United States and Soviet progress in space : summary data

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Material Information

Title:
United States and Soviet progress in space : summary data
Series Title:
Serial - House, Committee on Science and Technology ; no. 95-DD
Physical Description:
: ; 24 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Library of Congress -- Science Policy Research Division
United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on Science and Technology. -- Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications
Publisher:
for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Washington

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Astronautics -- United States   ( lcsh )
Astronautics -- Soviet Union   ( lcsh )
Exploration -- Outer space   ( lcsh )
Genre:
federal government publication   ( marcgt )

Notes

Issuing Body:
Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
General Note:
At head of title: Committee print.
General Note:
"Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session."
General Note:
April 1978.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 026612836
oclc - 04175014
System ID:
AA00024898:00001

Full Text
,*-J)J

[COMMITTEE PRIT]






UNITED STATES AND SOVIET PROGRESS IN SPACE:

SUMMARY DATA





REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE SUB COMMITTEE ON
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

OF H

COMMITTEE ON

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.LS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION BY THE

SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Serial DDy



SMAY




APRIL 1978


Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 24-497 0 WASHINGTON: 1978


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402











COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas, Chairman DON FUQUA, Florida JOHN W. WYDLER, JR., New York
WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida
MIKE McCORMACK, Washington BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR., Calfo
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California GARY A. MYERS, Pennsylvania DALE MILFORD, Texas HAMILTON FISH, JR., New York
RAY THORNTON, Arkansas MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
JAMES H. SCHEUER, New York CARL D. PURSELL, Michigan
RICHARD L. OTTINGER, New York HAROLD C. HOLLENBECK, New Jersey
TOM HARKIN, Iowa ELDON RUDD, Arizona
JIM LLOYD, California ROBFR!T K. DORNAN, California
JEROME A. AMBRO, New York ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT (BOB) KRUEGER, Texas EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey
MARILYN LLOYD, Tennessee JAMES J. BLANCHARD, Michigan TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, Colorado STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina THOMAS J. DOWNEY, New York DOUG WALGREN, Pennsylvania RONNIE G. FLIPPO, Alabama DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas BOB GAMMAGE, Texas ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California ALBERT GORE, JR., Tennessee WES WATKINS, Oklahoma ROBERT A. YOUNG, Missouri CHARLES A. MOSHER, Executive Director HAROLD A. GOULD, Deputy Director PHILIP B. YEAGER, Counsel JAMES E. WILSON, Technical Consultant WILLIAM G. WELLS, Jr., Technical Consultant RALPH N. READ, Technical Consultant ROBERT C. KETCHAM, Counsel JOHN P. ANDELIN, Jr., Science Cr-nsultant JAMES W. SPENSLEY, Counsel REGINA A. DAVIS, Chief Clerk PAUL A. VANDER MYDE, Minority Staff Director



SUBCOMMrIvEE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS
DON FUQUA, Florida, Chairman ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
JIM LLOYD, California LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida
THOMAS J. DOWNEY, New York HAROLD C. HOLLENBECK, New Jersey
RONNIE G. FLIPPO, Alabama ELDON RUDD, Arizona
BOB GAMMAGE, Texas ALBERT GORE, JR., Tennessee TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, Colorado WES WATKINS, Oklahoma
(II)











LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITr ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Waghington, D.C., April 1978.
Hon. OLIN E. TEAGUz, Chairman, Comnmittee on Science and Technology, House of Repre8entative8, Wa8hington, D.C.
DAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Forwarded herewith is a report entitled "United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data Through 1977 and A Forward Look" prepared by Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Dr. Sheldon's report constitutes the most authoritative review of the Soviet space program in the open literature. Because of its significance as a reference and comparison to the United States space program, I recommend its publication as a Committee print for the use of the Committee.
Sincerely,
DoN FUQUA,
Chairman, Subcommrittee on Space Science and Applications.
(II)

















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013











http://archive.ora/details/sovil978libr


























UNITED STATES AND SOVIET PROGRESS IN SPACE: SUMMARY DATA THROUGH 1977 AND A FORWARD LOOK




























CHARLES S. SHELDON II Chief, Science Policy Research Division

January 23, 1978



















The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and providing information at the request of Committees, Members and their staffs.

The Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon request, the CRS assists Committees in analyzing legislative proposals and issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals and their alternatives. The Service's senior speciahsts and subject analysts are also available for personal consultations in their respective fields of expertise.






3



TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page



I. INTRODUCTION........................................................... 1

II. BRIEF HISTORY.....,.. ............................................... 2

A. World War II........................................................ 2
B. The International Geophysical Year (IGY)........................... 2
C. Sputnik vs. Vanguard and Explorer................................... 2
D. Moon flights, Luna 1-2 vs. Pioneer and Ranger....................... 3
E. Manned orbital flight, Vostok vs. Mercury........................... 3
F. Gemini vs. Voskhod............... ............................... 4
G. Apollo and Soyuz Tragedies.......................................... 4
H. The Successful Apollo program....................................... 5
I. Soyuz flights....................................................... 5
J. The Soviet circumlunar program...................................... 6
K. Salyut space stations............................................... 6
L. Skylab Missions.. ................................................... 8
M. Apollo-Soyuz test project........................................... 8
N. Summary table of space flights...................................... 8


III. TABLE OF SPACE "FIRSTS" U.S. AND SOVIET.............................. 12

IV. SUPPORTING RESOURCES FOR SPACE FLIGHT................................ 16

A. How much does each nation spend on space?........................... 16
B. How much manpower is engaged in space work?....................... 16
C. How well equipped is each country in space laboratories and
factories?.....3............................3...................... 17
D. How do the two countries compare in launch sites?................... 18
E. How well equipped is each country in tracking facilities?........... 19
F. How do the two countries compare in launch vehicles?................ 20
G. Why did the Soviet Union originally have a lead in propulsion?...... 22

V. MANNED FLIGHT COMPARISONS............... ....................... ...... 25

A. How true are stories of cosmonaut deaths?......................... 25
B. Do the Russians fake their flights?.............................. 26
C. How do the publicity of the two countries compare?.................. 26
D. Accomplishments of manned flights................................. 27
E. Summary table of manned flights... ........... ................ 28






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VI. MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES................................. 35

A. How do the two programs compare in purpose: is one more military
than the otherw..*.****************.*****.**e.****..**.*.******** 35
B. How do the two countries manage their space program?............... 35
C. Do military flights constitute a threat to the world?............... 36
D. What about space weapons is there a threat?...................... 37
E. The fractional orbit bombardment system FOBS..................... 38
F. A possible satellite inspector/destructor vehicle................... 39
G. Ocean surveillance......... ...................................... 40
H. Mutual non-interference............................................. 40
I. Summary table of military vs, civilian space flights................ 41

VII. SPACE APPLICATION FLIGHTS............................................... 43
A. Co88uniCAtions.**********.***.*****..*****.**********.*.*.****..*.** 43
B. Weather reporting................................................... 44
C. Navigation and traffic control...................................... 45
D. Geodesy and mapping.............................................. 46
E. Earth resources...... ....................................... 46
F. Summary table of space missions by category......................... 47

VIII. LUNAR AND PLANETARY..................................................... 49

A. Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter vs. Luna 4-14............................ 49
B. Soviet lunar sample return flights.................................. 50
C. Soviet lunar surface roving vehicles................................ 51
D. Soviet lunar orbiters............................................... 51
E. U.S. planetary missions............................................. 51
F. Soviet planetary missions........................................... 52
G. Summary tables on lunar and planetary flights....................... 53

IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE SPACE PROGRAMS................................ 66

A. The space shuttle: What are the implications for each country?...... 66
B. Manned space stations in Earth orbit: What are the plans of each
country?......................................................... 69
C. Manned lunar landing: Are the Russians still interested?............ 71
D. What other major plans for exploration are likely to come in the
near term?.*..*.*.*.**..*.**********************************.**** 73
E. How do the two countries plan to compete in space applications?..... 73
F. What are the prospects for manned flights to the planets?........... 74
G. Can the two countries cooperate as well as compete?................. 77






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Page




Conversion of Metric to English Measures................................ 80

Tables

1. Worldwide Record of Known Space Launchings
Successes...... m.*. m.......nmum........... . .................. 10

2. Major Space "Frt"........................ 13
3. Worldwide Summary of Successful Space Launches by Site.............. 19
4. Number of Successful Launches to Earth Orbit and Beyond by
Basic First Stage, 1957-1977..............m.. ..... 22
5. Summary List of Manned Space Flights................................ 29
6. Approximate Comparison of United States and Soviet Successful
Space Launchings Primarily Civil Oriented Versus
Presumptively Military Oriented.............................. 42
7. Summary of U.S. and Soviet Space Payloads by Mission, 1957-1977..... 48
8. Sumary of Lunar Distance Flight Attempts........................... 54
9. Summary of Planetary Distance Flights Attempts...................... 61



















































24-497 0 78 2










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I. INTRODUCTION


Since October 4, 1957 when Sputnik 1 was put into orbit by the Soviet Union, the question of Soviet-American rivalry in space and its broader implications have been matters of public concern, waxing and waning with the irregular occurrence of new space spectaculars, followed by periods of relative quiet between major flights when work proceeded in the laboratories and factories, Sometimes the questions raised by space events have been matters of serious economic and military concern; sometimes they have been domestic and international political issues.

The purpose of this brief paper is to summarize how far these two major space powers have come in the last twenty years, to provide answers to frequently raised questions about the comparative aspects of the two programs, and, further, to look at possible future developments.

The space program is no subject of minor concern. By September 30, 1978, the United States expects to have spent about $100 billion on its combined civilian and military space programs, and over half a million people have been employed directly in our space endeavors. No corresponding data are available from the Soviet Union

becattse of their policies of secrecy in this regard, but considering the physical evidence of space-activity, the likelihood is that in real terms, they have committed a similar amount of resources

This new edition of what has become an annual review has gone "metric" in all

quantitative measurements, to conform to NASA and Soviet practice. (See X Appendix, for conversion table.)






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11, BRIEF HISTORY


A, World War II

Building upon a foundation of scientific principles common to much of the world, the Germans developed to a high degree of engineering success the technology of longrange guided rockets, of which the V-2 was the most spectacular, At the end of the war, most of the leading German rocket scientists and engineers surrendered to the United States, while smaller numbers and the Peeneaunde missile development center came under Soviet control. The German experience stimulated interest in rocketry, and their practical knowledge was quite useful, but it would be a mistake to judge the primary rocket programs of either the United States or the Soviet Union as depending exclusively upon this captured talent, The Russians in particular had a strong tactical rocket program in World War II, and as they moved into long-range ballistic missiles and space, they did not use Germans directly in their work on any significant scale.


Be The International Geophysical Year (IGY)

In 1955 both the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intentions to launch by 1957 small scientific satellites as a contribution to world understanding of 'Earth and space physics, The US, project was to be called Vanguard, with a payload of about 9 kilograms. Fewer details were available about Soviet plans, C. Sputnik vs. Vanguard and Explorer

The general public, and many specialists who might have known better, were caught off guard when Sputnik 1 was placed in Earth orbit, with a weight of 84 kilograms, Few had supposed that the "backward" U@SSR,, would beat the scientifically-advanced United States in this particular endeavor. One Western reaction was that this and subsequent Soviet achievements were fakes; and another reaction was one of near panic with thoughts of bombs dropped from orbit. Sputnik 2, launched November 3, 1957, did not help US.











CRS 3


complacency when it was disclosed to weigh 508 kilograms, and to carry a live dog,

Layka, U*S9 discomfiture, at the very least, was heightened by the explosion on the pad of the widely-advertised first launch attempt of a 2-kilogram Vanguard on December 6, 1957. On May 15, 1958, Sputnik 3 went into orbit as a comprehensive orbital laborstory of 1,327 kilograms. Meanwhile the United States had outpaced its own Vanguard series (Navy-built for the National Academy of Sciences) with Explorer 1 (Army-built) of 8 kilograms payload on January 31, 1958 (Eastern Standard time), Vanguard 1 was launched March 17, 1958.


Dp Moon flights, Luna 1-3 vs, Pioneer and Ranger

'In 1958, the United States began a double series of Pioneer flights one to photograph the far side of the Moon and the other to fly by it. All four launch attempts in that year failed to reach the Moon, In January 1959, the Russians launched Luna 1 which sent 361 kilograms past the Moon (apparently a miss) to circle the Sun, The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) followed in March 1959 with its 6

kilogram Pioneer 4 vhich went by the Moon and circled the Sun. U9S9 plans then were to follow up with four more, larger Pioneer series lunar orbit flights during the course of 1959 and 1960, but all of these failed to reach even Earth orbits. In fact, NASA did not reach the Moon until an early Ranger fell on the far side of the Moon (Ranger

4 in 1962), In September 1959, the Soviet Luna 2 struck the Moon near its visible center, delivering metal plaques bearing the Soviet coat of arms. Luna 3 in October 1959 flew by the Moon and by automatic means tooks photographs of the far side, never seen before, which were returned to Earth by radio facsimile, Still later, the U.S.

Ranger 7, 8, and 9 flights in 1964-1965 returned spectacular TV pictures of the Moon up to the moment of impact,


E, Manned orbital flight, Vostok vs, Mercury

While Mercury was still in its testing stage in the United States, with the goal of placing a man in Earth orbit for a nominal three orbits in a 1,360 kilogram ship,






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the Soviet Union moved more rapidly in this field, too, by exploiting its then larger launch vehicles. Starting in May 1960, test flights of a 4,700 kilogram ship were conducted, with the first successful recovery of two dogs in August of that year. On April 12, 1961, Yuriy Gagarin was placed in orbit in Vostok 1 for a single circuit of the Earth, and in the following August, German Titov repeated the flight but for 17 orbits.

Alan Shepard on May 5, 1961 in a Mercury Redstone (Freedom 7) had flown for 15 miniutes about 480 kilometers downrange from the Cape. "Gus" Grissom repeated this type of flight on July 21, 1961. But John Glenn was the first American to make it all the way to orbit with his three ioops on February 20, 1962 in a Mercury Atlas (Friendship 7)0

The Soviet Union flew the next two sets of Vostok flights in pairs in 1962 and 1963, with a near co-orbit in one case and a near pass in the other. Valentina Tereshkova, the only woman to go into space, in her 48 orbits (with Vostok 6) gained more orbital time than all six Mercury astronauts combined (34 orbits).


F. Gemini vs. Voskhod

The Russians were able to achieve some more firsts with Voskhod 1 in October 1964 which carried the first three man crew, and Voskhod 2 in March 1965 which provided the first 10-minute "space walk" (EVA) by Leonov. But after that the balance swung fairly sharply to the United States which conducted ten successful Gemini flights without any Soviet manned flights in the same period (1965-1966), U.S. two-man Gemini ships of about 3,600 kilograms weight were able to maneuver to change orbit, to rendezvous, and to dock with Agena target vehicles on several occasions. Using the Agena as a pusher rocket, Gemini flew as high as 1,369 kilometers, a new record. The United States, alsogained about 12 hours of EVA experience.


G. Apollo and Soyuz Tragedies

Before NASA could make the first manned launch with Apollo, there was the disastrous Apollo fire of January 27, 1967 which took the lives of three astronauts. This was both a great shock to the Nation and set back the program almost two years.







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The Soviet Union had its own tragedy on April 24, 1967 when it tried to recover its

first manned flight of the new Soyuz series. The parachute lines in the final phase of recovery became twisted, and Vladimir Komarov became the first human being to be killed

in return from a space flight. This set back the Soviet program almost two years also, and the shock of this accident was taken very hard by the Russians,

At the end of the Soyuz 11 mission, on June 29, 1971, as the three man crev vent through the routines for return to Earth, they fired explosive bolts to separate their orbital work compartment and service module from the recoverable command module. Unfortunately, a valve linking the two habitable compartments remained open at separation, and the men quickly were asphyxiated. Their capsule landed automatically, but they were dead.


H, The Successful Apollo program

After test flights in Earth orbit, NASA took the bold step on December 21, 1968 of launching Apollo 8 with Frank Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders on the first

manned Saturn V for ten close orbits of the Moon. The Apollo 11 flight, launched July 16, 1969, permitted Neil Armstrong and "Buzz" Aldrin to become the first men to set foot on the lunar surface on July 20, while Mike Collins orbited overhead.

Apollo 13, launched April 11, 1970, provided the most harrowing Moon mission when an explosion in the service module disabled some systems and cut consumable supplies, so that the crev, committed to going on, circumnavigated the Moon, using the lunar landing module as a lifeboat for all but Earth reentry,

The final flight, Apollo 17, launched on December 7, 1972, was the sixth successful manned landing, and the third to use a roving manned vehicle on the surface,


I* SoLx!z flights

Soyuz manned flights resumed in October 1968, and by January 1969 had been used to dock two ships together (Soyuz 4 and 5), permitting crew transfer through EVA, Soyuz 6,






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7, and 8 by October 1969, made a group coorbital flight with seven men but no dockings. Soyuz 9 set what was then a duration record by staying in orbit 18 days with a two-man crew. Soyuz 12 was a manned diagnostic flight after the Soyuz 11 tragedy. Soyuz 13 of December 1973 was a manned astronomical observatory flight. Soyuz 16 of December 1974 was a trial run for the Apollo-Soyuz flight to follow. Soyuz 22 in September 1976 was a manned Earth resources flight using a multispectral camera system from the German Democratic Republic.


J. The Soviet circumlunar program

It had been expected in the mid-1960's that the Russians would be the first to send men around the Moon, if not make a landing. Their program did not hold to such a timetable, but was able to send unmanned versions around the Moon for return to Earth. Spaceships named Zond 4 through 8 made flights to lunar distances, and returned either to the Soviet Union or the Indian Ocean where they were picked up. The Zonds resembled Soyuz spacecraft without the orbital work compartment, and they were launched by a more powerful (D) rocket, The program was abandoned before men were carried, probably partly because of uncertainties in man-rating the launch vehicle, and partly because the continued successes of Apollo landings made the Soviet circumlunar flights seem less pioneering,


K. Salyut space stations

The Salyut 1 space station of 18.6 tons was placed in orbit on April 19, 1971. It had about 100 cubic meters of interior space, compared with 6 in Apollo, 9 in Soyuz, and 357 in the American Skylab (see below).

Soyuz 10 was launched with a crew of three, docked with Salyut, but for unstated reasons they were not able to enter the station, so returned to Earth in 2 days. Soyuz 11 was also docked, and its mission ran 24 days long, successfully conducting medical, Earth resources, and astronomical experiments. This was the crew that died during preparations to reenter the atmosphere,







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Salyut 2 failed early in its mission, after launch on April 3, 1973. This was followed by Kosmos 557, launched May 11, 1973, intended to be a Salyut, but which failed as it reached orbit.

Salyut 3 was launched July 3, 1974, and differed from Salyut 1 in being a military vehicle by strong implication. (Indicators: An all military crew, telemetry and frequencies akin to other military flights, and a low orbit to improve Earth picture resolutions.) It was visited by Soyuz 14 during a 16-day flight. Soyuz 15 also went up to the station but was not able to dock and returned to Earth after only two days. The station continued to function in automatic mode and returned a data capsule in September 1974.

Salyut 4, launched December 26, 1974, was another civilian mission, flying higher

than the military type, using the usual manned-flight frequencies and open communications.

Soyuz 17 made a 30-day flight, with the crew in the station. On April 5, 1975, a Soyuz was launched to carry a crew to Salyut 4, but a problem in the booster rocket required an automatic abort which brought the crew back to Earth (unharmed) about 20 minutes after launch. Soyuz 18 followed, and conducted a 63-day mission, the Soviet duration record so far, Soyuz 20 in November 1975 was the first automated, unmanned "resupply" mission to a station (Salyut 4).

Salyut 5, another military station, was launched June 22, 1976. Soyuz 21 was

launched on July 6, and conducted a 49-day mission with the crew occupying the station, On October 14, Soyuz 23 attempted a revisit to Salyut 5, but was not able to complete the rendezvous, and returned to Earth after two days. Subsequently, on February 7, 1977, Soyuz 24 was launched on an 18-day mission and the crew reoccupied the station.

Salyut 6, an improved civilian station, was launched on September 29, 1977. On October 9, Soyuz 25 carried a crew up to enter the station, but a hard lock in the docking was not achieved and the crew brought their Soyuz to Earth two days after launch. Another attempt was made on December 10, with Soyuz 26, and this time the





















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crew was able to enter the station, for the first time entering a nev airlock at the opposite end of the station. (On January 10, 1978, another crew in Soyu: 27 also was sent to orbit to join the previous crew, a new development in the Salyut program.)


L. Skylab Missions

After Apollo Moon flights ended, the United States used a spare Saturn V to place in orbit a modified S-IVB stage equipped as a space station. This was on May 14, 1973. Three Saturn I B vehicles were used to send up modified Apollo ferry craft to dock with Skylab. These missions lasted 28, 59, and 84 days respectively. A wide range of experiments was conducted successfully, especially impressive since the crews had to make difficult repairs to the station damaged during launch.


M. Apollo-Soyuz test project

As a contribution toward detente, and as a spur to the development of a universal, androgynous docking system, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to work cooperatively to develop and to conduct a joint flight in which an Apollo carrying a special docking module would rendezvous and dock with a modified Soyuz. The flights began on July 15, 1975. The Soyuz 19 was sent up from Tyuratam with Leonov and Kubasov, and the Apollo from the Kennedy Space Center with Stafford, Slayton, and Brand. The two crews paid exchange visits after docking and did joint experiments with the Soyuz returning to Earth after 6 days and the Apollo after 10 days. N. Summary table of space flights

The table which follows gives annual totals for space launchings, payloads in Earth orbit, and payloads sent to the Moon or planets. The figures on successes are reasonably reliable because of requirements. for registration at the United Nations, although there are some differences of interpretation in counts on pick-a-back payloads and whether orbiting platforms from which further launches are made should be counted as payloads.











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The data on space failures are much more problematical. The United States publishes a launch failure count but not a count of payload losses. The Soviet Union (and presumably China) do not publish failure records. Hence, the table has to assume that the total Soviet failure count is in the same proportion to successes as applies in the United States; further, there is a reasonably safe inferential count of Soviet deep space payloads which became stranded in Earth orbit, whose total even exceeds the expected proportionate share comparable to U*S9 experience*

Further details of interpretation of the contents of this table are contained in more comprehensive congressional documents such as the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences committee print reviewing the Soviet space program through 1975.









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ITT, TABLE OF SPACE "FIRSTS" UPS* AND SOVIET Any attempt in simple form to compare the relative pace of the two principal space programs through a table of firsts has certain weaknesses. as it does not answer by how many days or years a particular event occurred in one country before another. Further, it does not distinguish between a nominal first accomplishment in crude form by one country, sometimes followed by a such more impressive and elaborate follow-up by the other country. Nonetheless, such firsts do affect public opinion. and analysis by various fields of endeavor may give some sense of relative direction of pacing efforts in each country. The table which follows attempts such a measure:









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TV, SUPPORTING RESOURCES FOR SPACE FLIGHT The ability of the two leading space powers to perform depends in the short run on the availability of existing resources to support such flights. These consist of finances, manpower, laboratories, factories, launch sites, tracking facilities, and launch vehicles, This section examines these categories to the extent data are available.


A. How much does each nation spend on space?

The United States by September 1978 expects to have spent $100 billion total since the beginning of the space program on space work in the several agencies of Government involved, These expenditures reached a peak of $7.7 billion in FY 1966, and in this fiscal year (1978) should be about $6.5 billion. Therefore, at the peak, we were spending close to one percent of gross national product, and today we are spending about 1/3 of one percent.

The Soviet Union does not publish space budget data, Because they fly a greater weight of hardware, one could assume that their program is at least of the same magnitude as that of the United States at its former peak, and may be larger, Their gross national product is thought to be about half that of the United States, and therefore they probably spend about two percent of their gross national product on space,

international comparisons of this nature are notoriously difficult to make, and one should avoid the temptation to convert such crude estimates into ruble or dollar equivalents.


B. How much manpower is engaged in space work?

In the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program alone at its peak employed about*400,000 people (with 7 percent of these on the NASA payroll), but now has dropped to about 150,0009 There were probably about 600,000 people at the peak employed in total US, space work, This figure does not include the indirect







23



CRS 17


beneficiaries of the space program from the multiplier effects of these expenditures, nor does this figure emphasize the dependence of some regions upon space expenditures.

The Soviet Union does not disclose bow many people are employed in their space

work, The productivity of this work force in comparison with that of the United States is now known, either* One would like to think our productivity is higher, but some Soviet approaches to space development may be simpler than ours, which incorporate very extensive testing and duplicative facilities in our industry. The Soviet work force may be close to 600,000 people because their effort today seems to be at least equal to our 1966 peak.


C, How well equipped is each country in space laboratories and factories?

The United States has several major NASA development centers, and other facilities operated by the Air Force and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The private aerospace industry has a widespread industrial base capable of building and testing our hardware. However, the reduction of manpower at work in the space industry by more than one half has dispersed many of the trained teams needed to man these facilities, and any resumption of full scale efforts to utilize the physical plant could not come immediately.

The Soviet Union does not allow visits to its development facilities and no real measure of their total capacity is available in the public domain.

We are aware of the existence of many technical and scientific institutes, and have heard of a special space city in Kazakhstan (Leninsk?) where it is believed major assembly work is done* There is no reason to believe their total aerospace industry is as fully equipped as our own, because of their tendency to do more testing

in flight compared with the United States. On the other hand, missiles of somewhat similar capabilities, but with different design philosophies appearing in Moscow parades, suggest the existence of more than one design and development team for space work just as in Soviet aviation.






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Do How do the two countries compare in launch sites?

The United States has its major launch site for manned, lunar, planetary, and com-. munications satellites at Cape Canaveral in Florida, It has a second important site for polar orbit military support flights and most weather and navigation launchings on the California coast at Vandenberg Air Force Base. A third minor site for small payloads is at Wallops Island, Virginia. Short-range vertical testing is done at White Sands, New Mexico,

The Soviet Union has developed launch sites amazingly like the United States pattern. Their major site for manned, lunar, planetary, and some comunications satellites, plus other developmental work, is near Tyuratam and Leninsk in Kazakhstan, They call it the Baykonur Cosmodrome, but it is about 370 kilometers from the town of Baykonur. A second, largely military operational site, but also used for navigation, commnunication, and weather satellites, is near Plesetek in the arctic north of Moscow. The third site is more modest, near Kapustin Yar on the Volga, south of what used to be Stalingrad (now Volgograd). It launches vertical probes as does White Sands, and small orbital payloads as does Wallops Island,

Each country seems to be adequately equipped with launch pads and ground support. Of course, as new vehicle systems come along, these require additional specialized facilities. The Soviet Union does not permit routine visits to its launch sites, and General de Gaulle with his personal physician (in 1966) and President Pompidou (in 1970) were the only known Westerners to have visited Tyuratam. until 1975, when a few Americans had a limited glimpse of this base. Eastern European, Swedish, and Indian scientists have been allowed to attend launches of their payloads at Kapustin Yar or Plesetsk.

Table 3 summarizes the number of launch successes and resulting payloads from all sites of the world through 1977.







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TABLE 3 --Worldwide Summary of Successful Space Launches by Site 1957-1977


Earth Lunar or
Place Orbit Escape Total


Plesetsk, Russia 562 562
Tyuratam, Kazakhstan 397 49 446
Vandenberg AFB, California 402 402
Cape Canaveral, Florida 224 55 279
Kapustin Yar, Russia 66 66
Wallops Island, Virginia 16 16
Indian Ocean Platform, Kenya 8 8
Shuang Cheng-tzu, China 7 7
Uchinoura, Japan 7 7
Kourou, Guyane 6 6
Haunaguir, Algeria 4 4
Tanegashima, Japan 3 3
Woomera, Australia 2 2

Total 1,704 104 1,808


E. How well equipped is each country in tracking facilities?

As an outgrowth of the IGY period, the United States created a worldwide tracking system with the cooperation of many other countries. This has been upgraded to a much higher capacity to meet the needs of Apollo as well as other programs. For our deep space work, we have large 25.9- or 64-meter diameter dish antennas in California, Australia, and Spain which supported both the lunar portion of Apollo and distant planetary flights. Even with all these facilities, our system has had to be supplemented with tracking ships and special electronic-systems aircraft working in conjunction with satellites used to relay data on a real-time basis. Data relay satellites will perform more of these functions in the future.

The Soviet Union claims to have a nationwide tracking system, and the great spread of their country (about 2-1/2 times that of the United States) gives them a good systems start without leaving their own territory, There have been occasional press reports of Soviet efforts to put some tracking facilities into other countries such as






26



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in Africa or in Cuba. Their principal deep space tracking facility is in the Crime& and has been visited by Sir Bernard Lovell of the United Kingdom who heads the Jodrell Bank radio telescope facility,

Primarily, the Soviet Union accepts certain constraints to their space operations, and relies on ships to fill in gaps, Eleven ships have been named as assigned to the Soviet Academy of Sciences for space work, and often these are described as scattered around the world for space support purposeif* Other tracking ships, not identified as under Academy control, have been pictured in the press and seem to be associated primarily with military missile tests, but could support space work as well, The most impressive tracking ship was the Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov, used for lunar support work in the tropical waters of the Western Atlantic Ocean* It is frequently in Havana harbor. Now it is outclassed by the larger Akademik Serge! Korolev and much larger, Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin. For support of manned flights, one ship typically anchors off Nova Scotia* Soviet Molniya satellites relay information between tracking ships and the U.S.S.R. The principle of launch constraints is to make flights only at times and places which will be in view of Soviet tracking stations at critical periods during the flight, and at other times to do without tracking, storing on tape in the space craft some data for later replay. The Kosmonavt Volkov, first of four new tracking ships entered service in 1977.


F. How do the two countries compare in launch vehicles?

The United States has used launch vehicles scaled to lift payloads from as light as nine kilograms up to the Saturn V which could carry over 136,000 kilograms to low Earth orbit. In its manned programs, the Mercury spaceship weighing about 1,360 kilograms was launched to orbit by Atlas. The Gemini weighing about 3,630 kilograms was launched by Titan II. The first manned Apollo flight was about 20,410 kilograms, put up by Saturn I B. The lunar version Apollos, launched by Saturn V, were about 52,600 kilograms in the vicinity of the Moon. (For any launch vehicle, the farther the orbit







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is from the Earth, the greater the velocity required to get there and the smaller the payload, This is why Saturn V carries much less to the Moon than to Earth orbit.)

The Soviet Union started to use in 1957 its original ICBM, with an orbital lift capacity of 1,360 kilograms, The same basic (A) vehicle is in use today with upper stages added to improve performance, These upper stages permitted the launch of about 450 kilograms to the Moon in the first Luna series, and about 1,500 kilograms in the second Luna series. The early Luna-type launch rocket also was able to put up Vostok manned craft of 4,700 kilograms, The weight of Soyuz is about 6,575 kilograms still using this same basic launch vehicle with improved staging. Their Proton (D) launch vehicle has been demonstrated to carry 20,000 kilograms to Earth orbit, Its circumlunar capacity should be on the order of 4,820 kilograms; and used to Mars, it carried 4,650 kilograms. We have not yet seen the very large Soviet (G) vehicle confidently predicted by NASA officials over the last decade. Lesser Soviet launch vehicles (B, C, and F) account for other unmanned programs.

Table 4 summarizes world-wide use of basic vehicles for successful launches to Earth orbit and beyond, through 1976.






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TABLE 4 --Number of Successful Launches to Earth Orbit and Beyond ,by Basic First Stage,- 1957-1977


Name Natona~ity Vehicle Origin Number

Sapwood (A) USSR missile (SS-6) 648
Thor USA missile 337
Skean (C) USSR missile (Ss-5) 171
Atlas USA missile 152
Sandal (B) USSR missile (SS-4) 144
Titan USA missile il1
Scout USA 67
Scarp (F USSR missile ((SS-9) 59
Proton (D USSR 50
Saturn 5 USA 13
Saturn 1 USA 13
Diamant B France 6
Mu Japan 6
China B China missile (CSS-X4) 5
Redstone USA missile 4
Jupiter USA missile 4
Diamant France 4
Vanguard USA 3
Unspecified USSR 3
"N"t Japan missile (Thor) 3
China A China missile (CSS-2) 2
Lambda Japan 1
Black Arrow U.K. I

Total 1,807


G. Why did the Soviet Union originally have a lead in propulsion?

it is argued in the Western World that the Soviet Union sized their first ICBM

before the thermonuclear breakthrough in weaponry allowing light weight hydrogen

bomb warheads. Hence, it ended up with a large and uneconomic vehicle on its hands,

while the United States was able to scale down the design size of Atlas and Titan

missiles because of reductions in warhead weight. Whether this assessment is right

or not, the consequence has been helpful to the Soviet space program. While the

United States was building its ICY program around a 9-kilogram, Vanguard, they were

building a 1,327-kilogram Sputnik 3, and planning to do even more on lunar flights.

Until the Saturn family appeared in service, at each stage the Soviet Union

was equipped with larger launch vehicles by far. The repetitive use of the standard







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(A) vehicle probably gave it good reliability. It is rugged, has a first stage of five sets of tanks, four of which fall away from the core vehicle early in flight. Each of the five segments has four rocket nozzles, plus separate steering nozzles,

By Soviet account, several of their launch vehicles use liquid oxygen and a kerosane derivative for the first stages (as do many of those of the United States), and use fairly conventional storable fuels for upper stages. There is no sign of a secret breakthrough in fuels, but their engines are run at a relatively high pressure, increasing efficiency,

The United States has developed solid-fuel rockets mostly for military missile

purposes, and certain space upper stages. The small Scout rocket is solid fuel in all stages, and strap-on boosters of solid fuel are used with Titan IIIC, D, & E, and Augmented Thrust Thors.

The Soviet Union began to put large solid rocket missiles into its Moscow parades only in the last ten years or so, well behind use of such rockets in the United States. These have some missile use, but there is no clear sign that solid-fuel rockets have been used for Soviet space purposes,

The United States experimented with components for a nuclear rocket as an upper stage for Saturn. A solid core reactor would heat hydrogen to be expelled from the nozzle. Despite this long time development effort, the work has now been cancelled as an economymovev

The Soviet Union could be developing a nuclear rocket, but so little has been said to date by them in this regard that any opinion on the subject would be highly speculative.

The Russians have issued publicity on electric rockets, but there is no sign this work has gone much beyond early proof-of-principle, and for orientation of vehicles in a few cases.
























24-497 0 78 5






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So, for the present, looking at the upper range of national capabilities, the Saturn V clearly has been the best operational weight lifter in the world, If the NASA officials are right, the 3.4 million-kilogram-thrust Saturn V may be challenged by a Soviet vehicle in the 4.5 to 6,4 million-kilogram-thrust class. It would not necessarily be as much larger in payload capacity as the figures imply because Saturn V uses liquid hydrogen for fuel in its upper stages, and there is no firm evidence the Soviet Union has switched to high energy fuel, although such a switch could co during the 1970's.







31



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V, MANNED FLIGHT COMPARISONS


The brief history already reported touched on the changing nature of the "racelf between the two space powers. Through Voskhod, every advantage remained with the Soviet Union. During Gemini, one "first" after another came to the United States along with a strong lead in total orbital experience, Apollo moved more rapidly than any Soviet corresponding effort, especially because at this time a Soviet launch vehicle capable of supporting a manned lunar landing had not orbited. But the Soyuz 'family-of manned craft, with two compartments for men, may prove able to serve usefully *as ferries-to orbit, as components in elementary space stations, and possibly even as part of a future lunar landing system, Discussions of U.S.-Soviet comparisons frequently bring questions, of which several can be posed: A, How true are stories of cosmonaut deaths?

Although there is always the possibility of an accident close to the launch pad of which we would have no knowledge, the odds are overwhelming that the only Soviet cosmonauts killed in space flight so far are Komarov in 1967, and Dobrovolskiy, Volkov, and Patseyev in 1971, This is because the Russians have followed a conservative approach to manned flight with heavy vehicles allowing much redundancy in equipment. Manned flights have been preceded by unmanned tests in the same pattern. Flights are supported by world-wide dispositions of tracking and rescue ships, Private word to other nations has been passed in Moscow before flights, Live television of the men in orbit has been the general rule.

With all this care and its known pattern of success, we are asked by those who

believe many Russians hive died in orbit in effect to accept the existence of a second Soviet"manned flight program run with reckless abandon which always kills the flight crew# These purported failure flights, often detailed irresponsibly in the press with names and dates to mike the unproven data look convincing, apparently would be






32



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conducted without advance warning, without tracking ships, without television, and use different models of larger, untried ships which always kill their crews or leave them stranded in orbit., Yet the "flights" cannot be detected by the same U.S. tracking systems that usually find even chance pieces of space debris at the altitudes manned flights occur. This is hardly credible.


B. Po the Russians fake their flights,?

In general, the Soviet Union seems to find that real successes which can be tracked and monitored by the Western World are more effective propaganda than inventing unreal flights which might fool the public briefly but would not impress governments with tracking facilities,

The Russians do not give many details in advance of their flights, so that when successes are less than complete they have less to explain away. They usually claim that all mission objectives have been met when in fact this may not be the case; but in the absence of a preflight statement, it would be hard to disprove what they saye

One area in which they were especially subject to attack for faking related to the space walk by Leonov. Some specialists thought the pictures released had been simulated or doctored, Actually, in a number of cases, a review of the original Soviet film shows it used such language as "Here is a simulation 9 a and this description somehow had been overlooked by the time other people in the Western World examined the questionable film, and quite correctly found some portions of it were not the real thing* Simulations were used where no camera could be positioned to capture the real event as it happened.


C. How do the publicity policies of the two countries compare

The NASA (civilian) part of the US, program is generally run on a very open basis with the press at launches and most questions about flights answered both before they occur and after they are over, There is less openness in the Department of Defense







33



CRS 27


space launchings, most of which are not given names or purpose, advance notice, or published results,

The Soviet Union holds to a minimum advance notice of flights, limits information on the bulk of their flights, but at least makes a prompt announcement, assigns a name, and gives orbital parameters for all flights which are successful in reaching some kind of an orbit which looks reasonable. All are described as scientific in purpose and successful in some degree. While a reporter in the United States can query NASA for more details of NASA flights, reporters rarely are able to gain elucidating details through questioning Soviet officials about their flights.


Do Accomplishments of manned flights

Apollo and Skylab have given the United States a proven capacity to stay in orbit with multiple-man crews up to 84 days, to adjust orbits repeatedly, to rendezvous successfully by several means, to dock and transfer crews, and to stay for hours outside the spaceship in protective suits, The men on occasion have felt discomfort, but have been able to perform basic tasks. NASA began flights with a reduced-pressure pure oxygen breathing systems. It has made occasional use of television from the spaceship to Earth, and by the time of Apollo 15 had reached a high level of perfection in color pictures even from a roving vehicle on the Moon. With these craft phased out, the United States has given up any manned capacity until the new space shuttle enters service.

Soyuz and Salyut have extended the Soviet manned capabilities as well. Soyuz is said to be capable of flying up to 1,300 kilometers altitude, and to provide a stay time of 30 days. So far, no Soviet ship with men on board has flown that high, although unoccupied ships have made circumlunar flights, Maximum stay time has been 63 days with Salyut 4, But the Russians have demonstrated both a fully automatic and partly manual rendezvous and docking capability, and have transferred a crew in orbit from one ship






34



CRS 28


to another, They have consistently used an atmosphere equivalent to normal air at sealevel pressure, and have used television from orbit extensively since their first manned flight*


E. Summary table of manned flights

The table which follows gives the principal results and characteristics of each U.Se and Soviet manned flight to date:









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VI. MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES


Questions are frequently raised as to the differences of purpose, organization, and use of space programs in the Soviet Union and the United States. The most frequently asked questions are posed here with tentative answers: A* How do the two programs compare in purpose: is one more military than the other?

For the most part there seems to be little difference between the Soviet and U.S. space programs as to general purpose and direction (with two major exceptions to be noted later). Both are broadly based, with elements of scientific exploration, technology' development, national image building, practical applications, and Military support services. About 572 of U.S. flights are conducted for the Department of Defense, with 50% for strictly military purposes. About 68% of Soviet flights are for strictly military purposes. About 42% of current U.S. space funds are spent for the programs of DOD which are less expensive than those of NASA because more of them are for routine operations rather than new development. Corresponding breakdowns for the Soviet total program are harder to establish because of their secrecy of budget data, and their claim that all flights are scientific. Yet a very considerable number of their flights and research give convincing indications of serving military purposes. Bo How do the two countries manage their space programs?

Under the terms of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the principal portion of the U.S. space program is run by a civilian organization, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. But another major segment is operated by the Department of Defense using the Air Force as its executive agent, with emphasis on supplying military support, or doing the R&D associated with military support. Lesser amounts of the program are scattered among other development or user agencies such as ERDA (development), the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Agriculture and






42



CRS 36


Interior (users)* A coordinating body, which operated from 1958 to 1973, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, has been disestablished.

Much less is known about the Soviet pattern of organizations The Russians have held secret even the names of their top space officials with very few exceptions* Nor is the exact names of their space organization known. The Soviet Academy of Sciences plays a role in planning a part of the program. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces conduct launches and apparently are responsible for-supplying the launch vehicles* But the interfaces are obscure, and if there are construction and testing ministries in between, little is know of them.


C. Do military flights constitute a threat to the world?

It is United States policy that our military flights are nonaggressive. Many of our flights are hardly distinguishable from flights conducted for civilian application purposes. Thus a message sent by satellite, or a weather report from apace observation, or navigational data to a ship are technically neutral in character. Often these services are of a traditional nature, simply done more speedily or cheaply by space means. Whether such services are aggressive is in the mind of the user, and are not subject to scientific, absolute determination. In a philosophical sense, a businessman or a government civil department sending a message by satellite might be more "aggressive" than a military user sending data on personnel counts or number of wool socks in a warehouse somewhere.

Although the U.S. Government is reluctant to discuss the subject, careful observers of military space activities have a strong conviction that the most active development of military space flights lies in the area of Earth observation. President Johnson, speaking in Nashville, Tennessee on March 15, 1967, claimed in an "off-the-record" statemenL widely reported at the time that the dividends of military space operations to the United States were equal to ten times everything which had been spent on space* This






43



CRS 37


implied savings in our defense budget over a ten year period on the order of $400 billion, because of more precise information about military and related activities all over the world* American analysts argue that sure information from space is one of the greatest safeguards against miscalculation by the major powers, and hence, in the absence of explicit international agreements for open skies and ground inspection, is the beat bargain all countries of the world have to limit the arms race and to provide insurance against a general holocaust of thermonuclear weapons*

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has a large and regular program of military support flights, including use of satellites for photographic observation, electronic listening, weather reporting, communications relaying, and ship navigation. Although these space services undoubtedly enhance Soviet military capabilities, in net balance they probably are to the advantage of the United States if surer knowledge between these two big power makes each more cautious and less prone to error in estimates. D. What about space weapons -- is there a threat?

Ever since the days of Sputnik 1, there has been public worry about bombs dropped

from orbit. The potential threat is there, but it must be qualified by many practical considerations. At the present time, the disadvantages of space weapons are sufficiently great that the United States has chosen not to develop them, and found little difficulty in agreeing to a treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction from orbit and all military activities from other celestial bodies.

The Soviet Union is also a party to this same treaty, and all reasonable analyses are fairly convincing that up to this time the Soviet Union has not placed nuclear bombs in orbit* Some of the logic runs as follows:

A bomb in orbit must be called down by signal, and on a particular orbit will fall close only to a selected path defined by the orbit, so that hitting a planned target is possible only at certain hours or days, and in a sudden emergency might not be near a useful target.





A A
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Xx



CRS 38


A bomb in orbit nay he subject to malfunction because Soviet spacecraft have been notoriously short-lived in their reliability. A malfunctioning bomb might fall to destroy a Soviet city as well so one in an enemy country

A bomb in orbit is less nanageable than one in a silo at hose or in a submarine, not only for reasons of maintenance. but also for command and control. If placed in orbit, it night be subject to spurious signals; and eventually the nuclear material might be wasted if the bomb ceased its functions, or the orbit decayed to let it fall at random, even with a safeguard against detonation*

A bomb in orbit can be precisely located, and hence intercepted by another space power*

One or a few bombs might be placed in orbit secretly or in disguised form, but

having only a few would not be decisive against a second strike capability by the target country* If done for terror purposes with publicity, then the Soviet Union would not only be avowedly breaking the space weapons treaty but would risk a preemptive strike by the United States if the threat were believed.

On the other hand, if a larger and possibly useful number of weapons were placed in orbit, the fact of such launches would quickly become evident to the radars, computers and analysts in the United States, and the threat would be clear and require as positive a counter move as would a direct ICBM attack on this country. Such launchings WOU14 signal Soviet intentions with more warning time than would a surprise attack directly by ICBM's.


E. The fractional orbit bombardment system -- FOBS

In one respect the Soviet Union has already heightened tensions by testing a fractional orbit bombardment system. This is not a technical violation of the treaty because there is no reason to suppose they would need to carry nuclear material on board

the test flights, and the dummy warhead has flown less than one full orbit* The pattern






45



CRS 3 9


has been to launch a satellite from the Soviet Union on a path avoiding the United States, and calling down the test warhead just before the end of the first orbit onto Soviet territory, while some minor debris and expended rocket casing stay in orbit for a few more hours before decaying.

From a Soviet point of view, FOBS has the advantage of complicating U.S. defenses. Although scientifically speaking the warhead is in orbit, in effect it is like an extended range ICBM capable of flying the long way around the world to bypass the normal ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radar fences which point to the north" If flown by the usual shortest routes to the United States, it could do so with a depressed apogee compared with conventional ICBM's, so as to cut warning time to BMEWS because of the delayed detection brought by the curvature of the Earth hiding the presence of the low-flying warhead. But such flights in combat have disadvantages too, including reduced accuracy on target if coming the long way around, and reduced payload by any route compared with the use of the same launch vehicle as an ICBM. The United States does not have a FOBS program because it does not regard them as necessary or desirable. The Russians obviously do, for reasons not wholly clear* However, there have been no flights since 1971.


Fe A possible satellite inspector/destructor vehicle

A few years ago, the President announced the United States had at least a limited capability to intercept hostile satellites using missile systems based at Johnston and Kwajalein Islands in the Pacific. These would not have met all possible needs, but over the course of some days could have intercepted most satellites in sustained low orbit. These facilities are believed to have been shut down. The United States also once had a satellite orbital inspector program called Saint, which was abandoned before the first flight.

It is assumed that because the Soviet Union has a limited deployment of the Galosh ABN system, it probably also could intercept hostile satellites in about the same degree as the United States could have from its mid-Pacific installations.


















24-497 0 78 6





46



CRS 40

Additionally, the Soviet Union within its Kossoa series has flown satellite* which British observers suspect from their orbital characteristics are launched by the same SS-9 Scarp (F) vehicle also used for the Soviet PUBS. These flights usually are maneuvered in orbit, and in both 1968 and 1970, two successive flights made a reasonably close intercept of a target satellite and then were in turn exploded into many pieces of debris. Three single intercepts were flown in 197le In the absence of Soviet announcements, an assessment cannot be conclusive, but the suspicion remains that a capsbility to inspect and destroy satellites has'been created* Flights resumed in 1976 using three target satellites and four interceptors. In 1977 there were also three target satellites and four interceptors.

G. Ocean surveillance

Still another part of the Soviet maneuverable satellite program using the F launch vehicle has been identified by DOD and by a British analyst as probably used for ocean surveillance by active radar able to penetrate clouds and darkness* If these judgments are correct, the main missions end some weeks after launch by separating the craft into several parts with one segment fired to a long life in higher orbit, perhaps because of a nuclear power source contained in it.

A second category of ocean surveillance flights stays at a higher altitude and is not maneuvered upwards later. Speculation is that these are electronic ferrets. Ho Mutual non-interference

For the time being at least, it remains in the Soviet interest not to interfere actively with U.S. satellite flights just as it is U.S* policy not to interfere with theirs. The SALT I agreement included a provision for non-interference with "national technical means" for policing compliance. The first visible new threat to such reciprocity was the report of late 1975 that the Russians had begun probing U.S. military satellites with powerful laser beams. If true, this could lead to very destabilizing relations in space. A follow-up Department of Defense analysis was that-gas pipeline fires accounted for the phenomena of temporary saturation of our sensors If correct#






47



CRS 41


that may be reassuring, although technologically the laser threat may be possible, and one hates to have in doubt any question of signal interpretation. I* Summary table of military vs. civilian space flights

The table which follows attempts to divide as meaningfully as possible, though

still tentatively, the space flights of the two nations as to whether they are civilian or military in character:







48





CRS 42












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CRS 43


VII, SPACE APPLICATION FLIGHTS


In the area of space applications, the United States has held a clear lead from

the earlier days of the space program, and this experience has permitted us to move

ahead to more advanced systems while the Soviet Union was still working hard to catch

Ups


A. Communications

The United States experimented with both civilian and military communication satellites, first with low-altitude pickup, tape storage, and replay systems, and also with passive reflectors of the balloon type. But now the pattern is well set to use

satellites of increasing capacity each year, synchronous at about 35,880 kilometers

which to all intents and purposes stay at a fixed point over the Equator relative to the ground. Color TV can be relayed across oceans, and telephone capacity is growing

rapidly, with a matching drop in costs of operation.

The Soviet Union has gone quite a different path. Following by some years the

U.S. start, since 1965 they have put up a series of Molniya 1 satellites which are

heavier than corresponding U.S. communications satellites. These Molniya l's fly in

an orbit inclined at 63 degrees to the Equator with a low point over the southern hem-isphere, but a long linger time at the peak of the orbit in the northern hemisphere,

so that each is in view of major Soviet ground terminals for about eight hours a day, including those at near polar latitudes, harder to reach with our equatorial systems.

Their high power has permitted the establishment of relatively low-cost terminals to distribute TV programs from Moscow to outlying points, as well as carrying telephone and computer data traffic. By proper spacing of four of these satellites in 12-hour

semisynchronous orbits in orbital planes 90 degrees apart, it is possible to give full daily coverage, with each satellite traveling the same ground trace each day.















3











CRS 44


Nov the Molniya I's have been relegated to military service vith 8 operating the system and never Molniya 2 and Molniya 3 satellites (4 each) using higher frequencies provide the prime service, arranged in the same planes as their earlier counterparts. In 1974 for the first time the Russians put Kosmos 637 and then Nolniya 1S-1 into 24hour synchronous equatorial orbits. Late in 1975 the Statsionar plan of 24-hour synchronous satellites, vas announced as expanding to eleven expected over the next five years. Raduga, the first Statsionar, vas launched December 22, 1973. It has been followed in 1976 by Raduga 2 and Ekran, a television distribution satellite. In 1977, Raduga 3 and Ekran 2 vere also placed in orbit.

Military communications systems within the Kosmos, program also are in place for theater tactical use and in store-dump mode worldwide. (Store-dump satellites receive messages, placing these on tape and replay them later on command.) B. Weather reporting

The United States has an operational weather satellite system using the TIROS and ESSA (nov NOW) series, and gross world coverage is fairly good, including the ability of local stations to read the APT (automatic picture transmission) equipment on board many of these satellites for a "real time" viev of local regional weather. More advanced sensors have been tested in the Nimbus and ATS (Advanced Technology Satellites) and the most recent NOMA series of flights. There are also military weather satellites in orbit. Even never are 24-hour synchronous SMS and GOES satellites which individually can give continuous views of large areas.

Again, the Soviet Union came late to this field compared vith the United States. only since 1966 have they distributed satellite-gathered weather pictures, and these spacecraft have had the disadvantage of a shorter useful life before electronic failure, compared to United States spacecraft. Their pictures have a higher resolution which may give more detail, but which also reduces the amount of daily coverage a satellite can give, with many smaller area pictures having to be fitted together for







51



CRS 45


larger area vievew On the other hand, the Soviet satellites more nearly resemble

our advanced Nimbus craft in terms of the wider variety of sensors carried and the experimental work underway which may open up nev discoveries, In 1977, for the first

first time, a Soviet weather satellite was put into a retrograde, Sun-synchronous

orbit (to take pictures at a constant local time), the pattern long favored for U.S.

U*Sw weather satellites. In addition to these Meteor weather satellites of lower

altitude flights, weather cameras have been carried on some of the higher flying

Molniya 1 satellites as well, so that a steerable camera at'40,600 kilometers can

give wide area views like those taken by the U.S. craft at similar altitudes. Now the Russians are also getting ready to add a 24-hour synchronous weather satellite

to the cooperative world system being created with the United States, Japan and

Western Europe, but the flight has been delayed beyond 1977a


Ce Navigation and traffic control

The United States has a U*S. Navy operational navigation satellite system, originally called Transit, now renamed NNSS. It operates through the passive reading on

ships of Doppler shift in harmonic signals from the satellites, and the data are manipulated by a computer on board the ship in connection with broadcast data on the position

of the satellite. It is not particularly suited to commercial economics, but it is highly effective for naval purposes. Commercial ships are now permitted to use the same

system if they care to invest in the necessary computer equipment. Future civilian systems are more likely to require the ship or aircraft to play an active role by broadcasting signals to satellites, which will relay to a shore-based computer these data

to find the ship or aircraft position, and this may serve in future traffic control

systems as well. This has been tested in the ATS satellites.

The Soviet Union claims to have operational navigation satellite system, but the

Russians have never identified the particular satellites used, However, certain of their Kosmos missions are flown in ways which strongly suggest these are navigation








F



.4







52



CRS 46


satellites, probably linked with a passive uhip system for naval purposes, which would seen a close parallel to the Transit system of the United States, even to using the same radio frequencies. Judgments as to quality are not possible in the absence of Soviet openness.


D. Geodesy and mapping

The United States has flown many geodetic flights in the interest of tying together maps of different parts of the world and for basic scientific studies to understand better the true shape of the world. If there have been mapping flight. as well, the results have not been published.

The Soviet Union professes an interest in both geodesy and mapping, but too few findings have been made available to judge how far along they are in comparison with the United States. Some known Kosmos flights have the right characteristics to support such missions.


E. Earth resources

one of the most exciting new fields of space application is that of finding and managing Earth resources in many fields through use of satellites. It is expected that mineral deposits and oil fields can be found, forest fires located. Diseases of trees and agricultural crops may be identified as to location, censuses of crops taken. snow fall and water status reported, fisheries run more efficiently, and many other similar practical things done from space. The United States has now flown Landsat I and 2 (previously known as ERTS 1 and 2) to conduct such experiments.

The Soviet Union has expressed a similar interest. Recent Soyuz flights and the Salyut stations were announced as having explored data-gathering techniques for Earth resources purposes. During 1977, two short-life recoverable Kosmos, flights were specifically identified as doing Earth-resources work.






53



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F* Summarytable of spacemission by category

The table which follows is somewhat arbitrary in classification, but attempts to place in broad mission category each payload launched since 1957 by the United States and the Soviet Union. Insofar as possible, categories between the two countries have been matched, but there remain minor differences* For example, the United States has not used the orbital launch platform concept on as large a scale; the Soviet Union has not designed special payloads to circle the Sun, measuring the interplanetary medium.

The table gives at least an indication as to the amount of activity by each country in major areas of space applications, such as weather, communications, and navigation. The United States has a large category of military missions not classified as to specific intent, beyond their developmental and support role. These have been grouped arbitrarily by orbital characteristics for approximate comparison purposes. Their groupings by possibly recoverable or non-recoverable categories may suggest parallels in mission, but public evidence is not conclusive.






'4



CRS 48


TABLE 7 Summary of U.S. and Soviet Space 'Payloads by Mission 1957-1977


United States Soviet Union

Earth orbital science 167 133
Earth orbital engineering 21 2
Communications 128 238
Weather 70 45
Navigation 34 51
Geodesy 19 12
Earth resources 2 2
Military observation
Low orbit recoverable (photo?) 277 393
Low orbit non recoverable (elint?) 75 56
Minor military 46 109
Early warning 37 11
Fractional orbit bombardment 18
ocean surveillance 9 19
Interceptors and targets 29
Earth orbit man-related 11 39
Earth orbit manned 20 37
Lunar man-related 16 8
Lunar manned 20
Moon unmanned programs 23 34
Mercury 1
Venus 2 23
Mars 9 16
Outer planets 4
Interplanetary space 7
Vehicle tests 13 7

Subtotal 961 1,282

orbital launch platform 161

Total 961 1,443




Mission assignments are arbitrary to a degree, and are subject to revision each year as more information becomes available.







55



CRS 49


VIIIe LUNAR AND PLANETARY

The Soviet Union has made an effort comparable in number of flights committed to lunar and planetary work to the United States, but so far, has not gained as good results. Approximately 8.1 percent of Soviet flight attempts have been in the "escape mission" category, compared with the 8.8 percent in the United States. Ae Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter vs. Luna 4-14

In 1963, both the United States and the Soviet Union planned to land survivable payloads on the Moon, The U.S. program was called Surveyor, and in fact it did not fly until 1966, at which time it was a very great success. The several Surveyors which landed intact returned close to 100,000 pictures of their immediate surroundings and by remote control dug holes in the surface and also by an indirect means determined the chemical composition of the lunar soil.

By contrast, the Soviet Union did start landing attempts in 1963, but later by its own admission, Luna 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 failed to achieve a survivable landing, and additionally, one unnamed flight and Kosmos 60 were lunar failures which did not leave Earth orbit. When Luna 9 in 1966 finally made it to the surface, the landing was not as gentle as a Surveyor landing, and the television camera returned only 27 pictures of the surroundings, Luna 13 additionally did impact testing of the soil with an extendable arm.

This comparison shows how difficult it can be to draw a balance sheet between two programs. U.Se Surveyors were more impressive than the Soviet Luna ships. But along with this, one must also note that Luna 9 landed a working camera before the first Surveyor, and the 27 pictures essentially answered the basic questions about the surface of the Moon, even though these did not compare in number with the thousands of pictures from Surveyore

In the case of orbiters there were also different comparisons to draw, but the

total usefulness of the U.S. Lunar Orbiters seems hard to contest. The Soviet Luna 10






56



CRS 50


reached a successful orbit before the first U.S. Lunar Orbiter, and its indirect measure told the Russians something of the probable composition of the lunar surface and also about gravity anomalies. Luna 12 in 1966 finally returned a few pictures to supplement earlier Soviet pictures taken of the for side by Luna 3 in 1959 and Zond 3 in 1965. But in no real sense did the few score Soviet pictures from these flights come anywhere near the clarity, detail, and variety of the five sets of Lunar Orbiter views, each of which returned about 200 double frames (simultaneous views through narrow angle and wide angle lenses). The subsequent Luna 14 seems only to have been an extension of the work of the non-picture-taking Luna 10.

Zond 5 and 6, the 1968 unmanned precursors to projected later manned flights, did better in picture quality because they returned actual photographs to Earth in the same manner as was done shortly thereafter by Apollo 8. Zond 7 in 1969 and Zond

8 in 1970 performed tasks similar to those of the two preceding Zonds. B. Soviet lunar sample return flights

In July 1969, the Russians sent Luna 15 to the Moon (using a large D class launch vehicle) at a time overlapping with the flight of Apollo 11. Its mission cannot be determined because it crashed during a soft landing attempt.

Luna 16 in 1970 maneuvered in lunar orbit, then landed, and by remote control bored a sample core 35 centimeters in length, weighing 101 grams, which was sealed in a container and rocketed back to Earth for recovery in the Soviet Union. Although the sample was small, it provided useful analytical material for a special quarantine laboratory similar to the Houston, Texas facility.

Luna 18 in 1971 on a similar mission made a bad landing, and was destroyed. Luna 20 in 1972 repeated the success of Luna 16, returning a sample from highlands, contrasted with the mare sample of its predecessor. Luna 23 in 1974 survived its landing, but its drill was damaged in landing, and after a few days the experiment was shut down without a sample return.







57



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Luna 24 in 1976 was the most successful, being able to drill to a depth of 2 meters

and returning all this sample core to Earth.


Co Soviet lunar surface roving vehicles

Luna 17 was the first successful landing of a Lunokhod roving vehicle weighing 756

kilograms. Landed November 17, 1970, it continued to function until October 4, 1971, traveling 10,540 meters over the surface, and returning 20,000 television views, 200

detailed panoramas, 500 soil-property tests, 25 soil chemical analyses, and a number of

astronomical observations with its X-ray telescope.

Luna 21 in 1973 landed Lunokhod 2 of 840 kilograms, which operated for three months,

but traveled 37,000 meters in that time, and returning proportionately more data and

pictures also, despite its shorter life than Lunokhod I*


D. Soviet lunar orbiters

The same D class launch vehicles used for the sample return and surface roamer missions was also used to place heavy payloads in lunar orbit. Luna 19 was sent to the Moon,

in 1971, and remained under active control for about a year, gathering a wide variety of synoptic data and some pictures. Lune 22 in 1974 was a similar mission, remaining under

active control for about a year and a half. During many maneuvers it was able to take

high resolution pictures at some close approaches to the Moon.


E. U.S. planetary missions

The U.S. Mariner program has launched ten vehicles of which six returned planetary

data. Mariner 2 and 5 brought back indirect readings from Venus. Mariner 4, 6, 7,

and 9 brought back increasingly good pictures of the surface features of Mars. Mariner I 10 not only returned good pictures of the cloud patterns of Venus, but made three photographic passes by Mercury with good results.

Pioneer 10 and 11 were able to bring back striking color pictures of Jupiter, and

Pioneer 11 is now continuing on its way to Saturn for a fly-by in 1979.











CRS -52


Viking I and 2 have represented a climax in U.S. planetary efforts to date. The orbiters continue to map the surface of Mars and have also collected clear views of Deimos and Phobos. The landers have brought back color pictures from the surface, and their on-board laboratories have conducted a search for life with puzzling, inconclusive findings.

Voyager 1 and 2 were launched in 1977 toward Jupiter and the outer planets.


F. Soviet planetary missions

The commitment of payloads to planetary missions by the Russians has been much

heavier than by the Americans, but with mixed results. Two Mars attempts as early as 1960 failed to reach even Earth orbit* In 1961, there were two Venus attempts, with Venera 1 reaching the vicinity of the planet in non-operating condition, In 1962, there were three more Venus attempts and three Mars attempts, with five of these payloads stranded Earth orbit, and Mars 1 in non-operating condition when it reached the vicinity of that planet. Zond 1, Venera 2, and Venera 3 were not in operating condition when they reached Venus. Zond 2 made a close fly-by of Mars in non-operating condition. Zond 3 was expended as a test flight taking pictures of the far side of the Moon and rebroadcasting these to Earth as it traveled as far as the orbit of Mars.

Results improved for the Russians when Venera 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 all functioned to return direct readings within the atmosphere of Venus. Of these Venera 7 survived a Venus landing and broadcast for 23 minutes on the surface. Venera 8 had similar success, plus doing soil analyses.

As in the lunar program, the Russians shifted from use of the A class launch

vehicle to the D class so that Venera 9 and 10 in 1975 accomplished the nearest Venus equivalent of American Viking missions to Mars. The orbital vehicles returned pictures and other data for many months in orbit. The landers operated about an hour on the surface, and their cameras returned good pictures of the farside surface, relayed via the orbiters. This was a remarkable feat, considering the 485%, temperature.







59



CRS 53


The D class vehicle was also used for the launchings of Mars 2 through 7. Mars 3

was the first to make a survivable landing with television, but signals ceased before the first complete picture was received on Earth. Mars 4 and 5 were intended as orbiters working with Mars 6 and 7 landers. Of these four only Mars 5 attained an orbit

and Mars 6 a landing. Mars 6 returned direct readings within the atmosphere but

signals ceased at the surface.

Six other Venus related flights were stranded in Earth orbit over the years, in

addition to those already mentioned. One other Mars flight ended in Earth orbit in

addition to those mentioned earlier. There have also been press reports of additional

Mars flight attempts which did not even reach Earth orbit, which reports are consistent

with the failure of flights to appear to match the Russians' own predictions of their

plans.

Had the heavy Mars vehicles of the U.S.S.R. been successful, many of the firsts of

the Viking programs would have been Soviet prizes. Soviet orbiters in general put greater

emphasis on a wide range of synoptic data readings, with color pictures less prominent than

in the U.S. operations. The D class Soviet launch vehicle has demonstrated an ability to

carry payloads up to 4,650 kilograms to Mars and 5,033 kilograms to Venus. The Venus landers weigh 1,560 kilograms each. These weights compare U.S. Vikings at 3,400 kilograms

and Viking landers at 1,090 kilograms each.


G. Summary tables on lunar and planetary flights

The first table to follow summarizes the known lunar attempts of the two countries.

The second table does the same for known planetary attempts. In both cases, the Soviet I record may understate the realities because of their penchant for secrecy in hiding

failures.






60



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TABLE 8 -- Summary of Lunar Distance Flight Attempts

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
S958
Aug. 17 Pioneer 0 US 38 38 Orbit Moon Fail--exploded 16 kmup.
Oct. 11 Pioneer 1 do 38 76 do Fail--climbed 113,830 km,
fell back over South Pacific.
Nov. 8 Pioneer 2 do 39 115 do Fail--climbed 1, 550 km,
fell near Africa. Dce. 6 Pioneer 3 do 6 121 Fly by Moon Fail-climbed 102,320 km,
fell back over Africa. 1959
.an. 2 Luna 1 U'SSR 361 361 Strike Moon Partial--missed Moon by
5-6. 000 km. entered solar orbit. 1Ilar. 3 Pioneer 4 it'S 6 127 Fly by Moon Success--passed Moon at
60,050 km, entering solar orbit. .Sep. 12 L.una 2 USSR 390 751 Strike Moon Success--struck 335 km
from visible center. .%*'p. 24 I'onver t S 170 297 Orbit Moon Fail--exploded in static
I'- test before launch.
(h. .1 I.una :3 I SSR 435 1, 186 Photo far Succeed--returned pictures
side of 70 percent of far
side of Moon. 26. I',ner I'S 169 466 Orbit Moon Fail--shroud tore away
I'-3 in launch, payload
impacted near Africa. I )60
Sep. 2. I'oner do 176 642 do Fail--impacted in Africa.
11-30
IkD. 15 If)incer do 176 818 do Fail--climbed 13 km and
1P1-31 exploded.
1 "61
Inc. 23 Hangecr I do 306 1, 124 Vehicle test Fail--intended to climb to
1, 102, 850 km, but stayed in low Earth orbit.
\o%. 18 Ranger 2 do 306 1,430 do Fail--intended to climb to
1, 102, 850 km, but stayed in low Earth orbit.
I "62
.I:n. 26 Hanger :3 do 330 1, 760 TV, hard Partial--missed Moon by
land 36, 808 km. no TV
pictures or landed instruments.







61



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TABLE 8 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight

Apr. 23 Ranger 4 US 331 20 091 TV, hard Partial--timer failed,
land fell on far side of
Moon, no pictures. Oct. 18 Ranger 5 do 342 2,433 do Partial--power failure,
so missed Moon by 725 km. entered solar orbit.
1963
Jan. 30 Unan- USSR 1,400? 2,586 Moon soft Fail--Earth orbit only.
nounced land
Apr. 2 Luna 4 do 1.422 4.008 do Partial--missed Moon by
8, 500 km, barycentric or solar orbit. 1964
Jan. 30 Ranger 6 US 365 2, 798 TV before Partial--on target, but
strike no pictures taken.
Jul. 28 Ranger 7 do 366 3, 164 do Success--returned 4308
pictures of Moon to impact.
Dec. 11 Centaur 2 do 952 4, 116 Vehicle test Fail--did not restart and
soon fell in Australia.
1965
Feb. 17 Ranger 8 do 367 4.483 TV before Success--returned 7, 137
strike pictures of Moon to
impact.
Mar. 2 Centaur do 635 5, 118 Vehicle test Fail--exploded at pad.
AC 5
Mar. 12 Kosmos 60 USSR 1,470 5,478 Moon soft Fail--Earth orbit only.
land
Mar. 21 Ranger 9 US 366 4,484 TV before Success--returned 5, 814
strike pictures of Moon to
impact.
May 9 Luna 5 USSR 1, 476 6, 954 Moon soft Partial- -retrofire failed,
land impacted Moon.
June 8 Luna 6 do 1,442 8,396 do Partial--missed Moon by
160, 000 km, entered solar or barycentric orbit.
July 18 Zond 3 do 890? 9, 286 Photo far Success--returned 25
side pictures, entered
solar oribit. Aug. 11 Centaur 3 US 952 6.436 Vehicle test Success--reached
820, 824 km out with Surveyor dynamic model, in barycentric orbit.






62



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TABLE 8 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
Oct. 4 Luna 7 USSR 1, 506 10,792 Moon soft Partial--retrofired early,
land fell on Moon.
Dec. 3 Luna 8 do 1, 552 12, 344 do Partial--retrofired late,
fell on Moon.
1966
.Ian. 31 Luna 9 do 1,583 13,927 do Success--returned 27
pictures from lunar surface.
:eb. 26 Apollo- US 15, 331 27, 767 Vehicle test Success--flew suborbitally
Saturn 201 to land in the Pacific.
11ar. I Kosmos 111 USSR 1,600? 15,527 Moon orbit Fail--Earth orbit only.
\lar. 31 Luna 10 do 1, 600 17. 127 do Succeed--returned physical
measurements from lunar orbit.
Apr. 8 Centaur 4 Ut'S 771 28, 538 Vehicle test Fail--low Earth orbit only.
li; 30 Survevotr I do 995 29, 533 Moon soft Succeed--returned 11, 237
land pictures from lunar
surface.
.hl\ 1 I xplrr ;;3 do) 93 29.626 Moon orbit Partial--failed to approach
Moon at right speed, so in barycentric
orbit.
.Iu1 1 Apodlo- d 26, 53:5 56, 161 Vehicle test Success--simulated in Earth
S.at1urn 203 orbit a Saturn V flight.
Aut. 10 I.unar ft :187 56, 548 Moon orbit Success--returned 414 pic()rbiter I tures of potential
landing sites on Moon. AU. 21 I.una II USSit 1, 604? 18,767 do Success--but failed to
return pictures from lunar orbit.
Aut. 25 Apollo- US 20, 275 76, 823 Vehicle test Success--simulated reSaturn 202 entry in suborbital
flight.
Sep. 20 Survcxor 2 do 1,000 77, 823 Moon soft Partial--stabilization
land failed, struck Moon.
(O ct. 22 Luna 12 ( SSR 1, 625? 20,392 Moon orbit Success--returned pictures of Moon.
OIlt. 26 Centaur 5 US 726 78, 549 Vehicle test Success--mass model
of Surveyor carried to 465, 032 km.
\6. L.unar do 390 78, 939 Moon orbit Success--returned 422
( )rhitcr 2 pictures of Apollo
sites, far side.
LIeu. 21 I.una 13 1 SSI 1,595? 21,987 Moon soft Success--returned piclanding tures and soil density
measures.
11467
.I. 27 Ap1ln- IS 20, 412 99,351 Capsule test Fail--Burned on pad in
Saturn 204 exercise.







63



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TABLE 8 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
Feb. 5 Lunar us 385 UU, 736 Moon orbit Success --returned 3U7
Orbiter 3 pictures of Apollo
sites.
Apr. 17 Surveyor 3 do 1,035 100.771 Moon soft Success --returned 6, 315
land pictures, dug soil
with shovel. May 4 Lunar do 390 101.161 Moon orbit Success --returned 326
Orbiter 4 pictures of large
areas of the Moon. July 14 Surveyor 4 do 1,039 102.200 Moon soft Partial --signals ceased
land at touch-down on
Moon.
July 19 Explorer 35 do 104 102,304 Moon orbit Success --returned data
from lunar orbit. A ug. 2 Lunar do 390 102.694 do Success --returned 424
Orbiter 5 pictures including
much of far side. Sep. 8 Surveyor 5 do 1,005 103,699 Moon soft Success --returned
land 18,006 pictures.
chemical analysis of soil.
Nov. 7 Surveyor 6 do 1.008 104,707 do Success --returned
30.065 pictures, chemical and mechanical soil study. Nov. 9 Apollo 4 do 42,506 147.213 Vehicle test Success --simulated full
lunar return reentry in Earth orbit. 1968
Jan. 7 Surveyor 7 do 1,040 148.253 Moon soft Success --returned
land 21. 274 pictures,
chemical analysis of soil from trench it dug.
Jan. 22 Apollo 5 do 14,379 162,632 Vehicle test Success--tested lunar
module in Earth orbit.
Mar. 2 Zond 4 USSR 5,800? 27,787 do Partial--flew to lunar
distance but recovery in doubt. Apr. 4 Apollo 6 us 42.577 205,209 do Partial--did not go
to lunar distance. but recovered payload.
Apr. 7 Luna 14 USSR 1. 615? 29.402 Moon orbit Success --returned data
on lunar mass distribution.







64



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TABLE 8 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
Sep. 14 Zond 5 U 5i 5, 8007 35, ZZ Circumliunar Success--ballistic reentry with biological subjects and pictures. Oct. I I Apollo 7 US 20, 577 225, 786 Manned test Success--flew in Earth
orbit.
Nov. 10 Zond 6 USSR 5,800? 41,002 Circumlunar Success--lifting reentry
with biological speciments and pictures. D)ec. 21 Apollo 8 .US 43. 854 269, 440 Moon orbit Success--men in lunar orbit and recovered. 1969
1lar. 3 Apollo 9 do 47, 167 316, 607 Manned test Success--tested lunar
module rendezvous, crew recovered. \Iaa 18 Apollo 10 do 48,638 365, 245 Moon orbit Success--tested lunar
module rendezvous at Moon, crew recovered.
.Julv 13 Luna 15 USSR 5,800? 46,802 Moon soft Partial--lunar orbit land success, but landing
failed.
Jul\ 16 Apollo 11 US 49, 698 414.943 do Success--first manned
landing on Moon and return. Aug. 7 Zond 7 USSR 5, 800? 52. 602 Circumlunar Success--lifting reentry
of photographs. Sep. 23 Kosmos 300 do 5, 800? 58,402 Moon soft Fail--Earth orbit only.
land
(L t. 22 Kosmos 305 do 5, 800? 64,202 do Fail--Earth orbit only.
Nov. 14 Apollo 12 US 49, 804 464. 747 do Success--manned lunar
landing and return
with part of Surveyor 3.
1~70
Apr. 11 Apollo 13 do 49, 990 514, 737 do Partial--explosion in
service module limited flight to circumlunar; crew saved.
Sep. 12 Luna 16 USSR 5,.800? 70, 002 do Success--made automated
sample collection, returned it to Earth. )tw. 2 o /Zond 8 do 5,800? 75, 802 Circumlunar Success--ballistic reentry
with photographs.







65



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TABLE 8 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Result
date name ality (kg) national
weight
Nov. 10 Luna 17 USSR 5, 800? 81,602 Moon soft Success--landed autoland mated roving vehicle
for long term exploration.
1971
Jan. 31 Apollo 14 US 46. 346 561,083 do Success--manned lunar
landing and return. July 26 Apollo 15 do 52, 759 613.842 do Success--manned lunar
landing, roving vehicle, safe return.
Sep. 2 Luna 18 USSR 5. 800? 87,402 do Partial--lunar orbit
success, but crashed
on landing. Sep. 28 Luna 19 do 5,.800? 93, 202 Moon orbit Success--returned photographs and other data. 1972
Feb. 14 Luna 20 do 5, 800? 99. 002 Moon soft Success--made automated
landing sample collection,
returned it to Earth. Apr. 16 Apollo 16 US 48. 606 662.448 do Success--manned lunar
landing, roving vehicle, safe return. Dec. 7 Apollo 17 do 46.825 709, 273 do Success--manned lunar
landing, roving vehicle, safe return.
~1973
Jan. 8 Luna 21 USSR 5, 800? 104.802 do Success--landed automated
roving vehicle for long term exploration. June 10 Explorer 49 US 328 709, 601 Moon orbit Success--radio astronomy
from far side of Moon. 1974
May 29 Luna 22 USSR 5. 800? 110, 602 do Success--returned pictures
and data.
Oct. 28 Luna 23 do 5.800? 116, 402 Moon soft Partial--landed safely,
land but drill damaged so
no sample returned to Earth.
1976
Aug 9 Luna 24 do 5, 800? 122. 202 do Success--made automated
sample collection, returned to Farth.






















Ii

I iiiiiii







66



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NOTES

le The table includes all known attempts to send payloads to the Noon or to distances from Earth equal to the distance of the Moon from Earth, together with test flights in Earth orbit of lunar-associated hardware. It cannot include Soviet flight failures which did not reach Earth orbit because these are not in the public domain.

2e Weights listed are in kilograms. with a second column shoving a running total of kilograms for all flights to data of the same national origin*

3. In a very few instances, the mission has been assigned by inference, in terms of the context of the time in which it took place.

4. The test of success or failure is somewhat arbitrary. Any flight staying in relatively low Earth orbit as well as not achieving Earth orbit is counted as a failures Flights which at least approached the Moon, although not achieving the estimated goal received the rating of partial success.

5. The Soviet label Luna was applied after the fact to the first flights which at the the were simply called Cosmic Rockets, with the third one called an Automatic Interplanetary Station (AIS 1). Luna I was also called Nechta (Dream)*



SOURCES: Soviet data are from Soviet TASS bulletins for the most part, supplemented
by inferential judgments that some Earth orbital flights vere almost certainly lunar attempts which failed, based upon the timing of the launch,
the nature of the debris in Earth orbit, the launch vehicle used, and the
orbital path chosen* U.Sm data are based mostly on NASA press releases,
although the first lunar attempt vas sponsored and reported on by the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense before the creation of NASA. Estimated weights of Luna 11, 120 13 and 14 by D.R. Woods, whose generalized estimate on later Luna and Zond flights also
has been used.







67



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TABLE 9 -- Summary of Planetary Distance Flight Attempts

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
1960
Mar. 11 Pioneer 5 US 43 43 Interplan- Success--returned
etary data from 36. 2
toward Sun million kilometers. Oct. 10 Unac- USSR 640? 640? Mars Fail--did not reach
knowledged Earth orbit.
Oct. 14 do do 640? 1, 280 do Fail--did not reach
Earth orbit. 1961
Feb. 4 Tyazheliy do 640? 1, 920 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
Sputnik 4
Feb. 12 Venera 1 do 644 2, 564 do Partial--Communications
failed; passed Venus at 100, 000 km. 1962
July 22 Mariner 1 US 202 245 Venus flyby Fail--destroyed at 160 km.
altitude.
Aug. 25 Unac- USSR 890? 3, 454 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
knowledged
Aug. 27 Mariner 2 US 203 408 Venus flyby Success--passed Venus
at 34, 853 km. Sep. 1 Unac- USSR 890? 4, 344 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
knowledged
Sep. 12 Unac- do 890? 5, 234 do Fail--Earth orbit only.
knowledged
Oct. 24 Unac- do 890? 6, 124 Mars Fail--Earth orbit only.
knowledged
Nov. 1 Mars 1 do 894 7, 018 do Partial--communications
failed, passed Mars at 191, 000 km. Nov. 4 Unac- do 800? 7, 908 do Fail--Earth orbit only.
knowledged
Nov. 11 Kosmos 21 do 890? 8,798 Venus test Fail--Earth orbit only.
1964
Mar. 27 Kosmos 27 do 890? 9, 688 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
Apr. 2 Zond 1 do 890? 10,578 do Partial--communications
failed, passed Venus at 100, 000 km. Nov. 5 Mariner 3 US 261 669 Mars flyby Fail--shroud did not
separate, thrown into wrong orbit. Nov. 28 Mariner 4 do 261 930 do Success--returned 22
pictures.
Nov. 30 Zond 2 USSR 890? 11, 468 Mars Partial--communications
failed, passed Mars at 1, 500 km.







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TABLE 9-- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national

1965 weiht
July 18 Zond 3 USSR 890? 12, 358 Mars test Success--returned 25
pictures of Moon far side, retransmitted from increasing distances. Nov. 12 Venera 2 do 963 13, 321 Venus flyby Partial--communications
failed, passed Venus
at 24, 000 km. Nov. 16 Venera 3 do 960 14, 281 Venus land Partial--communications
failed, struck Venus 450 km. from visible center.
Nov. 23 Kosmos 96 do 960? 15, 241 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
Dec. 16 Pioneer 6 US 61 991 Interplan- Success--returned data.
etary
toward Sun 1966
,Aug. 17 Pioneer 7 do 61 1,052 Interplan- Success--returned data.
etary
away from Sun
1967
June 12 Venera 4 USSR 1, 106 16, 347 Venus land Success--returned direct
readings of atmosphere to 25 km. altitude.
June 14 Mariner 5 US 245 1, 297 Venus flyby Success--returned data,
passed Venus at 4,094 km. .lune 17 Kosmos 167 USSR 1, 100? 17,447 Venus Fail--Earth orbit only.
I )ec. 13 Pioneer 8 US 66 1, 363 Interplan- Success--returned data.
etary
away from Sun
1968
Nov. 8 Pioneer 9 do 67 1, 430 Interplan- Success--returned data.
etary
toward Sun I 16!'
-Ian. .5 Venera 5 USSR 1, 130 18, 577 Venus land Success--returned direct
readings of atmosphere to near surface.







69



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TABLE 9 -- continued
Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
Jan. 10 Venera 6 USSR 1,130 19, 77 Venus land Success--returned Jirect
readings of atmosphere to near surface.
Feb. 24 Mariner 6 US 380 1,810 Mars flyby Success--returned 24
pictures and other data.
Mar. 27 Mariner 7 do 380 2, 190 do Success--returned 31
pictures and other data.
Aug. 27 Pioneer E do 66 2,256 Interplan- Fail--destroyed by range
etary safety.
at Earth
orbit
1970
Aug. 17 Venera 7 USSR 1, 180 20, 887 Venus soft Success--sent back data
land from atmosphere and
surface of Venus. Aug. 22 Kosmos 359 do 1, 180 22, 067 do Fail--Earth orbit only.

1971
May 8 Mariner 8 US 1,029 3, 285 Mars orbit Fail--fell in Atlantic Ocean
May 10 Kosmos 419 USSR 4, 650? 26, 717 Mars soft Fail--Earth orbit only.
land
May 19 Mars 2 do 4, 650 31, 367 do Partial--returned datafrom
orbiter, but lander destroyed.
May 28 Mars 3 do 4, 650 36, 017 do Success--returned orbital
data and survived landing.
May 30 Mariner'9 US 1,030 4,315 Mars orbit Success--returned 6, 786
1972 pictures of Mars.

Mar. 3 Pioneer 10 do 258 4, 573 Jupiter flyby Success--returned pictures
and other data. Mar. 27 Venera 8 USSR 1, 180? 37, 197 Venus soft Success--atmospheric data
land and soil analysis returned.
Mar. 31 Kosmos 482 do 1,180? 38. 377 do Fail--Earth orbit only.
1973
Apr. 6 Pioneer 11 US 259 4.832 Jupiter, Success--returned Jupiter
Saturn pictures and data;
flyby Saturn not yet reached.
July 21 Mars 4 USSR 4, 150? 42, 527 Mars orbit Partial--returned data and
in flyby, but did not enter orbit.







70



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TABLE 9 -- continued

Launch Spacecraft Nation- Weight Cumulative Mission Results
date name ality (kg) national
weight
July 26 Mars 5 ubilt 4, 150? 46, 677 Mars Orbit Success--returned data
and pictures. Aug. 6 Mars 6 do 4. 150? 50. 827 Mars soft Partial--returned data
land from flyby. but
lander signals ceased.
Aug. 9 Mars 7 do 4,150? 54,.977 do Partial--returned data
from flyby, but lander missed by 1,300 km.
Nov. 3 Mariner 10 US 504 5. 336 Venus, Success--returned picMercury tures from Venus
flyby and three times pictures from Mercury. 1974
Dec. 10 Helios 1 German Fed. 370 5. 706 Sun approach Success--returned data.
Rep. /US
1975
June 8 Venera 9 USSR 4,936 59,913 Venus soft Success--returned picland tures and other data.
.June 14 Venera 10 do 5,033 64,946 do Success--returned pictures and other data. Aug. 22 Viking 1 uS 3,400 9,106 Mars soft Success--returnrd pictures and other data.

Sep. 9 Viking 2 do 3,400 12, 506 do Success--returned pictures and other data.

1976
.Jan. 15 Ifelios 2 German/Fed. 376 12.882 Sun approach Success--returned data.
Rep. /US

1977

Aug. 20 Voyager 2 Us 700 13,582 Jupiter en route

Sep. 5 Voyager 1 do 700 14,282 Jupiter en route







71



CRS 65



NOTES


1. The table includes all known attempts to send payloads to the planets or into solar orbit, not including those intended to go to the Moon which only incidentally may have escaped barycentric orbit to enter heliocentric orbit. It cannot include additional Soviet flight failures which did not reach Earth orbit, when not in the public domain. The only year in which there had been persistent reports of Soviet intentions to launch planetary flights for which there is no public record of failures is 1969. This could mean that Mars flights using the D-l-e vehicle began in that year, but failed to reach Earth orbit*

2a Weights listed are in kilograms, with a second column showing a running total of kilograms for all flights to data of the same national origin.

3e In a few instances, the mission has been assigned by inference, in terms of the context of the time in which it took place. Some of the Soviet flights to the planets may have been orbiters or landers, but no attempt has been made to guess the mission other than that of the planet name.

4, The test of success or failure is somewhat arbitrary. Any flight staying in relatively low Earth orbit as well as those not achieving Earth orbit are counted as failureso Flights at least approaching interplanetary distances although not achieving their estimated goal received the rating of partial success.



SOURCES: Soviet data are from Soviet TASS bulletins for the most part, supplemented
by inferential judgments that some Earth orbital flights were almost certainly planetary attempts which failed, based on the timing of the launch, the nature of the debris in Earth orbit, the launch vehicle used, and the
orbital path chosen U.S. data are based mostly on NASA press releases.
Weight estimates for the more recent Mars and Venus flights by the Russians
have been varied from the weight of Mars 2 and 3 at the suggestion of
DoR. Woods and C.P. Vick, to reflect approximate energy requirement effects
on payloads.







72



CRS 66


IX, FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE SPACE PROGRAMS Attempting to predict the future of the space program is a difficult assignment as it depends upon political decisions as such as on technical capabilities. At least, there are more engineering possibilities than there are financial resources likely to be made available to pursue them, The issue of future goals has been with the United States for several years. particularly after the accomplishment of the dominating Apollo mission.

Estimating what the Soviet Union will elect to do in space may be even harder for a Western observer because of Soviet restrictions on freedom of information. The United States abounds in paper plans, but until the President and the Congress agree on funding, U.S. plans stay on paper, and there is no formal commitment to go ahead* In the Soviet case, they have stated at several levels of authority, including the highest, more positively their long run goals, although without a real, public timetable. They, too, undoubtedly have to face hard budget choices before actual hardware work can begin"

The announced Soviet goal is a comprehensive exploitation of space technology including the exploration and settlement (where practical) of the planets, along the way exploring the Moon in greater detail, and using Earth orbital stations for a host of practical purposes. The immediate purpose of this paper is again to pose questions about the choices immediately before each country, and to estimate how well they should be able to respond.


A. The spaceshuttle: What are the implications for each country?

NASA has made its principal development program for the 1970's the creation of a reusable shuttle spacecraft to act as a ferry from Earth to orbit and return* Over a period of time, various configurations have been studied. The favored design for a period was for two Completely reusable piloted stages. The booster stage would have been roughly the size of a 747 or C-5A; and the orbital stage about the size of a







73



CRS 67


DC-8 or 707* Both were to be rocket-powered, burning hydrogen and oxygen. After a vertical takeoff with the two craft attached in parallel, the booster was soon to fly back to the launch site to be readied for the next trip. The upper stage was to fly on to orbit, and later return for reuse. Both stages were to land horizontally like aircraft. Analysis showed that although these craft represented an economical combination in the long run, they involved cost-peaking problems during development which made their fiscal and political practicability questionable.

The plan finally proposed in early January 1972 traded off some reusability for annual development cost totals which could be given consideration within the kind of budget ceilings with which NASA has worked in recent years. This compromise offered fewer cost savings in flight operations, but was believed by NASA to represent the only approach which was feasible under existing fiscal conditions. It was hoped by the sponsors that the booster stage could be replaced later by a fully reusable design. What is now being built is a reusable orbital stage about the size of a DC-9, powered by three hydrogen-oxygen engines and a large external disposable and nonrecoverable fuel tank. It will carry useful payloads measuring up to 4.6 meters in diameter by 18*3 meters long, and weighing up to 29,480 kilograms. It will carry a crew of two, plus two passengers, with the capability of carrying more passengers in special modules in the payload bay, and with a flight environment which would not require the special training and stresses of present astronaut flight. It will stay in orbit for periods ranging from a week to a month. Its tasks will include ferrying people and supplies, supporting a Spacelab, launching other satellites, and potentially even acting as a rescue ship. It may service other spacecraft in orbit, bringing them back to Earth for major overhaul if required.

The interim booster will consist of two strap-on solid-futl rockets which after use will be jettisoned into the ocean and recovered for refurbishment and reuse.







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Replacing most existing launch vehicles, the shuttle is expected to bring down the launch cost per kilogram of payload somewhat. (Pricing policy is arbitrary so quoting a figure is difficult.) But even greater savings are expected ultimately in the redesigning and new applications of psyloadso Although the $5.22 billion (in 1971 dollars) estimated development cost is substantial even if the program is kept within costs, any continuing space program of the dimensions of the present-one is expected to permit the shuttle to pass a breakeven point and bring substantial savings within the effective life of this system. With more experience, parametric studies suggest, future shuttle systems, perhaps single stage to orbit, may reduce costs still another order of magnitude below those estimated for this first generation shuttle.

NASA is not only staking on the shuttle its only chance to continue a manned program, but is predicating its unmanned flights on use of this system as the most economical way of making future progress. The plan was no sooner announced than it came under attack in some quarters as a mistaken assessment of national priorities. Critics said it was likely to face future cost overruns, and the size of the mission model was disputed as optimistically large (assuming more flights than in fact will occur). But the ultimate test of success if the program is seen through to operation, will lie in the actual performance*

The Soviet Union has shown an equal awareness of the potential of reusable vehicles, and various Russian space officials have stated their own convictions that such development is essential. But in keeping with Soviet practice, internal debates, or even decisions without debate, about new technology are not exposed in any public forum, so the current status of the Soviet effort, if any, in this regard is not known Considering

the Soviet effort to maintain a position of leadership in space, and the continued high level of Soviet flight activity (triple that of the United States), they have even more compelling reasons to develop a reusable shuttle as a cost saving device. It is hard to imagine their attainment of announced goals, to be discussed presently, without use of a shuttle.







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Be Mannedspace stations in Earth orbit: What are the plans of each country?

The United States cancelled Apollo lunar landing missions after Apollo 17 and made

available for space station work Saturn V launch vehicle from our remaining small stockpile, now that production of these launch vehicles has ceased* Our experimental space

station is called Skylab, and was launched on a Saturn V in 1973. The station has been

built in the shell of an S-IVB rocket stage, and is accompanied by an associated docking adapter, air lock, and telescope mount. It is not likely to be used again for

continued habitation but could be visited by a space shuttle*

Plans for a military Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) have long since been abandoned because of budget squeeze and changing technology. Despite the similarity of name, this alternate program was to operate in so different a mode that it was never

competitive with Skylab; the only common factor was that it was manned.

.4 In September 1969, a special task group reporting to the President recommended a

four element program for the 1970's which included the already described space shuttle, a versatile space tug for extensive maneuvering in orbit or landing on the Moon, a nuclear-powered rocket ferry for transfers between Earth orbit and lunar or planetary orbit and a building block system of modules to construct permanent space stations in Ear:h orbit, and elsewhere. The program was carefully considered technologically, but

it involved fiscal peaking problems which were given small chance of winning general national support* Hence, the present effort to build the shuttle is the only one of

the four elements recommended by the Administration for active development (aside from

interim upper stages).

Part of the gap in the U.S. program will be filled by the Europeans who are to

build a manned sortie module (Spacelab) to be carried in the shuttle. But because it is not detached from its shuttle ferry, it is not a real substitute for any proposed

station module.

Only low level study and component development is underway for a U.S. space station module, as a potential follow-on to the interim Skylab. The paper concept calls







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for 12-man modules to be carried to orbit by the shuttle, jmd these could be linked to make Versatile stations housing up to 100 scientists and engineers with stay times ranging up to one year* Modules would be built for various functions and then joined to meet needs* While the main station would be in a fairly low Earth orbit, later modules might be used for other purposes such as 24-hour synchronous high orbit. lunar orbit, and deep space flight*

The Soviet Union claimed that its docked combination of Soyuz 4 and 5 in January 1969 represented a rudimentary space station, inasmuch *a there were four rooms assembled with four men present. But the ships were docked only a few hours, and the transfer of crews had to be done by EVA, rather than crawling through a connecting tunnel. The ASTP was a slightly better claim to such a label.

The Salyut space stations from 1971 on can make a real claim to their title, even though the over 25,000 kilogram combined weight (with Soyuz) and 100 cubic meters of interior space fall well short of the 82,235 kilograms and 357 cubic meters of Skylab. The advantage of Salyut is that it is an on-going and evolving program.

For the future, the Russians speak confidently of building a large and permanent orbital station for many men, for the purpose both of conducting Earth applications work and scientific observation of the stars, and additionally serving as an orbital soembly, checkout, and launch facility to send manned expeditions to the Moon and planets. Keldysh, then President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, predicted in October 1969 that such a station might be ten years away but would more likely be available in five years. (It is not yet here.) It may be that the long awaited new large

(G) launch vehicle will find use in lifting major components for such a station. Using this vehicle, the U.S.S.R. could put up its equivalent of the US, Skylab any time from 1978 on. There is more discussion world-wide than firm planning for space colonies which are receiving press and professional attention. A favorite scheme is the L-5 proposal to be positioned in Earth orbit as far away as the Moon at a La Grangian point







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C. Manned lunar landing: Are the Russians still interested?

When President Kennedy in 1961 asked Congress to support Project Apollo, his advisors had told him this was a project in which the United States had a good chance of being first. They were right, but it would have taken very little different to have come in second.

Many analysts had expected the Russians to be first to make a manned circumlunar flight, possibly to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet state in November 1967. The program slipped, but now unmanned precursors have accomplished this mission with improving success, although men have not yet been co itted. Instead, Apollo 8 was first to carry men to the Moon, and additionally it lingered in lunar orbit, something beyond the capability of the Zond 4 through 8 flights.

In the early 1960's Khrushchev made seemingly contradictory statements as to whether the Soviet Union was working actively on a lunar landing program, but in net balance his statements and those of other Soviet officials seemed to indicate they were. Until a few months before the Apollo 8 flight, Soviet cosmonauts were saying that when the Americans landed, they would find the Russians there to greet them. This talk ceased until new predictions were made in 1969. In April and June, respectively, Shatalov and Leonov, both cosmonauts, predicted that a Soviet manned landing and return would be accomplished some time between October 1969 and the early part of 1970, preceded by some unmanned tests of the entire system. This would seem to indicate that Soviet space officials thought whatever engineering difficulties which had held up the unveiling of their very large (G) vehicle had finally been solved.

In actual fact, the absence of appropriate Soviet flights during the summer and fall of 1969 probably indicated that whatever hopes were present in the spring had not been fulfilled. In the October statement by Keldysh, referred to above, he suggested that immediate plans for manned lunar flights had been set aside, but not precluded for the future. This admission in itself seemed to give substance to there having







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been such plans earlier, Further, the statement had the advantage of taking the public pressure off their program in the face of delays. But it must be added. it is not clear from what is known of the Soviet program that they had the means to conduct at so early a time a manned lunar landing. Not only would the expected big G vehicle have to be operational, but it would require either high energy upper stages, or have to be used in some pattern of rendezvous operations. The lack of evidence of readiness to go either of these paths as early as 1969 surrounds the cosmonaut predictions with questions. There is circumstantial evidence that subcomponents for manned lunar flights beyond the Zond circualunar program were flight tested by Koamos 159 (1967), Koamos 379 and 382 (1970) and Koemos 398 and 434 (1971). Some of these might have been used for future lunar orbit rendezvous options as their changes of velocity matched requirements for entering lunar orbit and for descending to the surface of the Moon, and returning to Earth.

Continued slippages in those parts of the Soviet program potentially related to a manned lunar landing suggest that the first flights could not come probably much before the late 1970's, and more likely will be later If such flights come before the establishment of an orbital launch facility in conjunction with a permanent Soviet space station, they would in most likelihood parallel the kind of interim approach used in Apollo, although possibly differing in detail. In December 1974, the Russians asked India for permission to base tracking and recovery ships in that country, strongly, suggesting a continued current interest in lunar recovery missions with a g-load low enough to carry men as in the cases of the Zond flights, However, no new flights have occurred since then to support any development.

In summary, a Soviet manned lunar landing does not seem imminent, but is still expected as a part of Soviet long range plans. Going to the Moon with men has been talked about so long and prepared for at such expense by the Russians that one must assume they will proceed as soon as they solve their present problems of unreliability








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of hardware. Our first clues may come from appropriate precursor flights, particularly of the big G vehicle, but also possibly in use of high energy upper stages, and further tests of multiple-burn maneuvering stages. Do What other major plans for exploration are likely to come in the near term?

Despite the shrinkage which has occurred in the NASA program, and the fact that

the shuttle is absorbing a large part of the funds during the six years of its development, NASA still has an interesting array of experiments in preparation. For example, the first flights through the asteroid belt to Jupiter are over, as is the first flight to Mercury (via Venus). The arrival of Pioneer 11 at Saturn lies ahead. Viking experiments at Mars will continue for a time. Now being readied are Pioneer payloads with multiple atmospheric probes for the atmosphere of Venus. Also, two Voyagers are on the way to more detailed studies of Jupiter and Saturno More Landeat missions, a Seasat, and more High Energy Astronomical Observatories are other projects expected to be flown. Additionally there are a number of co-operative applications flights for NOAA, ComSat Corp* and other nations.

Although the Soviet Union does not discuss specific flight plans in advance, it has put on the record.a variety of commitments in principle and of intent to conduct a wideranging program of solar system exploration and of Earth applications. E. How do the two countriesplan to compete in space-aRelications?

It is within the expected capacity of the United States to improve the completeness and quality of its weather reporting, with some good prospect for providing accurate forecasts of a week or so.

The Soviet Union will probably improve the reliability of its weather satellite equipment, and they are also interested in providing better forecasts. Their theory of weather systems may keep pace with ours, but they may lag for a time in computer capacity on the ground to support weather analysis.







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The United States is working with IntelSat, the international consortium, to provide a growing number of channels to all parts of the world for telephone, television, and computer links. Direct broadcast will come more slowly for reasons of political

concern and limited channel capacity. Domestic distribution of communications by satellite had finally appeared in 1974 but was delayed by the dispute over control of such systems.

The Soviet Union has tried to interest other countries in a Soviet comunications satellite system called InterSputnik, but this has had such a poor reception that the plan has advanced slowly. About five years late, Soviet television service to Cuba has opened. In late 1975 InterSputnik received a new lease on life with the plan to launch up to eleven large Statsionar satellites in 24-hour synchronous orbit between 1975 and 1980.

The Earth resources field is one which suggests a large expansion of space activity in the next decade. The United States seems likely to go ahead with operational systems, and it would be hard to believe the Russians would neglect further Earth resources work, although their comprehensive plans are not known.

Air traffic control using satellites as part of the system (Aerosat) has had its ups and downs in official support after some years of study and debate. Other nations also have a stake in such plans. A Marisat system is now in place to aid ship communications, but this is still an interim system* F. What are the prospects for manned flights to the planets?

For a number of years, NASA has studied various kinds of manned planetary expedi-. tions, principally to Mars. Briefly, there was interest some years ago in a fly-by of Mars and possibly of Venus by the late 1970's, using modified Apollo and Saturn V equipment, but this was not seriously entertained in any formal program. When the President's Space Task Group in the summer of 1969 submitted its long range U.S. space plan, it opened the possibility of a Mars landing by men in the 1980's.







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The general reaction in the Congress with few exceptions was either indifference or active hostility, and NASA has not pressed this possibility in its official plans.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, a national capability to use space in the late 1970's and thereafter was to be build around use of four types of largely reusable and multipurpose vehicles. The shuttle, already discussed, is the first and most vital* It is important to recognize that the shuttle is not intended to be an end in itself, but represents a design approach to cutting costs for all kinds of missions, whether unmanned, or manned, and whether in Earth orbit or beyond. The second element, already discussed, is the manned station module. This is expected to justify its costs of development and use in practical applications in Earth orbit once such a reliable unit is available, and the shuttle permits non-astronauts and less expensive payloads to fly to and from orbit safely at more moderate cost. Purely as a dividend, such a unit could also be used at nominal additional cost in orbit around the Moon. on the surface of the Moon, or for flight to the planets.

A third element is a space tug, to be used in assembling components in the vicinity of the future permanent space station, shifting payloads to synchronous orbit, or landing major components on the Moon as successor to the transport capabilities of the present lunar'module.

Only the fourth element of the proposed national program is aimed primarily at

deep space work: the nuclear-powered orbital transfer shuttle, also reusable, both for major movements to and from the Moon or in planetary flight. (Now of course, all nuclear propulsion development has been halted.)

When some Members of Congress reacted so negatively to the report of the Space Task Group, the very existence of the shuttle, which is so important to cutting costs near Earth, was threatened by the charge that it represented a back-door attempt to gain a manned planetary program without explicit approval. Consequently, little about planetary flight has been said since then by NASA in connection with the shuttle or other program elements.







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When the United States decided to send men to the Moon, it had to construct an entirely new capability whose cost totaled $21.35 billion up through the first landing. Successive flights were priced at $450 million or so, once the initial investment had been made. It was not surprising in discussing the much greater challenge of manned planetary flight that it soon became common in political circles to put a $100 billion price tag on a first expedition to Mares Considering that equipment would have to work reliably for about two years instead of two weeks. the needed redundancy for safety an well as the initial logistics requirements would add up to a fairly ambitious undertaking if the Saturn V and Apollo technology of 1961 were to be used* Human health reactions on such a long flight have also been questioned, despite some partial longduration tests of closed cabins on Earth, as well as use of the Skylab flights.

Themotivation for the Space Task Force plan was by no means, exclusively for creating a capability to fly to Mars; but perhaps the number of words devoted to the subject in the report, related in part to sounding out public support for an inspiring new goal, was misplaced in the climate of apathy and even hostility which followed so quickly after the Apollo 11 success*

The marginal cost per kilogram of using the shuttle to attain Earth orbit was

originally expected to drop from $1,500 to about $330 a kilogram in the first generation of this class. This cost advantage has largely eroded away, With the principal hope of breaking even with expendable vehicles on launch costs However, the shuttle also affords major opportunities to cut the cost of payloads through changing the flights environment, removing the extreme cost sensitivity to launch weight, and permitting recovery and repair of expensive payloads.

The shuttle justification is built almost entirely around these economic data for Earth applications. Yet it is true that the potential is created for more distant flights as well. For example, the estimate is that Apollo/Saturn V hardware had an operating cost for round trips to the Moon of $80,000 per kilogram, With the







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four new elements of the Space Task Group plan, this operating cost would have fallen to about $800 per kilogram, or only one percent as much. (All figures have to be adjusted for inflation.) In similar fashion, planetary flights fall drastically in cost, and even allowing for all the special payloads that might be required, a Mars expedition in the late 1980's might be priced at a figure far closer to $10 billion (1971 dollars) than to the former estimate of $100 billion (1971 dollars). This is not a question which must be decided now, but as elements of the four types of reusable vehicles may be added to the national capability, each justified on other ground, we may find that we have kept our options open for this later period in our history. The unmanned planetary explorers may bring back the data which will answer whether there is a reason to send men as well.

As already indicated, the Soviet Union has talked more positively about manned flight to the planets, and it is hard to doubt their ultimate intentions in this regard as one studies their total program effort. But to carry out such flights will face them with the same technical and financial questions which the United States will have.

This brief review does not assess the ultimate consequences of pursuit of such goals or failure to undertake them. Some people are already convinced that no set of circumstances would warrant the effort. Others are hardly deterred by the difficulties, expense, or uncertain results. It is hard to accept philosophically that mankind would forever exclude the possibility of visiting most parts of the Solar System. The late President Eisenhower saw practical reasons for limiting space expenditures, but even his first public report on space goals accepted in principle flights by men to Mars, as have most other U.S. Presidents since that time. G, Can the two countries cooperate as well as compete?

This is the hope of well-intentioned people everywhere. In some sense, cooperation already exists. There is a considerable exchange of information at meetings of






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scientists and engineers, and data are filed at the United Nations* There have been treaties negotiated on excluding weapons from space. not making territorial claims to other celestial bodies, and rescuing astronauts*

Further, there has been trading of space-collected weather pictures over the "cold line" between Suitland. Maryland and Moscow. There was a joint effort to write a multivolume textbook on space biology. There has been some coordination of efforts on geomagnetism. In 1970, negotiations also opened on possible common designs for docking attachments to facilitate space rescue or joint work in future generations of spacecraft, both Soviet and American* In 1975 the United States had biological experiments carried on Kosmos 782 and in 1977 had similar experiments carried on Koemos 936.

But the mid-1960's big question of Russians and Americans going to the Moon together was asked more in a rhetorical sense than as a concrete offer by either side. Each side probably was somewhat reluctant to pursue such a goal too openly during any period that one or the other was markedly ahead Nor has either been willing to give up any basic, independent capability to operate in space, which might be implied by such a division of labor as specialization in launch vehicles or spacecraft

Two principal motives for cooperation offered have been to lessen tensions politically, and to save money. The question of tensions may be more influenced by broader political issues than technical cooperation. Money savings are problematical, except as someday sharing of data might permit a division of missions as between one planet and another, for example. Useful also are the proposed biomedical data exchanges*

The most ambitious joint program was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) already described. ASTP came off technically without a serious hitch. but was quite controversial. Challenges were made on the grounds of cost, safety, technology transfer. and Soviet image-building. Because the program was largely dead-ended technically, and the amount of science was slight in relation to the-investment, the cost was criticized* Unknown problems of systems compatibility and worries about Soviet






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equipment unreliability led to some political demands that the program be suspended for much more detailed studies. There were worries that the United States was giving away more technology than it was gaining. A Soviet program which had faltered was presented to the world as an equal partner through ASTP. The Soviet investment in test flights and back-up hardware was probably at least as great as the U.S. investment in the docking module which it supplied. Most of the safety charges lodged against the Russians were based upon launcher problems such as their April 5, 1975 aborted Soyuz, not wholly applicable to the space orbital meeting. Both sides were rather careful not to give away really private technology. The Russians surely gained first hand insights into NASA management methods and documentation, and the Americans visited Soviet facilities and people never before available. It is not clear that the Soviet program needed a political boost in image considering its massive size and many successes.

More crucial is the question: Where do the Americans and Russians go next in cooperation? No specific follow-up of major proportions has been agreed to yet. At least the technical capability to work together has been demonstrated. New discussions of plans for joint space flights began in 1977.

It should not pass without mention that aside from the question of U.S. cooperation with the Russians, for many years this country has had a broad program of joint work with about 75 other nations in space. Those nations put in their own funds, and U.S. funds are used only for those aspects of flights which on their merits won competitions with rival U.S. proposals for allocation of the limited number of approved flight missions. Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. therefore is not an exclusive kind of arrangement although it has the potential for larger operations simply because of the scope of the total Soviet space program.

No assessment of the overall prospects can be made successfully without forecasting the future political climate, which is beyond the goal of this paper.






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X, APPENDIX


Conversion of Metric to English Measures

All data in this report have been quoted in metric rather than English measures. Only a fev such measures are required in this study. For the convenience of readers not as familiar vith metric measures. the following brief conversion table is supplied, related only to measures used in this report:

I kilogram equals 2.20462 pounds avoirdupois

1 kilometer equals 0,6214 statute miles1 cubic meter equals 35.31 cubic feet

I meter equals 3.28083 linear feet

I gram equals 0.03527 ounces avoirdupois 1 centimeter equals 0.3937 linear inches
























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