t:te Assoqiatiob.woupd. n6o succumb to sucrh atempation, or even
let uci4Wideint takd 'ircedrnie ovet the far more blatait violattions thit.occur
behind the Iron Curtain, for such a course wiiul% coistitbite i classic exanhple of
cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. It is in this area, particularly, that
idealism must be accompanied U1 ah eleimeit of pragmatismin if the result is not
to be self-defeating.
S ; LtfitRTY AND UNITY
'* II ;. 1, I ,$ I :.
The famous Spanish philosopller, Salvador de Madariaga, once ptit the
challenge tacirig the ftee world intb the most succinct .terms. "The trouble today,"
Mid Madariaga, "is.that the Coqnmm.unist. world understands unity but not liberty,
while the free world understands liberty but not unity." "Eventual victory,"?' he
continued, 'may be won by the first of the two sides to. achieve the synthesis of
bbth liberty and ,bnity." Tb that can only bie added the thought thdt it is eani
td have peoee without liberty, btut without liberty, what value is peace?
.. In hopes of achL6ving that syntheqis there is everything to gain atitl little to
lnab by moving forfalrd VWith .the. establishmedt of an Askociation of Freedorn-
Loving Natioxis. As fortuer Confgressfman Walter Judd put iti paraphraSirig thLe
famous words, of Abraham Lincbln In 1858, "the widrld cannot cbntinui hilf
slave And half free."


79-069-76---6













THE U.S. ROLE IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD: "HAS DEMOC-
RACY BEEN PROMOTED OR NEGLECTED AND WHAT ARE THE
LESSONS FOR FUTURE POLICY?"

Paper by Donald M. Fraser
A simple statement of my views on this subject would be that since the
end of World War II United States foreign policy has both promoted and ne-
glected democracy in the world, and that the lesson to be drawn from that record
is that the United States should assign a higher priority to internationally
recognized standards of human rights in shaping United States policies toward
other nations.
For our purpose the term "human rights" might be more appropriate than
"democracy" because international law and diplomatic usage has come closer to
reaching a universal definition for human rights. "Democracy" continues to be
a label which the most widely divergent political systems insist is their own.
The United States entered World War I with the grand declaration that the
world had to be made safe for democracy, but after two decades of isolated
neutrality on the part of the United States, it was clear that democracy was
far from safe in the world. This time, however, our objectives were stated more
pragmatically, and we established a wartime alliance of sorts with a major
totalitarian state, the Soviet Union, with whom the United States and Britain
had one objective in common-the defeat of Hitler. Our attitude must have
been similar to that of Winston Churchill who, when told that the Nazis had
invaded the Soviet Union, is reported to have said that if Hitler were to invade
Hell, he (Churchill) could probably find something nice to say about the Devil!

YALTA PLEDGE BROKEN
This wvas the beginning of Western efforts to find common denominators with
the Soviets for the conduct of international relations. The Yalta Declaration for
a Liberated Europe, by which the Soviets pledged themselves to guarantee self-
determination through free elections in Eastern Europe, was broken and made
unenforceable by the presence of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe. But
during this same period the Soviets also committed themselves to certain stand-
ards in the observance of human rights as set forth in the United Nations
Charter. It is those standards-which all members of the United Nations are
obligated to uphold-that provide the grounds for active promotion of demo-
cratic values of human dignity in international relations.
Although governments object that criticism of their human rights practices
is an unwarranted interference in domestic affairs, the U.N. Charter clearly
states that "all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of a number of purposes
"which the United Nations shall promote," among them "universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Expanding on this, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted unanimously by the U.N. General
Assembly in 194S, with only the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia and South Africa
abstaining. The Declaration has been generally accepted as customary interna-
tional law, and contains 30 articles recognizing everything from "the right to
life, liberty and the security of the person," to the right to free international
movement and asylum, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
the right to work and free choice of employment, the right to an adequate stand-
ard of living and ou education, and the duty to exercise those rights and free-
doms with due respect for the rights and freedoms of others.
United States policies reflected these principles fully in the postwar recovery
programs for Western Europe and Japan. These were our biggest successes,
flowing from a beneficial convergence of interest in democratic and economic
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33


development with the security interest in containing communist expansion. Sub-
sequent mutual defense treaties with many other countries either made specific
reference to democratic institutions, or such a reference was made by U.S.
officials when explaining the rationale of the treaties.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
Many other U.S. policies have been consistent with support for democratic
principles and human rights. Economic assistance to developing countries has
included programs designed to foster the development of democratic institutions.
The United States has condemned South African apartheid and since 1962
has imposed an embargo on the sale or transfer of arms to South Africa. At the
United Nations, the United States was one of the principal sponsors of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for many years has supported
the creation of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The
United States refrained from recognizing the white minority regime of Ian
Smith in Rhodesia, and supported the imposition of economic sanctions against
that regime as provided by the U.N. Charter. The United States supported the
termination of South Africa's mandate over Namibia and the related opinion
of the International Court of Justice. More recently, in bilateral relations, the
United States terminated military assistance and sales, and placed a ceiling on
economic assistance to the military junta in Chile. Military assistance to Uru-
guay also was ended; And at the United Nations, the United States has urged
the adoption of a U.N. convention against terrorism; voted in favor of a Gen-
eral Assembly resolution condemning violations of human rights in Chile; pro-
posed a resolution calling for general amnesty for all political prisoners: fought
against the adoption of the General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with
racism; urged steps by the U.N. to implement the declaration on torture adopted
by the General Assembly in 1975; and voted for the 1975 omnibus resolution on
the status of women.
SAt the initiative of Congress, most-favored-nation trade status for the Soviet
Union was made conditional on liberalization of Soviet emigration policies; this
provision, however, provoked cancellation of the Soviet-American trade agree-
ment by the Soviet Union. Another legislative initiative resulted in an amend-
ment to our military assistance laws expressing the sense of Congress that the
President should deny military and economic assistance to any government
whibLh practices the imprisonment of citizens for political reasons. But in the
strongest legislative action thus far taken, Congress declared it is the policy
of the United States that no military assistance shall be extended to govern-
ments which consistently violate internationally recognized standards of human
rights, and the President is required to report to Congress on the human rights
situation in each country for which military assistance is being requested. Con-
gress, under this provision, may pass a special resolution to terminate military
assistance to any country, although the action is subject to the President's
approval. With- regard to South Korea, Congress directed the President to
express strong concern over the erosion of democracy in that country, although
military assistance is continuing.

OPPOSITION BY PRESIDENT
These actions by Congress have been taken despite the oppoistion of the Presi-
dent, and they reflect a distinct Congressional disenchantment over special sup-
portive relationships with repressive governments. In the name of anti-com-
munism, the United States has been nourishing supportive relationships with
governments whose systematic denial of fundamental freedoms approaches some
of the worst abuses of communist regimes. In case after case, the outcome of
such policies has been unsuccessful, as the following examples illustrate:
South Vietnam-where the government, unable to win the solid support
of its people, succumbed to a communist overthrow.
Greece-where the United States, alone among Western countries, per-
sisted in a special relationship that eventually yielded a major international
crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Portugal-where the collapse of colonialism and an anti-democratic gov-
ernment left a vacuum which created equally serious problems.
The present American relationships with the Park government in South Korea
and the Marcos government in the Philippines likewise may have ominous






34


implications for the future if repression continues unabated. During my visit
to Seoul last year, the Catholic Cirdinal of South Korea posed a'question to me
which is painful for Americans to hear: "Why is it that so many of the govern-
mients supported by the United States become so anti-democratic?"
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY
The U.S. State Department would say tlihat while we do not approve of the
repressive domestic policies of such gkovernmients, and make l Out disapproval
known to them quietly behind. clqoed doors, therp i really not miiuci we tan do
about it and that our security relationhips 1With them must be contfllied for
reasons quite apart from the nature Of LC4 governments. With this attittidk, the
United States has engaged in so-called "qestibilkitaln"' tactics scih ds the
conspiracy to subvert the free election process iW Chile. AMlh in the case of Abuth
Korea, the expressions, of U.S. official disapproval through quiet dijlbpaicy Aire
hardly likely to be taken seriously by the i Pdrk govrniient, wliet the White
House and State Department exert full strength in Wahington tb ensure that
Congress authorizes full military assistance to that re*i. If the Untditd ta.fe
does have an interest in the development of democratic institutions. In allied
countries, it seems to me that at some point some linkage must be madd between
that interest and our security policies. .
Coincidentally. such a linkage now seems apparent ini U.S. policy toward raism
in southern Africa where Secretary of State Kissinger haks iiuiched a major
diplomatic initiative which emphasizes majority rule ig o$dsia anibjl.
But for many years, the problems of white minority domw ahion there hdd been
accorded a low priority in U.S. policy. It -was .otly when fi. .IC- ,P-
tame the scene of Soviet-American confrontation that the UriteX StaiWuee az
tin active advocate for majority rule. Now it may be too little, too late aMd for
the wrong reasons. .
Although the U.S. has taken some commendable positions on liumaI nohts
in the United Nations through the years, our rcrorr on .rafiWcatlop f.4hP, n
rights conventions leaves a. grett deal to..le des red,; pn, we 4re,urt i1n str
behind our Western European allies in this regard. Ie have ra4t 0m s'v
Mdnventions. but have yet to ratify 28 other!, inqckding th4q Genonqe ,Trtat,
the Cotenant on Economic.. Social and Cnltural..]ights ahd i A.ve4ant on
Civil anmid Political Rights. We continue to equivocatp. op support for oii' trtN.
authorityy over Namibia and for the past five .ipars the Unite Sta4es has.beeu
in open violation of econolnic sanctions against ]Rhodesia by trading ln Rho4esiah
ch ro m e. ; "
LEiADERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES

Many opportunities for U.S. ieadersipin ik rfense of dtphdceatic inshtutlbni
and human rights still eisti, howeve'. After assuiihig a rdtliber Idw brofile toufdr
repression. in the Sorijt Vt'nion in the ome ft ltente, w e now ha4e a ciahtie
to work with our European friends for iImplenentatjiqn (f the Hlelsinki Accor1ds.
And even if it appears that reduction bof military ass.stg.nce. to repressive.i.ime....A
may not bring about a restoration of democracy, a reduction nonetheless wonilfl
have the affect of ending our coatribution to repression.
Some of Secretary KissinZer's rhetoric seems to point in the right direction. In
a speech in Minneapolis entitled "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy"., for
example, he said: .
"There is no longer any dispute that human rights are on the agenda of inter-
national diplomacy. . The great human rights must be recognized, respected
and given reality in the ti fairs of nations. . We have used. and will use. our
influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demanii
Our traditions and our interests do indeed demand it. It is time for that rhet-
oric to become reality.
ANNEX
HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?
Suggestions offered by Congressman Fraser:
(1) Publish an international parliamentarians' newsletter op human rights
issues for the exchange of information among parliamirentarians in order to:
identify important human rights issues and the positions taken by national gor-








ernments with respect to them; and propose and coordinate activities by par-
liamentarians regarding human rights issues.
(2) Facilitate active cooperation among democratic political parties in de-
fense of internationally recognized human rights by convening an annual world
conference of democratic party representatives and establishing a secretariat to
support activities of the project.
(3) Regarding human rights issues in the United Nations General Assembly
and U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the United States and the European
Community nations should engage in advance consultations designed to reach
agreement on jointly-supported positions, and carefully coordinate tactics aimed
at achieving a majority.
(4) The European Parliament and members of the U.S. Congress might con-
sider conducting joint study missions to countries where widespread human
rights abuses have been reported.
(5) Participants in human rights study missions of the European Parliament
could be invited to appear at Congressional hearings to report on their findings.
(6) The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament, respectively, should adopt
resolutions which take positions regarding human rights violations by govern-
ments.
(7) Members of Congress and the European Parliament should urge their gov-
ernments not to allow military assistance or sales, except in the most extraordi-
nary circumstances, to any government with a consistent record of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights.
(8) The agenda for meetings between the U.S. Congress and the European
Parliament should include discussions of topics such as implementation of the
Helsinki Accords, encouragement of democratic development in Spain, white
minority rule in southern Africa, and major problems of repression in individual
nations.














RESPONSIBILITIES, REALITIES AND QUESTIONS


Paper by J. B. Broeksz

Public opinion seems to be taking an increasing interest in the violation of
human rights. This would be an encouraging development if we did not at the
same time have to witness the generalized occurrence of degrading and inhuman
practices. The matter is so grave as to demand our serious and urgent attention.
Public opinion, our electors, our nations ought to be as well informed as possible
on the theme and discussions of our meeting and on the conclusions at which we
arrive.
CARRYING OUT OUR RESPONSIBILITY
The individual seems helpless when confronted by the enormous number of
violations of human rights. How could he possibly have the slightest influence on
a particular oppressive regime, particular emergency legislation, or a particular
case of injustice?
Certain organizations have begun to draw together men and women of good
will. One of them has grown considerably during its 15-year existence: Amnesty
International, a world-wide movement pledged to defend human rights, independ-
ent of any government, political affiliation or religious denomination. This orga-
nization, which has its international headquarters in London, has some forty
national branches and several tens of thousands of members in some sixty coun-
tries. Amnesty International operates impartially, working simultaneously in its
political prisoners' adoption groups, on behalf of prisoners in capitalist coun-
tries, others in Communist countries and yet others in developing countries.
The influence of this movement, and various others too, may be felt daily in
the press and at the level of the governments concerned. A large number of po-
litical prisoners have regained their freedom thanks to its initiatives. This net-
work of international solidarity is a model for world-wide humanitarian action.
Therefore we must declare once more what we all know to be true, that poli-
ticians bear a heavier responsibility in this field. They are consequently obliged
to associate themselves with any demonstration or organization whose objec-
tives are greater humanity; it is their duty to support these movements, to
help them directly and to champion their causes.

HUMAN RIGHTS: MERE IDEALS OR REALITIES TO BE PROTECTED?
A respect for human rights should spur Members of Parliament into action
when it is plain these rights are being violated. They should join forces on an
inter-party and international basis to declare as forcefully as possible that such
a crime or offence against humanity is intolerable. Human rights cannot remain
mere ideals, they must be attained to, protected and consolidated in an unceas-
ing struggle for greater humanity. But "political struggle" entails certain sacri-
fices. You cannot fight without committing certain resources and without being
ready to make certain sacrifices. A long discussion would, moreover, be necessary
to analyse the paradox whereby western industrialized nations spend enormous
sums of money to defend democracy against a possible attack from the East,
but are in practice unwilling to spend money to help or to set up democratic
governments in entire continents such as Africa or South America.
The following questions are often asked by the public, sometimes translated
into policies, generally pursued without much success, but none the less neces-
sary, I feel. If we are determined to put an end to activities which are intoler-
able from the point of view of democracy and human rights, as seen in this or
that country, could we not take the following measures:
Refuse to implement existing commercial treaties beyond the strict mini-
mum (as the EEC did when it suspended its relations with Greece under
the Colonels' regime)?
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37

Refuse to negotiate or conclude new trade agreements?
Initiate a total or partial boycott of goods imported from the countries
concerned?
Refuse to grant international loans?
I should be very grateful if these matters could be discussed so that we might
have a clear indication of the genuine will of those who are by definition the
supporters of democracy, and of the extent of the efforts and sacrifices which
they are ready to make.













POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS


Paper by W. J. Schuijt
The general theme chosen is appropriate for this, our tenth meeting, in a year
when the United States are celebrating the bicentenary of their independence. It
is an innovation which, it is to be hoped, will become a tradition. Our regular
meetings since 1972 are a model of interparliamentary work between the major
democracies of the developed countries and as such should be developed and
strengthened.
THE SHAME OF THE 20TH CENTURY
In its 1973 Report on Torture, Amnesty International states: "No-one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
mient. Article 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
The country-by-country survey in this report indicates that many states in the
world today deliberately use torture. Policemen, soldiers, doctors, scientists,
judges, civil servants, poiitici.-ins are involved in torture, whether in direct beat-
ing, examining victims, inventing new devices and techniques, sentencing pris-
oners on extorted false confessions, officially denying the existence of torture,
or using torture as a means of maintaining their power. And torture is not simply
an indigenous activity, it is international; foreign experts are sent from one
country to another, schoolsof torture explain and demonstrate methods, and mod-
ern torture equipment used in torture is exported from one country to an-
other. . An increasing number of states use torture as a means of governing.
Torture in those countries plays an integral role in the political system itself. Its
function is not only to generate confessions and information from citizens be-
lieved to oppose the government; it is used to deter others from expressing
opposition. For those who govern without the consent of the governed this has
proved to be an effective method of maintaining power. To set torture as the
price of dissent is to be assured that only a small minority will act. With the
majority neutralized by fear, the well-equipped forces of repression can con-
centrate on an isolated minority.

LESSONS OF THE PAST
In drawing special attention to this specific and unfortunately spectacular
subject, we are not forgetting all the other fields and directions in which democ-
racy and public liberties should be developed. But in linking it with our political
discussion we must acknowledge that in many areas in which we were politically
active during the war years, the post-war years and beyond, most of our govern-
ments did not live up to their professed ideals or give adequate expression to the
political will and deep moral feelings of our peoples. We have allowed to develop
in other countries regimes that we would never have wished or tolerated in our
own; we did not speak out when we should have; we have done almost nothing .
to check the repression that is unworthy of man or put an end to the regimes
that shame the nations that have accepted them and humiliate those subjected to
them. Tribute should be paid to those who have had the courage to refuse certain
compromises, w'ho have had the lucidity needed to condemn a particular regime
and the audacity-sometimes in prophetic, isolated and apparently utopian ges-
tures-to protest against the unacceptable.
We have often taken refuge behind the lazy and legalistic doctrine of non-
interference in the internal affairs of another state, which is wrong because
there is no future in it. States are always interfering with and influencing each
other. When well-defined interests are at stake, any state is willing to intervene
and does so. Why then this sudden reticence in humanitarian matters? It is a
lack of courage, a lack of moral certainty or a lack of political clarity, or does
synicism reign supreme? What is unacceptable should no longer be accepted.
The rights of man are universal rights and affect us all, just as much as un-
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39


democratic, totalitarian or torture regimes. Suffice it to hear the appeals of a
Helder Camara, any of the Soviet dissidents who have recently come to the west
or our Greek, Portuguese or Spanish friends again recently menaced and tor-
tured, to understand that universal conscience is indivisible. Each time they
speak, we are reminded of the correct path of moral and true politics. That is
why, without even judging their political reasons, we should commend their
honest and courageous stand for human rights.

PROPOSED SPECIFIC ACTION FOR OUR DELEGATIONS
A. Our governments: It is up to us to intervene politically so that our govern-
ments do not support undemocratic regimes that have abolished the parliamen-
tary institution or reduced it to a mere embellishment. Our governments should
not help regimes to stay in power if they systematically violate human rights.
A democratic government should respect any regime legitimately established
and abstain from any act of sabotage on another democratic regime.
Our governments should be generous in granting political asylum to who-
ever requests it by extending the right and the possibility of refuge in em-
bassies and by organizing reception facilities for exiles.
B. As regards Members of Congress and Members of the European Parlia-
ment, we make the following proposals for concerted action and joint projects
along the lines of other joint projects such as the draft code of conduct for multi-
national companies.
1. Our meeting and cooperation body should be in a position rapidly to intro-
duce procedures for discreet and humane political intervention with regimes that
contravene human rights. Such interventions could contain a reminder about
common rules accepted internationally, human rights as defined in the universal
declaration and public declarations made by those regimes. Similarly we should
be in. a position, where appropriate, to intervene public by appealing directly
to the authorities of the countries concerned or appealing to public opinion and
protesting against certain attitudes.
2. It should be possible to have an exchange of information and documentation
on the situation of human rights and parliamentary democracy throughout the
world. Information could, perhaps once a year, be summarized in a report sub-
mitted to participants at our meetings who would consider the situation and,
where appropriate, the action taken on our public or discreet intervention.
3. Our body should at all times declare its support for international organiza-
tions such as the Red Cross and the High Commission for Refugees and organi-
zations such as Amnesty International that call for the application of the law by
all legal and non-violent means. We should also call for a development of interna-
tional legal institutions and of international constitutional law and for an inves-
tigation into any method or procedure that could more effectively guarantee
freedom.
These proposals are being made because our interparliamentary cooperation
body is a rarely found international political authority that can work effec-
tively in this field. We are probably the only people with enough freedom to
carry out research and to discuss these questions frankly and impartially at
international level and at the same time with the authority as the elected rep-
resentatives of our peoples to call attention to the rules of law and intervene
with a view to consolidating democracy and human rights.













ENCOURAGEMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Paper by Michael Stewart
The world situation may be crudely described as follows: one bloc (variously
described as "The West", "NATO", "The Free World") believes in democracy
and human rights, and claims that, on the basis of these principles, policies can
be carried through which will solve economic problems and right social injustices.
Another bloc (in effect the USSR and her allies; the future role of China in world
politics remains an enigma) maintains that the Western belief in democracy and
human rights is a sham, that the reality of Western life in plutocracy, corruption,
unemployment and class-conflict; and that not until a Communist economic basis
for society has been established can true democracy flourish. In the West we are
uneasily aware that Communist criticisms of our society are not entirely without
foundation; but the Communists have not succeeded in creating an economic and
social system that is more efficient or more just than ours; and their rejection of
our concept of democracy and human rights opens the door to tyranny.

A. SKEPTICAL VIEW
Meanwhile, watching the two blocs, is the "non-aligned world". This phrase in-
cludes a large group of countries, some of them having little in common with
others, except the mere fact of non-alignment; but in a world overshadowed by
blocs, this mere fact does create a fellow-feeling. It is disquieting to us in the
West that few of these countries are ready to take us at our own valuation: the
merits of democracy and human rights, which seem self-evident to us, are viewed
by them with a cool scepticism. Among the reasons for this attitude we may
note-
1. Some of the past front-line champions against Communism-the pre-Castro
regime in Cuba, the former government of South Vietnam, the present govern-
ment in South Korea-have been remarkably unattractive;
2. Many of the citizens of non-aligned countries cannot see that the democratic
process has any relevance to the solution of their problems-poverty, tribalism,
corruption, etc.;
3. Most of the citizens of non-aligned countries are non-white, and the suspicion
that "the West" is at heart racialist remains.
The USSR feels justified in supporting these attitudes in the hope of perma-
nently estranging the non-aligned from the West. There is, therefore, a strong
political reason why the West should strive to promote its own beliefs in the
world. There is also a profounder reason. A nation, or group of nations, which
does not believe in itself and its ideals will not, in the end, survive. The USSR
is fully aware of this, and loses no opportunity to proclaim the virtues of its
system and the defects of ours. We cannot face them without a faith; "The cour-
age of faith will always outstay the courage of wrath."
'or can the world-wide advocacy of human rights be condemned as interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other countries. Denial of human rights is not
merely an "internal affair"-it is a breach of an international obligation en-
shrined in the UN Charter.
But how is this task to be performed? Military crusading, bribery of political
individuals or parties, and mere lecturing from an assured position of moral
superiority are counter-productive. Below are suggested some possible lines of
action; but it must be emphasized that this is a long-term problem, requiring pa-
tience and, if possible, concerted planning in advance by "the West"-particu-
larly the USA and the countries of the EEC.
1. Use of international fora
The UN is often the scene of propaganda against Western countries, and their
friends in the non-aligned world. We could do more to bring before the UN un-
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41


doubted cases of denial of rights by Communist countries. This should be in
moderate language, persuasive and not abusive (our real audience is the non-
aligned, not the USSR's bloc), but with persistence and on the basis of fully
authenticated facts.
The forthcoming conference at Belgrade should give us the opportunity to com-
pare Communist professions at Helsinki with subsequent performance.
2. Economic policies--aid and trade
A detailed examination of what can be done in this field would extend this
paper beyond its proper length, and I therefore do no more than state a prin-
ciple. The West should recognize that policies of this kind involve a redistribu-
tion of the world's wealth-the rise in the standard of life of the richest in the
world must become slower, so that it can become faster elsewhere. The West
should also make it clear that its chief interest is in policies which benefit the
poorest people in the developing countries. Observance of these principles will
sometimes be in conflict with the immediate economic interest of some Western
countries; we have to recognize that it is worth the price.
3. Attitude towards the internal politics of nonaligned countries
It is, of course, the duty of the diplomatic representatives of Western coun-
tries to understand the politics of the countries to which they are accredited and
to do their best to see that those countries take a favourable view of the West.
This cannot be done by making pets of particular individuals or parties; the
decision as to who shall rule in a non-aligned country has to be made by that
country (even if, sometimes, by very unattractive methods) ; it is the job of West-
ern countries, and their representatives, to make it clear that they will seek to
get on well with whoever is in power.
Nor should Western governments and diplomats be alarmed if incoming Gov-
ernments in non-aligned countries take a drastic view of the rights of private
ownership of land and other sources of wealth. The Communist victory in Viet-
nam was connected with the fact that land reform measures were always too
little and too late. By contrast, Greece, for all her troubles, has never fallen into
Communist hands, and this is partly attributable to the land reforms carried
through many years ago by Venizelos.
The West has sometimes made the error of supposing that "human rights"
mean not only freedom of speech, writing, thought, association, worship, and the
right to criticise and peacefully change one's government, but also the right of
small groups to maintain economic and social privileges in defiance of the public
good. If this error were to continue, the whole cause of human rights would be
discredited.
4. Cultural and exchange policies
An important objective here should be to enable younger people. who are
likely to be influential in future in the non-aligned countries, to visit the West
and see how we try to tackle the kind of problem that arises both in their coun-
tries and ours-how do we provide primary education, or health services; how
do we deal with labour disputes; how do we handle the problems arising from
the existence of different ethnic groups within the nation? (A discussion with
members of the Community Relations Council in an English city would be more
useful than a visit to the Houses of Parliament). The aim should be, not to sug-
gest that everything in the West is all right, but that our respect for people's
rights, and our emphasis on free discussion and argument, are of real value to us
in the search for the right answers.
5. Rhodesia-a special case
There is one part of the world in which the Western countries could take more
striking and immediate action than has so far been proposed. It is now certain
that the Smith regime in Rhodesia will end; the remaining questions are "How
soon?" and "What comes next?". If the USA and the EEC are ready, by joint
action and policy, to hasten the end, two advantageous results will follow. First,
the chance that the succeeding government in Rhodesia will be one which re-
spects human rights will be greatly increased; second, it will be a clear demon-
stration to Africa that we mean what we say about human rights, and that our






42

concern for those rights is not restricted to white people. The items of policy
could be:
(a) A rigid enforcement of sanctions-if this had been practised from the
start, the problem would by now have been solved;
(b) A denial to Smith of any kind of help In resisting the attacks now
being made on his regime, both within Rhodesia and from without;
(c) Consultation with the governments of the neighboring states as to the
steps to be taken when the end is imminent. We and they have a common
interest in averting anarchy and giving a favourable wind to the succeeding
government.












Thursday, September 23, 1976


SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

SESSION III. A. POLITICAL DISCUSSION (CONTINUED)
(Working papers by Mr. Tsongas, Senator Pell, Mr. Biester, and Mr. Coust61)
Mr. Spenale stated that the general theme of the meeting-
encouragement of democracy and respect for human rights-is the
essential concern of all democracies, and has been for European Par-
liamentarians. He listed the following examples of actions taken by
the European Parliament:
(1) The Parliament's successful proposal that the European Com-
munities freeze the agreement of association with Greece, while that
country was ruled by a military junta.
(2) Likewise, the Parliament expressed reservations about the
Franco dictatorship in Spain, and had supported democracy in that
country. There has been some progress there but it is not sufficient.
(3) Parliament had agreed on a resolution in 1973 asking the Com-
mission to prepare a report on how basic human rights would be
guaranteed within the fully integrated Community. The Tindemans'
Report had stressed that the defense of human rights must be written
into any future European constitution.
(4) The Parliament realized that the European Community could
speak out against human rights violations outside its borders only if
rights are enjoyed and guaranteed within the Community.

JOINT GROUP SUPPORTED
Mr. Spenale outlined possible action. He agreed with Mr. Schuijt's
suggestion that a joint working party be set up to try to work out
possible joint actions concerning the defense of human rights. Such a
working party should, on the European side, keep in touch with the
Parliament's Legal Committee, to insure coordination with the inter-
nal work program of Parliament. Such a working group might pre-
pare a list of fundamental human rights.
Finally we should be concerned to defend human rights inside the
Community and the United States for only on this basis would we be
able to defend human rights outside the Community and the United
States.
For the information of American participants, Mr. Spenale dis-
tributed copies of the Bulletin of the European Communities. "The
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Community."
Mr. Fraser commented that European Parliament's attitudes to-
wards Greece and Spain had been noted with satisfaction in the
1 See pp. 51-64.
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44


United States particularly when they were compared with U.S. Gov-
ernment's attitudes toward these countries.

HIIUMAN RIGHTS INDIVISIBLE
S.ir lPeter Kirk agreed with Mr. Schuijt's proposal to set up a joint
working group. This group could draft papers for the next meeting
of the two delegations. As founder member of Amnesty International,
lie stated that we should differentiate between different types of viola-
tioi of human rights. The worst were political executions, torture and
arre-t> anid imprisonment without trial, the three subjects which Con-
gre-inian Fraser in his paper suggests the delegation concentrate on.
Although it might be easier to try to concentrate on these particularly
grav-e violations, human rights were indivisible. If the rights of assenl-
lvy and free speech were violated, people would not be able to speak
out aurainst or overthrow governments which violated human rights.
For instance, the undemocratic situation in India was allowed to
develop partly through press censorship. A free press and free elec-
tions to a parliament were necessary to maintain democracy and
himian rights.
Trrain-national political groups should try to influence events in this
field. It was disappointing that professional groups, such as the British
p.-ychologists, had not always acted to condemnn for instance the viola-
tion of human rights-in this particular case, psychological torture-
in the Soviet Union.
CASE-BY-CASE ACTION
General rules for action to be taken against countries violating
human rights were difficult to agree, but the freezing of trade between
the Community and Greece had a considerable effect on the colonels
regime in Greece, as did the threat of expulsion of Greece from the
Council of Europe.
Greece and Portugal had come back to democracy from dictatorship
recently, and Spain might do so shortly. Economic sanctions should
be imposed only on a case-by-case basis, but were justified towards
Greece on the part of the EC and Rhodesia.
For the nest meeting lie urged: consideration of the Fraser proposals
though he doubted about the value of a newsletter in the midst of the
quantity of mail parliamentarians already receive; and more informnia-
tion on the work of the Council of Europe and the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights. He proposed that the European Parliament
maintain a regular dialog with groups such as Mr. Fraser's
subcommittee.












SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION


B. Ecoxo3IIc AND SOCIAL DISCUSSION
Mr. Tsongas said that he had a direct interest in the Third World
in view of his Peace Corps experience in Ethiopia and the West Indies.
He underlined the suspicion that existed in the Third World concern-
ing for instance the Western contribution to the North-South dialog,
which was seen as political in nature.
The Third World views most Western aid and trade policies with
considerable skepticism. Poor countries were rarely grateful to the
wealthy countries for the aid given to them. Whatever the West said
about human rights in the Third and Fourth World countries would
have very little effect on these countries. In any event we tended to look
at these countries from the wrong viewpoint-in a kind of Dulles
way-as pawns in the world power game against communism.
AUTHORITARIAN SOCIETIES
He said that the Third World was authoritarian by nature, within the
family and the tribe being the models for its social and political
structure. Thus the real issue was not democratic development but
human rights.
We could try to persuade governments to uphold human rights
without threatening to replace them by other governments, whereas
insistence on democracy could give the impression that we intended
to change their governments. Apart from the main human rights
mentioned in the paper submitted by Congressman Fraser, racial and
religious freedom should be protected. Physical security, adequate
food supplies and shelter for people should be insured. Thus economic
development of the poorer countries should be viewed in the human
rights context.
Referring to the Jackson/Vanik amendment conditioning trade
preferences for the Soviet Union on liberalization of Soviet emigra-
tion violations, he said the United States "paid a high price" for the
amendment-Soviet cancellation of the trade agreement-but that
"the price was worth paying".

ROLE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGES
Senator Pell, cochairman of the U.S. Commission to monitor
Helsinki, set out his particular interest in cultural exchanges, and the
connection between these and developments concerning democracy and
human rights. He did not see cultural exchanges as "interference" in
the affairs of other nations. Neither did he see them as an export of
prestigious Western culture to mere "backward" countries. The West-
tern system of democracy was not necessarily the best model for all
countries. We could judge the effectiveness of democracy by the extent
to which human rights flourished in countries which employed that
political system.
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46


He thought that massive exchange programs could help to reduce
mutual suspicions and tensions, particularly between East and West.
In the past we had spent very little on cultural exchanges compared
with defense. The Helsinki Final Act should help us in moving ahead
in this field. Cultural exchanges were a peaceful way of helping to
avoid nuclear disaster.
Mr. Oilman said that cultural exchanges helped to maximize mutual
knowledge and friendship between countries, regardless of their po-
litical systems.
SOVIET EMPHASIS ON CULTURE
He stressed the enormous emphasis placed by the U.S.S.R. on devel-
oping propaganda broadcasting programs, printed books in foreign
languages, etc. Details of these programs were contained in the note he
had submitted to the meeting.2
He asked what would the effect on the Soviet Union be of increasing
East/West exchange programs. The West could not possibly lose by
increasing such exchange programs. These should be organized pri-
marily through private groups.
In conclusion, he proposed the creation of a commission on cultural
exchanges to support and encourage the spread of democratic ideals
throughout the world. Mr. Oilman's paper also contained a table of
comparative statistics showing various countries' expenditures and
output in the cultural and information fields.
Mr. Glinne supported the proposals made by Congressman Fraser
in his paper. He thought that the second suggestion of Mr. Fraser-
to facilitate active cooperation among democratic political parties in
defense of internationally recognized human rights by convening an
annual world conference of democratic party representatives and es-
tablishing a secretariat to support activities of the project-deserved
particular support. But what would the most appropriate framework
for such a conference be? It was important to avoid a structure similar
to the Interparliamentary Union.
THREATS FROM RIGHT AND LEFT
Threats to society and human rights were widely considered to come
largely from left-wing forces, but right-wing forces had arranged
takeovers of states in order to maintain economic and social privileges.
Although he continued to be suspicious of the activities of the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, he wondered
whether these Communist regimes were really capable of spreading
their systems elsewhere, especially if the West were to challenge them
on the basis of human rights and democracy.
Throughout the world many crimes were committed daily in the
name of liberty, for instance, the "Suppression of Communism" Act
in South Africa.
What action should be taken on Congressman Fraser's paper?
First, the West could not remain silent about the situation in
Africa. Action should be taken concerning Africa not only through
the United Nations, as suggested by Congressman Fraser, but through
a number of international agencies.
See p. 57.





47


Second, we had to put the principle of respect for human rights
above the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states.
In practice, we should send investigatory missions to countries where
violations of human rights were reported.
Third, the first suggestion made by Mr. Fraser concerning "an in-
ternational parliamentarians' newsletter on human rights" should be
taken up. It was essential that parliamentarians should be fully in-
formed of action taken by the U.S. Government, the Community or its
individual member states in protecting human rights, such as the
decision of the European Commission to refuse to extend trade ar-
rangements with Uruguay.
Finally, although Mr. Schuijt's suggestion of establishing a work-
ing group for people was a good idea, what was needed was a broader
basis and larger group.

PRESS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Mr. Rosati agreed with the stress placed on cultural exchanges by
previous speakers. He had been particularly impressed by the factual
information provided by Mr. Gilman on the Soviet propaganda ef-
fort. He agreed with Congressman Fraser on the need to initiate
action to protect the three most important human rights that had
been quoted rather than to launch into more controversial errors even
though he considered that to the three rights on which there seemed
general agreement should be added the right of religious freedom
and freedom of the press.
The West must try to insure the implementation of the Helsinki
texts on the freer circulation of ideas and people. Violations of Hel-
sinki must be denounced, and "Euro-Communism" should also be
denounced. Communism was the same throughout the world whether
in Eastern Europe or in Western Europe.
He wondered whether Mr. Gilman had perhaps implied that there
could be some principles and issues more important than those of
human rights. If this were what had been meant, he disagreed.
"Interventionism" by Western powers had been denounced at this
meeting. It should be remembered that this was not limited to the
United States. Chancellor Schmidt had also "intervened" in speaking
of internal Italian developments. Although every state had the right
to choose its own system it was legitimate for the United States or
other political leaders to express their views concerning internal po-
litical developments.
JOINT GROUP SUPPORTED
In conclusion, he agreed with the proposals made by Congressman
Fraser and Mr. Schuijt on the creation of a joint working party.
Mr. Biester introduced the paper he had submitted to the meeting.
He was confident that the Third and Fourth World countries were
capable of working out their own systems of government without
Western or other intervention.
In recent years we had come to realize that we lived in one global
economy. But this economy was "skewed" by an imbalance in the dis-
tribution of wealth. We had to try to get back towards the center. In
this context OPEC, International Bauxite Association and others





48


were not "cartels" but were countries exploiting what few economic
resources they had.
A global society was also developing. A bad "skew" was developing
here too! If freedom was reduced in certain countries these states be-
came "garrison states" imprisoned in their own systems. As members
of one human family, poverty and deprivation were matters for all
our consciences. Traditionally, we were only supposed to care about
the poor being fed and clothed, but developing their minds and their
personalities was equally important.

AUTTIORITARTANISM UNPRODUCTIVE
He did not think it realistic to set up our own standards about the
countries to which we should give aid. Such a policy was both pre-
sumptuous and unworkable. Authoritarian governments had within
them the seeds of their own downfall.
Mr. Bordu asked speakers to be restrained in their comments, and
regretted that more time was not available for the discussion.
It was important to distinguish between the many different de-
grees which existed of violations of human rights.
Individual states had laws which had to be respected. "Competition"
between different t'4ates aInd political systems was quite normal and
healthy. People in different countries should 1be fully aware of the
system of other countries Fo that they would be able to iudge differ-
(,nt political systems effectively. It was not possible to set up a single
universal model by which human rights and violations could be judged.
We should be realistic and perhaps limit ourselves to the three fields
outlined by Mr. Fra~er.

O'II TEI KINI)S OF VIOLATIONS
If we tried to enforce human rights standards outside our own part
of the world we would only increase international tensions. There were
all sorts of different violations.of human righlits which could not be
ignored, such as the arms stocks being built up in Iran and. also. the
growth of nuclear weapon stocks, which brought with it a threat to
human ity.
In conclusion, he said that the French Communist Party was open
to suro-estions and ideas. lie pointed out that the French Communist
Party had renounced the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
since it could not approve tlhe rule of a minority. The. French Corn-
munist Party worked tostlher in a wider political framework which
hoped to include many political forces. Its aim was to achieve a new
kind of democracy in France. It had no intention of disrupting the
French political framnework and it could certainly not do this, in any
case, against a popular majority. If France were to have a left-wing
government, this would reflect the will of the French people.

SOME LIMITATIONS. NEEDED
M.r. Broeksz said that in acting as parliamentarians on human rights
we should follow the advice of those who had suggested limiting our
activities to tlhe protection of three or four of the most essential human




49


riaohts and trying to stop the violation of these rights. He disagreed
with the views expressed by Sir Peter Kirk. There was considerable
difference between tlhe violation of some human rights-however im-
portant these might be-and being put into a concentration camp or
shot,
The United States and the Community could influence human rights
developments in areas such as Asia, through trading policy. Trade
policy could be used, if necessary, against countries where the United
Nations or Amnesty International had noted serious violations of
human rights.
He agreed with tlhe proposal made by Mr. Schuijt that a working
party should be set up. This should be larger than four members, pos-
sibly three or four members on each side. As for the group's terms of
reference, it could begin by listing those countries with which the Conm-
munity and the United States had trade relations and which were
guilty of violating human rights. The type of action to be applied
against these countries could then be determiined.
Mr. Sp6nale _aid that hlie felt that the press could be informed-at
the press conference which was due to conclude the morning's work-
that there had been broad agreement on Mr. Fraser's proposals alnd on
the creation of a joint working party as suggested by Mr. Schiijt,
although there had been understandably some minor differences of
opinion over points of detail.
Finally, it was important that we ourselves recognized violations of
human rights whenever these occurred in our own countries and that
we should act against such violations.


















PAPERS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Paper by Paul E. Tsongas
Gentlemen, let me first tell you of my interest and experience in the area
of democratic development in the world and perhaps give you some insight
into where I am coming from, to use the current American expression.
Between 1962 and 1964 I lived in a small town in Ethiopia as a Peace Corps
volunteer involved in both teaching and community development. In 1967 and
1968 I again worked for the Peace Corps, this time in the West Indies but with
a far less intimate relationship with the people of those countries. This Third
World cross-cultural experience has, I believe, enabled me to gain some insight
into the dynamics of the non-Western societies. It has also helped to define my
concerns as an elected representative. My long-term interest in the Congress is in
the field of international trade and finance, and it is my hope that in time I
will be able to develop an expertise in this field which I will be able to offer to
my colleagues.
POLITICAL GOALS SEEN
Trade and financial assistance programs by definition involve both the giving
and the getting, as each participant in the trade seeks to further their own ends.
In some cases those ends are purely economic, such as the trade of German-made
Volkswagens to the United States or American computers to South America.
Sometimes the ends are humanitarian, such as assistance to countries following
national disasters. Very often, however, the ends are political. They are political
both in pursuit of the individual country's goals and furtherance of the socio-
political system to which that country subscribes. This political ingredient is
more real than apparent. There are many Third World leaders who are con-
vinced that all financial assistance and trade is political. Indeed there are those
who think that all economic and humanitarian relationships are merely political
relationships disguised.
Rightly or wrongly this perception is critical to our discussion today. I am
convinced that in the dealings between North and South, between the developed
and less developed worlds, there exists a mind set of skepticism at best and the
outright hostility at worst on the part of the recipient countries. Specifically,
bilateral financial assistance (and even trade) is more often resented than appre-
ciated; thus the call for a New Economic Order that was and is before the
United Nations and was the focal point of the Sri Lanka Conference of Non-
Allied nations this past summer.
The countries where we hope to encourage democratic development are the
very countries where overt attempts to encourage anything may well be counter
productive. Where in your experience has the advice of the rich and comfortable
been well received by the poor and hungry?
So where does all this leave us? It seemed to me when I was in Ethiopia that
the United States never really understood how the average Ethiopian viewed
both the world in general and the Western World in particular. For example, it
seemed to me that we were still of the John Foster Dulles mentality that viewed
the Third World as important only in a grand struggle between a free world and
a Communist block. Thus we believe that in the case of Ethiopia, or Indonesia
or India, for example, neutrality in the struggle was immoral. Viewed from a
Third World Culture perspective, this, of course, is nonsense. Even worse, it is
insulting. The value of a nation to its people has very little to do with the super-
power conception to the struggle of the ideologies.
(51)







52


MARKET DAY IN ETHIOPIA
If one were to approach any Ethiopian in the town of Wolliso on market day
and ask him what democratic development meant to him, the question would be
met with well-deserved puzzlement. The fact is that most Third World coun-
tries do not have a democratic tradition, and there are very few John Lockes
or Rousseaus or Magna Cartas in the Third World legacy. Indeed the historic
tradition in most Third World countries is based on social institutions that are
mostly authoritarian, such as tribes, religious institutions, and the extended
family. Thus. I believe it is more appropriate to talk about freedom and human
rights. which I believe should lie universal objectives no matter what ideologies
may obtain.
In the post World War II era we have had thousands of instances of bilateral
and multilateral relationships between countries. What have we learned? We
know, for example, that the economic boycott of Cuba for the U.S. had a counter-
productive effect. Rather than isolating and weakening Fidel Castro, we strength-
ened him by providing a Yankee hobgoblin. We have the examples of massive
economic and military aid to Latin America, and I know of no one who will
suggest that democratic institutions are in the ascendancy on that continent.
We have had the examples of American and European involvement in raw ma-
terinals with several African countries, and our relations with those countries
today are hardly comforting.

TIES WITHOUT STRINGS
One need only review the post World War II era to appreciate that the gap
between policies intended and policies realized is enormous. Well then, perhaps
one should conclude that we should throw up our hands in dismay and retreat
to isolationism. Not at all! I strongly favor bilateral and multilateral trade
between East and West and between North and South. And I also believe strongly
in financial assistance programs, whether they be bilateral or involve the multi-
lateral financial banks and funds. Trade and assistance should not have demo-
cratic development as its sole objective, nor should such democratic development
lbe the criterion for participation in that trade and assistance. However, it
should recognize that an economically advancing nation is far more likely to
have the infrastructure necessary to fully appreciate and construct an atmos-
phere conducive to freedom and human rights. The trade and assistance should
have as its objective an interdependence that binds us all, but ironically, can do
so only if those ties have no strings attached.
Senrch your memories for examples where development meant democracy.
Greece and Turkey during the Marshall Plan. Japan and Germany in the same
era. Yes. Let us think of more recent examples-examples involving the non-
nlignpd. Who has developed, who currently has nuclear capability---certainly a
teqt of development-India. Taiwan, Brazil, Pakistan. Argentina. Korea, Mexico.
Where is the uniform democratic development? The answer is obvious.
I suggest that the realities dictate that we adjust our sights. Development does
not by definition bring about democracy. Nor can a pluralistic world provide an
atmosphere where development can be tied to movement toward a specific ideol-
ogy. If we don't help, there are others who will.

DEVELOPMENT A PRECONDITION
Our focus then should be two-fold. First, even if development only occasionally
results in democracy, it remains nonetheless a precondition. Name the undevel-
oped countries that have democratic institutions. The list is hardly extensive.
Second. our goal should be the advancement of human rights. This is not the
same as the promotion of democratic institutions. One can be under non-demo-
cratic governments and still enjoy a kind of personal freedom that world society
would rleem acceptable. And it is this pursuit of human rights that can and should
concern us.
The advancement of human rights can be achieved by altered policies of an
existing government-unlike the coining of democracy which often requires the
demise of existing governments. Thus the pressureto reform is viewed as gen-
erally different from the pressure to change institutions. The threat to the rulers
is not to their power per se but rather to the way they exercise that power. The






53


latter I submit is more realistic and less likely to trigger the skepticism and
hoNtility that I alluded to earlier.
A Third World head of state may be persuaded to abandon repression and
the deprivation of human rights in return for the establishment of trade rela-
tionships. He will never, by contrast, be persuaded to make such a choice if the
cost is his relinquishment of office in favor of free elections.

IDEOLOGICAL ILLUSION
(And I might add that the hope that withholding trade and aid in hopes of a
change of government is, as with Cuba, an ideological illusion.)
What human rights are we concerned with? For Americans, I would submit,
they are threefold. First, racial equality. The Anmerican experience in racial
matters is mixed-from a history of the slave trade through the horrors of
the civil war, and finally to the Martin Luther King era of struggle. We are now
a nation committed by statute, to the simple phrase of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence-all men are created equal. Our trade and aid should reflect that com-
mitment. Thus we should not trade in Rhodesian chrome since it implies an ac-
ceptance of minority and racial rule, and a refutation of racial equality.
Second, religious freedom. We are, as a people, committed to international
freedom of religious expression. Consequently, America has stood for the exist-
ence and survival of the State of Israel, the rights of Soviet Jewry to emigrate,
and the opposition to American participation in any boycott of firms that deal
with Israel. This commitment extends to other instances of religious persecution.
Thirdly and obviously, we are committed to the physical security of the indi-
vidual-or to put it another way, we oppose the use of personal violence such as
torture, jailings, beatings, and the wanton killing of citizens. As a consequence,
we should express our outrage, for example, over the physical brutalities of the
current regime of Chile, by more than simple laments. This commitment extends
as well to the assurance of the basic need for food and shelter.

CHANGING PRIORITIES
So let us place human rights at the center of our criteria for aid and trade,
and let's see where that leaves us.
Bilateral Foreign Assistance.-Foreign assistance by the United States on a
bilateral basis has reflected the strategic worth of the recipient country to the
United States and our perception of its devotion to our "cause". Thus aid in
Africa goes to a Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, to Liberia, to Nigeria because they are
"friends", and without reference to their degree of respect for human rights. In
Latin America, Chile is the most obvious example. The historic criteria-stable,
political leanings, strategic. Fine, but let now put respect for human rights at the
top of the agenda and do so openly, publicly, and resolutely.
Multilateral Asnistance.-The international development banks should also be
involved. Although there is variance of Western influence between the World
Bank and the African Development Bank, for example, the criteria need not
vary. The historic criteria-need, political leanings, economic viability. I would
substitute human rights for political leanings and add the criteria of impact on
the populace, i.e. more agrarian self-help projects and fewer "showcase" steel
mills.
East-West Trade.-The Jackson-Vanik amendment has had a controversial his-
tory but it has served to highlight a deprived human right, namely the right to
emigrate. We have paid an economic price for that amendment, but then that
merely reflects the injection of human rights as operational criteria along with
economic gain, strategic importance, and relative ideology.
North-South Trade.-This is clearly the single most crucial matter before the
world community next to nuclear holocaust. It has two parts. First, the respect
for human rights in trade instead of the previous criteria. So the criteria of Bi-
lateral Foreign Assistance would apply here as well. The second part, however.
is more complex. It involves coming to grips with the legitimate demands of the
Third and Fourth Worlds for a better standard of living-a better life embraced
by a standard of living where basic human rights include food, shelter, good
health and a decent education. Or put another way, of what value is freedom of
speech to one without food, or freedom of religion to one without shelter from
the elements?






54


The "haves" of the Western world will find that their life-style and their
standard of living will survive only if the "havenots" experience a sense of
catching up, a sense of sharing in the world's resources. This reality is just be-
ginning to catch hold, and our concern for our long-term human rights can best
be realized by assisting their present-term human rights.

CONCLUSION
My conclusions then, are as follows:
1. Trade and financial assistance are mechanisms which have long been used
to achieve perceived ends.
2. Those ends have very often been political with regard to competing ideolo-
gies and social systems.
3. The success of trade and assistance based on these criteria in achieving our
objectives has been questionable at best.
4. Human rights should be substituted as a primary criteria for assistance in
economic development.
Hopefully, we can then proceed toward a world where human rights are en-
couraged, where the gap between the rich and poor has narrowed-and then, we
just might witness the achievement of the objective we had put aside-demo-
cratic development.













CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
Paper by Senator Pell

I can think of few more important issues for consultations between the United
States and Western Europe than the encouragement of democratic development
and the observance of human rights throughout the world. Too often, the human
and moral dimensions of international relations are overlooked or consciously
downplayed in favor of other, supposedly more vital, aspects of national security
and foreign policy.
I believe, however, that at a time when liberal democratic principles are in-
creasingly threatened by varying forms of totalitarianism around the world, it
is in the national interest of democratic societies to encourage the democratic
elements struggling to assert themselves in so many countries. I happen to believe
that nations, just as individuals, have a moral obligation-if they consider them-
selves civilized-not to ignore oppression and abusive practices wherever they
occur. For those who take a more calculating view of national interests, it ought
to be a matter of grave concern that democratic societies could become an ever
decreasing minority in a world increasingly hostile to democracies, their values,
and their interests.
Having said all this. what role can and do cultural exchanges play in further-
ing democratic development and promoting human rights?

No ONE-WAY STREET
Before proceeding to answer that question, I would like to make it clear that
I do not look upon exchanges as part of a process of political manipulation or
interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Even less do I look upon
exchanges as a one way expression of cultural conceit in which non-Western
societies are viewed as backward consumers of advanced Western culture, in-
cluding democracy.
Rather, the principal purpose of exchanges is, and should continue to be, to
maximize constructive contacts and mutual give and take between influential or
potentially influential people in other societies in order to promote a better
understanding of andrespect for the achievements and values of each other's cul-
ture and institutions. Ultimately-and hopefully-such understanding and re-
spect will influence the behavior of governments and will lead to more coop-
eration and less confrontation among nations regardless of their forms of
government.
There is, however, another dimension to exchanges which relates directly to
democratic development. A couple of years ago, the Hazen Foundation, a small
private organization in New Haven, Connecticut, studied the impact of cultural
exchanges on governmental behavior and concluded that cultural relations "are
the chief means to shape the future of men and nations, to change their direc-
tions through creative mutual borrowing and to strengthen an awareness of
shared values. .2"
It is this concept of "creative mutual borrowing" that I would like to relate
to the theme of this morning's discussion. Exchange. programs, if they are well
planned and carried out, provide a two-way market place of ideas, many of
which hopefully will be relevant to the needs and aspirations of participants on
both sides of the exchange.

CREATIVE MUTUAL BORROWING
Among the important ideas and related value systems which the democracies
have to offer is their political system and respect for human rights. To the ex-
tent that democracy is shown as a system responsive to the needs of it people
and it is demonstrated that government can function on the basis of the.consent
of the governed and tle minimum use of coercion, so too will the prospects be
maximized that democracy will form part of the "creative mutual borrowing"
process.
(55)





56


It should lie borne in mind, however, that whether or not democratic ideas
or values are borrowed by another nation will depend more upon the needs, con-
ditions, and quality of leadership obtaining in that country than by whatever
exposure is fostered through contracts with a democracy. Yet, where conditions
aire favorable for democracy, contacts with legislators, educators, journalists,
and jurists in democracies provide important encouragement, support, and in-
tellectual stimulation to democratically inclined elements.
In this connection, it is encouraging that many recently established democ-
racies are actively seeking help in making their new institutions work; other
niation.s which have experimented with democracy intermittently have not ruled
out a return to democracy ; and a third group of countries-while closed and in
some cases rigid, totalitarian societies-at least pays lip service to democratic
principles. There is, consequently, a potential receptivity for democratic ideas
and a nucleus of democratically inclined leaders in much of the world. That
should be a source of optimism !

LUXURY OF CONSENT
On the other hand, it should be realized that many countries have not yet
consolidated their nationhood to an extent that consent can replace coercion as
the basis of their political organization. Before that essential aspect of demo-
cratic development can occur, history has shown us that bonds of mutual loy-
alty and kinship must first be forged within a state. The prospects for demo-
cratic development are, therefore, less encouraging where the internal con-
sensus to live together as a nation is weak or non-existent as compared with
a state with a strong sense of nationhood.
In addition, there are nations, some cohesive in terms of their nationhood and
others not, in which animosity toward democracy, either deriving from their
colonial experience or for other reasons, i so strong that there is little likelihood
that any "creative mutual borrowing" can take place. In these cases, it will first
be necessary to break down the barriers of prejudice and suspicion-which are
(Iften mutual, I might add. Faced with this kind of obstacle, it will be sufficient
If a dialogue aimed at creating understanding and mutual respect can Ie ini-
tiated and maintained.
Ideally, exchange programs are most effective if an effort is made to bring to-
gether people who are either already favorably inclined toward learning about
each other or are sufficiently openminded to permit a fruitful exchange of ideas.
In addition, the ideal exchange visitor should be someone whose personal, pro-
fessional, or power potential is such that he can make a difference in his own
country. Quite often, as we have seen. it will not be possible to combine both of
these ideal aspects of cultural exchange, and the process of facilitating demo-
cratic development through cultural exchanges will often be a slow one. But
breakthroughs do occur. In one recent case that has come to my attention, a high
official of a radical developing country remarked that his visit to the United
States changed his ideas about America and Americans and that his first-hand
impressions were totally different from the anti-American propaganda hlie had
been exposed to back home.
S RAISING EXPECTATIONS

In cases such as these, it is success enough if a foreign visitor is able, through
an exchange program, to compare his own perceptions of another country, or
those of.his government, with the real thing. In fact, in many cases, the very
exposure of foreign visitors to t free flow of ideas, even if they do not involve
politics, may raise expectations about individual rights and opportunities and
thus generate resistance to political constraints.
Given the potential good that cultural exchanges can promote, it is discourag-
ing to me that governments spend so little money on them. In a world which is
spending more than $250 billion for military purposes, it seems to me that it is
logical and sensible to devote more attention to cultural exchanges and make
them a major activity warranting at least one-half of 1% of the amount devoted
to military preparations.
For some time, I have been arguing for a reordering of American foreign
policy priorities and have called for a contraction of certain military and politi-
cal activities in favor of an expansion in the economic and ideological areas. In
this latter area, I have pointed out that the Department of State spends only $60





57

million on the exchange of persons programs and that a ten-fold increase in that
amount would only be the equivalent of two nuclear powered guided missile
cruisers.
CONFIDENCE IN NATIONAL VALUES
What would be the response of the rest of the world if the United States and
other democracies were to increase sharply their exchange programs' I am
thinking particularly of the reaction of those countries which now look with
disfavor upon democracies and are reluctant to engage in extensive exchanges
of their citizens. I believe those countries would find it difficult to stay aloof
from a major effort designed to break down the suspicion, prejudices and hatred
which have characterized international relations for too long. Moreover, I be-
lieve that national and cultural pride would cause countries everywhere to want
to participate fully out of concern that failure to do so would indicate a lack
of confidence in their own traditions and values.
It seems to me that no country would admit that its way of life and its social,
political, and economic system will not stand the light of scrutiny, that its citi-
zens are vulnerable to losing their national ties through contacts with foreigners,
and that they have nothing to offer in an exchange of ideas.
In closing, I would like to observe that in addition to being America's bicen-
tennial year, 1976 is also the 30th anniversary of the Fulbright exchange pro-
gram which is probably the largest planned program of education exchange in
the history of the world. While the impact of this program, or another inter-
change of people and .ideas, is difficult to assess with any degree of precision or
confidence, I believe that it has not only generated a greater and more favorable
understanding of America and its people but that it has also contributed to the
furtherance of respect for democracy and human rights generally.
I am convinced, however, that neither we in the United States nor others in
the Western community ought to be content with what has been achieved in the
past through cultural exchanges. More can and must be done, for I fear that the
future challenges to democratic values and the ability of disparate nations to
live together in peace are greater than is generally realized.


Comments of Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman on Senator Pell's Paper
In the United States and throughout Western Europe, the concepts of human
rights and democratic development have evolved not from our various political
institutions, but are instead fundamentals of our cultural heritage.
As Senator Pell has so thoughtfully pointed out in his paper before us this
morning, cultural exchanges help to "maximize constructive contacts .. in
order to promote a better understanding of respect for the achievements and
values of each other's culture and institutions." It is this respect and under-
standing that hopefully "will lead to more cooperation and less confrontation
among nations regardless of their forms of government."
The importance of this needed interchange cannot be overstated in an ever
increasingly interdependent world compounded by the increased importance of
national identity in a post-colonial period. Unfortunately, as the Senator also
states, there are those who use cultural programs solely as part of a process of
political manipulation or interference. .
Whatever our individual national policies are concerning the use of cultural
programs, we must recognize and comprehend their use by other nations. For.
instance, the Soviet Union leads the world in many categories of cultural and
information services as measured by total expenditures and volume of output.
Their external programs are coordinated at the highest levels of government to
be used solely as a tool for the implementation of their foreign policy.
In the fields of broadcasting, films and printed cultural information discrimi-
nation, they are world leaders. Each week, they broadcast over 1,980 hours in
84 different languages. They produce over 450 documentary films and print over
140 million books each year for distribution in foreign countries. I might add
that one of their prime targets is Western Europe. (Comparison figures follow,
statement)
Around the globe, the Soviets spend an estimated $800 million a year to sup-
port such programs as 72 cultural centers, 195 news gatherings and distribution
agencies and provide scholarships to Soviet universities for some 19,000 students
in the developing world.





58

With such an intensified effort by the Soviets alone, it would seem to indicate
their belief that cultural programs can be very beneficial to their objectives.
Senator Pell asks the question, "what would be the response of the rest of the
world if the United States and other democracies were to increase sharply their
exchange programs?" I believe we should also ask the question, what are we
losing by not increasing those programs?
The approach we take in responding to the need for increased exchange pro-
grams will be of great importance. The value and usefulness of such programs,
as the one in which we are now participating, has been proven over time.
Government sponsored approaches work well to bring together the leaders of
nations who are already inclined toward learning about each other and have no
misunderstandings concerning each nation's motives. However, I think we must
recognize the contribution that is made in the free world by the private sector.
Unlike the Soviet Union where all foreign activities are regulated by the gov-
ernment, we enjoy the benefits of the free and uncensored exchange of ideas,
values and impressions made possible by a vast network of private organizations.
In what is clearly a reflection of the differences in the two political systems, we
should encourage those activities to demonstrate our view of the concepts of
human rights and democratic development.
It is unlikely that the impressions gained by the 19,000 students from the
developing nations now studying in the Soviet Union will provide them with an
appreciation of democratic principles. I have no doubt, however, about the experi-
ences gained through exchange programs as provided by the independent com-
munity colleges such as in my own congressional district. Those students from
this nation and abroad, will learn not only who we are and what we seek, but
more importantly what we are and what we have to offer.
Perhaps a contribution that this interparliamentary forum can make towards
that goal would be to help create a Commission on Cultural Exchange to support
and encourage the spread of democratic ideals throughout the world. The need is
there, and as Senator Pell concludes, "the future challenges to democratic
values .. are greater than is generally realized."









59


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DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS

Paper by Edward G. Biester, Jr.
More than a decade of sobering experience has done much to enlighten Ameri-
cans about the complex relationship between economic development and the
growth of democratic institutions. In March, 1961, few of us questioned, or were
uninspired by, President Kennedy's enunciation of the premises and goals of
the United States' first comprehensive development program, the Alliance for
Progress. "Our unfulfilled task", he declared, "is to demonstrate to the entire
world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress can best be
achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions
. . (and) we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a
hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all
can live out their lives in dignity and freedom. To achieve this goal political
freedom must accompany material progress."
Fourteen years later, however, Secretary of State Kissinger's address before
the UN Seventh Special Session (which, significantly, was the product of un-
precedented consultation with Members of Congress) contained not a single ref-
erence to "democratic institutions" or "political freedom". Such an omission, I
am certain, was neither unintentional nor simply a reflection of differences in
style. In fact, fundamental changes in our perceptions and priorities explain the
evolution of American policies related to the developing world.

A FRAGILE HOPE
In retrospect, the hope of encouraging democratic institutions along with eco-
nomic development has proved to be more fragile than planners of the "Allianza"
anticipated. It would be useful here to enumerate a few of the lessons learned
since 1961, leaving the consideration of particular cases to our group discussion:
(1) In many instances more "democratic" LDC's have found it terribly diffi-
cult to mobilize the resources and concurrently impose the discipline on both
capital-owners and labor necessary for economic "take-off". Hence. the appeal
of the single party or authoritarian model, or at Icast a more socialist develop-
ment strategy.
(2) Economic growth may lead to an increase in social and political conflicts
injurious to the growth of democratic institutions. The's has been most often the
case in Latin America, where a growing middle class and inc're;sin'z organi-
zation of peasants and labor have led to military coups by threatened conserva-
tive elites or, alternatively, by aspiring "radicals".
(3) Increasingly, LDC's perceive themselves as forming a Third World "bloc"
which, at least in theory, must remain aloof from the ideologicall" struggles
of the superpowers. In other words, United States relationships with members
of this "bloc" may depend less upon any political affinity (e.g.. the shr;ng of
democratic institutions) than on common economic interests .and a mutual con-
cern in avoiding the spread of superpower confrontations to thle Tz:ird Wor!l.
(1) Economic aid seems a particularly unwiehly tool for a "ca-rrot and stl'ck"
approach to encouraging democratic development. While there is some chance
that economic aid mnay help) support a shaky democraticc" go\w nU-ient. tlhele is
little evidence to show that the withdrawal of such aid. lby itself, v.-will topple
a nondemocratic one. Moreover, cutbacks in aid to an LDC gone authoritarian
may drastically affect the poorest of that country, further inhihiting opportuni-
ties fnr growth whi.-h could hopefully create preconditions favorable toward
a political liberalization of the regime.

AVOIDING ARROGANCE
To the above observations-which, in my view, argue agAin-4t attempts to
closely link economic development to political (lemocratization-I would add a
(01)






62

general, but oft-forgotten, admonition: while we may venerate our peculiar
conception of democracy, it is not a self-perpetuating system adaptable to any
body politic. Attempts to define how and what sort of democratic institutions
might be developed in country X, Y or Z will inevitably appear as evidence of
American arrogance. At best. such concerns will seem pitifully irrelevant. One
need only recall the caution of Mahatma Gandhi: "God, Himself, dare not appear
to a hungry man except in the form of bread".
Having said this, it does not follow, h,-wever, that the political institutions
of LI)C"s should, or can be, totally irrelevant to American economic assistance
programs. Whether or not a recipient goverlnelt can qualify as "democratic".
its respect for hutian lights as defined, for example, by the UN Declaration, will
often influence the flow of international economic assistance. The explanation
for this is two-fold.
The first reason should lIe well understood by all legislators assembled here.
Economic assistance from the industrialized nations to the LDC's involves more
than the extension of technical cooperation or trade preferences; it involves,
as well, a transfer of some real resources from "North" to "South". Thus, to the
degree that our constituents are contributing a portion of these resources to
international development, we cannot be insensitive to their deeply-felt con-
cerns about gross violations of human rights by certain recipient nations. And
for those who would doubt the sincerity of these concerns, I need simply point
out that recently enacted legislation would require, in prescribed cases, the
cut-off of all American economic assistance to nations engaged in such systematic
violations. Short of a total cut-off, some nations such as Chile have witnessed
reductions in aid as a direct result of their practices in this area.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
Second, one could hardly argue that the more authoritarian LDC's have a
particularly good record in economic development. Practices such as arbitrary
arrest and torture do not, in general, enhance prospects of developing a compe-
tent managerial class or attracting foreign investors. Perhaps the Peop)]e's
Republic of China need not be concerned about creating a proper climate for
foreign investment; however, this may not be the case, for example, with
India. . .
Admittedly, the task of translating our broad concerns with human rights
into some effective action, even over the "long-term" of the development process,
will remain a perplexing one. For reasons indicated above, progress in this area
will be spotty at bpst. And while I do not believe that multilateral development
organizations are, in every case, the best response to the economic challenges we
may face, they may well be a more effective vehicle tht n bilateral programs in
aidvan-ing the cause of human rights. Most impo(,rtantly, donor nations working
together in this area can demonstrate that their shared concern is not subject
to misinterpretation or to playing-off one industrialized country against another.
We of the industrialized world know all too well that man's inhumanity to man
is not a simple function of our level of economic growth. But now that we have
resolved to build a global framework for economic development and cooperation
rather than continue the dangerous trend toward greater division between rich
and poor, should we not renew a common effort to improve political as well as
economic justice? To such a rhetorical question, one can always answer in the
affirmative. A more awesome question remains for us to discuss: "How?"














INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS

Paper by Pierre-Bernard Coust4
".. human rights are as important to the life of a nation as economic well-
being-they are not 'luxuries' only the rich can afford, but the basic entitlement
of all people." Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/75.
The numerous opinions expressed on our general theme reveal a basic agree-
ment on the principles and values without which our societies simply would not
exist. In recent statements both Mr. H. Kissinger and Mr. J. Carter have stressed
the importance of the defense of human rights in international relations. The
Secretary of State emphasized that one of the most effective weapons in the
struggle against the degradation of human values is still the organized concern
of the Community of Nations.
Mr. Carter declared that the United States and its allies should take the lead
in establishing and promoting basic global standards of human rights. He feels
that injustice in the world can be alleviated by our example, by the expression
of our opinions and by the various forms of economic and political persuasion at
our disposal. At the last meeting of the Organization of American States, Mr.
Kissinger went so far as to say that "a government that tramples on the rights
of its citizens denies the purpose of its existence". (Time, August 16, 1976).

EXAMPLE, INTERVENTIONS, AND PERSUASION
All of us will undoubtedly support the statements quoted above. Indeed, the
fact that we are debating this theme represents a step towards the "organiza-
tion" of our common concern.
It is only fair that we should be expected to practice the example we preach.
It is the very essence of our own internal democracy, of the development of our
social democracy and our liberties. While condemning extortion and refusing the
unacceptable, we must at the same time set an example and encourage others
to follow it. Demonstrations of opinion, official and unofficial interventions and
lobbying are just a few of the many ways in which we can make clear to others
what the legal position is and what may be the political and other consequences
of their actions. In the long run the procedure or method used is of little impor-
tance, though unofficial representations are perhaps more effective. The essential
point is that the intervention must be decisive, must make it clear where respon-
sibilities lie, and must be made before it is too late.
Economic and political persuasion can be used in many circumstances. Several
of the developing countries with whom we cooperate asked us to show, by prac-
tical preferential measures in the trade and aid sectors that we encourage and
favor those countries which maintain parliamentary democracy and civil liberties.
We feel politically and morally justified in using all available forms of influence
or persuasion on countries with which we have established special ties, to remind
them discreetly but firmly of universal rights, or to induce them to show clemency
and to grant political amnesty.

A RADICAL POLICY PROPOSED
In so far as there is a serious desire to establish "organized concern," the policy
of supplying military equipment of any kind, to any country, must be abandoned.
Depending on the regime involved, a distinction must be drawn between straight-
forward commercial consignments and other consignments such as arms and
military equipment. A radical, long-term policy of this kind naturally requires
genuine coordination to avoid competition and undercutting. Above all it requires
firm convictions and consistency between objectives, statements and policies.
(63)





64


As regards cultural exchanges, there must be a free flow and numerous contacts
at international level among the democratic countries. Moreover, future leaders
of developing countries should be given frequent opportunities to meet the leaders
of established democracies. By exchanging experiences and forming a common,
democratic vision of the future it will thus be possible to establish an "Inter-
national" based on parliamentary democracy and civil liberties.

STRENGTHENING THE GUARANTEES OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations agreements
are not enough to guarantee respect for rights and liberties. We must both extend
international constitutional law and create new forms of guarantees. Relations
between states are based on human rights. The rights of the individual and the
possibilities of appeal must now be consistently developed, in line with the
development of international legal and jurisdictional procedures. We must encour-
age our legal experts, diplomats and other officials responsible for international
relations to develop and experiment with new procedures, which must be both
effective and acceptable to all regimes. One possibility might be secret enquiries
carried out by an international body and acceptable even to a totalitarian or
dictatorial regime, in order to throw light on a complaint, an accusation or on
information relating to human rights.
Public opinion is playing an increasingly important role in international rela-
tions, in particular by denouncing the violation of human rights. It is highly
desirable that the public be made aware that their political leaders not only
share its concern in this matter but are endeavoring to take concerted action and
to establish a "common concern" with a view to restraining the unacceptable
attacks on human rights.














APPENDIX



BIOGRAPHIES OF PARTICIPANTS

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS
GERARD BORDU, born April 21, 1928, at Melun, C.A.P. and qualified elec-
trician. Member of the National Assembly since March 1973. Member of the
Central Committee of the French Communist Parliamentary Group. Former
secretary of the Federation of the French Communist Parliamentary Group in
the Seine and Marne district. Vice President of the European Parliament; Mem-
ber of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Communist and Allies
Group, France.
JAN. B. BROEKSZ, born February 12, 1906, at Amsterdam. Office manager in
Vara Broadcasting, then Secretary/Treasurer in 1940. Network secretary 1945-
66, then chairman of Vara. Chairman of European Broadcasting Union from 1965
to 1971. From 1935 to 1962 member of Hilversum local council. Member of the
First Chamber of the States General since 1956, Dutch Labour Party (pvdA),
Member of the Legal Affairs Committee and the Committee on Development and
Cooperation. Vice Chairman of the Socialist Group, Netherlands.
PIERRE-BERNARD COUSTE, born June 29. 1920, at Rochefort-sur-Mer. Doc-
tor of Law; Company Director; National chairman of "Centre des jeunes
patrons" 1958-61; Chairman of "Federation des jeunes chefs d'entreprises
d'Europe" 1961-64. Managing Director of Societ6 Lumiere. Chairman of RhOne-
Loire committee of foreign trade advisers. Member of the National Assembly
since 1962. Allied to the Union des d6mocrates pour la Republique (UDR). For-
mer Vice-President of the European Parliament. Member of the Committees on
Economic 'and Monetary Affairs, External Economic Relations, and the Joint
Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association. Group of European
Progressive Democrats, Prance.
ERNEST GLINNE, born March 30, 1931, in Forchies-la-Marche, Belgium.
Diploma in Political Sciences, Brussels University. Member of the Belgium Par-
liament since 1961. Minister of Employment and Labour 1973-74. Mayor of Cour-
celles since 1964. Member of the Belgium Delegation to the United Nations:
specialist in problems of the Third World. Member of the Committees on Social
Affairs, Employment and Education, and on Development and Cooperation;
Member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Greece Association.
Vice President of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, Belgium.
ROGER HOUDET, born June 14, 1899, in Angers. Agricultural engineer;
Graduate of "Ecole superieure d'6lectricitl"; General engineer for rural areas.
1937 Principal Private Secretary to Mr. Georges Monnet, Minister of Aericul-
ture; 1952 Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture; 1953-55 and 1958-59 Min-
ister for Agriculture; 1958 President of the Committee of Agricultural Ministers
of OECD countries. 1959 resigned from ministerial office to serve term of office
as Senator; 1968 re-elected Senator (Seine Maritime). 1962 elected Mayor of
Luneray. 1962-64 Member of the supervisory board of RTF. Member of CODER
(regional economic development committee) in Upper Normandy. 1965-68 Dele-
gate to Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and to the Assembly of
the WEU. Member of the Senate Committee on Cultural Affairs. Group of Inde-
pendent Republicans. Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture; Member of
the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport. Liberal
and Allies Group, France.
NORBERT HOUGARDY, born November 1, 1909, in Etterbeek. Studied for
degree at the "Institut Superieur de commerce". 1939 President of the Brussels
Young Liberals. 1940-45 Lieutenant Colonel in the Resistance; decorations.
(65)






66


Journalist and Company Director. Senator for Brussels since 1956; Vice Chair-
man "Parti de la Libert4 et du Progr&s" (PLP) ; 1967-68 Vice President of the
Senate; Member of the Committees on National Defence and Finance. Former
Vice President of the European Parliament. Member of the Committees on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs, and on Energy and Research. Vice Chairman of the
Liberal and Allies Group, Belgium.
EDGAR JAHN, born November 21, 1914, in Neustettin (Pomerania). Studied
history, law and political science in Berlin and Graz. Doctorate in political sci-
ences. War service. Author and publisher since 1947. Chairman of "Arbeitsgemein-
schaft Demokratischer Kreise" 1951-69. Vice Chairman of the refugee federa-
tion. Member of CDU since 1947. CDU Land Chairman for Brunswick and Mem-
ber of the CDU Land executive for Lower Saxony. Member of the Bundestag
since 1965. Vice Chairman of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health
and Consumer Protection; Member of the Political Affairs Committee and the
Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association. Christian-
Democratic Group, Federal Republic of Germany.
SIR PETER KIRK, born May 18, 1928 in Oxford. Educated Marlborough Col-
lege, Trinity College, Oxford, and Zurich University; President of the Oxford
Union 1949. Former journalist, and director of public relations company. Also
used to produce documentary films. Member of Parliament for Saffron Walden
since 1965; represented Gravesend 1955-64. Under-Secretary for War 1963-64;
Under-Secretary of Defence for the Army 1964; Under-Secretary of Defence for
the Navy 1970-72. Delegate to the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the
WEU for the whole period of his membership of the House of Commons except
for the time that he was serving as a junior Minister. Member of the Political
Affairs Committee and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and
Consumer Protection. Chairman of the European Conservative Group, United
Kingdom.
THOMAS NOLAN, born July 27,1921 in Carlow, Ireland, 1939-46, Army officer.
Wholesale distributor. 1961-65, Member of the Senate. Deputy (Fianna Fail
Party) for Carlow-Kilkenny since 1965. 1964-66, Member of the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1969-73. Dail Committee of Public Accounts.
Member of Carlow County Council since 1960; Muine Bheag Town Council since
1955. Vice Chairman of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and
Education; Member of the Committee on Development and Cooperation. Member
of the Group of European Progressive Democrats, Ireland.
LUIGI M. ROSATI, born on August 21, 1914, in Romeno (Trento), Italy.
Graduate of the University of Torino. Founder and President of various social,
cultural and sport organizations. Fought in the Resistance during the 2d World
War and imprisoned. Vice President of the joint Parliamentary Committee of
the ECC/Greece Association. Member of the Committee on the Social Affairs,
Employment and Education. Member of the Christian Democrat Group, Italy.
WILLEM J. SCHUIJT, born June 27, 1909, in Amsterdam. Doctor of Philos-
ophy and Letters. Schoolteacher 1929-45. Member of executive of advisory com-
mittee of Resistance 1943-46. Journalist (Paris correspondent of an Amsterdam
newspaper, and of Catholic broadcasting service) 1950-56. Deputy secretary-
general of "Nouvelles 6quipes internationales" in Paris 1952-57. Substitute at
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and at Assembly of WEU 1957-
60. Member of the municipal council of The Hague since 1970. Member of the Sec-
ond Chamber of the States-General 1956-71. Member of the First Chamber of the
States-General 1971. Member of the Political Affairs Committee, the Legal Af-
fairs Committee, and the Committee on Development and Cooperation. Member
of the Restricted Bureau of the Christian-Democratic Group, Netherlands.
JAMES SCOTT-IIOPKINS, born November 29,1921, in London. Educated Eton
and Oxford. Marketing Consultant. Regular Army commission, King's Own York-
shire Light Infantry until 1949 when he retired from the Army and became a
farmer. Member of the N.F.U. and the Institute of Directors. M.P. for North
Cornwall 1959-66, and for Derbyshire West since 1967. Parliamentary Secretary,
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1962-64. Joint Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Vice President
of the European Parliament. Vice Chairman of the Committee on External Eco-
nomic Relations, Member of the Political Affairs Committee, and the Committee
on Agriculture. Vice Chairman of the European Conservative Group, United
Kingdom.






67

GEORGES SPENALE, born November 29, 1913, in Carcassonne, France. "Li-
cenci6 en droit." Graduate of "Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer." 1938--
39, Economic Bureau of French Guinea; 1939-40, military service; 1941-42, dis-
trict officer in Upper Volta; 1942-43, labor inspector in Ivory Coast; 1943-45, mil-
itary service; 1946-48, head of the office for the Federation of Equatorial Africa;
1949-50, head of the Information Service of the Ivory Coast; 1951-53, head of the
Cameroon Office; 1953-54, Secretary General of Cameroon; 1954-55, Acting Hialh
Commissioner in Cameroon; 1955-56. Deputy Director of Political Affairs of
French Overseas departments; 1956, Governor of French overseas departments;
1956-57, principal private secretary to Gaston Defferre, Minister of French over-
seas d6partements in the Mollet Government; and 1957-62, High Commissioner of
France in Togo (until independence). Political career: 1962, Deputy for Tarn
department in the National Assembly; 1964, Conseiller general of Rabastens
(Tarn), Member of the European Parliament; 1965, Mayor of Saint-Sulpice
(Tarn); 1966-67, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Association with,
Greece; 1967-75, Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the European Parlia-
ment; 1968-71, Member of the Steering Committee of the French Socialist Party;
1974-March 1975, Chairman of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament;
February 1975, Vice President of the Regional Council of Midi-Pyren6es; and
March 1975, President of the European Parliament, France.
MICHAEL STEWART, born November 6, 1906, in Bromley, Kent, England.
Educated Christ's Hospital, and St. John's College, Oxford. President of the
Oxford Union 1929. Army Intelligence Corps, 1931-42. Former teacher at Mer-
chant Taylor's and the Coopers' Company Schools. M.P. for Fulham since 1950:
represented East Fulham 1945-50. Secretary of State for Education and Science
1964-65; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1965-66 and 1968; Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs 1966-67; First Secretary of State 1967-68; Secre-
tary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1968-70; Chairman of the
Select Committee on Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 1970. Mem-
ber of the Political Affairs Committee, Vice Chairman of the Socialist Group,
United Kingdom.

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
BILL ARCHER, Republican, of Houston, Tex.; born in Houston, Tex.,
March 22, 1928; attended Rice University, 1945-46; University of Texas, B.B.A.,
LL.B., 1946-51; served in the U.S. Air Force, Korea; elected to Texas House of
Representatives, 1966; reelected, 1968; attorney and businessman; president,
Uncle Johnny Mills, Inc., 1953-61; married; five children; elected to 92d Con-
gress, November 3, 1970; reelected to both 93d and 94th Congresses; member,
Committee on Ways and Means; ranking Republican, Subcommittee on Social
Security; member, Subcommittee on Trade; member, White House Commission
on Regulatory Reform; chairman, Republican Study Committee Task Force on
Regulatory Reform.
DWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Republican, of Furlong, Pa.; born in Trevose,
Pa., January 5, 1931; attended Doylestown public schools, and the George School;
graduated from George School, 1948; graduated from Wesleyan University, 1952;
graduated from Temple University School of Law, 1955; admitted to Pennsyl-
vania Bar 1956; assistant district attorney Bucks County, 1958-64; member of
the American Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association, Philadelphia Bar
Association, Bucks County Bar Association; past president, Doylestown Kiwanis
Club; member of board of directors, Bucks County Bar Association; married the
former -Elizabeth. Ruth Lauffer, April 10, 1954; four children; Ann Meredith,
Edward G., III, James Paul, and David Robertson; elected November 8, 1966.
PHILIP M. CRANE, Republican, of Mt. Prospect, Ill.; born in Chicago, Ill.,
November 3, 1930; educated at DePauw University, Hillsdale College, University
of Michigan, and University of Vienna, and received M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
from Indiana University; served with the U.S. Army, on active duty, 1954-56; 2
years, advertising manager, Hopkins Syndicate, Inc.; taught at Indiana Univer-
sity for 3 years before moving to Bradley University, Peoria, Ill., in 1963 where he
taught United States and Latin American history until 1967; served as director of
schools, Westminster Academy, Northbrook, 11., 1967-68; in 1962, employed by
the Republican Party as a public relations expert; in 1964, served as director of
research for the Illinois Goldwater Organization; at the request of Richard
Nixon, served as one of his advisers and researchers on political and national






68


issues, 1964-68; trustee of IIillsdale College; director of the Intercollegiate
Studies Institute; serves on the National Advisory Board of Young Americans for
Freedom; married Arlene Catherine Johnson of Chicago ; seven girls, one boy:
elected to the 91st Congress, by special election, November 25, 1969, to fill the
vacancy caused by the resignation of Donald Rumnisfeld; reelected to 92d, 93d, and
94th Congresses; member, Committee on Ways and Means.
MILLICENT FENWICK, Republican, of Bernardsville, N.J.: born Febru-
ary 25, 1910, in New York City; attended Foxcroft School, Middleburg, Va.,
1923-25; attended Columbia University, 1933; New School for Social Research,
1942; associate editor, Conde Nast Publications, 1938-52; served on the Bernards-
ville Board of Education; chairman of the Bernardsville Recreation Commission;
served on the Bernardsville Borough Council, 1958-64; elected to the New Jersey
State Assembly in 1969 and reelected in 1971; State Director of Consumer Affairs,
1971-74; two children: Mary Reckford and Hugh H.; eight grandchildren; elected
to the 94th Congress, November 5, 1974; committee assignments: Banking, Cur-
rency, and Housing; and Small Business.
PAUL FINDLEY, Republican, of Pittsfield, Ill.; born June 23, 1921, in Jack-
sonville, Ill.; graduated from Illinois College, A.B. degree, LL.D. (honorary),
1973; Phi Beta Kappa; Lindenwood College, D.H.L. degree (honorary), 1969;
engaged in the printing and publishing business and publisher of two weekly
newspapers; married to former Lucille Gemme; two children, Craig and Diane:
veteran Wrorld War II; elected to the 87th Congress November 8, 1960; reelected
to 88th through 94th Congresses; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Committee on Agriculture; secretary, International Movement for Atlantic Union;
author. The Federal Farm Fable (Arlington House, 1968).
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Democrat, of Lafayette, Ind.; born in Vesta, Nebr.,
November 3, 1928; attended public schools there and graduated from Vesta
(Nebraska) High School; Peru State College, Nebr., B.A., 1951; graduate work
at the University of Nebraska, M.A., 1955, and a Ph. D., 1964; Served in the U.S.
Navy with the rank of lieutenant, 1951-55, and in the U.S. Naval Reserves,
1955-71, as commander; held the positions as high school teacher, college pro-
fessor at Nebraska Wesleyan, and associate professor of history at Purdue Uni-
versity; member: Indiana Cattlemen's Association, Lafayette Farm Cooperative,
past president of Indiana Council of Social Studies, American Historical Associa-
tion, Organization of American Historians, Tippecanoe County Historical Society,
and State Council for Social Studies ; married to the former Marjorie Helm, 1952;
three children: Cindy, Judy, and John; elected to the 94th Congress, November 5,
1974.
DONALD MACKAY FRASER, Democratic-Farmer-Labor, of Minneapolis,
Minn.; attorney and former State senator 1954-62; born in Minneapolis, Febru-
ary 20,1924; educated in Minneapolis public schools and University of Minnesota,
B.A., cum laude, 1944, L.L.B., 1948; served in Pacific Theater, World War II;
1969-71--chairman, Democratic Study Group; chairman, Commission on Party
Structure and Delegate Selection; Democratic Advisory Council: vice chairman
of the Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees, 1968;
participating member, Anglo-American Parliamentary Conference on Africa,
1964 to present; active in D.F.L. Party since 1947: Congressional adviser on the
U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Seabeds Committee; 1973 national chairman. Amer-
icans for Democratic Action; married to former Arvonne Skelton; six children
(one deceased) ; partner in former firm of Lindquist, Fraser & Magnuson: elected
to the 88th Congress, November 6. 1962; reelected to the 89th, 90th, 91st, 92d, 93d,
nd 94th Congresses.
L. H. FOUNTAIN. Democrat, of Tarboro, N.C.: born in village of Leggett.
Edgecombe County, N.C., April 23, 1913: son of the late Sallie (Barnes) and
Lawrence H. Fountain; educated in public schools Edgecombe County and at
lUniversity of North Carolina-A.B. and J.D. degrees; married Christine Dail
of Mount Olive. N.C.: one dalighter, Nancy Dail Fountain: World War TI veteran
of 4 years service; North Carolina State senator 1947-52: Presbyterian elder;
member, board of trustees, St. Andrews Presbyterian College; elected Novem-
ber 4. 1952.
SAM M. GIBBONS. Democrat, of Tampa, Fla.; born, in Tampa, January 20,
1920, son of Gunby Gibbons and Jessie Kirk Cralle Gibbons; educated in public
schools of Tampa: received J.D. degree from the University of Florida; named
to the University's Hall of Fame and to its honor society Florida Blue Key;
member of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity; married to the former Martha Hanley;






69

they have three sons-Clifford, born 1950; Mark, born 1952; Timonthy, born
1958; elected to the Florida House of Representatives in 1952 and served for
6 years; elected to the Florida Senate in 1958 and served for 4 years; served
in U.S. Army 5 years during World War II; elected November 6, 1962. Member
of Ways and Means Committee.
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, Republican, of Middletown, N.Y.;: born in Pough-
keepsie, N.Y., December 6, 1922; educated in the public schools of Middletown
and graduated from Middletown High School, 1941; B.S., Wharton School of
Business and Finance, University of Pennsylvania, 1946; L.L.B., New York Law
School, 1950; veteran of World War II; appointed assistant attorney general,
New York State Department of Law, 1953; formed law firm of Gilman and
Gilman; attorney for New York State's Temporary Commission on the Courts;
served in the New York State Assembly, 1967-72; married Jane Prizant,
1952: five children; elected to the 93d Congress, November 7, 1972; reelected to
the 94th Congress; member of International Relations Committee, Select Com-
mittee on the MIA, Post Office and Civil Service Committee, Republican Task
.r'orce on Energy and Resources, Congressional Advisor to Law of the Sea
Conference; appointed to United States Military Academy Board of Visitors,
1973.
WILLIAM LEONARD HUNGATE, Democrat, of Troy, Mo.; born in Benton,
Ill., December 14, 1922; Central Methodist College; University of Michigan;
graduated from Missouri University, A.B. degree, 1943; and Harvard Law
School, L.L.B. degree, 1948; partner in the law firm of Hungate & Grewach, Troy,
Mo.. 1956-68; prosecuting attorney of Lincoln County, and special assistant to
the attorney general, 1958-64; a veteran of World War II; married Dorothy N.
Wilson of Cyrene, Mo.; two children, David and Kay (Mrs. Branson L. Wood
III); elected to the 88th Congress, November 3, 1964, to fill the vacancy caused
by the death of Clarence Cannon; reelected to the 89th, 90th, 91st, 92d, 93d, and
94th Congresses; member of House Judiciary Committee, chairman, Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice; Committee on Small Business, chairman, Subcommittee
on Regulatory Agencies.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, Republican, of Fort Collins, Colo.; born in Yankton,
S. Dak., June 2, 1930; B.A., Northwestern University, 1952; LL.B., University of
Colorado, 1959; served in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1952-56; prosecuting attorney,
Eighth Judicial District, Colorado; municipal judge, Ault, Colo., 1962-65; mem-
ber, Pondre R-1 School Board, Fort Collins, Colo., 1969-71; president, Larimer
County Bar Association; elder, First United Presbyterian Church, Fort Collins,
Colo.; member: board of trustees, San Francisco Theological Seminary; board of
directors, Fort Collins, Colo., Chamber of Commerce, 1968-70; charter member,
Dean's Law Club, University of Colorado; married Nancy Brown of Oconomwoc,
Wis., 1952; three children; Dea Lynn, Julie Conner, and Drake Bartel; elected
to the 93d Congress, November 7, 1972; reelected to the 94th Congress, Novem-
ber 6, 1974.
JAMES G. MARTIN, Republican, of Davidson, N.C.: born in Savannah, Ga.,
December 11, 1935; graduate, Mt. Zion High School, Winnsboro, S.C., 1953; B.S.
in chemistry, Davidson College, 1957; Ph. D. in chemistry, Princeton University,
1960, associate professor in chemistry, Davidson College, 1960-72; member,
Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners, 1966-72, chairman, 1967-68, and
1970-71: founder and first chairman, Centralina Regional Council of Govern-
ments, 1966-69; vice president and trustee, Beta Theta Pi fraternity, 1966-69;
president, North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, 1970-71; vice
president, National Association of Regional Councils, 1970-72; current national
president of Beta Theta Pi, 1975-78; Mason, married Dorothy Ann McAulay,
1957; three children; Jimmy, Emily, and Benson; elected to the 93d Congress,
November 7, 1972; reelected to the 94th Congress.
RICHARD M. NOLAN, Democrat-Farmer-Labor, of Waite Park, Minn.: born
in Brainerd, Minn., December 17, 1943; married, the former Marjorie Langer;
four children: Michael, Leah, John, and Katherine; attended St. John's Uni-
versity, Collegeville, Minn., 1962; B.A., political science, University of Minne-
sota, 1966; postgraduate work in public administration and public policy forma-
tion of the University of Maryland, 1967; educational director for Headstart for
three central Minnesota counties, 1968; curriculum coordinate for Adult Basic
Education for Little Falls School District, 1968; social studies teacher in Royal-
ton, Minn., 1968-69; project coordinator for the Center for the .Study of Local
Government at St. John's University in Collegeville, Minn., 1971; staff assistant






70

to U.S. Senator Walter F. Mondale, 1966-68; elected to Minnesota House of
Representatives in 1968 and reelected in 1970; Federal/State coordinator for the
Minnesota House of Representatives 1973 legislative session; general labor at
United Parcel Services, 1964-66; member of Teamsters Union; administrative
assistant to the senior vice president of Fingerhut Corp., 1978-74; elected to the
94th Congress, November 5, 1974.
CLAIBORNE PELL, Democrat, of Newport. R.I.; born November 22, 1918,
in New York City, son of Congressman Herbert Claiborne and Matilda (Bigelow)
Pell; St. George's School, Middletown, R.I., 1933-36; Princeton University, 1940,
A.B., Columbia University, A.M.; married Nuala O'Donnell in December 1944;
children: Herbert IIT, Christopher, Dallas, an-1 Julia; business executive, invest-
ments; Coast Guard, World War II, specialist assistant at San Francisco United
Nations Conference; served 7 years in United States Foreign Service and State
Department; elected November 8, 1960; reelected November 8, 1966; reelected
November 7, 1972.
THOMAS M. REES, Democrat, of Los Angeles, Calif., born in Los Angeles,
Calif., on March 26, 1925; graduated from Occidental College in 1950, B.A. in
political science; served with 3d Army during World War II; attorney, member
California State Bar: District of Columbia Bar; member of board, Connoisseur
Wine Imports, 1965-68; married the former Leanne Boccardo of Los Gatos; two
sons, Evan and James; member of California State Assembly, representing 50th
Assembly District, 1954-62; State senator representing Los Angeles County,
1962-65: elected to the 89th Congress in a special election on December 15, 1965,
to fill the vacancy caused by resignation of James Roosevelt; reelected to 90th,
91st, 92d, 93d, and 94th Congresses; member of the Banking, Currency and Hous-
ing Committee: chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and
Monetary Policy; subcommittee on Economic Stabilization; Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development; Subcommittee on International Develop-
ment Institutions and Finance; Committee on the District of Columbia; Sub-
committee on Fiscal Affairs; Subcommittee on Judiciary; member, National
Commission on Supplies and Shortages; areas of special legislative interest:
monetary policy, urban problems, and foreign trade.
HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Milwaukee, Wis.: born in Milwaukee, Wis.,
February 22, 1912: A.B. Cornell University. LL.B. Harvard Law School; lawyer
lecturer (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), and writer; author of "The
Critical Decade," 1964; "Revenue Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst," 1969; member
of Milwaukee School Board, 1953-55, married to Margaret Magrath, 1942; four
children-Christopher, Michael, Jackqueline, Anne; assistant corporation coun-
sel. Milwaukee County, 1939-40; assistant general counsel OPA, Washington,
D.C., 1941-42; United States Army 1943-45; deputy general counsel, Marshall
Plan, Paris, France, 1949; special prosecutor, Milwaukee County Grand Jury
1950: former president, White Elm Nursery Co., Hartland, Wis.; former director
Marshall and Ilsley Bank, Milwaukee, Wis., and Niagara Share Corporation,
Buffalo, N.Y.; elected November 2, 1954. Member, Banking, and Currency Com-
mittee; Committee on Government Operations, and Joint Economic Committee.
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, Democrat, of Elmhurst, Long Island, N.Y.;
born in New York City, N.Y., June 8. 1923; educated in the public schools of the
city of New York; attended Long Island University and City College; L.L.B.
Brooklyn Law School (1949). LL.M. New York University (1952) ; married Lila
Moskowitz, two children-Debra and Edward; attorney; admitted to New York
Bar 1949; admitted to practice before United States Supreme Court 1954; served
in United States Army March 1943 to January 1946, 18 months in Iceland;
elected as Democrat-Liberal to the 87th Congress in special election February 20,
1962; reelected to the 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92d, 93d, and 94th Congresses;
appointed member of National Commission on Food Marketing during 88th and
89th Congresses.
LEO J. RYAN, Democrat, of South San Francisco: born in Lincoln, Nebr.,
May 5, 1925; M.S. Creighton University, 1951; enlisted in U.S. Navy, 1943,
served in submarine service; teacher; school administrator; appointed to South
San Francisco Recreation Commission; elected city councilman and served as
mayor; authored book entitled "Understanding California Government and
Politics"; also edited the book "The USA: From Where We Stand"; elected to
California State Assembly, 1962; elected to the 93d Congress, November 7, 1972;
reelected to the 94th Congress.
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, Democrat, of Brooklyn, N.Y.: born in New York City,
September 12, 1940; attended New York public schools; graduated from Brandeis






71

University, received master's degree in public law and government from Columbia
University; elected to New York State Assembly, three terms, 1968 through 1972;
ranking minority member, Higher Education Committee; member: Executive
Board of America Jewish Congress, League School for Seriously Disturbed
Children, B'nai B'rith; married to the former Nina Koldin; two children: Randy
and Lisa; elected to the 94th Congress on November 5, 1974; member, Interna-
tional Relations Committee (Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy), Post Office and
Civil Service Committee (Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service, Sub-
committee on Employee Political Rights and Intergovernmental Property);
member: DSG, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, Environmental
Study.
JOHN WILLIAM STRATTON, Republican, of Painesville, Ohio; born in
Painesville February 20,1924; graduated from Culver Military Academy, Culver,
Ind., in 1942; entered the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., in July 1942; left studies to enter the U.S. Army in December
1942; served overseas in the Pacific theater for 33 months and discharged as a
-captain January 1, 1946; reentered Georgetown University, majored in govern-
ment and economics, and received B.S. degree in 1949; member, St. Mary's Catho-
lic Church in Painesville; Lake County commissioner 1956-64; married Decem-
ber 3, 1966, to the former Peggy Smeeton; one daughter, Kelly Marie, born No-
vember 11, 1967; elected to the 89th Congress, November 3, 1964; reelected to
-each succeeding Congress.
PAUL TSONGAS, Democrat, of Lowell, Mass.; born in Lowell, February 14,
1941; graduated, Lowell High School; B.A., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.,
1962; LL. B., Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn., 1967; served as Middlesex
County Commissioner and Lowell City Councilor; private law practice; deputy
assistant attorney general, Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement; served
with the Peace Corps in Ethiopia and West Indies; active in Jaycees; married to
the former Nicola Sauvage; one daughter: Ashley; elected to the 94th Congress,
November 5, 1974.
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jn., Republican, of Dayton, Ohio; born July 31,
1920; graduate of Oakwood High School; B.S. degree in business administration,
University of Dayton, 1942; M.B.A. degree, Harvard University Graduate School
of Business, 1946; honorary LL.D., Central State University, 1960; enlisted U.S.
Army, World War II, discharged as 1st lieutenant in 1946; vice president of the
Dayton Dress Co., 1946-52; professor of economics and chairman of the depart-
ment, University of Dayton, 1962-66; Ohio State representative, three terms,
1955-60; Ohio State senator, two terms, 1961-66; married the former Barbara
Gleason, of Sidney, Ohio, December 27, 1958; six children, Charles E., Daniel D.,
Edward J., Joseph M., Anne Elizabeth, and Mary Barbara; elected to the 90th
Congress November 8, 1966; reelected to 91st, 92d, 93d, and 94th Congresses;
member of the House International Relations Committee, District of Columbia
Committee, and the House Commission on Information and Facilities.













U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY


OTHER DOCUMENTS IN THIS SERIES
Reports on previous meetings of EP-US delegations:
The European Community and the American Interest, January 1972. (First
Meeting)
A Growing Bond: The European Parliament and the Congress, May 1972.
(Second Meeting)
New Dimensions in the Transatlantic Dialog, May 1973. (Third Meeting)
To Restore Harmony: New Efforts in Transatlantic Cooperation, October,
1973. (Fourth Meeting)
Turbulent Era: The Year of Europe in Retrospect, March 1974. (Fifth
Meeting)
The Multinationals: Their Function and Future. September 1974. (Sixth
Meeting)
The Multinationals: The View from Europe, April 1975. (Seventh Meeting)
The Ascendancy of Economic Goals in the World Order, October 1975.
(Eighth Meeting)
Assessing the New Political Trends, April 1976. (Ninth Meeting)
Hearings:
American Interest in the European Community, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Europe March 22; April 5; November 7, 9; December 6,
1973 and June 11, 1974.
United States-Europe Relations and the 1973 Middle East War, Hearings
before the Subcommittees on Europe and on the Near East and South
Asia, November 1, 1973 and February 19,1974.
(72)







UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
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