Annual report of the Federal Communications Commission on the effect of Public law 93-107, the Sports antiblackout law, ...

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Title:
Annual report of the Federal Communications Commission on the effect of Public law 93-107, the Sports antiblackout law, on the broadcasting of sold-out home games of professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey
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v. : 24 cm.
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English
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United States -- Federal Communications Commission
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Commerce
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Publisher:
U.S. Govt. Print Off.
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Washington
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annual

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Subjects / Keywords:
Television broadcasting of sports -- United States   ( lcsh )
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federal government publication   ( marcgt )

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94th Congress COMMITTEE PRINT
d^ Session COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session f




THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ON THE
EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107, THE
SPORTS ANTIBLACKOUT LAW, ON THE
BROADCASTING OF SOLD-OUT HOME
GAMES OF PROFESSIONAL FOOT-
BALL, BASEBALL, BASKETBALL,
AND HOCKEY




SUBMITTED TO

HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Chairman

FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE








JUNE 1976



Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce,
United States Senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-769 O WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $3.65


























COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington, Chairman
JOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
VANCE HARTKE, Indiana ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan TED STEVENS, Alaska
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada HOWARD H. BAKER, Ja., Tennessee
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana J. GLENN BEALL, JR., Maryland
FRANK E. MOSS, Utah LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., Connecticut
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky
JOHN A. DURKIN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, Chief Counsel
S. LYNN SUTCLIFFE, General Counsel
MALCOLM M. B. STERRETT, Minority Counsel

(II)









LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1976.
Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to transmit herewith the Third
Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the
Effect of P.L. 93-107, the sports anti-blackout law, on professional
football, baseball, basketball, and hockey.
I trust this report will be useful to your committee.
Sincerely,
RICHARD E. WILEY, Chairman.
Enclosure.
(III)



















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THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

ON THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107,

THE SPORTS ANTI-BLACKOUT LAW,

ON THE BROADCASTING OF SOLD-OUT HOME GAMES OF

PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL, BASKETBALL, AND HOCKEY











June, 1976







3


TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
INTRODUCTION 1

I. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 4

II. PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 15
A. INTRODUCTION
B. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE -- 1972-1975
1. Televised Games 19
2. Ticket Sales 24
3. "No Shows" 27
4. Revenues from Concessions, Parking and "PRO"
Magazine Sales 32
5. Audience Ratings 35
C. EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON MEMBER CLUBS OF NFL
1. Introduction 42
2. Model Used to Assess the Impact of Public Law
93-107 on "No Shows" 45
3. Results of "No Shows" Analysis on Individual
NFL Teams 52
4. Analysis of Playoffs 254
D. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES 258
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 262
WORLD FOOTBALL LEAGUE 268
III. PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
A. INTRODUCTION 269
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 269
C. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES 271
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 271

IV. PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL
A. INTRODUCTION 272
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 274
C. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES 282
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 282
AMERICAN BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 285

V. PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY
A. INTRODUCTION 286
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 288
C. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES 291
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 292
WORLD HOCKEY ASSOCIATION 293

VI. APPENDICES







4



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tootbal 1, 0as h< 1, b sk thball and 1h o k l t e>:.V >:1; a se x ;pt io.n : rmn. t-. a i

of the an itr stl l .iitihori z ing,
r i i'ii t t. iF Si 1 t aisl:, s u i" l- i."-s iona 1 r[)u r i .t['. ; ;: t ipso. 1 / in 1 i h ] : i id;' ;l

providrJ pr t, t <:: for int, rl ol 1 i it fo .;l :l.t. s fritr t S. teL I cf

pro ss ion.i1 football g W:n ti: Americat and National o tbi1 L au

ra:erd In 1 i 9 6, furt LWr rotct ion for non-p ro fesi ona! C:O teS .i Ir-r. rof-i)








Siol.i: L 1 (* a ist:. tS ;ads vi L til 1 ~ it 12/










1/ Lio r x \ 1.i s i a7 ;ivi n at in 1 .s :b li i B' T: arl 1 9, : .:t l rs 19



















Sk.it 732I
ol/ n, ri i ..c: 8C -800 L hL)(ta i n vi;. st, l i, .. .. Stat{i 15 .'
I.ci i sI:it~f i u o pass d i 1971 (Publcic Law, 95-llv7) aro:,: ; : E i




93-1,07 provi di.ed that i t a t;.in< ot a profi. ;il1, b ; tl"al i foo "

bal 1, or iiookev c] !as to be t k] rvibcd on a ne tSork p0rsu l) a- II kap VLeL

contract and ail tickets for s"oatsg marde aval s S 20 hours (fivB daatis r

Imore befor the sihecduln d Ioeginning tim, o f tI ga e lad Kn s(old 72 hours


LI/ "'his xemLption as .a q lified one, howver, ippl ing onlt aIo r1 Vt
ahics linited hilackouts to hle Lor territor' of ai mehoibr when that cI ,b
was plavin, at home. Soc PuIlic Iaw B7-331 1 Sept. 1, 1961, 7
Stat. 732.

2/ Public i.aw 89-800, i(b)() Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1315

3/ Sec Philip K. liochberg, "Congress Tackles Sports and Broadcasting",
,'Jestern State Universityv Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring, 1976),
pp L)3-2-49







5






(three clays) or rore before, no so-called lo:a 1 i1 i iki t it i, i ;: I

the televising of the game at the same tin:., and in the ,ar.:a in ~.ici ,i:

was to be played would have any force or effect.4/ Before tLe enlri:tirt ~

the anti-blackout law, local television blackouts had been impos:;d bv i.

various leagues on the theory that they were necessary to 1pr,,e rve a; piro-

mote the live game attendance. The rationale for the legislation, ho.::' r,

was that professional sports had benefited from previous antitrust x. mptio:s.

It seemed justifiable that in return for such benefits, the public s dould be

given the opportunity to view sold-out games of the local team on television.

Congress did acknowledge that the legislation might cause some financial loss

to professional sports business from decreased revenues of parking franchises

and concessionaires due to possible additional "no shows"5/ at locally

televised games. It was believed, however, that the benefits from local

telecasts of home games would outweigh any potential detrimental effects.6/

The anti-blackout law was adopted on a three-year trial basis

during which the Federal Communications Commission was to report annually

on the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional sports. The two preceding

annual reports of the FCC have failed to show any significant injury to pro-


4/ Public Law 93-107, Sept. 14, 1973, 87 Stat. 350

5/ "No shows" are defined as patrons who have already purchased tickets for
an event but choose not to attend.

6/ House Report 93-483, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 11, 1973)
Senate Report 93-347, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1973)







6



-3-

fessional sports from telecasts of sold-out home games.7/

The following is the Third Annual FCC report to Congress on the

effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional football, baseball, basketball

and hockey.







































7/ Report of the Federal Communications Commission: The Effect of Public
Law 93-107, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, on the Broadcasting of Sold-out
Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball and Hockey.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. April, 1974.

Second Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the
Effect of Public Law 93-107, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, on the Broad-
casting of Sold-out Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball
and Hockey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April, 1975.







7



-4-

I. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL,
BASKETBALL AND HOCKEY: GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

In a letter dated March 22, 1976, the Honorable John 0. Pastore,

Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, requested that the Federal

Communications Commission provide an "analysis of the effects of the Sports

Anti-Blackout Law during the past full three year period on all four professional

sports which were included in the law."l/ The results of this analysis are

summarized below. The reader will note that most of the discussion pertains to

professional football. This is simply due to the fact that Public Law 93-107

has had a relatively greater applicability to this sport, than to professional

baseball, basketball or hockey, due primarily to the higher incident of televised

professional football games. Additionally, the National Football League has

provided the Commission with an extensive amount of information on the number of

televised games, ticket sales, live gate attendance and concession revenues,

all of which were necessary to thoroughly assess the effect of the legislation.

A lesser amount of information was available for the other three professional

sports. Consequently, the analysis on each was less extensive.

B. Professional Football

An effort was made to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on each

of the 26 member clubs of the National Football League, as well as on the League

as a whole. Four different issues were addressed in the study concerning the

effect of Public Law 93-107 on; (1) the number of locally televised games and

ticket sales; (2) the number of "no shows" at NFL games; (3) revenues earned


I/ Letter from Senator John 0. Pastore to Richard E. Wiley, Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, March 22, 1976.











-5-


from the sale of concessions, stadium parking, and "PRO" magazine; and, (4)

local television audience ratings for NFL games. Summaries of the findings are

provided below.

1. Locally Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 has resulted in an increase in local television

coverage of the home games of all but two NFL teams, the New Orleans Saints and

the San Diego Chargers. All other teams have locally televised one or more

home games since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in 1973.

Prior to that year, member clubs of the NFL blacked out all regular

season home games regardless of whether or not those contests were sold out.

During 1973, the first year in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect, 109 of

the NFL's 182 regular season games were sold out 72 hours in advance and

locally televised, as required by the law. A total of 86 home games was locally

televised in 1974. Last year, that number declined to 75.

Between 1972 and 1973, total tickets sold to all NFL regular season

games increased by three percent. However, in 1974, the NFL experienced its

first season decrease in ticket sales since 1968, when total sales fell to

10,236,322 which was about five percent below the number of tickets sold to

regular season games in 1973. Last year, ticket sales decreased again, although

by less than one percent.

Lower ticket sales experienced in 1974 and 1975 can largely be

attributed to a decline in season ticket sales during both of those years.

For example, the total number of season tickets sold fell by 6.1 percent in 1974

and decreased again last year by 5.3 percent.







9



-6-

The NFL believes that the downturn in season ticket sales was a direct

result of locally televised games. The league has consistently argued that fans

are less inclined to purchase season tickets if given the opportunity to watch

home games on television. However, the results of an analysis of season ticket

sales (see Appendix A of this report) indicate that the NFL's fear in this respect

is unfounded. Specifically, the findings demonstrate that the average number of

season tickets sold by NFL teams increased when the number of home games locally

televised during the preceding season also increased as a result of Public Law

93-107.2/ Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the NFL's total ticket sales

have not been seriously affected by the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

2. "No Shows"

Given the NFL's concern that Public Law 93-107 has proven detrimental to

live gate attendance, an effort was made to analyze those factors which influenced

the number of "no shows" experienced by each of the 26 member clubs of the NFL over

the past four seasons. Specifically, the statistical technique empldyed in this

study permits one to assess whether and to what extent "no shows" were dependent upon:

(1) locally televised games, (2) temperature, (3) the presence of some form of

precipitation, (4) the won-loss records or divisional standings of both home and

visiting teams, and (5) other factors which influenced "no shows" and which were

also peculiar to any of the four seasons under consideration. It should also be

noted, however, that these factors or variables did not account for or "explain" the

total number of "no shows" experienced by each of the teams. However, in most

instances they did account for a relatively large proportion of the variation in the

live gate attendance at a team's home games.

The results of the empirical analyses of the live gate attendance at games

of each of the 26 NFL clubs indicate that four teams -- the Atlanta Falcons, the

2/ The analysis further demonstrated that season ticket sales were influenced by the
teams' won-loss records in the preceding season as well as the size of the pop-
ulation of the market in which the franchises are located. That is, teams which
won more games in the preceding year, sold more season tickets. Additionally, teams
which played in relatively large cities, generally sold more season tickets than
did teams playing in cities with smaller populations.







10



-7-

Dallas Cowboys, the Miami Dolphins, and the Los Angeles Rams -- experienced a sig-

nificant increase in the number of "no shows" when their games were locally televised.

Furthermore, the analyses show that these increases were principally attributable

to Public Law 93-107. However, it should also be noted that locally televised games

do not account for all "no shows" experienced by these teams. With the exception of

Los Angeles, attendance was also influenced by the weather -- that is, a larger number

of ticket holders stayed home when the weather was bad, regardless of whether or not

those games were carried on local television stations.

The relationship between Public Law 93-107 and "no shows" is particularly

notable in the cases of Miami and Atlanta. During the 1973 season when all seven

of the Dolphins' home games were locally televised, 21 percent of all ticket holders

failed to attend games. In 1974, three games were locally televised. About 21

percent of all ticket holders failed to attend the three televised games while

13 percent did not attend the four non-televised contests. Last year, none of the

team's home games was telecast locally and the percentage of ticket holders who chose

not to attend those games fell to 8.5 percent. Atlanta "no shows" also increased

when home games were locally televised. The blackout was lifted on all seven home

games in both 1973 and 1974. "No shows" were equivalent to 15.8 percent of total

tickets sold in 1973 and 35.7 percent in 1974. Although no home games were locally

televised last year, 19 percent of all tickets sold went unused. It is not readily

apparent why these two particular teams were affected by Public Law 93-107 in this

manner and to this degree.

Although Public Law 93-107 has also influenced "no shows" at Dallas and

Los Angeles, the problem has been of lesser significance in both instances. For example,

the Cowboys lifted the blackout on only four home games; televising three in 1973 and

one last year. During the 1973 season, 8.9 percent of all tickets sold for Dallas'

locally televised home games were not used, while 4.9 percent of all ticket holders

failed to attend blacked-out games. In 1975, 5.3 percent of the tickets sold to







11



-8-

Dallas' single televised home game were not used, whereas 2.4 percent failed

to attend the six non-televised contests. All of these percentages were

below the league averages of 9.7 percent in 1973 and 8.6 percent in

1975. Los Angeles has locally televised only one home game since 1973. Over

21,000 ticket holders, or 24 percent of the total, failed to attend the

game. The analysis, however, suggested that less than half of the total number

of "no shows" was apparently due to the game being locally televised. While

attendance at other locally televised games could be similarly affected, it is

unlikely that the Rams will be able to sell all 91,000 available seats in the

L.A. Coliseum for many home games. Hence, Public Law 93-107 does not appear

to pose a serious threat to the live gate attendance of this particular franchise.

The number of "no shows" experienced by eight additional NFL teams

-- Chicago, Denver, Green Bay, New England, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh

and St. Louis -- appear to have been indirectly affected by locally televised

games. In each instance, "no shows" significantly increased when the weather

was cold and/or wet. It is conceivable that the fans' unwillingness to attend

games under these conditions could have been influenced by local telecasts.

Specifically, fans appeared to be less inclined to attend games in bad weather

when given the opportunity to see those games on television, than when those

contests were not locally televised. Unfortunately, there is no way to differen-

tiate the effect of weather from that of locally televised games, since that

relationship depends on the fans' preferences to watch the game in person, as

opposed to their unwillingness to sit in a cold and/or wet stadium. An assess-

ment of this type was beyond the scope of the study.

Nevertheless, with the exception of Chicago and Philadelphia (in 1973),

these teams enjoyed relatively high gate attendance that is, the percentage of

ticket holders who failed to attend all home games of these seven teams was







12



-9-



below the league average.3/ Again, the high number of "no shows" at Chicago

is probably not entirely due to the locally televised games. Many fans would

probably have stayed home in bad weather regardless of whether or not the game

was locally televised. This was particularly evident last year when the average

number of "no shows" at locally televised Bears' games was lower than the number

of "no shows" at blacked-out home games. Consequently, it is reasonable to con-

clude that Public Law 93-107 has not posed a serious threat to the live gate

attendance of those teams which appear to have been indirectly affected by the

legislation.

It should be pointed out that the league has made a greater effort

to accurately record the number of "no shows" subsequent to the enactment of

the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. The 1972 "no shows" figures, therefore, may be

less precise than those figures compiled in subsequent years. If so, the impact

of locally televised games on these teams may be of lesser consequence than the

figures indicate.


3/
Percentage of Tickets Sold to All Home Games
Team Which Were Not Used

1973 1974 1975

Chicago (7) 18.4% (6) 25.9% (2) 16.5%
Denver (7) 1.6% (7) 4 % (7) 7.6%
Green Bay* (7) 3 % (7) 4.5% (7) 8 %
New England (2) 1.5% (5) 6.8% (2) 3.4%
Oakland (5) 8.1% (4) 7.3% (5) 8.5%
Philadelphia (7) 9.8% (7) 9.2% (7) 7.3%
Pittsburgh (8) 6.4% (7) 7.6% (6) 3.3%
St. Louis (1) 5.9% (4) 5.9% (3) 5.2%



League Average 9.7% 11 % 8.6%

The figures in parentheses indicate the number of locally televised
home games.

* These figures represent the average percentages of "no shows" for at
home games played in Green Bay and Milwaukee.







13



-10-



Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that the Sports Anti-

Blackout Law has significantly affected the live gate attendance of the

remaining 14 NFL clubs. This is further evidenced by the fact that the percen-

tage of ticket holders who, in 1975, failed to attend blacked-out games (i.e.,

9.6 percent) exceeded the percentage who failed to attend locally televised

contests (i.e., 7.1 percent).

3. Revenues Earned from Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine
Sales

To the extent that locally televised games have adversely affected

a team's live gate attendance, Public Law 93-107 has also resulted in a diminution

of revenues earned from concessions and "PRO" magazine sales. However, on the

basis of the results discussed above, these losses do not appear to have been

substantial except in the cases of Miami and Atlanta, during the 1973 and 1974

seasons.

Parking revenues which usually accrue to Municipal authorities

and are used to finance the operation of stadiums have not been adversely

affected by Public Law 93-107. This is simply because the parking capacity at

nearly all NFL stadia is not large enough to handle all the fans' automobiles

who wish to drive to the game. Even if a team experienced a large number of

"no shows," the demand for stadium parking spaces would very likely exceed the

available supply.

4. Audience Ratings

NFL telecasts are one of the most, if not the single most, popular

type of programming on television today. On the average, about 30 percent of

all households in markets which support NFL franchises watch their home team's



















72-769 0- 76 -2








14



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televised games. It is further apparent that most fans clearly prefer to watch

the home team's televised games as opposed to games involving other NFL teams.

This is particularly true when viewers are able to choose between the two. To

illustrate, games involving other teams which were televised at the same time

as were the home team games, but on a different network, were viewed in only 6

or 7 percent of all households in the market as compared with an average 30

percent who watched the home team's televised games. Games of other NFL teams

which were not broadcast at the same time as the home team's games, were viewed

by about 19 percent of all households in all 25 markets which support an NFL

franchise.

These findings are further indicative of the enormous popularity

of professional football when compared to the ratings of other programs. Most

NFL games, of course, are played on Sunday afternoons. Other types of programming

aired by network affiliated television stations during this time are usually

viewed by only 6 or 7 percent of all television households. Prime time pro-

gramming (excluding Monday Night Football) attracts larger audiences. But

even here, the audience tuned into a particular network affiliated station bet-

ween 7:00 and 11:00 p.m. generally averages out to only 20 percent of all house-

holds in the market. In light of the wide audience appeal of telecasts of home

team football games, it can be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has had a

substantial public interest benefit in making significantly more of these

games available to television viewers.

C. Professional Baseball

Public Law 93-107 has had no effect on professional baseball

even though games are televised pursuant to a television contract with the







15



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National Broadcasting Company. NBC carries he Saturday al Ltrnoon "CGae o:

the Week," 15 mid-season Monday night games, the All Stcr (are the National

and American League playoif games and the World Series. That contract requires

NBC to locally televise tie World Series and the All Star games regardless of

-whether or not those games were sold out. Moreover, all of tlh League's ch'rriion-

ship series was locally televised, even though some games were apparently not

sold out 72 hours in advance. As required by the terms of the network contract,

all regular season Saturday afternoon and Monday night televised games were

blacked out in the markets of both home and visiting teams. 'ublic Lai,s 93-107

has not applied to televised regular season games.

D. Pro fe siona Basket bhl l

The impact of Public Law 93-107 on professional basketball has

also been minimal. Member clubs of the National Basketball Association play

about 780 games during the course of the season. During the 1973-74 season,

40 games were televised pursuant to a network contract. Of these, 14 we~re

broadcast in home team territories, although only four were sold out 72

hours in advance and locally televised as required under Public Law 93-107.

During the 1974-75 seasonI a total of 40 games was again televised, with 20

being aired in the home team's market. However, only seven of the 20 local

telecasts were required under the provisions of the legislation. Information

provided on the 1975-76 season indicated that 22 regular season NBA games

were televised, of which eight were broadcast in home territories. Only four

of these 22 games were sold out 72 hours in advance and locally televised in

accordance with the legislation.

In conclusion, a very small percentage of NBA games were televised

pursuant to a network contract. Although less one half of these tclevised








16



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games were carried in the home team's market, even fewer (about 13 percent)

were required to be locally televised. Moreover, locally televised NBA games

have not resulted in substantial increases in "no shows." For example, "no

shows" at locally televised games during the 1974-75 season averaged out to

about 4 to 5 percent of all tickets sold as compared with 3 percent for non-

televised games. The percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend nationally

televised NBA games during the 1975-76 season averaged out to 5 percent for

blacked-out home games but only 1 percent for telecasts as a result of Public

Law 93-107.

Since the enactment of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, member clubs

of the American Basketball Association have never locally televised a home game

pursuant to the requirements of the law.

E. Professional Hockey

Previous FCC reports have concluded that Public Law 93-107 has

had minimal impact on the National Hockey League. In preparing this year's

report, the Commission again requested information on: (1) the total number

of NHL games played during the 1975-76 season; (2) the number televised pursuant

to a network contract; (3) the number locally televised either voluntarily or

as required by law; (4) the number of "no shows;" and, (5) concession and parking

revenues. The League did not provide data on "no shows" or concession revenues,

nor did the NHL specify which of the games were locally televised in accordance

with Public Law 93-107 and which were voluntarily televised.

The Commission has received no information from the NHL to change

its original conclusion concerning the minimal economic impact of Public Law 93-107

on the National Hockey League. (Telecasts of World Hockey Association games







17



-14-



are handled through local arrangements and, therefore, Public Law 93-107 does

not apply to the WHA.)

F. Complaints and Inquiries

The Commission received 14 letters from April, 1975 to April, 1976

alleging violations of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law or raising questions as

to its applicability. From April, 1974 to April 1975, there were 39 letters and

from September, 1973 to April, 1974, there were 20 letters. No records were

kept of complaints and inquiries received by telephone, but there were not a

great number of these and, for the most part, they did not warrant Commission

inquiry or action. The most common type of complaint concerned the territorial

extent of the permissible blackout at football games.

Prior to the enactment of the law, the Commission received over 100

complaints regarding blackouts of professional football games. This year, as

well as last, the Commission failed to receive one letter of complaint regarding

the law's unfairness to the fan or to any team or league. Not one letter requested

that the law be allowed to expire at the end of its three-year life. Instead,

most of the complaints received by the Commission dealt with subjects to which

the law did not apply, i.e., the territorial extent of the blackout, the number

of football games at home. In addition, all of the letters which showed dis-

satisfaction with the law's application requested changes to allow additional

home games to be broadcast within the home territory.







18



-15- *





II. PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL



A. INTRODUCTION

The objections of the various sports leagues to anti-blackout

legislation have centered on the effect of an increase in "no shows" that

is believed to accompany televised home games. The National Football League

(NFL) is especially concerned that the continued psychological and financial

vitality of their industry depends on live attendance. Additional television

exposure, the NFL argued, would 1) oversaturate the sport and lead to a de-

cline in its popularity; 2) result in financial losses to municipal stadiums

that require tax compensation from concessions, etc., as well as direct

losses to the parking and concession owners themselves (due to "no shows");

and, 3) cause a loss of radio revenues to the teams as well as an audience

loss to the stations involved.

The prospect of oversaturation of professional football on television

audiences is a mjaor NFL criticism of Public Law 93-107. The League believes

that enactment of the law has distorted its previously balanced TV policy which

favored restricted exposure of the home team on the local audiences. Since league-

wide network contracts were initiated in 1961, the NFL guaranteed home telecasts

of every away game of the local team. In 1966, other telecasts as replacement

games were brought to the local audience if the team was playing at home. Such

a policy "doubled the amount of professional football on network television and

resulted in a greater variety of NFL games being made available to the television






19



-16-





viewing public."l/ The present average of 74 football telecasts per

season, as well as increased coverage of other sports, is believed by

the NFL to produce an environment of oversaturation. Declining

attendance at pre-season NFL games is blamed on the steady supply of

home telecasts now available to National Football League cities.

The fear of a decline in the popularity of professional football

emanates from conclusions the NFL has reached about fewer sold-out

games and the fear of an increasing number of "no shows." According

to the National Football League, Public Law 93-107's effect in 1975

was to create the fewest number of sold-out games since 1970, whereas

prior to 1973 the trend was in the opposite direction. This reduction

in the number of sellouts is due to the prospect that the game will be

televised, according to the NFL, and this is progressively eroding fan

interest in buying season tickets.

The NFL believes that the possibility of an increasing number

of "no shows" might result in such "no shows" becoming "non-fans". A

decline in season ticket sales in 1974-75 is given as an example of the

creation of "non-fans." Weather conditions and team standings do not

sufficiently account for "no shows" according to the NFL. As proof

of the increase in "no shows" from home televised games, the NFL

refers to a 100 percent increase in "no shows" from 1972 with 624,686

(when the League was not required to conduct an accurate count of "no

shows") to 1,124,162 in 1974. Thirty-eight percent of these "no

shows" resulted from games involving 14 teams that the NFL considers



1/ "Statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, NFL" in Hearings before the
Subcommittee-on -Communications of- the Committee on-Interstate -and--
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9566. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 22,
SOct. 29-31, 1975) p-72







20



-17-'




to have been in playoff contention in 1974-75.2/

Furthermore, the financial losses which the National

Football League sees as a possible effect of the Sports Anti-Blackout

Law arise from concession sales and parking fees and revenues from

the sale of radio broadcast rights. The NFL believes that a decline

in concession sales is detrimental to potential revenues of member

clubs and also of public stadium owners who require tax compensation

from concessions, as well as causing threatened employment losses

to vendors and others.3/

Finally, a "substantial" impact of the law is viewed on the

sale of radio broadcasting rights. According to the NFL, a two-year

loss of $500,000 in radio revenue as well as an alleged $1.2 million

decrease in advertising to the individual stations is not being offset

by increased television revenues as had earlier been predicted.4/

The NFL says that local telecasts of games have not greatly increased

television ratings since 1973.5/

In summary, while the arguments of the National Football

League are substantially the same as in 1973, the NFL believes that

it has experienced the most harm from the enactment of Public Law

93-107. The past three seasons, moreover, are not considered by the

NFL to be sufficient time to determine the full long-range impact of

the Sports Anti-Blackout Law on professional football.



2/ 'Ibid. pp. 70-71

3/ Ibid. p. 69

4/ Ibid. p. 73

-/ Ibid. p. 74







21



-18-



These NFL claims of injury from the effects of the Sports Anti-

Blackout Law will be analysed in the sections that follow. The subsequent

section will present an overview of locally televised games, ticket sales,

general concession revenues, and television audience ratings of NFL games

played since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in September of 1973.

Section C will provide analyses of the impact of Public Law 93-107

on each of the 26 member clubs of the NFL. This will be followed by a brief

summary of the Commission's findings and a discussion of the conclusions

based thereon.







22



-19-.


B. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC-LAW 93-107 ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL: AN OVERVIEW
OF NFL TELEVISED GAMES, TICKET SALES, "NO SHOWS," CONCESSION REVENUES
AND 1973-1975 AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR LOCALLY TELEVISED GAMES.

1. Televised Games: An Overview 1973-1975

In 1973, the first season affected by Public Law 93-107, 109 of the

182 regular season games, or 59.9 percent, were locally televised in home team

territories. Since then, the number of home games locally televised pursuant to

the legislation has declined. For example, of the 182 regular season games

played in 1974, local blackout provisions were lifted on 86 games,l/ or 47.3

percent of the total. Last year only 75 games were locally televised which

represents 41.2 percent of the total number of regular season games played.2/

Additionally, 11 of the 26 NFL teams, or 42 percent, televised

fewer games in 1975 than in 1973. Conversely four teams or 15 percent, tele-

vised more games in 1975 than in 1973 while the remaining 11 teams, or 42 per-

cent of the total, televised the same number of home games in 1975 as they did

in 1973.





1/ Two additional games were sold out 72 hours in advance but not locally
televised. The first involved a Cincinnati home game which conflicted
with a World Series game in which the Cincinnati Reds were involved.
The second involved a Jets game which the local station declined to
carry, apparently due to its belief that telecasting a different game
would attract a larger audience.

2/ In 1975, three of the New York Giants' games were sold out 72 hours in
advance but were not locally televised. The first two were played on
Saturday afternoons in -hea stadium and were not carried by a network
because both contests conflicted with local college football games. Con-
sequently, Public Law 93-107 did not apply. In the third instance, WCBS
which normally carries the Giants' home games, televised a Jets game
instead. The station was able to do so because WNBC, which normally
televises the Jets' games, opted to carry the World Series.







23



-20-.


Comparing the 1974 and 1975 seasons, the figures in Table 1 shows that

eight teams televised more games in 1975 than in 1974 while eight teams televised

fewer. Ten teams televised the same number of home games in 1974 as in 1975.

The total number of home games televised by each of the 26 NFL teams

are summarized in Table 1 below. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of NFL

teams televising none, one, two, three, four, five, six or all seven home games

during each of the past three seasons.

The figures in Table 1 indicate that four teams Denver, Green Bay,

Philadelphia, and Washington televised all 21 home games played during home games

played during the same three-year period. Pittsburgh, which had an extra home

game in 1973, televised 21 of 22 home games played during the three years. Two

other teams, Minnesota and Cincinnati, televised 19 and 18 of each of their 21

games, since the Sports Anti-Blackout Law went into effect.

A total of four teams Atlanta, Chicago, the New York Jets and Oak-

land televised between 51 and 75 percent of all home games played during the

1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons. Seven teams Buffalo, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami,

New England, the New York Giants, and Saint Louis televised more than 25 percent

but fewer than 50 percent of all 21 home games, while the remaining eight teams -

Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, San Diego and

San Francisco televised fewer than 25 percent of all home games played between

1973 and 1975. Additionally two of these eight teams, New Orleans and San Diego,

did not televise a single home game while Baltimore and Los Angeles televised

only one home game between 1973 and 1975.

Table 2 below gives some indication of the extent to which tele-

vised coverage of NFL home games has changed since 1973. The figures reflect

a downward trend in the number of locally televised home games. For example,

five teams (19.2 percent) did not televise a single home game in 1973, while







24



-21-

nine (34.6 percent) and six (23.1 percent) teams failed to do so in 1974 and

1975 respectively. Additionally, a total of six teams (23.1 percent) televised

only one, two or three home games in 1973 compared with three teams (11.5 per-

cent) in 1974 and 11 (42.6 percent) in 1975. During the past three-year period

the number of teams televising between four and six home games stood at six

(23 percent) in 1973, increased to seven (27 percent) in 1974 and decreased to

four (15 percent) in 1973. Finally, a total of nine teams (35 percent) sold

all and subsequently televised all home games in 1973 while only seven (27

percent) and five teams (19 percent) did so in 1974 and 1975 respectively.

While there has been a definite downward trend in the number of

locally televised games over the past three seasons, it must be remembered

that NFL home games were not televised locally prior to the adoption of Public

Law 93-107. As will be demonstrated in a later part of this report, locally

televised home games tend to be far more popular than games not involving the

home team (see Section 5). Thus, Public Law 93-107 has proven beneficial to

professional football fans.

Whether or not the continuation of the Sports Anti-Blackout Legis-

lation proves to be beneficial remains to be seen. If, as the National Foot-

ball League argues, mandatorily televised home games oversaturate the sport,

general interest in football may decline.

However, information provided by the NFL on ticket sales and "no

shows" does not conclusively demonstrate a depreciation of interest in pro-

fessional football. As will be shown later, the analysis of audience ratings

for televised professional football games further indicates the sport is one of

the most popular types of program on television today. Moreover, there is no

evidence that its popularity has diminished since the adoption of Public Law

93-107.






25



-22-




TABLE 1

Summary of the Number of Home Games
Televised by Individual NFL Teams During
the 1973, 1974 and 1975 Seasons


TEAM 1973 1974 1975

Atlanta 7 7 0
Baltimore 0 0 1
Buffalo 3 4 2
Chicago 7 6 2
Cincinnati 6 7 5
Cleveland 2 1 1
Dallas 3 0 1
Denver 7 7 7
Detroit 3 0 3
Green Bay 7 7 7
Houston 0 1 2
Kansas City 6 0 0
Los Angeles 0 0 1
Miami 7 3 0
Minnesota 7 5 7
New England 2 5 2
New Orleans 0 0 0
NY Giants 6 0 2
NY Jets 4 4 4
Oakland 5 4 5
Philadelphia 7 7 7
Pittsburgh 8 7 6
St. Louis 1 4 3
San Diego. 0 0 0
San Francisco 4 0 0
Washington 7 7 7

TOTAL 109 86 75







26



-23-





TABLE 2


Summary of the Number of NFL
Home Games Televised Locally
Between 1973-1975


Home Games Televised Number of Teams

1973 1974 1975

None 5(19.2%) 9(34.6%) 6(23.1%)

One 1 (3.8%) 2 (7.7%) 4(15.4%)

Two 2 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 5(19.2%)

Three 3(11.5%) 1 (3.8%) 2 (7.7%)

Four 2 (7.7%) 4(15.4%) 1 (3.8%)

Five 1 (3.8%) 2 (7.7%) 1 (3.8%)

Six 3(11.5%) 1 (3.8%) 2 (7.7%)

Seven 8(30.8%) 7(26.9%) 5(19.2%)

*Eight 1 (3.8%) --- --

Total Teams 26 26 26

Total Number of Televised
Home Games 109 86 75




*In 1973, the Pittsburgh Steelers played 8 home games, all of which
were televised.



NOTE: The figures in parentheses denote the percentage of all 26 NFL
clubs which televised the specified number of home games during
each of the three years. The percentage may not add to 100% due
to rounding.







27



-24-


2. Ticket Sales: An Overview 1972-1975

Even though fewer NFL games have been sold out since 1973, total

ticket sales for the League's 26 member clubs have remained relatively stable

over the four-year period under consideration. Indeed, as the figures in the

table below indicate, total ticket sales increased by 3 percent during 1973,

the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, when 109 of the 182 regular

season games were sold out and subsequently televised in home team territor-

ies. In that same year, season ticket sales also increased by 3.8 percent.

Even so, NFL clubs sold a lower percentage of available seats in 1973 than in

1972. As the figures indicate, this occurred because the average seating

capacity for all stadia increased.

In 1974 the NFL experienced its first decline in annual ticket

sales since 1968 when total sales fell by 4.6 percent. Nevertheless, the

10,236,322 tickets sold was still equivalent to approximately 90 percent of

all available seats. Moreover, the drop in total ticket sales is largely

attributable to a 6.1 percent decline in season ticket sales.

Similar circumstances characterized 1975's ticket sales. Again,

the total number of tickets sold decreased, but this time by only .3 percent.

On the other hand, season ticket sales fell by 5.3 percent. It is therefore

likely that total ticket sales in both 1974 and 1975 would not have declined

had the sale of season tickets remained constant.

As noted earlier, the NFL has consistently argued that locally

televised games have adversely affected the number-of "no shows." The

League is also fearful that "no shows" eventually become non-fans and as a

consequence do not buy season tickets. Taking this argument one step

further, it would follow that Public Law 93-107 is responsible for the

recent decline in NFL season ticket sales.







28



-25-


Summary of Ticket Sales
For All NFL Teams: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total Tickets Sold 10,455,827 10,730,933 10,236,322 10,207,041
(percentage change
from previous season) (3%) (-4.6%) (-.3%)

2. Average Stadium Capacity 58,355 62,135 62,453 63,249

3. Average Tickets Sold
Per Game
a) All games 56,964* 58,946 56,255 56,083
b) Locally televised games 59,522 57,023 57,087
c) Non-televised games 56,964* 58,089 55,567 55,379

4. Percentage of Stadium
Capacity Sold
a) All games 97.6%* 94.9% 90.1% 88.7%
b) Non-televised games 97.6%* 89.9% 83.6% 83.0%

5. Total Season Tickets Sold 1,314,485 1,364,780 1,282,218 1,214,106
(percentage change from
previous season) (3.8%) (-6.1%) (-5.3%)

6. Average Number of
Season Tickets Sold
Per Team 50,557 52,491 49,316 46,695

7. Number of Televised Games 0 109 86 75









* Excludes ticket sales of the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans Saints.







29



-26-


Fortunately, the League's argument lends itself to an empirical

analysis which has been performed. A thorough discussion of the manner in

which this was done can be found in Appendix A. Briefly, the analysis of

season ticket sales indicated that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely

affected season tickets sold by all 26 NFL teams. Contrary to the NFL's

position on this issue, the results indicate that season ticket sales

actually increased significantly when fans were able to see locally tele-

vised home games played during the preceding season.

This is not particularly surprising. The more television

exposure a team receives, the greater the interest on the part of the

fans. Moreover, since many people prefer to watch games live, that growing

interest is translated into increased season ticket sales.

As expected, season ticket sales were also influenced by the

teams won-loss record during the preceding season. Fans are more likely

to purchase season tickets when the team is winning. The demand for season

tickets was also higher in large cities such as New York, Chicago and Los

Angeles. However, season ticket sales did not prove to be particularly

sensitive to changes in price and/or household income. Again, a more

thorough explanation of the season ticket sales analysis is provided in

Appendix A. Given these findings, it must be concluded that Public Law

93-107 has not adversely affected the sale of season tickets to profession-

al football games. Indeed, the results indicate that the availability of

locally televised home games has increased season ticket sales. Total

ticket sales were not subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. Conse-

quently, is not possible to assess the impact of the legislation on total

sales. However given that a large proportion of a team's tickets are sold

on a seasonal basis, it is unlikely that total ticket sales of most NFL

clubs have been seriously affected by Public Law 93-107.












72-769 0- 76-3







30



-27-



3. "No Shows: An Overview 1972-1975

The National Football League has consistently argued that Public

Law 93-107 has and will continue to adversely affect the live gate attendance

at NFL home games. The league believes that ticket holders are less inclined

to attend games when those contests are televised in the team's home territory.

This is thought to be particularly true in those cities where fans experience

difficulties in getting to the stadium.

At first glance, it appears that there is some merit in this pro-

position. The number of "no shows" at NFL home games has increased since the

adoption of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. For example, in 1972, the "no shows"

total for all games (excluding those of the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans

Saints) was 579,294 or an average of 3,447 per game. This was equivalent to

6.1 percent of all seats sold. No home games were locally televised that year.

The adoption of Public Law 93-107 coincided with a large increase in

"no shows" in 1973. As noted previously, the law triggered a lifting of the

blackout on 109 of the NFL's 182 regular season games played in 1973. "No

shows" increased to 1,035,831 1/, averaging out to 5,691 per game during

the year or 9.7 percent of all tickets sold, which was somewhat higher than

the 1972 averages. However, since no law was in effect in 1972 which had any

bearing on "no shows," the 1972 figure may be less accurate than the figures

for the three years under the legislation.



I/ This figure includes "no shows" recorded by Dallas and New Or1
teams which did not submit attendance information for "







31



-28-


Moreover, "no shows" at locally televised games averaged out to

5,911 in 1973, as compared to an average of 5,363 for non-televised games.

The percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend home games was also

higher for locally televised contests than for those games which were not

locally televised (i.e., 9.9 percent for locally televised as compared with

9.2 percent for non-televised games).

Live gate attendance at NFL games did not improve in 1974 even

though the number of locally televised games decreased from 109 in 1973 to 86

in 1974. "No shows", including those recorded by Dallas and New Orleans,

increased to 1,124,879 which was equivalent to an 8.6 percent increase from

1973 and a 94 percent increase from 1972 when Dallas and New Orleans were not

included.

The average number of "no shows" at all locally televised home

games played in 1974 was 6,411 per game. This was slightly higher than the

5,974 ticket holders who, on the average, failed to attend games which were

blacked out in the teams' home territories. There was a negligible difference,

however, in the percentages of ticket holders who failed to attend locally

televised and non-televised home games (i.e., 11.2 percent for locally tele-

vised games as compared to 10.8 percent for non-televised games).

In 1975, live gate attendance at NFL home games increased, as did

the number of blacked-out games. The total number of NFL "no shows" fell to

874,733 which was approximately 22 percent below the 1974 level but 51 percent

above the total number of "no shows" recorded in 1972.

On the average, 4,806 ticket holders failed to attend the 182 regular

season NFL games played during the 1975 season. This was equivalent to 8.6







32



-29-



percent of all seats sold. Attendance at locally televised games also

improved. In fact, there were fewer "no shows" for televised games than

for games which were blacked out. On the average, only 4,069 (7.1 percent)

of all ticket holders failed to attend locally televised games, while 5,323

(9.6 percent of the ticket holders) chose not to attend blacked-out games.

To summarize, the figures reported in the table at the end of this

section indicate that "no shows" have increased substantially since the

adoption of Public Law 93-107. On the other hand, last year's live gate

attendance at NFL home games was higher than in the two previous years.

The National Football League believes that both phenomena can be

explained by Public Law 93-107. Specifically, the NFL and its member clubs

contend that decreases in live gate attendance since 1973 can be attributed

to locally televised games. Following the same line of reasoning, the NFL

has pointed out that improved attendance during last year's season simply

reflects the fact that fewer games were locally televised in 1975 than in

1973 or 1974.

Even though "no shows" have increased since the adoption of

Public Law 93-107, it would not be appropriate to attribute those increases

solely to-locally televised games. As will be explained in a later section

of this report, live gate attendance at NFL games may be subject to a number

of different factors. For example, if the weather was cold and wet, one would

reasonably expect a decline in attendance, regardless of whether or not the

game was locally televised.







33



-30-




The figures in the table below further indicate that other

factors may have a more influential impact on attendance than does local

television coverage of home games. This would certainly appear to be

true with regard to attendance at last year's games, where the average

number of "no shows" at non-televised games exceeded the average number

of "no shows" at locally televised games. Additionally, there were

virtually no differences in the percentage of ticket holders who failed

to attend games during the 1973 and 1974 seasons. Both of these

findings suggest that live gate attendance is subject to influential

factors other than Public Law 93-107.

The subsequent section will provide a detailed empirical analysis

of the live gate attendance over the past four years for each of the 26

NFL teams and should provide an accurate assessment of the impact of

Public Law 93-107 on professional football.







34



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Summary of "No Shows"
For All NFL Teams: 1972-1975


1972 1973 1974 1975


1. Total Tickets Sold 9,569,988* 10,728,351' 10,237,952, 10,207,041
(percentage change 10,445,827+ 10,730,933+ 10,236,322+ 10,213,193+
from previous season) (2.7%) (-4.6%) (-.3%)

2. Total "No Shows" 579,294* 1,035,831 1,124,879 874,733
(percentage change
from previous season) (78.8%) (8.6%) (-22.2%)

3. Average Stadium Capacity 58,355 62,135 62,453 63,249

4. Average Tickets Sold
Per Game
a) All games 56,964* 58,946 56,252 56,083
b) Locally televised games 59,521 57,023 57,087
c) Blacked-out games 56,964* 58,089 55,563 55,379

5. Average "No Shows"
Per Game
a) All games 3,447* 5,691 6,181 4,806
b) Locally televised games 5,911 6,411 4,069
c) Blacked-out games 3,447* 5,363 5,974 5,323

6. Percentage of Seats Sold
Not Showing
a) All games 6.1%* 9.7% 11% 8.6%
b) Locally televised games 9.9% 11.2%- 7.1%
c) Blacked-out games 6.1%* 9.2% 10.8% 9.6%

7. Number of Televised Games -109 86 75


Excludes Dallas and New Orleans

+ Indicates figure given in NFL annual reports







35



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4. Revenues From the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine: An
Overview 1972-1975

Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a meaningful summary

of revenues earned on the sale of concessions, parking and "PRO" magazine. 1/

Much of the information necessary to do so was not made available either by

the National Football League or companies which handle the concession franchises

for the individual teams. 2/

Morevoer, much of the data that was available from some teams

reflects revenues earned from concession sales at pre-season games as well

as regular season games, whereas other teams reported revenues for regular

season games only. Consequently, meaningful comparisons between seasons for

all 26 teams is virtually impossible. However, information on these revenues

reported by NFL clubs is reviewed in a later part of this section which

provides an analysis of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on individual teams.

The Commission also requested that the NFL specify those member

clubs which do and do not share in revenues earned form the sale of concessions

and stadium parking. This information was provided and is reported in the

tables below.






Ij "PRO" magazine is an NFL publication that contains the scorecard for
the particular game, stories and pictures highlighting players and activities,
and local advertisements.

2/ Letters from concessionaires who did respond to the Commission's Inquiry
are contained in Appendix E.







36



-33-





CLUB REVENUE SHARING FROM CONCESSIONS

CLUB NONE YES

AFC FOOD BEVERAGE PARKING

Baltimore Colts X 20% X 20% l/ X

Buffalo Bills X 13 1/2% X 13 1/2% X

Cincinnati Bengals X X 2/ NO

Cleveland Browns X approx. 20% X approx.20% 3/ NO

Denver Broncos X

Houston Oilers X

Kansas City Chiefs X 42% X 42% X 100%

Miami Dolphins X X 4/ NO

New England Patriots X 12 1/2% X 12 1/2% NO

New York Jets X

Oakland Raiders X

Pittsburgh Steelers X

San Diego Chargers X 10% X 10% X 10%




1/ May be 30% if lease negotiation makes this retroactive to 1975.

2/ 33.2% of gross receipts on sale of food and beverages; 33.6% of gross receipts
on sale of alcoholic beverages; 13.2% of gross receipts on tobacco sales and
vending machine sales; 32.2% of gross receipts on sales or rental of all other
products; less 10% this total amount retained by City of Cincinnati.

3/ Cleveland Browns, Inc. does not have any ownership interest in the concession
operation. Concessions, however, are operated by Cleveland Stadium Corp., which
is owned and controlled by Arthur B. Modell who also owns Cleveland Browns, Inc.

4/ City of Miami receives 30.5% of the gross revenues from concessions. The con-
cessionaire, Restaurant Associates, participates in 50% of the profit after
payment to the City of Miami and amortization of equipment. The Dolphins
keep the remainder.







37



-34-






CLUB REVENUE SHARING FROM CONCESSIONS


CLUB NONE YES

NFC FOOD BEVERAGE PARKING

Atlanta Falcons X

Chicago Bears X

Dallas Cowboys X 16 2/3% X 16 2/3% NO

Detroit Lions X

Green Bay Packers X

Los Angeles Rams X 16 2/3% X 16 2/3% X 16 2/3%

Minnesota Vikings X

New Orleans Saints X

New York Giants 1/ X

Philadelphia Eagles X 15% X 15% NO

St. Louis Cardinals X

San Francisco 49ers X

Washington Redskins X















1/The Giants will share in concession revenues (50/50) once they move to Giants
Stadium. Previously, however, they have not participated in concessions
revenues.







38



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5. Audience Ratings: An Overview 1973-1975

In a recent report on the extension of the Sports Anti-Blackout

Law, the Senate Committee on Commerce requested that the FCC study and report

on the impact of Public Law 93-107 on local television audiences and the

potential for greater NFL revenues resulting from future television contracts.l/

An analysis of audience ratings for local telecasts of NFL games was, therefore,

carried out. Specifically, this analysis compared audience ratings of tele-

casts involving home teams with televised games involving other NFL clubs.

An audience rating refers to the percent of all television house-

holds which are tuned to a given TV station at a given time. Overall, audience

ratings vary depending on the popularity of the program, the time of day,

the day of the week, and the season in which the rating is taken. Typically,

the highest audience ratings occur in the winter during the evening or prime

time hours (i.e., 7:00-11:00 p.m.) in the middle of the week. Moreover,

ratings tend to be somewhat lower on Sunday afternoons, since fewer people

watch television at that time.

To illustrate, prime time audience ratings for network affiliated

stations located in cities which support NFL franchises generally acquire

an average audience rating of about 20 during the prime time hours in the winter

months. This simply means that about 20 out of every 100 households in a

particular market are watching one of the three network affiliated stations

licensed to that market. Similarly, an average of about six or seven out of


1/Senate Report 94-510, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.(Dec. 5, 1975) p. 5.








39



-36-



every 100 households watch programs aired by a network affiliated station on

any given Sunday afternoon. 2/ Of course the actual audience figures will

fluctuate with the popularity of different programs. The average ratings

quoted above are simply provided as an indication of the general popularity

of various types of programs other than professional football, which are

broadcast in prime time and on Sunday afternoon.

The figures in the tables below indicate that professional football

games are substantially more popular than other types of television programs.

Furthermore, locally televised home games were also more popular than televised

games involving other NFL teams.

On the average, a home team's locally televised games were viewed by

30 to 35 percent of all households in the team's home territory. 3/

Moreover when required to choose between watching the home team play

as opposed to televised games involving other NFL clubs, local viewers by an

average margin of about five to one watched the home team. 4/


2/ See Arbitron Television Market Summary, New York: American Research Bureau,
Inc. February March, 1975.

3/ These percentages are based on local audience ratings for NFL games collected
from the Arbitron Corporation's four-week Fall audience sweeps of 1973, 1974
and 1975. Audience ratings for 25 NFL markets were analyzed. This number
does not coincide with the number of teams because the New York Jets and
Giants as well as the San Francisco Forty-Niners and Oakland Raiders share
markets, while the Green Bay Packers play home games in Green Bay and
Milwaukee both of which represent separate television markets. The figures
presented in the subsequent tables represent average audience ratings for
home and away games played by the home team during each of the four week periods.

Specific dates for Arbitron's Oct. Nov. audience sweeps are as follows:
Oct. 24 Nov. 20, 1973
Oct. 24 Nov. 19, 1974
Oct. 29 Nov. 25, 1975

Because ARB ratings are recorded in half-hour segments, it was necessary to
compute an average game figure by summing these half-hour periods and dividing

(3/ continued and 4/ on following pages)








40



-37-



The home club also attracted substantially larger local audiences

than other teams when their games were televised at different times. In those

instances, the average audience ratings for the home team's games exceeded those

of other "non-competing games" by about 50 percent.

Moreover, there is no evidence of oversaturation of the sport. If

this were a problem, it should be reflected in a decline in average audience

ratings particularly for those teams which have locally televised all or nearly

all of their home games. However, this has not been the case. Indeed, as will

be seen in a later part of the analysis, teams which have televised most of their

games tend to achieve higher than normal audience ratings. This further indicates

that a significantly larger number of people watch televised NFL games when those

contests involve a team of local interest.

Finally, it is apparent that NFL football is one of the most-if not

the most-popular type of program on television today. Audience ratings for

Sunday afternoon football games, particularly those involving the home team,

are generally five to six times larger than audience ratings for other types

of programming televised at that time. Differences in audience size also

appear when ratings for prime time programs (excluding Monday night football)

are compared to NFL telecasts, although the magnitude of these differences is

smaller.


3/ continued
by six or seven (depending on perceived length of the game). It was
assumed that most games would run three hours and any doubleheaders
were split accordingly, after the first six ratings segments. All ratings
were counted from an on-the-hour origin point with any pre-game segment
(e.g. a 12:30 p.m. rating) excluded. Average figures were computed for
each home and away game involving the local team. Next an average for all the
home and average for all of the away games of the team were calculated. It
was further assumed that American Football Conference teams have their games
carried on NBC while National Football Conference games are broadcast on CBS.
In the case of an interconference game, the visiting team's network would
broadcast the contest.







41



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Consequently, it must be assumed that Public Law 93-107 has proved

to be beneficial to professional football fans in those markets which support

NFL franchises at least to the extent that the legislation has triggered a

lifting of blackouts on sold out home games.




































4/ This is reflected in the differences in audience ratings for the home team's
games and those of competing games involving other NFL clubs. If another
NFL game started at the same time as a home team telecast but was aired on
a different station or had ratings for more than half of the segments during
which the local team's telecast occurred, then those other games were defined
as competing games. All other games not involving the local team were defined
as non-competing games. Again, this distinction was made in order to assess
the magnitude of the local viewers' preferences for watching their home team
play as opposed to other NFL clubs.







42



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AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 24 November 20, 1973


1973 HOME TEAM OTHER TEAMS

HOME AWAY COMPETING OTHER TIMES
HOME MARKET # RATING # RATING # RATING # RATING

AFC

Baltimore 2 23.1 2 4.2 10 16.8
Buffalo 2 45.5 1 30.7 2 10.1 8 22.4
Cincinnati 1 19.1 3 28.6 2 4.9 9 16.1
Cleveland 3 32.3 3 7.8 8 24.5
Denver 1 36.8 3 36.6 3 4.8 7 27.4
Houston 3 17.1 3 17.1 9 23.4
Kansas City 2 34.6 2 37.8 2 7.6 9 19.3
Miami 1 35.7 3 41.0 3 6.4 8 22.9
New England 2 21.0 2 20.3 3 5.6 7 16.9
NY Jets 3 11.6 1 17.9 2 15.9 6 16.8
Oakland 3 20.1* 1 9.8 2 18.9 6 18.2
Pittsburgh 3 36.3 1 40.7 0 10 18.6
San Diego 2 27.6 1 17.2 11 22.0

Conference
Average 29 28 10 20.4



NFC

Atlanta 2 36.3 2 30.3 2 5.8 9 18.6
Chicago 2 19.2 2 27.0 2 6.4 8 15.2
Dallas 2 41.3 2 2.5 10 25.5
Detroit 2 27.5 1 4.0 11 17.6
Green Bay 2 41.2 2 45.4 3 4.4 7 22.7
Milwaukee 2 44.3 2 38.3 4 5.6 8 22.0
Los Angeles 2 31.4 2 6.3 10 20.1
Minnesota 3 37.4 1 45.8 0 9 17.2
New Orleans 2 47.2 1 4.8 11 25.9
NY Giants 1 14.8 2 17.1 2 8.9 7 17.0
Philadelphia 3 28.6 1 35.7 1 6.7 8 24.4
St. Louis 2 20.4 2 6.5 10 16.7
San Francisco 3 22.7* 2 13.9 7 21.4
Washington 2 34.1 3 44.0 1 4.3 9 22.8

Conference
Average 32 33.9 6.2 20.5

League Totals: 33 30.5 53 30.9 49 8.1 224 20.5

*Includes one simulcast game carried on CBS November 4, 1973 with Oakland and
San Francisco sharing average rating.






43



-4'o0-


AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 24 November 19, 1974


1974 HOME TEAM OTHER TEAMS

HOME AWAY COMPETING OTHER TIMES
HOME MARKET # RATING # RATING # RATING # RATING

AFC

Baltimore 2 25.7 2 6.6 10 14.0
Buffalo 1 41.3 2 48.4 2 1.3 9 20.1
Cincinnati 2 30.4 2 29.4 3 5.2 7 12.7
Cleveland 1 29.5 2 35.8 2 5.0 9 20.2
Denver 2 41.4 2 35.0 2 3.4 9 22.0
Houston 3 25.1 3 13.5 9 21.7
Kansas City 2 33.6 1 11.0 11 15.6
Miami 1 34.7 1 35.2 0 11 17.0
New England 3 38.4 1 32.8 1 2.2 8 12.0
NY Jets 1 11.7 1 10.7 11 14.6
Oakland 1 19.8 1 3.4 10 17.1
Pittsburgh 2 33.3 2 31.6 1 5.8 10 17.8
San Diego 2 23.7 2 6.5 10 20.3

Conference
Average 35.6 29.8 6.2 17.3



NFC

Atlanta 1 34.4 3 25.3 1 5.5 11 15.2
Chicago 2 24.3 2 23.9 3 6.1 7 15.2
Dallas 2 40.1 1 10.2 11 22.2
Detroit 1 25.2 1 5.8 11 15.9
Green Bay 2 48.3 2 46.0 3 6.7 8 22.2
Milwaukee 2 37.4 2 38.1 3 6.6 8 18.2
Los Angeles 3 25.6 2 5.1 10 16.6
Minnesota 2 32.8 2 38.6 3 8.3 7 16.6
New Orleans 1 39.8 1 2.5 11 22.3
NY Giants 2 18.5 0 11 13.3
Philadelphia 2 28.7 2 23.0 3 4.6 7 18.2
St. Louis 2 32.2 2 34.0 2 3.9 9 16.0
San Francisco 2 19.6 1 10.0 9 16.2
Washington 1 45.3 3 38.3 3 3.8 7 19.6

Conference
Average 35.4 31.1 6.1 17.7

League Totals: 24 35.5 50 30.5 45 6.2 243 17.5








44


-*41-



AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 29 November 25, 1975


1975 HOME TEAM OTHER TEAMS

HOME AWAY COMPETING OTHER TIMES
HOME MARKET I RATING # RATING # RATING # RATING

AFC

Baltimore 2 37.0 2 2.7 9 13.1
Buffalo 2 39.7 1 4.0 11 20.3
Cincinnati 2 34.2 2 34.8 1 .3 10 14.5
Cleveland 3 24.7 3 6.2 9 19.8
Denver 2 37.6 2 37.1 2 3.6 8 26.6
Houston 2 39.8 2 35.5 2 8.2 9 25.2
Kansas City 2 30.0 1 2.3 11 16.0
Miami 2 37.3 2 6.8 10 19.4
New England 1 18.1 3 20.0 2 7.7 9 11.9
NY Jets 1 18.1 1 17.8 0 10 14.6
Oakland 1 23.1 2 24.8 1 2.8 10 19.0
Pittsburgh 2 32.7 2 39.0 1 5.5 9 20.3
San Diego 2 16.5 1 5.8 11 15.8

Conference
Average 29.1 30.3 4.7 18.2



NFC

Atlanta 2 21.9 2 8.2 10 17.6
Chicago 1 28.8 2 18.1 1 14.5 10 14.4
Dallas 2 50.5 2 3.3 10 26.3
Detroit 2 29.0 1 3.6 11 15.1
Green Bay 2 44.8 2 45.6 4 4.6 7 21.4
Milwaukee 2 41.7 2 38.7 3 4.2 8 19.7
Los Angeles 2 23.4 1 3.0 10 15.8
Minnesota 2 37.1 2 40.7 2 5.1 8 18.8
New Orleans 1 31.0 1 8.3 11 23.4
NY Giants 2 17.0 1 15.4 1 7.3 8 15.7
Philadelphia 2 26.3 2 21.9 2 6.8 9 17.6
St. Louis 1 29.1 2 25.0 2 3.8 9 18.4
San Francisco 2 15.9 1 8.3 11 20.5
Washington 2 44.4 2 38.6 0 10 16.7

Conference
Average 33.7 29.7 6.2 18.7

League Totals: 23 31.4 51 30 39 5.5 250 18.4







45



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C. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON MEMBER CLUBS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE ...

1. Introduction

Past analyses of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law have generally con-

cluded that mandatory local television coverage of sold-out home games has not

proved harmful to professional football. The Federal Communications Commis-

sion's First Annual Report on the Sports Anti-Blackout Issue noted that the

legislation appeared "to have a minimal economic impact on the 26 member teams

of the National Football League in its first year of operation." The Report

also maintained that professional football was in no danger of becoming a TV

spectator sport. According to the Commission's First Annual Report, radio

stations were the only parties to be adversely affected by Public Law 93-107.

This, of course, was due to the fact that football fans, when given the oppor-

tunity, preferred to watch a game on television than listen to it on radio.

Consequently, the Commission's First Annual Report concluded that:

the Law's overall effect on the NFL member clubs was
minimal in the first year and this must be weighed
against what many believe to be the substantial benefit
to the public of having available 109 home games that
were locally telecast. I/

The Commission's Second Annual Report on the effect of Public Law

93-107 provided a far more detailed analysis but, generally, came to the same

conclusions with regard to professional football. Specifically, the Second

Annual Report maintained that mandatory local telecasts of sold-out home games



1/ Federal Communications Commission, First. Annual FCC Report on the Effect
of Public Law 93-107, op. cit. p. 35.



















72-769 0 -76 4








46



-43-,




did not appear to affect materially live attendance and concession sales, although

it did have an adverse impact on the audience ratings of radio stations broad-

casting televised home games. While attendance, concession sales, and subsequent

revenues earned by NFL teams did decline during the 1974 season, this was attri-

butable in large part to the players' strike, which preceded the 1974 season

and presumably alienated fans, and to the generally poor state of the economy

during the fall of 1974.

A third analysis of the impact of Public Law 93-107 was recently performed

by Professors C. Elton Hinshaw and John Siegfried, both of Vanderbilt University.

Their study assessed the effect of the locally televised home games on "no shows"

(i.e., ticket holders who did not attend the game). Their results indicated

that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law did not significantly effect the number of "no

shows" during the 1973 and 1974 seasons. The authors went on to conclude that

live gate attendance was for the most part determined by weather conditions

(i.e. temperature and precipitation), the team's divisional standing, and to some

extent the city in which the home team played. 2/

Unfortunately, each of the previous studies was done with a scarcity

of data on individual NFL teams. As a consequence, the analyses were constrained to

requiring the assessment of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on all 26 NFL teams

as a whole rather than assessing the impact of the law on individual clubs.

This is troublesome in that the previously reported results were based on the



2/ C. Elton Hinshaw and John J. Siegfried, "No-Shows" and the Anti-Blackout
Law: An Assessment. Paper to be delivered at Western Economic Association
Conference, June 27, 1976, San Francisco, CA.







47



-44-.



assumption that all home team football fans react similarly to such factors as

weather, temperature, precipitation and the home team's divisional standing

when deciding to purchase a ticket and attend home games. If this assumption

is not true, then subsequent results based thereon will be inaccurate.

For a fair and thorough assessment of the impact of Public Law

93-107 on professional football, each team must be examined separately. While

mandatory local telecasts of home games may not affect the financial and/or

psychological vitality of professional football in general, it may adverse-

ly effect certain teams. The benefits accruing to the public as a result of

locally televised home games, then, must be weighed against the actual and/or

potential harm to selected NFL teams as a consequence of the Sports Anti-

Blackout legislation.

The subsequent section provides a team-by-team analysis of the

impact of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law on locally televised games. Ticket

sales, "no shows", revenues earned from the sale of concessions, parking, and

"PRO" magazine, and television ratings for home and away games, as opposed to

audience ratings for games not involving a team of local interest, will be

analyzed. Before discussing the results of the analyses, however, an explana-

tion of the research methodology employed in the "no shows" analysis is in

order. This entails a discussion of the model used to estimate the impact

of Public Law 93-107 and other factors on the proportion of ticket holders who,

for one reason or another, did.not attend.NEL games.








48



-45-



2. Methodology: The Model Used to Assess the Impact of Public Law 93-107 on
the Number of "No Shows" Experienced by Individual NFL Teams between
1972 and 1975

The Variables.

While there may be a number of factors which influence a ticket

holder's decision on whether or not to attend an NFL game, it is likely that

most decisions will be influenced by a relatively small number of factors.

Specifically, it can be assumed that the number of "no shows" will be sensitive

to the following considerations:

a. Televised games: According to the NFL, mandatory local

telecasts of home games increase the number of "no shows".

A variable indicating whether or not a game was televised

was incorporated into the model to test the validity of

this argument.

b. Temperature: Ticket holders are assumed to be less

inclined to attend games on a cold day than they would

be if the weather was mild. The variable employed in the

analysis reflects the temperature during the game.

c. Precipitation: Ticket holders are also assumed to be

less inclined to attend a game where it is raining,

sleeting or snowing. The variable utilized in the

analysis indicates the presence or absence of some form

of precipitation during the game.

d. Attractiveness of the home game: Whether or not ticket

holders attend NFL games is expected to depend on the








49



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perceived attractiveness or "importance" of the game.

For example, fans are expected to be more inclined to

attend games if the home team is having a winning season

or is in contention for thedivisiona]championship. The

same could be true if the visiting team is having a "good"

year. The attractiveness of the game is measured by both

the won-loss records and the divisional standings of the

contestants. 3/


3/ Consequently, three separate analyses were done on the "no shows" of
each of the 26 NFL teams. The first analysis utilizes the "won-loss"
percentage of the home and visiting team as a measure of the attractiveness
of the game. "No shows" are expected to decrease as the percentage "won-
loss" record of the home team and/or the visiting teams increases.

The attractiveness of individual NFL games could also be reflected in
the Qdivisional standing of the home and/or the visiting tea. If one team,
particularly the home team, is in contention for the divisional champion-
ship, then "no shows" would be expected to be lower than if one or both
teams had no chance of getting into the playoffs. The second analysis of
"no shows" utilizes the divisional standings of both teams as a surrogate
for the attractiveness of the game.

A third measure of the attractiveness of particular games was also defined.
This was done by simply multiplying the "won-loss" percentages of both
home and visiting teams and incorporating that variable into the model.
This particular measure yields an overall indication of the quality of the
game by reflecting the combined success of both teams. This measure of the
quality of the game was used in the third analysis of the number of "no
shows" experienced by each NFL team.

It was thought necessary to do the three separate analyses since attendance
fluctuations may be more sensitive to divisional standings than to "won-loss"
records. This is particularly true if a team in one division ranks higher
in the divisional standings but has a poorer "won-loss" record than a team
in another division. Additionally, fans in other markets may be more
sensitive to the measure of overall attractiveness of the game than they
are to the home team's or the visiting team's prior victories. If so, this
"quality of the game" variable (i.e., the product of the "won-loss"
percentages of both teams) should prove to be the more relevant determinant
of "no shows".








50



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e. Season effects: Keeping in mind that subsequent analyses

performed on individual NFL teams are based on home games

played during 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons, it is

important to account for variations in "no shows" which

can be attributed to individual seasons. As a result,

each analysis incorporates variables designating whether

or not a game was played in 1973, 1974 or 1975. Inclusion

of these variables allows one to test whether or not "no

shows" were significantly greater, all other things being

equal, during any of the past three seasons than they were

in 1972, the year prior to the implementation of the Sports

Anti-Blackout Law.

Finally, "no shows" were computed as the ratio of "no shows" to tocal

tickets sold. This measure was used instead of the absolute number of "no shows,"

since it accounts for relative ticket sales differences and, as a result, better

reflects the relative importance of "no shows" to individual teams. To illustrate,

suppose one team sells 70,000 tickets to a game while another only sells 35,000.

If 5,000 of those ticket holders fail to attend both games, the number of "no

shows" will be of greater consequence to the team selling 35,000 seats than to

the team selling 70,000. By defining "no shows" as a percentage of tickets sold,

we are able to measure the relative importance of the impact of Public Law 93-107

3/ Continued
The "won-loss" percentages and divisional standings for games played during
the first three weeks of the season used in the analysis are the final
"won-loss" percentages and divisional standings from the previous season.
The rationale for those measures is based on the assumption that the fans'
perceptions of expected team success are determined to a large extent by the
teams previous season record, at least for the first three weeks. It was
assumed further that after that time, fans would have a good idea of actual
or potential team performance for the current season and would, accordingly,
make their game attendance decisions.






51


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on teams which have different seating capacities and which subsequently sell

different numbers of tickets to their home games.

It should be understood that "no shows" will also likely be

influenced by factors other than those defined in the model. For example,

if a team has been eliminated from the playoffs during the latter part of the

season, "no shows" could increase. Attendance may also depend on the month,

day and/or time of the game. Fans may be more inclined to attend games during

the early part of the season. They may also be more willing to attend games

which are played in the early afternoon (i.e. 1:00 p.m.) instead of later in

the day (i.e., 4:00 p.m.). "No shows" could also depend on whether the game

is played on a Monday night.

Strong rivalries or the appearance of superstars such as 0. J.

Simpson, Joe Namath, or Larry Czonka could also affect attendance. Similarly,

"no shows" may depend on how well the team has done in the past. The NFL,

for example, believes that attendance is subject to a certain degree of fan

loyalty which generally results from outstanding performances by the team

and/or selected players in past years.

The situation in Green Bay is illustrative. The Packers under Coach

Vince Lombardi built a virtual dynasty in the NFL during the mid-to late 1960's.

While the team's performance has deteriorated since that time, ticket sales

and attendance remain high which in all probability reflects a certain degree

of loyalty.

Finally, "no shows" could depend on the availability of other types

of entertainment, including other professional sports. Professional baseball,







52


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basketball and hockey seasons overlap with the professional football season.

Consequently, attendance at football games may be affected by attendance at

other sporting events. Similarly, fans residing in certain' cities may have

more recreational opportunities and, as a consequence, could be less inclined

to attend NFL games.

Unfortunately, most of these factors are highly qualitative in nature.

As a result, they could not be quantitatively measured and were therefore not

incorporated into the model. Even so, the methodology employed in the "no

shows" analysis should provide an accurate assessment of the impact of Public

Law 93-107 on live gate attendance at NFL games.

The Data

Data on the number of "no shows", tickets sold, and whether or not

the game was televised were obtained from the National Football League. Data

on temperature and precipitation were also obtained from the NFL. When weather

conditions were not reported by teams, this information was obtained from the

National Weather Service. Data on divisional standings and "won-loss" percen-

tages were obtained from The Sporting News, The New York Times, and The

Washington Post.

The Statistical Technique

Multivariate regression analysis was employed to measure the extent

to which each of these factors influence the percentages of ticket holders who

do not attend games. Briefly, this particular statistical technique permits

one to ascertain whether and to what extent a change in one variable "no shows"

in this instance is influenced by changes in any or all of the other variables






53


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(.e., temperature, precipitation, "won-loss" records, etc.) which are included

in the model. The analyses empirically assess the impact the Sports Anti-Blackout

Law has had on the number of "no shows" experienced by each of the 26 NFL clubs

over the three-year duration of the initial legislation.








54



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AMERICAN FOOTBALL CONFERENCE



BALTIMORE COLTS


BUFFALO BILLS


CINCINNATI BENGALS


CLEVELAND BROWNS


DENVER BRONCOS


HOUSTON OILERS


KANSAS CITY CHIEFS


MIAMI DOLPHINS


NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS


NEW YORK JETS


OAKLAND RAIDERS


PITTSBURGH STEELERS


SAN DIEGO CHARGERS







55


-5?-



3. The Results of the "No Shows" Analysis for Individual NFL Teams

The American Football Conference

The Baltimore Colts

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have significantly affected the

Baltimore Colts. During the three seasons in which the law has been in effect,

only one home game has been locally televised. This, of course, is attributable

to the Colts' failure to sell out home games at least 72 hours in advance.

The Baltimore Stadium seats 60,000 fans. A summary of the Colts'

ticket sales and "no shows" over the past four seasons is provided below. Public

Law 93-107 was not in effect during the 1972 season. That year was included for

the sake of a comparison.


Summary of Baltimore Colts'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Stadium capacity 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000

2. Total seats sold 392,320 375,572 269,806 328,394
(percentage change from (-4.3%) (-28.2%) (21.5%)
previous season)

3. Avg. seats sold per game 56,046 53,653 38,544 46,913

4. Season ticket sales 48,315 47,233 32,593 27,377
(percentage change from (-2%) (-31%) (-16%)
previous season)

5. Percentage of games won .357 .286 .143 .714

6. Divisional standing 3 4 5 1

7. Number of televised home 0 0 0 1
games








56



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It appears that Colts' ticket sales are sensitive to the team's per-

formance. Specifically, the downturn in ticket sales experienced during the 1973

and 1974 seasons coincides with lower divisional standings and poorer won-loss

records. This probably explains the 22 percent increase in ticket sales during the

1975 season when the Colts finished first in their division with a record of 10

wins and 4 losses. 1975 ticket sales would probably have been higher if the

Baltimore fans had more rapidly come to appreciate the team's improvement over

the previous three seasons. This is reflected in the fact that total ticket

sales increased by 22 percent in 1975, even though season ticket sales decreased

by 16 percent. The Colts were only able to sell an average of 39,949 tickets for

each of their first three home games played during the initial 7 weeks of the

1975 season. However, the average number of tickets sold for the following four

home games during the latter half of the season increased to 52,137. Again, this

increase is illustrative of fans willingness to buy tickets if their team is

winning.

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Given that only one of the Colts' home games was televised locally

during the past three seasons, it is unlikely that Public Law 93-107 has had an

effect on the number of "no shows" at Colt games. Nevertheless, an effort has

been made to determine the factors which influenced the number of "no shows."

The figures in the summary table below indicate that the total number

of "no shows" increased from 37,062 in 1972 to 56,977 in 1973 while decreasing

to 36,018 in 1974. Baltimore experienced a precipitous decline in "no shows"

during the 1975 season when only 9,623 ticket holders failed to attend home

games during the entire year.






57



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Summary of "No Shows" For
Baltimore Colts: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total "No Shows" 37,062 56,977 36,018 9,623
S(percentage change from (53.7%) (-36.8%) (-73.3%)
previous season)

2. Avg. "No Shows" per game 5,295 8,140 5,145 1,375

3. Avg. number of seats sold 56,046 53,653 38,544 46,913
per game

4. Percentage of seats sold 9.5% 15.2% 13.3% 2.9%
not showing

5. Number of televised games 0 0 0 1

6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised 1,141
game

7. Avg. "No Shows" per 5,295 8,140 5,145 1,415
non-televised game

8. Percentage of games won .357 .286 .143 .715

9. Divisional standing 3 4 5 1

The detailed statistical analysis presented in the subsequent tables

reveals that all variables in the model explained approximately 79 percent of

the variation in Baltimore's "no shows" during the past four seasons. However,

only two variables proved to have a significant impact on the Colts live gate

attendance. Specifically, "no shows" increased significantly in the presence of

some form of precipitation. Additionally, the results indicate that attendance

was significantly lower when fans expected to see a good game (i.e. when both

the home and visiting team were playing well).

Finally the results indicate that attendance was significantly higher

in 1975 than in 1972, when all other factors defined in the model were con-

trolled for. This particular finding probably reflects dramatic improvements

in the team's performance. All other factors, including that which indicated








58


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whether or not the game was televised locally, did not significantly influence

"no shows."

On the basis of this analysis, Baltimore ticket holders are more likely

to attend games if it is not raining and if both teams are having good seasons.

They are not likely to be influenced by whether or not the game is televised.

Thus, on the basis of data supplied to the Commission by the NFL, Public Law

93-107 does not appear to have had an impact on the Baltimore franchise.







59



b-


RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BALTIMORE "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975


Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .79012
F( 8,19 ) 8.94088

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .01749 .123
Temperature -.00087 1.701
Precipitation .13422 16.734
Home Team's win-loss % -.00010 2.867
Visiting Team's Win-loss % -.00006 2.572
1973 -.00542 .046
-1974 -.00773 .086
1975 -.06706 8.359
Constant .22470



Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 = .77476
F( 7,20 ) 9.82756*

-ndendenrint Variablps Fegressi_ Cefficiet_ F Values

Televised Games .02156 .163
Temperature -.00071 1.016
Precipitation .13207 17.104
Home Team's Div. Standing .01100 1.448
Visiting Team's Div. Standing .01271 2.570
1973 .00673 .114
1974a -
1975 -.07158 10.460
Constant .06997



Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R2 = .79405
F( 6,21 ) = 13.49447*

IndeDendent Variable Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .04557 .747
Temperature -.00091 2.141
Precipitation .13007 21.584
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L% -.21003 4.959
1973 a
1974 -.00413 .049
1975 -.06847 12.003
Constant .19272


* Indicates the equaLion or independent variable is significant at the
.05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to
an exceedingly low F value








60



-5.7-





3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Baltimore franchise receives approximately 20 percent of

total revenues earned from the sale of concessions and stadium parking. All

income from "PRO" magazine sales also accrues to the club.

The Colts have locally televised only one home game during the

past three years. Hence, Public Law 93-107 could have had only a minimal

adverse impact on these revenues. Moreover, concession sales have increased

every year since 1972, even though live gate attendance declined in both 1973

and 1974. "PRO" sales fell in 1974 and then increased in 1975 as live gate

attendance improved.







61



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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Baltimore Colts: 1972-1975 1/

1972 1973 1974 1975
(7 games) (7 games) (9 games) (7 games)

1. Concessions $ 38,397 $ 47,929 $ 54,794 $ 83,841
(percentage change (24.8%)
from previous season)**

2. "PRO" magazine 56,935 43,597 40,371 51,422
(percentage change (-23.4%)
from previous season)**

3. Parking NA 3,925 5,164 6,165
(percentage change
from previous season)**

4. Total tickets sold 392,320 375,572 269,806* 328,394
(percentage change (-4.3%) (-28.2%) (21.5%)
from previous season)

5. "No Shows" 37,062 56,977 36,018* 9,623
(percentage change (53.7%) (-36.8%) (-73.3%)
from previous season)

6. "Number of televised 0 0 0 1
home games

NA Information was Not Available
Seven regular season home games only
** Where no percentage changes appear, data compared is for
different number of games. Therefore, no valid comparison
can be made between seasons.



1/ The figures in the Table represent the Colts' share of concession and parking
revenues which is approximately 20 percent of the gross.
































72-769 0-76-5







62



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4. Audience Ratings

Football fans in Baltimore, as in the case in nearly all cities which

have NFL franchises, appear to have strong preferences for games involving the

home team as opposed to games which do not. The table below lists audience

rating for Colt games during the 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons. The ratings used

in this analysis were computed by the Arbitron Corporation and reported in their

annual four week periods running from the latter part of October through the

latter part of November 1/ during each of the three seasons.

Ratings are used to measure the size of the audience watching a par-

ticular program. The figures reported in the subsequent table denote average

audience ratings for the number of games televised during each of the three

measurement periods. For example during the 1973 four week rating period the

Colts played two away games both of which were televised. The average rating

for both games in the Baltimore market was 23.1. Consequently, it can be

inferred that about 23 percent of all households with television sets were

watching these games. Even though the Colts did not have particularly good

seasons in 1973 and 1974, Baltimore's away games attracted a substantially

larger audience than did games not involving the Colts. Additionally, the

differences in ratings between Baltimore's away games and other games tele-

vised at the same time on other channels is a further indication of the

preferences of Baltimore fans.






1/ Specific dates for the Arbitron's Oct-Nov. Audience sweeps are as follows:

Oct. 24-Nov. 29, 1973
Oct. 24-Nov. 19, 1974
Oct. 29-Nov. 25, 1975








63



-60:r


The figures in the table below also suggest that the popularity of

games involving the home team is sensitive to the club's success. Again the

Colts had a very good year in 1975, finishing the season with a 10-4 won-loss

record and a divisional championship. This probably explains why audience ratings

for the Colts away games (played during the audience rating period) increased from

an average of 25.7 in 1974 to 37.0 in 1975. Additionally, Baltimore's success in

1975 should also account for the decline in audience ratings (from 6.6 in 1974

to 2.7 in 1975) of games involving other teams which compete with televised away

games. It must therefore be concluded that the Colts' games are significantly

more popular with Baltimore fans than are games involving other teams.

Audience Ratings for Baltimore Colts: 1973-1975

Colts Ratings For Other Teams
Home Games Away Games Competing Non-Competing

1973 (0)* (2) 23.1 (2) 4.2 (10) 16.8
1974 (0) (2) 25.7 (2) 6.6 (10) 14.0
1975 (0) (2) 37.0 (2) 2.7 (9) 13.1
Avg.
Ratings (6) 28.6 (6) 4.5 (29) 14.6


*The figures in parentheses represent the number of games played during ARB
sweep.








64



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The Buffalo Bills

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 in 1973, nine of Buffalo's 21

home games, or 43 percent of the total, have been televised in the team's home

territory. Three of the nine games were televised during the 1973 season, four in

1974 and two in 1975. In some respects it is surprising that the Bills were able

to sell out this many games 72 hours in advance.

In 1973, the Buffalo franchise moved to a new 80,000-seat stadium,

which by NFL standards is relatively large. Additionally, the population of

the Buffalo metropolitan area is somewhat smaller than populations of other

cities which support NFL franchises.

Nevertheless, the new stadium enabled the Bills to increase

total ticket sales from 309,814 in 1972 to 544,722 in 1973 which is equivalent

to a 76 percent gain. Ticket sales increased another 2 percent in 1974 before

decreasing by 3 percent in 1975. Season ticket sales reflected a similar trend,

increasing by 113 percent in 1973 and by 3 percent in 1974. Last year season

ticket sales fell off by 20 percent. Nevertheless, the Bills were still able

to sell 96 percent of their available seats during the 1975 season.

The intensity of demand for football tickets to the Bills' games

is also unusual in that the team has never won a divisional championship,

although the Bills did make the playoffs in 1974. In any event the figures

below indicate that the financial vitality of professional football in

Buffalo, New York is in danger from Public Law 93-107.







65


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Summary of Buffalo Bills'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

1972 1973* 1974 1975

1. Stadium capacity 45,748 80,000 80,020 80,193

2. Total seats sold 309,814 544,772 555,496 537,619
(percentage change (75.8%) (2.0%) (-3.2%)
from previous season)

3. Avg. seats sold per game 44,259 77,825 79,357 76,803

4. Season ticket sales 24,700 52,474 54,182 43,184
(percentage change (112.5%) (3.3%) (-20.3%)
from previous season)

5. Percentage of games won .286 .643 .643 .571

6. Division standing 4 2 2 3

7. Number of televised
home games 0 3 4 2

*Buffalo moved to a new larger stadium in 1973

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Not surprisingly, the total number of "no shows" at Buffalo games

has increased since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Again, much of this can

be attributed to the new stadium which nearly doubled the Bills' seating capa-

city. For example, even though the total number of "no shows" increased from

8,310 in 1972 to 17,964 in 1973, the percentage of ticket holders who did not

attend games increased only marginally, from 2.7 percent in 1972 to 3.3 percent

in 1973. Even during 1975, the Bills worst year in terms of "no shows", the

percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend games amounted to only

5 percent.






66



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Summary of "No Shows" For The
Buffalo Bills: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total "No Shows" 8,310 17,964 12,047 27,137
(percentage change (116%) (-32.9%) (125.3%)
from previous season)

2. Average "No Shows" 1,187 2,566 1,721 3,877
per game

3. Average number of seats 44,259 77,825 79,357 76,803
sold per game

4. Percentage of seats 2.7% 3.3% 2.2% 5%
sold not showing

5. Number of televised 0 3 4 2
game

6. Average "No Shows" per 2,813 1,723 1,502
televised game

7. Average "No Shows" per 1,187 2,381 1,719 4,827
non-televised game

8. Percentage of games won .286 .643 .643 .571

9. Divisional standing 4 2 2 3


The results of our statistical analysis of the team's live gate

attendance further indicate that Public Law 93-107 did not have a significant

impact on Buffalo's "no shows." That is, the rafio of "no shows" to total

tickets sold did not increase significantly when the Bills' home games were

locally televised. However "no shows" were influenced by temperature and the

divisional standings of both home and visiting teams. Neither result is

surprising. Buffalo fans are simply more likely to stay at home when the

weather is cold. Additionally, the fans are more sensitive to divisional

standings than to won-loss records since the standings have better reflected

the Bills' chances of getting into the playoffs. As noted above, Buffalo







67



..-64-



was able to make the playoffs in 1974 while winning only nine games. This also

explains why more ticket holders attended games when the visiting team was also

in contention for the divisional championship. Buffalo fans appear to be more

Sinterested in seeing their team get into the playoffs than they are in the

team's chances of winning a particular game.

All three seasonal variables were also significant when divisional

standings of the home and visiting teams were used to measure the attractive-

ness or quality of the game. This suggests that "no shows" were significantly

i gher during the three years in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect than in

1972 when it was not.

However, this does not necessarily indicate that the Sports Anti-

S Blackout Law had an adverse impact on attendance. "No shows" were not signi-

ficantly higher when home games were locally televised. The seasonal differences

in "no shows" must therefore be attributed to other influential factors which

are not specifically defined in the model. The team's move into the new stadium

in 1973 could afford one possible explanation. That is, if the Buffalo fans

experienced more problems in getting to the new stadium, as opposed to the old

one, then this could account for the higher ratio of "no shows" to total tickets

sold which the team has experienced since 1973. Again this is simply a hypothesised

explanation. We have no evidence to support or refute its accuracy. However we

are reasonably certain that Public Law 93-107 has not had a deleterious affect

on Buffalo live gate attendance.








68



-65-


RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BUFFALO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975


Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .51476
F( 8,19 ) 2.51945*

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -.02714 1.764
Temperature -.00134 4.507
Precipitation .02658 1.649
Home Team's win-loss % -.08801 2.839
Visiting Team's Win-loss Z .01291 .109
1973 .03840 1.489
.1974 .04789 1.690
1975 .07776 5.142*
Constant .10199



Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
.R2= .62154
F( 8,19 ) = 3.9000

Independent Variables Reeression Copffici~nts F Value

Televised Games -.02554 2.329,
Temperature -.00151 7.331
Precipitation .01934 .976
Home Team's Div. Standing .02815 8.619
Visiting Team's Div. Standing -.00499 .704
1973 .06341 4.922*
1974 .06941 4.960
1975 .09869 11.153
Constant -.00699



Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R2 = .44350
F( 5,22 ) = 3.50653 *

Independent Variable Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -.01498 ,675
Temperature -.00127 4.324
Precipitation .03095 2.402
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L% -.02443 .244
1973a -
1974a -
1975 .03618 3.691
Constant .08870


* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the
.05 level of confidence
a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to
an exceedingly low F value






69



-66-



3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Buffalo Bills share in revenues of concessions, "PRO" magazine

and parking though the exact percent of such shares varies (e.g., in 1973,

comession revenues per game ranged from 56 to 84 percent of the gross receipts).

Because of such variations in the franchise's shares as well as different

figures submitted by the club for the same years (see note 1/), an analysis

of the effect of Public Law 93-107 is particularly difficult. Moreover, the

Bills feel that comparisons between the 1972 and 1973 seasons would be

inaccurate given that the team moved to a larger stadium in 1973. Figures

for the 1972 season, therefore, have not been made available by the Bills.

There is no readily explainable relationship, moreover, between

telecasts as a result of Public Law 93-107 and revenue trends. For example,

while gross revenues for concessions declined from 1973 to 1974 when the

largest number of games (four out of seven) were televised, revenues from

parking and "PRO" magazine sales increased. 1975 concession revenues have

increased even though total "no shows" have also risen for the season and other

revenues have declined.

The impact of Public Law 93-107, therefore, has not been to directly

cause decreases in concessions, parking or "PRO" magazine revenues especially

since the number of telecasts has varied each year.







70



-67-







Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Buffalo Bills: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975
(10 games)

1. Concessions* $ NA $582,966 $516,593 1/ $672,133 2/
(percentage change
from previous season) (-11.4%) (30.1%)

2. "PRO" magazine NA 64,616 74,075 70,430
(percentage change
from previous season) (14.6%) (-4.9%)

3. Parking NA 194,887 200,310 NA
(percentage change
from previous season) (2.8%)

4. Total tickets sold 3/ 309,814 544,722 554,496 537,619
(percentage change
from previous season) (75.8%) (2.0%) (-3.2%)

5. "No Shows" 3/ 8,310 17,964 12,047 27,137
(percentage change
from previous season) (116%) (-32.9%) (125.3%)

6. Number of televised 0 3 4 2
home games

NA Information was Not Available

Gross receipts

1/ The Commission's Second Annual Report to Congress on the Effect of P.L. 93-107
states that concession revenues for 1974 were $375,261. However, the Buffalo
Bills state that concession revenues for that year were $516,593.

2/ There was a substantial increase in the number of higher priced items newly
available in 1975.

3/ Total based on seven home games.








71



-68-



4. Audience Ratings

As noted earlier, professional football appears to be very popular

in Buffalo. This phenomenon is further reflected in audience ratings for the

Bills' televised games. Over the past three years, locally televised home

games have achieved an average audience rating of 44.1 while away games

attracted an average rating of 41.4. Once again, this indicates that, on the

average, over 40 percent of all households in the Buffalo television market

watched the Bills play when the team's games were televised during the past

three NFL seasons. The magnitude of the Bills' popularity among local

viewers can be appreciated further by comparing these ratings with other types

of entertainment programs. Even the most popular prime time programs usually

achieve audience ratings of only 25 to 30, in the Buffalo.l/ Consequently,

professional football appears to be the single most popular type of program

among Buffalo viewers.

The figures below further indicate that the Bills' games are

significantly more popular than games involving other teams. The intensity

of demand for the Bills' games is well reflected in the extremely large

differences between the home team's average audience rating and an average

rating of 5.5 for other televised games which were competing (i.e. televised

at the same time but on another station) with televised Buffalo games for the

local audience.

Non-competing games involving other teams achieved a much higher

average audience than did competing games (20.8), but this was still well

below the enormous ratings which accrued to Buffalo's televised home and


1/ For ratings of other programs in Buffalo market, see: Arbitron Television
Market Summary, Book 3 (New York: American Research Bureau, Inc.
November, 1975) Section 1.







72


-69-


away games. It must therefore be concluded that citizens in Buffalo and the

surrounding area have benefited greatly by Public Law 93-107. Furthermore,

there is no indication that this situation will change should the Sports

Anti-Blackout Law be reenacted.

Audience Ratings for Buffalo Bills' Games: 1973-1975

Buffalo Other Teams
Home Games Away Games Competing Non-Competing

1973 (2) 45.5 (1) 30.7 (2) 10.1 (8) 22.4
1974 (1) 41.3 (2) 48.4 (2) 1.3 (9) 20.1
1975 (0) (2) 39.7 (1) 4.0 (11) 20.3
Avg.
Rating (3) 44.1 (5) 41.4 (5) 5.5 (28) 20.8






73



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The Cincinnati Bengals

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Eighteen of the 21 Bengal home games (86 percent) played during the

three seasons since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 have been televised. In this

regard, Public Law 93-107 has substantially increased local television coverage

of the Cincinnati team. Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium seats approximately

59,754 fans. As the figures in the table below indicate, the Bengals have been

able to consistently sell most of these seats. During the past four years, the

number of tickets sold per game has never fallen below 95 percent of the

stadium's seating capacity.

There was a 1.2 percent decline in total ticket sales during the

1975 season, associated with a 4.0 percent decline in season ticket sales.

(This decrease in season ticket sales probably reflects the team's .500 won-

loss percentage for the 1974 season. Specifically, Cincinnati fans may not

have thaVht the Bengals would do as well in 1975 as they in fact did and, as

a result, fewer people purchased season tickets before the season began).

Nevertheless, the average number of tickets sold to 1975 home games was equi-

valent to 95 percent of the stadium's capacity. Consequently, even during

1975, the Bengals sold out and subsequently televised five of seven home games.

Generally, however, Cincinnati total ticket sales do not appear

to be highly sensitive to the team's performance. The Bengals were able to

sell more tickets in 1974 when they finished second in their division with a

.500 won-loss record than in 1975 when the Bengals won a berth in the play-

offs, albeit finishing second in the AFC Central Division.

In any event, the figures below indicate that professional football

is quite popular in Cincinnati. Furthermore there is nothing in the analysis

which indicates that this situation will change in the near or more distant

future.







74



*71-



Summary of Cincinnati Bengals'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Stadium capacity 56,000 59,754 59,754 59,754

2. Total tickets sold 403,616 407,500 404,112 399,166
(percentage change (1.0%) (-.8%) (-1.2%)
from previous season)

3. Avg. seats sold per game 57,659 58,214 57,730 57,024

4. Season ticket sales 53,634 53,610 53,424 51,310
(percentage change (0%) (0%) (-4.0%)
from previous season)

5. Percentage of games won .571 .714 .500 .786

6. Divisional standing 3 1 2 2

7. Number of televised games 0 6 7 5


2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The Bengals have experienced rather large increases in the number of

"no shows" over the past three seasons. In 1972 prior to the adoption of the

Sports Anti-Blackout Law, Cincinnati had 21,789 "no shows" which amounted to 5.4

percent of all tickets sold during the season. In 1973, "no shows" increased to

26,059 or 6.4 percent of all seats sold, and increased again in 1974 to 41,084

or 10.2 percent of all tickets sold. Cincinnati had 44,669 "no shows" in 1975

which is equivalent to a 105 percent increase over the number of ticekt holders

failing to attend games in 1972.

The ratio of "no shows" to seats sold has also increased substantially

from a low of 5.4 percent in 1972 to a high of 14,3 percent in 1975. Addition-

ally, in 1973 the average number of "no shows" per televised game was 3,829

compared with 3,085 "no shows" for a single non-televised game. However in

1975 the average number of "no shows" at the two non-televised games was 8,109

compared with an average of 5,691 "no shows" at the five televised games.








75



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Summary of "No Shows" For The
Cincinnati Bengals: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total "No Shows" 21,789 26,059 41,084 44,669
(percentage change (19.6%) (57.7%) (8.7%)
from previous season)

2. Avg. "No Shows" per game 3,113 3,723 5,869 6,381

3. Avg. number of seats sold 57,659 58,214 57,730 57,024
per game

4. Percentage of seats sold 5.4% 6.4% 10.2% 14.3%
no showing

5. Number of televised games 0 6 7 5

6. Avg. "No Shows" per 3,829 5,869 5,691
televised game

7. Avg. "No Shows" per 3,113 3,085 8,109
non-televised games

8. Percentage of games won .571 .714 .500 .786

9. Divisional standing 3 1 2 2


The results of the detailed statistical analysis of Cincinnati "no

shows" indicate that the variables in our model explain approximately 80 per-

cent of the variation or change in the proportion of ticket holders who do not

attend the games. The analysis indicates that "no shows" do not significantly

' increase when home games are televised locally.

The most important determinants of Cincinnati "no shows" are

temperature and the presence of precipitation. In short, a larger number of

ticket holders do not attend games when the weather is cold and/or wet.

The results further indicate that the number of "no shows" during

each of the three years when the Sports Anti-Blackout Law was in effect were

significantly greater than the number of "no shows" in 1972. But, again,







76



-73-.


this cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107, since the seasonal variations

are independent of changes in "no shows" due to locally televised home games.

It must, therefore, be assumed that factors other than television account for

the seasonal differences in Cincinnati "no shows." There are any number of

possible explanations for this phenomenon, none of which are readily ascertain-

able at this time.

Finally, "no shows" did not prove to be sensitive to Cincinnati's

won-loss records or divisional standings. However, the divisional standing of

the visiting team as well as the multiplicative term reflecting the won-loss

percentage of both teams had a significant impact on "no shows." This suggests

that Cincinnati fans are rather discriminating and more prone to attend games

that involve two well-matched winning teams which are vying for the divisional

championship.








77



-74-


RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CINCINATI "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975


Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .80106
F( 8,19 ) 9.56320*

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -.02910 1.256,
Temperature -.00157 7.263
Precipitation .09490 30.840
Home Team's win-loss % -.00003 .256
Visiting Team's Win-loss % -.00004 1.790
1973 .06929 6.071
974 .09129 8.253*
-1974
1975 .09040 7.996*
Constant .14295



Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
.R2 = .82411
F( 8,19 ) = 11.1270*

Independent Variahbes Regrcssion Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -.03042 1.659
Temperature -.00162 8.605*
Precipitation .09962 33.898*
Home Team's Div. Standing .00407 .150
Visiting Team's Div. Standing .01357 4.966*
1973 .07207 7.013*
1974 .09022 9.747
1975 .08089 10.156
Constant .06283



Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R2 = .80515
F( 7,20 ) = 11.80621*

Independent Variable Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -.02259 .763
Temperature -.00158 7.878
Precipitation .09593 35.275*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L% -.05790 2.785
1973 .06371 5.424*
1974 .08437 7.875
1975 .08568 12.218
Constant .12381


Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the
.05 level of confidence
a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to
an exceedingly low F value












72-769 0-76- 6








78



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3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Cincinnati franchise receives approximately one-third of all

revenues earned from the sale of concessions. All parking revenues are

retained by the city. In addition, stadium parking spaces are sold on a

seasonal basis, but when "no shows" occur, spaces are resold after the start of

the game. Therefore, "no shows" have not affected parking revenues. Indeed

they may have increased those revenues, since unused spaces resulting from

"no shows" are resold.

Concession sales increased between 1972 and 1973, even though live

gate attendance (for regular season games) fell. However, concession sales

decreased in 1974 and 1975 as did the Bengals attendance, although the

percentage decline in concession sales over the past two years has been smaller

than the percentage increase in "no shows". This can partially be explained

by the fact that the average concession sales per person increased from $1.08

in 1973 to $1.22 in 1975.

With the exception of the 1973 season, there appears to be a direct

relationship between the sale of "PRO" magazine and live gate attendance.

Nevertheless Public Law 93-107 did not appear to be responsible for these losses.

The decline may simply reflect the fans' lower propensities to buy the magazine

due to its lower perceived value.







79


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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Cincinnati Bengals: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975


1. Concessions 1/ $517,710 $586,770 $580,853 $558,108
(percentage change (13.3%) (-1.0%) (-3.9%)
from previous season)

2. "PRO" magazine 81.691 86,313 66,038 48,951
(percentage change (5.7%) (-23.5%) (-25.9%)
from previous season)

3. Parking 129,528 135,017 132,104 NA
(percentage change (4.2%) (-2.2)
from previous season)

4. Total tickets sold 403,616 407,500 404,112 399,166
(percentage change (1.0%) (-0.8%) (-1.2%)
from previous season)

5. "No Shows" 21,789 26,059 41,084 44,669
(percentage change (19.6%) (57.7%) (8.7%)
from previous season)

6. Number of televised 0 6 7 5
home games

NA Information was Not Available
Total for seven home games

1/ Figure refers to gross receipts for concessions.

















-. Audiezce RFati:ngs

Television viewers i Ci-fc .:i prefer t: watch the Begas play as

z:Zpse t:o other eas. As t:he figures i the tae ta el ew idicate, televised


egal ~es whe:her played at me cr away at:rac: far larger audie s than ~

gaes t vlving the Cici=ati te.a This is Epariart. larly trae whz z gal

gas as well as games vlving oher tea are televsed i the sae te

zeriz~ by differet. networks.

pe f:a lly, Begal ahome a~ away games had average audiece

ratLgzs :f 2~.9 a. 30.., respectvely over the three year period. ther -FrL

gaZes c:mpetig- wth televised Cl.. .a: ges wEere oalv able t draw az

average razig of 3.5. the oher had, ges not i cpe:titioz vth televised






7 ; - - I - .-- - - - - - -
eogal contests achieved a a verage rati=g of 14. oer the three year period

vwic: is stil weil below the ratings for Cinci a:i games.

Surt.he re, t ere is n:o of.: tion o rversa:=tra:ioo. he average

audiece ratgs. f"or se gal es i-creased durig each of the past three

seasons. iven the refere. e Cinciati viewers for egal es the

fa:c that IE home ges have been televised locally over the past three seasons,

it m-t e nolwaded that Public Lw 3-17 has bee. ver beneficial




Audience -at-ins for .C:.:i Sglgas ames: 1 3- |

Bengals Other Teams
Eme Gamves Away ames re zoZ-Comlet e




) -. -
Av il








81



-78-



The Cleveland Browns

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had a significant impact

on the Cleveland Browns. Since 1973, Cleveland televised only four of 21 home

games. This reflects the team's problems in selling all available seats at

least 72 hours in advance of game time. For the most part, the Browns' lack of

success in this area probably can be attributed to the team's relatively poor

won-loss record over the past three years and to the fact that the Cleveland

stadium seats a large number of fans--79,282.

The Browns, in the past, have played well, usually winning a large

percentage of their games and finishing high in the divisional standing. Con-

sequently, the past three seasons have been unusual. In 1973 the Browns won

half of their games and placed third in the Central Division of the AFC. In

1974, their record deteriorated to a .286 won-loss percentage and a fourth

place finish in their division. The Browns fared no better in 1975, finishing

fourth again with a won-loss percentage of .214.

The team's poor showing during the past two seasons is reflected

in ticket sales. During 1974 and 1975 total tickets sales decreased by 10.8

and 12.5 percent, respectively. Season ticket sales also declined by 2.3 per-

cent in 1974 and 13.0 percent in 1975. Given that Cleveland fans have tradition-

ally enjoyed winning seasons, the recent downturn in ticket sales is not particu-

larly surprising. Furthermore, since the Browns have only televised four home

games over the past three seasons, the team's recent lack of success in selling

tickets cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.









82



-79-





Summary of Cleveland Browns'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Stadium capacity 79,282 79,282 79,282 80,165

2. Total seats sold 505,247 520,903 464,760 406,679
(percentage change from (3.1%) (-10.8%) (-12.5%)
previous season)

3. Avg. seats sold per game 72,178 74,415 66,394 58,097

4. Season ticket sales 48,901 49,670 48,542 42,252
(percentage change from (1.6%) (-2.3%) (-13%)
previous season)

5. Percentage of games won .714 .500 .286 .214

6. Divisional standing 2 3 4 4

7. Number of televised 0 2 1 1
home games


2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Cleveland experienced substantial increases in "no shows" in 1973 and

1974. Between 1972 and 1974 "no shows" increased from 30,094 to 52,666, or by

73.7 percent. However in 1975, the "no shows" declined to 28,177, a decrease

of 46.1 percent. These variations do not appear to be reflected in changes

in the number of locally televised games, won-loss records or divisional standings.







83



-80-


Summary of "No Shows" For
Cleveland Browns: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total "No Shows" 30,094 38,787 52,266 28,177
(percentage change (28.9%) (34.8%) (-46.1%)
from previous season)

2. Avg. "No Shows" per game 4,299 5,541 7,467 4,025

3. Avg. number of seats 72,178 74,415 66,394 58,097
sold per game

4. Percentage of seats sold 6% 7.4% 11.2% 6.9%
not showing

5. Number of televised games 0 2 1 1

6. Avg. "No Shows" per 9,717 2,029 6,848
televised game

7. Avg. "No Shows" per 4,299 3,871 8,373 3,555
non-televised game

8. Percentage of games won .714 .500 .286 .214

9. Divisional standing 2 3 4 4


The results of the statistical analyses also indicate that Cleveland

"no shows" are not particularly sensitive to variables defined in the model.

Taken together, these factors accounted for approximately 37 percent of the

variation of the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold. However, none of the

three equations used to estimate the determinants of "no shows" was significant.

The same was true of each of the variables defined in the model. Consequently,

it is apparent that attendance at Browns' home games are influenced by other

factors. However the results do demonstrate that Public Law 93-107 has had no

apparent impact on Cleveland "no shows."









84



-81-


RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CLEVELAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975


Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .35208
F( 7,20 ) 1.55257

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -
Temperature -.00242 1.556
Precipitation .06350 1.738
Home Team's win-loss % .00009 .373
Visiting Team's Win-loss % -.00009 1.384
1973 .04207 .649
-1974 .12019 2.762
1975 .08584 1.109
Constant .14353



Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .37129
F( 7,20 ) = 1.68728

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .04273 .630
Temperature -.00145 .683
Precipitation .08111 2.836
Home Team's Div. Standing .02262 1.302
Visiting Team's-Div. Standing .02741 2.742
1973 .01227 .076
1974 .04370 .794
1975a -
Constant -.00580



Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R2 .30338
F( 7,20 ) = 1.24429

Independent Variable Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .02266 .135
Temperature -.00154 .614
Precipitation .07817 2.220
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L% -.10058 .364
1973 .03123 .317
1974 .05900 1.110
1975 .01063 .029
Constant .14174


* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the
.05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to
an exceedingly low F value







85


-82-


3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Cleveland Browns share approximately 20 percent of the revenues

from concession sales at their home games. Since 1973, concession sales have

increased while the number of televised games has been minimal. This would

indicate that Public Law 93-107 has not had any adverse impact on concession

sales in Cleveland. Furthermore, the 1975 decrease in total ticket sales

means that concession sales are increasing because of greater consumption on

the part of fans attending the games (from an individual's per game expendi-

ture of $.89 in 1973 to $1.23 in 1975).

Sales of "PRO" magazine, on the other hand, have declined since

1973. No relationship between such revenue losses and televised games,

however, can be determined.









86



-8'3-


Revenues Earned form the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Cleveland Browns: 1972-1975


1972 1973 1974 1975
(7 games) (10 games) (9 games) (10 games)

1. Concessions 1/ $ 43,139 $ 64,987 $ 93,988 $111,019 2/
(percentage change
from previous season)**

2. "PRO" magazine 86,326 120,013 76,279 71,032
(percentage change
from previous season)**

3. Parking 36,750 NA NA NA
(percentage change
from previous season)**

4. Total tickets sold* 505,247 520,903 464,760 406,679
(percentage change (3.1%) (-10.8%) (-12.5%)
from previous season)

5. "No shows"* 30,094 38,787 52,266 28,117
(percentage change (28.9%) (34.8%) (-46.1%)
from previous season

6. Number of televised 0 2 1 1
home games

NA Information was Not Available
Figures for seven home games
** Where no percentage changes appear, data compared is for different
number of games. Therefore, no valid comparison can be made
between seasons.




1/ These figures reflect the Browns' share of revenues only. Total concessions
were approximately five times this amount.

2/ Part of the increase in concessions revenue for 1975 is attributed to the
addition of novelty sales. Prior to 1975 novelties were sold by a third
party and the Browns did not share in profits or commissions. Browns'
commissions for novelty sales during 1975 was $9,165.







87


-84-


4. Audience Ratings

Even though the Browns have had three consecutive poor seasons, their

televised games are still more popular with Cleveland viewers than are games in-

volving other teams. As the figures below indicate, between 1972 and 1975 about

30 percent of all TV households in the Cleveland area tuned into the Browns'

televised games. This compares quite favorably to the average audience rating

of 6.3 for televised games which were competing with the Browns and an average

21.5 for games which did not compete against televised Cleveland games.

While 1975 proved to be Cleveland's worst season, the three tele-

vised away games still drew larger audiences than games involving other NFL

teams. Hence, to the extent that Public Law 93-107 has triggered the lifting

of the Browns' home game blackout policy, the legislation has clearly been

beneficial to Cleveland football fans.

Audience Ratings for the Cleveland Browns: 1973-1975

Browns Other Teams
Home Games Away Games Competing Non-Competing

1973 (0) (3) 32.3 (2) 7.8 (8) 24.5
1974 (1) 29.5 (2) 35.8 (2) 5.0 (9) 20.2
1975 (0) (3) 24.7 (3) 6.2 (9) 19.8
Avg.
Ratings (1) 29.5 (8) 30.9 (7) 6.3 (26) 21.5







88


-85-




The Denver Broncos

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

As was pointed out earlier, the Denver Broncos have televised all seven

home games played during each of the past three seasons, reflecting continuous

sellouts at least 72 hours in advance of game time. Indeed, between 1972 and

1974, the average number of tickets sold to each home game exceeded the stadium's

capacity. The difference, of course, reflects tickets sold for standing room

only. In 1975 the average number of tickets sold to home games was only 768

short of the stadium's capacity. This was partially due to the team's decision

to hold back an additional 511 complimentary tickets.

As a consequence of the limited supply of seats and the popularity

of professional football in the Denver area, there is an excess demand for

tickets. This accounts for the small variation in ticket sales during the past

four years. Indeed, marginal increases in ticket sales over each of the past

three seasons reflect small increases in seats made available. The same is

true of season tickets. The 2.1 percent increase in 1974 was simply due to the

club's offering and subsequent sale of 1,000 additional season tickets.







89


..-86-




Summary of Denver Broncos'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Stadium capacity 50,000 50,000 51,706 52,702

2. Total seats sold 355,693 356,364 356,494 363,525
(percentage change from (.2%) (0%) (2%)
previous season

3. Avg. seats sold per game 50,813 50,909 50,928 51,932

4. Season ticket sales 48,000 48,000 49,000 49,000
(percentage change from (0%) (2.1%) (0%)
previous season)

5. Percentage of games won .357 .500 .500 .429

6. Divisional standing 3 2 2 2

7. Number of televised 0 7 7 7
home games


2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Denver has also experienced a relatively small number of "no shows."

Ticket holders who failed to attend the Broncos' home games in 1972 totaled

12,150, or an average of 1,736 per game. During 1973, when all seven home games

were televised locally, "no shows" actually decreased to 5,615, which averaged

only 802 per game or 1.6 percent of all tickets sold. However, the franchise

has experienced increases in "no shows" during the past two seasons. In 1974

"no shows" increased to 14,420, or 4 percent of all tickets sold. In 1975 the

total number increased again to 27,682, which was equivalent to an average of

3,955 per game or 7.6 percent of all tickets sold.








90



-87-



Summary of "No Shows" For
Denver Broncos: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975

1. Total "No Shows" 12,150 5,615 14,420 27,682
(percentage change (-53.8%) (156.8%) (92.0%)
from previous season)

2. Avg. "No Shows" per 1,736 802 2,060 3,955
game

3. Avg. number of seats 50,813 50,909 50,928 51,932
sold per game

4. Percentage of seats sold 3.4% 1.6% 4% 7.6%
not showing

5. Number of televised games 0 7 7 7

6. Avg. "No Shows" per 802 2,060 3,955
televised game

7. Avg. "No Shows" per 1,736 0 0 0
non-televised game

8. Percentage of games won .357 .500 .500 .429

9. Divisional standing 3 2 2 2

It is difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on Denver's

"no shows" due to the fact that the Broncos have locally televised all home games

played during the past three seasons. Consequently there has been no variation in

the number of televised games since 1973. Given this situation, the effect of

televised home games on "no shows" may to a certain extent be reflected in other

variables.

For example, although the analysis indicated that locally televised

games did not directly affect the team's live gate attendance, the findings did

conclusively demonstrate that "no shows" were influenced by temperature and pre-

cipitation. Both variables accounted for nearly 60 percent of the variation in

live gate attendance. Not surprisingly, more fans failed to use their tickets







91



-88-




when the weather was cold and wet, than when the skies were clear and the tempera-

ture mild. This is likely to be true whether or not a home game is locally tele-

vised. However, Denver fans may have become more sensitive to adverse climate

conditions. As a result of Public Law 93-107, that is, they may be more inclined

to stay home when the weather is cold and/or wet if given the opportunity to watch

the game on television. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 may have had an indirect

effect on the Denver's live gate attendance. Nevertheless, the ratio of "no shows"

to total seats sold has been lower than the league's average during each of the

four seasons under consideration. Consequently, it must be assumed that if Public

Law 93-107 has had an effect on the Broncos' attendance, the impact has been

minimal.

Denver "no shows" also proved sensitive to the team's won-loss

record. Again, more ticket holders attended games when the Broncos were winning

than when they were losing. When the won-loss percentage of both teams were

multiplied together and used as a surrogate for the quality or attractiveness of

the game, this variable also proved to be significant, again reflecting the fans'

preferences to see two winning well-matched teams play.

All other variables defined in the model were not significant. Hence,

the differences in Denver's "no shows" could not be attributed to factors peculiar

to any or all of the three seasons since the enactment of the Sports Anti-Blackout

Law.







92



-89-

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DENVER "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975


Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R2 .74675
F( 7,20 ) 8.42461

Independent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .01619 .319
Temperature -.00231 29.386
Precipitation .05274 4.380
Home Team's win-loss % -.00019 3.003
Visiting Team's Win-loss Z -.00005 1.930
1973
-1974 .02656 1.345
1975 .04616 4.304
Constant .24005



Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
.R2 .78296
F( 7,20 ) = 10.302*

Indenendent Variables Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games .03438 .958
Temperature -.00246 37.992
Precipitation .05022 4.821
Home Team's Div. Standing .01981 1.519
Visiting Team's Div. Standing .01341 5.891
1973 -.03227 2.241
1974
1975 .02634 1.604
Constant .05597



Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R2 .73011
F( 6,21 ) = 9.424*

Independent Variable Regression Coefficients F Values

Televised Games -
Temperature -.00233 29.504*
Precipitation .05923 5.587*
Home W-LZ x Visitor's W-LZ -.14529 4.492
1973 -.00408 .030
1974 ,01691 .455
1975 .03708 2.623
Constant .08110


Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the
.05 level of confidence
a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to
an exceedingly low F value







93



-90-




3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Denver Broncos do not receive a percentage of the revenues

from concessions or parking. Since Denver has not provided sales information

relating to these enterprises, it is impossible to determine Public Law

93-107's impact on them.

"PRO" magazine sales figures, however, were made available. They

demonstrate an inverse relationship with the figures for "no shows". Specifi-

cally, as the number of "no shows" increased, the sale of "PRO" magazine

has decreased..

It is, therefore, possible that Public Law 93-107 could have had

an indirect impact on the sale of "PRO" magazine. That is, if fans are more

prone to stay home in cold weather, partially as a result of the availability

of local television coverage of home games, then-the legislation may have

contributed to the decline in "PRO" sales. Unfortunately this is impossible

to measure since the exact nature of the interrelationships between temperature,

"no shows" and locally televised games is equally impossible to ascertain.



































72-769 0-76-7






94



-91-





Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Denver Broncos: 1972-1975

1972 1973 1974 1975


1. Concessions $114,024 $ NA $ NA $ NA
(percentage change
from previous season)

2. "PRO" Magazine 64,545 75,346 69,997 43,173
(percentage change
from previous season) (16.7%) (-19.0%) (-29.2%)

3. Parking 37,261 NA NA NA
(percentage change
from previous season)

4. Total tickets sold 355,693 356,364 356,494 363,525
(percentage change
from previous season) (.2%) (0%) (2.0%)

5. "No Shows" 12,150 5,615 14,420 27,682
(percentage change
from previous season) (-53.8%) (156.8%) (92.0%)

6. Number of televised 0 7 7 7
home games

NA Information was Not Available