The Panama Canal and the problem of security

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Title:
The Panama Canal and the problem of security
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Book
Creator:
Hughes, Harold E
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on the Judiciary. -- Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
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U.S. Govt. Print. Off. ( Washington )
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Letter of transmittal
        Page 1
        Page 2
    Title Page
        Page 3
        Page 4
    Introduction
        Page 5
        Page 6
    The problem of security
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
    Summary of findings
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
    Appendix
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
    Back Cover
        Page 45
        Page 46
Full Text
y....j.0f.... : i

J L-') _____________


94th Congress 1
2d Session I


COMMITTEE PRINT


THE PANAMA CANAL


PROBLEM OF


AND THE


SECURITY


REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY


UNITED STATES


SENATE


NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION


SEPTEMBER 1976


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


WASHINGTON : 1976


77-634 0













COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman


JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dakota


ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia


SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman


JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana


STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia


RICHARD L. SCHULTZ, Chief Counsdel
CAROLINE M. COURBOIS, Aaisitant to the Chief Counsel
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, Chief lrwuestigator
ROBERT J. SHORT, Senior Investigator
MARY E. DOOLEY, Research Director
DAVID MARTIN, Senior Analyat



RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, That the report entitled, "The Panama Canal and the Problem of
Security" be printed and made available for the use of the Committee on the
Judiciary. -


Approved: September 24, 1976.


JAMES U. hJASTLAND, (Jhazrman.


(i)









LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C., July 7, 1976.
JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Judiciary Com-
mittee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 2241, Washington,
D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Earlier this year you requested that I visit
Panama for the purpose of making an appraisal for the Subcommittee
of the internal security problems affecting the Zone and the Panama
Canal itself.
I have the honor to submit herewith my report entitled, "The
Panama Canal and the Problem of Security".
With every best wish,
Sincerely,
HAROLD E. HUGHES.
Enclosure.


(1)



















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013













http://archive.org/details/panaprobl00unit








THE PANAMA CANAL

and the

PROBLEM OF SECURITY






A report submitted to

Honorable James 0. Eastland,

Chairman

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee

by

Harold Hughes

Special Assistant to the Chairman
(3)














INTRODUCTION


Pursuant to the directive of Senator

James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate

Subcommittee on Internal Security, the

Honorable Harold Hughes, Special Assistant

to the Chairman, former member of the U. S.

Senate and Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief

Investigator for the Subcommittee, visited

Panama in early March to conduct an inves-

tigation into certain related matters that

might pose a threatto the security of the

Panama Canal. In Panama, they had extensive

conversations with the Governor of the Canal

Zone, the Honorable Harold R. Parfitt, with

the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, the Honorable

William Jordan, with the Deputy Commander

of the Southern Command, General J. Breedlove,

with Mr. William Le Brun, the Internal Se-

curity Chief for the Canal Zone, and with

other officials. This on-the-spot investi-

(5)








gation was the culmination of several years

of research and fact-gathering by the Sub-

committee staff, bearing on the problem of

the security of the Canal.

Aware of the fact that the negotiations

between Panama and the United States are at

a very delicate stage, the Subcommittee es-

tablished prior contact with the State Deo

apartment, the Panama Canal Zone Adminis-

tration, and the military authorities of

the Southern Command, and it made it clear

them that the proposed investigation would

limited to areas falling within the mandate

of the Subcommittee.

The report that follows has been submit

ted to the Chairman of the Subcommittee by

Mr. Hughes.


to

be











THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

There are few issues of international pol-

icy that have produced sharper differences in

Congress and among the American people than

the issue of the Panama Canal.

There are many members of Congress who feel

that it would be in our national interest to

abandon the claim to sovereign powers "in per-

petuity" which is written into the original

Panama Canal Treaty. They argue that insis-

tence on the status quo would constitute a

dangerous irritant to our relations not only

with Panama but with the whole of Latin Amer-

ica; and that our national security could best

be served by agreeing to transfer sovereignty

over the Canal Zone to the Panamanian govern-

ment after a stated period of years, and full

operational and military control over the

Canal after a further period of years.

There are other members of Congress who

believe just as strongly that we cannot afford

(7)


77-634 0 7t 2








to turn the control of the Canal over to the

Panamanian government because they feel that

so small a country could not guarantee the

security of the Canal that it might fall

prey at any time to Soviet-Castro infiltra-

tion leaving the control of the Canal in hands

completely hostile to the United States. They

therefore argue that we must not retreat from

the language of the original treaty, which,

they say, ceded the Canal Zone to the United

States "in perpetuity".

It is not the function of the Subcommittee

to come up with findings designed to resolve

this dispute in one direction or the other.

In the final analysis, this will be the re-

sponsibility of the Administration and of

Congress.

What is clear, however, is that, no matter

what the course or the outcome of the current

negotiations, the United States will retain

responsibility for the operation and the de-

fense of the Canal for a very long time. As

long as it retains this control, it will have

to confront an array of problems that have a






bearing on the security of the Canal Zone and

the Canal.

The interest of the Subcommittee is jus-

tified by the fact that the foreseeable threats

to the security of the Canal fall primarily

under the heading of internal security. There

is little or no danger that any nation will

seek to seize the Canal through overt mili-

tary action because such a challenge would

almost certainly be regarded as a casus belli

by any administration. Among the foreseeable

threats to the security of the Canal are:

(1) The continuing danger that Castroite

elements and other extremists could seize on

some incident to incite anti-American riots

in the Canal Zone, similar to the riots of

1964;

(2) The possibility of terrorist actions

directed against the locks of the Canal, or

against the retaining dams;

(3) The possibility hopefully remote -

that the Castro government would seek to take

control of the Panamanian government by infil-

tration and subversion or by means of a coup








on the style of the attempted subversive coup

in the Dominican Republic in 1965.


Some General Observations:

Americans in the Canal Zone, with whom

we discussed Panamanian Nationalism, from

Governor Parfitt on down, told us that all

Panamanians conservative and middle-of-

the-road as well as radical are united in

the desire to reassert Panamanian sover-

eignty over the Canal Zone sometime in the

not-too-distant future, and that this is a

simple fact of life with which we must reckon

in our policy decisions.

The secrecy surrounding the current ne-

gotiations on the Panama Canal has perhaps

inevitably generated speculation and appre-

hension. Convinced that this was having an

impact on the morale of the employees under

his jurisdiction, Governor Parfitt told us

that he had sought the assistance of the U.S.

Embassy in an effort to allay the anxiety of

his employees. Apparently because secrecy

is regarded as essential to the conduct of








the negotiations, Governor Parfitt said that

he had been unable to obtain specific answers

to many pressing questions with the result

that those who had expressed concern on one

ground or another still continue to do so.


Economic and Social Problems and Their

Bearing on Security:

The security of the Canal Zone is clearly

linked to the morale and loyalty of the work

force, both American and Panamanian. This is

an exceedingly delicate situation because the

Panamanian employees, quite understandably,

insist on complete equality of treatment with

the American employees, and on the elimination

of certain inequities that are a heritage from

the past and smack of colonialism.

Governor Parfitt has approached this sit-

uation with courage, tact and understanding.

He frankly concedes that Panamanians in the

-Canal Zone have had many legitimate griev-

ances, and that there has been a tendency on

the part of U.S. Canal employees to look down

upon the Latin American employees and to seg-





12


regate them socially. He says that this

mentality is now being overcome, despite the

lingering suspicions of the Panamanians. He

admits, however, that many American employees

are strenuously opposed. to any improvements _in

the living standards, educational or employ-

ment benefits for non-American employees, if

these improvements are to be achieved, as

they perceive the matter, at their own expense.

In an attempt to deal with this situation,

Governor Parfitt has recently taken a number

of initiatives dealing with Canal Zone schools,

employment policies, housing policies, and se-

curity positions.

In the case of the school system, Governor

Parfitt has recommended the termination of sep-

arate schools for Latin American students.

While these schools were well-intentioned in

the beginning, the Governor now says candidly

that today this separate school system is unan-

imously rejected by the Panamanians. American

employees of the Canal Zone strongly protest

that the proposed integration of the school








system will drastically affect the quality

of the schools. To this, the Governor has

replied that it is his intention to fully

protect the quality of the schools.

Under Governor Parfitt's proposed plan,

the Latin American schools in the Canal

Zone would be phased out in two stages. In

phase one, the Latin American students en-

tering grades K-4 in March 1976 would be given

a choice of attending the U.S. schools in the

Canal zones or in schools in Panama. If they

elect to go to schools in Panama, the school

costs, including transportation, would be

taken care of by the Panama Canal Company and

the Canal Zone government. However, if they

elect instead to go to U.S. schools in the

Canal Zone, they would be given four months

of transitional training from April through

July of 1976, and in August they would be

assigned to a U.S. elementary school. In the

second phase of the plan, terminating in De-

cember 1979 and December 1980, students in

higher grades would also be given the option

of attending Canal Zone U.S. schools, or going





14


to school in Panama, or, if they so desired,

they could continue to attend Latin American

high schools in the Canal Zone until the last

of the current student body graduates in De-

cember 1979 or December 1980.

The proposal also stipulates that Latin

American teachers qualified under the Canal

Zone U.S. schools certification requirements

will be transferred to the U.S. schools.

Governor Parfitt has also recommended

greater job opportunities for Panamanians and

enhanced opportunities for advancement. This

has resulted in apprehension among the Amer-

ican work force that the new policy will re-

sult in fewer job opportunities and promotion

opportunities for Americans in the Zone.

Tension has been reduced somewhat on this score

by assuring American employees that no indi-

vidual will lose his job, and that changes

will be effected only as jobs are vacated

through retirements, promotions, and so on.

The effect of the new employment policy on the

mix of U.S. and non-U.S. employees will be








minimal for years to come.

Opportunities for advancement for Pana-

manians have in the past been seriously re-

stricted by the stipulation that only Ameri-

cans could fill the many so-called "security"

positions, which have traditionally included

a majority of all positions, as well as all

senior positions in the police force, fire

force, and Canal security force. It is Gov-

ernor Parfitt's position that this require-

ment is an anachronism. He believes that the

non-U.S. citizens are rightfully proud of the

part they play in the Panama Canal team and

that they are resentful of any challenges to

their loyalty. They are, in consequence,

disposed to regard the limitation on security

positions as a strategem for assuring that

all the better paid positions go to U.S. cit-

izens, in violation of treaty commitments

calling for equality of employment opportunity.

I would be inclined to agree.

In the revised security criteria he has

proposed, Governor Parfitt has made certain

recommendations designed "to achieve a balance





16


between providing upward mobility for Pana-

manian employees and maintaining an adequate

level of security." In the case of the ap-

proximately 185 positions now designated as
"security" because they involve access to

classified information, the proposed new

security criteria says that "an effort will

be made to reduce the number of such security

positions to the lowest number possible, com-

mensurate with safeguarding national security

information." The Governor's paper agrees

that any individual having access to classi-

fied information must possess an appropriate

security clearance. It points out that this

is not the same thing as designating the

position a "security position", which has had

additional restrictive implications.

In the case of the Police Department, the

Fire Department, and the Canal Protection

Department, the proposed new security cri-

teria, in the interest of upward mobility,

established maximum percentages of security

positions for the different grades. In the








case of the Fire Department, for example,

only 25% of the class 4 positions (class 4

positions are sergeants) will be considered
"security"; 75% of the class five positions -

(lieutenants) will be considered "security";

and 1001 of the class 7 (captains) will be

so classified. Roughly similar percentages

are suggested for the Police Department and

Canal Protection Department.

The new criteria would certainly help to

improve the lot of Panamanian employees of

the Canal Company and the Canal Zone govern-

ment. However, they could be regarded by the

Panamanian employees as a continuation, at a

lower level, of the discrimination to which

they have been subjected in the past. Re-

gardless of this, the new criteria represent

a major step in the right direction.

Acknowledging that some of his proposals

are highly controversial, Governor Parfitt

underscores the fact that they were the sub-

ject of prolonged and painstaking deliberations.

He believes we must seek to avoid any lengthy








open confrontations between Americans residing

in the Zone and Panamanians. He points out

there is no possible way in which the rela-

tively small number of American employees

could independently operate the Canal effi-

ciently for a prolonged period of time. "We

must depend," he says, "on the earned loyalty

and support of all of our employees during

times of distress and disturbances."

The willingness of the American employees

of the Panama Canal to accept an upgrading

of Panamanian employees that may be partly at

their expense has been adversely effected by

certain planned economies in the operation of

the Canal. The proposed economies have been

justified on the ground that the Canal has been

losing money for the past two years. According

to the Canal Zone local of the American Fed-

eration of Government Employees, these economies

include the elimination of the 15% tropical pay

differential for Panama Canal employees, certain

reductions in the generous leave system hereto-

fore in force, and cuts in personnel and ser-


of community life, including


vices in areas





19


the schools and health services.
Instead of cutting back on operating costs

in this manner, the local urges that serious

consideration be given to increasing Panama

Canal tolls. They point out that more than

half the ships using the Canal are foreign

flag vessels, that the cost of Canal tolls is

a very small percentage of the total cost of

carrying goods by sea, and that, despite a

20% toll increase in 1974, the overall in-

creases, compared to a 1950 base, lag far

behind price increases in other sectors.

They say that, in effect, this puts the Pana-

ma Canal employees in the position of having

to subsidize shipping.

In arguing in the favor of maintaining

the privileged salary and leave systems of the

past, the Union points out:

"The U.S. citizen employees of the Panama

Canal Company are, in a sense, captive employ-

ees. The Personnel Director of the Company has

stated that Company policy is to hire individ-

uals for a career, not for a job, and that he








looks for someone who will stay with the Com-

pany throughout his working life. The mul-

titude of specialized jobs required by the

Canal take training and time to learn, and

don't provide the kind of varied experience

that would permit an employee to easily trans-

fer back to the States. Making a career with

the Panama Canal Company has traditionally

required commitment, and the recruitment in-

centives of the tropical pay differential,

the leave system, and a stable community life

provide the necessary attraction for making

that commitment."

The facts set forth above will help to

illustrate how delicate and complicated the

situation is. A policy designed to satisfy

the essential aspirations of the non-American

employees in the Canal Zone has produced con-

cern and some resistance in the ranks of the

American employees. But despite the resis-

tance he has encountered, Governor Parfitt

feels quite rightly, in my opinion that


to move, with all


deliberate speed,


we have






21


towards a policy of equality. He believes

this to be morally right and essential to the

tranquility and security of the Canal Zone.


Security and the Need for Restraint:

The security of the Panama Canal Zone

can be adversely effected by statements and

actions on either side reflecting a lack of

restraint.

Because of this, inflammatory rhetoric

or inflammatory actions can be difficult to

manage. The situation was not helped, for

example, when General Omar Torrijos, Supreme

Revolutionary Leader of Panama, exhorted his

people, on the occasion of anti-Imperialist

week, in these terms:

"The present North American negotiators

have told us that now we have come up with

the business of sovereignty that has never

been reaffirmed before with so much vehemence

and that they have never been told here was

a people that was ready to make a sacrifice

in order to have its flag flying over this

territory of ours.








"Apparently this is a language to which

they are not used. It appears that we have

taken them by surprise, because our country

is not talking to them about financial ben-

efits but is telling them that the Canal

problem is a sentimental problem and that

we give much more importance to the flag

than to any economic benefit.

"Undoubtedly the economic benefits have

to come to us by force of gravity because

the Canal is a necessary passageway that the

world has used and a property through which

the whole of humanity benefits. And if the

whole of humanity benefits, it is also log-

ical that the country that gave its entrails

for the construction of this passageway has

to receive economic benefits."

And then Torrijos made it clear what the

intentions of his government were with the

regard to the peaceful flow of communications

between the government of Panama and the

United States:

"Because if there is no satisfactory






23


treaty for our nation and for our people,

there is something inevitable that is going

to happen. It will come by internal com-

bustion and it will be an explosion of the

Panamanian people. The National Guard has

two alternatives. There are two alterna-

tives left to Omar Torrijos as a head of the

National Guard to suppress this patriotic

rebellion of the people, or to lead it. And

I will not suppress it."

The key phrase in this statement seems

to be "if there is no satisfactory treaty for

our nation"; but in view of past occurrences

affecting the Panama Canal Zone, one must

examine this statement and its implications

carefully.


The Incidents Involving the Panamanian

National Guard:

Certain actions taken by the Panamanian
- National Guard in late December 1975 and early

January of this year also had a highly de-

stabilizing effect. At the very least, Pres-

ident Torrijos must have had knowledge of








these actions. Before discussing these inci-

dents, it might be useful to say a few words

about the structure, role, and history of

the Panamanian National Guard.

As a military organization, the Panamanian

National Guard, which is also Panama's law

enforcement agency, is not large numerically;

nor is it well-equipped. It has a logistical

system which is not capable of maintaining

a line of supply and communications for more

than a few days at a time. Translated into

practical terms, it has a reserve of fuel

and food supplies for approximately 76 hours

for most of its posts.

The most important role of the Panama-

nian National Guard is riot control, a role

for which it is very well-trained and has

demonstrated its capabilities in the past.

We have had good cooperation with them most

of the time, but should there be a decision

not to cooperate, the effect could be quite

troublesome. This is a fact that cannot be

overlooked when the internal security of the





25


Canal Zone is at stake.

During the 1964 riots, the Panamanian

National Guard abstained from intervening

at the initial stages of the riots, thus

allowing the ringleaders to take over a

situation: that could have been otherwise

managed by a joint effort of the Panama

Canal Zone police and the Panamanian

National Guard. When it finally inter-

vened, the riots stopped almost instantly.

This erratic performance on the part of the

Panamanian National Guard has several times

characterized its handling of demonstrations

against the United States.

Because of the career and promotion

system, the officer cadre supports General

Torrijos and thus represents the support

base for the government. Most of the high

ranking officers of the Panamanian National

Guard are the product of training in U.S.

military schools in the Panama Canal Zone

and are intimately familiar with methods

used by the U.S. military.





26


The series of incidents involving activ-

ities of the Panamanian National Guard with-

in the Canal Zone was described in a lengthy

newsletter put out by the Police Union in

early January 1976. For some reason, these

events were not carried by the American press.

According to this newsletter, Captain Ferrufino


of the Panama National

1975, presented a forma

the Republic of Panama

Panama National Guards

areas of the Canal Zone

morning, December 24th,

and other Canal Zone of

to discuss the request,

Guard, acting unilatera


Guard, on December 23,

1 written request that

be allowed to post

within the boundary

On the following

while Governor Parfitt

'ficials were meeting

the Panama National

lly, posted 10 to 14


of its traffic patrolmen along a border road

which is in the Canal Zone. A short while

later, the PNG patrolmen started issuing
"courtesy" citations and parking tickets to

passing motorists and to Canal Zone vehicles

legally parked within the Zone. According

to the Police Union newsletter, the PNG had





27


arranged to have photographers on hand to

take pictures of the citations being issued.

When Major Gordon of the Canal Zone

Police Division met later that morning with

Major Garrido, Chief of the Panama Traffic

Section, he strongly protested the intrusion

of the members of the Panama National Guard

and he asked Major Garrido to remove his

men from the Canal Zone. Major Garrido, in

reply, agreed that his men had overreacted,

but he told Major Gordon that he could not

comply with the request for removal although

he did remove some of his men. Major Garrido

said that the Panama National Guard had infor-

mation that leftist Panamanian students were

planning demonstrations in the area, between

Christmas and January 9, 1976, and that the

National Guard would like to have "observers"

on the Canal Zone side of the border during

that period of time only.

The matter was taken up with Governor

Parfitt, and the Governor agreed that,

beginning December 24th through January 9th,





28


two National Guard patrolmen would be per-

mitted to accompany Canal Zone policemen

in their patrol cars as "observers".

According to the Police Union news-

letter, the two Panama National Guardsmen

assigned as observers engaged in several

provocative actions. (For more details,

the Police Union newsletter is attached as

an appendix.) These incidents generated a

good deal of tension at the time, but

thanks to Governor Parfitt's firm but dip-

lomatic handling of the situation, things

never really got out of hand and it is

my understanding that there has been no

repetition of such incidents since January.


The Canal Zone Police and the Question

of Security:

The Canal Zone Police are the first line

of defense against the possibility of violent

demonstrations, originating in the Canal

Zone or on the Panama side.

In conversation with the Internal Secu-

rity Chief of the Panama Canal Zone, Mr.





29


William Le Brun, regarding the employment

of the Panama Canal Zone police, the fol-

lowing information was obtained.

At present there are 262 policemen

employed by the Panama Canal Company. A

breakdown of the positions is attached,

divided by U.S. and non-U.S. citizens and

their location of employment. Because the

new proposals for the integration of the

Panama Canal Police force are discussed

extensively in the proposals of Governor

Parfitt, this section will cover only the

operational activities of the Panama Canal

police as it relates to riot control.

The police force is organized in ten-

man riot squads, equipped with riot control

equipment. The use of firearms is autho-

rized only in extreme situations and by the

Governor. It is obvious from the numbers

available and the size of the territory

that the Panama Canal Zone police could not

secure the borders of the Zone in the event

of a crisis. For this reason, there is a






30


special contingency plan to be implemented

in time of emergency. Under Panama Canal

Zone law it is the responsibility of the

Governor to call for assistance from the

military command, which would be placed on

alert and the primary operational respon-

sibility would be turned over to the mil-

itary while the civil forces picked up

support roles. In the Governor's absence,

his duties would be taken over by the Lt.

Governor.

According to the operational plans,

the police are prepared to respond imme-

diately, and a simultaneous alert can be

implemented in 5 to 10 minutes when there

is available intelligence regarding im-

pending disorders. This reaction time is

lengthened to lh to 2 hours when there is

no intelligence. It should be pointed out

that we consider our intelligence systems

to be adequate.

Great emphasis is placed on training,

and the military forces to be utilized have








had daily exercises to familiarize themselves

with the locale and installations because

the Governor can ask the military to supply

guards for the Canal installations. Some

military personnel are presently utilized

as guards at locks and power stations.

The operational plan by both the Canal

Zone police and the military is obviously

sound, and is based on an excellent system

of intelligence, supported by daily contact

with the intelligence community. There is

a Joint Intelligence Committee which includes

the Ambassador, the Governor, and the plan-

ning officer of the Southern Command. It

is chaired by the intelligence officer of

the Zone.

The Question of Cuba and the Security of

the Panama Canal:

Castro Cuba has the capability of posing

.the principal threat to the security of the

Panama Canal. This is so because of Castro's

continuing hostility to the United States,

because of his continuing commitment to rev-





32


solution throughout Latin America, because of

his training programs for Latin American

guerrillas and terrorists, and because of

his recently demonstrated willingness to

project Cuban revolutionary power thousands

of miles across the ocean for the purpose

of installing a pro-Communist regime in

Angola.

The Senate Subcommittee on Internal

Security has received information since the

early 60's on Castro infiltration in Panama.

The Subcommittee's files contain numerous

reports and items of information on this

subject which are available to the Chairman.

The inordinate interest displayed by

the Cuban government in the Panamanian

situation finds another expression in the

fantastically inflated size of the Cuban

Embassy in that country, which is now

reported to be operating with a.personnel

of approximately 60 staff members. It must

be assumed that many of these are members

of the DGI and that their real activities





33


have little to do with

status. There is also

travelers from Cuba to

President Torrijos

Castroite; he has even

certain leftist radical

too extreme. The relat

ident Torrijos and the

aptly summarized in the

from the U.S. Communist

World", of January 17,


their diplomatic

a continuing flow of

Panama and vice versa.

is certainly not a

expelled from Panama

elements he considered

ionship between Pres-

Communist left is probably

following paragraphs

Party organ, "Peoples

1976:


"Torrijos' government is regarded by

Panama's Marxist-Leninist party, the Peoples

Party of Panama (PPP) as 'petty bourgeois

in composition and nationalist in essence."

"The new government took on an anti-

Imperialist stand under the pressure of

democratic forces,' Galdomero Gonzales, a

leading member of the PPP, wrote in the June

*World Marxist Review'."

The Subcommittee has evidence that a

significant number of men holding important

positions in the government have, over the








years, either been involved with the pol-

itical left in Panama, or have been involved

in the disturbances of 1959, 1964 and 1965,

or have openly professed their sympathies

for Castro Cuba.

The Subcommittee has evidence that at

least three officers of the Cuban General

Directorate of Intelligence were invited by

Colonel Manuel Noriega Moreno, Assistant

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to act as

advisors to the Panamanian National Guard for

a period of two months in 1973.

With Panamanian nationalism as such,

an accommodation acceptable to both sides

seems possible. It seems highly question-

able, however, that the Castroite elements

in Panama would be prepared to settle for

any solution that the United States would

find acceptable.

Most responsible Panamanians and these

are by far the majority seek to achieve

their objectives primarily through peaceful

methods and negotiations but it would be





35


prudent to anticipate that the Castroite

elements, many of whom may have been

trained in the Cuban schools for guer-

rillas and terrorists, may be committed

to the course of violence.

I believe most Panamanian nationalists

desire a continued American presence to be

worked out through peaceful negotiations.

Any Castro influence, on the other hand,

in Panama will be committed to the total

eviction of the American presence economic,

political and military from Panama.

American policy should therefore strive

to help the moderate Panamanian nationalists

extricate themselves from the embrace of the

Castroites who masquerade under the guise of

nationalism. There is reason to believe

that this can be done.





36


SUMMARf OF FINDINGS:


1. I believe that Governor Parfitt has

made excellent judgements in recommending

changes in the areas of schools, housing,

and job opportunities for our Panamanian

employees in the Zone. Though this creates

tensions within the American community, it

should relieve tensions between nationalist

Panamanians and the Zone authorities.


2. Our intelligence community there has an

excellent grasp of what is taking place over-

all, and we can have confidence in their

capacities.


3. Overall, there is an attitude of coop-

eration in controlling any Zone border dis-

turbances. In the case the cooperation is

lacking, the U.S. has more than adequate

capacity to respond to any need ultimately.


4. Our military capacity is such we need

not be concerned with any military action

from the outside. Terrorist action on a

local basis against locks or dams would be






37


more difficult to control, but I believe

we have the best possible contingency

plans to cover any problem. I have con-

fidence in our military, political, and

intelligence groups there.


5. There will be constant attempts by

Castro elements and other leftist groups

to bring pressure against the U.S. presence

in Panama. Overall, I believe the Pana-

manians do not want this. The negotiations

underway should work to our advantage in

this situation. However, constant alert-

ness and awareness to what they are doing

is essential for the future.









APPENDIX




THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE
LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE
tBox No. 1994
BALBOA, CANAL ZONE
N'OV 1975
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT -975
Uilliain R. Drumrond

TO; All Union members and Presidents and delegates of the CLU-iTC

Dear Brothers and Sisters:

I wish to present to you my views on a motion, made by myself that has been
tabled. It is an opposite motion to a previous one which was voted down.o

As you know, the CLU President has been contacted with the proposition of
trading the treaty annex for our support of this roosed treaty or at
least our non-o-position of that treaty.

MIy motion is, in effect, not to engage in that contact nor to makco that
commitment. To add validity to this contact, General Torrijos indicated
in his October 11, 1)7T address that he wanted dialogue with the pooplo in
the Canal Zone. Further, the State Drumartment has indicated that they will
protect the interests of the Canal Zone Jupl yees. It has been indicated
that this contact is not in labor nor is this an official contact. However,
on its face it appears to be a valid contact.

In order to best explain .iy position, I think you should understand why I
am against ing our hopes to this Labor Amnne

To begin with, there is nothing in this Anne:. that I object to. On the
contrary, I believe it to be the best position possible for the employees in
the Canal Zone.

However, as you know, I have been to !ashington five times in the last nine
months. During that time I have discussed this annex with all that would
take the time to listen. I have given those people copies of the annex to
study. I have re-contacted many of the same people, labor representatives
and Congressmen, so that I could got a feel as to what their position was
on this subject.

Officially; most labor representatives indicate support for this annex.
Un-officially they have indicated that this annex doesn't stand a chance of
getting the necessary legislation for its enactment into law.

Officially; most Congressional Ro.r.sentativos who will have to vote on the
legislation for its enactment have politely indicated that it is rather
"broad" and "extensive". Unofficially, most Congressional Representatives
have indicated that little if any of it stands a chance of being enacted
into law even given that it was annexed to the treaty.

Like you, prior to making these tri,)s, I was convinced that if a treaty came
we would be protected because the AFL supported tho annex and it was included
in the 1967 treaty. After my first two trips, and I had received the infor-
mation as sot out above, I was contoi- that the AFL-CIO was well aware that
the demands in this annex would not be accepted by the State Department and
in turn they the AFL would come out against the treaty.

I am now convinced that we have maneuvered ourselves into a most dangerous
position if a treaty comes, not because we support the annex, but because wV
have made it our primary and total position.


(39)






40


I am convinced of this for the following reasons:

1. This annex can be included in the treaty and still not get the
lcS-islation for its inactmen:it. To prove this point I refer to the "Homor-
andx., of Understandings" onaeted into w pursu-nt to the 1955 Trc-ty. I
remind you that the treaty was -.-provca by both IIousos of Congress, while
this part of the treaty was enacted by separate legislation. (P.L. 85-550).
I invite you to rc-.d the CoinirOssior il debate on the '55 Treaty -s well as
thu hearing record on P.L. 85-550 which will further substantiate my asser-
tion that this annex hasn't got a chance of enactment.

2. To -.dd to this, the 1.st time out, I chocked out the '67 treaty
which is still classified as "secret" although published in the papers. I
a.dmit that my check was a very 'ursory one, therefore I do not assert that
the following is fact but rather something that should be investigated. I
found in that treaty a very cinbiguous reference to employee benefits con-
tained in Article twenty or twenty-one. I did not find the labor annex that
we have beeoon l;d to believe is contained in that treaty. Again, I aim not
a-sserting thAt it is not theuro but only that I could not find it at the
time.

I was disturbed but not overly -.lJ-rmod about this course of evonts since,
as I have st-.tcd, oven i. it wore included in the treaty, I have boon led
to believe that it has no chance of being enacted into law.

3. In order for us to get this ainox 4lacted into law we would nooeed
the full force of the AFL-CIO, the State Department, the Civil Scrvico
Commission, and most of these Consurvative and Liberal Congressmoen that
a.re -Z-.inct this tre-tty, as well as those that arec pro-treaty.

Honestly ask yourself if these groups aro prepared to exert the effort
noccssary to do this. I remind you that it would takec the cooperation of
all of these groups to get this annex e.nacted into law.

i.y distrust for the promises of the State Dvartment -and Panama should be
the s.ae as yours out of experience. I amn convinced that their promises
moan nothing.

The Civil Service Commission, on the other hand has a great dcnl to lose
if this law was enacted. It would disrupt the whole system for the benefit
of somQ throo thous-nd employees oven if you exclude the non-U.S, employees.
It would sot a formidable lcgal prceedent for every other government employee
in the Service bent on ccu-.l rights, notwithstanding all wo h-ave hoard of
what took l-lacc in Guam or Okinawa. The enactment of this annox would entail
multi-millionc over 2 protracted period.

Further, if we -ccout this proposition, we will have undercut our only allies
in this problem in the Confrress. Logic tolls you that you do not insult a
Con7,rusao: a a-nd then ask himr to support you on an issue that may have wojeak-
cned his position to bugin with. We n-.y gAt some liboral pro-treaty Congroos-
men to support thu a7nnux leUgiil tion, but I remind you that this is a non-
np-.rtis-an issue. There are mrn-ny coeizurvative pro-treaty Congressmon tht
base their ,l:ole position on tho fact that they bolievo the C-jial Zone
'mnloyjca to be sklfisli colonialists. Our -ccuptance of this proposition
c-n oIlj entrench thum in their belif. ilMany I' ,rals also havu this buliof.
It is foolish to CugeiLst tha they' jd not know.

11W would b l.-ft Iith ti41 ruppmrt of the AFL-CIO. They in turn would have to
exert -II of their lobby-in(C ..ffort to convince -ji alre-dy hostile Congress
that we (I.'9nrv-c thcse benefits. Thi. y would b.- f--cod with strong opposition
from the Civil :;irvico Coiainirulion at least.

On the othiur li-nd, what c.n be lose by t Jing opposition to this trca.ty?
'.Ih-.t can We ,. .ir?







41



At its worst uo can lose the trc,-.ty nnex which, -.s I have stated, iv a
false premise as a primc.ry position rayyway. Theoretically, if the .nnox is
not included, we would have the support of the AFL-CIO to r.dd to our allies
when ratification time comes around. 2ven if this effort failed .nd the
trcr.ty was ratified, wio would still have an oven stronger base in uhich to
get some port of legislation to protect ourselves. I ra convinced that we
would be in a much stronger position without the annex than with the annex
left up to the State Departmcnt for support in its enactment.

Do we have a viable position? I believe that we do but our weakest point is
that wo have gained the reputation, true or false, of selfish colonialists.
W-thout this stigma, we would not be in the position that we aro in today.
Natural as it may be to want to protect your job within the United States,
it is looked upon as gross selfishness two thousand miles awjay. Ne are put
at a great disadvantage.

I have enclosed a statement that puts all the arguments of the State Depart-
ment to rest. I believe it to be a true, logical, reasonable, and just
solution which will be to the benefit ofall parties concerned for many years
to come.

It is not based on self interest, and if this idea is adopted, the only
interests that will lose are the communist interests and the corrupt.

Let me warn you that if this body does not take a firm position one way or
the other, we arc going to lose by default. The State Department and theo
Government of Panamia are making every effort here and in the United States
to sell this proposed treaty. Ue,as well as the people of Panama are fast
becoming the victims. We have the tools at our disposal with which to
count oraot.

lWe are using one tool, a mailing campaign, but that is not nearly enough.
Another tool at your disposal is the now revised Snyder amendment. I marvel
at how little significance this body seems to attach to that amendment, say
as compared to the Senate and House treaty Resolutions. This amendment is
the sense of the whole House and the Senate. It must be signed by the
President. It goes a long way further than these resolutions; locally as
can be soon by tho fact of the Torrijos'accomodation on October 11, 1975,
and this proposition to solicit our supp' This amendment does not just
say the Canal, it says the Canal Zone as well. This was one of the major
issues fought over between the Department of State and the Congress.

As it was, this amcncijiint could have gone either way; which indicates to me,
and I am sure the State Department feels the same way, that the House is not
retreating from their position.

If that amendment could be described as being lost at all, I personally
blamec this body for that loss.

I want you to stop and think that there owcre at least 150 groups working to
pass this revised amendiaecnt. Ths original amendment was passed by the Uouse
twice without revision. On the third time, a twice revised amcndnont passed
by 11 votes. This issue could have been decided the other way by only six
s;ding votes. Knowing how the house votes, I am sure that this is exactly
how the revised ar.icndricnt was decided. Had we had a man in the States who
could convince just six Rcpresentatives, I doubt that we would be getting
the covert contacts from our own State Department.

No amount of mail can effect this. You must be able to personally make eye-
ball contact to change situations such as the above.







42


To make matters worso, you toll me one rational Representative that was oven
awaro or made any effort to swing those votes in the right direction. I
tell you that there was not one. Issues as vitally important to us as this
one arc lost to us "jy du fault.

To _ivo you an -x:Ale of what we can do, I was in the States when this
issue was brought up the two previouss times. I certainly do not lay claim
to winning those times, but I know dazin-,d well, had I been there I could
have convinced six ieon to vote our way. iTo one is going to fight our battles
if wo don't help fi-ght them ourselves. It takcos money oven if you lose.
But if you don't oven male the effort to try we are certainly going to lose.

1e are not as weal: as our opponents would have us believe. But iwo must use
the tools we have aic3nblc to us. It is utter stupidity to think that our
problems can be put off until tomorrow.

I have zuggeustd, on a number of occasions, of sending a permanent legis-
lative representative to thl States. You have answered that by excuses
ranging fro it is not the right time to it costs too much money. You have
all bencfited front the several trips that this Union has made to Uashington.
I had hoped that you would finally realize through those exanplos just how
iiiportant it is to havo a man up there; not only to counter the enormous
lobbyi.a; effort now bcinL conducted; but also to work on current labor
probl uris.

I have started a public information corporation so that wo could combat the
d-)rossin-" apathy aa-d propaganda put out by the State Department and Panaruia
both hire and in the States. You have refused to support this organization.
You take the position that by supporting this corporation you nay al.cnate
your chances in rspn.ct to the labor annex.

Lool -.round you. The State Departr.nt and those pushing this proposed
treaty have inundated the States with propaC-nda, they have intensely
lobbied the Congress and national Labor for support on their position.
They have -onc into the Department of the Army and the Company/Government
to sell that position. They have solicitX1 -. the Civic Councils and are now
coming to us indirectly.

11o all know what results they have or have not achieved in these areas men-
tioned. The vcry fact that wo are bDing approached, and especially in the
manner that we arc being appro.chced should indicate a cweaknlss in their
position as well as an inherent weakness in any promises made to us should
we accept this proposition.

Tice last tool we have, ..nd the most formidable, is the truth.

In all honesty, I sometimics wonder vihy I even attend these mrectings. Time
.znd time -.gain, I have boon told that you won't do anything for yourself or
'thr. ncople ,')u rLpresunt, and you refu:-; to allow anyone else to take the
actionn for you. The only counter I havu for this is the assertion that you
are buing misleri and nisinforr- icd.

I do not e-x.cct you to t:d:- at f V.ce value what I have stated heroin. I urge
y-u to ui-Jk out for yourself, h foro it is too late, thu truth of the matter.

This Union can no loii,-c:r b bur luiinud by huoit-ition, inactivity, -nd suspicion.
I a1 not a wL]k--..rd r.H rc.niaitivo. ijor do I have. tinec to sit down with each
and overs, one of y u and l e.i.i each dtail and everj action and the legal






43


basis for a certain position, which I night add, has alw-ays boon for the
benefit of this body. I think history rill boar me out. I wish to oripha-
size that there is just not enough tint for all of this.
I have outlined what I believe to be the right and the wrong thing to do in
this matter based on uxporioncQ. I loavo it up to you to mnakeo your decisions.
I urge you not to act irresponsibly, but rather to mackco a sold, logical
decision or two.
The Bible -ays the "nook" will inherit the earth, but history says that the
forceful, and decisive will inherit the fruits of the nook.





Sincerely yours,

'Jilliam R. Dru.iinond


S


THE CANAL ZONE POLICE LODGE
LODGE NO. 1798, AFGE
Box No. 1994
BALBOA, CANAL ZONE


OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WILLIAM R. DRUMMOND









i 5iT OF FLORIDA51


3 1262 04248 5101



























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