The end of the postwar era

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The end of the postwar era
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United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Letter of transmittal
        Page v
        Page vi
    Text of report
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Appendix
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
    Back Cover
        Page 57
        Page 58
Full Text



94th Congress I
2d Session f


COMMITTEE PRINT


THE END OF THE POSTWAR ERA


TIME FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP
OF EQUALITY WITH JAPAN


A REPORT

BY

Senator MIKE MANSFIELD
Majority Leader, United States Senate
TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS


UNITED STATES SENATE









t AkGUST 1976
I. clel



ooYl'1e use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976


75-150
































COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman


MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
'HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
DICK CLARK, Iowa
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAl' T'V "'n'


CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan


ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
(n)


LT Chief of Rt~ff










CONTENTS



Letter of transmittal --------------------------------------------v
Text of report -------------------------------------------------- 1
I. Importance of the United States-Japan relationship -----------1
II. Foreign policy and security matters ------------------------2
(a) U.S. bases and personnel -------------------------- 8
1. Okinawa -------------------------------- 9
II. Economic relations ------------------------------------10
IV. Concluding observations --------------------------------11
V. Recommendations -------------------------------------13
Appendix -----------------------------------------------------15
1. Text of the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty ------ 15
2. Text of the Status of Forces Agreement With Japan ----------- 21
3. Text of Japan's Defense "White Paper" ---------------------41
4. Data concerning U.S. military personnel and bases in Japan -... 53
(MII)



















Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013













http://archive.org/details/endarerat00unit





LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


AUGUST 2, 1976.
Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Vashington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, with the Committee's permis-
sion, during the July recess I made an official trip to Japan to study
major United States foreign and security problems in the Far East
with emphasis on United States relations with Japan and Japanese
attitudes concerning a number of matters of mutual interest, such as
issues involving the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union,
and Korea. I am hereby transmitting my report on that trip. A con-
fidential report has been sent to the President.
I was in Japan from July 9 through July 16, when I returned to
Washington. While there I received a thorough briefing from Ambas-
sador James ). Hodgson and his staff concerning political, economic,
and security matters. I also had an informative briefing from Lt. Gen-
eral Walter T. Galligan, USAF. Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and
his staff concerning the status of U.S. military bases and personnel in
Japan. Both Ambassador Hodgson and General Galligan were most
helpful and cooperative.
I met with a number of officials of the Japanese government, each
of whom was most generous with his time. Among those with whon
I held discussions were Prime Minister Takeo Miki: Deputy Prime
Minister and Director General of Economic Planning, Takeo Fukuda -
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa: Director General of the Japant
Defense Agency, Michata Sakata: and Finance Minister Masavoshi
Ohira. My conversations with each official covered a wide range of
subjects and thus gave me a broad cross section of opinion within the
Japanese government on many matters of common interest.
In addition to these meetings. I had an opportunity for informal
discussions with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Keisuke Arita
and several of his colleagues, former Japanese Ambassadors to the
United States Takeshi Yasukawa and Nobuhiko Ushiba, and others.
I was accompanied on the trip by Mr. Francis R. Valeo, Secretary
of the Senate, and Mr. Norvill Jones of the Committee staff. In order
to obtain further information concerning the Korean problems and
the Taiwan issues, as they relate to Japan, I sent Mr. Valeo to Korea
and Mr. Jones to Taiwan following the completion of my schedule in
Japan. At my request, Mr. Jones also inspected the U.S. military base
situation in Okinawa on his way back to Washington.
I wish to express my appreciation to the Department of State for
making my travel arrangements: to Ambassador Hodgson and his
staff for their assistance and many courtesies: to General Galliwin
and his staff for the briefing and other helpful information: to the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for as-
sembling background materials: to the Department of Defense for
assistance in the field to Mr. Valoo and Mr. Jones: to Mr. Valeo. who,
as a former consultant to the Committee on Foreign Relations. has
accompanied me on many past missions abroad, and to Mr. Jones of
the Committee staff, who has also accompanied me on a number of past
missions. for their assistance in connection with the trip.
Sincerely yours,
MIKE MANSFIELD.














THE END OF THE POSTWAR ERA-TIME FOR A NEW
PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALITY WITH JAPAN


I. IMVIPORTA.NCE OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP
One hundred and twenty-three years ago Commodore Matthew
Perry led four U.S. naval vessels into Tokyo Bay, opening Japan to
the outside world after more than two centuries of isolation. A new
relationship began for our two countries, a relationship which, over
the years, has moved through a broad spectrum, from friendship to
war and back to friendship again. It is commonplace to say that there
is a special relationship between our two countries. But this is an in-
adequate term to describe the interdependence and mutuality of inter-
ests that have come to bind our countries together. A stable Japan,
which poses no military threat to the nations of Asia, is essential to
stability and peace in the Pacific and the world. Although it lacks
military power, Japan is the world's third ranking economic power
and second only to the United States among the industrial democracies.
In this sense, it is a factor to be reckoned with in its capacity to in-
fluence the flow of international events.
Aside from the umbrella of security provided by the mutual security
treaty, the United States relationship is essential to Japan as a source
of food, raw materials, and as a market for Japan's industrial output.
To the United States, far less dependent on world markets for eco-
nomic well-being, the Japanese tie is essential in a different, but no less
important sense. It is a fundamental pillar in present U.S. foreign
policy whose goal is continued stability in the Western Pacific. Geog-
raphy and history, combined with the genius and industry of the
Japanese people, have made Japan a keystone of that policy. The
waters of the Pacific lap the shores of all the world's major powers-
the United States, the Soviet Union. China, and Japan-and it is in
the environs of the latter country that the interests of all are most
entwined. For this nation which has fought three wars in Asia within
a, eneration, the role of Japan in the structure of peace in the Pacific
will continue to be of utmost importance in the years ahead. It is
in the interest of both peoples to work at strengthening this unique
relationship.
The visit by Commodore Perry began what became the first of a
series of ups and downs in relations between Japan and the United
States. Unlike our ties with Great Britain, language and cultural dif-
ferences have been obstacles to mutual understanding between Japa-
nese and Americans. Trust does not come easy under these circum-
stances. Extraordinary efforts by both sides are necessary. As Pro-
fessor Edwin Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan. wrote
recently, this difficulty is compounded by the fact that: "We for
(1)








our part have lingering traces of the unquestioned nineteenth century
assumption that the West was in all ways superior to the rest of the
world."
Since the post-World War II occupation began, Americans have
had a tendency to take the Japanese tie for granted. The Nixon
"shocks" arising out of a failure to consult on measures to support
the dollar, to suspend soybean exports, and on the new China policy
have not been forgotten. There should be no more such unnecessary
and undiplomatic treatment of our closest major ally in the Pacific.

II. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY
Japan is an island nation. That, and an astute foreign policy have
relieved its people of any discernible fear of attack from abroad. It
enjoys good relations with all of the major powers and diplomatic and
commercial relations with practically every nation of the world. A
security commitment from the United States permits the spending of
less than one percent of its gross national product for defense pur-
poses. Japan's foreign policy, which is built around the umbrella of
the security pact, with the United States, has paid rich dividends by
freeing resources for economic growth that would otherwise be de-
voted to unproductive military spending.
Article IX of the Japanese Constitucion is the foundation of Ja-
pan's external policies. It states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of bel-
ligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Within these constraints, Japan has, like a Phoenix, risen from the
ashes of defeat and humiliation into a unique position on the interna-
tional scene. There is widespread public sensitivity among the Japa-
nese to all military issues, particularly to those involving nuclear
weapons. Japan's status as an unarmed, economic giant in a world
bristling with weapons of mass destruction has contributed greatly to
the easing of bitter memories of Japanese militarism, to the opening
of doors to Japanese economic dynamism, and to a more stable inter-
national environment, notably in Northeast Asia.
Japan maintains only a small Self-Defense Force consisting of some
240,000 men. Recruitment for even this small force is difficult. At bot-
tom, Japan's real security, aside from the U.S. commitment, is en-
trnsted to effective foreign policies.
Following in the path of the Nixon visit to Peking, Japan estab-
lished diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on
September 29. 1972, but a Sino-Japanese peace treaty to end the formal
state of hostilities from World War 11 has not yet been concluded. It
is stalled by a dispute over Chinese insistence on an "anti-hegemony"
clause. Although agreeable in principle to such a clause, the Japanese
confront the fact that the Soviet Union has indicated that such lan-
guage in a treaty would be considered an unfriendly act. Negotiations
with China have been at a stalemate since last year. Meanwhile, trade
and other relations with China continue, with'$2.5 billion in exports
to China and $1.5 billion in imports from China in 1975, three times
the level of trade in 1970.







Under the "Japanese formula," Japan also maintains economic and
cultural relations with Taiwan. The nation's interests on Taiwan
are represented by the unofficial organization designated the "Japanese
Interchange Association," which is headed by a former Japanese am-
bassador. The association is financed primarily by private funds.
Taiwan's interests in Japan are represented by the Far East Associa-
tion. The personnel of neither organization have any form of diplo-
matic status or immunity.
Other countries which recognize the People's Republic of China
look after their trade or cultural interests in Taiwan through varying
types of organizations: Great Britain through the Anglo-Taiwan
Trade Committee; Germany through the Goethe Institution; Spain
through the Cervantes Center; and the Philippines through the Asian
Exchange Center. Taiwan has developed a web of relationships in
order to handle specific circumstances which may be involved with
any individual country.
The "Japanese formula" has worked well for Japan. Since formal
diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China, trade, in-
vestment, and travel between Taiwan and Japan have all expanded.
Trade has more than doubled-to $2.5 billion last year-and accounts
for 22 percent of all Taiwan's trade (the U.S. accounted for 31 percent
of Taiwan's trade in 1975-$3.47 billion).
With regard to the Soviet Union, Japan has yet to conclude a World
War II peace treaty, the matter being snagged over four islands north
of Hokkaido claimed by both Japan and the Soviet Union.1 No break
in the impasse is in sight. There is in Sapporo, the principal city of
Hokkaido, a "Movement for the Reversion of the Habomais." The
agitation which this group fosters from time to time is tempered by
the realization that the Soviet Union is in a position to curtail fishing
rights which are of significance to the Japanese. Moreover, there is
a substantial general trade with the Soviet Union, although it is some-
what less than commerce with China. Last year exports to the U.S.S.R.
were $1.62 billion and imports $1.17 billion. With regard to the status
of Japanese joint ventures with the Soviets in the development of
Siberia, many projects have been discussed but only two, natural gas
and timber, have made progress. Others seem to be "fading away," as
one Japanese official put it, due in part apparently, to the reluctance
of U.S. private interests, which were also involved, to pursue them
at this time.
Japanese officials are concerned about the increase in Soviet naval
activities in the Western Pacific, citing in particular an increase in
the activities of intelligence vessels. While I was in Japan, Soviet
ships and ASW aircraft were conducting maneuvers in the Okinawa
area. Insofar as Japan is concerned, the increase in Soviet naval opera-
tions in the Western Pacific is viewed, one involved official said, as
constituting "a potential threat to Japan-but it is not overt yet." He
went on to say that the Soviets were also engaged in a "cultural
offensive."
Developments in the situation on the Korean Peninsula are reflected
in Japan, in part, through the large Korean communitV in Japan,
which is divided in its sentiments about the problems of the Peninsula.
1 The Islands in dispute are: Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomat.


75-150-76---2






Some favor the North and others support South Korea and Japan is
frequently drawn into difficulties arising from this division. There is
also a deep-seated historic concern in Japan with the impact of devel-
opments in Korea on Japanese security.
The traditional overland invasion route to Japan has been via the
Peninsula. While this route has also operated in the other direction,
the fact is that in present circumstances both Soviet and Chinese mili-
tary power which might approach by way of Korea appear over-
whelming to Japan. Those Japanese given to nightmares in this
matter, moreover, note that if the Koreans of the North and South
should ever get together, their combined armed strengths would be
four or five times greater than Japan's lightly armed self-defense
force.
It is clear that a military conflict between North and South Korea
could pose a threat to Japan especially if it were to draw in great
powers as would be almost inevitable. Indeed, a breakdown of order
in South Korea alone would create serious difficulties for the Japanese
who have developed a major trading relationship of about $4 billion
annually with Seoul 2 and, in addition, have large investments in
Korea.3
There is little that is apparent in the current Korean situation to
feed these Japanese anxieties. The Republic of Korea, functions under
a government which is for all practical purposes, a military-bureau-
cratic authoritarianism under the control of President Park Chung-
Hee. Two years ago there was still protest and agitation for political
freedom on the part of intellectuals, religious groups and others but
that has now ceased. Civil liberties are in abeyance and fear of prison
or death has silenced the opposition. The Park Administration is said
to have considerable popular support. Certainly, it has the backing of
the military establishment and the acquiesence if not the active sup-
port of major industrial and commercial groups. It has, of course,
official support from the United States and, probably, from other
foreign sources. The government, in short, gives the appearance of
stability.
Moreover, the South Korean economy has been converted into a
modern establishment which is second only to Japan among Asian
nations. Its peoples are industrious and dexterous and, in the space
of two decades, have developed a great range of modern industrial
skills. Recent concentration on the improvement of agriculture has
resulted in a rapid growth in the output of food to a point that is now
close to adequate for maintaining the population.
Presently, the nation is in the midst of a boom, with industrial pro-
duction expanding at the rate of 20 percent a year. The growth in
GNP is running between 6 percent and 8 percent which, in the face of
a drastically declining birth rate, is said to be bringing a great im-
provement mi general living standards.
The Korean economic transition has depended heavily on U.S. eco-
nomic aid, a program which is drawing to a close. The vestiges are
calculated at about $40 million in the pipeline and, approximately $300
2 Japan also has very limited trading contacts with North Korea, which, for the pres-
ent have been suspended due to the inability of Pyongyang to make payment for past
purchases.
3 One readily recognizable yardstick of this investment; all black and white Sony T/Vs
which are distributed by Japan are now made in South Korea.






5

million in agricultural products, under a PL 480 agreement. An in-
vestment guarantee program continues to operate and is a significant
factor in the inflow of private capital.
Korean trade is still closely tied to the United States and Japan,
with the latter, in particular, providing a funnel for the outflow of
Korean manufactures. However, the Koreans are beginning to devel-
op independent commercial contacts with the rest of the world and Ko-
rean firms are said to have written in the neighborhood of $2 billion
of contracts to undertake construction in the Middle Eastern oil coun-
tries. Seoul is attracting an increasing inflow of businessmen from
that region and from all other parts of the world, except Latin
America and Africa.
The Korean capital city which now contains about 7 million persons
is the center of industrial and commercial activity. It is a dynamic
modern city in the midst of a building boom. It should be noted that
the building includes deep concrete tunnels everywhere which are de-
signed to relieve heavy surface traffic but which could serve as shelters
in the event of war.
It is not possible to find in the present situation a persuasive reason
to believe that war is imminent. Along the 38 parallel, except for
occasional localized personnel clashes and a two-way loud-speaker
propaganda war, all is quiet. The International Commission (Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden), as it has been for more
than two decades, is present in the Zone. North Koreans and U.S. and
South Korean military personnel continue to maintain rigidly formal
contact, with occasional quarrels across the conference table that stand
astride the 380 parallel. While the southern approaches to the demili-
tarized zone run through a kind of no-man's land, it is said that 40,000
tourists and other visitors a year pass through them to the 380 parallel.
North Korea also has its flow of tourist buses carrying Koreans and
other visitors from Communist countries to observe the dividing line.
The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are believed
to have exercised a restraining influence on Pyongyang in order to
prevent a precipitous rekindling of the war. However, Kim II-sung,
the Northern ruler, asserts that there is no intention to seek unifica-
tion of the country by military means. The two sides continue to meet
periodically at a very low level of Red Cross contact to seek unifica-
tion by other means but progress to date has been completely absent.
In the South, the government stresses continuously the danger of
invasion from the North and concentrates on the improvement of its
military forces. The modernization program, except in regard to the
Navy, is well-advanced. The U.S. aid-subsidy of the Korean military
establishment is now largely provided under the military purchase
program. The Koreans are assuming an increasingly larger share of
the cost of their military establishment.
Notwithstanding these developments, the presence of U.S. combat
forces in the South is seen as the critical factor in preventing an inva-
sion from the North. There is deployed in the South, a contingent of
about 40,000 U.S. servicemen. Except for small economy-induced re-
ductions, the number has not been lowered in many years. Even those
who stress most heavily the role of these forces in preventing a renewal
of conflict do not argue that the total cannot be reduced in a gradual
way over a period of years or, even, eventually be withdrawn. Any sug-







gestion of rapid withdrawal, however, is a source of profound anxiety
to South Korean officials, even more perhaps than to the Japanese.
Some estimates are that the present structure in South Korea would
have no more than a 50-50 chance of survival without the U.S. military
,presence. However, the Administration has made clear that the United
states has no intention of withdrawing precipitously and, similarly,
the Congress has not taken any measures which would compel a pre-
cipitous withdrawal. In short, the situation insofar as the U.S. forces
are concerned is one of stability.
It is a stability, however, which is underlain with uncertainties. In
the first place, the economic progress which is probably a mainstay of
public acquiescence in the present government rests on an extremely
fragile base. It is dependent almost entirely on the import of raw ma-
terials and the export of industrial surpluses which are produced
competitively largely by the comparative advantage of a low wage
scale and investment guarantees. Any tremors in either the economy of
Japan or the United States tend to become earthquakes in South
Korea.
In the second place, although the present government is fully aware
of the aversion which exists in segments of Congressional and
other opinion in the United States regarding its authoritarianism, it
appears to have no intention of modifying the present political struc-
ture. Its view is that this structure is not only necessary for defense
against the North but is essential to the kind of economic progress
which is being fostered in the South.
Finally, there is the question of U.S. military withdrawal. The
question is often asked: how long will the commitment last? Clearly, a
precipitous pullout by the United States, even if it did not open the
door to military attack from the North would shake the government of
South Korea to its very foundations. The reactions of an embittered
political opposition and from within the military establishment are
.not measurable. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the deep-seated
-sentiments for Korean unification would surface in both North and
South. The potential for spreading instability would be very great.
Notwithstandig outward appearances, then, the basis for the Japa-
nese concern regarding the Korean Peninsula is very real. In short,
Korea is a time-bomb which has yet to be defused.
Looking at Asia in general, there is a strong mutuality of interests
shared by Japan and the United States. Japan is a firm supporter of
ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as a new force
-for economic cooperation and progress in Southeast Asia. Japan is
iilso interested in working toward broadening the regional concept of
ASEAN to bring the nations of Indochina into the current member-
ship: the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
IRegional cooperation for peaceful purposes is a concept which appears
-to have broad support in Japan and, if pursued, should contribute to
Asian stability and progress. "Poverty and peace," one Japanese of-
ficial put it, "cannot co-exist."
As to national security matters, in June the Japanese Defense
Agency issued a Defense White Paper, the second since the end of
World War II. The basic objectives of the paper were to stimulate
discussion of Japan's defense posture and to strengthen public support
for the Government's program to upgrade the quality of these forces








(the text of the paper is printed in the Appendix). The report is prem-
ised on a continuation of the international status quo between the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China and no change in Japan's
ultimate dependence on the U.S. security guarantee.
Basically, the report takes an optimistic view of the international
situation for Japan and assumes that any U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict will
not spill over to affect Japan. It rejects a nuclear option, stating that:
If Japan should take a nuclear option, even for a purely defensive purpose,
her actual possession of nuclear arms will create serious suspicion and fear on
the part of other nations.
The international environment on which Japan's defense policy
will be based is described as assuming:
(a) that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will try to avoid an inter-continental
nuclear war and an armed conflict which might lead to their full-scale invoh-e-
ment.
(b) that the Soviet Union will continue to face many European problems-
a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation and the control of East European nationi,
among other matters.
(c) that Sino-Soviet relations, if improved partially, will most unlikely lead
to an end of confrontation.
(d) that in Sino-U.S. relations, a further adjustment will continue on a
reciprocal basis, and
(e) that the status quo, more or less, will be maintained in the Korean
Peninsula where a minor incident would not escalate to a large-scale conflict.
Japan's view of the U.S.-Japan security relationship is described
this way:
(a) The system is generally understood to play the role of preventing aggres-
sion against Japan from actually taking place, and of limiting the scale of an
invasion, should it ever be undertaken.
(b) The system is also instrumental in providing the U.S. forces with facilities
and areas for their use, which in turn make their presence tenable.
An integral part of the basic framework of international relations in Asia, the
system thus contributes to the stability of the world and the maintenance of
peace. Finally, but not the least importantly, it is the indispensable base of
the wider spectrum of friendly U.S.-Japanese relations.
Clearly, reliance on the U.S. commitment remains strong on the
part of the Japanese government. and close observers say that there is
less controversy now over the U.S. security treaty than at any time
since the relationship was formalized twenty-four years ago. There is
now a more rational, less emotional, public dialogue over security
issues than in the past. I found no indication that the fall of Indochin'a
had resulted in any lessened confidence in the U.S. commitment, al-
though there was some initial nervousness.
Tlie White Paper emphasizes that Japan's defense objective is "on
qualitative improvement rather than on quantitative expansion in the
planned buildup of our defense capability." Defense Minister Sakata
described the basic concept, as one for a "small armed force, but a
bigger load" for Japan. The Japanese view, in this connection, should
be respected. It behooves us to be very cautious in taking any step that
could be interpreted by Asians, or by the Japanese people, as pressing
the Japanese government to make a quantitative increase in the size
of its defense force or to change its defense posture in a significant
way.
This year Japan will spend .089 percent of its GNP and 6.17 percent
of the government budget for defense, compared with current defense








spending totaling 5.5 percent of GNP and 24.8 percent of the budget
by the United States. Japan ranks tenth in the world in military
spending but at the bottom in relation to per capita income, GNP, or
as a portion of the overall budget.
Agreement has been reached to establish a joint Defense Coopera-
tion Subcommittee to operate under the U.S.-Japan Consultative Com-
mittee on Security, the basic focal point for discussion of security
treaty matters. The Subcommittee will have the responsibility to dis-
cuss guidelines for military cooperation between the two countries in
the event of an emergency. Officials on both sides place much value on
the new subcommittee, seeing it as a symbol of a new spirit of coop-
eration on security matters.
A. U.S. bases and personnel
United States bases in Japan, particularly those on Okinawa, are
still a source of tension although the situation is easing with continued
reduction in the number of bases and the drawdown of military per-
sonnel.4
Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty provides:
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of
America is granted the use by its land, aid and naval forces of facilities and
areas in Japan.
In 1952, according to the Japan Defense Agency, there were 2,824
U.S. military facilities in Japan, of all sizes, covering 334,100 acres,
and occupied by 260,000 U.9. servicemen. These facilities have now
been reduced to 136 and take up 125,089 acres; they range in signifi-
cance from the huge Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to a single antenna
site taking less than an acre. Most are small facilities with few people
attached. There are still 50,000 U.S. servicemen in Japan, along with
43.220 dependents and 3,768 civilian Department of Defense em-
ployees. Land for the bases is provided rent-free. The rent on privately
owned land is paid to the landowner by the Japanese government.
Thirty-eight of the facilities are used jointly by U.S. forces and the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces. More than half of the base acreage
and nearly two-thirds of the personnel are located on Okinawa. Other
than those on Okinawa, measured by the number of personnel at-
tached, there are only seven major U.S. bases:
U.S. Military.
personnel attached
1. Yokota Air Base-Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan and of the 5th
Air Force ------------------------------------------------4, 122
2. Camp Zamia-Leadquarters of the U.S. Army in Japan --------------- 791
3. Yokosuka-Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces in Japan ------------- 1, 876
4. Iwakuni Air Station-Air Base for First Marine Air Wing -----------5, 102
5. Atsugi Naval Air Facility-7th Fleet Naval Air Facility --------------614
6. Misawa Air Base-Air Force Base ----------------------------- 3, 081
7. Sasebo--Naval base -------------------------------------------168
4 What has happened on the northern island of Hokkaldo Is a microcosm of the kind of
contraction in the U.S. presence in most parts of Japan over the last quarter of a century.
At the end of World War II, the military occupation introduced 13,000 U.S. troops into
Hokkaido. mostly centered on the capital city of Sapporo. At least a division remained
dirigr the Korean War. in 1959. the airfield for SapToro reverted to Japan and U.S.
forces were cut back to a communications unit. By 1970, only a guard unit of 200 men
remained. It was not until June of 1975 that this unit was withdrawn. What is left of the
U.S. military presence is a Coast Guard "LORAN" unit on the Hokkaido coast. The offi-
cial U.S. presence now consists of a consulate In Sapporo, with three Americans, a
U.S.T.S. center run by an American and a specialist from the Department of Agriculture,
Oil a1 temporary basis.








Japan makes a significant financial contribution to paying for the
costs of the U.S. military presence. This year Japan will pay $373
million toward the costs of retaining the bases: $105 million for land
rental, $104 million in compensation to impacted communities, and
$173 million for the costs of reducing the number of bases through
consolidation. All new construction in connection with the consolida-
tion of U.S. facilities is paid for by the Japanese government.
1. Okinawa.-Although anti-U.S. military base pressures on the
Japanese mainland seem to have eased, there is still strong public op-
position to American bases on Okinawa. Twenty percent of the land
area of the island of Okinawa is occupied by U.S. bases and they take
up to 12% of the Ryukyu Islands chain. A joint decision was reached
recently to return twelve additional U.S. facilities, including a firing
range on lejima Island which has been the source of much local con-
troversy. After these reversions take place, the area occupied by the
U.S. bases will be reduced from 12 percent to 9.8 percent of the total
land area of the island chain.
Okinawans have strong feelings about the bases, which are scattered
throughout the island in a checkerboard fashion. Residents carry a
bitter legacy of anti-military feeling as a residue from World War II,
when 150,000 Okinawans were killed. There is also a widespread feel-
ing that Okinawans are carrying a disproportionate burden of Japan's
defense effort, that they are being used in Tokyo. They are also con-
cerned over the possibility of being sucked into an outside war reo-ard-
less of the fact that they do not feel threatened by any external power.
Recently the opposition candidate for governor won in a close elec-
tion with a plank that called for removal of all U.S. bases and per-
sonnel, although the pro-Tokyo government candidate also favored
substantial reductions. It is impossible to determine how significant a
factor the differences in the views of the candidates on the bases was
in the election, but officials in Tokyo with whom I discussed the situa-
tion were acutely aware of the sensitivity of the base issue to Okina-
wans. It is an issue easily susceptible to political exploitation through-
iout Japan.
Although the bases account for 1'5 percent or more of Okinawa's in-
come. this fact does not appear to have softened the persistent public
resentment against the U.S. military presence. The 32.000 remaining
servicemen in their concentrated U.S. communities still stick out like
a sore thumb on the island, although incidents of overt personal hos-
tility are becoming rarer. It is interesting to note that there are only
about 5,000 members of the Japanese Self-Defense Force on Okinawa,
using land which totals less than one percent of the area used by
American forces. There is little joint use of facilities; the Japanese air
units, for example, do not have a firing range and must return to the
Japanese mainland for firing practice.
Apart from Okinawa, a heavy U.S. military concentration exists in
the Tokyo-Yokohama area, the most densely populated part of Japan
and is being reduced only slowly. The Sanno Hotel which has been
held by the U.S. Army since occupation days is an example. Located
in the heart of Tokyo, the hotel is used primarily for U.S. military
personnel on leave and, on occasion, by U.S. Government travelers on
military business. Since the mid-1950's the Japanese government and








the owners of the property have been trying to get the United States
to release this building. Finally, late last year, after taking the
Japanese government to court, the owner won a settlement calling for
payment of compensation and for return of the property within five
years. But the U.S. still insists on a replacement in the downtown
Tokyo area before it will relinquish the Sanno, notwithstanding the
fact that any valid military justification for retaining this particular
facility ended long ago.
The reduction and consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan which is
spurred by pressures of budget limitations, steeply-climbing prices in
Japan, and Japanese cooperation, is generally headed in the right
direction. It should continue, on the basis of close consultation at all
times with Japanese officials.
111. ECONOXIO RELATIONS
Japanese and American economic interests are inextricably en-
twined. America is Japan's largest market and Japan is our most
important market, aside from Canada. Currently the United States
absorbs some 24 percent of Japan's exports, down from a considerably
higher proportion several years ago, marking the diversification of
Japan's foreign markets.
There have, of' course, been problems with our trade in the past-
over steel, textiles and other items-but with time, restraint, and con-
cessions on both sides these problems have been surmounted. Other
bilateral trade difficulties are to be anticipated in the futte. With
goodwill, cooperation, and understanding of mutual needs, these p .ob-
lems should also be manageable. There may well be a need for addi-
tional mechanisms for day-to-day dialogue between the two govern-
ments on economic issues, both to find solutions to problems before
they become critical as well as to provide forums for discussion of
matters of mutual interest.
A matter of potential concern for the immediate future, is the re
appearance of a growing gap in bilateral trade balances. Japanese ex-
ports to the United States for January-April 1976 exceeded imports
from the United States by $1.628 billion, compared with a deficit of
$735.5 million for the last four months of 1975.
Japan's economic growth rate this year, in real terms, is estimated at
6.2 percent which will result in a GNP of $515.6 billion, somewhat
more than one-third of that of the United States. Inflation has been
brought under reasonable control and is now running at an annual
rate of 8.8 percent. Unemployment is 2 percent, although U.S. and
Japanese figures are not comparable due to different employment
practices. Environmental issues are of growing public concern in
Japan and expenditures for environmental protection now absorb
some 13 percent of all capital expenditures compared with about 5
percent for comparable spending in the United States.
As is the case with most other raw materials, Japan is heavily de-
pendent for its energy requirements on foreign sources and it will con-
tinue to be for the foreseeable future. Eighty-nine percent of its energy
needs are derived from imports (seventy-seven percent from oil).
.nder a ten-year plan for energy development, its dependence on for-
eiin energy sources will be reduced by only seven percent. Japan's







domestic petroleum production is negligible, although some drilling is
underway at offshore sites.
Other than the trade deficit, which to a great extent is a factor of
the uneven recovery rates of our respective economies, there are only
two major bilateral issues of current concern, fisheries and air routes.
The Japanese people depend on fish for 60 percent of their protein
and are heavily dependent on ocean fishery resources. They are deeply
concerned over the potential impact of the recently enacted law to
establish a 200 mile territorial limit for fishing (P.L. 94-265). I ex-
plained to the officials who raised this matter that the Congress voted
this interim measure out of self-defense following repeated failures
by the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference to arrive at an in-
ternational agreement; after many nations had unilaterally increased
their territorial claims to 200 miles; and that imposition of the limit
would be held in abeyance for an additional period to give the U.N.
Conference more time to come up with a solution. Discussions between
Japanese and U.S. officials over the implementation of the new law
have begun and it is to be hoped that a satisfactory bilateral solution
can be found, assuming that the U.N. Conference again fails to pro-
duce an international accord. The air route issue involves a Japanese
desire for new ports of entry into the United States and it is also likely
to involve requests by U.S. airlines for the right to continue service
to Okinawa.
The Lockheed affair, or Lockheed "typhoon," as one official called
it, is Japan's Watergate. It is a Japanese-not an American-prob-
lein. Thus far, it appears that the affair has had no major adverse ef-
fect on Japan-U.S. relations. However, it has had an impact on the
conscience of the Japanese public and may eventually set in motion
significant changes in Japan's political structure and alinement. In
my judgment, the American political system has not only survived
the WVatergate affair, in the end, it may be strengthened by it. It is
entirely possible that the Lockheed scandal could have the same effect
in Japan.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has turned over to the
Executive Branch all information in its possession relating to the af-
fair for transmittal to the Japanese government. Japanese officials
are aware that Congress had been fully cooperative with their govern-
ment on the matter.
Looking to the future, it is in the interest of Japan, the United
States. and the world to establish international ground rules to control
under-the-table business deal mgs and political manipulations like
those involved in the Lockheed affair. In this era of multinational
corporations and state trading, a single country cannot do much, acting
alone, to prevent such practices. "Multinational firms," one Japanese
official agreed, "cannot be checked through individual governments."
This dry rot in the world's commerce is an international problem and
.solutions in a similar fashion can only be international. The United
Nations may well be peculiarly suited to this purpose.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Although the Japan-U.S. relationship began nearly a century and
a quarter ago, the unique meshing of our two countries' interests began


75-150-76-3








with the end of World War II. Japan has now become the second
most powerful industrial democracy in the world. And under the J.S.
security umbrella, Japan has been free of fear of outside attack and of
burdensome military spending. It has been able to devote its vast en-
ergies to creating an economic machine of immense productivity.
In 1960, riots and widespread public protests against the mutual
security treaty with the United States caused the cancellation of Pres-
ident tisenhower's plans to visit Japan. President Ford's visit to
Japan in 1974 and Emperor Hirohito's visit to the United States last
October, historic occasions for both nations, epitomized the changes
which have taken place in our relationship since that time. At no
period in our post-war history have U.S. relations with Japan been
better.
But as the visit by Commodore Perry signaled the end of one era
for Japan,.an era of isolation from the outside world, we have entered
a new era in our contemporary relationship. The end of the post-war
era was signaled by the 1972 Okinawa reversion agreement. 'We have
now reached a new plateau, where trust in affairs of mutual concern
is essential to both countries. We cannot afford either to preach to the
Japanese, to patronize them, or to ignore their legitimate interests.
The only basis for trust is to treat with one another on the basis of
equality.
The U.S.-Japan security treaty is more than a pledge to main-
tain a stable and peaceful Pacific. It is a symbol of the need for day-
to-day cooperation between Japan and the United States across a
range of human activities. The partnership begun at the end of World
War II should be strengthened by additional mechanisms for consul-
tation and discussion, building on the precedent of the recently cre-
ated Joint Defense Cooperation Subcommittee.
Japan is the only major nation in the world which has rejected
military power as the basis for the protection and advancement of its
interests. Japan is in a unique position, therefore, to exercise leader-
ship in dealing with the problems which will increasingly trouble the
world in the years ahead. Environmental issues, shortag'es of energy
and other resources, food and population problems. the world arms
burden and nuclear dangers-all are matters with regard to which
Japan is uniquely situated to play an international role of leadership.
Japan's unique position in the world warrants a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council and an amendment to the U.N. Char-
ter to that end would be in order.
There may be shifts in Japanese political currents in the period
ahead as Japan goes through a period of reassessment. It is especially
important that United States officials become better acquainted with
and more closely attuned to the broader spectrum of Japanese opinion.
A greater exchange of academicians, politicians, journalists, cultural
leaders, and others would be in the longTange interests of both
countries.
Japanese and American policy interests in the Far East are well
served by continuation of the present security treaty relationship. Jap-
anese confidence in the United States commitment is a key factor for
stability in the area. I found no evidence of a move to change Japan's
military status in such a way as to cause her neighbors concern. Nor
is there any reason that a further reduction in S. bases and forces







should create uncertainty about the U.S. treaty commitment. Contin-
uation of the present policy to consolidate and eliminate non-essential
facilities is desirable, economical and will serve our common interests.
U.S.-Japan relations are good but they could be better. The era of
patron-client is over. A new relationship on the basis of equality an([
a mutuality of interests has begun. Professor Edwin Reischauer de-
scribed the potential of that relationship as a pattern for the world's
future in this way:
If we and the Japanese can build a fully equal relationship of complete trust
and cooperation as the two leading members of the group of industrialized
democracies, this may be a hopeful sign that in time other such relationships can
be built across the chasms of racial and cultural difference, as we move toward
creating a truly viable "one world."
This is a worthy goal for both countries.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations which are contained in this report may be
summarized as follows:
1. No more "shocks". Wherever feasible, joint mechanisms should be
established for periodic consultations on problems of common concern.
Our unique relationship warrants unique approaches to insure a con-
tinuing dialogue, at all levels, on matters of mutual interest.
2. Japan should obtain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security
Council.
3. The reduction and consolidation of U.S. military facilities and
personnel should continue in close consultation with the Japanese
government.
4. There should be broadened contacts, official and unofficial, be-
tween Japan and the United States.
5. The United Nations should undertake to develop a treaty en-
compassing a code of conduct for international commercial dealings
which would outlaw practices such as those involved in the Lockheed
affair.
6. There should be a gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces
from South Korea as that nation's military strength improves.
















APPENDIX


1. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND JAPAN
Signed at Washington January 19, 1960: Ratification adivsed by the Senate of
the United States of America June 22, 1960; Ratified by the President of the
United States of America June 22, 1960; Ratified by Japan June 21, 1960; Rati-
fications exchanged at Tokyo June 23, 100; Proclaimed by the President of the
United States of America June 27, 1960; Entered into force June 23, 1960. With
Agreed Minute and Exchanges of Notes.
The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally exist-
ing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, indvidual liberty,
and the rule of law.
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and
to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries.
Reaffrming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all govern-
nients,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense as affrmed in the Charter of the United Nations.
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a trealy of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. to
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to
strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international
peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bring-
ing about a better understanding of the pirnciples upon which thes- in-titutions
are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will
seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies afnd will en-
courage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop,
subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementa-
tion of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of
Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
(15)







16

ARTICLE V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the terri-
tories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accord-
a nce with its constitutional provisions and processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America
is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in
.Ja pan.
The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States
armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the
Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the
United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as
amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any
way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United
Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
ARTICLE VUI
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into
force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been ex-
changed by them in Tokyo.
ARTICLE IX
The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed
at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering
into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of
the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such
United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Japan area.
However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may
give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which
case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.


AGREED MINUTE TO THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

d(pa ii xC Plenipotentiary
While the question of the status of the islands administered by the United
States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan has not been made a
subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations. I would like to em-
Ijhmaize the strong concern of the Government and people of Japan for the safety
of the j4qple of these islands since Japan possesses residual sovereignty over
these islands. If an armed attack occurs or is threatened against these islands,
th two countries ANill of course consult together closely under Article IV of
I he Treaty ,f Mutual Cooperation and Security. In the event of an armed attack.
it is the intention of the Government of Japan to explore with the United States
IelSUres which it might be able to take for the welfare of the islanders.







17

United States Plenipotentiary
In the event of an armed attack against these islands, the United States Gov-
ernment will consult at once with the Government of Japan and intends to take
the necessary measures for the defense of these islands, and to do its utmost to
secure the welfare of the islanders.


EXCHANGES OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN DATED
JANUARY 19, 1960

his Excellency CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the United States of Amerioa.
EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today, and
to inform Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Govern-
ment of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:
"Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces,
major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan
as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than
those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior
consultation with the Government of Japan."
I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your
Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance
of my highest consideration.
NOBUSUKE KIsHI.
His Excellency NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan.
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
Note of today's date, which reads as follows:
"I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between Japan and the United States of America signed today, and to inform
Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Government of
Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:
"Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces.
major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as
bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than
those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior
consultation with the Government of Japan.
"I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your
Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America.
"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance
of my highest consideration."
I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing
is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the
United iStates of America.

Ilis Excellency NOBUSUKE KISIiI,
Prime Minister of Japan.
EXCELLENC.Y: I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the
United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on
September 8. 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr.
Shigeru Yoshida. Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary
of State of the United States of America, and the Agreement Regarding the
Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on February 19.
1954, as wvcIl as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the









United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understanding of my
Government that:
1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force so long
as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan
remains in force.
2. The expression "those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to
the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and
the United States of America" in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned
Agreement is understood to mean the facilities and areas the use of which is
granted to the United States of America under the Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security.
3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces under
the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to the Security
Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their status in Japan are governed by
arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation nad Security.
I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your
Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the foregoing
numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government and that
this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the entry force
of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at Washington on
January 19, 1960.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

His Excellency CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State, of the United States of America.
EXCELLENcy: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excel-
lency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:
"I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the United
States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on Sep-
tember 8, 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr.
Shigeru Yoshida. Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary
of State of the United States of America and the Agreement Regarding the
Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on February
19, 1954, as well as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
the United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understand-
ing of my Government that:
1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force
so long as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces
in Japan remains in force.
2. The expression 'those facilities and areas the use of which is provided
to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan
and the United States of America' in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-
mentioned Agreement is understood to mean the facilities and the areas the
use of which is granted to the United States of America under the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces
under the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to
the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950. and their status in Japan
are governed by arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security.
"I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your
Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the fore-
going numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government
and that this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the
entry into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed
at Washington on January 19, 1960."
I have the honour to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing
is also the understanding of the Government of Japan.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance
of my highest consideration.
NoBusuKE KISHT.






His. ExceIlency C:Lazt-.: A. lI-EKR
DEA SEc i'r y H~ rT I ;" i-h t :re~ r te T:'e uv -y M .[ a' C rt v
and Secrity between n .Jr. ia the Unite:t S[et ,f A~e~ I ~ned U di v
I de:" Artic'le IV f the T rat. the tw ; overnmen>s w:l -.u'r t ether r n
time to rime re zardinz the i Uplmn> i rin if rhe Ttr v. axt I, t:he request ,
either Governntn. w henev er the se uriy ,f Japa n o*r rnrnai maii peat e an i
se-nrity in the Far Fa-- i-. threatenedI. The ex han..e if nv tes under Arr l1V
of the Treaty specific certainly matters as. :he -.ulje .:>s f p :i r e isuirarion wi:th
the Go vernment if Jaa.
Such consultations will be (arried rn between the wo Governrents- hou&,
appropriate channels. At the same time. however. I ifeel that the establishments
of a special committee wih U ould a- appro priatere used if r the~e cpu-':>a-
ions between the Governments w,-ud prove very usef':'. This would meet whenever requested by either -ide. i l......eran a~~
urnderlying and related :, securhy affairs whichi~ woul se-rve r, i rn ~e under-
standing between the two G governments and conltrut~e ro the cr-a- nrxn ...t
e-uoperarive relations betw~een the two eounrries in the field I f se urirv.
Under this proposal the present "Japane -Ameri can C,,tumirtee on Securuv"
esablished by the Gvernments f the United Staes and Jap~an on Aucu-. aL
19.37. would be replaced by this new e nimiltee 'hc nJ .n be ,ai:e! 'The-
S~.urity Consultative -Co-' f _mmitee I would aiso re nommend that lhe mem[ er-
shilp of this new omlmittee be the same as the nember-hip f the 'gaipanee--
American Committee on S.ecuriry namely on the .Japane~e ide. the Ministr
for foreign Affairs. who will p re-ide on the .Jap ane-e se andI the Diret r
General of the Defense Azenyv. and ii the T'hired "-ar ".~~ t ,t:e,.1 : ~
Ambassador to .Japan. who will serve as Chairman o n Whe UntiedI States side
and the Commander-in-Chief. Paiu "fhiwl b h A~hi -d r "ri 1i
advisor on military and defense matter-. The C : nnau: r, :. ite S*tares F: r ,,
Japan. will serve as arernate for fihe C inmander-i,- X t. 1a nc.
I would appreciate very nmuc h yo ur views Qn th-s tie r.
Most sincerely.
NX(OuSuKE KIS IIT
iIis Excellency
NoBUSUKE K~sHL
Prime MIinister of .Jacpan.
DnKR MIR. PRIME M INISTER:
The receipt is acknowledged of your N, -e of today-s date -u zesrin: hens,-
lishment of "The Security Consultative C n-nitee". I 'Wyv :ree your ur -
p)-sal and share your view that such a con'mitt~ e can cn xri'bute to srenath> -
iii the cooperative relation between the two~ .... un-e itheUe f
I also azree to your tprop, sal regarding the miembersh>ip f this vouittee.
Most sincerely.
CHrnITtx A. HEriTEr.


75-150--76 4

















































































































I















2. AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND
SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN, REGARDING
FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARimED FORCES IN
JAPAN I
The United States of America and Japan, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and
Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, have entered into this Agree-
ment in terms as set forth below:

ARTICLE I
In this Agreement the expression-
(a) 'members of the United States armed forces" means tile personnel 011
active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of the, United States
of America when in the territory of Japan.
(b) "civilian component" means the civilian persons of United Status nation-
ality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United States
armed forces in Japan, but excludes persons who are ordinarily re ident in
Japan or who are mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article XIV. For til lt,,rllses of
this Agreement only, dual nationals, United States and Japanese. who are brought
to Japan by the United ,States shall be considered as United States natioinals.
(c) "dependents" means
(1) Spouse, and children under 21;
(2) Parents, and children over 21, if dependent for over half their suipport
upon a member of the United States armed forces or civilian compinpoent.

ARTICLE II
1. (a) The United States is granted, under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, the use of facilities and areas in Japan. A areeemnts
as to specific facilities and areas shall be concluded by the two G(, verninents
through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXV of this Agreement.
"Facilities and areas" include existing furnishings, equipment and tixtumes neces-
sary to the operation of such facilities and areas.
(b) The facilities and areas of which the United States has the use at the time
of expiration of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security
Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, shall be considered as
facilities and areas agreed upon between the two Governments in accordance
with subparagraph (a) above.
2. At the request of either Government, the Governments of the Uinited States
and Japan shall review such arrangements and may agree that such facilities
and areas shall be returned to Japan or that additional facilities and areas nmay
be provided.
3. The facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces shall be re-
turned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed for purposes of tilis Ag-,ree-
ment, and the United States agrees to keep the needs for facilities and areas
under continual observation with a view toward such return.
4. (a) When facilities and areas are temporarily not being used by the United
States armed forces, the Government of Japan may make, or permit Japanese
nationals to make, interim use of such facilities and areas provided that it is
agreed between the two Governments through the Joint Committee that such
use would not be harmful to the purposes for which the facilities and areas are
normally used by the United States armed forces.
(b) With respect to facilities and areas which are to be used by Urit el .at,
armed forces for limited periods of time, the Joint Committee shall specify in
the agreements covering such facilities and areas the extent to which the pro-
visions of this Agreement shall apply.
~(21)







22

ARTICLE III
1. Within the facilities and areas, the United States may take all the measures
'necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and controL In order
to provide access for the United States armed forces to the facilities and areas
for their support, safeguarding and control, the Government of Japan shall, at
the request of the United States armed forces and upon consultation between
the two Governments through the Joint Committee, take necesary measures
within the scope of applicable laws and regulations over land, territorial waters
and airspace adjacent to. or in the vicinities of the facilities and areas. The
United States may also take necessary measures for such purposes upon con-
sultation between the two Governments through the Joint Committee.
2. The United States agrees not to take the measures referred to in paragraph
1 in such a manner as to interfere unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, com-
miunication, or land travel to or from or within the territories of Japan. All
questions relating to frequencies, power and like matters used by apparatus em-
ployed by the United States designed to emit electric radiation shall be settled
by arrangement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments.
The Government of Japan shall, within the scope of applicable laws and regula-
tions. take all reasonable measures to avoid or eliminate interference with tele-
coniniulucations electroniics required by the United States armed forces.
:,. Operations in the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed
forces shall be carried on with due regard for the public safety.

ARTICLE IV
1. The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to
Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore
the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they
became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan
in lieu of such restoration.
2. Japan is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for
any imiprovements made in the facilities and areas or for the buildings or
structures left thereon on the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier return
of the facilities and areas.
8. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to any construction which the
Government of the United States may undertake under special arrangements
with the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE V
1. United S'tates and foreign vessels and aircraft operated by. for, or under
the control of the United States for official purposes shall be accorded access
to any o rt or airport of Japan free from toll or landing charges. When cargo
or passengers not accorded the exemptions of this Agreement are carried on
such vessels and aircraft, notification shall be given to the appropriate Japa-
nese authorities, and their entry into and departure from Japan shall be ac-
cording to the laws and regulations of Japan.
-2. The vessels and aircraft mentioned in paragraph 1. United States Govern-
nlt-]Vied vehicles including armor, and members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component. and their dependents shall be accorded access
to and movement between facilities and areas in use by the United States armed
f,)rc* and betvoen such facilities and areas and the ports or airports of Japan.
Such a8c1e to and movement between facilities nnd areas by United States
military vehicles shall be free from toll and other charges.
:. When the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 enter Japanese ports, appro-
priate notification shall., under normal conditions. be made to the proper
Jl 1):1e authorities. Such vessels shall have freedom from compulsory pilotage,
but if a ibt is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.

ARTICLE VI
1. All civil and military air traffic control and communications systems
shall be developed in close coordination and shall be integrated to the extent
necessary for fulfillnent of collective security interests. Procedures, and any
subsequent changes thereto, necessary to effect this coordination and integration









will be established by arrangement between the appropriate authorities of the
two Governments.
2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or es-
tablished in the facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces and
in territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity thereof shall conform
to the system in use in Japan. The United States and Japanese authorities
which have established such navigation aids shall notify each other of their
positions and characteristics and shall give advance notification before making
any changes in them or establishing additional navigation aids.
ARTICLE VII
The United States armed forces shall have the use of all public utilities and
services belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Government of Japan.
and shall enjoy priorities in such use, under conditions no less favorable than
those that may be applicable from time to time to the ministries and agencies
of the Government of Japan.
ARTICLE VIII
The Government of Japan undertakes to furnish the United States armed
forces with the following meteorological services in accordance with arrange-
ments between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments
(a) Meteorological observations from land and ocean areas including olbserva-
tions from weather ships.
(b) Climatological information including periodic summaries and the histori-
cal data of the Meteorological Agency.
(c) Telecommunications service to disseminate meteorological information re-
quired for the safe and regular operation of aircraft.
(d) Seismographic data including forecasts of the estimated size of tidal
waves resulting from earthquakes and areas that might be affected thereby.

ARTICLE IX
1. The United States may bring into Japan persons who are members of the
United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, sub-
ject to the provisions of this Article.
2. Members of the United States armed forces shall be exempt from Japanese
passport and visa laws and regulations. Members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be exempt from Jap-
anese laws and regulations on the registration :and control of aliens, but shall
not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in
the territories of Japan.
3. Upon entry into or departure from Japan members of the United States
armed forces shall be in possession of the following documents:
(a) personal identity card showing name, date of birth, rank and number,
service, and photograph; and
(b) individual or collective travel order certifying to the status of the indi-
vidual or group as a member or members of the United States armed forces and
to the travel ordered.
For purposes of their identification while in Japan. members of the United
States armed forces shall be in possession of the foregoing personal identity card
which must be presented on request to the appropriated Japanese authorities.
4. Members of the civilian component, their dependents, and the dependents
of members of the United States armed forces shall be in posse-~ion of appro-
priate documentation issued by the United States authorities so that their status
may be verified by Japanese authorities upon their entry into or departure from
Japan, or while in Japan.
5. If the status of any person brought into Japan under paragraph 1 of this
Article is altered so that lie would no longer be entitled to such admission, the
United States authorities shall notify the Japanese authorities and shall, if such
person be required by the Japanese authorities to le:ve Japan, assure that trans-
portation from Japan will be provided within a reasonable time at no cost to the
Government of Japan.
6. If the Government of Japan has requested the removal from its territory
of a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or has
made an expulsion order against an ex-niember of the United States armed







24

forces oi. r le civilian component or against a dependent of a member or ex-
member. the authorities of the United States shall be responsible for receiving
thi, ler .' eoIcer~ned within its own territory or otherwise drSposing of him
outside Japan. This paragraph shall apply only to persons who are not nationals
(if ,Jal)oa and have entered Japan as members of the United States armed forces
or '1 viliali comnjonent or for the purpose of becoming such members, and to the
(letcI(IcenTs of" suci persons.
ARTICLE X
1. .Jlapan shall accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit
or license or military driving permit issued by the United States to a member
(f the united d States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.
2. (Olticial vehicles of the United States armed forces and the civilian com-
ponent shall carry distinctive numbered plates or individual markings which
will readily identify them.
3. 1'rivat ely o\viied vehicles of members of the United States armed forces,
the civilian component, and their dependents shall carry Japanese number plates
to be acquired under the same conditions as those applicable to Japanese
111ttionalls.
ARTICLE XI
1. Save as provided in this Agreement, members of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be subject to the laws
and regulations administered by the customs authorities of Japan.
2. All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United States armed
forces, the authorizedd procurement agencies of the United States armed forces,
or by the organizations provided for in Article XV, for the official use of the
U united States armed forces or for the use of the members of the United States
armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, and materials, sup-
plies and equipment which are to be used exclusively by the United States armed
forces Pr are ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities used by
such forces, shall be permitted entry into Japan: such entry shall be free from
customis duties and other such charges. Appropriate certification shall be made
that such materials, supplies and equipment are being imported by the United
States armed forces, the authorized procurement agencies of the United States
armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article XV, or, in the
case of materials, supplies and equipment to be used exclusively by the United
States armed forces or ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities
used by such forces, that delivery thereof is to be taken by the United States
armed forces for the purposes specified above.
3. Property consigned to and for the personal use of members of the United
States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, shall be
subject to customs duties and other such charges, except that no duties or
charges shall be paid with respect to:
(a) Furniture and household goods for their private use imported by the
members of the United States armed forces or civilian component when they first
arrive to serve in Japan or by their dependents when they first arrive for
reunion with members of such forces or civilian component, and personal effects
for private use brought by the said persons upon entrance.
(b) Vehicles and parts imported by members of the United States armed
forces or civilian component for the private use of themselves or their dependents.
(c) Reasonable quantities of clothing and household goods of a type which
would ordinarily be purchased in the United States for everyday use for the
private use of members of the United States armed forces, civilian component,
nand their dependents, which are mailed into Japan through United States mili-
tary post offices.
4. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply only to cases of
importation of goods and shall not be interpreted as refunding customs duties
and domestic excises collected by the customs authorities at the time of entry
in cases of purchases of goods on which such duties and excises have already
been collected.
5. Customs examination shall not be made in the following cases:
(a) Units of the United States armed forces under orders entering or leaving
JaIpan :
tb) Official documents under official seal and official mail in United States
military postal channels;









(c) Military cargo shipped on a United States Government bill of lading.
6. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the United States and Japa-
nese authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods imported
into Japan free of duty shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled
to import such goods free of duty.
7. Goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges
pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, may be re-exported free from customs duties
and other such charges.
8. The United States armed forces, in cooperation with Japanese authorities,
shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent abuse of privileges granted to
the United States armed forces, members of such forces, the civilian component,
and their dependents in accordance with this Article.
9. (a) In order to prevent offenses against laws and regulations administered
by the customs authorities of the Government of Japan, the Japanese authori-
ties and the United States armed forces shall assist each other in the conduct
of inquiries and the collection of evidence.
(b) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their
power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the customs
authorities of the Government of Japan are handed to those authorities.
(c) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their
power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes, and penalties payable by members
of such forces or of the civilian component, or their dependents.
(d) Vehicles and articles belonging to the United States armed forces seized
by the customs authorities of the Government of Japan in connection with an
offense against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over
to the appropriate authorities of the force concerned.

ARTICLE XII
1. The United States may contract for any supplies or construction work to be
furnished or undertaken in Japan for purposes of, or authorized by, this Agree-
ment, without restriction as to choice of supplier or person who does the con-
struction work. Such supplies or construction work may, upon agreement between
the appropriate authorities of the two Governments, also be procured through
the Government of Japan.
2. Materials, supplies, equipment and services which are required from local
sources for the maintenance of the United States armed forces and the procure-
ment of which may have an adverse effect on the economy of Japan shall be
procured in coordination with, and, when desirable, through or with the assist-
ance of, the competent authorities of Japan.
3. Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for official purposes
in Japan by the United States armed forces, or by authorized procurement
agencies of the United States armed forces upon appropriate certification shall
be exempt from the following Japanese taxes: (a) Commodity tax; (b) Travel-
ling tax; (c) Gasoline tax; (d) Electricity and gas tax.
Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for ultimate use by the
United States armed forces shall be exempt from commodity and gasoline taxes
upon appropriate certification by the United States armed forces. With respect
to any present or future Japanese taxes not specifically referred to in this Article
which might be found to constitute a significant and readily identifiable part of
the gross purchase price of materials, supplies, equipment and services procured
by the United States armed forces, or for ultimate use by such forces, the two
Governments will agree upon a procedure for granting such exemption or relief
therefrom as is consistent with the purposes of this Article.
4. Local labor requirements of United States armed forces and of the organiza-
tions provided for in Article XV shall be satisfied with the assistance of the
Japanese authorities.
5. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax, local in-
habitant tax and social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise
be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as those re-
lating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection
of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labor relations shall be those
laid down by the legislation of Japan.
6. Should the United States armed forces or as appropriate an organization
provided for in Article XV dismiss a worker and a decision of a court or a Labor







26


Relations Commission of Japan to the effect that the contract of employment has
not terminated become final, the following procedure shall apply :
a) The United States armed forces or the said organization shall be informed
by the Government of Japan of the decision of the court or Commission;
(b) Should the United States armed forces or the said organization not desire
to return the worker to duty, they shall so notify the Government of Japan within
seven days after being informed by the latter of the decision of the court or
Commission, and may temporarily withhold the worker from duty;
(c) Upon such notification, the Government of Japan and the United States
armed forces or the said organization shall consult together without delay with
a view to finding a practical solution of the case;
(d) Should such a solution not be reached within a period of thirty days from
the date of commencement of the consultations under (c) above, the worker will
nit be entitled to return to duty. In such case, the Government of the United
States shall pay to the Government of Japan an amount equal to the cost of em-
ployment of the worker for a period of time to be agreed between the two Gov-
ernments.
7. Members of the civilian component shall not be subject to Japanese laws or
regulations with respect to terms and conditions of employment.
8. Neither members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, nor
their dependents, shall be reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes
or similar charges relating to personal purchases of goods and services in Japan
chargeable under Japanese legislation.
9. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the United States and Japa-
nese authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods purchased
in Japan exempt from the taxes referred to in paragraph 3, shall not be disposed
of in Japan to persons not entitled to purchase such goods exempt from such tax.

ARTICLE XIII
1. The United States armed forces shall not be subject to taxes or similar
charges on property held, used or transferred by such forces in Japan.
2. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and
their dependents shall not be liable to pay any Japanese taxes to the Govern-
ment of Japan or to any other taxing agency in Japan on income received as a
result of their service with or employment by the United States armed forces, or
by the organizations provided for in Article XV. The provisions of this Article do
not exempt such persons from payment of Japanese taxes on income derived from
Japanese sources, nor do they exempt United States citizens who for United
States income tax purposes claim Japanese residence from payment of Japanese
taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely by
reason of being members of the United States armed forces, the civilian compo-
nent, or their dependents shall not be considered as periods of residence or domi-
cile in Japan for the purpose of Japanese taxation.
3. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and
their dependents shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use,
transfer inter se, or transfer by death of movable property, tangible or intangi-
ble, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of
these irsons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to prop-
erty held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of business in Japan
w, to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under
this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads
hy private vehicles.
ARTICLE XIV
1. Persons, including corporations organized under the laws of the United
States, and their employees who are ordinarily resident in the United States
an( whose presence in Japan is solely for the purpose of executing contracts
with the United States for the benefit of the United States armed forces, and
who are designated by the Government of the United States in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 2 below, shall, except as provided in this Article,
he subject to the laws and regulations of Japan.
2. The designation referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be made upon con-
sultation with the Government of Japan and shall be restricted to cases where
"pen competitive bidding is not practicable due to security considerations. to
the technical qualifications of the contractors involved, or to the unavailability









of materials or services required by United States standards, or to limitations
of United States law.
The designation shall be withdrawn by the Government of the United States:
(a) upon completion of contracts with the United States for the United States
armed forces;
(b) upon proof that such persons are engaged in business activities in Japon
other than those pertaining to the United States armed forces ; or
(c) when such persons are engaged in practices illegal in Japan.
3. Upon certification by appropriate United States authorities as to their
identity, such persons and their employees shall be accorded the following
benefits of this Agreement:
(a) Rights of accession and movement, as provided for in Artiie V, piara-
graph 2;
(b) Entry into Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article IX;
(ec) The exemption from customs duties, and other such charges provided for
in Article XI, paragraph 3, for members of the United States armed forces, the
civilian component, and their dependents;
(d) If authorized by the Government of the United States, the right to use
the services of the organizations provided for in Article XV;
(e) Those provided for in Article XIX, paragraph 2, for members of the
armed forces of the United States, the civilian component, and their depen(lents;
(f) If authorized by the Government of the United States, the right to u'e
military payment certificates, as provided for in Arteile XX
(g) The use of postal facilities provided for in Article XXI
(h) Exemption from the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to terms
and conditions of employment.
4. Such persons and their employees shall be so described in their passports
and their arrival, departure and their residence while in Japan shall from
time to time be notified by the United States arned forces to the Japanese
authorities.
5. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed
forces, depreciable assets except houses, held. used, or transferred, by such per-
sons and their employees exclusively for the execution of contracts referred to in
paragraph 1 shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges of Japan.
6. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed
forces, such persons and their employees shall be exempt from taxation in Japan
on the holding, use, transfer by death, or transfer to persons or agencies entitled
to tax exemption under this Agreement, of movable property, tangible or intangi-
ble, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of
these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property
held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of other business in Japimu or
to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this
Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by
private vehicles.
7. The persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be
liable to pay income or corporation taxes to the Government of Japan or to any
other taxing agency in Japan on any income derived under a contract made in
the United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the
construction, maintenance or operation of any of the facilities or areas covered
l)y this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph do not exempt such persons!
from payment of income or corporation taxes on income (erived from Japanese
sources, nor do they exempt such persons and their employees who, for United
States income tax purposes, claim Japanese residence, from paymeiit of Japanese
taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely in c( n-
nection with the execution of a contract with the Government of the United
States shall not be considered periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the
purposes of such taxation.
8. Japanese authorities shall have the primary ri-ht to exercise jurisdiction
over the persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
in relation to offenses committed in Japin and punishable by the law of Japan.
In those cases in which the Japanese authorities decide not to exercise such
jurisdiction they shall notify the military authorities of the United States as soon
as possible. Upon such notification the military authorities of the United States
shall have the right to exercise such jurisdiction over the persons referred to
as is conferred on them by the law of the United States.





28

ARTICLE XV
1. (a) Navy exchanges, post exchanges, messes, social clubs, theaters, news-
plapers and other non-appropriated fund organizations authorized and regulated
by the United States military authorities may be established in the facilities and
-reas in use by the United States armed forces for the use of members of such
forces. the civilian component, and their dependents. Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Agreement, such organizations shall not be subject to Japanese regu-
lations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls.
i[)i When a newspaper authorized and regulated by the United States military
authorities is sold to the general public, it shall be subject to Japanese regula-
tions, license, fees, taxes or similar controls so far as such circulation is
concerned.
2. N. Japanese tax shall be imposed on sales of merchandise and services by
such organizations, except as provided in paragraph 1(b), but purchases within
Japan of merchandise and supplies by such organizations shall be subject to
Japanese taxes.
3. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the United States and Japa-
nese authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods which
are sold by such organizations shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not
authorized to make purchases from such organizations.
4. The organizations referred to in this Article shall provide such information
to the Japanese authorities as is required by Japanese tax legislation.

ARTICLE XVI
It is the duty of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian com-
ponent. and their dependents to respect the law of Japan and to abstain from
any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity in Japan.

ARTICLE XVII
1. ,Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exer-
cise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them
by the law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of
the United States:
(b) the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over the members of the
United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents with
respect to offenses committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by
the law of Japan.
2. (a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of the
United States with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security,
punishable by the law of the United States, but not by the law of Japan.
(b) The authorities of Japan shall have the right to exercise exclusive juris-
diction over members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component,
and their dependents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the
security of Japan. punishable by its law but not by the law of the United States.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a
security offense against a State shall include (i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of
that State, or secrets relating to the national defense of that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following
rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces or the
civilian component in relation to: (i) offenses solely against the property or
security of the United States, or offenses solely against the person or property
of another member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component
or of a dependent; (ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of Japan shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction.







(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction,
it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The
authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consid-
eration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its
right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular
importance.
4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the
military authorities of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over persons
who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Japan, unless they are members of
the United States armed forces.
5. (a) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of
Japan shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the United States
armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents in the territory of
Japan and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdic-
tion in accordance with the above provisions.
(b) The authorities of Japan shall notify promptly the military authorities
of the United States of the arrest of any member of the United States armed
forces, the civilian component, or a dependent.
(c) The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or
the civilian component over whom Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is
in the hands of the United States, remain with the United States until he is
charged by Japan.
6. (a) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of
Japan shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations
into offenses, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the
seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an
offense. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to
their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.
(b) The military authorities of the United States and the authorities of Japan
shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which there are con-
current rights to exercise jurisdiction.
7. (a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in Japan by the military
authorities of the United States if the legislation of Japan does not provide for
such punishment in a similar case.
(b) The authorities of Japan shall give sympathetic consideration to a request
from the military authorities of the United States for assistance in carrying
out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the military authorities of the
United States under the provisions of this Article within the territory of Japan.
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this
Article either by the military authorities of the United States or the authorities
of Japan and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has
served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same
offense within the territory of Japan by the authorities of the other State. How-
ever, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the
United States from trying a member of its armed forces for any violation of rules
of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offense for
which he was tried by the authorities of Japan.
9. Whenever a member of the United States armed forces, the civilian compo-
nent or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of Japan he shall be
entitled :
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if they
are within the jurisdiction of Japan;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have
free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time
being in Japan;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent inter-
preter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the United
States and to have such a representative present at his trial.
10. (a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of the United States
armed forces shall have the right to police any facilities or areas which they use







30

under Article II of this Agreement. The military police of such forces may take
all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security within
such facilities and areas.
(b) Outside these facilities and areas, such military police shall be employed
only subject to arrangements with the authorities of Japan and in liaison with
hose authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain
discipline and order among the members of the United States armed forces.
11. In the event of hostilities to which the provisions of Article V of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security apply, either the Government of the United
States or the (Government of Japan shall have the right, by giving sixty days'
notice to the other, to suspend the application of any of the provisions of this
Article. If this right is exercised, the Governments of the United States and
Japan shall immediately consult with a view to agreeing on suitable provisions
to replace the provisions suspended.
12. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any offenses committed
before the entry into force of this Agreement. Such cases shall be governed by
tim provisions of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement under Article
III (if the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, as
it existed at the relevant time.
ARTICLE XVIII
1. Each Party waives all its claims against the other Party for damage to any
property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air defense services, if such
anmage-
a) was caused by a member or an employee of the defense services of the
other Party in the performance of his official duties; or
(b) arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned by the other
Party and used by its defense services, provided either that the vehicle, vessel
or aircraft causing the damage was being used for official purposes, or that the
damage was caused to property being so used.
Claims for maritime salvage by one Party against the other Party shall be
waived, provided that the vessel or cargo salved was owned by a Party and being
used by its defense services for official purposes.
2. (a) In the ease of damage caused or arising as stated in paragraph I to
other property owned by either Party and located in Japan, the issue of the
lial)ility of the otlier Party shall be determined and the amount of damage shall
be assessed, unless the two Governments agree otherwise, by a sole arbitrator
seleeted in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. The arbitrator
shall also decide any counter-claims rising out of the same incident.
(1) The arbitrator referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be selected
by agreement between the two Governments from amongst the nationals of Japan
who hold or have held high judicial office.
(c) Any decision taken by the arbitrator shall be binding and conclusive upon
the Parties.
(d) The amount of any compensation awarded by the arbitrator shall be
di-tributed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5(e) (i), (ii), and
ii) of this Article.
(e) The compensation of the arbitrator shall be fixed by agreement between
111e two Governments and shall together with the necessary expenes incidental
t h0 Terformance of his duties, be defrayed in equal proportions by them.
(f Nevertheless, each Party waives its claim in any such case up to the
o:ini-int of 1,400 United States dollars or 504,000 yen. In the case of considerable
variation in the rate of exchange between these currencies the two Governments
hall agree on tie appropriate adjustments of these amounts.
For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the expression
1owed b1y a Party" in the ease of a vessel includes a vessel on bare boat charter
1'' that Party or requisitioned by it on bare boat terms or seized by it in prize
(Npt to the extent that the risk of loss or liability is borne by soie person
other' ihan such Pairty).
4. FEli Party waives all its claims against lhe other Party for injury or
(la-th suffered by any member of its defense services while such member was
eiigagdl in the performance of his official duties.
5. Claims (other than contractual claims and those to which paragraphs 6 or
7 of this Article apIly) arising out of facts or omissions of members or employees
of the United States armed forces done in the performance of official duty, or









out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which the United States armed
forces are legally responsible, and causing damage in Japan to third parties,
other than the Government of Japan, shall be dealt with by Japan in accordance
with the following provisions:
(a) Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance
with the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to claims arising from the
activities of its Self-Defense Forces.
(b) Japan may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed
upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by Japan in yen.
(c) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication
of the case by a competent tribunal of Japan, or the final adjudication by such a
tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Parties.
(d) Every claim paid by Japan shall be communicated to the appropriate
United States authorities together with full particulars and a proposed distribu-
tion in conformity with subparagraphs (e) (i) and (ii) below. In default of a
reply within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded as accepted.
(e) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding subpara-
graphs and paragraph 2 of this Article shall be distributed between the Parties
as follows:
(i) Where the United States alone is responsible, the amount awarded or ad-
judged shall be distributed in the proportion of 25 percent chargeable to Japan
and 75 percent chargeable to the United States.
(ii) Where the United States and Japan are responsible for the damage, the
amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally between them. Where
the damage was caused by the defense services of the United States or Ja)an
and it is not possible to attribute it specifically to one or both of those defense
services, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally between
the United States and Japan.
(iii) Every half-year, a statement of the sums paid by Japan in the course of
the half-yearly period in respect of every case regarding which the proposed dis-
tribution on a percentage basis has been accepted, shall be sent to the appropriate
United States authorities, together with a request for reimbursement. Such reim-
bursement shall be made, in yen, within the shortest possible time.
(f) Members or employees of the United States armed forces, excluding those
employees who have only Japanese nationality, shall not be subject to any pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against them in Japan in a
matter arising from the performance of their official duties.
g) Except in so far as subparagraph (e) of this paragraph applies to claim.
covered by paragraph 2 of this Article, the provisions of this paragraph shall not
apply to any claim arising out of or in connection with the navigation or opera-
tion of a ship or the loading, carriage, or discharge of a cargo, other than claims
for death or personal injury to which paragraph 4 of this Article does not apply.
(". Claims against members or employees of the United States armed forces
(except employees who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Japan) a rising
out of tortious acts or omissions inl Japan not done in the performance of official
duty shall be dealt with in the flowing manner:
(a) The authorities of Japan shall consider the claim and assess con-
pensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all
the circumstances of the case. including the conduct of the injured Ixersoni,
mind shall prepare a report ,n the matter.
(h) The report shall be delivered to the l)propriate United States au-
tlorities who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an ex
gratia payment, and if so, of what amount.
(e) If an offer of ex gratia payment is made. and 'accepted by the claie'ant
in full satisfaction of his claim. the United States authorities shall make the
payment themselves and inform the authorities of Japan of their decision
and of the sum paid.
(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts
of Japan to entertain an action against a member or an employee of the
United States armed forces unless and until there has been payment in full
s satisfaction of the claim.
7. Claims arising out of the unauthorized use of any vehicle of the United
States armed forces shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 6 of this
Article, except in so far as the United States armed forces are legally responsible.









S. If a dispute arises as to whether a tortious act or omission of a member or
an employee of the United States armed forces was done in the performance of
official duty or as to whether the use of any vehicle of the United States armed
forces was unauthorized, the question shall be submitted to an arbitrator ap-
pointed in accordance with paragraph 2(b) of this Article, whose decision on
this point shall be final and conclusive.
9. (a) The United States shall not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
the courts of Japan for members or employees of the United States armed forces
in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Japan except to the extent
provided in paragraph 5(f) of this Article.
(b) in case any private movable property, excluding that in use by the United
States armed forces, which is subject to compulsory execution under Japanese
law, is within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces.
the United States authorities shall, upon the request of Japanese courts, poss
and turn over such property to the Japanese authorities.
(c) The authorities of the United States and Japan shall cooperate in the
procurement of evidence for a fair hearing and disposal of claims under this
Article.
10. Disputes arising out of contracts concerning the procurement of materials,.
supplies; equipment, services and labor by or for the United States armed forces,
which are not resolved by the parties to the contract concerned, may be sub-
nitted to the Joint Committee for conciliation, provided that the provisions of
this paragraph shall not prejudice any right which the parties to the contract
may have to file a civil suit.
11. The term "defense services" used in this Article is understood to mean for
Japan its Self-Defense Forces and for the Vnitrd States its armed forces.
12. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article shall apply only to claims arising inci-
dent to non-combat activities.
13. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any claims which arose
before the entry into force of this Agreement. Such claims sha!l be dealt with 11
tbe proivsions of Article XVIII of the Administrative Agreement under Article
III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan.

ARTICLE XIX
1. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and
their dependents, shall be subject to the foreign exchange controls of the Gov-
ernment of Japan.
2. The preceding paragraph shall not be construed to preclude the transmission
into or outside of Japan of United States dollars or dollar instruments repre-
senting the official funds of the United States or realized as a result of service
or employment in connection with this Agreement by members of the United
States armed forces and the civilian component, or realized by such persons and
their dependents from sources outside of Japan.
3. The United States authorities shall take suitable measures to preclude the
abuse of the privileges stipulated in the preceding paragraph or circumvention
of the Japanese foreign exchange controls.

ARTICLE XX
1. (a) United States military payment certificates denominated in dollars
may be used by persons authorized by the United States for internal transactions
within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces. The
Government of the United States will take appropriate action to insure that
authorized personnel are prohibited from engaging in transactions involving
military payment certificates except as authorized by United States regulations.
The government of Japan will take necessary action to prohibit unauthorized
persons from engaging in transactions involving military payment certificates
and N ith the aid of United St'ites authorities will undertake to apprehend and
punish any person or persons under its jurisdiction involved in the counterfeiting
or uttering of counterfeit military payment certificates.
(h ) It is agreed that the United States authorities will apprehend and punish
members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component. or their
depen(lents, who tender military payment certificates tO unauthorized persons
and that no obligation will be due to such unauthorized persons or to fhe Govern-







33

ment of Japan or its agencies from the United States or any of its agencies as a
result of any unauthorized use of military payment certificates within Japan.
2. In order to exercise control of military payment certificates the United
States may designate certain American financial institutions to maintain and
operate, under United States supervision, facilities for the use of persons author-
ized by the United States to use military payment certificates. Institutions au-
thorized to maintain military banking facilities will establish and maintain such
facilities physically separated from their Japanese commercial banking business,
with personnel whose sole duty is to maintain and operate such facilities. Such
facilities shall be permitted to maintain United States currency bank accounts
and to perform all financial transactions in connection therewith including receipt
and remission of funds to the extent provided by Article XIX, paragraph 2, of
this Agreement.
ARTICLE XXI
The United States may establish and operate, within the facilities and areas
in use by the United States armed forces, United States military post offices
for the use of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian con-
ponent, and their dependents, for the transmission of mail )etween United
States military post offices in Japan and between such military post offices and
other United States post offices.

ARTICLE XXII
The United States may enroll and train eligible United State' ciiz1,ns resid-
ing in Japan, who apply for such enrollment, in the reserve organizations of
the armed forces of the United States.

ARTICLE XXIII
The United States and Japan will cooperate in taking such steps as may from
time to time be necessary to ensure the security of the United States armed
forces, the members thereof, the civilian component, their dependents, and their
property. The Government of Japan agrees to seek such legislation and to take
such other action as may be necessary to ensure the adequate security and pro-
tection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and
official information of the United States, and for the 1)unishinent of offetiders
under the applicable laws of Japan.

ARTICLE XXIV
1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of thi.s Agree-
ment without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the inainteance of
the United States armed forces in Japan except those to be borne by Ja pan
as provided in Articles II and III.
2. It is agreed that Japan will furnish for the duration of this Agreement
without cost to the United States and make conpensation where appropriate
to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way,
including facilities and areas jointly used such as those at airfields and ports,
as provided in Articles II and III.
3. It is agreed that arrangements will be effected between the Governments
of the Unlted States and Japan for accounting applicable to financial transac-
tions arising out of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXV
1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation be-
tween the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan on
all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the iml)lementation of this
Agreement. In particular, the Joint Committee shall serve as the means for
consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required
for the uset of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
2. The Joint Committee shall be composed of a representative of the Govern-
ment of the United States and a representative of the Government of Japan,
each of whom shall have one or more deputies and a staff. The Joint Committee







3 4

shall determines its own procedures, and arrange for such auxiliary organs and
;1(ministrative services as may be required. The Joint Committee shall be so
organized that it may meet immediately at any time at the request of the repre-
sentative of either the Government of the United States or the Government of
Ja pan.
3. If the Joint Committee is unable to resolve any matter, it shall refer that
matter to the respective Governments for further consideration through appro-
priate channels.
ARTICLE XXVI
1. This Agreement shall be approved by the United States and Japan in accord-
anee with their legal procedures, and notes indicating such approval shall be
exchanged.
2. After the procedure set forth in the preceding paragraph has been followed,
this Agreement will enter into force on the date of coming into force of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, at which time the Administrative
Agreement under Article III of the -Security Treaty between the United States
of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, shall
expire.
3. The Government of each Party to this Agreement undertakes to seek from
its legislature necessary budgetary and legislative action with respect to pro-
visions of this Agreement which require such action for their execution.

ARTICLE XXVII
Either Government may at any time request the revision of any Article of this
Agreement, in which case the two Governments shall enter into negotiation
through appropriate channels.
ARTICLE XXVIII
This Agreement, and agreed revision thereof, shall remain in force while the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains in force unless earlier termi-
nated by agreement between the two Governments.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Agree-
ment.
Done at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both
texts equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.
For the United States of America:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
DOUGLAS MfACARTHUR 2ND,
J. GRAHAM PARSONS.
For Japan:
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
AIC InRo FUJI'YAMA,
MITSUJIRO ISHII,
TADASHI ADACHI,
KOICHIRO ASAKAI.
AREvDDoMINUTES TO TfiE AGREEMENT T UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THlE TREATY OF M.TUTVAL
('O PFRATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN,
E;ARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED
]FORCES IN JAPAN
The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America and Japan wish to record
the following understanding which they have reached during the negoitations for
the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu-
rity between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, signed today:

ARTICLE III
The measures that may be taken by the United States under paragraph 1 shall,
Io the extent necessary to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement, include,
inter alia, the following:
I. To construct (including dredging and filling), operate, Maintain, utilize,
occupy, garrison and control the facilities and areas;






35


2. To remove buildings or structures, make alterations, attach fixtures. or
erect additions thereto and to construct any additional buildings or structures
together with auxiliary facilities;
3. To improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages,
and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording access to
such facilities and areas;
4. To control (including measures to prohibit) in so far as may be required by
military necessity for the efficient operation and safety of the facilities aid
areas, anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs and operation of ships and water-
borne craft, aircraft and other vehicles on water, in the air or on land comprising,
or in the vicinity of, the facilities and areas:
5. To construct on rights of way utilized by the United States such wire and
radio communications facilities, including submarine land subterranean cables.
pipe lines and spur tracks from railroads, as may be required for military pur-
poses; and
6. To construct, install, maintain and employ in any facility or area any type
of installation, weap ,n, substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the
ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be requisite or appropriate
including meterological systems, aerial and water navigation lights, radio aind
radar apparatus and eletronic devices.

ARTICLE V
1. "United States and foreign vessels . operated by, for, or under the control
of the United States for official purposes" mean United States public vessels and
chartered vessels (bare boat charter, voyage charter and time charter). Space
charter is not. included. Commercial cargo and private passengers are carried
by them only in exceptional cases.
2. The Japanese ports lnentioned herein will ordinarily mean "open ports."
3. The exemption from making "appropriate notification" will be applicable only
to exceptional cases where such is required for security of the United Slates
armed forces or similar reasons.
4. The laws and regulations of Japan will be applicable except as specilically
provided otherwise in this Article.

ARTICLE VII
The problem of teleconninunications rates applicable to the United States armed
forces will continue to be studied in the light of, intf r ali. the statements concern-
ing Article VII recorded in the official minutes of the Tenth Joint Meeting for
the Negotiation of the Administrative Agreement signed on February 2a. 1952,
which are hereby incorporated by reference.

ARTICLE IX
The Government of Japan will be notified at regular intervals, in accordance
with procedures to be agreed between the two Governments, of numbers and cate-
gories of persons entering and departing.

ARTICLE XT
1. The quantity of goods imported under paragraph 2 by the organizations
provided for in Article XV for the use of the members of the Untied States armed
forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be limited to the extent
reasonably required for such use.
2. Paragraph 3(a ) does not require concurrent shipment of goods with travel of
owner nor does it require single loading or shipment.
3. The term "military cargo" as used in paragraph 5%ic) is not confied to arms
and equipment but refers to all cargo shipped to the United States armed forces
on a United States Government bill of lading, the term 'military cargo" being
used to distinguish cargo shipped to the United States aried forces from cargo
shipped to other agencies of the United States Government.
4. The United States armed forces will take every practicable measure to ensure
that goods will not be imported into Japan by or for the members of the United
States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents, the entry of









which would be in violation of Japanese customs laws and regulations. The
United States armed forces will promptly notify the Japanese customs authorities
whenever the entry of such goods is discovered.
5. The Japanese customs authorities may, if they consider that there has been
an abuse or infringement in connection with the entry of goods under Article XI,
take up the matter with the appropriate authorities of the United States armed
forces.
63. The words "The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within
their power etc." in paragraph 9(b) and (c) refer to reasonable and practicable
measures by the United States armed forces.

ARTICLE XII
1. The United States armed forces will furnish the Japanese authorities with
ap)lropriate information as far in advance as practicable on anticipated major
changes in their procurement program in Japan.
2. The problem of a satisfactory settlement of difficulties with respect to pro-
curement contracts arising out of differences between United States and Japa-
nese economic laws and business practices will be studied by the Joint- Commit-
tee or other appropriate persons.
3. The procedures for securing exemptions from taxation 'on purchases of
goods for ultimate use by the United States armed forces will be as follows:
(7. Upon appropriate certification by the United States armed forces that ma-
terhias. supplies and equipment consigned to or destined for such forces, are to
be used, or wholly or partially used up, under the supervision of such forces, ex-
clusively in the execution of contracts for the construction, maintenance or oper-
ation of the facilities and areas referred to In Article II or for the support of the
forces therein, or are ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities used
by such forces, an authorized representative of such forces shall take delivery
of such materials, supplies and equipment directly from manufacturers thereof.
In such circumstances the collection of commodity and gasoline taxes shall be
held in abeyance.
b. The receipt of such materials, supplies and equipment in the facilities and
.ireas shall be confirmed by an authorized officer of the United States armed
forces to the Japanese authorities.
c. Collection of commodity and gasoline taxes shall be held in abeyance until:
(1) The United States armed forces confirm and certify the quantity or degree
of consumption of the above referred to materials, supplies and equipment; or
(2) The United States armed forces confirm and certify the amount of the above
referred to materials, supplies, and equipment which have been incorporated into
articles or facilities used by United States armed forces.
d. Materials, supplies, and equipment certified under c(1) or (2) shall be ex-
einmpt from commodity and gasoline taxes insofar as the price thereof is paid
out of United States Government appropriations or out of funds contributed by
the Japanese Government for disbursement by the United States.
4. The Government of the United States shall ensure that the Government of
* pTaii is reimbursed for costs incurred under relevant contracts between appro-
priate authorities of the Government of Japan and the organizations provided
for in Article XV in connection with the employment of workers to be provided
for such organizations.
.5. It is understood that the term "the legislation of Japan" mentioned in para-
graph 5. article XII includes decisions of the courts and the Labor Relations Com-
missions of Japan, subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, Article XII.
6. It is understood that the provisions of Article XII, paragraph 6 shall apply
only to discharges for security reasons including disturbing the maintenance of
milita ry discipline within the facilities and areas used by the United States armed
force..
7. It is understood that the organizations referred to in Article XV will be
QIflJiect to the procedures of paragraph 6 on the basis of mutual agreement be-
t\ et, the appropriate authorities.

ARTICLE XIII
Wir rcp ct to Article XIII, paragraph 2 and Article XIV, paragraph 7, in-
come p:1yable in Japan as a result of service with or employment by the United









States armed forces or by the organizations provided for in Article XV, or under
contract made in the United States with the United States Government, shall
not be treated or considered income derived from Japanese sources.

ARTICLE XV
The facilities referred to in paragraph 1 may be used by other officers and
personnel of the United States Government ordinarily accorded such privileges
abroad.
ARTICLE XVII
Re paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2(a) :
'ie scope of persons subject to the military laws of the United States shall
be communicated, through the Joint Committee, to the Government of Japan by
the Government of the United States."
Re paragraph 2(c) :
"'Both Governments shall inform each other of the details of all the security
Offenses mentioned in this subparagraph and the provisions governing such of-
fenses in the existing laws of their respective countries."
Re paragraph 3(a) (ii) :
-Where a member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component
is charged with an offense, a certificate issued by or on behalf of his commanding
officer stating that the alleged offense, if committed by him, arose out of an act
or omission done in the performance of official duty, shall, in any judicial pro-
ceedings. be sufficient evidence of the fact unless the contrary is proved.
The above statement shall not be interpreted to prejudice in any way Article
31S of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure."
Re paragraph 3(c) :
"1. Mutual procedures relating to waivers of the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction shall be determined by the Joint Committee.
"2. Trials of cases in which the Japanese authorities have waived the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction, and trials of cases involving offenses described in
paragraph 3(a) (ii) committed against the State or nationals of Japan shall be
held promptly in Japan within a reasonable distance from the places where the
offenses are alleged to have taken place unless other arrangements are mutually
agreed upon. 1Representatives of the Japanese authorities may be present at such
trial..
Re paragraph 4:
"Dual nationals. United States and .apanese. who are subject to the military
law of the United States and are brought to .Japan by the United States shall
not be considered as nationals of .Japan, but shall be considered as United States
nationals for the purposes of this paragraph."
Re paragraph 5:
"1. In ease the Japanese authorities have arrested an offender who is a member
of the United States armed forces, the civilian component. or a dependent subject
to the military law of the United States with respect to a case over which Japan
has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, the Japanese authorities will.
unless they deem that there is adequate cause and necessity to retain such
offender, release him to the custody of the United States military authorities
provided that be shall, on request, be made available to the Japanese authorities.
if such be the condition of his release. The United States authorities shall, on
request, transfer his custody to the Japanese authorities at the time he is
indicted by the latter.
"2. The United States military authorities shall promptly notify the Japanese
authorities of the arrest of any member of the United States armed forces. the
civilian component or a dependent in any case in which Japan has the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction."
Re paragraph 9:
"1. The rights enumerated in items (a) through (e) of thiz paragraph are
guaranteed to all persons on trial in Japanese courts by the provisions of the
Japanese Constitution. In addition to these rights, a member of the United
States armed forces, the civilian component or a dependent who is prosecuted
under the jurisdicition of Japan shall have such other rights as are uaranteed
under lie lows' of Japan to all persons on trial in J;a pa neso e1rt. Such ;ddi-







38


tional rights include the following which are guaranteed under the Japanese
Constitution:
"(a) He shall not be arrested or detained without being at once informed of
the charge against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall
he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such
cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence
of his counsel;
(b) He shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial tribunal;
"(c) He shall not be compelled to testify against himself ;
"(d) He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses;
"(e) No cruel punishments shall be imposed upon him.
"2. The United States authorities shall have the right upon request to have
access at any time to members of the United States armed forces, the civilian
component, or their dependents who are confined or detained under Japanese
authority.
"3. Nothing in the provisions of paragraph 9(g) concerning the presence of a
representative of the United States Government at the trial of a member of the
United States armed forces, the civilian component or a dependent prosecuted
under the jurisdiction of Japan, shall be so construed as to prejudice the provi-
sions of the Japanese Constitution with respect to public trials."
Re paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) :
"I. The United States military authorities will normally make all arrests
within facilities and areas in use by and guarded under the authority of the
United States armed forces. This shall not preclude the Japanese authorities
from making arrests within facilities and areas in cases where the competent
authorities of the United States armed forces have given consent, or in cases of
pursuit of a flagrant offender who has committed a serious crime.
Where persons whose arrest is desired by the Japanese authorities and who
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces are within
facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, the United States
military authorities will undertake, upon request, to arrest such persons. All
persons arrested by the United States military authorities, who are not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces, shall immediately
lie turned over to the Japanese authorities.
"The United States military authorities may, under due process of law, arrest
in the vicinity of a facility or area any person in the commission or attempted
colnmission of an offense against the security of that facility or area. Any such
person not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces shall be
immediately turned over to the Japanese authorities.
-2. The Japanese authorities will normally not exercise the right of search,
seizure, or inspection with respect to any persons or property within facilities
:tnd areas in use by and guarded under the authority of the United States armed
forces or with respect to property of the United States armed forces wherever
situated, except in cases where the competent authorities of the United States
a rmed forces consent to such search, seizure, or inspection by the Japanese
authorities of such persons or property.
"VWhere search, seizure, or inspection with respect to persons or property
within facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces or with
respect to property of the United States armed forces in Japan is desired by
the Japanese authorities, the United States military authorities will undertake,
upon request, to make such search, seizure, or insption. In the event of a
judgment concerning such property, except property owned or utilized by the
United States Government or its instrumentalities, the United States will turn
over such property to the Japanese authorities for disposition in accordance
with the judgment."
ARTICLE XIX
Payment in Japan by the United States armed forces and by those organiza-
tions provided in Article XV to persons other than members of the United States
armed forces, civilian component, their dependents and those persons referred
to in Article XIV shall be effected in accordance with the Japanese Foreign
Exchange Control Law and regulations. In these transactions the basic rate of
exchange shall be used.
ARTICLE XXI
United States military post offices may be used by other officers and personnel
of the United States Government ordinarily accorded such privileges abroad.







3n


ARTICLE XXIV
It is understood that nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the United States
from utilizing, for the defrayment of expenses which are to be borne by the
United States under this Agreement, dollar or yen funds lawfully acquired by
the United States.
WASHINGTON, January 19, 1960.
C. A. H.
N.K
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 19, 1960.
His Excellency NOBUSUKE KISIII,
Prime Minister of Japan.
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to paragraph 6(d) of Article XII of
the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu-
rity between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, signed today. The
second sentence of the said paragraph provides that "in such case the Govern-
ment of the United States shall pay to the Government of Japan an amount equal
to the cost of employment of the worker for a period of time to be agreed between
the two Governments."
I wish to propose on behalf of the Government of the United States that the
period of time mentioned above shall not exceed one year after the notification
provided for in paragraph 6()) of Article XII of the above-cited Agreement, and
may be determined in the consultations under paragraph 6(c) of Article XII
above on the basis of mutually agreeable criteria-
If the proposal made herein is acceptable to the Government of Japan, this
Note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall be considered as constituting
an agreement between the two Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
CHRISTIAN A. I RTER,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.

WASHNGTON, January 19, 1960.
His Excellency CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.
EXCELLENCY : I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
Note of today's date, which reads as follows:
"I have the honor to refer to paragraph 6(d) of Article XII of the Agreement
under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, signed today. The second sen-
tenee of the said paragraph provides that 'in such case the Government of the
United States shall pay to the Government of Japan an amount equal to the cost
of employment of the worker for a period of time to be agreed between the two
Governments.
"I wish to propose on behalf of the Government of the United St,ites that the
period of time mentioned above shall not exceed one year after the notification
provided for in paragraph 6(b) of Article XII of the above-cited Ag.reement.
and may be determined in the consultations under paragraph 6(c) of Article XII
above on the basis of mutually agreeable criteria.
"If the proposal made herein is acceptable to the Government of Japan, this
Note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall be considered as constituting
an agreement between the two Governments."
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan
accepts the above proposal of the Government of the United States, and to con-
firm that your Note and this reply are considered as constituting an agreement
between the two Governments.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances
of my highest consideration.
NOBUSUKE KIIS Ii.

















3. "DEFENSE OF JAPAN'


Defense White Paper-Summary, June 1976
(Published by the Japanese Defense Agency)
Japan's internal and external environments have undergone far-reaching
changes since 1970 when the last Defense White Paper was published. The cur-
rent White Paper is designed partly to clarify the background against which
the so-called "post Fourth Defense Buildup Plan" is being programmed, and
primarily to give a wider segment of the public an understanding of the realities
of the international environment, the basic concepts of our national defense and
some facts about the self-defense forces. The Paper consists of four chapters:
Chapter I: Trends of the International Situation. Chapter II: Defense Policies
of Japan. Chapter III: The Public and Self-Defense Forces. Chapter IV: SDI
and Their Major Activities.
In Chapter I, the international situation is analyzed in terms of its relatively
long range trends and with emphasis on the factors relevant to the concept of
our national defense policies. The chapter also outlines the general implications
and the respective roles of the collective security system and military power in
the nuclear age; it also elaborates factual data on the military presence around
Japan.
Readers will find in Chapter II explanations of our basic defense policies,
including the concept of a basic standing force which can be characterized as a
basic defense capability.
Chapter III is devoted to civilian control and other related issues indispens-
able for understanding the fact that the self-defense forces are people's arms
and their effectiveness depends on mutual trust.
The last chapter includes factual information on the forces, their activities
and some of the problems inherent to their organization.

Chapter I. Trends of the International Situation
1. COEXISTENCE AND STRUGGLE
A. East-West relations
(a) The United States and the Soviet Union, fearing the consequences of
mutual use of nuclear arms with massive detructive power, have found that
it is to their mutual interest to continue their dialogue on how to avoid crisis,
whatever their conflict of interests, and to adopt political and military measures
necessary for accommodation. Thus East-West dialogue has continued in Europe
where impressive military forces, including those of the two superpowers.
directly confront each other; and potential confrontations have heen cli trolled
in other regions of the world where the interests of the two powers are deeply
involved.
(b) In the background of this trend exists a military equilibrium based on a
mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union or
between Western and Eastern Europe. Also contributing to this trend is the
common recognition that nations increasingly have to turn their eyes to their
own problems, that military expenditures would become too heavy to bear if
they should increase as tension remains and grows, and that many global prob-
lems are beyond resolution by military means only. In Asia. the SVino-United
States rapprochement became to some extent a regional stabilizing factor: but
the region is far from stable because of its multiplicity which has ao parallel
in Europe but has long been inherent to Asia.
(c) On the other hand, the world has faced a series of wide-ranging problems-
population increase, poverty, resources, pollution, among others. In the 1970's
in particular, food. oil and other resources have become serious issues which
impressed the world with the urgent need for international cooperation. The
issues no longer remain purely economic but are today identified as problems
(41)









directly relevant to national security. As a result, the growing need for inter-
national interdependence cannot fail to have a favorable impact on East-West
relations.
(d) However, the United States and the Soviet Union do not hide the mutual
distrust that lies underneath their detente; in fact, critical voices are constantly
raised in their respective domestic scene against concessions and compromises
related to detente. The United States interprets detente as a policy that governs,
with limitations, the relations between superpowers who are essentially in a
state of confrontation. The United States, therefore, seeks a more stabilized
international order by, on one hand, maintaining sufficient military power neces-
sary for a military equilibrium and, on the other, continuing her dialogue with
Moscow. As for the Soviet Union, peaceful coexistence is designed to avoid war
with nations with different social systems. Her policy, however, never rules out
all types of struggles, either national liberation or ideological.
(e) All this inevitably reveals the limit of detente. Its primary objective is
nothing but the avoidance of an intercontinental nuclear war as well as conven-
tional armed conflict that might escalate to such a war. Hence, detente does not
keep big powers from staging political struggles for expanding influence or for
preventing it. Neither does d6tente itself prevent military conflict in the areas
where big powers have only limited strategic interest, as evident in the case of
Angola.
(f) The emergence of China as a nuclear power has made international rela-
tions more complex than before and has contributed to the multipolarization of
world politics. Against the background of the Sino-Soviet dispute, China never
('eases to be defiant vis-a-vis her northern neighbor and always challenges any
possible creation of a new international order under a Pax Russo-Americana.
(g) Thus the realities of the world today are far removed from peace: powers,
in the East and the West, build up their military capabilities while keeping their
mutual distrust under the carpet, and make political accommodation only to the
extent it is necessary. D6tente or reduction of tension basically connotes both
coexistence and struggle between East and West. Consequently the international
community would have to live, for the foreseeable future, with the realities of a
continuous cycle of tension and relaxation. However inevitable the parallel pres-
ence of coexistence and struggle may be, if international relations are to turn
more stable, the world may continue to need international efforts to maximize
the coexistence relationship and to minimize the struggle factors through accel-
erated development of arms control and other measures.
B. Roles of collective security 8y8tem8
(a) Direct, armed collision has so far been successfully deterred both between
the two nuclear superpowers and between collective security organizations, each
with a US or Soviet deterrent, including nuclear capabilities, integrated as their
respective basic security factor. The rest of the world, however, has suffered
from countless military clashes since the end of World War II.
(b) The collective security system among nations had primarily been military
in Cold War days. As East-West confrontation was relaxed and interdependence
gained momentum, the system has become the base for a wider spectrum of
cooperative relations, not only military but also political and economic.
(c) This does not spell an end to conflict of interests or to confrontation
,imong nations. In the contemporary international community where the UN
peacekeeping function falls short of an effective means, collective security sys-
tems under regional arrangements still remain an appropriate option.
C. Contemporary implication of military power
(a) In the politico-military context outlined above, a kind of stability exists
among the major nations today. To uphold this stability, however, the US and
the Soviet Union have to keep their nuclear capabilities invulnerable while
others maintain a military potential based on credible conventional arms. It
might sound paradoxical that a strong military power is essential for the mainte-
nIance of peace; it might not be so, however, if one identifies military power with
the strength to deter war. This is the basic characteristic of military power in
the nuclear age.
(b) To avoi(l wars of any kind, a chain of nations should have no single feeble
link which might provoke a military challenge; only an international system
whose every link is strong and enduring can survive any test it faces. An appro-
priate defense posture, coupled with diplomatic efforts, is the first step to







43

strengthen the links of the chain of nations and to make peace strategy viable.
Such a defense posture depends, first of all, on a collective security system based
on common will and mutual responsibility.
Secondly, it implies that every member nation of the system must have a strong
will and capability to defend itself by itself. The maintenance and improvement
of such a posture over a long period is the prerequisite of regional stability and
peace.
(c) Even if a war should break out, the major powers will most likely try to
avoid a nuclear exchange or a large scale military conflict: thus it is quite pos-
sible that the actual employment of their military means will be limited to a
significantly lower level than what their inherent military might represents.
This explains why even a nonnuclear military power can be useful for the de-
fense of small and medium nations.

2. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF JAPAN
A. Most Asian nations have built-in domestic problems which, coupled with
regional multiplicity, contribute to an ever present instability. To make the inat-
ter more complex, China and the Soviet Union almost annually step up their
positive approaches to these nations; nowhere in the world does the Sinooviet
rivalry seem to be so overt and intensive. The United States, on the oti~er hand.
plays the role of a counter-weight to the communist rivalry by expre ssng her
concern in terms of a visible presence in the region.
B. Northeast Asia is the area where the vital strategic interests of the U[nitedl
States, the Soviet Union and China converge. It is also one of the areas where
a number of bilateral security systems function effectively, more or less. In
sharp contrast to the European environment, the area is laced with confronta-
tions and rivalries making it one of the most unstable regions in the world. A
large scale armed conflict, however, is deterred at the moment by the tacit efforts
of the United States, the Soviet Union and China.
C. On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union maintain iln
this area frontal deployments of their armed forces, second in scale only to tli *.r
of the European front. China and the Soviet Union have contributed since ri:'
late 1960's to a continued military tension along their land border where troop
concentrations are obvious on both sides.
D. The Soviet military has deployed in this region a sizable military force
with a variety of combat capabilities which seems to have been substantially
augmented in quality and quantity in recent years. In particular, its Pacific
Fleet has acquired the status of a full-fledged Blue Water navy.
E. China possesses a substantial military power with. as its mainstay. an
army with the largest manpower in the world and some nuclear capability. She
seems to be now focusing her efforts on the modernization of her military
capability.
F. The United States has gradually streamlined and reduced her military
presence in this region. but she still deploys an infantry and a marine divi-n
in the Korean Peninsula and Okinawa respectively while her 7th Fleet and the
5th Air Force maintain high mobile strike capabilities.
G. In the Korean Peninsula. the confrontation continne between the no, th
and the south with each side deploying more than a total one million reulr
troops in highest combat ready status. The area thus is one of the highest thret
areas in the world in terms of military tension. A military contingency. h ,wever.
still remains a remote likelihood mainly due to the continued military equilib-
rium supported by the US military presence in Korea.
H. Military situation in Japan's periphery: Chart I and 2 show the zenerl
trend of the military disposition around Japan and the deployment of forces in
her periphery.
Chapter I. Defense Policies of Japan

1. BASIS OF DEFENSE POLICIES
A. Futndanental implication of defense capability
(a) A nation possesses its own defense capability as a demonstration of its
people's will and responsibility to defend their freedom, independence and secur-
ity. and to uphold peace. progress and prosperity. In Japan's case, such a capa-
bility must be strictly for purely defensive purposes in accordance with the
stipulation of article 9 of the Constitution.









(b) With respect to nuclear arms, the three non-nuclear principles will be
maintained and, against a nuclear threat, Japan will depend on the credibility
of the American nuclear deterrent. If Japan should take a nuclear option even for
a purely defensive purpose, her actual possession of nuclear arms will create
serious suspicion and fear on the part of other nations. So long as Japan stands
on this premise, she should feel no need to go nuclear, from not only the military
but also the political viewpoints.
(c) With this as the basic characteristic, Japan's defense capability should
be ready to deal with a contingency by denying others easy armed aggression.
This defense capability, together with the United States-Japan security system,
must form a defense posture that leaves no operational deficiency. And under this
system, the capability must be one which can function effectively in preventing
al aggression before it is actually launched.
(d) The implication of possessing such a defense capability lies not so much
in fighting a contingency as in functioning for the maintenance of peace. The
capability, coupled with the United States-Japan security system, substantially
contributes to a stable equilibrium of international relations in Asia. From this
point of view, our defense capability should be of a size appropriate for such an
implication and a contribution; it also must be of a nature that directly serves
the public in helping and cooperating with them in peacetime.
B. United States-Japan security system
(a) The system is generally understood to play the role of preventing aggres-
sion against Japan from actually taking place, and of limiting the scale of an
invasion, should it ever be undertaken.
(b) The system is also instrumental in providing the US forces with facilities
and areas for their use, which in turn make their presence tenable. An integral
part of the basic framework of international relations in Asia, the system thus
contributes to the stability of the world and the maintenance of peace. Finally,
but not the least importantly, it is the indispensable base of the wider spectrum
of friendly United States-Japanese relations.

2. THE CONCEPT OF BASIC STANDING FORCE
A. Procedural background
The concept has been adopted by the Defense Agency in planning the follow-on
of the Fourth Five-Year Defense Buildup Program (fiscal year 1972-76). It is
expected to make the buildup program more concrete, practical, rationale and
meaningful than it has ever been. In other words, the concept represents a form
of thinking fed into the policy-drafting process in the Agency, and hence will be
ain input into a further review as to its practicability before it will be submitted
to the Defense Council for a final decision.
R. International en vironment
The concept presupposes a continued, effective maintenance of the United
State-s-Japan security system, and in addition assumes:
(a) that the United States and the Soviet Union will try to avoid an inter-
continental nuclear war and an armed conflict which might lead to their full-
scale involvement.
(b) that the Soviet Union will continue to face many European problems-a
NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation and the control of East European nations,
aniong other matters.
(c) that Sino-Soviet relations, if improved partially, will most unlikely lead
to an end of confrontation.
(d) that in Sino-U.S. relations, a further adjustment will continue on a re-
c'ilrocall hasis,. :1nd
ie) that the status (uo. more or less, will he maintained in the Korean Pe-
ninsula where a minor incident would not escalate to a large-scale conflict.
Thik s-eries of assmll ptioins makes it almost unthinkable that a large-scale
ilitlrv aggression might be launched against Japan but does not rule out the
1-s-illility of a spin-off from an armed conflict in Japan's peripheral areas and
f ot her sznall-scale military invasions.
'. conceptuall implicafions
:1) Against the background of the international environment assumed above,
our defense capability could he identified with a defense power in peacetime. Its









primary goal is not so much an ability to deal with a specific, imminent threat as
a basic posture streamlined as a whole with no gross deficiency and well-balanced
so far as its integral elements are concerned. Such a defense capability by nature
spells that:
(i) Every integral element of defense should have no serious deficiency so
that the capability as a whole would be sufficient to take minimum, necessary
steps in dealing with possible aggression staged by any of the conventional means,
(ii) In terms of operational function, all the elements must be built up and
organized by taking into account the characteristics of Japan's peculiar terrain
and other local conditions. This is indispensable for an organized defensive reac-
tion to an aggression, from its very outset, should it break out in either Japan's
territory or her peripheral air or sea space. The organization needs both a bal-
ances between, and an organic integration of, combat and logistic elements, if
they are to operate as an effective, comprehensive defense power against the
aggression.
(iii) In peacetume, the defense capability should undertake meticulously
planned training and education. Further, to be always ready for rescue-relief op-
eration in case of a large-scale natural disaster, the required units with necessary
facilities and equipment ought to be propositioned in such a manner as to leave
no serious geographical gap.
(b) In terms of operational capability, the basic standing force must main-
tain the following posture:
(i) For a quick and flexible response to changes in situations, a higher priority
should be given to operational readiness of air and strait surveillance as well as
other intelligence activities than to other elements of the defense capability.
(ii) The basic standing force must maintain an operational posture ready to
deal quickly and appropriately with indirect aggression, violations of territorial
air and other types of illegal military acts.
(iii) A most conceivable small-scale aggression, if any, may well turn out to
be a near-surprise attack. This spells a need for a quick response posture which
in turn depends on the sufficiency of manpower and equipment within a necessary
limit.
tiv) In upgrading various force functions and equipment, it should be taken
into account that the United States-Japan security system would function effec-
tively; that in turn means that smooth operational coordination with the U.S.
forces will be of critical importance.
(v) The force must be a basis for a smooth expansion and reinforcement to a
necessary level, if and when a political decision should be made to that effect in
response to changes in the international situation.
D. In short, our defense capability can be best described as the basic standing
force--hasic" in that it is similar to a meaningful basic minimum force com-
monly accepted as something which any independent nation will need, and "stand-
ing" in that Japan in particular needs it at all times, given the contemporary
domestic climate and international environment. The concept, however, will be,
subject to a review, should substantial changes emerge in the presupposed inter-
national situation.
E. Primary emphasis
A major emphasis is placed on qualitative improvement rather than on quanti-
tative expansion in the planned buildup of our defense capability under the
concept of the basic standing force. By qualitative improvement, it is not ineant
only to upgrade the performance factors of tanks, aircraft, ship and other major
equipment but rather to enhance the defense capability as a whole with combat
and loistic elements well balanced functionally in the context of an overall
national security posture.

Chapter III. The Public and Self-Defense Forces
1. CIVILIAN CONTROL
One factor differentiates the contemporary self-defense forces from the mili-
tary uaider the old constitution; it is the fact that they are integrated into a
civilian c,''ntrol system that exists in various forms at every planning and policy-
making stage from the Diet, the cabinet, the Defense Council to the I)tfen.t
Agency. The system, if it is to remain valid and viable, should be supported by
politico-administrative efforts public concern as well as by the understanding of
the men in the forces.







46

2. "COMMITTEE TO THINK ABOUT DEFENSE"
The 11-member committee was set up to give a conceptual input of public
opinion into defense planning for the period that follows the Fourth Defense
Buildup Program. The members studied and discussed, among other things, the
need for Japan to possess her own defense capability, the implication of the
United States-Japan security system and its role. The views and suggestions
produced in the committee have contributed substantially to the conceptual work
of the basic standing force.
3. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERN
Public concern in defense affairs has gradually grown greater as evident in a
recent public opinion poll which showed that 79 percent of the polled recognized
the need for having the self-defense forces. Close contacts are also developing
between the public in general and the men in the forces, while a minority of the
people still maintains a negative attitude toward the forces, producing a detri-
mental effect upon the morale of the men in service.
4. DEFENSE FACILITIES AND COMMUNITY
For an overall defense posture, it is critically important that a harmonious
relationship should exist between defense facilities and the surrounding com-
munity. On one hand, the facilities must function effectively; on the other, the
function should not disturb the community excessively. For this purpose, a new
law was put into effect in 1974 for the improvement of the living environment
around defense facilities. The Agency has since taken positive steps to reduce
the noise levels of aircraft and to prevent other forms of possible public nuisance.
5. RESCUE-RELIEF AND OTHER COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
In addition to their inherent mission, the self-defense forces must contribute to
the stabilization of national life by making best use of their organization, equip-
ment and capabilities. They must have undertaken rescue-relief operations, dis-
posal of unexploded bombers and other community activities, including civil
engineering projects. The rescue-relief operations have increased both in scope-
and scale as illustrated in chart 3. An exercise has also been conducted in prep-
aration for a possible major earthquake.
Chapter IV, SDF and Their Major Activities
1. ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORIZED MANPOWER
2. OUTCOME OF THE FOURTH DBP
The five year buildup program for fiscal year 1972-76 is about to end with a,
substantial proportion of the planned acquisition of major equipment left un-
accomplished, mainly due to extremely high procurement cost.
3. NEW UNITS AND NEW EQUIPMENT
Newly organized or commissioned units and equipment include the 1st Tank
Brigade, the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, DDG Tachikaze equipped with
SAMs, submarine Takashio, and F4EJ squadron and a C-1 Squadron, among
others.
4. SCRAMBLES
The Air Self-Defense Force is under alert around the clock against possible-
violations of Japan's territorial air. In September 1975, for instance, a Soviet
plane did violate the territorial air forcing the ASDF to scramble. Frequency of
scrambles stands at about 320 times a year (table 1).
5. RESTRICTED TRAINING AIR SPACE
Air space for ASDF training has been strictly restricted since 1971. This
creates considerable difficulty in the training programs of jet planes. A similar
diticulty exists in finding maneuver grounds for the GSDF and training waters
for the MSDF.
6. UPGRADING OF EDUCATION
A Defense Medical College was set up to meet an acute shortage of medical!
officers while the Defense Academy has added a new faculty of Humanities anU
Social Science.







47


7. INTERNAL OPINION SURVEY
A recent survey conducted by the GSDF shows that 74 percent of the men feel
their daily duties are worthwhile, that many list, as an ideal mode of living,
"life with time for individual hobbies" and that many others call for more in-
;tensive daily training.

8. NEW POLICIES FOR SDF PERSONNEL
A new system was initiated to recruit high school graduates of high caliber
and train them for quicker promotion to the EM grade; the Agency also improved
pay and accommodations for those living in barracks, and started in fiscal year
1974 to accept women in both the MSDF and the ASDF.

9. R. & D. AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
Domestic arms production is a desirable option for acquiring equipment that
is exactly suitable for Japan's terrain and other specific requirements as well
as maintaining a technological potential and streamlining logistic support.
However, there can be a case in which domestic technology and cost-effectiveness
,could be inferior to equipment purchased overseas. Procurement decisions have
thus been made on a case-by-case basis. Domestic arms production and R. & D.
have to. be undertaken in an extremely difficult condition, cost-wise and man-
power-wise. The problems that need further scrutiny include, therefore, a selec-
tion of items with predetermined priorities, strict evaluation and properly
planned home production.

10. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: THEIR TRENDS
During the Fourth DBP, the defense-expenditure/appropriated-budget ratio
,decreased annually as shown in Chart 4: the average increase of the expenditure
stands at 17.7 percent against 20.9 percent of the appropriated budget. On the
other hand, the manpower cost has risen while the proportion allocated to ma-
terial cost has dropped as shown in chart 5. The absolute amount of Japan's
defense expenditure can be ranked 10th in the world; but this is somewhat mis-
leading since Japan belongs to a world group ranked at the bottom if the ex-
penditure is measured in relation to either GNP, per-capita income or the ap-
propriated budget.

FIG. 1.-TREND OF FORCES AROUND JAPAN (APPROXIMATE)

Division Naval forces Air forces

'U.S.S.R. in the Far East:
1955 -------------------------------------------------------- 8 (17) 70 1,430
1970 --------------------------------------------------------- 20 (22) 100 1,870
1975 -------------------------------------------------------- 30 (30) -------------- 2,000
'China:
1965 --------------------------------------------------------- 225 (115) 21 2,800
1970 --------------------------------------------------------- 245 (118) 21 3,300
1975 --------------------------------------------------------- 280 (142) 35 4,400
l'iorth Korea:
1965 -------------------------------------------------------- 33 (18) 1.5 600
1970 -------------------------------------------------------- 37 (22) 1.4 580
1975 -------------------------------------------------------- 41 (24) 4.4 590
Republic of Korea:
1965 -------------------------------------------------------- 57 (29) 5.7 --------------
1970 ---------------------------------------------60 (30) 7.0 200
1975 -------------------------------------------------------- 58 (24) 7.8 220
VJ.S. Forces in the Far East:
1965 -------------------------------------------------------- 8.7 (3) 90 920
1970 -------------------------------------------------------- 9.6 (3) 110 740
1975 -------------------------------------------------------- 6.6 (2) 60 500
Japan:
1965 -------------------------------------------------------- 15.2 (13) 11.2 720
1970 -------------------------------------------------------- 15.8 (13) 13.9 590
1975 -------------------------------------------------------- 15.5 (13) 16.8 610

I. The figures for ground forces (10,000 persons) and air forces (combat aircraft) are quoted mainly from the Military
Balance published in the corresponding year.
2. The figures for naval forces (10,000 tons) are quoted mainly from the Jane's Fighting Ships published in the corre-
'sponding year.
3. The figures for Chinese divisions do not include artillery, and railway construction engineer divisions.
4. Naval force of the U.S. forces in the Far East is the 7th Fleet Air forces include carrier borne elements of the 7th
Fleet.
5. U.S. forces in the Far East are in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines.
6. The figures for Japan indicate actual strength.







48


Ii'*,blJic of' Korea


' E 7.8
S 220
Mariw. (,irfs 2
I.-S.F'. ill R.O.K.
t' '1.2 (1 div.)


00~(


if). OfIle Far Casit.

ImmUI H~I int 30)

um 120


L.S.F. ill

0.25


!I,.1 .F i l le s li
4 &I1 "a 220 The 7th Fleet

-A 5.2 Morine Corps 3.5 60
1-4" 5 0
A 50 _-a 150
(Carrier bornie)


(No e ) I. Aircrttft i i "ceribat t i rr aft" frw Mi i tary B I awce, it
,ses b,,..ber fighto-inm-ler st iki, intercepter
r#c',ii,, i ss~uic i c.; it does not iflcIude helicopters.


Japai.

ff 15.5

J16.8

x,/

.4"wC 500



U.S.F. ini Jai.pau
2.6

200

Marine Corps 2.4


hi na


28










,1, ,lO(i


-Irma






49

FIGURE 2.-Deployment and basing around Japan.


6 8 10 1
. I .
(3 J) L".


4 (10 20
FI l- i~J',






50

FxGuRE 3.-Relief for disastered people.


10. M







51


FIGURE 4.-Trend of defense budget.

1nT r,,ovme. r L 1,o ca I Si t, 11 o

AI.jalil.I Lo, Faci ii Lios a d Areast,
a.nd 1e i i on ________


C I '5- on i


C: V, =1


Oi.alld F t 0~I. ( th Ilk q




,:.>,l. laci I i Li s



0 -1


slid D.


2.9
1.9
1.1
3.1
2.0
1.3
2.(,
I 9
I .(0
2.3

0. 9
2.,
1.7
). 9


.I I ------------ --- -- I
10( 20 w 40 ) 60 70 80 0 00 (1,)


(Ni1,(-) I l'roV ii lliil Ii i IM]S 'O : plliS slid V ellhi cIes
2. Op(rat.ia i l still .a, ili'l.C 1eC 1)aI coE L CCiMCS ,i.v i lit' cost,
khlink.-lln, nce uid R~epai r.' "


Ai ycli ft. stlid zhips.
CIoLhilg, 1101 ,


FIGURE 5.-Change of composition of defense budget under the fourth 5-year
defense plan.

The number of times of scramble (Fiscal year 1970-74)
Fiscal year: Number of times
1970 --------------------------------------------------------370,
1971 --------------------------------------------------------345
1972 --------------------------------------------------------30
1973 --------------------------------------------------------27
1974 -------------------------------------------------------- 23

Total ----------------------------------------------------1.601
Average --------------------------------------------------- 320;


1 About.


FY 1972



1973



971


I )75


I ')7 ,t















4. DATA CONCERNING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND BASES IN
JAPAN

GRAPH I

U.S, 1,1fLITARY POPULAT10 IN JAPAI
(IN THOUSANDS)


z50 "


:: l' I ,1 i 1
. % I I j I *I

I I t I I






1 I!


L


1*


5. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 615 2 3565 67 Z3 6D 73 '71 7: T 7- 7
NoTE.-Rise on graph in 1972 reflects the U.S. bases on Okinawa which became
a part of the U.S. military community in Japan upon reversion.
Source: Dept. of Defense.

GRAPH II


400C


2CO

Co


C952


. . . .. . I'
1955 1960 1965 1570 1975


NOTE.-Rise on graph in 1972 reflects the U.S. bases on Okinawa which became
a part of the U.S. military community in Japan upon reversion.
Source': Dept. of Defense.
(53)







rh p '. 77',+,,,.
~f~j u~VIAi


U.S. MI R CIVIL SERiCE U.S. DEPENOENTS
EMPLOYEES (MIL a CiV)

ARMY 4.,462
NAVY 6,607
3,768 43,220
MARINES 23,915
AIR FORCE 14,756

TOTAL 49,750
3/76
G RA NDTO TAL 96,728 '

Source: Dept of Defense.


L~S OE~C' S &1 J


3/75.


Source: Dept. of Defense.













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