The effects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the cultural relations of the United States and E...

MISSING IMAGE

Material Information

Title:
The effects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the cultural relations of the United States and Eastern Europe executive communication 2276 : a special report to Congress from the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs ... April 1976
Physical Description:
x, 134 p. : ; 24 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs
United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on International Relations
Conference:
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975
Publisher:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Washington
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Relations -- United States -- Europe, Eastern   ( lcsh )
Relations -- Europe, Eastern -- United States   ( lcsh )
Genre:
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

General Note:
At head of title: 94th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 025787698
oclc - 02281749
System ID:
AA00022559:00001

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Foreword
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Letter of transmittal
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Table of Contents
        Page ix
        Page x
    I. Foreword to the report
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
    II. The background and purpose of our trip
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
    III. General observations
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
        Page 70
    IV. General recommendations
        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
        Page 74
        Page 75
        Page 76
        Page 77
        Page 78
        Page 79
        Page 80
        Page 81
        Page 82
        Page 83
        Page 84
        Page 85
        Page 86
        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
        Page 91
        Page 92
        Page 93
        Page 94
    V. Country-by-country analysis
        Page 95
        Page 96
        Page 97
        Page 98
        Page 99
        Page 100
        Page 101
        Page 102
        Page 103
        Page 104
        Page 105
        Page 106
        Page 107
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
        Page 121
        Page 122
        Page 123
        Page 124
        Page 125
        Page 126
    Appendix A. Principal foreign officials consulted by the authors of this report
        Page 127
        Page 128
        Page 129
        Page 130
        Page 131
    Appendix B. "Inventions by Bourgeois Propaganda and the Realities," Tass, August 26, 1975
        Page 132
        Page 133
        Page 134
Full Text
4
,


94th Congress
2d Session


COMMITTEE PRINT


THE EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY


AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ON THE CULTURAL


RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN

EUROPE





EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION 2276





A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

FROM

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND
CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Pursuant to Public Law 87-256,


APRIL 1976


A ~



** SA-
t,
~- ~


Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-5040 WASHINGTON : 1976


/


I
















COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, CViirmn


CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGS, JR., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, PennsylvarAa
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illnots
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR, Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
EDWARD G. BIESTER, JL, Pennsylvwiia
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, Calfornia,


MARLN A. CZARNECKI, Chief of Staff


(II)










FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 5, 1976.
This report was submitted to the Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives, the Honorable Carl Albert, on December 29, 1975,
pursuant to section 107 of Public Law 87-256 (the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961), and was referred to the Com-
mittee on International Relations.
It is published herewith as a committee print because of the com-
mittee's continuing interest in and oversight over followup to the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
which was entered into on August 1, 1975.
It is hoped that this document will be useful also to other Members
of Congress, the executive branch, and the public who are interested
in this matter.
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.


(III)



















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013













http://archive.org/detaiIs/confere00unit









LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL


Letter Of Transmittal From Hon. Leonard E. Marks
THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., December 29, 1975.
Hon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Section 107 of Public Law 87-256 (the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961) instructs the U.S.
Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs to submit annual reports to the Congress and "such other reports
as they deem appropriate."
In accordance with that mandate, I am submitting the attached
report with reference to the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, entered into in Helsinki, Finland, on
August 1, 1975. This report embodies the observations and recom-
mendations reached by William French Smith and me during a recent
official visit to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.
Fifteen days after the signing of the Helsinki Agreement, we started
on our mission, visiting Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Hun-
gary, and the U.S.S.R. Together with our Staff Director, we had
extensive talks with high-ranking officials of the Ministries of Culture,
Education and Foreign Affairs; we met also with Rectors of leading
universities and museum directors, and with other representatives of
cultural and educational groups in Eastern Europe.
We found a willingness to listen and to talk about the very real
problems involved in increasing contacts with the United States. They
spoke to us frankly about their suspicions of our motives, as well as
about their hopes for better relations. We did the same.
We were encouraged by the growth in the rate of contacts, partic-
ularly at the scientific and academic levels, already under way in most
of the countries we visited. In less than twenty years, these contacts
have moved from virtually nil to a varied pattern of programs,
involving exchanges at every level and almost every subject of mutual
concern.
The dialogue, in short, has begun. It is still tentative. It is severely
limited by heavy-handed political controls on their side and by prag-
matic distrust on ours. Nevertheless, the basis for continued dialogue
is there. It is this which encourages us in our belief that there are
significant opportunities for raising the level of contacts in ways that
will be beneficial to each of the countries involved.







It is relevant to note that we made our survey trip within a month
after the signing of the Helsinki agreement. This gave us a chance to
test official Soviet and East European reaction to a significant pat
of the agreement, the so-called "Basket Three" provisions, dealing
with human contacts and with cultural, educational and information
exchanges between East and West. We were informed of the Soviet
reluctance to include this subject in the agreement, and of their hard
bargaining to minimize their obligations in this area. We know that
the final language on this subject is couched largely in terms of intent
rather than obligation. And we know that the agreement's provisions
involve, at Soviet insistence, a wide range of escape hatches for avoid-
ing or minimizing the application of these provisions. We were pointed-
ly reminded of these facts in our many discussions with Communist
officials during our survey trip.
Nevertheless, we came away from these discussions with the con-
viction that, for all their inadequacies, the Basket Three provisions
of the Helsinki Agreement represented a step forward. The Communist
officials we talked with were uniformly aware of the fact that their
country had signed an international agreement which committed
them, in princilpe at least, to reciprocal actions in the fields of human
contacts and other exchange programs; and they were made aware
(by us, among other Western sources) that the United States and
West Europe took this subject seriously. More significantly, they
indicated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, that their countries
planned to take some measured steps towards compliance with at
east some of the Basket Three provisions. This may be, admittedly, a
small gain, and no doubt it falls somewhat short of the expectations
generated in some quarters by the Helsinki agreement. Nevertheless,
it is a gain.
We therefore believe that the United States has important oppor-
tunities for strengthening the mutual exchange of people and ideas
with the Soviet Union and other East European countries in the
coming years. These contacts can play a significant role in moving our
relations with the Communist world to a more stable, constructive
relationship. Accordingly, we recommend that U.S. Government
Agencies, working with the private community, should develop an
active plan for carrying out the educational, cultural and other
provisions of "Basket Three." In particular, it should make sure that
it has the resources ready to meet its obligations under these provisions.
We are not recommending the expenditure of significantly larger
amounts of money, although some increases in funds and other re-
sources will be called for. In this endeavor, more is not necessarily
better. Our main point is that the United States, along with thirty-four
other countries, made in Helsinki an important commitment to expand
human contacts and other exchanges. It is a commitment very much
in our democratic tradition and in our national interest. We will be
pressing other nations, particularly those in the Communist area, to
fulfill their commitments. We should not let inadequate planning or
failure to program adequate resources get in the way of meeting our
side of the bargain when useful opportunities arise.
In expressing our hopes about the possible impact of the Helsinki
provisions on human contacts, we do not have any illusions about the
political realities involved. We sensed in our talks the limits on





VII


basic freedoms which still exist in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, and the continuing desire of the leadership in these countries
to limit exchange programs for their own narrow ends. Rigorous
controls still exist there over the kind of human dialogue we take for
granted. We are also aware of the limited impact of any exchanges
of people or ideas on the day-to-day lives of most people in the Soviet
Union or Eastern Europe. Thus, in dealing with the Helsinki provisions
for greater contacts, the Eastern Europeans will be inclined to promise
more than they will deliver, to temporize, to substitute rhetoric for
accomplishment, and they will also try to put the onus for "hindering"
cultural and information exchanges on the West, and on the United
States in particular. In part, this involves building up their case for
the follow-up conference scheduled for Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1977,
which will review progress made in implementing the Helsinki Agree-
ment. We must be prepared for this by establishing a mechanism to
monitor their, and our, performances in support of Basket Three
proposals.
These are realities. But they need to be matched against another
set of realities: the considerable progress that has been made in
opening the doors to greater dialogue and exchange between East and
West during the past two decades. Instead of considering the great
distance we have to go, it is useful to consider the distance we have
come. For example: jamming of the Voice of America programs has
ceased (but not those of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty);
each country has significant, and growing, academic and cultural
arrangements with the United States and other Western nations;
East-West scientific and technological cooperation is expanding
rapidly; Western information and cultural services have been per-
mitted to expand their activities in most Eastern European countries.
These are, perhaps, small gains when measured against the overall
pattern of restrictions on access to "outside" contacts, and they
represent a reluctant response to internal and external pressures.
Nevertheless, such contacts have already reduced the sense of sharp
confrontation which marked the post-war years.
Evidence collected on our survey trip leads us to the conclusion that
these contacts can and should be expanded in the post-Helsinki period.
Communist officials and others with whom we talked generally saw this
trend as being in their national self-interest, so they are likely to do
something about it. Their priorities are, on many points, different from
those of Americans, yet we found important areas of potential agree-
ment on expanding programs in ways that can be mutually beneficial.
This calls for steadiness of purpose, both in recognizmg our own
national interests and those of the countries we are dealing with. This
latter point deserves to be emphasized. To the degree that ideological
policies prevent healthy dialogue, Americans have a right to be
critical. We should avoid, however, being self-righteous when Russians
or East Europeans find certain of our cultural values and products
irrelevant or even undesirable. These are honest differences of tradi-
tions, taste, and purpose, and we should understand them. In our
dialogue, we should stress, without compromising our own freedom of
expression, the social and cultural values we share.
The best approach for the United States will be to work for measured
progress in improving both the quantity and the quality of our ex-
changes. We do not foresee any sudden or dramatic breakthrough. It






VI


is this approach which we have suggested in this report. We are not
recommending any "crash programs" or other large-scale initiatives.
Even assuming that the resources would be made available, such
initiatives would not be realistic in view of the continuing suspicions
of Communist leaders about alleged "ideological subverion." We
believe, then, that the U.S. Government and private organizations
should plan for steady incremental increases in the level of resources
devoted to cultural and information exchanges with the Soviet Union
and Easterl Europe over the next five year;, for we find the climate is
propitious for improving the quality of our present exchange program,
with Eastern Europe and for plannng an expanded program of con-
tacts in the years ah ead. The end results could be a significant realiza-
tion of proposals of the Helsinki Agreement in ways that will sere
the interests of all nations involved.
Copies of the report, which is enclosed, will be sent to the committees
of Congress interested in international activities,. Since the report
contains recommendations for legislation, I am hopeful that hearings
will be held on these proposals.
Sincerely,
LEONARD H. MARKS,
Chairman.

Letter of Transmittal From Hon. William French Smith
THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1976.
lIon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
Wa., hington, D. C.
DEAR MIR. SPEAKER: On December 29, 1975, in accordance with
provisions of Public Law 87-256, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Chairman
of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and
Cultural Affairs, sent to you a report on a trip he and I made to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Tnion last autumn. It is entitled
"A Special Report on the Effects of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe on the Cultural Relations of the United States
and Eastern Europe."
Mr. Marks sent the report under cover of a letter of transmittal
which summarized our findings and placed them in the political
context of our times. Since Mr. Marks and I shared equally the
responsibilities of the trip and the report, I believe it appropriate that
I should indicate my full concurrence with the comments and recom-
mendations carried in lr. MIarks' letter. I do so herewith and would
be pleased to have this letter appear with that of Mr. Marks if our
report is published as a House document.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH,
Member.









CONTENTS

Page
Foreword by Hon. Thomas E. Morgan --------------------------------III
Letters of transmittal:
Hon. Leonard H. Marks------------------------------------- v
Hon. William French Smith -------------------------------------VIi
I. Foreword to the report ----------------------------------------- 1
II. The background and purpose of our trip -------------------------- 8
III. General observations ------------------------------------------- 22
1. Officials in every country we visited were well informed on the
provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement and gave
every indication that they intended to implement those deal-
ing with educational and cultural interchange -------------- 22
2. Officials in every country we visited strongly supported inter-
national educational and cultural exchanges as a means for
promoting better relations with the United States -----------32
3. The countries we visited do not act as a "bloc" on international
exchange matters; on the contrary, they vary greatly in
their approach to, and activity in, the field ----------------- 34
4. "Step-by-step" is the watchword as we move towards more,
and more varied, exchanges ------------------------------37
5. There is a uniform desire throughout the area to increase ex-
changes with the United States in science, technology, and
management ------------------------------------------42
6. There is, in the countries we visited, a growing interest in
furthering institution-to-institution contracts, but pro-
cedures for doing so are not yet clearly defined -------------- 46
7. "Reciprocity" in exchanges with the United States is a matter
of concern in all the countries we visited --------------------52
8. American student and professor participants in exchange
programs in Eastern Europe are generally contributing to
the achievement of "mutual understanding;" but there is
room for improvement in their selection and orientation 58
9. U.S. Embassies in the countries we visited are strong support-
ers of exchange programs, and their officers are excellently
equipped to deal with them ------------------------------67
IV. General recommendations ---------------------------------------71
1. The United States should in every way possible take advan-
tage of the expressed intention of the Eastern European
countries to implement the provisions of Basket III of the
Helsinki agreement -------------------------------------71
2. The United States, unilaterally and in consort with its NATO
allies, should maintain a record of actions they have taken to
implement the Basket III provisions of the Helsinki agree-
ment, and another of actions by Eastern European countries
which defy them ---------------------------------------73
3. The United States should take the lead in promoting in 1976 a
meeting of cultural representatives of the Western European
countries which signed the Helsinki agreement --------------75
4. The funds requested by CU for its official exchange programs
with Eastern Europe should be made available --------------78
5. The United States should attempt to meet the desire of East-
ern Europeans for exchanges in science/technology/manage-
ment ------------------------------------------------ 81
6. The United States should encourage direct institution-to-
institution exchanges with Eastern European countries, and
respond promptly to overtures from them ----------------- 83


(IX)









7. Private and governmental organizations should be alert to,
and assist in, the "mutual exchange" of cultural materials
between Eastern Europe and this country ----------------- 86
8. The State Department and the International Research and
Exchanges Bard (IREX) can and should improve the
selection and orientation of their American grantees to
Eastern Europe--------------------------------------90
9. The U.S. Government should institute a program which
permits Eastern European publishers, booksellers, and film
distributors to purchase American media products with
their own currencies -----------------------------------93
V. Country-by-country analysis -----------------------------------95
1. Czechoslovakia ----------------------------------------95
2. Poland ----------------------------------------------101
3. The Soviet Union -------------------------------------104
4. Romania --------------------------------------------112
5. Hungary --------------------------------------------120
VI. Appendixes:
A. Principal foreign officials consulted by the authors of this
report --------------------------------------------127
B. "Inventions by Bourgeois Propaganda and the Realities,"
Tass, Aug. 26, 1975 ----------------------------------132









I. FOREWORD

From August 16 to September 7, 1975 the undersigned

members of the United States Advisory Commission on

International Educational and Cultural Affairs,

accompanied by the Commission's Staff Director, visited

on official Commission business five Eastern European

countries: Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union,

Romania and Hungary.

In the twenty-three days we spent in the area, we

visited eight cities: Prague, Warsaw, Poznan, Leningrad,

Moscow, Kiev, Bucharest and Budapest. We met formally

with approximately 120 European officials in a series of

34 official meetings, which averaged over an hour each in

length (see Appendix A for list of principal contacts);

and we talked informally with approximately 100 more. We

met about 75 American student and professor participants

in formal exchange programs, and spoke at least briefly

to most of them. We had the benefit of the advice and

counsel of some thirty-eight U.S. officials at seven U.S.

diplomatic missions, including three Ambassadors, two

Consuls General, three Deputy Chiefs of Mission, seven

Counselors for Press and Cultural Affairs, and five

Cultural Attaches.


(1)












t c.)vet nJct~d at n Ie1 level of the
i un I ducat l
i o f astern this Act ho sn eu--tr iesI I ct w ds

S;... in any case, at a most propitious moment:
f w w<
A t I, 1975, of the "Final Act" of the Conference
-i ty ai {d Cooper at io lb Lurope The provisions

)f "Bas~ket iII" of this "Act" (i.e. the section dealing

with "Coperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields')

becaue the focal point of all our discussions; we willl

rV fr to them repeatedly in the body of our report.*~

in the pages which follow we have summarized the

_cckground for our study and made general observations
an: Iecomrrendations which we believe are applicable


othe region as a whole. We have followed this with a

ountry-b)-country account of our observations on, an



*Although we shall in the following pages frequently refer
to th is "Final Act" for convenience sake as an "agreement,"
we are aware that it is not an official international
agreement which carries the force of law, but only a
declaration of mutually acceptable principles which the
35 signatories acknowledge as a basis for inter-state
relations and cooperation.








suggestions for, action in each individual country cn

our itinerary.

Our aim is not simply to shed light on recent

trends or developments in the area of this country's

educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe.

We hope, rather, to point the way to specific actions

which can and should be taken by various elements of

our government and our private institutions to assure

that the United States capitalizes on an unusual

situation: an almost unprecedented opportunity to use

effectively in our national interest one of the under-

appreciated tools of diplomacy: international educat -hal

and cultural exchange.

If our purpose is achieved, if our trip can be

counted in any sense "a success," the credit belons-

much to those who helped organize it as to those who

undertook it. We therefore acknowledge here with deec

appreciation the cooperation given to our mission by

officers of the United States Information Agency (US-'

and the Department of State, both in Washington and in

the field.










In Wash i on the idlea ( f our on-t he-spot

~ur vey wa a roved arid su1por ted by James Keogh,
[)irec tor of the USIA, end by ,John Richardson, Jr.,

i h t t> r of the State Department's Bureau of

Educati nal and Cultural Affairs (CU). Under the aegis

)f the former we were provided a vaIhable briefing by

John W. Shirley, Director of the USIA's Office of

European Affairs, and his deputy, Philip Arnold. Under

the aegis of the latter we were provided with

essential documentation on our exchange programs with

Eastern European countries and were generously briefed

by Lee T. Stull, Deputy Assistant Secretary of CU, and

Yale W. Richmond, Director of CU's Office of Eastern

European Programs. The information and judgments given

to us by these representatives of our government became

the basis for much of our later discussions with foreign

officials.

The State Department extended us an additional

courtesy which contributed directly and significantly

to the effectiveness of our mission. It named us the

official U.S. delegation to the opening at the Pushkin

Museum in Moscow of the exhibit, "One Hundred

Masterpieces from New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art." The










exhibit was our part of the exchange which brought to

this country the "Scythian Gold" treasures from the

U.S.S.R. As the official U.S. representatives to this

event, we were guests of the Ministry of Culture. Many

doors were thus opened to us, many high-level contacts

assured, which might otherwise not have been.

Without the assistance and understanding of our

posts abroad, our mission would not have been possible.

They provided both, and we are much in their debt. We

should note that the timing of our trip was generally

bad from each post's point of view because: a) many

local officials who could contribute to our study were on

holiday; b) the small Embassy staff was exhausted from

recent responsibilities (e.g. President Ford's visit to

Poland), or deep in preparation for imminent ones (e.g.

Deputy Secretary Ingersoll's visit to Budapest). Yet our

American Missions uniformly performed on our behalf above

and beyond the call of duty. The programs they arranged

for us were unfailingly responsive to our needs; the

"talking points" papers and briefings they provided us

were perceptive and helpful; the caliber of local

officials whom they had arranged for us to meet was

unexpectedly and gratifyingly high; the representational









k w t t o o u r o f c x i a l i e i z n t v n t s ; t h e ro u t i ne

r t e t I o o u r v i s; i t w e r ade w i t h s c

l w c t ~ w e w r e a l w a y s a b l e t o c o n c n t r a t e o n.

u r i r ~ e i o n a u i c n e n s .

t1 1s A forItunaely impossible for us to identify

S h s i (epor al 1 t hose5 at each post f r om A:mbassa d or s

I c{ l translators, who contributed in sone way to cr

li-bin, but we would be remiss if we did not

Abliciy ckowede our indebtedness to the followin,

Io bo( the brunt of our visit.

i) Our Counselrs f r Prss and Cultural Affars:

E.Frederick *Quinn in Czechoslovakia; James radshaw

n Polan; Raymond E. Benson in the U.S.S.R.;

Aurelius Fernandez in Bucharest; Stephen F. Dac. =

Wudap est.
2) Their principal cultural assistants: GereC

Kinzer in Prague; Robert Gosende in Warsaw; 3hn :::_t

Williams in Poznan; Robert K. Geis in Leninra; _)-H.

oah in Moscow; Kathryn L. Koob in Buchare s; A~e '

Sijrund in Budapest.
3) Our to-ranking Mission personnel: jac
DCM in Czechoslovakia; John R. Dvis, DCM in iri

J oh I.. W. Ne b rt Consul General in Len ixngrd ; A, z dor








Walter Stoessel, Jr. and his DCM,


in Moscow; Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr. and his :c' ,

Richard Viets, in Bucharest; Ambassador Eugene V.

McAuliffe in Budapest.


Leonard H. Marks, Chairman
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs


William French Smith, Member
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs


December 12, 1975


57I -2


John F. Matlock, Jr.










I f. iZII ,\rAi<~1I.)U AN)Di I{VUtSI.; k k if IRIP

'. _: i tial I>. icat ionatl and Cult ural E xchang;e Act :

19 i" (Public Law 87-256) created the tU.S. Advisory

Co~u lssi< on Interniational Educational and Cul tural

Ai~airs Ink: defined its role. It was to fer late ani

recor JIen i o th& President pol icies for exerci sing. his

authority under this Act and [to] appraise the

effectiveness of programs cared out pursuant to it." -n

it was to "submit annual reports to the Congress anid s,*

other reports to the Congress as they deem appropriate -2

[to] m ake reports to the public in the United States

and abroad to develop a better understanding of and s_-rt

for the programs authorized by this Act."

The purpose of The Act was equally clearly, s~a~e. It

was "to enable th~e Governi:lent of the Unilied Sca~es to

increase mutual understanding between the people of ..

United Scares and the people of other countries by -:aT_= of

educational and cultural exchange. . and thus to ass-:B: 2ni

the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peacef..L

relations between the United States and other countriesi

in the world."








The burden, and opportunity, of carrying out

this purpose devolved largely upon the Bureau of

Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) of the Department

of State; therefore the U.S. Advisory Commission has

always worked closely with, and carefully scrutinized

the activities of, CU. Over the years the methods,

programs and/or emphases used by the Bureau to promote

its aims have altered in conformance with alterations

in the world and in U.S. foreign relations. In its

most recent statement on the subject the Bureau

defines its objectives as follows:

weseekto increase mutual understanding,
cooperation and community between the people of
the United States and other peoples by direct and
indirect efforts to: 1) enlarge the circle of
those able to serve as influential interpreters
between this and other nations; 2) stimulate
institutional development in directions which
favorably affect mutual comprehension and
confidence; 3) reduce structural and technical
impediments to the exchange of ideas and informa-
tion."

This, then, is the legislative and conceptual

framework in which the Commission operates. But the

country's exchange activities have so markedly increased







10






ai r thn ef ,ctvcn:ess o)L U thl gov~r I nt 's

i )Ing Lrgr .instead I it ,o .a~1 nnu lJy slects fox

411s ition. a limited nube of su cs to wichI Ut
I t h 4L L tA ~ IS

hop~sto b abo to do 3sie

At its anniua IIl an:n n se ssion late in Ma~ of this

Ri a, the CoI uxisorn decided to I1.derItake as on of its

17- 76 projects an Lsvldation of our educational and

cs .1 al exchanges with Eastern E uropean countries. It

had ever s : riously addressed: the subject, though

stabilizingj relations with the $oviet Union anu other
Western European countries has in recent years clearly


L
foreign policy. This was explicitly stated last spring

thc Statc Department's United States Foreign Policy:

An Ovrview/May1975. In a chapter headed "Detent with

the Soviet Union," this document points out that, although

our search for a more constructive relationship with the

Soviet Union has been a continuing process, therc is

something new in the current period of relaxation of

tensions, to wit: "its duration, the scope of the

re 1tionship which has evolved, an: te continuity and






11



intensity of consultations it has produced. "

By the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 70's,

the Overview continues, "the time was propitious for a

major atteiti)t to improve U.S.-Soviet relations."

Much has been accomplished. For example: Berlin's

potential as Europe's perennial flash-point has been

substantially reduced through the quadripartite

Agreement of 1971. The SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks) has placed a permanent limitation on defensive

weapons and may lead to the long-sought process of arms

reduction. And on July 3, 1973 we and our allies

launched negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other

countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe -- a conference designed to foster East-West

dialogue and cooperation.

OnAuustl, 1975 the "Final Act"of that conference

was signed in Helsinki by the thirty-five

participating nations, including of course all those

within the Soviet bloc. A large section of the

conference agenda dealt with subjects which did not have

to do directly with political, economic or security

matters. These were lumped together in what came to be

called "Basket III," under the title, "Cooperation in










2~ ~tiAt I a d Uther Fields." The "Final Act"

devoted twenty-three of its aies to reeonmendations

fr act ion in this general ared. In signing the Act,
thi, E astern E uropeain nations "declared their readiness
to take measures which they consider ap propriate and


to conclude agreements or arrangements among

themselves. . to proceed to the implementation of"

such things as:

-- facilitating the freer and wider dissemination

of information of all kinds.

-- encouraging the wider showing and broadcasting

of a greater variety of filmed information from

other participating states.

-- establishing, developing or encouraging programs

providing for the broader exchange of scholars,

teachers, students, including the organization of

symposia, seminars and collaborational projects,

and the exchanges of educational and scholarly,

information.

-- increasing substantially their cultural exz. anges,

with regard both to persons and to cultural w-r's.

-- promoting, for persons active in the field of

culture, travel and meetings; encouraging in this





13



way contacts among creative and performing

artists and artistic groups.

-- expanding and improving cooperation in the

fields of education and science.

-- facilitating the extension of communications

and direct contacts between universities,

scientific institutions and associations.

-- developing the coordination of programs

carried out in the participating states, and the

organization of joint programs, in the areas of

the humanities and social sciences.

-- encouraging the study of foreign languages

and civilizations as an important means of

expanding communications among peoples for their

better acquaintance with the culture of each

country.

Eastern European leaders speaking at the signing

ceremony strongly implied that they took these semi-

commitments seriously and planned to carry them out.

Remarks by Dr. Husak, First Secretary of the

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of

the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, were typical:







14







t. em~n t he d ve lopmn t ot th li ond it ions f or
h, rfore wo are in fvor o the widest


Itual its i it ion thiouJh culture m Itters. We are

i aavor : thi I Ihange of ideas and informant ion
wh. h ser ve jaefu under standing and the al -round

h ve 1:Idnt of a. We are in lavor of a wie

exchange of persons which will help to produce

b ,eficial cooperation and mutual understanding.

M-ny Western observers greeted such pronouncements

with ;reit scepticism and more than the usual

cynicism. Their position was that the Soviet Union,

and therefore presumably its allies, would give

lip service to implementation of the "humanitarian"

and "cultural" proposals of the agreement while

ex loiting the political and economic. Or as the

New York Times correspondent in Moscow put it, "While

the agreement signed in Helsinki today includes

provisions for broader exchanges of people, inforna-

tion and for other human and civil rights

considerations, the recent attitude of Soviet

officials has offered little hope to citizens Iher





15



that their lives will be favorably affected by

the signing of the documents."

In a retrospective piece in the Washington

Post, Peter Osnos summed up this attitude as

follows: "Just before the wind-up [of the

Conference] Senator Jackson, exiled Soviet author

Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others assailed the

agreement for giving the Kremlin its long-sought

hegemony over Eastern Europe in trade for

unenforceable, limp pledges on an increased

east-west flow of information, ideas and people.

Criticism so outweighed support for the

agreement. . that President Ford and his entourage

were almost apologetic about going to Helsinki

for the summit-level signing."*

Although he wrote the following well after the

signing of the Final Act, Georgi Arbatov, iirfector

of the Institute of United States and Canada

Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, expressed

a point of view which had already contributed to

doubts here that the Eastern European nations

*What the President actually said was: "The United States
considers the principles on which this conference has agreed
are part of the great heritage of European civilization which
we all hold in trust for mankind. To my country they are rot
cliches or ety phrases. We take this work and these words
very seriously."






16



s1 isiy xt ,nded to imle~ment the Basket II I
r tff h a S ei I t Is


"jn reference to the item in the Final Act on

f Jom o information, the Soviet Union
intends earnestly to fulfill all provisions

recrded. however, if some people regard

the a an invitation to fling open the door

to subversive anti-Soviet pro-violence

propoganda, or to fan national or racial strife,

then they are laboring in vain. Neither the

document signed in Helsinki nor detente will

permit such occurrences. "

The Advisory Commission was, of course,

deeply concerned with reactions in Eastern Europe

to the proposals of the Final Act encompassed under

"Cooeeration in I-umanitarian and Other Fields," for

t'e "Ot.her Fields" covered with remarkable precisio-

the questions of international educational and

cultural exchange which are the Commission's

business. The Commission's deliberations start from

the premise tr.at international educational and

cultural exchange, when properly conducted, can anu











will contribute to "mutual understanding," and thus to

peaceful relations between the United States and

other countries of the world. Experience has

demonstrated that this country can establish

cordial cultural relations with other countries,

even when our political or economic relations are

strained, and that these good cultural relations

can lead in time to improved political relations.

There has probably never been a more propitious

time in our history to exploit for our good this

technique of diplomacy. Therefore we were

instinctively hopeful that the Helsinki accord

might lead to increased and improved cultural

relations with the Soviet Bloc, and that this

greater interchange of experience, opinion, and

achievements would contribute ultimately to the
"more constructive relationship" with the Soviet

Union and its Eastern European allies which is

the goal of our foreign policy.

But this potential significance of the

Helsinki agreement was called into question by the

doubts cast upon at least the Soviet intentions to







1t







i 1 si~ should he to de.ter ilu& what were the

tt {
J ;ri ent, ad fion tis to project wht effect the

ml .lii have on our exchange programs.
wel migit V1ad parentheticallytatw focused

entir } on the 2iucational and cultural implic tions

of thi agrecrent, feeling it was not within our

.~da~te to probe European reactions to its political

e( enomic ro visions. kie did, of course, meet ,th

many hiqh-ranking Foreign Office officials (e.g. th

Act ingand Deputy Foreign Ministers in

Czechoslovakia and Romania;the head of the Division of

North American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Hungary, the Chief of the Cultural Div-in of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow- the Vie-

irector of Department III of the Polish Ninistr, f

n Affairs); but on such occasions any referee

to political relationships served only as backer .

to our discussion of culLural relationships. Generaly,

our contacts were with university and museum dre::v rs,

impresarios, educational and cultalal institu ,






19



representatives of cultural and educational minis:r-cs.

and foreign office officials specifically concerned

with international cultural, educational or

informational affairs.

The point of departure in our talks with almost

all of these officials was some variation on the

question, "How do you think the Helsinki agreement=

will affect the cultural relations between your

country and the United States?" From the discussions

which ensued we learned much: not only about reactions

to the Helsinki agreement, but also about the poten_:_

for educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern

Europe and about our existing programs.

To learn what we could about our existing prcra: s

in Europe, and their prospects, was the secondary

focus of our trip. The State Department had spenz

the area, on direct program plus administrative

costs: $3,823;211 in fiscal year 1974; and $4,104,30Y

in 1975. For fiscal 1976 it was requesting an increase

of $1,270,000, or a total of $5,375,800. The proposed

increase seemed justified in the spirit of detente

which prevailed. As CU saw it (in its budget







20




t ~ t Ivi Iu Cu;qr I) STh Uo h as u1Ji!7
a desire to broaden and increase cultural relations

with the United States. In Poland and Romania our well

estab lished cultural relations activities have

Aecole an inLegral part of our bilateral relacions,

and the prospects for gradual expansion are favorable.

In Hun ary and Czechoslovakia, as in the Soviet Unio- ,

opportunities for cultural relations have been

severely limited, however, these governments now show

interest in concluding agreements which could

provide a basis for new programs of cultural relations

with the United States." CU therefore requested the

following funding increases for programs in the

countries we would visit.

Fiscal 1975 Fiscal 1976 Increase
Czechoslovakia $ 65,488 $ 131,953 $ UE,465

Poland 758,467 966,849 208,382

U.S.S.R. 1,008,743 1,849,370 840,627

Romania 845,876 892,438 4562

Hungary 34,597 144,551 109,954

In light of these developments it was

evident that an objective, independent appraisal of this

burgeoning U.S. program would be a useful adjunct to







21



research into post-Helsinki attitudes. Our

observations and recommendations stemming from

discussions with U.S. and foreign officials

are reported in the following pages.














S. i ,I aI t J. alli
s* xa o s a; : ly is:oss-tho -bgard~ to a] 1 the:,

CI': I : 'hs we Siio Thes '11 lis:tedl an(!

d~cus I t JI Ia aJIaJs which i ICeatly



I. Officials of ever juntywe visited were

wel1 intormed ion the jrovisions of Basket ill of the

k n ave ever indication that

to implement thosc deain with

educational aand cultural interchan

Ue were somewhat surprised by this aeess, ror .

cnditioned L} emerican comentary from Moscow to

susecct that we could ex ect fret. Bloc country

officials only a "correct"reception and evasive answers.

The contrary proved to be the case. Every responsible

of 1cial ,- t was f1lly infored on the Agreement's

,roeosals for increased exchanges of information,

people, documentation, exhibits, etc. Not one ex ressed

hi:tself as oposed. A few frakly noted limitations.

the CzI cs that i: roved cultural relations

depended on improved political relations- the Russians,

Romanians arnd unyarians, that they would not ,ernit the

importation of books featuring sex, violence,




-I


23



pornography etc. But almost all echoed in one way or

another the following sentiments:

-- We consider the Helsinki Agreement as a

base for development, and we intend to put it

into effect. (Y.I. Volskiy, Chief, Cultural

Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R).

-- The Helsinki "Final Act" has become

official Soviet policy (L. I. Seleznyov, Pro-

rector for Educational Affairs, Leningrad State

University).

-- The government of Hungary worked for the

Helsinki Agreement and is therefore all for it --

not only in words but in deeds. (Dr. Endre

Rosta, President, Institute of Cultural Relations,

Budapest).
-- It is difficult to say now what Helsinki

may mean in terms of future relations between our

countries for we are just beginning to implement

the Agreement. But we are working now with other

ministries to see how we can implement the Basket

III provisions of "The Final Act." We are looking

first at our legal agreements; can we improve

them? Do existing agreements meet the criteria of


68-504 0 76 3











'he i nra I Act ?" Can we make other ao:reea~ts?

{V~sile Gi ja, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,


-- ;.A sut ort the CSCE Agreement and the idea

of increased cultural exchange. You will find

in this country no barrier, no official who will

try to revent cultural exchange. (Otakar Holan,

Deputy Minister of Culture, Czechoslovakia).

A less direct, but, we feel, still significant

evidence of the seriousness with which our hosts

regard the provisions of Basket III is found in the

level and nature of our reception wherever we went.

We expected to be received correctly; we were, in

fact, everywhere treated as visitors with a vital

mission. Some illustrations:

-- In Moscow we were scheduled to meet with

the Deputy Minister of Culture. When we arrived

at the Ministry, we were welcomed by the M1inister

himself, P.A. Demichev. He spoke with us frankly

and cordially for an hour. The next morning he

participated unexpectedly in the ceremonies at

the opening of the Metropolitan Museum's exhibit




bk


25


and continued with us informally the

discussions of the previous day.
-- In Bucharest our first meeting was

with the Deputy (and Acting) Foreign

Minister. He talked with us cordially but

very frankly about U.S.-Romanian relations

for over an hour. At the end of our

meeting he invited us to return at the

conclusion of all our consultations to

give him our impressions. Our Embassy

reported as follows: "The final call

on Gliga, at his request (and while he

was in the role of Acting Foreign

Minister), had particular significance

since he indicated that the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs will call a meeting of

representatives from all institutions

visited [by us] to review the state of

all U.S.-Romanian exchange. Gliga

accompanied us to the door of the Ministry






26



ter the eing0 where he reiterated

his I reca~it on or te new impulse
yoJI visit has given to exchanges."

-- In Poznan we were received by

the Poznan PZPR (i.e. Communist Party)

First Secretary, Jerzy zasjda.

his comments [on USI-Polish

relationships]I were particularly

interesting, for traditionally it has

been more difficult to conduct our

programs in Poznan than in other parts

of the country. Moreover, it is

interesting to note that the Consul's

dinner in our honor was attended by

guests who in the recent past had

declined to attend functions at his

residence.








27


-- In Kiev we were the official guests of the

Ukranian government, whose Ministry of Culture

assigned a full-time guide/escort to us and whose

Acting Minister of Culture not only received us

in his office but held a luncheon for us.

-- In Leningrad the world-famous Director of

the Hermitage, Academician B.B. Piotrovskiy,

spent four hours with us on a Sunday morning in

August, guiding us personally through his

fabulous collections.

-- Before we left the United States, our Embassy

in Warsaw had recommended cancellation of our visit

there on the ground that no Polish official of any

stature would be available to see us. Yet we were

entertained at lunch at the Foreign Office on o&r

last day in Warsaw by the Vice Director, Departent

III, and the Director of the Press and Information

Department of the Foreign Office. Both made

unusual efforts to make the appointment.

-- In Prague we were received, in the absence of


kk











th -orei gn Minister, by is Oel ty.
I:{ s;oke to~ us oi U.:.-C: ch slov ikitn

cultu !O i o ica r elit: ions with a

-i: i r not or d iil y ncountt:red in

this area.

We bel ieve that the only 1ogical

interim retation for the level,

cordliality ani seriousness of our

meingus is this: the officials with

whom we suoke looked u ,on us as ai

influential, htgh-level delegation,

consciously dispatched from the

United States to test their intentions

concerning the Basket M I recomnmenda-

tions of the Helsinki Agreement. For

reasons which may or may not be

obscure, they wished us to get and

uransmit the message th~at they knew

what these recommendations meant, and

that they intended to do their share

co see that they were implemented.









We are not so naive as to believe that declara-

tions of intent can be construed as positive action.

We are aware that we may have been subjected to what

the late Ambassador Bohlen decried as "ruthless

Russian amiability:" it never really means a thing, he

said, "and when it is over we're in worse shape than

before." We are aware that very soon after our

departure from the Soviet Union several things happened

which could suggest that Russian promises on Basket

III were just so much rhetoric. Representative John

Brademas quotes Chairman Brezhnev as saying, "There is

the third basket which refers to freedom of information.

That is to be fulfilled according to agreements. But

all this will have to be seen as time goes on." A

Russian teacher married to an American professor has not

been allowed to join her husband at the University of

Virginia. A Soviet ministry official has informed

journalists that Moscow











wIl :t Dtermfit an influ oX W'st ern Ideas and

ii.llcat ions contrary to Soviet leI'slat ion and
t l th norality of socialist societyy"
si'or at 1 ~ c io A 'rr


I CO i ra; u None of the Soviet

1'7 1 1a Sii jete" that the H ] ink-

agreen)t replaced and extended our bilateral

cultural agreement with the U.S.S.R.; and yet a number

of exchanges outside our formal agreement, including

the :etropolitan-Pushkin exchanges, had taken place

:r are projected. We did not discuss the human-

rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement, which call

for tinc reunification of families, marriage between

citizens of different states, improvement of conditions

for tourism; and no official told us the U.S.S.R. had

liberalized its positions on these matters. As we have

noted dbove, officials of all the countries we visited

candidly admitted that they would not permit importation

of printed or filmed material which was contrary to

their legislation and to the morality of socialist

society. In the one area somewhat outside of educational

and cultural exchange which we frequently touched apon,

multiple entry visas for journalists, the U.S.S.R. has











taken positive action -- as we were told it would.

To conclude: We doubt that the Eastern

European countries, and particularly the Soviet

Union, will actively promote the noncultural human-

rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement. We

feel quite sure that they will not relax their

prohibitions against the importation of materials

which question their political or moral values,

Helsinki notwithstanding. We cannot be absolutely

certain that their expressed intentions to implement

the cultural and educational exchange provisions of

Basket III are more than bland deceptions which will

lead to no concrete action. But we are inclined,

on the strength of the evidence at hand, to accept at face

value their statements on this subiect. We wn d hnP fnr

an era of somewhat expanded cultural contacts, both

governmental and private, between the United States

and the Bloc countries; we should "give it a try" in

the spirit of Helsinki, rather than encourage a

continuation of the confrontation which existed in the

Cold War years.







32


rivals in evris country we i tsited stron1

i ,u'tiora t I i t t hioni 1 and cult ura1 exchanges s

t ;(arlS 1( r I : I'~t inl bet ter re lat ions wi th the United States.

FhA oservatio)n may seem obvious, particlalrly since it

is clo)sely r Kated to the previous one; So it is perhaps

Instructive to recall that this was not always the case.

Our off icial exchange program with Hungary is only two

ars old; that with Czechoslovakia, only three; and hard

bargaining went into the establishment of our programs

with the U.S.S.R. in 1959, and with Poland and Romania

a few years later.

It was, then, with genuine interest that we asked the

officials we ret their views on the value of exchanges.

without exception they spoke affirmatively on the value of

the principle. Any reservations they had were related to

details of implementation. For example, in Warsaw we

asked Mr. Jacek Dobierski, Director of the Ministry of

Culture's Department of International Cooperation, point

blank whether he thought cultural exchanges contributed

to the inirovement of Polish-American relations. Mr.

Dobierski affirmed without reservations the importance of







33


cultural relations to Poland's foreign policy

saying, "ours is an open policy, necessitating

that we learn about the cultural achievements of

other countries while simultaneously making our own

culture known to other countries."

Even in a country with a less "open policy,"

Hungary, we received a similar, if somewhat

oblique,response from Mr. Laszlo Nagy, Head of the

Foreign Ministry's Division of North America and

Western Europe. After detailing at some length

impediments to good U.S.-Hungarian political

relations, Mr. Nagy stated: "These problems do not

affect the cultural field. .The Foreign Ministry

deals with the formulation of foreign policy. The

presentation of Hungarian culture abroad is an

important aspect of policy, so we have established

an organization at the deputy-ministry level,

working closely with the Foreign Ministry, to work

out cultural agreements with other countries."






34



3. he couitr"es we visited do o act is a

"ioc" on iIteLnatIonal exchange matters; on the

rj ar reat in their aj roacn to,

dr1J actlIty' 1i1, the field,

Although, as we have just noted, Czechoslovakia,

Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania and Hunqary appear

to agree on the value of international cultural

oAxchange, and on their intention to implement the

provisions of the Helsinki Agreement which deals with

it. they do not offer identical, or even similar,

problems and possibilities for the United States in

this field. On the contrary, they vary markedly in

their receptivity to increased exchanges with this

country, in their methods of establishing and

operating programs, and in the possibilities for

imnplementing new activities.

These variations can ne suitutarizea as

follows.
-- Czechosloval-ia subscribes in theory to the

increase of exchanges with the United States, and

its cultural leaders are all for it; but

significant expansion of the proqram in this











tightly controlled country depends upon negotiation

of a cultural agreement, which in turn yi-ay deend jn sami respects

upon settlement of an outstanding claims

agreement.

-- Poland offers a vivid contrast to

Czechoslovakia. It already has innumerable

contacts with the United States through private

as well as government-supported programs; and it is

wide open to more. The only barriers to an almost

unlimited exchange are funds on each side to

finance additional activity, and a growing Polish

sensitivity to the issue of reciprocity; i.e. a

more equitable balance between information on

Poland in the United States and information on the

United States in Poland.

-- The Soviet Union is clearly on the record as

favoring the increase of exchanges along the lines

of the Helsinki Agreement, and for the first time

since 1959 (when the formal U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange

agreement was signed) has given some evidence

that she will permit institution-to-institution

arrangements outside the terms of the agreement. But


35












wlil h 1 : l ox oi her re al and impliled pr houses?
R-Iornna seems generally recejptive to exchanges






Li an oft refi 1se- library in Bucharest -nd in


ilelsinki Agreement. Yet, she is still a

tightly-contro1led socialist country where

decisions are centralized. This affects her

changes with the United States in at least two

adverse ways: 1) over-cautious selection of her

grantees to vi t this country often causes her

not to take full advantage of the exchange

possibilities offered; 2) over-insistence on the

principle that all grants contribute to the

government's plan for national development !-"

the scope of her exchanges by putting a

disproportionate emphasis on science and technoloc-.

-- Hungary, like Czechoslovakia, would prefer

to operate within the framework of an official

cultural agreement; and although she professes

interest in the immediate negotiation of such an

agreemnt, it seems likely that she will drag e -r

feet on it until certain "political" problems

resolved.










4. "Step-by-step" is the watchword as we move

towards more and more varied exchanges.

We have maintained in paragraphs 1 and 2

above that the Eastern European countries favor

increased exchanges with the United States and

seem prepared to implement the cultural proposals

of the Helsinki Agreement. This does not mean,

however, that they are prepared for a sudden

great leap forward. Over and over again we heard

expressed the necessity for "orderly" step-by-step

expansion of our exchange activities.

This comment by Dr. Robert Boros, Head of the

Department of International Relations of the Hungarian

Ministry of Culture, was typical: "It is our

opinion that our relations with the capitalist

countries have progressed well. We are now exploring

the next phase: how best to take advantage of the

Helsinki provisions." Nothing headlong here.

Czechoslovakia's Deputy Foreian Ministpr

was more precise: "We are all for the improvement

of U.S.-Czech relations, but we were offended by

your failure to sign the trade agreement. We can

make a new start by negotiating a cultural agreement,










but this must be done in an orderly way." His

colleague, the ieuty Minister of Culture,

Cx.,ou ned on what might be done when "all aspects

o u relations which have hindered cooperation

and are not a concern of the Ministry of

education [i.e. the trade agreement) have been

clarified. We should first develop cooperation

in spheres where we have already had good

experience -- e.g. in universities and in

scientific studies; then we might send you

lecturers in Czechoslovak languages; then we

could increase our mutual participation in

scientific congresses in the United States and

Czechoslovakia, and so on."

Perhaps the best exposition of the

Bloc countries' ooint of view came from the

Soviet Minister of Culture, Mr. Demichev. Here are

some relevant excerpts from his long talk with us:

"We have signed an agreement [with the United

States]; we have our plans for 1976, '77 and '78. .

Our cultural relations are growing and are helping

in the political field as well. The situation

today is more favorable than it has ever been. We











should not only exchange performing arts groups but

also develop conferences and symposia on the arts

The spiritual and cultural life of each of our

countries is not developed at random but according to

plan. We have different understandings and different

approaches; we will find common ground, though it

will not be easy. We should argue, prove our points

and exchange our ideas." Toward the end of this part

of our discussion, Mr. Demichev made an

argument which is possibly more revealing (and

perhaps even more encouraging) than any other

statement we heard from a public official. We asked

him when we might open an American bookstore in Moscow.

In reply, Mr. Demichev raised the point that this

would violate the Helsinki principle of non-

interference in the internal affairs of another

country. Ihen he added, almost wryly, words to this

effect: "We regard freedom from a different point of

view than you. We take as our task the

spiritual health of our society. Any infection

should be excised. Some people say, 'Let the people

choose!' Some countries and parties feel responsibility


68-504 0 76 4






40


f .tu ~~ I_ ns. O w + woi i avc+ to contro,

w! t 2 t< }ou bokstore. This would iead to



Jncjn j 4~i a what passes four thbe pr i',



&s~u tors, imrpresarios -- implied that there

w e no. re strictions on an 1Funediate dnd jarge

: ras< in, exchau ges with the United S tates --

'cjet on 0 on) O r talks ,with those higher in t.<

: crarihy convinced us that they we're wrongj on the

first scor, right on thc second. Even in these

countries, the centralized planning of international

exchange, like everything else, could circumscribe

t) ri~va1te initiatives, even if lack of money did

ut lack of money will, in Poland and Romania_ in

ch)slcvakia, the U.S.S.R. and Hungary. In the fini

aual>Iss, the State controls purse strings as well

lic; We saw no evidence in any country visited

that- the State was iretared to make greatly increa~&

expenditures of hard currency to augment its excnz?

programs with the West.







41



The prognostication, then, is for a gradual,

carefully orchestrated, step-by-step enlargementu

of our exchange programs with Eastern Europe. This

is, we believe, as it should be.






42


:. 'he is a un iforn desire throut biout the

taes with the United States

1 l ;c1unc c cc~ojy maaeet

,> asked th< ch~'a ii man ot Pcm i

Nat ionial Council1 for Science and Technology,

Mr. Ion Ursu, how he would use $100,000 for an

exchange program with the United States if he were

suddenly presented with it. After a moment of

token hesitation denoting reflections Mr. Ursu

avowed that he would use it all for the exchange of

specialists in the hard sciences. It was a logical

conclusion to his hour-long harangue on the need

for Romania to move away from the purely academic

typ)e of exchange program into areas which provided

greater technological and practical pay-off for

the -omanian economy.

Mr. Ursu's position was an accurate, if somewha:

heightened, reflection of a point of view we

encountered wherever we went, with this elaboration.

Many of our interlocutors included management

techniques in their definition of science and technology.

Here are representative comments:

-- Premyslav Jakos, Czechoslovakia's Deputy

Minister of Education. "We must make use of







43



scientific knowledge any place in training our students.

Exchange in nonscientific fields is difficult but

not impossible."

-- Jersy Zasada, Poznan's PZPR First Secretary,

summarizing his views on how existing good

relations between the United States and Poland could

be improved, suggested the following exchange activities

in this order: l)Exhibits of technology, particularly

of agricultural technology; 2) Exchanges between

universities, particularly in biological sciences;

3) Exchanges of musical groups.

-- Dr. Belik, Rector of Kiev University. When

asked what the Soviets expected to gain from lecturer

exchange, the Rector replied frankly that the U.S.S.R.

tried to take advantage of the lecturer program to

get teachers in fields in which they were weak and

which were important to their national interest.

They would particularly welcome lecturers in

cybernetics, mathematics, economics, aesthetics in

engineering and design, psychology of work and

management.

-- Dr. Endre Rosta, President of Hungary's






44



hIst itute of 1 Cultural Relations, when asked how we

c~ti i:iipl vwc our e'ducat ional exchange prog);ams.

"our f ii st rio! 1tv is to send ind rt'cive scientists...

% Jre 1 ised with our agreement with your

0111 CCe oundat ion We are a so

!.rticularly interested in agriculture d management

science."

-- Dr. Leonte Rautu, Rector of Bucharest's

Stefan Georghiu Academy, which trains Ronania' s

top-echelon government officials, when asked

what role the United States can play in the

Academy's training program. "Management! We

want to learn from you about the introduction

of computers to management, the organization of

production, the use of manpower. ."

The obvious desire of the Communist countries

to get from us, at the least possible cost to themselves,

what they badly need in the way of expertise in

management, science and technology to advance

quickly their own industrial development is nothing

new, but it seems, if anything, to have taken a

new lease of life as a result of the Helsinki

agreement's emphasis on scientific exchange.







45


At the same time we detected what we felt

were encouraging signs of willingness on the part

of the Eastern Europeans to increase established

exchanges in the cultural (principally

performing arts) area and in the humanities and

social sciences. For example, the University

of Warsaw is about to open an institute of

American Studies; in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Demichev

openly advocated more conferences and symposia in

the arts. All the countries we visited are eager

to have their cultural achievements made known to

Americans (see point 7 below). Mr. Ursu of

Romania agreed that some of his hypothetical

$100,000 might be spent on grants for students who

wished to study "folklore or language."

We must, then, somehow accommodate in our

exchange programs the desire of these countries

for American technical/management know-how, while

not failing to capitalize on their awakening

interest in exchanges in other fields.







46


i I~ti cJ1 t7s e WviVsited, a
z, .nsttution-to-

tnst o motacts,* but j ecdures forz doir. s~o

..... .l....l. d. ...n d .


1t iI sin k i Agree vme nt makes ( reuent reference

totAs o1 th. signatories to romote the conclusion
of drec arrangemen wrt s between universities and

)tnl :stitucions. Ihis has always been a fundamental

ri c.Li of our country's international cultural and

educational policy. Conse(-uently, we spent a good deal

of time in our discussions probing the intentions of our

hosts on the subject. ,'hat we discovered was generally

encouraging, though here again there were fairly wide

discreacies froo country to country as to what had

eor could be expected.

.Prajue the Vice-rector of Charles University

sai Ia- could work out an exchange of professors between

C..arlYs >.,ivers.ty and an American institution, and then
it wc be approved" by the Ministry of Education.


The euty minister of Education saw it a bit differently.

According to him there existed at the moment no

uniwer;s -to-university agreements. He sugges'e "-a*

a direct exchange between Charles University an. the










University of California might be worked out like

this. The United States cultural attache in Prague

would inform the Rector of Charles University of the

interest of the University of California in

establishing a direct relationship. Then the two

rectors would correspond and come up with a concrete

proposal. This would then be "examined" (and

presumably approved or rejected) by the Ministry of

Education. "Since we have a centralized system," he

concluded, "we prefer to work through a formal

cultural agreement." In short, institution-to-

institution arrangements in Czechoslovakia are, for all

practical purposes, made by the central government.

At the other extreme was the situation in Poland.

When Mr. Marks asked the rector of one

university whether the Ministry imposed any

restrictions upon his university, he snorted, "Mr.

Ambassador, there is war between the Ministry and

the universities." He backed up his implication that

his university acted independently by noting that

each year it sent abroad 330 of its professors and

received 340!










Fuither discussion witi the rector

did, hcwver, elicit the informatLion that there
was a small Lil in the ointme~.nt ot his independence:

mr.y. ie could apparently do what he wanted with

th. money appropriated for his university, but

the Ministry, "which is only interested in money,"

did .ot always give him all he wanted. While this

did not act as a serious brake on Poznan's direct

institution-to-institution atrangements, we

discovered that in some places the central

government could (but not always did) exercise

veto power over proposed institutional contacts

through its control of the purse strings.

The Soviet Union fell between the extremes of

Prajue and Poznan, and probably best illustrates

the situation as it actually is. The Pro-rector

for Educational Affairs at Leningrad State University

seemed to think there would be no trouble in his

negotiating a direct exchange with an American

universityprovided general approval for such

actions was included in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural

agreement. His opposite number at the Polytechnic

Institute of Leningrad felt the only way to arra--e.







49



an institution-to-institution exchange was through

tie Ministry, or at least with the Ministry's

blessing in advance. The Rector of Kiev University

said the correct procedure would be a simultaneous

approach to him and to the Ministry of Education.

The Vice-rector of the University of Ilosco avoided an an-

swer on the question of procedure by saying simly,

"We have direct relationships with more than i00

countries. .the Ministry doesn't hamper the

relations of the university with other countries,

but we work these out within the framework of

a culture agreement." The Minister of Education

said,"The U.S. university wishing to establish a

direct exchange with a Russian university slo: ..c

address a proposal to the Russian university. After

deciding it liked the proposal, the Russian

university would take it to the Ministry. Financinc

would then determine what could be done."

The Hermitage Museum in Leningrad and tho >ushkln

Museum in Moscow departed from tradition (but f resumably with the

approval of an appropriate Ministry) by going outside

the terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural agree.-- .- to

work out a series of art exchanges with the










Metropolitan Museur of Art and institutions

associated wLth it in the project.
Paradoxircal1ly we t ake encourajt ment

trorn this patterniess situation. It indicates

that countries which have never before thought

very much about direct institution-to-

institution exchanges are now beginning to think

seriously about them. What emerges from our

talks is that powerful institutions, like the

universities of Leningrad, Moscow and Poznan,

or the Hermitage and the Pushkin museumscan in

practice negotiate international exchanges

and receive almost automatic Ministerial approval;

and that in this post-Helsinki world, the

prospects for direct contacts between the United

States and less-renowned Bloc institutions are

enhanced.

Given the nature of Communist regimes, it is

improbable that any Eastern European university or

cultural institution will ever have the complete

autonomy of action of an American institution; but

it was nevertheless encouraging to us to note the :cw











tentative steps the Eastern European institutions are

taking in this direction.*














*After our return the Rector of Moscow University, Dr.
Rem Khoklov, visited thirteen universities in the
United States and discussed bilateral agreements for
the exchange of professors. Although his mission may
have had prior approval of the Ministry of Education,
his apparent willingness to conclude final
arrangements confirms the impression that the Ministry
is not directly involved in all negotiations.






32


7"Rcjjoctf in cxn es with _the.
:tel States 1s a mattur of concern in al i the

IUItwe nts we visit i.
L oint 3 above we noted the onlct'r of thu: Polish

0;v 1rnMnt that a at deal more information

a 0t, And material from, the United States was

available in Poland than was true of the reverse.

The same concern was evident in all the countries

we surv-yed, and with almost equal intensity.

The one exception was the U.S.S.R., but even

the Soviets raised the question in a slightly

different connotation. Since they have always

insisted that our exchanges be governed by formal

agreement, it would have been invidious (not to

say humiliating) for them to complain that more

;Amrican cultural material was translated and

produced in the U.S.S.R. than there was Russian

-aterial produced in the United States. Yet

:4-nister Demichev was at pains to point out to us,

in detail, the number of U.S. books translated,

films shown, plays produced -- ostensibly as
evidence that reports on the Soviet Union's cultural


isolationism were unfounded. We were struck, too,







53



by the strange coincidence that Tass carried on

August 26, 1975, the day of our arrival in the U.S.S.R.,

a piece entitled "Inventions by Bourgeois Propogania and

the Realities." The first paragraph of the despatc>

read:

"It is often alleged in the Western press,

without any grounds whatsoever, that Soviet

people are isolated from Western, specifically

American culture. Some contributors of such

materials even go so far as to assert that works

by Western writers and Western films are sort of

'banned' in the Soviet Union. These are absurd

inventions, of course, and they could well be

ignored if they had not, repeat not, been repeated

systematically with the obvious purpose of

giving the poorly informed reader a distorted

view of the Soviet way of life."

The article went on to point out that in the last :.xc

years Soviet cinemagoers had seen over 500 foreign

feature films and 200 plays by "specifically

American" authors; and that American writers had

been translated into 52 languages in the Soviet

Union and printed in 170 million copies. (Full text-

at Appendix B.)






54



Thi Czechs, Poles, Romanians and |lungarians

were less subtle. Their spokesmen were.

zrncd with detailed tiqures: they

cit.d us chapter and verse on U.S. books, films,

piays, exhibits, etc. available in their countries

an th contrast this represented to their materials

available in the United States; and they were

frank to state their dissatisfaction at the injustice

of it all.

Thus, after telling us that Polish television

had carried in 1974 and 1975, 67 U.S. films, 18

plays and seven serials, the Director of the Office

of Foreign Cooperation of Polish Television and

Radio told us bluntly: "Something must be done to

fill the gap between U.S. products shown in Poland,

and Polish products shown in the United States.

There must come a time when we can say to our

public that the gap is being filled."

The Hungarians were even more adamant,

pointing out that in three years only three

Hungarian books had been published in the United

States, while "dozens" of U.S. authors, including







55


contemporaries, had appeared in Hungary in "millions"

of copies. "We are for Helsinki," said one, Vnot only in

words but in deeds. It is in your interest as well

as ours to implement the Agreement. Though small,

Hungary can make an intellectual contribution to

the world, and we want to be respected for it.

Sovereignty applies to intellectual life as well as

to political."

We understandthe strong feelings of these cultural spokesmen,

but we doubt that the United States can do much

to alleviate the sense of injustice they feel on

this issue of reciprocity. The trouble lies in

the basic differences between the social/political

systems of the socialist countries and ourselves,

a difference which it is impossible for them

really to understand. Since the government of a

socialist country controls and often subsidizes,

importation and distribution of products frog

abroad, it follows that all those American books

and films are in the country because: a) they are

in demand; b) the government wants them there.

What the Poles and the Hungarians cannot comprehend

is that only the first of these conditions prevails


68-504 0 76 5













deterriniri what reacho the Amcr i can market.
th at if they produce things which Americans
want badly enough (the Hungarian composer Bartok, the


-amous Russian novelists like Tolstoy, etc.) t*-y will widely

distributed commlercially in the United States --

but only if this is the case. What they seem

unable to grasp is that the U.S. Government cannot,

and will not, at'erdpt to determine what cultural

fare the American public should have.

In fairness to the officials with whom we

discussed the matter, we should add that they do

not expect one-for-one reciprocity. They do not

expect a country of ten million to send to a country

of 220 million as much intellectual or cultural

material as it receives. Nor do we believe that this

kind of reciprocity should be determined on a

geographical basis or on a population basis. We do

believe that our relations with Eastern European

countries would be improved if they felt their cultural

achievements were more widely known in this

country. I.- therefore seems advantageous

that both the public and private sectors of our

country do what they can to assure that the real

talents of Eastern Europe are discovered and made

known to Americans.


56








57


To satisfy this overwhelming desire for recognition

will not require a change in our free enterprise system.

It is in our best interest to know what the Eastern

Europeans are writing or thinking. Scholars in all

disciplines are always eager to share knowledge with

their contemporaries throughout the world. Currently

there is an exchange of ideas between the United

States and Eastern Europe. We are suggesting that the

flow through the pipelines be stimulated in both

directions.







58


8. Americai student and oftessor participants

in exchan Programs in Eastern Europe are Henerally

co1'tribuin to the achievement of "mutual understanding;$

but there is room for improvement in their selection and

or ientat ion.

We heard the first reference to U.S. grantees in

the first post we visited, Prague. It was not an

auspicious introduction to the U.S. side of our exchange

program. What we learned was that in the 1973-74

academic year one of the very limited number of grants to

Americans for study in Czechoslovakia (made by the State

Department-supported International Research and Exz=-.a:ges

Board, or IREX) had gone to a woman who was sustaine:

almost solely on a diet of carrot juice. This singular

deficiency did not come to light until the grantee was in

Czechoslovakia. Czech and American officials, in s2;:e of

the best will in the world, were unable to locate, h

less reduce to juice, in snow-bound Czechoslovakia t

many pounds of carrots the lady needed for survival. Ehe

was, consequently, shipped home, trailing behind her a

certain understandable trail of ill will. Somethin- had

obviously gone very awry with the IREX selection prz :ess.

We learned later that this was an isolated caT: and

that IREX had been deceived by the medical report e by

the grantee. But the case does illustrate the protles










that can arise, even when due diligence is

exercised.

Our first exposure to American grantees

was in Poznan, where we met with a group of

young university professors who had spent one

or more years at Polish universities. They

were intelligent, articulate and adaptable.

To our surprise they admitted that with the

favorable rate of exchange accorded them,

they had no financial problems; surely a first

in the annals of the Fulbright program.* They

also expressed satisfaction with the physical

conditions of their lives in Poland, though

we were later informed that they had, before

the meeting, decided among themselves not to

raise with us their very real problems of

inadequate housing, of buying food and other

personal necessities, of difficulties with Polish

authorities. Their principal complaint, shared

by about half of the group, was that Polish

universities were not making proper use of them.

Our reaction was that the complaints arose more

*Since our return to Washington we have received
a letter from a Fulbright student grantee to Romania
maintaining that student stipends are quite
inadequate. We have referred the complaint to the
Board of Foreign Scholarships for investigation.










trom an exagerated estimate of their own

talents than from failures in the Polish

system. There was, we felt, probably more

justification for the report, which was

almost unanimous, that at the beginning of

their experience they had not been assigned

to do the work they thought they would do

when they accepted the assignment to Poland.

Clearly there was room for improvement in

their pre-assignment orientation, or in communica-

tions between U.S. and Polish officials. Yet

even so they were unanimous in a favorable

reaction to their assignments. In fact, the

majority wished to return for a second year,

and there was general agreement that three

years was an optimum period of a ssignment --

an opinion we did not share.

We met our next group of American grantees

in Leningrad. They were newly arrived and

optimistic. Though, we were told, housing for

them was bad, they recognized that they had

been given the best rooms available, and generally

s.d.erior to those of their Russian colleagues;






61



they therefore accepted the inconvenience with

good grace. What struck us about this group

of grantees was the rather esoteric nature of

their projects. We therefore checked on our

return to Washington the projects of Americans

who would be studying in Leningrad and Moscow.

Among them: "Aspects of Negation in Contemporary

Russian!" "Latin Materials in the Rossica

Collection;" "The Evolution and Distribution of

the Bird-of-Prey/Bleak-Head Motifs in Eurasian

Late Bronze-Early Iron Age Aru;" "Aspects of

the Genitive Plural in Contemporary Standard

Russian;" "The Balto-Slavic Predicate

Instrumental;" "Poetic Language in Russian Prose:

Non-Referential Pronouns and their Emotive

Effect;" "Ecclesiastical Policy of Grand Prince

Witold of Lithuania, 1392-1430."

While we have no doubt that the American

grantees engaged in these studies will profit

personally from their year in the Soviet Union, we






62



wondered whether they were contributing in

more than the most ephemeral way to the purposes

of our exchange program. It was a concern we

felt again, even more acutely, in Romania.

In Moscow we met, and were impressed by,

American students who had completed the Summer

Language Training Program at Moscow University

and others who had just arrived to embark upon

a year of graduate work. They were a mature,

well-prepared and contented lot. The former

group was pleased with the suamrer program and had

clearly established rapport with their Russian

hosts. Many in the latter group were returning

to the Soviet Union for the second time, knew

what to expect and were looking forward to the

experience. We were under the impression that,

here at least, the American side of the program

was operating flawlessly.

We were disabused of this notion by the

Ministry of Education official responsible for






63



U.S. U.S.S.R. exchanges, Mr. L. B.Bazhanor

His reply to our question on how the U.S.-

U.S.S.R. academic exchange program can be

improved is worth summarizing because it

touches upon a number of points we have referred

to in this report. Bazhanor began by saying

that the U.S.S.R. is ready to consider an

increase in the number of grantees, but dealing

with IREX is "complicated." He complained that

IREX insists on sending candidates even if

"the situation here is not suitable." He went

on to say that Soviet nominees don't raise

problems "outside the realm of studies,"

as Americans sometime do. What he had in mind,

it developed, were the problems posed for his

government by U.S. grantees with families, and

by a recently arrived crippled student who is

confined to a wheelchair. He summed up by

saying he had the impression that IREX takes

just about anyone who applies, while the Soviets

have several applicants for each position, and

suggested that each side nominate more than the

50 to receive grants and allow the other side to





64



1ace 50 from the larger number. We found much

food for thought in Mr. Bazhanor's observations.

Odr contact in Bucharest with some 25

American grantees who had Just arrived in

Romania and our talks with U.S. officials

deepened the questions about the selection and

preparation of American grantees which had been

growing as a result of our talks in Prague, Poland

and the Soviet Union. Here again the projects of

study of many of the grantees seemed far remote

from everyday life, and not even designed to

bring the grantee into contact with Romanians

(e.g. "German Minority Adaptation in Romania,"
"Charge and Counter-charge. Romanian Peasantry in

the Carpathians.")

We noted, too, a number of married couples, and

several with children among the grantees and wondered

whether they posed the same problems in Romania as

they did in Moscow. When we asked a senior U.S.

official his opinion on these and related matters

we received a forthright reply. He was, he said,
"very concerned about the quality of U.S. Fulbright






65


grantees," many of whom were selfishly motivated

to accept grants, did not study seriously, spent

much of their time in vacation and travel. He was

equally concerned about the subject matter many

studied, describing it "as of no national advantage."

Grantees with families he bluntly characterized as
"a pain," noting that they often became "a social

welfare problem for the Embassy." He did not

recommend barring grantees with family from the

program, but he did think family status should be "a

factor to consider" in the selection process.

Parenthetically, it should be said that his

strictures applied more to the Fulbright grantees

than to IREX grantees. He found the latter, on

the whole, much better: good students, serious of

purpose. We have talked since our return with the

Director of IREX, Mr. Allen Kasoff. He has assured

us that the IREX recruitment process is being

refined so that there are several candidates for each

available grant, that personal as well as professional

factors are considered in selecting grantees, and

that great progress has been made in recent years






66



in making grants to people whose research is

relevant to U.S. interests.

Even so, the comments of this and other

U.S. officers in Romania tended to confirm our

growing feeling that, as Mr. Bazhanor had

maintained, too many of our grants to Americans

seemed to be made on a first-come, first-served

basis. More careful selection of grantees, a

better orientation for them on what they will

find in Eastern Europe, and an insistence that

the subject each studies can really contribute

to the purposes of our exchange programs will,

we believe, improve a program which has already

proven its worth.







67



9. U.S. Embassies in the countries we

visited are strong supporters of their exchange

programs, and their officers are excellently

equipped to deal with them.

This observation may sound redundant, but

the time was, and not so long ago, when many
"regular" Foreign Service officers thought

international cultural and information programs

played no part in our foreign policy and should

not be a concern of our Embassies.

This is certainly no longer true inthe

Embassies we visited. On the contrary, the

prevailing view appears to be that expressed

by our Deputy Chief of Mission in Bucharest:

"I would give higher priority to no other use

of U.S. resources in this post." Other

Ambassadors and DCM's wtmwe met gave explicit

or implicit support to this position by saying

they could effectively utilize more funds for

educational and cultural exchange if they were

available; and all proved that they were not just

parroting a conventional truth by demonstrating

a thorough knowledge of CU and IREX programs, and












by making specific suggestions for improved or

exaided exchange activities. We felt that they

saw the cultural and educational exchanges as a

highly useful way to establish contacts and

promote an understanding of the United States and

its policies in areas where rapprochement on

political or economic issues seemed remote. It was,

in other words, clearly our impression that the top

echelon of our Embassies genuinely believed that

the exchange program could, and did, in the words

of CU's concept paper, "strengthen patterns of

informal two-way communication in ways which will

favorably influence relations between the United

States and other countries."

Mere interest in the programs, while undoubtedly

important, is not enough to equip our personnel

overseas properly to conceive and operate them. We

were therefore gratified at the very obvious competence

of our Chiefs of Mission and their Deputies. In each

country we found them extremely knowledgeable about

local customs, traditions and politics; shrewd judges

of what could and could not be done through







69



exchanges; well accepted by high-level officials

of the countries to which they were accredited;

firm but "diplomatic" in their defense of U.S.

interests; fully informed on all aspects of the

work of their Embassies, and therefore respected

leaders of their staffs.

Equally important to the success of our

cultural efforts, of course, is the ability of the
"working stiffs" to function effectively in the cultural,

political, social and economic environment to which they are sent.

tWe were impressed in eachi post by the quality of our

personnel who are responsible for the operation

of the exchange programs. Our Counselors for

Press and Cultural Affairs, and their Cultural

Affairs Officers, were everywhere efficient,

effective, dedicated. Each was thoroughly

familiar with the cultural-educational climTate in

which he worked; each was surprisingly fluent in

the difficult language of his country; each had

a detailed knowledge of his exchange program;

each was working enthusiastically yet without

illusions in a difficult situation. Even the







70



four officers who were relatively new to their

posts when we arrived had adapted with remarkable

speed to their new conditions of work. ectl

We left the area confident that the

direction and operation of our international educational

and cultural programs were in good hands.







:et

-hal:







with

-s p









seiz











IV. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The observations we have made in the preceding

section of this report suggest to us the following

recommendations for action.

1. The United States should in every way possible

take advantage of the expressed intention of the Eastern

European countries to implement the provisions of

Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement.

This recommendation sounds vague and general,

yet it represents the essence of our conclusions. We

shall try to put flesh on its bare bones in this and

succeeding paragraphs.

The Soviets and their Eastern European allies are

on record -- in statements by their leaders, in talks

with us, indeed in their signing of the Agreement --

as prepared to carry out all the recommendations of

the Helsinki Agreement, not just those of primary

interest to them. The West has much to gain by their

fulfillment of the agreements on cooperation in

humanitarian and cultural fields. We should therefore

seize the opportunity presented by their expressed

intention to cooperate in this field. We should not,


68-504 0 76 6







72


through inaction, allow the Eastern Europeans to renege

on their promises; we should, on the contrary, constantly

present them, as though we expected automatic acceptance,

exchange possibilities and projects sanctioned by

Helsinki. Ultimately, we should, if necessary and

desirable, trade a Basket III quid for a Basket I or II

quo in our official negotiations. In short, the

cultural exchange iron is hot; and we should strike it

hard before it cools.











2. The United States, unilaterally and in consort

with its NATO allies, should maintain a record of actions they

have taken to implement the Basket III provisions of the

Helsinki Agreement, and another of actions by the Eastern

European countries which defy them.

The Agreement calls for a conference in

Belgrade in 1977 ". . to continue the multilateral

process initiated by the Conference." At this meeting the

Eastern European countries will come armed with lists of

all they have done, according to their lights, to

cooperate with other nations in humanitarian and cultural

fields. Many of their listed activities will be

fictitious or inconsequential, yet the overall list will

look impressive.

It is essential that the NATO allies be able to

demonstrate that their overall record on Basket III

proposals is superior to that of the Eastern European

countries if they are to extract concessions from

them; therefore, the NATO countries must know in detail

what they have done, and what the Eastern countries

have not done.

We understand that the State Department has already







74



taken steps to keep a record of this country's

official actions in support of Basket III. We

highly approve this, but would recommend that it

enlarge its effort to include in its record whatever has

been undertaken by private initiative.

We also have heard that preliminary moves have been

made to have NATO coordinate the recordkeeping for its

member nations. We commend this move and urge the

United States to promote it and cooperate with it.







75


3. The United States should take the lead in

promoting in 1976 a meeting of cultural representatives of the

Western European countries which signed the Helsinki areement.

We have referred above to the 1977 follow-up

conference in Belgrade called for by the Final Act of

the CSCE. The chapter of the Act which

provides for Belgrade encourages other meetings, in

this language: "The participating states. . declare

their resolve. . to implement the provisions of the

'Final Act' of the Conference. . multilaterally, by

meetings of experts of the participating states,and

also within the framework of existing international

organizations, such as the United Nations Economic

Commission for Europe and UNESCO, with regard to

educational, scientific and cultural cooperation."

We believe the United States should avail itself

of this resolve to bring about in 1976 a meeting of cultural

representatives of the Western European signatory con..tries.

The purposes of the meeting would be: a) to review

progress made by participating countries in carrying

out the provisions of Basket III; b) to uncover areas

of possible action which had received inadequate

attention; c) to expose states which were not living ip

to their commitments; d) to make plans for cooperative







76


future actions; and thus e) to prepare the way for a

productive discussion of Basket III at the Belgrade

Conference in 1977. The logical and obvious agenda

for sucha meeting would be a point-by-point

consideration of the main subjects (and subheads)

in the Final Act's chapter on "Cooperation in

Humanitarian and other Fields:" 1. Human Contacts;

2. Information; 3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the

Field of Culture; 4) Cooperation and Exchange in the

Field of Education.

We believe the following advantages would

accrue to the United States from its sponsorship of

such a conference:

-- It would have the psychological advantage

of convincing the European nations of our genuine

interest in international humanitarian and cultural

causes.

-- It would have the practical effect of spurring

international action in areas in which we are eager

to cooperate, but in which the Socialist countries

are reluctant to move.

-- It would help to prepare us for the more

serious confrontation of Belgrade, 1977, by:










a) indicating the positions

which the Socialist countries will take; b) enabling

us to coordinate our approaches and projects with

our allies.

The language of the Act implies that meetings of the

kind we propose can be organized not only within the

framework of existing organizations but also by

individual states, or presumably by any other competent

existing or ad hoc organization. UNESCO would

obviously be an appropriate sponsor, but preferable from our

point of view is a conference sponsored and organized in the

United States. It could be done either by the U.S.

Government or private interests. We recommend a combina-

tion of the two. We favor the strictly U.S. approach,

for we do not believe we can realize maximum advantage

from the meeting unless it is clearly seen to be an

American initiative. We suggest that the conference be held in

Williamsburg, Virginia, which is itself an illustration of

American cultural achievement.






78


4. The funds rejjuestedb Cu for its official

exchairams with Eastern Europe should be made

available.

The State Department, in making its FY 1976 budget

request to Congress indicated that it would spend $3,986,000

in direct program costs to support exchanges with Eastern

Europe if its total budget request of $65 million were

approved. We believe the circumstances justified the request.

The sum was about a million dollars more than its actual 1975

expenditures on programs, but the possibilities for useful

educational and cultural exchange had surely increased more

than proportionately.

We were therefore distressed to learn on our return

from Europe that Congress had cut CU's budget request and

that CU now proposed to use only $3,565,000 of its $60 million

appropriation for the direct support of exchanges with

Eastern Europe. This represents an increase in the Eastern

budget of only $672,000 just at a time when possibilities

for meaningful exchange have greatly improved.* We regret this

unexpected development and believe it should, if at all

possible, be rectified. Since there is no chance that

Congress will increase CU's fiscal 1975 appropriation, the



*A graphic illustration of an opportunity missed for lack of
adequate funding is found in the USIS library in Bucharest.
This unique window on America in Eastern Europe remains open
to the public only thirty hours a week because USIS lacks
authority to hire the one more employee which would enable
the library to be manned for at least the normal forty working
hours per week.







79


only apparent way to increase its funds for F:atQVI.

Europe is for CU to take monies from other Areas.

This would seem possible to us in light of these

tentative CU allocations for direct program costs:


For Eastern Europe $3,565,000

For Africa 4,405,000

For the American Republics 5,275,000

For Western Europe 4,650,000

For East Asia 6,535,000

For the Near East and
SouLh Asia 5,250,000


Although we are not informed on all the factors which

led CU to this geographic distribution of its funds,

we would recommend that CU reconsider its allocation

of 1976 funds with a view to finding at least a

modest increase (say up to $4 million) for Eastern

Europe. Anything less would appear to be a repudiation

by this country of its support of the Basket III

provisions of the Helsinki agreement.

Fiscal 1977 will give us a new opportunity to

demonstrate our intentions concerning these provisions,

and we should make it clear that our intentions are

honorable.










:
approved by the Conqress, it proposes to spend

&5.645,000 on exchanges with Eastern Europe. We

beieve this is reasonable. Furthermore, we believe

it important that the United States go to the Belgrade

follow-up conference in 1977 with proof that it has

given more than lip service to the Helsinki agreement:

that it has in fact increased its educational and

cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. We therefore

strongly recommend that the Congress authorize a

fiscal 1977 appropriation for CU which will enable it

to spend at least the projected $5,645,000 in the area.

We do not make this recommendation in the belief

that more is necessarily better; we are well aware

that quality is vital in our exchanges. But we

believe it is true that Americans have far fewer

points of contact in Eastern Europe than in Western

Europe or Latin America, where relationships in

business supplement those in education or the arts. We

therefore favor using U.S. government funds to increase

contacts with Eastern Europe -- so long as the

quality of the grantees remains high.







81


5. The United States should attempt

to meet the desire of East Europeans for

exchanges in science/technology/management.

This country has always insisted that in its

exchanges with the Soviet Bloc a reasonable balance

be maintained between science/technology on the one

hand and social sciences/humanities on the other.

We believe this policy is sound. But our trip has

persuaded us that we can go farther than we have to

accommodate the wishes of the Eastern Europeans for

scientific/technological exchanges without giving away

classified iformation or jeopardizing the i7ain goal of the exchange program:

. to increase mutual understanding. ." In

fact, we believe it would be in our national interest

to do so.

It is clear that the future leaders of the

countries on our itinerary are going to come largely

from the technically, scientifically trained elite.

It is altogether to our advantage that these leaders

have had exposure to the United States; to American

methods, to American patterns of thought, to American

people. It is not essential that they be students of










the social sciences or the humaIities to establish

the contacts with Americans which become the basis

for mutuall understanding." A scientist or a

management expert can develop as healthy a respect

for America and Americans as can an historian.

We are not advocating the elimination of

exchanges in the social sciences and the humanities;

we recognize their value; we believe we should

continue to insist upon some exchanges in these

fields. What we are advocating is a greater exposure

of Eastern European scientists, technologists, and

experts in management to the American way of life.

We believe we have nothing to fear in this, and

perhaps quite a lot to gain.






83



6. The United States should encourage direct

institution-to-institution exchanges with Eastern

European countries and respond promptly to overtures

from them.

This recommendation flows directly from our

observation that universities and cultural institutions

in the countries we visited seemed ready, often

eager, to enter into direct relationships with their

American counterparts, coupled with our assumption

that an increase in such exchanges is desirable. We

thought originally that, given the centrally controlled

nature of socialist societies, the initiatives would

have to come from U.S. institutions; but since our

return we have been pleasantly surprised to learn that

Moscow University has, of its own accord, proposed

direct exchanges with several U.S. universities. Other

powerful Eastern European universities may follow suit.

We believe it is in the U.S. interest to respond

affirmatively to such approaches, as well as to encourage U.S.

institutions to take the first steps to establish such

relationships.

We recognize that before the first part of this

recommendation can mean very much, someone must spell out

initiatives to be taken which give promise of leading to

the desired end. Although we ordinarily avoid operational

matters, we venture the following suggestions on how the







84


r C kA n trdtion might be implemented.

In our opinion the first, and essential, stein
is to jet the wird out to selected American inst::- zns


that possibilities now exist for them to establish i-

exchange with an Eastern European counterpart. On:

they receive the word, we think those with a genuxnI

interest will make a direct approach to a Eurpean

institution, and the process of establishing an

exchange will go forward according to the system

prevailing in the country concerned.

The word will undoubtedly spread by word of mc,:h

along the academic grapevine; our Advisory Cornmiss::

can mention it in its quarterly periodical, Excha.-:.

and certainly individual institutions here and there

will act without prodding. But we believe a

particular organization should be charged with

j)romoting and coordinating the whole process. I r. -

opinion, the organization best qualified to do th-- s

the Office of Eastern European Programs of the State

Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural

Affairs. We would therefore add this as a supple.=--.

to our recommendation: that CU's Office of Easter-.







85


European programs be asked to develop a plan to

promote and coordinate institution-to-

institution exchanges between the United States

and Eastern European universities, museums and other

appropriate cultural organizations.






86


P. rivate andjocrnntlorlzations

sh< u1d be iert to, and assist in, the "mutual

t'"of culture materials between Eastern
oadthis counr; specificallyi

A The question should be considered

Sy the Guvern ent Advisory Coriwittee on
International Book and Library Programs



B) The U.S. Advisory Commission on

International Educational and Cultural

Affairs should organize a meeting of film-

ratrs, [publishers, museum and gallery

directors, ~producers of television programs

nd the like, to examine the problems and

itjnities relating to the exchange of

'cultral materials from Eastern Europe.

We have already observed that the appearance of

cultural materials from abroad on the American scene

is governed by the laws of supply and demand, and







87


that there is therefore very little anyone can do to

increase the flow; nevertheless, we believe the

matter is of sufficient importance for us to see to

it that at least that "little" is done. A small effort

on our part may yield a large dividend of good will.

During our talks with East European officials

we made many suggestions on the subject, for example: rh :

distributors of noncommercial films be approached by Eastern

European groups to distribute their productions; that American

university presses be solicited to publish scholarly

works from abroad; that foreign governments subsidize

the translation and publication of books in English

editions; that possibilities for increased broadcasting

of foreign films and television programs by stations

associated with the Public Broadcasting Service be

thoroughly explored; that arrangements for wider (and

more frequent) distribution of European films be negotiated

with the Motion Picture Association of America; that

cultural presentations (plays, musical groups, films,

etc.) be directed towards the influential university

circuit, rather than the tough commercial one.

Some of these suggestions may bear fruit, but they


68-504 0- 76 7






88


are haphazard and obviously do not plumb all the

possibilities.

We believe the Government Advisory Committee on

International Book and Library Programs is the

logical agency to examine what can and should be done

to study the flow of books and related

documentary materials from Eastern Europe. We know,

furthermore, that the GAC is deeply interested in the

ramifications of the Helsinki agreement on the book

trade, and that it plans to take these up at a forth-

coming meeting. Our Advisory Commission will be

represented at this meeting, from which hope some

concrete suggestions for action will emerge.

We know of r existing body which can organize

repre sentatives of other media involved into a discussion

of the issues at hand, as the GAC can the book industry.

We have therefore recommended that our Commission

itself take at least a first step in an effort to

collect the advice of qualified authorities on ways

in which the cultural productions of Eastern European

states can be made more widely known here. We propose







89


to invite these authorities to meet with the

Commission and offer suggestions. From such

meetings we hope will come useful proposals

for further action by the government and the

private sector.







90


8. The Department and the international

s' IrCh and Exchanies Board (IREX) can and should

!irirove the selection and orientation of their American

j1r11t (s to Lastern Europe

Our observations on American grantees suqqest

t1is Ieom~endatiol. We do not say. and

we do not mean, that the CU and IREX programs are

ineffective. On the contrary, we felt them to be

extremely useful. It is precisely because of their

real value and because of their greater potential value

in the years ahead, that we recommzend that everythi:z

possible be done to assure that the best possible

Americans are chosen to represent us in Eastern Eurce,

and that- they go to their assignments fully informer : n

what to expect and on what is expected of them.

We think, for example, that it should be poss.:.e

to eliminate the kind of misunderstanding we found x:7ng

our grantees to Poland, who claimed they were not

as they thought they would be. At the very least, -:

grantee should know that his bureaucracy is not

unfailingly efficient, and that he should be prepare. :o

adjust to the unexpected.