The War powers resolution : relevant documents, correspondence, reports

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The War powers resolution : relevant documents, correspondence, reports
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Foreword
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Letter of transmittal
        Page v
        Page vi
    Table of Contents
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
    Conference report, No. 93-547, to accompany House Joint Resolution 542, the War Powers Resolution
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
    Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 93-287, to accompany House Joint Resolution 542, the War Powers Resolution, together with minority and supplemental views
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
    Letter of July 16, 1974, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger from Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Hon. J. W. Fulbright, chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
        Page 37
    Letter of September 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
        Page 38
    Letter of October 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
        Page 39
    Report dated April 4, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with section 4(1) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the transport of refugees from Danang
        Page 40
        Page 41
    Report dated April 12, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with section 4(1) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cambodia
        Page 42
    Report dated April 30, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with section 4 of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the evacuation of U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam
        Page 43
        Page 44
    Report dated May 15, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the Mayaguez incident
        Page 45
        Page 46
    Back Cover
        Page 47
        Page 48
Full Text




94th Congress O
2d Session J









THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports






PREPARED BY THE

SUBCOMMIITEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATI0NAi, .-

RELATIONS ,3
















JANUARY 1976 EDITON



Printed for the use of the Commiittee on International Relations


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
6-700, WASHINGTON : 1975


For sale by the Superintendent of DocuhC m ent 1' on ertionat Printing (fice
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $IA(

















COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman


CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGS, JR., Michigan
ROBE RT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BIN GHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., AlabaIna
J. HERBERT BURKE,
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Pennsylvania
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California


MARxAN A. CZAINKCKI, Chi of Scta



SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIR

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman


L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
JONATHAN B. BIN GHAM, New York
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan


PAUL FINDLEY, Illnois
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California


GEORGE R. BERDES, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
DONALD I. FORTIER, Minority Subcommittee Staff Consultant
SiiELLY SSELTON, Staff As8istant


(II)












FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Wahington, D.C., January i1, 1,976.
The material contained in this volume was drawn together at the
request of Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee
on International Security and Scientific Affairs.
It is expected that these documents will be of assistance to the com-
mittee and its members in their efforts to review and provide for ef-
fective implementation of the War Powers Resolution, Public Law
93-148.
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.
(I)



















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013














http://archive.org/detaiIs/waresolut00unit












LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS,
HWashington, D.C., January 21, 1976.
Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The War Powers Resolution was enacted
on November 7, 1973 as Public Law 93-148. At that time it was
cited as "historic" legislation; with the passage of time its significance
has risen, as demonstrated by recent events.
Because of wide interest in the resolution many relevant documents
have gone out of print. In addition, important correspondence relating
to compliance procedures has been written. Finally, and most im-
portant, four reports submitted by the President in compliance with
section 4 of the resolution have been received by Congress.
All of these materials bear, directly on the jurisdictional oversight
responsibility for the War Powers Resolution by the Subcommittee
on International Security and Scientific Affairs. In that connection,
they should prove necessary and useful to the subcommittee in fulfill-
ment of its oversight function. It is also expected that these materials
will be helpful to the committee and the entire House in assuring the
effective implementation of the resolution.
For these many desirable reasons I respectfully request that the
materials be made available in the form of a committee print. As
always, please be assured that your favorable consideration will be
deeply appreciated.
With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific
Affairs.

















CONTENTS

Page
Foreword---------------------------------------------------------III
Letter of transmittalv-----------------------------------------------v
Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution------------------------ -1
Conference Report, No. 93-547, to accompany House Joint Resolution
542, the War Powers Resolution------------------------------------7
Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 93-287, to accompany
House Joint Resolution 542, the War Powers Resolution, together with
minority and supplemental views_------------------------------------17
Letter of July 16, 1974, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger from
Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
Hon. J. W. Fulbright, chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations--------37
Letter of September 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.. -- 38
Letter of October 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.... -- 39
Report dated April 4, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with
section 4(a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the transport
of refugees from Danang------------------------------------------40
Report dated April 12, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with
section 4 (a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the evacuation
of U.S. nationals from Cambodia-----------------------------------42
Report dated April 30, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with
section 4 of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the evacuation of
U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam--------------------------43
Reported dated May 15, 1975, from President Gerald R. Ford, to Hon. Carl
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in compliance with
section 4 (a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution, relative to the Mayaguez
incident -----------------------------------------------------
(vII)













Public Law 93-148
93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542
November 7, 1973

w ow onessluti hr
Concerning the war powers of Co)ngress and the President.


Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers
Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SEc. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the
intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the con-
tinued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers
but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its ter-
ritories or possessions, or its armed forces.
CONSULTATION
SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduc-
tion shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States
Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed
from such situations.
0 REPORTING


War Powers
Resolution.


USC prec.
title 1.


SEc. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in
which United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces,
or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
nation;


27STAT.555
87 STAT. 556


(1)

























































H7 ~K.TAP, ~


the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a
report, in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsi-
bilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of
Vliite(l States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this
section. the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be
engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodi-
cally on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the
scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall
lie report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGMESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall
be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day.
Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when
the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has
adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitionedby at least 30 per-
cent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request
the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the
report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever is
earlier., the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed
Forces with respe ct to which such report was submitted (or required
to Ibe submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has
e-nalcted a s1)e(ific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is
10h'ysically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
IUnit(d States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more
tha11 an11 a(litimal thirty days if the President determines and certi-
ties to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respe), ting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the
(,iti11,1id u5 of suh armed forces in the course of bringing about
:I removal of such forces.
(c) Not wit hstainding subsection (b), at any time that United States
A ried1 Forces are engaged in hosrtilities outside the territory of the
I nited States, its possesions and territories without a declairaion of
war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed
by the iPresidvint if the Congress so dlire(-ts by concurrent resolution.









87 STAT. 557
CONGRESSIONAL I'R1ORiTY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT lRE'I* OIA-Tll NOR BILl.
SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and
such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together
with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pend-
ing business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the
time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and
the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days there-
after, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5 (b).
The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending
business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three
calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall other-
wise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of
conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution
or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in section-5(b). In the event the conferees
are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their
respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either
House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or
concerning anydelay in the consideration of such reports, such report
shall be acted on by both Houses notlater than the expiration of such
sixty-day period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR (ON CU RRENT HES( )LUTI( )N
SEc. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall
be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations
within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise deter-
,nine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending
business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time*
for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the
opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days there-
after, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)
and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recom-
mendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become
the pending business of such House and shall be voted uipon within










87 STAT, 558
three alendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine
by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of
conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent
resolution within six calendar days after the legisletionis referred to
the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House
concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or con-
cerning any delay i the consideration of such reports, such report
shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after
the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to
agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses
in disagreement.
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION


51 tat, 1031.

introductionn
of United
States Armed
Forces,"


SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce Uiiited States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such pro-
vision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint
resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require
any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of
I united States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of
the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters
operations of high-level militarcommands which were established
prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to
the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States
prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of
United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of menmers of
such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the move-
ient of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any
foreign ountry or government when such military forces are engaged,
or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become
engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution--
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Con-
gress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President
with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances Which authority he would
uiot hlave had in the absence of tis joint resolution.






5


SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEc. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of
the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other
person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its
enactment.

CARL ALBERT
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JAMES 0. EASTLAND
President of the Senate pro tempore.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,
November 7, 1973.

The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution
(H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of
Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States
with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it
was
Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of
Representatives agreeing to pass the same.
Attest:
W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representa-
tives.
W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 7, 1973.

The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res.
542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the
Preiident", returned by the President of the United States with his objections
to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was


87 STAT. 559
87 STAT. 560











87 STAT. 560
Resolved, That the said joint resolution
present having voted in the affinnative.
Attest:


pass, two-thirds of the Senators


FRANCIS R. VALEO
Secretary.


LEGISLATIVE HISTORYt


HOUSE REPORTS: No. 93-287 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 93-547
(Comm. of Conference).
SENATE REPORT No. 93-220 accompanying S. 440 (Comm. on Foreign
Relations).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 119 (1973):
June 25, July 18, considered and passed House.
July 18 20, considered and passed Senate, amended, in
lieu of S. 440.
Oct. 10, Senate agreed to conference report,
Oct. 12, House agreed to conference report,.
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCrUJ ErS, Vol 9, No. 43:
O. 24j vetoed; Presidential message.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol, 119 (1973)t
Nov. 7, House and Senate overrode veto.






93D CoNGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES f REPORT
1st Session No. 93-547




WAR POWERS


OCTOBER 4, 1973.--Ordered to be printed


Mr. ZABLOCKL, from the committee of conference,
submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT.
IT@ accompany H.S. Res. 542]

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two
uses on the amendment of the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J.
Res.. 542)' concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.,
having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend
and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:
That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of
the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
In -Tinu of -the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amend-
inent insert the following:
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers
Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
Ste. 2. (a) It i the purpose of this joint resoluWion to fulfill the
intent ofthe framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Co,ngress and the Pres-
ident will apply to the introductioAn of United States Armed Forces
into lwstilihies. or into situations where imminent involvement in hos-
tilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Tnder article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specificaly
pro'?ided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own poweiw
but also all other powers ested by the Constitution in the Gorern-
ment of the United States. or in any department or o7?Ffeer thereof.
(c) The constitutional pow'8 of the President as Commder-ini-
Chief to introdce United States Armed Forces into hostilities. or into
situations wh71ere immn ent h noloement ;n hosl tes is clearly id-
cated by the circumstanes, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a dcIa-


(7)









ration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergeney created by attack upon the United States, its terr;torfes or
possessions, 0 r its armed forces,.
CONXULTATION
Ntc. The President in erery possible instance shall consult with
Co/?jure.s, before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-
t;es o' i0o situations whe; imminent ivolvement in hostilities is
clearly vnd;cated by the crcumstances, and after every such intro-
dw-tdon hall consult regqularly with the Congress until United States
A rmed Force are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been re-
ioved from, such situations.
REPORTING
ASEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in
which waited States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into ostilitie.s or into situations where imminent involve-
,ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territolry, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployinments which relate
volclyto supply, replacement, repair, or training of anh forces,-or
(3) "i numbers which substantially enlar-United States
Ar nbd .Force8 equipped for combat already cated in a fotleign
nation
the President shall s",bmi within 48Ao urs to the Speaker of the Howe
of Repewentatives and to the'-President pro tempore of the Senate a
report, .i writing, settin gforth- ..
(A)1 the cicvrsLanes necessitating the introduction of United
State. A rmed Forces:
(R) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and6
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the Vwstilities, orin-
irol iem ent.
(b) The President shal provide such other information a, the Con-
gress may requet in the, f 0fdfllmnnt of its constitutionlresponsibili-
ties with respect to contmitting the Nation to wqar and to the use 'of
Un ited ,te Ar~nrd Forces abroad.
(e) whenever Tnl'ted States Armed Forces are introduced into ho-
;ftiers or to any situation described in ubsectio n (a) of tis section,
tho President shall, so long as such armed forces' continue to be en-
gaged io ,ch hostilities or situation, report to the ongreR periodi-
calbl on the .tatuls of such. hosfilXes or sztution.as well "onts
and d(raion of s 7h hostilities or situation, but in no event shall
report to the Cop gress less often than onceevery sv month_.

CoNGRESS0IONAL ACTION
,AY. 6. (a) Each report submitted 1orernsn to section 4(a) (1) ehall
he tuWqiM;ttedi.o the Spealer of the Hose of Represeneativesand to
thIe P-' I;'rt pro tefmore of the Senate on the same calendar day.
A ad. Pdpo.t 0 franl netted shall be referred to the, Committee on For-
e;qn .Iffis's of the Iowe of Representatives and to the Com-mittee on


1. Rept. 93-547









Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the
report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has ad-
journed for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 per-
cent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly re-
quest the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider
the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) "Within, sixty, calendar days after a report is subm itted or i?
required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), 'whichever is
earlier, the President shall term' inate any use of United States Armed
Forces with respect to which such report wvas submitted (or required
to be submitted), unless the congressss (1) has declared iar or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by lam such sixty-day period. or (3) is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United 'States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for 'ot more
than an additional thirty days if the President determines and,, certifies
to-the Congress in writing that u iiavoidable military 'necessity respect-
in the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the coi'tinued
use Of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt re-
moval of such forces.
(c) Notwlithstandiig subsection (b). at any t;me that United S tates
Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States, its possessions anc. territories without a declarat;on of
war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by
the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR tLL
SE. 6., (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to sec-
tion 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the
sixty-day period specified in surh section shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign A ffairs of the House of lRepresentatibes or the
Comnuttee on, Foreign Relations of the .Sentate, as the case may be,
and vuch-committee shall report one such Joint resolution or bill.
together with its recommendat;ons. not later than tu'enty-four .ale0 -
'dar days before the expiration. of the sixty-day period spec, ied in
suwh section, udess such House shall otherwise deternine by the yeas
and nays.
(4.) Any joint solutionn or bill .o reported qhall become the ped-
inq business of the House in question (i) the case of the Senate the
time for debate shall be equally diided between the propone'nfs and
the opponents), aed shall be roted on ,imthin three ca/ceadal, (lays
thereafter, unless such House shall othei'wise determbie by y/e (Imid
hayes.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill psm.sed byow one Joe shall be re-
ferr'ed to the comn;Ittee of the other louse named in ub. etin, (a)
and shall be reported out not later than fourteen c(alendarl dais before
the expiration of the s.xty-day period specified in section 5). The
)oint resolution or bill so reported shall become the wndhq lnN;,,ex
of the HIouse h question and shall be rotedl on-. ';th;ili three alc da

t.- TRopt. 9. -547
63-970 0 76 3









(lays after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise
(leterml'le by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of GCo-
Jiress with respect to a joint resolutio or bill pa8sed by both Houes,
'oaferee. shall be promptly appointed and the committee of confer-
e/We shall awke and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill
iot liter than foutr calenda days before the expiration of the sixty-
(lay period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are
iwable to agree within 48 hours. they shall report back to their 7re-
speci e lesin. dtsagreeme at. Notwithstandiimq any rule in either
house co#cernong the printing of conference reports i9 the Record or
Conceritnq any delay in the cons.ideration off such reports. such re-
port shall he acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of
sac/h shty-day period.
(ONGREsIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
SC. 7. (a) Anty concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to sec-
t;o 4ic) shallbe referred to the Com.mittee on Foreign Affairs of
the Hloase of IRepresentatires or the Committee on Foreign Relations
(f th.e Senate. as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution
shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommen-
(dlt;o Us with, fifteen calendar days, unless ch House shall otherwise
d term in, by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shal become the pend-
;iig business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the
t;me for debate shall be equ(,lly divided between the proponents and
the opponents) and still be voted on within three calendar days there-
(it, i unless such Iou1se shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(e) Nuch a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be re-
ferred to the committee of the other Hlause named in subsection (a)
,,nd shall be reported out by .,uch committee together with its rec-
f)11100 ndatif ions within fifteen ca lendar days ane- shAll thereupon become
thc peniuiob,11hof Hurh ouse andshall be voted upon within
three calendar days) unless siteh lHouse shall otherwie dete-mine by
ys tnd ais.
((/) in the case of a y (lisageement between the two Houses of
Colqres s .;th respect to a co rrtirrenlt resolution passed by both
Jiouse:. can ferees sa/wi bIe pr-omptly appointed and the committee of
(co,,feretYW1e skhall make atd file a report with respect to such concur-
)'nt e. ollit;on i'thin s// cafetdld( days aIfter the legillioln is re-
frre! to f/t coi ittee of confereIce. Notwithstawln;g tiny rile in
ef her House co IcernIn the prnti(ng of conference reports ixn the
1) eCOdI o, ctit crnin9t a ny debly in the consideration of such reports.
ieh report shall be (wetd on h y both Htouses not later than six calen-
da, d I/. tf/f, p' the eo fe(.11 e report is filed.tIn the e, elt the onferees
ard iIhe )t) aqOre w,;t/mi 4A hours they sh/mal report back to their

INTVIRiVTA TIO V f JOIN ) INT kRs()1,1 7T.I
Nrcv'. 8. (a) Aut/hoiitI to ;todee Unted States Armed Forces
0to liost;l;t(e or lilto sdtit;oii where inrolvement in hostilities is
(/1 d/lq1 ;11e, *af l te, (7;rc'u/Sf1aees swl/ ilot be i ferred-


II. Rept. 93-547









(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactwrnent of this joint resolution), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such pro-
vision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within' the meaning of this resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization with in the meaning of this joint
resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require
any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of
United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of
the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters
operations of high-level military commands which -were established
prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to
the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States
prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of
United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of
such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the move-
ment of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any
foreign country or goiernment'when such military forces are engaged,
or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged,
in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution,-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Con-
gress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-
dent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which au-
thority he would not have had in the abence of this joint
resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLA USE
SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the applicatio'
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder
of the joint resolution and the application of such proirisiov to any
other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEc. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its
enactment.


11. IteIpt. 93,5,47









And the Senate agree to the same.
CLEMENT J. ZABLO)CKI,
THoMAs E. MORGAN,
WAYNE L. IHAYS,
DOwxALD FRASER,
DANTE B. FASCELI,
PAUL FINDLEY,
W'M. BROOMFIELD,
Man ager on the Part of the Howse.
J. W. FULBRIUHT,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
STUART SYMINGTON,
EDMUND S. MIUSKIF,
G. AIKEN,
CLIFFORD P. CASE,
J. K. JAVITS,
Managers ontle Part of the Senat


11. Rept. 93-547











JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE
The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the con-
ference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment
of the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542) concerning the
war powers of Congress and the Pxesident, submit the following joint
statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect
of the action agreed upon by the maiagrs and recommended inl ,the
accompanyiLg conference report:
The Senate amendmrent to the joint resolution strck out all after
the resolving clause and inserted :a new text. tnder the confeavnce
agreement the House Tecedes with anamendment which ,substit4es a
new ,text explained below except for Jerical corrections, .iicidei ,d
changes made necessary by reason of agreements reachedby the con-
ferees, and minor drafting and claxifing changes.
SHORT fTIAI

Section 1 of tie Senate amnend littubiitiit1d "War Powers Act"
as a short title in lieu of the short title "Wa'Vr Pov ers R stutioin 44
1973" in the House joint resolution.: Section Iof th .conereiice sub-
stitute provides a short title of"War'Powers esluti on".
PURPOSE AND POLICY -
The Senate amendment coitained a section entitled "Purpose and
Policy" (section 2)-and a section entitled ".En~rgency Use of the
Armed Forces" (section 3) which defined the emergencypowers of the
President to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
situations of imminent hostilities.'
The House joint resolution did not contain similar provisions.
The conference report contains a section entitled 'Purpose and
Policy". The new section statesthat:
(a) the purpose of the joint resolution is to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances. anid to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations;
(b) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides the basis for
congressional action in this area; and
(c) the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly in-
dicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a

H. Rept. 93-547


(13)








declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a na-
tional emergency created by attack upon the United States, its terri-
tories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Section 2(c) is a statement of the authority of. the Commander-in-
Chief respecting the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Subsequent sections of the
joint resolution are not dependent upon the language of this subsec-
tion, as was the case with a similar provision of the Senate bill
(section 3).
CONSULTATION
The House joint resolution provided for presidential consultation
with the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress before
and after the President introduces United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The conferees modified
the House provision, to provide for consultation with the Congress.
Section 3 of the conference report is not a limitation upon or substitute
for other provisions contained in the report. It is intended that consul-
tation take place during hostilities even when advance consultation
is not possible.
REPORTI NG
Section 4 of the conference report concerns reporting both the House
joint resolution and the Senate amendment contained similar report-
Ing provisions requiring the President to report to the Congress on
specified actions. In the case of the House joint resolution, the report-
ing provisions triggered the subsequent congressional action provi-
sions. In the Senate version; congressional action provisions were not
triggered by the reporting provision, but were otherwise brought into
play. Section 4 of the conference report draws on both the Senate and
House versions. It requires that the President provide such other in-
formation as the Congress may request following his initial report on
the introduction of United States Armed Forces, and further requires
sulpplementary reports at least every six months so long as those forces
are engaged. Th1e lintial presidential report is required to be submitted
within 48 hours. The objective is to ensure that the Congress by right
and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it
requires to carryN out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to
conmttilng the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed
Forces abroad.
CONGRESSIONAL, ACTION
R1oth the louse joint resolution and the Senate anmdmnent po-
vided for termilnationI within a specified time of presidential use of
Ignited States ArIed Florces without a declaration of war or specific
prior statutory, atthorizatiou. The termination period in the House
joint resolution was 12() days; in the Senate aniidnment, 30 ( days.
The conferees agreed on a 60 day) period following the forty-eight
hol period in which thle President is required to report under section
4. The I60-day .eriod can be extended for up to 30 additional days if the
PIesidelit dete0mlnes and certifies inI writing to the ( congresss that un-
a V( idahl, in ii itary necessity respect ing t he safety of the trl)ops requires
tll(ei) coItinued use in bringing about a prompt disengagement from
hosti 9t-5es.
if. Rept. 93-547









In section 5(a) the conferees accepted the provisions of the House
joint resolution relating to the transmittal of the presidential report
to Congress, with amendments which (1) provide for the possibility
of reconvening of Congress in case of adjournment in order to consider
such report, and (2) provide that 30 percent of the membership of
the respective Houses may petition for such reconvening.
The House joint resolution provided that use of United States
Armed Forces by the President without a declaration of war or specific
statutory authorization could be terminated by Congress through the
use of a concurrent resolution. The Senate amendment provided for
such termination by a bill or joint resolution. The conference report
contains the concurrent resolution provision.
The House joint resolution provided for termination of certain
peacetime deployments of United States Armed Forces through the
elapsing of a time period in which Congress failed to approve such
deployments. The Senate amendment did not include such deploy-
ments in its congressional action provisions. The conference report
requires presidential reporting on such deployments but section 5 (b)
does not require their termination.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES
Both the House joint resolution and the Senate amendment con-
tained congressional priority procedures. They differed primarily in
that the House language specifically stipulated resort to a procedure
of committee consideration while in the Senate version any pertinent
bill or joint resolution was to be considered as reported directly to the
floor of the House in question unless otherwise decided by the yeas and
nays. The language agreed to by the conference in sections 6 and 7
corresponds to the House version including separately stipulated
priority procedures for consideration of concurrent resolutions re-
quiring removal of forces. The following changes, however, were
made:
(1) language was added at the end of sections 6(a) and 7(a)
allowing each House to change the procedures by the yeas and
nays;
(2) the various time frames in section 6 for full cycle consid-
eration of a joint resolution or bill were shortened to conform to
the change in section 5(b) from 120 days to 60 days:
(3) following the reporting of a joint resolution or bill or con-
current resolution by the appropriate committee it was stipulated
that the time for debate in the Senate shall be equally divided be-
tween the proponents and the opponents: and
(4) section 6(d) and section 7(d) prove for expedited con-
ference committee procedures in the consi deration of pertinent
legislation passed by both houses.
TERMINATION OF CONOESS
Section 7 of the House joint resolution provided a niechanisni to
insure that the time period provided for under section 4 of thm eJilt
resolution would not expire while Congress was iii a(ljouriimeiit. le
Senate amendment had no similar provision. The conference report
does not contain the House provision on the groulli(Is tIat the lanuare
I,. Uipt. 9:8 547









of section i5 of the conference report had obviated the need of this
section.
INTFERPRETATION- OF JOINT RESOLUTION
The Senate amendment contained definitions of certain terms. The
House joint resolution, while incorporating some broad interpretations
of the meaning of the joint resolution. did not contain such definitive
language. The conferees agreed to combine both definitions and in-
terpretations in a single section 8 with changes including:
(1) adoption of modified Senate language defining specific
statutory authorization. and defining the phrase "introduction of
United States Armed Forces" as used in the joint resolution;
(2) elimination of House language concerning the constitu-
tional process requirement contained in mutual security treaties;
and
(3) addition of Senate language which makes clear that the
resolution does not prevent members of the United States Armed
Forces from participating in certain joint military exercises with
allied or friendly organizations or countries. The "high-level
military commands" referred to in this section are understood to
be those of NATO, the North American Air Defense command
(NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea (UNC).
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
The Senate amendment contained a separability clause stipulating
that, if any of its provisions or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the
application of such provision to any other person or circumstance
would not be affected. The House version did not contain a correspond-
ing provision. The conferees accepted the language of the Senate
amendment, with certain technical modifications.
EFFECTIVEE DATE
Both the House joint resolution and the Senate amendment con-
tained language providing that the legislation would take effect on the
date of its enactment. This provision "was not in disagreement.
(Y1EMI:'T ,J. ZABLOCKI,
TiHOMA~S E. MoRoAN-,
WAYNE: L. HAYS,
DONALD FRASER,
D1NTS B. FASCELL,
PAUL FINDLEY,
WM1. BRDoM*FLELD,
AlaIaq'S ou the Part of te IHwe.
..W. FviLimrrT,
MIIKE 'MA NSFIELD,
STUART SYMINUT(ON,
E.MIND S. MUSKIE,
G. AIKEN-,
Criol P. CksF,
J. K. JALviTS,
3faaitgers on te Part of t7 1eSemte.


11. Rept. 93 547






93D CONGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES f REPORT
18t Session f No. 93-287




WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973


JUNE 15, 1963.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed


Mr. ZABLOCIRI, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
submitted the following

REPORT

TOGETHER WITII MINORITY AND
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.J. Res. 542]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint
resolution (House Joint Resolution 542) concerning the war powers
of Congress and the President, having considered the same, report fa-
vorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the joint res-
olution as amended do pass.
The amendments are as follows:
On page 2, line 19, strike out "forty-eight" and insert in lieu thereof
"seventy-two".
On page 4, line 18, insert "one such resolution or bill" immediately
after "and".
On page 5, line 13, insert "one such resolution" immediately after
"and".
On page 6, immediately after line 2, insert the following:
TERMINATION OF CONGRESS
SEc. 7. For purposes of subsection (b) of section 4% in the
'event of the termination of a Congress before the expiration
of the one hundred and twenty-day period specified in such
subsection (b), without action having been taken by the Con-
gress under such subsection, such one hundred and twenty-
ay period shall not expire sooner than forty-eight days
after the convening of the next succeeding Congress, pro-
vided that a resolution or bill is introduced, pursuant to such
subsection (b), within three days of the convening of such
next succeeding Congress.

(17)


63-970 0 76 4









On page 6. line 4, strike out "7" and insert in lieu thereof "8".
On pa(re 6, line 16, strike out "hereof" and insert in lieu thereof "of
this Act"
On page 6, immediately after line 16, insert the following:

APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN EXISTING COMMITMENTS
SE:c. 9. All commitments of United States Armed Forces
to hostilities existing on the date of the enactment of this
Act shall be subject to the provisions hereof, and the Presi-
dent shall file the report required by section 3 within seventy-
two hours after the enactment of this Act.
Oni pagre 6, line 18, strike out "8"and insert in lieu thereof "10".
On p)a.(e 6, lines 4 and 18, strike out "resolution" and insert in lieu
thereof "Act'.
BACKGROUND
On three occasions in the past two sessions of Congress, the House
of representatives has passed war powers legislation. In the 91st Con-
gress a joint resolution reported by unanimous vote from the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs was adopted under suspension of the rules in
the house by a vote of 288 to 39. The House-passed measure was sent
to the Senate where. because of that body's failure to act, it died with
the end of the 91st Congress.
In the 92d -Congress, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, again
unanimously, reported House Joint Resolution 1 to the House. It was
passed unanimously in the House by a voice vote under a suspension
of the rules. The Senate, however, passed its own version of a war
powers measure, and because of a parliamentary snarl which devel-
oped. it became necessary for the House to act once again. The Senate
1)ill was amended with the language of House Joint Resolution 1 in
the lfouse-by a vote of 344 to 13-and sent to conference. The con-
ferees met once near the end of the 92d Congress but could come to
no agreement and the war powers resolution died once again.

ACTION IN THE 93D CONGRESS
1pon the opening of the 93d Congress the chairman of the Sub-
comnmittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments,
and 11 cosponsors, introduced a new war powers resolution (House
Joint Resolution 2), somewhat modified from those of prior years.
Six days of hearings were held by the subcommittee on that reso-
lution and other war powers measures which had been referred to
the Committee on Foreli Affairs. Among those proposals were:
('onceruillg tihe war powers of ihe Cogress and the President.
If.-I. Res. 9H Pepp r
II.R. 2053 ) Malsunsg a
I.I.R. 437,1 (,.ude
IH.J. Re". 49 1u Pont
( Ili ig the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in the absence
of a dhecla rat io)n of war by the Congress.
II.R. :17 Bingham
I1I.R. 403"S Nix
II.R. ,6!iH -l ugh.aiu
II.R. G,1214 Biingham et al.











Relating to the power of Congress to declare war.
H.J. Res. 315-Leggett
Relating to the war power of the Congress.
H.J. Res. 21-Danielson
H.J. Res. 71-Chappell et al.
H.J: Res. 72-Chappell et al.
H.J. Res. 89-Matsunaga
H.J. Res. 250--Dickinson
H.J. Res. 271-Fuqua
H.J. Res. 409-Chappell et al.
H.J. Res. 448-Cronin
Relative to the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces.
H. Res. 112-Rarick
To define the authority of the President of the United States to intervene
abroad or to make war without the express consent of Congress.
H.R. 3722-Sisk
H.R. 4834-Nix
To make rules respecting military hostilities in the absense of a declaration
of war.
H.R. 926--Quie
H.R. 2616--Railsback
H.R. 2740-Tiernan
To make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States
in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress.
H.R. 454-Dellenback
H.R. 1454-Ullman
H.R. 3139--Harrington
H.R. 3333-Charles H. Wilson of Calif.
H.R. 3408-Fish
H.R. 3832-Mazzoli
H.R. 4725-Sandman
H.R. 4858-Ruppe
H.R. 4966--Meeds
H.R. 545-5-ZWach
H.R. 5594-Esch
To make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States
in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States
or of a military attack upon the United States.
H.R. 3046--Dennis et al.
H.R. 4295--Rousselot
H.R. 6318--Dennis et al.
Testifying were seven Members of the House, two Senators, a spokes-
man for the Department of State, and five private experts. Four
markup sessions followed at which new language was drafted. A re-
vised war powers resolution was ordered reported to the full commit-
tee by a vote of 9 to 1 on May 2. The following day the measure, House
Joint Resolution 542, was introduced by the subcommittee chairman
with 14 cosponsors, including Mr. Fountain, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Bing-
ham, Mr. Fascell, Mr. Davis of Georgia, Mr. Charles Wilson of Texas,
Mr. Findley, Mr. du Pont, Mr. Biester, Mr. Nix, Mr. Broomfield, Mr.
Pepper, Mr. Hays, and Mr. Holifield. The committee considered the
bill in markup on May 22, May 31, and June 7. The resolution was
reported with amendments on the latter date by a vote of 31 to 4, with
one member answering "present."

CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The Cambodian incursion of May 1970 provided the initial im-
petus for a number of bills and resolutions on the war powers.
Many Members of Congress, including those who supported the action
were disturbed by the lack of prior consultation with Congress and






20


the near crisis in relations between the executive and legislative
branches which the incident occasioned.
The issue concerns the "twilight zone" of concurrent authority
which the Founding Fathers gave the Congress and the President
over the war powers of the National Government.
The term "war powers" may be taken to mean the authority in-
herent in national sovereignties to declare, conduct, and conclude
armed hostilities with other states. In the U.S. Constitution the war
powers which are expressly reserved to the Congress are found ill
article 1, section 8, of the Constitution:
1. The Congress shall have power * *
*
11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,
and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
12. To raise and support. arinies, but no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years:;
13. To provide and maintain a Navy:;
14. To make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces;
15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining
the militia and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States;
*
18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by
this constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof.
The war powers of the President are expressed in article II,
section 2:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States, when called into the actual service of the
United States * *.
The interpretation and application of these constitutional grants
have varied widely through our Nation's history. Testimony received
(uring hearings held in t e 1st 92d, and 93d Congresses confirmed
the view of many Members of Congress and outside observers that the
constitutional "balance" of authority over warmaking has swung
heavily to the President in modern times. To restore the balance pro-
vided for and mandated in the Constitution, Congress must now
rea ss ert its own prerogatives and responsibilities.
In shaping legislation to that purpose, the intention was not to re-
flect criticism on activities of Presidents, past or present, or to take
punitive action. Rather, the focus of concern was the appropriate
scope and substance of congressional and Presidential authority in
the exercise of the power of war in order that the Congress might ful-
fill its responsibilties under the Constitution while permitting the
President to exercise his responsibilities.









The objective, throughout the consideration of war powers legisla-
tion, was to outline arrangements which would allow the President and
Congress to work together in mutual respect and maximum harmony
toward their ultimate, shared goal of maintaining the peace and
security of the Nation.

THE INTENT AND EFFECT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542
The issue of the war powers is a complex and challenging one. The
committee's objective was to reaffirm the constitutionally given author-
ity of Congress to declare war. At the same time, the committee was
sensitive to and cognizant of the President's right to defend the Nation
against attack, without prior congressional authorization, in extreme
circumstances such as a nuclear missile attack or direct invasion. On
the basis of the deepened understanding generated over recent years,
however, it became increasingly evident that the problem did not
center on such extraordinary circumstances. Rather, the main difficulty
involved the commitment of U.S. military forces exclusively by the
President (purportedly under his authority as Commander in Chief)
without congressional approval or adequate consultation with the
Congress.
As a result of extensive hearings and the contributions made by
many members of the House who have given thought to, and sponsored
legislation on, war powers, it was possible to arrive at a consensus as
to what legislation in this important area should encompass. House
Joint Resolution 542 embodies that consensus. Briefly, the legislation
does the following:
1. Directs the President in every possible instance to consult
with the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress be-
fore, and regularly during, the commitment of United States
Armed Forces to hostilities or situations where hostilities may be
imminent;
2. Requires that the President make a formal report to Con-
gress whenever, without a declaration of war or other prior specific
congressional authorization, he takes significant action committing
U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities abroad or the risk thereof, or
places or substantially increases U.S. combat forces on foreign
territory;
3. Provides for a specific procedure of consideration by Con-
gress when a Presidential report is submitted;
4. Denies to the President the authority to commit U.S. Armed
Forces for more than 120 days without specific congressional
approval, while also allowing the Congress to order the President
to disengage from combat operations at any time before the 120-
day period ends through passage of a concurrent resolution.
5. Stipulates a specific congressional priority procedure for
consideration of any relevant bill or resolution which may be
introduced-in other words, an antifilibuster provision; and
6. Specifies that the measure is in no way intended to alter the
constitutional authority of the Congress or the President, or the
provisions of existing treaties.






22


COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 7, Rule XIII, of the House Rules, the commit-
tee believes that the adoption and implementation of this war powers
resolution will result in little or no additional cost to the Government
of the United States. If adopted, however application of the legisla-
tion could result in substantial future savings to the Nation, both in
blood and treasure, by preventing U.S. military combat involvements
abroad which are found by Congress to be not in the national interest.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1. Short title adm introductory clause
The introductory clause simply reads: "Concerning the war powers
of Congress and the President." See. 1, the "Short Title," reads:
"This measure may be cited as the 'War Powers Resolution of 1973'."
The word "concerning" was chosen because the resolution is merely
intended to elaborate upon the application of the warmaking powers
of the Congress ad the President mentioned in the Constitution. By
contrast with other war powers proposals, House Joint Resolution 542
does not attempt any itemized definition of the war powers.
Section 2. Consultation
This section directs that the President "in every possible instance
shall consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the
Congqre. s before commuting n ded States Aimed Forces to hostilities
or to .twtias where hostilities may be imminent. * *"
The use of the word "every" reflects the committee's belief that
such consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be
inclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emer-
gency circumstances-even when it is not possible to get formal con-
gressional approval in the form of a declaration of war or other spe-
cific authorization.
At the same time, through use of the word "possible" it recog-
nizes that a situation may be so dire, e.g. hostile missile attack under-
way, and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation
will be possible. It is therefore simultaneously firm in its expression
of Congressional authority yet flexible in recognizing the possible need
for swift action by the 1President which would not allow him time to
consult first with Congress.
The second element of section 2 relates to situations after a commit-
ment of forces has been made (with or without prior consultation). In
that instance, it imposes upon the President, through use of the word
"shall", the obligation to "coioult regularly Fith such Member8 and
(oleommdtee8 u/nt s'7wlh Un ited States Armed Forcsare nolonger en-
qaqed in host llties or haoe been removed from areas ,where hostilitie8
may be imminent "
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of
comultation. Rejected was the notion that consultation should be
synonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this
provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that
Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice









and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of
action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful,
the President himself must participate and all information relevant to
the situation must be made available.
In the context of this and following sections of the resolution, a
commitment of armed forces commences when the President makes
the final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into
effect.
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict
during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered
to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which
fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of con-
frontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear
and present danger of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes
a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of
confrontation or for actual armed conflict.
Section 3. Reporting
This section contains a reporting requirement obligating the Presi-
dent to submit a written report to Congress when "without a prior
declaration of war by Congress", he takes certain actions committing
U.S. Armed Forces. The section stipulates the circumstances
requiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature of its
contents, and states the timing of its submission. A central purpose of
the reporting requirement is to cause the President, in the process of
decisionmaking, to take into account the legal and constitutional
foundation for his actions, as well as the constitutional role of the
Congress in warmaking.
Three sets of circumstances which would require a report are
enumerated in the resolution as follows:
(1) When the President "comm ;ts United States Arniied Forceg
to hostilities outside the territory of the United States. its posses-
sions and territories." This includes all commitments of U.S.
Armed Forces abroad to situations in which hostilities already
have begun and where there is reasonable expectation that Ameri-
can military personnel will be subject to hostile fire.
The language makes clear that the subsection applies to hostili-
ties outside the territory of the United States, as opposed to at-
tacks directly upon, or within, the territory of the United States.
This language implicitly recognizes the President's right to pro-
tect the United States against attacks by all enemies, foreign and
'domestic. There is no implication whatsoever that the resolution is
intended to impair the President's authority to provide such
defense.
(2) Reporting is required when the President "eomit s United
States Armed Forces equipped for combat to the terlitolj, (itr-
space or waters of a foreign nation, except for deployments which
relate solely to supply, replacement, repair or training of united
States Armed Forces". While subsection (1) refers to the com-
mitment of U.S. troops to an area where armed conflict actually
is in progress, subsection (2) covers the initial commitment of
troops insituations in which there is no actual fighting but some






24


risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A
report would be required any time combat military forces were
sent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing political
status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example,
the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of
Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential reports.
Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emer-
gency aid measures, normal training exercises, another noncom-
bat military activities.
(3) Reporting is required when the President "submntialy
enlarges United States Armed Forces equipped for combat al-
ready locted in a foreign nation." While the word "substantially"
designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-
sense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100-percent in-
crease in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy-say from 5 to
10-clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand
additional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does
not significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about
300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000
would mean an increase of 25 percent, which is substantial. Under
this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required
to report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S.
military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.
The latter half of section 3 deals with the timing, form, and scope
of the report submitted by the President.
(1) Tirninq.-Although prior war powers legislation had used the
word "promptly" in designating the time periodin which a Presiden-
tial report had to be submitted followingan action specified under the
resolution, the committee saw the need for more precision and adopted
72 hours as the time limit. This period is assumed to be sufficient for
the President to assemble all the pertinent information necessary to
make a full report to the Congress.
(.) Form.-The report by the President is stipulated to be in writ-
ing. Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified.
If the President desires to make classified information available to the
Congress as additional justification for his actions, he is free to do so.
The procedure of submitting the report to the Speaker of the Ihouse
and the President pro tempore of the Senate is a normal one for re-
ceiving such reports on behalf of Congress.
(3) Scope.-Five stipulations are made on the contents of the
report. By prescriptive language in the resolution, the President is
to include:
(A) the cir;m,4tan ce necefPsitat qhis wtion:
(B) the co ttiitovam an d leqiative pro,4,ons wnder the ae-
thorty ofw1hich he took xwh aIcftil
(C) the estimated scope of actir'itk*s;
(I)) (he e (tm ated fuw cost of ch"omet or ch
cnlayement of fcwes ; and
(A) swch other information aty the P'residevttmay deem useful
to the Coures in the flfillincat of its onxthituttonl respoiibili-
tes with respect to cornuittlw the Nation to loar and to the use
of I n ,StatesI A rined Forces (broad.








It is the belief of the committee that a report which fulfills the cri-
teria set forth above will provide the Congress with adequate informa-
tion on which to base its deliberations and possible action concerning
the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces by the President.
Secti 4. Congressional action
Section 4 has four basic purposes: first, to provide for a specific
procedure of consideration by Congress when a report is submitted
pursuant to section 3; second, to provide for the receiving of a report
when Congress is not in session; third to deny the President the au-
thority to commit U.S. Armed Forces Yor more than 120 days without
further specific congressional approval; fourth, to authorize both
Houses of Congress to order- the President to disengage any forces
from hostilities outside the United States at any time during or after
the 120-day period through passage of a concurrent resolution.
Subsection (a) of section 4 provides that each report ubmitted by
the President pursuant to section 3 shall be transmitted to the Speaker
of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate on the same day.
It further provides that if such a report is received when Con-
gress is not in session the Speaker and President pro tempore, if they
deem it advisable, shall jointly request the President to convene Con-
gress to provide for consideration of it and allow the Congress to
take appropriate action pursuant to this section. There are three rea-
sons for this language:
By use of the phrase *if they deem it advisable * *" it is in-
tended that the good judgment of these two officials would determine
whether the report covered a situation of sufficient urgency, im-
portance and severity to warrant the extraordinary measure of order-
ig the reconvening of Congress. There may be instances when a report
is filed on a relatively minor action.
The language * shall jointly request" makes clear that both
the Speaker and President pro tempore would have to concur in the
importance of and urgency of the situation covered in the report and
in the desirability of asking the President to reconvene Congress.
Yet, through use of the word "shall" the committee intended to con-
vey its strong belief that reports dealing with situations of urgency
and importance would obligate these two officials to request the Presi-
dent to reconvene Congress. In this connection the committee recog-
nizes that the Constitution states clearly that only the President
"may" reconvene Congress.
The language * that it may consider the report and take appro-
priate action * *" refers to the congressional action and procedures
outlined in section 4 (b) and (c) as well as sections 5 and 6, "Congres-
sional Priority Procedure."
The resolution further stipulates that following receipt of the re-
port the Speaker and President pro tempore shall refer "it to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. *"1 The purpose of this
language was to make clear that these two committees have proper
jurisdiction over declarations of war and with foreign affairs gen-
erally. Further, in order to make the report available to all members
of Congress the resolution stipulates that it "be printed a a docu-
ment for each House."






26


Subsection (b) of the resolution is one of its major provisions. In
brief, it stipulates that "within one hundred and twenty calendar days
after a report is submitted or is required to be subMatted * *" the
PIesident vould be required to terminate the commitment referred to
in tle report and "-,)-(moce any enlargement of U.S. Arned Forces"
unless the Congress enacts a declaration of war or a specific authoriza-
tion for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. Considerations which entered
into this provision are as follows:
The language "* * within one hundred ad twenty calendar
d/ys * was used as a means of providing an adequate but
fixed limitation on the period of the Presidential action. The
Congress recognizes that the President has, from time to time,
assumed a power to act from provision of treaties, laws, and
resolutions as well as from the Constitution itself which do not
constitute an explicit or specific authorization. This provision
enables Congress to consider the necessity or wisdom of a Presi-
dent's action and to require the President to abandon such action
if Congress is not persuaded that the action is in the interest of
the United States, or to endorse the action if Congress believes
it to be in the national interest. As is made clear in section 8 of
the resolution, this provision is not to be construed as a grant of
authority to the President to act for 120 days. Rather, it should
be considered a specific time limitation upon any power to act
assumed by the President from sources other than a specific
authorizationbyCongress.
Nor should is limitation and the power contained in subsec-
tion (c) be interpreted as limiting the means now available to
Congress and citizens to challenge the authority of the President
to act.
The language *)*or i,8 required to be submitted * tales
into account a situation in which the President for whatever
reason may decide not to submit a report. In that case, the 120-
day period would begin after the 72-hour period referred to in
section 3.
The language .* * the President shall terminate any com-
mitmet * *" obligates the President explicitly to stop the comn-
m1itinelt or enlargement and remove 1.S. Armed Forces to whih
the report refers.
The phrase "* * aless th e (O1iress enats a decration o f
war or a specific authorization for the use of United States
A nwed Forces" spells out either of the two specific af fi'wtive
actions which the Congress would have to take in order for the
President to coIIntie his action, namely, a declaration of war or
a specific autolri nation in the form of a oifit resolution.
Subsecton (c) Is atIoth(erof the resolutwiotis umjor provisions. It
l)rovides for teI tJiiniiiiation of the P1resident's action covered in the
report through passage f a concurrent resol u iOn by both Houses,
be fore tlw (e1id of teI 12():ay .erliod rer, red to in section 4(b) and
not wit istauding sect ion 4(b) It Is, in other words, an option of con-
gressional ad to1. (usilmrat,)Ins which entered into the legislative
languIage IreII are as follows
The phrase "shall be disengaed" has as its antecedent the
PrIesident's action of coniumittin)g U.S. Armed Forces. The intent








of the committee was simply that the President shall stop the
action to which he has committed the forces by releasing the
forces from the order which committed them, and removing them
from the situation.
The language * if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution" is the heart of subsection (c). It authorizes the use of
a concurrent resolution to "veto" or disapprove an action of the
President committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities.
In effect, the joint resolution "endows" this concurrent resolution
with the binding force of statute. Since the language applies to a
situation where there is no congressional authorization for the
President's action it thereby avoids the possibility of a Presi-
dential veto-and resulting impasse-which would be possible on
a bill or a joint resolution. A discussion of the use of a concurrent
resolution for this purpose may be found on pages 13-14.
Sections 5 and 6. Congressional priority procedure
Sections 5 and 6 stipulate a specific congressional priority proce-
dure for consideration of a relevant bill or joint resolution which may
be introduced pursuant to section 4(b) or a concurrent resolution
introduced pursuant to section 4(c). Sections 5 and 6 are, in other
words, the "antifilibuster" provisions of the resolution. While it was
recognized that filibusters are primarily a problem of the Senate, it
was felt that these provisions would protect the interests of the House.
It would achieve that objective, for example, by allowing the House
enough time to deal with any relevant bill or resolution sent by the
Senate. Section 5 relates to section 4(b) and section 6 relates to sec-
tion 4(c). In both cases, the language provides for referral to relevant
bills or resolutions to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in accord with the tradi-
tional jurisdiction of those committees.
The intent of the committee in including sections 5 and 6 is to
establish the status of relevant legislation as "privileged motions,"
approximate to the procedure followed when a discharge petition is
filed for the consideration of a resolution.

TIMING OF SECTION 5
As prescribed in section 5 which relates to section 4(b), the tim-
ing of congressional procedures would be as follows:
Forty-five days before end of 120-day period.-Bill or joint
resolution must be introduced to be guaranteed protection of
committee consideration.
Thirty days before end of 120-day period.-One such resolu-
tion or bill must be reported out by committee.
Vithin 3 legislative days of being reported by commiftee.-
Legislation becomes pendingtbusiness of either House and shall
be voted on and sent to the oer body.
Fifteen days before end of 120-day pei-od.-Legislation acted
upon by one body and sent to the other body and referred to
appropriate committee shall be reported out.
Within 3 legislative days of being rei~olled by cobei/te
other body.-Legislation so reported shall b1ecoe pendin I si-






2S


ness and shall be voted on unless such body shall otherwise deter-
mine by yeas and nays.
End of lhO-day period.-Presidential action must stop unless
previously sanctioned by Congress.

TIMING OF SECTION 6
The timing for congressional consideration under section 6, which
relates to section 4(c) is as follows:
Within 15 calendar days of introduction of coeurrent resolu-
tion.-One such resolution shall be reported out by committee
with recommendations and shall become pending business.
With in 3 legislative days of being reported out.-Shall be voted
on unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.
With in 15 calendar days of concurrent resolution passed by one
House and referred to other body's appropriate com mttee.-
Shall be reported out by committee and become pending business.
Within 3 legislative days of being reported out by commttee.-
Shall be voted on unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.
Section 7. Terdirution of Congress
Section 7 deals with a situation in which a Congress terminates
during the 120-day period specified in subsection 4(b) without having
taken final action to approve or disapprove a commitment of armed
forces.
The committee did not wish to force the President to cease a mili-
tary action abroad simply because Congress was not in session at the
expiration of 120 days and it had not been possible to take final action
before adjournment.
This. section P,,ovides tlt in sich a case the 120-day period shall
not expire sooner than 48 (lays after the convening of the next succeed-
ing Congress, providing that a resolution or bill is introduced pursuant
to su1)se)wtl 411) "ihin (a's of thehconveing of the next suc-
ceeding Congress. This language is meant to insure that in any case
in which the 120-day period is interrupted by statutory termination of
(1ongrss without congressional action, there would be an extension of
tile lrioL. It lf) \ Nal(l allow the ant filibuster provisions to come
into effect.
Section 8. Ilnterpretatwn of act
Section 8 deals with the construction, intent, and effect of the resolu-
tion.
TIe intent (f sJI1Is(ctionl (a) is to dis(1ailn any intention of alter-
ing wle ,-ost it IIi,al grants of war owers tothe legislative and
exeu.t i e IH, e It therebly helps inlsiure the constitutionality of
the rsolutio, by making it clear that nothing in it can be interpreted
cha 1gi(g in any way the powers delegated to each branch of govern-
inenc 1wV t Ic ( iist itIi~ition. In additionit, reassures U.S. allies that
passage of the re'sOlviet io w\ill not affect U.M. obligations under mutual
d!efeise a ree,ii1s anl ot tI*reaties to which the United Staites is

[Hwe i ilhIi of sulsecfioll (h ) is to state explicitly that nothing in
the resolution "scll be (onstrucd to represent corgressioivd accept-






29


aiwe of the propo8itw'n that Executive action alone can -atisfy the
cowritutional process requirement contained in the provision of mu-
tual security treaties to which the United States is a party."
This statement is aimed at rejecting those interpretations of the
treaty obligations of the United States which hold that mutual secu-
rity treaties such as NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS are "self-execut-
ing" and do not require congressional sanction of any kind for Presi-
dential actions taken in pursuit of such obligations, including actions
which involve the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.
The intent of subsection (c) is to emphasize that this resolution
does not grant the President any new authority and, in connection
with the 120-day period referred to in section 4(b), that the President
would not have any freedom of action during the 120-day period
which lie does not already have.
Section 9. Applicability to certain existing commitmnents
This sectioA provides that the resolution would apply to those com-
mitments of U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities which are in progress
on the date of its enactment into law. The section further provides
th upon enactment of the resolution the President should proceed
toffkl the report as required by section 3 and that the 120-day period
called for by subsection 4(b) would begin on the date of the filing of
the report.
Section 10. Effective date
This section states that the resolution, except to the extent otherwise
provided in section 9, shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
USE OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Section 4(c) provides that an action by the President committing
U.S. troops to hostilities or into areas or situations where hostilities
are imminent could be terminated by both Houses of Congress acting
through a concurrent resolution. Some question has been raised about
the constitutionality of the use of a concurrent resolution for this pur-
pose. After careful study of the issues involved the committee believes
that there is ample precedent for the use of the concurrent resolution
to "veto" or disapprove a future action of the President, which action
was previously authorized by a joint resolution or bill.
There are many examples of legislative actions which have the effect
of law without a Presidential signature. Perhaps the most notable is
the ability of Congress to veto executive branch reorganization plans
under the Executive Reorganization Act. Other examples are amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and orders to spend
money appropriated to the use of the Conrtess.
Further, most of the important legislation enacted for the prose-
cution of World War II provided that the powers granted to the Pres-
ident would come to an end upon adoption of concurreilt resolutions
to that purpose. Among those acts were:
The Lend-Iease Act;
First War Powers Act;
Emergency Price Control Act;
Stabilization Act of 1942;
War Labor Disputes Act.






30


In more recent times both the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution provided for their repeal by concurrent resolu-
tion.
This use of a concurrent resolution has been accepted by various
authorities as a constitutionally valid practice. It might be noted that
Senator Sam J. Ervin, a noted constitutional scholar, has authored a
bill which would permit international executive agreements to be
vetoede" by the Congress through passage of a concurrent resolution.
This proposal has been endorsed by many constitutional experts and a
former Supremie Court justice.
The constitutional validity of such usage of a concurrent resolution
is based on the cap,city of Congress to limit or to terminal the author-
ity it delegatess to the Executive. In the case of the war powers, the
Constitution is clear that the power to declare war, as well as the power
to ralse and maintain an army and a navy, belong to Congress. Under
tei institutionn, the President is designated as the Commander in
Chief to prosecute wars authorized by Congress.
When the President commits .S. Armed Forces to hostilities
abroad on his own responsibility, he has, in effect, assumed congres-
sional authority. Under this war powers resolution the Congress can
rescind that authority as it sees fit bv a concurrent resolution and
thereby avoid the problem of a Presi(lential veto. The authority for
the CO ngriess to establish a legislative process for rescinding an assumed
power to act on thel part of the President can be found in Article 1,
Section 8, of the Constitution through the "necessary and proper"
clause.
This authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate when Con-
gress passed legislation permitting the President to prosecute W1rorld
War II. This authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate in
the passage of the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution. It is no less legitimate and constitutional today as em-
bodied in this war powers resolution.












SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES MAILLIARD, BROOMNFIELD,
MATHIAS, GUYER, AND VANDER JAGT
We voted in committee to report this resolution because we strongly
support the reporting and consulting provisions of the legislation, al-
though we have equally strong reservations over the operating pro-
visions. In our opinion the House should have the opportunity to de-
bate the resolution.
It is our hope that as the House works its will, the Members will
carefully scrutinize section 4 (b) and (c). In our opinion, section 4(b)
is dangerous and perhaps unconstitutional. It would unwisely put into
law a provision whereby the failure of the Congress to act could force
Presidential action with major national and international implica-
tions. Specifically, section 4(b) requires that within 120 calendar days
after a report is submitted or required to be submitted pursuant to
section 3, the President shall terminate any commitment and remove
any enlargement of U.S. Armed Forces with respect to which such
report was submitted, unless the Congress enacts a declaration of war
or a specific authorization for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. In our
opinion, the Congres ought to exercise its powers in a positive way
and not have major consequences ensue from the inaction of the
Congress.
There are several objections to terminating the Presid(.lnt's authority
in this manner. Recognizing that the war powers are shared by the
President and the Congress, the President-to cite one exampile-ob-
viously has the authority to commit U.S. Armed Forces stationed
overseas to hostilities in order that they might protect themselves from
attack or threat of imminent attack. We doubt that the Congress can
consitutionally terminate the President's authority to protect the
Armed Forces. We further doubt that the Congress can constitution-
ally terminate the President's authority by a failure to act, as pro-
vided for by section 4(b).
This section appears to be as unwise as it may be unconstitutional.
Section 4(b) could require the disengagement of our Armed Forces
even in the face of a continuing attack. It could destroy an adversary s
incentive to reach an early settlement of a dispute, since he surely
would hope that the Congress-by failure to act or otherwise-would
conipelthe President to disengage U.S. Armed Forces.
We should also consider the constitutionality of section 4(c). which
would permit the Congress by a concurrent resolution to require the
President to disengage U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities. We have
no problem with the policy envisioned in section 4(c) ; namely that in
exercising a shared constitutional power a majority of both Houses


(31)









of Congress should have the power to require the disengagement of
Armed Forces committed to hostilities by the President without con-
gressional approval.
We would, however, call attention to the constitutional question of
whether a concurrent resolution, not requiring the approval of the
President, would be binding upon the President.
WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD,
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIEW,
ROBERT B. (BoB) MATHIAS,
TE.NNYSON GUYR,
GUY VANDER JAGT.











SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES IBUCiANAN AND W1tALEN
We concur that there is great need for war powers legislation. Con-
gress must possess the means by which it can act on the question of
placing U.S. Armed Forces in combat. House Joint Resolution 542
goes a long way toward providing such a mechanism.
.Neverheless, the language in section 4(b) troubles us. It permits
the exercise of congressional will through inaction. It is our opinion
that in order to fulfill its constitutional responsibility, Congress must
act, whether it be in a positive or negative manner.
Therefore, during the committee's markup of the resolution, we
supported replacing the committee's language in section 4 (b) with an
amendment similar to the following:
Not later than one hundred twenty days after the receipt of
the report of the President provided for in section 3 of this
Act, the Congress, by a declaration of war or by the enact-
ment within such period of a bill or resolution appropriate
to the purpose, shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and au-
thorize the continuation of the action taken by the President
and reported to the Congress, or shall disapprove, in which
case the President shall terminate any commitment and re-
move any enlargements of the United States Armed Forces
with respect to which such report was submitted.
We shall offer this amendment during floor debate on House Joint
Resolution 542. On an issue which may involve the death of thousands
of Americans, we cannot delude ourselves that no action at all is an
appropriate response. Rather, each Member of Congress should de-
c are his views-through a "yes" or "no" vote-when the President
commits our Armed Forces to combat or substantially enlarges our
military presence abroad. Passage of our amendment will afford this
opportunity.
JOHN BUCHANAN,
CHARLEs W. WHALEN, Jr.

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63-970 0 76 2











MINORITY VIEWS OFR RFPfESEN'TATIVES FRELINGHUYSEN, DERWINSKI,
TOM0SO-N, A ND Bur.u
We are opposed to the enactment of House Joint Resolution 542. Its
most important provisions are probably unconstitutional and certainly
are unwise. We strongly doubt the wisdom of attempting to draw rigid
lines between the President and Congress in the area of warmaking
powers. Ironically, enactment of this resolution in some respects would
expand considerably the constitutional authority of the President, and
in other respects would severely restrict his authority. In our opinion,
the only appropriate way to make such far-reaching changes would
be by an amendment to the Constitution.
While we are in accord with the understandable desire of Members
to assure Congress its proper role in national decisions of war and
peace, we consider the severe restrictions which this resolution seeks to
impose on the authority of the President to be dangerous. Should they
become effective, they could affect adversely important national se-
curity interests of the United States.
Flexibility-not the exact delimitation of powers-is a basic char-
acteristic of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution clearly
had that aim in mind when they refrained from closely defining the
responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches in the areas of
warmaking powers. Moreover, throughout our history, Presidents have
employed the power which that flexibility has allowed them to en-
courage peaceful resolutions of potentially dangerous situations.
What is most ironic is that this joint resolution, constructed as it is
with an eve to our unfortunate experiences during the mid-1960's,
would not'have prevented our steadily deepening involvement in Viet-
nam, had it been on the books 10 years ago. For example, there is no
reason to believe that Congress after the Gulf of Tonkin incident
would have refused to approve Presidential action through the mech-
anismn pro\lded in this measure. Congress at the time would have do-
lared wvar, had that been requested, or we would have specifically
authorized the use of our Armed Forces.
louse Joint Resolution 54o cannot give Congress foresight or wis-
(loIn, and will not force an uncooperative Executive to be more forth-
coming. In fact, it may achieve lust the opposite effect. A President
faced with a possible congressional veto of his actions might be
tenlpte(d to (.i',umVent Congress. lHe miight, for example, appeal di-
rely to tHe Ameri(an people in order to force Congress to support
him. If that were to happen, Congress could be virtually excluded
fronl the (hii opnnking ip)rocess. Moreover, HIouse Joint Resolution
5P2. which seeks to provide a "trip wire," invoking restrictions on Ex-
cutive act ion, might well encourage a President to be less than candid
when setting forth the circumstances and justifications for his actions.
Following are our vl( Sn more detail with respect to each section
of the resolution.


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35


Section 2, and most of section 3, seek to insure reasonable consulta-
tion with Congress, by requiring submission of reports to Congress by
the President whenever he commits the U.S. forces to hostilities or
potentially hostile situations, or when he enlarges our combat forces
already located in foreign nations. Essentially the same provisions
have been enacted previously by the House of Representatives in two
preceding Congresses. Section 4(a), which seeks to insure prompt
action by Congress on such reports, also is the same language as that
already twice approved by the House. We consider these requirements
to be entirely appropriate.
We have reservations, however, about the wisdom, of the inclusion
of section 3(d), language which was not contained in the 'resolutions
previously approved by the House. Section 3(d) requires that the
President communicate to Congress the estimated financial cost of any
commitment of U.S. forces outside the United States. What point
would there be in requiring the President to announce at the outset of
a national security emergency his judgment as to the cost of com-
mitting of our forces? It may be argued that Congress needs a specific
estimate of costs in order to help us make up our minds about whether
or not to support the President. In our opinion, that information
would be of no particular value to Congress but might be extremely
revealing to an enemy. We believe that Congress would receive ade-
quate information under the requirements of the other subsections of
section 3, and that the advantages to be gained by hostile powers
through the required financial disclosure would far outweigh any
incremental benefit to Congress,
Section 4 (b) and (c) are at the heart of our objections to the resolu-
tions. Section 4(b) provides that the President at the end of 120 days,
without regard even to the immediate safety of our armed forces,
must terminate any involvement of U.S. forces in hostilites outside
the United States, and withdraw newly dispatched combat forces
from the area of any foreign country (except for supply, replace-
ment, repair or training deployments), unless the Congress by that
time has enacted a declaration of war or "specifically" authorized the
use of our Armed Forces.
This effort to limit the President's power-by the failure of Con-
gress to take affirmative action-strikes us as highly dangerous. For
example, suppose the President were to commit troops in Europe in
order to defend our own country? That he has such power as Com-
mander in Chief is not challenged, but the 120-day limitation might
make it necessary for him to withdrawtroops already fully committed
to combat. At best, the limitation could only be construed as an effort
to circumscribe sharply his ability to continue to exercise his power.
To avoid such a reversal of national policy, a President might hur-
riedly escalate hostilities, to force Congress to support him, or in an
effort to win the conflict within 120 days--or an enemy might seek to
avoid negotiating a settlement in the belief that the President would
soon be forced to withdraw our troops. Thus the 120-day provision
might actually promote, rather than deter, our involvement in
hostilities.
Proponents may argue that in such a situation Congress would
recognize the necessity of declaring war, or of specifically authorizing
the use of troops. As a practical matter, however, Congress does not






36


always move quickly and a legislative deadlock might develop. More-
over, in our opinion it is highly undesirable for Congres, through its
own inaction, to be able to determine whether a course of Presidential
action should be continued.
The manifold constitutional and national security problems created
by the 120-day provision of section 4(b) are compounded by section
4(c). This section provides that hostilities and deployments may be
terminated by Congress alone at any time within the 120-day period,
by means of a concurrent resolution having no force of law.
If the Commander in Chief, acting within his constitutional au-
thority, orders our forces to deploy or to engage in hostilities, Con-
gress may affect such action if it wishes, but necessarily must do so
through use of its constitutionally granted powers. By seeking to
provide that a concurrent resolution shall have the force of law, we are
embarking on an extremely dangerous, and probably unconstitutional
course of action.
There may be cases in which Congress has specifically authorized
hostilities or deployments by constitutional means other than a dec-
laration of war. Under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, au-
thority granted by any bill, order or resolution may be repealed or
amended only through the same process; once Congress has given its
consent to legislation it may not be withdrawn unilaterally by the
Congress with less than a two-thirds vote.
Section 5 is another example of the difficulty of tryingto establish
rigid procedures where, in fact, flexibility is required.. During com-
mittee consideration it was clear that the practical effects ofthe time
requirements were not adequately explored. For example, the question
was raised, if the beginning of the last 45 days of the 120-day period
coincided with the end of a Congress, would be the 15 days for commit-
tee consideration be binding upon the next Congress? A related ques-
tion was whether Congress would be able to organize quickly enough
to meet the deadline. These questions, in our opinion, were not an-
swered satisfactorily.
While sections 7 and 8 are generally helpful, given their context, we
strongly oppose the requirement of section 9 that this resolution be
applied retroactively to cover hostilities existing on the day of its
enactment which were previously authorized and initiated.
The aroiper and most useful role for Congress to play, in decisions
of war and Jeace, cannot be developed through confrontation with the
Executive. To function effectively, particularly in times of national
crisis, our system of government must exhibit a maximum amount of
cooperation between the two branches-executive and legislative. In
the past such cooperation has been the means by which we have
achieved successful policy decisions. It is to this end that we should
be striving. House Jroint Resolution 542 wA'ill not help-indeed, we beV-
lieve it will seriously impede-the achievement of this objective.
PETER H. B. FR LINoujuYSEN.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKT,
VER.-oN. W. ThOMSON,
J. HERBERT BURKE.












Letter of July 16, 1974, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger,
From Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on For-
eign Affairs, and Hon. J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee
on Foreign Relations

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1974.
Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are writing to you concerning implemen-
tation of Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution. As you
know, this legislation established by statute the requirements and
procedures to be followed to ensure the exercise by the Congress of
its constitutional responsibilities concerning any decision to involve
the United States Forces in hostilities. We believe that the effective
and diligent implementation of P.L. 93-148 can remove from con-
tention an area which has been a subject of strain between the Exec-
utive Branch and the Congress in recent years.
Because the statutory mechanisms for implementation of the pro-
cedures set out in the law are activated in the first instance by the
reporting system mandated in Section 4, we would like to know what
arrangements have been made within the Executive Branch to ensure
full and timely compliance. Specifically, we would like to know which
responsible official within the Executive Branch has been designated as
the "action officer" with respect to the Section 4 reporting require-
ments. Moreover, if the designated person is a civilian official such
as the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, we would like to
know what arrangements have been made for coordination with the
pertinent elements in the military chain of command to ensure that
he has full and immediate access to all information required to be re-
ported to the Congress under the law.
We also believe that it may be useful for staff members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives to meet with officials
of the Executive Branch designated by you for purposes of discussing
the details of those implementation arrangements which require care-
ful coordination and cGoperation between the Congress and the
Executive.
Sincerely,
THOMAS E. MORGAN.

J. W. FULBRIGHT.
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Letter of September 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chair-
man, Committee on Foreign Affairs, From Secretary of State
Henry A. Kiinger
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 7, 1974.
Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the suggestions made in your
letter of July 16 concerning implementation of the War Powers Reso-
lution (P.L. 93-148). I am taking this matter up with the Secretary
of Defense and will be back in touch with you as soon as our plans
are developed.
Best regards,
HENRY A. KISSINGER.

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Letter of October 7, 1974, to Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, From Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, October 7, 1.974.
Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On July 16 you wrote to me regarding the
implementation of the War Powers Resolution. In particular, you
asked what arrangements had been made within the Executive
Branch to insure "full and timely compliance" with the reporting
requirement of Section 4 of the Resolution. I am pleased to inform
you that since my September 7 letter to you on this matter, Secretary
Schlesinger and I have agreed that our respective legal counsels will
be jointly responsible for bringing immediately to our attention cases
where it would be appropriate for us to recommend to the President
that a report be submitted to the Congress pursuant to Section 4 of
the War Powers Resolution.
With regard to the question of access to information, I understand
that several months ago the Office of the Secretary of Defense in-
stituted an arrangement whereby the Legal Adviser to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informs the Department of Defense
General Counsel of all troop deployment actions routed through the
Chairman's office which could raise a question as to whether a report
to the Congress is required. In implementation of that arrangement
a written instruction was promulgated establishing a War Powers
Reporting System within the Operations Directorate of the JCS.
Arrangements have been made for this Department's Legal Adviser
to receive the same information as is supplied to the DOD General
Counsel. Consultations between the two departments' legal counsels
will be arranged as needed.
George Aldrich, the Acting Legal Adviser, would be pleased to
arrange for further discussions of this matter with you or with members
of your staff if you so desire.
Best regards,
HENRY A. KISSINGER.
(89)













Report Dated April 4, 1975, From President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
Compliance With Section 4(a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution,
Relative to the Transport of Refugees From Danang

APRIL 4, 1975.
Hon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the Ho-use of Representatives,
Peking, China
(C/O Ambassador Bush).
As you know, last Saturday I directed United States participation
in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport refugees
from Danang and other seaports to safer areas farther south in
Vietnam. The United States has been joined in this humanitarian
effort by a number of other countries who are offering people, supplies
and vessels to assist in this effort. This effort was undertaken in
response to urgent appeals from the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam because of the extremely grave nature of the circumstances
involving the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation
has been brought about by large-scale violations of the Agreement
Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam by the North
Vietnamese who have been conducting massive attacks on the northern
an(d central provinces of South Vietnam.
In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4(a)(2) of
the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to
you concerning one aspect of United States participation in the refugee
evacuation effort. Because of the large number of refugees and the
overwhelming dimensions of the task, I have ordered U.S. Naval
vessels to assist in this effort, including Amphibious Task Group 76.8
with 12 embarked helicopters and approximately 700 Marines. These
naval vessels have been authorized to approach the coast of South
Vietnamin to pick up refugees and U.S. nationals, and transport them
to safety. Marines are being detailed to vessels participating in the
rescue mission. The first vessel entered South Vietnam territorial
waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3, 1975.
Although these forces are equippe(l for combat within the meaning
of section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission is to assist
in the evacuation including the maintenance of order on board the
vessels engaged in that task.
As statetI above, the purpose of the introduction of United States
Naval vessels into V0ietnamese waters is to assist in an international
humanitarian effort involving vessels of several nations, including
othI military and civilian craft. The United States participation in
this effort inl ides the charter of commercial vessels, the use of
Military Sealift Commandl vessels\ with11 civilian Crews, as well as
United States naval vessels with military crews. This effort is being
undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as
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41

Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive in the conduct of foreign
relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, which authorizes humanitarian assistance to refugees,
civilian war casualties and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities
or conditions relating to hostilities in South Vietnam.
You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you precisely
how long United States forces may be needed in this effort. Our
present estimate, however, is that this operation may involve the
presence of United States Naval vessels in Vietnamese waters for a
period of at least several weeks.
GERALD R. FORD.









Report Dated April 12, 1975, From President Gerald R Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
Compliance With Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, Relative to the Evacuation of U.S. Nationals From Cam-
bodia
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., April 12, 1975.
Hon. CARL AILBERT,
/Spcaker, US.. Hoitse of Iepresenitatives, Waihington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: As you and other members of Congress were
advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States
had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed Forces
to assure the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from that country.
On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communists forces had ruptured
Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defense lines to the
north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar
range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In
view of this deteriorating military situation, and on the recommenda-
tions of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U.S. military
forces to proceed with the planned evacuation out of consideration
for the safety of U.S. citizens.
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers
Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to report to you that the first ele-
ments of the U.S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M.
EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops
of the U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and
command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from
helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within
the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately
10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground
security force Marines departed the Cambodian landing zone at ap-
proximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last elements of the
force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. There was no firing
by U.S. forces at any time during the operation. No U.S. Armed
Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no
casualties among the American evacuees.
Although these forces were equipped for combat within the mean-
ing of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to
effect the evacuation of U.S. Nationals. Present information indicates
that a total of 82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force
was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159
Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.
The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi-
dent's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander-
in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.
I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the
United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted
without incident.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD.
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Report Dated April 30, 1975, From President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
in Compliance With Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution,
Relative to the Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Others From
South Vietnam
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washing ton, April 2 0, 1975.
The Honorable the SPEAKER,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On April 4, 1975, I reported that U.S. naval
vessels had been ordered to participate in an international humani-
tarian relief effort to transport refugees and U.S. nationals to safety
from Danang and other seaports in South Vietnam. This effort was
undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of
South Vietnam and in recognition of the large-scale violations by
the North Vietnamese of the Agreement Ending the War and restor-
ing the Peace in Vietnam.
In the days and weeks that followed, the massive North Vietna-
mese attacks continued. As the forces of the Government of South
Vietnam were pushed further back toward Saigon, we began a pro-
gressive withdrawal of U.S. citizens and their dependents in South
Vietnam, together with foreign nationals whose lives were in jeopardy.
On April 28, the defensive lines to the northwest and south of
Saigon were breached. Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Saigon came under
increased rocket attack and for the first time received artillery fire.
NVA forces were approaching within mortar and anti-aircraft mis-
sile range. The situation at Tan Son Nhut Airfield deteriorated to
the extent that it became unusable. Crowd control on the airfield
was breaking down and the collapse of the Government forces within
Saigon appeared imminent. The situation presented a direct and im-
minent threat to the remaining U.S. citizens and their dependents in
and around Saigon.
On the recommendation of the American Ambassador there, I
ordered U.S. military forces to proceed by means of rotary wing
aircraft with an emergency final evacuation out of consideration for
the safety of U.S. citizens.
In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed
on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4 of the
War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to
you that at about 1:00 A.M. EDT, April 29, 1975, U.S. forces entered
South Vietnam airspace. A force of 70 evacuation helicopters a nd 865
Marines evacuated about 1400 U.S. citizens, together with approxi-
mately 5500 third country nationals and South Vietnamese. from
landing zones in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. Saigon, and the
Defense Attache Office at Tan Son Nhut Airfield. The last elements
of the ground security force departed Saigon at 7:46 P.M. EDT
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44


April 29, 1975. Two crew members of a Navy search and rescue heli-
copter are missing at sea. There are no other known U.S. casualties
from this operation, although two U.S. Marines on regular duty in
the compound of the Defense Attache Office at Tan Son Nhut Air-
field had been killed on the afternoon (EDT) of April 28, 1975, by
rocket attacks into a refugee staging area. U.S. fighter aircraft pro-
vide protective air cover for this operation, and for the withdrawal
by water of a few Americans ,from ('an Tho. and in one instance slp-
pressed North Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery firing upon evacu-
ation helicopters as they departed. The ground security forces on
occasion returned fire during the course of the evacuation operation.
The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi-
dent's Constitutional executive power and his authority as Comman-
der-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.
The United States Armed Forces performed a very difficult mis-
slion most successfully. Their exemplary courage and discipline are
deserving of the nation's highest gratitude.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. Foiw.











Report Dated May 15, 1975, From President Gerald R. Ford to
Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
Compliance With Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, Relative to the Mayaguez Incident

TmnWrrE HousE,
The Honorable the SPEAKER,Washington, D.C., May 15.1975.
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On 12 May 1975. I was advised that the SS
Mayaguez, a merchant vessel of United States registry enroute from
Hong Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew, was fired upon,
stopped, boarded, and seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats of the
Armed Forces of Cambodia in international waters in the vicinity of
Poulo Wai Island. The seized vessel was then forced to proceed to
Koh Tang Island where it was required to anchor. This hostile act
was in clear violation of international law.
In view of this illegal and dangerous act, I ordered, as you have
been previously advised, United States military forces to conduct
the necessary reconnaissance and to be ready to respond if diplomatic
efforts to secure the return of the vessel and its personnel were not
successful. Two United States reconnaissance aircraft in the course
of locating the Mayaguez sustained minimal damage from small fire-
arms. Appropriate demands for the return of the Mayaguez and its
crew were made, both publicly and privately, without success.
In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this
matter and taking note of Section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, I wish to report to you that at about 6:20 A.M., 13 May, pursuant
to my instructions to prevent the movement of the Mayagwez into a
mainland port, U.S. aircraft fired warning shots across the bow of
the ship and gave visual signals to small craft approaching the ship.
Subsequently, in order to stabilize the situation and in an attempt to
preclude removal of the American crew of the Mayaquez to the marn-
land, where their rescue would be more difficult. I directed the United
States Armed Forces to isolate the island and interdict any movement
between the ship or the. island and the. mainland, and to prevent move-
ment of the ship itself, while still taking all possible care to prevent
loss of life or injury to the U.S. captives. During the evening of 13
May, a Cambodian patrol boat attempting to leave the island disre-
garded aircraft warnings and was sunk. Thereafter, two other Cam-
bodian patrol craft were destroyed and four others were damaged and
immobilized. One boat. suspected of having some U.S. captives aboard:
succeeded in reaching Kompong Som after efforts to turn it around
without iniury to the passengers failed.
Our continued objective in this operation was the rescue of the
captured American crew alone with the retaking of the ship Afa?1aquez.
For that purpose, I ordered late this afternoon an assault by United
States Marines on the island of Koh Tang to search out and rescue
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46


such Americans as might still be held there, and I ordered retaking
of the Mayaguez by other marines boarding from the destroyer escort
Holt. In addition to continued fighter and gunship coverage of the
Koh Tang area, these marine activities were supported by tactical
aircraft from the Coral Sea, striking the military airfield at Ream
and other military targets in the area of Kompong Som in order to
prevent reinforcement or support from the mainland of the Cambo-
dian forces detaining the American vessel and crew.
At approximately 9:00 P.M. EDT on 14 May, the Mayaguez was
retaken by United States forces. At approximately 11:30 P.M., the
entire crew of the Mayagjuez was taken aboard the Wilson. U.S. forces
have begun the process of disengagement and withdrawal.
This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the Presi-
dent's constitutional Executive power and his authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.
Sincerely,
GuwR. Fo..











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