Development, use and control of nuclear energy for the common defense and security and for peaceful purposes

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Material Information

Title:
Development, use and control of nuclear energy for the common defense and security and for peaceful purposes
Physical Description:
v. : 24 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
United States -- Congress. -- Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Publisher:
Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Washington

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Nuclear disarmament   ( lcsh )
Nuclear energy -- Law and legislation -- United States   ( lcsh )
Nuclear weapons -- International cooperation   ( lcsh )
Genre:
federal government publication   ( marcgt )

Notes

Dates or Sequential Designation:
1st- 1975-
Numbering Peculiarities:
Report covers fiscal year 1976.
General Note:
CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 75 J803-13, CIS 76 J802-4
General Note:
Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from LexisNexis Academic & Library Solutions.
General Note:
Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.
General Note:
"Second annual report to the United States Congress by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy pursuant to section 202(b) of the Atomic energy act, as amended."
General Note:
At head of title: 94th Congress, 2d session. Joint committee print.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 023732847
oclc - 02244136
lccn - 75648138
issn - 0360-4349
Classification:
lcc - JX1974.7 .U525a
ddc - 327/.174
System ID:
AA00022490:00001

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
    Purpose of the report and chronology
        Page 1
    Summary of key issues
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Proliferation
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
    Nuclear export and control
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Arms control
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
    Strategic deterrence
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
    Deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
    Security of nuclear weapons
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
    Safeguards
        Page 33
        Page 34
    Appendix A. Nuclear proliferation
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
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        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
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        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
        Page 74
        Page 75
        Page 76
        Page 77
        Page 78
    Appendix B. Nuclear export and control
        Page 79
        Page 80
        Page 81
        Page 82
        Page 83
        Page 84
        Page 85
        Page 86
        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
        Page 91
        Page 92
        Page 93
        Page 94
        Page 95
        Page 96
        Page 97
        Page 98
        Page 99
    Appendix C. Arms control
        Page 100
        Page 101
        Page 102
        Page 103
        Page 104
        Page 105
        Page 106
        Page 107
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
        Page 121
        Page 122
        Page 123
        Page 124
        Page 125
        Page 126
        Page 127
        Page 128
        Page 129
        Page 130
        Page 131
        Page 132
        Page 133
    Appendix D. Strategic deterrence
        Page 134
        Page 135
        Page 136
        Page 137
        Page 138
        Page 139
        Page 140
        Page 141
        Page 142
        Page 143
        Page 144
        Page 145
    Appendix E. Deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons
        Page 146
        Page 147
        Page 148
    Appendix F. Security of nuclear weapons
        Page 149
        Page 150
        Page 151
        Page 152
    Appendix G. Safeguards
        Page 153
        Page 154
        Page 155
        Page 156
        Page 157
        Page 158
        Page 159
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        Page 171
        Page 172
        Page 173
        Page 174
        Page 175
        Page 176
        Page 177
    Appendix H. Tables
        Page 178
        Page 179
        Page 180
        Page 181
        Page 182
        Page 183
        Page 184
        Page 185
        Page 186
        Page 187
        Page 188
        Page 189
        Page 190
        Page 191
        Page 192
        Page 193
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        Page 195
        Page 196
        Page 197
        Page 198
    Back Cover
        Back Cover 1
        Back Cover 2
Full Text

A F L 0,9



1977
41
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*'8ECON10 F.ASSUXL. REPORT


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94th Congress JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT 2d Session





DIL'VELOPMENT, UjSE, AN) CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE COMMON

DEFENSE AND SECURITY ANI) FOR

PEACEFUL PURPOSES





SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

TO THE

UNITED STATES CONGRESS

BY THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 202(b) OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, AS AMENDED










TJUNE 30, 197;



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 73-642 WASHINGTON : 1976


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington. D.C. 20402 Price $2.05




























JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

JOHN 0. PASTORE, Rhode Island, Chairman MELVIN PRICE, Illinois, Vice Chairman

SENATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JOHN YOUNG, Texas
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico MIKE McCORMACK, Washington
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey MANUEL LUJAN, JR., New Mexico
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas FRANK HORTON, New York
JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York ANDREW J. HINSHAW, California

GEORGE F. MURPHY, Jr., Fxecutive Director JAMES B. GRAHAM, Assistant Director WILLIAM C. PARLER, Committee Counsel JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Assistant Counsel FRANCESCO COSTAGLIOLA, Professional Staff Member ALBION W. KNIGHT, Jr., Consultant NORMAN P. KLUG, Technical Consultant STEPHEN J. LANES, Ttchnical Consultant BEVERLY A. BAUGHMAN, Research Assistant MICHAEL R. KEPPEL, GAO Consultant CHRISTOPHER C. O'MALLEY, Printing Editor
(U)}













r i
CONTEND -1.


page
Purpose of the report ---------------------------------------------- I
Chronology -------------------------------------------------------- I
Summary of key issues --------------------------------------------- 2
Prolif ration ------------------------------------------------------ 4
Definitions ---------------------------------------------------- 4
Nuclear capable nation, ------------------------------------------- 4
Nuclear potential nations --------------------------------------- 4
Nonproliferation treaty ----------------------------------------- 5
Geneva Review Conference ------------------------------------- 5
International Atomic Energy Agency ---------------------------- 6
Nuclear export ------------------------------------------------ 7
Joint Cominittee on Atomic Energy interest ---------------------- 8
Nuclear export and control ----------------------------------------- 9
Background --------------------------------------------------- 9
Agreements for Cooperation ------------------------------------ 9
Nuclear export licensing procedures ------------------------------ 9
Nuclear export licensing activity -------------------------------- I ()
Nuclear supplier nations ---------------------------------------- 10
FRG-Brazil -nuclear fuel cycle agreement ------------------------- I I
Nuclear supplier conferences ------------------------------------ 12
Principles governing nuclear exports ----------------------------- 12
Armq control ------------------------------------------------------ 15
Background --------------------------------------------------- 15
Test ban treaties ---------------------------------------------- 15
Limited Test Ban Treaty ----------------------------------- 15
Threshold Test Ban Treaty --------------------------------- 16
PNE Treaty ----------------------------------------------- 16
Treaty ratification ----------------------------------------- 16
Strategic arms limitation negotiations ---------------------------- 17
Background ---------------------------------------------- 17
SALT I -------------------------------------------------- 17
Vladivostok Agreement ------------------------------------- 18
SALT 11 ------------------------------------------------- is
Issues of SALT II ----------------------------------------- 18
Mutual and balanced force reductions negotiations ----------------- 19
Background ----------------------------------------------- 19
Aspects of MBFR ----------------------------------------- 19
Strategic deterrence ------------------------------------------------ 20
Background --------------------------------------------------- 20
Soviet military trends ------------------------------------------ 20
Objectives for U.S. strategic nuclear force ------------------------ 21
Adequacy of U.S. strategic forces -------------------------------- 21
U.S. strategic nuclear force programs ---------------------------- 22
U.S. strategic force issues --------------------------------------- 22
The nuclear weapon stockpile ----------------------------------- 23
Nuclear polic.1 ------------------------------------------------- 23
Deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons -------------------------------- 24
Background --------------------------------------------------- 24
Classification policy -------------------------------------------- 24
Nuclear weapons in the Pacific ---------------------------------- 24
Nuclear weapons at sea ---------------------------------------- 25
Nuclear weapons in Europe ------------------------------------- 25
Background ----------------------------------------------- 25
Allied participation ---------------------------------------- 25
NATO nuclear capability ------------------------------------ 25
Soviet nuclear capability in Eastern Europe ------------------- 26
Weapons reductions ---------------------------------------- 26





IV

Page
Security of nuclear weapn ----.------------------------------------ 28
Backgroucr ondd.---------------------------------------- 28
Con(gres-ional int re-t------------------------------------------ 28
The threat---------------------------------------------------- 28
Congressional security concerns---- -------------------------------- 29
Security ii)rovement- ----------------------------------------- 29
Department of 1)efenie actions---------------------------------- 30
Safeguard -------------------------------------------------------- 33
Background--------------------------------------------------- 33
ERiDA and NC afeguard activities---------------------------- 33
I)icussi(on of iue---------------------------------------------- 33
DI)omef-ti -------------------------------------------------- 33
International ---------------------------------------------- 33
Adequacy of IAEA safeguards------------------------------ 34

APPENDIXES

A. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION [p. 33]
A-I. Treaty on proliferation of nuclear weapons, July 1, 1968 ---------- 36
A-2. NPT parties and nn parties .....41 A-3. Statement by Senator Symington regarding "The Nuclear Safeguards D)elusion": July 13, 1973 -- --------------- 42
A-4. Address by Senator Pastore on "The Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy": April 22, 1976 ------------------------------------- 45
A-5. Statement by Senator Symington regarding "Nuclear Proliferation
and Counterforce": October 22, 1975 -----------------55
A-6. Statement by Senator Symington regarding "The Nuclear March
to Armageddon": April 14, 1976 ----------------------------- 59
A-7. Statement by Senator Tunney concerning Senate Resolution 415,
relating to the transfer of nuclear material to India: March 26,
1976 ............-. 64
A-8. Statement by Senator Pastore concerning the FRG-Brazil Nuclear
Agreement: June 3, 1975 ----------------------------------- 67
A-9. Statement by Representative George E. Brown, Jr., concerning
"Nuclear Proliferation": June 18, 1976--- --------71

B. NUCLEAR EXPORT AND CONTROL [p. 79]
B-1. Executive Order 11902, "Procedures for an Export Licensing
Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment": February 2,
1976 -- ------------------------ 80
B-2. Statement prepared by NRC, "Export Licensing Procedures,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission": April, 1976- 82
B-3. Table, "Nuclear Power Supply Capabilities of Various Countries":
March 1, 1976 *--- 84
B-4. Table, "Estimated Cumulative Value of Enriching Services and
Reactor Sales to Exporting Country Through December, 1975"- 85 B-5. Senate Resolution 221 concerning "International Safeguards of
Nuclear Materials": December 12, 1975--------------------- 86
B-6. Statement by Senator Symington, "Nuclear Suppliers Illusion":
November 4, 19735 88
B-7 Statement by Senator Symington, "Unwarranted Nuclear Secrecy":
April 6, 1976- __ 90
B-S. Statement )by Fred C. Ikle, D)irector ACDA, concerning the Nuclear
Suppliers Conferences and Principles to Guide Future Nuclear
Exports: February 2'., 1976_ --- 92
B-9. Table prepared by NRC, "Recap of Licensing Activities and Projection for Expected Applications: April, 1976 94
B-10. Table(, prepared by NRC, "Nuclear Export Licenses Issued, May 1,
1973-April 00, 1976" --------------------------------------- 95
B-11. T.1able1 prepared by NR.C "Pending Export License, April 30, 1976" 97

C. Anis CONTROL [p. 100]
C-1. Nuclear Test Bzon Treaty, 1963 -------------------------------- 101
C-2. Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests: July 3, 1974- 104






v

Page
C-3. Trctty Betweeii the t-nited Stit-,; '111d tho S()%,i(,t t-11ioll )It Vlldf'rground F:xplosions for Pe.tceful AkY 28, 19716 108
C-4. Joi tit, Uii ited Stzito.,-. ()vict V Ilion 0 ,11111111ilique,
V.S.S. It.: Novcmber 24, 1974_ 126
C-5. StAcment hv Buckl(,v "'SALT 1)(-celither I S, I 9 il 5 129
C--6. St"Iteziwiit, I)v Rcpr(-- eiitit1ve (;e()r -e j :. 1'ro \ it, Jr, (m di- ztm wijwiit pr(q)(isils Of Awlrei Saklmr(,v_D. S"rjz_k'rj,'Gic DETERRENCE [1). 134]
D-L DO I )-preptrod :4titeniont, cmif-eriling the miclezx wcipotl,- tockpile:
F(d)ruztry 2 7, 19 176_,_,_ ]:)5
D-2. D0D-pr(,jwr',,d tal)le 'i 7 -md Strttegi,- 1,(.vei," 139
D-:)). DOD-pn'par( d t,hle, "Acquisition C()sts of :Q"ijor Strategic Force,,
Mwicrnizziti0ii md Improx-oment Progritw.4"_ 140
D-4. D()D-pr ,pzired 0h1(,:-;, Dci :ver.v 'S.vsteill- _N Iv.v'
ArmN, md Air F()rc(,"__ 141
D-5. Stitoiiwiit I)Y S( imtor BuckleY, "_Nuc'wir Arms" ALIN- 251 1 9 6_ 143
D-6. Tahle, Li 4 ()f zwmounced foreign wiclc tr to J!ui('
71 145
19 1 G

E. DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. -NUCLEAR WEAPONS [1). 14G]
E-1. Extract Ai wwl Dcfe)' se Departmeot Report, FY P 1-,*, concerniliell)
"Alodernizttion of The.-tter Nuclear Welpon-' ------------------ 146

F. S4--CURITY OF _Nl.(LEAR AVEAPONS [1). 149]
F-1. Extract from Aovual Defcose Departmeot Report, F17
corning "Peacetime Securitv mid Storage of Nuelear A (",pons"_ 150 F-2. DOD-prepared tlablo "Status of DOD Personnel I'lLeliability
Program for Caleiidttr Ycar 197517 --------------------------- 152

G. SAFECT-ARDs [1). 15f*30]
G-1. NRC-prcpared stfitement, "NUC 'Sifeguards. Program ----------- 154
G-2. Ell DA-prteparcd statenuJit, "L1lD.A Nuclear AlAerials Secur.tv
-ind de(ni.trds Proarc-1111 -------------------------------------- 165
'R DA-prepared statertient, "Internation.,A Safeguards Initdative,"_ 170 G-4. ERDA-prep.tred statement, '*IAJ-"A Sdegimrds Implemciitatdon"_ 171
G-5. Ell DA-prt parod st itenlcnt, "A Comparison of !:'xistivo- 1AF:A
,ifegu,,,rck land U.S. 11equircinci its' -------------- 176

11. [p. 17SI
arcoments for C(_-)operation in the Civil 17.zes of Atomic Enero v- 179 11 -21. _Nonpro!iferation treaty ind szJvg1itird-, ,tatus of countries with
Which the Unit-d S6te,, ll .s for C(m_)er.ttioll ------- I 11 0
1. igrCenwnts, f017 1'1j)l)1iC:1ti011 Of
-TAVA trilateral saffopi, '_1
A J
A..:A al'(- uard, to I _! )T)Iiod intturi, !,
ITA. Aleinher: ,Iiip, Internati(_ A Atomic Vner-N A g- ,v JS2
11-5. U.'S.4ype imcle.-11- 00wvrph .,,A. ; abroad oT)cr,,,Llnr)_, ill C()Iistviction,
or mi order, .:Is Of '11111" '3)01 1975 -------------------------------- I
H-G. '_Non-UT.S.-type riuclear p-)w-rplant -, d)ro.td operate)(,;, in ecil.".4tructioil, or wi ()rder, a, of Jun.- 302 1975________ --------------- 1,10
If- i AVoi -1d uranium production ------------------------------------ I 11- S
1-1-8. World uraminn resource:.: -------------11--91. Currcut and mti,1ipttcd foreigli oimchiii- production cL,,pxitv
and s ejmr,,tive Nv()rk (s.w.u.) rcqmrom; tit:- 19 0
11--10. Estilmit(A cumulative v'-111c Of ellrichiiig services md r ,wtor szdto exporting comitxv through 1)(-cein1wr
11-11. Status of forciorn urmmin (_-,nriching s(,r*-ices zwuvitW,- '.\Lrch 1,
19 76 ----------------- ------------------ 192
If 12. 'Nuelcar power suppIN etipabilities of various cwmtrio's, __\kirch 1,
1976 ------------------------------ ------------------------ 194
11-13. Fuel rc processing capabilities, Mzireh 195
11-14. National programs oil mixed-oxide (CU, Pu) 0)) fuel ----------- 19 7

















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DEVELOPMENT. USE, AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR TtHE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY
AND FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

Pursuant to section 202(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy are required to, on or before June 30 each year, report to their respective Houses on the development, use, and control of nuclear energy for the common defense and security and for peaceful purposes.
It is required that each report provide facts and information available to the Joint Committee on matters of weaponry; foreign policy; defense; international trade; and in respect to the expenditure and appropriation of Government revenues. Further, that in recognition of the need for public understanding, presentation of the reports shall be made to the maximum extent possible in open sessions and by means of unclassified written materials.
This is the second report submitted in response to that requirement. The report categorizes, in unclassified form, the major nuclear issues within the framework of the above which are now and probably will be of direct concern to the Congress within the next 12 months.
This report is intended to provide useful unclassified information on nuclear national security matters. It does not present conclusions of the Joint Committee or its members, even though the members may have strong convictions about the matters discussed. However, several definitive statements were made during the year by Joint Committee members on the basic issues discussed. They are included for information within the appendices.

CHRONOLOGY
Some of the key events during the past year which had an impact upon nuclear national security policy interests within the Congress were:
a. June 27, 1975. Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a nuclear agreement which will provide Brazil a comtnlete nuclear fuel cycle. This agreement is of major iml)ortanlce as an examlple of the potential spread of nuclear weapons capl)ability through export of nuclear equipment and technology.
b. September 1, 1975. Israel and the United States initiated an agreement which trade Israeli withdrawal from part of the Sinai Peninsula for U.S. participation in a monitoring force. From a niuclear standpoint, the agreement included provisions in which the U.S. promises advanced military equipment including some nucle,'rcapable systems such as the Pershing missile.
(1)





2

c. December 11, 1975. NATO Ministers agreed to a U.S. proposal to include thle withdrawal of a significant number of U.S. nuclear \weapons in Europe in the negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (M BFR) with the Warsaw Pact nations.
d. December 12, 1975. The Senate passed Senate Resolution 221, which called upon the President to take certain actions to improve international safeguards in the export of nuclear equipment, materials and technology.
e. January 26, 1976. Spain and the United States signed a Treaty ill which, among other things, the United States agreed to withdraw anyi nuclear weapons deployed in Spain by June 1979.
f. January 30, 1976. The Republic of Korea canceled its planned purchase from France of a plutonium reprocessing plant. This action wNas taken after strong pressure from the United States Government.
g. February 23, 1976. The United States and six other nuclear suppl)lier nations announced an agreed set of principles by which they would conduct their nuclear export transactions in order to maintain a degree of standardization of safeguards in these transactions.
h. March 31, 1976. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed on July 3, 1974, established this (late as the cutoff for nuclear weapons tests exceeding 150 kilotons in yield. However, the treaty had not been sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification by that date. The Executive Branch was waiting to complete a companion treaty with the Soviet Union on conduct of peaceful nuclear explosives.
i. May 24, 1976. Japan ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
j. May 28, 1976. The United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the detonation of peaceful nuclear explosives. This was a companion agreement to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Its outstanding provision is an inclusion of an on-site inspection. This is the first time that on-site inspection has been included in an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
In examining thie events listed in the chronology above, several mn ajor problem areas are apIparent:
The incirea d danger of more nations seeking an independent nw-1(eleaIr weapons capability and the need to develop more effective methods to deter and delay this threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons.
2. ''The growing Soviet strategic nuclear capability and the consequent need to cause a mutual slowdown in both the qualitative and quantitative efforts of both the Soviet Union and the United States in strategic arnms.
3. If that mutual reduction in strategic arms cannot soon be accomplished, tile question continues whether the United States must pursue actively its programs of strategic initiatives to improve the quality of its own strategic arms capability.
4. The continuing but growing need to improve the physical security protection given to the many U.S. nuclear weapons deployed outside the continental United States.
5. IThe need to assure that the U.S. nuclear weapons which are now deployed overseas under earlier security conditions and doctrines match the present foreign policy and security objectives.




r

6. The Twed to Improve dic, safeo.iiards ao*am ,t po ,,-;Iblc.,
or theft of nuclear materials; s.d)(Aacre of miclear facilitic-,; ()I,. othel. acts of 1111cle"11--related terrori"Ill.
The,,e are th( _,, identicnt kev is,-,ucs noted in the .11'Irst Ammzd Report submitted in 19757 which, indic11tes that there has been little tna,1011 progress in the solution during the past year. 1"here are a flumber of SubordiAllate issues to these six overall problems. "I"hey are de.-;c-rIb(,,,d ill some detlait ill the se(Jiorls Which follow.











PROLIFERATION
DEFINITIONS
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is the increase of weapons already possessed by a nuclear-capable nation (vertical proliferation), and the increase of nations which have demonstrated a capability of developing, producing, or obtaining nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation). Nuclear proliferation is considered by most nations to be undesirable as it is believed to increase the probability of nuclear war. At the least, it will create new uncertainties and probable instabilities in the international situation.
The problem of vertical proliferation is generally associated with the number and quality of nuclear weapons now owned and being developed by the two nuclear super-powers-the Soviet Union and the United States. The potential resolution of vertical proliferation is being approached through the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations (SALT) which have been conducted by the two nations since 1969. The issues related to vertical proliferation are listed under the subject of Arms Control in this report.
NUCLEAR CAPABLE NATIONS
The nuclear capable nations, as of May 15, 1976, are: the Soviet Union; the United States; Britain: France; and, the Peoples Republic of China. When India detonated its "peaceful nuclear explosive" on May 17, 1974, the world considered that she joined the nuclear club. During the past year, there have been increasing indications that Israel has also become a member of this now less than exclusive club, although she neither admits to such a capability, nor has there been any evidence of Israel conduting any nuclear explosions.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL NATIONS
As nuclear technology advances there are an increasing number of nations which have the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons within the next twenty-five years. The deterrent to such action is predominantly world opinion. For most of these nations, there are also satisfactory security assurances from larger nuclear powers which make their )ossession of nuclear weapons unnecessary. The grown g dangers of proliferation, di;.scu,,sed in more detail below, may come from a collapse in the credibility of these security assurances, along with a growing danger of unfriendy neighboring 'states which seem to be acquiring the weapons. Table 1 lists the potential Nth countries as evaluated by the Energy Research and Development Administration.
(4)





5

TABLE 1. Potential Nth couidries, as f April 1976
[Indicates technical capability only. There is no speculation inferred on tw polit ical imotivaio. to d(iviop a nuclear weapons capability]
A. Countries which appear technically c )able of detonating a nicle:r (d vice in the short term (within leI than 1-up to 3 years of a de- isiin to d() -,.
Canada South Africa
Republic of China Spain
Israel Sweden
Italy Switz erland
Japan
B. Countries which appear technically capable of detonating a nuclear de ice in the intermediate term (within 4 to 6 years of a decision to do ,).
Argentina E"st G'ermany
Austria Republic of Korea
Belgium The Netherlands
Brazil Norway
Czechoslovakia Poland
Denmark
C. Countries which appear technically Cpable of detonting a nuclear device in the longer term (within 7 to 10 years of a decision to do so).
Egypt Portugal
Finland Romania
Iran Turkey
Mexico Yugoslavia
Pakistan
NoN-PROLIFERATION TREATY
The first major step in resolving the horizontal proliferation problem was the Non-Proliferation Treaty which became effective in March 1970 [Appendix A-1]. A major impetus within the United States Governminent for the Non-Proliferatien Treaty (NPT) was Senate Resolution 179 which was introduced by Senator John O. Pastore and passed by the Senate on May 17, 1966 by a vote of 84 to 0. Senate Resolution 179 included the following words:
Resolred: That the Senate commends the President's serious
and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of nuclear
proliferation problems.
As of May 30, 1976, 98 nations are a party to the NPT, with an additional 12 nations which have signed but not ratified the Treaty. Appendix A-2 lists the status of nations participating in the NPT. The most notable nations which have neithler signed nor are a party to the NPT are three nuclear capable nations: France; the Peoples Republic of China: and, India. (Ohhers iot a party to the Treaty but) which are potentially capable of developing nuclear weapons before the end of the centurv--or sooner if the political motivation so (1i(tated-are : o Ai
tated-are Ar~entima; Brazil; LEgypt Israel; Pahitan; Prt u~al: South Africa; Spain: Switzerland; and Turkey.

GENEVA REVIEW CONFERENCE
During gMIavy 1975 the Geneva Conference to Review the Non-,Proliferation Treaty was conducted in accord with Article VIII. Section 3, of the Treaty for the objectives of "assuring that thle purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are b1eii( realized." The Final Declaration of the Review Contferene, p1u li-hed





6

May :30, 1975, noted a review of each article of the Treaty and included the following reaffirmation to the purposes of the Trreaty:
Th~e States Party to the reaty, reaffirm their strong common
interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Trheyr reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedicationl to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.
They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international
efforts:
To avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
To achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament;
and
Tio promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
under adequate safeguards.
In its review of T~reaty~ articles, very little specific action was recommended. However, it took special note of the possible benefits off regional or multinational fuel cycle centers.
The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy safely and economically, the needs of many States in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of
JAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty.
The Conference also reaffirmed confidence in the International Atomic Ener'gy Agency, as a key element in the effort to control nuclear proliferation.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
There have been a number of suggestions by Members of Congress which would strengthen the role and authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Tfhe IAEA's role in the safeguarding of nuclear materials is especially important to the control of nuclear- proliferation. The objectives and functions of the IAEA safeguard sN-stems are described in a My6, 1975, Report by the President to the Congres. s on "Laws andi Regulations Governing Nuclear Exports and Domestic and International Nuclear Safeguards."
The objective of IAEA safeguards is the prevention of national
diversion of nuclear material from peaceful application by the risk of early detection. In this effort, the IAEA relies heavily, but by no means exclusively, on existing national control systems to generate information for transmittal to IAEA. The major elements of the IAEA system are (a) material accountancy, (b) containment and (c) surveillance. The basic pr nciple of the IAEA system lies in a comparison of information provided by the con try being ins;pcted and the verification observation provided byN the Agency. IAEA inspectors are accorded extensive opporP inities to physically inspec t and take independent measurements at safeguarded facilities, and their intensity of access increases with the strategic value of the nuclear materials at given locations. The system has undergone periodic upgrading and was extensively revised in 1970 to reflect the major new responsibilities the IAEA has assumed under the Trreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Should a diversion be detected, specific






7

penalties are possible including suspension of IAEA mIietbei slI), (lisclosure of the d(liversion to the UN Sectirit Y (1 nll ,il aind General Assembly, and ceinsure hbv the inter nation al conununit v.
The IAEA system d(loes not in itself allow for d(lirect inI terven tio(,n for the prevention of diversion by terrorist or (lisi(lent 'groui).
The effectiveness of the IAEA has been of particular c()oic('erii to Members of the Congress. Senator Stuart Syminington vi ited( tlie IAEA June 29 through ul biv 1975, and( reporte( to the Senate ()on that visit July 15 [Append(ix A-3]. lie express(led concern over lie ability to enforce sanctions in the case of safeguar(l violations letecte(d by IAEA.
Any enforcement of sanctions in the case of safe(uiiard
violations detected by the IAEA-that is, diversionn of nuclear fuel from peaceful to weapons-(levelopment puirposes--would appear to be the responsibility of the United Nations. As a congressional representative on the U.S. Delegation to the last U.N.
session, however, I found the possibility would be remote indeed that the U.N. would enforce sanctions against a country which
obtained nuclear weapons.
The adequacy of IAEA Safeguards is discussed( in greater d(letail in the section on Safeguards of this report.

NUCLEAR EXPORT
During the past year the key events affecting nuclear proliferation have centered upon the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. Of particular concern have been the sale by two of the nuclear supplier nations, France and West Germany, of the critical items of the fuel cycle: fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment
plants. Table 2 lists these transactions.
TABLE 2. Announced major transactions in the nuclear fuel cycle, May 1975May 1976
June 1975:
Agreement between Federal Rel)ublie of G(ermany and Brazil (signed):
Uranium exploration and mining.
Uranium enrichment (200 metric ton demonstration plant by 1981;
commercial-scale plant to follow. Nozzle separation process).
Fuel element fabrication (pilot plant followed by commercial plant).
Reprocessing (pilot lait).
Power reactors (four 1300MWe PWR's by 1983 and plans for four
more by 1990).
Reactor components manufacture capabilityy for large components )by
1985).
January 1976: Agreement between France & Pakistan (initialed): Supply of
French reprocessing plant, scheduled for operation about 1980.
February 1976: Cancellation of French supply )f pilot reprocessing to the( lepulblic of Korea.
Further, within the United States there were other propose(l nuclear sales which caused concern within the Congress over the mechanism for licensing nuclear exports within the U.S. Government. The Senate Government Operations Conmmittee held extensive
hearings on this matter and has reported out S. 1439 which would( make certain changes to the existing nuclear export licensing procedures. It is anticipated that the Congress will consid(ler the I)ill in this session. The issue of nuclear export has become so critical that it will be addressed separately in this report in the next section.





8

JOINT COAUMITTEE o N ATOMic ENERGY INTEREST
Through the year,-,,, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy not only, has been a strong voice decrying the threat of a nuclear proliferated world but has acted consistently to encourage the Executive Branch to take prudent and workable actions to delay, discourage, and prevent if at all possible the spread of nuclear weapons. It was by the direct action of the Joint Committee or its members which:
1. In Mav 1966 encouraged the Executive Branch to proceed seriously wiili negotiations for a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
2. In July 1968 insisted upon the inclusion of Article III into the NPT-which defined the safeguards requirements.
3. In Mav 1974 raised the seriousness to nuclear proliferation posed by the Indian nuclear detonation of May 17, 1974.
4. In june 1974 defined the need to examine carefullv the safeguard requirements of the then proposed nuclear power agreements between the United States and the Governments of Egypt and Israel. It is because of unsatisfactory safeguard provisions that neither of these agreements have been submitted to the Congress.
5. As a result of this Mid-East proposal, initiated legislation which was passed by the Congress to assure adequate opportunity for the Congress to examine all Agreements for Co-operation on civilian nuclear power between the United States and other i governments. This was the amendment to Section 123d of the Atom c Energy Act on October 26, 1974 (Public Law 93-485).
6. In June 1975, raised strong objection to the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil on the construction in Brazil of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. [Appendix A-81
7. In December 1975 initiated Senate Resolution 221 to encourage the Executive Branch to bring to a successful conclusion the agreement between nuclear supplier nations, the terms of which were announced on February 2, 1976. [Appendix B-1].
During the past year several Members of the Joint Committee have made statements" which deal directly with the problem of proliferation. Appendix A-4 is a speech by Chairman John 0. Pastore before the Fiftieth American Assembly on April 22, 1976, on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. This includes an important section on proliferation. Appendix A-5 is a speech by Senator Stuart Symington reported, to the Senate on October 22, 1975, on "Nuclear Proliferation and Counterforce." Appendix A-6 is a statement by Senator Symington to the Senate of April 14, 1976, "The Nuclear March to Armageddon." Appendix A-7 is the March 26, 1976, statement to the Senate by Senator John V. Tunney in which he introduced Senate Resolution 415 which urges the President to suspend the transfer of certain nuclear materials to India pending public hearings by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Appendix A-8 is the June 3, 1975, statement by Senator Pastore to the Senate on the danger of nuclear proliferation involved in the FRG-Bra.zil nuclear fuel cycle agreement. Appendix A-9 is a statement by Representative George E. Brown, Jr., on "Nuclear Proliferation" in which he includes for the record a valuable summary by the Congressional Research Service on nuclear proliferation issues. These statements are firm indications of the Joint Committee's continuing concern over the problems of nuclear proliferation.












NUCLEAR EXPORT AND CONTROL
BACKGROUND)
The "Atoms for Peace'" program instituted by President Eisenhower in December 1953 and the subsequent Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, promoted the development of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy under controls which would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1954, the United States has been the leader in the export of nuclear power and research reactors and, iup until recently, held virtually a world-wi(de monopoly in the nuclear services to support these reactors. Appendix H-10 is a table prepared by ERDA which shows the estimated cumnulative value of reactor sales and fuel enriching services of the nuclear exporting countries through December 1975. It notes that the United States has received some $29 billion from its nuclear exports, $10 billion from reactor sales and $19 billion for enriching services (which has entered the U.S. Treasury). This represents about 58% of the world-wide nuclear export market of about $50 billion.

AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy is the mechanism for Congressional control over nuclear exports an(l to assure that there is established a satisfactory system of U.S. or international safeguards to prevent peaceful applications of nuclear energy from being diverted to weapons purposes. The United States has in force Agreements for Cooperation with 29 nations and two international organizations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATO I).
Under section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, after an Agreement for Cooperation has been negotiated it is forwarded to the Congress where it lays for 60 days while the Congress is in session. The Agreement will not go into effect if, (lu1:inlg the 60-day period, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed Agreement for Cooperation. During the period the Joint Committee on Atomiic Energy would hold hearings and make a report to the Congress on the proposed Agreement.

NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES
Under tlhe framework of the Agreement for Cooperation a U.S. vendor may apply to the Nuclear Regulatory 'aolnI 15ion (N R(') for a license to export, nuclear equipment, material and (or teclinology. On February 2, 1976, the President i*ue Ex;utiv rider r 11902, "Procedures for an Exp)ort Icensing Policy as to Nu'cle(ar Materials and Equipment" [Appendix B-l]. This order designated the Department of State as the agency to receive the export li(e e
(9)






10

application from the NRC to establish the Executive Branch position on the proposed license and to notify the NRC of that position for its consideration before the license is issued.
Appendix B-2 is a description prepared by the NRC for this report of its licensing procedures and defines the eight specific areas it reviews in assuring that the export would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes andl would meet the "common defense and security requirement of the Atomic Energy Act."
The Senate Government Operations Committee has examined in (let ail nuclear export licensing procedures (during the past year and has reported out bill S. 1439 which would reorganize certain nuclear export functions of the Federal Government. It would, among other things, assure that all nuclear export licenses would be issued by the N RC. At the present time there are still licensing functions for nuclear equipment components resting within the Department of Commerce, and ERDA with respect to technology.

NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING ACTIVITY
Appendix B-9 is a summary of the export licensing activities of the NRC for the period May 1, 1975, through April 30, 1976. It notes that 264 licenses were issued in the period (including 6 reactors) with 115 more applications pending on April 30. Appendix B-10 is a (detailed listing of the major cases for which the NRC issues licenses. Appendix B-i1 is a. listing by the NRC of major licenses pending. These listings are included in order to show the breadth and extent of the U.S. nuclear export industry.

NUCLEAR SUPPLIER NATIONS
During the past two years it has become clear that the number of nations capable of manufacturing and exporting elements of the nuclear fuel cycle is increasing and that their share of the world-wide nuclear export market ii increasing at the expense of the United States. Table 3 below shows the extent of this spread of nuclear supplier nations.







11

TABLE 3. POWER REACTORS BUILT OR PLANNED, REFLECTING SUPPLIER AND USING COUNTRIES

Number of Megawattsreactors electrical

West German supplied power reactors:
Germany ----------------------------------------------------------------- 47 50, 808
Argentina ----------------------- ----- .---------------------- 1 340
Austria ------------------------.-------------------------------- --------- 1 723
Iran ------------------------------------------------------------- 2 2,400
Netherlands --------------------------------------------------------------- 1 477
Switzerland --------------------------------------------------------------- 1 970
French supplied power reactors:
France --------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 32,616
Belgium ---------------------------------------------------------- 7 5,696
Iran ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 2,400
Canadian supplied power reactors:
Canada ---------------------------------------------------------- 25 14, 141
Argentina -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 649
India --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 440
Korea --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 1,358
Pakistan ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 137
Russian supplied power reactors:
U.S.S.R ------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 9,931
Bulgaria ---------------------------------------------------------- 4 1,760
Finland ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 3,437
East Germany -------------------------------------------------------------- 2 730
Hungary ---------------------------------------------------------- 2 880
Japanese supplied power reactors: Japan ----------------------------------------- 23 15, 438
Other locally built power reactors:
Czechoslavakia ------------------------------------------------------------ 5 1,795
India ------------------------------------------------------------ 4 940
Italy ------------------------------------------------------------- 7 5,214
Spain ------------------------------------------------------------ 11 10, 133
Sweden ----------------------------------------------------------- 9 5,902
Switzerland --------------------------------------------------------------- 5 4,240
United Kingdom ----------------------------------------------------------- 25 18,333
U.S. supplied power reactors:
United States ------------------------------------------------------ 237 214, 615
Brazil ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 626
Germany ---------------------------------------------------------- 1 237
India ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 400
Italy ------------------------------------------------------------- 3 1,379
Japan ------------------------------------------------------------ 3 1,120
Korea ----------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 2 1,128
Mexico ----------------------------------------------------------- 2 1,200
Philippines --------------------------------------------------------- 2 1,252
Spain ----------------------------------------------------------- 10 7,901
Sweden ----------------------------------------------------------- 3 2,400
Switzerland -------------------------------------------------------- 6 3,332
Taiwan ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 4,792
Yugoslavia --------------------------------------------------------- 1 600


Appendix B-3 is a table which describes the capabilities of the
count to supply elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. T"h

are 18 nations listed on this table. Thus, it is apparent that this
growth of nuclear sul)lier nations poses increasing problems to the
United States an(d to the world on trying to stem the rush to nuclear
proliferation.


FRG-B3zII, NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AGREEMENT

The major event of the past year which exemplified this growing
danger was the agreement signed on June 27, 1975 between Brazil
and the F"ederal Republic of Germany in whicl 'West Germlnlll
would construct in Brazil a full nuclear fuel cycle in (ljjiig a Irannin
enrichment l)]ant and a fuel reprocessing plant. Thiis agreeet
caused imine(liate concern within the Congress as a wlole anid iii tle
Joint Comniittee on Atomic Energy in )articular. Ai)I)endix A-S is
the statement of Senator John O. Pastore to the Senate ()Il Jne 3,
1975, soundly (enouncing that agreement. Senator St art S-mingt on,
as Chairman of the Arms Control, International ( )rgaizat ios and
Security Agreements of the Senate Fioreigi Relations (C(ominittee,
73-642- 76-2





12

held extensive hearings on this landmark agreement during July 1975. A key factor in the concern over the agreement is the fact that Brazil is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has not denied an ultimate 010al of developing a nuclear capability.
NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONFERENCES
The growing number of nuclear supplier nations, along with the increased market for nuclear power reaction; due to the 1973-1974 oil embargo and price rise, has caused the United States to seek increased cooperation among the nuclear supplier nations in order to seek agreement on the safeguards which should be imposed on their nuclear exports. Conferences were held several times in London during 1975 and this year. By December 1975 the impact of the FRGBrazil agreement and the possible sale of reprocessing plants by France to Pakistan and the Republic of Korea motivated the Senate to pas,.-, Senate Resolution 221 which urged the President to take the leadership in seeking international cooperation in strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials [Appendix B-51.
The nuclear suppliers conferences have been held in secret at the request of at least one of the participating nations. Some Members of the Joint Committee believe strongly that these conferences should be held in the open so that world opinion would be better informed on these critical nuclear matters. Appendices B-6 and B-7 are two statenients on this matter by Senator Stuart Symington.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNINGNUCLEARExPORTS
During a February 23, 1976 hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, announced that the United States, together with other exporters, has decided to apply certain principles to our future nuclear exports (Appendix B-8). The principles described by Dr. We are:
The requirement that recipients must apply international
JAEA) safeguards on all nuclear imports.
The requirement that the importer give assurances not to use
these imports to make nuclear explosives for any purpose
whether called "peaceful" or not.
The requirement that the importer have adequate physical
security for these nuclear facilities and materials to prevent theft
and sabotage.
The requirement for assurances that the importers will demand
the same conditions on any re-transfer of these materials or
types of equipment to third countries.
These agreed principles are a hopeful sign. Yet, there continue to be nuclear sales which raise questions on how closely the other supplier nations will adhere to these principles such as the sale by France to South Africa of two reactors and France's sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Therefore, the Congress will continue to observe closely these type sales by the United States and other supplier nations as important to the overall problem of nuclear proliferation.





13

In June 1976 Senator Stuart Symington proposed an important amendment to the International Security Assistance and Exp)ort Control Act of 1976 which is a landmark in the control of nuclear exports. It is the first time that there have been enacted legislative restrictions upon certain critical nuclear exports. Senator Syming- ton's amendment, as adopted by the Congress, states:

NUCLEAR TRANSFERS
SEc. 305. Chapter 3 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by add(ling at the end thereof the following new section:
"SEC. 669. NUCLEAR TRANSFERS.-NO funds authorized or ap)propriated under this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, or any other Act (other than title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 for disasters, famine, or other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements) may be used for the purpose of"(1) providing economic assistance;
'(2) providing military or security supporting assistance or
grant military education and training; or
"(3) extending military credits or making guarantees;
to any country which"(A) delivers nuclear reprocessing or enrichment equi)pment, materials, or technology to any other country; or
"(B) receives such equipment, materials, or technology
from any other country;
unless before such delivery"(i) the supplying country and receiving country
have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, and technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and
"(ii) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the
safeguards system of such Agency.".
"(b)(1) Provided, however, that the President may by Executive Order effective in not less than 30 days permit delivery to be na 'e to a country to which such subsection would otherwise apply if he determines that (1) the termination of assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests and (2) certifies that he has received reliable assurances that the otherwise ineligible country will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations to do so and transmits such determination to the Speaker of the Ilous>e of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relatio(i of the Senate; and such certification shall set forth tle reasons sunporting such d(letermination in each particular case.
(2) (A) Thle Congress may thereafter b joint resolution intro(uiced( within such 30 days terminate or restrict assistance dewribed in paragiral)hs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) for a country to whicli such ,-lbsection applies or take any other ation witl respect to such assistance for such country as it deems appropriate.
"(B) Any such -joint resolution within respect to a v.iountry ll!. if introduce d within :0 das after the tranusmittal of a certifiation





14

un(Ier paragraph (1) with respect to such country, be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."












ARMS CONTROL

BACKGROUND
Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess enough massive nuclear power to destroy the fabric of each other's industry and society were deterrence to fail and these weapons actually be used against each other. It has long been the policy of the U.S. Government to reduce the probability that nuclear weapons will be used and to find means to limit the growth of strategic nuclear arms and, ultimately, to cause a mutual reduction in their numbers.
TEST BAN TREATIES

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY
The first major step in nuclear disarmament was the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. This treaty, known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, was signed at 'Ioscow on August 5, 1963, after five years of intensive negotiations [Appendix C-1]. The basic obligation is stated in Article
1 of the Treaty, as follows:
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction
or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits including outer
space or underwater, including territorial waters or high
sea s oI
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.
The Treaty has been a success. France and the PRC are the only lIajor nations not a party to the Treaty. However, In June 1974 Presi(leute Giscard D'Estaing announced(l that all future French nuclear tests would be conducted underground, thus, effectively ab)idilg by the terms of the Treaty. Even India's first nuclear (letonalion on lav 17, 1974, was conducted underground, thus in observation of the T'reaty.
Since the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Uinited Nations, through the Eighteen Nation Disarmamient Conmnittee (now known as the Conference of the Coinnittee on Disarnianinent') has e1ncouT"e(d the extension of the Treaty to underground 1cit(1i' te-ts a- well. There have been intermittent proposals to (ofler a tr iat'V 1)allnig all underground nuclear tests (known as a (Copl)reien-iv(1 Test Ban Treaty) or underground tests above >ome identil,,bl)e limit (known as a Threshold Test Ban Trieaty).
(15)





16

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY
On July 3, 1974, President Nixon signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) with the Soviet Union [Appendix C-2]. It prohibits all nuclear weapon development tes,-ts. larger in yield than 15-0 kilotons. It was scheduled to take effect March 31, 1976. However, shortly after the r1eatv was signed, the Administration stated it would not submit the Treatyv to the Senate for ratification until there was a companion agreement with the Soviet Union to include peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) as well as nuclear weapons tests. Since the Soviet Union continues to have a strong PNE program, negotiation for the PNR agreement was long and difficult. As a result, the March 31, 1976, TTBT effectiveness (late passed without the Tpreaty being submitted to the Senate for ratification. However, both nations have adhered to the Treaty beyond the cut-off date even without Treaty ratification.

PNE TREATY
On May 28, 1976, President Ford signed the Treaty~ on "Undergroundl Nuclear Explosives for Peaefeul Purposes" with the Soviet Union [Appendix C-3]. This PNE Treaty places exactly the same 150 kiloton limit on the yield of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. Further, it places the aggregate yield of any group of explosions (consisting of a number of individual explosions) under a limit of 1500 kilotons. (This permits the Soviet Union to conduct an important engineering project to construct a canal between the Pechora and Karma Rivers, to cause additional water to flow into the Caspian Sea.)
The PNE Treatv also includes the feature that provides information and access to sites of explosions by each side. The permitting of on-site ac cess by observers is a, landmark in U.S.-Soviet cooperation in implementing agreements concerned with nuclear arms control. This provision would permit, for example, American observers to place instruments down the emiplacement hole of each nuclear device in a group explosion.
TREATY RATIFICATION
The sig-ning: of the PNE Treaty\1 now makes possible the forwarding of both retie to the Senate for ratification. Ratification will be difficult. The Threshold Tfest Ban Treaty has been criticized widely within the Congress andl the arms control community. Those who
hav crticzedth rr~esboll Teay have also criticized the companion PNE Treaty. This opposition is summarized in a May 2.S, 1 976, press release by the Arms Con trol Association, which stated:
Thle Association believes that the two treaties represent
a diisheartening step backward fromn responsible arm-s control policies. By permitting continued nuclear weapons tests of very sizeable magnitudes and by establishing arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions- for peaceful purposes, the agreements are likely to delay\7 indefinitely the achievement of a bung-sought treaty banning all nuclear tests, anti to provide new respectability for the arguments,, of states which seek to (develop nuclear weapon capabilities b-\ pro-





17

fessing an interest inll peaceful explosions alone. By so doillg, the proposed treaty sets back still furthlier the prospects of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, and for countering the grave threat to world peace andl secirity such proliferation poses.
Those in support of that view would prefer to bypass these T'Ire ties and proceed directly with the Soviet Union on a Coilmprehensive Test Ban Treaty which would limit all nuclear weapon tests. tIowever, others note that if the Threshold "'reaty were to be ratified, there will be a sound basis for further progress toward either a (C'oinpreliensive Test Ban Treaty or a IThreshold Treaty with a yield limit lower than 150 KT. The Treaty states that as an objective. Further, ratification) of the PNE Treaty would establish for the first time tlie firm basis for on-site inspection, a major step in improving arns control verification capabilities.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS
BACKGROUND
Since 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations with the objective of limiting the growth of strategic nuclear arms owned by these two nuclear superpowers. This is an effort to solve the problem of vertical proliferation. It is obvious that each nation possesses enough massive strategic nuclear power to destroy the fabric of the other nation's industry and society. The cost to both nations for this power is staggering and is a diversion of resources from activities which would improve the welfare of each nation's peoples and of the rest of the world. More imlportant they represent, a destructive force which could endanger civilization were it ever to be employed. Therefore, the Congress has recognized the utmost importance of these bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.
SALT I
The first important result of these arms limitation negotiations was an interim agreement signed by the two nations at Moscow in May 1972 to freeze their land-based and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles at the number then in operation or inder (co)nstru ction; a permanent agreement to limit the number of launchers for each side' defensive missile system; and to limit deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) defense systems to two sites, one defeilnin each country's capital and the other dlefenliing an ilntercontilnletal ballistic missile system deployment area.
The Congre.-;s exj)ressedI its appI)roval ofi the agreenet- bv h i li ic Law 92-448 of Sep)tember 30, 1972, which '(rante(l approval aI:(I authorization for the Presi(lent of thle Unite State n n) a(cet 11 Interim Agreemenwt between the Unite(d States of A li<' ai(l t]he Union of Soviet Socialist Re)ublics on certain INas-;re wi t Rsj 1p'ct
to the Limlitatioll of Strateg'ic ()ffinsive Anrls." ieiuded i1 tli, I:w was an amendiinent by Senator Hlenr 'v Jack son I whi iad : as cent rtal pl)rovision a request to the Presidelit to s-eek a SALT 1'reat v tliA would involve equal limits to tie in tercoitilin t al 1rat iric folrce of the U.S. and( the Soviet Uion.





18

VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT

Since SALT I, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have continued their negotiations with the objective of placing the interim limitations on strategic arms on a more permanent basis. On November 23, and 24, 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met in the area of Vladivostok. The Joint United States-Soviet Communique [Appendix C-4] stated that an objective of the SALT II negotiations would be to limit the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,400 and of those vehicles carrying MIRV's to 1,320.

SALT II

Negotiations have continued at Geneva since the Vladivostok meeting with the objective of formalizing into a treaty the provisions of that Agreement. The difficulties which have extended the negotiation have centered upon the problems of verification of MIRV-carrying missiles,, what bomber systems are to be included as strategic delivery systems, and the characteristics of air-launched and sea-launched Ctui.se missiles. Whether these matters can be successfully negotiated in this political year is still unclear.
An apparent majority of the Congress, being intensely aware of the costs and dangers of large strategic nuclear delivery systems, believes that realistic progress toward mutual strategic force reductions is a necessity. There are others within the Congress who are wary of a SALT IT Treaty in light of questions raised during the past year on whether there have been violations of the SALT I Treaty. Appendix C-5 is a statement made by Senatoi James L. Buckler to the Senate on December 18, 1975, which reflects this view.
ISSUES OF SALT 11

In the event that the Administration completes successful SALT II negotiations, some of the following issues will be of concern to the Congress:
1. If SALT II includes the Vladivostok limitations, do those limitations (2,400 delivery vehicles, including 1,320 MIRV carriers) actually place a "cap on the arms racetn
2. What is the impact of the Soviet Union significant advantage in throw-weight upon the )erceived balance of strategic capabilities between the two nations? Will they thus be able to overcome in the near future the major U.S. advantage of numbers of deliverable nuclear warlheads? What would be the ultimate foreign policy result if that would be achieved by the Soviet Union?
3. Is there adequate provision for verification of the Treaty )roVisiolnS
4. Should the Treaty (if that be the result of SALT II) be ratified or should ratification be delayed pending more definitive results of detente between the two nations?
5. Should there be insistence on delaying ratification of any SALT IT Treaty in order to gain agreement on numerical limitations lower than those agreed to at Vladivostok?





19

MUTUAL AN-\i) BALANCED F~ORC(E REDUCTIONS N LGOTIATiI4Ns


Since October 1973, the 'Uited "-ttt t (.ill cooj )(tioll NNX it Ii ii NATO alllie, Ia-, been ellQage(l inl lhiitlteC-al neQrotiat,,u)i- at \ieI11 with the Soviet, Union fand(, itS '\a, a Pact allic> on 0!e 7'\l IItIl~ti z1Il Balanced IForce Red titions (.\IBIJI) of troops andl wet-t)imit ill lilie central region (of Eturope. As its it ml iie~otizition J)o>Il ION, NVAV(R)
sougt relucio~lof oviet, forces (predoniinaiitly tank force>,) 'it thle Central Re,(,lrol, with. a conctirrent, re( Itcino ..~U tdfre only. The Watrsaw Pact, oin tihe other hland, SOJUigft re(Ill(1tio1 of U.S. aircraft and nuclear weapon,, as well asreduiction, of Am~ericani --mu West Germ-tan around forces. Beeaui--e of t hio- e (lfllering I]~tr'~ the negotiations stalle(l.
In order to break the stalemate by midI-I975 the I. iiii ( 1a(
according to pi-es- rOport>-, iproloseo-l to it. NATO ) a l i l then, b' e incluledl i the lle2gotiationhs al 1e(lucition of 1.000 U.S. nuitclea.- wett omv-, fromn Europe, in addition to the proj)ose({ re(tictiolI of .S. gr1oiIfldi forces. This woill(1 caus,-e, hopeflly, Soviet ,greeineilt for redim-tion of a tank army of about 69,000 troops-' and 1,700 tanks. rfhi.,ropsa waagreed to by the NATO allies; in Decembller 1975 and~ 111,1M(k, to the Warsaw Pact that month. As of June 1976, there has, been 10 vindication that this 'sweeteiier'' offer has broken the stalemate. 'Fliene still aIpear,; to be no immediate lpr)5I)(ct of near-term aozreewen(it which will be of iminedjlate leg-islative concern to the Cn'es

ASPECTS O)F NIPFR
The '\BFR neg()otiations.- have direct tiucica. r-relatedl as pects, which (10 concern the Congress. (These are dsuedmore etnievin the section of this report on dleployment".) The principal djHlictltv of M\BFR at this moment is; the relation of the level of U.. force, and{ nuclear weapons to the cr-edibility of U.S. commnitmnents to the -Not-th Atlantic Alliance.
A second difbcultv is that M-\BFIR is- a -mltil ateral nc()otiatioml and it will be much mnore difficult to l)1odtluce an effective a~(-reem1ent than anIvl of the bilateral SALT" nee-otiationis.











STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
BACKGROUND
In spite of the recent and potential steps towards effective strategic arms limitation, the problem remains of assuring that there is an adequate U.S. strategic nuclear force. That force provides a foundation for our national security by providing long-term deterrence against strategic nuclear war.

SOVIET MILITARY TRENDS
The adequacy of the U.S. deterrence force should be viewed against the background of the trends in the Soviet military capability. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld reported to the Congress in his fiscal year 1977 Defense Report:
* it is well to consider some conspicuous trends in Soviet
military capabilities-trends that are facts, not projectionsbefore making any judgements about the desirability of increasing
U.S. strength:
Over the past decade, Soviet defense spending has been increasing steadily in real terms.
In that same period, the Soviet military establishment (not
counting border guards and internal security forces) has expanded
by a million men from 3.4 to 4.4 million men.
Between 1965 and 1975, Soviet strategic offensive forces have
also increased:
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from 224 to
1,600 (an increase of nearly 1,400);
Sea-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLB\Is) from 29 to 730
(an increase of about 700); and
Strategic warheads and bombs, from 450 to 2,500 (an
increase of about 2,000).
-The momentum of this buildup shows no sign of slackening.
Qualitative improvements continue, such as:
The development of four new ICB1s, two of which are
currently being deployed with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs);
The production of a new generation of Ballistic Missile
Submarines (SSBNs), one version of which has deployed
with a new 4,200 mile range SLBM;
Accuracy improvements which could give their ICBMs
a significantly reduced circular error probable (CEP);
Large MIRVs with high-yield warheads; and
Development of a mobile IRBM (in the form of the
SS-X-20) .'
1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report, fiscal year 1977, p. 3.
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21

The long-range meaning of these trends is uncertain. What is certain is that the Soviet Union continues to develop, after SALT I, a massive, modern, high quality strategic capability. This obviously necessitate> U.S. action to assure that our basic goal of deterrence and international stability remain viable.

OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE
The size and composition of the U.S. strategic nuclear force is dependent upon its basic objectives. Secretary Rumsfeld defined these as:
The basic objectives for the strategic nuclear forces are four
in number:
To have a well-piotected, second-strike force to deter
attacks on our cities and people, at all times;
To provide a capability for more controlled and measured
responses, to deter less than all-out attacks;
To insure essential equivalence with the USSR, both now
and in the future, so that there can be no misunderstandings or lack of appreciation of the strategic nuclear balance; and
To maintain stability in the strategic nuclear competition,
forsaking the option of a disarming first-strike capability and seeking to achieve equitable arms control agreements
where possible.

ADEQUACY OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES
The adequacy of U.S. strategic forces has become during the year a volatile political subject. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is in no position to make any definitive judgment on the issue. The judgment of Secretary Rumsfeld, as he reported to the Congress is appropriate:
The Strategic Nuclear Situation
As of today, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces retain a sillbstantial, credible capability to deter an all-out nuclear attack.
Their ability to execute controlled and limited responses is being enhanced as a result of improvements in plans, command and control, and the increasing flexibility being introduced into the Minuteman force. However, there remains a basis for concern iti three areas, and that concern will deepen in succeeding years.
First, the submarine and bomber forces are aging: at the same
time the Soviets are improving their antisubmarine warfare
capabilities and their defense against bombers.
Second, there is an increasing possibility that major aynunetries will develop between U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces because of the momentum in Soviet offensive an (l defensive programs, and that the Soviet strategic capability will come to
be seen as superior to that of the United States.
2 Ibid., p. 5.





22

Third, a continuation of current Soviet strategic programseven within the constraints of SALT-could threaten the survivability of the Minuteman force within a decade. If that should be allowed to happen, our ability to respond to less-than-fuflscale attacks in a controlled and deliberate fashion would be severely curtailed, and strategic stability could be endangered.3

U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE PROGRAMS
In response to the Soviet military trends and to meet the strategic force objectives, the Department of Defense has requested in its FY 1977 budget funds for the following major aspects of the strategic nuclear program:
At the present time, one component of the Triad-the Minuteman force-is essential to both diversity and control. And, it is the Minuteman force that the increasingly sophisticated Soviet ICMB capability threatens to neutralize eventually. Accordingly, we must move steadily, but with deliberation, to retain the option to move toward a more secure basing mode for the ICBM force.
The Trident program is necessary in any event to replace the
aging SLBM forces in the mid-1980s. We are also concerned with possible Soviet advances in anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and the quieter Trident boat with its longer range missiles hedges
against any significant Soviet ASW gain,.
The B-1 bomber represents a suitable successor to the B-52.
Its ability to penetrate at low altitude and high speed will allow us to offset any Soviet air defense improvements. Most important the B-i's advances in structural desigii, hardening against nuclear effects, and the ability to fly out from under nuclear attack, with minimum warning time, would represent a valuable improvement in survivability.
The M-X mis-1e, either in fixed silos or in a multiple-aimpoint mode, with a combination of larger throw-weight and increased accuracy, should improve on the desirable features of the Minuteman, without Minuteman's potential vulnerabilities.
We should develop MI-X at a rate that would allow us to supplement part or all of the Minuteman force in the 19S0>, should that
prove necessary.
In order to keep open the option to diversify further the nuclear forces, exploiting new technology in which we lead the Soviets, we are developing two cruise nissilessea-launched
(SLCM) and air-launched (ALCM) .4

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE ISSUES
The Congress considered these U.S. strategic programs dung the Defense Authorization and Appropriation legislation for fiscal year 1977. Each proposed project centers on the nuclear weapon as the essential ingredient. There is strong feeling wNithin the Congress that it is not in the best interest of the Nation to continue suhi a wide ranging strategic research and development effort as long as detente
3 lid., p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 8.





23

seem-s to be working and a,; long a-; there are c current armn linitiati()n negotiations. Others believe that tile Soviet Union imay be continllling their strategic (levelopillent program for their own reasons-tho- e which are related to gaining anll evident strategic superiority in order to maximize their political advantage. TIhey generally believe that in the uncertainty of thie post-Viet nam environment and the absence of successful conclusions of (Iturrent arms limitation negotiations, it i-. appropriate for thile U.S. to ('ontilliue this strategic research andt development program.
The decisions are being suIbjected to a very rigorois series of hurdles in the Congress, depending upon the threat at the tine, the progress or lack of progress in negotiations, the vulnerability of existing systems as compared to Soviet progress, and, as a most important factor in this time of economic uncertainty, the cost of systems.
THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE
There has been a lingering impression within the Congress that the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile grows with each year. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is insistent that the stockpile be no larger than necessary for valid security reasons and has consistentlv encouraged the Administration to reexamine its rationale for the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile with an objective of reducing levels where possible.
Appendix D-1 is the Department of Defense response to this issue which was raised during \larch 1976 hearings by the Joint Committee on the nuclear weapons budget request of the Energy Research and Development Administration. This indicates that the stockpile leveled off in the 1960's and, shortly thereafter, took a downward trend as strategic missile forces started to replace a portion of the inventory of strategic aircraft and bombs. The stockpile continued to decrease beyond 1973 due to the retirements of CONUS air defense weapons andl retirements of some obsolete tactical weapons being replaced by new conventional and modernized nuclear weapons.
A second indication is that the general trend in U.S. strategic weapons has been to reduce the megatonnage. This resulted from the U.S. decision to place multiple warheads on each strategic missile, improved accurancy of missile guidance systems, and the ligher alert status of missiles allowing a reduction in bombers with their larger yield bombs.
The third indication is that the Soviet Union retains a megatonnage advantage over the U.S. forces by a ratio of over 3 to 1. Ilowever, DOD believes that overall qualitative factors compensate somewhat for this large Soviet throw-weight advantage.
NUCLEAR POLICY
During the past year some Nlemnbers of the Co(ngire- have be comoe concerned over the national policies which govern the collnt rotl all( possible use of nuclear weapons in the diast-erolus event t hat deterrence should fail. For example, several conmmnittees of both bodies have examined the "first-use" doctriine. Nuclear strategy -is a particmliarlv important and an especially seniitive area of concern. It is apparent t that the Cong(ress intends that all confusion in this isV-e ie ti spelted so that there "is no question about thie absolute control over thile eIllployment of our strategic and tactical nuclear force.











DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BACKGROUND
United States, foreign policy for five successive Administrations has provided for the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons abroad as a part of the "shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security" (from the Foreign Policy Report of 1971). Thus, consistent with that policy and as a result of NATO and bilateral agreements, the United States has deployed for many years a large number of nuclear weapons overseas. Most were deployed initially during 1958-1964. In Europe, several Secretaries of Defense have revealed that there are about 7,000 nuclear weapons. In the Pacific there has been no such announcement, although it is widely known that nuclear-capable Army, Navy and Air Force units are located in that area. In addition, the Navy has many nuclear weapons capable ships (in addition to the Polaris/Poseidon submarine fleet) which are at sea.
CLASSIFICATION POLICY
The U.S. Governmental security policy regarding nuclear we apons, locations is that it will neither confirm nor deny the existence or location of U.S. nuclear weapons located anywhere. In part, this is at the request of the nations where the weapons are deployed, since in most nations the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons within their borders is a difficult internal political issue. Thus they generally have requested that the United States not declassify the fact that U.S. nuclear weapons are locSted in their specific nation-even though the evidence that they are there is obvious and generally known by their population. Nevertheless, there is strong feeling by many members of the Concrress that the continuation of that classification as well as other facts about the nuclear capability, is not in the best interest of the Nation.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PACIFIC
The main purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Pacific area is to provide a support to the deterrent posture needed to protect certain nations from aggression-particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. With the concern over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons nations, these deployed U.S. nuclear weapons are also an important element in convincing these nations that they need not develop their own independent nuclear weapons capability in order to assure their national security. This has become particularly important in view of the strong and growing Japanese nuclear power capability. In spite of this, there is a strong belief in the Congress (especially by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) that the Administration should make a careful review of the number and location of weapons in the Pacific area and reduce them in every instance where new security situations make that possible.
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25

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA
The nuclear weapons aboard Naval vessels include bombs whichl could be delivered by aircraft from carriers, warheads for missiles to defend the fleet from air attack, anti-submarine warfare weapons and torpedoes. The fact that a ship is capable of carrying nuclear weapons does not guarantee that those weapons are, in fact, aboard ship.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
BACKGROUND
As a result of NATO and bilateral agreements since 1954, and at the request of our NATO allies, the United States has deployed about 7,000 nuclear weapons in Europe. Most weapons were deployed in the 1958-1964 time frame and have remained essentially at the 7,000 level since 1964. These weapons are considered by our NATO allies as an integral element of the NATO defense plans, as a major contribution of the United States to the defense of Europe, and as an indicator of the United States continuing commitment to NATO.

ALLIED PARTICIPATION
The heads of the NATO governments understand clearly the meaning and purposes of these weapons and have full opportunity to examine ini detail each year their implications for the defense of Europe. The Nuclear Planning Group (of which the U.S. Secretary of Defense and other key NATO Ministers of Defense are members) meet several times a year to discuss nuclear weapons matters of the Alliance. Allied officers in the NATO commands and staffs participate in d(letail on nuclear weapons planning and operational matters. Through bilateral agreement, a uthorize by the Congress, most NATO nations have formed and trained their own nuclear weapons delivery unit. The United States is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to hold in its custody and possession the nuclear portion of the weapons and will make them available to the Allied delivery units only when both the President of the United States and the NATO command channels direct.

NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
The nuclear capability of NATO consists of three separate elements: the U.S. weapons stored( for delivery by U.S. units; the U.S. weapons stored for delivery by Allied units; and, British weapons stored( for delivery by British units. In addition, the growing French nuclear capability, both strategic and tactical, could become available for the defense of Western Europe in the event of a major Warsaw 1Pa(ct aggression should that nation so decide. However, there are no known plans for that event. The U.S. nuclear weapons capability inii Europe includes the ability to deliver the about 7,000 nuillear wealpoins by Army, Navy, and Air Force delivery systems. Thee svst enl are listed in Appendix D-4. However, the key sVstems for the Navy are aircraft carrier-based fighter bombers, anI Poseidon slubmlrines assigned to NATO support. The Air Force major system are FB- I I and F-4 aircraft. The major Army systems include the Pershiin and





26

iLance missile,-, nuclear artillery, a decreasing number of Nike Hercules
air defense missiles, and some atomic (demolition munitions.
SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE
Trhe Soviet Union also has a major nuclear capability in the Eastern Eutropean area. Some unclass-ified sources estimate that Warsaw Pact forces could he capable of using up to 3,500 nuclear weapons in any attack against NATO. They consist mainly ofte3RGrokt the SCUD missile and bombs upon aircraft. Further, they still retain 600-700 intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union which 'are targeted upon Western Europe. It has been reported to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense in his Defense Report of fiscal year 1977 that:
**'The Soviets continue to increase the flexibility with which
they can use nuclear weapons. Older tactical aircraft are being replaced With modern (lual-capable fighters and fighter-bombers such as the swing-wing Fitter C, Fencer and Flogger. Further, the quantity of delivery systems has been increasing. They are improving their theater-wide command, control and communications systems. A new and unique Soviet development is a MIRVed mobile IRBM, the SS-X-20 . ..The SS-X-20 uses the first two booster stages of the SS-X-16 ICBM. It is believed that the system will be deployed in a mobile or road-transportable
mode.'I
Thus, the Soviet Union has reached a condition of nuclear parity for theater nuclear weapons in Europe. This fact has had a significant influence upon NATO strategic policies and in the NATO positions during the MBFR talks in Vienna.

WEAPONS REDUCTIONS
The major congressional issues related to deployed nuclear weapons continue to be centered upon the nuclear weapons in Europe. The Joint Committee has been concerned that these weapons be adequately secured, are capable of survival under nuclear or non-nuclear attack, and remain unquestionably responsive to the direction of political authorities. Thle Joint Committee supports reduction in the number of deployed weapons in Europe as welt as in other parts of the world. Thle DOD consolidation of nuclear weapon sites, noted in the next section ont Security, is a positive step of improving both the security and survivability of these weapons.
The Department of Defense has been able to achieve some reductions in deployed tactical nuclear weapons through modernization. For example, the Honest John rockets and Sergeant missiles in Europe have been replaced on a less than one-for-one basis by the Lance tactical missile system. Other reductions may,7 be possible by assigning former nuclear weapons targets to the new precision guided issiles, or "tsmart- bombs," which proved to be effective in both Vietnam and the October 1973 -Middle East War. The Joint Committee, since 1973, has expressed to DOD the need to proceed with greater energy this program to replace nuclear weapons with improved
I Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Defe~nse Department Report, fiscal year 1977, p. i02.





27

conventional weapons. This continues to be a fruitful area of gaitiing further reductions without a loss of NATO combat capability.
The current U.S. proposal to reduce the U.S. nuclear weaponry iln Central Europe, as a part of the NIBFR negotiations in Vienna ((ldi;cusse(d earlier in the Arms Contol section), is also an effective maimer of reducing the deployedd weapons. However, the careful effort to gain NATO allied approval for that proposal illustrates the sensitivity of this subject. Tihe allies continue to view both U.S. force levels and deployed nuclear weapons as an ind(lication of the strength of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe. Thus, all reductions of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe must be carefully coordinated with our European allies.





































713-642-76- 3












SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BACKGROUND
A basic foundation of our national security is the large stockpile of nuclear weapons stored in many locations both within and outside the continental United States. Nuclear weapon storage sites vary in size from large depots where hundreds of bombs and warheads of
,vl)es are stored to small sites having a small number of various t Zn
warheads in support of a single nuclear delivery unit.
CONGRESSIO-NAL INTEREST
The Congress, mainly through the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has expressed great concern over maintaining adequate security over U.S. nuclear weapons, and especially those weapons which are deployed in overseas areas. Members of the Joint Committee and its staff have visited a number of locations where weapons are stored, have observed the conditions, and have made recommendations to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. These actions have caused some upgrading of security conditions. However, the consensus within the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is that there still is more progress that should be made.
Other committees of the Congress beside the JCAE have become interested in the security of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has made several investigations of this matter over the past five years. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed an interest through its Military Construction Subcommittee. The Sehate Armed Services Committee took special note of this matter in its consideration of the FY 1977 military construction authorization.

THETHREAT
The security threat to our nuclear weapons are of several types. The Department of Defense in its Nuclear Weapons Security Primer, dated April 1, 1975, categorizes these threats as follows:
(a) Covert Penetrators. This threat would arise from the
desire of a hostile element to infiltrate personnel into a nuclear weapon site for the purpose of gaining intelligence information
on our weapons or sabotaging them.
(b) Unauthorized Use. Only the President can authorize use
of nuclear weapons. Our security measures must be designed to preclude use of a nuclear weapon by our own people until Presidential approval has been granted.
(c) Psychotic Attack. This threat could result from one of
our own people becoming deranged and atteml)tin(T destruction or unauthorized detonation of one or more nuclear weapons.
(28)






29

(d) Host Nation Takeover. Sonme U.S. 111ich'lar weaponslI;1TC
been earmarked for use by our allies. Physical security o' thle 'e( weap)on,-, is.' providedl by tile host couit y all bough cil1sto(ly 1i> maititainedl by siflll U.S. dletachmfenlts. Ili adlditioni, W(1(1ol- j)ii> are stored in the sovereigni territory of' allied nat ions- for use byV UT.S forces, if required. Thus,~1 clianges in (atit1(le-, of allies 11111't1)(be evaluated carefully andl onl a (.oil till Iling) ba'si's "() t Iat app)p~om -te(
action can be taken as warr-aiite(l ,5;hotil(i t i ii thiretat arise.
(e) Terrorist. Interna tional, teI-ronr-s11, dIurin g tlie past few Yea -,,
has (lenionst rat e that it is- a, force-( to be rkN with. Becm-v of the violent, eficient, and ra})i(l niier bywhi W~11 terrorist, act ; have been exec(11te(1, terroism-11 1)) a i )ott i' t jl1heat to (o 1
wC{1f)oi stockpile and is (driving most of the ncw security upgad
efforts.
CONGRESSIONAL SECURITY CoNCEHNxS

First, ever since the terrorist actio-r during~ the 19'72 Olvipics at Munich, the Potential threat to U..deployed nuclear weap~onls Ote to terrorist attack has been of increasing concern t,,) the Coiigies..
Second, there has been ai new (lang'er to seelirity of weapons xlil might be deployed in vulnierab~le and outlying, areas'-7 in(un e whe re the political situation mnay become unstable. (1ircuiimst aiices, ex-emplified by the Greco-Turkish war- over Cyius inl 1974 demoinstrate how the complexion of an alliance may-t ch angre rap-idly.
Third, and (Iirectly stemming from the seconl concern, is the nlew circumstance posed 1)y th)e strong ()'sbiIVof 1leii)(.1''sIon of co'1imunists in the gyovenem's of NATO. Thle 1974 coup) i Portugralwa the first indication of this problem. Ini oi-der to protect nuclear we.a )Oi planning data, Portugal waTt ldern!netnso teNT
Nuclear Planning Group (iNPG)-of which it was a mebrat I he time. With the high possibility of comlmunlistsoiin thle 'tlall Government, this same question will be r-aised, sice Italy is a ininbet. of the NPG. There will also be gr-owing- concer-n over the deploymint of any U.S. nuclear weapons which mnay be located in Italy.
Fourth, a further threat has, disttrbedl the mem-bers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in rela-tion to many of the wveapon, which are delployed in the forward areas of Europe. The 1'oce(il're' for getting Unitedl States an(1 NATO governmental appr,)toval for tlios (. weapons to be firedI in the event of a linajor Warsaw Pact agigress--ion i long and cumber-sonle. lucr-e is concern thlat those weapons m1igh1t, be overrun andl captur-ed before there is author-ity granted to fie. it hoped that modifications to dleployment plans, wNill help) ea-se tliut
problem.SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

The basic security problem with dleployed U.S. inuclea-r weapons can be solved in several ways:
(a) Improvement of the Jphysical ,-eciirity at theel it n.r-t ,
Partly because of Congressn101 1.1II1su'~ and(' l)a1-1 b)'cz1lve 1)1 action by the Secretary of IDefense, tihe DepIartmnici of Dcfi'- ia






30

increa-sed their funding requests to upgrade the physical security of the U.S. nuclear weapon sites. The funding levels have been:
Fiscal year: Millions
1972 -----------------------------------$3. 8
1973----------------------------9. 6
1974----------------------------12. 0
1975------------------------------------- 29. 6
1976----------------------------93. 9
DOD projected funding level:
Fiscal year: millionsa
197----------------------------------------$135. 8
1978---------------------------76. 7
(b) Withdrawal of weapons from more vulnerable areas to more secure areas.
(c) Total withdrawal of weapons from nations where political conditions have become unstable.
The withdrawal of some or all of the nuclear weapons would be, obviously, an action which would have very important political implications relating to U.S. security assurances to other nations, impact on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, and nuclear proliferation aspects. Nevertheless, it is important that there be a full review of deployed nuclear weapons and consequent readjustments where it appears that weapons no longer are essential for their defense mission. Just as has been done in the case of the U.S. MBFR proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe by 1,000 weapons, as reported by the press, any proposal to reduce deployed weapons would have to be coordinated thoroughly with our allies.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS
In the period 1972;-1975, the Department of Defense has taken increased cognizance of the security problem. Appendix F-i is the extract from the Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1977 which describes DOD on-going programs to improve the peacetime security and storage of nuclear weapons. These include:
(a) Review of present, storage sites on a cas--e-by-case basis to determnine if they can be closed or consolidated with other sites. As a result of this review, the DOD has reported to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that there was a net closure of 97 nuclear sites during calendar years 1974 and 1975 and that it is anticipated that there will be even further reduction-- as a result of other on-going actions.
As noted in the June 9, 1976, Conference Report on the FY 1977 Military Construction Authorization Act, H.R. 12384, the Conference Committee took the following note of the Senate Armed Services Committee recommendation:
Yu clear weapons security
For the past sever al years the Congress has expressed concern
over the security of nuclear weapons. Last year Congress authorized over $56 million for this purpose and this bill contains
$117,746,000.





31

In its report oil this bill, the Senate directed the Department
of Defeii,,e to report to the Arined Setwices Committees of' the Senate atid House of Rvpi-( ,I sentative,,,, on a bittionfli1v bw l-, for
the next two Ye.-Ir" oil uprgyraditig nuclear Nveapoiis stortige
The House accrued tliat) a bimontlily report requirement was too
frequent to be nwaiiingfut and suggestv(t 101"I't flile repoi-t I)(' initted semi-ammally, (mid tlio Senate a(_lTCd. The con
a(7)*aill exp-essed swiioll- Colicel-11 Nvith t1lis sitmation aild 111,1""ted that upgj-diiip: the physical secm-it-v of om- nuckar stonlge
facilities be, 01VOll. top priority by Gle b epar till Oil t.

Tlariov.8 locati(MS-Wic4ar meapovs st ciu- *fy, S'37,075 000
T'lio Semite added $"T ,))15 000 foi- nuclear weapoii-; security
and t1w flloivle. ad(Ied 000. The confemo-, looke(i kwt tjlllo-, -e
the (ruet-At nvpovl, 11( c of, 1111piovM(r IMCIear we."Ipwl" securllv, fl-le IIOW 10 ITCe(le(l C-A110, 6 t o
the 'Son"Ite fiolul-el bi-mo-mg t1le. total autlAorlz e d. fo v I i e, N t xT v
for this puipo- e to $:_))7,07.15),0()0.'
Tlils i ; a firi!i indic.w-lou of the Jesiiv of the dlat, the
stocage-,,ito impiovei, ieuts be completed a..; rapildlv a-,
(b) I 1) Iprov(-Iil ent to Plivsical Secmlit.v (A Durmo1975, the 1A)D com-lucied i -;ite-bv-sito Survey of C"wh lllu'lo, r Nve,, poll Storage sl'ue to detel-111111,11e what inilittary ConstructiOll l'i 1*0(jull-ed to upo-l-ade 010 p1)vS1c(1l eclirlillv of dle,;o Based upoil +li-tt survey the DOD has proi(wte(l tile cxpei)dittire of the followlil" military construction illolley for dte upgr"t(le: Fiscal vear: M1711"wis
I 9' 7 -------------------------------------------------------- C-; 13;-). S
1978 -------------------------------------------------------- 76.7
In its considt.--ratioli of t1ie for the fi- ctal yvar 1 1 )77
Xlilltarv Coil st 1 tw tion flic, Sonate Armed Services Committ"'!e)
Av'as particuhlTiv concerned that tlhi. ite security up ,):iuue be completed as expeditiousIv po,,sible. It iii(Ilidt-J ill 't-; r )ort
94-S56 to accomplan-v S. _)4-34 the requiremt.,rit fli (A:
In order to permit the Coiwress to,,,tav aDre, 4 of 'tlle
ress of this prop-nam, beginluing i-miiiediateiv, the of
Defeiise is (111'ected to report to A.-m,04 Servlic _., (20!illlliltees
of t1w. Senate, alidt flie House of RepresNitativos on a bimotuililv basis for the next two year,-,, the foltowilio, informatiolil 111_ a, 11111111fluill oil each site in tlie nuclear storacre slt,0 UPOTMle
71
proigrain:
1. E,,Aiiliated cost (currviit Nvork.rig estim-ate)
2. Design start date (actual or estimated)
3. Constructimi award date actuat or e,41inated)
4. Completion (late actualt oi- e,-,timated)
Further, the Committee added to tli\,-, futiding utliorizatioli of
$7,375,000 to accelerate the Nav s miclear weapoii sectii-ity pro(n',l I'll
(c) Improvenimt of the Persomiet 11ellabillity Program. 'I'll(, DOD revised its DOD Directive 5210.42 which updated tile policy
governing the Personnel Reliability Program Nvliic1i:
Provides foi- iiied'eat evaluation of nuclear Nveapoii. perSonnel, by ph3-sicians.
1TT. Rept. 'No. 94-124.3, Conference RepOl't Mi TT.R. 12:N4, 'Military Cow4riw1ion XittliorIzation Act, 1977 (appearing on p. 1154919, Conl,;ressional Record, june 11976).





32

Expedites reassignment of disqualified personnel
Establishes specific reliability factors.
Applies the program to DOD contractors who are associated with nuclear weapons as well as DOD personnel.
Requires an updated investigation for those persons who
have a break in service of 12 months or whose Background Investigation was completed in excess of 5 years prior to
assignment to nuclear duties.
Appendix F-2 is a summary of the total number of persons in the DOD Personnel Reliability Program and includes the actions during e al end ar year 1975 on disqual ifi cations.
(d) Improvement of DOD Nuclear 'Weapon Security Procedures. In 11975 the DOD published the Nuclear Weapon Security Manual which provided additional guidance on the security procedures to be cinployed at storage sites and alert areas and while weapons are in transit.
While these actions are helpful, it is certainly the intent of the Congress that further improvements be pursued vigorously.











SAFEGUARDS
BACKGROUND
The rapid growth of the nuclear power industry (domestic and international) with the conseqllent ilcrvease in tle worldwid(le availability of plutonium, coupled with the recent rise in terrorist activities, has dramatically increased national concerns over the osuil)le d(iversion or theft of nuclear materials, saotage of nuclear facilities, or other acts of terrorism.

ERDA AND NRC SAFEGUARD ACTIVITIES
The Energy Researchli and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are the key U.S. agencies involved in the nuclear safeguard program. In general, ERDA is responsible for the research and development aspects; NRC is responsible for the licensing aspects and the adequacy of the licensees' abilities to assure the necessary protection. Appendices G-1 and G-2 are statements provided the Joint Committee by the NRC and ERDA respectively as descriptions of their safeguards program. It is apparent that during the past year both agencies have made major progress in establishing valid and effective safeguards programs.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
DOMESTIC
Some essential issues involved in maintaining an effective domestic nuclear safeguards program are as follows:
1. Are shipments of critical amounts of nuclear materials adequately protected?
2. Are the procedures for accounting for nuclear materials through the nuclear fuel cycle sufficiently accurate to assure that there has been no diversion into unauthorized channels?
3. Are the nuclear facilities of commercial licensees and Government agencies adequately protected against terrorist attack or other incidents?
4. Are the costs of an adequate safeguards program maintained within the limits of economic benefits?
5. Is there adequate availability of intelligence to warn of potential nuclear domestic safeguard incidents?
6. Is there a realistic capability of responding to specific safeguards problems?
INTERNATIONAL
The international safeguards issues center on the basic issue of nuclear proliferation andl the control of nuclear exports as (lisc'ss(ed in those earlier sections of this report. In addition, tihe iss-e of pre(33)






34

Ven t i I 1 11 t C I- I A ft t I I I I acts of nuclear tei roi'isni i paramount. AI)I)endix CT-.") i, ii tateiiient by ERDA on the U.S. efforts durlucr the pa'4 V (-11ft r t () ('00pel-ate with other nations and the Intern-ational Atoinie,
Agrcnuv on t1w afe,_riizard-, of nuclear material. It in(licate,; t 'I I I T t I I I- Pla'Villo, ft Major educational role with otlier nation, to
Z111 'i"I('(1liate woi 1(1-wi(l(, -- eii- Iiivity to nuclear ,afecrtiar(k pr ihleni an(l to encoiii-i_(-e effective multinational soliitlon- to tlio- e piohleia- While the v effort, tire helpful. the Con!zre- ,- is concerned t1l'It thev coritlillie and that effective ao elements re-ult whicti could re(ltLce ilie potential rangerss.

ADEQUACY OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
A ftin(l iii,, ,Tital i-, ue of afearuard- i-: the effectivenes-- of the ImerDation"11 _- t0j,.,;o Eiierz-\- Aayency's p!,wran-1. Apj)ell(lix
G-4 i- by ERDA of the lAEAzafeo-uar(11s proaram NN-IMMIL
that within the pre-:-,cribed limitations of the IAEA : tz.Wte, the an effective safeguzard-; procp-aill. However, tllele is,
lwllof within the Congre- that the role of the JAEA nee(I.-, to N" -z nn-t1wn(,d and expancie(l. Some iiieniber- li-ive questioned the fim(lamental effectivene- ,m of tli(- action th.it Iioiild be impo ,ed
--,hoiild the 1AEA detect za of nucle, r iii;itei-ial,: SeiiatoiStuart Svmin(-Y-ton visited the IAEA J une 29-Jull- "), 19 7 -3, and on Jifly 15. 1975, reported to the Senate on hi [Appendix A-31. He noted that onforceinent, of sanctions would e-%-()k-e upon the United Natiollz. Ba-zed upon hi-m experience as a recent Congressional Representative, on the Deleo-ation to the U.-N., Senator Svmincrton observed.
tj found the po, ability -would be reinote indeed that. the U.'N. would enfol-(,(, acfain,,zt a cotintrv whi(.4i obtained nuclez-tr weapon>z."
A c')1 ()11,irv to il(le(juacy of IA :A t afeouard-, i- how tliev conip.1re With (Iomez tic safeguardd requirement, Appendix G-5 is a comparison iiizide by ERDA which notes that whereas IAEA stan(larcls al' 2 inten(led to detect diver- ion of nuclear material, the U.S. donie security of nuclear in,;-t&lation ; ziiid niaterial. However, due to problems of areat sen- Itivitv in other sovereio-n. nations on matters of internal security, such expansion may be difficult to achieve.


















APPENDIX A


-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION


A-1. Treaty on Proliferation of -Nueear WeaponR, July Pg
---8~-------------------------------------------3
A-2. -NPT Parties and -Noni-Parte'.-------------------------- 41
A-3. Statement 1w Senuttor "-vin(.-rton regar(Iinr '"The NXuclear Safeguards, iDelus-ion'' Juil\ 15, 1975------------- 42
A-4. Adldre-,s 1w Senator IN,- t re on "'The Peaceful Uses of
AtmcEnrw:April 22. 1976--------------------41D
A-. ttement bv Senator S.-vti n~ton. rcugarlingy ''Nuclea-r
Proliferation and( ouiiterforce'': October 22, 195 35 A-6. Sta tem-ent, 1w Semkn tor S.-vniiwzton regarding The -Nuclear MJli'arch to Ariaw ,ion i: April 14, 1976 ----------59 A -7. Statement 1y SenatoIr~ cine oncerning Senate Re-.oliition 415', Relatingr to t le Tr ansfer oNuclear -Materni
tInia: Mach 16C 19-6h----------------------------64
A-S. Statement b\ Senator Pa ;tore concerning the ERGBrazil -Nuclear Agzreemenut: June 3. 1973------------- 67
A-9. Sta temient 1w Repn s ent ttne Georgye E. Brown, jr.,
concerning "Nucl 'ar Prolif,.ration', : June I's,196--- 7
(35)











APPENDIx A-i


NONPROLIFERATION TREAY JUY1,4o

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 19681

The States, concluding' this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty"',
Considering the de-Vastation that -wold be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Tfreaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclearweapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arins race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disa,)rm-iamentI
Urging the cooperation, of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,2
I ACDA files, The U.S. Senate approved the treaty on Mar. 13, 1969, by a vote of 83 to 15. Treaty signatories as of June 27, 1969, are list?(lpost, p). 871.
2 Docume~nts on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 21-293.






37

Desit-ii-lo, to ftirtlier tile ea,-,iii(y of ii-itermItiollal tellsiOll '91)(1 tile streno-theiiiiiO, of trust between k" -)tate,, ill order to factlit,"Ite t1le ce-- -,(,Ition of the nianufaettire of mick"al. N -eapolts, d"o li(pli(lation, oil* '1111 their existiiig stockpile ,, and the elimimition from i,,Aiom.iI of nuclear weapon,-, mid, tile illeall" of their (Jelivel-Y plir- llallt to a, treaty on genertll al'id, collIplete ImAer -: tiict atid (.41'ectix-e
international control,
Recallino, that, in accordalicle Witf) the of' tile United
Nations, States must refrain .I it), their ititcrilittiollal refatlol from the threat of- i.ise of force taigrai!14 the territorial ()I- potitical
independence of arty St,,&-, of- iii odier malill'(111 ill(10111_11 4("Ilt With, the, Purposes of the Ufiited _Natimi_ all(i tj at. the Jill(", If-, (I'lld
Inaintella Ilee of ilaei ll(.lhollal pet-we "Imi sectirlh- are to be prol, Iwio(_, with tile least diversion for of' tile, 1vollW.-.., 1111"INI;l
e(10110111W re,,.1o I tre(!Q' I
Have aOlree(] as follow: :

ARTICLE I
Each imc.etin-weapon S',fate Porty to III(' to
transfer to tifi.N eclpiel U wilat,,4oever 1111clet"I. or oflw-r ll-"(4
explosive device,; or COM11-ot over such weapcll -; ()I, directly, or indirectiv; and i-ot III any NN-aN- to induce anv Stat to 111 '(111111 ctlil-0 or othel-,,,*
acquire fiticlear weap1mis or other nuclezir explo- ;D\7e (i(,v-1ce: Or C trol over siicli weapoii-, or explo-,ive device ,.

ARTICLE 111
Each non-,Iticlear-wez lpon St,,t(,, Part to the Tr,--JN7- iindertalt-,e ,, not to receive the trainer front an.N:- transferor whatsoever of miclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device,, or of coiitrot over -- iiclt weapons or explosive devices directly \-, or indirectly; not to maimfacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapo-11s or other miclear exj)I()sive devices; and not to seek or receive any as -,,istaiice iti the manttfac,ture of nuclear weapons of- other nuclear explosive device,.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuelear-weapon State Partv to the Tre ,ilY
to accept safeguards, as set forth in an a(yreemelit. to I)e nec"Oti".1ted and concluded with the International Atomic Eiwro-v A(r( ,'iic ir accordance with the Statute of' the Internatimia. Atoiii1c 11'_A-ler(r.-,1and the Agenc-\"s safeguards system, for the pm-po-'e of
verification of ihe fulfillment o-f its oblicratioii a-, ,mlic(l lit)( Icr Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of ilticlear (']lero-v frolli peaceful uses to nuclear weapons of- other miclear vxplo- ivo (i("*Vicc Procedures for thesafeguards required bY tlli article 1)(' rollolN-cd
with rest)ect to source or special fi.,,-,,ioiiabIe m-itertal. whedlwr it. 1- ', belill), pro'd, Or I-, mitLticed., processed (.)I- m,,-'A in :A- v prilicip"'I ilticl-ai. f"cl
side anNT sach faeilltv. The sare,niards re(Iltired bY article S11,111
be applied on all soill-ce or special fissiollal)le imateri'll ill att peacehil nuclear activities within the territory \- of sticli ,-;tate. mi(Ict. it- j*m.1*"-,diction, or carried out under its control aii\-where.





38

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material expecially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or productionn of nuclear
material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the ISO-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
ARTICLE IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty- undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure tlat, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate interna tonal procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development, non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of





39

non-nuclear-weapoii State,, 'Negotiatlolls ou this -;Ilbjcct' llall coinible fter t1le TreatN- owers ilit'o l'o'-ce. N()Ilmence as soon as possi It
nuclear-weapoji States Party to the Treatv o HMV ('11"o obttill
-Oatet- I aureeiiieiits.
such benefits puniuant, to bi a

Ain'iCT, E Vl
Each of the P(,Utics to tite Treaty iiiidertake-) to pur,,ue negotiatmils in crood faith on effecti\re nwasiti-es rel"Itill(r to ce" tatioll of, tile 1111clear arms race at an c.arly date aiul. to uticlear di'-'ffl*1l'laIlleIlt' alld oil a treM v on general aiid coriiplete (11i"'(11 III :I Illei) t under strict aiid effective, 111ternational control.
AwnciE VJJ
Notbiii(r in this Treaty affects the right, of aT'V gt'Otlp Of State-; 10 collcUlde regiojitftl treaties iti mder to assuree the total ab ,erice of nuclear weapons in their respective teri-Itories.

ARriCLE V111
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose to t1iis
Treaty. The text of ai-ly proposed aiiic-ildiiiei-it, shatl be, subillitte(I to the. Depositary Goveriimeiits which sliall cii-culate it to all Partl('. to the Treaty. Thereuport, if requested to (-to so by one-thh-d or lliw"(., Of the Parties to the Trefttv, the Depositary Gove1-ninents s(-11 (-onvciie a cojiferellce7 to which they sball iiiN-ite (-ill the Parties to tile Treat- '-l to coi-isider ,ueli ar aineiidnwiit.
2. Aii3f ailienallielit, to this Treaty imist be approved by a, toajmity of the votes of all the Parties to the TreatA-7 ilicludilig tile N-Ot'es of till I and all other Particc A hicl
nuclear-weapoi-I States Part-\,- to the Treat-\ I
on the (late the aiii.eii(Irtieiit I,-, circulated aie men of the Bo Governor,; of the international Atoirlitc, Eiieigy Agenc-\,-. The allielldmetit -,hall enter itito force foi, each Party diat deposits its instruii,,cia of ratification of the aineildnient, upoll tile (h '.posi.t of such illstrullielits of ratification bv a. niajorit, T of all the Parties 111cludillCr tit(, nietits of ratification of ,)It miclear-weapoii "-)'ttates Part-V to the Treai- ,and all other Plarties which, on the date the aineuldi-nei-It 1',s circt!'atedl are inembers of th- Board of Governors of the Internatioiud Atomic D-lergy Aoency. Thereafter it sball either Into force for a1-'y- odler Party upon the deposit of its, instrument, of ratificatioll of the

,J) Five, year after the entrNT ii-ito force of this Trot 1 ('011101ellf, cf Parties to ttie Treat-\, shall be held in Ge uevt- 11) M'(1
to review the operation of this, Treaty wii h a N-iew i o I Ill(" I ill 111 t J) purposes of t'110 pre"Anible aild the proN'i"Jolls of the Tlvat tar"- beirorealized. At intei \,als of fiNre years die;-eafter a 11".1 01'it oI* t1l"' to tile Treaty iiiav obtain 1 -\ -"tibillittilig pl'opo -,It to Hli-; t tile Depositar t1le colIN-ellilig o14 fillflu'l. cwIt".1-ence-1
with the saine objectNI -e of revievv-ii4cr dle oper-itioll of, tll('

ARTICLE I X
TliiL; Tret Y -,hall be open to (,dl States foi, siMat A11Y : i'l*c which does iiotslgii die rreaty bel'ore its eiarYMto I'm-cc ill with paragraph of this article illay accede to it at am- till)(,.





40

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treatv and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any Requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years. after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Fart*es to the Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives Of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Govern-ments of the signatory and acceding States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treatv.
Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.






APPEN-\DIx A -2


_NPT PARTIES AN -N O-PATE


The 98 St ates which hiave ratified, acce~ded to, or suMCCeeded to the NPrr are:

Afghanistan Haiti Now Zealaiid
.Australia JI ulx See N cIetrgI"1a,
Austria lotidiras -Nig(eria
Belgium I tungary vw~
Blivia Icelaind Paragu" ay
Botswana Iran Perui
Bulgaria Iraq J)h iip )piles
Burundi Ireland P~oland
Cameroon Italy R lin-aiila
Canada Ivo)ry Coa-4thaid
Central African Republic Jamaica Sani Marino
Chad J apa n Senlegal
China, Republic of Jo rdan Sierra Leone~
Costa Rica Kenya Sigapo re
Cviprus Korea, Rtepuiblic of Somialia.
Czechoslovakia Khmner R-Zepublic Sudan
Dahomev Laos Swaziii a iid
IDenmark- Lebanon S;weden
Dominican Republic Lesotho SN-ria
Ecuador Liberia Tfhailand
El Salvador Libya Too-o
Ethiopia Uxemi )o urg T1oniga
Fiji i.lgayRepuiblic Tunisia
Finland Malaysia -USSR
G abon -Maldives Republic Uniited Kigdom
Gambia M-\alta Uniited States
German Democratic -Mali -Upper Volta
Republic -Mau rit iis Uruguay
Germany, Federal M-\exico Venezuela
Republic of -Mongoolia 'Viet-Nam
Ghana Mo\(-rocco Western Samnoa
Granada Ni7e paI Yuigoslavia
Greece Netherlands Zaire
Guatemala
The 12 States which have signed but have not ratified the NPT are:
Barbados Sri Lanka
C 1 rn bi a Swi tzorlanid
Eg ypt Triidad anid Tob:.-,go
Indonesia Tre
Kui-w ait Yemleni Aral) BRepublic
Panamia Pcople'"4 DXinocratic Ilepublic of Yemen
The States which have not signed the NPT are:
Algeria \ Iolia Co
ArgentinaNir
Brazil North Korea
Burma Nn Vietnam
Chile atu
People's Repuiblic of China Poriugal
Cubi)a 0: t: r
Equatorial Guinea >a .udi Arabia
France South Africa
Guiinea Spain
Guyvana J auizaia
India U0i11iida
Israel 11iiited Anra) Liiiirates3
Malawi Zanibia,
Mauritania
(41)












APPENDIX A-3


Statement by Senator Stuart Symington, in the U.S. Senate, concerning "The Nuclear Safeguards Delusion", July 15, 1975
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record July 15, 1975, page S 12610.]


Mr. President, accompanied by staff members George W. Ashworth of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, David A. Raymond of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and Gen. Albion W. Knight, Jr. of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1 visted Vienna and Geneva June 29 through July 3 during the Senate recess.
On this trip, we explored a number of questions concerning recent developments in the strategic arms race, including the spread of capability to make nuclear weapons in presently nonnuclear states. Those related areas can only become increasingly important to our own security as well as the rest of the world.
In Vienna, we held extended talks with officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency-IAEA. This Agency is considered the princip al 'safeguards" instrument of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to insure that nuclear technology is not (diverted to weapons development.
Unfortunately, the position of U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA has been vacant for some months; and in light of recent developments, let us hope this does not reflect any loss of interest in the vital work this Agency was set up to perform.
In Vienna, we also met with United States and foreign delegates to the talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions-MBFR. The U.S. delegation is ably led by the Honorable Stanley Resor.
When we arrived in Geneva, a new round of the strategic arms limitation talks-SALT-was just getting underway, this after many postl)onements; and we held di nssions with members of the U.S. negotiating team headed by the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson.
Based upon our deliberations- at IAEA, MBIBFR, and SALT. it is increasingly apparent that the control of nuclear proliferation and related aspects of arms limitation not only is loose, but is slipping. It appears that the prospects for meaningful arms control have become increasingly doubtful.
The more I read the papers on this subject. the more I am impressed that what we are talking about is form, not sub-stance.
The discus-,ions held in Vienna with officials of the IAEA were of special interest in light of the Iultibillion dollar nuclear "deal" which had just been concluded between thle Governments of West Germany and Brazil. Earlier we were informed that this arrangement was first offered to the United( States but rej acted by this Government because we would not allow the export of a complete fuel cycle-including
(42)





43

enrichment and reprocessing facilitie-;-whic-h could be u,"ed to l1lak(, nuclear weapons.
Now West Germany, however, it colliltrY wIlich both ',i(-rl)('d
and ratified the Non-proliferation 'Trvat-,Y---al1d thereby collillilto'd itself "not in any- way to assi-X' stitte to mallur.Ictill.(- 11!1clear weapoil,,-lifts agreed to traiisf-r to Brazill--(a counti-.v xvii-ich hai ; not evell sigile(17 let alolle ratified, flll ; ti-eal v----aII tll(. 111,0('rial, equij)ineilt and technology needed to establisli wild operate a 1,1111, nuclear we,)pous fuel
This agreement ni,- rk the first scale of col)II)Iett, filet cvcl 1 11 V
nation. 'Note that ill this, case tll(, matioll is ill fllie V (' ,l f'r'll
Hemisphere and posses,-;( -; extellsive Ill-allillill dep(),,.iv, .
The German-Brazil "deal" will eiiable Brazil to prodlice liude"t-r weapons for its own possible use as, well as for salc t.o otlier couiltn*(,. inchidillicr Germanv.
QuestiOnincr of t1liis dancrero-o-, arranLreili( iit, i-- reiii1tot-ced bv
testimony presented to the Senate Forei(Irn Relatiot),, C;()nIniltt(,(t people high in tile State Departillelit, a,,, tt(raill-4 statellielit", bY the West German Government. Last niolitli State te 4ified thz1f, the United Stat(,.-,, prote.,.4ed flie deal, tried to 4()p it but, could llot succeed. Later during that saine ninth, howk"Ver, tll(, ('11811cellor of, West Germany- Helimit Sclimidt, Stated iat (.I liew" colifel-elice ill Bolin th,(it the Anierican Government "h(as not exPressed it word of critl(Ill-All to us. "
In any case, and regardless of who i,-; responsiblfl-,, for the fir-- t tilIV, zi country whiell Ilia-; refused to eit'ller sicri) or ratify flie _Non-Prolifention Treaty now has been able to purcha-w a con-1plete 1111clear filet cycle, which can be used for it wealmn-, development prwrilalli.
This denlon,-;trates, that the coujitrle, which ave (t.qpable of' slippIving nucL ar technology have been either uiia'Ok, or lillwillim). to l""zicIll a sio-n'ficant agreement anioiny thelllselve-; wit!) l.e.-pect to the of this technology to iloilliliclear State-, \4ore thaii that, it is b( comiugincreaSill O'1V clear thiat commercial illtere4, -; now 1)revail over consideration of iiii-tear Nveapons coiltrA. This sale by West G -many to Brazil confirms t hat fact.
Despite the IAEA in ;I)ection systeni, whi(I]i over recent year,,
people had been led to bfllieve would check flie ,i)read of nuclear weapons, today thtlt acrency actlially furilishe-, no snfeglla!-d" to any sucli ;I)rvad. During om- vi-it to the IAEA, we found fli.J, flil-, a 01enev does little moi-e flian moilitor rotto'h1v tile flow Pltcltzu materials. It lias no power of either 1)revetit'1011 Olt (111forcement.
In this re(vard, the followiil(r colidilsion of the
report of 1946 would appeal- to still ]lot(! trile today: "A 'Y-teill ot, in, pectioii superin-II)osed oil an otlievwi ;e uncolltrolk I ('Xj)I()1*f.'n!()11 (d atomic energy by national governments wilt iiot be an safteora-ard.)
Ali flle of
enforcement of sanctiolls
detected by the IAEA-fliat- i 4, diver-don of nuclear 1,11(d, fltmli P"'W01*111 to t ,) tll, ,
ability of the United Natioiis. X., a, coll(,),.re,, ,ion id U.S. D\Ae(yatiou to tile last U.N. I1()Nvivc1., 1, fouled, tile 1),
bility would be, reinote indeed tInJ tli(-- U)".N. \vmild enk)i ce 110'.Must it country which obumied nuclear NN*CtP()l1-- .





44

Turning to the subject of the present SALT negotiations, our vi- it to Geneva confirmed that progress-,, in SALT has been slow and tortuous. Sunimed up, the two parties have not yet achieved any meaningful. control over the nuclear arms race; and the pace of new weapons, technology, as illustrated hr the socalled "cruise missile," along with additional precision-guided vehicles, seems to be outsrpping efforts to curb the arms race. A great scientist once characterized the nuclear picture of the 1950's as "two scorpions in a bottle."
Today there are six scorpions in that bottle, and we now know that soon there will be many more; so it is becoming increasingly apparent that what any two countries may decide w ill not necessarily be decisive, no matter how many nuclear weapons they may possess.
Any- country which possesses nuclear weapons could provide a grave threat to virtually anyl other country, a condition which implies f uture danger to all nations.
In this nuclear age, while the spread of atomic weapons continues unchecked, the assurance of any nation that it would not seek nuclear weapons-or would only seek nuclear explosive devices for "peaceful purposes -may only reflect its current public attitude. But, as Lord Pahnerston once observed regarding the behavior of nations, "we have no enternal allies, we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow."
In this connection, consider that 30 years ago our two chief enemies in war were Germany and Japan, and two of our strongest allies were the Soviet Union and China; therefore any nation would be foolish to consider present alinements and present appearances of mutual goals to be a permanent state.
In any case, the nuclear genie is now out of control, and the number of scorpions continues to grow.
The Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which I chair, will resume hearings on nonproliferation this Friday, at which time we will receive testimony from the Honorable Dwigzht Porter,* director of International Goveirnment Aff airs of the Westinghouse Electric Corp., and former Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.
It was reported in the press that Brazil had originally approached the Westinghouse Corp. for the nuclear arrangement it was finally able to receive from West Germany.
I would estimate -that since World War II we have probably put over $200 billion into the defense of West Germanyv which, of course, means also the defense of Europe; and yet they accepted the arrangement which this Nation refused to give the Brazilians, and in doing so they have set tip a nuclear power in the Western Hemsiphere.
Our hearings will examine various aspects of this arrangement.
We shall also examine broadly new developments in the commercial nuclear field, such as the Common M arket's reported turn to the Soviet Union for enriched uranium which it has in the past purchased almost exclusively from the United States.












APPENDIX A 4


Address by Seniiator John O. Pastore, to the Fiftieth American Assembly, concerning'' "Safe and Reliable N ticlear Power: Promises
Fulfilled-Challenges Remaining," April 22, 1976
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, Apr. 26, 176, page 5870.]


I deeply appreciate your invitation to share this occasion with you. I am sure that your Association and those who are here this evening are dedicated to the betterment of community and country and are deeply concerned with the d(lestiny of America.
In this Bicentennial Year, our citizens are able to look back with pride on the almost unbelievable accomplishments of America.
One such accomplishment occurred in 1942 when Enrico Fermi and his co-workers unlocked the secrets of the atom by achieving the first self-sustained fission chain reaction.
This was civilization's most exciting scientific discovery.
It unleashed a physical force greater than that discovered by man in all of recorded history.
In the short time of just nearly thirty-four years since Fermi's historic achievement, nuclear power has emerged as the d(lominant factor in the great human equation and as undoubtedly the single most important factor determining the course of international relations.
This is so because the atom can be used as a weapon to (lestroy the human race or it can be used to provide a safe, reliable and boundless source of usable energy to the benefit of hopeless and distressed people everywhere on the planet.
In view of the origin of its birth, it is natural that the world thought then, and even now, of atomic energy primarily as a weapon of destruction-Fermi and his associates and the thousands of ledlicated workers who followed them were aware of the other side of the 8ton-the vision of the untold benefits to our civilization from its peaceful use.
For the past twenty years, I have been a member and (lhairmanll of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. My attraction to this responsibility has been the peaceful atom. As I remnarked at the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Atomic Energy Act, if iiiV responsibility as a member of the (Committee was only to ake a
better and bigger bomb, then I would have had no part in it. Unless we can put this tremendous power at the disposal of ilan for his enrichment, I must say tonight that it would be far better if this great achievement had never occurred.
(45)





46

The fact is that the peaceful atom, primarily through the safe and reliable generation of electricity, offers an opportunity to help achieve what I believe is the fundamental desire of people everywhere-the vision for a better life for our children and those who follow.
At the outset, I emphasize safety because safety is an indispensable essential in nuclear power.
Although I will have more to say about safety later, the fact is that reactors of the type now in use in this country have proven themselves as safe, reliable and economic sources for the generation of electricity. The commercial nuclear safety record is excellent.
But we all know that the benefits of nuclear power necessarily involve some risks, as does every other industrial activity, including every known means to generate electricity in large amounts.
While past experience, including that gained during the demonstration stages of a new technology, provides a large measure of assurance and confidence that the risks are minimized and should be acceptable, this experience can not, and must not be allowed to reduce the emphasis and eternal vigilance which is being placed on safety and environmental considerations.

JCAE EXPERIENCE
I do not reach any conclusion about reactor safety based on any pretension or expertise of my own.
I am not a scientist or an engineer. My conclusion is based on the favorable operating experience to (late and the overwhelming views expressed in testimony before the Joint Committee in hearing after hearing conducted during the past twenty-five years.
Members of this committee have studied these matters over the years with the intensity of a physician studying a patient with a rare or puzzling ailment. I might also add that the committee itself has been studied by some with the same intensity and interest.
This is as it should be in view of the tremendous responsibility in the field of atomic energy of the Joint Conmnittee to the Congress and to the American people.
The accomplishments which have already been achieved in the use of commercial nuclear power and its promise for the future did not just happen. It required a long and dificult effort requiring close coopera.tion and partnership between the Executive Branch, the Con* I
gress, universities, national laboratories and industry.
Over the years the Joint Coinmmittee has recommended to the Congress and the Congress bes enacted legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for research, development and demonstration of commercial miD clear power.
h ese programs-once established by the Congress-were followed closely by the committee. Battle after battle was fought with budgeteers who short-sightedly tried to slash a modest program that has already saved our people hundreds of millions of dollars and, in the long run, will save billions of dollars.
Nuclear power has been developed-to the point where it is now generating liarge2 quantities of sate, reliable, and economic powerby a few f-hort years of d(e(licated effort and modest, well-paced dleinolnstration programs, nost through cooperative arrangements





47

with industry. The total Goverliment costs for these proo-r, ins L, ve been appi-oximately $2Y2 billion. Ttm c-olitt"'Ists wit'll our preselltallimal costs of over $25 billion for 1111port.e(l oit.
I don't want to leave 'ml with t1w impression that corl ect (Ieci- iolls were made reaarditig all of tliese pi-oblerris. I wi+11 frailkly tell yoll later oil where, 1 belIGve P110,ri"Ims, 1)(Thaps could have beeii haridled a I* ttle different
My point simply is t1lat finy Iong-terril metlibei. of the Joint ComIllittee-even though not ,I sclel)tlst' or. el I (rill N"111-Ce r tairi I v is ill a, position to evaluate thoroughly flle pliblic polley issues i-elafil)(r to tile, benefits of nticleiat- power mid IlIe pai-anlount ull portall(J." of
-afetv *n the coinmercial, ipj)l*('.'lt*o1l'-; of' tilt t h'chllolog st .' I I I It
I would not want ativ citlzeii to (Imibt foi- one moment, regar(ll(- -' ,Of what past an(] present, ci-itics might, h(ave staid or wi-itten, 6af t'lle 'Joint Comi'llittee wotild tolei-ate W'iN-tliimr le-;s flian flie highest witalitv regulation of nitcleai- powei- mid ftill and open communication to the An-lerican people on tlie i-isks involved.

CO-M-NIERCIAL --\U(.'LEAR POWER
Several very impoi-tatit, fitctoi%.; infliienced progress, oil the way to the development and &,Lmmistration of safe and competitive nuclearpower.
First, of all, industr-y wa,.; beiiilcr acked to participate with tile Government in a new teelmoloo-v im(ler a new law the, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which pi-ovided foi- the first time the aiitllol-it,.\ under which industry could 1):Ii-ticiptate in the commercialization of the "Itoln.
Another factor was the abim(lance, of natural resom-ces with which this country was blessed. '_\Jaii v di(l not, realize then diiat the resotirces f1lel Supplie, Wel r, p (11\r
were finite, and that liqtiid alld O"ZIS I being dimildshed. Tfier(,! was tlivi-efoi-e, ,I lack of sense of urgency to meet tile challencres of sotirce from ,:I new technology.
Radiation from fallout of atmo ;plierlc weapons tosts W (11111le fi-om those who became becall"e their olice extravagayit hopes for the atom Nvet-e not realized fast, enoll(ril.
11 too, was conceded :Libotit the pi-ogt-es.,, beilig ma(le ill tile development of commercial jmcleai- powei% hi die Fall of 1961, 1 met, Avitil PreQi(lent Kenne(iy- and disciis"- e(l wit"ll Ilim tile importallre of 11(.1-61101 it definitive assessment (,md mi tan(l illo. of otil. (1011-lestic llee(ls 4-Clild, pi-o ,,,pects foi- atomic power.
Thel.eafter Presi(lent Keimedv a ,ked Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, therl Chairman of the Atomic Eiieigyy Commissioti, to take tt iiew aii;l liard look at the role of liticle"t I- power in oul. ecolloill.y. 'I'lle stml v was submitted to Pre--,I(Ient 1 eiine(IY- on Novellibei. 22', 1(9G:)'. T111-i laiithoi-itative report pt-ovided (all OWTalt plan fol. the
development of miclear powei- Ili the United Stlates.
The report colichided ill pall:
"Nuclear enei-gy (,all andsilotild ni:ike all impoi-talifaml, idtimilt,(,1Y a vital contribution toward meetitur otir n1elits, and, in partictilal- thilit: 'I"he (ievelollmleiit aiid exj)loIt,:1tl()j1 of nuclear electric power is (-lear-ly Ili the 1)(11all- and loi)(r-tei'm natimiat
i *7
interest and should be vi(roroa-4 ptll-sued."





48

Tiis conclusion has been emphatically confirmed by the significant events affecting our available energy sources which occurred subs equently.
The report laid out four basic objectives which, in the succeeding years, have charted the course for the development of nuclear power in this country. The report called for:
"Tle demonstration of economic nuclear power by assuring the construction of plants incorporating the presently most competitive reactor types.
"The early establishment of a self-sufficient and growing nuclear power industry that will assure an increasing share of the development
CO t-.
"The development of improved converter and, later, breeder reactors to convert the fertile isotopes to fissionable ones, thus making available the full potential of the nuclear fuels.
"The maintenance of U.S. technological leadership in the world by means of a virgorous domestic nuclear power program and appropiiate cooperation with, and assistance to, our friends abroad."

EARLY PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORT
The year 1957 is significant in the development of commercial nuclear power because it was then that the Government-owned demonstration plant of 60 megawatts was placed in operation in Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
This was the Nation's first large scale civilian nuclear reactor. It has operated safety and reliably in the succeeding two decades.
The years 1957 to 1963 saw the initial operation of several demonstration nuclear plants with power outputs of 200 megawatts, such as the Yankee Reactor ini Massachusetts and the Dresden Reactor in Illinois. They are still operating with a safe record.
I wish to reiterate that these were demonstration plants, a primary purpose of whicl was to'learn more about the art of nuclear technology.
From the construction and operation of such plants have come much experience and data which provide additional support for the extraordinarily high degree of safety which is present.
The next phase in the demonstration program involved plants above 400 megawatts, such as the Connecticut Yankee plant and the San Onofre, California, plants, which also have operated safely.
The increase in plant size to the 400 megawatts range, together with competition between the two largest atomic equipment companies, enabled nuclear powerplants to compete with fossil fueled plants without Government assistance.
It became clear in 1965 that the utility industry considered competitive nuclear power near at hand.
The first large wave of nuclear powerplant orders began in 1965 and continued until by the end of 1974 some two hundred and eleven plants, with a total capacity of around 205,000 megawatts, had been ordered. Virtually all of the capacity ordered involved reactors ranging in size from 400-1300 megawatts.
The significant increase in the number and size of nuclear reactors is cause for particular vigilance in their design and construction so they will operate with a high degree of reliability.





49

A member of have beell IIH v plzlce(l ill o1wl."Itioll.
Arotind sevviity of them are iiii(lei- coiistritctloti.'As a ivsiilt pi-iiii(tril v of recessioii-related redtictioiis iti. eloctt-icitv ii- e nii(l f]l(, ,r(,l conditiwis of the iuoiieN,--iii,,irkot) -Lj)j)roXilllat1elY 2:1 of tlieso were cancelle(l olltl.il(),Ilt aild ne.11.1v -(I liave bevil, (Iefcn v(l.
I wrote elach of the titility execAtlives iavotve(l iii the (- )Ilcl(,11,0101 11_, and deferrals so that I Iiiid ilie coiiiiiiittee wojil(l kiiOw wlietlwt- t1io--:(, actioii,-, were Im-,ed iii aily llva- Itlrv oil, aII\- lack of, colifi(lelice ill the safety or reliablilicv or 1111clear t.(1'clll1olo<),v.
The responses were timiiiiniotis iii. exj)rv:-;Sioji- of' conq)lete collfl(lellce in the safety aii(I relic -ibllltv of I)ow(,i*.
far as 1 ha-ve beeil, at)l' tl)(, conI 11 litllk, Il t to 1,111cle'll.
o to (lotel-11141o'l
power in the loil-g run zt re"llity. Wilit ll,-1pj)c1lw(l 1"; Illit,
the treiii-eildotis lall(l, -,u(Well (-scalat;o1l ill t1le lillcl("ll. or(lonin 1965 from ahno ,t zero has ilow ,Cttle(l down to lval*_ f_.,
ord cri..8,- demands.
Althotlo'll .1 (levviv reolvt tLe ecollowic coll(liti( Ils w1licl)
to litippen, t1he strctcli-out jii:iv be bcneflicizil if flio ii(i(ilitioiin! tili)ic iuSed I)v both the Goverimicio, (1111(i in'([U tv.v to procee(I Nvidl lv'. earcll and developiiient pro,(4-nams Nvhich slioill(l furtliei- in)prove the rell",bility of reactors.

ECONOMIC BENETF1TS 13EING RECEIVED F111011 -NUCLEAR FOAVER
Sill st"intit-11 ecolloillic bellef1 -, are alrea(ly beimx (rniiie(l ft oin flit, min-iber of miclear plaiit -, no-\v iii operation. A 1,000 llieg, iwzitt juicle"ti. plant so ves the eqlaivalent of approxiiiiately 10 million b1irrels of oI[ annually.
In 1974 less thaii 50 nuclear plant,., siippiied just miller 8 per colit of the electricitA, operatedted in the Uilited States. 'I'litit ii :e of illiclef,11. poNver saved ciistoiiiers approximately $SIO milliOll ill fliel cost". lt S"Ilved the equivalent of i1pproxiniately P5 million bztrrel, -: of oil ot' some 45 million ton,-, of coal.
Tlie benefits were even greater in 1975. Approxiiiititel.v 51' miclezir plant-, supplied around 9 per ceiit of the electricity o-viienite(l il,1. tlli, country. They slaved over $2 billioii in fuel cost-s aii(l ovet- 200 million barrels of oil or sonic 55 million tons of cotfl.
In certain parts of the country, nuclear plant,,, geiierzite Oveii (Xivilter percentages of the electricity used with correspoii(Iii-lo- benefit-, to the regions served by those plants.
In 1975 nuclear power counted for 35 per ceiit of the viocti-icitv generilted by that utility which services the ("Itictigo nietiopollt -III area. During 1975 nuclear power lived that utility tipproxillizitel-v 37 million barrels of oil.
Nuclear plants generated 28 percent of the electricity v ii, e(! ill New Enghind in 1975. If those plants were not iii opertitioii, N I ew Ello.l.111(l utilities would have ha(l to biirn an a(I(Jitioiiat ,-)4.9 ii'lill,;oi-l'j1,,.1l,1-Ck of oil at a cost to the con,,unier of $400 nlillion.
The Energy Research and Developme'lit Miniiiistrzitioii
that there are about 93,000 people working iii flic priv.1to 1111cl,"')v industry. There are about anotlu r 50,000 coii 4nictioll wol ker, Mvolved in building niielear power plants. Ail -i(Witioii.-il I 10,000 people are employed by ERDA's contractors ill I 111cle'll. Iv'Wt(,(l lctiv:tieApproximiately $100 billioil litis been liivv -4e(l to (1,1to hY the IwivzIte sectorin commercial nucle,ir power.






PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
According to some of the most current projections, nuclear energy (ould represent about 26 per cent of electric power generation in 19S5. However, the nuclear power projections account for a 30 per cent smaller contribution than earlier projections due to the utility cahcellations and deferrals caused primarily by uncertainty in demand growth, financial difficulties and the long lead-time involved in bringin a nuclear power plant into operation.
In addition to the 58 nuclear plants now licensed to operate, there are now 69 nuclear power plants for which a construction permit has been granted. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimates that in 1976 operating licenses will be issued for about 10 units and that con-truction permits will be issued for about 34 units.
There are presently seventy-one additional plants which are under const,uction permit review, 17 are on order, and 21 others committed by utility announcements of intent. All of these figures represent a total of 236 plants with a capacity of 236,000 megawatts-a little more than one-half of nuclear power commitments in the world.
By the middle of the next decade, if all of these plants are on the line to generate electricity they should over their lifetime represent the equivalent of about 65 billion barrels worth of petroleum generating capa(citv. This is about six times the estimated reserves of the Alaskan North Slope. Even at the present price of oil per barrel, the cost of such an oil replacement, assuming its availability, will be approximately $25 billion annually.
The availability of these nuclear. plants would reduce our dependency on oil imports which have increased substantially since the oil emibargo in 1973 to the point where they are sometimes in excess of domestic production.
Moreover, their availability would result in the conservation of petroleum, the supply of which is finite and which has a multiplicity of e,,ential uses other than to produce electricity.
0
WORLD WIDE COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR POWER
Other industrialized countries of the world now have some 273 nuclear power plants in operation, under construction or on order which would produce a total of 165,000 megawatts of electricity.
Even though we possessed a monopoly on the technology at the (lose of World War I, this science did not remain in our domain. In the Geneva Conference of August 1955, I saw the surge of a new spirit of atomic development. Here scientists were gathered from every corner of the earth exploring what to do to make the atom a servant of man for a brighter and better future. The Russians were there with evidence of their atomic power reactor which they said had been in operation for more than a year. The British were there also and their howing was centered around atomic power to generate electricity. Even then, there was an awareness of a keen competitive interest in the atom by our friends as well a, our adversaries.
Since those early days, particularly when President Eisenhower delivered his speech in December 1953 before the General Assembly of the United Nations urging the establishment of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, the development of atomic energy for







peaceful purposes essentially beanie an(I has stibseqiiently reinaineol a vital part of otir foreigy-n poliCtNT.
As, long as, it so ren-iiiins, it bel-io0ve-, this Goverimient to work witit, private in(histry and Nvit[i otlier colintrie" III t1le (leveloptnelit oI' tbl-sotirce of power so that, we 'Min ('111(l liol(l t1le 111(1 Itlin k of
people all over the glol)e who look to its for lielp all(I for Ilope.
I i wa -; in i privi k ge to be selecte(l I)y 1'red(lent Elsoidmwor a- a (Jele(i.rate to the U.S. to t1te 7( ntli Geiiertil As.,-wnif)l v tile
Un I te d N ti tion I t w ,I-, so r I I y 1) ri N- I i ege t o a( i N' :'t I I c e oI I I)e I I .I; f o f, m I r.
Goverlinlent, the (1naft resOll-Ition t1lat [("d to the creIttioll of ttle Intei.national Atol,)ii(, Enenrv Aoenc ,- in 1957.
In 19636, 1 intro(liice(l S. Res. 179, the fir-4
Hil(r the nilcle"'Ir
port n Tre.,itY. Tliza r(,-,")1tttIo!1 ;),I, t
the Sen -ite by a vote of' 84-0.
On lifliv 17 Pre"Rient Jollilsoll t1le "'re'lh- oll
Proliferation. Th,(A (locutnient" too'etllor witil 8 'Ikr(r'(r 111tonliIJI -Z Atomic Ao-oncN-, provi"le ali interil(af-ioil'd
Which tll(, colintrie" of tile worki ctill act III pztl tller"Jllp tl) 'c tt'hic '11o
beneflt,- of tke OV01" 111,111(r to al--- ;tvj"
atoms for pe,),("e aro. not (!iverwa t i I I I:-; I () I, W z- 1.
01 1 zi
Our poiiev froni the start ivco 11 z('(l t1l tt t1lere wolild v,-orld (,In ino1*l'ea,4' 1111111be'r ot 1111ch"iAT '- uppllei- Z-111d, thercrorel it wo[Ild i)e ill tti*s Natioll' -L9 (1""VOIGT) d S.\4'ein '-tdniini, tered b a. stroti(2- Z' 't W
mernbership.
The fact is however, that 01e powor 01, ilit '1-11"IlAiw)"ll corti-ol oi,
-act I'Li liatloil-;. B lit, Cit.
SovereiCY1-1 ('0111it"ieS I-) not Witiloat pI I swer i,--, not to ab ,indon t'lP SOIU2 1t-,Ift('P "'Wd oi but to (to all 'Within our power to assure tli.it, it, I,, strong an(l ciffer-ti'V0.
Providing internition,,it control to tzi- :-;iilre tinit the benelit- of flio
-01*f( rzltioll of iluclear "v'- 011".,
peaceful atoni tire achieved without In I
represents one of the greatest ("'11(allenc)'e" w1i'i-ch face" the tll"
world today. This is a challenge whicli I (to ii0t believe I I W
by any precipitous action on the 1),zirt of oiir -Nzttion. It one NN-Iiicil, wi require constant vigilance aii(i pitti-nee in tr\-in(-r to 11ti-N-o tll(, leaders of the world, especial1v those of the stippller nation.-;, exeiv their influence and restraint.
Such an approach through coinintinic.
seems to me is the course which is most, lil elv to ,Isure tli,(-tt die
-y the N'.-i 'dolli to
human mind which created this tecl-inol()().,-s() has understand the absolute necessity of the need to prevent the pr():lf(',ration of nuclear weapons.
This is exactly what Senate Resohition 221, which I inti-I.,)t1ilro(l and which the Senate passed on Deceinber 12.1, 1975, urcres oar dent to do.
The leaders of the world niust realize that, the atoni is NNit"111 it- for good or for evil and that only in. the lizin&-, and inin(Is of lminzil)can this miracle of science remain a positn-e contribution it) die human race.
OTHER CHALLENGES WHICH REMAIN
In view to the current energy situation which this (' otiiitry now faces and will face for yeai lie tliat (r1T' Or
-s to conie, it NN-otild s ein to
reliance on nuclear powei is essential.





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Our domestic supplies of oil and natural gas. are being rapidly diminished. The United States will -need increasing supplies of all available sources of energy, and clearly it would seem that both the coal industry and the nuclear industry will have their hands full in meeting their f ull share of the demand.
Nevertheless, there are challenges that are now being faced by the nuclear industry. Perhaps the most important of tli ese challenges is the public acceptance of nuclear power.
From the beginning of the commercial nuclear power program, the Congress has insisted that the regulation of the commercial nuclear industry be conducted openly, with opportunity for public participation. This is as it should be in a society of free people-for without public support, little can really be accomplished.
Although the accomplishments through the dedicated efforts of many people can be pointed to as a source of pride, in many parts of the country there are aggressive campaigns being waged against the coi-Itinued development of commercial nuclear power.
The points about nuclear power which seem to continue to worry people the most are:
1. What is the possibility of a very serious accident to a nuclear plant and how serious will the consequences be to the public?
2. What will be done about radioactive wastes and, in view of the long periods of its radioactivity, will we ever be able to dispose of this waste without a continuing concern for its potential effect on public health and safety?
3. Can the nuclear material, such as plutonium, be safely handled ,Ind adequately safeguarded so that it cannot be diverted by terrorist groups?
These are all legitimate questions to which the public is entitled to have answers.
Our committee, too, has been concerned with these questions and we have continually and constantly urged upon the various agencies to come up with definitive plans and adequate budget requests to solve the problems.
Public debate began with some intensity for the first time in the late 1960's and has continued. Because of the questions being asked, I decided several years ago to discuss these problems with Dr. James Schlesinger, who was then the distinguished Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.I suggested that a study be conducted of reactor safety which would render the answers to these and other questions to the American public. I also suggested that prompt consideration be given to the establishment of a separate independent agency to regulate the commercial atom so that there would no longer be a basis for the charges being made that the quality of regulation was being influenced by promotional considerations.
A new independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission came into being on January 19, 1975, under the aggressive leadership of its first Chairman, William A. Anders.
One of the very first actions of that new Commission required safety inspections which resulted in the shutdown of certain nuclear power plants because of the discovery of a hairline crack in some of the piping.





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I publicly commended the Commission for its action. Frankness must always prevail on such issues and tlhe facts developed so that the American people will have a clear understanding of what actually is involved from the standpoint of risks to them.
That and subsequent actions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have demonstrated( to my satisfaction that this coIItry has a strong agency wlich is carrying out its responsibilities to regulate the commercial atom.
I might add that the regulatory system established by the ( 'ore s in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for mnultipl)e reviews by qualified experts with opportunity for public participation before indepi)en(ldeit licen-ing boards.
The agency's decision is sIubject to jui(lcial review. I am pleased to note that the quality of the regulatory decisions which have been reviewed by the courts has not been found by them to be lacking.
As far as I am aware, no other industry anywhere in the world has been the subject of more research. more scrutiny and regulation than has nuclear power technology. This, of course, is as it should be in view of its complexity and the awesome power which is involved.
Another striking point in my judgment is that the development and application of nuclear power is one of the first, if not the first, major example of considering in detail environmental and public Ihealth issues min advance of industrial application.
The regulatory system complies with both the letter and the spirit of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The track record, in other words, has been good.
With the establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration, substantial additional emphasis has been placed on research and d(levelopment to assure that the quality of the regulatory review and the safety of the technology are even further iml)roved.
As long as this technology is used there will always be a continuing search for additional information so that the technology which has already been demonstrated to be safe can be further understood and improved.
As far as public acceptance is concerned, full and frank information to the public on the risks involved is the most essential ingred(lient for insuring the ability of a democratic government to deal with this technology.
I believe that the public can now have confidence that the conmercial nuclear power program is being closely supervised and regulated with every reasonable assurance of safety.
Of course, no one can say that this or any other technology is completely without risk. We all knew this from the very beginning. Any new accomplishment which holds promise of substantial benefits also comes with some risks. The Congress insisted, however, frolm tlhe outset that safety was of p)aramnount imortance. Without safet v there is no question but that the economic benefits of the atom should not and can not be available for our people.
The regulatory system which the Congress has (est" blibI(I for )commercial nuclear power was tested recently witlht lie nhi ieati(oS ) node(li by four individuals who formerly occupied poitions of respond ibiliy in and out of Government.






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I promptly decided that a complete and exhaustive investigation should be made of the allegations and that a formal report should be made to the Congress and the American people upon the completion of that investigation.
Although I do not for a moment question the sincerity of these individuals, I can say now after listening to their testimony and that of officials of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis.sion and the independent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that the established regulatory stem can and does work.
If those allegations or any future information reveal that the system should be strengthened or changed, this I assure you will be done promptly.
The high quality of regulation needed for nuclear power as well as public confidence in the regulatory system is, of course, enhanced by respoiisible and constructive criticism of that system.
The nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Joint Committee must always listen to such criticism and act promptly and responsibly to correct any deficiencies. All public officials should welcome this participation as a helpful contribution to the carrying out of their responsibilities under the law.

CONCLUSION
Nuclear energy must be made to be the salvation of free nations in helping to alleviate the hunger and the hopelessness of distressed people everywhere.
Many challenges have been successfully faced-domestically and internationally v-in only a very short time.
There are still areas in which the Government, in cooperation with industry, must accomplish even more. This is needed, not to benefit utilities or to benefit industries, but needed in the public interest. The people of this Nation aie the ultimate beneficiaries.
The discovery of this new technologv occurred at a time when the world's deepest despair was with man's utter helplessness against the furies and hates of man for nman. Out of that crucible the beneficial uses of the technology have come at a time to offer an abundant source of energy. The human race now has within its power the opportunity to determine whether this technology shall carry man on to greater achievements or whether it shall be a means of destruction.
These tremendous accomplishments d(lid not just happen. There was a lot of hard, patient work by trained and dedicated people. I have every reason to believe that the challenges which we now face, both domestic and international can be met by similar dedicated efforts by, people of good will everywhere.














APPENDIX A-5


Statement by Senator Stuart Symington, in the U.S. Senate, Concerning "Nuclear Proliferation and Counterforce," October 22,
1975
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, Oct. 22, 1975, page S 18464.]


Mr. President, owing to the important votes of today on energy issues, I canceled a planned trip to Boston. Dr. Paul Doty had asked me to talk to the Harvard University program for science and international affairs.
In my prepared remarks to this group, I was emphasizing that the current nuclear weapons spread represents the most important security issue of our day; also that the now recommended counterforce nuclear policy, one of "limited nuclear war," threatens to undercut any chance for strategic balance.
This prepared talk was given to the press.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the talk was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND COUNTERFORCE
It is a pleasure to address this distinguished group today at the invitation of my good and valued friend, Paul D)oty.
I was asked to speak on two subjects: (1) nuclear proliferation, and (2) counterforce.
In this nuclear space age, the policies of the nuclear powers about the use of nuclear weapons can only relate to the fact that many more nations will soon have the capacity to develop such weapons; in fact on Friday of this week our Subcommittee on Arms Control will be taking testimony from the Pentagon on the defense implications to this country of the growing number of nations currently developing nuclear arms capabilities.
As to proliferation, it is a fact that time is fast running out for establishing any meaningful control over these weapons. One can no longer deny that the growing worldwide "Atoms for Peace" trade is rapidly spreading the capability to use nuclear energy for war.
Whether it is still possible to delay, let alone prevent, further proliferation is at best uncertain.
Since the Baruch Plan of some 29 yealrs ago, no equally bold initiative designed to control the spread of these, weapons has been advanced. But in the intervening years we have seen the numnh)er of states that have exploded nuclear devices gr,,w from 1 to 6; and there are nman y additional nations which currently either pos(ss untested nuclear weapons, 0r have the eapalhility to produce them.
As a result of the estal:ish ient of the international Atonlic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957, and also the r ntv onl the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear \\Weapons of 1968, it was felt this Agenev and this Tr(aty provided some hope of prevenlting proliferation, but that hope would pipe'ar to be fading.
Mxanv nations, including three members of the so-called "nuclear club," will not Uiippcrt the Non-Prdolifration Treaty. So(nie inportnt c1oultris wilichl s supply nuclear techno tgyv, ,,, wll as other which receive it, have a-moerted thl y will not ratify this Treat:.
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M \oreover, what is generally not understood is that by ratifying the NonProliferation Treaty nations "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to, participate in, the fullest possible exchange of (nuclear) equipment" (Article IV) and then can withdraw, without penalty, upon giving notice "three months in advance" (Article X). This means that any nation can first sign said Treaty, receive all the technology and equipment neces sary to produce nuclear weapons, and then withdraw from the Treaty after only ninety days notice.
Limitations on the effectiveness of the IAEA have also become increasinglyapparent. Its so-called "safeguards" against proliferation are based exclusivelyon inspection and monitoring procedures, conducted at the forebearance of' states; and it has no ,,uthority to prevent these states from using nuclear materials for weapons development.
It is, interesting to recall the conclusion of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946, which report in turn led to the Baruch Plan. The latter plan emphasized that there could be no effective control over nuclear weapons proliferation under a sy-stemn which relied "onlv 7' "on inspection, but which at the same time allowed allowed "an otherwise uncontrolled exploitation of atomic energy by national governments."
Let us note also the results, of a recent study sponsored by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ER DA). That study states that,' forboth financial and political reasons, the JALA will be unable to carry out even its lim-ited inspection tasks; important because over the next 15 years the nuclear market it expected to expand to more than 100 times its present size.
.Nor would there appear to be any decrease in these problems: in fact the reverse. As example, we all now know about the recent multi-billion dollar nuclearcontractual agreement between Germany and Brazil, which was signed last July. This agreement gives Brazil a ''complete nuclear fuel cycle,'' i *e., all the facilities required to develop and produce nuclear weapons. This is the first time in history an-%- such transaction has taken place; and Brazil has extensive deposits of uranium.
Both countries involved have s ought to allay criticism of the agreement by noting the IAEA inspection provisions which they say they will apply to it. But these provisions could not prevent a Brazilian regime-perhaps not the present one-from developing nuclear weapons: nor could they prevent Brazil from selling such weapons to other countries, including Germany.
In a world in which such transactions -are talking place, how can there be any real control over proliferation.
I have spent niost of my life in the arms field-and am now convinced that thisis the most important security issue of our day. Perhaps this is now being recounized. Representatives of seven nuclear supplier nations-Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States have have over a period been meeting in semi-secrecy in London.
The 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report recommended an international agency with powers to regulate the enrichment and reprocessing operations that are essential for the production of nuclear weapons. This premise, that true control over nuclear proliferation requires some form of meaningful regulation over the nuclear fuel cycle, tas distinguished from any system based solely on inspection, is now being revived.
A Congressional Resolution introduced last July by Senator John Pastore, the able and experienced Chairman of the Joint Com~mittee on Atomic Energy, urges, "that the United States should take the lead in seeking agreement for the development of regional, multinational, rather than national, centers to undertake enrichment and reprocessing activities, in order to minimize the spread of technology which could be used to develop nuclear welapons.1
Last month, in ail address by Secretary Kiss-inger before the United Nations, this country formally proposed the establishment of such "multinational regional fuel cycle centers." In that address the Secretary asserted that these centers would reduce the financial burden of nuclear power for a growing number of nations; a-nd would al'4o help curb nuclear weapons proliferation.
For myself, however, I question whether a practical and mneaningful plan for multinational centers could actually lie aceom-rplished. Not only wcul'd it require an unprecedented degree of cooperation among the world's nuclear supplying nations; but it would also require a commnitmnent to dependence upon non-national facilities by those nations seeking energy self -sufficiency, not to mention other countries with clear-cut ambitions to achieve nuclear military powe-r.
It is logical to believe the latter would desire to possess, on a iitional basis, all those fa cilities necessary opouesc vz us






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It is now clear that nuclear power is to l)become in essential solrce of ener-y for :i growing number of countries. It would al.s appear clear that any fturt to( curb the use of this new p)wer for energv could result in moving forward thli( dev. l(h poi of nuclear weapons in ilnore countries.
The paradox the world facees today, therefo)re, would ajpo(8,r to be thit tl(' development of nuclear power for peaceful ipurp)ose, bearing in uind the '" rill aagainst subist:mce" control of the IEA, child actu:iily be a pliani ftar fiuthierinLI the possibility o(f nuclear war; and h)ow to( provide this (ellrm -oUrcc without further looselning the reins o()f control over nuclear weaZj)n- de(vehl o 1pit is t ite gre'tet' problem facing all peoples today.
We can only go so far in strengthening amny ini)pection and n it(ring s,-tei1 of the IAEA; nor is the world Owut to est(b)lih anyV international PIo(licy struc uv with meaningful authority over the action of national goat ruineni.
Nevertheless the prolposai for nultinationil nucit ar centers, even with its obvious slihortcomings, is a )propos.ld which deserves fuirt her Itiy, evn' t I hui ti, diverse interests of all nations in this nuclear age N-ill no t en 1)( lv recncle:( aind even though any arrangeiments for multinational nuulclar c( enters w()uld at I (- t provide but a partial -oluti >n.
Let me now turn to the question of counterforce. reviewing briefly the history of this concept, and where it would a)pear we stand it(day.
As we all know, the term counterforcee" connotes in atta k against an adv rsar y's military capability, particularly his strategic inilitary c:pa)ility. Typicl targets comprise stragegic bombers and their baes, balli Counterforce is thus to be distinguished from planned attacks against civilian population and industrial centers of an adversary. The latter have been turned "countervalue" targets.
During its formative stages-1945 through the early 1950's-United Statws nuclear strategy concentrated on "countervalue" targeting rather than on "counterforce;" for the Soviet Union had yet to deploy any intercontinental nuclear delivery systemnis. The term "massive retaliation" came into use during iiiperiod, because ne knew the enemiy had little if any capacity to retaliate in kind.
When in the 1930's the Soviet Union deployed long-range strategic bomier--Bear, Bison-United States policy shifted to counterforce concepts designed to knock out attacking aircraft. "Massive retaliation" then had a two-fold purpose
(1) to destroy counterforce targets; (2) to destroy civilian populations and industry.
In the early 1960's, after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union expanded its own strategic missile force sufficiently to constitute an "assured destruction" capability against this country. As of that point, our nuclear policy became based on the so-called "balance of terror," with population targeting as the primniary deterrent.
In 1969, in his first foreign policy address to the Congress, President Nixon posed the question whether, if deterrance based on "balance of terror" failed, the President would be left with only the option of destroying the cities of a major aggressor, with knowledge that millions of Americans would die in return.
The strategy advocated by his Administration retained "assured destruction" as a central component, but also emphasized the feasibility of a range of options that depend on the ability to fight a "limited nuclear war."
What concerns many of us about the recent emphasis on such limited nuclear conflict, however, is that the United States already has adequate power to destroy targets on a selective basis.
Under these circumstances, the concept of emphasizing increased flexibility to fight a "limited nuclear war" appears to undercut deterrence rather than strengthen it; for it would make such a war seem to be an acceptable option.
Without any sure means of capping escalation should such a "limited" conflict occur, it would in all probability result in a full nuclear exchange, at the expense of civilization.
Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Armis ('Contrl released a study of the effects of limited nuclear war. This study contained ' The Pentagon now concedes that tens of millions of Anmericans, as w( i as 800,000 Canadians, could die in any such war. By coincidence this S00(),000 1igU~ was the estimate of American fatalities first presented by the Pentagon last yeav:.
After our Subcommittee's request for further study, the estimate (f S()00,000 total United States fatalities, resulting from attacks against only our IC('Bls, has now been revised to 22 million.






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Note that this figure still does not include the tens of millions more casualties which would result from fires, long term radiation exposure, the loss of communications, hospital facilities, and so forth.
In any case, this new information raises serious questions about any limited nuclear war doctrine. Apparently that doctrine was formulated before the Department had solid information about its possible price to society in lives and treasure.











APPENDIX A-6

Statement by Senator Stuart Symington, in the U.S. Senate, (oncerning "The Nuclear March to Armageddon," April 14, 1976
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, Apr. 14, 1976, page S 5720.]

Mr. President, for som year. I h ave been presenting to te Senate the greatest securiity problem this country and the world face to(daythe steady increase in the number of nations capable of building nuclear weapons.
Others are also bringieg attention to that (aner. The dstineuished senior Senator from Coinnecticut, Senator Eibicoff, wrote an interesting and constructive article which appeared in the New York Times on March 26.
I ask unanimous consent that this article, "Trading in Doom, be included in the Record at the conclusion of these remriks.
At one time, the Ui*b s Svtcs was t e on1 nation possessing nuclear weapons. Later the were produced and tested by the Soviet Union; and thereumnon the resulting daiinger was described as "two scorpions in a bottle."
Now we know there are at least six scorpions in that bottle, in all probability more; and it would seem certain that, in the not too distant future, there will be many more.
Under the atoms for peace effort, nuclear know-how and equipment has been spread throughout the world.
Many of the nations we have helped are today themselves nuclear exporters; and unfortunately some of their policies in this area have not, been as restrictive as ours.
Over strong objections from many countries, including the United States, two nations in particular, France and Germn- have sold reprocessing and enrichnlient facilities; that is, have sold for profit the means to produce nuclear weapons.
It has been suggested that in order to force these countries to stop these dangerous exports, the United States stop supplying then with enriched nuclear fuel. Whether such action would achieve its desired purpose is questionable, however, because Frrce ad We-t Germany already have access to other nuclear fuel facilities; and are capable of expanding their own.
France possesses its own enrichment plants. Germany, through its involvement in the Uranium Enrichment Corporation-Urenco-a consortium of British, Dutch, and German interests, alo has acce-s to nuclear fuel.
Moreover, for some time Germany has been working oni the socalled Becker nozzle process, a possible addition to the en uichii :ent art.
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So while a ban on nuclear fuel to those two nations may have a short-termi impact, it would not appear to achieve its desired effect. .Moreover it could result in both countries acquiring larger uranium enrichment facilities of their own, thereby becoming ever greater nuclear competitors of the United States.
Let, uis note also that such a ban could violate certain provisions of our owni adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as agreements with Euratomn. In addition, it might violate other specific contracts with foreign utilities.
The o uonztio often cited as the possible cure-all for nuclear prol1i fe rato iteInterna tional Atomic Energy Agency-JAEAwith itV headquarters in Vienna.
Th at AgYency, however, Ias neither the authority nor the capability to (1o the job tile world has been led to believe it is doing-namely, stopping proliferation.
The IAEA can posssibly detect, but cannot prevent, the diversion or theft of nuclear material to weapons development. It is strictly an inspection andl accounting organization for the nations under its jurisdiction, b37 virtue of their membership in the Nonproliferation
Tretyor their adherence to the terms of certain commercial nuclear contracts.
IAEA could well be useful to verifty honesty-but it cannot stop a nation that is bent on obtaining nuclear weapons.
Under the IAEA charter, sanctions are the responsibility of the United Nations. That latter organization, however, would not appear either determined, or equipped to deal with the problem.
So far as, tile IAEA is concerned, the way- that organization recently handled a series of important developments illustrates its inherent weakness, arid makes one wonder whether it is more interested in promoting, rather than preventing, nuclear proliferation.
As but one example: A letter- from the Energy Research and Development Administration-ERDA-to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy discusses some of the proceedings of the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting held last February 24-25. The two most important topics discussed at this meeting were the safeguards agreements to be applied to tile sale of a "complete nuclear fuel cycle" to Brazil by West Germany, and the sale of a plutonium reprocessing plant to Pakistan by France.
The dangers inherent in these two deals were and are obvious. They were widely publicized in the press.
-Nevertheless, we are told there was little or no discussion of these dangers at the IAEA Board meeting.
Possibly this was because, surprising as it may sound, that Board has no authority to judge the merits of a transaction let'alone to prevent dangerous transactions from occurring.
Only the presumed adequacy of the so-called safeguards it plans to apply are reviewed by the IAEA Board. C-




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In addition, to the best of our knowledge, the German and Fren ch deals in question have not been subjected to review in any other international forum.
After studying this matter over a period of years, it is our couiidered opinion that any hope for a realistic constraint oil nuclear proliferation must begin with open discussions by the supplier nation on the real issues involved.
All we hear about today, however, are secret nuclear meet ig,
secret nuclear deals, inadequate controls-politics which, in ilhenliselves, would appear to defeat the very purpose of preventing further proliferation.
One proposal which wouIld seen to have merit is an agreement among the nuclear supplier nations not to export enricl nent or reprocessing equipment to any individual country.
Such action would not deny a nation the benefit of nuclear power through the sale or leasing of nuclear reactors and fuel; but it would arrest the spread of facilities that are essential for nuclear x eapoIlmaking. We have it on good authority that the 'nited States, the
Soviet Union, and several other supplier nations are willing to acept such a ban; but other countries not only are opposed; they desire to keep their opposition secret from their own people. This of course means from the people of the rest, of the world.
That secrecy is totally unjustifiable. In itself it is a growing danger to civilization.
We understand the supplier nations will be meeting again in June for further dis cnssion of these export matters; hopefilly to nke substantial progress toward a meaningful agi'eemient, openly arrived at and of substance. That would be well, because elimination of this unnecessary secrecy would allow all peoples to understand just what must be accomplished if we are to slow down the current march towards Armageddon.
EXHIBIT 1
[From the New York Times, Friday, March 26, 1976] TRADING IN Doom
(By Abraham A. Ribicoff)
WASHINGTON.-Thirty years ago, when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were freshly imprinted on the mind of a war-weary world, Bernard Baruch presented the United Nations with our nation's plan for peacefully harnessing the atom. "VWe are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead," he admonished. "That is our business."
That is still our business today. The potential for a holocaust-producing showdown between the superpowers is the most immediate nuclear danger, but the greater danger may lie in the spread of nuclear weapons to many nations, even to terrorists, through the export of civilian nuclear technology.
In 1946, the Soviet Union's refusal to restrict its own development of atomic weapons prevented the United Nations from placing all dangerous nuclear activities and stockpiles under international ownership and control. Today, the refusal of France and West Germany to restrict their civilian nuclear exports poses the greatest obstacle to curbing dangerous nuclear trade.






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The French and Germans, seeking to pull multibillion-dollar reactor sales away from the United States, offer an option that we do not-the facilities needed by a nation to produce and process its own reactor fuel. The problem is that these facilities-uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing plants-produce material suitable for making atomic bombs as well as reactor fuel. Therefore, they constitute the essential component of any nuclear-weapons-development program. Furthermore, these facilities are much harder to safeguard against theft than reactors, and they cannot be operated economically except in industrial nations with very large reactor programs.
For aIll of these reasons. the United States exports reactors and fuel that is unsuitable for weapons-making-but not fuel facilities capable of producing weaponis-grade material.
The French and Germans have rejected our proposals for banning the export of nuclear-fuel facilities.
They also have blocked diplomatic efforts to bar nuclear sales to nations that refuse to ratify the treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or that refuse to agree to place all their nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The French and Germans suspect that our warnings about weapon's proliferation are a smokescreen for protecting our pre-eminent nuclear industry. The Germans approved the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants to Brazil as part of a major reactor dcal over strong United States objections. But this action came shortly after the West German Government learned that an American company was trying to sell Brazil an enrichment plan-and this at the very time out diplomats in Bonn were saying that policy prohibits such sales.
Similarly, the French are not prepared to forfeit their technological lead in plutonium reprocessing because the United States objects to the export of these plants. France is going ahead with the shipment of such a plant to Pakistan despite our objections.
These exports are particularly dangerous because Brazil and Pakistan, which refuse to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, are free to have unsafeguarded nuclear activities and set off nuclear explosions.
o Unfortunately, the United States, as exporter of 70 percent of the freeworld civilian nuclear technology is also the biggest supplier of nations that are treaty signatories. Thirteen of the 29 countries to which we make nuclear sales refused to ratify the treaty-not a good example for the French and Germans to follow. Moreover, our current and planned nclear exports extend to most countries suspected of having atomic-weapon intentions, among them India, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Israel and Egypt.
Our explanation for exporting to nontreaty nations and to otherwise suspect nuclear customers is the same s that of France and Germany: "If we don't, they will." The difference is that we will not export fuel facilities-only reactors.
The United States must persuade France and West Germany not to engage in dangerous nuclear trade. We should set a nonproliferation example they can follow, and we should rernind them that they still depend heavily on us for the technology, components, and particularly the fuel used in their own ambitious nuclear programs.
Our greatest, and perhaps last, opportunity for persuasion is immediately at hand. For at least the next four years, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the sole sources of enriched-uranium fuel for France and West Germany. Furthermore, the Russians seem to be as concerned as we are about the spread of nuclear weapons-the one issue on which the two superpowers have a strong identity of interest. It provides an excellent opportunity, therefore, to breathe new life into detente.
However, Secretary of State Henry S. Kissinger refuses to approach the Russians on pointly applying pressure on France and West Germany through the denial of nuclear fuel. I agree with Ir. Kissinger that this would be drastic action-even blackmail-but I also believe that drastic action will not be necessary once it is clear that the United States is prepared to act to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, I propose the following steps for the United States.
1. We should immediately explore with the Russians whether a common position can be reached in support of a b)an on the export of nuclear fuel facilities to nonnuclear-w eal)()ns countries, and on all nucler exports to non-treaty nations.
2. If a common position can be reached, it should he announced at the next meeting of the nuclear supplier nations, in June, and France and West Germany should be asked to announce their positions.






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3. At the same meeting, we should demonstrate our good faith by offering to enter into a cooperative arrangement with the other sip)pliers, including France and West Germany, that will guarantee each supplier a minimum numbeter of reactor sales a year. A "market share" arrangement among the suppliers may be our best hope for eliminating cut-throat competition in the sale of reactur- and for promoting fuel arrangements that will discourage production and stockpiling of weapons-grade material outside the supplier :nalio)ns.
4. If agreement on strict export controls and mark(t-share arrangements cannot be reached, the United States should announce that future supply of enricheduranium fuel and of all other nuclear a assistance will be made only to nations that joint in meeting these nonprolifertion objectives.
If all else fails, the United States should stop supplying reactor fuel to the normans and French. This would make them wholly dependent onithe Soviet Union. I do not believe that France and Germany are prepared to rely solely on the Russians.












APPENDIX A-7

'Statement by Senator John V. Tunney, in the U.S. Senate, Concerning
"Senate Resolution 415-Submission of a Resolution Relating to
the Transfer of Nuclear Material to India," March 26, 1976
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, Mar. 26, 1976, page S 4384.]

Ir. President, I am submitting today a resolution urging the President to suspend the transfer of certain nuclear materials to India pending a public hearing on the implications of such a transfer by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and until such time as the dangers posed by such a transfer can be more accurately assessed.
Last month, the NRC announced that it would approve the sale through private channels of 40,000 pounds of enriched uranium for use in the American-built dual reactor complex at Tarapur in India. No hearing was held and no opportunity was presented for interested individuals to comment on the transfer. In response on March 5 a group of concerned citizens led by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists filed a petition for a public hearing. On March 12, 54 Members of the House of Representatives, led by Congressman RICHARD OTTINGER, followed suit and in a letter to the Commissioner of the NRC requested a delay in the sale until a formal hearing could be held and the potential dangers fully explored. No reply to the request has yet been forthcoming, and administration sources say only that the matter is under consideration.
Mr. President, the transfer of thousands of pounds of nuclear material to India presents grave questions about the viability of our nuclear sales program and about the procedures designed to insure that such transfers are in our national interest. As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who has sat through many hearings on the problems of proliferation and nuclear safety, I for one am concerned about the potentially disastrous consequences of such a. transfer.
In the first place, while routine inquiries are made of the Department of State by the NRC in its approval process for private sales of nuclear materials, these inquiries are often pro forma, more concerned with the political ramifications of the transfer itself than technical questions concerning safeguards against diversion, theft, terrorism, sufficiency of international inspection, safe operation and and maintenance and return or safe disposition of reactor-produced plutonium. Independent sources are rarely invited to comment on the proposed transactions and hearings to discuss the appropriateness of the transfer are almost never held:
Thus, many of the objections that might otherwise be voiced on nuclear sales are never publicly aired. The Indian deal is a case in point; 40,000 pounds of uranium is enough if enriched to produce
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10 hIiroshima-sized nuclear weapons. In addition to that uranium, there are indications that the Indians now possess up to 1,000 pounds of plutonium produced in the Tarapur reactor under Indian control. If reprocessed, this plutonium would be sufficient for 100 additional nuclear weapons. Today-not tomorrow or 10 years from now-but today the Indian reprocessing facility at Irombay has the capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Yet that facility is subject to no international or bilateral controls.
Despite this threat, and despite the fact that the Indians have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and have exploded a nuclear device, overall implementation of safeguards under the agreement for cooperation with India has been left to the IAEA and U.S. bilateral rights have been suspended. Legally, the ownership rights of the plutonium produced at Tarapur are vested in India and the United States has not required either the return of that plutonium nor its safe disposition abroad. Should India decide to abrogate its responsibilities under the agreement for cooperation there is no guarantee that the United States could ever retrieve the material. Tflhis, Mr. President, is a blueprint for disaster.
Beyond the question of the inadequacy of bilateral safeguards, there is a distinct, danger that safeguards s upervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency may be insufficient to prevent either theft or diversion. According to the petition filed by NRDC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has made no independent analysis of and finding regarding the safeguards applicable to special nuclear materials shipped to Tarapur. And while the IAEA has entered in subsidiary arrangements with India which detail the specific safeguards which have been applied, this information has not been made available to the NRC.
Two glaring problems arise. First, as we have seen, not all Indian nuclear installations are subject even to IAEA sareguards as called for in the Nonproliferation Treaty. Because India is not a party to the Treaty, she is therefore free to maintain nuclear facilities which are only partially safeguarded or are totally fiee of international inspection. The result of this according to NRDC is that India is free to use these facilities for the development of nuclear weapons. Thus, safeguards even when applied to all the special nuclear material utilized at Tarapur are not enough to insure that nonpeaceful nuclear activities are not carried on in India so long as fissionable material from unsafeguarded sources remains free of control and so long as unsafeguarded facilities are available to reprocess special nuclear material diverted from Tarapur.
Second, provisions in article VI(c) of the agreement on cooperation which permits the substitution by India of equal quantities of special nuclear material under the agreement by materials not covered thereunder could be used to divert material from Tarapur to unsafeguarded facilities. Without adequate systems of measurement and inspection, there is no way to know whether this loophole has been used and safeguard provisions thus circumvented.
If these safeguards, be they bilateral or international, cannot be guaranteed, there is a strong possibility that the United States will find itself in violation both of provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and of the trust of nonnuclear signatories, since article III requires the safeguarding of facilities in nonsignatory states as a








prerequisite for such. a transfer of nuclear materials the sale to India may result iii an abrogation of our legal responsibilities. The continued shiipuien t of such material to India in the face of her refusal to sign the NPT and the recent explosion of a nuclear device could be interpreted as frustrating the intent of the treaty and sanctioning Indian policies, encouraging other states to follow the nuclear path and discriminating in effect against those who did not.
In lighlt, of these serious dangers and the uncertainties surrounding this transfer in particular and others like it, 1 urge these specific steps: First, the NRC should review its rules for granting export licenses for nuclear sales to make provisions for public hearings in cases of such magnitude and involving nonsignatories to the NPT. Second, I would encourage a delay in this particular transfer until public views can be heard. Trdj~ I believe a more detailed analysis of the impact of the transfer to India and the whole question of the adequacy of safeguards under the agreement for cooperation should be undertaken before this sale is allowed to proceed.
Mr. President, we are faced here with the frightening prospect of contributing inadvertently to the demise of the Nonproliferation reat, of encouraging the development of an Indian nuclear capability, and of transferring the capacity to produce over 100 nuclear weapons without adequate safeguards against diversion and misuse of potential weapons-grade material. While 1 firmly believe in the cause of international atomic energy cooperation, I think this transfer deserves more than the cursory examination that it has received. I urge my colleagues to join me in my effort to delay this sale until somie very disturbing questions cani be answered.
Mr. Tunney submitted the following resolution:
H. RE s. 415
Resolved,' Recognizing the grave dangers inherent in the transfer of large amounts of nuclear material to nations not party to the Nuclear INIon-proliferation Treaty, nations not permitting inspection by the IJEAB at all nuclear facilities, and nations unwilling to accept bilateral controls or safeg-uards on diversion, safety or use;
Noting that the Government of India has declined to implement any or all of the above measures designed to insure the safety and peaceful use of nuclear materials and has, in the recent past used both derivative materials and technology in the fabrication and testing of a nuclear device.
Realising that over 1000 pounds of plutonium-enough to produce 100 nuclear weapons-have already accumulated at the American-built Tarapurcomplex at a time when U.S. bilateral rights under the Agreement for Cooperation with India have been suspended and no clear provisions for the recovery of that plutonium have been made;
Acknowledging American responsibilities to signatory states under the provisions of Article 11I sections (1) and (2) of the Non-proliferation Treaty requiring that special safeguards be applied to the transfer of all nuclear materials to all facilities in nons5ignatory States; and at the same time;
Reaffirming the willingness of the United States to cooperate in peaceful nuclear experiments with nations party to the Non-proliferation Treaty or accept-ing adequate bilateral and/or international safeguards to insure the safety, security and peaceful use of nuclear materials: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate of the United States urges the President to suspend the planned transfer of 40,000 pounds of enriched uranium to the Government of India until a public hearing on the transfer can be held by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and until such time as the serious dangers inherent in such a transfer can be more accurately assessed, and provisions m ade for the disposition of reactor-produced plutonium













APPENDIX A-8


Statement by Senator John 0. Pastore, in the U.S. Senate, concerning
"The FRG-Brazil Nuclear Agreement," June 3, 1975
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, June 3, 1975, page S 9312.]


Mr. President, an article entitled, "Brazil Nuclear Deal Raises U.S. Concern" written by Lewis 11. Diuguid appeared in the June 1, 1975, edition of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that the article be placed in the RECORD in its entirety at this point.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Rk;CORD, as follows:
BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL RAISES U.S. CONCERN
(By Lewis H. Diuguid)
Brazil has arranged to obtain from West Germany the technology that would give it the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and U.S. officials are concerned that the military-dominated government has decided to opt for the bomb.
Brazilian authorities insist, however, that the sole purpose of the contract with the Germans is to generate electricity.
Neighboring Argentina, with a long-standing nuclear research program, is also thought by some high-ranking officials to have decided to attempt nuclearweapon manufacture.
Neither South American nation signed the 1970 nuclear nonproliferation threaty, and both appear on lists of countries expected soon to be capable of joining the United States, Soviet Union, Britian, France, China and, since last year, India in the nuclear club.
The development lending immediacy to the Brazilian case is an accord now being completed with the STEAG, AG consortium of Essen for provision of several large nuclear reactor, fuel-processing plants and, most important, a uranium-enrichment plant using a unique process.
Robert Gillette of Science niagazine, commenting in the current issue, quotes estimates that the secretive conaract will run to $8 billion over the next 10 to 15 years.
It is considered possible that Brazil will pay for the technology with the enriched uranium eventually produced. The vast country has deposits of natural uranium and fissionable thiorium, !)lus the hydroelectric power in large quantity needed for the new enrichment process offered by STEAG, AG.
West Germany will need the enriched ,lraniium for its own nuclear generators but it lacks cheap electricity needed for the STEAG, AG production process on which it is banking. The )resent gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge processes, developed in this country and WVestern Europe, require less electricity. All demand huge investments of capital and technology.
A major question is what controls West Germany w1ll require on the technology. As a signer of the nonproliferation treaty, Bonn is under some restraints. But the treaty's restrictions on supplies of enriched uranium need not apply if Brazil produces the weapons-grade fuel itself.
Without naming countries, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Director Fred C. Ikle said in April, "Unhappily, short-sighted comniercial interests sometimes militate against application of effective controls . You would think that all nations willing to export nuclear materials or equipment would be anxious to prevent proliferation.
"Even the largest nations would suffer greviously if nuclear explosives became widely available."
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The president of Brazil's nuclear energy commission, Hervasio de Carvalho, told Washington Post special correspondent Bruce Handler that the country must act now to assure supplies for its booming seaboard cities.
Carvalho explained that most of the rivers with undeveloped hydroelectric potential are too far away for cheap transmission to the cities.
Enriched uranium, however, could be produced at jungle generating sites and brought to the eight or so nuclear power plants-with a total capacity of nearly 10 million kilowatt hours-foreseen in the agreement.
Carvalho pointed out that the "basic principles" for bomb-making "are known in practically all countries," but that there are still "technical secrets."
A main If S. control on those secrets has been refusal to sell the technology for production of enriched uranium.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger offered assurances last week at the International Energy Agency meeting in Paris that the United States would increase supplies of enriched uranium to meet demand in countries agreeing to safeguards against proliferation of arms.
But West Europeans, and now the Brazilians, have been unwilling to rely solely on U.S. sources.
Neither Brazil nor Argentina signed the nonproliferation treaty because, they said, it offered unfair advantages to the nuclear powers. Both are also exempt from the lesser-known 1967 treaty establishing Latin America as a nuclear-free zone.
Argentina has not ratified the treaty and Brazil did so with a waiver requiring all territories within the zone to adhe e before it takes effect for Brazil.
A member of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, Lysaneas Maciel, told the Associated Press Friday in Brasilia that he had been told by an Argentine legislator that the Agrentines are able to produce a nuclear explosion.
"That may cause a problem of imbalance in Latin America," said Maciel, who is chairman of the mines and energy committee of the Brazilian lower house.
Brazil, with a population of 100 million but a per capita income under $700, is a traditional competitor of Argentina, where the population of 24 million has a per capita income of about $1,000.
Argentina has long invested in nuclear research and has a nuclear power plant. functioning, whereas Brazil's first station-provided by Westinghouse with U.S. enriched uranium-is still under construction.
The West- German-supplied plant now operating and a second Argentine plant being supplied by Canada both use natural rather than enriched uranium.
As India proved with the use of plutonium in its Canadian-provided plant, nuclear explosions are possible without enriched uranium.
But as U.S. officials see it, the Indian and now the Brazilian cases show that the real proliferation is of technology, not just fuel. Once the national capacity is built up, the national leaders can use it for peaceful explosions or nuclear bombs.
And while such decisions are tightly held, U.S. officials show intense concern that Brazil and Argentina kave both decided to produce the bomb.
Mr. PASTORE. I must say at this j tincture, parenthetically, that the substance contained in that article is correct.
The article points out that West Germany is about to enter into an agreement with the Brazilian Government to provide several large nuclear reactors, a fuel reprocessing plant, and a uranium enrichment plant. In other words, the arrangement would provide essentially an entire fuel cycle for the Brazilians. This matter disturbs me greatly as it does, I am sure, many of my colleagues and interested citizens. The Brazilian Government"has not signed or ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty. In fact, the representatives of the Brazilian Government have made statements which have been carried in the press to the effect that they do not preclude the possibility of developing peaceful nuclear explosions. The scientific director of Brazil's center of physical research is quoted in the New York Times of August 24, 1974, as saying:
Brazil already has the necessary conditions for building its first atomic bomb.
I ask unanimous consent that that New York Times article be printed in the RECORD at this point.





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There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
'From the New York Tnimes, Aug. 24, 19741
BRAZILIAN A-BofMB REPORTED VITHIIN COUNTRY'S CAPACITY
RIO DE JANIERO. Aug. 23.-The scientific director of Brazil's entertr of Phyvieal Research, Alfredo Marques, said yesterday that "Brazil already has the necel-arv conditions for building its first atomic bomb."
But Mr. Marques, speaking at an astronomy seminar, said there were oth(r problems to be solved in making the bomb, because "a project of this itture involves rather ample questions, including the diplomatic field."
Brazil presently depends on the United States for plut(oinium and enriched uranium. The supplies are covered by an agreement signed with the United States Government two years ago, providing radioactive materials for Brazilian nuclear power plants for 30 years.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President. it is my under-tanding that behind the scenes the U.S. Government has taken steps to try to di-uade the Federal Republic of Germany from muidertaking su(1h an arr gel ent particularly on providing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to Brazil. Notwithstanding protestation by U.S. official<. incluing a meeting last April in Bonn, the arrangement apparently is going to be executed. I have been advied that on April 30 of this year the West German Parliament approved in principle ihe sale and the elated arrangements to provide power reactors, a pilot plant for reprocessing fuel, and an enrichment capability to Brazil.
Now, I understand that the United States has sold Brazil two research reactors and a power reactor. The research reactors began operating in 1958 and 1960. respectively, and they do not have any significant amounts of plutonium connected with them because of their small size and design. The power reactor will not come into operation until 1976. All of these arrangements are governe( by an Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Brazil signed on July 17, 1972-which superseded an agreement signed in 1955-and this agreement runs until the year 2002. All of the facilities that I have mentioned are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
The proposed sale by West Germany to Brazil adds, however. a completely new dimension to the nonproliferation problem. West Germany is going to provide essentially a complete fuel cycle which could assist Brazil in making a nuclear bomb, if it so desires. Brazilian officials have been quite frank to indicate that Brazil does not plan to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty.
This, of course, reminds us all too vividly of the situation when India became the sixth nuclear power. The Indians utilized plutonilin produced in a reactor not subject to IAEA safeguards and are now constructing a power reactor not under IAEA safeguards utilizing technology and knowhow obtained from a Canadian power reactor. I think this is an extremely important fact because no matter what arrangements are made with the West Germans, even if they were comnpletely effective, there is nothing to preclude the Brazilians- front buillding separate and indigenous reprocessing and enricliing facilitie' imply by copying what the West Germans have given them. and( then deciding to build a nuclear explosive device, unless all such reproducedl facilities are specifically subject to adequate IAEA safeguards.
Arrangements such as the proposed one between West Germany and Brazil would greatly aggravate the additional measures which





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must be taken to deaJ with nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices. There are those, myself included, who strongly believe that the adequacy of international safeguards must be carefully and promptly reexamined and strengthened, and that this country should provide leadership to that end.
I am informed that the United States has urged its manufacturers of nuclear facilities not to enter into any arrangement such as the one proposed by West Germany, pending further study of thesituation. and that the manufacturers have agreed. I applaud this decision because we cannot expect others to show restraint if we do not ourselves exercise restraint. The problem of nuclear explosive device proliferation does not concern any one country of the world or groups of countries-every nation's security and survival is directly involved. Secretary of State Kissinger in an address on September 23, 1974, before the 29th United Nations' General Assembly, said that the United States is prepared to join with other countries in the world community to work urgently toward a system of effective international safeguards against the diversion of plutonium to nuclear explosives. The Secretary said, among other things thatThe United States will shortly offer specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to other principal supplier countries.
I hope that the Secretary is now acting decisively to present specific proposals, at the earliest date, to the principal countries which supply nuclear technology which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices.
Despite all of this, and despite the protestations of our State Department, the West Germans have -decided to go ahead because they apparently look upon this as "business as usual." Nothing could be further from responsible action, no matter who the supplier might be.
I strongly stress the need and importance for the United States to urge the Federal Republic of Germany not to proceed with the arrangement, until these matters, which are of the gravest international concern, receive the most deliberate and careful consideration at the hio-hest 'levels of international diplomacy.
Vest Germany's apparent disregard of the plea of our Government on this important international policy issue is really difficult forme to understand and accept. The United States has gone out of its way to assure our NATO allies, and particularly the West Germans, that we would defend them and has backed up this commitment with positive actions. Yet despite 'this, and despite the obvious need for reason and sound judgment to prevail, the pleas of our Government have been to no avail.
And what concerns me to no end is the fact that this is a likely peril being instituted by an ally in our own back yard, so to speak, while, at the same time, the U.S. Government is heavily committed in West Germany's backyard to defend them against a likely peril.
I urge the Secretary of State and the President to use and exhaust every available diplomatic avenue to assure that the proposed arrangement-and any similar arrangement which may be proposed by any other nation-be held in abeyance until the principal supplier countries have had a reasonable opportunity to consider and agree on the practical steps which can and must urgently be taken toward a system of effective international safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear explosives.













APPENDIX A-9


Statement by Representative George E. Brown Jr., in. the U.S.
House of Representatives Con cerning: "Nuclear Proliferation.":
June 18, 1976
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, June 18, 1976, page E 3468.]


Mr. Speaker, when you honored me with an appointment to thie Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a, short time ago, I endeavored to update my files and improve my understanding of the many coinplex issues within the jurisdiction of the Joi-nt Committee. This is a continuous, on-going process, especially since the nuclear field has undergone dramatic changes in public perception, and achieved a new level of importance on a global scale.
Among the areas undergoing change is the policy and practice of control of proliferation of nuclear weap~ons. Trlis subject has received extensive attention since the explosion of the first bombs over Japan in World War 11, with specific. proposals for control being madle primarily in 1946 at the meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and during the negotiations and final agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In spite of these past efforts, nuclear proliferation is occurring and, if the popular press is to be believed, beyond the control of the United States. Not all Members of Congress agree with this widespread assumption, and efforts are again being made to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Senate Government Operations Committee has passed a bill, S. 1439, the "Export Reorganization Act of 19'76," which hopes to reduce proliferation by reorganizing certain export functions of the Federal Government. The House has passed House Concurrent Re.-olution 570 which also addressed the nuclear proliferation issue. Ini addition, Mr. Longr of Maryvland has another resolution, House Resolution 951, which calls for the establishment of a, House select comnmittee to explore the nuclear export policy of the United States and the worldwide nuclear proliferation issue." This resolution, it should be noted, has over 120 cosponsors.
The Joint Committee on Atomnic Energy has scheduled hearings on June 22 and June 29 on the bill. S. 1439, where it is expected that many of these issues will be discussed.
For background on these issues, I recently drse w usin
to the Congressional Research Service. The first question was, "W'hat controls could the United States exercise over n cear proli fera tion?" The second question was closely rela ted, since, it dealt within one suggested option for controlling p~roliferationi. Thalt question was, "Ils leasing of reactor fuel. a viable option to control proliferation?"
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Tii order to share these answers with my colleagues, I will insert them in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks. One point should be highlighted, however, since it relates, to a biII9 H.R. 84019 the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act of 1976, which is now on the House i,-alendar- That point is that if the private enrichment plants, which are partially authorized in H.R. 8401, are built, the leasing option Will be much more difficult to negotiate. The other point, also related to H.R. S401, which should be made is that if the United States expects to convince other nations not to build reprocessing facilities, the United States, will have to expand its own enrichment capacity.
I offer the CRS materials for my colleagues review.
The material follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., June 16, 1976
To: The Honorable George Brown. Attention: T. Lynch. Froin: Varren H. Donnelly, Senior Specialist, Energy Environment and Natural
Resources Policy Division
Subject: Control of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Question 1. What controls could the United States exercise over nuclear proliferation?
In replying to this question, I have sought to identify conceivable measures which the United States could consider to control further proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons among nations that now do not have them. Some measures would require international actions, others could be unilateral by the A:nited States. The options listed vary greatly in probable acceptability because some of them would require substantial 'changes in the relations between nations individually, and between the developed nations and those seeking to develop into industrial states. I have not excluded such options, however, because acceptability depends so much upon the urgency which the reader assigns to control of proliferation and the relative priority he would assign to it in comparison with ,other national and international problems. If, as some analysts and statement indicate, control of proliferation is truly the gravest long-term threat we facegoraver than famine or energy shortages, for example-then certain measures would be acceptable simply because of the press of events and fears of nuclear holocaust. If, however, control of proliferation is viewed as but one of many urgent problems, then the range of acceptable measures would be narrowed and individual measures subject to compromise in the give and take. The purpose of the following listing is to indicate the range of potential international actions the United States could promote and the range of unilateral actions it could take to control proliferation.
Briefly, the conceivable measures to control further proliferation include:
1. Removing nuclear material from world use.
2. Reducing pressure's to proliferate.
3. Keeping nuclear explosive materials and technology out of the hands of nonweapons nations and subnational groups.
4. Making theft, diversion or sabotage more difficult.
5. Increasing the probability of detection of theft or diversion of nucleaX materials.
6. Applying sanctions or other measures against nations which undertake or persist in those nuclear activities which are particularly dangerous to world peace and to the security of the United States.
Each category includes subordinate measures that the United States could undertake in cooperation with other nations, or unilaterally.
1. Remove nuclear materials from world use.
The most drastic control of nuclear proliferation, if it could be accomplished, would be to remove all nuclear materials from the possession and use by persons,
-organizations and nations. To do so would require the collection of all nuclear materials, from all weapons and all nuclear power plants and related facilities; the dispersion of that material back into nature in some unrecoverable form; the sealing of all uranium and thorium mines and absolute prohibitions of their further use; the erasure from world literature of all information about nuclear energy; the deletion from all teaching and instruction of any information about nuclear






73

energy; and the isolation from society for the remainder of their livs of all persons with knowledge and experience in the use of nuclear energy for military and civil purposes.'
A lesser unilateral measure for U.S. action would be to declare a national moratorium on use of nuclear energy, shut down all nuclear establishments, and destroy all nuclear weapons as an example to the world. A more limited option would be a national ineratorium on civil use of nuclear energy in the hope of convincing other nations to do likewise. Note, however, that abolishing civil use of nuclear energy throughout the world woud substantially reduce, but not stop proliferation because civil nuclear power is not necessary for the production of nuclear explosive materials.
II. Reduce pressures to proliferate.
1. International measuresa. Convince non-weal)ons nations that they do not need nuclear weapons for their security and well-being.
b. Begin to substantially reduce present levels of nuclear armaments of the United States and the Soviet Union, as each nation is committed to do under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby demonstrating that the superpowers do not regard nuclear weapons as necessary.
c. Conclude an effective, comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that also bars testing of peaceful nuclear explosives.
d. Establish additional regional nuclear free zones such as provided by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and for Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.
e. Provide reliable international assurances to nations that clandestine production of nuclear explosive materials and devices by neighbors or competitors will be detected.
f. Persuade more nations to ratify the NPT and so to forswear use of nuclear weapons. Provide incentives and special treatment for nations that ratify.
g. Persuade nuclear weapons nations to pledge no first use of nuclear weapons against non-weapons states.
h. Improve ways for nations to settle disputes without resort to threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons.
2. Unilateral measuresa. United States reduction of its nuclear arms stockpile and use of recovered nuclear explosive materials for nuclear fuel.
b. United States pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons against a non-weapons state, or against any state.
III. Keep nuclear explosive materials and technology out of the hands of nonnuclear weapons nations.
A. Reduce the need for nuclear power by non-weapons countries:
1. International measuresa. Provide reliable, economically competitive supplies of oil, coal, and synthetic fuels to developing nations so they would not need nuclear power.
b. Provide technical and financial assistance to develop indigenous fuel and energy resources, perhaps via the International Atomic Energy Agency.
c. Exchange oil, coal and synthetic fuels for uranium from developing countries on an energy equivalence basis.
2. Unilateral measuresa. Expedite U.S. development of energy supply technologies suitable for developing countries and creation of iiidumtries to make, export, install and help service such technologies. Primary candidates would include solar energy, inproved water turbines, wind machine,,, etc.
b. Provide attractive U.S. financial assistance for use of such alternatives instead of nuclear power.
e. Provide U.S. training for technical personnel of such countries in these technologies.
B. Reduce the need of non-weapons nations to produce and possess weaponsgrade nuclear materials.
1. International measuresa. Encourage nuclear interdependence among nations, particularly between nuclear supplier nations and other nations, so that national nuclear indepr ndence is not considered to be necessary for the economic health and future of nations using nuclear energy.

IEven if all these things were done, the folklore and culture would still Include enough Information so that future scientists could rediscover uranium, fission and nuclear explosives.






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b. Establish international ownership and operation of all nuclear energy facilities throughout the world. (A revival and updating, of the Baruch plan of 1946.)
c. Establish multinational, regional centers tinder IAEA safeguards for production of enriched uranium, reprocessing of used nuclear fuels, storage of fissionable materials, fabrication of fis-sionable materials into nuclear fuel elements, temporary storage of used nuclear fuels, and permanent management of radioactive wastes from reprocessing operations.
d. Persuade prcs(mt nuclear supplier states to guarantee a supply of enriched uranium to other nations Rot interruptible for political or foreign policy reasons.
e. Establish regional nuclear fuel repositories tinder IAEA control and safeauards which could store perhaps a year's working inventory of nuclear fuel per country so as to insulate them from interruption of access to enriched uranium.
f. Persuade nuclear supplier states to limit export of nuclear fuels to natural uranium and to low enriched uranium. (Use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium would be permissible only within nuclear supplier states.)
g. Persuade nuclear supplier nations not to sell but rather to lease nuclear fuels and to require return of used fuels to the supplier state or to a multinational fuel reprocessing center.
h. Persuade nuclear supplier states to offer a credit for plutonium estimated to be contained in returned used nuclear fuels, the credit to be in cash, or in an enriched uranium of equivalent energy content.
2. Unilateral measuresa. Guarantee future supply of U.S. enriched uranium to those nations that agree not to reprocess nuclear fuels or to build and operate any reprocessing facility I
b. 6ff*er to lease U.S. enriched uranium at prices attractive enough for user nations to accept U.S. conditions and controls.
c. Ban the export of U.S. enriched uranium to any nation, other than present nuclear supplier nations, that reprocess used nuclear fuels.
C. Slow the spread of the ability to make nuclear materials and weapons:
1. International measuresa. Persuade nuclear supplier nations not to export technology, plant and equipment, or to provide technical assistance, training, or financial assistance for the construction and operation of facilities to enrich uranium or to produce plutonium.
b. Persuade non-supplier nations, to accept an annual IAEA survey of indigenous nuclear industries to assess their capability to produce nuclear explosive materials or weapons.
c. Offer nuclear supplier nations the benefits of a market-sharing arrangement for nuclear power exports in return for measure (a) above.
d. Emphasize the NPT commitment not to assist "in any way" a non-nuclear state to make nuclear explosive devices.
e. Persuade ratifiers of the NPT to agree to removal of the obligation in Article V to make available the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to non-nuclear weapons nations, and provide non-nuclear ways of obtaining the expected benefits of these devices,
2. Unilateral measuresa. Ban the U.S. export of technology, materials, plant and equipment for construction and operation of facilities to produce enriched uranium or plutonium except to multinational fuel centers.
b. Ban all U.S. nuclear exports to nations which will not:
(1) Ratify the NPT or submit all of their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.
(2) Agree to abstain from building and operating any enrichment or reprocessing facility except, for the present nuclear nations.
c. Ban Export-Import Bank assistance for nuclear power to nations that will not comply with (b) above.
d. Ban all forms of U.S. economic, military and other assistance to those nuclear supplier nations that, through exports and other assistance, help other nations to build and operate national fuel enrichment or reprocessing plants.
e. Limit training of foreign nationals in the Unitted States in nuclear technology tonationals of those nations which agree to U.S. policy on nuclear export control.

2 NOTE. This measure would require prompt expansion of the U.S. domestic enrichment capacity.







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D. Keep nuclear explosive materials out of the hands of developing countries.
1. International measuresa. Ban the export of highly enriched uranium or plutonium except that incorporated in fabricated nuclear fuel.
b. Bani the export of nuclear power reactors that require highly enriched uranium for fuel.
2. Unilateral measuresa. Ban U.S. export of enriched uranium or plutonium not incorporated in fabricated nuclear fuel.
b. Ban U.S. export of nuclear power reactors that require highly enriched uranium for fuel.
IV. Make theft, diversion or sabotage more difficult.
1. International measuresa. Convene an international convention to reach and ratify internati >nal agreement to authorize, fund and direct the Initerna:tional Atomic Energy Agency to establish standards for the physical protection (of nuclear materials and install:tions for civil purposes and for the transportation of nuclear materials; and to authorize the Agency to regularly inspect for compliance with such standardand to publish the results of its inspections.
b. Establish an international nuclear security force to protect international shipments of nuclear materials including high-level wastes.
c. (1) Arrange for international collection analysis and uce of intellig.ence information to anticipate attempted theft or diversion of nuclear materials, claiidestine production of nuclear materials and weapons, and sabotage of nuclear installations; (2) intercept and prevent such attempts; (3) capture and hold persons involved in such attempts; (4) recover stolen materials.
d. Establish theft, diversion of nuclear material and its subsequent misuse, and sabotage of nuclear facilities and shipments as serious international crimes to be tried in world court.
e. Consolidate the several different IAEA safeguards systems into one single, coherent system with emphasis upon personal inspection.
2. Unilateral measuresa. Require analysis and assessment of physical security systems available to protect U.S. exports, and upgrade phy-ical security as may be necessary to meet U.S. requirements, as a prerequisite forl an export license. Perhaps reqire eCmpliance with U.S. standards of IAEA standards for all nuclear materials and facilities rather than solely those received from the United States.
b. Require recipient nations to agree( to subsequent U.S. physical security inspections and to correct deficiencies found.
V. Increase the probability of detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials.
1. International measuresa. Persuade nuclear supplier nations to require all norn-weapons recipient nations to place all of their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards as a condition of export and all other assistance in use of nuclear energy.
b. Strengthen IAEA safeguards by:
(1) Combining the several present IAEA s:afeguards systems into one unified, coherent system, which emphasizes personal inspection.3
(2) Beginning a planned expansion of IAEA inspection and safeguards caability (system, personnel, plant and equipment) to be refdy for the anticipl.d substantial expansion in nuclear energy in the early 19'-s.
(3) Improving systems; technologies, instrumentation and equipment for national and international safeguards sys tems.
(4) Increasing public credibility of IAEA safeguards by reducing the secrcev on details of IAEA agreements for application of safeguards and re-u'ts of IAL.L inspections.
(5) Providing a reliable, independent source of financing, IAEA -a fuard perhaps by an international tax on generation of nuclear energy, or inspecti n fee.
(6) Establishing an international institute for safeguards research and for training of safeguards personnel of all nations.
2. Unilateral measuresa. Increase U.S. contributions to IAEA safeguards activities to both increase and improve the inspection force and to better equip it with field and ianoratry instruments and equipment.

SAt present the IAEA safeguards system for NPT nations diffl r frm nt f r r, nNPT natiois. The former empihasizes use t sYof stns l1a d pe 1ial eq~ i1v a vi i ,i i inspec-,ion rights. The latter emphasizes unrestricted access of iip,:ut r> to n .ilatr facilities.
T3-642-76-6






76,

b. Expedite completion of the long-delayed agreement between the Un4ed States and the IAEA to voluntarily place selected U.S. nuclear facilities ulider IA&A, safeguards. Make available information about details of the agreement and subsequent inspections that normally are held secret for IAEA safeguards agreements with other countries.
c. Help to recruit well qualified personnel for all IAEA posts.
d. Establish a continuing training program in ERDA facilities for IAEA Aafeguards personnel and their counterparts from national safeguards programs.
VI. Apply sanctions or other measures to those nations which persist in. nuclear activities that are particularly dangerous to world peace and to the security of the United States.
1. International measuresa. By international convention and treaty, or by super-power agreement, provide for sanctions and other measures to be taken against any present nonweapons nation that:
(1) Constructs and operates enrichment or plutonium production facilities.
(2) Develops and tests nuclear explosives of any sort.
(3) Violates NPT commitments or IAEA safeguards agreements.
(4) Provides haven for nuclear saboteurs or criminals.
b. Persuade nuclear supplier nations to apply sanctions and take other measures against such nations, and against any supplier nation which helps a non-, weapons state to acquire the ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear material'
2. Unilateral measuresa. Cut off present and future U.S. nuclear assistance of any kind to developing nations that undertake to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
b. Cut off all forms of nuclear and economic assistance to supplier nations'that help developing nations to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
c. Cut off all forms of nuclear and economic aid to those non-weapons nations which will not either ratify the NPT or agree to IAEA inspections of all their nuclear activities.
I d. Declare that persistence in certain dangerous nuclear activities will be
regarded by the United States as hostile to its security and interests.
Question 2. Is leasing of reactor fuel a viable option to control proliferation?
SUMMARY
The leasing of reactor fuel by nuclear supplier nations or by an international or perhaps multinational, regional organization could be one effective way to help to control proliferation by eliminating reasons for nonsupplier nations to reprocess plutonium and re-use it as a fuel. By helping to keep plutonium out of the hands ofl non-supplier nations, leasing would substantially reduce the possibility that plutonium-would be stolen or diverted in such nations to make nuclear weapons or other terrorist devices. National or international leasing'of nuclear fuel, however, might have some disadvantages to be considered.
DISCUSSION
The problem
The proposal addresses a central dilemma of proliferation control, which is: If developing nations -are supplied with the means to exploit nuclear energy, how can those nations which supply the technology, fuels and hardware hope toretard the proliferation of nuclear explosives and still provide the means of increasing the standard of living of these nations through nuclear energy?
An underlying proposition which leads to this dilemma is that developing nations of the world will have to use uranium to reduce their dependence on imported oil.
The proposal
Leasing of nuclear fuels has been proposed to limit or slow proliferation by keeping plutonium out of the hands of developing countries. This follows from the observation that proliferation is not as much affected by the presence- of nuclear powerplants, as by the presence of used nuclear fuels from which the countries could recover the nuclear explosive plutonium and so be able to make nuclear weapons.







77

The proposal would substantially close thi- route to proliferation b having nuclear supplier nations or an international ( worldwide) or multinational (regional) organization lease nuclear fuel to using nations. After the fuel has produced its designed amount o()f energy, it would be returned to the supplier which would own the c(on stained p)lut(onium and would decide what to do with it. The lease fee would depend upon the energy content of the fuel.
Such a leasing system would mean that non-nuclear weapons states would have no economic reason to build and operate fuel reprocessing plants, and the building such a plant would then be a suspicious act, a signal of the start of a weapons effort which could be countered by diplomatic and other measures.
Advantages of the proposal
(1) Nations other than the few supplier nations have no economic reason to reprocess, recovered plutonium.
(2) User nations would not have to store used fuels or intensely radioactive wastes from fuel reprocessing.
(3) User nations would have no reason to build and operate uranium enrichment plants which might be used to produce weapons-grade uranium.
Matters for consideration
(1) A proposal for leasing would have to consider the relation between the nuclear supplier nations and those non-supplier nations that are sources of natural uranium.
(2) Leasing could imply that only nuclear supplier nations could own uranium and could control its production and use. If so, it would not address production of uranium by those developing nations which have uranium resources and suLbsequent use of that nuclear fuel in power reactors designed for natural uranium fuel.5
(3) Criteria for setting lease charges would have to be established. For example, would the supplier nations set a common price analagous to OPEC oil pricing or would charges be competitive? Also, to what extent, if any, would leasing nations expect to make a profit, or, on the other hand, to subsidize the rates to provide a financial incentive?
(4) For a leasing system to be acceptable to user-nations, supplier nations must provide credible assurance of reliable supply. This implies that supplier nations would have to convince user nations that they would not threaten to withhold or interrupt supplies of nuclear fuel for political or foreign policy reasons. For example, the United States would have to forgo using the threat to cut off nuclear fuel supply as a way to influence policies of other nations. This problem, however, would diminish as the number of supplier nations increased.
(3) Private ownership of fissionable materials in the United States poses the question: Could the United States advocate leading of nuclear fuel to user nations while permitting private ownership and reprocessing of nuclear fuels by the U.S. nuclear power industry?
(6) Leasing procedures would have to be established. Would the leasing approach be accomplished through formal international agreement or treaty, or by informal understanding?
(7) The proposal suggests possible requirement of some form of international or external control of prospecting, mining and milling for uranium in non-supplier states.
(8) The proposal implies that nuclear supplier nations could recover and use plutonium as a domestic nuclear fuel, presumably saving normal or slightly enriched uranium for exports. If this is contemplated, however, the proposal lands squarely in the midst of the current controversy over risks from plutonium am a nuclear fuel. Also, would leasing contemplate the export of plutonium mixed with uranium (mixed oxide) in fabricated nuclear fuel elements to user nations?

4 The principal nuclear supplier nations for enriched uranium are the United States and the Soviet Union. \VWithbin a few years a multinational enrichliment plant in F'ra:P, is scheduled to supply enricheld uranium, and beyond that are prospects that Ith l Vnited Kin-doni, West Germany and Holland within a few years inay prove the economic and te.hn ical feasibility of an alternative enrichminent pro(e- the ce ntri fuwe oros. Major suIppliers of complete nuclear power raetors iIclud(ie the Unit(ed Siat s. tie Soviet Union, the United Kinedoi, Canada, France and West Germany. Japan will probably be a major supplier within a few years.
5 Canada has developed a power reactor that uses natural uranium for fuel. the( CANI)U reactor. Argentina and India have such reactors under construction or in use and Canada plans to export the designs and technology for building such reactors.






78

(9) Would lease charges be negotiated individually with user nations, or woulct. an across-the-board leasing schedule be adopted by the suppliers, acting aa a monopoly or cartel?
A background note
The idea of limiting nuclear proliferation by controlling ownership of fissionable materials is not new. Indeed, it was the keystone of the U.S. proposals put forward by Bernard Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in, 1946, which called for international ownership and control of nuclear facilities and materials. When that proposal failed, Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act. of 1946, applied the concept to the domestic use of atomic energy. Under the original atomic energy act, the Government owned all nuclear materials and leased them to users. In retrospect, this was an extraordinary legislative act because it intervened directly in the operations of the free enterprise, private property concepts if the United States' economy. Government ownership was continued to, the major overhaul of the atomic energy legislation in 1954 and it was not until the Private Ownership Amendments of 1964 that Congress permitted special nuclear materials to be owned by private parties within the United States.6
MMMM
Pub. L. 88-489, 78 Stat. 602, Aug; 22, 1964a













APPENDIX B


NUCLEAR EXPORT AND CONTROL

Page
B-1. Executive Order 11902, "Procedures for an Export
Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment": February 2, 1976 ------------------------- 80
B-2. Statement prepared by NRC(, "Export Licensing Procedures, Nuclear Rtegulatory Commission": April,
1976 -------------------------------------------82
B-3. Table, "Nuclear Power Supply Capabilities of Various
Countries": March 1, 1976 ----------------------- 84
B-4. Table, "'Estimnated Cumulative Value of Enriching
Services and Reactor Sales to Exporting Country
Through December, 1975" -------------------------85
B-5. Senate Resolution 221 concerning "International Safeguards of Nuclear Materials": December 12, 1975- 86 B-6. Statement by Senator Svm igton, "Nuclear Suppliers
Illusion": November 4, 1975- --------------------- 88
B-7. Statement by Senator Symmington, "Unwarranted Nuclear Secrecy": April 6, 1976 ---------------------- 90
B-8. Statement by Fred C. Ikle, Director ACDA, concerning
the Nuclear Siipplie s Conferences and Principles to
Guide Future Nuclear Exports: February 23, 1976 92 B-9. Table prepared by NRC, "Rocap of Licening Activities
and Projection for Expected Applications": April,
1976 -------------------------------------------94
B-10. Table prepared by NRC, "Nuclear Export License
Issued, May 1, 1975-April 30, 1976" ----------------95
B-11. Table prepared by NRC "Pending Export License,
April 30, 1976" ----------------------------------97
(79)











APPENDix B-1


PRESIDENTIALDOCUMENTS
TITLE 3-THE PRESIDENT
Executive Order 11902, February 2, 1976
Proceditres for an Export Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and
Equipment
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission the licensing and related regulatory functions previously exercised by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The exercise of discretion and control over nuclear exports within the limits of law concerns the authority and responsibility of the President with respect to the conduct of foreign policy and the ensuring of the common defense and security.
It is essential that the Executive branch inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of its views before the Commission issues or denies a license, or grants an exemption.
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Atomic Enercry Act of 1954 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and as President of the United States of America., it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. (a) The Secretar y of State is designated to receive from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a copy of each export license application, each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a general license for export, and each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for exemption from the requirement for a license, which mav involve a determination, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 19 54, as amended, that the issuance of the license or exemption from the requirement for a license will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.
(b) The Secretary of State shall ensure that a copy of each such application, proposed general 'license, or proposed exemption is received by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Director, and the head of any other department or agency which may have an interest therein, in order to afford them the opportunity to express their views, if any, on whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted.
(80)





81

SEC. 2. Within thirty (lays of receipt of a copy of a license appication, proposed general license, or proposed exemption, the Secretar'y of Defense, the Secretary of Conmnierce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head of any other agency or department to which such copy has been transmitted, shall each transmit to the Secretary of State his views, if any, on whether and under what conditions the license should be issued or the exemption granted.
SEC. 3. The Secretary of State shall, after the provisions of section 2 of this order have been complied with, transmit to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head of any other department or agency who has expressed his views thereon, a proposed position of the Executive branch as to whether the license should be issued or the exemption grante(1, inculdmg a proposed judgment as to whether issuance of the hcene or granting of the exemption will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.
SEC. 4. If the heads of departments and agencies specified in section 2 of this order are unable to agree upon a position for the Executive branch, the Secretary of State shall refer the matter to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council in order to obtain a decision. In the event the Under Seci-etaries Committee is unable to reach a decision, the Chairman of that Committee shall refer the matter to the President for his decision.
SEC. 5. The Secretary of State, after taking the actions required by this order, shall notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the position of the Executive branch as to whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted, including the judgment of the Executive branch as to whether issuance of the license or granting of the exemption will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. The Executive branch position shall be supported by relevant information and documentation as appropriate to the proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
GERALD R. FORD.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 2, 1976.
[FR Doe. 76-3382 Filed 2-2-76 ;11 :23 am]











APPENDIX B-2

EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoAIMIssioN: APRIL 1976
When NRC receives an export license application, it will be distributed to relevant NRC staff and, at the same time, forwarded to the State Department, which will be asked for a presentation embodying the data NRC requires as well as the formal views of the Executive Branch on the given license request.
Under Executive Order 11902, dated February 2, 1976, entitled "Procedures for an Export Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment" (F.R. Vol. 41, No. 23, Page 4877), the Department of State is designated as the agency to receive copies of export license applications, proposed general licenses and proposed exemptions from the requirement for a license, from the Nuclear Regulatory Coimission and to ensure that a copy of each such application is received by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the head of any other department or agency which may have an interest therein, in order to afford them the opportunity to express their views, if any, on whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted.
For the purpose of assuring that the export will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and will meet the "common defense and security" requirement of the Atomic Energy Act, the following information inter alia will be developed and assessed by the relevant agencies:
1. What is the purpose for the export?
2. Does the recipient country have an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended? And, if so, is the export in question covered by the Agreement?
3. Has the recipient country accepted and implemented IAEA safeguards and/or other appropriate supplementary bilateral conditions (including, where applicable, understandings regarding reexport) imposed by the United States?
4. In cases in which the recipient country is not required by the NPT to accept JAEA safeguards, does the recipient country or organization have accounting and inspection procedures such as to assure compliance with the requirements of the relevant U.S. Agreement?
5. Does the recipient country have adequate physical security arrangements to deal with threats of sub-national diversion of significant quantities of nuclear weapon materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium)?
6. What is the position of the recipient country with regard to nonproliferation (e.g., party to NPT, LANFZ, public statements)?
(82)






83

7. What understandings does the United Ste have with the
recipient country with respect to the use of U.S.-supplied material or equipment to acquire or develop nuclear explosive devices for an y purpose, and as to tlhe recipient country's policies and aclions as In such development using equipment and maIterial firom "iy sil-ce'?
8. What other factors are there wlich bear onl the issuance of tlle export license, such as further U.S. understa(iidizs with thle recipe ielt country, other suppl)lier countries or interestel regional county ri -?
While the NRC will not directly participate in ihe Exective aencies' development and evaluation of t"his iforiat ion, N R(C wili be in regular staff level communication with the executive Bramncl :, at particular concerns of the Conission can be taken into account in the Executive Branch review.
The Executive Branch will then forward to the NRC an analvsis of the pertinent and required information, as well as a coordiited Executive Branch view on the license application. The Execitive Branch has advised us that if the involvIed Executive agencies should be unable to resolve any differ ences in view during thle development of the analysis, these differences will thelo be resolved throuTh, th mechanism of the National Security Council aud ultitmatelv 1by t ie President himself, if necessary. The NRC will be made aware of this process by the Executive Branch.
The Commission will consider the Executive Branch presenttion prior to making the NRC determination on the license. In reaching its decision, the Comminission will also take into account alt other matters of record in the licensing proceeding, including contributions to the record of its own staff, the applicant and such others who may be parties to the proceeding.
Within the NRC, is-suance of the following licenses will be approved in advance by the Conmmnission itself:
Any license involving more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material, as defined in 10 CFR Part 70;
Any license involving 10,000 kilograms or more of source material; Any license for a production or utilization facility or major component thereof;
Any other license having policy implications.
Routine applications not covered by the above criteria will be acted( on, within NRC, by the NRC staff.























APPENDIX B-3




NUCLEAR POWER SUPPLY CAPABILITIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES:
MARCH 1, 1976


Other
major
reactor Uranium
NSSS corn p0- ore U30a-UFs Fuel Spent fuel Enrichment
Country vendors I nent process- conver- fabrica- reproc- facilities
vendors ing sion tion essing,

Argentina---------------------------------X -----------------Australia ---------------------------------X -----------------Belgium'2------------- X X X ------ X X
Canada-------------- XX X X ------France 2------------- X X X X X X X
Federal Republic of
Germanys'---------- X X X X X X X
I ndia --------------- X X X X X X
Italy 2-------------X ---- X------------ X X X
Japan --------------- X X ------ X X X
Netherlands'3------------------- X- ------------------------ X---------- X
Portugal'2---------------------------------X -----------------South Africa-------------------------------X -----------------Spain-------------------------- X X- ------------------------ X
Sw eden - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sw itzerland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.S.R -------------x X X XIX4XX4X
United Kingdom -------- X X--- ------------ X X X X3
United States ---------- X X X X X X3 X

INuclear steam supply system (independent capability-Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and others through a license or by subcontracting).
2 Member of Euratom.
3 Site of centrifuge enrichment facilities of tripartite group-Netherlands, United Kingdom, West Germany.
4 Not known to have been offered internationally but the capabilities are believed to exist.
6 U.S. reprocessing facilities presently have no contracts for reprocessing foreign spent reactor fuel and no spare capacity for further contracting.
(84)

























APPENDIX B-4



ESTIMATED CU.MULATIVE VALUE OF ENRICHING SERVICES AND
REACTOR SALES TO EXPORTING COUNTRY THROUGH DECEMBER, 1975


Power reactor sales
Enriching Number
services of re- Amount
Exporting country (billions) actors (billions)' Remarks on financing

United States ------------------ Over $19.2' .... 3 48 $9.8 Eximbank with flexible down payment
and interest rates below commercial interest rates.
U.S.S.R ----------------------- About $1.65 4.. 5 .3 Barters on some sales.
Urenco (Netherlands, United $2.16' ---------------------------- International credit, joint ownership.
Kingdom, and Federal Republic
of Germany).
United Kingdom-Capenhurst .... $0.26 ---------- 2 .1
France-Eurodif ------------ $11.43 --------- 9 2.2 BFCE credit agency, with up to 100 percent
financing with flexible interest. France- Pierrelatte ----------- $0.86 -----------------------------Federal Republic of Germany --- See Urenco ----- 7 1.8 KEW credit agency, with up to 75 percent
financing, generally higher than prime rate.
Canada ----------------------------------- 5 .5 EDC credit agency, with up to 60 percent on
some reactors.
Sweden --------------------------------------- 2 .4

I Based on assumption that $300/KWe accrues to exporting country.
2 Based on 1975 price levels.
3 Does not include U.S. share of sales by licenses of U.S. companies or by joint ventures. 4 Based on estimated price of $45/SWU, excluding fuel for reactors in bloc countries.
5 Excludes 17 reactors exported to bloc countries-$2 billion.
(85)












APPENDIX B-5


INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS [Excerpt fromn the Congressional Record, December 12, 1975. Page S 21961.]


Thc resolution (S. Res. 221) urging the President of the United States to take the leadership in seeking international cooperation in strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials, was considered and agreed to.
The preamble was itgr ebe redtaoolos
Tjhe resolution, withitpraberadasflo :
Resobwdm, That the President seek the immediate international consideration of strengthening the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and seek intensified cooperation with other nuclear suppliers to insure that most stringent safeguard conditions are applied to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.
Whereas the Senate of the United States, ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferabion of Nuclear Weqpons (NPT) in recognition of the devastation associated with a nuclear war and of the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war;
Whereas the parties, to the treaty expressed a common belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war;
Whe reas the United States and other parties to the treaty pledged to accept specified saf~ guards regarding the transfer to nonnuclearweapon states of special nuclear materials and facilities for the processing, use, or production of such mat-erials;
Whereas recent events-, including the explosion of nuclear events, including the explosion of nuclear devices, the development of uranium enrichment facilities, and the proposed transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to nonnuclear-weapon states, emphasize the imperative need to increase the scope, comprehensiveness, and effec tiveness of internatoal safegu ards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. capability;
Whereas the Senate of the United States is particularly concerned about the consequences of transactions without effective safeguards that could lead to the production of plutonium and other special nuclear materials by nonnuclear-weapon states throughout the world; and
Whereas the Senate is particularly concerned about the proliferation threat posed by the possibility of the development in the near future of a large number of independent national enrichment and reprocessing facilities and therefore believes that the United States should take





87

the lead in securing agreement for the (lex'eloprnent of regional mullti-national, rather than nat ionial, centers to un(lertAe en1riclinient andl r-eprocessing activities iin order to minimize the spread of technology which could be used to develop) nuclear elois:Now, therefol ," be it,
Resoli'ed, Thlat the Senate of the Uitited States sAtrorgly reqiiets,, and urges the Presijdent, to seek through the highest level of consutlt ation in the United Nations and with, the othei leaders, of the world community, an inten,;iVe cooperatiN-e ut ernatjoijat effort to 51 rengrIlien, and improve both, the scopecmrhsvns, and effectiveness
of the international stifeo-mards on peaceful nuclearIi activities s-o that, there wvili be t-) substantial and immediate reductions lin the ri- k of diversion or theft of phIntoniuim and oilier- special nuclear materials to military or oilher uses fltt would jeoJ, icdize worlId peace andl secu li x be it fur-therRC8olccd, That the Peintseek, thirough con~iiltafion with su ippliers of nuclear equipment -and technology their re.1strainit In the transfer of nutclear technology and their cooperation ina~rn that such equipment, tn( technology onily, is tr-ansierrcd to o~ her natiloniisunilei the most rigoirous, pirttdenit, and safeguat-rded conditions designedl to assur th0 h techoe g I--elf 'is not employ ed for tIie production of -nuele.,r explosive es; andl le it fun other
IRcsolcred, That the S&'crcetaiy of the Senatte is dlirectedl to tran init copies of -this res -_olution to the Presildent of t United States and to the Secretary of Sta-c.











APPENDIX B-6


STATEMENT BY SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON, IN THE U.S. SENATE CONCERNING "NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS JLLLUSION" : NOVEMBER 4, 1975
[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 4, 1975, p. S19159]


Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, France's sale of nuclear reprocessing equipment to South Korea-the subject of a recent editorial in the New York Times-is just one more example of how national commnercial interests continue to override any consideration of nuclear weapons control.
Note that France is one of the nuclear supplier nations meeting in London in semisecrecy, supposedly to come up with a plan to control nuclear weapons spread.
Note also that West Germany-which recently sold a complete nuclear weapons fuel cycle to Brazil-is also a participant in this suppliers conference.
From the actions of these nations it would appear there is a lack of progress at that meeting though the illusion of progress is being maintained by public spokesmen.
One can only wonder whether the desire to control nuclear weapons spread really exists among certain supplier nations.
I ask unanimous consent that this editorial, "French Nuclear Spread," be reprinted in the Record.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 29, 1975]
FRENCH NUCLEAR SPREAD
By deciding to sell South Korea equipment and technology to produce weaponsgrade plutonium, the explosive material for atomic bombs, France has taken mankind a long step toward worldwide spread of nuclear weapons-and ultimate disaster.
For thirty years, the United States and other advanced nuclear countries have refused to sell such equipment. Then West Germany broke ranks in June by agreeing to sell Brazil a similar pilot reprocessing plant.
Apart from the threat to non-proliferation policy-and violation of the spirit of of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which both West Germany and France have pledged to honor-the Korean deal poses special dangers.
Divided Korea is the tinder box of Asia, with massive armies of the Communist North and the American-backed South facing each other across the 38th Parallel. North Korean ambitions to reunify the country by force, as was attempted in the 1950-53 war, have been reawakened by American withdrawal from Indochina. The South Korean nuclear move could provide a pretext for a Northern attack-or lead to the even more dangerous nuclear arming of North Korea, stimulating dormant pressure for nuclear weapons in Japan.
The prolonged eff orts of American officials to discourage France and West Germany from their nuclear deals undoubtedly would have had a far better chance of success if Secretary Kissinger and President Ford had not over-pessimistically refused to engage their own personal prestige, and the full influence of the United States, for fear of a profitless crisis with major allies.
(88)





89

After an overly cautious approach to the issue, Secretary of Stat, Kisingr has belatedly underscored the awesome risks involved, when he told the United Nations General Assembly last month: "The greatest single danger of tiunrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants."

One urgent need is to step up American efforts to estlablish niulti-in:ttial regional nuclear fuel centers. Spent but still radioactive fuel rods could thls he securely stored for possible future use, if reprocessing ever becomes safe and co(mmercially feasible.
More important would be a genuine effort to provide the world with an at-ired supply of enriched uranium, a far cheaper fuel than plutmoniun would be e\ on if the breeder reactor proved safe and commercially feasible by the 1990's. Neither this country nor the world can afford further delays in expanding uranium enrichment capacity.
Finally, it is essential that the United States hold firm in it-, thirty-year p) liY of( refusing to spread nuclear weapons capability around lie world, whatever the French and Germans do now. The p)r(essur(es undoubtedly will be intene. A 7billion reactor order from Iran is hung up right now on Washington's insistence that the site and form of plutonium reprocessing, if ever economic, be subject to joint agreement. To hold firm on this position and the American refusal to sell power reactors to Egypt-unless there is a guarantee that the spent f el red will be processed abroad-will be difficult unless a more vigorous effort is niiade to reverse French and West German policy or, at the very least, to obtain assurances that no further such sales will be made.
The alternative is a world of a dozen or more states brandishing their nicle:ir arsenals within the next decade, in such a circumstance, the threat of niulear holocaust would be immeasurable.













APPENDIX B-7


Statement by Senator Stuart Smntinthe U.S. Senate, Concerning "Unwarranted Nuclear Secrecy", April 6, 1976
[Excerpted from the Congressional Record, Apr. 6, 1976, page S 5,028]


Mr. President, for years now all of us on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee have known that the unnecessary secrecy which has pervadled and still pervades all aspects of our nuclear force effort has been (letriimental to both the security and prosperity of the United States.
The latest practical illustration of the logic of this position is currently well demonstrated b'y the secrecy which surrounds the meetings of the seven countries that produce nuclear material; which countries,. in unwarranted secrecy. have been meeting periodically in London.
Thle absurdity of this secrecy is now becoming a matter of world attention as well as something of deep concern to many of us in this couflti'.
As but one illustration of the above, Takuaioscnetta
an article in "The Economist" of February 28, 1976, be printed in the Recordi at the end of these remarks.
Mr. President, the first sentence of the first paragraph of this article sumis up the thrust of what we are saying. The sentence follows:

Control of nuclear technology looks more and more endangered by undue Secrecy, misplaced priorities in the less-developed countries, and the ambivalent role now played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

EXHIBIT No. 1
NUCLEAR INSPECTOR OR SALESMAN?
Control of nuclear tecllinology looks more and more endangered by undue secrecy, misplaced priorities in the less-developed countries, and the ambivalent role now played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The case for overhaul of the agency is urgent, for it is now being asked to take on new responsibilities in a regrettably piecemeal way. Few any longer take much notice of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
On Tuesday Britian laid a proposal on the table of the agency's governing board in Vienna, which is a direct result of the cosmetic gentlemen's agreement concocted last month by the -United States and six other nuclear-exporting countries. Britain suggests rewriting the standard JAPA agreements (usually signed by buyer and seller nations and by the agency) for supervision of nuclear sites. Ostensibly, the object is to make the rules more strict but in fact the new standard 11gree ment, by replacing several alternative types now used, would merely be a sim pli fi cation. Seliers of nuclear materials would not feel constrained (if they do now) in deals with nontreaty countries, and buyers would be saved from having to make a political display of their peaceful intentions by signing the treaty In short, Britain's proposal (on behalf of America, Canada, Denmark, Holland and Venezuela as well) lays the treaty to rest.
By definition, the agency's standard agreement will be technical and will therefore glos.s over the buyer country's promise not to use nuclear know-how to mna ke bombs. Those countries that obj ected to signing the non proliferation treaty were anyway unlikely to sign JALA agreements unless they thought their hands
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would remain relatively free. But the agency has ()ly 67 inspectors to cover sonie 400 atomic facilities worldwide. Nuclear t(})we'r stations are lpmpping u) everywhere, and the agency will have to inspect at least 1 ,00( facilities by 19S0. So, although new inspectors are )eing recruited, there will continue to be looj)li()les that cannot be plugged no matter how detailed the agency's rnarndate to sul)ervis(,.
January's wide agreement is still secret. Weirdly, the secrecy extends even to the IAEA, which, although it would police the regulations, did not take pa rt in the talks last year in London and has still not been formally notified ()f the outcome. However, the agreement is known to boil down to a vague c()niitment to forget about the treaty and to let nuclear peddlers sell their wares to anyone who is willing to accept standard IAEA safeguards. That does not seem much.
But the gentlemen's agreement could yet prove workable if the agency is ible to move its regulatory operations into high gear. Its j()b is to detect any diversion of nuclear materials from commercial to riilitary applications, but increasingly it has become more preoccupied with spreading conunercial nuclear power than with regulating its uses. The agency now spends about a third of its $37mn annual budget on site inspection and the supervision of health and safety regulations. These regulatory functions relate specifically to improper uses that might be made of commercial nuclear equipment or fuels. The remaining two-thirds of the budget goes on information and, notably technical assistance for developing nuclear power in the third woold. This is the IAEA's promotional business. It has grown tremendously in recent years.
Regulation and promotion are inconsistent. In 1974, the American Atomic Energy Commissio t was disbanded, and in its place two new bodies were
created, one to license and regulate nuclear power plants, the other to encourage their construction through research and development. Since then, the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proved far stricter in its regulatory duties than the old commission had ever been, much to the displeasure of the nuclear industry and of electricity producers. Their resentment is perhaps the best barometer of the success of the commission as a regulatory body.

EXPENSIVE POWER, EASY 13OMBS
Although officials in Vienna are certainly not trying to encourage weapons proliferation, they have become open partisans of greater use of nuclear power in the poor countries. The economics of nuclear power depend greatly on levels of interest rates and on assumed forward prices for other rates of energy, but at present the economic arguments tell against nulcear power except in the most populous and advanced countries of the third world, such as Brazil and Iran. Reactor types are generally too big for their needs. Now the IAEA is promoting smaller reactors and soliciting support from poor countries.
Furthermore, the agency is encouraging third-world countries to ask for a "nuclear power planning study" to assess the prospects for atomic energy. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia called in the IAEA early on, and the studies were completed last year. Others will follow. Aid although each of the studies is essentially an "energy audit," the common assumption is that, where at all possible, nuclear power should fill the gap between indigenous energy supplies and demand. That is a self-serving assumption to make, especially when a, wide range of alternative energy sources, notably solar, are only now coming on line. It is also politically undesirable. Most northerners should not want a body that their taxpayers help finance to be persuading the generall Amins of this world to make uneconomic decisions in favour of energy systems from which local nuclear bombs could be a byproduct.
There is an argument for providing information to the less-developed countries, but not for myopically promoting nuclear power in them. The sellers' cartel formed by the seven exporting countries, now trying to put some order into safeguard rules, should be the first to accept the need for the IAEA to spend all its time safeguarding, not promoting, the seven's exports. That is what Britain should have proposed this week.







73-642-76- 7









APPENDIX B-8


Statement of Fred C. Jkle, Director, United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency before the Subcommittee on Arms Controt, International Organizations and Security Agreements, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Monday, February 23,
1976

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.
This morning I would like to comment on two kinds of initiatives undertaken by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Executive Branch to deal with nuclear proliferation.
The first concerns nuclear exports, the second, multinational fuel centers.
The United States over the years has sought to work with other countries to insure that civil nuclear exports would be used only for peaceful purposes. We have recently had a number of bilateral and multilateral discussions with nuclear exporters to develop common rules on safeguards and export controls. As a result, the United States together with other exporters has decided to apply certain principles to our future nuclear exports. Most of these are consistent with current U.S. practice; some are new. All are designed to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons while permitting nuclear exports of equipment to meet the world's growing energy needs. These principles include the following:
The requirement that recipients must apply international (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear imports.
The requirement that the importer give assurances not to use these imports to make nulcear explosives for any purpose-whether called "peaceful" or not.
The requirement that the importer have adequate physical security for these nuclear facilities and materials to prevent theft and sabotage.
The requirement for assure ances that the importers will demand the same conditions on any re-transfer of these materials or types of equipment to third countries.
Now, on the question of more sensitive exports-those which involve fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water. We intend to use restraint in supply of these exports, particularly when we think they could add to the risk of proliferation.
In addition, in cases where we do export sensitive technology, we require that the importers obtain our consent before they re-transfer any sensitive nuclear technology to a third country.
These are the minimum standards the United States will apply to nuclear exports. We are. prepared to be more stringent when appropriate.
Together with other leading exporters of nuclear technology, we are also committed to follow-up efforts along there lines.
1. To promote international cooperation in exchanging information on plhysical security, on measures of protection of nuclear material
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