|Table of Contents|
Letter of transmittal
The problem of security
Summary of findings
y....j.0f.... : i
J L-') _____________
94th Congress 1
2d Session I
THE PANAMA CANAL
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
RICHARD L. SCHULTZ, Chief Counsdel
CAROLINE M. COURBOIS, Aaisitant to the Chief Counsel
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, Chief lrwuestigator
ROBERT J. SHORT, Senior Investigator
MARY E. DOOLEY, Research Director
DAVID MARTIN, Senior Analyat
Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, That the report entitled, "The Panama Canal and the Problem of
Security" be printed and made available for the use of the Committee on the
Approved: September 24, 1976.
JAMES U. hJASTLAND, (Jhazrman.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C., July 7, 1976.
JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Judiciary Com-
mittee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 2241, Washington,
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Earlier this year you requested that I visit
Panama for the purpose of making an appraisal for the Subcommittee
of the internal security problems affecting the Zone and the Panama
I have the honor to submit herewith my report entitled, "The
Panama Canal and the Problem of Security".
With every best wish,
HAROLD E. HUGHES.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
THE PANAMA CANAL
PROBLEM OF SECURITY
A report submitted to
Honorable James 0. Eastland,
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
Special Assistant to the Chairman
Pursuant to the directive of Senator
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security, the
Honorable Harold Hughes, Special Assistant
to the Chairman, former member of the U. S.
Senate and Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief
Investigator for the Subcommittee, visited
Panama in early March to conduct an inves-
tigation into certain related matters that
might pose a threatto the security of the
Panama Canal. In Panama, they had extensive
conversations with the Governor of the Canal
Zone, the Honorable Harold R. Parfitt, with
the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, the Honorable
William Jordan, with the Deputy Commander
of the Southern Command, General J. Breedlove,
with Mr. William Le Brun, the Internal Se-
curity Chief for the Canal Zone, and with
other officials. This on-the-spot investi-
gation was the culmination of several years
of research and fact-gathering by the Sub-
committee staff, bearing on the problem of
the security of the Canal.
Aware of the fact that the negotiations
between Panama and the United States are at
a very delicate stage, the Subcommittee es-
tablished prior contact with the State Deo
apartment, the Panama Canal Zone Adminis-
tration, and the military authorities of
the Southern Command, and it made it clear
them that the proposed investigation would
limited to areas falling within the mandate
of the Subcommittee.
The report that follows has been submit
ted to the Chairman of the Subcommittee by
THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY
There are few issues of international pol-
icy that have produced sharper differences in
Congress and among the American people than
the issue of the Panama Canal.
There are many members of Congress who feel
that it would be in our national interest to
abandon the claim to sovereign powers "in per-
petuity" which is written into the original
Panama Canal Treaty. They argue that insis-
tence on the status quo would constitute a
dangerous irritant to our relations not only
with Panama but with the whole of Latin Amer-
ica; and that our national security could best
be served by agreeing to transfer sovereignty
over the Canal Zone to the Panamanian govern-
ment after a stated period of years, and full
operational and military control over the
Canal after a further period of years.
There are other members of Congress who
believe just as strongly that we cannot afford
77-634 0 7t 2
to turn the control of the Canal over to the
Panamanian government because they feel that
so small a country could not guarantee the
security of the Canal that it might fall
prey at any time to Soviet-Castro infiltra-
tion leaving the control of the Canal in hands
completely hostile to the United States. They
therefore argue that we must not retreat from
the language of the original treaty, which,
they say, ceded the Canal Zone to the United
States "in perpetuity".
It is not the function of the Subcommittee
to come up with findings designed to resolve
this dispute in one direction or the other.
In the final analysis, this will be the re-
sponsibility of the Administration and of
What is clear, however, is that, no matter
what the course or the outcome of the current
negotiations, the United States will retain
responsibility for the operation and the de-
fense of the Canal for a very long time. As
long as it retains this control, it will have
to confront an array of problems that have a
bearing on the security of the Canal Zone and
The interest of the Subcommittee is jus-
tified by the fact that the foreseeable threats
to the security of the Canal fall primarily
under the heading of internal security. There
is little or no danger that any nation will
seek to seize the Canal through overt mili-
tary action because such a challenge would
almost certainly be regarded as a casus belli
by any administration. Among the foreseeable
threats to the security of the Canal are:
(1) The continuing danger that Castroite
elements and other extremists could seize on
some incident to incite anti-American riots
in the Canal Zone, similar to the riots of
(2) The possibility of terrorist actions
directed against the locks of the Canal, or
against the retaining dams;
(3) The possibility hopefully remote -
that the Castro government would seek to take
control of the Panamanian government by infil-
tration and subversion or by means of a coup
on the style of the attempted subversive coup
in the Dominican Republic in 1965.
Some General Observations:
Americans in the Canal Zone, with whom
we discussed Panamanian Nationalism, from
Governor Parfitt on down, told us that all
Panamanians conservative and middle-of-
the-road as well as radical are united in
the desire to reassert Panamanian sover-
eignty over the Canal Zone sometime in the
not-too-distant future, and that this is a
simple fact of life with which we must reckon
in our policy decisions.
The secrecy surrounding the current ne-
gotiations on the Panama Canal has perhaps
inevitably generated speculation and appre-
hension. Convinced that this was having an
impact on the morale of the employees under
his jurisdiction, Governor Parfitt told us
that he had sought the assistance of the U.S.
Embassy in an effort to allay the anxiety of
his employees. Apparently because secrecy
is regarded as essential to the conduct of
the negotiations, Governor Parfitt said that
he had been unable to obtain specific answers
to many pressing questions with the result
that those who had expressed concern on one
ground or another still continue to do so.
Economic and Social Problems and Their
Bearing on Security:
The security of the Canal Zone is clearly
linked to the morale and loyalty of the work
force, both American and Panamanian. This is
an exceedingly delicate situation because the
Panamanian employees, quite understandably,
insist on complete equality of treatment with
the American employees, and on the elimination
of certain inequities that are a heritage from
the past and smack of colonialism.
Governor Parfitt has approached this sit-
uation with courage, tact and understanding.
He frankly concedes that Panamanians in the
-Canal Zone have had many legitimate griev-
ances, and that there has been a tendency on
the part of U.S. Canal employees to look down
upon the Latin American employees and to seg-
regate them socially. He says that this
mentality is now being overcome, despite the
lingering suspicions of the Panamanians. He
admits, however, that many American employees
are strenuously opposed. to any improvements _in
the living standards, educational or employ-
ment benefits for non-American employees, if
these improvements are to be achieved, as
they perceive the matter, at their own expense.
In an attempt to deal with this situation,
Governor Parfitt has recently taken a number
of initiatives dealing with Canal Zone schools,
employment policies, housing policies, and se-
In the case of the school system, Governor
Parfitt has recommended the termination of sep-
arate schools for Latin American students.
While these schools were well-intentioned in
the beginning, the Governor now says candidly
that today this separate school system is unan-
imously rejected by the Panamanians. American
employees of the Canal Zone strongly protest
that the proposed integration of the school
system will drastically affect the quality
of the schools. To this, the Governor has
replied that it is his intention to fully
protect the quality of the schools.
Under Governor Parfitt's proposed plan,
the Latin American schools in the Canal
Zone would be phased out in two stages. In
phase one, the Latin American students en-
tering grades K-4 in March 1976 would be given
a choice of attending the U.S. schools in the
Canal zones or in schools in Panama. If they
elect to go to schools in Panama, the school
costs, including transportation, would be
taken care of by the Panama Canal Company and
the Canal Zone government. However, if they
elect instead to go to U.S. schools in the
Canal Zone, they would be given four months
of transitional training from April through
July of 1976, and in August they would be
assigned to a U.S. elementary school. In the
second phase of the plan, terminating in De-
cember 1979 and December 1980, students in
higher grades would also be given the option
of attending Canal Zone U.S. schools, or going
to school in Panama, or, if they so desired,
they could continue to attend Latin American
high schools in the Canal Zone until the last
of the current student body graduates in De-
cember 1979 or December 1980.
The proposal also stipulates that Latin
American teachers qualified under the Canal
Zone U.S. schools certification requirements
will be transferred to the U.S. schools.
Governor Parfitt has also recommended
greater job opportunities for Panamanians and
enhanced opportunities for advancement. This
has resulted in apprehension among the Amer-
ican work force that the new policy will re-
sult in fewer job opportunities and promotion
opportunities for Americans in the Zone.
Tension has been reduced somewhat on this score
by assuring American employees that no indi-
vidual will lose his job, and that changes
will be effected only as jobs are vacated
through retirements, promotions, and so on.
The effect of the new employment policy on the
mix of U.S. and non-U.S. employees will be
minimal for years to come.
Opportunities for advancement for Pana-
manians have in the past been seriously re-
stricted by the stipulation that only Ameri-
cans could fill the many so-called "security"
positions, which have traditionally included
a majority of all positions, as well as all
senior positions in the police force, fire
force, and Canal security force. It is Gov-
ernor Parfitt's position that this require-
ment is an anachronism. He believes that the
non-U.S. citizens are rightfully proud of the
part they play in the Panama Canal team and
that they are resentful of any challenges to
their loyalty. They are, in consequence,
disposed to regard the limitation on security
positions as a strategem for assuring that
all the better paid positions go to U.S. cit-
izens, in violation of treaty commitments
calling for equality of employment opportunity.
I would be inclined to agree.
In the revised security criteria he has
proposed, Governor Parfitt has made certain
recommendations designed "to achieve a balance
between providing upward mobility for Pana-
manian employees and maintaining an adequate
level of security." In the case of the ap-
proximately 185 positions now designated as
"security" because they involve access to
classified information, the proposed new
security criteria says that "an effort will
be made to reduce the number of such security
positions to the lowest number possible, com-
mensurate with safeguarding national security
information." The Governor's paper agrees
that any individual having access to classi-
fied information must possess an appropriate
security clearance. It points out that this
is not the same thing as designating the
position a "security position", which has had
additional restrictive implications.
In the case of the Police Department, the
Fire Department, and the Canal Protection
Department, the proposed new security cri-
teria, in the interest of upward mobility,
established maximum percentages of security
positions for the different grades. In the
case of the Fire Department, for example,
only 25% of the class 4 positions (class 4
positions are sergeants) will be considered
"security"; 75% of the class five positions -
(lieutenants) will be considered "security";
and 1001 of the class 7 (captains) will be
so classified. Roughly similar percentages
are suggested for the Police Department and
Canal Protection Department.
The new criteria would certainly help to
improve the lot of Panamanian employees of
the Canal Company and the Canal Zone govern-
ment. However, they could be regarded by the
Panamanian employees as a continuation, at a
lower level, of the discrimination to which
they have been subjected in the past. Re-
gardless of this, the new criteria represent
a major step in the right direction.
Acknowledging that some of his proposals
are highly controversial, Governor Parfitt
underscores the fact that they were the sub-
ject of prolonged and painstaking deliberations.
He believes we must seek to avoid any lengthy
open confrontations between Americans residing
in the Zone and Panamanians. He points out
there is no possible way in which the rela-
tively small number of American employees
could independently operate the Canal effi-
ciently for a prolonged period of time. "We
must depend," he says, "on the earned loyalty
and support of all of our employees during
times of distress and disturbances."
The willingness of the American employees
of the Panama Canal to accept an upgrading
of Panamanian employees that may be partly at
their expense has been adversely effected by
certain planned economies in the operation of
the Canal. The proposed economies have been
justified on the ground that the Canal has been
losing money for the past two years. According
to the Canal Zone local of the American Fed-
eration of Government Employees, these economies
include the elimination of the 15% tropical pay
differential for Panama Canal employees, certain
reductions in the generous leave system hereto-
fore in force, and cuts in personnel and ser-
of community life, including
vices in areas
the schools and health services.
Instead of cutting back on operating costs
in this manner, the local urges that serious
consideration be given to increasing Panama
Canal tolls. They point out that more than
half the ships using the Canal are foreign
flag vessels, that the cost of Canal tolls is
a very small percentage of the total cost of
carrying goods by sea, and that, despite a
20% toll increase in 1974, the overall in-
creases, compared to a 1950 base, lag far
behind price increases in other sectors.
They say that, in effect, this puts the Pana-
ma Canal employees in the position of having
to subsidize shipping.
In arguing in the favor of maintaining
the privileged salary and leave systems of the
past, the Union points out:
"The U.S. citizen employees of the Panama
Canal Company are, in a sense, captive employ-
ees. The Personnel Director of the Company has
stated that Company policy is to hire individ-
uals for a career, not for a job, and that he
looks for someone who will stay with the Com-
pany throughout his working life. The mul-
titude of specialized jobs required by the
Canal take training and time to learn, and
don't provide the kind of varied experience
that would permit an employee to easily trans-
fer back to the States. Making a career with
the Panama Canal Company has traditionally
required commitment, and the recruitment in-
centives of the tropical pay differential,
the leave system, and a stable community life
provide the necessary attraction for making
The facts set forth above will help to
illustrate how delicate and complicated the
situation is. A policy designed to satisfy
the essential aspirations of the non-American
employees in the Canal Zone has produced con-
cern and some resistance in the ranks of the
American employees. But despite the resis-
tance he has encountered, Governor Parfitt
feels quite rightly, in my opinion that
to move, with all
towards a policy of equality. He believes
this to be morally right and essential to the
tranquility and security of the Canal Zone.
Security and the Need for Restraint:
The security of the Panama Canal Zone
can be adversely effected by statements and
actions on either side reflecting a lack of
Because of this, inflammatory rhetoric
or inflammatory actions can be difficult to
manage. The situation was not helped, for
example, when General Omar Torrijos, Supreme
Revolutionary Leader of Panama, exhorted his
people, on the occasion of anti-Imperialist
week, in these terms:
"The present North American negotiators
have told us that now we have come up with
the business of sovereignty that has never
been reaffirmed before with so much vehemence
and that they have never been told here was
a people that was ready to make a sacrifice
in order to have its flag flying over this
territory of ours.
"Apparently this is a language to which
they are not used. It appears that we have
taken them by surprise, because our country
is not talking to them about financial ben-
efits but is telling them that the Canal
problem is a sentimental problem and that
we give much more importance to the flag
than to any economic benefit.
"Undoubtedly the economic benefits have
to come to us by force of gravity because
the Canal is a necessary passageway that the
world has used and a property through which
the whole of humanity benefits. And if the
whole of humanity benefits, it is also log-
ical that the country that gave its entrails
for the construction of this passageway has
to receive economic benefits."
And then Torrijos made it clear what the
intentions of his government were with the
regard to the peaceful flow of communications
between the government of Panama and the
"Because if there is no satisfactory
treaty for our nation and for our people,
there is something inevitable that is going
to happen. It will come by internal com-
bustion and it will be an explosion of the
Panamanian people. The National Guard has
two alternatives. There are two alterna-
tives left to Omar Torrijos as a head of the
National Guard to suppress this patriotic
rebellion of the people, or to lead it. And
I will not suppress it."
The key phrase in this statement seems
to be "if there is no satisfactory treaty for
our nation"; but in view of past occurrences
affecting the Panama Canal Zone, one must
examine this statement and its implications
The Incidents Involving the Panamanian
Certain actions taken by the Panamanian
- National Guard in late December 1975 and early
January of this year also had a highly de-
stabilizing effect. At the very least, Pres-
ident Torrijos must have had knowledge of
these actions. Before discussing these inci-
dents, it might be useful to say a few words
about the structure, role, and history of
the Panamanian National Guard.
As a military organization, the Panamanian
National Guard, which is also Panama's law
enforcement agency, is not large numerically;
nor is it well-equipped. It has a logistical
system which is not capable of maintaining
a line of supply and communications for more
than a few days at a time. Translated into
practical terms, it has a reserve of fuel
and food supplies for approximately 76 hours
for most of its posts.
The most important role of the Panama-
nian National Guard is riot control, a role
for which it is very well-trained and has
demonstrated its capabilities in the past.
We have had good cooperation with them most
of the time, but should there be a decision
not to cooperate, the effect could be quite
troublesome. This is a fact that cannot be
overlooked when the internal security of the
Canal Zone is at stake.
During the 1964 riots, the Panamanian
National Guard abstained from intervening
at the initial stages of the riots, thus
allowing the ringleaders to take over a
situation: that could have been otherwise
managed by a joint effort of the Panama
Canal Zone police and the Panamanian
National Guard. When it finally inter-
vened, the riots stopped almost instantly.
This erratic performance on the part of the
Panamanian National Guard has several times
characterized its handling of demonstrations
against the United States.
Because of the career and promotion
system, the officer cadre supports General
Torrijos and thus represents the support
base for the government. Most of the high
ranking officers of the Panamanian National
Guard are the product of training in U.S.
military schools in the Panama Canal Zone
and are intimately familiar with methods
used by the U.S. military.
The series of incidents involving activ-
ities of the Panamanian National Guard with-
in the Canal Zone was described in a lengthy
newsletter put out by the Police Union in
early January 1976. For some reason, these
events were not carried by the American press.
According to this newsletter, Captain Ferrufino
of the Panama National
1975, presented a forma
the Republic of Panama
Panama National Guards
areas of the Canal Zone
morning, December 24th,
and other Canal Zone of
to discuss the request,
Guard, acting unilatera
Guard, on December 23,
1 written request that
be allowed to post
within the boundary
On the following
while Governor Parfitt
'ficials were meeting
the Panama National
lly, posted 10 to 14
of its traffic patrolmen along a border road
which is in the Canal Zone. A short while
later, the PNG patrolmen started issuing
"courtesy" citations and parking tickets to
passing motorists and to Canal Zone vehicles
legally parked within the Zone. According
to the Police Union newsletter, the PNG had
arranged to have photographers on hand to
take pictures of the citations being issued.
When Major Gordon of the Canal Zone
Police Division met later that morning with
Major Garrido, Chief of the Panama Traffic
Section, he strongly protested the intrusion
of the members of the Panama National Guard
and he asked Major Garrido to remove his
men from the Canal Zone. Major Garrido, in
reply, agreed that his men had overreacted,
but he told Major Gordon that he could not
comply with the request for removal although
he did remove some of his men. Major Garrido
said that the Panama National Guard had infor-
mation that leftist Panamanian students were
planning demonstrations in the area, between
Christmas and January 9, 1976, and that the
National Guard would like to have "observers"
on the Canal Zone side of the border during
that period of time only.
The matter was taken up with Governor
Parfitt, and the Governor agreed that,
beginning December 24th through January 9th,
two National Guard patrolmen would be per-
mitted to accompany Canal Zone policemen
in their patrol cars as "observers".
According to the Police Union news-
letter, the two Panama National Guardsmen
assigned as observers engaged in several
provocative actions. (For more details,
the Police Union newsletter is attached as
an appendix.) These incidents generated a
good deal of tension at the time, but
thanks to Governor Parfitt's firm but dip-
lomatic handling of the situation, things
never really got out of hand and it is
my understanding that there has been no
repetition of such incidents since January.
The Canal Zone Police and the Question
The Canal Zone Police are the first line
of defense against the possibility of violent
demonstrations, originating in the Canal
Zone or on the Panama side.
In conversation with the Internal Secu-
rity Chief of the Panama Canal Zone, Mr.
William Le Brun, regarding the employment
of the Panama Canal Zone police, the fol-
lowing information was obtained.
At present there are 262 policemen
employed by the Panama Canal Company. A
breakdown of the positions is attached,
divided by U.S. and non-U.S. citizens and
their location of employment. Because the
new proposals for the integration of the
Panama Canal Police force are discussed
extensively in the proposals of Governor
Parfitt, this section will cover only the
operational activities of the Panama Canal
police as it relates to riot control.
The police force is organized in ten-
man riot squads, equipped with riot control
equipment. The use of firearms is autho-
rized only in extreme situations and by the
Governor. It is obvious from the numbers
available and the size of the territory
that the Panama Canal Zone police could not
secure the borders of the Zone in the event
of a crisis. For this reason, there is a
special contingency plan to be implemented
in time of emergency. Under Panama Canal
Zone law it is the responsibility of the
Governor to call for assistance from the
military command, which would be placed on
alert and the primary operational respon-
sibility would be turned over to the mil-
itary while the civil forces picked up
support roles. In the Governor's absence,
his duties would be taken over by the Lt.
According to the operational plans,
the police are prepared to respond imme-
diately, and a simultaneous alert can be
implemented in 5 to 10 minutes when there
is available intelligence regarding im-
pending disorders. This reaction time is
lengthened to lh to 2 hours when there is
no intelligence. It should be pointed out
that we consider our intelligence systems
to be adequate.
Great emphasis is placed on training,
and the military forces to be utilized have
had daily exercises to familiarize themselves
with the locale and installations because
the Governor can ask the military to supply
guards for the Canal installations. Some
military personnel are presently utilized
as guards at locks and power stations.
The operational plan by both the Canal
Zone police and the military is obviously
sound, and is based on an excellent system
of intelligence, supported by daily contact
with the intelligence community. There is
a Joint Intelligence Committee which includes
the Ambassador, the Governor, and the plan-
ning officer of the Southern Command. It
is chaired by the intelligence officer of
The Question of Cuba and the Security of
the Panama Canal:
Castro Cuba has the capability of posing
.the principal threat to the security of the
Panama Canal. This is so because of Castro's
continuing hostility to the United States,
because of his continuing commitment to rev-
solution throughout Latin America, because of
his training programs for Latin American
guerrillas and terrorists, and because of
his recently demonstrated willingness to
project Cuban revolutionary power thousands
of miles across the ocean for the purpose
of installing a pro-Communist regime in
The Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security has received information since the
early 60's on Castro infiltration in Panama.
The Subcommittee's files contain numerous
reports and items of information on this
subject which are available to the Chairman.
The inordinate interest displayed by
the Cuban government in the Panamanian
situation finds another expression in the
fantastically inflated size of the Cuban
Embassy in that country, which is now
reported to be operating with a.personnel
of approximately 60 staff members. It must
be assumed that many of these are members
of the DGI and that their real activities
have little to do with
status. There is also
travelers from Cuba to
Castroite; he has even
certain leftist radical
too extreme. The relat
ident Torrijos and the
aptly summarized in the
from the U.S. Communist
World", of January 17,
a continuing flow of
Panama and vice versa.
is certainly not a
expelled from Panama
elements he considered
ionship between Pres-
Communist left is probably
Party organ, "Peoples
"Torrijos' government is regarded by
Panama's Marxist-Leninist party, the Peoples
Party of Panama (PPP) as 'petty bourgeois
in composition and nationalist in essence."
"The new government took on an anti-
Imperialist stand under the pressure of
democratic forces,' Galdomero Gonzales, a
leading member of the PPP, wrote in the June
*World Marxist Review'."
The Subcommittee has evidence that a
significant number of men holding important
positions in the government have, over the
years, either been involved with the pol-
itical left in Panama, or have been involved
in the disturbances of 1959, 1964 and 1965,
or have openly professed their sympathies
for Castro Cuba.
The Subcommittee has evidence that at
least three officers of the Cuban General
Directorate of Intelligence were invited by
Colonel Manuel Noriega Moreno, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to act as
advisors to the Panamanian National Guard for
a period of two months in 1973.
With Panamanian nationalism as such,
an accommodation acceptable to both sides
seems possible. It seems highly question-
able, however, that the Castroite elements
in Panama would be prepared to settle for
any solution that the United States would
Most responsible Panamanians and these
are by far the majority seek to achieve
their objectives primarily through peaceful
methods and negotiations but it would be
prudent to anticipate that the Castroite
elements, many of whom may have been
trained in the Cuban schools for guer-
rillas and terrorists, may be committed
to the course of violence.
I believe most Panamanian nationalists
desire a continued American presence to be
worked out through peaceful negotiations.
Any Castro influence, on the other hand,
in Panama will be committed to the total
eviction of the American presence economic,
political and military from Panama.
American policy should therefore strive
to help the moderate Panamanian nationalists
extricate themselves from the embrace of the
Castroites who masquerade under the guise of
nationalism. There is reason to believe
that this can be done.
SUMMARf OF FINDINGS:
1. I believe that Governor Parfitt has
made excellent judgements in recommending
changes in the areas of schools, housing,
and job opportunities for our Panamanian
employees in the Zone. Though this creates
tensions within the American community, it
should relieve tensions between nationalist
Panamanians and the Zone authorities.
2. Our intelligence community there has an
excellent grasp of what is taking place over-
all, and we can have confidence in their
3. Overall, there is an attitude of coop-
eration in controlling any Zone border dis-
turbances. In the case the cooperation is
lacking, the U.S. has more than adequate
capacity to respond to any need ultimately.
4. Our military capacity is such we need
not be concerned with any military action
from the outside. Terrorist action on a
local basis against locks or dams would be
more difficult to control, but I believe
we have the best possible contingency
plans to cover any problem. I have con-
fidence in our military, political, and
intelligence groups there.
5. There will be constant attempts by
Castro elements and other leftist groups
to bring pressure against the U.S. presence
in Panama. Overall, I believe the Pana-
manians do not want this. The negotiations
underway should work to our advantage in
this situation. However, constant alert-
ness and awareness to what they are doing
is essential for the future.
THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE
LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE
tBox No. 1994
BALBOA, CANAL ZONE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT -975
Uilliain R. Drumrond
TO; All Union members and Presidents and delegates of the CLU-iTC
Dear Brothers and Sisters:
I wish to present to you my views on a motion, made by myself that has been
tabled. It is an opposite motion to a previous one which was voted down.o
As you know, the CLU President has been contacted with the proposition of
trading the treaty annex for our support of this roosed treaty or at
least our non-o-position of that treaty.
MIy motion is, in effect, not to engage in that contact nor to makco that
commitment. To add validity to this contact, General Torrijos indicated
in his October 11, 1)7T address that he wanted dialogue with the pooplo in
the Canal Zone. Further, the State Drumartment has indicated that they will
protect the interests of the Canal Zone Jupl yees. It has been indicated
that this contact is not in labor nor is this an official contact. However,
on its face it appears to be a valid contact.
In order to best explain .iy position, I think you should understand why I
am against ing our hopes to this Labor Amnne
To begin with, there is nothing in this Anne:. that I object to. On the
contrary, I believe it to be the best position possible for the employees in
the Canal Zone.
However, as you know, I have been to !ashington five times in the last nine
months. During that time I have discussed this annex with all that would
take the time to listen. I have given those people copies of the annex to
study. I have re-contacted many of the same people, labor representatives
and Congressmen, so that I could got a feel as to what their position was
on this subject.
Officially; most labor representatives indicate support for this annex.
Un-officially they have indicated that this annex doesn't stand a chance of
getting the necessary legislation for its enactment into law.
Officially; most Congressional Ro.r.sentativos who will have to vote on the
legislation for its enactment have politely indicated that it is rather
"broad" and "extensive". Unofficially, most Congressional Representatives
have indicated that little if any of it stands a chance of being enacted
into law even given that it was annexed to the treaty.
Like you, prior to making these tri,)s, I was convinced that if a treaty came
we would be protected because the AFL supported tho annex and it was included
in the 1967 treaty. After my first two trips, and I had received the infor-
mation as sot out above, I was contoi- that the AFL-CIO was well aware that
the demands in this annex would not be accepted by the State Department and
in turn they the AFL would come out against the treaty.
I am now convinced that we have maneuvered ourselves into a most dangerous
position if a treaty comes, not because we support the annex, but because wV
have made it our primary and total position.
I am convinced of this for the following reasons:
1. This annex can be included in the treaty and still not get the
lcS-islation for its inactmen:it. To prove this point I refer to the "Homor-
andx., of Understandings" onaeted into w pursu-nt to the 1955 Trc-ty. I
remind you that the treaty was -.-provca by both IIousos of Congress, while
this part of the treaty was enacted by separate legislation. (P.L. 85-550).
I invite you to rc-.d the CoinirOssior il debate on the '55 Treaty -s well as
thu hearing record on P.L. 85-550 which will further substantiate my asser-
tion that this annex hasn't got a chance of enactment.
2. To -.dd to this, the 1.st time out, I chocked out the '67 treaty
which is still classified as "secret" although published in the papers. I
a.dmit that my check was a very 'ursory one, therefore I do not assert that
the following is fact but rather something that should be investigated. I
found in that treaty a very cinbiguous reference to employee benefits con-
tained in Article twenty or twenty-one. I did not find the labor annex that
we have beeoon l;d to believe is contained in that treaty. Again, I aim not
a-sserting thAt it is not theuro but only that I could not find it at the
I was disturbed but not overly -.lJ-rmod about this course of evonts since,
as I have st-.tcd, oven i. it wore included in the treaty, I have boon led
to believe that it has no chance of being enacted into law.
3. In order for us to get this ainox 4lacted into law we would nooeed
the full force of the AFL-CIO, the State Department, the Civil Scrvico
Commission, and most of these Consurvative and Liberal Congressmoen that
a.re -Z-.inct this tre-tty, as well as those that arec pro-treaty.
Honestly ask yourself if these groups aro prepared to exert the effort
noccssary to do this. I remind you that it would takec the cooperation of
all of these groups to get this annex e.nacted into law.
i.y distrust for the promises of the State Dvartment -and Panama should be
the s.ae as yours out of experience. I amn convinced that their promises
The Civil Service Commission, on the other hand has a great dcnl to lose
if this law was enacted. It would disrupt the whole system for the benefit
of somQ throo thous-nd employees oven if you exclude the non-U.S, employees.
It would sot a formidable lcgal prceedent for every other government employee
in the Service bent on ccu-.l rights, notwithstanding all wo h-ave hoard of
what took l-lacc in Guam or Okinawa. The enactment of this annox would entail
multi-millionc over 2 protracted period.
Further, if we -ccout this proposition, we will have undercut our only allies
in this problem in the Confrress. Logic tolls you that you do not insult a
Con7,rusao: a a-nd then ask himr to support you on an issue that may have wojeak-
cned his position to bugin with. We n-.y gAt some liboral pro-treaty Congroos-
men to support thu a7nnux leUgiil tion, but I remind you that this is a non-
np-.rtis-an issue. There are mrn-ny coeizurvative pro-treaty Congressmon tht
base their ,l:ole position on tho fact that they bolievo the C-jial Zone
'mnloyjca to be sklfisli colonialists. Our -ccuptance of this proposition
c-n oIlj entrench thum in their belif. ilMany I' ,rals also havu this buliof.
It is foolish to CugeiLst tha they' jd not know.
11W would b l.-ft Iith ti41 ruppmrt of the AFL-CIO. They in turn would have to
exert -II of their lobby-in(C ..ffort to convince -ji alre-dy hostile Congress
that we (I.'9nrv-c thcse benefits. Thi. y would b.- f--cod with strong opposition
from the Civil :;irvico Coiainirulion at least.
On the othiur li-nd, what c.n be lose by t Jing opposition to this trca.ty?
'.Ih-.t can We ,. .ir?
At its worst uo can lose the trc,-.ty nnex which, -.s I have stated, iv a
false premise as a primc.ry position rayyway. Theoretically, if the .nnox is
not included, we would have the support of the AFL-CIO to r.dd to our allies
when ratification time comes around. 2ven if this effort failed .nd the
trcr.ty was ratified, wio would still have an oven stronger base in uhich to
get some port of legislation to protect ourselves. I ra convinced that we
would be in a much stronger position without the annex than with the annex
left up to the State Departmcnt for support in its enactment.
Do we have a viable position? I believe that we do but our weakest point is
that wo have gained the reputation, true or false, of selfish colonialists.
W-thout this stigma, we would not be in the position that we aro in today.
Natural as it may be to want to protect your job within the United States,
it is looked upon as gross selfishness two thousand miles awjay. Ne are put
at a great disadvantage.
I have enclosed a statement that puts all the arguments of the State Depart-
ment to rest. I believe it to be a true, logical, reasonable, and just
solution which will be to the benefit ofall parties concerned for many years
It is not based on self interest, and if this idea is adopted, the only
interests that will lose are the communist interests and the corrupt.
Let me warn you that if this body does not take a firm position one way or
the other, we arc going to lose by default. The State Department and theo
Government of Panamia are making every effort here and in the United States
to sell this proposed treaty. Ue,as well as the people of Panama are fast
becoming the victims. We have the tools at our disposal with which to
lWe are using one tool, a mailing campaign, but that is not nearly enough.
Another tool at your disposal is the now revised Snyder amendment. I marvel
at how little significance this body seems to attach to that amendment, say
as compared to the Senate and House treaty Resolutions. This amendment is
the sense of the whole House and the Senate. It must be signed by the
President. It goes a long way further than these resolutions; locally as
can be soon by tho fact of the Torrijos'accomodation on October 11, 1975,
and this proposition to solicit our supp' This amendment does not just
say the Canal, it says the Canal Zone as well. This was one of the major
issues fought over between the Department of State and the Congress.
As it was, this amcncijiint could have gone either way; which indicates to me,
and I am sure the State Department feels the same way, that the House is not
retreating from their position.
If that amendment could be described as being lost at all, I personally
blamec this body for that loss.
I want you to stop and think that there owcre at least 150 groups working to
pass this revised amendiaecnt. Ths original amendment was passed by the Uouse
twice without revision. On the third time, a twice revised amcndnont passed
by 11 votes. This issue could have been decided the other way by only six
s;ding votes. Knowing how the house votes, I am sure that this is exactly
how the revised ar.icndricnt was decided. Had we had a man in the States who
could convince just six Rcpresentatives, I doubt that we would be getting
the covert contacts from our own State Department.
No amount of mail can effect this. You must be able to personally make eye-
ball contact to change situations such as the above.
To make matters worso, you toll me one rational Representative that was oven
awaro or made any effort to swing those votes in the right direction. I
tell you that there was not one. Issues as vitally important to us as this
one arc lost to us "jy du fault.
To _ivo you an -x:Ale of what we can do, I was in the States when this
issue was brought up the two previouss times. I certainly do not lay claim
to winning those times, but I know dazin-,d well, had I been there I could
have convinced six ieon to vote our way. iTo one is going to fight our battles
if wo don't help fi-ght them ourselves. It takcos money oven if you lose.
But if you don't oven male the effort to try we are certainly going to lose.
1e are not as weal: as our opponents would have us believe. But iwo must use
the tools we have aic3nblc to us. It is utter stupidity to think that our
problems can be put off until tomorrow.
I have zuggeustd, on a number of occasions, of sending a permanent legis-
lative representative to thl States. You have answered that by excuses
ranging fro it is not the right time to it costs too much money. You have
all bencfited front the several trips that this Union has made to Uashington.
I had hoped that you would finally realize through those exanplos just how
iiiportant it is to havo a man up there; not only to counter the enormous
lobbyi.a; effort now bcinL conducted; but also to work on current labor
I have started a public information corporation so that wo could combat the
d-)rossin-" apathy aa-d propaganda put out by the State Department and Panaruia
both hire and in the States. You have refused to support this organization.
You take the position that by supporting this corporation you nay al.cnate
your chances in rspn.ct to the labor annex.
Lool -.round you. The State Departr.nt and those pushing this proposed
treaty have inundated the States with propaC-nda, they have intensely
lobbied the Congress and national Labor for support on their position.
They have -onc into the Department of the Army and the Company/Government
to sell that position. They have solicitX1 -. the Civic Councils and are now
coming to us indirectly.
11o all know what results they have or have not achieved in these areas men-
tioned. The vcry fact that wo are bDing approached, and especially in the
manner that we arc being appro.chced should indicate a cweaknlss in their
position as well as an inherent weakness in any promises made to us should
we accept this proposition.
Tice last tool we have, ..nd the most formidable, is the truth.
In all honesty, I sometimics wonder vihy I even attend these mrectings. Time
.znd time -.gain, I have boon told that you won't do anything for yourself or
'thr. ncople ,')u rLpresunt, and you refu:-; to allow anyone else to take the
actionn for you. The only counter I havu for this is the assertion that you
are buing misleri and nisinforr- icd.
I do not e-x.cct you to t:d:- at f V.ce value what I have stated heroin. I urge
y-u to ui-Jk out for yourself, h foro it is too late, thu truth of the matter.
This Union can no loii,-c:r b bur luiinud by huoit-ition, inactivity, -nd suspicion.
I a1 not a wL]k--..rd r.H rc.niaitivo. ijor do I have. tinec to sit down with each
and overs, one of y u and l e.i.i each dtail and everj action and the legal
basis for a certain position, which I night add, has alw-ays boon for the
benefit of this body. I think history rill boar me out. I wish to oripha-
size that there is just not enough tint for all of this.
I have outlined what I believe to be the right and the wrong thing to do in
this matter based on uxporioncQ. I loavo it up to you to mnakeo your decisions.
I urge you not to act irresponsibly, but rather to mackco a sold, logical
decision or two.
The Bible -ays the "nook" will inherit the earth, but history says that the
forceful, and decisive will inherit the fruits of the nook.
'Jilliam R. Dru.iinond
THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE
LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE
Box No. 1994
BALBOA, CANAL ZONE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WILLIAM R. DRUMMOND
i 5iT OF FLORIDA51
3 1262 04248 5101