Service Chiefs on defense mission and priorities

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Service Chiefs on defense mission and priorities seminars
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Task Force on Defense of the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate ...
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At head of title: 94th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.
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Volume 3. Includes indexes.

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94th Congress COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session I






SEMINARS





SERVICE CHIEFS ON
DEFENSE MISSION AND PRIORITIES




TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE

OF THE


COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

UNITED STATES SENATE


65-705 0


November 13, 1975-AIR FORCE



VOLUME III

.~









FEBRUARY 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976





























COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine, Chairman


WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington
FRANK E. MOSS, Utah
WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
ALAN CRANSTON, California
LAWTON CHILES. Florida
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
SAM NUNN, Georgia


HENRY BELLMON, Oklahoma
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., Maryland
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New'York
JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico


DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr., Staff Director
JOHN T. McEvoy, Chief Counsel
ROBERT S. BOYD, Minority Staff Director
W. THOMAS FOXWELL, Director of Publications



TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman


WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington
ALAN CRANSTON, california
LAWVTON CHILES, Florida
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota


ROBERT DOLE, Kansas
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York


MICHAEL B. JoY, Task Force Coordinator












CONTENTS



STATEMENTS BY COMMITTEE MEM BERS
Page
Senator Hollings -- 1
Senator Cranston -- ----- 1

WITNESSES

Jones, Gen. David C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force----------------- 3
Biography of G(eneral Jones 76

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Written questions from Senator Cranston to General Jones and the
responses ------------------------------------------------ (
Force data for U.S. Air Force-------------------------------------- 67
Brief description of Air Force major acquisition programs ---------- 74

INDEX -7----- ---9
(III)





















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SERVICE CHIEFS ON DEFENSE MISSION AND
PRIORITIES


Air Force Mission and Priorities


THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1975
U.S. SENATE.,
TASK FORCE ox DEFENSE.
C()MMIU=E ON TILE BUDGET,
lVashhngto ., D.C.
The task force met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 357.
Russell Senate Office Buildino, Hon. Ernest F. Hollings presiding.
Present: Senators Hlollings, Cranston, and Chiles.
Staff members present Michael B. Joy, task force coordinator, and
Andrew Hamilton. professional staff.
Senator IJOLLINGS. The task force will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOLLINGS
Today we continue our hearings on national defense priorities and
budgets.
Our objective in these hearings is to examine the rationale behind
the Administration's projection of national defense budgets for the
next 5 years. We will be looking into the policy guidance and planning
alssumptions which shape our militar-y forces, the force requirements
which result, the key manpower management and moderiization
issues facing the Congress and the Department of Defense in the
next 5 years. and the budgetary implications of all this.
Today we have with us General David C. Jones, the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, to give us an overview of the Air Force: its
roles and missions and how the Air Force is divided anong them.
how force requirements are established, and what kind of Air Force
we will need in the coming decade, and how the Air Force manages
its resources.
Senator ItOLLINc.S. Senator Cranston.

OPENING STATE-MENT OF SENATOR CRANSTON
Senator CRANSTON. I have just a brief opening statement to make.
This week this task force heard testimony from General XVevand.
Chief of Staff of the Army. He testified about the Army's "essential
need" for 2 percent "real rrowth--4 percent in procurement ac-
counts--over and above inflation increases, for the next several vea's.
(1)







Earlier, in September, we heard Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval
Operations. Ile indicated a belief that the Navy's budget should in-
crease by $1.5 billion per year for ship construction alone. In addi-
tion, he requested another $900 million to $1 billion per year increase
for personnel to create and operate a 600-ship Navy.

URGENT NEED FOR REAL GROWTH
I expect that today General Jones will want to indicate to us the
urgent need for real growth in the Air Force budget. The Air Force, I
understand, plans to increase the number of wings from 22 to 26 by
1980, resulting in real increases in both personnel and equipment costs
over and above any inflation.
The I)efense I)epartment has informed us that it must plan for a 2
percent annual increase in its funding in constant dollars adjusted for
inflation just to "maintain a stable operational force."
All of this occurs at a period when the United States is not at war
anywhere with the base of the first $100 billion defense budget in the
Nation's history.
Unlike the temporary expenditures which we have added to the
budget this year to assist the Nation to recover from a deep recession,
defense expenditures do not disappear or revert to the private sector
when the economy has recovered. Instead, they seem endlessly to grow,
regardless of economic or military conditions in the world.

DEFENSE 25 PERCENT OF BUDGET
Defense expenditures already make up roughly 25 percent of the
Federal budget. This does not include the $18 billion we pay annually
for veterans' benefits, or the $36 billion we spend in annual interest
on the Federal debt, which results primarily from past wars.
President Ford has requested congressional help in reducing the
size of the Federal budget. This is an idea not without its attractive-
ness for all of us.
I hope that in his testimony today General Jones will be able to
show us ways to save money from the costs of maintaining the Air
Force. Or, in the alternative, that he will have suggestions for sav-
is from other portions of the military, budget. Or, in the absence of
either of these, that he will tell us how his plans for increasing the
annual cost of the Air Force-together with the similar plans of the
Army and the Navy-will, if adopted, enable us to achieve the goal of
his Commander in Chief, to reduce the size of the Federal budget.
I am looking forward to hearing General Jones address these ques-
tions as he describes the 5-vear plans of the Air Force, and I welcome
him to the Bu(loet Committee Defense Task Force.
Senator IT OLLjx(s. General .Jones, we welcome vou here today and
you can proceed as -vo wish with an opening statement or vou can file
it for the record and summarize it.
We have on the Budget Committee side informal hearings and more
or less a group discussion format. I hope the group will show up be-
fore long. In any event, von won't be wasting your time. I will be
listening and I want to hear as much as I can hear this morning.







STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. AIR FORCE*
General JONES.''. llank VOll. Mr.0r. ( 'llalman.
I do not. have a foial 'prepared statelmet, )ut I would like to make
a few remarks alout the Air Force.
First, apIplaud the -work of the committee in that I can think of
nothing more important thani working ol the Ion r-ralge plans for
our country. We in the Air Force (1o project our .5-'ea 1efen5(e pro-
*feIeurn e poec -ya ltesepo
('ram, our specific requirements and their beyond that with extended
planning on into the next decade.

MISS ION REQUIREME N'PS
With reoard to the missionization, which is of (reat interest to
people these days, as to (ur11 mission and wlat are m)ll re(uireielnts to
perform that mission, I would break it out for the nlati "ol secuiiiV
overall into four lasic areas.

STRATI.GIC BALA NCE
First and foremost is to maintain the strategric balance in the world,
equilibrillnl with the Soviet Union, both real and perceived. The per-
ception of that balance is very important in addition to the real bal-
anlice from a technical standpoint.
As Thomas tlobbes said in the 17th century. Uti 1 power is used.
it is what people think it is." We have programs to modernize our
strategic force primarily with the B-1. We provide two legs of the
strategic triad with tle intericontinental ballistic missiles and the
bomber force. So that strategic balance is first.

FORWARD) )EFENSE
second. would be in concert vith our allies to maintain a forward de-
fense, particularly a '(rood conventional capability so that we can keep
down the prolabilitv or tile possibility of having to escalate to nuclear
weapons in order to protect cil interests-to keep that probabilitv as
low as possible. Of cours-e, much of our effort in the Air Force is ill
this area of providing a conventional capability with our tactical
fi liters, our reconnai ssance and other such systems.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Third, maritime security: maintain the sea lines of coitimunicetion.
This is a collateral mission for the Air Force. We do not develop force
requir-ement and force structure to help with the sea lines-of-collimili1i-
cations problem, bulit we lave within the Air Force a great intrinsic
capability to hell iii this very important role. Recently Admiral lol-
lowav. the Chief of Naval Operations. and I si(rneo a memnorandum
of a.reelmient under which we would develop t raining.
We have been doing some trainmio. but we want to do it more cmil-
prehensively so our crews can be used inore efficientlv in the sea control
*See biography of General Jones, beginning at p. 76.





mission, in the mission of surveillance, and if called upon, the mission
of destruction, the sinking of ships.

MOBILITY
Fourth would be mobility. There is a very important requirement
to rejectt forces. A unit stationed in the United States in the general-
purpose category has very little utility until we can move it to the part
of the world where it is necessary in an emergency, and. hopefully in
time to prevent or deter conflict.
So we put considerable effort on mobility in our airlift, and in our
airlift enhancement programs to be able to move all services, and
particularly the large requirements of the U.S .Army.
Those are the four basic requirements-strategic balance, forward
defense, lines of communication, and mobility.

INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE. CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS
I put a fifth requirement with these and it is sort of like the thumb
with your fingers. and that is information-intelligence, control, com-
munications-which makes the other four operative, giving the ability
to do the other four, and giving you the capabilities for surgical
dexterity.
Those are basically the five requirement areas that I would outline
in national security, and where we contribute to all five.

PURCHASING POWER EROSION
Now with regard to our ability to perform these functions, I think
it is good. We still. in my judgment, are the best Air Force in the
world today. Our concerns, of course. have been with the erosion of our
purchasing power.
Since the Vietnam war-and I will go back before the buildup in
Vietnam to the more stable period-we have had about a 25-percent
increase in the Air Force budget in terms of dollars. W hen you relate
that to real purchasing power. it is a reduction of about 40 percent.
That doesn't tell the whole story, because our personnel costs have gone
up 21/ times per person. And although we are using half the fuel today
that we used in 1964, it is costing nearly three times as much money
in absolute dollars. So when you look at the increased personnel costs
beyond inflation and the increased fuel costs, we have had a greater
increase in the operating area than we have in the others as far as
requirements are concerned.
So despite a one-third reduction in people. we have had an increase
in personnel costs. Thus in funding we have had to take a greater cut
in our research and development and in investment. In real terms our
R. & D. is down about 50 percent from 1964, and our procurement in-
vestments are down about 60 percent.
QUALITY PEOPLE AND SYSTEMS
I think we have done very well to accommodate this change-this
reduction of people, the reduction in airplanes which are down by







many, many thousands, and reductions in procurements-through
good quality, quality in our svstens, and quality in our people.
Our weapon systems are thie best in the world today. In one area
the United States has a, very, very niarked advantage over anyone else
in the world and that is in building airplanes. Everybody wants to fly
U.S. airplanes, whether they are coimniercial or military. Our equip-
ment to go in them is 1y far the best in the world-the electronic
equipment, the guided weapons that give us the great precision in ap-
plication of weapon systems.
So we have quality in our weapon systems and we have quality in
our people, very liigli standards in our people. We only accept a little
over 20 out of every 100 serious applicants for the Air Force. We have
a good. large backlog in people applying to )e hired, including col-
lege graduates who want to be officers in the U.S. Air Force. We are in
a buyer's market as far as personnel are concerned.

GOOD MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
We have been able to accommodate these reductions not only through
quality, but I believe through some good management initiatives, some
very significant ones.
As an example, in airlift, from the start of the Air Force we had
our airlift aircraft, divided in three categories: the biger aircraft,
the strategic, C-5. C-141. which are the long-haul intercontinental;
the tactical to support mainly the Army in the front lines; and then
what we call our support aircraft. sometimes called the executive
transports.
We had aircraft in these three categories fragmented in assign-
ments throughout the world.
In this last year we have taken all of these aircraft and placed them
under one commander, the commander of the Military Airlift Com-
mand. In so doing we have achieved greater efficiency and have been
able to phase out 400 support aircraft, most of them the executive-type
aircraft, at a saving of more than 6.000 people, 150.000 gallons of fuel
a day and $100 million per year. So there is a very significant change
in how we (1o airlift and in the number of aircraft involved.

HEADQUARTERS CUT
We have also cut headquarters drastically. The Air Force personnel
total has come down about, one-third since the level period before the
Vietnam war. We increased for the war and then came down, so we
are really down about a third from wartime peaks. But our head-
(uarters have cone down about 50 percent. We have reduced the
manning in the Pentagon since the end of 1973 by 20 percent. I believe
I can reduce my headquarters in the Pentag-on and people in the
Washington area even further and I have an objective of reducing at
least 5 percent a year.
GREATER RELIANCE ON RESERVE FORCES
We have another initiative in that we have greater reliance on the
Reserve forces. Today about 60 percent of our continental air defense


65-705 0 76 2







aircraft is provided by the Reserve forces, primarily the Air National
Guard in this case. About 30 percent of our tactical fighters and about
half of our airlift aircraft are in the Reserve forces.

ACCOMMQDATION WITH FEWER PEOPLE
We are now putting some of the Strategic Air Command mission of
air refueling into the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard with
our KC-135 tankers. So we are taking a lot of management actions in-
ternally to be able to accommodate with many fewer people.
I believe we can continue to do more in this area of insuring that
we get a full dollar return for every person we have in the Air Force.
We have come a long way. I am proud of what we have done and I
assure you we have a way to go and we have many, many initiatives in
the areas of getting greater readiness and greater combat capability
out of the people and the dollars that are appropriated to us.
Mr. Chairman. that pretty well completes my statement.
Senator HOLLINGS. That is an excellent summary.

FOUR TACTICAL AIR FORCES
With respect to trying to combine not only the airlift capability, I
noticed yon mentioned the tactical phase of it also for a saving of
manpower. dollars and fuel. Why do we have more or less four or
five tactical air forces in the U.S. (lefense complex? Have you looked
at that with respect to each havin- their own tactical air force? 'What
coordination, combinations, and economies could there be there ?
Is there any duplication?

SOM3E DUPLICATION
General JONES. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is some duplication. Of
course, all duplication is not necessarily bad. There is very little dupli-
cation between the Air Force and the Army. When people talk about
four separate tactical air forces-Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma-
rines-the Air Force and the Army are working much more closely
today than ever before.
I don't take credit for it. General Abrams and General Brown
started this and one of the things that came out of the Vietnam war
was a very close association. So the Army has their armed helicopters
and we have our close-air-support aircraft and these are very
complementary.
I would say in that regard that there is really virtually no duplica-
tion between the Air Force and the Army.
With regard to the Navy and the Marines, there is some degree of
overlap of mission capability. However, there is a need. When you
look at the Soviet aircraft-and they outnumber the U.S. aircraft sig-
nificantly in tactical air in particular-there is a need for the total.

MUTUAL TRAINING
We are trying to manage better now. We are starting mutual train-
ing. We have a lot of training, particularly of our technicians, that we







are starting to dovetail so we dont (omipletelv operate two trainin(r
plants.
We have a long way to go. but we lhave niade progress in this area.
We are ,oniin" closer togmetlietr and I tIintlk ini the next few years we
will do better than we have in the past.
Senator IlOiOLTx;s. Is there a definite plan withbin the Air Force or
tie Pentagon fer tile coordlin'ation of tliese four tactical air forces ? I
know you have, heard tie criticism. Former Air Force General Barry
Gold:ater says that is one place to save.

GREATER CO(O)RDI NATION AND CO()PERATION
General JONES. Not to combine. no. sir. but there are actions to insure
greater c.ooTdination and cooperation and integration of effort, but no
plan to combine the air forces.

MISSION APPROACH
Senator CRANrSTr)N. Does the Air Force have any plan to adopt a mis-
sion approach rather than just a plane-by-plane approach?
General JoNES. Yes. sir. We in the Air Force believe we have been
pioneers in the mission approach and we are totally mission-oriented"
st,'ateo-ic. ta rtiral. witin i lie (reneial-purpose area. anlJd airlift.
Senator (RANXTOX. Can that be coordinated with the plans of the
other services?
General JONES. We do cordinate. We don't integrate in nn opera-
tional sense. hut I would be the first one to say we still have a long
way" to go before we (do have a total coordination of this effort. We are
making progress. but we are not there vet.

ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
Senator ( R\NsT()iN- As I understand it. the annual operating costs for
tactical air forces are aromd $24 )illion. or roughly one-quarter of all
military expenditures. Are there any real ways to coordinate activities
that wouI(l reduce the expense significantly ?
General JoNEs. Within that I think they include airlift, which has
now been virtually integrated since all of the airlift except a few
support aircraft are now managed by- the Air Force. S'o that is one
]art that we have totally intemrated or virtually totally integrated.
There are savings. We are making savings particularly in the training
plant. We are bringing- it together. We have a long way to go, I agree.
Senator.
INCREASE AS RESULT OF INFLATION
Senator CX\ xsroN. Do you see that b24 billion annual expenditure
as something that will remain at that level or increase on into the
future?
General JONES. In our projections I would expect that it will re-
main about level in real terms, which would mean an increase as a, re-
sult of inflation. In tactical air we have deferred modernization a great
deal. For example. this year in 1975. money was appropriated for
only 124 aircraft, which is the fewest aircraft purchased since 1940.







So we have deferred and deferred this modernization and now have
a need to expand in the investment area. We are trying to cut in the
operational area so that we can invest in the new systems without
having a significant increase in total costs.

FORCE REQUIREMENTS
Senator HOLLINGS. General Jones, the broad issue that we are con-
cerned with here, first, of course, is just how the military services
establish their force requirements and how you put those budgets to-
getlher. What directive-in specific terms-do you receive from the
National Security Council or does the Secretary of the Air Force draw
up one set of requirements and the Chief of Staff some other?
Somehow or other we seem to have a free-for-all in the Pentagon
as to how you get your force requirements and how they are issued.
Can you tell the committee something about that?

BROAD GUIDANCE
General JONES. There is a programing and budget cycle we are in
every year and we are in the latter stages now of the 1977 budget,
but essentially the broad guidance comes out of Department of De-
fense initially.
This is put out in a draft form. We are able to comment on it by
services and by the Joint Chiefs. This then forms the framework of
what our national defense policies will be, what the objectives are.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND NEEDS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff address that guidance and come in with
recommendations as to force structure and needs. Then there are a
series of iterations and a general force structure will be developed and
the services come in with the detailed costing of that force structure.
Then we will go through an adjustment process because the cost al-
ways comes in higher-at least in my experience-it comes in higher
when you add the whole thing together than what is the target or
what is believed to be the total appropriate target number. Then there
is a series of decisions made internally in the Department, working
with OMB, and then we have the budget proposed to the President,
and then the President's budget is proposed to the Congress.
So there are many iterations, but it is generally the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are the ones most involved
in the specific requirements area with the services providing the tech-
nical inputs and needs to a great extent.
I am really not too familiar with how other agencies in the Govern-
ment operate, but I think that we do pretty well particularly in pro-
jecting our requirements out 5 years.

CONTINGENCIES
Senator HOLLINGS. What are the contingencies against which your
current forces are planned and sized? Can you give us some idea?
General JONES. Yes, sir. I would rather not get into specifics, but, in
general, from a conventional general-puirpose standpoint, Europe, and







our involvement with our NATO allies and the defense of NATO is
No. 1, while at the same time being able to have some capability
to contain conflict on a limited basis in another part of the world, in
case it breaks out.
But we are not talking about two major wars at one time since one
would be a smaller one. That is, in the general-purpose area, how we
develop our force requirements.

ROLE OF AIR FORCE IN EUROPEAN WAR
Senator HOLLINGS. With regard to NATO how do you see the role
of the Air Force in the event of, let's say. a war between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact?
PREVENT LOSS OF NATO TERRITORY
General JONES. There is some inisinf ormation around as to what the
Air Force's supposed objectives are. There are some who have said
that we are out to win an air battle and do deep interdiction, going
deep into East Germany and into Poland. But that is incorrect.
The objective of NATO is to keep from losing NATO territory.
Therefore, our primary requirements over there would be to help blunt
an attack, particularly an armored breakthrough. In doing that we
would be providing support to the Army both in attacking targets, and
overhead in trying to provide some degree of local air superiority-to
keep the enemy from attacking our forces, providing information, par-
ticularly in the area as to where possible breakthroughs would be, and
hitting the enemy in the interdiction role but right over the hill, right
behind his main forces as opposed to deep in his territory.
So we see our primary requirement is to prevent the loss of NATO
territory, which is really the objective of the NATO alliance.

EFFECT OF BAD WEATHER
Senator HOLLINGS. How about if in the first 3 weeks you had bad
weather? What effect would that have on the defense posture of the
Air Force?
General JONES. It would have an impact on us: but it would have a
greater impact on the Warsaw Pact air force. WVe have a better all-
weather capability than the Warsaw Pact has. So both air forces would
be affected, but so would the ground situation. If it is bad weather, it
probably includes a lot of rain.
Having spent many years in Europe. I know it is much more diffi-
cult for the tanks to operate through the areas in very wet weather.
So all forces would be affected, but we in the NATO air forces would
be affected less than the Warsaw Pact air forces.

AIRLIFT TO REINFORCE NATO
Senator ITOLLINGS. You were talking about the airlift to reinforce
NATO rapidly. Is that complete and dependable now with the C-5A
considering all the problems with the wing. Could you res llplly in a
matter of days? What is the number of troops that would be needed
and so forth?







AIRLIFT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
General JONES. Yes, sir, we have a very good capability to resupply
in comparison with the past. However, when you look at the objectives
of the amount. of tonnage and the amount of people we must get to
Europe, it is in the cargo area that we have a, deficiency in being able to
get the number that is stated in the requirements--of moving the
Army to Europe in the first 30 days. It is a very substantial capability,
but it is well short, and that is why we have an airlift enhancement
program including greater use of commercial aircraft.
We have a great passenger-carrying capability with commercial
aircraft, but we are looking to improve the commercial cargo-carrying
capability, and there are hearings before the House Armed Services
Committee today on this very subject of what is the best way to en-
hance airlift. Our airlift capability is significant, but not all that is
required.
MILITARY TANKER CARGO PLANES
Senator HOLLINGS. On those areas would it be more cost-efficient to
build a new generation of military tanker cargo planes or to modify the
existing civilian aircraft such as the 747? Have you testified on that or
what is the position of the Air Force?
General JONES. We think that the best is a mix with some tanker
cargo aircraft because in the tanker role it can make the C-5 far
more efficient. We can refuel the C-5 and refuel at goTeat distances with
tanker cargo aircraft, while the 747, even modified, will not be able to
do what the C-5 can do, at least in the modifications we are talking
about.
It won't carry the tanks and the big stuff. So we need a very limited
number of tanker cargo aircraft to be able to enhance our current air-
lift force-the number to be provided at low cost. Also, we would
modify commercial airplanes-a larger number of wide-body
transports.
A-10 AIRCRAFT
Senator 1-JOLLINGS. I think it was after the Yom Kippur war the
Department of Defense assembled a team to assess what lessons were
learned and determined that the low-speed aircraft couldn't survive in
the modern-day battle environment.
My point or question goes to the A-10 which is limited to about 350
knots. With that role as you describe it, let me hear your comments
on that A-10.
General JONES. The A-10 is specifically designed, as you know, to
provide the Army close air support. As far as survival is concerned,
we have made it a very hard airplane. It can take many, many rounds
of fire from the ground before it will be knocked down. It is a very
sturdy airplane. The problem we have had with other aircraft in that
environment is the lack of armor.
What I am really saying is that speed can gain you some pro-
tection as can armor. We plan to have flares to counter the infrared
missiles that are fired. We believe that properly used, the A-10 can
survive and operate in close air support with the Army and can
do a good job.







SUFFICIENT SPEED
Senator HOLLINGS. And you think it does have sufficient speed to
sustain it?
General JONES. Not so much the speed as the armor and the flares
and countermeasures. If you are slow and you have, no armor and
no countermeasures, the vulnerability would be fairly high. That
was the problem in the Yon Kippur war, in which some aircraft
were operated slow and had no protection.

STRUCTURAL STRESS PROBLEMS
Senator HOLLINGS. Are there some structural stress problems wIlil
the A-10?
General JONES. No serious problems. In one of our fatigue tests at
about 80 percent of the life of the airplane, we had some cracks in the
wing joint area. We have come up with a fix for that. It will be put
into all the aircraft.
We have asked an independent review group to take a look to make
sure that our fix is right. We are confident it is. but we want to make
sure it is right. We think there is no serious problem with the A-10.

PROJECTED COST OF A-10
Senator HOLLINGS. What was the original projected unit pru-
curement cost for the A-10, and what do you estimate it now to be
with these adjustments?
General JONES. These adjustments should not have any significant
cost impact. I think it is just a few thousand dollars in modifica-
tion for the aircraft that are already down the line.
In 1970 dollars, the A-10 was projected at about $1.5 million
average unit flvaway cost. If we now, in accordance with the normal
practices, take everything back to 1970 dollars, I believe we are at
about $1.9 million. roug'hlv. When you take into consideration the
cost of initial spares ad )eculiar supI)ort and inflation, the procure-
ment cost of the progratit is iM the ,3 million category.
Senator CR.ANSTt)N. Is that in current dollars ?
General JONES. It is a little under $3 million in current fiscal year
1976 budget dollars. It is a little over $3 million in the projected
dollars for the future.

COST AND TIME FOR TRAINING PILOT
Senator IoILINGS. I am going to move, Alan, on to something else
and then come back to these, the F-16 and several others.
I would like to g-et into this other area.
General Jones, I agree with you about the topflight recruits, accept-
ing 20 out of 100 that apply. I have a feeling', generally. that they learn
to fly and get their flight pay and then quit flying, and the maintenance
of these forces costs too much.
I notice in your curriculum v'itae you went in to the Air Force in
April of 1942. and you were flying by the next Marc h, or you went
in in March and were flying by the next April. Why is it in the training
process of 20 years' service that you have 6 years of training and







schooling and schooling and training? Isn't that a high percentage
for any particular com mand or endeavor?
I would like to get in my years of service that much sabbatical
time to (To off and study. What is your comment on that?
The required time for training to make a pilot, to begin with, isn't
that unusually time costly?

MODERNIZATION CAUSES RETRAINING
General JONES. Yes, sir, it is costly. Of course, in that 6 years, I be-
lieve you are probably including nonpilot training time. There is an
educational period where we send people to the Squadron Officers
School. We also send some to the Air War College, and to the Air Com-
mand and Staff College. I am just trying to calculate in my own
career the various schools I attended. So many of these schools are not
costly or anywhere near as costly as a flying training school, but we
basically put a young man through pilot training, which takes about
a year, and then he goes to a combat crew training school, and he is
there for a few months, and then he goes out into an operational unit,
and he will stay there for a number of years.
Then as time goes on, he may go to that Squadron Officers School.
After a few years, we will convert aircraft and go, for instance, from
the F-105 to the F-4, and we will send him to the F-4 school to become
combat-ready in the F-4 and then go back and be in his unit for a
while, maybe into an operations job or a staff job. Later, he may
attend Air Command and Staff College.
So modernization to a great extent is one of the reasons he will go
to more than one school in flying and learning to fly. We are cutting
back on our pilots. Just a few years ago we were training 4,000 pilots
a year. We will soon be under 1.500 per year new pilots. So this brings
our training base down, brings the whole thing down very
substantially.
We do have today an excess of pilots; not an excess of officers, but
an excess of pilots. We have many pilots in jobs that normally would
not require a pilot.

NUMBER OF OFFICERS DRAWING FLIGHT PAY
Senator TOLLINGS. That means there is an excess of pilots on flight
pay. I will include a copy of this table furnished by the Air Force. The
number of officers in the Air Force is 102,873. The number of officers
drawing flight pay-aviation career incentive pay-lieutenant colonel
and below, is 29,014 pilots and 13,103 navigators for a total there of
42,117.
And then under colonels and generals, we have around 2,053 pilots,
416 navigators, for a total of 2,469.

NUMBER OF OFFICERS ACTUALLY FLYING
In comparison with the 42,117 personnel with rank of lieutenant
colonel and below-pilots and navigators-there are only 31,794 who
are actually flviii. Of the 2.469 colonels and generals receiving flight
pay there are only 667 actually flying.
There are many other points in this table, and we will include the
entire table in the record.










SENATE BUD)GE-T COMJ TTE.L REQUEST

SUBJECT: Air Force RaLed Officers and Positions

Mr. Hamilton, SBC, requesLed tbe following informazttion,
12 Nov 19V5:

(Data as of 30 Sep 75)

A. Number of officers in the Air Force 102,873

B. Number of officers drawing Aviation Career Incentive
Pay (ACIP)


Pilot
Navigator
*TOTAL


Lt Col and Below
29,014
13,103
42,117


Cols and Generals
2,053
416
2,469


In addition 1,433 rated officers receive "save pay"
IAW the ACIP Act of 1974--thru 31 May 1977

C. Number of rated requirements (Lt Cols and Below)


Pilot
Navigator
TOTAL


24,690
12,356
37,046


D. Number of officers actually flying


Pilot
Navigator
TOTAL


Lt Cols and Below
22,291
9,503
31,794


Cols and Gens
663
4
667


65-705 0 76 3







VERY FEW PEOPLE FLYING
General Ju)iS. First, MAr. (hairinan, we used to have a lot more
proficiency flying when we had the support aircraft and training air-
craft where we kept people flying their entire careers. We have now
stopped people flying at certain years unless they are in-a combat job,
and there are other provisions. Ior example, there are very, very few
people in the P'entagon who fly.
During the period they are in the Pentagon for duty they don't fly
with the exception of a very small number. Then when they go back
to an operational unit, we will have a requalification and they will fly
at that time.
SAVE-PAY PROVISION
-Not very many of our generals are flying today except those that
are In command of flying units. So there are some who are drawing
flying pay under the save-pay provision which said, when Congress
passed the legislation 1 months ago-that for 3 years, people who
have been drawing flight pay may continue to draw, so they wouldn't
immediately have a cut in pay.

REDUCTION IN NUMBER
So there is a group of people in that category. But we are coming
down. We soon will be under 100,000 officers from almost 103.000 now.
We are coming down under 100,000 this year and we are coming down
on our pilots, and as I nientione(l, our inputs are down from 4,000 to
1.1500.
So we are working off this extra number. Also the new bill that was
passed by Congress about 18 months ago had what we called gatee
provisions," which means that in order for people to continue to draw
flying g pay, they have to spend much more time in operational flying
positions than in the past an we are now into that gate systein. So we
are nOVlig iin the right direction.

REDUCTION IN FORCE
Senator H WLI xls. Are vou working off the right crowd? I ask that
advisedly after our experience with the Post Office Department. The
civilian crowd took over and immediately fired anybody who knew
aiitiing about running the Post Office and you see the result.
They are still delivering Look magazine to my house. We find that
you get those fine young men and train them and they become pilots
and captains and make $16.000 or $17,000 a year. Then under the re-
(luction-in-force program the Air Force is forcing them out and keep-
ing in all the colonels.
A young captain stays around and the only thing lie ever does as far
as any incentive or thought or real dedication to the Air Force is find
himself dedicatedd to old colonels waiting for their retirement. The
young officers are not flying or moving or doing anything. They get dis-
appointed and disillusioned, and they quit.








BEST WAY l'O S- ((F1A) IN T II \IhI F(uR( I'
Sonie of us feel the best way to succeed in fiie Air Forue is to et out
of the cockpit. as soon as woi ca I anid g'et into the icro s-trailI In0 pro-
grain. Go toas many schools as V"ou can and stay o0t- of' the Nwa an gIet
under a colonel anfd stay quiet. -What is your Iposit ion on that,?

REDU(TION OF COLONELS
General JoN-s. III the last y V ears we have re(l ouir cuol(mels by
about 700 and we have provisions t continue to reduce oir n1t1iiber
of colonels. I believe we can.

DEFENSE MNAN TOWER PERSONNEL ACT
In nianpower, the )efense Officer Personnel \Ianarement Act that
is under consideration bv the Armed Services Conmtittee, there are
pI'ovisio1s which will help solve this lpro)lem of people who get
tenure and then are not subject to review 1inider the current law.
They can now be eliminated if they are totally ineflicient. but if some-
one. starts coastino, the current system doesn't give us adequate pro-
visions to separate such people.

PERIODIC REVIEW
This new system will allow us to review periodically people who
have temire, to keep the incentive up. I al not saying that we have
a large number of colonels in this cate gory: we have done pretty
well. But we would like to have this provision.

NEED (F PROPER BALANCE
What we are trying to do is to reach the proper balance where we
don't have just all new people and we waste money onl training these
new 1)eople and where we don't have too umany older people in tile
senior ranks: That is why we have cut the input to 1.5 (W. But we
donft want to go down below 1,500 because we need to maintain a
training base and also to maintain soic youth coming" into tile systein.

BASIC PILOT PRo BLE-M
But we do have a basic pilot problem in the Air Force. A)out half
todav of what it was a year ag-o and we are workiIur it off now pretty
well. D u ring" the Vietnam war we increased the 1i1()t production very
substantially u) to 4.0()00 and then all of a sudden things turned
around and our force structure dropped and our number of pilot re-
(luirements dropped and we had this grI) lln Oil board.

RETIREMENT ENCOUIZA(GED
They are being used, because we are not over iii officers. AWe are
over In pilots, but not as much as last year. We are looking at the
question of a RIF, reduction in force. We are not sure this year
whether we will have to have a RIF. Our projections have been that








we will need a RIF. But iwe have been working the problem by en-
couraging people to retire, and by other actions, to where now we are
sitting where we are not sure we need a RIF, and the determination, to
a great extent, will be based on our projections of the 1977 budget
whenever that is made final. The young men that we have to RIF are
very, very competent. I have talked with some of them and I have
looked at their records. We would rather not have to RIF our officers
and would rather work our problem out in the longer term than have
an immediate, drastic impact on some very capable young people.

FLIGHT PAY
Senator CimTES. On those pilots that you are indicating as excess,
do most of them go on and get their flight pay? Do you keep them
qualified that way or do you feel like there are certain of those that
if they are not going to be in a pilot slot, you therefore don't have to
give them the flight pay or have them get the flight pay?

SAVE-PAY PROVISION
General JONES. There is a mix. There are some that under the law
get the save-pay provision for another 16 months who are not flying,
but they get the flying pay. Flying pay is nowhere near what it was
when I was a young officer.
When I was a young officer, it was half my basic pay. Today it runs
$150, $160 up to $240, something in that category.

DETERMINED BY RANK
Senator CHILES. Depending on your rank?
General JoNES. And it goes down as you get more senior as opposed
to other pay which normally goes up for senior people, I think it is
$150 or $160, and something like $245 for a more junior person.

SMALLER PERCENTAGE
So it is not the percentage it used to be. In one air force they said
their flight pay is about 100 percent of their base pay, so ours is a small
amount.
There are some young pilots coming in the system that we have fly-
ing temporarily on a C-5-we will have three pilots where normally
you will only need two. It is good for a young lieutenant to get that
experience though there are three people aboard and you have to
rotate in flying that multimillion-dollar aircraft. I don't mean to over-
state our pilot situation. It is not a great problem now.
We have worked our way at least halfway out of it, and we will
work out of it in the days ahead unless there is a significant change
in requirements.
PILOTS IN THE LOWER RANKS
Senator CimLEs. But you do have pilots that are not getting flight
pay in the lower ranks, or do you?
General JONES. The flying pay is very complicated these days with
these gates, and we support the gate concept. I forget the specific






numbers. but if you fly sonmetlii like (1 out o the first 12 years. you
get, 1av for a certain leno'tlh of time. If vou fl more. Voi et paid
depending on a longer look at your career rather thaii j tist a 1-year
look.
So if you have beeii dom lots (f flying n11d Voll i'o to school, you can
continue to get pay. If voi havelit been doiiuT imich flying and you go
to school, you dont get paid.
That is in oversiml)lificatiomi of a very complicated scliedule.

BASED ON HOURS AND MNONTItS OF FLYING TIIE
Senator CHILES. So it is not based on how nitiiy hours and months
that you fly ?
General, Joexs. It is. during that time that 'ou are involved. We used
to get pav only for the months iln which we flew, and every year we
would have to flv in order to gret that pay. As a result we. had at our
professional schools lots of aircra ft out on the fligll line at great
expense-far, far more than the fly in(," pay--in order for those people
to fix, to maintain their proficiency. to -et tleir flying pay.
Congress many years ago said. don't spIend the money on those sup-
port airplanes. we vill pay during that schooling period without flv-
ing. Theii the bill about 18 months ago said, we will do it. but only if
von have done a lot of living previously and have been in the cockpit
for a long time-then when you go. von get flying pay.
That was worked out by the Congress about lS months ag-o, and
it is a crood balance. It makes us ima-ae better, and it makes its keep
our people in the cockpits a little bit more. It is a trend in the right
direction.
COST OF PILOT TRAINING
Senator IovLIiNS. Vhat is the cost of training a pilot. General
Jones, about a half million bucks?
I had a note somewhere that said it was about $300.000 to $500.000.
General ,!o\ns. That is the total for an individual into a combat
airplane. That is not to make hi a basic pilot. That is to train him into
an aircraft.
AVERAGE COST
Senator tOLLINGS. Senator Nunn was cop-menting on the (cost of
pilot training, and he listed at that time $157,000 as aln average c()st for
undergradate training, and then for an F-4 pilot. 267A,400 foir )ilot
traininr costs. So) it is getting up there. 'snt that
General Jo-Nxs. Yes, sir. It costs S1(2.90) to mtake 11i11 a pilot. 1Fro11
there on in he can o-o into a number of aircraft, so e fairly low-cost
training. some fairly high cost. and the k2?;7.400 puts him in an ole'a-
tional airplane andl makes him a combbat-ready pilot. But a pilot al-
ready wearino- wings can also ) fi, these airplanes.
You can put him in an F-15 or-5 a 13.5: and make him combat-ready.
The second figure is an average for such training.

AVERAGE STAY OF PILOT
Senator ItoLL(s. Amid the average stave of a pilot il the Air Force
is about 10.8 years. is that right ?







General ,oNEs. Yes. sir. But that is an average; it is not the statis-
tical mode in that most of .our people will either stay about 5 years or
20 years or more. There are a few that go out in the middle, but it is
usually either .5 or 20. It tends to be an uneven distribution: 20 for
retirement, 5 for minimum commitment.

MAINTENANCE COSTS
Senator HOLLXiiNs. Let's (o for a moment then to the high main-
tenance costs. The Air Force complains annually of a high maintenace
backlog. They talk and testify about large numbers of aircraft, tied up
duo to a lack of maintenance funds. From my notes I find that the Air
Force allocates about 58 to 60 maintenance man-hours for a B-52,
about 44 for a C-5, 30 to 34 for the F-4, 25 for the F-7 and F-15, 20
to 21 for the C-141 and C-130.
Now, the commercial airlines. General Jones, tell me they have
sticceeded in greatly reducing maintenance man-hours by a variety of
modern management techniques. The major airlines tell us that they
devote 1 to 2 direct maintenance man-hours per flying hour to a DC-7
or a Boeing-727. and with the wide body jets, the DC-10, about double
that--or to 4 direct maintenance man-hours per flying hour.
Are those figures accurate? Has the Air Force been concerned about
this; and if so, what are you folks doing about it?

CTIANGES BEING MADE
General JONES. I am an old maintenance type. I spent 2 years as the
chief of maintenance of a B-52 outfit. and we have many, many
(hanes that have been made and are being made in the way we do
m1mainteniamice. But there is a little bit of apples and oranges there.
One is the airlines flv very high utilization rates. They fly some of
the 747's and DC-10's 12 hours a day. Our aircraft will fly maybe 1
hour a day. On some (lays we iight fly more, but I am talking about
a fighter aircraft that may fly 1 hour a day.

CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS
Yom have certain maintenance requirements even if You don't fly, or
if you fly 1 hour a day that are the same whether you fly 1 hour or 12
hours in a (lay. So there is aii awful lot of apples and oranges.
Also within this there are hours for munitions maintenance and
other categories which are a significant part. We work very closely
with the airlines. We are adopting some of their concepts, and in the
past they adopted some of our concepts. We think we maintain our
ai r1craft fairly well.
EXPERIENCE LEVEL
We are working to maintain them better. We have some ideas in
this regard. But the airlines also have the advantage of their people
beiig 12. 14:15 years in the business of maintaining airplanes, whereas
we will have a young man or woman who is counted in the mainte-
nance hours who has been out of tech school maybe a month or 2
months or a year. So the experience level is a great deal different. But
there are many, many factors to make it different.






We work with the airl ines, and we are not that ,imch different in
how we do oir btuiness.

MAN-HOt I C(OMP \RIS0N
Senator HOLLIN;S. Those wide coil1i)a ii is> are not a1)propriate
then? For example, the difference )et ween U awl 4 1iotirs am1 I58 to 6)
maintenance man-hours for a 1--.52
General JONES. I think ther are iiiieadiiu1 in that I could im-
mediately reduce the maintenance ma-lhonvs per r1ivig hour in the
B-52 bv flying longer and more illissiolls.
senator IOLLN;s. eight. I understand that.

OVERM7AINTAIN AIR(CnRivr
General JoNF..s. That would immediately probably cut it in half.
TIowever, we have t ended, at times. to overuia imta illor airplanes and
inspect them more often than necessary.
There is another factor that temIs to be muiiea(dimy in tills also. It
is that to a great extent we man for a wartime iurgoe late so we can
fight in time of war at high utilization rates 2-4 hours a day, 7 days a
week. So in peacetime you have that wartime maningr cajabihitv
which you use to maintain airplanes, but which you would not alw ays
need in peacetime if you were always going to stay at that low flying
rate.
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES TN MAINTENANCE
Senator Itoi~lNiys. General Jones, -what. productivity measures are
being implemientedin maintenance and for what percentatre of the
.Air Force,'s, -work forne.; Inl other -words. c!all yoi (rive the con)!1:1ttee
a general rundown of the efforts I emi made to ,ieasul'e tile l)rolic-
tivitv of the ni iitary and civilian manpower, the supplv an I the other
support activities. and what, productivity ineaures are being iiple-
mented
General JONs. Yes- sir. We have what we call olr managelnt
engineering teams t!hat go out and actually measure work and measure
requirements of peoplee to perform that work, and we have a very hi2l'h
percentage, I tlink it is the highest of any of the service>-of oulr
p~eole uIller tils miageinent evaluatim effort. to determine what iV
requi red.
QUEEN BEE PROGRAM
AX> are iiicreas'no. the number all the time as to people who are
under it. So we can measure our pro(luctivity quite well. One of the
initiatives we are takino- in reducin( time requ'lirements is what we call
Queen Bee. That is. rather than do all the work at each: base, we will
do the more major work at central locations.
Take a B 5 We are running a test now where more of tle m ajor,
maiteiian(e is done at one. l)as with lessta dise-4l11 e
out through the system. Bv consolidatimnr we (can (et by w ith less
equipment and fewer people. So that is one concept.






BROADER CAREER FIELD TRAINING
We are testing" another concept in both Florida and in Arizona since
we are gettiir greater stability in the Air Force and our people, we
can have individuals trained in a broader career field so that maybe
one person can do the work of two because he is around -long enough
to be trained to work on more than one group of black boxes. If we
have tremendous turnover we can train an individual to work in just
one specialty.
We think we can expand it a great deal. We can make good progress
in maintenance. We have a lot of interesting tests going on.
BASE CLOSINGS
Senator IHOLLINGS. I have a note on bases. Be careful because you are
liable to close some in my backyard.
What bases. if any, could you recommend as surplus to the Air Force
now? Is every one of them absolutely necessary to the Air Force or
could you close some of them and promote efficiency and economy at
the same time ?
General JONEs. We have closed many bases in the years past. I would
expect that in the next couple of years we would close some more bases.
Right now we are analyzing for the 1977 budget our total force struc-
ture and our overseas alinements-the change in Thailand-that has
an impact on the number of bases we own.
FIRST YEAR COSTS MONEY
So our number of bases has been coming down very substantially
and I would expect that to continue. We ought to recognize that the
first year you close a base it costs money. There are the entitlements.
You have not only the cost of moving people, but the entitlements of
the people we let go.
So normally the first year it costs money to close a base and you start
your savings in the second year.
Senator HOLLINcS. Like Donaldson at Greenville, S.C., we put 13
industries in there and it has worked out very well.

INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
With respect to the intelligence budget, General Jones, Senator
Cranston has been interested in this and I was waiting for him to come
back. Do you have a high amount of unnecessary intelligence costs
within the Air Force budget, or would you like to rid yourself of
certain intelligence budgeting that really doesn't pertain directly to
the Air Force?
MONEY GOES WITH MISSION
General JONES. Senator, if I could take that mission out and still
keep the total money, it would be nice. But the money goes with the
mission.
Senator JOLLINGS. Air Force missions?






Genera] ,ToN1i:s. No. What I nean is ii soniebodv look a certain mis-
sion out of mv bl]Idet. then III d ln(Yet wot I I dhe redired bv the amount
of money earmarked for that mfission. Therefore. I i er sonallIv have no
objections to funding" some at ona I l ro ills oll of tie Air Force
t)udget, because nmobodv says vol can have $2; billion andl then youl
must do this.
It builds from the bottom llp rather illan froml tile lop (lowli. So
it really doesn't give me aii conicen llat I hi l nat i omia 1 1 rogranl is.

FIVE-YEAR PI( JE(TI( N OF BUI)GIET
Senator HOLIINGS. On the 5-year lrojection of your Itldget. can
you rive the committee the projected I)ld(-et for ti mission and liea
projected budget for the Air Force for the next 5-years?
('Teneral ,14 )Es. In generall teams. 011r ol feet wou ld'l be to level off and
have. hopefully, a real growth in the long" tern of ab out 1 to 2 percent.

FOUR A)I)ITIONAL TACTICAL AIR SQUADIR)1I NS
Senator Hoii tional tactical air squadrons and what will they cost ?

A-104 AND) F-1 6
General Jo.N-Es. We are not really adding the additional units. What
we have had is 2(; wins of if you went out and counted our wings
today, we have 26 wings formed,but we have only had 22 wing-s worth
of airplanes. So what we are trVinig to do with tle hib'h-low mlix in
cost is go for cheaper airplanes, less expiensive A,-10 and F -16, ather
than fewer higher cost aircraft and stay at tte undercinained or under-
equip)ped level.
It is b .asically to round out to the 26 win s we already have and
round them out. within less exlpenlsive airplanes such as the A-10 and
the F-16 rather than lhavino" a smaller nunbller of more expensive air-
planes. We will do this within the budget projections I was talking
about. We will do it within the manpower that we are authorized.
which means taking people out of support and putting them into
combat capability and better utilization of our maintenance people
who are already performing maintenance on aircraft.

FIVE-YEAR PROJE(CTE) BUDGET
Senator HOLLINGs. We would aplreciate your furnishing for the
record the 5-year projected budget for the Air Force allocated in
terms of operating costs and investment costs. laybe I could ask now
what would you do if You hadl a 5-percent (-uit and wl at would you do
if you had a 5-percent Increase .

FIVE-PERCENT CUT
generall JoNES. Mr. Cha1*ma1, a (Iut in the earlier years would
tend to have a disl)roptortionate imnl)act because, to a (reat ex-
tent, we are in a bind of controllability with our funds lbecabse or


65-705 O 76 4







entitlements Ind incurred costs. Therefore. for early cuts we tend to
end 1) with, No. 1 cutting. fiinz hours and fuel, which has a dispro-
)ortionate impact on combat readliness-beyond the 5 percent-and
p-ersonnel. But the only way you really save money on personnel in the
near tern is to reduce the input, because when you put someone out
who is already in. such as riffing an officer, they get entitlements you
have to pay out, and it really starts to cost you money. usually, in the
first year.
So the cuts in the near term tend to have, because of this controllabil-
itv an(d entitlement, a disproportionate impact on readiness. It is hard
to cut 5 percent in dollars and not have a significantly higher impact
on readiness. reduction of flying combat readiness hours, training of
our people. our crews.
As for the increase, we would balance it with some in research and
development.
FIVE-PERCENT INCREASE
One of the reasons we have been able to maintain a strategic balance
and an overall balance with the. Soviet Vnion is because of quality and
good R. & I. I am concerned about the erosion of our effort in re-
search and development. so I would Diut some in research and develop-
ment. I would insure that we would continue to modernize with our
new systems: the B-i; and particularly the AWACS, on which we
put No. 1 priority in the general purpose area: and also buy some
additional spares for wartime use for our combat force. I would tend
to spread it out a little bit in all three of these categories.
[The information follows:]
AIR FORCE 5-YR. PROJECTED BUDGET
[In millions of dollars]
Fiscal year-
1976 197T 1977 1978 1979 1980
Investment -------------- --------- 13, 398 2,798 15, 792 17,206 18, 619 18, 624
Operating ------------------------ 16, 798 4, 226 16, 373 16, 390 16, 494 16, 528
Notes: (1) The above figures represent the estimates included in the President's fiscal year 1976-7T budget request.
(2) Investment costs include funds for R.D.T. & E., aircraft and missile procurement, other procurement, and military
construction appropriations and provide for future escalation. Operating costs include funds for military personnel and
operation and maintenance appropriations. These operating appropriations are priced at current pay rates and price
levels.
PROJECTED COSTS OF F-16
Senator HOiLmIXus. What were the projected program unit costs
of the F-16 and what are they now?
General JONES. I do not recall the specific number. It was $4.5
million, I believe, but I am not sure on that.

MAJOR CHANGES
Senator HIOLIXNs. There have been some major changes in the
(lesig n and cost increases, is that not correct?
General JoN.-E.S. Well, years ago people talked about a lightweight
fighter. They established certain numbers and then we developed an
airplane, that is different than what the people were considering as






that lig htweio-ft fighlter. So i' YoU take it back to that number, it is
different. But tie F-1; program, since its inception and since we have
started working, on it, has been vevy, very well ,ontrolled in costs.
Other than inflation, we are (loin ? veiy, very well anld our negot.i-
ations with- the conitiactor and cost estimates are within the budget
figures.
FUSELAGE SIZE
Senator HOLLINGS. The chance in the fuiselae size and the aero-
dviiamic design did not materially increase costs ?
General ,oNEs. Not in coinla nson with weapons systems of the
past. We just lengthened the fuselag'e about 20 inches so we, can et
the second pilot in the traininV airplane and we put a little more in the
wing area. I3ut for the airplane, our cost projections now are very good
on the F-16. Our two radars are flvin2 in competition now in F-4
aircraft as a tested. It looks like they may come in under our cost
estimates.
The program right now is doing very well as far as our managenlnt
is concerned. I predict that we will be able to control costs, adjusted
for inflation, obviously. But I think it would be one of our better
managed programs.
RADAR
Senator IJoLLIN radar. I think that required lengthening the fuselage
General JO looking~r at for the Navy, it would have had a biger nose and a bigger
area for radar biut not for ours.
Senator 110LAAN-GS. Is the cost of radar included in the plaile and
your comments with respect to stayino- in the ball park ?
General JONES. Yes, sir, that is total flyaway costs.

TACTICAL AIR FORCE MISSIONS
Senator JIOLLINGS. General Jones, what proportion of our tactical
Air Force is devoted to the mission of air superiority and what pro-
port ion to close support and then to deep interdiction

F-i 11
General l oi*s. M-i. airi ian. we do not break it out that way. I
Categorize it a little differeiltlv. We live our F-111's that are called
deep i tertictioll airplanes bV most leo>le. We (o )ot pl,1i to Ilse
them for deep interdiction. It is the best all-weather tactical Ir-
plane we have. As a. former commander of the 4th Allied 'Fa Air- Force inu rope, not only tile U.S. Air Force blut of our allies. I
considered it to be the No. i plane we would uise to blast a brea-
throtigli at night and in bad weather.
We are extensively using it in radar beacon offset bin and In
other ilcdes of employment near tie front liMe. I do not say that under
certain conditions we would not use it deeper behind the lines but
primarily it would be used nights andl1/or all-weatler in the forward
areas in lbattletield inter(Iictioin-iot really close air slljpo1't of a sol-
dier in a foxhole but in the forward battle area.





24

A-71 F-4 AND F-15
Te A-7 woul1 be used in the forward area. The F-4 we consider
to 1w a swingc force-air-to-air and air-to-ground. The F-15 will be
I)rilnarily air-to-air. There may be some documents that talk about
air doctrines as to air superiority, interdiction and all of that, but we
should reco-inize that as used in Europe, we operate as part of Allied
Air Forces under Allied control with a i.S. commander. The plan is
to use their in Europe to stop a breakthrough with very, very limited
opera tions deep in enemy territory or deep strikes for air superiority
against his airfields.
I am not saVinig there will not be some of that. But, basically most of
our air would be coilmnitted to battlefield support and battlefield air
superiority.
NUMBER OF WINGS
Senator tOLLIN(S. With respect to your answer. General Jones,
on the matter of wings, as I understood it you said 'we had 26 wings
and we were fleshing out 4. The Department of Defense in its report
talks of the active tactical fighter force being retained at 22 wings.
Tliy have really always talked in terms of 22 wings in all the docu-
nenits we know of. I an trying to get it clear in my mind.
I sonetimnes get tile feeling that some of us do that, perhaps you are
adding four wings and if so, why do you need these new aircraft.

TWENTY-TWO WINGS ASSIGNED TO UNITS
General ,lox:s. The 22 wings calculation is a matter of arithmetic.
Noiliiallv a wing would have 72 aircraft and if you take our aircraft
assigned to units and divide by 72 you would come out a little over 22.

TWENTY-SIX TA(TFICAL FIGHTER WINGS
But w eu you go out and look at the number of tactical fighter
win % we hav-e that are banned with a wing cflimanlder and squadrons
and the organization, we have 26 tactical fighter wings. So what we
are saViiiy is that we would fill out those 26 wings. So it depends on
how you calculate it.

If you add tHie airplanes up and divide by 72 you come out with '22.
With the grtowinr inodernization of the Soviet Air Force-and it is
as (Inilatic iii iiIv 1ind as tlie growth in their sea capability, their
maritime cal)al)ilit v-a (rrowth not only in nmml)ers but in quality
wvith many new aircraft the Soviets have been turning out, our options
were to 0*) for snialler iiuliil)ers including more expensive airplanes
or larger ii uinbers with a mix of inexpensive air)lanes, inexpensive
not oNly in ac(liisition but in operating costs. So that is what we are
talkiiuz about with the 26 wing force, but we will do it within our cur-
rent malnl)owe. within our current management structure, within those
current 26 ving( that are already formed. I guess the point is we are
not going out and activating four new wings with new wino com-
I1iainders and all the base structure and all that goes with it which is
a costly part of it.





(;R IVTI IN SE\ I*I AI1lO\VI:ER


Senator. Will voIl ela) orate ()n tttt I I rwtlh in Soviet air-
)ower. as .yon ('all. for tle coillnittee ? You)l saY it is a u"It~at as
their gro wth in seaplower ?

FOXBAT AN) FLO(A(ER
General ,JoNEs. Yes, sir. 17ntil a few years ago the Soviet) Nir Force
was generally limited to air inter(epotiors. clear weather, fairl y short
range. There were thousands of earlier versions of tile MJ( witl
some limited capability in groundl attack. 'Now with the Foxhat and the
Flc rger, the later M ia's. t her have a far 'greater ralg~e. greater pay-
load. greater radar capabilitv. They have >1helhered miost of tilcir air-
craft in Eastern Europe so that they are not ac vulnerable on the
ground. They have expanded thieir command collt l'ol capability and
liardened it. very substantially. and they have increased their nulileirs
somewhat.
NEW SYSTEMS IN FOiWARI) AREA
But the most dramatic chance was in the qu'alitv of the new aircraft
introduced. par ticularly into the forward area. I[aving jist returned
a year ago last summer from Eumol)e. I cold see the very marked iII-
crease in capability of the XVarsaw Pact but primarily the Soviet Air
Force.
They were introducing the liew svstemls into the forward area w ith
longer range, better 1)avloads. greater offensive capability. gyrea tei
counterneasures--a significant advance.

VLADIV)ST( AK C ORD
Senator TiOLLNUS. What impact onl th~e Soviet strategic force de-
plovment and modernization is expected to result from tile V adi V()s-
tok Accorls. What are the results and Imp)lications for your lplaiimm*i
of the U.S. Air Force?

UNITED ST-ATES SHOULD MAINTAIN PROPER BALANtCE
(ieieral .JONES. I full V1i111llO4t that action of the Ire-i delit <111(1 of i 1e
2,400 ceiling -and hopel'u4l1 sul)sequent negotiations will result iR a
lesser niiliibei'--it is essential that tile [United States Iiallital a ropi'jl
balance. As lon" as the number i- 2,40)-aired to oil both sides. a
undoubttedlv tile Sovlet> will have tile 2.-100-we ill t le Ulited States
should not be appirecialfly sort of that 2,400.
Ave should hIave an obje'1ive to be at the 2.4()0 o- very, very 'lo(-e', it.
Any significant number less than that a utoniaticallv accllues to rieurn a
lpercei red advant'ao'e.

MOI)ERN IZE BOAMBERk FORCE
Our intent would be to niodeniize tlie onmibolr' force witlh the BI-1. to
c'ontinuie woik oli all inllproved iisjile folr tile Aiitemiai, tie 7\I X.
The piessiure. though, on the thiird le+, of the triad, tihe land-l-aved Ihal-







listi( iiissile, is less if we modernize the second leg of the triad, the
l)Olli)er force.
If yon do not FIodernize the bomber force, there is a greater urgency
to do I iiings wittl the missile force. It is interrelated. So we would con-
tinue to modernize with the B-1 and continue some work on the M-X
type missile to replace the Minuteman-not at a high rate of expendi-
ire. but enough to keep the technology going. More work on mobility
o5>l1iilities, air and land inobile missiles.

MOBIL ICBM S
Senator HOLLINGS. Will the mobil ICBM's offer an appropriate
hedge against fixed-sight vulnerability?
General JWNEs. Yes. sir. tiey would. The need though, would de-
pend on how well the other two legs of the triad were doing in effec-
tiveness and survivability.

EFFECT OF SOVIET WARHEADS
Senator HOLLINGS. HOW will the improved accuracy and increasing
nunibers of Soviet warheads affect the survivability of land-based
ICBM1s ?
General JONES. The most critical thing, of course, is accuracy and as
Soviet missiles become more accurate the probability of their being
aible to (lest Vov somie of the M inuteman oees up. I think it will be a
long time before they could disarm the Minuteman force with any
great ass urance. I question whether they will ever be able to achieve
that. blt obviously as they get greater accuracy, the vulnerability of
an illdivi(lual missile goes up. It is very interrelated. The important
point is how well we inodernize the rest of the strategic force.
The criticality of ICBM vulnerability depends on how we modernize
the rest.
STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES
Senator It )LINGS. What will be the effect of the develol)ment and
deployment of tle strategic cruise missiles by either the United States
or the Soviets on the strategic )alance ?
General Jo \N-s. The impact would depend on the numbers and the
conditions ln(tler which they were deployed. If the United States de-
plovedi its cruise missiles, it would be in an attempt to maintain the
balance and to offset some of the advantage the Soviets now have in
mtinbers of missiles. So. we would not be trying to upset a balance, but
to maintain a blalanlce.
B-1 PROGRAM[
Senator I HOLLINGS. Is the B-1 program proceeding fast enough, Gen-
(ral Jones. IIl yo ol)inion ?
General 0m- S. Our concern is twofold. One is when it will come into
ti( opera at ional fleet in the early 1 9S()'s. and the other one is to be able
to 1h:lae t le ill (all nftticient wav.
Wiheni we (zet these so-calied )athtlil)s where we do not get ade-
qiuate financing. and we have to stretch the program out, we lose the
contin-itv of the operation which increases program costs greatly.







That is why we are cotwcerned alboiit t lie sn ia II ami oiint of long-lea(l tin
money, small in coli parisol I with total prograli costs it this year's
budget.
TWO REASNS T) I'ROCEEI)
It is not that we want a coilliitmcnt tllis year to l)ro(hlctioll will the
64 million fiscal 197; dollars, it is to keep from having a loss of colt-
timlity resulting in ilcreased costs of lititdreds of iiil lions of dollars
from disruptingg the program. There are two reasons we would like to
proceed at, a good orderly rate, aIn( one is tie need for the alreraft
from a, strategic stai(lpoint, and we are concerned because it, has been
slilI)ino" duie to lack of funds. Second, we want to be able to manage the
program efficiently.
AMOi N 'I N EDEI) TO IPRO)CEEi)
Senator Ihtoiii It h1as l>eell slipping to what extent ? It yol were
it charge of the tire ) Progra nl nmot o1vy (o01n nmditi it kit coiiorres-
sionaIl3 +I)prolpriat ing for it, how would Ion accelerate it'? Wiat
alolunts (to you \oillneeol to ia e to proceed in -accordice with what you
(deein lecessll ,?
General Jm)NxI. I wo)ild not lrOl)ose thlat we woll1(1 )llt 11115 sV''
'iliiOulit 0 of 10lev iito tri'ing to VO to a fairly lii-h risk proorai.
Would pit a little 1iore lin than is lrobaltyd goino to coile out. of
(omgress, a ml andl wollb sIrulni lt1re a well- iiai a ('l pr gra lii and 1(1fund
it to that level, Is olqposed to havilgo these stretclouts and peaks and
valleys. I will try to get aill oIerati()olt. capa)ility within the early
1980's.
'IIELTERIED AIICAFT IN EUIiOPE
Senator tolAi iN;s. Yoi mentioned the shielteredI liat ire of tie
Soviets' aircraft in IEurope. Wha t ercenita e of the 1Vnited States or
NAT() aircraft arie sheltered in Europe
General JoNv,,s. Seveiitv r)ei'enI is tte ll11ili er tll Iat Iti been estal)-
lisiledl by SHJAP}E tbIat t iey would fiuld for shieltering.
All nations are not up yet to the TO perlcelit, alld we do not have our
ill}2,nllentatiotn forces or om.r airl)lalles il tile I united Kinio>om slielteredI
Yet. So we are olown bIelow the 0-l)ercent Inarik.
A IIIiANE MA N UFA\('TUIRIEII MAIlNTE+NA NO(T lldR(,lAM-

Senator th%>LI Nas. Witi respect to 1ii ai ntelian ce, (ieieral .! you faijil iar with a docninelit by t le A i' Tra sp ort Asso clatiOlt Plc-
pared bv the l lialhilitv and laintainlillitY Suil)-oniitte the III-
llieo~/lIi ,lal/fa c(t 1r rlll.(i 1m n ellancte pro i l' iali1ll liint.g doc' iillelit
(tell( ral JO NES. No. Sil.
Selnat(or II ,I-s. WVill you Imial i his to tie ( iel So lie call ]A( c
\vhat I all asking about I 1ight wallt to llake that p.art of the re<'ord
an(i then have .\-oi exantiii it and for lie re rld later mit Sliil)lilii Yom,
ins wIer.I




















AIRLINE/MANUFACTURER

MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

PLANNING DOCUMENT



MSG-2


Prepared By: R & N Subcommittee
Air Transport Association

Date: March 25, 1970


Air Transport Association of America
1709 New York Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006






29



1.0 GENERAL

1.1 Introduction

Airline and manufacturer experience in developing scheduled
maintenance programs for new aircraft has shown that more
efficient programs can be developed through the use of logical
decision processes. In July, 1968 representatives of various
airlines developed Handbook #MSG-l, "Maintenance Evaluation
and Program Development", which included decision logic and
interairline/manufacturer procedures for developing a maintenance
program for the new Boeing 747 airplane. Subsequently, it was
decided that experience gained on this project should be applied
to update the decision logic and to delete certain 747 detail
procedural information so that a universal document could be
made applicable for later new type aircraft. This has been done
and has resulted in this document, #MSG-2.

1.2 Objective

It is the objective of this document to present a means for de-
veloping a maintenance program which will be acceptable to the
Regulatory Authorities, the Operators, and the Manufacturers.
The maintenance program data will be developed by coordination
with specialists from the operators, manufacturers and when
feasible, the regulatory authority of the country of manufacture.
Specifically it is the objective of this document to outline the
general organization and decision processes for determining the
essential scheduled maintenance requirements for new airplanes.

Historically the initial scheduled maintenance program has been specified
in Maintenance Review Board Documents. This document is intended
to facilitate the development of initial scheduled maintenance
programs. The remaining maintenance, that is non-scheduled or
non-routine maintenance, is directed by the findings of the sched-
uled maintenance program and the normal operation of the aircraft.
The remaining maintenance consists of maintenance actions to cor-
rect discrepancies noted during scheduled maintenance tasks, non-
scheduled maintenance, normal operation, or condition monitoring.

1.3 Scope

The scope of this document shall encompass the maintenance program
for the entire airplane.

1.4 Organization

The organization to carry out the maintenance program development
pertinent to a specific type aircraft shall be staffed by repre-
sentatives of the Airline Operators purchasing the equipment, the
Prime Manufacturers of the airframe and powerplant and when feasible
the Regulatory Authority.


- 1 -










1.4 (Continued)

1.4.1 The management of the maintenance program development
activities shall be accomplished by a Steering Group
composed of members from a representative number of
Operators and a representative of the Prime Airframe and
Engine Manufacturers. It shall be the responsibility of
this group to establish policy, direct the activities of
Working Groups or other working activity, carry out liai-
son with the manufacturer and other operators, prepare
the final program recommendations and represent the op-
erators in contacts with the Regulatory Authority.

1.4.2 A number of Working Groups, consisting of specialist rep-
resentatives from the participating Operators, the Prime
Manufacturer, and when feasible the Regulatory Authority,
may be constituted. The Steering Group, alternatively,
may arrange some other means for obtaining the detailed
technical information necessary to develop recommendations
for maintenance programs in each area. Irrespective of
the organization of the working activity, it must provide
written technical data that support its recommendations to
the Steering Group. After approval by the Steering Group
these analyses and recommendations shall be consolidated
into a final report for presentation to the Regulatory
Authority.

2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS

2.1 Program Requirement

It is necessary to develop a maintenance program for each new type
of airplane prior to its introduction into airline service.

2.1.1 The primary purpose of this document is to develop a pro-
posal to assist the Regulatory Authority to establish an
initial maintenance program for new types of airplanes.
The purpose of this program is to maintain the inherent
design levels of operating safety.* This program becomes
the basis for the first issue of each airline's Operations
Specifications-Maintenance to govern its initial maintenance
policy. These are subject, upon application by individual
airlines, to revisions which may be unique to those air-
lines as operating experience is accumulated.

2.1.2 It is desirable, therefore, to define in some detail:

(a) The objectives of an efficient maintenance program,

(b) The content of an efficient maintenance program, and

(c) The process by which an efficient maintenance program
can be developed.

* See Glossary
-2-








2.1 (Continued)

2.1.3 The Objectives of an efficient airline maintenance program
are:

(a) To prevent deterioration of the inherent design
levels of reliability and operating safety of
the aircraft, and

(b) To accomplish this protection at the minimum
practical costs.

2.1.4 These objectives recognize that maintenance programs, as
such, cannot correct deficiencies in the inherent design
levels of flight equipment reliability. The maintenance
program can only prevent deterioration of such inherent
levels. If the inherent levels are found to be unsatis-
factory, engineering action is necessary to obtain improve-
ment.

2.1.5 The maintenance program itself consists of two types of
tasks:

(a) A group of scheduled tasks to be accomplished at
specified intervals. The objective of these tasks
is to prevent deterioration of the inherent design
levels of aircraft reliability, and

(b) A group of non-scheduled tasks which results from:

(i) The scheduled tasks accomplished at
specified intervals,

(ii) Reports of malfunctions (usually originated
by the flight crew), or

(iii) Condition Monitoring.

The objective of these non-scheduled tasks is to restore
the equipment to its inherent level of reliability.

2.1.5.1 This document describes procedures for developing
the scheduled maintenance program. Non-scheduled
maintenance results from scheduled tasks, normal
operation or condition monitoring.

2.1.6 Maintenance programs generally include one or more of the
following primary maintenance processes:

Hard Time Limit: A maximum interval for performing
maintenance tasks. These intervals
usually apply to overhaul, but also apply to
total life of parts or units.


- 3 -










2.1 (Continued)

On Condition: Repetitive inspections, or tests to
determine the condition of units or
systems or portions of structure. (Ref.:
FAA Advisory Circular 121-1).

Condition Monitoring: For items that have neither hard time
limits nor on condition maintenance
as their primary maintenance process. Condition mon-
itoring is accomplished by appropriate means available
to an operator for finding and resolving problem
areas. These means range from notices of un-
usual problems to special analysis of unit
performance. No specific monitoring system
is implied for any given unit. (Ref.: FAA
Procedures 8810.4, paragraph 3033).

This document results in scheduled tasks that fit the
hard time limit or on condition maintenance programs
or, where no tasks are specified, the item is included
in condition monitoring.


2.2 Scheduled Maintenance Program Content

The tasks in a scheduled maintenance program may include:

(a) Servicing

(b) Inspection

(c) Testing

(d) Calibration

(e) Replacement

2.2.1 An efficient program is one which schedules only those
tasks necessary to meet the stated objectives. It does
not schedule additional tasks which will increase main-
tenance costs without a corresponding increase in relia-
bility protection.

2.2.2 The development of a scheduled maintenance program re-
quires a very large number of decisions pertaining to:

(a) Which individual tasks are necessary,

(b) How frequently these tasks should be scheduled,

(c) What facilities are required to enable these
tasks to be accomplished,


- 4 -










2.2 (Continued)


(d) Where these facilities should be located, and

(e) Which tasks should be accomplished concurrently
in the interests of economy.

2.3 Aircraft System/Component Analysis Method

The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance
program for systems and components (parts a and b of Paragraph
2.2.2) uses decision diagrams. These diagrams are the basis of
an evaluatory process applied to each system and its significant
items using technical data provided (Ref. 2.7). Principally, the
evaluations are based on the systems' and items' functions and
failure modes. The purpose is to:

a) Identify the systems and their significant items*.

b) Identify their functions*, failure modes* and failure
effects*.

c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential
effectiveness* relative to the control of operational
reliability*.

d) Assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks having
potential effectiveness.

2.3.1 It should be noted that there is a difference between
"potential" effectiveness of a task versus the "desir-
ability" of including this task in the scheduled main-
tenance program. The approach taken in the following
procedure is to plot a path whereby a final judgment can
be made as to whether those potentially effective tasks
are worthy of inclusion in an initial maintenance program
for a new airplane.

2.3.2 There are 3 decision diagrams provided (Appendix I, Figures
I thru 3). Figure 1 is used to determine scheduled main-
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness relative to
the control of operational reliability. This determines
tasks which can be done.

Figures 2 and 3 are used to assess the desirability of
scheduling those tasks having potential effectiveness.

Figure 2 tasks must be done to prevent direct adverse
effects on operating safety and to assure availability
of hidden functions.

Figure 3 tasks should be done for economic value.


* See Glossary.








2.3 (Continued)

2.3.3 The total analysis process is shown diagramatically
below. See Appendix I for details.


2.3.4 The following guidelines encourage consideration of failure
consequences and the potential effectiveness of scheduled
maintenance tasks. In those cases where failure conse-
quences are purely economic, the guidelines lead to con-
sideration of both the cost of the scheduled maintenance
and the value of the benefits which will result from the
task.


- 6 -






:35



2.3 (Continued)

2.3.5 A decision tree diagram (Figure 1 of Appendix 1) facilitates
the definition of scheduled maintenance tasks having poten-
tial effectiveness. There are five key questions.

Note: Questions (a), (b), & (c) must be answered for each
failure mode, question (d) for each function, and
question (e) for the item as a whole.

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance* detectable by
routine flight crew monitoring*?

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
in situ maintenance or unit test?

(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect
upon operating safety? (See Appendix 2)

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the
flight crew? (See Appendix 3)

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and
reliability?

2.3.6 Each question should be answered in isolation, e.g. in
question (c) all tasks which prevent direct adverse ef-
fects on operating safety must be listed. This may re-
sult in the same task being listed for more than one
question.

2.3.7 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, this means there
are methods available through monitoring of the normal
in-flight instrumentation to detect incipient conditions
before undesirable system effects occur. A Yes answer
does not require a maintenance task. If the answer is
No, there is no in-flight monitoring which can detect
reduction in failure resistance. This question is meant
to refer to the flight crews' ability to detect deterio-
rating calibration or system operation before a failure
occurs. NOTE: Tasks resulting from in-flight monitoring
are part of non-scheduled maintenance.

2.3.8 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, it means there is a
maintenance task, not requiring item disassembly, that has
potential effectiveness in detecting incipient conditions*
before undesirable system effects occur. Tasks may include
inspection, servicing, testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks result-
ing from a Yes answer to question (b) are part of the On
Condition maintenance program.


* See Glossary.


- 7 -










2.3 (Continued)

2.3.9 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this failure mode
has a direct, adverse effect on operating safety. It
is necessary to examine the mechanism of failure and
identify the single cells or simple assemblies where
the failure initiates. Specific total time, total flight
cycle, time since overhaul or cycle since overhaul limi-
tations may be assigned these single cells or simple
assemblies and the probability of operational failures
will be minimized. Examples of these actions are turbine
engine disc limits, airplane flap link life limits, etc.
In many cases, these limits must be based upon manufac-
turer's development testing. Fortunately, there is only
a small number of failure modes which have a direct,
adverse effect on operating safety. This results from
the fact that failure mode analyses are conducted through-
out the process of flight equipment design. In most cases,
it is possible after identification of such a failure mode
to make design changes (redundancy, incorporation of pro-
tective devices, etc.) which eliminate its direct adverse
effect upon operating safety. If no potentially effective
task exists, then the deficiency in design must be referred
back to the manufacturer. The term "direct adverse effect
upon operating safety" is explained in Appendix 2. NOTE:
Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) are part of
either the Hard Time limitation maintenance program, or the On
Condition maintenance program.
2.3.10 Refer to Appendix 3 for explanation of question (d). If
the answer to question (d) is Yes, periodic ground test
or shop tests may be required if there is no other way of
ensuring that there is a high probability of the hidden
function being available when required. The frequencies
of these tests are associated with failure consequences
and anticipated failure probability. A component cannot
be considered to have a hidden function if failure of
that function results in a system malfunction which is
evident to the flight crew during normal operations. In
this case, the answer must be No. NOTE: Tasks resulting
from a Yes answer to question (d) may be part of either
the Hard Time limitation or the On Condition maintenance
program.

2.3.11 If the answer to question (e) is Yes, periodic overhaul
may be an effective way of controlling reliability.
Whether or not a fixed overhaul time limit will indeed
be effective can be determined only by actuarial analysis
of operating experience. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a
Yes answer to question (e) are part of the Hard Time
limitation maintenance program.


- 8 -










2.3 (Continued)

2.3.12 It has been found that overall measures of reliability of
complex components, such as the premature removal rate,
usually are not functions of the age of these components.
In most cases, therefore, the answer to question (e) is
No. In this event, scheduled overhaul cannot improve op-
erating reliability. Engineering action is the only means
of improving reliability. These components should be op-
erated, therefore, without scheduled overhaul. NOTE:
Systems or items which require no scheduled tasks are in-
cluded in Condition Monitoring.

2.3.13 The preceding paragraph is contrary to the common belief
that each component has an unique requirement for sched-
uled maintenance in order to protect its inherent level
of reliability. The validity of this belief was first
challenged by actuarial analyses of the life histories
of various components. More recently, the correctness
of the preceding paragraph has been overwhelmingly demon-
strated by the massive operational experience of many
airlines with many different types of components covered
by Reliability Programs complying with FAA Advisory Cir-
cular 120-17.

2.3.14 It is possible to change the answers to the five questions
in the decision diagram by improved technology. It is
hoped that Aircraft Integrated Data Systems (AIDS), for
example, will reliably indicate reduced resistance to
various modes of failure of many components during normal
airline operations. If this is determined to be possible,
many "No" answers to questions (a) and (b) will become
"Yes" answers. Answers may also be changed by various
developments in the field of non-destructive test tech-
niques, built-in test equipment, etc.

2.3.15 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine main-
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness for possible
inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. However,
it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial
scheduled tasks would not be "desirable" even though such
tasks could improve reliability. This might be true when
operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost of
the scheduled maintenance task is greater than the value
of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of com-
ponent premature removal, reduced incidence of departure
delays, etc. Additional diagrams are used to assess the
"desirability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which
have potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by
Figures 2 and 3 of Appendix 1.


- 9 -









2.3 (Continued)


2.3.16 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because
of operating safety or hidden function considerations.
Figure 3 selects those tasks which should be done because
of economic considerations.

2.3.17 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of
questions c and d in Figure 1, and selects those tasks
which must be done.

2.3.18 For the operating safety question, at least one task must
be listed for each failure mode having a Yes answer to
question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be given
for any question c tasks not selected.

2.3.19 For the hidden function question, normally at least one
task must be listed for each hidden function having a Yes
answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is not selected,
as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation must be provided.

2.3.20 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers in
Figure 1, questions b and e and select those tasks which
should be done because of economic considerations.

2.3.21 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and
applicable data* show desirability of scheduled task?"
A "Yes" answer is appropriate if there is:

(1) Prior knowledge from other aircraft that the
scheduled maintenance tasks had substantial
evidence of being truly effective and economically
worthwhile, and

(2) The system/component configurations of the old and
new airplanes are sufficiently similar to conclude
that the task will be equally effective for the
new airplane.

2.3.22 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch" refers to
whether the item will be on the Minimum Equipment List
(MEL).

2.3.23 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure
> 0.5 Hr." refers to whether corrective action can be
accomplished without a delay during a no ml transit stop.

2.3.24 When a task "requires evaluation" it is tant that
the frequency of the failure and the cost of carrying
out the task are taken into consideration.


* See Glossary.
10 -










2.4 Aircraft Structure Analysis Method

The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance
program for structure is:

a) Identify the significant structural items.*

b) Identify their failure modes and failure effects.

c) Assess the potential effectiveness of scheduled in-
spections of structure.

d) Assess the desirability of those inspections of
structure which do have potential effectiveness.

2.4.1 The static structure will be treated as hereafter described.
Additionally, the mechanical elements of structural com-
ponents, such as doors, emergency exits, and flight control
surfaces will be treated individually by the processes de-
scribed in Section 2.3.

2.4.2 The decision tree diagram, Figure 1 of Appendix 1, facil-
itates the definition of scheduled inspections of structure
having potential effectiveness. There are five key questions.

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
routine flight crew monitoring?

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
in situ maintenance or unit test?

(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect
upon operating safety?

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the
flight crew?

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and
reliability?

2.4.3 The answer to question (a) is normally No. However, if
in-flight instrumentation is developed which permits de-
tection of incipient structural failures then the answer
could be Yes.

2.4.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there are methods
available to detect incipient conditions before undesir-
able conditions occur. It would be expected that all
redundant external and internal structure would be in
this category. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer
to question (b) are part of the Structural Inspection
program. This program is an On Condition program.
* See Glossary.


- 11






40



2.4 (Continued)

2.4.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, there is a failure
mode which has a-direct, adverse effect on operating safety
for which there is no effective incipient failure detection
method. It would be expected that non-redundant primary
structure would be in this category. See Appendix 2 for
explanation of "direct adverse effect on operating safety".
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c)
are part of the Hard Time limitation (usually total time
or total cycle limits) maintenance program.

2.4.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function
required of this element of structure that is not regularly
used during normal flight operations. Some inspection or
test is therefore necessary to ensure that this function
has a high probability of being available when required.
Tail bumper structure and structure provided for wheels
up landing are typical structural examples. NOTE: Tasks
resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) are part of
the Structural Inspection program.

2.4.7 Structures would be expected to have a Yes answer to ques-
tion (e) but only in a very long total time envelope. The
tasks performed as a result of Yes answers to the other
questions are capable of detecting deterioration prior to
failure of these items.

2.4.8 It is probable that some of these "potentially" beneficial
scheduled inspections would not be desirable, even if such
tasks would improve reliability. This might be true when
airworthiness is not affected by failure and the cost of
the scheduled inspection is greater than the value of the
resulting benefits. Therefore, additional diagrams are
used to assess the desirability of those scheduled tasks
which have potential effectiveness. This is accomplished
by Figures 2, 4 and 5 of Appendix 1. A No answer to all
questions is unlikely for structure. If it occurs, the
item is included in Condition Monitoring.

2.4.9 Figure 2 selects those tasks that must be done because of
operating safety or hidden function considerations.

2.4.10 Figures 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 establish internal and external
class numbers for structural items. The class numbers take
into account vulnerability to failure, consequences of failure.
The class numbers are to be used as guides for setting internal
and external inspection frequencies.

2.4.11 The items to be evaluated by Figures 4 and 5 are those termed
"structurally significant".


- 12 -











2.4 (Continued)

2.4.12 Each item is first rated for each of five characteristics
per Figure 4 (fatigue resistance, corrosion resistance,
crack propagation resistance, degree of redundancy and
fatigue test rating).

2.4.13 Each item is then given an overall rating (R No.) per
Figure 4 which considers all of the above ratings and
combines them by judgment into a single overall rating
(R No.) representing a relative level of structural in-
tegrity of the item. In general, the overall R No. for
an item is equal to or less than the fatigue resistance
or corrosion resistance rating for the item, whichever
is lesser.

2.4.14 The internal and external class numbers for each item are
then determined by reference to Figure 5. Note that some
items have both internal and external class numbers. This
occurs for those internal items which have some probability
of the internal item's condition being evident by some ex-
ternal condition. In these cases the item as described is
visible internally and the "internal" inspection specified
refers to the item as described. The "external" inspection
of this item refers to that portion of the external struc-
ture which is adjacent to the internal item and which may
yield some indication of the internal item's condition.
Therefore, when an external inspection is specified for
an internal item it refers to the adjacent external struc-
ture and not the internal item itself.

2.5 Aircraft Engine Analysis Method

The method for determining the content of the scheduled engine
maintenance program is:

a) Identify the systems and their significant items.

b) Identify their functions, failure modes and failure
effects.

c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential
effectiveness relative to the control of operational
reliability.

d) Assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks having
potential effectiveness.

e) Determine initial sampling thresholds where appropriate.

2.5.1 The engine as a whole and each significant engine item
will be treated as described below.


- 13 -











2.5 (Continued)

2.5.2 The decision tree diagram, Figure 1 of Appendix 1, facil-
itates the definition of scheduled inspections having
potential effectiveness. There are five key questions.

NOTE: Questions (a), (b), and (c) must be answered for
each failure mode, question (d) for each function,
and question (e) for the item as a whole.

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
routine flight crew monitoring?

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
in situ maintenance or unit test?

(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect
upon operating safety?

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the
flight crew?

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and
reliability?

2.5.3 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, there are methods
available through monitoring the normal in-flight instru-
mentation (including computerized Flight Log Monitoring)
to detect incipient conditions before undesirable system
effects occur. A Yes answer does not require a maintenance
task. If the answer is No, there is no in-flight monitor-
ing which can detect reduction in failure resistance.
NOTE: Tasks resulting from in-flight monitoring are part
of non-scheduled maintenance.

2.5.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there is a maintenance
task, not requiring engine dis-assembly, that has potential
effectiveness in detecting incipient conditions before un-
desirable system effects occur. Tasks may include inspec-
tion, servicing, testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks resulting from
Yes answers to question (b) are part of the On Condition
maintenance program.

2.5.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this engine component
has a failure mode with direct, adverse effect on operating
safety. It is necessary to examine the mechanism of failure
and identify the single cells or simple assemblies where the
failure initiated. Specific total time, or total flight
cycle, limitations may be assigned these components to
minimize the probability of operational failures. NOTE:
Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question c) are
part of either the Hard Time limitation maintenance program,
or the On Condition maintenance program.


- 14 -










2.5 (Continued)

2.5.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function
required of this engine component that is not evident to
the flight crew when the component fails. Some scheduled
task may be necessary to assure a reasonably high proba-
bility that this function is available when required.
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (d)
may be part of either the Hard Time limitation or the
On Condition maintenance program.

2.5.7 It is expected that the answer to question (e) is always
Yes for structural engine components, but that their
expected life is very long relative to the usual engine
inspection periods. If tasks defined by questions (a)
through (d) are inadequate to control wear or deteriora-
tion of engine components, additional tasks should be
listed here. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer
to question (e) are part of either the Hard Time limitation
or the On Condition maintenance program.

2.5.8 Engine components for which no scheduled tasks are selected
are included in Condition Monitoring.

2.5.9 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine main-
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness for possible
inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. However,
it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial
scheduled tasks would not be "desirable" even though such
tasks could improve reliability. This might be true when
operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost
of the scheduled maintenance task is greater than the value
of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of component
premature removal, reduced incidence of departure delays,
etc. Additional diagrams are used to assess the "desir-
ability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which have
potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by Figures
2 and 3 of Appendix 1.

2.5.10 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because of
operating safety or hidden function considerations. Figure
3 selects those tasks which should be done because of
economic considerations.

2.5.11 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of
questions c and d in Figure 1, and selects those tasks
which must be done.

2.5.12 For the operating safety question, at least one task must
be listed for each failure mode having a Yes answer to
question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be given
for any question c tasks not selected.


- 15 -







44



2.5 (Continued)

2.5.13 For the hidden function question, normally at least one
task must be listed for each hidden function having a
Yes answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is.not
selected, as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation
must be provided.

2.5.14 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers
in Figure 1, questions (b) and (e) and selects those
tasks which should be done because of economic consider-
ations.
2.5.15 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and
applicable data show desirability of scheduled task?"

A "Yes" answer is appropriate if there is:

(1) Prior knowledge from other aircraft that the
scheduled maintenance tasks had substantial
evidence of being truly effective and econom-
ically worthwhile, and

(2) The system/component configurations of the old
and new airplanes are sufficiently similar to
conclude that the task will be equally effective
for the new airplane.

2.5.16 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch" refers to
whether the item will be on the Minimum Equipment List
(MEL). The answer to question (b) is expected to always
be Yes for engine components that cause engine failure.

2.5.17 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure
> 0.5 Hr." refers to whether corrective action can be
accomplished without a delay during a normal transit stop.

2.5.18 When a task "requires evaluation" it is important that
the frequency of the failure and the cost of carrying
out the task are taken into consideration.

2.5.19 Engine tasks are included in the Threshold Sampling main-
tenance program. This program is described below.

2.5.20 The Threshold Sampling maintenance program is intended to
recognize the On Condition design characteristics of
modern Turbo-Jet engines, while sampling to control re-
liability. This program uses repetitive sampling to
determine:

1) The condition of engine components.

2) The advisability for continued operation to the
next sampling limit, and


- 16 -










2.5 (Continued)


3) The next sampling limit, threshold, or sampling
band.

2.5.21 Initial sampling thresholds are based on:

1) The design of the engine under study, the results
of developmental testing, and prior service ex-
perience,

2) The results of previous engine programs,

3) The fact that samples are available from engines
removed for all causes at virtually all ages. This
means that knowledge of the condition of engines
is available over the complete continuum of time
from start of operation to the highest time ex-
perienced, and

4) The fact that most engine design problems become
apparent and can be controlled well within any
established limits or thresholds.

2.5.22 The Threshold Sampling program establishes the initial
sampling threshold. Operators are subsequently responsible
for:
1) Evaluating the samples obtained from the initial
threshold,

2) Determining the next sampling threshold, and

3) Determining the number to be sampled at the next
threshold.

2.5.23 Threshold Sampling is normally accomplished by inspecting
the parts or systems of engines that are removed and ac-
cessible in the shop. These engines provide samples over
a full range of ages without waiting for the threshold to
be reached. The results of inspecting these samples are
used to determine the future program. When samples are
not available from engines that are in the shop, sched-
uled samples or in situ inspections may be required.

2.6 Program Development Administration

Regulatory Authority participation is encouraged as early and as
thoroughly as possible in all phases of working group activity.
It is recognized that the Regulatory Authority will later be
asked to approve the proposed program resulting from these efforts.
Therefore, the Regulatory Authority participation must necessarily


- 17 -






46



2.6 (Continued)

be restricted to technical participation, contributing their own
knowledge, and observing the activities of the working group.
Regulatory Authority approval of working group recommendations
is not implied by the participation of Regulatory Authority
members in working group sessions. The following activity
phases will apply.
Phase I. Steering Group general familiarization
training.

Phase II. a) Working Group or Working Activity Training.

b) Preparation of first draft Significant Items
List. (Ref. 2.7.1)

c) Establish functions and failure modes ap-
plicable to the Significant Items.

d) Preparation of Figures 1 thru 5 decision
diagram replies and supporting data for each
system and significant item.

Phase III. a) Evaluation of manufacturer's technical data and
recommended tasks by the Working Groups' air-
line personnel and meeting with manufacturer to
make necessary revisions and prepare task recom-
mendations.

b) Development of task frequency recommendations.
(This phase is meant to follow Phase III. a).

NOTE: A Steering Group member should participate
in all Phase III activity.

Phase IV. Presentation to Steering Group (meeting with
each Working Group or Activity Chairman).

Phase V. Preparation and presentation of the Steering
Group's proposal to the Regulatory Authority.

2.7 Supporting Technical Data

The following supporting technical data will be provided in
printed form, together with adequate cross-references on the
records of replies to the decision diagrams.


Steering Committee audits are required for these steps before proceeding.


- 18 -










2.7 (Continued)

2.7.1 Maintenance Significant Items List

This list will include by ATA System, the name, quantity
per airplane, prime manufacturer part number. vendor
name and Dart number for each item considered by the
Working Group/Activity to require individual analysis.

2.7.2 Significant Items Data

a) Description of each significant item and its
function(s).

b) Listing of its failure mode(s) and effects.

c) Expected failure rate.

d) Hidden functions.

e) Need to be on M.E.L.

f) Redundancy (may be unit, system or system
management).

g) Potential indications of reduced failure
resistance.

2.7.3 System Data

a) Description of each system and its function(s).

b) Listing of any failure modes and effects not con-
sidered in item data.

c) Hidden functions not considered in item data.


- 19 -












GLOSSARY


Inherent Level of Reliability and Safety That level which is built into the unit
and therefore inherent in its design. This
is the highest level of reliability and safety that can be expected from a
unit, system or aircraft. To achieve higher levels of reliability gen-
erally requires modification or redesign.

Maintenance Significant Items Those maintenance items that are judged by
the manufacturer to be relatively the most
important from a safety or reliability standpoint, or from an
economic standpoint.

Structural Significant Items Those local areas of primary structure which
are judged by the manufacturer to be relatively
the most important from a fatigue or corrosion vulnerability stand-
point or from a failure effects standpoint.

Operational Reliability The ability to perform the required functions within
acceptable operational standards for the time period
specified.

Effective Incipient Failure Detection That maintenance action which will
reliably detect incipient failures
if they exist. That is, detect the pending failure of a unit or
system before that system fails. For example, detection of turbine
blade cracks prior to blade failure.

Real and Applicable Data Those data about real, operating hardware that is
similar enough to the hardware under discussion
to be applicable to the design of maintenance programs for the cur-
rent hardware.

Reduction in Failure Resistance The deterioration of inherent (design)
levels of reliability. As failure resis-
tance reduces, failures increase; resulting in lower reliability.
If reduction in failure resistance can be detected, maintenance
can be performed prior to the point where reliability is adversely
affected.

Function The characteristic actions of units, systems and aircraft.

Failure Modes The ways in which units, systems and aircraft deteriorate
and can be considered to have failed.

FaiLure Effects The consequence of failure.

Potential Effectiveness Capable of being effective (maintenance action)
to some degree,


- 20 -











GLOSSARY (Continued)


Routine Flight Crew Monitoring That monitoring that is inherent in normally
operating the aircraft. For example, the
pre-flight check list, or the normal operation of the aircraft and
its components. Does not include monitoring of "back-up" equipment
that is normally not tested as a part of a normal flight.


- 21 -









APPENDIX I



AIRPLANE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT







M$G'2 DECISION DIAGRAM

FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3
WHICH TASKS CAN BE DONE WHICH TASKS MUST BE DONE WHICH TASKS SHOULD BE DONE

QUESTIONS a ,b bc APPLY TO EACH FAILURE MODE QUESTION I APPLIES TO c TASKS QUESTION A, B & C APPLY TO
OF ITEM QUESTION II APPLIES TO d TASKS b AND e TASKS
QUESTION D APPLIES TO EACH FUNCTION OF ITEM
QUESTION e APPLIES TO ITEM AS A WHOLE
8
IS REDUCTION IN
FAILURE RESIST, L
TANCE DETECTABLE LIST OF MEANS OF
BY ROUTINE IN FLIGHT
FLIGHT CREW MONITORING
MONITORING? ,eYES-0.

b% NO-
b

IS REDUCTION IN TIAL TASKS REF. TO
FAILURE RESIS REDUCT IN FAILURE
TANCE DETECTABLE RESISTANCE (CHECK,
BY IN SITU MTCE. INSPECT SERVICE,
OR UrIT TEST? drYES ETC)

c %-NO-
DOES FAILURE LIST ALL POTENTIAL WHICH OF THE TASKS RE. I

MODE HAVE A TASKS REF. TO FERRING TO OPERATING
DIRECT AD. OPERATING SAFETY SAFETY MUST BE DONE ?
VERSE EFFECT (TOTAL TIME LIMITS, AT LEAST ONE TASK MUST A a C
ON OPERATING CHECK. INSPECT, BE DONE. EXPLAIN ANY
SAFETY? ,YES4* ETC,) TASKS NOT SELECTED. DOES REAL AND IS ELAPSED
I (APPLICABLE DOES TIME FOR DISPOSITION
%-NO- II DATA SHOW FAILURE CORRECTION OF TASK
d DESIRABILITY OF PREVENT OF FAILURE RELATIVE TO

LIST ALL POTENTIAL WHICH OF THE TASKS RE. I SCHEDULED TASK? DISPATCH? >01 HOUR' PROGRAM
IS THE FUNCTION TASKS REF. TO HERRING TO HIDDEN
HIDDEN FROM THE HIDDEN FUNCTION FUNCTION MUST BE DONE'
VIEWPOINT OF THE (CHECK. INSPECT AT LEAST ONE TASK MUST Y
FLIGHT CREW) ETC1 BE DONE EXCEPT AS PER
YES EC MITTED BY APP. 3Y

%-NO-- ..YES- REQUIRES
VERSE~~~~EALATO REAIN EIDC,,E >
IS THERE AN ADE VU
VERSE RELATION- PERIODIC--------------------
SHIP BETWEEN 0
. . NO- OMIT :j I
AGE & OVERHAUL NOoN' IO OI
RELIABILITY? eYES* 091"

1, 2-2-7 %-NO-- "NO- OMIT l-4









APPENDIX I Figure 4






AIRLINE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT




STRUCTURE ANALYSIS METHOD




1 2 3 4


FATIGUE
RESISTANCE


CORROSION,
RESISTANCE
0INCL. STRESS
CORROSION)


CRACK
PROPAGATION
RESISTANCE




DEGREE OF
REDUNDANCY



FATIGUE
TEST RATING



OVERALL
RA I IN(G
NUMBER R
IR


AN INDICATION OF THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE ITEM RELATIVE TO THE FATIGUE
DESIGN GOAt FOR THE OVERAEl AIRPLANE

SMALL MARGIN ABOVE FAIR MARGIN I CONSIDERABLE MARGINI HIGH MARGIN ABOVE
DESIGN GOAL ABOVE DESIGN GOALI ABOVE DESIGN GOAL DESIGN GOAL

AN INDICATION OF THE RELATIVE CORROSION RESISTANCE OF THE ITEM, CONSIDERING
BOTH EXPOSURE AND PROTECTION


LEAST MARGIN OF
RESISTANCE


FAIR MARGIN OF
RESISTANCE


CONSIDERABLE MARGIN HIGHEST MARGIN OF
OF RESISTANCE RESISTANCE


+


AN INDICATION OF THE RELATIVE ABILITY OF THE MATERIAL USED TO RESIST PROPAGATION
OF CRACKS


LEAST MARGIN OF FAIR MARGIN OF j CONSIDERABLE MARGIN HIGHEST MARGIN OF
RESISTANCE RESISTANCE I OF RESISTANCE RESISTANCE
(HI HEAT TREAT STEEL) (7000 SERIES ALUM I (TITANIUM) (2000 SERIES ALUM.)


AN INDICATION OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE ITEM IS BACKED UP BY
REDUN[)ANT STRUCTURE

SMALL HIGH

WILL THE LOADS APPLIED TO THE ITEM IN THE FULL SCALE FATIGUE TEST PROPERLY
REPRESENT LOADS PREDICTED FOR SERVICE JSAGF


NO i


I YES


A RATING WHICH CONSIDERS ALL THE ABOVE RATINGS AND COMBINES THEM BY JUDGEMENT
INTO A SINGLE OVERAtL RATING WHICH REPRESENTS A RELATIVE LEVEL OF THE STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY )F THi ITEM


THIS PORTION OF CHART
TO BE EXECUTED FOR EACH
ITEM WHICH HAS BEEN
DESIGNATED AS "STRUC-
TURALLY SIGNIFICANT"


THIS RATING NO IS
ASSIGNED TO ALL OTHER
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
STRUCTURE WHICH IS NOT
STRUCTURALLY SIGNIFICANT
5


" 0-






APPENDIX I ., gure 5


AIRLINE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURE DETECTABILITY EVALUATION
THIS CHART CONVERTS OVERALL RATING (R) TO INTERNAL & EXTERNAL CLASS NUMBERS


STRUCTURALLY SIGNIFICANT ITEMS
(EX) EXTERNAL ITEMS ........
(IN) INTERNAL ITEMS:
HIGH PROBABILITY OF EXTERNAL DETECTABILITY OF ITEMS CONDITION
BY FUEL LEAK OR VISUAL CONDITION OF ADJACENT EXTERNAL ITEM _
LOW PROBABILITY OF DITTO--, -
NO EXTERNAL DETECTABILITY OF ITEM'S CONDITION
SINCE NO ADJACENT ITEMS ARE VISIBLE EXTERNALLY

ALL OTHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY STRUCTURAL
ITEMS WHICH ARE NOT STRUCT. SIGNIFICANT


(EX) EXTERNAL ITEMS
(IN) INTERNAL ITEMS


A
INTERNAL
CLASS NO.
NONE


R+I
R
R


-NONE


B
EX. CLASS NO.
IF >10 ABOVE GROUND
IN NON FUEL AREA
R

R
R+I
NONE



5
NONE


C
EX. CLASS NO.
IF <10 ABOVE GROUND
ORIN FUEL AREA
R+1


R+I
R+I
NONE


5
NONE


erfAWI. MEANS THERE IS VISUAL
ACCESSIBILITY WITHOUT DETACHING
ANY PARTS (INCL.ACCESS PANELS) FROM
THE AIRPLANE, AND INCLUDES CONTROL
SURFACE DEFLECTION AS REQUIRED


IV/A'M4L MEANS THERE IS VISUAL
ACCESSIBILITY ONLY BY DETACHING
REMOVABLE PARTS OR BY RADIOGRAPHIC
MEANS


10 WHERE VISUAL ACCESSIBILITY
EXISTS SIMPLY BY REMOVAL OF AN
ACCESS PLATE AND NO ADDITIONAL
DETACHMENT OF PARTS IS NECESSARY
TO GAIN VISUAL ACCESS


'
l &
m x












APPENDIX 2


The following elaborates on the term "direct and adverse effect on operating
safety".

During the design process considerable attention is given to system
and component failure effect analysis to ensure that failures that
result in loss of function do not immediately jeopardize operating
safety. In many cases, redundancy can cause the consequences of a
first failure to be benign. In other cases, protective devices serve
this purpose. Although it may not be possible to continue to dispatch
the airplane without correcting the failure and although it may indeed
be desirable to make an unscheduled landing after failure, the failure
cannot be considered to have an immediate adverse effect upon operating
safety. The inclusion of the word direct in the phrase "direct adverse
effect upon operating safety" means an effect which results from a
specific failure mode occurring by itself and not in combination with
other possible failure modes.

Certification requirements ensure that a transport category aircraft
has very few failure modes which have a direct adverse effect upon
operating safety.


- 25 -













APPENDIX 3


EXPLANATION OF HIDDEN FUNCTIONS


A component is considered to have a "hidden function" if either of the follow-
ing exists:

1. The component has a function which is normally active whenever the
system is used, but there is no indication to the flight crew when
that function ceases to perform.

2. The component has a function which is normally inactive and there
is no prior indication to the flight crew that the function will
not perform when called upon. The demand for active performance
will usually follow another failure and the demand may be activated
automatically or manually.

Lxamples of components possessing hidden functions exist in a bleed air system.
A bleed air temperature controller normally controls the bleed air temperature
to a maximum of 4000F. In addition, there is a pylon shutoff valve which in-
corporates a secondary temperature control, should the temperature exceed 4000F.
A duct overheat switch is set to warn the flight crew of a temperature above
4800F, in which event they can shut off the air supply from the engine by
actuating the pylon shutoff valve switch. There is no duct temperature
indicator.

The bleed air temperature controller has a hidden active function of control-
ling the air temperature. Since there is a secondary temperature control in
the pylon valve and since there is no duct temperature indicator, the flight
crew has no indication of when the temperature control function ceases to be
performed by the temperature controller. Also, the flight crew has no in-
dication prior to its being called into use that the secondary temperature
control function of the pylon valve will perform. Therefore, the pylon valve
has a hidden inactive function. For a similar reason, the duct overheat
warning system has a hidden inactive function. And the pylon valve has a
hidden inactive function (manual shutoff) since at no time in normal use
does the flight crew have to manually close the valve.

The hidden function definition includes reference to "no indications to the
flight crew" of performance of that function. If there are indications to
the flight crew, the function is evident (unhidden). However, to qualify
as an evident function, these indications must be obvious to the flight crew
during their normal duties, without special monitoring (bear in mind, however,
that special monitoring is encouraged as a part of the maintenance program to
make hidden functions into evident ones).

It is recognized that, in the performance of their normal duties, the flight
crews operate some systems full time, others once or twice per flight, and
others less frequently. All of these duties, providing they are done at some
reasonable frequency, qualify as "normal". It means, for example, that al-
though an anti-icing system is not used every flight it is used with sufficient


- 26 -








55



APPENDIX 3 (Continued)


frequency to qualify as a "normal" duty. Therefore, the anti-icing system
can be said to have an evident (unhidden) function from a flight crew's
standpoint. On the other hand, certain "emergency" operations which are
done at very infrequent periods (less than once per month) such as emergency
gear extension, fuel dump actuation, etc. cannot be considered to be suf-
ficiently frequent to warrant classification as evident (unhidden) functions.

The analysis method requires that all hidden functions have some form of
scheduled maintenance applied to them. However, in those cases where it
may be difficult to check the operation of hidden functions, it is accept-
able to assess the operating safety effects of combined failures of the
hidden function with a second failure which brings the hidden function
failure to the attention of the flight crew. In the event the combined
failures do not produce a direct adverse effect on operating safety, then
the decision whether to apply maintenance to check the pertinent hidden
function becomes an economic decision to be considered by Figure 3 of
Appendix 1.

Note also, in some cases, it is acceptable to accomplish hidden function
checks of removable components during unscheduled shop visits, providing
the component has at least one other function which when failed is known
to the flight crew and which causes the unit to be sent to the shop. Also,
the hidden function failure mode should have an estimated reliability well
in excess of the total reliability of the other functions that are evident
to the flight crew.


- 27 -







[The following was subsequently supplied for the record by General
Jones :]
AIR FORCE RESPONSE TO "AIRLINE/MANUFACTURER MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
PLANNING DOCUMENT"
Upon examination of the document submitted, we find it to be the Airline/
Manufacturer Maintenance Planning Document, MSG-2, which the Air Force
has used since early 1975 as a planning guide for establishing aircraft inspection
requirements.
The MSG-2 document outlines engineering analysis methodology and a de-
cision tree logic for establishing scheduled maintenance requirements. Applica-
tion of these techniques requires detailed knowledge of aircraft design, the
engineering ability to identify structurally and functionally significant items
and accomplishment of a failure modes and effects analysis. The end results of
this effort are consistently traceable engineering decisions on what portions of
the aircraft must be inspected, the correct interval between inspections and at
what level of maintenance the inspection tasks should take place. This approach
to maintenance inspection tasks will result in more efficient use of the total
maintenance work force and an increase in the operational availability of our
aircraft.
In January 1975, Boeing was awarded a contract to apply the airline approach
to B-52 base level maintenance inspections. This effort was completed in June
1975 and is forecast to substantially reduce the maintenance manhours expended
on base level inspections and also result in approximately 2000 fewer downdays
per year on the fleet. Based upon the success of the B-52 work, the Air Force has
established a multi-year program to apply the techniques outlined in the Air-
line/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning Document, MSG-2, to all
acquisition and in-service aircraft.

MANPOWER PLANNING
Senator -IoLLINGS. Air Force manpower is planned on a high main-
tenance and wartime operating posture. Is that correct ?
General JONES. Yes, sir. For example, our munitions load teams in
peacetime really need little training but they have to be available for
war because, in wartime, the munitions loading tends to become a limit-
ing factor. So, for normal peacetime flying you could have very, very
few munitions people but for wartime you need a lot of munitions
people.
I would like to take this report and study it, because I find that in
calculations on maintenance man-hours per flying hour, the assump-
tion of what goes into the calculations is so important and there are
so many different ways of doing maintenance and so many different
ways of calculating that you can come out with very, very different
answers with the same title. So I would be very willing to do that.
Senator IIOILLINGS. We are not trying to trap you or trick you.
I iust want your honest comment if there is some savings to be had
with respect to the maintenance program. You have a high cost
l)ud~et, olbviouslv. With respect to airline maintenance, we want
to find out from -some comparables whether we could effect a savings
there. Are there any econoniies which could be implemented with re-
spect to the pilots, the cost of training. the length of time they stay in
and their actual flight pay, including the fact that as I indicated some
6 years of the 20 years are dedicated to education, a sort of sabbatical
off on different training.
In a general sense, what is the Congress denying you? What is the
Congress refusing to give you with respect to supporting the Air
Force? Are you getting all you need from the Congress?






ALLOCATIONS LESS TIIAN REQUIREMENTS
General 0N ES. NI-. Chairman, I will be very candid. We do not 'et
all we ask 101r. 1 an not sayimi we should get all we ask for. I do not
mean to imply when I say that that we pllt fat in the 1ud1det. But
when you in you, wisdom look at tile total nIatiolial l),iorities anId total
national requirements and at what should be allocated to various areas,
we do cret less than what we consider to be the requirement.

AWACS AND B-1 PROGRAMS
Then trying to put that in the perspect ive of nat ional reqi I rements
and other priorities. on r concern'D in the 1976 1)1 (ylet is that tle
AVACS and the B-1 be supported.

MNFULTIPLE-YEAR BUI )GETNG
Senator Ji( )LLINS. Would nmult iple-year fuiding on that be helpful ?
I am trying to get to that batiltu) 'you (lescu-ibed.
General JONES. Y es. sir. Multiple-year tld('et in" wold help a good
(leal. or at least an aori'eed taro-et for mlilti)le-year fundinc-. We fully
fund each individual airplane. but for the subsequent years we can
not be sure which way we will on m funding. It would help if ve
could (et the B-1 and the AAYA(S sulp))orte(l to the level that came
out of the authorization act. This Included sonie loll" led(lt ime money
on the B-l, but no 1)ro-(lction decision, and the six AWA(CS wtiNci
have been supported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Also,
some help is needed iii'the spare parts for the wart ine readiness. The
Senate restored some of the cuts. but )art of the problem would be how
much of the restorattion we will Nget from I )epartmeient of Defense. They
took the total of the department of I Deense and cut it some and then
the Senate restored some. It would depend on how much that we would
get back.
But I would think that if we could sustain these two programs an(d
get some back in our WTRM. we would be ready to continue the mod-
ernization and provide a good Air Force.

AIR F(RCE WELL MANAGED
I think we manage very, very well. I would be most )leased to have
anybody coimie out to ()r bases and look at ()ur maintenance, as well as
the airlines. They concede we manage well.
I would be the first to admit that in all of the services, as in the Air
Force, there are things that we can o--ontinue to do to manage better
with our people and with our system. I am dedicated to that. to cutting "
overhead, to more efficient use'of our people. What I tell my people is
we are a great Air Force but we can do better and we want people
who want to be all the wa v in or all the way out, a highly d isciplined
force, dedicated. selfless, with p people who are interested in their
country. We do have o'ood )eol)le. They are working hard. Our main-
tenance people work harder than anybody else in the Air Iorce.







I am ami ex-maintenanee type myself and spent many years in Europe
with our people in the snow and the rain. They are working hard. They
put in more overtime than any other large group of people. That does
not mean tliough that we cannot somehow change the way we do
business.
You take one of the reasons the airlines can do so well in their main-
tenance area is that the 747 has well over 99 percent reliability today
in its worldwide operations.

PRODUCTIVITY. RELIABILITY. AVAILABILITY. AND M[AINTAINABILITY
What we need to do is to devote more effort into reliability and the
maintainability so the equipment does not break as often and when
it breaks. it is easier to fix. I have taken one initiative in this area. I
have formed a program office called PRAM. What this means is pro-
ductivitv, reliability, availability. maintainability proyra mn office.
I am giving them a small amount of money to start with and they
are. going to industry and within the Air Force saying we want ideas
and proposals as to how, if we put in a little seed money, we can im-
1)rove this the productivity or the reliability or the maintainability
and amortize it very quickly-and our people that are in the program
are very enthused with all of the ideas that are flowing in now.
That is really the way that we will. in the long term, reduce the
number of people. to have the equipment )reak less frequently and
when it breaks to be able to fix it easier and faster.

F-15 PROGRESS OVER F-4
We have made good progress in the F-15 over the F-4. In the F-f,
to replace the radio we have had to take out the ejection seat because
of the very compactness. That was the only place they had room for it.
So when you have to repair a radio you have to count the mainte-
nance time to pull out that complicated ejection seat and fix the radio
and put the seat back in.
The F-15 is muntch better. We have not found vet that we have that
sort of problem at all. The F-16 should be even better. That is the
way I think we will Nmake our major progress in the reduction of
manpower in the life cycle costs on our airplanes.

C-5 AIRCRAFT
Senator TOLLIN ;S. What is the status of the C-5? It had a defect
in the wing at one time, has that been corrected ?
General .ToN-s. No, sir. With the C-5 we collectively made an
error-not in buvii(Y the C-5, it is a fine airplane. It is doing yeoman
service today. It is a good aircraft. But at that time there was a con-
cej)t of total prograil 1)ackae in research and development and up
through procurement of the aircraft to meet certain specifications.
Wien the airplane was being developed it did not quite meet those
speci fications and there was a contract that said the contractor must
deliver this airplane at this price with these specifications.






WEIG I IT ANID PAYLOAD REQU IREAE NTS
A risk was taken to remove some of that weight from the wing in
order to meet the weight reqiiirements and the payload requirements.
At the time, the people thought that taking the weight out would not
they knew they were takin" some degree of risk, I ami sure. but they
did not believe that it. would affect the lifetime of the aircraft. It
turns out that it would have been much wiser to leave that weight in.
Where does the blame lie ?
I say part with the contractor. I would say part with the Air Force,
and the Department of Defense, and mavfbe in part. ith Conress.
I am not blaming it on Congress. I think there is enough blame to go
around as a result of our saying to that manufacturer. "You said you
could do this and when it became an impossible task"
Senator IOLXN-GS. Ihow (lid Congress get part of that ? Do you
know anybody around here who knows how to build a C-5 ?
General JoNEs. Not directly. I almost would rather withdraw those
words. But in the prograning, maVbe it was the reluctance to come to
Congress and say we have a )roblel, avid we ought to change our whole
program. I do not know. I was not in on the program at the time. I
am just sa-ving that as -vo look back at the program. it is pretty hard
to pt the finger on any one agency for our ending up with a wing that
has less strength than it should have.

NO FATIGUE LIFE
What this means is that in the long term, the C-5 will not have tle
fatigue life expected, and in the 1980's we would have to quit flying the
airplane if ve (lid not fix the wing. Tie C-5 is good today. Our p1o-
gram is to take one airplane an(d to do the design, the engineerilng, and
rework the wing, and we have that money now that has been appropri-
ated. We will prograni over a longer period of tinie the fixing of the
wins in the C-5 fleet. It is a good airplane. It will remain a good air-
plane. The only thii- tle winu,- fix does is extend the life. It will be
much cheapet than poin(g out and blving a new airplane, a new C-5 or
a newly designed airplane that will carrv tanks and a comparable ca-
pabilit,. We have !ea rned that the total proraamm concept is really
not tle way to go. although it was endorsed 1v everybody in that time
period. When I say the blaitle. I think it is priiarily the contractor and
the Air Force and the Department of Defense as 'opposed to anybody
else.
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE
Senator IoiILisNU. W lat is the alternative to the total program con-
cept ? I am just trying to gyet the terminolow.

FLY BEFORE BUY
General JoNEs. InI oversimlplification, it is fly before buy. In those
(ays it was not. Now we go through tile fly before buy. Even that has
its pitfalls if you cro too far in that direction, which'imeans if you do
not, put any leadtim-e in at all. then vou get this bathtub. So what you
try to (10 i fly and test the airplane and maybe y-et a little long lead.
You do not coimnit yourself to lar-e tuy proo'rams-you need a little






lead so you do not get the bathtub. After testing, you get to procure-
ment as opposed to going to a company and saying-going to Rockwell
and saying, "Build me 244 B-l's and bid on it today," with their hav-
ing so many unknowns for the days ahead that will come out in the test
program including realistic costs or performance and all the rest. It is
divided up now; fly before buy and then procure. It is working much
better. It is working on the F-15 and the other weapon systems.

REDUCTION IN B-52 ALERT RATES
Senator HOLLINGS. Vould you explain the reduction in the B-52
alert rates? What does it save: and if that works, what about applying
that to other air-alert systems?
General JONES. Other than the B-52, we have very few airplanes
that are on alert today: some aircraft in Europe. some aircraft in
the Air Defense Command, but very, very few. The Minuteman in
its normal operations is on alert. It is not an airplane, but most of
them are sitting alert. As to costs, I do not have, offhand, the specific
costs, but what we have done now is restructure our crew requirements
on the B-52 so it can generate all the airplanes in an emergency and
maintain a generated capability for a reasonable period of time. As
an outgrowth of that, we determine how many can be on alert, as
opposed to hav-in a high number on alert and men for it. Should there
be an emergency, we have an ability to change that alert. One of the
great advantages of the bomber force is to be able to signal our resolve
as in 1973, when we went on increased alert. In 1973, we probably put
only one more Minuteman on alert, or two, or some small number,
because most were normally on alert. But we were able to take the
bomber fe-ce and to increase its alert, deploy it if we want to. It is
based on that requirement that the crews are authorized as opposed
to a high alert in peacetime.
It will give us a capability to flex our muscles when necessary for
political and military purposes.
Senator HoLLicGS. General, is there anything you wish to add? I
will leave this record open for your review and any additional
comments.
BEST DEFENSE EVER
We will keep this record open. I appreciate very much your testi-
mony here this morning. 1, like many around this town, feel badly
about this charge of Secretary Schlesinger and vet at the same time
there is a general feeling in this Congress that we have got the best
defense we have ever had.
We are lucky in that regard, and I think the appearances of your-
self and Admiral tlollowav and General Weyand and the others have
proved that. This country is lucky ; at least you have the confidence of
the Congress. Yet yon get a feel over in the Pentagon we are after you.
We are just after economy. You know a man said when he came back
after World War II as he was driving away from National Airport
and had not seen the Pentagon, and he said, "How many people work
in a building like that ?" Without batting an eye, the taxi driver said,





61

"About half. YoH see a lot of dedicated people working front early
11101.1ing to late at lnighlt. an d you see a lot of people in tle gym, or
stretching. or eating'. (wr teadillg to another club.
Htow do you clean that tlimr out and get the costs down The con-
sultants or auditors prepare your defensee :entagoll ig-t. The costs
are more than the operation of this entire ( congress Ttlese are things
that we have a hard tilme lider'tanding. It is n ot in *Im\ way a criti-
cisin of the collmand and the ca alaility of our (hiefs. I ikp i
Ollr (llIefs I ll keep this
recor(l open. and we appreciate very liuch your appearance andl coma-
Ilents here t his morning'.
generall JONES. Thank von. Mr. Chairman. for those kind words. I
Sist want to assure von that we are w,)rking as hard as we can to spend
the taxpaye r'- Iilo(ney il tlie p r,)er way.
We uake miiistakes. We Call inake improveneients. Ve are trviner to
1ininiize our mistakes and tr.ioi"' not to repeat thie. and we are dedi-
cated to dto the best p)sible Jol). We are trying" to find tile ilicentives
for our people to participate. to) innovate, and I think we do well. anoi
we can do better.
Senator I ()LLINGS. Thank ou1 very uc h.
[Whereupon. at 11 :5, a.m.. the > ibcon Iilittee adjour ned. to recon-
vene at the call of the ('hair.]

WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM 'SENATOR CRANSTON TO GENERAL JONES AND TIE
tR t2 SP() N E S

SERV-ICE*S REAL GROWTH DESIRE VS. PRESIDENTS
Senator CRANSTO-N. How does your desire for real growth in the Air Force, and
the Army* and Nav's desire for real growth, square with tlhe President's desire
to reduce the size of the Federal budget
General JON ES. In my capacity as ('iief of Staff of the Air Force, it woiimld b e
presumi)tuous of me to address thle I'rei(e Its bIdget priorities. It()we\.er, tie
President has stated that he supp )rts a strong National defense. As ( chief of
Staff of the Air Force. I reomimiel( to the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Secretary of I)efeiise the level of funding that is n(vessary to support the Air
Force mission.
The Air Force is not wedded to any arbitrary, internally generated growth
pattern. Indeed, we w mild welcome intternatioal conditions which would make a
smaller Air Force appt)riate. ttowever, we nmust re ,,mmend an Air Force
budget that includes modest growth to meet the expanding Soviet tlireat. While
U.S. national priorities for defelise hi general and the Air Foree funding in
particular have declined, the trends in the USSR have been precisely the op-
posite. The dramatic growth of Soviet forces is far out of prol)4)rtimn to any
rational perception of threat or equilibrium. In my judgment, if the present
trends are permitted to continue to diverge, the IV.S. (iamiot hope to maintain
the precartius eqilil rium vhicti mir tenlnogical stuperiority ia s) far pre-
served. Over time. the sieer prep deran(ce ()f increasing ng numbers and improved
calability in Soviet strategic and general purpose forces must inevitably tilt the
military balance in their favor. It is a matter of utmost importance to as-ess the
risks and the impact on National security of such a shift and to set the spending
priorities according.
PERSONNEL REDUCTION
Senator (RANSTON. I understand that beft tre the end of the deca de ym xvill
have increased the numlr of wings in the Air Force from 22 to 26. To accomplish
this y, N will have converted approximately 30.000 support and auxiliary per-
sonnel into portions with c-mfiat units. Budgetary eonstraints persuade me that
we colld make some real savings by eliminating most--if not all-of tlese
positions. Why did you reject that course of action?
General JONES. The Air Force tactical tighter foreetresently ,rists of 26
organizationally structured wings. However, for such reasons as combat attri-
tion in Southeast Asia and limited production of new ((iUipment. our present
force is undereftuipped. Our plan is to gradually increase the unit equipage
within the 26 wings to bring them to full combat capability by 1981.







62

MODERNIZE FORCE WITH F-15, F-16, AND A-10 AIRCRAFT
To achieve this posture we will moxlernize our total force through tile intro-
(duction of new production aircraft such as the F-15, F-16. and the A-10. These
aircraft, with theiir improved capabilities and lower life cycle costs, will allow us
attain inr necessary strength and yet remain within manpower ceilings and
budgetary constraints.
I would briefly like to explain how we arrived at our 2'; wing posture. In the
guidaie issued by the Secretary of Defense. the defense of Europe is given first
)riority after the defense of the United States. This guidance further requires
1hat our force be able to mount a strong initial conventional defense in Europe,
susained for as hlng as our adversaries are capable of fighting. Moreover, we are
directed to prepare for a simultaneous minor contingency elsewhere. Require-
ients ased on this combination of contingencies determine our force size. This
force requirenient is then modified by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to meet the strategy at a prudent level of risk within the constraint of reasonable
attainability.
In the process of considering current fiscal realities, the 26 active and 10
reserve wing level represents the best balance between combat capability and
resource availability that the Air Force, the JCS, and the Department of Defense
call achieve.
Using the President's FY 197$ Budget request as a baseline, the manpower
cost to accoinodate full equipage of the 26 wing structure is 5,000 spaces, not
::0.000. Technological advances and reductions in support would provide these
5.0011 sIaees from within requested manpower levels.
Tlerefore. we feel our fully equipI)ed 2(; wing posture is necessary and we have
structured a force which achieves our objective at the least cost.
Senator CRANSTON. IlOW 1;anv additional aircraft will be nee(led to 'uply the
new wings? What are your estimates for the total procurement and annual opera-
tion and maintenance costs?

ADDITIONAL 2 T -iE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED
General JONES. Two hundred ninety-six additional UE aircraft will be required
to fully equip 26 Tactical Fighter Wings by FY 81.
In achieving this posture we will simultaneously modernize our total force
through the introduction of new production aircraft such as the F-15, F-16, and
the A-10 which offer improved capabilities at lower life cycle costs. This will allow
us to attain our necessary strength and yet remain within manlower ceilings
and budgetary constraints.
Using the President's FY 1976 Budget Request as a baseline, the manpower
('(ost to accon d(late full equipage of the 26 wing structure is 5,0-0 spaces.
Technological advances and reductions in support would provide these 5,000
spaces from within requested nianpower levels. Reductions in F-4 aircraft, phase-
out of A-7 and F-105 aircraft and minor adjustments in the F-111 force between
FY 1976 and FY 191l will result in substantial savings of military personnel. The
savings projected to accrue from the equipment design objectives of our newer
aircraft will permit us to attain full equipage of our 26 wing force within pro-
jected in anni ng nconstra inuts through actions that produce manpower economies
with the least degradation of capability.
The Air Force flying hour program will not increase as these new aircraft are
phased into the inventory. This will be 7)ossille as a result of increased use of
simulators and refined management of the flying hours on the basis of training
events ( calle'l the l)esigned ()Iprational abilityly
Therefore the 26 Tactical Fighter Wing structure can be supported from within
jirograinied aircraft F-ro(.relents F-15. F-16. A-10). manpower and flying
hour levels.
"QUIET REVOLUITIONX IN AIRPOWER

Senator CRANSTON. John Finney reported in the New York Times of October 12
that Air Force ilianners foresee a (lay --some 10 or more years in the future when
fighter bombers will be able to take off from American lbases, be refueled in flight,
('arry out tactical strikes and return after refueling. Mr. Finney notes that, if
implemented. this ilan wold impinge on the traditional domain of the Navy's
aircraft carriers. Mr. Finney also quotes von. General Jones, as promoting the
coilcelIt and talking in terlls of a quiet. dimly prceived revolutioln" in ;oir-
power. How does this "quiet revolution" affect your budget planning for FY 77,
and for the next 5 to 10 years ?






63

(enie'al .J(NES. Fir-t, let 114 make the ()bserv'ltion Illit "qutli(et rwv~dut1i)'" is n
terlll which esc(l*.ribes cIl ges il m)t11" r1(t(ical air I)()wver Cia)8ailities whose glol)al
employmenti is f)reseeit in the 4(ml4ilug years. These ('Ialiges are tt sigi fica tii
1 (iVa II(slIn capabilities (l'ed b y mIll. l()g-(lelayed force mo dernlizationl1 pro-
.... ,,-,. SIfica(h lly. 1 1 speaking 4)1 systems sud. as oit new tal ic'al lir(raft, Ilhe
F- 1, F- 16, aitd A-I() our a irsp;ace stUr veitlaII(e ,(I eutro)l airer'f t, the AWAS ;
and programs to enhance lie survivability of ()ur systems, such as the EF-111,
IMI Vs. a'11d iew\ s114l)fI, we w)(ois. Ill (hIiti )ln 1to these .18 l il 11r()ve el ,elts.
f1reseeti iml)v(ens in (ill re ief elilp cap1l)ability. i.e., tilie Advaced Tlatikeir
('arg) Aireraf((AT( Ainl l)-rgra Inmed airlift i1l1r,4veiiients will furthe1,r (c)1-
tribute to Itle eftectiv elles with which we call eilh)y (mr Iact ic.a forces.
The tI ch114() gi cal1 1ldvalices eibo1)died ill all )f 111,s, new svsl eli is will pr(-
(1u'e a lead in wvealm)I) qualiy which, I feel, will I'ar(ly ()ffs( the I)' '(11(), )'(e--
allce of iuiilbers lnj(oyed by the Sovie! Il i(4n a id Warsaw l( 1 '()ci411ies. The
fullilliniil of this "(ltiet revollinll is predicated ()I the acquisition ()1' t l1s
systems in ,Su fficicit imimbir,;'. t( allow f4)r ihe full use f oir ecuhn)4)gi(.11 lead4.
Acluisition (f sufflicient numl)rs of these sys(,i1s im1es 14ong -telrm bu1 ys it'
y' art()-y508cl" oitiolaiiry reqlil(i eiit's alte 1() h)e keiept '41)1 8)1v ]Vv.

F I; ANI) A-1() L'SS EXPENSIVE AIR(CIAlFl'
\ith regard to) keeping ('(4515 l(w, the F'-16 and the A-l(0 are two exampless
of sign i fica lit ly less e expensive airca'ft cIt()mar(I with )lher m4,1'ii air.raIi
systems. Their unit 11()sts as well as their )r dl(,41 apiiiiial ()l eralions a111d mai-
teniallie. costs a 114d overall lif1' cyvle c()sts are all (14(v1, uinmlaralively. These
aircraft we'e dlesig"ied 144 1be less sI1litic eda : 1th11s. 1hey cost less a lid req (uir'
fwe'r ope l'rato)r ;m1d Sull(rt personnel and re ezisi er 1(4 maintain. The AT('A
('onIcept, ill terms of 1 ilizin- off-illie-shelf lecl1iol : and lilimiiially i111o(lify ili
an inllein g c()miiiiercial aircraft rather Ihain ill ves-til1.', in costly research and
(1evelolpm1nt wo)rk, is a1mt her exail)l e ()I 1()\ wex x1la* t( keel, system1 costs s (doxvl1.
In )r(l(er to( take full a(vailI a(, (4f this "(jlliet revollion'" in (a14ahility we
have included t (, aft1 e)mentioned systems in our FY 77 14uIget reqluest and mit-
year i gral11. W e anit 1i1)111' 044111tili 11 (h s '1111411Si ()i the a0 iI i i c i 44 l) ()ti)1
(41 (mli l.bld~g-el, while at tite s1a1e time, striving t4) to 1ail1aill ('ure'l'nilt ('(ilba[
('al848blil ies ihiri( 44i m)re etflicint oe(la'tii41al 1 lc'c(lures an4 less e'Xlpensix'
systemIIs. We (' elvisioll ihis 144 1' ('e hara cter'istic (41 o111" Igetarty lur tlil le iiln.1
for the lx't tive t(o te1 ea's.

"'QUiIET REVOL'TI0N," TE iii,: CO(NfRESS. AND TIHE B13)tGET ('04OIMrT'i 'EES

Seiatoir O('RAS'()N. Ihwv shod( this "('lliet rev)l1lio" 1(1 'I't'(.t 114 p)lh1i1ili"
of tile l (tgel (om11itt11e '111d t114 ('olig'ress? For 'Xamlle. ill the next few yea-.
ti(, (,otgr(ss will have t4) make (h(ision" 41 4411 aj11 r m lys ()1 carriers, csc'()rl
ships s(l1 as th( strike' ('r'uiser. an( a 1inii1nei of v''y xpliensive ait racI'r t4
('om11limenrlt a cal'ri er. Wia t 148 i')a'il'll. g11idallce 0a11 V481 give 11s ?
(eh lera11 JONES. This ''(lio't rv(xlli(on, as I ('all it-, is 4)4'(, 'r i l t l"P of
silnifica ht 11 14',ses ill tI 1 ('a1l) ilitis 41' our i1ewx tactical ail'tl''ft1 and lir
subsyst(ms. Wi ti l'4'1 to '141' planning (of the I (lldg4t ('4)m itt11 1104' (1l'oIS1r'(4S:.
(.oitinil4,d (C'onlr4ssi(0118 sull)rt of these Air Force pro gra ins will b 144 ,ec'ssary
if tle fruit s of this "(ui et rvolli o" are t( )e fully renlize(d. Fludilil- 44f lihes'
liexx sy, is' will b4e' lle('est',y (o'' th1 n14 xt live to t( vyl'8;is be(l 4114yond ais xx'
Prlr(1( tnd b~rill' theml oil linle.
(Co)tr 1ning o11 force stp lid lIre l1ilo)soIly, we (lesii ()t11' f)or((,s to I)rf )I'II
spe4ifi( primary missions l'vied ()1 t11, Air Fo)rce by statute. The flexibility in-
lieI'e11 ill (411' sYstel s 114 Iv S 1 )r' l (.1t 811rlil ('441 later l l issiol1s, -,ls) sl)'''-
ifiel by statute. )ur system 're ill 1) way ili(141:l4) to 'rform tihe 1ri 11ry
issi()is 4)f Ihe )tll(er s(ervi(4's. The ('4) leal rl Sulpport 4' systellis )r0vidh' is l
function of their flexibility n(d is 11)1 a (rivinl" fact(4r in either m)1r force struc-
ti'e )1' systems t(luisilion rat 14na14. I woul (111 1)11siz 111 iha1 all h4 services
are integral to a syner4listi4' 11tional se(qlrity 1()str'e, witl eahi service per-
forming slpe'ific )rilnary sks. utu111 sl)I)rt 111(1 (.l()s e()(I'hrati4n 111110)114
t114 services is fulldal(lantal t7 ahiieving I he higust l)w)ssil'le lr'($dluctivity )f
('a('h. We (10 111ve different l)('l)5('(etives. o f courses. but there, is n) l (arochialisnl
1111d there' is str)n1- 1iutu'l Sul )l)rt ,wrc).S,7 the board. It is th1(' jo) of 8Ill t1e
S4'rvice(, 'hiefs. indivihmilly m1d 4()ll(,tivclxy s 1114' 1 4 he1)ii4t ( to) r(,,)41111i ',i
tihl minimum essentially syst(,ms llee('ssry to )r4) 01 17.8. s0%'1'rity. JIist xvhirlh
it('\\ systems adl ill xviat (lllll vi are qu(o4stions tht aill of us 11111st csi('s4r
(ng (1 hard ill terms (f each service's statutory resi.)()4lbilitieS.






64

NEEDLESS DUPLICATION ANI) THE SERVICE AIR FORCES
Senator CRANSTON. Each service has developed its own air force, stressing
its own operating environment and supposedly unique capabilities. The Army
has about 11,000 aircraft; the Air Force 9,400: the Navy 5,100; and the Marine
Corps 1,300. How can we avoid needless duplication and achieve-real budgetary
savings in this area? For example, the Army wants 481 Advanced Attack Heli-
copters for close support of ground forces. The entire procurement package is
expected to cost over $3 billion. The Air Force, on the other hand, has chosen
the A-10 for its close support mission. The entire procurement package for the
A-10 is expected to cost another $3 billion.

AIR ELEMENTS TAILORED TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS
General JONES. The duplication is more apparent than real. In fact, there is
some overlap in capabilities among our various aircraft but within the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD), the four Services establish and maintain air elements
to perform assigned roles and missions. These air elements are tailored to meet
specific Service mission requirements and collectively contribute to the total
I'S aerial firep)wer available.
The Air Force provides General Purpose Tactical Air Forces which meet a
wide range of responsibilities as promulgated by current laws, directives, and
agreements. These responsibilities include: gain and maintain general air su-
premacy: establish local air superiority, defend against enemy air forces; con-
trol vital air areas; provide close air support to the Army and other ground
forces; and provide air forces for joint amphibious operations, airborne opera-
tions, theater airlift to the Armed Forces, tactical air reconnaissance, and inter-
diction of enemy land power communications. Collateral responsibilities
include interdiction of enemy sea power, antisubmarine warfare, protection of
shipping, and aerial minelaying. The Air Force has purposely structured its
tactical air (TACAIR) forces to meet its primary responsibilities.
To make the most efficient use of the combat capability of our tactical air
force, we employ Air Force TACAIR as an entity under a single manager-the
'Air Force Component Commander (AFCC). This enables us to apply the full
capabilities of Air Force TACAIR in response to the direction of the theater com-
mander. The AFCC, through his Tactical Air Control System (TACS), cen-
trally controls assigned or attached resources and integrates all tactical air
operations to meet a variety of needs throughout a theater of operations. Tactical
airlift and tactical reconnaissance missions, as well as combat fighter opera-
tions (close air support, air interdiction and counter air) are employed to
meet the threat in concert with the overall land campaign.
The Air Force employs a "systems approach" in order to most effectively and
efficiently apply the full capabilities of TACAIR at the most decisive points.
The Air Force tactical control system, fighters, airlift and reconnaissance forces.
support personnel, and equipment offer an unlralleled capability to meet the
air support requirements of ground commanders, as well as the broader re-
quirements of the theater commander. Air Force TACAIR. applied through
centralized control, possesses a flexibility unconstrained by geography and arbi-
trary boundaries. It is a system capable of applying decisive firepower at the
critical time and place.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AVIATION
My view on the Navy and Marine Corps is that their air elements are tailored
for specialized operations, sea lane control, and fleet defense for the Navy
and amlphibious operations for the Marine Corps. These forces have a specific
job to do. In the case of the Navy, they must be able to establish and maintain
local air sui)eriority in areas of naval operations and control the sea lanes in
support of armed conflict in Europe. Without the vast amounts of ammunition
and supplies require(l to conduct a large-scale land battle, we cannot sustain
combat operations for a very long period of time. Marine Corps aviation to sup-
port the Marine mission of amphibious operations is needed during the critical
phases of getting an amlphil)ious force ashore.

ARMY AVIATION
In regards to Army aviation, the attack helicopter is organic to the Army
ground maneuver unit and is an extension of organic firepower. It is to be em-






65

I)loyed with, or to the rear of, ground forces aloni tie forward edge of tlie battle
area (FEBA) to provide helicopters escort and sllpliressive lire, to counter eneniy
armor at the FEBA, and to counterr enemy arIminor penetrations behind friendly
lines.
The attack heli(olIter and Air Firce close air suiport offer the g)romid <(in-
inander a comlilenentary capability in terms of a wider s1iectrimi of fir, suppI rt,
enhanced responsiveness, flexibility and capal ility. Because of the limited range.
speed and firepower of attack helicop)ters as cmnpared to Air Force fixed-wing
close air Support capabilities, the Air Force does not consider the attack heli-
copter as duplicating Air Force close air sulIiort.
General Creighton W. Abrams, who coinmanded the -.S. Military Assistance
Command in Vietnam, made the followifig remarks in support of Air Force
TACAIR in the close air support role, during his testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee in 1973: "Close air support, as provided by the Air
Force for somebody in the position I was, the overall coInmander, there is no way
to replace that with helicopters. The power of it-first, it can generate more
power, two or three squadrons are going to generate more hittin- power than any
conlination of helicopters. I am talking about sheer power in terms of tonnage,
bombs on the target .. because high performance fixed-wing aircraft carry a
much greater payload. And you can focus that very quickly."
The essential difference between Army aviation and Air Force TACAIR is
that TACAIR responds functionally to theaterwide requirelments while Ariny
aviation assets are employed as an organic element of the ground force in opera-
tions such as logistics sulj)ort, battlefield observation, command and control, and
mobility.
In an effort to make the most of our existing combat capabilities, we are train-
ing- jointly with the other Services and are looking for ways to provide mutual
support. Use of Air Force aircraft to assist the Navy in its sea control inission is
an excellent example. The Air Force will continue to seek the fullest utilization
of its weapons, techniques and capabilities in fulfilling our assigned roles and
missions. In so doing, we will continue to work closely with the other Services to
avoid unnecessary overlap.

FIGHTER LOSSES TO GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES
Senator (CRANSTON. What do you see as the future mission of air power based
on the lessons of the Middle East \Var? Some strategists have observed that the
1973 Middle East War showed the tactical fighter to be extremely vuherable to
cheap defensive missiles. Less than 5(, (if the Israeli fighter losses resulted fr mn
air-t -air Ciloai a 95(/' were credited to the array of Soviet -made grmnd-t )-air
missiles in the hands of Egyltiai and Syrian troops.
G eneral JONES. \hen comliaring the cost ofi ain aircraft to the cost Oif a surface-
to-air missile ( SAM), it appears that the SAM or anti-aircraft artillery (AAA)
weapon povides an inexpensive counter to the relatively expensive aircraft. How-
ever. these \vealils slimild iiot be compared un a one for one basis. rather they
nust be cimil)ared in the larger cOItex t of ail overall system.
Tie Soviets have iilt a large and ml ui+elrn surface-to-air defensive system
which has unlldergo)e considerable imlprovemelnt in the last decade. This systeni
eniconmpnsses literally tliousan(s (if fixed and mobile SAMS. a multitude of sol)his-
ticat,( AAA weapons, and arn extensive and complex net of early warning, ground
controlledl intercept and fire control radars. This aggregate air defense ground
envirimnent is a very expensive venture-expensive to procure and exl)en'sive
to maintain.
The development of this elaborate defense system is in direct response to the
recognlized effectiveness of airborne wveapon systems. Thus, the Soviets and their
allies have been forced to concentrate considerable effort and expense into de-
velolnent of a system specifically to center the threat of modern air power.
Similarly, it is partially in light of improved surface-to-air weapons systems
that we have undertaken several initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of U.S.
airlpower. Some examples of these initiatives include : procurement of more ad-
vanced electronic (''oiterlleasillre alil avimijis systems: development and pro-
curemeent of improved delivery systems and war reserve munitions leading to a
wide range of stand-off an(d (lose-in kill elations: and, aircrew combat training
in a realistic threat enviromnent. These initiatives consider tie realities and
sope of Soviet-desigrned sulrface-ti -air wealm ins andl are designed to further en-
hance the effectiveness of airpiower.






66

Through the initiatives I have mentioned and the continual exploitation of the
inherent flexibility of air power, the aircraft remains a formidable and cost-ef-
fective weapon system.
F-15 OR F-16?
Senator CRANSTON. Does the U.S. need to purchase so many complex and ex-
pensive tactical fighters like the F-15, or would it be better served to invest more
heavily in the simpler, cheaper F-16? What is the appropriate mix? What cri-
teria do you use in determining that mix?
General JONES. The USAF tactical fighter force is based on the objective of
achieving a mix of capabilities which provides a balanced combination of quality
and quantity. We are designing our force to meet the threat with both of these
features, while remaining within projected fiscal constraints. Consequently, we
tire structuring our force within the concept of a high-low mix of systems.
The F-15 is a highly sophisticated weapon system optimized for the demanding,
all weather counter air mission. If fiscal constraints were not a driving factor
in planning our fighter force, we would deploy the F-15 in sufficient numbers to
meet the total threat. However, in light of projected fiscal constraints, current
plans include development and procurement of the less sophisticated, lower cost
F-16 which will complement the F-15 in performing the air superiority role.
There are many factors which affect the size and structure of our fighter force,
the most important being the projected threat and the postulated environment
in which we will meet that threat. Our potential adversaries are developing and
deploying m(re sophisticated air-to-air and ground attack aircraft, thus adding
increased quality to their already established numerical advantage. Also, we see
a marked change in Soviet doctrine, wherein they are placing increased emphasis
on offensive operations by utilizing all weather attack aircraft similar to our
F-111. To meet this type of threat we must depend upon the F-15 with its so-
phisticated avionics, radar missiles, and look down, shoot down capability
against high speed, low altitude threats in adverse weather.
Other factors affecting our force mix include, but are not limited to, forecast
fiscal resource availability, initial procurement and life cycle costs, maintain-
ability and capability of the-e aircraft, )ossible geographic areas of conflict, and
the industrial capacity of our nation to rapidly produce sophisticated weapons
systems when required.
Iii consideration of these factors, the programmed deployment of six wings of
F-15s is the minimum necessary to insure an adequate hedge against the threat
in the more demanding portions of the counter-air mission.

50 PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT READY TO FLY
Senator CRANSTON. In testimony before the House Budget Committee on
July 10, 1975. Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonard Sullivan stated, "Fifty per-
cent of our airplanes are ready to fly at any one time. . ." Is that statement
an accurate picture of the readiness of Air Force aircraft? If so, doesn't this state
reflect a major management problem and what specific steps are you taking to
correct it?
General JONES. Senator Cranston, the Air Force readiness at this time, in terms
of flyable aircraft, is significantly greater than 50 percent. We have only minor
isolated problems in meeting our peacetime training requirements. However, we
do have some concern about our ability to deploy and sustain higher sortie and
flying rates involved in wartime operations. This is due to a shortage of service-
able spare parts for both peacetime operation and for war reserve requirements.
Part of the current problem is caused by higher prices of spares and longer
leadtimes for their delivery. Also, we have been unable to articulate to the Con-
gress the requirement for war reserve materiel (WRM), and consequently have
incurred congressional reductions in our budget requests for these spares. Per-
haps the greatest impact on our current readiness relates to the reduced repair
program for spares, caused by inflationary effects in the O&M accounts and by
congressional cuts in FY 76. Thus, the backlog of unserviceable components is
increasing.
Improvement in our logistics support posture is planned in our budget for
FY 1977, covering spares acquisition and especially the repair program.






61


End FY 4/76 Position




BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USAF FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE
(FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION: Military Airlift Command (MAC) -
The mission of MAC is to maintain a constant state of readiness
in the military airlift system for support of: worldwide
strategic airlift deployment and supply operations; theater
tactical airlift requirements during contingency/combat operations;
and Air Force Rescue and Recovery and Air Weather Service.

MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:

Altus, OK Norton, CA Charleston, SC
Dover, DE Scott, IL Little Rock, AR
McChord, WA Lajes, Azores McGuire, NJ
Pope, NC Travis, CA Rhein Main, Germany

M NPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)

Officers: 11,581 Enlisted: '57,850 Civilian: 19,120

COMBAT FORCES:

Active ANG/AFR

Sqdns Acft Auth Sgdns Acft Auth

C-5 4 70- 0/4 0/0*
C-141 13 234 0/13 0/0*
C-130 15 234 16/14 134/128
C-7 1/2 16/32
C-123 0/4 0/64
HC-130/HH-53 5 21/23
HC-130/CHH-3 1 3/9 2/1 20/9
C/HH-3 4 Dets 13 -
EC-130 /1 0/6
HH-1!! 0/1 0/12
HH-lH/HH-3E 0/1 0/9
C-9 3 19 0/1 0/0*

*These are Reserve Associate units which fly with active AF aircraft.







68



BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USAF End FY 4/76 Position
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION:* Strategic Air Command (SAC)
Organizes, trains, equips, administers, and prepares strategic
forces for aerospace combat, including offensive strikes,
reconnaissance and special missions.

MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:


Andersen,*Guam
Beale, CA
Carswell, TX
Davis-Monthan, AZ
Ellsworth, ND
Fairchild, WA
Griffiss, NY
K I Sayer, MI
Loring, ME
March, CA


Minot, ND
Pease, NH
Rickenbacker, OH
Whiteman, MO
Barksdale, LA
Blytheville, AR
Castle, CA
Dyess, TX
F E Warren, WY


Grand Forks, ND
Grissom, IN
Kincheloe, MI
Malmstrom, MrN
McConnell, KS
Offutt, NE
Plattsburgh, NY
Vandenberg, CA
Wurtsmith, MI


MANPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)


Officers:


19,395


Enlisted: 89,774


Civilian: 19,306


COMBAT FORCES:


B-52
FB-1 11
KC-135
RC-135
SR-71
u-2
DC- 130
Minuteman
Titan


Active

Sadns

22
4
35
3
1
2
1
20
6


ANG/AFR


Acft Auth


330
66
583
16
8
15
6
1000


Sqdns


0
0
4/0
0
0
0
0
0
0


Acft Auth


0
32/0
0
0
0
0
0
0







69



End FY 4/76 Position
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USAF
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COM4AID AND MISSION: Alaskan Air Command (MAC)
Conducts aerospace defense operations according to tasks assigned
by Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defense Cr,-,iand/Aerospace
Defense Commnand (CINCNOP.AD/CINCAD) and provides designated forces
to CINCNORAD/CINCAD. A Joint Task Force (JTF) may be established
for contingency operations, other than aerospace defense.



MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:

Eielson, AK Elmendorf, A-K Shemya, AK



MANPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 'position)

Officers: 784 Enlisted: 7,637 Civilian: 1,811



COMBAT FORCES:

Active ANG/AFR

peSqdns Acft Auth Sedns Acft Auth

F-4E 1 24 0 0
EB-57 0 .. 2 0 0
O-2A 1 -6 0 0











End FY 4/76 Position
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USAF
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION! US Air Forces in Europe SAFEF)
Plans, conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive
air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by the Commander-
in-Chief, United States Eurooean Command (USCINCEUR).



MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:


Alconbury, UK
Athenai, Greece
Aviano, Italy
Bentwaters, UK
Bitburg, GE
Cam: New Xrmsterdam,
Netherlands


Hahn, GE" -
Incirlik, TK
Lakenheath, UK
Mildenhall, UK
Ramstein, GE
Sembach, GE


Spangdahiem, GE
Torrejon, SP
Upper Heyford, UK
Woodbridge, UK
Zaragoza, SP
Zweibrucken, GE


:'ANPY'?ER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)


Officers: 5,932


Enlisted: .39,652


Civilian: 11,244


COMBAT FORCES:


Acft Auth


Sqdns


Acft Auth


420
72
18
54
30
8


0
0
0
0
0
0
0


Active
Sqdns .


Type


F-4
F-111
F-5
RF-4
OV-10
CH-53
AC-i 30


ANG/AFR






71



End FY 4/76 Position
B A C K Q R O U : .D . . 0 O : Uo .F
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COAMND AND MISSION: Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
Plans, conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive
air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by .Comander-
in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC).



MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:

Clark, PI Osan, Korea
Hickam, HI Taipei, Taiwan
Kadena, Japan U Tapao, Thailand
Korat, Thailand Wheeler, HI
Kunsan, Korea Yokota, Japan



MANPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)

Officers: 2,756 Enlisted: 21,245 Civilian: 9,643



COMBAT FORCES:

Active ANG/A FR

pSdns Acft Auth Sqdns Acft Auth

F-4 9 216 0 0
T-38 1 7 0 0
RF-4 *1 18 0 0
0-2 1 9 0 0
OV-10 1 16 0 0
AC-130 1 4 0 0











End FY 4/76 Position
BACKGROUND INFORM TION ON USAF
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (FORCE DATA)


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION: Tactical Air Command (TAC)
Organizes, equips, trains, administers, and operates forces assigned
or attached to participate in prompt and sustained tactical air
operations including tactical fighter, tactical air reconnaissance,
special operations, tactical air control, and support units.

MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:


Bergstrom, TX Howard, Panama Mt Home, ID
Cannon, NI'1 Langley, VA Myrtle Beach
Eglin 09, FL Luke, AZ Nellis, NV
England, LA MacDil!, FL Seymour John
George, CA Moody, GA Shaw, SC
Holoman, Nt!
Homestead, FL
MA1NPOWETI: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)


Of ficers:


10,386


Enlisted: 65


5,906 Civ


l, SC

s-,n, NC





ilian: 12,287


.O!:'-AT FORCES:


Type

F-105
A-7
F-111
F-4
F-I5
RF-4
RF-101"
C-130E
AC-' 30H
CH-3/UH-IN
CH-I
CH-53
0- 2A
Ov- 10
EC-121
KC- 97
A-37
F-100


Active

Sadns


ANG/AFR


Acft Auth


36
192
216
408
.48
90
0
9
10
10
4
4
* 40
26
0
0
0
0


Sqdns


3/3
6/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
7/0
2/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/1
0/0
7/0
0/0
1/0
8/0
2/4
16/0


Acft Auth

68/66
114/0
0/0
18/0
0/0
126/0
36/0
0/0
0/10
0/0
0/6
0/0
168/0
0/0
8/0
64/0
48/84
342/0






7 3



End FY 4/76 Position
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON USAF
FOR THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE (TORCE DATA)


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION: Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) -
The mission of the Aerospace Defense Cornand is to dischargee
United States Air Force responsibilities for aerospace defense
of the United States and to provide forces for defense of over-
sea land areas as required.


MAJOR INSTALLATIONS:

Duluth, MN Tyndall, FL
Hancock, NY Keflavik, Iceland
Peterson, CO


MANPO'WER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position)

Officers: 3,564 Enlisted: 20,902 Civilian: 5,316


COMBAT FORCES:

Active ANG/AFR

Ty _e Sqdns Acft Auth -Sqdns Acft Auth

F-4 1/0 18/0
F-101 4/0 72/0
F-106 6 113 6/0 90/0
EB-57 1 18 2/0 18/0
EC-121 4 0/1 .0/6









BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF AIR FORCE MAJOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
B-J.-The B-1 is being developed to provide an effective weapon system for
modernization of the bomber portion of the strategic forces So that the United
States can maintain strategic sufficiency and force effectiveness in the 1980s and
beyond. The B-1 is a medium gross weight bomber, characterized by variable
swe)t wings. four turbofan engines, a four man crew, and a flexible avionics sub-
system. Its three weapons bays with 75,000 lb internal capacity permits maximum
carriage flexibility for nuclear air-to-surface missiles, nuclear or conventional
gravity weapons, fuel, or penetration aids. The primary mission of the B-1 is low
level penetration of sophisticated enemy defenses at high subsonic speed. The
fast start, short take-off distance, high climb-out rate, and nuclear hardening
of the B-1 make it highly survivable in an attack on U.S. bases. The first de-
velopment aircraft is currently in flight test and is successfully proving the B-i's
potential to perform its operational mission. The B-1 )roduction decision is cur-
rently scheduled for November, 1976. The Air Force requests for long lead pro-
cureInent funds do not constitute a commitment to, or approval of production.
These funds will only be used to permit the Air Force to transition from B-1
development to production in a more efficient manner at substantially lower total
program cost.
E-3A (AWACS).-The Airborne Warning and Control System is a Boeing
707-320B with an integrated suite of avionics. AWACS possesses the unique
ability to provide timely and accurate intelligence, warning and communications
which are essential to prevent or control conflict. It is recognized by both the
U.S. Department of Defense and NATO as a major advance in command and
control capability not only for air forces but for forces on the land and sea as
well. This command and control capability has a synergistic effect which allows
the most effective application of high cost weapon systems in either a potential
or actual conflict. AWACS overcomes the line of sight/terrain blocking surveil-
lance limitations inherent in other systems and permits surveillance of both
high and low flying targets. The ability to detect aircraft flying at low altitude
over land or water makes a significant contribution to the effective integration
of air forces to defend the continental United States, support NATO require-
ments, and meet contingencies throughout the world. The design and mobility
of the system give it an inherent survivability to attack and resistivity to
electronic countermeasures. The first six aircraft are in production and delivery
should begin in November, 1976. AWACS is planned to be operational by Sep-
tember, 1977.
F-15.-The F-15 "Eagle" is an advanced tactical fighter designed specifically
for superiority in air-to-air combat. Its twin engine, high thrust-to-weight ratio
and low wing load characteristics, provide outstanding turning ability, accelera-
tion, and agility. The F-15 emIploys long range, pulse doppler. look down radar;
carries armament of 4 AIM-7F and 4 AIM-9L missiles; and 20am cannon with
$40 rounds of ammunition. The F-15 also has the versatility to be effective in
air-to-ground missions. 7,000 hours have been flown on F-15 aircraft, of which
4.000 are in the test program. Twenty-seven operational F-15s have been de-
livered to the Tactical Air Command. Procurement is continuing towards an
operation force of 729 aircraft.
F-16.-The F-16 is a multimission single place, single engine fighter. incorpo-
rating advanced technology features which enhance total system performance.
The objective of the F-16 program is to develop a fighter which can perform a
wide range of tactical air warfare tasks at reduced life cycle costs, thus per-
mitting procurement of the quantities of aircraft required to meet force structure
requirements. The F-16 will have exceptional close-in air-to-air combat capability
to coniplement the F-15. and with inherent design characteristics, to be a potent
air-to-ground( weapon system. The F-16 utilizes the same engine as the F-15,
exploits a(vanctl aerodynamic features for increased maneuverability and re-
duced drag and incorporates a high visibility/high -'G- cockpit with a 300 re-
elined ejection seat and a fly-by-wire flight control system. The selection of the
F-16 by the European Consortium will lead to significant standardization within
NATO. The prototype YF-16 aircraft have completed more than 550 flights (630
hours of flight obstructionon of the first developmental F-16 aircraft is well
underway. A t)rodution decision is currently scheduled for September. 1977.
A-10.-The A-10 ik an attack aircraft specifically designed and optimized for
support of ground forces. Dedicated ground support is needed in light of the





75

numerical superiority in nmanipower and arlnlor of Warsaw Pa(t, ground umits
which confront NAT() forces. 'file A 10 is a twill turbofa i, single place aircraft,
characterized by charge payload carrying g cai ci1bility, Ioui loiter time aid a high
degree of maneuverability, survivability, and weapon delivery auccracy. It is
hardened to survive 2rm tIligih EXplosive Incendiary ilt EI ) rounds, and Armor
Piercing Incendiary (AII) rounds. The Ak-10 also coil ai s electronic collll(-
ileasures and ififrared countermeasures for increased survivabilty in a high
threat environment. This aircraft is lesi:11ned to carry a in ordnance load of 16.000
lbs, has the O"inim gun with the API heavy metal penetrator for effective anli-
armor (tank) kill, can operate from forward airstrips, and has a ferrying ranie
of 2,;01 miles. The first production A-l() is scheduled for delivery in Novenber,
1975. The initial operati enal capability for the first operational A-10 squadron
is January, 1978.
Advamw'cd A irbori( ('ommajid Post 1AB('t).-The AABNCP (designated
the E-4) is a mo(tiie(d Boeing 747 aircraft specially equipped to serve as the
National Emergency A irborne Command PIst (NEACP ) for the National (C'omn-
mand Authorities (NCA) and supporting staff, and as the Headquarters Stra-
tegic Air (onnmand ( SAC ) Airborne C'onmmand Post. The AABNCP will accom-
modate a larger battle staff and will have significantly improved conimand,
control and communications (C3) equipment comp)are(d to the present E(G-135
Airborne ('lontiniad llo 'ts. The AAN('I" will provide a modernized, highly sur-
vivalle capability for command and control of our strategic forces during all
phases of a general war. Four of the six AABNCP required have been )rocured
two of these are currently operational at Andrews AFB. Command, Control and
Coununi(ations equiipnent testing is continuing, and full operational capability
is scheduled for early 19S8.
.llI TK.MA MinuteniauI lls and Ills are threo stage solid propellant
iiitercoiitilnetal ballistic missiles whiih are guided to their targets by all-inertial
guidance and control systems. l'he missiles are deployed in hardened and dis-
persed underground silos. The missiles can be launched from ground control
facilities or by the Airborne Launch Control System. With the improved third
. age and the post )(ost vehicle, the Minuteman III missile can deliver multiple
inlependently targetable reentry vehicles I V and their penetration aids to
11muli iple target s. The capability ,f this weapon system has been continually
(lihance(l over tile years through the Force Modernization Program, which con-
sists of ilrovenmnets in ground equiIment. airborne subsystenis, and command
an(l control. The Air Force is continuing the Force Modernization Program and
buying additional Minutemail III test missiles.
lA I Et'I('K.-MAVERI( K is an air-to-surface missile designed for use
against stationary or ii oviiig small. hard targets such as tanks, armored vehicles,
an( tiel fortitications. The MAVERllIK missiles achieve a low cost per kill by
increasing aircraft suvivability through lanch and leave capability, multiple
t.arriage on a single aircraft and higli probability of hit. Current production of
MAVERI('Ks consii4s of the basic television and Scene Magnification electro-
optical guidance versions. I)evelopment of imaging infrared (11R) and laser
seekers as mo dular guidance heads ft r the MAVERI('K airframe' will provide the
MAVEIIK weapon system capability for day/niilt/reduced visibility opera-
tions. The addition of new seeker hardware under development to the low (-ost
MAVERI(CK iirframne is needed to enhance our Tactical Force's (lose air support
a nd iiterdiction capability.
Sparrou- (AIM -7F).-The AIM-7F is a joint service acq(list ion prog Iram with
the Navy to provide an all-weather, aill-asl et, day-night missile for tacti(cal em-
)loyment at ne(ium to short ranges in air-t(-a ir lighter co(mlbat. This aiile, a
solid state improvement over the AlM-7E. provides for increase( lperformm ne in
tie areas of reliability, range, lethality. clutter rejection and counteriiiea/slres.
The AIM-7F will be the primary radar air-to-air missile for the F-15. F-15/
AIM-F7 development, test and evaluation is ongoing. Procurement will lbe iti
-support of operational and War Reserve Material iWRM) requirements.
>'id w'inder (AIM-PL .-The AI I-L is a ,joint Navy/AF program to develop
and acquire an imlprove(le air-to-air do-fight missile. The AIM- 9L will provide
an expanded operational capability iil Ill( sirt range combat eniio unters. The
improved reliability of the AIM- I, will reduce the size of the War Reserve
Material ( WRM) requirement and ()irations and Maintenanmce (0&M) costs-4.
The missile is presently scheduled for use on the F-15 and the F-16, and is under






76

consideration for us on the F-4E. AIM-9L Initial Operational Test and Evalu-
ation is underway and production release (I)SARC III) is scheduled for
January, 1976.
SHRIKE (AGM-45).-The AGM-45 SHRIKE is composed of a family of
anti-radiation missiles designed for the detection and suppression/destruction
of enemy radars. It is operationally employed with F-105G, F-4C, and will
deployed with F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft. The missile will passively home on
emitting radar signals. Target destruction is accomplished with a fragmenting
warhead. Current and future'SHRIKE procurements will be in support of War
Reserve Material (WRM) requirements.


BIOGRAPHY OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General David C. Jones was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Air
Force on July 1, 1974. As Chief of Staff, he manages a worldwide organization of
men and women employing the world's most advanced defense systems, and is
responsible for the administration, training, and equipping of these forces. Con-
currently, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are the principal mili-
tary advisors to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary
of Defense.
Drawing from a widely varied career, General Jones brings to his position a
wealth of experience and knowledge of the diversified activities of the U.S. Air
Force. His assignments have included operational and command positions in
bomber, tanker, training, and tactical fighter units as well as service in staff posi-
tions in the Strategic Air Command and Headquarters U.S. Air Force.
In combat, General Jones was assigned to a bombardment squadron during the
Korean War and accumulated over 300 hours on missions over North Korea. In
1969, he served in the Republic of Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations
and then Vice Commander of Seventh Air Force.
General Jones' intimacy with the NATO alliance and its complex multinational
defense structure is based on a range of assignments which cover the spectrum of
planning and operational responsibilities. Having served as inspector, operator,
planner and Commander in Chief of United States Air Forces in Europe
(USAFE), he has dealt with every facet of the diversified missions of military
forces committed to Europe. Concurrent with duty as Commander in Chief
USAFE, General Jones was Commander of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force.
General Jones was born at Aberdeen. S. Dak. He graduated from high school in
Minot, N. Dak.. in 1939 and attended the University of North Dakota and Minot
State College until the outbreak of World War II. General Jones entered the
Army Air Corps, beginning aviation cadet training in April 1942, and receiving
his commission and pilot wings in February 1943. A graduate of the National
War College. General Jones was awarded an honorary doctorate of humane let-
ters degree from the University of Nebraska at Omaha in 1974.
General Jones is married to the former Lois M. Tarbell of Rugby, N. Dak. They
have three children.
A. Personal Data
1. Born, July 9, 1921, Aberdeen, S. Dak.; father, Maurice Jones; mother, Helen
M eade.
2. Ma rried, January 23, 1942; wife, Lois M. Tarbell; children, Susan. Kathy,
,and David.
3. Hometo wn, Minot, N. Dak.
B. Education
1. Graduate, high school, Minot. N. Dak., 1939.
2. Attended University of North Dakota and Minot State College.
3. Gradu:ite. Flying School, Roswell, N. Mex., 1943.
4. National War College, Washington, D.C., 1960.
C. ,'crrice
1. April 1942-February 1943: Avn. cadet, Roswell, N. Mex.
2. February 19.3-August 1945: Adv. fly. instr., Roswell, N. Mex. ; Yuma. Ariz.,
lecos. Tex.: and Hobbs. N. Mex.
3. Augst 1945-May 1948 : Pit., ops. off., tng. off., and later Comndr., 3d Emerg.
R(se. Sq., 5th AF, Japan.
4. M y 1948-January 1949: Unit instr., 2236th AFRes Tng. Cen., Godman FId.,
Ky.





77

5. January 1949-Aril 1949: Stu .... Air T:tw. S'l-I, Tyiidall At t,, 1.
6. Alril 1949(.-August 1949: Sru., Atoiii Eiiergy ('rs.-.K ,r AI,)l i.s.
7. August 1 4.(,-c)totwr 1949 Asst. ()ps, and Tag. Off., (odman AFB. KN.
8. (-),tober 1949-,Jailia ly 1950: Stii.. SpTw. \Vlais. ir.. S~nulia I)-s(,. N. MItlx.
9. J8 1mary 1,(5()-My 1)5"' t., (: M I. off.. lIat( I C m'i ()ndr.. l111 lwiii Sq...1 1ar- di
AFB. Calif.
10. Mayv 1953 June 1954: Co()mdr.- 22d Ai i- l. S(I..Marnh AF1. ('aiif.
11. Jin(w 1954-Se4(,iiilwer 1!)54 C(ii()1r.. 33I B)m1lb "4q.. Mtinr AVK It,1.
12. Seltem lier 1974-1 )eeler 1954: )s. plainer, lt)mler\ .Hi s, SAC, Otiitt AFB. N(.)r.
13. ,Jazmarv 1)55- July 1957" Aide to (IN(' SA( Offutt AF1. -Nbr'
14. July 1957--Ju!y 19.5)1 )ir. (f Mat.. latr I )ep. (,'(Imdr. ft)r Ma:ih!i.. 93d
B(1m). Wg.. Castle AFB. (Calif.
15. August 1959-.Ime I 1;) StuN.. national Wair (I'-)iege, WaIhi l -oll. I).('.
16. July 1960-July 1964: Ch., Manned Sys. Br.: Diep. Ch., Strat. I)iv.: later
Cli., Stiat. Div., l)C'S. (),s.. I l1. ISA,. \Vashiilliii., 1)).,
17. August 1104-4Febriuary 19(65 St., U'SA, ()l)s. ) J'ng. Crs.. lue AFB ail
I)avis-M(nthan AFB. Ariz.
18. March 1965-October 1965: Comdr., 33d Tac. Ftr. W,., Eglii AFB, Fla.
19. (OcLtol)er l,;65--January 14967: 1(. 1IIq. IUSAI"E. \isl a~len. ( hrIuJi iy.
20. January 1967.-Jime 1967: (fS, I11(l. 1 SAFE. WViesh)ad(,en. (i ri-mai.
21. ,Trme 1967 -Jamary 1969: 1)1,5. Plans & ()ITs.. III. IUSAFE. Wielia(lei.
Germi a li.
F2. l'elii1:I 1969 .J- 19K;9: CI CS, )pS.. 11l. 7th AF, Tani S,'m)i Nloit AtId..
Replublic ()f Vietniam.
23. June l9(1)9-July 19(09 Vice ((mdr.. 7th AF, T n Soi Nhiit AII(I., 1el1ubli(
of Vietim in.
24. August 1969-ApIril 1971 Coidr., 2d AF, Barks(lale AFB. LaI.
25. April 1971-August 1971 : Vice (I NC I SAFE, Wiesbadei. ermany.
26. Sel)embier 1971-Jme 1974: (I_ USAFI', Wiesbadeni. G(ermany (Raw'-
stein. Germany after March 1973) and C(omdr., 4th ATAF, Ramstein AB,
Gern ai \ '
27. July 1974-1)r(seni : Chief of Staff. U.S. Air F'orce, Waqiingtoii, D).C.
D. I)c owtiis (11(1 S rrie I waIrlds
Distinguished Service Medal wi 1 oak Vietiam Service 'Medal w/1 service
leaf cluster star
Legion of Merit Air Forc'e Longevity Service Award
Distinguished Flying Cross Ribbon w/6 oak leaf clusters
Bronze Star Medal Natimal ()rder, Republic ()f Vietnam,
Air Medal w /1 oak leaf cluster Fifth Class
Air Force Commendation Medal Republic of Vietnam Air Force I)is-
Air Force ()utstanding Unit Award tinguished Service Order, First Class
Ribbon UInited Nations Service Medal
American Campaign Medal Ro, Ipilic of Vietnami Campaign Medal
Asia tic-lacific 'amaign Medal Granld (.ross wv/star and slioulder board
World War II Victory Medal )f The rder of Merit of the Federal
Army of Occupation Medal (Japan) Republic of Germany
National Defense Service Medal w/1 Missileiiian Badge
service star
Korean Service Medal w/2 service stars

E. EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONS

Grade Temporary Permanent

2 d lie u t e n a n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F e b 6 1 9 4 3 F e b 6 1 9 4 3 .
Ist lieuten ant -------------------------------------------------- ------------- Fe b. 28 1944 Fe b. 6 1946 .
C aptain ------------------------- -------------------------------- ---------- -- A p r. 11, 1946 O ct. 25, 1948
M ajo r ----- - - -- - - - - - - -- -- -- -- - -- - - - -- -- - - -- - -- - - - - -- - - F e b 5 19 5 1 J a n 2 3 19 52 .
L ie u te n a n t c o lo n e l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J u n e 1 1 9 5 3 J u ly 1 1 9 5 9 .
C o lo n e l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- A p r 2 3 1 9 5 7 D e c 2 2 1 9 6 0
B rig a d ie r g e n e ra l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D e c 1 1 9 6 5 F e b 1 0 1 9 6 6 .
M ajor general ---------------------------------------------------------------- N ov. 1, 1967 Jan. 24 1969.
Lie uten ant general ------------ ---------------------------------------------- A u g. 1, 1969 _
General (date of rank Sept. 1, 1971) ........- Sept. 1, 1971

















INDEX


1P
Aerospace Defense Command----
Combat forces----------------
Major installations --- -
Manpower------------------
Aircraft and missiles:
A-7 --
A-10 --------------10, 21, 62, 6;3,
Projected cost __
Structural stress problems .-.
Sufficient speed
AABNCP (E-4) --
AWACS (E-3A) --------- 57,
B ------------------- 26, 57,
Amounts needed -- -
Two reasons to proceed ------
B-52 alert rates, reduction in___
C-15
Fatigue life -..
Weight and payload require-


age
73
73
73
73


ments --
F-4 24. 58
F-16 --- 21. 63.(6.74
Fuselage size- 23
Major changes__ -
Projected costs 22-
Radar -------------------- 23
F-15 --------------24.58.62.66. 74
F-111 ......ll........ 23
Fifty percent ready to fly ------ (C
MAVERICK -------75
MINUTEMAN 75
Sheltered in Europe -- 27
SHRIKE (AGM-45) 76
Sidewinder (AIM-9L) 75
Sparrow (AIM-7F) 75
Tanker cargo 10
UE, additional 296 required -- 62
Alaskan Air Command ------------69
Combat forces --9
Major installations --------------69
Manpower --- 69
Coordination and cooperation ---- 7
Defense 2.60
Four tactical air forces --------- 6, 21
Some duplication ---------------- 6
Ground-to-air missiles, tighter loss-
es to 65
Growth. urgent need for 2
Management initiatives ------------5
Military Aircraft Command 7
Major installations---------- 1 7
Manpower 67
Combat forces ------------------67


Missiles (SeC Aircraft an missilesPage
M issi -- .-........- 3, 7, 23, 64
A rm y a v ia tio n . ...... ..... .... 6 4
Forward defense --.... 3
Inf,)rlllti 1. iltell igl('1.e. ('oi-
trol, (ollllilli( ti( --- -- 4
Line-. (of comlunication 3
A\a riie {()orIs aviation_ --- 4
I abilityy --------- ------------ 4
Navy aiatioll...... .. . (34
Strateg('ic bala -ce -- - 3
\lu t 1181 Traiing -n,(
Needless duplicatii11 and the svrv-
ice air forces ---- -.-------- 64
Operation and imliiltelna1(ce:
Aircraft maintelilnce costs ..... 18
Broader careerr field training_ 20
Certain requirements ---------- 1S
'haIges beilg Ilade......... .
Experience level -S
Man-hour co pIarison -------- 19
Over intenance ----------- 19
lPro(1lctivity inea sures ------- 19
Queen Bee program --- 19
AirI in/ma nufacturer Il i te-
iance progra--_ 27.56
Development of illainitenlllCe
program ms
Aircraft engine analysis
m ethod ----------------- 41
Aircraft structure analysis
method -- 39
Aircraft systemicml )rlent
analysis method ----- 33
Pi' 1 raill (levelot)ilent a(1l1in-
istra tion 45
Program requirement 30
Sche(duled maintenance pro-
grai content 32
SipI)ortin technical data-- 46
I)irect and adverse effect on
operating safety -.----- 53
(General
Introduction --- 29
Objective ---- 29
Organization 29
Scope -- 29
GIossa ry -- 4
Iidden functions, explanation
of ----------------------54
MSG-2 decision dial-ra ... 50
Structure analysis method -- 51
Structure detect bility evalua-
tion --- 52


(79)




UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

IIIIII IIIIl Ml I I I UIII I 111
3 1262 09112 4866


()per;Itiill : lid a[llil1telall( --('on. Page
A n n u al 1 ;t --.. --......... 7
-a cloi---gs 20
Five- er lpr,,jectdI budget 21, 22
Five--e-e--t cu --...... 21
Five-lierelki increase- ------- 22
Fliht y_ ...12, 16
Based (m ]hou;rS and liontlis of
lying_ time ---------17
I )etermin(d by rank -----------16
'ereitge------------------
ilots in lower ranks -----------16
S-p Iprovision .... 14, 1
Increase, result of inflation ----- 7
Intelligence budget -------------20
PIacitfi Air Forces ----------------71
('onbat forces ------------------71
Major installations --------------71
Manpower -----------------------71
Pers onIlel
Air Force well managed ---------57
(olonels, reduction of ------------15
Defense Manpower Personnel
Act ----------------------- 15
Fewer people, accommodation
with -----------------------6
Flight pay, nmmber of officers
receiving ---------------- 12, 16
Officers actually flying --------12
Reduction in number ---------- 14
Save-pay provision -------- 14, 16
Force requirements ------------- 8
Headquarters cut --------------- 5
Manlmuwer planning--------------56
Pilots ----------------------15, 17
Proper balance, need of ---------15
Quality people and systems ----- 4
Reduction-in-force -----------14, 61
Reserve forces, greater re-
liance on ---------------- 5


page
Retirement encouraged ---------15
Pilot training, cost of -----------11, 17
Modernization causes retraining- 12
PRAM program ------------------ 58
Program alternative -------------- 59
Purchasing power erosion --------- 4
-Quiet Revolution" -------------62, 63
Role in European war -------------9
Airlift program ----------------9
NATO territory, prevent loss of- 9
Service's real growth desire v. Pres-
ident's ----------------------61
Soviet airpower, growth in ------- 25
FLOGGER --------------------25
Forward area, new systems in-- 25
FOXBAT ----------------------25
Strategic Air Command ----------- 68
Combat forces ----------------- 68
Major installations ------------- 68
Manpower --------------------68
Tactical Air Command -----------72
Combat forces ------------------72
Major installations -------------72
Manpower --------------------72
U.S. Air Forces in Europe ------- 70
Combat forces -----------------70
Major installations ------------- 70
Manpower --------------------70
Vladivostok Accords -------------- 25
Bomber force, modernize -------25
Mobile ICBM's -----------------26
Proper balance, United States
should maintain ----------- 25
Soviet warheads, effect of ------ 26
Strategic cruise missiles -------- 26
Wings, number of ----------------24
Options -----------------------24