Safeguards in the domestic nuclear industry

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Title:
Safeguards in the domestic nuclear industry a report
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v, 17 p. : ; 24 cm.
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United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. -- Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment
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Nuclear industry -- Security measures -- United States   ( lcsh )
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General Note:
At head of title: 94th Congress, 2d session. Committee print no. 17.
Statement of Responsibility:
prepared by the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, August 1976.

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University of Florida
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Letters of transmittal
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Table of Contents
        Page v
        Page vi
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
    I. The threat
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
    II. Reactor sabotage
        Page 6
        Page 7
    III. Material accounting and control
        Page 8
    IV. Adequacy of safeguards systems
        Page 9
        Page 10
    V. Conclusions
        Page 11
    Appendix A. Government operation of nuclear material transportation system
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Appendix B. Letter from Hon. Marcus A. Rowden, chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Hon. Morris K. Udall, chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, dated July 20, 197
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
    Back Cover
        Page 18
Full Text




94th Congress COICKITTE PRINT NO. 17
2dI Session L





SAFEGUARDS IN THE DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY


A REPORT PREPARED BY

THE SUBCOMMliITTEE ON ENERGY AN,
THE ENVIRONMENT u :

OF THE JA

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS


AUGUST 1976



Printed for the use of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


WASHINGTON : 1976


75--723














COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JAMES A. HALEY, Florida, Chazirman


ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
HAROLD T. JOHNSON, California
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
PHILLIP BURTON, California
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin
PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
LLOYD MEEDS, Washington
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., Texas
ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., Georgia
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, Pennsylvania
JOHN MELCHER, Montana
TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming
JONATHAN B. BfINGHAM, New York
JOHN F. SEIBEALING, Ohio
HAROLD R TUNNELS, New Mexico
ANTONIO B RJA WON PAT, Guam
RON DE LUl O, Virgin Islands
BOB ECKHARDT, Texas
GOQDLOE E. BYRON, Maryland
IAI17, BENTEZ, Puerto Rico
NMI SANTINI, Nevada
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALLAN T. HOWE, Utah
JAMES WEAVER, Oregon
BOB CARR, Michigan
GEORGE MILLER, California
THEODORE M. (TED) RISENHOOVER,
Oklahoma
JAMES J. FLO RIO, New Jersey


JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas, Ranking Minority Member
SAM STEIGER, Arizona
DON H. CLAUSEN, California
PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan
MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
KEITH G. SEBELIUS, Kansas
ALAN STEELMAN, Texas
DON YOUNG, Alaska
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
STEVEN D. SYMMS, Idaho
JAMES P. (JIM) JOHNSON, Colorado
ROBERT 3. LAGOMARSINO, California
VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California


CHARLES CONKLIN, Staff Director
LEE McELVAIN, General Counsel
MICHAEL C. MARDEN, Minority Counsel
HENRY R. MYERS, Special Consultant on Nuclear EnergMattere



SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona, Chairman


JAIME BENITEZ, Puerto Rico
JONATIIAN B. BINGHAM, New York
BOB CARR, Michigan
RON DE LUGO, Virgin Islands
BOB ECKIIARDT, Texas
JOHN MELCIIER, Montana
GEORGE MILLER, California
TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio
PAUL E. TSO'NIGAS, M hetts
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, Pennsylvanila
JAMES WEAVER, Oregon


ALAN STEELMAN, Texas
JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas
SAM STEIGER, Arizona
MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, Maryland
STEVEN D. SYMMS, Idaho


STANLEY E. SCOVILLE, Staff Counsel
MICHAEL B. METZ, M~iRt4.1taff0 Counsel
NoT.-The first listed minority member Is counterpart to the subcommittee chairman.
(1r)









LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL
COMMITTEE, ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 3, 1976.
MENIBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR COLLEAGUES: A major concern of the Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Energy and the Environment is the problem of security
in the domestic nuclear industry. This is the problem of protecting
against theft of materials from which nuclear explosives might be
constructed. It is also the problem of safeguarding against sabotage
that could result in radioactive materials being released into the
environment.
Since this is a matter of concern to all of us, I am forwarding to
you the following report based on the subcommittee's efforts in the
area of domestic safeguards.
Sincerely yours, JAMES A. HALEY, Chairman.



COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 1, 1976.
Hon. JAMES A. HALEY,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report concerning
security in the domestic nuclear industry. The report is based on
hearings before the subcommittee and on materials the subcommittee
has received subsequent to the hearings. The hearings, held Febru-
ary 26 and 27, were chaired at my request by my colleague, Paul
Tsongas.
Information provided us indicates a major discrepancy between the
security threats the Nuclear Regulatory Commission believes to be
plausible and the security measures required to protect against such
threats. The Commission has failed to make hard choices about
security in the nuclear industry; it should decide either that the threat
to 'security is overblown and that existing protection systems are
adequate, or it should decide the threat is, or could well be, of major
proportions and that much more stringent measures are needed.





lV

This failure to choose confuses further the debate over nuclear
policy and this confusion and indecision adds to the Congress prob-
lems in weighing the arguments presented us by the various factions.
I believe the following report and hearing record on which it is
based will be of consider.le assitane to the Congress in under-
standing the problem of security in the nuclear industry.
Sincerely,
MORRIS K. UDALL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy
and the Environment

























CONTENTS

Page
Letters of Transmittal -------------------------------------------- III
Introduction -...... ----------------------------------- 1
I. The Threat ------------------------------------------------- 3
II. Reactor Sabotage ..------------------------------------------- 6
III. Material Accounting and Control -------------------------------- 8
IV. Adequacy of Safeguards Systems ---------------------------- 9
V. Conclusions ------------------------------------------------ 11
APPENDIXES
A. Government Operation of Nuclear Material Transportation System... 12
B. Letter from Hon. Marcus A. Rowden, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission, to Hon. Morris K. Udall, chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Energy and the Environment, dated July 20, 1976 ------- 15
(V)


















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013












http://archive.org/details/safedomeOOunit









SAFEGUARDS* IN THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
On February 26 and 27, 1976, the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment,
pursuant to its nuclear oversight responsibilities, held hearings con-
cerning security in the domestic nuclear industry. The hearings were
held in consequence of events occurring early in 1976 which called to
question the ability of the nuclear industry's security systems to
protect against theft and sabotage. Among the events were:
Release of a memorandum written by the Director of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Safeguards
which contained a statement of concern that currently licensed
facilities might not have safeguards adequate against the threat
being considered as the basis for planning in NRC safeguards
studies.
Appearance of failures in the safeguards system at an Erwin,
Tenn. facility which handled substantial quantities of highly
enriched uranium.
A petition by the Natural Resources Defense Council to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission asserting insufficient security
and requesting either that security be upgraded or that certain
facilities be required to shut down.
At the outset, the acting Chairman, Congressman Paul Tsongas,
stressed the subcommittee's concern that there be public under-
standing of the safeguards problem:
If we are to have nuclear power, it is essential that not only should hazards
be small, but that the public be aware of what those hazards are. Mere assurances
that everything is all right will not suffice.
During the course of the hearing, the subcommittee sought infor-
mation with regard to the nature of threats against which protection
was required, with regard to steps necessary to provide protection
against these threats, and with regard to whether the requisite meas-
ures were in effect. The purpose was to develop a base for a subcom-
mittee judgment as to the adequacy of security against current and
projected threats.
This report contains analysis and conclusions based primarily
on the February 26 and 27 hearing record and subsequent communi-
cations between the subcommittee and the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission. Section I addresses the nature of the threat to security.
Section II concerns nuclear reactors' intrinsic vulnerability (or lack
thereof) to sabotage. Section III discusses nuclear material ac-
counting and control systems.
Section IV discusses safeguards system adequacy. Conclusions are
presented in section V. Appendix A addresses the question of Federal
For purposes of this report, "Safeguards" refers to security systems designed to protect against malevo-
lent acts which could lead to release of radioactive substances into the environment.
(1)





2

,operation of the system which transports materials that could be
fabricated into nuclear explosives. Appendix B is an NRC letter
responding to a subcommittee request for information with regard
to the adequacy of security measures.
Unless otherwise noted "hearing record" refers to "Oversight
Hearings on Nucear Energy Safuards in the Domestic Nuclear
Industry"; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, 94th Con-
gress, 2d session, February 26 and 27, 1976, serial No. 94-16, part V









I. THE THREAT
The use of nuclear energy for electric power generation leads to
production of substantial quantities of plutonium and radioactive
residuals of the fission process. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium
in amounts of 20 pounds or more might be fabricated into nuclear
explosives; plutonium in very small quantities is exceedingly toxic.
The radioactive byproducts of the fission process, if released from their
containers, have the potential for causing a widespread hazard to
human health. Because of the dangerous nature of these materials,
great care must be taken to insure that they do not come under
control of persons with malevolent intent. Plutonium and highly
enriched uranium must be protected against theft; nuclear reactors,
spent fuel repositories, and fuel reprocessing plants must be guarded
against those who would threaten or cause actions leading to release of
radioactive materials contained therein.
Testimony before the subcommittee showed that those responsible
for nuclear security must consider a diversity of threats: theft of
plutonium by criminals who might sell the material to a nation wishing
to possess nuclear weapons, but not having a means of producing nu-
clear explosive materials; theft by terrorists intent on building their
own nuclear bomb or plutonium dispersal device; threat or conduct of
sabotage by terrorists seeking to create social disorder; and sabotage by
deranged individuals. Witnesses disagreed widely with regard to how
likely it was that such threats would materialize; they disagreed about
willingness of conspirators to incur risks in carrying out illicit action:
about whether threatening groups would have the requisite skill and
resources; and about motivations to cause widespread death and de-
struction. A sampling of the expert views follows.
Dr. Bowyer Bell, of Columbia University and an expert on revo-
lutionary violence said:
There is about the entire subject of nuclear terrorism a dreadful lack of precision.
There can be no absolute assurances. There may be those with the will, capacity,
and the desire to steal plutonium or detonate a bomb in a powerplant to cause a
meltdown. The chances are slim that there are many so inclined in the United
States and slimmer that a foreign organization will be so attracted. But in nuclear
matters a qualitative estimate that the threat is remote is cold comfort. Somewhat
more reassuring is the obstacle facing any such terrorist venture; yet the ter-
rorist may assume a vulnerability where little exists, may launch a failed operation
so spectacular that a frightened public will perceive a present danger.'
Brian Jenkins, Rand Corp. director of research on political con-
spiracy and violence, guerrilla warfare and international terrorism
presented testimony stressing the importance of keeping nuclear
terrorism in perspective:
We should not exaggerate the threat. The potential consequences of serious
sabotage leading to a radioactive release, the fabrication of an illicit nuclear
explosive device, or plutonium contamination are serious. But I have tried to
point out why some of the more horrendous scenarios in which hundreds or
thousands of lives might be imperiled appear less likely.
I Hearing record, p. 60.


(3)


75-723-76-2






There are disincentives, even among those we call terrorists, to carry out these
extreme acts. And they are not that easy to accomplish. Planting a bomb at a
tourist attraction or seizing hostages in a consulate is a far easier task than
destroying a nuclear reactor or making-not designing, but making-a nuclear
bomb. We should not overestimate the capabilities of terrorists.
They tend to operate at a low level of efficiency.2
Dr. Douglas DeNike, a clinical psychologist and technical consultant
with Californians for Nuclear Safeguards, presented a more pessimistic
prognosis:
. The general problem of crime and violence is enormous, and it is still
increasing ..
It ha been said, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people
dead . mas casualties simply may not serve the terrorist' goals." This
formulation appears to be a frail reed upon which to lean, since any newsperson
will readily grant that the more people dead in a given atrocity, the more people
will be watching the account on the evening news ....
Even apparently overwhelming odds in favor of nuclear facility security forces
might not deter those possessed of this kind of (extremist) mentality. While it is
tempting to divide domestic insurgents into hot-blooded and cold-blooded categor-
ies, such a distinction would have limited application. The very same groups can
-how signs of crafty calculative ability at some times, and intemperate quasi-
delusional behavior at others.3
A hedge(ld assessment of the threat was presented by Mr. Kenneth
Chapman, Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards:
There is no information available to us which indicates that any group is plan-
ning an act of theft or sabotage against the licensed nuclear industry at this time.
Nevertheless, there is a continuing potential for insiders to execute malevolent
acts or to provide assistance to outsiders in the execution of acts which could
result in adver e impacts on the Nation.
Furthermore, there are organizations with malevolent intent which could
develop the capability to carry out operations against the licensed nuclear power
industry.
Our studies have concluded that there is evidence to support the possibility that
present threat groups may be highly motivated and disciplined; well equipped and
financed; well trained; well prepared to execute the tasks they have selected.
*
The exact threat then, to summarize, cannot be predicted with confidence,
ince it i an inherently uncertain problem and history is an unsure guide to the
future, My assessment, however, based on currently available evidence and expert
opinion is that an attack on nuclear facilities would likely stem from a relatively
small number of persons, possibly aided by an insider.'
Following the hearing, the N RC was requested to be more specific
with regard to the threat. The subcommittee asked:
What kinds of resources, xpertise, and capabilities are assumed to be possessed
Lv threatening persons or groups?
The N R( response submitted for the record was as follows:
NRC f1e that it is possible that adversarici may possess any of the following:
LqUlJ~meht. miutoma~ftic pistols and rifleS; automatic pistols and rifles;
submnachiie guns; shotguns; hand grenades; machine guns (up to 50 caliber);
dynamite; plastic explosives; shaped charges; citizen band radios; two-way radios;
general and special purpose vehicles; aircraft (fixed-wing and helicopter) ; tear gas,
MACE, etc.; light ortars;* hand held air-defense weapons;* and light antitank
T Iap_ tir. *
I hid., p. 41-A2.
ltid, p. 21-2.T
I ado p. 1VO.

*NT: hl :+ r+ +diy available a the other items,. the +c ae known to be avalb tooTr trop.






Indwztdwa and tea :kdI,:.-_Nuclear materiaL identifeation and handling;
radiation monitoring and safety; communications; intelligence and security
(reconnaissance, surveillance and alarm systems, etc.) ; tactical operations (combat
experience); pioneer (demolition, structure and barrier breeching ; transpo ration;
and managerial.
Terrorist groups (especially foreign) and organized crime are well known to have
adequate resources to mount highly organized, -ell-planned, and extremely
violent and disruptive acts. Therefore, NRC feels that it is prudent t assume that
potential adversaries might possess any of the above described resources, expris,
and capabilities.
The NRC also indicated in a July 20, 1976 letter to the subcom-
mittee that for purposes of its review of adequacy of security, it
assumes a group consisting "at a minimum, of three well-armed, well-
trained perns, who migt po-ss.ess inside knowledge or asitnce., 6

I *eappendix B.











II. REACTOR SABOTAGE


One session of the hearing series focused on the question of the
vulnerability of reactors to sabotage of a kind that would lead to the
release of substantial quantities of radioactive materials into the
atmosphere. Recognizing that vulnerability to sabotage is not en-
tirelyv independent of the Iesources and motivations of those who
might undertake such sabotage, the subcommittee sought informa-
tion to indicate what kinds of difficulties might confront a saboteur.
Several of the witnesses held the view that the design and con-
truction characteristics that made reactors safe with respect to acci-
dents also made them safe against sabotage. However, an inference
from the totality of the testimony is that while security from sabotage
can be achieved, such invulnerability may not exist at aU operating
reactors.
On the one hand, to indicate invulnerability in principle, there is
te tiniony of Dr. David McCloskey, Director of NRC-sponsored
reactor sabotage studies at the Sandia Corp.:
These acts of sabotage in a nuclear powerplant could be highly destructive and
exI)ensive to the operating utility, but we feel that it is extremely unlikely that
they would cause a radioactive release.
Sabotage which might endanger the public could only be carried out by knowl-
edgeable, capable personnel having a high degree of technical competence. Such
an attack would require thorough planning and coordination in order to mount
an effort to bypass the plant security system and to disable or destroy elements
of several plant systems in the multiple plant defenses against a radioactive
release.'
In prepared statements other witnesses made a similar Point.
Dr. Norman Rasmussen, professor of nuclear engineering at M.I.T.
and Director oI the NRC's Reactor Safety Study stated:
The conclusion that it would be difficult to cause serious public damage was
11ot based upon the degree of difficulty in overcoming the security system of the
)lant, but rather the difficulty of damaging all the equipment necessary to cause
a large release of radioactivity.
As you know, nuclear plants have numerous systems whose function is to
ijinimize such a risk. It would take a person very knowledgeable in the details of
the plant as well as sabotage techniques to accomplish this.
If one looks at the senseless, terrorist acts that have been carried out in recent
years, one finds that rarely do they exhibit the degree of sophistication required
for successful nuclear plant sabotage.
In another )repared statement, Mr. Bernar(l C.herry of General
IPublic Utilities (orp. of New Jersey said:
It is (extremely unlikely that an act of sabotage can result in harm to the general
Al)li c.
In view of the difficulties in initittting potentially serious accident sequences,
the favorable conclusions regarding nuclear l)owerplant safety are not diminished
by tht threat of :Lcts of sabotage .... (
!Iein r,~pr. p.
:Ibid ,:i. 102.
(U)







On the other hand, there was also testimony casting doubt as to
whether the potential invulnerability had been achieved in practice.
Such testimony was received from Robert Pollard, a former NRC
employee who resigned his position because of his concerns about
nuclear safety. In his former position, Mr. Pollard had engaged in
preparation of design standards and in review of reactor safety system
design. He stated:
In our review of license applications on the NRC staff, we do not consider at
all the possibility for sabotage in deciding whether or not a particular design is
acceptable.4
This suggests that actual designs may not take into account the
possibility of sabotage. For example, Mr. Pollard suggested that in
some situations vital and redundant safety systems could be made
ineffective by relatively simple acts of sabotage because of the manner
in which control cables were configured. Mr. Pollard thus implies that
if a person bent on sabotage were to gain access to an area through
which vital cables passed there might be opportunity to prevent opera-
tion of redundant systems, possibly leading to a loss of ability to cool
the reactor and hence to a core meltdown.
Prevention of this kind of act would thus appear to depend upon
first, saboteurs not knowing the physical location of such vulnerabil-
ities, and second the ability of the physical security system to prevent
access to areas in which the vulnerable systems are situated. If this be
the case, there is reason to doubt Professor Rasmussen's conclusion that
the public was protected against harm from saboteurs not because of
the difficulty in overcoming the plant security system, but because of
the difficulty of damaging equipment to the extent that a large release
of radioactivity would be caused.
In fact, Rasmussen himself, said in response to Pollard's comment
that the NRC regulatory staff paid insufficient attention to cable
routing:
Yes, and I think that this is a case, where doggone it, if the staff doesn't start
looking at it after this eye-opener,5 they darn well ought to.6
Finally, while the thrust of the McCloskey testimony was that
reactor sabotage was a problem which could be satisfactorily dealt
with in principle, McCloskey was vague as to whether this invul-
nerability existed in practice. For example, he speaks of the Sandia
sabotage study recommendations having all been taken into account
in proposed NRC regulations (regulations which are not yet in effect);
but McCloskey does not say how many of the recommendations, in
addition to being taken into account, actually were translated into the
proposed regulations.7 This leaves open the question as to how close
the actual security systems come to the level implicit in McCloskey's
conclusory statement.
# Ibid., p. 103.
6 This is in reference to the fire at TVA's Brown's Ferry nuclear generating station which occurred on
March 22, 1975. The fire was initiated by a workman using a candle to test for air leaks at a point whe
electric control cables passed through a wall. The fire damaged several hundred control cables, causing fail-
ure of certain safety systems. Brown's Ferry units 1 and 2 have not yet reentered service.
6 Ibid., p. 113.
7 "The proposed NRC regulations published in November 1974 for comment took account of our recom-
mendations and would implement certain of these." Ibid., p. 86.










III. MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL


Proper design of facilities and careful accounting of materials can
prevent surreptitious theft of nuclear materials by persons familiar
with the workings of a facility. However, the usefulness of material
accounting procedures is limited by the inherent accuracy of measure-
ment techniques.
The revelation of large uncertainties with regard to inventories of
highly enriched uranium at a plant in Erwin, Tenn., raised the
question of the degree of accuracy that might be expected from
material accounting and control systems. Further doubts concerning
the accuracy of these systems were raised by a recent report prepared
by the Government Accounting Office and submitted to the Sub-
committee on Energy and the Environment of the House Small
Business Committee.
In view of apparent limitations on the accuracy of material account-
ing systems, the subcommittee requested the NRC to state its view of
the role of such systems in the overall safeguards process. The NRC
esponse follows:
Material control-comprised of access controls, containment, and material
accounting-reinforce the protection provided by physical security measures and
provides a quantitative basis for material accountability. Material control meas-
ures are especially effective against internal diversion where the participants have
authorized passage through barriers and access to material in the normal course
of business.
The material accounting system can deter and detect, but not prevent the
theft or diversion of material. The accounting system should be capable of con-
tinuously tracking the location and the movement of all discrete items and con-
tainers of SNM on inventory and of monitoring the in-process inventory for indi-
cators of diversion. Through shipper-receiver comparisons, data monitoring pro-
grams, and periodic physical inventory checks, the accounting system provides
positive assurance that SN M is indeed present. Should a significant loss of material
occur, the system should be capable of identifying the general location and the
quantity of material involved. The accounting system provides backup detection
capability for theft and diversion which circumvent detection capabilities pro-
vided by physical security and other material control measures. Internal audits
are directed to assuring that records have not been falsified.
Reliance cannot be placed solely on material accounting to detect theft and
diversion because the effectiveness of the system is limited by timeliness and
measurement uncertainties. Inventory discrepancies caused by measurement un-
certainties will continue to occur in nuclear plants, especially, where chemical
processing and scrap recovery are required. Accordingly, NRC is working on in-
depth protection systems to prevent, deter, detect, and defeat any attempt to
illicitly remove nuclear material frotin facilities.'
The inference from this is that prevelntion of diversion of small but
significant quantities of plutonium depends not upon material account-
ing systems but upon tight control of access to and egress from plant
areas from which plutonium or highly enriched uranium mirlt be
(iverted.
SIbid., p). iN1-1C.
(8)









IV. ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS


The subcommittee heard conflicting views with regard to the
ability of existing and future security systems to protect against
nuclear malevolence. Testimony at the hearings by representatives of
the NRC, ERDA, and industry concluded, in effect, that safeguards
were now adequate and could be improved should the threat level
increase over that which was currently perceived. For example, in
summarizing his assessment of the ability of safeguards systems to
deter and defeat attempts at theft and sabotage, Mr. Chapman in
his capacity as Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Materials Safety
and Safeguards stated:
Present nuclear industry security measures are expected to deter most attacks
and to prevent the success of such attacks as are attempted. It should be noted
that the nuclear industry has customarily taken the approach of going beyond
the normal precautions taken elsewhere in society in facing uncertain contingen-
cies. The same conservative approach is being taken in nuclear safeguards, to the
extent that we believe the total safeguards system for the industry, including
onsite and offsite security forces, can protect against theft or sabotage attempts by
groups larger than those thought to constitute the most likely threat.

May I say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that my operating philosophy is that
one should never be quite satisfied with the status quo in safeguards. Safeguards
will always be under review and will always be evolving. We will continue to make
changes in our programs as conditions warrant and as new technologies develop.
We are confident we can now design cost-effective systems for the future by using
practical, available solutions; by keeping closely attuned to ERDA's R. & D.
programs; and by striving to attain inherently secure plant designs utilizing the
proper balance of guards, security devices and material control and accounting
systems.,
Testimony presented by representatives of the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) maintained that security was inadequate
to protect against the threats the NRC appeared to consider plausible.
Prior to the hearings the NRDC had petitioned the NRC to require
either an upgrading of security at certain facilities or that these
facilities not be allowed to possess significant quantities of plutonium
or highly enriched uranium.
To substantiate their assertion concerning the inadequacy of
security, the NRDC witnesses cited the previously noted memoran-
dum of the Director of the NRC Division of Safeguards which con-
tained the statement:
I am concerned that some or even many of our currently licensed facilities may
not have safeguards which are adequate against the lowest levels of design threat
we are considering in GESMO. (January 19, 1976 memorandum from Carl Builder
to Ronald Brightsen.)
The NRDC also cited the transcript of a meeting at which members
of it and the NRC were present. The subject was the adequacy of
domestic safeguards. Of particular concern was the NRC contention
that two guards armed with shotguns and .38 caliber handguns
could hold off an intruding group until reinforcements in the form of
local and State law enforcement authorities could arrive.
1 Ibid., p. 150-151.
(9)





10


Also relevant to the question of whether guards could protect a
facility until outside help arrived is the issue of how guards are
instructed with respect to use of their weapons. A report prepared by
the Safeguards Policy Committee of the Atomic Industrial Forum
(a group representing the nuclear industry) and submitted for the
record, contained a recommendation that:
. any escalation of the use of force beyond [the use of handguns for the
purpose of] self-defense would be the responsibility of the forces acting under
Government orders .... 2
The latter forces are envisioned to be local, State, or Federal
police who have responded to a call for assistance. The quandary
concerns how guards armed only with handguns to be used only in
self-defense (as opposed to defense of the facility or nuclear material)
could protect a facility or materials until such time as assistance from
police is available.
Following the hearings the subcommittee requested the NRC to
provide additional information concernig the ability of safeguards
systems to protect against the threats of a kind considered by the
NRC and described in section I of this report. In responding on
July 20, 1976 the NRC indicated that 15 facilities, in which plutonium
or highly enriched uranium were handled, had been evaluated with
regard to their effectiveness against threats, as noted in section I,
consisting "at a minimum, of three well-armed, well-trained per-
sons, who might possess inside knowledge or assistance." This re-
view found security deficiencies in each of the 15 facilities. A sub-
sequent review found deficiencies in 7 of the 15 facilities. Security
systems at reactors apparently were not inspected with regard to
their ability to withstand threats of the kind specified above. It is
unclear from the NRC response whether security required during
transportation is sufficient to protect against the specified threat.
(The July 20 letter is attached to this report as appendix B.)
3 Ibid., p. 338.
















V. CONCLUSIONS


Testimony presented before the subcommittee on security in the
domestic nuclear industry was contradictory in many respects. There
was little agreement as to the nature and severity of the danger, and
the motivations of those who might engage in nuclear malevolence.
Witnesses were not in agreement with regard to the intrinsic vulnera-
bility of reactors to sabotage undertaken for the .purpose of causing
a large release of radioactive materials into the environment. Similarly
there was no concensus concerning the degree of difficulty in protecting
nuclear materials against theft.
In spite of such a wide disparity in viewpoint (and to some extent
because of it) several conclusions can be drawn from the subcom-
mittee hearings and subsequent correspondence:
I. Neither the nature of the threat, nor motivations of threatening
groups or individuals is sufficiently understood. It is prudent, there-
fore, to design physical security systems on the basis of threats sub-
stantially in excess of those for which there is clear evidence.
2. A substantial discrepancy exists between the kinds of security
dangers the NRC believes to be plausible, and the kinds of security
measures required to protect against such dangers.
3. While nuclear reactors can be designed with an exceedingly
high invulnerability to sabotage of a kind that would result in release
of substantial quantifies of radioactive materials into the environment,
it is not clear that such invulnerability has been achieved in practice.
4. In view of intrinsic limitations on material measurement tech-
niques: the role of material accounting systems in the overall safe-
guard process needs to be better defined.
(11)










APPENDIX A


GOVERNMENT OPERATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM
Testimony was heard relating to the question of whether commercial
carriers could provide adequate security for shipments of Government-
owned materials which might be fabricated into nuclear weapons.
Prior to 1975 some such materials were shipped via commercial carriers
that were required to operate in accordance with AEC regulations.
Late in 1974, the AEC decided that Government-owned materials
being transported by private carriers-which included plutonium used
in the breeder reactor development program and highly enriched
uranium destined for naval reactors-should be transported by a
Government system as soon as the Government obtained new vehicles
designed for this purpose. At the time this decision was made, the
AEC was already using its own transportation system for shipments
of nuclear materials associated with the weapons program.
The immediate significance of this decision was in the displacement
of commercial carriers who under contract to ERDA were currently
involved in transportation of Government-owned materials. The
longer term significance is that the same logic leading to this decision
could lead to a determination that adequate protection of privately
owned materials in transit would also require a Federal transportation
system in place of private carriers. While at present the number of
shipments of privately owned materials is small, that number would
increase substantially were the NRC to permit the use of plutonium
as a reactor fuel. A Federal takeover of this element of the industry
would therefore represent a major move by the Federal Government
in an area traditionally reserved to the private sector.
With regard to the possibility of the latter, Mr. Harvey E. Lyon,
Director of ERDA's Division of Safeguards and Security, testified:
I know of no decision arrived at by either the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
or ERDA at the present time for transporting privately owned material.,
Frank Graham of the Atomic Industrial Forum testified that the
Forum's Safeguards Policy Committee was of the opinion that:
Private equipment and guards operating under Government orders would
provide appropriate security assurance.2
Wv'hatever the eventual decision regarding transport of private y
owne(1 material, the current AEC/ERDA decision that Government-
owned material be transported via a Government system was criticized
by Samuel Edlow, p)resildent of Edlow International, Inc. which acts
as agent for shippers of nuclear materials:
I Id., p. 516.
SIbid., 3.
(12)






13

We deplore and protest the ERDA plan under which at this very moment a
Government transportation network has already replaced private industry as a
carrier of nuclear materials, and which now threatens to expand to that point
where all of us are driven out of business in favor of a Government-owned and
operated transportation monopoly.3
*
The very thought that the Government functions better than private industry
as a security organization is wrong, and is not based on facts. The attempt on the
part of Government; namely, ERDA, to usurp the security function of private
industry must be stopped. The rights of small business enterprises must be
protected, and we believe they will be.4

Let me make it abundantly clear, Mr. Chairman, that we believe that the
Congress and the executive have, wittingly or unwittingly, violated the very
spirit of the free enterprise system by sponsoring and supporting the replacement
of the private enterprise system by a Government-owned-and-operated monopoly.5
On April 27 the subcommittee sought a more complete explanation
from ERDA concerning the basis for its determination that Govern-
ment-owned materials should be transported by the ERDA trans-
portation system. On June 29, 1976, ERDA informed the subcom-
mittee that a response to its request would be delayed owing to the
need to respond first to a request for information from the Office* of
Management and Budget on the same matter. The OMB had asked
ERDA "certain questions and for certain analysis with respect to the
(ERDA transportation) system's expansion to handle the non-
weapons SNM (strategic nuclear material)."
The subcommittee received from ERDA on August 30, 1976, the
following response to its April 27 request:

U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D.C., August 27, 1976.
Hon. MORRIS UDALL,
House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. UDALL: On June 29, 1976, I wrote to you at Dr. Seamans request
concerning the plans of the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) to extend the coverage of its existing transportation system for highway
movement of nuclear weapons to include shipment of strategic quantities of
ERDA-owned special nuclear material (SNM).
The decision to include shipments of nonweapons SNM was made by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) on August 2, 1974. On March 29, 1976, after thorough
reexamination, that earlier decision was reaffirmed by the Administrator of Energy
Research and Development. In reaching this decision, the Administrator deter-
mined that the most effective and efficient security would be provided by expan-
sion of the existing ERDA system's shipments to cover all strategic quantities
of ERDA-owned SNM, and that this security was essential considering the large
number of shipments involved.
The decision to enlarge the coverage of our ERDA highway transportation
system was reached only after careful review of all the factors of comparison
between an integrated Federal system and one which would include some degree
of commercial participation. While ERDA remains firmly committed to a policy
of reliance on the private sector to supply its needs and provide its services, we
are convinced in this particular case that there is a compelling basis for the
judgment that ERDA can best fulfill its responsibilities for transporting weapons
and strategic quantities of Government-owned SNM with the required degree of
safety and security by using its own unified, single-manager transportation
system. Among the factors supporting this judgment are: the added deterrent
effect associated with a recognized Federal force; the enhanced authority to
command and control the integrated transportation system and the individuals
operating that system; the inherent planning and operational flexibility in a single,
3 Ibid., p. 503.
4 Ibid., p. 507.
& Ibid., p. 507.






14

unified weapons/SNM system; the improved cost effectiveness, management, and
manpower utilization of such a dual-purpose system; the consistency of policy
,and procedures employed for each operation; the increased eecivness o coordi-
nation and cooperation with State, local, and other Federal ageies, including
the DOD; the possible great potential responsiveness of GOo rnment-eniloyrd
personnel to ERDA direction in an emergency; the advntags of using guards
trai'ied for the protection of weapons for SNM shipments as well; and the e ssur-
ance that shipments related to military requirements would not be adversely
impacted by potential strikes or strike threats.
In summary, in reaching decisions concerning our EUDA transportation
responsibilities, we have been acutely aware of the need to optimie the security
of the transportation system. The potential for serious consequences-should
the security of SNM prove inadequate-is so great that we feel a strong obligation
to achieve maximum assurance that ERDA has done all it can to protect its
shipments of SNM as well as weapons. We believe our planned system accop-
lishes this in the most effective and efficient manner.
Earlier this year, the Edlow International Co., a transportation management
contractor who obtains transportation services by subcontracting requested
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review this matter and the
basis for the policy of using the all-Federal transportation system planned by
ERDA. In this connection, the OMB asked ERDA to provide an economic
analysis comparing the Federal system with alternatives which involved varying
degrees of participation by private industry. ERDA provided informally to
the OMB on July 7, 1976, the final version of the analysis requested. The ana ysis
showed that the Federal system, with its coverage extended to SNM shipments,
could be operated more economically than options involving a split Federal/con-
tractor approach. After its review of the analysis, the OMB informed ERDA
on August 23, 1976, that it supported the decision of the Administrator of ERDA.
In view of the OMB action, we are proceeding to complete the implementation
-of our plans for a unified Federal (ERDA) transportation system, to include
movement of the SNM referred to above, by October 1976.
In your letter you also inquired regarding what bearing our determination
might have on possible subsequent requirements of the Nuear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) with respect to transportation of strategic quantities of
privately owned nuclear materials. In this regard, it is the clear position of
ERDA that its decision is not intended to influence future actions by the NRC,
nor should it be regarded as so doing. The ERDA decision stands alone on its
own merits and has been arrived at using a particular set of circumstances and
factors unique to ERDA. We believe that another Federal agency, suc as the
NRC, could reach different determinations based on different requirements
and considerations. Such determinations might not include a Government-
owned transportation system as a necessary feature of providg adequate security.
We do not believe that the decisions by ERDA should be regarded as constraining
to the NRC; and, in particular, we do not believe the actions being taken by
ERDA to protect its shipments should govern whatever actions the RC might
subsequently direct regarding shipments of privately owned materials.
I should be pleased to inform you further on this matter should you so4esire.
Sincerely,
AAssita D. i
Asiatant Adminitrator for Naoa Seoul.










APP NDIX B


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., July 20, 1976.
Hon. MoRRm K. UDALL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Houe of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In your letter of April 20, 1976, you stated
that it was not clear whether the Nucl Regulatory Commission
believes it necessary to protect against threats discussed by Mr.
Builder in his January 19, 1976, memorandum and by Mr. Chapman
in his February 27, 1976, testimony.
In January 1976, the NRC began a special review of safeguards
focusing on licensees who possess significant quantities of highly
enriched, uranium or plutonium. Onsite evaluations were made to
assess the effectiveness of programs approved and implemented to
meet current regulations and to judge safeguards capabilities against
postulated threat levels. The capabilities of 13 licensees (involving 15
faciities) were examined. Although there are no specific threat levels
defined in our regulations, the threat levels used for this review
consisted of an internal threat of at least one employee occupying any
position and an external threat comprised, at a minimum, of three
well-armed, well-trained persons, who might possess inside knowledge
or assistance. Licensee safeguards capabilities were expected to defeat
this threat with high confidence.
This special review focused on fuel cycle facilities possessing strategic
quantities of special nuclear materials. For safeguards purposes, this
is defined as at least 2 kilograms of plutonium or 5 kilograms of
uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to more than 20 percent
in the U2'5 isotope).
Weaknesses relative to the threat levels used in this review were
found at each of the 15 facilities. The most prevalent weaknesses
related to control of access to significant quantities of special nuclear
material (both stored and in process), exit search procedures, and
adequacy of response by onsite and offsite forces. The review teams
indicated that short-term fixes could correct most weaknesses and
that some could be resolved by procedural changes alone. On-the-
spot followup actions were initiated to correct weaknesses found.
During the initial review, guard forces of some licensees were
judged inadequate because of their stated reluctance to engage an
attacking force or because of their lack of strength in numbers. Since
then, one licensee has significantly increased his guard strength, two
others have hired more watchmen and all licensees have affirmed their
commitment to intervene to protect strategic quantities of special
nuclear material.
(15)





16


On the basis of a special survey by inspectors in the NRC regional
offices, it has been determined subsequent to the review mentioned
above that all licensees have made significant improvements in their
safeguards systems. Of the 15 facilities involved in the safeguards
review, 8 facilities were judged to be adequate to withstand both the
external and internal threats defined in the second paragraph of this
letter. Of the remaining seven, one was judged adequate to protect
against the external threat but not the internal threat, four were
judged adequate to defend against the internal threat but not the
external threat, and two were judged not adequate to protect against
either threat with high confidence.
Correction of safeguards deficiencies by licensees is presently being
accomplished by NRC staff using existing inspectioni, enforcement,
and licensing procedures.
Through the combination of voluntary licensee corrective actions
and new license conditions, all fuel cycle licensees are expected to have
the capability to withstand as a minimum the internal and external
threats defined in the second paragraph of this letter by August 1976.
To determine that this capability has been achieved, NRC assess-
ment/evaluation teams wll review again all fuel cycle facility safe-,
guards measures onsite during August-September 1976. 0
In a separate series of reviews, the NRC staff has been analyzing the
vulnerability of road shipments of strategic quantities of special
nuclear materials to attack by one internal and three external adver-
saries having military training and skills. These reviews, conducted
with industry cooperation and assistance from U.S. Army special
forces teams have already led to improvements in commercial trans-
portation planning and scheduling and in the training of drivers and
guards. Furthermore, based upon these reviews, the NRC staff has
implemented new license conditions requiring increased protection for
strategic quantities of special nuclear material in transport.
Nuclear reactor facilities were not included in the safeguards re-
views discussed above. However, special physical security inspections
have been conducted during the period February-May 1976. These
inspections indicate that guard forces at certain reactor sites have
recently been upgraded in anticipation of a pending amendment to the
reactor safeguards regulations.
With regard to civil penalties associated with safeguards activities,
the first penalty for noncompliance was assessed in August 1974. Since
then, safeguards civil penalties have been assessed against 14 licensees
and 3 are presently pending. Only one licensee has received two civil
penalties for noncoipliance with safeguards regulations.
In reply to your questions concerning the utility of monetary civil
penalties, it should be noted that civil penalties are only one of several
sanctions Itilized in or enforcement program. In addition to civil
pelnaltles, the N Ri{ hat authority to modify, suspend, or revoke
limenses. In general, these sanctions are considered to be more severe
than civil penalties, although the ranking is not a clear-cut one. In
terms of impact on a licensee, We generally consider that the most
sever(e s1anction) is that of revocation of the license, thus, denying the
firm the ability to perform the activity subject to the license. The
selec.liti of which nfrelfo('ment sanction to be applied in a particular
case is oe(, of the responsibilities tlat the NRC 1mst discharge. All of





17


the various enforcement sanctions available to the NRC have been
used in the past and, as necessary, they will be used in the future to
obtain needed corrective action.
The NRC staff is initiating a study to examine, in more detail, the
effectiveness of the various enforcement sanctions available to it. This
study is expected to be completed before the end of this year.
I hope this letter has clarified these nuclear safeguards matters for
you. Please let me know if the Commission can be of further assistance
to your subcommittee.
Sincerely,
MARCUs A. ROWDEN,
Chairman.




tINIV


4 .