94th Congress COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session C
SERVICE CHIEFS ON
DEFENSE MISSION AND PRIORITIES
TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE'
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
September 18, 1975- NAVY
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine, Chairman
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington
FRANK E. MOSS, Utah
WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
ALAN CRANSTON, California
LAWT4()N CHILES, Florida
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota
JOSEI'II R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
SAM NUNN, Georgia
HENRY BELLMON, Oklahoma
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., Maryland
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York
JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr., Staff Director
JOHN T. McEvoY, Chief Counsel
ROBERT S. BOYD, Minority Staff Director
W. THOMAS FOXWELL, Director of Publications
TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington
ALAN CRANSTON, California
LAWTON CHILES, Florida
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York
MICHAEL B. JoY, Task Force Coordinator
STATEMENTS BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Senator Iollings ------------------------------------------- 1
Prepared statement ------------------ 3
Senator Bellmon ------------------------------------------------- 3
Senator Buckley ---------------- 4
Iolloway, Adm. James L., III, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
accompanied by Rear Adm. Alfred J. Whittle. Jr.. U.S. Navy, Director,
General Planning and Programing Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations: Rear Adm. Stanley S. Fine, U.S. Navy, Director of IBudgets
and Reports, Office of the Comptroller of the Navy: Rear Adm. M. Staser
Holcomb, U.S. Navy, Director, Systems Analysis Division, Office of the
CNO; Capt. Nelson P. Jackson, U.S. Navy, Ihead, Congressional and
Policy Coordination Branch; and R. C. Green, Congressional and Policy
Coordination Branch, Office of the CNO -- 4
INDEX ----- 45
Digitized by the Internet Archive
SERVICE CHIEFS ON DEFENSE MISSION
Navy Planning and Operations
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975
'FAs] FORCE o x DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON THE B-UDGET,
The task force met at 10 a.mn., pursllant to notice, in room 6202,
Dirksen Senate Office Binilding, Iton. Ernest F. Hollings pIreidi.
Present" Senators Iollings, Bellmon, and Buckley.
Staff memb ii ers present: Miciael B. Joy. task foice coordinator,
Andrew Ialamilton, professional staff.
Senator HOLLINGS. The task force will please come to order.
OPENING STATE-MIE1NT OF SENATOR JtOLLINGS
WIe welcome this morning the (listinoiuished Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral Holloway, and his colleagues, in commencing the
public hearings of the Task Force on Defense of the Budget Corn-
mittee. Necessarll from time to tine we are going to have to get into
restricted areas, but for our hearings, in general, we will hold public
In emphasizing the public nature. I also have to emphasize the char-
acter and i'esI)onsibil ity of our particular Budget Committee. For
example, today we will be voting on pay rates. You wouldn't think the
Budget Conmmittee had anything to do with it, but I would presume
its position is persuasiv'e on that vote.
BILLS HELD UP
For one, we held up the military procurement bill by a majority vote
in the Senate. sending it, back because it was$1.3 billion over. We held
I) the child school I mich program because it was some $180 million
over. In defense, we have used the pay figure with the other levels of
Government of 5 percent rather than the 8.66 percent.
So, for myself, I am with President Ford on it and the Budo'et
Committees position taken at that pay level. I want to point this
out because what we do here, and what we agreed uipon back in Janu-
ary and Fel)ruary. affects us way down the line in September. What
happens with the Navy's budget today and tomorrow will affect us
iiot (oilv next year, but 20 years from now. We are trying to get that
kid of perspective in testimony from you.
Where are we headed in the Navy ?
SIZE OF FLEET
In trying to brief myself, I was looking at the number of warships,
the number of amphibious ships, the number of mine warfare ships,
the auxiliaries, say, in 1968 and later 1974, 1975 and 1976.
In general terms we have gone from a total of about 976 down to
490 projected for 1976. I look at the type of warships, and then I look
at the manpower figures, things that we look at in the Budget
When you reduce the vessels by some 50 percent, why doesn't man-
)ower come down a similar amount? There could be a very good
reason. We should know and understand that reason.
SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITY-MISSION
We should im(lerstand the Soviet capability, what the mission is,
since more recently we have had arguments on military procurement
on strike cruisers and otherwise, the size of the vessels.
Generally, in what direction are we heading? We have your prede-
cessor, Admiral Zumnwalt, saying that the Soviet commander, Admiral
Gorshkov, is headed in a different direction of smaller vessels. I don't
know whether I agree or disagree, but these are the kinds of things
that are on our nunids.
Why are we getting in the electronic missile age and era, larger and
larger vessels, let's say, and larger and larger targets in the Mediter-
ranean under the air cover of the Soviet cruise missiles? What is our
mission and how do we meet it with respect to personnel, with respect
to actual construction ?
Years back we used to put primary emphasis on firepower, the gun
power. and the seaworthiness of the vessel itself. Now, perhaps, pri-
oritv one is the electronics and then maybe second, the weaponry.
These are the kinds of things on which the Budget Committee is try-
ing to get in rhythm with the Navy Department so we go down the
same road together, and we don't make a last-minute decision on an
itein in a budget that will cost us $30 billion down the road.
Some of the other committee members might want to come. We try
to carry this on in informal fashion and, more than anything else, we
do it in public. We haven't had any restricted hearings.
I have a prepared statement that I have deviated from consider-
ably, so, without objection, I will include the full statement in the
[The prepared statement referred to follows:]
PREPARED STATEM ENT OF SENATOI ERNEST F. IlOLLINGS
NATIONAL DEFENSE PROJECTION
Today we begin a series of hearings on our national defense priorii id
budgets. Our objectives in these hearings will be to examine the rationale behind
the Administration's projection of national defense budgets for the next 5 yea rs.
We will be looking into the policy guidance and planning assumptions xxhich
shape our military forces, the force requirements which result, the key ian-
power management and modernization issues facing the Congress and the )e-
partment of Defense in the next 5 years, and the budgetary im)lications (of all
We begin our hearings today with the Navy, which has the largest budget and
is the most capital intensive of our military services. In recent years the size of
the active fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent, from 976 ships in fiscal
1W68 to less than 500 today.
SIZE AND COST
At the same time, the size and cost of new major naval combatant ships under
construction has risen dramatically. So has the Navy Irn dget. In 1968-a lpak
war year-it was $20.8 billion. For 1976 the requested budget is ()ver $34 billion.
We are told that this upward trend is likely to continue. The Navy has indi-
cated a desire to increase the size of the fleet from 500 to 600 ships requiring
substantial increases in the shipbuilding budget and, eventually, in Navy oper-
In projecting its future budget requirements, the Navy faces-, questions not only
on the size of the fleet, but the kind of fleet to build, bearing in mind that our new
warships may be in service into the 21st Century. Should wve have 100.00(0 toll
carriers or 50,000 ton carriers? F-14's or F-18's? Or both? What is the future of
the carrier, of any size, in the face of the growing guided cruise missile threat?
Should our escort ships have nuclear power or conventional power? Shouhl we
have new classes of ships for new missions, like the nuclear strike cruiser? What
are Navy manpower requirements going to be. and can they be met under the
all-volunteer force? Is the ratio of manpower to ships increasing or decreasing,
and what are the reasons? What are the opportunities for reducing waste, and
inefficiency, so that we get the highest value for our Navy dollars?
All of these questions can best be answered in the context of Navy missions and
planning assumptions, and in the light of budgetary limitations.
Today we have with us Admiral James L. Holloway, III, the Chief of Naval
Operations, to give us an overview of the Navy its roles an missions and how
the Navy budget is divided among them, how force requirements are established,
and what kind of Navy xxe wil need in tile remaining years of the century. We
will also want him to discuss trends in the Soviet Navy and their impact on U.S.
Navy requirements. Admiral Itlloway is accompanied by his chief planing,
programming and budgetary aides.
We plan to follow up this overview with other hearings devoted to a more
detailed review of Navy prgasan
lNy programs ad issues, and their impact on budgets for
the next 5 years.
We will also invite the Chiefs of Staff of the other military services to make
presentations to the Defense Task Force in the coming weeks.
Senator HIOLLINGS. Senator Bellmiion, would you like to comment
OPENING STATEMENT OF SE NATOR BELLMON
Senator BEL.xLx. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
The only comment I would make is that niany of us in Conogres are
a little confused because we now see an end to Vietnami and we see
the beginning of detente with both the Russians and the Chinese.
We see now what appears to be at least the beginning of the resolu-
tion of the Middle East problem, and yet the request, perhaps the
requirements for the defense budget seem to continually go up and up.
XWe are confused as to what the reason is. I hope that your testi-
mony before the committee helps us better understand what is
Senator HOLLINGS. Senator Buckley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUCKLEY
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am more anxious
to hear what the witnesses have to say than to say anything, but I
am immediately concerned as to the implications for the Navy of the
dramatic growth in the Soyiet naval power globally in recent years.
I think this could be an extremely illuminating hearing for us as a
result of that.
Senator HOLLiNGS. Admiral Holloway, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. ALFRED
J. WHITTLE, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, GENERAL PLANNING
AND PROGRAMING DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS; REAR ADM. STANLEY S. FINE, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR
OF BUDGETS AND REPORTS, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE NAVY; REAR ADM. M. STASER HOLCOMB, U.S. NAVY, DIREC-
TOR, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CNO; CAPT.
NELSON P. JACKSON, U.S. NAVY, HEAD, CONGRESSIONAL AND
POLICY COORDINATION BRANCH; AND R. C. GREEN, CONGRES-
SIONAL AND POLICY COORDINATION BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say, first, I am delighted to appear for the first time before
this task force. I have no prepared statement, but I would like to
open with some brief informal remarks and then make myself and
my colleagues available to answer your questions.
In these remarks I would like to provide a background which might
assist us in putting the questions in context. I think we would all
agree that this country needs a Navy. I think the question is what kind
and what size?
The Navy needs ships, but we need more than just a number of
ships. We need capable ships and we need capable ships in the proper
balance. That is a balance among types such as carriers, surface com-
batants, submarine, amphibious ships and suppo1't ships, and we also
need a balance between those very capable multipurpose ships, which
are quite expensive on an individual basis, and the single-purpose
smaller ships of limited capability, but which can do a limited job
and which are relatively inexpensive and which, therefore, within
a fixed budget we can buy more of.
I think that the Navy must be more efficient in relating our re-
quirements to national needs. When I talk about Navy requirements,
I look at them in two ways. First, there are requirements in terms
of mbml)ers; and, second, requirements in terms of the military char-
acteristics of those weapons systems that we are asking for.
In these few minutes this inorning I would like to try to establish
an auditable trail between national needs and our requirements in
the Navy. I think that our ultimate objective would be able to estab-
lish that relationship between national security requirements and
budget line items.
To begin this, I would like to go back to what we perceive as being
our national strategy today. We look at it as a forward strategy. That
means that our country is overseas-oriented. We have to be. The United
States is essentially an island. We have two international borders.
Two of our 50 States lie overseas.
We look abroad in a cultural sense. in an economic sense, but in a
military sense this forward strategy means that we use the oceans as
barriers in defense of this country, and we use the oceans as avenues
for extending our influence abroad where so many of our interests are.
This forward strategy requires two things. in my view. First. it re-
quires we have overseas allies: and, second, it requires that we have
overseas-deployed U.S. forces to support our allies and to protect out-
interests on a worldwide basis.
NAVY S ROLE IN NATIONA, STRATEGY
The Navy's role in this forward strategy is twofold. We do two
things. First, the Navy provides components overseas to these deployed
forces, such as the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in
the Pacific; and, second, the Navy is responsible for insuring the in-
tegrity of the lines of communication b etween the United States, t ae
heartland, the lines of communication between the United States and
our overseas allies and our forces, not only naval forces but land and
air forces deployed overseas.
I think every military man is aware of the fact that the security of
our lines of communication is absolutely essential to the success of
any military plan.
The functions of the Navy are described in considerable detail in
title X, United States Code, but I think I can summarize them very
succinctly by saying that we see the Navy's functions again as twofold.
First, the. Navy must insure the continued ability of the United States
to use the seas, the high seas, the free seas as we require in the pursuit
of our national policy. The second function of the Navy is to exploit
our control of the sea for the projection of power in support of Our
When I talk about sea control, and that is the term that has been
used, I think, very loosely in the past and is probably not very velt
understood. I do not mean that it is the US. Navy's intent or objective
to be able to control all seven-tenths of the Earth's surface which is
63-969 0 76 2
covered by international waters. What I mean is that we need to be
capable of fighting and winning any actions required to insure that we
are able to use those parts of the high seas required for us to support
our national policy, only what we need.
PROJECTION OF POWER
The second function I alluded to is the projection of power. This is
anextremely important capability for the Navy because it represents
an instrument of national power available to the President in the
exercise of his national policy. The Navy is able to project power
First is from the fleets' ballistic missile submarine force, the SSBN's,
employing Polaris and now the Poseidon, and in the future the Tri-
(tent missiles. This is the projection of power which would be used,
of course, by these ships only in a strategic and nuclear war and a
capability which we consider more to be today a strategic deterrent.
We believe that if we are strong in this area, we will never have to
use that force.
Our second means of projecting power from sea-based forces is by
carrier-based aircraft. Although the carrier's primary mission is to
permit us to maintain superiority at sea and prevent the interdiction
of sea lines of communication, since World War II the principal em-
ployment of our carriers and their aircraft has been in projecting this
air power ashore, again in support of the President's objectives.
The third mode of power projection, and the one that is probably
the ultimate in a conventional sense is our ability through amphibious
forces to put marines ashore against opposed opposition to seize terri-
tory. This is as important a capability as, I think, the President can
have, because it is very meaningful to be able to seize the territory
you need, not only to support naval operations, but as an instrument
of naval power and policy.
With these functions in mind, we must then look at why the Navy is
deployed as it is in order to be effective in carrying out these functions.
We find the active fleets, the combat-ready units on the other side of
the oceans. There are a number of reasons for this.
The first is with the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific and the 6th
Fleet in the Mediterranean and all-nuclear task force of Nimitz and
South Carolina and keahorse operating off Scandinavia, we provide a
visible reassurance to our allies of a U.S. military capability which is
ready to support them if required.
Second, we provide a visible deterrent to any hostile acts which
might be taken against the United States or our allies.
Third, since most of these crises do occur overseas, we have our naval
forces on the scene and combat-ready to respond in the shortest possi-
ble time to a crisis. I think we are all aware of the fact that a ouick
response to a minor crisis in very m1any cases prevents that crisis from
enlarging into a, major catastrophe.
SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION M1OST IMIPORTANT
Finally, I have pointed out one of the Navy's major responsibilities
is protection of the sea lines of communication. The most vulnerable
parts are those distant terminal ends. Why ? Because those parts of
the sea routes that, are close to the I united States are near our own
bases where they can be covered by our own land-based air, whereas
the terminal e(ids are near enemy bases where their threat from their
small boats and their short-range land-based air makes protection
So the fleets in protecting the sea lines of commuicationi need to be
at the vulnerable end.
NEED FOR SIIIPS
All of this leads us to the establishment of certain requirements for
the U.S. Navy. Why (1o we need a certain number of ships and why
do we need ships of certain types and why do we need them in a bal-
ance ? When you conceive of our fleets, the 6th Fleet and the 7th Fleet
being on the other side of the globe from us, you can draw conclusions
as to what the characteristics of those fleets should be.
First, our overseas fleets must have the offensive capability to defeat
any other naval force routinely present. in their theater of operations.
In other words, the 6th Fleet must be capable of maintaining superior-
ity over the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.
.Vhy? Because unless our fleet in the Mediterranean is capable of
winning, it is no longer a, positive asset to national policy, but could
very well become a hostage.
CAPABILITY AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK
The second required capability that I see for our deployed fleets is
that they must have the defensive strength to beat off a surprise attack
from reinforced enemy units. This simply recognizes a military truth
that air and naval forces are capable of redeployment in concentration.
For example, in the Indian Ocean where routinely we might have a
superiority of naval forces, by an enemy deploying more ships or air-
craft into the Indian Ocean, that balance of power can be reversed with
a sudden attack on our forces, unless we are able to beat it off and use
our own mobility to retire to avoid being destroyed by those forces. So
we must equip our fleets with this ability to fight their way out of
an engagement and disengage so they can resume combat, if necessary,
on terms advantageous to ourselves.
AlBTIJTY TO PROJECT POWER
Third, our deployed fleets must have the capability to project power.
They must be able to put air power where it can threaten the enemy's
intrastructure and destroy his capability to wage war on land. We
must be able to put our marines on the beach, because in many cases
this is the only language that those who would take hostile action
toward us understand; the reaction to acts of aggression with power
on our part.
Finally, a fourth characteristic these fleets must have is logistic
independence. This means that our ships must be large because they
have got to carry quantities of their own fuel, fuel for the aircraft
that fly from them, ammunition for them to expend in combat because
they are many thousands of miles away from the United States, the
main base, and because we cannot always depend upon overseas bases
being available to us.
BIG SHIPS NEEDED
We know the experience of the Middle East that in the past four or
five crises we have not been able to use our bases in Greece or Turkey.
As a matter of fact, since 1958 at the time of the Lebanon landings, we
have had to go it with mobile forces. Although the Navy likes to use
overseas bases, they are very important to us and they make our
operation more efficient; nevertheless, we have got to be prepared to
do it without overseas bases.
So we need big ships that can operate at sea for long periods of time
far away from home and we must have replenishment ships that can
take the bullets and the supplies out to those ships in a combat
Finally, Mr. Chairman, having talked about requirements in terms
of the kind of forces the Navy needs, I would like to touch on how
big should the Navy be.
Now I want to reiterate numbers alone are not the answer. A 600-
ship Navy could consist of patrol craft and do this country no good at
all. We need a balanced force. The size of the Navy and the structure
of the Navy, in my view, is determined by three factors.
The first, what is the strategy that the Navy must support? I have
pointed out to you that I believe we are supporting a forward strategy.
Second, what is the threat against our ability to carry out that
strategy, and I think we have to look at our possible opponents and
come to the conclusion that the threat against the Navy's ability to
execute its missions and tasks has to be the Soviet Navy and Soviet.
Finally, and this is the most difficult part of the formula, what
degree of risk are we willing to take to see that our Navy can carry
out its missions and tasks?
You have heard us talk about a 600-ship Navy. If I can, I will con-
clude these remarks by describing how this 600 number was deter-
mined, we in the Navy think it was really an orderly process. It starts
by taking our Navy today and analyzing its a)ilitv to execute oir war
plans against the potential threat, which is the Soviet N a y.
CAN MEET CURRENT THREAT
I might say that otir analyses indicate that we can carry out our
missions and tasks against the current threat as we analyze it, )ut only
by a very slim margin of success. There are some areas of the world in
which we can't cope with the threat, but in the most important area,
which is the Atlantic in the context of a N ATO-Warsaw Pact conflict
where the resupply of NATO through the Atlantic is absolutely essen-
tial to the fulfillment of our goals in that theater, the U.S. Navy can.
we believe. maintain the integrity or gain the integrity of oil] sipi)ly
lines across the Atlantic.
When we think of what kind of Navy we ought to have in the future.
we project our own force levels 10 years ahead. This is based imj)on
the approved programs, both provided to us by the Congress and the
5-year extension provided by the Department of Defense. We also
project the Soviet naval force 10 years ahead. We examine the capa-
bility of the U.S. Navy during that period to carry out oir strategy
against the threat of that period.
FIVE-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM
In this analysis deficiencies emerge. We address those deficiencies
and we attempt to rectify them in putting together a 5-vear' ship-
building program. Let's say, for exanliple. bet'innin" with 1976. run-
ning through 1980. we will build a 5-year shi 1) cont iiction program
which is designed to correct these deficiencies that our analyses 10
years in the future has indicated.
LIMIT OF USEFUL LIFE
Why? Because the ships that we build during this 5-year period
will be operational in the fleet 10 years from now. We construct this
projection of our future fleet, as I say, taking those ships that we
expect to acquire and dropping the ships that are in the fleet today.
which will be during this period reaching their limit of useful life.
It is very important that we all understand that in looking at the
Navy of the future we begin with exactly what we have in hand today.
We are simply not affluent enoui-h to say we are roiny to retire car-
riers at, the end of 10 years when they have a 30-year useful life. We
are going to employ every bit of hardware rio-ht out to the maximm.
We are going to use every ally we have in iiiaking these plans for
our capability in the future.
UPPER BO FUNDS OF FUNI)ING LEVEL
So we build our 5-year shi1) construction program. anid though it
is ambitious, it is realistic. We use the upper hounds of what we think
is realistic. We use the upper bounds of what we think is a reasonable
finding level from the I)epartmnent of Defense. It is not an average, it
is an upper level. This will give us the best shipbuilding program.
We do not exceed the capacity of the shipbuilding industry in put-
ting together this shipbuilding program. We have, through this
method. an ambitious but realistic )-year program. developed a force
for the middle 1980's which amounts to between 580 and 600 ships.
Now, the important aspect of this force for the middle 1980's is the
structure, the nmber of carriers, we have, the number of submarines,
the number of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and support ships, and
the amphibious lifts, but it happens when you aggregate all of these
units that we want to have in our force structure, the number comes
out to be very close to 600. That is the 600-ship Navy, Mr. Chairman,
that you have heard reference to, I am sure, very often.
Sir. this completes my comments, and we are available for your
SIX IIUNI)RED-SIIIP NAVY-BREAKDOWN AND NEW CONSTRUCTION
Senator 1IoT LINGS. Can you give us a general breakdown of the 600-
ship Navy development over the next 5 years? What are the new ships
to be built in order to reach the 600-ship Navy?
Almiral HOLLOWAY. We will propose to build new carriers to replace
carriers that are dropping out of the inventory because of age, but
we do not see any sicrnificant increase in carrier force levels.
Senator IiOLLIGxS. Is it classified to say how many carriers, how
many cruisers, how many this, how many that?
Atmiral HoLLOWAYv. Yes, sir. I believe in order to answer it ex-
plicitly we would have, to go into closed session.
Senator HOLLINGS. Give it as best you can in open session here.
Admiral IHOLLOWAY. We will build carriers but the carrier force
level will not increase because the carriers we would propose to build
would be replacements for those dropping out of the inventory.
Incidentally. two carriers will leave the inventory this year because
of old age: the OrL.kanq/and the Hancock.
We will build our force of cruisers which are the major surface
combatants, the traditional ships around which most navies are
constructed,( beginning- with the Monitor over 100 years ago, progress-
ing through 1)attleships and now the "strike" cruiser. That is simply
a surface combatant, but we want it to be the best surface combatant
in any navy in the world. Therefore we have incorporated in its
(lesig"ln those features that will make it a superior fighting ship to
those cruisers that other nations miglit put to sea, nuclear power,
idv:1nc:,d electronics, cruise missiles of two ranges, possibly light-
weight. S-inch guns and the best in anti-submarine warfare equipment.
IESTR(YERS AND FRIGATES
We will Ibe able (diring this period to increase our cruiser fore level.
W~e will also increase the force level of destroyers an( frigates. two
classes of ships very imIortant to controllin- a hostile sbularinie
We will maintain our amphibious capability at about tie same level
that, it is today but. make it much more efficient in that we will be able,
in our new amphibious slips, to keep) both the troops and their airlift
and the amphibious craft that go over the beach, all together and move
them at a higher speed in the future.
OILERS AND AMMINITIN SHIPS
Now, the one part of the force tlat we struggle with. the oilers and
the ammunition ships. are not very glamorous. We do have our
problems getting them through the Congcress each year because they
do not represent in themselves a fio'htin" capability.
As I point out, if we are to operate or 'Navv on the high seas we
still need to have a balanced force whicl includes these support ships.
CARRIERS AND SUBMARINES
In summary. we maintain our carrier force levels about where tiey
are today, and we increase the numbers of surface combatants and we
have a llest increase in the number of nuclear attack sulmarines
and, of course. the number of fleet ballastic missile submarines is gov-
erned not by the Navy lut by the srategic arns limitations talks.
FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM COST
Senator TOLLIN(GS.. Generallv. what is the cost of that 5-year pro-
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would like to ask one of mv colleagues here to
give us the cost. if I may.
Admiral WHIITTLE. The cost of the slipbuliding alone, sir?
Senato, TOLLINGS. We Iust want to know tile total costs.
This is the Budget Clommittee. W e have a general feel and we llaN'c
the unclassified figures of the type ships and the construction to be
had in the next 5 years. If you give u. a total figure withi a ru akdowii
into the same classiications that Admiral Holloway described, I think
it would be adequate.
Adnirial W1I17LE. The total cost of the Navy budget over the 5-
year period increase from the order of ill at rte o
$1.5 billion a vear for the ship construction costs.
Senator IIOLLI -;s. That includes the entire constrction t)10 I I!a
for 5 years"?
Admiral WHITTLE. Yes. sir.
I()-I' IN ST'ABIE OR INFLAI-A) DOLLARS
>eator B t ( RIY. I would just like soine clarification, Admiral.
Are "(e talking about an, increase in stable dollars or does this antici-
ate irlflatin [w)
A li I Vii I TT.;. IIliat ant i c i)a tes some inflation.
Senator B('KA. If you were talking in terms of stable purchas-
1z, 1)ower', what kind of an increase would that be?
Admiral W1111'u:. We have in 1976 about $4- billion; in 1977 about
) i)illion, in 1,, about ,51/2 billion; and in 1979, about $6 billion;
.80, about $6!, billion, in stable dollars. That is for ship construe-
on, and those are1 V7 dollars.
CAPABILITY OF MTEDITERRANEAN FLEET
Senator th)L0LI.NGC Back to Admiral Holloway, I have about 2 dozen
(oie t ions left to ask.
You describe our forward strategy and our need for allies. You ree-
og-nize in your statement that since 1958 in Lebanon we could not
depIent upon those allies. We had to depend upon mobile forces. I am
-ieakiiig specifically of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. When you
get the ships large enough to be self-supporting, and you have all the
vese1s aoiund, and you are under air cover, you are saying that the
greatest danger to uts is way forward. As you described it, our own air-
1)oVe' culd (' o ei us in the Atlantic and Pacific to a large measure.
We are under the Soviet inbrella in the Mediterranean. Is that
6th Fleet really able to-as you characterize it-defeat a Soviet
Me(literla e1(an1 1 squadron, or else it could be a hostage.
How long would the 6th Fleet last in an engagement with the
CAPABILITY PRESENTLY ADEQUATE
Adiiiiral tt1oi~i'w. "With carriers, with the 6th Fleet constituted as
it is todlay with two earrers, a dozen or more surface combatants and
t1e sul)nma'ines that are associated with it, I consider that the Gth
Fleet, in a ittatch against the squadron of Soviet ships that are in the
le(literran Iean to(lay, would defeat that squadron.
LA ND-BASED AIRCOVER
(,iiator IToTT-,-(;s. You should realize that I am not suggesting that
We do a',way with the 6(th Fleet. I think its presence there is supported
iii otlwr ways. If it were actually engaged in a Soviet battle, are we
()t jwst g(mii to be ship for ship? There would be cruise missiles
knocking out ev ery one of us. Am I wrong about that ?
Admniral lIHoLLw.\owv. Yes, sir. I think you are wrong, because that
w'as tlie second requirement for a forward deployed fleet that I cited
ei ie1, an(l that is the abil ity to defend against a surprise attack of
rein forcd tin its, and] with Soviet a ii coming down from the land bases
in the ('rnnea. for example, the 6th Fleet in my view could protect
itself tactically. It would probably retire to a somewhat more favor-
MORE FAVORABLE POSITION
Senator HOLLINGS. Where? Outside of the Mediterranean?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. NO, sir, remaining in the Mediterranean but
taking advantage of geography, retire temporarily to a more favorable
position-it is hard to decide exactly how a battle would go-and be
able to work its way back into the eastern Mediterranean. This is one
point that I will make because it is my conviction that there will be no
such thing as a war between the 6th Fleet and the Soviet Mediter-
ranean squadron. There will be a war between the United States and
the Soviets, or a war between the Warsaw Pact nations and NATO in
which the 6th Fleet will be required to support the southern flank.
It is my conviction that with carriers they can support the southern
flank and defeat the forces sent against them in a balanced war on the
Without carriers I would say we have absolutely no chance of main-
taining any kind of capability in the Mediterranean. The carrier pro-
vides the local airpower which permits us to defeat the guided missile
attacks both by destroying the launching platforms and by largely
destroying guided missiles that are launched against the force.
So although carriers may be a target. the carriers themselves are the
ships that permit us to defeat the Soviet threat.
Senator HOLLINGS. Senator Buckley.
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REFUELING OF MNEDITERRANEAN FLEET
I have to go to another hearing but I would like to ask one question.
It did not contemplate any action directly between the United States
and the Soviet Union, but rather another Middle East crisis, it would
seem that the oil embargo is a rather strong instrument and I think it
is not too implausible that it could deprive the 6th Fleet of any refuel-
ing base in the Mediterranean.
To what extent are we able through our support forces on very short
notice to take care of the refueling and resupply needs of the 6th
MIDDLE EAST OIL
Admiral HOLLOWAY. We are very capable, Senator Buckley. Al-
though the oil for the 6th Fleet largely comes from Middle East
sources, it comes by a very roundabout route in which it occasionally
may even be sent to the iited States. refined. and then placed in war
reserve inventories located in our allies' ports in Europe, in Italy,
Greece. and Turkey, for example.
Our problem would be not that the oil would be turned off by the
Arabs. I think our problem would be that our NATO allies would not
risk offending the Arabs, perhaps by not releasing those stocks to us.
Senator BUCKLEY. That was the contingency to which my question
PROBLEMS CAN BE OVERCOME
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Certainly it would be an enormous strain for
us but we could do it, particularly since under those circumstances I
would envision that we would be engaged only in the eastern Mediter-
ranean and some of the tanker support that would normally be directed
toward fleet operations in the Atlantic and on the Atlantic coast would
be diverted from there and we would be able to concentrate our forces
in support of the fleets in the eastern Mediterranean.
Yes, it would be difficult, but the points I think I have to make con-
stantly is that war at anytime is inherently not good, and conflict
makes everything very difficult for us. When we talk about how would
we fare in a conflict in the Mediterranean, certainly we are going to
take losses. I am talking about in terms of whether we would prevail
in the ultimate when I say we would be successful or not successful. It
is the same thing with supporting the fleet. Yes, it is my considered
judgment that we could, in most circumstances.
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you very much.
Senator HOLLINGS. Senator Bellmon.
Senator BELLMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CARRIERS AND MILITARY BASES
I have only a couple of questions, Admiral. Has the Navy evaluated
the cost effectiveness of using our highly mobile carrier fleet in place
of our foreign military bases?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Senator Bellmon, I think that we have. In fact,
we have demonstrated the use of our carriers in the place of military
bases, and we have done it very recently because in the three major
crises since the end of our involvement in Vietnam, namely the evalua-
tion of Saigon, the evacuation of Phnom Penh, and in our response to
the seizure of Mayaqez-in every case carriers and not only carrier
aviation but carriers, played a major part. As a matter of fact, because
of the loss of our bases in those areas and the fact that we were being
thrust out of those bases, the carriers made it possible for us to evacu-
ate. During the evacuation of Saigon, as an example, we had four car-
riers on the scene. Two of the carriers were equipped with tactical air-
craft, fighter and attack, to provide local superiority if it had been
necessary to use them in combat, which fortunately it was not.
Interestingly enough, the other two carriers had their normal com-
plements of aircraft removed and in the case of one, its aircraft were
replaced with Air Force helicopters. In the case of the second carrier
its aircraft were replaced with a Marine air group of helicopters which
carried out the evacuation.
So, in effect, these carriers. not only fulfilled the function of a land
base, but permited us to safely evacuate our people from land bases
f rom which we were being driven out.
Senator BELLMON. This then reduces the seriousness of the possible
loss of bases in places like Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Thailand?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would say we view the loss of our ability to
use bases in Turkey and in Greece with apprehension because it makes
our job more difficult. But at the same time, the loss of the use of those
bases in no way means that we are going to be unable to operate in
the eastern Mediterranean, and in the same power that we operated
there before. We are going to have to commit more support resources
to the 6th Fleet, but because we have these mobile air platforms we will
continue to be able to operate in those areas.
MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF ATLANTIC SUPPLY LINES
Senator BELLMION. You mentioned in your testimony that you feel
the Navy can maintain the integrity of the Atlantic supply lines. It
was not clear to me whether those supply lines covered the petroleum
routes from the gulf.
STRONG AND READY ENOUGH FLEET
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I believe that the protection of the supply lines
between the Persian Gulf and the United States will largely be effected
in the Northern Atlantic. First on the worldwide basis by having a
fleet strong enough and ready enough to make it clear to any nation
large or small that we will not accept any interference with the avail-
ability of that supply of oil, I think we can deter 90 percent of the
possibility that some adventurous smaller country would attempt to
interdict those supply lines.
Second, in a general war, I would have to say it is not possible to
provide a convoy or an escort for every tanker coming out of the Per-
sian Gulf to the United States.
PROTECTION BY BLOCKING
What we would have to do is protect those sea lines in a strategic
sense in the case of the war with the Soviets, by blocking the access
of the Soviet fleet to that part of the world; accepting losses from those
Soviet ships that would happen to be in the Indian Ocean and the
South Atlantic when the conflict started, but avoiding those ships
as we have an opportunity.
In the long run my answer would have to be that we would take
high initial losses but as we were able to block and destroy the Soviet
forces which would interdict our sea lines of communication. we would
be getting more ships through.
A very significant analogy to this. I think, is the battle of the At-
lantic in World War II against the German submarines where we had
to accept very severe losses initially before we were able to destroy
the platforms that were interdicting our supply lines.
DEVELOP ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF PETROLEUM
Senator BELLO-N. If this country was successful in developing ade-
quate supplies of petroleum from domestic resources, would this reduce
the cost. to the Navy because we would not then need to worry so much
about the delivery of the Persian Gulf oil at our ports?
Admiral HoOAOWAY. I think this would certainly be a factor. Sen-
ator Bellmon, but I am not prepared to say how much a factor it
would be. For example. Mayaq was not involved in the transport of
critical raw materials at all. It was simply an interference with the
I .S. citizens and our privilege to operate freely on the high seas, and
we necd(ed to be able to respond to that. But certainly if our overseas
interests are reduced for any reason, then I think that the role of the
N.avy is probably diminished the same way, because, as I pointed out,
it is our overseas interests, whether that be maintaining our economy
through cominerce, whether it is our commitments to our allies,
whatever it means, that drives the Navy's function and the Navy's
INVULNEIIABILITY OF SUBfARINES
Senator BELLMION. Just one additional question. We realize at the
1)resent time our Poscidon and Polaris submarines are a major part
of our strategic defense. The Soviets are in the process of developing
wh i at appears t( be fairly effective antisubmarine warfare methods.
Ilow long does the Navy feel that the Polaris and Poseidon subma-
rines will remain relatively invulnerable?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I think a great detailed answer would have to
be given in closed session, but I will say this, we foresee Poseidon and
I,01wis )eing able to continue to operate with a high degree of invul-
leralbility throughout their projected lives. The projection life of one
of tlose ships is 20 years, although we may be able to extend Poseidon
to 25 years. Ho~vever. I do agree with you that the Soviets are devot-
ill an enormous amount of effort to the antisubmarine warfare prob-
leni, and to me that means that those ships with which we replace the
t'oseidoi have got to be far superior to the Poseidon over the 25 years
of their life because Soviet antisubmarine warfare capability, as we
ext rapolate it. will challenge them.
WILL REMAIN AHEAD
I am personally convinced that we are ahead, and will remain ahead
as their capa)ilitv increases. Our submarine capability, I believe,
vill stay just ahead of theirs to preserve this relative margin of rela-
tire vulnerability into the future. But we certainly have to continue
t(, work on it. and we have to devote an enormous amount of our en-
(T(gV and resources toward continuing to improve the art of subma-
Seiiator BEiLLroN\. Thank you.
Senlator I tOLI oS. Thank you.
V()RI,)W 1:DE PL()YMENT---MISSION5 AND BASES INVOLVED
Ad-iral. on the matter of bases, try to fix in the committee's mind
tlie costs that wold increase if you should lose some of your bases.
Fo' example, you were talking about how it would put a strain on
our resources if we lose our bases in Greece and Turkey. Let's begin
by gk-ing the worldwvide deployment of the Navy with the missions
alnd tile bases iIvolved. will then ask the question, as to which added
costs and what naval forces will have to be considered in your budget
in order to take care of that loss.
N )RMAL DEPLOYMENT
Admiral I.)LLOWAv. Omr normal deployment keeps about one-third
of our fleet, in terms of ships and aircraft squadrons, forward deployed
in a combat-ready status. We have been able, for long periods of time.
to keep 50 percent of the fleet on the other side of the world in a coin-
bat-ready status. We did that during periods ini Vietnam. Under
circumstances of general war, based upon our experience in World
War II, we had about 90 percent of the fleet units at sea, and I will use
the term "deploy" because they were either in contact with the enemy
or could be in contact with the enemy. In wartime, we can afford to
go to those high levels of deployed ships because in general war, na-
tional survival is at stake. But by keeping 90 percent of the fleet at
sea for an extended period of time, we decline rapidly in our capability
because the crews wear down and the ships wear out.
THE 7TH FLEET
Our 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific is responsible for maintaining
this stabilizing influence in that part of the world. Interestingly
enough, I think even Chou En-Lai has said that he would hate to see
the 7th Fleet withdrawn from the Western Pacific because it repre-
sents the stabilizing influence among all of the powers in that part of
If we were to give up our two most important bases, in the Western
Pacific. in Japan and in the Philippines. we would find it impossible
to maintain the same level of presence in the far Western Pacific with-
out substantial augmentation of the fleet.
MAINTAIN BASES IN PHILIPPiNES AND JAPAN
Senator SI()LLINGS. So your plans are projected on maintaining the
bases at Subic Bay in the Philippines and in Japan for the next 25
Admiral HoLOWAY. Yes, sir. From the very parochial Navy view.
we realize that we can do our job better in maintaining stability il
the Western Pacific if we do have those bases than if we do not have
them; therefore, we hope to retan them. I we did not retain tlem,
however, I would nct sav that we woulK propose to give up our pres-
ence and our objective of maintaining stability in the Western Pacific.
We would probably go back to Guam. and we would find other ways,
probably less efficient and less effective ways, but we nevertheless
would make every effort to carry out what we consider a national
Senator HOLLINGS. Now jump over to the other side with respect to
what bases, if any, you have in the Mediterranean? Did you say you
have been totally mobile since Lebanon in 1958 ?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. There are NATO bases in Turkey. We had
some bases, and those were logistic bases; that is, they were providing
fuel storage and some ammunition storage. We also had bases iii
Greece, communication stations and airfields that we could use fo-
supporting the fleet. We have NATO bases in Crete and in Italy. I
would like to point out that we do not have a naval base in the
Mediterranean and in the same sense that we have a base at Norfolk
orI even a base at Subie. If a large ship had a collision in the Mediter-
raIIeanI and required drydocking, we would probably take it back to
Norfolk. hat is the closest major naval base to the Mediterranean.
So we do tend to be very mobile in our operations, but instead of send-
inu a tanker or oiler all the way back to Norfolk to pick up a load of
fuel. we would prefer to send it to one of the NATO fuel depots in
SOVIET BUILDUP IN MEDITERRANEAN
Senator HOLLIXGS. When you said that we should be able to prevail
in any Soviet naval engagement in the Mediterranean, does that
project the Soviet buildup that we are observing there-now and for
the next 10 to 15 years? Do you think you are keeping pace with the
buildup there ?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I don't necessarily foresee a buildup of Soviet
capability in the Mediterranean as a theater, and I would not want to
project Soviet capabilities on a theater basis.
DECLINE IN TOTAL NUMBERS
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, may I say that we perceive the Soviet
maritime capability in the future as not going up in numbers of ships.
We actually would tend to forecast a decline in total numbers, perhaps,
in the Soviet Fleet. But we see an increase in total capability in that
as they drop the older, smaller, less capable ships from their inventory,
they are replacing them with more modern ships in the same category,
suchl as the 9,600-ton Kara cruiser which is replacing some of the old
World War II cruisers that are dropping out, but we are also seeing
new kinds of ships introduced into the Soviet inventory.
For example, last month for the first time the Soviets actually had
a carter at sea. and this was the Kiev. We know that they are building
a second carrier of the Kiev class. The Kiev carrier, which they have
never had before this year, is about the same size as the Oriskany and
the Hancock which are operational in the U.S. Navy today.
CWPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NAVIES
Senator HOLLINGS. Would you please compare the United States
an Soviet Navies by the ship type, tonnage, and the mission. For
exaImlple. I would like to go right to the Oriskany or the Hancock,
and once we get that comparison, we want to know just why we are
going into 91,000 tons from the 40,000 or 50,000 to the 60,000 to 70,000
we previously had. First, can you give us the type of tonnage and the
mission of the Soviet Navy. its breakdown?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Senator, I would like to provide those details
for the record, if I could, and give you a general comparison of the
capabilities of their cruiser force versus ours, if that would suffice.
Senator HOLLIaS. That would suffice.
[The information referred to follows :]
COMMIITTEE ON BUDGET, U.S. SENATE
(DEFENSE TASK FORCE)
SUBJECT OF HEARING NAVY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
Admiral Holloway: Direct comparisons of U.S. and Soviet ships
by tonnage are not always possible since ships with comparable
missions are not always of comparable size. The following
table gives the displacement tonnage of U.S. and Soviet naval
vessels by type and class, Also attached are the general
comparison of the missions of Soviet cruiser force versus the
=U-SC art". LU1J_
United States (KTONS) USSR (KTO
Aircraft Carriers (CV)
USS KITTY HAWK
Aircraft Carriers (CVN)
Helicopter Cruiser (CHG)
63-969 0 76 3
Guided Missile Cruisers -(CG)
USS ALBANY 19
Guided Missile Cruiser (CGN)
USS LONG BEACH 16
Light Cruiser (CL)
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG/CLG)
USS LITTLE ROCK 15
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)
Guided Missile Frigate (DLGM)
Guided Missile Nuclear Cruiser (CGN)
USS BAINBRIDGE 8.6
United States (KTONS) USSR (KTONS)
Guided Missile Nuclear Cruiser (CGN) (Cont'd)
USS TRUXTUN 9
USS CALIFORNIA 10.1
USS GEARING 3.5 KOTLIN
USS SHERMAN 4.1 SKORYY
USS SPRUANCE 7.6
Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)
USS ADAMS 4.5 KOTLIN
USS DECATUR 4.2 KRIVAK
USS MITSCHER 5.3 KILDIN
Frigate/Destroyer Escort (FF/DE)
USS BRONSTEIN 2.7 KOLA
USS GARCIA 3.4 MIRKA
USS KNOX 4.1 PETYA
Guided Missile Frigate (FFG)
USS BROOKE 3.4
Patrol Gunboat (PG)
USS ASHEVILLE .2
Guided Missile Patrol Boat (PGGVf)
63-969 0 76 4
>ean Minesweeper (MSO)
Fleet Minesweeper (MSF)
Coastal Minesweeper (MSC)
A t ac Submarines (SSN)
ASW Patrol Boat (PCEP)
Missile Attack Boat (PTFG)
United States (KTONS) USSR (KTONS)
Attack Submarines (SSN) Cont'd
USS TULLIBEE 2.6
USS STURGEON 4.6
USS NARWHAHL 5.4
Guided Missile Submarine (SSG
Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN)
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SS&Q
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON 6.7 HOTEL
USS ETHAN ALLEN 7.9 YANKEE
USS LAFAYETTE 8.3 DELTA
Amphibious Command Ship (LCC)
USS BLUE RIDGE 17
Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA)
USS TULARE 17
USS CHARLESTON 21
United States (KTONS)
Amphibious Transport (LPA)
USS PAUL REVERE 17
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
USS RALEIGH 14
USS AUSTIN 17
Dock Landing Ship (LSD)
USS THOMASTON 11
USS ANCHORAGE 14
Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH)
USS IWO JIMA 18
Tank Landing Ship (LST)
AT T Tf' A lT's~
Medium Landing Ship (LSM)
Ammunition Ship (AE)
Stores Ship (AF)
United States (KTONS)
Underway Replenishment (Cont'd)
Combat Stores Ship (AFS)
USS MARS 17
USS ASHTABULA 36
USS MISPILLION 35
USS NEOSHO 39
Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE)
USS SACRAMENTO 54
Replenishment Oiler (AOR)
USS WICHITA 38
PRESENT SHIP MISSIONS
(GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER)
(GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER)
To operate offensively, independently,
or with strike antisubmarine, or
amphibious forces against air, surface,
and submarine threats.
To screen support forces and convoys
and to operate offensively against
To operate offen. relyy with surface
or carrier strike forces, hunter/killer
groups, in support of amphibious assault
operating and sc.:en support forces and
convoys against vi)-marine, air and
(GUIDED MIS. ]L.E FRIGATE)
To provide self ,cenqe ind
effectively supp!(nent planned
and existing e:;c
ment groups, amphidaious forces,
and military and rercantile
sipping against tub-surface,
air and surface :i.reats; and
to conduct ASW o3crations in
conjunctions wit.: other sea
control forces ta,;ked to ensure
our use of essent.'.al sea lines
To operate offensively with strike
forces, with hunter/killer groups,
in support of amphibious assault
operations, and to screen support
forces and convoys against submarine,
air, and surface threats.
PATROL HYDROFOIL (GUIDED ISSILE)
To operate offensively against major
surface combatents and other surface
craft. To conduct surveillance,
screening and special operations.
PRESENT SHIP M:[SIONS
KRESTA I CLGM
- SVERDLOV CL
ID 0 1 ev aa
Senator HoLLrNcxs. Getting to those aircraft carriers, can we afford
then from a budget standpoint? If we are going to be comparably
competitive and be able to prevail, is it necessary for us to continue
with 91,000-ton aircraft carriers? Especially in comparison with the
40,000-ton aircraft carrier?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like not to pin down
the tonnage of any future aircraft carriers we have in the future but
would like to put it this way. If the U.S. Navy does not maintain a
capable carrier force, I predict that we are guaranteed to take a second
place to the Soviets.
My rationale is this. If we examine our two cruiser forces, we find
that we are essentially numerically equivalent. In the question of de-
stroyers, we have a few more, but there is not a significant differrnce
capability when we combine destroyers and frigates.
Baliistic missile submarines I will set aside because those numbers
are determined through the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.
In the case of our naval amphibious forces, they have many more
ships than we have, but we have more capable and better amphibious
ships. We can move more troops, and we can move them longer dis-
stances. They can move about half as many troops shorter distances.
Probably in terms of man-miles, we tend to be essentially equivalent.
When it comes to attack submarines, the Soviets are vastly superior
to us in force levels. On the other hand, with our 15 carriers today and
13 projected into the future, and then with 3 carriers that we know the
Soviets are building, projected into the future, we are superior in car-
rier force level.
Therefore, it is my contention that with the Soviets essentially
equal to the United States Navy in numbers of surface combatants and
superior to our Navy in numbers of submarines, if we are to give up
our lead in carriers, which is the backbone of the United States Navy,
we siiiiply abrogate our position of being superior to them. In other
words, we pull ourselves down to their level.
SOVIETS LEARNING CARRIER OPERATIONS
Now the reason they are not building 90,000 ton displacement
N;mitz class carriers is because they are still learning carrier opera-
tions. They started with the Moskva class; they built two of those.
They are still operating them effectively. Now with the Kiev class they
have done in about 5 or 6 years what the U.S. Navy and the British
Navy and the Japanese took about 30 years to do. So their curve of
learning in carrier warfare is going up at a very steep angle.
MUST BUILD CAPABLE CARRIERS
I believe that if we are to demonstrate our determination to main-
tain this country in a position of maritime superiority we must con-
tinue to build capable carriers. Mr. Chairman, that does not necessarily
mean that we continue to build Yimitz size carriers. We recognize that
these are big, expensive ships, and we are trying to explore ways of
getting air power at sea to be just as effective but perhaps in a less
expensive way. But I will say there is no point in putting to sea a ship
or an aircraft which on a unit basis is inferior to the ship or aircraft
it is going to fight, because you are throwing your money away by bet-
ting on a losing horse.
LARGER SOVIET SHIPS
Senator HOLLINGS. So in the changes in the size and tonnage of those
Soviet naval forces, you don't see any trend. Using your analyses, sup-
posing they built two or three large carriers. Would we immediately
be in trouble ? What would we have to do then ?
NO IMMEDIATE DANGER
Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir, we would not immediately be in
trouble. It would give them, perhaps, a capability which they do not
have now and that is namely the capability for their ships to operate
effectively beyond the range of their own land based air against a
force which has its own organic air power. I think that we saw the
Soviets turn back at the time of the Cuban missile crisis because their
forces got beyond the range of their land-based air support.
ONLY INTERDICTING FORCE
Now by building several carriers they then have the beginnings
of a capability to put a task force at sea with its own organic tactical
aircraft, and in selected areas of the world then they will find them-
selves in a position where they can compete perhaps with the United
States with those forces we have deployed in that area. But certainly
on a worldwide navy-to-navy basis, until they are able to get airpower
to sea in the same dimensions that we are able to do it with our carrier
force, they don't constitute a. worldwide maritime threat in the same
way that our own capability is represented, that is the ability to gain
andl maintain control of the seas. They are essentially an interdicting
RISKS OF 500- VERSUS 600-SIIIP NAVY
Senator HOLLINGS. What are the risks that we would run if we
maintained the 500-ship Navy rather than expanding, as you testified
to. to the 600-ship Navy?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Our analysis indicates that today with a 500-
ship Navy with the threat that we face, and taking into consideration
the contribution that our allies would make in the case of a NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict, also examining our capabilities in a unilateral
coIflict, our analyses indicate that we would prevail in most cases.
I say most cases because a conflict between the United States and the
Soviets could take place in many contexts and many different scen-
arios. In the majority of scenarios, I believe, the Navy could accom-
plish its mission, although with a very small margin of probable suc-
cess. Some elements of a scenario such as surprise, bad luck, things
of that nature, could tip the balance in the favor of the Soviets. So
we are on a relatively thin margin today as far as risk is concerned.
Now if you project into the future several things can happen. If
we maintain our own force capability constant and the Soviets im-
prove their capability, very definitely the balance of power is going
to shift in their favor, or, if they maintain their capability constant
and we decrease in our capability, again the balance of power is going
to shift in favor of the Soviets.
Now the risk I think you have to look at in two ways. In the case
of our major concern of the battle of the Atlantic, in order to win the
battle of the Atlantic, it is going to mean the redeployment of vir-
tually the entire fleet to that theater. So the risk is we could very well
in winning the battle of the Atlantic, lose in other theaters.
The second risk is in fighting the battle of the Atlantic if there is this
shift in the maritime balance of power, we could lose that battle, too.
So the reason for our projected force in the mid-1980's is to maintain
this margin of superiority over the force that we see the Soviets having
during that same period.
TWO-OCEAN NAVY AND PANAMA CANAL
Senator HOLLINGS. You are talking about that two-ocean Navy or
forward based Navy. Is the Panama Canal fundamental to our Navy
and its mission?
CANAL ESSENTIAL DEFENSE, ASSET
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. We do feel in the Navy that the Pan-
ama Canal is an essential defense asset, and our ability to use the
canal into the foreseeable future in the deployment of naval forces
should be safeguarded.
Senator HOLLINGS. Let's say you lost it, what would happen?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. If we lost the ability to use the Panama Canal
we would have to redeploy ships between the Atlantic fleet and the
Pacific fleet by either sending them around the tip of South America
or through the Indian Ocean and around the tip of Africa.
HOW MUCH USE OF CANAL?
Senator HOLLINGS. How much of that redeployment occurs during
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Normally, in steady state operations such as we
are enjoying today there are probably not more than 3 to 5 percent of
the fleet-I will reduce it from that-1 to 2 percent of the fleet is
transiting the Panama Canal. During Vietnam, however, we rede-
ployed major parts of the Atlantic fleet to Southeast Asia in order to
support our efforts out there.
I would point out, for example, that six carriers assigned to the
Atlantic fleet were deployed at least once to Vietnam in the Pacific.
Now the carriers could not go through the canal, and they did have to
transit through the Indian Ocean and one of them returned around.
But with the smaller ships, the destroyers and logistic support ships,
there was quite a flow of those ships through the Panama Canal dur-
ing the Vietnamese conflict.
In the case of a war in the Atlantic theater, I think that one would
simply have to make the assumption that major components of the
Pacific fleet would have to move to the Atlantic. Except for the car-
riers, that force we would prefer to send through the Panama Canal.
VOLUNTEER NAVY FORCE
Senator HOLLINGS. As to the voluntary naval force, what has been
the impact on the Navy of the all-volunteer force?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. We certainly had our problems during the first
year of our experience in recruiting, because it was a new experience
for us after the many years of the draft-driven volunteer system.
However, if we look at the last fiscal year which ended in July
1975, we find our experience has been a good one. We met 100 percent of
our quota for regular personnel and about 99.6 of our quota of reserves.
More than that, the quality was very high. We achieved about 75
percent high school graduates. An even higher number of our recruits
were people who we refer to as being school-eligible. That is, we can
send them to technical schools where they pick up the necessary skills
required to maintain the modern Navy. So about four out of five of all
the recruits we brought in had the intellectual capacity to go to this
I must say, Mr. Chairman, we don't delude ourselves that this was
not helped to a large extent by the economic condition that existed in
this country. I have consulted with my recruiting people and we agree
that we could be in for some hard times in the future, but we are facing
it with realism and with a determination to do everything we can to
continue to bring the proper number of high quality people into the
Navy, people who have the motivation to stay on and make the Navy
FIVE-YEAR MANPOWER INCREASE
Senator HOLLINGS. I think you do project an increase in naval man-
power during the next 5 years, is that correct?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator HOLLINGS. How do you explain that to the committee when
you have been reducing the size of the Navy? Is that because you are
going from 490 to 600 ships? Does it concern that ?
LARGE SHIP REQUIREMENT
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, that does affect the manpower needs.
There will be a net increase in our manpower requirements based on
planned new ship acquisitions and deactivations. Some classes of new
ships with expanded capabilities, such as the nuclear carriers, will
require higher manning levels than ships being replaced. Other ship
(lasses, such as the gas turbined propelled Spruance (DD-963) class
dest royers will require less personnel than the conventionally powered
IWorld War II class destroyer.
I might answer a question that you asked at the beginning of these
hearings, Mr. Chairman, that why is it that even though force levels
have come down we still don't see a large reduction in the fleet manning.
The reason for that is that as we reduce the numbers of ships we gen-
erally drop off those that are the least capable and those would be the
smialler destroyers, the old World War II destroyer escorts that would
not be effective in today's combat environment. The ships that we re-
place and we hold on to are ships like carriers and cruisers and frig-
ates which represent the real strength of the Navy.
SIX IIUNDRED-SHIP NAVY-COST AND -MANPOWER
Senator HOLLINGS. How many more men are required for a 600-ship
Navy and how much extra cost is involved ?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I can't give you that figure
rilit off. I would like to supply it for the record, if I might.
Senator IIOLLJN(;S. I think that it was stated in testimony before the
Armed Services Committee in April that it would be approximately
Adirmiral IHOtLAOMB. In that testimony before the Subcommittee on
Manpower, tle question came differently than yours. Compared to
what we have requested in the fiscal 1976 budget for manpower what
would the 600-ship Navy require for manning in the mid-1980's and
that number was 60,000 people total difference, related to the differ-
ence. the 1976 submission and the 1985 achievements of a 600-ship
Senator HOLLINGS. Do you have a different figure now?
Admiral HOLCOMB. No, sir. That number is still a valid number.
Senator IHOLLIN-GS. The 60.000 additional men would cost approxi-
mately how much now?
Admiral WhIIITTLE. About $S6;70 million per year.
FLEET AIR DEFENSE-5-YEAR COST
Senator lioitmcIs. How much (toes the Navy plan to spend in the
next 5 years for fleet air defense?
Adittiral tOLLOWAY. 'Mr. Chairman, I can't break out fleet air de-
fetise as a discrete function because I don't look at fleet air defense
as being unique. The F-14 aircraft with the Phoenix missile system,
wliicli contributes largelv to the defense of fleet units, also has an
offensive Hi ission which is to destroy enemy aircraft andl missiles which
tiey liii ght encounter in gaining local air suI)eriority. So that we would
have to divide thle cost of the F-14 and the Phoenix missile.
AIR AND SURFACE DEFENSE
Further, the defensee of the fleet against surface targets or against
surface threats is largely carried out by strike aircraft and surface
coitil batants which also have a primary mission which is offensively
oriented. As you may know, the strike cruiser, and let me refer to it
simply ais our cruiser force of the future, is having its orientation
redirected to a more otlleisive role.
In the past we di(ln't have a major surface threat to tie fleet, anl
as a consequence we employed our frigates and (estroyers for whiat
might be referred to as fleet air defense.
DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE
Now, since the number of carriers has )een reduced from about 26
to 13, we are relyillg" nlo)re on surface combatants to carry out a more
ofensive role for the Navy. Therefore, the shift in mission of our stir-
face colibatants which previously had )een largely a (defensive one has
moved to a primarily offensive role. So we are in the process of shift-
ing our strategy and our thinking', and I could provide some more
information for the record )llt I am not able to dis(retely pull out
just what those costs are.
Senator HOLLINGS. Are you able to pull out the costs for offensive
national caI)ability during the next 5 years
Admiral ItOLI)WAkY. No, sir, I cannot I tHink we run into a )roblel
of trying to define what is offensive a lid defensive.
ANTISUBMARINE COST -NEXT 5 YEARS
Senator tto LmIN(s. How about antisul)ma vine protection of our
naval forces during the next 5 years '
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, I can provide that.
[The following was subsequently sUpplied for the record as
Admiral Holloway: Our antisubmarine warfare efforts are directed
towards destroying enemy submarines in an offensive sense, not
just towards protection of our naval forces. However, any
attempt to estimate the programming for these efforts involves
some assumptions since many items only indirectly support ASW
platforms. Many platforms are themselves multi-purpose. In
the MPN and O&MN appropriations particularly, multi-purpose
ships and overhead costs such as base support make it impossible
to account fully and accurately for ASW costs. This is because
of the inability of the accounting and programming systems to
make a precise allocation of costs for personnel, basic train-
ing, ships' fuel, etc., on a strictly ASW or non-ASW basis.
Nonetheless, a reasonable approximation of our total ASW invest-
ment in the Five Year Defense Plan is as follows:
(Dollars in Billions)
FY-76 FY-7T FY-77 FY-78 FY-79 FY-80 FY-81
6.000 1.525 6.250 1 e el
TOTAL 5-YEAR BUDGET FIGURES
'lnat or I()iLLI-N(S. Senator Buckley gave the budget figures for the
next 5 years. Will you give those figures again for the next 5 years?
A(i i iIal I I LL()W.AY. Yes, sir. I think we gave only the shipbuilding
and construction Navy accounting figures, and I was not sure whether
you wanted those or the total Navy budget figure.
Senator HOLLINGS. I wanted the total Navy-both.
Admiral WiitiTiF. The SCN authorization request is about $4
billion in 1976. These are in 1976 constant dollars. The shipbuilding
and con version. Navy 1977 is about $5 billion; 1978 is about $5.5
billion; 1979 is about $6 billion; and 1980 is about $6.5 billion.
Now I can't readily translate those into escalated dollars. There
are different escalation rates used in different years. We can furnish
for the record the total obligational authority (TOA) associated
with those iiuiiibers.
[The following was subsequently supplied for the record as follows:]
TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTII()RITY
Admiral Whittle. The Navy TOA for the program years is as follows
($ in millions):
FY 77 $36,138
COMPARISON OF F-14 AND F-I 8
Senator HOLLINGS. You know there were some adjustments in the
.Department of Defense with respect to inflation. We are just all try-
ing to get on the same basic level.
With respect, then, Admiral Holloway, to the F-14 and F-18, can
you rive the committee a comparison of the capability, the mission,
111(l the c(st of them, in vol ir opinion?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. I would like to start with a little
history to provide the background.
It was the Navy's original intention that we have two F-14 fighter
squadrons aboard every carrier to be our principal fighter interceptor
aircraft. This would have required .24 F-14 squadrons. A decision was
made by the Secretary of Defense to limit the Department of the Navy,
and that includes the Marine Corps, to a total of 18 F-14 squadrons.
This left six squadrons of fighters to be provided.
YF-1 6 OR YF-1 7 DERIVATIVE
The Navv proposed a VFAX which would be a fighter bomber and
woild be at)le to replace some of the present F-4 aircraft, and at the
same time give us a dividend in that they would be a capable attack
aircraft. We were proceeding with the VFAX program when tihe Coii -
gress directed that the Navy ittilize the teclinolo;y of the Air I orces
air combat t fighter comipetition to produce a naval ,a',ir combl )at -" lit eV ,
This meant that. the 'Navy would look to a derivative of either the YF-
16 or the Y V-17.
The reason we lid to have a derivative was that neither of those ali-
craft could operate froi calrers.
F-i 8 IS DERIVATIVE OF YF-1 7
The competition was held and the winner of the competition as far
as t1e Navy is concerned was the derivativee of the YF-17. wh ich we
refer to as the F-18. This aircraft has our (nthusiastic supI))rt. We
recognize the fact that we are looking to the future with consitrained
We are asked, "Well, if you had your choice and money was no
object, which would you pick?" I iniiie(liatelv dismissed that kin(
of question, because I think it is simply unrealistic.
SIX F-18 AND EIi'ITJ;EN F-I- SQUAI)RNS
We are not living in that kind of a world where monev (oes not
count. Our plan would be to procure F-1's to replace all of those
F-4's which vwill not be replaced by F-14s. So that we will have a
fighter force of 18 F-14 squa(rois and 6 F-18 squadrons.
F-18 FORESEEN AS A-7 REPLACEMENT
Additionally, tie F-lS's l()oke(t so pronslii g t() is as all air4rani
engine combination that we foresee it as a replacemnent for the A-7
aircraft. We vill need a replacement for the A-7 iii the decade of tlie
1980's because that plan( siill)lv lacks tle agilit*v, t hat is tHe speed
nid nanetiveral ility to survive in the lbattlefield eniri)niit we
foresee during that period. This is a fairly normal situation. We had
the A-i. the Skvraider, for example. duiiii- the early days in Viet-
nam. It outlived its usefulness because of its vulnerability Ind t()wa(1
the end of ietnaiii we even saw tHe A-1 Skvhawvl becoming hdo'601N
vulnera )le e'aus it lacks t he mobility to L)et in and (lelivet- the
weapons and safely retire.
HIGHLY M1ANEUVERABLE AI('RArr
That means that the F-1 will complement the F-14 in the fi'l~t er
role and those fio-hter s(ua(lrons. Alt.hou-li thie individual a"i"reraft will
not be as capable as the F-14 in terms of all-weatlie i lnte 1ce)ts at long
ranges, it will still I e a very hiIhly v aneieral)le aircraft and capable
of all-weather fighting.
STRIKE \IR(CRAII ('APAIiIiTy
It has an additional (ivideil(1 in ti at it caii also (ioll)le in tlie attack
role. The tactical commaii(ler, sli1ul the situation require. (ca use
his F-18's as strike aircraft bv put1tin weapons aboard them a iid
using them in the air-to-grouiid role which very much imnl-oves tHie
total capability of our force in that we have a flexible group of air-
craft that can go either direction.
SPEED AND MANEUVERABILITY
Senator JIOLLINGS. Oi that score, I don't want to interrupt, but you
are a Navy air pilot. Are we going to have the dogfights that Eddie
Rickenbacker had in World War I ?
Somebody said that that is out now and they will be intercepting
each other miles away with radar. Is that wrong? Do we still have
dogfights in the Mideast and more recent wars?
When you are talking about speed and maneuverability, is that
desirable still ? Are those the kind of battles we will fight?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, that is desirable still.
F-14 ALSO DESIGNED FOR CLOSE COMBAT
Let's take the F-14. We even designed into the F-14 the capability
to dogfight and conduct combat in close, the reason being this. The
primary system of the F-14 is designed to shoot down enemy air
targets at some considerable distance away beginning 50 to 60 miles
from the F-14. But we must understand that the enemy doesn't always
fight the war the way we would like him to fight it. We might be in
a situation, as we were in Vietnam, where enemy fighters can lurk close
to the ground undetected by our long-range radar capability and
pop up in the immediate vicinity of our F-14 fighters.
EXERCISE TECHNOLOGY IN RADARS AND MISSILES PREFERRED
We must look to the future when there may be vertical takeoff and
landing fighters that could become airborne inside the minimum
ranges of the Phoenix. We can't say if we don't shoot them down at
40 miles, they get a free ride. That is the reason the F-14 had the
Variable sweep wing to be a dogfighter itself. We would prefer to
exercise our superior technology in radars and missiles and knock down
the enemy's planes before he could even get within missile or gun
MANEUVERABILITY VERY IMPORTANT
At the same time we need the redundancy as we need in every mili-
tarv system so we can still fight and win if he somehow gets through
that long-range missile screen. So maneuverability remains very im-
portant in my view into the foreseeable future.
WEAPONRY AND COSTS OF F-18! S
Senator HOLLINGS. Go ahead and complete the analogy that you
were making and. I -ould like then to get into the costs and the weap-
NAVY PLANS TO PROCURE ABOUT 800 F-18'S
Admiral HOLLOWAY. We would foresee, going through the decade
of the 1980's, the Navy's plan would be to procure about 800 F-18's.
About 400 of these would fulfill fighter requirements for the Navy
and the Marine Corps. As you are aware, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps has elected to go with an all F-18 force. Ile feels that
the F-14 will be difficult for his people to maintain iii the field because
of the complexity of its Phoenix missile system and radar. So there
will be about 400 F- S's in the Navy and Marine Corps replacillg
Now, just to maintain the F-4's until they can be replaced by F-18's
we are going to have to go into a major program called SLEP. service
life extension program, to keep enough F-4s in the Navy and Marine
Corps to fill our squadrons. We have to extend their service, life.
Additionally, we anticipate about 400 F-18's to replace those A-7's
that will be falling out of the inventory during the 19S0's.
GOOD FIGHTER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT
So what we would have preferred., initially, was to build one air-
craft, the F-18, which was just as good a fighter as it was an attack air-
craft. That is an ideal approach. However, it appeared we would pay a
penalty for that.
It would give us enormous flexibility, but it became apparent that
it would be very expensive to have our attack aircraft carrying around
radar intercept equipment largely required by fighters, and vice versa,
fighter aircraft with forward looking infrared trackers and with the
guidance systems for precision.
TWO MODELS OF F-18 S
So we decided we would divide the F-18's into two models. One, we
would call the F-18A and it would have a major in the, fighter role and
a minor in the attack role.
The F-18B-and I use these A's and B's as illustrative now-would
have a major in attack capability and a lesser air-to-air combat
This would be of great benefit to us on our carrier decks because in-
stead of having two entirely (ifferent kinds of aircraft for these two
missions. as we have today, for example. in the F-4 and the A-7, we
would replace them with a single engine/airframe combination with a
very high degree of commonality. The peripheral weapons equipment,
would be either fighter equipment or attack equipment.
COSTS OF F-18
Now the costs of the F-18 unit flyaway is $5.8 million peI' aircraft in
constant fiscal year 1975 dollars.
F-141 AND F-i8-20-YEAR COSTS
Senator IJOLLINGS. When you talk about flyawav. that includes re-
search and development. That doesn't account for the maintenance
for it, or the operation of it. or for the financing for it over 20 years
does it? Now give us all of those for the F-14 and F-18 because there
is some contention that you are getting a heck of a lot less plane
for practically the same amounts of money over the next 20 years. I
would like your comments on that.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Let us take a look at the Navy program of 800
aircraft. specifically an 800 F-18 buy in constant fiscal year 1975 dol-
lars and the unit program cost, which takes in the research and
development; all the costs on that F-18 is $9.6 million per unit. I com-
pare that to the F-14 comparable figure for an 800 F-14 buy, and the
F-14 cost is $15 million. As we drop to unit procurement costs, which
eliminates the development costs, the comparisons are $7.9 million for
the F-18 to a comparable $13.4 for the F-14.
INCREASE IN F-14 COSTS
Senator HoLLINGS. IVe just read in the New York Times that the
cost of the F-14 had gone to $20 million a unit now. How do you ex-
plain that ?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. That figure that was given would be, I be-
lieve, in then-year dollars. It is true that we are seeing an increase
in costs in the F-14, and it is because the business base of Grumman
has shrunk and more overhead is being applied to the aircraft which
the Navy is procuring.
UNIT COSTS-20 YEARS
Senator HOILLINGS. Does your F-18 figure include the same costs as
for the F-14? Over the 20-year period there is some interest costs to
the Government. I know you are giving a candid and straight answer,
but sometimes we hear "Oh. no. when the admiral said that he didn't
inchide over the 20 years what it will cost the Government to finance
it." and so on.
At the end of the 20 years would you look at the unit costs on this
particular 800 plane buy? Are these figures still valid, $9.6 million to
TRUTHFUL AND REALISTIC COMPARISON
Admiral HOLLOWAY. To the best of my knowledge, they are, Mr.
Chairman. These particular figures were developed in order to show
as truthful and realistic comparison between the F-18 and the F-14
as we could make. As you know, there are many different ways of look-
ing at these, and we establish certain ground rules for comparability.
If I could. I would put into the record the basis on which these figures
Senator HOLLINGS. I would appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
F-14. F-18 COST COMPARISON
Admiral Holloway. TABLE A compares development and procurement
costs of an 800 F-14A aircraft program and a comparable 800
F-18 (plus R&D) aircraft program in constant FY-75$.
800 F-14 Program
(Number of A/C)
Program Unit Cost
800 F-18 Program
Program Unit Cost
7 7 78 79 80 81 8
(84) (108) (108) (108) (113)
1125 1287 1220 1195 1004
83 84 85
86 87 88 TOTAL
(30) (72) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (35)
537 808 893 793 778 652 649 561 231
Admiral HOLLOWAY. They are for the same numbers of aircraft
being )rocuired and they are of constant fiscal year 1975 dollars in the
saile time frame.
F-1 8 SUPPORT COSTS
Senator ITOLLINGS. And the same life cycle costs?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. These do not contain life cycle costs because life
cycle costs do not necessarily involve procurement dollars. They will
involve manpower dollars and 0. & M. dollars and in that sense the
F-18 is much more attractive to us because it requires many fewer
maintenance personnel in the squadron which reduces the manpower
dollars to support it, and also fewer 0. & M. dollars because it is a
smaller, more simple aircraft than the F-14.
As for support costs for the F-18, if you will permit me, I would like
to furnish that for the record, if I could. Mr. Chairman, because I
think there is a dramatic difference in the cost to operate and support
the F-18 as compared to the F-14.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral HOLLOWAY. The annual operating and support costs of the F-14 and
F-18 are as follows (July 1974 Navy Resources Model) :
Operating and support costs per operating aircraft per year
F- ------------------------------------------------------------- $1.4
F-14-FAVORABLE OFF SMALL CARRIERS
Senator HOLLINGS. Favorable, of course, to the F-14.
Can it operate over the 50,000 ton carrier, the mini carrier?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would have to say we don't have a design of
a 50,000 ton carrier. This is a conceptual goal that has been discussed
by the Secretary of Defense and myself. I would say that the F-14 can
operate off of very small carriers because it has a very favorable set
of carrier landing and launching characteristics. Its approach speed is
In designing any carrier for the future it would be my position that
it would be imprudent to the point of being irresponsible if we de-
signed a carrier that could not handle the aircraft we have in the
Senator HOLLINGS. So it would have to handle both the F-14 or
F-18. That is not a factor in making the judgment?
Admiral HOLI.OWAY. -NO, sir, it isnt at all.
Let me say this. When I compare the F-14 and F-18 and make this
favorable comparison costwise, I still have to go back to the point that
the 14-14 is a far superior interceptor than the F-18, but then we are
paying more money for it. But when it comes to their ability to oper-
ate off certain classes of ships I see no differentiation between the two.
F-18 SUPERIOR TO F-14?
Senator HOLLINGS. I have heard the comparison, but is the F-18
superior to the F-14 ?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir, it is not superior to the F-14.
F-14 SUPERIOR TO F-18?
Senator HOLLINGS. Is the F-14 superior to the F--18?
SUPERIOR AS A FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. It is superior to the F-18 as a fighter
interceptor. But if we take the Navy's plan of a mixed F-14/F-18
force, you can say that for the same capability this mixed force is less
expensive than an all F-14 force, or if you take the same number of
dollars we have a greater capability in the mixed F-14/F-18 force.
EFFECTS OF BUDGET CUT
Senator HOLLINGS. I know you are pressed for time. This has been
a tremendous help this morning.
You talked for a moment about how the Secretary of Defense cut
you back. I think you said it was from 24 squadrons to 18 squadrons.
The Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee, chaired by Senator McClellan, have both cut back the Pen-
tagon budget $5 billion-5 percent to 10 percent.
Realistically how could you cut your budget? How could you econ-
omize 5 percent or 10 )ercent ? What would you eliminate?
REDUCE EACIt PROGRAM
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I believe that I would take a little bit out of
each of the accounts, Mr. Chairman. The reason is this. We have a
balanced program now which is the product of very careful judg-
ments. You must remember that we have two obligations. In the pro-
curement account we are building a military force for future genera-
tions, but we still have the responsibility to be able to fight and win
today. The 0. & M. accounts relate to today's capability, the procure-
ment accounts relate to tomorrow's and I cannot see drawing down
either of these responsibilities in favor of the other. So I don't see any
soft programs in the Navy's budget today. I believe that if we took a
cut it would be a little out of this progaiam and a little out of that.
And maybe I would have to say, perhaps we have hit rock bottom in
the 0. & M. accounts.
For the security considerations of this moment, we are getting to the
point where there is not a great deal more that can be taken out of our
operating funds and still be able to say that we are providing the
defense that we think the country needs today.
USE OF BUDGET INCREASE
Senator ITOLLINGS. Suppose You had the opposite and you wanted
to increase your capability some 5 to 10 percent, or given '.5 to 10 per-
cent more money, how would you use it?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I believe up to 5 percent I would tend to restore
funds ac ross several accounts and then above 5 percent I would add to
the 0. & M. accounts where I would have those funded to the point
beyond which I couldn't profitably use those moneys. I would then
take the balance of the increase in procurement accounts.
Senator HOLLINGS. Procuring of what?
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Both ships and aircraft.
EFFECT OF DELAYING PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
Senator HOLLINGS. One thing that has concerned me is delaying and
stretching out of the procurement programs by Congress. Usually,
these deferrals are portrayed as savings, but I wonder if that is true.
Can you tell us what effect that delay has upon your budget?
UNIT COST INCREASES
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. It increases the unit price of an item.
In other words, if you stretch out the buy of F-14's, it increases the
unit cost of the F-14. Now over a 5-year period it will still probably
reduce the amount of money you invest in those F-14's but if you
intend to buy 100 of them and you stretch out the buy, those 100
F-14's are going to cost you more before you are through than if
you bought them in a shorter period of time. So I think we have to
understand that, yes. you are saving money in one sense in that period
of time you are spending less, but per unit of acquisition, you are
>pending more. And it depends on which is important to the Budget
SPEED OF STRIKE CRUISER
Senator HOLLINGS. The matter of the strike cruiser is, of course, of
momentary importance. We will be having the military procurement
bill back before both bodies of the Congress and there is the question
aurail of the nuclear strike cruiser being considerably slower at
top speed than the Soviet cruiser. What about that, Admiral
SIMPLY A CONCEPT
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I believe that that thought comes from a set
of characteristics which floated out of my staff which were only work-
ing papers which perhaps showed a strike cruiser design with a top
speed of 28 knots. I have to point out that at this time the strike
cruiser is simply a concept. A strike cruiser is defined as a major sur-
face combatant which will have the Aegis weapons systems, Har-
pooh. ti e silp launched cruise tactical missile accommodations for
two helicopters or VTOL. will be nuclear power and the latest in ASW
eqluiteimt. and possibly a 8-inch gun. The speed of the ship, the size
of the ship. the silhouette, the configuration has not been defined,
and we will not define it until we make a number of tradeoffs that will
determine for us the best ship for the dollar invested. We have strike
cruiser designs with speeds from 28 knots up to 32 knots, depending
on the type of propulsion plant we put in it and the hull lines and the
PROTECT SEA LANES IN A NUCLEAR WAR
Senator HOLLENGS. Finally, in a nuclear war is it possible to protect
the sea lanes?
SEA LANE PROTECTION BECOMES 'MEANINGLESS
Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir, I don't believe it is. Mr. Chairman. Mv
personal philosophy is that in a nuclear war that protection of the
sea lanes becomes meaningless because I think the vast destruction
that would be visited on both sides would mean there wouldn't be a
great deal to import for the survivors.
It has been my contention when people say is a carrier vulnerable to
nuclear weapons, I agree that it. is. It, is probably not as vulnerable to
nuclear weapons as a land base because it is harder to target. But when
I say not as vulnerable I don't mean that it would necessarily survive
,a nuclear war, I mean ships at sea will probably survive longer, as a
matter of hours or days in a nuclear exchange than land base forces
and, therefore, they have a certain utility in the conflict. But as far as
anything surviving at sea in a nuclear war. I am not very sanguine
about the prospects, but I don't think it is piarticularly meaningful
because what if a ship does survive if we have lost most of the country.
CONVENTIONAL WAR AT SEA WITH SOVIETS
Senator HOLLINGS. Does the Navy assume then a conventional war
at sea with the Soviets without going nuclear?
STRONG CAPABLE NAVY USED AS DETERRENT
Admiral HOLLOWAY. We think the main reason for a strong Navy
capable of handling the Soviet Navy is as a deterrent. I think we all
have to agree that there are very few wars that have ever been started
) a country that knew it was going to lose. It was generally a mis-
calculation. In fact, I think these iniscalculati ons probably stemmed
from the fact that one nation didnt think the other would respond.
By having a strong Navy capable of fighting and winning in a con-
ventional sense it would appear to me that this would make our ad-
versaries realize that they would have to go to nuclear war to win and
this would deter them front taking the first step even in a conventional
The Navy is not unique in this respect. I think all of our general
purpose forces are fielded on the premise that we may very well have
to fight a conventional war with the Soviet Union. That certainly is
the initial premise of our NATO war plans.
CONVENTIONAL LENGTH BEFORE GOING NUCLEAR
Senator HOLLINGS. HOW long would we persist at the conventional
level at sea before we would go nuclear?
OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES CAN PREVAIL
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. Of course, it is very difficult to con-
sider the conditions under which a war would be fought, but if the
escalation were to nuclear war, in my view it would be done not by us
but by the other side, because our naval weapons technology, I think,
is the best in the world, and it would be to our advantage not to use the
bludgeon type of weapon which the nuclear bomb represents. But I
believe we can prevail with conventional forces and we would want to
maintain a conventional war for many reasons, the principal one of
which in that escalation to nuclear war is almost unthinkable because
of the results. A second reason is if we had a war at sea and it was
confined to navies I think the use of nuclear weapons would be con-
sidered as an equalizer on the part of the Soviets.
DEVELOPMENT IN MARIANAS
Senator HOLLINGs. There is presently under consideration a pro-
posal granting commonwealth status to the Marianas. Does the Navy
have any plans for support facilities or any development in the
Admiral HoLLOWXy. Not that I am familiar with, Mr. Chairman.
May I consult with m colleagues?
Admiral WHITTLE. No expansion. no, sir.
Senator HOLLINGS. I think it has been very helpful to me at least,
and I am sure to the Committee. Is there anything you wish to add?
We will leave the record open.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, Mr. Chairman. It has been our great pleas-
ure to be here and have this opportunity to give you and your Com-
mittee our views.
Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you very much.
The committee will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
Antisubmarine cost, next 5 years--
Atlantic supply lines, maintain in-
Fleet, strong and ready-
Protection by blocking
Philippines and Japan- -
Big ships needed
Budget cut, effects of--------
Budget figures, 5-year total
Budget increase, use of
Carriers and military bases, cost
effectiveness of ....
Carriers, must build
Current threat, can meet
F-18, support costs--
F-18, weaponry and costs of
F-14 and F-18, comparison of ---- 34,
F-14 and F-18, 20-year costs ----
Fleet air defense, 5-year cost -..
Manpower increase, 5-year
Mediterranean fleet, capability of_
Mediterranean, Soviet buildup in-
National defense projection-
Navies, United States and Soviet,
Aircraft carriers ....
Cruiser forces _- -
Panama Canal ....
Petroleum, develop adequate sup-
Procurement programs, effect of de-
12 Projection of power- -
33 Amphibious forces
15 SSBN's .....
15 Refueling, Mediterranean fleet
15 problems of
8 Middle East oil
17 Sea control-
17 Sea lanes, protection in nuclear
S Sea lines of communication most
34 Seventh fleet -
41 Ship needs---------------------
Shipbuilding, 5-year program
14 cost ------------------------9.
2)9 Upper bounds of funding level--
6 500 vs. W0O, risks of
16 Need for
16 Logistic independence
40 Overseas fleets
36 Power, ability to project -----
3s Surprise attack, capability
32 600-ship Navy:
31 Breakdown and new construc-
2 Carriers and submarines --
Destroyers and frigates -----
Oilers and ammunition ships
18 Cost and manpower .......
28 Size and cost ........
28 Size of fleet --
28 Soviet :
28 Buildup in Mediterranean ------
30 Learning carrier operations ....
15 Strike cruiser, speed of---------
3 Submarines, invulnerability of ---
42 Volunteer force------------------
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
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