Science, technology, and diplomacy in the age of interdependence

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Science, technology, and diplomacy in the age of interdependence
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Library of Congress -- Congressional Research Service
United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on International Relations. -- Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
Library of Congress -- Congressional Research Service
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Foreword
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Other documents in the series
        Page v
        Page vi
    Table of Contents
        Page vii
        Page viii
        Page ix
        Page x
        Page xi
        Page xii
        Page xiii
        Page xiv
        Page xv
        Page xvi
    Letter of transmittal
        Page xvii
        Page xviii
    Acknowledgement
        Page xix
        Page xx
    Preface
        Page xxi
        Page xxii
    I. Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
    II. The global context of science, technology, and American diplomacy
        Page 9
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    III. Six cases illustrating the interaction of science, technology, and American diplomacy
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    IV. Six substantive issues which further illustrate the interaction
        Page 92
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    V. Initiative versus reactive foreign policy
        Page 196
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    VI. Bilateral versus multilateral diplomatic relationships
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    VII. High-technology diplomacy versus low-technology diplomacy
        Page 232
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    VIII. Roles and interactions of public and private institutions in international technology
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    IX. Independence versus interdependence
        Page 272
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    X. Long-range and short-range planning
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    XI. Some concluding observations
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    Science, technology, and American diplomacy: A selected, annotated bibliography by subject
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    Back Cover
        Back Cover 1
        Back Cover 2
Full Text








[COMMITTEE PRINT]


SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN

DIPLOMACY





SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DIPLOMACY IN

THE A E OF INTERDEPENDENCE





PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY THE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

(As part of an extended study of the interactions of science and
technology with United States foreign policy)


JUNE 1976



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $4.35














THOMAS E. MOQR GN enyvna hi
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wicni3ILIMS, OMFRD iit
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L H. FOUNTAIN, North
DANTE B. PASCELL, FloridaJONHBUAAli.Aabm
CHARLES C. DIGGS, R.,


BENJAMNS ROSENTA, Nw York EDADGBSTRJ.,PXVR&

LESTE L. WOLFF,
JONATHAN B. BIN GIUA NewYorkT
GIUS YATRON, PennsylvanaRBRI AOMRIs altnla
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Crln
MICHAEL HARRINGTON,
LEO J. RYAN, California
DONALD W. RIRGLE, JR,
CARDISS COLLINS,Illinois
STEPHEN J LR, Nw Yor
HELEN S. MYENwJre
ON BONKER,W
GERRY E. STUDDS,Mascuet











L. H. FOUNTAIN, NorthCaoiaPUFIDElins
JONATHAN B. BINGHM e okRBRI AOASNClfma
DONALD W. RIE(LE, JR., Mcia
GERRY E. STUDDS,Mascuet
GERER--DESbmn~ SafCnfn

DOAL R. FOTIR Mhi S'~Mf &W C!8&f





SHLL A. SHLOSafA8dn
(3:1)












FOREWORD


ience and technology are compelling determinants of the human
ition. In September 1975 the United Nations General Assembly
d to convene an international conference on science and tech-
7y. The intent of this move was to allow the technologically
heated and dynamic elements of the U.N. family to focus the
of the 1979 General Assembly on a concerted program of
%I advance. The agenda of this program would include economic,
1 political, and commercial concerns, but its backbone would be
biological and managerial.
ie depth and pervasiveness of the influence of science and tech-
xy-the ways in which technology, especially, has become the
aL of dynamic change in the lives of the world's peoples-are
,npletely assessed and exploited. It was out of a conviction of the
[ to understand and better manage the impact of technology on
an relationships, and on the enduring issues of war and peace,
)Verty and plenty, that the Subcoinittee on International Secu-
and Scientific Affairs, 6 years ago, asked the Congressional Re-
-h Service to undertake a wide-ranoing series of studies on Science,
biology, and American Diplomacy.
3der the leadership of Dr. Franklin P. Huddle as project director
Mr. Warren R. Johnston as associate director, the CRS series has
,d in parallel many of the myriad problems in the interface of
.OG, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. As summed up and
,preted in the present publication, Science, Technology, and Diplo-
F in the Age of Interdependnce, it has also identified many oppor-
ies for meeting these problems. The general emphasis of this
y is parallel to that of the U.N. effort; with respect to the U.S.
specifically, it points to the imperative of making better use of
reat American strengths, technological inventiveness and mana-
skill, and to the further imperative of systematic efforts to plan
he future.
March 1970, in the foreword to the first committee print of the
y series, I stated the belief that the series would prove to be of
or use to the Congress, the executive branch, the Foreign Service,
scholarly community, and others, in a cooperative effort to enhance
Nation's ability to conduct its international relations in an age of
Le and technology. With this final report, the research and analy-
ihase comes to .a close. In the ensuing legislative phase of the
ect, the locus of effort will be the membership and staff of the
se Committee on International Relations. For this phase, it is my
and expectation that the analytical contributions of the Con-
;ional Research Service-and particularly this final integrating
y-will prove in a practical way to have yielded three separate
of products: (1) specific legislative options to strengthen the
(MI)






conduct of
consensus t
initiatives ii
of the Ex
(with speci
primarily di
more far-rei
out the Fe'
involve the
and concern

Leaders i
af isare r

oppose

of Americai








OTHER DOCUMENTS IN THE SERIES

A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of Articles, Books, Documents,
Periodicals, and Reference Guides. Compiled by Genevieve Knezo.
(69 pages.) Issued March 1970.1
Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age. An introduction to the
entire study by Franklin P. Huddle. (28 pages.) Issued April 1970.1
The Evolution of International Technology. A review of the emergence
of technology as a factor of change m international relations by
Franklin P. Huddle. (70 pages.) Issued December 1970.2
The Politics of Global Health. A study of worldwide efforts to prevent
epidemic disease by Freeman H. Quimby. (79 pages.) Issued May
1971.2
Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. A survey of technical, eco-
nomic, legal, and political considerations involved in using the
natural wealth of land below the seas by George A. Doumam. (86
pages, plus appendixes.) Issued July 1971.2
Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation. A study of the inter-
relation of food and population and the resulting impact on inter-
national affairs by Alan S. Nanes. (96 pages.) Issued October
1971.2
The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. A
case study of the accomplishments and failures of the massive
Indochina works project by Franklin P. Huddle. (86 pages.) Is-
sued May 1972.2
The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. A study
of an early, serious attempt to bring atomic energy and weapons
under international control by Leneice N. Wu. (67 pages.) Issued
August 1972.2
Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American
Diplomacy With a New Technology. Analysis of the interaction
during last 30 years between American diplomacy and the tech-
nological development of nuclear power in Europe by Warren H.
Donnelly. (163 pages.) Issued December 1972.2
U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Tech-
nology Transfer, and Diplomacy. An assessment of the linkages
in U.S.-Soviet relations among diplomacy, economics, and tech-
nology transfer by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday. (105
pages.) Issued June 1973.2
The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. An anal-
ysis of attitudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed in the
IGY as a step toward detente by Harold Burns. (64 pages.) Issued
November 1973.
U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Non-
governmental Scientific Exchange. A study of major Federal pro-
grams which send nongovernment U.S. scientists and technical per-
sonnel abroad by Genevieve J. Knezo. (163 pages.) Issued April
1974.
1 Documents now out of print and not available from the International Relations Committee or the
Government Printing Office.
2Documents available from the International Relations Committee only.





vi

Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Jmu of Internaional ~Scigni&
Mobility. Assessment of the costs and benefits of the mi ja rof
technically trained persons, especially from develo g ~evlone
countries, by Joseph 0. Whelan. (272 pages.) IssuedSepjtember 1974-
Science and TechRo14oJAJ in the Dewuubnent of State: Brnging Ted. uimel
Content Into Diplonudtic Polic and Operaztions. This concluding study
of the series, by Franklin P. Huddle, analyzes the impact of science
and technology on the Departmeut'of State, and describesdeat
mental efforts and opportunities to relate science and tcnlg
to its mission.(180 pages-.) Issued June 1975.~
9 Documenits available fromi the International Belaimns Committee or the (owunt rddgOfm














CONTENTS

Page
FO.REWORD--II
O RDOCUMEETS IN THE SERIES ...... ......... V
LETR OF TRANSMITTAL ............ ........... XVII
CKDGMENTS ......................................... XI
PREFA E ---------------------------------------------------- XXI
I. INT oDVU TIO -.................................. 1
Scope of the Study ..........- 2
Methodology of the Study 3
Organization of the Report 4
An Anticipation of the 5Finigs...5
Opportunities for nstitutinal orm 5
lImportance of Science and Technology for Diplomacy..--- 6
Problems and Opportunities Facing the Congress- 7
II. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY -- - - - - - - - - - - - -9
D6tente Vis-a-Via the U.S.S.R 9
Deterrence .. 10
Thne P. . . . . . . . . . . 10
Isolation sm ......................................... 11
U.S. Economic Burdens ---------------------------------- 11
The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy --------------- 11
The Shaky Global Economy ........ 13
Atomic Energy .............................. 13
P ations ..... u....... a t...........o n.............. 14
Food -------------------------------------------------- 14
Oceans ------------------------------------------------ 15
Resource Allocation ------------------------------------ 15
Multinational Corporations ------------------------------- 16
Nationalism .--..................................... 16
United Nations ----------------------------------------- 16
Regionalism -----------------------------------------17
Shrinking World Community ---------------------------- 17
Global Flows ------------------------------------------- 18
Disorientation ---------------------------------------- 18
II. SIx CAsES ILLUSTRATING THE INTERACTION OF SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY --------------------------- 20
Case One--The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the
Nuclear Age --------------------------------------- 20
Statement of the Case ------------------------------- 20
Importance of the Case ------------------------------ 21
How the Case Developed ---------------------------- 21
U.S. Involvement ----------------------------------22
Role of Congress ---------------------------------- 23
Outcome---------------------------------------- 23
Assssment ---------------------------------------- 23
General Lessons From the Su .....- 25
Author's ent in 1975 ------------------------ 27
Need for Congressional Involvement--------------- 27
Some Illustrative Questions -------------------------- 28
(VII)







II. SIx CASES ILLUSTRATING THE INT
NOLOGY, AND AmERICAN Dirwx&







U.S ...o..e.e..
U.S.Potion of Do Wa
Imort c ofte a-,--



the CsoDevo and Agn
Utc.Io e mn-----



U.S.hSu mnt in
EU.Rat nhi to




U.S. Posit o o Sa _.
Thle fCoe ss------
The CongrfetiandAr
Caseom The-The--P---ti-a---
Ahyoca Yeasssmntir
Relorance of Stdye
om e LsosFo h

o we --- -- -


LegslaiveImpictin








IIL SIx CASES ILLUSTRATING THE INTERACTION OF SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY-Continued
Case Four-The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems
4 of Regionalism-Continued
Assessment-Continued Page
The Momentum of Nonpoliticized Regionalism 65
Geography as the Binding Force ------------- 66
Advantages of Multilateral Regiona --m- 66
Author's Reassessment in 975 67
The Mekong Project in ctve ...... 67
Some Observations and Conclusions---- 68
Some Illustrative Questions ..................... ------ 69
Case Five-Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed ------------ 71
Statement of the Case -------------------------------71
Importance of the Case ------------------------------ 71
How the Case Developed ---------------------------- 72
U.S. Involvement in the Case ------------------------- 73
Role of Congress ----------------------------------73
Outcome ---------------------------------------- 74
Assessment -------------------------------------- 75
Author's Reassessment in 1975 ------------------------ 75
Policy Proposal by Secretary Kissinger ------------- 77
Some Illustrative Question -------------------------- 78
Case Six-U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay
of Economics, Technlogy Transfer, and Diplomacy --------- 78
Statement of the C ------------------------------78
Importance of the Case ------------------------- 79
How the Case Developed ----------------------------- 80
Accelerated Movement Toward D6tente ------------- 81
U.S. Involvement ..-...------------------------------ 81
Barriers to Trade Expansion ----------------------- 82
Role of Congress ----------------------------------83
Outcome ---------------------------------------- 84
Assessment-.-------------------------------------- 84
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Prospects --------------------- 85
P euees --------------------------- 86
Rukhs ial Gains ----------------------- 87
Ahor's Reses et i 1975-: -....._...... 87
'~------------------------------8
East-West Trade in erspective -------------------- 87
Expansion of Tade as Element of D6tente -----------88
PatU.S. Legal Restrictions -. ----------- 88
Recent Moves Toward Liberalization of Trade-------- 89
Some IlustrativeQuestions ---------------------------- 90
IV. SIX SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE INTER-
ACTION --------------------------------------------------- 92
Issue One-The Evolution of International Technology ------ 92
Statement of the Issue ------------------------------- 92
Importance of the Issue ----------------------------- 93
How the Issue Developed --------------------------- 93
Technology as a Primary Source of National Power.- 94
Dimensions of the Impact of Technology on Society
and on Diplomacy ---------------------------- 95
U.S. Involvement ---------------------------------- 97
Elements of U.S. Technological Structure ---------- 98
Role of Congress ------------------------------------ 99
Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options-------------- 100
Author's Reassessment in 1975 ----------------------- 102
Science and Technology in the Department of State-------104
Some Illustrative Questions-----------------------104
Issue Two-The Politics of Global th------------------105
Statement of the Issue -----------------------------105
Importance of the Issue ---------------------------- 105
How the Issue Developed--------------------------- 106
Beginning of Preventive Medicine-----------------106
Early International Efforts To Control Disease ------ 107
Establishment of World Health Organization -------- 108
Status and Potential of WHO Today --------------- 109









ACTION-Contne

U.S. Involvement - - - - - - - - - 1
Posibe easnsfo EalyU.. Dla i Spporig



ohe oeofH W --- - -- - - -- - 1




Rndaean fordge JshifictinfrUShe of



Statemes of the sue ---------- ----------- 15
Prospects -------Op-t-o---------------------------------- 11



Sttu s of asse ssmene in 197 5 ------------- 1


ImliaiosofGoblHelh lnnn---------- 19


Issue ToreS -eodMlhs h odPepeEuto 2
St t m nto h I s e- -- - -- - -- - -- 2



Im o ta c o heIsu -- - -- -- -- -- -- 2
Howth IsueDe elo ed-- --- -- -- --- -- -- --- -- 12



U.S.- In olem n -- - - - -- - - - - 12
U.. olcyNed f acs bot oo ad opla
tio s -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- 12
R oe fCo g es -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --42








IV. SIX SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH )'URTHER ILLUSTPATE THE INTER-
ACTION-Continued
Issue Five-Brain Drain: A Stuy of the Persistent Issue of Pat
International Sienti Mbility 152
Statement of the Isu ----------------------------- 152
Importance of the Issue ------------------------------ 152
How the Issue Developed ---------------------------153
The Heightened Human Mobility of Modern Times 154
Impact of Decolonization on Brain Drain ------------155
Effects of Changes in Immigration Priorities---------- 155
U.S. Involvement. -------------------------------- 156
Main Trends in Immigration --------------------- 157
The Growing Influx of Foreign Medical Graduates - 157
The Foreign Medical Graduates as a U.S. Domestic
Problem ------------------------------------- 158
The Brain Drain as an International Issue ---------- 159
The Complexity of the Brain Drain Problem---------- 160
Role of Congress ------------------------------------ 161
SStatus of the Issue ----------- ----------- ----------- 162
Prospects and Options ----------------------------- 164
The Problem of Losing Track of Problems ------------ 164
Remedies for the Brain Drain Problem -------------- 165
Some U.S. Options in Coping With Brain Drain--------166
Author's Reassessment as of Januay 1976 -------------- 167
Some Illustrative Questions --------------------------168
Issue Six-Science and Technology in the Department of State 169
Statement of the Issue ------------------------------- 170
Importance of the Issue ----------------------------- 171
How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement ------------ 172
Official U.S. Concern With Science and Technology-- 172
The Berkner Report --------------------------- 173
Establishment of Post of Science Adviser ----------- 173
The Ups and Downs of Science at State ------------174
Functions and Lmitations of SCL ----------------- 175
Shift of Presidential Science Advisory Functions to
NSF and State; Creation of OES ---------------- 176
Role of Congress --------------------------------- 177
Earlier Cong onal Studies of Science, Technology,
and Foreign Policy -------------------------- 177
Studies and Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee -------------------------------------- 178
Studies and Hearins by House Science and Astronau-
tics Committee -----------------------------179
Introduction of National Science Policy BiL --------- 180
The Murphy Commission Report----------------- 181
Need of Added Congressional Resources ------------ 181
Status of the Issue ---------------------------------- 182
Diplomatic Personnel Are Dscouraged From Acquiring
Technical Expertise -------------------------- 182
The Department Is Not Organized To Conduct Tech-
nical Planning__ ---------------------------- 183
Presidential Leadershp- Not Motivated the
Necessary Technical oernizaton of the
Department ..------------------------------- 183
Prospects and Options ------------------------------- 184
Author's Reassessment in Jan 197 ---------------- 184
Kissinger's 19 Proposals to U.N. General Assembly__ 185
Implications of Kissinger Initiatives for State Depart-
ment and Con onal Backstop--------------186
Nei Study of State Depof
Diplomacy-Technology Interface ----------------187
Some Illustrative Questions ------------------------- 187
Letter of Resignation to Secretary Kissinger
FromAssistant Secretary iy Lee Ray and Her Letter
to the ...... ----------------------------- 191
EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE ESSAY To FOLLOW --------------- 195





























VI.















VII.






X111

I HIGH-TECHNOLOGY DIPLOMACY VER ys Low-T~c'vN9LoGY DWLO-
MACY-Continued
Secondary International Aspectsbf U.S H and Low Tech- P5W
J0o 3 ......... 11 8 .....------ ----------- --............-- ..- 250
O ,3T -ncu Observatlin - -- - - -- - 2
Some Questions or Further C deration .... 252
Q uestions -------------------------------------------. 252
[I. ROES AND INTERACTbONS OF PUBLIC AND PRIAT INSTITUTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL TEcHoLooY ----------------------------- 2 54
Kinds of Technological Diplomacy Since 195 254
A Conceptual Modl ----------------- 255
Problems of Diplomacy Inviting Solu y Private Industry.- 255
Support of Diplomatic GoabyP a Enterprise --------- 257
Lessons for the Public/Private Interface Found in the Study__ 257
Case One: The Baruch Plan ------------------------- 258
Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe -------259
Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geo-
physical Year ---------------------------------- 261
Case Four: The Mekong Project --------------------- 261
Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed -------262
Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations ------------- 263
Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology--._ 264
Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health --------------- 265
Issue Three: Beyond Malthus ----------------------- 265
Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad --------------------266
Issue Five: Brain Drain ---------------------------- 267
Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of
State ------------------------------------------ 267
Some Concluding Observations -------------------------- 270
Some Questions for Further Consideration ------------------ 270
K. INDEPENDENCE VERSUS INTERDENDENCE ----------------------- 272
Indepenece as an Historic Force ----------------------- 272
Technology and Interdependence ------------------------ 274
Interdependence as a Growing Concern of Political and Other
Leaders ------------------------------------------ 274
Obstacles and Problems Affecting Constructive Interde-
pendence ---------------- -------------------------- 276
The Obstacle of Political and Economic Nationalism ----- 277
U.S. Proposals for Global Economic Cooperation --------277
Cultural Obstacles to Interdependence ----------------- 278
Growth Versus Environmental Constraints ..------------- 279
Attempts to Cure Pollution by Redistribution ----------- 280
The Obstacle of Imperfect Comm tion.. -------------281
The Issue of Independence Versus Interdependence as a Theme
in This Study ------------------------------------- 282
Case One: The Baruch Plan ---------------------- 282
Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe -------- 283
Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geo-
physical Year ------------------------------------- 285
Case Four: The Mekong Project --------------------- 286
Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed--------289
Case Six: U..-Soviet Commercial Relations ------------ 291
Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology ..-- 292
Issue Two: The Politics of Global Heal .-------------- 294
Issue Three: Beyond ----- 295
Issue Four: U.S. Scienti Abroad. ----------- 297
Issue Five: Brain DrainL-...------ ----------------- 299
I Six: Science and Techology in the Department of
State --------------....-.------------------------ 301
A Concluding Remark -----------------..------- 305
Some Questions for Further Co...aon---------- 306
Questions ----------------------------------- 306























I













XL Sx







JICE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMCY: A SELECTED, ANNO- FAge
,TED BIBLIOGRAPHY BY SUBJECT --------------------------------- 361
Introduction ------------------------------------------------- 365
Tebnology and Global Interdependence: General Issues ----------- 367
Formulation of Foreign Policy With a Scientific or Technological
Content: The United States --------------------------------- 375
Formulation of Policies Dealing With Science and Technology: Re-
gional and International Organizations------------------------ 389
Science and Technology in NATO and OECD)--------------------393
International Technology Transfer: General Issues and Processes ... 396
International Technology Transfer and Technical Assistance: The
Developing Nations ----------------------------------------- 402
International Technology Transfer: The Developed Nations -------- 414
Multinational Corporations ---------------------------------- 421
TheBrain Drain -------------------------------------------- 425
Energy -------------------------------------------------426
Environmental Quality: International Issues --------------------- 437
TeStockholm Conference ----------------------------------444
Issues of Food and Population ------------------------------- 447
Global Health -------------------------------------------453
Natural 455
Ocean Resources and Policy -----------------------------------462
The People's Republic of China: Cooperation and Scientific and
Technological Infrastructure --------------------------------- 472
Physical Sciences Research: Cooperation -----------------------475
S Cooperation and Policy--------------------------------476
S Satellite Applications ------------------------------------ 481
T Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Cooperation and Scientific
and Technological Infrastructure ----------------------------483
International Standards and Related Issues ---------------------- 489
Weather Modification: International Issues ---------------------- 491







At ~#A~t )~t4~i


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCK, Washington, D.C., February 2, 1976.
,,man, Subcommittee on I&ternational Security and Scientific Affairs,
committee on lnternationd Relations, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
',R MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to submit this concluding docu-
in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy research
ct which the Congressional Research Service has carried out at
request.
.e first two submissions, you will recall, were an annotated bibliog-
7 and a prospectus. They were followed by individual studies in
depth (prepared by 10 authors associated with four jCRS
rel divisions) of 12 different policy issues related to the general
e The present study, Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the
of Interdependnce, subjects the previous 12 to analysis, first
ining the 12 studies one by one and then looking at them col-
rely from several relevant perspectives. Its purpose is to provide
Libcommittee with a wide range of insights into the interaction in
mporary practice of science, technology, and the formulation and
ict of U.S. foreign policy. As you asked us to do, we have tried
-sent these insights in terms which the subcommittee could trans-
Rto legislative initiatives or put to other appropriate congressional

ake particular satisfaction in this study as it appears to employ a
if unpretentious methodology of political science analysis. The
r demonstrates, I think, the utility of systematic, point-by-point
[ation of real-life scenarios or cases, based on thorough document&.
to yield broad principles of policy in a field of transcendent na-
1 importance.
e authors of the present volume are the two CRS senior specialists
have guided this major research enterprise from its inception:
rarkin P. Huddle, senior specialist in science and technology,
with Dr. John H. Sullivan (then staff consultant to the subcom-
e) developed the concept of the study series in 1969, and who
erved as the director of the overall project; and Mr. Warren R.
3ton, formerly assistant chief of the CRS Foreign Affairs Division
iow chief of the CRS Office of Special Programs, the associate
ct director.
March 1970, in your Foreword to the first committee print of
.ries, you wrote: "Previous work by the subcommittee has indi-
i that, in many instances, U.S. foreign policy has lagged far
d technological innovations of worldwide importance. Through
XVH1)





XVM

this study, we hope to find out.;.
can be improved in this vital area."
participated in it, let me express the h(
nating in the present submission will h
expectations.
Let me also conve
this challenging assignmen.








ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


It seems fitting on the completion of a research undertaking of the
magnitude of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy for the
project director and associate director to claim the privilege of givmn
public recognition to the many significant contributions to the overall
project, as well as to acknowledge the participation of those who helped
m the preparation of the final study, Since, Technology, and Di-
ploc a th b ofIterdependence.
Sat beginning: two successive staff consultants of the
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Dr.
John H. Sullivan and Mr. George R. Berdes, are to be thanked for
their constructive guidance on many occasions during the past 6
years and for their unfailingly sympathetic support of an enterprise
that proved much more demanding, and extended over a considerably
longer period of time, than was originally foreseen.
Apart from the codirectors, there were 10 authors of studies. They
meritoriously deserve recognition and gratitude, not merely for
superior accomplishment but for their tolerance of strenuous condi-
tions of competing work assignments, their thousands of hours (in the
aggregate) of volunteered overtime, and their assistance in the review
and updating of material in this final study. One of the study authors,
Genevieve J. Knezo, additionally produced the original annotated
bibliography for the series, now replaced by the current bibliography
(also prepared by Ms. Knezo) to be found at the end of this volume.
Dr. Huddle's assistant, Mrs. Elaine Carlson, performed many essen-
tial editorial and research support tasks.
Dozens of others in CRS, over the years, contributed their time and
skills in bibliographic, research, and clerical assistance, and in the
review of studies in draft. CRS Coordinator of Research James W.
binson reviewed the studies in their entirety and made many helpful
suggestions. Outstanding clerical assistance in the production of the
present volume was provided by Mrs. Eula C. Kenely and her staff in
the CRS Senior Specialists Division and by Mrs. Margaret E. Rice of
the CR8 Office of Special Programs.
In addition, many scholars and officials outside CRS were generous
with their help in reviewing portions of the draft and providing
constructive criticism. Prof. Edgar S. Robinson of American Uni-
versity submitted extensive notes in review of Sience and Technology
in the Department of State which were of value in preparing the present
study; he also served as consultant in the preparation of this con-
cudingtudy. To him and to the other scholars, too numerous to cite
vi lly, appreciation and thanks are expressed for their assistance
in collecting facts, offering suggestions, and encouraging the ultimate
completion of this undertaking.
A final important acknowledgment: gratitude beyond measure is
due our wives, Clare Scott Huddle and Eunice C. Johnston, for 6
years of indispensable support and forbearance.
FRANKLIN P. HUDDLE.
WR R. JOHNSTON.
(MX)



















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PREFACE


The finding of this study is that U.S. diplomacy is neglecting two
powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution:
technological expertise and management skill. Most of the countries
of the world look to the United States as the undoubted leader in both
technological achievement and in the skills of organization and ad-
ministration to apply technology effectively. But during the rise of the
United States to technological preeminence, the Department of State
has given slight attention to the implications of technology for foreign
policy. Only meager resources have been spared to search for ways to
turn technology to achievement of diplomatic goals.
The emerging trend toward congressional participation in the diplo-
matic process plays a significant role in this context. The opportunity
is at hand for the Congress to examine the uses of technology made by
the executive branch toward the purposes of foreign policy.
More than that, the study suggests that the necessary teamwork of
the legislative branch with the executive branch in the field of foreign
policy requires that the Congress equip itself with its own resources of
equal diplomatic expertise. The impressive array of technological
implications for U.S. diplomacy further requires that these congres-
sional resources of diplomatic expertise contain a strong technological
element for both current oversight and long-range planning of future
initiatives.
Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to at-
tain the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy. But technology also
offers many opportunities for the attainment of these objectives. No
element of national policy and no component of national program
warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of
the United States.
(xx")



























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I. INTRODUCTION
is the concluding chapter in a 6-year study by the Congressional
RService of the problems and functional interactions of science,
t, and American diplomacy. The study had its origins in
cnal concern with science and technology that had been
. ting since World War II. The prospectus for the study,
attributing to science and technology "an ever-ncreasing influence on
public policy," added that they "also appear to have a
effect on the content and conduct of American foreign policy."'
T e l purpose of the study, as stated in the prospectus, was "to
pv Congress with background material useful in strengthening
that support the conduct of American diplomacy." For
t purpose it would "describe and analyze the formulation and ad-
m tion of American diplomatic policies having significant science
alogy components."
M specifically, the study was designed to examine six "cases" and
six "issues" in recent diplomatic history in order t-
1. characterize processes and problems involving the interac-
tion of science and technology with diplomacy;
2. define organizational requirements for the effective formula-
tion of important policies to direct and control activities involving
this interaction;
3. identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at
t interface can be strengthened legislatively or adminitra-
tively;
4. discover ways in which science and technology can better
support foreign policy objectives of the United States; nd
5. discover ways in which the conduct of matic activities
can better support the healthy growth of national and interna-
national science and technology.
A quarter-century ago, in a report on "Science and Foreign Rela-
t for the Department of State, Lloyd V. Berkner posed two
questions:
How can the potentialities of scientific be integrated
into the formulation of foreign policy, and the adnistration of
forei relations, so that the maximum advantage of scientific
pand development can be acquired by all peoples?
2. How can foreign relations be conducted m such a manner as
to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective of
scece and technology?'
T 12 completed studies in the series, and this final chapter of the
project, are intended to suggest answers to Berker's two queston.







However, much has happened in the 25 yeai
posed. It is unlikely that the participants in
mind the vast scope of the impacts that scie
impose on the world of diplomacy. Space ec
lites for communications and remote sent
deterrent impasse, the Gre R,
to petroleum that mad e o arg(


&rajiontai vorl
ce the pu
physical


ana oy tne pesent au-
the performnc e of th
relation to the outcome
implications f s4u
chapter is accom
dates the bi
Scove of the Studu


arms


Ltng 11V f Uel, cA t,
of Contents. Refe
listing of selected


I ch






ieaqjot director a d associate director also regret that it was
)Se extend the study series to cover some other important
: for example research and deyelopmnent in the U.S. foreign aid
a location of materia and fuel resources, and science
gy activities in the complex of United Natiols org0aiza-
eed, one of the difficulties in undertaking a broad policy study
e fld of diplomacy is the richness of the subject and the attrac-
ess of the issues it presents. What was attempted, therefore, w.as
election of a representative and manageable list of topics that
judged to yield instructive guidance to the Congress and to
Y analysts in the executive branch. Perhaps it will be pos-ible
he academic community to extend the anases begun with the
nt series in 1970 into the topics neglected.
was a part of the plan for the project that each of the 12 separate
es should perform 2 functions: It should stand alone as a
1 ccount and analysis of an issue containing important policy
ions and legislative values; and it should be an integral part
e total project on the managing of the interface of science and
iology with diplomacy. There is evidence that the first purpose
readyy been served. This concluding analysis represents the
to achieve the second purpose.
o oJ the Study
e six cases and six issues examined in the total stud necessarily
some substantive relationship to each other. However, there
intention of presenting them as a time sequence. This is not
iy sense a chronology of science, technology, and American
macy since 1945, when the atomic bomb gave the subject a
a t urgency, or since 1950, when an early effort at serious
L was made in the Berkner Report. Each separate case or
i ented in its ow-n time frame. The focus of the study as a
x is on the nature of the problem of relating technical problems
)pportunities to diplomatic methods, processes, and philosophy.
c or issue is presented as a study complete in itself, but the
of these studies taken together provides a longitudinal report
e subject prepared during the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive, and
Selected events over a much longer timespan. Inesca ably,
vidnal studies are somewhat time-dependent; accordingly,
ate of original publication is indicated for each summary n this
report. The order of the summaries is determined by the topic
;ubst tive matters rather than by the chronological order of
orgia issuance.
eliminate some of the awkwardness that this methodology
l each author has reviewed his or her contribution to
Itobrig it-more or less-up to date. Questions that have
red since first issuance are indicated and comments on te
Lg studies are responded to.
t to repeat: The purpose of the entire project is not historical
tical; it is intended that the project as a whole will provide a
and reasonably comprehensive set of observations forise
e Cngessinsurveying the broad canvas of science, technology,
c d ah subject as crucial to th welfare of
nity as i is sometimes alleged to be? If so, why, a$ in what





4

way? Wat reits major arasofcncrWaaeitiniuiol


series, it was promnised4httefra fte ae ol eeal
be as follows:
Definition of tepolm
Chronologicd d.e
~The decision roes
Desciption

Asse ent of the

subject matte, woul efloe ntetn h sus
Importance
Changes in the issue oe ie
Organizational assets.

Poicis avanced









Fpure ros~es.so
*Int hus imosigsedege fuiomiyouhesprtecss
averisg Y itw















woud bvn






the essays examines all 12 of the studies from theperspective
uajor aspect or dimension of the general theme. Finally, the
,rngs to a focus, for consideration by the Congress, the central
LB and opportunities of science, technology, and American

iipation of the Fiidings
is final report that concludes the CRS project, a number of
products ought to emerge, properly documented and defined.
i set of general conclusions as to he need for reform of the
onal arrangements for dealing with the broad scope of the
Another is a better appreciation of the importance of the
whip between diplomacy and both science and technolovy-
e the latter. A third is the particular set of problems
)ortunities that challenge the Congress to provide for their
ve solution or exploitation.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL RFORM
illustrations appear, in the publications of the project, of the
eliminate institutional gaps and deficiencies in. the U.S. dip-
mhinery that result from the emergence of technology as a
.rce, if not the primary force, compelig diplomatic change
ptation to change. Among these illustrations are the following:
-The United States is preeminent in technology and admin-
ative management but neither of these great attributes has
n eectively mobilized by the Department of State for pur-
es of U..dpomac.
-iru all th gre t problems facing the United States in
5 have alarge technoogicl content. 'Yet those most knowl-
eable about the generation, m ent, and utilization of
tcology are not being induc into the U.S. diplomatic
Dhinry;conversely, too few of those who are part of the
Dery'of diplomacy are equipped by education, training, and
erience to comnmunicate effectively with the technologists or
n torecognzewhen a technological/diplomatic problem exsts.
-Multinational corporations are reonzda the primary
-for international transfer of ology, yet the United
tes has no policy for enlistment and coordination of this
at organizational resource to advance the purpose of U.S.
lomacy.
-In its development of large technological systems,
hneeringhasledtheworld in itsabilityto dealwith anin
ty of variables, design options, and interfaces. Apart from
ily military initiatives of the Department of Defense, systems
)roaches congenial to technologists have not been exploited
develop tehologcal initiatives beneficial to U.S. dilomacy.
-In the murky field of national security the emphasis has
n on the design of nuclear weaponry and high-precision sub
lear weapons, to the neglect of the broader aspects of national
arity such as: vulnerability of external sources of materials
rtial to the U.S. economy, vulnerability of U.S. transport
itoheavy ind and the
ovativeness of basic material industries.





6!




State Department-are serious deficit. re


port for the Uited Nations its

that of Ameican industry, in thtegneigmvsfo h
establishment of goals to the desg of porm oaheete
while diplomacy waits for crises to apperadtnatmpso
cope with them.
Thus, the present report roe a
greater emphasis on ong-r
emphasis on its tara
andstematic seaxh fo uur rnd ntewolouokas-
tained effort to fomltU..gasanabra-ueefrto

Better an more ccsibe info
of the global dilomati c brigstobern it.
tion of theenormous .et
academic un nogvrmnltts i

lionIan1d furtherancofdpoaigoleryeokwudb
worth consideration tobrntehooiasklsnocoero-
junction wit tose of oiia~n eooi oiy
portujniiest einitrainlisiuin orvretealto
eident trend, toaddsfectoofhe"irWrl"owdte

IPORTANCE~ OFr SCIENCE AN~D TECHNOLOGY FRDILMC




Stde fwraddilmc pt 95asue hfihro
ths w oe fitentoa|eainhi a h xnino







ingte world diplomatic scene. The United State, a- the principal
cmal exponent in technological achievement, t therefore to be
.as diplomatically preeminent, but ought also to accept the
o tfor leading the way in the application of technology to
a vement of goals shared Nith the other nations of the world.
hu, the theses emerge from the study of Science, Technology, and
,4can Diplomacy that-
)In a rapidly chan world, the business of the Federal Govern-
. governance of relations with other States,
gwith them in rational and controlled wa toward global

) historical role of violence or the threat of violence as the
diplomatic effectiveness has been considerably superseded
o titfre excellence in technology.
D estically, the United States is foremost among world powers
cological excellence.
ercise of this preeminence for purposes of achieving world
tess and harmony is both a moral imperative and a requirement of
,nl security. As technolooy brings peoples closer together, these
motivations-national interest and international morality-tend
- and more to reinforce each other. To the extent that they do not,
esult may be chaos and, ultimately, failure of the human race, or
ast of the present geat civilizations of the world, to survive.
There are difficulties, not yet susceptible of evaluation as to
relative importance, but certainly including-
The sheer numbers of contacts and agencies concerned with
ogy on the international level, for multiple purposes having
an infinite variety of sponsorship, affiliation, and structure;
(b) The grossly inadequate resources allocated by the United
States to the analysis of its technological resources, with particular
rto their applicability toward global objectives of the
UntdStats;
() Diffusion of effort, both because of the number of interna-
tiona claimants for attention and because of the absence of clearly
defined foreign policy in technology-in particular, policy as, to the
p relationship of U.S. efforts to those of other countries and
oir ational organizations;
(d) The tendency of less-developed nations to identify the U.S.
mix of moral purpose and technological superiority with
colonialism;
(e) The fact that too much has been expected of American
and skills to yield quick results through sheer volume and
t, and that too little has been said of the need
Science, perseverance, and acquired insights to accommodate
to epsychoogies of other cultures and to solve large problems of
d opment by tackling the innumerable small, everyday

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE CONGRESS
te12th study in the series, the importance was stressed of
i tic role of the Congress: "In the last analysis the Cousti-
m vests i. the Congress of the United States a large share of




8

decisionm power on foreign as well as domestic affairs. Senatorial
assent is the am qua non of trearaking. 714 power of the pww
defines congressional control over positive actions and programs of
the Federal Government, foreign as well as domestic. The control of
forei trade and international transfers of persons, no lew than the
r(=ation of Armed Forces and the right to declare war, rests in
the Congress."
Also, the congressional need was suggested for strengthened insti-
tutional means to provide assistance in the following ways:
-Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with
congressional intent in the area of scientific and techno--, "'0'
impacts on foreign policy and international relation&-and vice
versa;
-Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic
environment as changes occur in response to the global spread of
technological innovation;
-Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of
"international" technological issues;
-Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions
in the face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting
from the global spread of technological innovation;
-Structuring and maldn coherent the array of foreign policy
interactions with science and technology; and
-Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an
extended institutional memory, and an assistance cadre for
major studies for "international" committees concerned with
S. & T. questions, S. & T. committees concerned with foreign
policy questions, and committees monitoring major technological
mi 3ion with significant international implicstions.
The interest of the Congress is inevitably-and more and more
demonstrably-drawn to the importance of technology in ita influence
on the U.S. world posture, both directly through the diplomatic
process and indirectly through the contributions of technology to U.S.
economic health and vitality. Other congressional interests include
the development of specific diplomatic initiatives employing tech-
nology for national and international benefit; and the evolution of
sound policies for the sharing of U.S. technology abroad and for the
mutually beneficial exchange of technology with other countries&
From these preoccupations, it would seem to follow that the Con-
gress has a strong justification for considered action to supply (a) the
best possible mechanism for long-range diplomatic planning in the
Executive Office of the President; (b) means to strengthen orgard-
zational resources of the Department of State at home and abroad
relative to science and technology; (c) positive 04ance to the De-
partment of State in the use of nongovernmental mtellectual resources
and institutions bearing on the relationship of diplomacy with science
and technology; and (d) means to strengthen the resources supporft
the Congress itself in maldn its own independent decisions on au
these matters.
A U.S. Congrew, Haaw, Caminittee an 1imtennitional Relations, Sckw mW Teakadw in de Zk
of BWe, in the smies Science, Technology, and Axnexicau 1hploinacy, pnipared for the MZQ&;
tematLonal Security and Sdmti& Affaft by Frankiln P. Huddle, Science PoUcy Re9mvft Divh6am Cvmk-
Service. Librury of Congras, UM M p. (Cenmittw pdnL) p- 12L











GLOBAL CONTEXT 0F SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AiiRTCAN
DIPLOMACY
.policy today as never before is confronted by a world
. strivings and uncertain directions. The modern world
s complex mixture of dynamic new forces and drift, of active
naial conflict and d6tente, of wayward nationalism and a grow-
nculum of multinational cooperative activities. The 200th
sary of the beginnngs of history's most successful experiment
cal democracy finds the Nation pondering the question of how
ke and advance those aspects of its heritageof independence
e valuable in a world of growing interdependence. The mid-
re thus a pivotal time: a time of reassessment of U.S. for
a time to search for a new and more stable, more durable wri
e that could be realized by creative diplomatic initiatives,
-liberately according to a purposeful and coherent design. The
-s that the United States can mobilize to meet this challenge
nly the technology a manaeral skills in which the Nation
an unchallenged superiority. These two strengths, by a con-
fact of history, are precisely those needed by most of the
actions of the world in order to achieve progress toward their
,ernal national aspirations.
ver, elements ofthis changin world do not automatically
r or facilitate the exercise of US leadership in applying these
skills toward the achievement of a more stable, more durable
structure of cooperative and peaceful nations. The enormous
ity of the world of the 1970s derives from the great variety
ins and groupings of nations, each with its own rate and direc-
politica, economic, and technological change, leading in turn
ging goals and national attitudes. Change can generate conflict
a promote harmony and cooperation. All of diplomacy resolves
ely into the balancing of these opposites. Whether by bold
- moves or by slow and cautions increments, the largely un-
red challenge facing the United States is to use its skills of
ogy and management to assemble the elements of the present
Lg world into the more constructive and reliable order on which
ire of civilization so manifestly depends.
ie first consideration, what are the salient elements of the
world? Some of them are the following:
Vis-aVis the U.S.SR.
igidities of the cold war are being replaced by a new flexibility
ch the still-potent, still-dangerous adversary relati
i the United States and the Soviet Union is moderated
and partial truce. This truce is marked by trade
transaction, agreements on scientifc and techno ogical co-
)n, technology transfers, and other unwarlike dealings epit-
by the term detentee."








Deterrence
ThA iTh


and


iess consi
ideological
Weaponry
The put
mous dest
irresistible
So nVt TTini


powers an act oXi msanity, the ead
various kinds of war by proxy. K
United States in Korea and Vietnari


of
the


ou
Opp(








dispute that divided Americans in the period between the
Ers concerned the extent to which this country could re-
7om European conflicts. The rise of Nazi Germany made
salient but it was not resolved until Janese ambitions
hegemony precipitated a conflict hal way around the
,he initial theater of war. Thereafter, the ties among the
undercut the position of those who favored U.S. isolation.
the interventionists were confirmed by events: It became
foreign policy that the United States had an inescapable
selling interest, and a great power responsibility in assur-
ace and stability. During the cold war, this theme domi-
dealings abroad. An attempt to withdraw from this re-
on the mainland of Asia led to the Korean war. The
assert it led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The
tunes of the United States in Vietnam led to renewed
of the extent of U.S. responsibility for maintaining
tability abroad, and even to a denial of such respon-

iale of great power control over small-country wars and
lrbances remains ill-defined, but recent events in the
have demonstrated the hazard of a unilateral withdrawal
power from the scene, and the perhaps equal hazard of
b powers' committing themselves to opposing causes of
LS. Several lessons can be drawn from this sequence.
viouss that the diplomatic reaction to this kind of crisis
rad hc and governed by circumstances; rigid adherence
olationism or interventionism would invite disastrous
S. A less obvious but more fundamental lesson is that the
sfu1 kind of diplomacy is that which anticipates, and
itives to keep small crises from developing. Itis note-
such successes generate no headlines and create no
es, and are recognized only in a small community.
ic Burdenis
,ld War II the U.S. dollar has remained the primary-
cently the strong and stable-currency of international
.S. assistance has been extended to many nations abroad
of nuclear deterrence, trained soldiery, and arms ship-
.aty allies and developin nations. These economic bur-
b ycread b U.S. eort to raise the technological
eloping countries and by commitments to supply ag-
oducts to needy countries at less than market value.
msuade other developed countries to shoulder more of the
Laintaining an international currency and credit system
ye, with the Soviet Union, a less demanding level of
programs are features of the contemporary economic
ver, the abrupt rise in world petroleum prices, unease in
East, and persistent ideological and organizational ob-
LS.-U.S.S.R. cooperation tend to perpetuate the U.S.
rdens.
g U.S. Industril Ecnomy
'developed" applied to the U.S. national economy means
i y was setted, ndthat tepredt f





12

productiveactivity chnefrmarcluetmnfcuig rg




sericy
Te ttrd ofthe 20tntury Sandfo aufcuigtosrie

the o~fervtice Cinutres0 ar nomainadnocmoi
rlated bytives T s suce is poal o eesbe n
futurenht ofteUSecnmdeedontedvlpnt'f




oldtat te anial eplthes, edea okradtoei i


tservi MT
The trnd inthe Fnied Ses towrdevice nuti> h

emhasi or the qityO 1n uniyo euit evcstax







wroideness a rea,suha roetosagis rie nm







these brakes on industrial growth and productivity have not
ad full strength, they have served to warn that these rising
n and incremental costs in the industrial economy are ap-
g a serious stage. When coupled with the impact of the (e-
embargo and price increases from 1973 on, the observable
LS a mixed situation of recession combined with inflation. The
* these forces were felt most keenly in areas of largest popula-
tably New York City. Escape from this dilemma is vital to
re health of the U.S. diplomatic posture in the world-as
Iso for U.S. domestic economic health-but the escape rouse
undefined. The economic surplus needed to fund past levels
Programs may be a product of the U.S. past. U.S. foreign
rest more in the future on the skill of its diplomacy than
,eight of its economic programs.
by Global Economy
c interdependence has long prevailed in international re-
the 19th century, Central Europe fed on American grain;
tral nations relied on Chilean nitrates; England supplied
o develop rail transportation systems in Argentina, India, the
'tates and China; English textile mills wove cloth with United
id Indian cotton; and so on. During the 1920s efforts to restore
)al economy conflicted with internal efforts to stabilize na-
-onomies and employment; the global monetary system col-
i the face of stiff tariff barriers, competitive devaluations,
currency schemes, and quotas. Restoration of the global
was a high-priority U.S. goal after World War II but, despite
ts, achievement was obstructed by cold war divisiveness,
Aic tendencies of former colonial regions, and-ultimately-
lity of the dollar to serve as a global currency in place of the
mct gold standard. Achievement of a stable global economy
s to be a U.S. goal. Dtente with the Soviet Union was con-
L positive move toward its achievement. But many old and
forces obstruct progress toward the goal: internal obligations
)ped countries to sustain economic growth and high levels of
rent; resistance of developing countries to terms of trade
iey see as blocking their escape from economic colonialism;
,t recently the exploitation by the OPEC countries of a
yr temper but severely acute) monopoly position in world
n supply. Efforts at reaching international agreement on a
Id economic structure were underway at the time of this
ut the issue remains in doubt.
energy
c energy places such extreme demands on technology that
ace in competition with fossil fuels as a source of electrical
tas been slow. However, the manipulated rise in petroleum
v OPEC and the complex environmental problems in the


fortf





iiii i~ iii iii iiiii1 4
ai sae fomo neg rm ula fso repoedigbtth rb











The utimat concer of aiiill gvrmns ini term ofbt ed n
mens is eope.Ofroincoer i the relatioip ewentoa
aai la l re o r e n o u i o iii iniiiiii! theiiiiiiiiiii enti~iiii !!iii!i i re!~ii!iiiiii!iii!!iii wo ld bu es e i ly i
the most....... populous reg i an tos in whii~iic the rate of populationiiiiiiiii!ii~i~i
,inces ssaps.Ppltosaesgiiati eainteore




ofaal adad aeilaiiy obyfolveso osmto
of iJiJi~~ii'' allgods rte a w ichenirnmntl olutin ccrs ad biit







1 all potentially food-defident a well Bt if
S of cooperation in development not achved, the
.n will rest inescapably with the leaderliip of the most
intry, the United States.

)f the three-fifths of the globe covered by oceans was in
e mid-197O-. Squabbles over fhing riht and seaward
ional sovereignty were frequent. entrepreneurs
aited for some sort of legal determination of seabed
id property rights in order to exploit. emeioin tech-
,uning the petroleum and metallic wealthof this remain-
aval use of the international mecthn of thp ncpans


asa


on of miner and fossil fuels is proportional to the
mic development of nations, and levels of development
.Production of s andfossilfuels is related to their
the earth, and they are unevenly distributed among
- extractive industries are first to be attmp
nations, the effect is that of a flow of ma s from tI
sto the rich, anda flow of
3 to the poor. Efforts by poor countries to correct these
advantageous terms of trade have brought controversy
Led Nations and other forums. For all poor countries to
tIq of mAtprislq ennuirrintion alr +dv aehipvPd v flip


-td


)e with its





16



of foreign corporations, a fomof inentionlcmeiaistuio
has rapidly proliferated. form, the multinational corpoati






tomnieize te enmi asignficanc rest.oa bonaieI
neglitpaloliertisi, new causesofcnfitndfusrtion. costsroc-
terstialisttyo the MNC oers pthe, maperialsceittaagra
exprtise t skills i cr and even2tr ned
liabo from countryetodcountry i order to maximize its total ovei. .
and logtr prft In the) process iteoe h aioaoeegt

ohotcutisdietcaiaan o rmntoal lne
ecnmc loatos adcmptsfr cnmi n ee.poiia
poewil rsrinitsoneooi n ehooiaoe





.......ne g le c t p o i i a s c i al .... ...... i n sti t ti o n a..................i o n s
Asanintttoth NofestecpbltofifunigCn

stutvl h vlto fasabewrdeooyadtedvlp
enoflgigeooisBuasteMCcretyoeaei

exe s reetetaog ..'aoruin sa ntu ett



cau s u n e m p loy m ent....a..h om..;.i...e...t.e............t in .....................................

contre ysprmoigfrinmngmn vrdmsi







nk and the World Health Organization offer a glimmer of
,e in since evident in the General Assembly has found
part in UNESCO and 1.. By the mid-1970s, respect for the
itions in the United States had been seriously impaired and
enefit of the association of nations was widly questioned.
bstantial contributions Of the U.N. System were largely
p its futilities were highly visible. Whether public opinion
content to tolerate this u-satisfactory state of affairs long
evolve a more workable and useful structure remained


building block available to U.S. diplomacy in the balancing
,tion and conflict is the circumstance that many contiguous
are common geographic and economic problems and oppor-
lany such multinational regions exist throughout the world
ifect on the nations that share them varies widely. Some, like
vian countries, have established cooperative relations;
e the nations of former French Indochina, have a long history
ome, like the States of Central America, are groping toward
n; and some, like the Middle East, are fiercely divided by
.d ideology. The opportunity for economic and social benefit-
ions is great but largely wasted; cooperative planning,
abor in the development and testing of useful technology,
restructures, and the recognition of commonality of prob-
irtunities, goals, and approaches, are ill available as elements
the economic significance of national boundaries, Reason's
ject of this opportunity to strengthen international amity are
d, but the want of effort to this end seems hard to justify.
Worl Community
global communications, verbal and visual, bring the whole
the living room. A terrorist attack in the Middle East or
Ireland, an earthquake in Chile or Turkey, an election in
or Portgual, is described or shown minutes later everywhere
infinite variety of events inviting global attention over-
receptors of the individual and the time or space of the
actors. Censorship is inherent, not only for reasons of na-
Ley or economic advantage but because limited capacity
otion according to some policy or principle. "Newsworthy"
ke war or unrest in Morocco, Agola, Belize, Ethiopia, Por-
1rus, Lebanon, or elsewhere-are reported while crop statis-
hools, technological developments, and other constructive
ignored. Even so, the individual is told more than he can
Excessive demands arep laced on his enthusiasm and indig-
response, the individual tends to dismiss the information
relevantt to his own interests, and to rely on the "experts"
bh these hopelessly numerous and complex matters. Or else,
of his own tradition or esthetic sense, the individual may
me one conflict as his own, choosing a side for reasons of
direction or ethnic, religious, or national origin. Even so,
re American in 1975 is more aware of the world outside his
ry than ever before but perhaps more depressed by what








Information o urn vnsi nyoeo ayknso lw
tha crssnationa onais heetr lb sa ope eiok


hoae, stearnd eletoi ikgslotalntoscnrbt


tists seeking to exchange knowledge, and dipoatbetof cliig
the conduct of international relations. Tranlsacionaflwasotk
plae in the form fcrdt matril an rdcs delgclves
and goals.' tlQte lwrnigfo ihydsrciet oe

drugs, the spread o ies pdmchsiesgasad as

Enouragement and dicurgmnt ofvrou ftes lwsi h
business of every govrmnsmmoetaotr.Tgthrwh
the resposstjhmta edbc oteoiia orecuty
most flows are on th inrese it can b adta oeg eain

strngt, ad other mesue of a yai4oiey rlsrasnl
plex than those of ay oher cuntr ntewrd
However, U.S. institutional mechanisms to aae la oo
even~ keep tack of these inrasing flows are not rwn orsod

policy. It is aloprbble tat the same dfcec xssi te


Rarely, if eve,has US.4orinplcfaesomyfudetl
be mt i n furhernc of its~ goals.~i~ Diorenato is noti tool stron aiii~iiiiiiiii~ii


ter fo h sttei,~s ofiii~ii U.S.frign poiyintemd17s
tth is pond nt in the Nation' hi story !;iiiit ............... jus emerged........
trgic;il,diisi veii i + and+ i i h mii fm n ftlwx.N to a




atiue r ie oadfrhreecs TUS oe n nlec
in++ th e w,,r,,l ev e ............. ..... ........... .................. re i a o h iso la tio n ism................................... o ,th ,1 3 s




forced.. buig worries.ove..une.plo.men..nd....la.io.,..pprehensio
over. thetee shrtg of negy
A.... long.,, lito isutosabodwreas fpulcndofca
concern the fsteringand eiodc~yepoieAa-sal n
...... th e ot ft eT ird, W ol i th .N............mbly
Thr ol cooi hlene opeaiigptenso omre
peidial renewed ........ co cr ......... th lb licesei o uain







global food supply, assertions of nationalism and intran-
the many new nations, incidents of bombing and terrorism
world, hijackings and kidnarnlys, ur)an guerrilla move-
weral countries, religious conflict Northern Ireland and
conflict in Cyprus and Lebanon, power Jhifts or active
many points in Eurasia and Africa, unease over prolifera-
-lear weapons and the stability of the nuclear deterrent,
over the issue of seabed sovereignty, growing awareness of
,ration of the world monetary structure erected after World
Iof the possibility of world monetary collapse, and a general
national goals of the many old and new nations of the world
iss-purposes.
Lt of coherence and shared common purpose in the United
he superpowers, NATO, and other groups of nations that
opportunities for cooperation is a distressing characteristic
amporary world. It is a time for rebuilding and new leader-
d purposes that all can share. That is the prine challenge
diplomacy in the final quarter of the 20th century.





III. Slx CASES ILLUSTRATING






Baruch proposal ended in failure and the threat continues to

inoe of the Case
arrival of atomic power was a technological event of u-arab
gfance for international affairs. It raied the eost of all-out
t an intolerable level and substantially altered the basis for
itions of diplomats at the bargaining table. The problem of how
b control over both military and peaceful uses of atomic
p an unprecedented challenge to world diplomacy. At
tset, the technological necessities of effective international
were politically unacceptable, especially to the Soviet Union.
S. diplomacy the problem, seen in retrospect, was a test of
t to establish an atmosphere of confidence despite differing
goals, then to fashion a step-by-step control program, keyed
tmon interests, which could serve as a basis for productive
4ion. From the perspective of the Science, Technology, and
an lomacy study series, it was a major test of the capacity
U States to use its scientific, technological, and diplomatic
s in concert to solve a crucial world problem.
eae Deleloped
S use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been
Rated to the world, the Truman Administration acted to
public understanding of the bomb and its sig ance for the
States. The Smyth report, containing a great deal of previously
basic scientific information, was released in Atgust 1945;
esident took initial steps toward enunciation of U.S. atomic
p y in two major addresses in October. On November 15
ited States, Canada, and the Unted Kingdom laid a foundation
1.ional action to control atomic energy in the Three Nation
Delrtion..
le er the Soviet Union was made a party to the endeavor
signing of the Moscow Declaration. Earlier fhat month Assist-
,ratary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed to head a
btee to report to the Secretary on U.S. policy for international
In January 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Coin-
L (UNAEC) was created, and a Board of Consultant- headed
.k Chairman David Lilienthal was formed to assem~ble technical
for the Acheson committee. The findings of the Acheson con-
and the Board of Consultants (which came to be known as the
n-Lilienthal report) were released in -Marc 1946. In thea
Baru h was appointed to represent the United States in the
C.
plan which Baruch presented to the UNAECon June 14, 194,
omation of his own ideas oil international control of a nic
a the proposals of the Acheson-Lilihal report. A central
of the plan was an international organiztion to which would
u all phases of the development and use of atomic, energy.
an also called for inspecion and for making violations of the
agremet ubjctto pnsmtand a prpo~al that the
cwreinth Siect oilw not appl in gon
n In a counterproposal on June 19, the $oviet nion rejected
a of waiving the veto and urged a toa hpo-ibition of atomic(
is, promotion of peaceful development ofatonii enry, n
ent on international control but with retention of ful soyeeg


























the







.!orngres
ess played no direct role in the negotiations but exercised a
ig influence. At the time of the December 1945 conference
suited in the Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vanden-
airman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other
sof Congress repeatedly sought and received assurances from
ident that the United States would not release atomic energy
ion before adequate safeguards were established. This pro-
tttude was heightened by the revelation in early 1946 of
of espionage activities in Canada involving the transmission
c energy information to the Soviet Union.

Alapse of the Baruch plan negotiations was a costly diplomatic
It would be idle to speculate on the consequent diversion of
3 from peaceful uses to armament expenditures. More con-
ai still is the question of how the pattern of ration
ed through a diplomatic success in this critical problem area
ave altered the course of postwar political develogments.
agree ent on an international control system m* t have
tthe uncertainty which has prevailed ever since: the
ical uncertainty of escalating military power in conjunction
ing security.10 Further, an early ent might have
groundwork for the development of peaceful applications of
e almost a decade earer than it in fact occurred, and
ler scale-thereby, among other things possibly heading off
ag more manageable the present complx economic, energy,
atic situation with respect to oil. But apart from the uses
ax power itself, a successful conclusion to the Baruch plan
ions could have provided an influential precedent-somewhat
'Y did a decade later, but in a more direct intergovernmental
-for the acceleration of international cooperative activity of
.ds, It is conceivable, in short, that it might have averted or
d the course of the Cold War.
n.t
were the reasons for the failure? One way of summing them
concede that the American political leaders and scientists
did not bring to bear the vision and persistent effort de-
by a problem of this extraordinary nature and magnitude.
specific terms, some of the elements of the failure were the
-There was a basic contradiction in the U.S. negotiating
1ion. The United States had demilitarized ihaste after World
. 1J, whereas the Soviet Union had maintained very sub-
Ltial forces in combat readiness. This factor argued for
ntion of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons as long as





24
A41
,psiderq u that was asmuch a
gossible-a p in t
bviet _Ik4d il 4 it, was a 6oncem of the'
'the Coxigr;6ss. et th MiericAn leader-ship r'6
ke secret could not be kop.t !or 1on
preh6,
,,move quickly, an
was necepsary to d c6hi, n ive
lish inte#AAtional don4rols" Nradwdc lly, the U.S.
in particiAlax, the e'United Stat6re'poat
6fx liuqW ing.atomic weapons. but e-
4 1 ae
and tua4 of
ppmt definmigthe conditions i A
consicrer accep4 ciintrol ap aLr have iin4
s tte
U.S.S.R.'s suspicion tha:'i it 8;a ericau purpo
essential control while g ving the appearance of vest' 'Wj#4M
intematibnal, bodyt 14
X here: wa, calcuktod ambiguity in the. SOVIA Pos,"
'L _L_ A V,
nindly ampi6ious-of, the United States, the U.S.S. IL I
Gtssemeihits Wp iple for concrete plans *hilid: Ai
OVVjW,*tOPjkwe .ponry progmm which w1aq toO: ov e 3h==
,:4s*a'fffMd Wiii:?wost American scientisis aiitd Adip
p4"r at the tima. In retrospect, thefact of undi 4
:and atk-ImLst a .Justifi6d-; Soviet suspidon-ma-
tbLq,-!.United.i8tatas shauld.4ave adopted:&. xnore;! n, M
ii t t theV.S, proposals V hioh kz e
o- -Cortai fea. ur-e'go
essential ani&ctiv6'control system-notably"thm Vii =11-
ing: limitAition, of. natio-nal, sovereignty, inspeetwu midi*11im
of, vata,)hu i, tha,:&cufity Council in mattem. of punoon4qv for
noWi4is vf: a econ&ol Agreewent were.- totally im* *kble
tothe Soiiet UWDW.1 The qiiestion aris6sas to -Wked"4iA*@
poiats were M.faci ssential to a controtplan and its twthw *Mt
Ao whi4 -they, vievented, meaningful negofiaitibiL 200mifik
alternative, approa hidn the U.S. policyrualdne' t
have been.-first to doUrmine what among the bask tebbiI6
and political requirements of an effective control
side would accept, aud then try to establish some com A
between th4p,. two po*ions. A willingness to proceed 0 11 is
4uight "a IQ t liavp-en-aphasized good faith and si fy er-
kialdin that 'each h d its spe 'al polit
xes6lve.
Th _weie n&i-ere in the relationshiDs d lr4 ettil
of h co an IToe
e An 6rieian scientists and dip: lomats. kthough
Camed 1 heTaction, with the scient sts in. a limi
it a4 ph6 tee,6291y"'bif 'atomic energy which: tleeldt, o And
tO116 of t;W tio 'I
*01 it t Ons. Disagreemen s wer
t ofie'hv"
.9gical fierm -'Ad lfallyl h. y i6f1peted political di&+m but
qj'A'+Plomat9 fall' d to d: al ihem. accordija ame
time, sclentist, who iveke'ffi A position to in-hu 'n
ence polli y W
the, Z*44--Stat8s and i1a the, UNAEC failed to recognize e
Of of -,poiltrol, in the c of em
pqst-war po e
%
pf '. o . 0 :..:. . .
()A t1watlier hmdMs of OQUrse P6; "Ie to speculate thaiLtiink cm4d hayein
to 00taprQWkwon what thpyedrWdered key issaq4, as jongjs&.(&) the'u.8'"'
and thereSDM roaamed, In s, TOM
Strongly Possible that the U.S.S. d =e own atomic bomb.




40
A ich set'the stage for failure was the over-~ii~~i~iiiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiii~~iii
Zt tdn 'US laesoftetctcl dvnaew ichmnpl
S$ ;ioniofiAtomiciweaponsigaveithelUnitediStates."iAsitheiauthor
10N,~~ ....boreg
e ecluiv posesio ofa ew ecnolgy temin fom siiiiii
May V43 1.1 Uatiioniian advantageiiniinternationaiiaifairsithatladvantage
.............................................................. e p.................. iian i
d ..4 w~s ale to dupiiiiiiheidicoveryiofiissioniandtoicreate


chbdiiii ofiilonaiiiioiod tin
to:M9,~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ onscec,....eapicto f e ecnlg
4js~bo froeuky dmontrtedbefretheword s i te cse f he toic....
t~ox *W),Itp,, pr t, o~hq nation fom acquiing or: creating thisitehnolo .1

Vfiwa* te eaon fr aiur o te archpln egtitins





26







bhe elements from science, technology, and diplomacy could be
ected to devise a workable system for control which would
acceptable to the leading nations of the world."
g Reassesmsent in 1975
author of the study makes the following comments 3 year'
e study was completed (summer 1972):
3 appears to have been a general acceptance by Congress of
as a competent negotiator in this area, an acceptance Which
tt be as forthcoming today. The question is still relevant: to
ftet does Congess have a voice in, or can it effectively raise
s regarding, th selection Qf a chief arms control negotiator?
ect, and in light of developments since 1946, it would seem
iate for Congress to intensify its efforts to insure that persons
tedfor such critical diplomatic assignments as the negotiation
control agreements were not unduly subject to a particular
onal, bureaucratic, special-interest, or other bias.

NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT
og Congress had expressed an anxious determination to
1e "secret" of the atomic weapon-a goal which has since
impossible-there was little co essionaJ involvement in the
plan negotiations. Was the reluctance in Coe during
bo transfer peaceful nuclear technology similarly based on the
1at blocking this action would prevent the spread of weapons
y? There is a greater need now than ever for Congress to
intimately familiar with facts of nuclear technology, its
and peaceful uses, and the vital question of acceerating
ation versus international controls.
wer the issue of controlling nuclear energ presents a much
OMpiex set of circumstances now than it did in 1946. Confess
Ion to understand defense needs in the field of increasingly
c and costly strategic weapons. Current arms control negotia-
specially SALT, require congressional decisions to support or
specific arms control program. In the face of growing demands
*ful uses of nuclear energy to overcome the energy shortfall in
arts of the world, and with the offers of U.S. nuclear assistance
)t and Israel last year and the addition of India to the nuclear
congress has seen the need for, and sought, solutions to the
L of nuclear proliferation.
ter, in ration to such developments as the Vladivost k
SC ess will increasingly be called on to make timely
s in a chapter on Arrs Control and Disarmament in Congrw and Feign Pol:4
)rteCommittee on International Relations, U.S. House ofRersnaisbthFoig
C onal Research Service; Washington, U.S. Government Printing ,Apri 15
Amajorissn the Co (in174aroseover the offer ofU.
inologyto both Eygpt and ,during
congresss was the arms control implications: whether saf were adequate to vent diver-
pens use, and whether such moves might contribute uma to te of nuclear
he fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuea dvie n M
A vided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful u The author
onal concern for control was eventually translated into a number of t peces of
a t in principle signed by President Ford and Soviet party leader Bre-hnev at VIadi-
lecember 1974. The two leaders agreed to numerical ceilings on the offensive weaponssytm
,try, The SALT teams of negotiators of both countries were to attempt to translate thes
rylate 1975, when Brezhnev was scheduled to visit the United tate n event which been
several times. [As-of April 1976 neither the treaty nor the visit had mtraie.butth eo






















lation of
combined
42-45.)






on had assembled it.s own stockpile of Hirohima-typ)
s and had successfully tested a hydrogen b. Meanwhile,
opie's Republis" had been established in Eastern Europe
, South Korea had been invaded, attenipts to far a
efnse Community had not worked out, and international
it negotiations were dead ovked. Moreover, the mn
d a vigorous and cons derably successful diplomatic a1d
L offensive to persuade the world fliat nuclear Weapons were
le, that they nevertheless were especially hor-ible and
anned, and that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the
eloping nonmilitary applications of atomic eneCr.0 The
r.S. reaction to the frustrations of this period of strategiC
id declining nuclear advantage was to threaten massive
with nuclear weapons against Communist aggression.
reactive policy wa, the "Atoms for Peace" proposI. "With,-
ed Nations, the response. .. wa- instantaneous and favor-
;eech was scored as, victory for the United States in
Sby undercutting a persuasive Communist propa-

ily, the proposal represented a unique and constc t Ive
shift the emphasis utilizing a significant new technology
its military potential and toward its peaceful applications:
the start of U.S. diplomatic effort, to create an international atomic
y; American encouragement to two European regional, multinational
nuclear energy; establishment of a network of bilateral agreement-
United States and individual nations for technical assitance in
ry and a treaty to establh international safeguards over nuclear
s.These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of nuclear
d, ranging from applications of radioisotopes for research and for
treatment in medicine to the demonstration of nuclear power for the
electricity. Underlying the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing
science and technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of
the United States.2
ost consequential way, probably, of any of the 12 studies
,ne, Technology, and American Diplomacy series, this
her with the preceding one on the Baruch plan) raises
s to what diplomatic courses of action in fact are, in the
iost advantageous to the U.S. national interest in dealing
at new technology.
?e Developed
-national activity most directly associated with atoms for
e International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was
July 29 1957, as an international organization within the
of the United Nations. It continues to report annually to
enera1 Assembly and, on occasion, to the Security Council
onomic and Social Council.
;3inier. V& LIear IVeapi ail POrovsW Poli. New Yark, pulse for ths C~unil on,
by IHarpqr & Bros., 1957: pp. 30-364.
dt, pp; 21-221














arm
the


The Agency shall
energy to peace, hea
far as it is able, that
vision or control is n
Dr. Donnelly c(
in the statute, ti
enough to accomp
desireA".a
The IAEA was


system.


The


Euratom
March 25,







Suez Crisis still fresh in mind, [the authors] observed that a future
oil could be an economic calamity for Europe, and that excessive
upon an oil supply from al unsta le ren might lead to serious
uble throughout the world. Estimating t future energy require-
e economic community would increase by 83 percent between 1955
e advised that the economic growth of the six countries was in danger
ously hamper d by lack of another source of energy."
a quickly ran into diplomatic difficulties. The Soviet Union
oth it and the European Economic Community, labeling
a scheme for the rearmament of Germany with atomic
end charging that both organizations were instrument-, of
six European nations disregarded Soviet threat. and an
ring Soviet plan for Pan-European economic and atomic
1gration. However, there were other problems; for example,
railed to win necessary support for building facilities to
re enriched uranium-considered by European proponent.
Lity feature of an independent program-but was obliged
buy enriched uranium from the United States. Further, of
rarch programs provided for by the Treaty of Rome,
L958--2) was largely limited to building an organization;
(1963-67) was characterized by dissension and budget
and the third (proposed for 1968-72) was not even
-Euratom's research program has since been funded
.uratom did not produce a nuclear industry for the Com-
it rather faces competition from the national industries of
rs.
]ear Energy Agency of the then OECC was, like Euratom,
to European fears of a fuel shortage. The NEA was estab-
n international statute effective February 1, 1958, with the
active of furthering "the development of the production
r nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the participating
Like its parent OECD, the NEA is a forum rather than
)nal agency. As Dr. Donnelly p .uts it,".. .its strong point
coordination and pro gram [review] rather than direct
The Agency has led its members into areements on
Health and safety standards, and on nuclear insurance. By
,uratom s an operating organization as well as an agency
Sestablishing an industrial structure for nuclear power in

NO-N-PROLIFERATION TREATY
A recent major diplomatic consequence of the scientific
f fission was the negotiating of the Treaty on Non-Prolif-
{iuclear Weapons (NPT), which etrdinto force March 5,
c pt of the treat was a radical one: it divided nations
t which hadtheatombombndthosewhich
id it committed the non-nuclear-weapons to relin-
Leir sovereignty to the extent of permittmng inspections on
aries by international inspection. Ireurn, the nonweapons



































gained
which


at first advocated


another
Strauss
ments C


io i1e Non-r
created a sitt
U.S. Arms
History of N





33
-The IAEA's first Director General, W. Sterling Cole-who bad
repagiRod the chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
to.take the post-tried to structure the Agency as a channel for atomic
emtrgy aid and as a proponent of international safety standar(14 and
international controls for nuclear fuel materials. The United States did
not respond to his vision of a strong international ageng. In 1961 the
State Department, in agreement with the AEC, estab ished an Ad-
vi$pry. Committee chaired by Dr. Henry D. Smyth-author of the
postwar "Smyth Report"-to conduct a general review of the IAEA.
TheAd =* Committee urged that the IAEA be strengthened under
U. 8. le p and that more U.S. nuclear energy aid be channeled
throu the Agency rather than bilaterally. The State Department and
the 14C rejected the Advisory Committee's recommendations, pre-
feming that the IAEA limit itself to such technical service functions as
int mational safeguards and inspection.
U.S. RELATIONSHIP TO EURATOM AND NEA
: T.S;,:.backinf of Euratom, as of the IAEA, was mixed. Secretai-y
#os, mtd ar "that the United States wanA ed Euratow to con-
ja q exclusive on development of nuclear power and not as ire
i*ufth greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com-
idunity orthe fostering of greater political unity among its member
s1t9tA. While some European proponents of Euratom looked to it to
e th6 influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington
is the opposite." 18
Three major issues central to the establishment of Euratom were
whether it should manufacture enriched uranuim, whether member
states should be precluded from military use of atomic energy, and
whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear materials.
.Vor security reasons, the United States opposed foreign production
ofenriched uranium and retained its monopoly by guaranteeing an
0equate supply to Euratom at reasonable prices. The idea-denved
fMT, t1le Atoms for Peace concept-that Euratom. could serve to pre-
ivke nWear armament in Europe was stillborn because of French
in elarle on the right to'produce and use atomic weapons for national
seddrity. Y6t the, French pressed successfully for a Euratom monopoly
" $ 1 ti to the U.S.
onluifiar, upplies for commercial pu oses. By poin ing
6Affiple.M' tb&Atomic Energy Act 07 1946, which tooi title to all
Lede'ar Inaterials in the Nation and forbade private ownership, the
1? enth'pte-iaile'd over West German opposition to nuclear monopoly'
?gt6m' a'tible with the principles of a free-market economy.
eTh1ted States did pgrticipate with Euratom in a joint power
Fam, using S. nuelear technology, which resulted in the con-
gtHbtion of three operating nu'clear powerplants with a combined out-
puVbf kbout 600 megawatts. The goal bad been six plants and 1,000
M6ka*Atts. In the negotiations leading to the bilateral agreement
66AibM*i'i.g this program, the only significant issues were over U.S.
go tion rights and safeguards with -respect to nuclear material%
%p Ii d by the United States. The U.S. negotiators wanted to send
inspectors into nuclear facilities of European member states; the
Eur-atom. negotiators refused. A resulting compromise provided for
X Dwneny, op.cit., pp. 75,-76.





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Eurato toetbihfrUS-upl aeras aegadsse
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gur n otrlsse oldb optbl ih1Es


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de ie U .....berhi..ni....sfolowd.m re.........l.B t


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recntl aagrpntamaktfrheUSnulpor indsrta h


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ith issrnlbakdgvrmnprgafodeepent n tpia~.o








3 5 HHH] N i~ ~~~i~ ~ iH=ii~i.........ii ]-i.~iiiiiii
Rol o Ciies
Presdens Trmanand isehowe esabliheda pater of los
c~oratin wih te Cngres i wha wa reognied s a attr o
big at oncen t U.. seuni andothr nation cancer. her
MW~~ W!v iiainb h nrs nmn ftedvlpet
atedig eshrn o ucerenrinfoai o an aeis
numerous hearings were heldiii important legislatiiio waiasein
#A v ipp....................n.t... ea.. rov.sions
To peseve uclar ecrey a a atinalsecuitymeaure th
C ongrew ,,,,,,,, ............... th A to mic............... E nergyi A cti~i of..... term ia e nuclear............... ii
olbrto wt h at memso h ntd tts steCl
....................................................................................m i1c
Eni''omiso o ne no cranlte aragmnswt






























































































:4UVV rLI
the peseeft
remains in





37
_Despite the importance of a nuclear safety function for the
1ARA, radiation safety &des, are confused d a iparently over-
lap Pmg. issued by
In Europe there are standards an toth the IAEA
utut Buratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation rather than
traAafer the committee's functions to the IAEA. Meanwhile, the
latikw's role in setting standards for the construction and opera-
IiOnof nuclear powerplants is dormant. 64)
-Euratom's nuclear supply function ts not grown as origi-
-fially expected. The safeguards function, in contrast, has been per-
formed effectively and has demonstrated the practicability of
3 intdmational inspection. (p. 86)
-The Safeguards Committee which the IAEA created in 1970
was open to all member states of the Agency, in recognition of the
T 4*666ralm'terest in safeguards and the desire of nonweapons mem-
14 nations to participate directly in developing safeguards
A ments. The committee met intensively over many months
4iid iti5ded three reports covering all aspects of the proposed
agitements. Nearly 50 delegations, very different in character,
sO*e involved. A British member of the IAEA Board of Gover-
'144 vldftl who participated commented on the moderate, compromising
spirit and friendly atmosphere which prevailed: "Informal con-
sultation came to count for more and more in our work; and when
*e --"t back to the Board room even the intractable problems
[more or less worked out]." (p. 142)
: Atoms for Peace ]has been unique as an example of inter-
national cooperation in scientific fields, in that international
? oo 6ration in the Peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about
ii ge result of deliberate decision of governments rather than
0 acientific communities. Among its other accomplishments, it
MV vided mechanisms for working on health, safety, and en-
vironmental problems which cross national bound aries. (pp. 26-2 7)
. %l TA 1. -t--Asqurning that it is in the best interests of the United States
wid of world peace to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate
*-At fa effectiveness,. and zrantine that the bilateral agreements
have provided the United" State-s with certain benefits, it may
1 bb time to roexamine the respective roles of bilateral agreements
md the 1AEA with a view to possibly channeling more aid
Jhrough the latter as a means of strengthening it. (p. 45)
-Although the 1AEA evolved out of the discovery of fission
y scientists, the scientific community had relatively little part
H i the n ti ti s. An eminent European nuclear scientist
complaine in 1960 that "Scientists do not generally know what
an enormous effort lies behind the creation of a, full-fledged in-
ternational agency. They also do not know what an irresistible
lies in international organizations . it is practi-
dally impossible to terminate one land it is] therefore only a
question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giints
0 which can be influenced . the scientists and technolo t f
"the world have not as a group realized the potenflarppower
PI.A :of the instrument created and have failed to follow up with
spealdng or writing about the duty of scientists we
have not even tried to influence the sele4ion of representatives
of our countries f or important positions in the Agency organs." (p
49)





38

-If the IAEA had evolved in the direction indicated by the
Atoms for Peace proposal, it could have had a major irduence
on development of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a
channel for technical assistance and nuclear materials. However,
because of cold wax tensions, the United States chose not to
promote the Agency as a distributor, or custodian of a pool, of
nuclear materials; neither did it support an international regula-
tory role for the Agency in the design and operation of nuclear
powerplants. On the other hand, the Agency provided a forum
in which United States and Soviet representatives could meet in
a relatively friendly atmosphere at a time when most contacts
between the two countries were strained and formal, if not
hostile. (pp. 71-72)
-The experience of Euratom illustrated a diplomatic reality:
the political cohesion of members of an internatiorad technologi-
cal undertaking is a prerequisite to its success, not simply a
desirable byproduct. As a corollary, the troubles of Eurstom's
R. & D. programs illustrate also how the cohesive force of inter-
-nationalism in science may not be strong enough to withstand
the divisive forces of national commercial interests. (p. 84)
-A tenet of modem management, private or public, is that an
organization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that
seek to create and apply new technologies. (p. 84)
-The Treaty of Rome is silent on the issue of environmental
protection. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining
and controlli. g the environmental effects of nuclear power and
fuel reprocessing plants. (p. 91)
-Euratom and the OKCD's Nuclear Energy Agency overlap,
in many of their interests and activities. Euratom's usefulness
appears to be handicapped by the dispersion of human and
financial resources of its member states between its own pro-
grams and those of the NEA and IAEA. (p. 92)
-Moves toward European unity such as the establishment of
Euratom have been eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism.
Euratom's successes have come in activities which were linked
to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of
France, Italy, and West Germany. Inability to form a common
European approach to nuclear technology has proved advan-
tageous to the U.S. nuclear industry [but perhaps at the expense
of long-range U.S. national goals and interests]. (p. 94)
-The lessons of the diplomatic effort of organizing joint U.S.-
Euratom programs for nuclear power production could point
the way toward future joint ventures to develop other new power
sources, such as large-scale use of solar energy. (p. 108)
-Froni World War 11 to Sputnik, U.S. world technological
leadership went unchallenged and was sustained in large part by
advances in nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek
to monopolize this leadership, the United States offered and
supplied technological assistance to many countries, especially
in Europe, to develop their own use of nuclear power. During
the late 1960s, U.S. world leadership was challenged by other
nations. Looking to the 1970s and to an era of greater peaceful
rather than military competition, there are several fundamental




39
Issftes involving nuclear energy: To what extent should U.S.
foreign policy and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use
.;of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with
futur&'U.S. technological leadershi to be worth the effort, or
would the required financial and ot er resources be more profit-
ably dedicated. to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S.
"chnological leadership be more than offset by economic losses
4 ough competition from other countries re U.S. tech-
nological assistance? Most important of all, caer'e t ere any Big-
ilbfficant risks and dangers from the standpoint of U.S. national
security in continued U.S. support of foreign nuclear power
davbJopment? (p. 156)
01*04ty.of outlook and experimental approach can lead to weak-
titsit bi vulnerability when the danger is either unclear or not imminent.
Thi ) Potential for extreme danger in nuclear proliferation has been
t4o enough to American diplomatic and congressional leaders from

1h*)6dtset but not the imminence of that danger. Reaction to this
4hteat hm'lbeen slow in coming.
Although many voices compete in the formulation of U.S. foreign
-#6110YAhere is relatively free play for influential expression of the
Vie*s of strong individuals (as Secretary of State or Secretary of
'ff6fbnsb, for example) unchecked by sustained and sober analysis of the
16013imoldw,"eal implications of any given proposal regarding nuclear
,,dhfty. There is, in short, no central governmental machinery for
lktbnological assessment in the nuclear Iffeld comparable to the Office
of Technology Assessment with its mandate in other areas. Further-
rhorid OTA is a mechanism of the Congress. There would appear to
U: compelling need for centralized institutional machinery and
.foeedui dg in the executive branch to provide impartial, measured,
lblig-range, assessments of all nuclear energy developments or
-t&dposajs (or needed initiatives) affectmi U S ational interests and
Ow9 . n
Intienitional security.12 It would foll at development of counter-
part oversight machinery, possibly involving an extension of
tha OTA, mandate, should be considered by ihe R=gress.
*thor',R.Reassessment in 1975
Authot.,Waxren H. Donnelly comments retrospectively as follows:
Beginning with the explosion of the atom bomb over 11[roshima in
.Auqu t.1945 U.S. diplomacy was doubly affected by the discovery of
It
I.... fission. The military use of atoinic energy became a main ta
o. U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the mi
.1%50s the civil uses of nuclear power appeared promising enough for
"U.S. diplomacy to back efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear
ei nergy to create international and regional atomic organizations for
purpose. With the late 1960s and early 1970s the unperatives of
,witkar Weapons led to international treaties and agreements and to
the strategic arms limitations tal s. During these years, U.S. diplo-
14aw aJso assisted the domestic development of nuclear power by
h4ing to open markets for the infant U.S. nuclear industry and to
PrQyWe opportunities to demonstrate nuclear power abroad before
branch machinaT for PoUcy and management
ed than ever. One agmey (the 7=% Re -
tal LqWts of nuclear power ux e
loping new or improved technologies for nuclear
Energy Administration) is beginning to ad
ate





40





41

-The question of whether the influence gained by the United
States' long standing but now diminished role as the incipal
free-*orld supplier of enriched uranium has justified the cost,
and whether it is in the U.S. interest to expand the Nation's
cap,",. ty to make enriched uranium sufficiently to maintain a
free world monopoly position.
-The effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic efforts to' persuade
11111cear supplier countries to limit their exports of dangerous
nuclear products and technology.
6XX LIWSONS FROM THE ST BAR R
'ODY OF COMMERCIAL NUCL POWE
Thisubject of commercial nuclear power in Europe continues to be
ularly illustrative of the interaction of science, technology, and
acy. This interaction is highlighted by such matters as the
fuither favorable development of the g as centrifuge, the new prospecti
4 laser enrichment of uranium, the possibility of transfrontier pollu-
tiu'u'froip nuclear powerplants, demands that international nuclear
be strengthened, and prospects for more
saf p" usq vigorous inter-
xWlonoJ. cooperation to develop the breeder reactor. Further prolifera-
don. of weapons-making ability, as well as attempts to halt such
proliferation, will place great stramis upon American diplomats and
Jheii diplomacy. Another complication is the congressional quest for a
,gr "or, influence in the negotiation of international agreements for
-coop eration.
A;aeAcan experience suggests that international cooperation in
energy production and similar high-technology enterprises should give
less attention to technologies approaching commercial application and
emphasize longer-term ventures in their early tages-as nuclear
efloirgywas until recently and as solar energy, fusion, or ocean heat
Tesi&Fch, are now.
,;. -sVh6, author also states that he would now give much more attention
W the impact of nuclear safeguards upon diplomacy, in anticipation
of commercial use of the breeder reactor. The long-term future of
nuclear powermiy depend upon success of the breeder react-or. If the
blm der succeeds, it will greatly increase the amount of energy re-
bov*mble from world uranium and thorium resources. But it will also
u4txoduce -great quantities of plutonium into international- commerce;
i *.eontrol of that plutonium will pose many new problems for
diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts view these problems as so unsolvable
that they might favor barring use of the breeder both in the United
40s and elsewhere.
Le lative Implications
&w h umber of issues for congressional. considem-
.,,Sestudy identified
tift; most, of which have legislative implications. Slightly updated,
these include:
-Sustaining U.S. international leadership in nuclear tech
.0y in th 1970s.
-Reducing United States,. European, and Japanese depend-
upon imported oil.
V..
-Controlling the possibilities for nuclear proliferation.
-Demonstrating the practicability of international inspection
for arms control.
-Improving the U.S. position in world trade.





42

-Assessing the implications of domestic opposition to nuclear
energy upon U.S. diplomacy.
-Maintaining a competitive position for the United States in
the world market for nuclear goods and services.
-Cooperatinu in international efforts to control environmental
effects nuclear power.
-Developing international safety and environmental protec-
tion standards for nuclear powerplants.
-Protecting the U.S. position in uranium enrichment and
fuel repro c essing.
Finally, the study identified two main lines of thought thatthe Con-
gress might wish to pursue: the use of nucleax technology in U.S.
diplomacy; and the use of diplomacy to advance nuclear technoloov
While separate, these lines do interact and that interaction shoulcie
systematically taken into account. The study also indicated a dose
interaction of U.S. domestic and foreign interests in commercial nu-
clear power, which suggrests that if present efforts by Mr. Nader;- the
Union of Concerned Sclentists, and others, to persuade the C'o if
I : Tess
to enact a moratorium on nuclear power reach the stage of legit abony
the implications of such an act upon U.S. diplomacy would require
analysis. i
Further, the study sought to highlight present and coming issues of
international safeguards for nuclear power. To strengthen int6rna-
tional safeguards would necessitate treaty changes, with attendant
Senate advice and consent; both Houses would be involved Vnith"le'gis-
lation to authorize and fund new or expanded U.S. agency activities
to this end.
Some. Illustrative Questions
Cases One and Two suggest an extensive catalog of questions which
appear to warrant congressional concern. Because of the special ur-
geny of the problems of nuclear energy utilization and control, they
are given in some detail.
CHANNELING OF U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR POWER
In the light of current concern over risks of theft of nuclear materials, should
the United States seek renegotiation of the NPT to deemphasize this commitment
and deliberately slow down technical assistance for nuclear power?
If U.S. technical assistance should continue, would U.S. interests be best served
by channeling this assistance through bilateral agreements with recipient countries,
by supplying it through the IAEA? Conversely, which approach would seem most
favored by the recipient nations?
To what extent should U.S. technical assistance be limited to installation and
operation of nuclear powerplants, with assistance for other parts of the nuclear
power cycle to be avoided or withheld?
To what extent should the United States unilaterally proceed to reserve exports
of nuclear materials, products, information, and assistance to those nonweapons
nations that agree to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA
safeguards?
What should be the participation of the private U. S. nuclear industry in
negotiating and carrying out bilateral arrangements-in particular, extension of
present agreements on commercial use of nuclear power?
How satisfactory is the present interworking of the Energy Research and
Development Agency (ERDA) and the State Department in negotiating and
carrying out bilateral agreements? How consonant with national foreign policy
have past bilateral agreements been?
What should be the U.S. position in offering technical aid and assistance to
Arab nations for nuclear power?





43

To what extent should commercial exports of nuclear products, services, and
teelmdogy by private organizations be required to conform to UA foreign
and how should this be done?
t should be the role of Congress in review and appraLmd of major ventures
in nudew cooperation or in export of nuclear powerplants and associated goods
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
-Wh" should be the U.S. diplomatic position on proposals to establish and
enfom international standards for the d, nstructio and operation of
aftlWsr powerplants and other facilities of t 's i % c le'oa r fuel cA0e that may
risks to the environment, to public health and safety, and to national :Yas inter-
I iond security?
To what extent would channeling US. assistance exclusively through the
1AEA strengthen that agency in general, and in its capabilities to provide effec-
tive wdeguards for nuclear materials?
What should be the U.S. position on establishing and enforcing international
tifts for transportation of fissionable and radioactive materials?
jk
t should be the U.S. position on future development and use of nuclear-
1?owereA merchant ships?
."WhM should be the U.S. position on extending international control of atomic
to include location, design, construction, and operation of facilities that
cause transfrontier pollution in normal operations or in case of an accident?
coucy, t
'would be the implications of U S. articipation in such arrangements
for domestic regulation of nuclear Xi r Z t would be the expected roles of
th6ftate'Department, ERDA, the 1;ut Regulatory Commission, and ADCA?
If the United States abandons its position as the sole supplier of enriched
uranium to the free world nuclear powerplants, would U.S. self-interest be served
better by establishing additional production facilities in the 1AEA or by encourag-
ing national or regiona ventures?
what extent would U.S. interests be served by having the IAEA locate,
bM and operate facilities to reprocess spent fuel, recover plutonium and
depleted uranium, and store or manage long-term disposal of radioactive wastes?
Considering questions about safekuards being raised by domestic critics of
nuokn6r power, what would be the comparative benefits and drawbacks of U.S.
A,&&Mic efforts to revive the Baruch-lAlienthal plan in art and make the
the sole proprietor of fuel reprocessing plants and all Fi2ities, for making
..plutonium into nuclear fuel elements for use in domestic nuclear powerplants?
Tim Un#ed- States has offered voluntarily to place its dom tic nuclear power
luitry under 1AEA safeguards once hold-out nations have ratified the _NPT-
I.NhaA would be the advantages and disadvantages of fulfiffing that offer now
without W81tin longer for nations such as Rrance, Indis, Lsra@, and mainland
China to ZY .
YI
What would be the pros and cons of a U.S. policy to promote consolidation of
various regional nuclear organizations into the IAEA?
TELE ZAVA ABA TBOTBED
To what extent is this idea inhibited in US. circles by the presence in the
of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China? Conversely,
i&the presence of these world powers in the IAEA make experiments with it a
potentially valuable way to got new, practical working experience?
T9.what extent and in what ways could diplomacy isolate 1A9A operations
fjoin ideological contests? Is this a realistic goal to postulate?
E[w anything been learned from U.S. experience with the IAEA that applies to
other fields such as aviation, trandroutier pollution control, communications, or
disesse control?
EURATOM
To *hat extent should the United States encourage Euratom to build and oper
*te a uranium enrichment PIELnt in, Europe?
;To what extent should the UnitAd States attemlit to recoup some of the national
& w emt in nuclear energy- through licensing fees, royalties or other charges,
Rx eamorts of -nuclear products.and technologies?
Vu
Wo long should the United States continue its commitment to 3u1WI clear
I 'powermi Europe with enhched uranium? What would be the e&cts on. foreign
ji0hey of a decision to end thiscommitiment?,





u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~- Ai~~ ~ii iii
W h at.. .. ............ .. .......... . ................. p a t i i a t o ................................ .............................a r d s
by........ Eurto goenignularpwr.lnt. ndrl.e.acltis.Hwmuho
s~ priipionsol easge oteDeateto tt n R
Ho~~ muhsoudb ef ovlutr ffrso teUS ncerinuty
Shoul .... ip.o..cy.s..k..o..xp..d..ur..m..or..in...dio.ct.v........



Howiiiii~iiil shl d va~ilal U.S. rsucsb ivi de m n uao ,teO C
Nuclear!' Enrg Aec N ),adtIAEAi
Whtbnft oudacu rm ..dpoaicefrst xpn uao'
programs~i i andi loriesfo ula nryt uesadeeg ngnrl
JOIN EUAO-..RSAC
What did the Un ite State ler fromi the Atomiciii Enrg Commissions
pici pati i in i n thei~ l jin U.S.-Euratomiii!iiiii reeac programiiii Wha wer the'' strength
and~ii~iii weaknesses ofiiii th.... etue
Wha are the imlctosofteelsoni te jitvnues(hc h
Secrtar of Stt per t eecua i) forexmpl, n usinsoar negy
or. synthet ic fuellsfo cal?
ToiL wha exten sho......u,! .........i l d and.......... co l jo...i n ven ure wii ...............ith E uratom ..... r e .........
radiiiiii~iiii~ii !!iiii i ii'ioa tv wa t management andii isp s l de elpm n and~ dem nsraio ofi ~~l ii~ii~~~iii ..
nula aeurstcnlges n eeomn fnwdi mproed wyso
f'' iiii !ii~ ii iiiii .......n g a n d e n ri...............c.................g u ra n iu m ? ''""" '' ....
iTHE OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
Sh ul U.S. dilo ac seek ocom i Eurato with............
What onion can....... bedanfo h oprtv ucs fNArltv
to Euratom
U.... NUCEA FUE..RVCE
Sh ul he Un t d ta e .......... to.............. preserve.......... itsposiion asth ..... u plero


enr!!ichduanu oth re olIfswhtaeth ianilad te ipia





45

i i ---State government moratoriums on future construction of nuclear
powerplants?
E&Ctive_ safeguards will require extraordinary measures to leam about, pre-
V;6ut, or intercept thefts of nuclear materials or to recover stolen materials. What
Is Ahe U.S. assewment of the need for a world protective or police force with per-
bpps suprAuxtional powers to give safeguar& credibility? Are safeguards important
Moug4 to the United States to induce it to accept the problem and risks of such a
foroe--especially if its members included nationals from the Soviet Union,, its
jittellites, and mainland China?
To what extent should the United States in its bilateral and multilateral agree-
nts;extend safeguards terms and conditions beyond those compatible with the
XM fuActions under the NPT?
Vithilt the United States what are the respective safeguards functions, respon
Mbflitiea, and authorities of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Dis-
t ornmunbut Agency, ERDA, the National Research Council (NRC), and the De-
artm, nts of Defense and Commerce? Who is responsible for coordination of these
ac#vities? How are these activities coordinated with U.S. f 901i
rVetr level of international effort would be needed to assure reasonably e ective
saftift'ards in an international plutonium economy? How should this be financed?
t sbould be the nature and extent of U.S. participation?
Should the IAEA be transformed into a world nuclear safeguards agency?
-Sh9ul4: thq saferar& function be transferred to a new, separate agency with no
dthier functiow-r
To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand international safeguards
I toibuiude physical protection of nuclear materials, interception of attempts to steal
alt and recovery of stolen materials?
any:.clpveloping countries appear to be less concerned with safeguards than
with ulflng the benefits of nuclear power. How are they to be persuaded that
ItU =2 for safeguards is not a "put-on' ". designed to serve the convenience of the
nations which already have nuclear power?
To what extent should the United States seek to influence preparation of the
IAEA guidelines for physical security, and to adopt those guidelinesfor domestic
114. adezuards?
'To what extent and in what ways should U.S. diplomatic efforts encourage the
V16hing,"orgamzation, construction, and operation of international, including
"giodal, 'facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuels and related operations of
JW=aation and perhaps enrichment?
,,0JTb.wh&t: extent would placing U.S. nuclear fuel facilities for civil nuclear power
i4a&r IA19A safeguards by voluntary action reduce or neutralize expressed fears
'And'con'cwns of nonweapons nations that 1AEA safeguards may'violate their

MSE EF,-THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL,
GEOP191YSICAL YEAR
iigtstemmt of the Case
.'..T.he Thtmmational Geophysical Year or IGY (July 1, 1957-Decem-
N.:
1514r 1058) was the most ambitious venture in international scientific
cooperaiion in history. Broadly speaking, it had as its purpose the
observation of phenomena relating to the entire Earth and everything
in and around it. It enlisted the services of tens of thousands of
'd volunteer observers from 67 nations, working at some
Iscie'tists an
!8*01M dbservat-ion stations around the world. It yielded mucK. scientifi'c
datft ,-was attended by significant technological achievements, and
stimulated other major international cooperative efforts involving
mence and technology in the years to follow.
I*qwrtakrA of the Case
The IGY's feats of science and technology were impressive and in
some instances spectacular; its accomplishments in the area of politics
and diplomacy were also important.
U.S. Congress, House, committee on For I Affairs The Political Legacy of the International Geo-
physical Year, a study in the series on Science, _y, and American Diplomse prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Semlity Policy and Scientific Developments by Haro!d Bu is, Se
Reseuch Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government
Prin:ting Office, November 1913, 64 pages. (Committee print.)




ii i ' i i i i~ i ................i l...................................................................................................................................
A m o ngiiiiii th la t te r: i i~ ; liii~' ( 1)' the~~iiiiii ii~iiii : I G Y w h ile' i'iiiiiiiiiii @ ii iiiiiiiiii' iii .........ii i ii .... ........... ..... .... ''i'''"ii g e n e r o u sly.............................................................byii
nionlgvrmns a ucsfll u ysinit -o mn


tii ndntfo oitclpupss;() i evh e sscnrb td o
tiiiiiiiiih di plo atic fra m e w orkiiiii~Hi~iiiiiiiiii ~iii! !!iiiiiii~iii~iiii!iii fo late n e o iatii!!ii on iiii;iiii l eadiiiiuiiiiil~l~i i ng to suchi= ii
development as the! 1961 Anarctic reaty, he 1963Test Ba Tirea
and:, .............................. 196 Spaceiiiiiii'i Treaty;iiii andii (3 tlatoI G vn i aea
p o w e r fu l p o litic a l i m p a c t e sp e c ia lly in th e U n it e d S t a te s : T h e S o v iet
l a ci ngiiii!iii ii~~~ ,~ o f",,,,,,:,,' ~i S p u tn,,i~~ii,,,i k 1 ,,,l,,,ii ,,,,,i iii iiiiii~,,,,,, ~~i iiiiii "! "' '' '" ",,,,,M,, " iiiiiiiiii .....................
The H I G,, Y's ,,,; sc, ,, i ; ,,,,i !''ii ific ahi eve ent inlue the acquisition and pub-

lication of valuable data relating, among other things, to cosmic ra ys ....
ge m geim ............ ph sis meerlgoeaorpy'o
ai viy n h p e tm sh .T eA trtcwsoee pt
scetfi xloainonasbsatalsae
Th ousadn eh ooia eelp eto h ed!

entac into .......... SpceAg -ws.. elanc...o..tiicalEat












iii47
......................... C O N C E P T ii .............. T H AT~i O F T P Y i. .......... ... ,, =='i"'" ~~iii
success ..... the= Fis adSeodoarYar tinevl .... 50
yaa le t e pe ti on that. a..h.................olar Yea
(TV w ul b h ld ini 1982 -83............ ='= = ............................... eve ha f o an the


50-y..... peid ol ea, it became apparen to some observer
tW heaceeainpcoftcnl adthfctht availl
baedaainte athsiene habenlxg epoie wr
In further.intenational.observtion.efforts.deirable.iEarlyii
................................................. TiPi b eihe ldiiin 1 9 5 7 -5 8 ,ii
25yasatrth Padcinidenafl a..io.. wihunsa
solr atiitywasprdiced





ii ii i iiiii iii ) ) )) )i)i48 ~~i )))


I GYi~li programsi were selected ai nly to.. asis ................... solving speifi

planetar probemsof..e.art,.wth.mphai..n.poblms.......

concurrentii obe-aiosa an onsaxudte lb ndcoea
iveefot b ay aios T eeprbem el eerly no.he
broad. areas theiiiii~' E art asl a~~ii~ structure atmospheriiiii 'i iiiiii~~iii iiiiiiiiiiiiii i c and) oce'anic i iwi iiii ........
ionii,, an pe toshr hscsadslrtersra eltosis
Thei~i bodaeswrdiie inot irte cetfcaes fr xm

ple oceanography, io o p e i iii~i~iiiiiii phi csiii~) iiiiiiiii~ii~iiiiiiii nuciiiiiiii~iii~~llea radiaion-in whichiiii")) .....
.........h wo l bei concentrated. ,! """ ..............
i !ii!!!!!! iii!'ii~i~i!! .................................... ........ !ii~i ......... ............ .................................................................................................... ... ............................. iiif
SCIENTIFIC~i REUT O G
Th sietii rsutsweeunreedntd
...........d ousiii m a se ........ .. d ata w ere......... ob ai e ............ th I ''i ..... Y.............. F or"i exa pl...on

of recordsi were~ii geerte by American...... Antric sttin alone......... Thiiis ......................

pouriiiiin of inorato posed, mor qusinsta..r nse. Beke likene
the stuati o to... tha ofcmn rm ue pc ndfniganw lnt3
Onmomnao rt htcsi a hsc a m Idfo
the~ii!i~~~ I Ya tebods agn fal a' nelculn aos
encompassingiii', not.....he...t.on.et ....gaa..e.a....trg..cti
spacei ii! ):!i: but, ', i~i alsoi' the m ic o sm .... at m i particles................
i n v e s t i ga....... ......t.. ............... n si...... .......... ........................ .................................... ... .. ... ............ .............. d e p t hs................. m ay.......................... ........... e x e n .. ............................... .... .........
m o r e t h a n )) ) ) 1 4 ,0 0 0 f e e t M u c h w a s le a r n e d c o n c e r n in g t h e e la s tic i ty o f))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) ))))))))))) ))))) )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))))) ))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))) ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))




49
U.S. Involvement
7%0 connection of the U.S. Government with the IGY, like that of
qt1her national government, was unofficial. Nevertheless, about a
third Of the initial U.S. financial support-more than $43 million-
Onwted of appropriated funds. An equivalent amount was contrib-
i*W by private institutions-mainly universities-with the remain-
1T19 third provide through existing programs in both public and private
reseArch Kboratories. (if the $43 million of appropriated money,
ne 1 $20 million was for the U.S. Earth Satellite progTam." Ulti-
istic a] and rational support for IGY activities brought
the total cost of the UA contribution to about $500 million.
Mony different approaches to the administration of funds for the
10Y were taken by the 67 participating countries. In the United
States a National Committee for the IdV::the USNC-was estab-
rished ; the National Academy of Sciences, a member of ICSU. The
USNC served as a focus for all U.S. technical panels, geographical
ittees, and stecial. groups, as
COMM well as for a broad cross-section
df.. American geop, ysicists. It provided technical guidance for the
National Science Foundation, which was responsible for preparation
of budget estimates and for obtaining congressional appropriations.
km the U.S. Government agencies which assisted the USNC
were the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Atomic
Ej ergy Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.
A64 e Congress
The ongmal budget for the IGY presented to Congress by
Dr. Alan T.-Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, was
for $13 million. Dr. Waterman emphasized that this budget was not
to 1* confused with the separate amount of about the same magni u e
needed for the NSF's regular programs. Altogether a consiaerably
greater amount was requested, and more than $43 million was
a]pproved.
C .With only minor qualifications congressional reaction to the IGY
iti both in the early stages and after the event. As author
Harold BWlis, comments:
. Although both Houses of Congress supported IGY requests enthusiastically,
the House frequently reduced the amounts requested whereas the Senate usually
v9ited for the full amounts. The final figures arrived at represented a compromise
bq twemthe two bodies. Action in the House reflected a belief that the budget
6stimates arrived at by the scientists were necessarily ruugh and could be reduced
NiMhout 4amage to the U.S. IGY program, whereas the scientists insisted that
the budget estimates were conservative and that any reductions would indeed
severely damage the program. Irritation was also expressed in the House that the
scientists were making use of admini t tion prestige to "sell" the IGY program,
thereby relegating the Congress to a back seat in the endeavor. These difficulties
m ino however, and for the most part the Congress granted the
he requested.4
It In the light of the magnitudeof U.S. spending for space exploration in the years following the IGY,
million seem a modest enough investment. However, even that amount was not arrived at without
dissension. The associate director of this study series, Warren R. Johnston. recalls atteudij39 --9D-
of the NBC Planning Board in 1956 at which Presidential advisers debated the queMion of how mue r
bMw Ifte.-money it would take to assure a minimallY SUOOOssM Earth satellite expWiment. With 6
dwk of Sputnik 1, the emphasis suddenly changed hrm minimal to n=imal-
is RUM% #P. cit. P. 16.




















































































op. cu





51
The Soviet achievement carried the implication that the Soviet Union had
mastered the primary technology required for an intercontinental ballistic missile.
At One stroke, this achievement erased the issue of the "Bomber Gap," created a
J I ?Aatle Gap, rendered obsolete the elaborate early w system of the United
Wlies apinst bomber attack, reduced the warning tl=mof an attack from hours
MWL q and raised the issue as to whether manned strategic bombers would
Et s&n be. obsolete. It gave a practical demonstration of:the possibili and ad-
V Nes of technological surprise. And, finally, it ralaed the prestige of %e Soviet
0iivz ae a technological power of the forezqost rank.
T4* U.S. response was enactment of Public Law 85-568, the National Aeronau-
pg a4d Space Act, approved July 29, 1958. From this point on, the American
Odc6 pto'grwn was launched on an arduous and costly technological course for
ifier* than -a decade of competition with the Soviet Union; it was to embrace a
.0eftendous. range of scientific investigation, technological 6oncepts, and practical
Apocationfk. Most #aportantly, for the purposes of this study, it was a form of
aRivity of'Inher'ent importance in international relations: its achievements were
prestigious and enabled the United States to recover and even raise its diplomatic
stature; Its'opdrations were obviously global in nature and required the cooperation
of many i nation and the exploitation of its technological capabilities offered
latk"tivd rewards to many nations, developed and undeveloped alike.
While space was later to be formally abjured as a military combat regime,
4tq#tea obviously offered great advantages for surveillance (which would con-
taute ib the stability of the mutual deterrence evolving between the United States
the* Soviet Union). Surveillance from "ce also -offered a way out of the
"awkward impasse presented by Soviet reluctance to admit any form of external
,Purpection:as an adjunct of arms control agreements .46
The new space pro -yram made heavy demands on the Federal budget
uad' Caused some restaping of both executive and legislative branch
madbinery. In addition to the establishment of NASA, there were
f ro&cal- changes in the Federal structure for national and international
kiebee policy and programs, including.the ypointment of a Science
Adviser to the President and the location o the President's Science
Advisory Committee directly within the White House-a st p which,
imeording to Berkner, had profound i Dlications, for making the needs
Im -F
fbf beience, scientific research, and science education discussed and
t6ida-stood at top governmental levels." The expanded science
advisory apparatus within the Executive Office led in turn to creation
ioUthe post of Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, or
.eq**alent, in most old-line departments.
Within the State Department, which had created an Office of
.Bdmca Adviser in 1950 and assigned science attach6s to several West
"opean. countries but had curtailed these activities in 1955, the
salMee function was revived. Science attach6s were appointed to serve
oA'V,,& Emabassies in London, Pasis, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo,
Migeow, New Delhi, and some South American countries.
To promote military applications of space research, the position of
,Directo'r of Research and Engineering 'was established within the
-Department of, Defense, rankin above the, Assistant Secretaries of
DeNnse and possessing the authority to manage interservice projects
vithout following; the normal military chain of command. This senior
,ofAw Vas: supported by an Office of the Director of Defense Research
Ali". EDgmeermg and by the [Defense] Advanced Resewh Projects

gfi&Ua, 7%S Fvauffon of ltdemdjond Tednology, p. 24.














































































4 Huddle, The Evolution of





53
use for surveys of global resources of agricultural and mineral
wealth and for the management of these resources.41
INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS
TU intemational impacts of the IGY and the Soviet Sputniks
14nwe-every bit as spectacular as were the impacts upon the United
States and would be difficult to exaggerate."
I Foremost was the impact upon the cold war. Tensions heightened in East-
West rektions as the Soviet leadership sought to use its success in space to further
Its goals in foreign and military policy and as the United States countered Soviet
tbrustswith crash programs in space and missile development. Sputnik I catalyzed
thecold warAnd not until the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis 6 years later
were Soviet -Axnerican leaders able to take the first steps decelerating the spirallin
pressuret iof the arms race. Additional impacts were the effect upon the internati=
politics of science, the use of science as a vital element in foreign affairs, and the
*n, of a remarkable degree of international cooperation and good will
in politicialy nonsensitive pursuits. 50
Aaeworthy effects on international science included the strengthen-
ing of the ICSU and its affiliates; the bringing together of Western
I scientists with Soviets and others previously cut off from the Western
I d; e. stimulation, on a worldwide basis, of the interdisciplinary
P. each t problem solving; and encouragement of the revival
of science in underdeveloped countries newly experiencing their
mdependence.
Oe10Y and the manner in which it was conducted served also,
in -vanous ways, as a model for other programs involving international
0 eollq6horation in scientific activity. These new programs, govern-
me, sored included the International Years of the Quiet
"titally BIDOD
Suli 1'rbm January 1, 1964, through December 31, 1965; the Upper
Mantle Program held in 1966-70; a Global Atmospheric Research
Program, ; an International Geodynamics Project; an inter-national
qppopphere Survey; the World Weather Watch; Indian Ocean
Ilesear6h; and the International Biological Program.
Apart1rom. orgaIlized. developments and institutional impacts,
the IGY was effective in helping to meld the top scientific talent of
the.' vanous participating countries into an international scientific
1 adership element. The pervasive influence of this element has not
een ccinfined, over the years since the IGY, to purely scientific
matteml. but has moved into the realms of politics and ethics. The
Ptie'was o erences are a manifestation of this trend; others
111c6do numerous conferences and movements of recent years in
Such- population control, food production and distribution,
and conservati6n of the Earth's resources. While m ther influences
have combine to bring about these moveirie= le IGY appeal-s
f6:bave played an important part in helping to set the stage for them.
AlHaddle, 7%eB#dutf6nof ]WemaHoWrech7Wogvpp.28-29. (For further trea;buont otthis latter subjec-
Congram Senate. Farth Resources Satellites. Hearings before the Senate ComnittesOnAaro-
=UllelduOla Space Spiences pursuant to S. 2&50 and S. 8484, August 6 8 and 9 and Sept. 18,1974. Wash.
lwwn, U. Gcmt. Frint OL, 1974,386 P. (2) T-T.S. Congress. Senate.'Rarth Resiourew SurveY SYstwn
b ore the Sutomrn ttee on space science and Applications.. House Science and AsbMauties
C ltee pursnaut to H.R. 14M and H.R. 15781, Oct. 3,4, end 9,1974. Washington, U.8- Govt. Print.
btdh, op. cit., pp. 4546.










among partlcq
to the Antaret'
terms, it clear]

sep-by-step p:
objectives in si




Perh aps, I
the record of
exuiberant pi
tion-the wi
observes tha
the IYand
Unied tat
research:
Unlike man-
remot and ex
scientific active
remains so. AI
research, to th(

that it would
sufficiently bro




Science care(
either the pnec
-careers. Furthe
was largely un'
it was needed t.
parts," rather I
science wa beji



taiined and sc
posal f or a









on the oe r]
could., p. 82.
bringp lasi.



6 1 Ii., p. 62-.




55

i the-extended IG"Y machinery into a front organization serving its own
version of peace and progress? The answeN. to these questions are
beyond the reach of the present study, but they would seem worthwhile
gor 4igprians and long-range policy Klanners, toypnder.
ajyy case, it is clear that what t e I GY and its sponsors failed to
U. Ad was far outweighed by its accomplishments. Its outstanding
achievements in science have been mentioned. On the organizational
jeYel', a4rula was invented which made possible the sii)ooth and in-
-q peiN t tunctioning of a complex enterprise, tinder the leadership ?f
-1 but a muni-
00tists, with generous support from many governnient ,
inu of interference by them.111 On the substantive side, iltbough the
4r: as.pimarily an exercise in pure science, it made brilliant use of
Con=pbrdry technology; the scientific space proLes which opened a
new era of exploration were only the most visible of many such uses.
In the area of international cooperation, to cite one category of results,
4a.sWo technology employed in the Earth satellite program requ.ired
I Mr"Plwts Among -nations which subsequently smoothed the way for
qtb.Wjagreements in related axeas.
TI*M .'is, perhaps, a danger attending the eu boria generated by a
a ar*d successful enterprise in international cooperation like the
i $speqWly among scientists, for whom good will is an accus-
acwnipaniment to cooperation in scientific and techno-
logicil problem solving, there may be a tendency to underestimate the
inherent in the political setting. On this theme, Bullis

-"Ovie- *f Ahe difficulties in attempting to transfer scientific methodology into
tpolitioal rehlity is suggested by Sullivan's observation that "science, in treating
our as indivisible, is far ahead of politics, which treats it as two worlds.,"
*In "ew6o toda s multiple ideologies, "multiple worlds" might be a more appro-
$iist6poltd6tiVignation. DuringtheIGY, as aresultof their common participa-
Ition in effbift Wkich opened up to man not only Antarctica but outer space, scien-
W Were paid.to have experienced unusually strong feelings of humility and
4fotherhood.. These feelings served to reinforce the traditional attitudes most
pAtiiral scientists develop as a result of sharing with others thi common objective
6f,'unveniniiiature's secrets. There is but one universe for scientists to study, and
iJ&WiM&JJlaAty unites.all scientific minds.

77,nwiaentists tend to have fewer social problems since their research is generally
ilk cusdd upon common well-defined objectives offering "a natural point of con-
vergence, namely, the correct result." Unlike politicians, they are not engaged
in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibility for
the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence
of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward social
cQoperatiomL despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a characteristic
dt the Intbrnational scientific community.

W VU'W of the substantial differences between the scientilic and political
ctwmuikies in the kinds of problems they are respectively called upon to solve,
vrdAmpe would suggest caution in looking fortoo bold a transfer of techniques
'Trom one community to another. The I G Y itself was apolitical and closed ended
WhoreaRthe political process is, a prior, political and open ended, Yet, politicians
8 6mtists do share some important human chaxaCterisVcs. Politicians and
!govetwents, no less than scientists and scientific organizations, are capable of
and motivated toward uniting to achieve common objectives. A major difficultY
is that the procedures for finding solutions to problems facing politicians and
governments are less clearly defined than are the procedures for finding soluflons
to the mpecific types of problems commonly faced by scierttigta and ewneerg.
Scientific and engineering problems are typically more specifical y defined than
b, See ibid. pp. 9-13, for a description of how this was done.






,iiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~i ~~~~ii~~iiiiiiii~ iiiiiiiiiiiii!ii~ ~iiiiiii i .. iii~ ii i.... .. ...........i~ i~ iiii~ iii ii i~iiiiiiiiii~ i~ i ~ iii ii~ ~ i iiii iiii i~ ~ i ..............'' ii H"i ' "i i'56 '' ,i~i ....... ,i ....
are..... u,, political....... ... p o l m ihiiii ten toiiiii be~ ,i~ ov rb rd ne wit valueii system in whichii......
ri ona an iiiiiiiiiii i rratiiii iiiiii i onaiiii l f ac or ar i ntermixed.
N e v e r th elessiiii~iiiii the iiii a u th ori c o n clu d esiii=' ii ii~ii i~iiiiiiii~~ii i i~~' ~~i'' i ii iiii iii ii'''ii .............. ii~ iii~iiiiiiii'~~'ii"i i ~iiii~iiii"!~ii

. .i mnca nietoslv rolmsune oese f icusane (h
scetfcteepeualyioomfrhp htteycnlant os ne.

o4


ante tepltcl.Sinita led niaetn osaeti oe5
AuhrsRassmn n17


Th Inentoa ephsclYa a n epsdwta gn-1

n ng n ned h nevlsnetebscsuywswitn'a
yile oipratnwrvltosaotit ritrrttosot
sgiiac.Neeteesitinleccotnetob exrda




57

REMAINING OBSTACLES
the negative side, the Soviets have not always honored tentative
49T I emehts for exchange of scientific information and research.
V
Tvb1c this failure is I ack of cooperation in mental health research,
ffi6l proposed in mid-1971 and discussed in subsequent years as part
6f an overall health package, but still not agreed upon by 1974.-IT
Xudh of the delay has been due to Soviet unwillingness to discuss
Aetaili of the proposed research and possible exchange of scientists
betweEM'.the two countries. More recently, U.S. scientists have devel-
ap6:d ddubts as to the advisability of such cooperation as a result of
41%6 ib t some Soviet psychiatrists may be deliberately
sing political dissidents as schizophrenic to silence them by
conftemQt"Ml mental hospitals.

THE EMIGRATION PROBLEM
JAmther problem which has developed recently is friction between
Utifted States and Soviet scientists over alleged Soviet persecution
d8oviet scientists who wish to emigrate to firael., The head of the
Relations Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
hifg ex'pressed the view that such e ation represents a capitalistic
brainArain to the disadvantage of ffSoviets,,18 whereas U.S. scien-
tbts have expressed their strong support for the Soviet scientists
..Who vM to move. Correspondence between United States and Soviet
S : Olen.tist& on this subject has at times been abrasive. As a result of
thme.and other incidents, communication and travel by scientists
between the United States and the Soviet Union have been character-
JZ as tecently as May 1974 as being "a difficult problem.""
A SUMMING UP
I:ft. summ ary, whil e it is el ear that the "I G Y spirit" is by no means
T
M. 'WIVersal evidence throughout today's international scientific
comii unity, international scientific cooperation continues at a higher
levelpf activity'than it had reached iR pre IGY days. To the extent
difference, there is perhaps justification for greater hope that
bridges, buidt by this cooperation will increasingly serve constructive
4i&pbses of science and diplomacy.
Some lUmtrative Questions
The IGY Wed. fax more new data for scientists to assimilate
thandid the 011Y 1932-33. On the other hand, data assimilation and
techiiological application axe growmg progressively more rapid with
every passing decade. The following questions are posed in the light
of this latter consideration:
,t Ik what scientific areas covered by the IGY, and to what extent, is
thme, already a need for fresh data? Are there other geo hysical. are-
covered by the IGY which should now be studied, Irom a purely
anioutific standpoint, through a similar. international cooperative

lff.Saimo, vol. 183, Max.- 1974, pp. 9W-9W.
_H,*PAJrsW Today, vol. 27, Iug. 1974, P. 64.
A Aid., vol. 47, May 1974, P. 78.



















dures, by the sauce
scious effort been r
the best ex-perieno


e.g., energy,
discovery, an


&atent


the 1950s jointly by Cam
the support of the United


58




iiiii iii" i i i!i iiii5 9i ,iii i iii
P IL(P O A F E ) a n d th e c o o p er a tio n of a la rg e n u m b e r of U .N ag e n c iesiii~~~iiii~iiiiii~iiii~~~iiiiiiiiii~ !~iii i~~~~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~iiii~~~iiii~~~iii~i~ ~~i~i i~~~~iiii~~~~iiiiiiiii~~iiii~~~~iiiiiii~~~~iiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~iiiiiiiiiii~~~~iiiiiiiiiii


'Ii n a d in d ii l c ti es.iiiiiiiiiii~ ~iii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~i~iiiii iiiiiiiii @i~ iiii i iiiii


peceintatveth reidntsoferfile; anindPein

y....... re ec e it ................................. ro p ti t is een s m er ly a brie
th vnflpro, hrceie m outnmppsto
............ W ar)) that )) culm inat........... in)))))) the Pr sd n de))))) ion noti to(
't ~~~)) ................................................o t h p ote n
idis~ ~)d the ........... Meon..oetbt....slfad.sa..el ndo
as ........ ...ap pr......oach to d evelop m en t. ))))H)) ))))) ) ))))))))))))))) ))))
vjt-eCs
109Waeere rmtiJ std assgiiati ntte@eie
6r L aaithuhiwaattetmbttehriesote
el gr project an th einlprah
ito g ott e7y asfo h i eo h p eht h rs n A a










On thste unusua nd exepie~ d fudto a rce h rai
tion a n d a a r
draIn.g basin of the arges i te wrl

By tetime of Prsdent Johnson'spooa o a ilo-alid
program featurg t M ng rion p

endof195-N dth technical n diitaie eore fte

coordination committee's exeage t ands
France, India, and New Zealand were collabor
plans for a major dam tTneSa aei Cmoi;a apns
team was at work oD ls
States was taki the lead ($2.5
section with a
had a halnhilrion-d p
Sambor and Pa Mong Dmsts nadtocntuto ai
progress on dams, ch el makers n
paratory projects on tutary streams f e
In short, the enterprise to which the Presidetpooe'oetn
massive support was no mere flight of fancbuamjopret
being, backed by a srn n ral ae utntoa omt
ment to see it through. At the sm ie.tcul ecniee
grossly iinderfinance4 eneprie proceeding aeehc ol
require. many years for copletowofmotfiselensadvn
decades for some. Was it noltaprpithefrheniowic
had fathered "the frt regiona developmentpoeto mbn
worldwide attention-the TenseValyAtoi" oofr
assistance in acceleratn the prgess of ti nepie sacntu
tive contribute to a ngtiate peace?
The U.S. and world pessi gnea foundd i prpittog
recognzn the offer as part of a "carrot andstc"apoh-
The timing of the spehcoided ihsepe-pbmin fsrtei ag
in North Venm by U.S. miltar aicat beinn ihioae tienmd
1February, and.~ broadening ino a mor utie i fesiei al ac.I
followed by a week h rsdn' eiin ob icoe ae n odpoUS
troops and underake groudcma prtosi ot ita t nqtn
that would number 184914 military personnel in teare by teedo 05

The deterie nationalsm. ofNrhVenmi hefc fcnlc e



198to epete potenia Jfor a rgona deelpmetpfg o
the Lower BaiofteMkn.Tefrtothswasaredu b
the Bureauof FloodConto and Water. RsoucsDvlpeto


62lbid., p.21.
65 Ibid., p. 2.




61

xhou the political situation in the area had stabilized briefly after
-thwd*gning of the Geneva Accords of 1954, was a reconnaissance b
oe U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the U7
International Cooperation Administration (later U.S. AID). According
p the Study,
Altbough the interest of the States themselves was undeniable, it seems likely
4hat-Ow initiative for this effort traces ultimately to France and the United
'-ftatemi, It may well have been thought that stimulating a general interest in
Iechnd ogicaland economic development of the r i
eeon might elp to stabilize the
Politiml regimes there. At any event, a Special Project Agreement was signed
between'.,.the Riparian States and the United States in November 1955. There-
After, the representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation ranged the area held
oevqqk.1 meetings with representatives of the four countries, and returned to the
United: fttes, where their "Reconnaissance Report-Lower Mekong River
Badn" was issued in March 1956.6?
-'This 3 -page report and its detailed appendices received close
attention in Indochina, the study continued, perhaps because it was
is'sitled by re presentatives of the nation that had most to offer in
upport of the project as well as the broadest experience with sys-
,Umatic river development. In any case it was a collection of the best
dats. available about the re qon, and it specified what further data
would be needed to get on with the project:
gpec!W it called for hydrographic and sediment surveys of the main
river; sdt4leys of such features of the entire basin as topography, geology, trans-
portation,: communications, and agriculture; establishment of water flow meas-
uring s$ations on the main stem and tributaries, weather stations, and a systematic
search for preferred dam sites; studies of such special problems as the control of
the *ater level of the great lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia the salty soil
'in the great Plaine des Jones of Vietnam, the technology of dougle-cropping to
inareme agriculture production and improved fish capture and processing; and
such action programs as impr0ed sanitation in water supply, and the training of
local pvrsonnel in the technical skills that would be required later on. The study
emphWze:d the need for cooperation among the four Riparian States in collecting,
malnuining, and disseminating data on a uniform, integrated basis.68
The Bureau of Reclamation report was enthusiastically endorsed
N6en' it was presented at the annual meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok
March 1957. Meetings of experts from the Riparian States were
held'in May and September to implement the recommendations of
the report, and resulted in agreement on a charter for the aforemen-
69
*0ned Coordination Committee.

THE WHEELER AND FORD FOUNDATION REPORTS
When. a Preparatory Committee met to adopt this Chaxter, it also
4sked the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to
h recruit a visiting team of water resources experts to review and
am, lify the previous studies. By mid-November 1957 a U.N. team
been "sembled in Bangkbk under the leadership of Lt. Gen.
...Raymond Wheeler (Rot.) of the U.S. Army Corps of En qneers. The
-Wheeler Report, completed January 23, 1958, reinforced and went
b -yond the recommendations of the Bureau of Reclamation study,
i4ofing a 5-year program of data collection at a total estimated
cost 2001000.
Ni Of Aid., p. 22.
0 Ibid.
u Renamed in 1967 the "Mekong Development Committee."















































was
The





= i ii~ 'iiiiiiiiii''iiiii i''63iii




U,42 6*iii will. ii~ustrate

Ig in amteaiamoeoftervrw i reenaie frmh

";p Rve. eaqurtrsofth US Crp o Egiees er udetai
a &ystm atuyof te Mekn St ies wee undrway y theWorldHealt
Oranztinofth rolmsomauai adsoisoomaisi te ain coe
4hdooianmeerlgcsainhabenstuanaraio networkiiiiii
................... thp t ed uatr nB n ko ,w eetei eot ee olce n
iOua&Th.BraofReintowabeinnwokoafesbltstd
4 th,11P, Mog Da. Steam radint mesureentson te man stm ha bee
.............................................................ir s w a s ii
In164 CAEcopetdanariutua mretaalss
R b! 4 6i..he...............e....t....of....ld ..e. an..f.r......

of .............sin iiiiiiiiitu v~ a po e n e san esu ce a
i" 92 ihteItrainlLbo fiea edaec.TeFo n
te ainadIral eesuyn
........ tu miiiiiiiiiiifthe U n
ciiiiiiiimprovemenimethods;plans wer underwayfor farm nd timbe
ii iiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii














































































KOK.- tree Appenuix
7 ADDendix to The











it.of.........hepro osd...o development r t.ii At'''' the' sa e ime

as 4iiiiiiliiiiiili1965iiiiiii tod ay.............................ad er i n
V i e t n a m......[....nt................u..s t.....f..th..e............... ...............................................

,rspns to offersiof aii.
Y~fteMkn rjc sapr icua udra ing oe
tueM einaim ada tesbjc f aorwrim oiical,,ii
stive~ods a nuberiof ignificntiiii
i'i t at a a d e i to i "" ''' ................................ of co -
SL,,, on........ In,,,,,, it. reioaldveopet chm desnt reet cn
.... 11 78i
,Ii op or 0,riitho. i n moeseiictrs"h
q te .. ppar o av emn
tha 'dlla dilomcy'dos nt cnvice n averar























































































8SIbid., p. 54.
83 Ibid., p. 1.






67~ i ..........

,,db 'Ire etle en of. hu dr d ............ thousands = .............. famil"'"" i e from the
Oftervvg~ ~ area,........... hedfrlreaonso heia etlzra amr
frmfrtl lorpaist es etieuladflono
tiielris n imnse is ouaion. Nevertheless, si~'
t, Ing .... .6 f ... ut it in a series of newspaper articles on the M ekong ..................... ''"' ""i" iiiiiiiiiiiii!
"OC' m 171 "o oce dveoprsan plannersi are g ivi some iii
to~ii ffii sor ofi thngbfoe h een.




&Vgb'ieesadiceetl ,()inaingii prga i
g ydig n c tetont h rbescetdb
tevnn n et ntesbleeulbi fetbihdeo
............... .............. .......... ..... ...........t s


I iydeeo et ilb i atades, u ht h oseune

of6bNi tgito o r emntal des.H al o































participf
but ma3


87 Source: U.S. Department of State.





69

:a mst risks, the long-range consequences-both regional and
"Alplomatic-may be unfavorable.
-Political acceptability of a multination re al d ;relopment
o.,,.',OoJect requires that benefits be evident to all participants, and
. ..... thm costs and benefits to each nation be in reasonable balance.
ji: C.A laxge multination Rroj ect can attract contributions from many
ilations outside the region; these can aggregate to an impressive
!total.,investment even though no one contribution is much of a
bur4km to the donor.
-Aa important benefit of a large pro ct in a developing region
V:11 :the, necessary ducation and trainingJof local participants, and
tbeem ice gained in local leadership and planning.
-The subject of regional application of technology for social
'Purposes contains many of the elements that make the interaction
T 4.,*f scaeace and technology vith diplomacy important politically. In
addition to the potential contributions of the subject to diplo
3*0alsi it challenges the ability of the executive and legislative
branch es to exploit., opportunities that may require years of
evolution.
-When the President presents the Congress with a specific
regional program, with the costs and benefits adequately defined,
the Congress tends to respond favorably and promptly.
-The combining of U.S. interests in international regional
development as an approach to national security and as an ap-
proalch to economic advancement tends to detract from the effec-
tiyeaess, of such development for either purpose. A "low profile"
of external supporting nations tends to yield most fruitful results.
For a variety of reasons attention to international regional
development by the Congress has diminished. Domestic economic
i concerns have attracted attention away from foreign develop-
ment. Tensions in the Middle East have replaced Southeast Asian
troubles as the focus of effort in conflict reduction. Confidence in
'the practical utility of social science for public policy has been
s"ken.. Finally, there is a tendency for the Congress to give
'PrIncipal attention to short-term problems, at the expense of
lin er-range considerations-especially when the opportunities of
dip omatic gain offered by the latter are at a low confidence level.
-To conclude with a quotation from the study itself: "It is
sheer speculation that a U.S.-encouraged regional development
.,,,of the Lower Mekong Basin in 19 54 might have provided a focus
for peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process,
.:.Ond established a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted
R :rpgion. However, the question seems legitimate as to whether
-the consequences of a slowly an deliberately encourafed regional
do by region-in lagging parts o the world
-.......velopment region
*&,t serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run." 118
S;wfte Illustrative Questions
What U.S. institution -might best take the lead in planning for the
"11 ationbf -regional development principles to advance U.S. diplo-
ROP
hiatid objectives?
Might the- role of U.N. agencies be usefully expanded for this
0
&W., p. 67.







Would the InternatinlIsiu
(IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, be a

What reins of the world offer t
development, and which of these mi
beneflts- e.g., Middle East, th4
Ibeian Penlinsula, etc.?
In December 1973
House floor in support of the formE
v t Bank. Such a Bank, Mr.
sent a positive, reasoable, adpr
the social and economic d opn
creating a climate for true and ti
in this proposal as ~a practical posil
conditions in the Middle Eatand
recent Arab oil price manipulation
Could it perhaps put some of the
beneficial to the entire Mi e e
What constructive roles might be
tions in supporting multinatal
What geogr hic features o LI
central coherence for regional develo
Does the Tennessee Valley Autho
is, in the relationships among State
to exploit the diplomatic vantage
Could TVA personal serve usefi,
in developing countries in the pr
development?
What interactions woul be va
between siibnational and siuprana
activiti s?'What s ofti
of basic data in this field?
A stronger role is required of pdI
field of regional development; how is
How can political and social scieni
approach to defining the normative c
work within which economic olbjecl
do so in a manner acceptable to
elements involved?
Apart from economic factors, f
regionalism-having to do, for mnsa
adaptation to geographical environmai
into the body of thought andpl
An inven~tion is' needed that canl d
systems approach~ hasdone for mnissil4
The thrust of systems developmnit i
tatively defined and subjected to co


88 Congrenional Record, December 11, 1973, H11076.





71

e of.intensity of these social tensions? How can changes in these
be brought about, and (b) measured? To what extent is it
t o attempt to ascertain the ideal level of tension-that which
vould "sult in the best blend of harmony and accomplishment-for
AAy pm regional enterprise?
1,
CASM FIVE: EXPLOITING THE RESOURCES OF THE SEABED"
IAW m of & Case
,,'Th6 matter of who owns the ocean floor came into prominence as
x consoquence of technology. Historically, the seabed was an inter-
*Stiona., f commons of negligible utility. International law afforded no
W"IatW provision for its governance or possession because there
Vas n1o need for it. Man's invasion of the ocean deeps came gradually,
1. with exploration by deep-submergence vehicles, mapping
ditions using the military technology of ultrasonics, systematic
ection of samples from the ocean floor, and ultimately core drilling
,of the iumbed at progressively deeper submergences. Offshore drilling
lor oil by the United States, begun during World War II, led to the
ovolutim 4 a larre and complex technology that extended from its
"o application 'm the Gulf of Mexico to Asiatic waters, and most
rfteutly t? the North Sea. Early discovery of manganes nodules,
I qapuwW W great profusion on the deep ocean floor, received little
notice until world consumption of such materials as copper, nickel,
_"balt, as well as manganese, contained in these nodules began to
101W on. world capacity to extract them from sources on the continents.
']W the irinnmg of fro
them resources, as well as petroleum, in the
Z;tWueared practicality, the question of who owns the ocean floor
d* thiplernational attention.
Impar*mw qf the Case
44uestiovLs of national sovereignty traditionally rank high among
na e on o seaw juris c on o
t4d BtalkeS remEtin an unresolved question wi proponents of
Affetent M'terests adducing conflicting principles: major maritime
ta seeking boundaries close in some smaller states reaching
M far as possible, and some states pursuing a mixed strategy
bisod on the principle of submarine geography.
Ub potential for conflict is inherent in a resource-rich region over
*hkJi,4cp authority of law extends. As on larrd, the riches of the seabed
I **e unevWy distributed and the right of first capture can always be
thallei pd by astronger power. States lacking the technological means
44 ex_*iting the regime adopt the position that they should, be able to
the harvest of seabed wealth from the international commons.
states contend that the accident of geography should not
4VJmvd them of a' share in the new source of mineral wealth. Poor
I S s' dev I ?'ed states base their claims for some preference in the
A tter a n the act of their relatiwly greater -need.
7hP technology of 'extracting petroleurn'from the ocean floor is
Wy lbimigVplied, with ever-increasing expertise. In the face of
e f ener, out of the OPEC oil em
gy crisis growmg bFg?: and price
reise's, seabed petroleum, operations axe growing m importance.
10 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Erploiting the ReBources of QV Seabed in the
series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security
and Scientific Developments by George A. Doumani, Science Policy Research Division, Congres-
81=Resaarch Service, IAbrary of Congress, 19n, 86 p.










Aa act atterte p esectioe of.................i -iii




i les i aiatl in s t iit h h e
some ; ire e
byhnatual 4 Arcese moerpdytan t e ol vrb ie.A
a matter pfctitiaiv perspective, it i rah

otieapture ofi th esolid inr gorldrhav



i ........ .. !Doumani e i i
qieoprtion al souaonrHweeri the souini o ece
before i iiiiiii needed~ =iiiiii,; thei prospecis ha te ecnooy f ceninn






ofete som unito ofsebl in ternatia c
owii!=i theii Case Dvelope




deep seatdmain is s e.. t o umani .........................
bt the ise isoves poetias s the onIi
imme."
Howeer [oumai cotne] tecnuincetdbyteGnvaCnvn
.... s part !icuaryth xpotaiit las, nvts eie;deiitv pltia
bounarie ar eddfrth ewr ii o ainljrsdcin.Byn

this limit thiepsaaraiol ihe ecnime stecmmnd' m
ofiii+ thel~iiili comuityo nations.Whateverregime s suggesed forihis intenationa
deepiiiii!i ii~iiiiii!iiiii sea=== d mai n is subject to i legal considerat...................ions and internation......al approiiiiiil f~ iiiii====! ................ i ..........
but=====::= the= i ssueii s no sugn si h dlnaino ainl uidcin tti
=i me .9i! 1!
A fterNiii~! p r s n t n in so me.......l..h...te....l...........................
explitin seabed igii reorcs thiitorrconsihipltiaia
i p mai c .....t.... io. ns.th.t.........deavo.ri...t..de..l.with these'iIn i!



seabediiiii (otsd of thelimits of present nainlisictos fro
apprpr i atiiii i oni!iii by natons andiiiiii~iiiiii~i theiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~iiii~li~ i use f i tsiiii @iiiii+ iii~ resources prii i ai ly t





73

p a
*t tess '. the treaty w s awaiting approval by the U.S. Senate of its
atification.'(The treaty was subsequently ratified.)
14 W ement in the Case
The Doumani analysis included a statement of the problem, a
,ption, of the U.S. and U.N. institutions created to deal with it,
4000unt Of problems up to July 1971, and an assessment of pros-
for.-resolution of the problem thereafter.
'Thus inJune 1966 the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
: WJ,-Public Law '89-454, was passed by the Congress. It es-
lished ". ... policies and objectives for the U.S. effort to develop
NiLtion"s.m'arihe resources" and for the establishment of
"Niti6nia'Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
that ". .'.,represented a wide-ran
.... ging mandate over the
nAl4onal progyarn in oceanography." This Council was to make
bompr6hensive investigation and study of all aspects of, marine
ce in order to recommend an overall plan for -an adequate national
eanQgraphic program that will meet the present and future national
I eds.,0,4(5 Vanel'of the Marine Council was the Committee on Inter-
ionlal ] dlicy in"the Marine Environment. Another action by the
cil '*as,.to recommend creation of an operating agency in the
:policy committee lapsed in 1971, and was replaced by an
t,6 '6 c: Law-ofi-the-Sea Task Force, under the chairmanship of
it Zk3 .Adviser of 'the, Department of State. The agency, as created
tht ang'ress in'October 1970, took the form of the National
Oceanic and, Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).91
A U.S. P Iicy was 'proposed May 23, 1970, by President Nixon,
who called for two types of "international machinery":
st propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international com-
uxty inp i international trusteeship zone consisting of the continental margins
6fid, 6' ftth of 200 meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal State would
ve a share of the international revenues from the zone in which it acts as
trustee. andcould impope additional taxes if these were deemed desirable.
'An a gemnd step, aVepd international machinery would authorize and regulate
r96 o:ft gpd use of'sesbed resources beyond the continental margins.94
A.s the study concluded, it was "too early to predict what success
WIU.S. proposal will achieve". It was likely to encounter opposition
tonly4broad but at -home as well. Moreover, the proposal left
touched the thorny question of where the seabed began and the
tak slielf 'terminated. The U.S. position favored a 12 mile limit.
American nations clung to their 200-mile limits. Agreement
&tptpome easy.

Numerous committees and subcommittees of the Congress had
4 themselves in the seabed problem."s An early congressional
tk was. the creation of the Marine Council. Following the Malta
posal to the United. Nations,
4bduto dozen resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate,
-M 16pposition to vesting control over the deep ocean resources in the
;4;6tio0&, House resolutions were for the most paxt identical, expressing
lbf4., pp. 5S-N.
Ibid., p. ft
A d pir726UMer
Thc 0 ated on p. '58 of the study.
































An ex(


96 Ibid., p61.
07 Ibid., p.062.


74


the
resc




75

in 1971,. Dou-mani concluded his study with the observation
Vol ti of U.S. seabed policy "had been relatively slow".
ubtpAythe marine scientists and technoloais.ts would have preferred a
aTt4an. tue diplomats were prejered to t I e For its part, the Congress
to move faster than was the Department of State, although in what
b1till not evident.$$

*tedStates and the other interested countries of the world
opportunity to resolve the question of who owns
seab d before the beginning of 'a rush of entrepreneurs to exploit
mineral wealth, using. technology certain to be perfected
Ar Mralter. The probl emis not a technological one, althou I it is
Y technoll o and without the prospect of a Cogical
the Fo em would be a trivial one. Only when the
Is ded to enable profitable exploitation pf seabed
ur, will & robiem, require urgent solution.
vantage of advance resolution of the problem is evident.
the e4os ofanintern atio al gold rush into a territory
nJunaginq n
ut J&, r or prope3Ay rights. The prospect of anarchy in a difficult
pexiJous en*oment, with. many cl 6&nts and costly equipment,
Wbjn&towiiLtemplate. Yor the United States to assert a policy
dot of, c4l4gm,' based on this country's technological supen-
answer if the fi&t should bechallenged by another
officialjy-sanctioned'forice, based oia territoriid claims.
the 9 among Aalion so
will be apportioned al vereignt$es,
b. rce, oF some I device forshared sovereignty in ii Ailds
'A Pinyy estabfiifhed regulatory body must. be created to'regulate
e ,4t srn_ J, i, One waybr
attpnsa 00MMOM the otlwr, an agreed decision
tw I .. I .
vftugt he made among nations as to jurisdiction qver every part of the
=lWor ,SQ like.liature, abhors a vacuum.
I 1007407M &partpaent.of.:F!tt&te had not formulated any
pogw Qn.how to ieiolve'the diler ma. The Congress was divided
ow A U and an international solution. There was un-
certaint ver the' comp etence and ev'ea thepolitical stability of the
ted ZQRV61t,.Tlie ,problem of PIXitent of seaward. boun4aries re-
0 Th re w.)ere emerAmg dWereaces in gpoaJs bet*een
41heAeVeloping nations.And uncertainty over the
9 technologie4 advance permitted the problem to IM'ger in
e,-rsy. until echnolo would eveiitually compel a crash
JjL46i .. I I I
r=4 condition It is-interesting to note that in. this
case the: essentially facts of 'the situation are A'ot in question; the pas'e,
twa. natierat4er than technological, even though it is
4 1 1. and diploii
9U tha m*es. it important -.
Resu At in. -1-975
TM stW deffied. the lieghl: and physical'batindaries of th6 sobed
hp led hi 0 to of its Tesources., The : value of thee i*-
Dsoh. .. =. VVn
*M )L ielateVto.'econotaics 6na th ant and future
MI,
6100W 64pithilitie's for I ning and ekpldilLgi them. The
diku s6d pdtetiti 'technologiftl breAthro -hb arti ul y
ug ', p c arb
the areas of offshore oil and hard minerals on the ocean floor.











































has


76i