Peace efforts in the Middle East area

    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Foreword
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Table of Contents
        Page v
    Frontispiece
        Page vi
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
    NATO's southern command
        Page 3
    Egypt-Israel
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
    Iran
        Page 10
        Page 11
    Turkey-Greece
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
    Yugoslavia
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
    A concluding observation
        Page 22
    Back Cover
        Page 23
        Page 24

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman


CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L. H. FOUNTAIN. North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL. Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.. Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER. Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL. New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
LEO J. RYAN. California
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY. Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
EDWARD G. BIESTER, Ja., Pennsylvania
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California


MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, Chief of Staff
LEWIS GULICK. Staff Conisultant
SSTEPHEN E. WARD, Minority Staff Consultant
NA.NCY M. CARMAN, Staff Assistant
(i:)











FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
lVashington, D.C., March 3, 1976.
This report is submitted herewith to the Committee on International
Relations by a study mission which traveled to the Middle East area
in January 1976 to obtain information in connection with legislation
pending before the committee.
The observations and findings in this report are those of the study
mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of
the full Committee on International Relations.
THO.MAS E. MORGAN, Ch( i-in a .
L. H. FOUNTAIN.
CHARLES WILSON.
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD.
PAUL FINDLEY.
LARRY WINN, Jr.
ROBERT J. LAGOMA0RSINO.


(In)



















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CONTENTS

Page
Foreword ----------------------- n
Map of Middle East area--------------------- vi
Introduction -------------------------------------------------------- 1
NATO's Southern Command------------------------------------------- 3
Egypt-Israel -------------------------------------------------------- 4
Discussions with Egyptian leaders--------------------------------- 4
Discussions with Israeli leaders---------------------------------- 6
Findings and recommendations------------------------------------ 8
Iran --------------------------------------------------------------10
Turkey-Greece -----------------------------------------------------12
Discussions with Turkish leaders--------------- ------------------- 12
Discussions with Greek leaders------------------------------------ 15
Findings and recommendations---------------------------- ------- 17
Yugoslavia ------------------------------------------------------- 19
Findings and recommendations------------------------------------ 20
A concluding observation------------------ -------------------------- 22
(V)











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INTRODUCTION


On October 30. 1975, the President sent to Congress a message re-
questing substantial sums for international security assistance in fiscal
year 19M6 and "such amounts as may be necessary" for fiscal year 1977.
The maior share for fiscal 1976-some 70 percent-was requested for
programs he stated were necessary to sustain peace in the Middle East.
with the principal recipients being Israel and Egypt. The President
also proposed security assistance for the two allies on NATO's south-
eastern flank, Greece and Turkey.
Noting U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East since the 1973 war,
with the Sinai disengagement agreement of 1975 as the latest move in
the step-by-step process toward a permanent settlement, the President
stated that: "The hope for a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute is stronger today than at any time in the previous quarter
century."
Concerning Greece and Turkey, the President said implementation
of his proposed programs "would allow the United States to resume its
traditional cooperative role following the unfortunate disruptions oc-
casioned by the Cyprus crisis." He concluded that:
After 25 years of seemingly irreconcilable differences, two parties to the
Middle East dispute at last have taken a decisive stride toward settling their
differences, in joint reliance on our good offices and continuing Isupport. In the
strategic Eastern Mediterranean, two of our long-standing NATO allies look to us
for a tangible sign of renewed support and traditional friendship.
The Presidential request was referred to the International Rela-
tions Committee. On November 6, Chairman IMorgan and the ranking
minority member, Mr. Broomfield, introduced the President's proposal
by request. The committee began hearings that day with the Secretary
of State as the lead witness. Other prominent administration spokes-
men followed, after which the committee heard Members of Congress
and nongovernmental witnesses.
The. committee moved into markup November 13 on the basis of
draft legislation which combined the President's request and amend-
ments derived from extensive studies which had been conducted by the
committee.
By the time of the congressional year-end recess., the committee had
completed much work on the legislation. However, in the course of the
testimony and markup, the chairman and various members felt it
necessary to have more complete information on certain questions that
had arisen during the proceedings on the bill. It also became apparent
that. some of these matters would have to be dealt with again fairly
soon in separate fiscal 1977 legislation.
Under these circumstances-the importance to major peace efforts of
the pending and prospective legislation, and the need for further in-
formation before committee action-Chairman Morgran decided to
(1)







lead a bipartisan committee study mission to examine, firsthand, the
situation in the Middle East. The congressional recess provided an
opportunity to do so without, interrupting the legislative process.
Chairman Morgan was joined in the mission by Congressman Wil-
liam S. Broomfield, the committee's ranking minority member, and by
Congressmen L. H. Fountain, Charles Wilson, Paul Findley, Larry
Winn. Jr., and Robert J. Lagomarsino.
The mission left. Washington January 3, 1976. After a 1-day stop
in Naples, headquarters of the NATO Southern Command, the group
visited Egypt January 5-7, Israel January 7-9, Iran January 9-11,
Turkey January 11-13, Greece January 13-14, and Yugoslavia Janu-
ary 14-15, returning "to Washington January 16.
Because. of a. mishap in Naples, requiring medical attention, Chair-
man Morgan remained there temporarily but rejoined the group in
Ankara. During his absence from the mission, Congressmen Fountain
and Broomfield acted as cochairmen.
The mission met with the leadership in the capital of each country
visited. It was received with graciousness and cordiality throughout
its journey.
The chairman and members unanimously wish to express their
appreciation to the leaders and hosts in each nation visited, and to the
Ameriean Amiba-sadors and staffs and departments for their assistance
in the success of the mission.
After returning to the United States, the mission conferred on Jan-
liary 20 with Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco concerning
its findings and recommendations, and on January 22 met with Pres-
ident Ford.










NATO'S SOUTHERN COMMAND


On January 4 in Naples. the mission received a briefing from
Adm. Stansfield Turner, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, South-
ern Europe, at the admiral's residence. Senior members of the admiral's
staff also were present for the discussion.
Admiral Turner's command is one of the three under the Supreme
Allied Commander for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
Europe, the other two being the Northern Europe and the Central
Europe Commands. The Southern Europe Command extends from
Gibraltar to the Black Sea and is responsible for the defense of the
NATO region including Italy, Greece, and Turkey. It maintains a
working relationship with France, although the French do not par-
ticipate formally in NATO.
Admiral Turner spoke of four potential combat theaters in the south-
ern region along its 1,700-mile defense arc that extends from Resia
Pass in northern Italy to Mount Ararat in eastern Turkey, in the event
of attack by Warsaw Pact forces. They are northeast Italy, Greek and
Turkish Thrace, eastern Turkey, and the Mediterranean.
The Warsaw Pact forces are estimated by the NATO Command
to have a land force superiority of 11/ to 1 numerically facing the
southern region and an air superiority of 21/ to 1, including advanced
aircraft and a more comprehensive air defense missile system. In the
Mediterranean. NATO forces are numerically superior though the
Russians have engaged in an extensive buildup and now have a Medi-
terranean fleet among the most modern and sophisticated in tlie world.
The Mediterranean figures importantly in NATO's southern com-
mand because of its geography: The land fronts are separated from
each other by water with Italy, Greece. and Turkey all having exten-
sive coastlines.
While NATO still is the leading naval power in the Mediterranean.
Admiral Turner voiced concern about the increase in Soviet forces
while those of the alliance are decreasing. Concerning Greek-Turkish
dissension over Cyprus, he told us he was personally optimistic that
both parties realize they must make progress toward a settlement.
The admiral also expressed views on other political problems in the
area and responded to questions.
(3)











EGYPT-ISRAEL


Ever since the October 1973 hostilities in the Middle East, the U.S.
Government lias been actively engaged in assisting the parties to
reconcile their differences through the process of step-by-step negoti-
ation. The specific achievements to date--two interim agreements be-
tween Egypt and Israel in the Sinai and one agreement between Israel
and Syria on the Golan Heights-are significant both as military dis-
engagement and for the psychological impact of the negotiations.
Largely as a result of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, the principals to
the Middle East dispute have broken with the patterns of the past and
opted for negotiation rather than war as the preferred means to settle
their problems.
Maintaining the momentum toward a just and durable peace in the
Middle East is of obvious concern to Congress and the American pub-
lic. We have seen vivid, compelling evidence of the human and eco-
nomic cost of hostilities in the region; we are encouraged by the U.S.
role as catalyst in the negotiations, by the progress to date, and by the
potential for further progress toward peace.
The Congress has played a significant role in the U.S. effort. It has
consistently encouraged peace endeavors and. specifically since the
October war, lias enacted legislation to assist the Middle East parties
in a manner designed to enhance prospects for a just settlement. The
international security assistance bill pending before the International
Relations Committee at the end of 1975 featured further proposed aid,
primarily for Israel and Egypt, toward this end.
In visiting Egypt and Israel, the mission had two important ob-
jectives: to examine the requirement of each country for proposed
U.S. as-is',aince and to ascertain, on the basis of face-to-face discussions
with the leaderi-hlip of each country, the prospect for continued move-
ment toward peace in the area.

Dts'i-ssoNS WITH EorGYPTT..x LEADERS
Ti missi-on arrived in Cairo on January 5 and attended a country
team briefing at the Aknerican Embassy flthat afternoon. In the eve-
nin,. the d(leegation attendl(led an Eml);ssy recepl)tion to which promi-
nent Evpfti; na from (,o\ernmental and private seet.i s were invited.
TIe hosts w.re, Delputy Chief of M.ision Frank .[aestrone (Charge
in tli al .-ence of A ml1a s dlor lenirm nn Eilts who was in Washington
for ,onsnlt:mti,,u-) and M.s. Eilts. On J;nuar y 6 the inission met with
)Dr. C;aim,:il Oteifv, Depiit 'y Spealiker of the lPeople's Assefmbly, and
e(leeitl i, mcml, rs of the Egvpl-tin Peia ples A.sem, k bly. We then trav-
el(.,l to the B,1:1I.imlr for a i met ig w-ith Preiddent Sadat. In the eve-
Hinmg the mi-siol ;alteiled :a rc('eP)tion hote,.dl by Dr. Oteifv. On Jan-
i; arv 7. before. dep,'rtini; for T.-rel, the deleiratii n met witli the
Sel"kver of the People's Assemidbly., Sayyin M;r'liM iaid (ot lher Egyptian
Pauiaien(;n(4)s.
(4)






In our discussions with the Egyptian leadership the following views
were expressed to the mission:
United States-Egyptian relations
United States-Egyptian relations have improved dramatically since
the 1973 war and currently are excellent. The warm reception accorded
President Sadat during his visit to the United States had a very favor-
able impact on the President and the people of Egypt. Egypt also is
thankful for various forms of U.S. economic assistance since the war,
including our help in clearing the Suez Canal and in establishing an
Egyptian early-warning station near the Sinai passes. Egypt does not
demand an end to America's special relationship with Israel, only an
"objective" look at the Middle East situation. Egypt strongly hopes for
a continuation of U.S. peacemaking efforts, despite 1976 being an elec-
tion year in the United States. From Egypt's viewpont, friendship
with the United States cannot become just a slogan.
Massive U.S. military aid to Israel could jeopardize the future of
United States-Egyptian relations, particularly if the United States is
not prepared to respond positively to Egyptian requests for "defensive"
arms. Egypt is anxious to avoid the mistakes of the 1950's; that is, a
situation in which the United States refuses to respond to Egyptian
requests for assistance and forces Egypt to look elsewhere for help.
Peace efforts
Egypt discerns a new willingness in the United States to take a fresh
look at the problems of the Middle East. This is all Egypt had ever
asked. Egypt favors a step-by-step approach as offering the best pros-
pects for success, but emphasizes the urgent requirement for maintain-
ing momentum. Egypt proposes a reconvening of the Geneva Confer-
ence, to be joined by the Palestinians as a next step in the peacemaking
process. For the next several months the Conference would attempt to
block out the framework of a global solution to the Middle East prob-
lem. Egypt does not expect a full U.S. peace effort during the election
year, but after the election the new American administration would be
able to throw the full weight of U.S. prestige behind the peacemaking
process. Egypt recognizes that inclusion of a Palestinian representation
at Geneva would cause problems for the Government of Israel. Egypt
is ready to recognize Israel within her pre-1967 borders.
Palestinians
There can be no final settlement to the Middle East problem unless
the aspirations and legitimate interests of the Palestinian people are
taken into account. The Palestinian problem is a political problem and
should be recognized as such. A West Bank-Gaza state, connected by
a corridor through Israel, probably would be acceptable to the major-
ity of Palestinians. The denial of the Palestinians, the refusals to deal
with them, has produced the current ascendency of radicals in the
movement. The United States should undertake a dialog with tlhe more
moderate elements of the Palestinian movement to help forestall radi-
cal ascendency.
Arms for Egypt
Egypt wants to obtain "defensive" arms from the United States.
This would help in the context of peace negotiations, because there can







be no solution while Israel is powerful and Egypt is not. Israel's
1973 coimibat losses have been more than replaced by the United States.
The Soviets have done the same for Syria. For the past 2 years. Egypt
lias received nothing of consequence from the Soviet Union. Arns from
Europe cause logistic and parts problems. Egypt does not expect
parity with Israel in U.S. military assistance, but would be satisfied
with 40 percent of American supplies to Israel.
Eroiw nm.w
Egypt wants to turn her attention to economic and social develop-
ment. For this it is necessary to have peace. Egypt's economy is a mix-
ture of public and private sectors, and the private sector is being en-
couraged. If the encouragement of private enterprise in Egypt proves
successful, it will be copied elsewhere in the Arab area. The United
States should have a fundamental interest in supporting this develop-
ment in Egypt. Egypt's desire to turn its attention to economic and
social development is the best possible guarantee of Egyptian bona
fides in the quest for peace.
Syr?/a
Syria can cause trouble but cannot make war. Syria and the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization liave no meaningful choice but to go
forward with the momentum toward peace. Egypt favors U.S. assist-
ance to Syria, despite Syria's hostility toward Egypt. rather than
leaving Syria to the Soviets.

Tlhe Palestinians have long been neglected. They cannot be expected
to lI)e reasonable, logical, and rational. International recognition of the
movementt will strengthen the hand of the moderate elements and
hop e fully (decrease terrorisnI among the Palestinians. Even the PLO
leader-hrip has frequently condemned acts of international terrorism.

DISCU'SSIONS WITH ISRA.ELI LEADERS
Tlc' mission arrived in Tel Aviv late in the afternoon of Janu-
ary 7, anpd )roceeded directly to the Alierica lElmbassy for a country
ti.am briefing. In tle evening tlhe mission attended a reception hosted
bylN- Thomias J)iiniiiguIj 10d Mis. Malcom Toon. wife of the
A.iisi, do..',(' to whi(lI a wi(l, ra nge of Israeli Government officials
nd,1 1prominen t per'soins fromi private life were invited. On 0 Jauary 8.
tlie (le,(gatit()I 11(t with ArAnon Gafni. Director (Geieral of tlie Finance
Miisti.r.; split up for inspection trips to the Golan Ileights and the
Sinaii; attei ded ai working 11,'clu(on in Jerlusalem, with members of
tlhe I.sraeli K esset; and received a 1,riefing from I defensee Minister
S iim,1 Peres ;mid flie Chief o(f Staff, generall Gur, in Tel Aviv. The
briefling vwas followl',d by a dlifiiner hot('(l by vMiiiste"r Peres. A,\ong
thoae prevent a 111dl)tiijit ing in a lively alter-dinner dliscuIssioni were
former Defenise Miiiister Da *aii and Miuister ()f Jstice / a1k. (O)
Jliaiy 9, tlie mission ,1et with Prime Minister Rabilln before depart-
ing for Irii.
.A simairy of 'views gi\eI to tlie m issi.os by Israeli leaders includes
the follovwing lpoilnts:
,u t// /f ff iXf
lsr;ie.1 fi v,,-s the concept of g':idui;ilismthe tlhe lecenakilig efforts.
l11 it.w Sinai al.g\.i Sii'its is importta t ,becai se it coitinuIes tlie trend







toward peace in the area. Hopefully, this trend over the long run will
produce a change in the state of mind of the parties and will lead to
real peace. Some Arab parties, notably Syria and the PLO, are not
yet prepared for even the early steps toward peace symbolized by the
Sinai disengagement. The Soviets are using Syria and the PLO as
instruments to block the United States-Egyptian-Israeli effort for an
interim solution. As matters now stand, even the most moderate Arab
leaders have yet to express a willingness to recognize the existence of
Israel as a Jewish state; they just want to eliminate the state of war
with Israel. President Sadat of Egypt is the Arab leader closest to
accepting the concept of a reconciliation with Israel.
The pillars of the negotiating process are Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, and they must be kept intact in order to keep
momentum in the peace process. Israel is prepared to make territorial
concessions in return for movement toward peace, but return of
territory is related to steps toward peace. Israel is prepared for
territorial concessions on the Golan Heights in the context of peace.
To achieve peace in the Middle East. however, it is important to
maintain the balance of power in the area and to use all diplomatic
channels. The quest for peace requires patience, determination, and
realism.
Palestinians
The Palestine Liberation Organization has declared as its goal a
democratic secular state in Palestine, by which it means a state domi-
nated and controlled by Arabs. Israel would agree to a state com-
prised of a federation of 3 million Jews and the 1.5 million Arabs
in Palestine; everyone could vote, and there would be two Jews for
every Arab. The best way to deal with the Palestinian dimension
of the problem is through negotiations between Israel and Jordan.
The majority of Jordanian representatives at Geneva were Pales-
tinian, and Israel would not object if some prominent West Bank
leaders were included. However, a Palestinian niinistate on the West
Bank would not be an answer to the Palestinian problem, and would
inevitably undermine any agreement. The Palestinians are refugees
who must be resettled in an Arab state.
Syria
Israel has agreed to negotiations with Syria under U.S. auspices
but President Assad has refused to meet with Presi(ldent Ford to discuss
the framework of such a negotiation. Syria, not Israel, is holding
back on negotiations. Israel will not back down all the way in making
territorial concessions on the Golan Heights, but for genuine peace
might be prepared to do a lot.
Economic
Israel is making substantial sacrifices to meet her economic prob-
lems. U.S. aid does not improve the standard of living in Israel. it
does not even meet her foreign currency needs for defense. Forty
percent of Israel's budget goes for defense and 20 percent for debt
service. Israel's program involves reducing the standard of living
of her citizens, increased taxes, and reduced imports. Her people
are the most heavily taxed in thle world. Israel is asking for $2.3
billion in aid from America, not to pay for war but to give Israel the
basis of strength and security needed to continue her quest for peace.






At the same time Israel favors aid to Egypt for her economic
development.
Military
Potential adversaries include Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and. con-
sidering the turmoil in Lebanon, foes on the hitherto inactive northern
front. To the east. Syria. Jordan. Ir'aq. and Saudi Arabia together
could muster some 14 to 15 divisions. 3,700 tanks and 700 combat
aircraft. Israel has little buffer space in this direction, its popula-
tion centers being close to the border. Thus it is essential for Israel
to have early warning, even if only a few minutes, in case of an Arab
offensive; and Israel believes she must dominate the terrain in order
to get such wanling.
Thle Arab States have the forces. and tlhe ability to attack Israel at
any time they choose. The Arab States are improving the quality of
their military equipment. They canll buy fromi the. United States. the
Soviet Unionll, and Western Europe. Before 1973 Israel had to contend
with only one technology, which was Russian.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The mission was very pleased and impressed with the warmth of
the reception accorded to us in Egypt. While contrasting this with
the chill of United States-Egyptian relations prior to the October
197.2 waar, we recall lSpeaker Mir i's observation that Egyptians do not
hate Americans even in bad times. We found that the welcome given to
President Sadat during his visit to the United States last fall had been
well noted in Cairo. President, Sadat himself stressed to us that after
years of confrontation, Egypt and the United States now enjoy a
new relationship of understanding, and he added that "I should
always be working for peace and will try to maintain the best pos-
sible relatiotls with the United States..
There seemed to be little doubt about the genieiineness of tlhe interest
shown by President Sadat and his associates in achieving a Middle
East peace settlement. The focus of our talks was on how best to
reacli a solution. [lThe Lgpt ini leaders envisioned t lie "step-lby-step"
approach as offering thle best prospects, )buit stressed the necessity for
continued forward movement. However, they also anticipated that the
American effort on behalf of negotiations would be hindered somewhat
during 1976 because of the U.S. elections.
Co(nernling tile Palestinian question. Cairo"s recomimielildationl to us
\\as tlhtl tlie Unitad States eliterl into 1a 1 ialor \withi moderates in tlie
Palestine Liberation Organiiization (PLO). President Sadat specific-
:uly I ,etioled Ya.sir Ar;ifait atid Fatah inii thllis collection, and said
si.h a i move 1v I'.S. oflici ils would strengthen the hiand of tlie
1110'derates aII( hiell forest ill ascendaicy of rail icai1s along lthe Pales-
tinians. Suchli a dialog would produce "a dramatic change in the
Palestinian way of thinkingg" we were told.
We found notewortlhy the li(igrh priority the Egyptian Government
is placing, oi, i lmp roing i gyl)t's e'oomy3.l Tl. desire to turn the
(coilntry's resources to economic developmnent is an important incentive
for mrnoving to a peace settlenieiient.
In Israel, w. found tlie leadership) fully desirotis of a peace settle-
ieit. :1inIl ai tlie silie i tim,' ext re'lic y waI.ry of ally uiisslteps along the







way. Israel is willing to offer territorial concessions, but only in re-
turn for genuine progress toward peace. As Prime Minister Rabin
explained, yielding territory could bring Israel closer to war, and
shortcuts are not always the best way to achieve one's objective. He
said the quest for peace requires patience, determination, and realism.
Like Egypt, Israel sees merit in the step-by-step process. The Sinai
II disengagement was portrayed to us as evidence of the merits of
gradualism. The hope is that in the long run a trend toward a solution
will produce a change in the state of mind of the parties and will lead
to real peace. The Israelis emphasize that, as the party being called
upon to make concrete, as opposed to symbolic, concessions they must
examine carefully each step in the negotiating process.
Israel clearly is not prepared to negotiate with the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization at this time. She would prefer to negotiate Pales-
tinian aspects of a peace settlement with King Hussein. She sees no
willingness by the PLO to accept Israel's right to independent existence
as a Jewish state.
From a military standpoint, Israel's defense leaders make a strong
case concerning the possible threat to Israel. As part of their
responsibilities, they must presume the possibility of a unified and
surprise attack from all potential foes, which if it were to occur,
would severely challenge Israel's defenses.
Israel's defense requirements entail severe economic burdens. Prime
Minister Rabin spoke to us about how difficult it has been for him
to go to the Israeli public with a program of reducing the standard of
living, but it has been done. Israel is trying to help herself, but she also
needs assistance from the United States.
We are pleased, from our talks in both Israel and Egypt, with
the desire for peace manifest in both capitals.
We observed also that the leadership of each country has developed
respect for the other.
We believe that the economic interests of each country provide a
further strong incentive for peace, and that assistance from the United
States to both is a worthy investment toward an eventual Middle East
settlement.










IRAN


Iran's size. resources,. and strategic location make her a major factor
in relation to both the Middle East and South Asia. Under the vigorous
leadlerslhip of the Shah and through intensive application of her re-
sour,'es. Iran is fast becoming a nmoderni power. Because of her capac-
ity as the world's second largest exporter of oil, her foreign economic
policy has wide impact on the industrialized and developing nations
of the world.
The United States and Iran have enjoyed close relations for many
years. We have supported Iran's independence, encouraged her leader-
ship in regional security affairs, and cooperated in her efforts for
social and economic progress. Iran purchases arms from the United
States on a large scale, and al:-o imports a wide range of American
goods and services for her economic development.
Because Iran would be affected by certain legislative proposals be-
fore the International Relations Committee. and because of Iran's
unique relationship to other areas of concern to the mission, we wel-
comed the opportunity to ol)tain firsthand views of the leadership in
Teliran.
The mission arrived in Iran on the afternoon of January 9. Tlhe
delegation received a briefing from Ambassador Richlard Helms and
tlie country team at the American Embl)assy, and in the evening at-
tendled a reception lhosted by Ambl)assador and Mrs. Helms at which a
(listingiiislied cross-se(ction of Iranian governmental, academic and
jourla listic leaders was present. The followingl day the group met witli
the Miniister of Economic Ak flairs and Finance. Hisslanr Ansary, with
His Majesty the Shah, received a briefing from tihe U.S. Defense Repre-
senltative. ( riieral Brett, and attended a reception hosted 1)y the Presi-
dent of the Senate at which the delegation met members of both
Houses of Pairlianiient.
Views expressd(l to tlhe mission by Iranian leaders included tlie
following:
WIorld situation
The Uiiited Stit's cannot afford to turn isolationist. If the United
Stnates, tlhe mo-t powerful nation in the world, d(oexs not take u1) its
glIobaI relsponsil)i lit ies, the ,Soviets will lmove into thle vacuum. After
the .lf-;lysi. following Vietia ii, A.1 ierici murtst decide where its
vit;1l interests lie, niiulke it-, .-.;tid clear to otliher vicomitries. ad continue
to prIoi,11e the l.ade.rslilp io oiler country can offer. We miist not
;allow onr sti'engt'. to lw sapp)led I)y tit illusion that detente will re-
St I.,IiI I So iet agg(re -,Ssion.
11,11ii x I -V f1 r n/ifio11,(1 pfffRIfOI(
Soviet :l ,intions in tlie Midd le 1 East and So,,tll Asia pose a threat to
I;,in ald( tll(e free world. IranI's military buildup must be seen in this
glill. TIle Soviets are providing sophisticated arms to Iraq and other
(10)







neighboring countries. In this region there must be someone besides
the United States capable of intervening to stop the Communists if
the need arises, since the United States cannot be expected to inter-
vene in each and every situation. Ideally, Iran would prefer that no
major powers be present in the Indian Ocean, but since the Soviets
are pursuing intense naval activities in the area, Iran welcomes the
U.S. Navy's presence at Diego Garcia. Iran's help will be required to
police the Indian Ocean.
Arms sales
Iran is a peaceful nation but she must acquire arms against the pos-
sibility that she may have to stand up against Soviet or other radical
influence in the area. Iran must have the means to protect herself. The
Soviets, for example, have supplied Iraq with Migs, Scuds, Frogs and
tanks. The Soviets have use of a new airport at Berbera and are basing
20 new missiles there. If Iran cannot procure a navy, the whole of the
Indian Ocean may be left to the Soviet Union. Those who would re-
strict U.S. arms sales to Iran are irresponsible, because if the United
States restricts herself from selling, Iran will buy elsewhere.
Economic
Iran has embarked on an extensive and so far successful economic
development program. However a reduction in oil lifting causing a
$2.5-$3 billion revenue loss this year threatens Iran's large foreign as-
sistance program and her mushrooming purchases from abroad. Iran's
largest trading partner is the United States, and if her purchases have
to be curtailed this could impair the U.S. balance of payments and
employment. Iran receives no aid from the United States. Its $3.5
billion to be dispersed in foreign assistance in 1976 is 7 percent of
Iran's GNP, the highest for any country in the world, although ad-
mittedly only $1.2 billion of this is on concessional terms. Iran's GNP
was up by 46 percent, last year. She anticipates her current GNP of
about $50 billion will rise to $170-$180 billion by 1985, placing her on
a par with Western European countries. Iran is pleased with opera-
tion of the United States-Iranian joint economic commission, but does
not like her exclusion from the U.S. Generalized System of Preference:
because of her membership in OPEC; Iran did not embargo oil to the
United States in 1973, as did a number of other OPEC nations. Con-
cerning oil prices, only 1 percent of U.S. inflation was caused by in-
creased oil prices while the price of imports from the United States
climbed 35 percent in the same period.
Palestiniaqs
Iran sees no other solution to the Palestinian question than the es-
tablishment of a new Palestinian state. King Hussein will not be able
to solve the Palestinian problem himniself. The United States has, no
choice but to seek an appropriate dialog with the PLO, establishing re-
lations with those who will eventually set up a Palestinian state.
Turkey-Greece
The United States must try to keep good relations with both Turkey
and Greece.










TURKEY-GREECE


No area of the world is of greater importance to America's security
than Western Europe. Within the Atlantic community, the key role
in defense of the southeastern flank of NATO lies with Greece and
Turkey. Thliis. it is of concern to us. and to our other Atlantic friends
and allies, when a serious dispute arises between Turkey and Greece,
threatening NATO solidarity and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.
It is of further concern when such a dispute damages our bilateral
relations with both states and throws into doubt the future of impor-
tant common defense installations in their territories.
In going to Ankara and Athens, the mission was mindful also of the
need for American forces to maintain a credible presence in tihe eastern
Mediterranean in times of crisis and to support U.S. goals in the
Middle East. Our access to ports and air bases in both Turkey and
Greece has enabled this in the past. Installations there additionally
have provided significant intelligence about Soviet activities in the
area. as for instance during the October 1973 war.
Therefore the mission was keenly interested in the Cyprus issue,
thie prime cause of dissension between our two longstanding friends
and allies. Without urgency in movement toward a peaceful solution,
we felt. the damage from the dispute could go beyond repair.
The Cyprus question, long a source of contention between Turkey
and Greece, flared anew in the summer of 1974 when the legitimate
government of Cyprus was overthrown with the assistance of the mili-
tary government in Athens. Turkey, perceiving a threat to the Turkish
Cypriot community on the island, intervened in Cyprus, using Ameri-
can-supplied equipment, and its forces still occupy 40 percent of
Cyprus.
Congress invoked a ban on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey in view
of the statutory requirement that An"erican-supplied military equlip-
ment must not be used for plilposes other than for which it is fur-
nlislied. The bai took effect February 5,1975. In July 1975, following
House rejection of n Senate-passed bill providing for partial lifting of
the armis eIa mba rgo. Turkey suispended activities at joint defense instal-
latiolns inll that country including intelligence collection stations.
In October the House l)aSsed legislation allowing release of the $185
million of aris contracte(l and Imaid for by Turkey before the Febrit-
Sry 5 eIambrgo, and pl)erjiitting Turkey to make coinlnercial military
pulrch..-es in tlhe IUnited States. Tlie measure further required that the
President rel)ort to Congress every 60 days onl progress being made
toward a ie'gotiatedl ,olutioi of tle (cy rtIS conflict.
Meaniwiile (1liploiitic efforts, tho, glug the Inited Nations and via
i Ilat v,. I" ona, t act s. h];I v. been m11.de for neg l otiated set t lenent. Secre-
tarv Kissiiiger, for vexavipfle, iiet with tlie foreign mini sters of ( reece
:iad Tuurkevy while il Briussels last Deceiibelr. The variouts initiatives
l i 'e i ot siu'(''eeded iii aIy 1J),ei-kt IrojIgil to late, althl ouagh in Ills D)eceli-
(12)





13


ber 5,1975, report the President stated that "they have advanced pros-
pects for a negotiated settlement."
It was in this atmosphere of strains in NATO, obvious distress in
United States-Turkish bilateral relations resulting from the arms em-
bargo, the shutdown of important installations in Turkey, and uncer-
tainty over the prospects for movement toward a Cyprus settlement
that the mission visited Ankara and Athens.

DiscussioNS WITH TURKISH LEADERS
The mission arrived in Ankara Sunday afternoon January 11. At
5:30 p.m. the delegation met at the residence of Ambassador William
B. Macomber for a thorough briefing by the Ambassador and his coun-
try team. The briefing was followed by a reception by the Ambassador
and Mrs. MIacomber at which Turkish government, business, press, and
academic leaders were present.
On January 12 the mission began the day with a simple but im-
pressive wreath-laying ceremony at the Ataturk Mausoleum. There
followed a series of meetings with senior officials of the Foreign Minis-
try concerned with American, NATO, and Cyprus affairs; a session
with members of the Turkish Parliament at the Grand National As-
sembly (Parliment) Building; a private meeting and luncheon with
Prime Minister Demirel; an hour's audience with President Koruturk
at the Presidential Palace; an interview with former Prime Minister
and opposition leader Ecevit at his Republican Peoples' Party head-
quarters; and an evening banquet hosted by Deputy Prime Minister
and Mrs. Feyzioglu at the Parliament Building.
The Turkish leaders were friendly and candid in expressing their
views to the mission. Their statements to us concerning important
points of mutual concern can be summarized as follows:
United States-Turkish relation.
For three decades, Turkey and the United States have had a mutual
interest in stability and world peace. Turkey considers that this shared
concern remains valid. However, there has been a severe setback in
bilateral relations during the past year because of what Turkey views
as an artificial link between the Cyprus issue and Turkish-American
relations. Turkey believes it to be a mistake to inject this third country
issue, with its long and complex history, into Ankara-Washington
relationships. The embargo is particularly painful to Turkey since
it comes from a trusted friend. Turkey sees it as a breach of faith and
obligation and must now question the credibility of the U.S. defense
commitment. However, there is a mutual interest and determination
to restore our relationship to previous levels, which we hope will
succeed.
VNATO
Turkey regards NATO as an essential element of Western security;
NATO is important to Turkey; Turkey has been a loyal ally for three
decades; with NATO facilities in the country, Turkey has assumed
additional security risks and must maintain adequate security forces.
However Turkey's ability to meet her joint defense responsibilities,
in view of her limited resources, is also related to available military
assistance. Turkey's contribution to NATO will be in proportion to







her capabilities. The U.S. embargo hurts Turkey's capacity to continue
as an ally for tlhe common cause against a common threat. A multi-
million-dollar airplane that the United States has supplied Turkey
cannot fly if the United States will not allow shipment of $50 worth of
-pare parts.
BRoses
The United States-Turkish negotiations concerning bases in Turkey
involve both status-of-forces agreements (the conditions governing
the U.S. presence in Turkey) and thle. levels of U.S. assistance to
Turkey. In order to undertake rational long-term defense planning,
Turkey is anxious to know how much aid it will be receiving and for
how long. This in effect would involve a long-term U.S. commitment.
Turkey is not demanding rent or putting a price tag on its NATO
membership, but needs some assurance of future aid levels. A condi-
tional pledge of support is not enough.
Cypress
Turkey's leaders (including opposition leader Ecevit) sincerely
de-ire a r.-oluition of the Cypruis problem. Tlhe Governmnents of Greece
and Turkey have reached tacit agreement on the. broad outlines of a
Cyprus settlement: there should be a bizonal federation on Cyprus,
with limited powers for a central government inll which both commu-
nities would participate equally. Tile Turks are willing to negotiate
on the borders of the Turkish zone, but have certain principles to
which they adhere: the Turkish area should be economically viable,
homogeneous and secure. When there is a settlement, Turkey will
witlidraw from Cyprus.
Turkish officials acknowledge that they face domesticc political diffi-
41ilties in negotiating a Cyprus settlement (although former Prime
Minister Ecevit told us that he has encouraged tlhe Government to
move toward a settlement) and tliat the Turkish community on
(Cyprus. which lias three political parties, lias its own ideas oil how
the situation should be lhandile(d. Nevertheless. Tiurkev maintains that
these problems are manageable and far less significant than what
they see as the negativismn and veto power wiel(led by Archbishop)
Makarios.
As evidence of Greek Cy(priot recalcitrance and ill will, the Turks
s1ggested thIit tlie Go(vernr1ent of Cy~pri-. lunhap.py at tihe easing of
tlh(e a rms emarngo, took the Cyprus (question to the United Nations
Secilluitv CoInci il where it gained( a resol ution totally unacceptable
to Turke(y. Akrhibisliop MaIkarios was accused of fuirthler stalling tac-
tics )\. se(ekig I I to use, t Ile I .N. .pesol ution as tlie l)asis for negotiations.
I'iurkev's py. siti n is tliat slie did nt cause tle Cyprus problem and
wo(ld like to( see it settled M-ice it diverts l'urkisl energies fromi
pres-in (l,,,1ie-[ti,' prole. s. Turkey 1,elieves slie ated with restraint
and foe.laranc over a 1.-yealr period while Archbislhop Makarios
violtedl tlhe .rilt-, of' the Turkldi (.colll'l nitv on tihe island. After tlhe
.x .iii,, p ovo<)v, it ion of tle Sa ,isoil Iop). Tuilrkiey believed shlie hlad
tHie ri.!ht to intrve.e in (.virus. As to tle argumeInlet tlhat there was
S.o(1,e ljust ificutii i for t ,, i 1iti al 1unrkisl int,'erve tion but not for the
:eC( (1-Ia -tge A.;Itust ol'eI ivre wli'l ledt t tfi he c ',onquiest of a great deal
of territory :,1il1 t lie :dplaceielnt of Imo,.t of the refugees. tlie Turkisli
vie\ i ;is is fIllows : ; ft.r tlie initial invasion of (Cypru-s T'irkey liad too





15


many troops in too small an area. The situation was militarily unten-
able. In the initial Cyprus negotiations, the Turks had proposed a
buffer zone enabling them to spread out their troops, but the Greeks
had refused the idea. The second-stage operation had then become a
military necessity; it was not intended to annex territory.
The arms embargo, from the Turkish standpoint, has not contrib-
uted to a Cyprus settlement. Turkey wants to negotiate a settlement
on Cyprus but maintains that the embargo encourages the Greeks and
Greek Cypriots to stall and manipulate the arms issue. She believes
the Greeks can continue to try to hurt Turkey simply by standing pat.
Turkey has withdrawn 10,000 troops from Cyprus since its maxi-
mum buildup.
[NOTE.-With the announcement in early February of an additional with-
drawal of 2,000 troops, the figure now stands at 12,000.]
Turkey believes that, in the past, offers made in good faith by Tur-
key were not given adequate consideration by the interested parties.
Turkish-Greek relations
Turkey is satisfied with the territory it has. It wants to promote eco-
nomic development within its existing boundaries. It has always been
and will continue to be a basic principle of Turkish foreign policy to
seek solutions through negotiation to problems with Greece in order
to establish a new era of friendship and cooperation in the relations
between the two countries. To leave the problems unsolved is not in
the interest of the two countries.
DISCUSSIONS WITH GREEK LEADERS
The mission arrived in Athens the morning of January 13 and at-
tended an early afternoon briefing at the American Embassy by Am-
bassador Kubisch and his country team. Later in the day the delegation
met with Foreign Minister Bitsios and Minister of Coordination and
Planning Papaligouras, and then with Prime Minister Caramnanlis. In
the evening the mission attended a reception hosted by Ambassador
and Mrs. Kubisch to which leading Greek officials. Parliamentarians,
academicians and businessmen were invited.
The Greek leadership spoke to the mission with candor about a
number of significant matters. Points they made to us included the
following:
United States-Greek relations
Greece and the United States are bound by friendship; the Govern-
ment and people of Greece want the closest possible cooperation with
the United States. Despite differences between the United States and
Greece because of U.S. policy during the junta years and with respect
to Cyprus, Greece remains attached to the West and wants close and
friendly relations with the United States. However the present Greek
leadership needs moral and political support to stabilize the situation
in Greece, to help establish a safe and sound democracy following 7
years of dictatorship. Serious difficulties must be overcome: differences
over Cyprus, shoring up the economy and building institutions to pre-
serve democracy. If Greece can meet these challenges over the next
2 to 3 years, it will have the strongest democracy in Europe and the
United States will have the best possible partner with which to work
and cooperate.





16


Cyprus
The conflict with Turkey over Cyprus threatens the peace and sta-
bility of the eastern Mediterranean. Greece has proven its good faith
and willingness to negotiate. In urging Greece to support prompt prog-
ress in the Cyprus negotiations, members of the mission were "forcing
an open door." Although Turkey perpetrated the injustice on Cyprus,
Greece, the aggrieved party, has accommodated almost all the Turkish
demands, yet there has been no response from the Turks. It is the
Government of Turkey and the Turkish community on Cyprus that
are creating obstacles to negotiations.
Three days after invading Cyprus, the Turks had achieved their
purposes as a guarantor power. Sampson was out, replaced by Clerides.
The military dictatorship in Athens had been replaced by Prime Min-
ister Caramanlis. Yet the Turks did not withdraw from Cyprus; 15
days later they advanced and occupied 40 percent of the island, creat-
ing a huge refugee problem in the process. The only justification for
the second operation was military conquest. Despite this evidence of
Turkish perfidy, the new Greek Government asked to sit down and talk
about Cyprus. Greece could have insisted on a return to the status quo
ante. but instead acceded to Turkish demands for a federal system
with a weak central government. Greece must insist, however, that the
site of the territories, or zones, be roughly proportionate to the popu-
lation of the respective communities on the island.
The reality of the situation on Cyprus is that the Turks have 18
percent of the population and 40 percent of the territory. Approxi-
mately half the Greek Cypriot population-some 200.000 people-are
refugees. The Greeks recognize that this is an intolerable situation
and are anxious to negotiate; it is the Turks who are stalling. The
problem is not w-hat the Greeks are going to do; the problem is to make
the Turks see the light. The Government of Greece has been so moder-
ate and so forthcoming on the Cyprus issue as to arouse some domestic
political resentment. By adopting a moderate position on Cyprus.
Greece has made a solution to the Cyprus problem relatively easy;
there is no solution because there is no Turkish good will.
LEmil 1 o/ NA TO
Greece regards the embargo on arms to Turkey as an internal Ameri-
can question and has no wish to interfere in the matter. However, no
one likes to see their enemy armed. Lifting the embargo will not help
solve the Cyprus problem. The Tuirks were warned on the embargo
before it took place and paid no attention; they have not responded to
tlhe October relaxation.
Gr'eek-Tu"rksi relation
Gree,', is iHtereste(l in finding a solution to Cyprus and other
Greek-Turkish problems. However a way must be found to get. the
Turks to respond; otherwise, there is a real danger of war. The Aegean
issue is another exan1iple of Greek reasoniial)leness and Turkish intran-
sitrence. teallwlhile l)oth GIreece and Turkey face economic problems.
Greece does not oppose economic assistance to Turkey.
Er'nornwm i: n'roblem.s
Greece's economic problems are aggravated by the need to sustain
large defense expenditures because of tlie situation with Turkey.







Greece also wants to be strong in order to meet her Atlantic alliance
responsibilities in the event of a general conflagration. Moreover
Greece faces critical social demands and must reactivate its economy if
democracy is to prosper.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No portion of the mission's trip to the Middle East involved more
immediately pressing considerations than the visits to Turkey and
Greece, where the key issue discussed was the dispute over Cyprus.
In both capitals we sought to convey a sense of the urgency we attrib-
ute to achieving progress on Cyprus. In so doing we stressed to our
Greek and Turkish allies that we came as friends seeking to be helpful
and were not engaged in pressure tactics.
In both Ankara and Athens we were impressed by the evident
friendship and good will toward the United States, despite pending
problems in our bilateral relations. Greece and Turkey retain an on-
going interest in cooperation with the United States, notwithstanding
that in reference to the Cyprus question, Greece believes she is the
aggrieved party, while Turkey feels she has been seriously wronged
by the United States.
We left the area with a more vivid understanding of why the
Cyprus impasse, if permitted to fester, will increase the danger of
hostilities between Turkey and Greece. Prime Minister Demirel and
Prime Minister Caramanlis both spoke to us, in different contexts.
about the possibility of war in the eastern Mediterranean under cer-
tain circumstances. These statements were made amid extensive dis-
cussion of efforts to move toward a peaceful settlement and were not,
in our opinion, intended as threats. It is apparent that until there is a
mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem, this dispute will
continue to poison Greek-Turkish relations, will impair our relations
with two important allies, and will work to the detriment of NATO
solidarity and the prospects for enduring peace in the region.
Our visits to Greece and Turkey left us guardedly optimistic about
the prospects for progress on Cyprus despite the failures to date in
the search for a solution. In Ankara, the Turkish leadership showed,
in our opinion, a sincere interest in moving toward a settlement. The
mission was assured that a date would be set soon for intercommunal
Cyprus talks. In Athens, Prime Minister Caramanlis encouraged us
with his statement that in urging Greece to negotiate, "you are forcing
an open door."
Thus we were pleased, though not surprised, with the Ankara an-
nouncement shortly after our return to Washington that the Cyprus
talks would be resumed on February 17. We also welcomed Turkey's
subsequent announcement of a withdrawal of another 2,000 Turkish
troops from the island, in addition to the approximately 10,000 already
pulled out.
Perhaps the most hopeful indication of potential for progress on
the Cyprus issue is an apparent similarity of views reoardiing the gen-
eral framework of a settlement. The concept envisages an independent
Cyprus under a loose federal government, with the Greek and Turkish
zones each possessing a large measure of autonomy. How much terri-







tory would be accorded to each zone would, of course, be a major item
to be negotiated.
Regretfully, we gained no evidence to suggest that renewed negotia-
tions on Cyprus will quickly produce any dramatic breakthroughs.
The suspicions and animosities between Greece and Turkey are deep
and longstanding. The Cyprus issues are complex. Bothli sides must
contend with domestic political considerations and the positions taken
Iby the leadership) of their kindred communities on the island. Such
(elements work against a speedy solution.
In order to create. and maintain momentum toward a Cyprus settle-
ment. we favor maintaining diplomatic efforts by the United Nations
and by friends and allies of the two countries, including the good
offices of an American mediator if the appropriate opportunity arises.
We have found no evidence to suggest that U.S. pressure against
Turkey such as the alrms embargo can effectively induce a Cyprus set-
tlement. We did gain a heightened awareness of the damage done to
United States-Turkish relations and to Turkey's contribution to
NATO from the previous embargo action, and we believe that any
further action along this line would be detrimental to U.S. interests.
On the other hand, it seemed clear to us that both countries want
and need U.S. assistance in carrying out mutual security responsibili-
ties. We therefore favor the provision of U.S. assistance to both Tur-
key and Greece under the pending International Security Assistance
Act of 1976 in order to sustain a strong Atlantic alliance and gain the
stilpport needed for U.S. interests in the Middle East.










YUGOSLAVIA


In going to Belgrade to confer with Yugoslav leaders prior to return-
ing to the United States, the mission sought to reaffirm congressional
interest in good bilateral relations with Yugoslavia. to learn more about
Yugoslavia and her outlook on international issues, and particularly
to gain perspective on the problems of the Middle East as seen from
her unique vantage point.
Yugoslavia is Communist, but a determinedly independent country.
She has sought to maintain friendly relations with all states. East and
West, but without linkage to-their security blocs. Over the years Yugo-
slavia has played a leadership role in the nonalined world and has
cultivated ties with newly independent countries of the Third World.
Yugoslavia's geographic position in the Mediterranean area and the
fact that she has borders with both NATO and Warsaw Pact states
makes her particularly conscious of certain international questions,
such as the Middle East and Cyprus problems. With the neighboring
European Common Market as an important trading partner, her de-
velopment plans are sensitive to the economic policies of the West.
The mission arrived in Belgrade the afternoon of January 14 and
received a briefing at the American Embassy from Ambassador Lau-
rence H. Silberman and his country team. The briefing was followed by
a reception at the Embassy residence hosted by Ambassador and Mrhs.
Silberman which was attended by many prominent Yugoslavians. On
January 15 the delegation met with members of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, chaired by Mihajlo Javonski. and other members of the
Federal Assembly; with Vladimir Bakaric, Vice President of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; with Kiro Gligorov, Presi-
dent of the SFRY Assembly; with Edvard Kardelj, Member of Slo-
venia of the SFRY Presidency; and attended a lunch hosted by Presi-
dent and Mrs. Gligorov.
The mission was unable to meet with President Tito during its stay
in Yugoslavia. We were told he had been taken ill and was away from
Belgrade. The mission expressed its wishes for a full recovery and
future good health for the President.
Our discussions with Yugoslav leaders covered a wide range of sub-
jects. The views of our hosts on important points included the
following:
Middle East
Whether or not Yugoslavia is invited to participate in the Geneva
Conference, she will be active in trying to promote a peace settlement
based on the U.N. resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from all
occupied territories and Arab recognition of Israel. Yugoslavia ,favors
a speedup in the step-by-step process. A solution of the Palestine issue
is necessary for a settlement. The PLO would be ready to accept a
Palestinian state composed of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
but Israel must be willing to help make this Palestinian state viable.
(19)





20


Such a state would also need economic assistance. The PLO, as the
most authoritative representative of the Palestinians, should be in-
cluded in all Middle East discussions. The United States should under-
take a dialog with the PLO. Overall, the United States has the greatest
responsibility and opportunity to resolve the Middle East problem and
should come up with a complete plan for a settlement.
Detente
Yugoslavia is concerned about detente being limited only to great
powers. Smaller states, including Yugoslavia, are also trying to reduce
tensions.
Eco anmy
Yugoslavia's GNP grew 5.5 percent in 1975 and her industrial pro-
duction went up 5.8 percent. However, the inflation and balance-of-
payments deficits are troublesome, and have been due to excessive
spending as well as to a drop in foreign exchange earnings from the
economic downturn. Restrictive European Common Market economic
policies have worked against Yugoslavia, while with the United States
Yugoslavia has had a balanced trade relationship. Yugoslavia is
anxious to step up economic relations with the United States, includ-
ing joint business ventures and long-term investment.
A ngola
Although Yugoslavia has long supported the MPLA. she had
wanted a national coalition in Angola at the time Portugal left. Yugo-
slavia's position is that all foreign intervention should be withdrawn.
The final solution must be a nonalined and independent Angola.
Cyprus
Yugoslavia has good relations with Greece and Turkey and has had
talks with the parties concerned including the national groups on
Cyprus. There are two conditions under which a peaceful solution is
possible. One is to recognize Cyprus as independent and nonalined;
the second is to recognize national groups on Cyprus on the principle
of parity. The Turks want parity, the Greeks proportionality. Coiin-
ditions for a resolution are not bright at present, but a solution may
be possible in the future. Also, international support would have to
be given to a Cyprus solution.
B atera 88Wssues
While United States-Yugoslav relations are crood, Yugoslav officials
are d(is1)le;Ised(l with what they regard as i-nslfi0(ient effort by the U.S.
Government to stop terrorist attacks on Yugoslavian missions in the
United States. Tlhe-e attacks are perpetrated by Yugoslav emigrees
andl go back a nulml)er of years, but U.S. authorities have failed to
plrosecute those guilty of the crimes.
FIN1)IN(;S ANDI RECOMMENDATIONS
The i ission received a most cordial welcome in Yugoslavia which
we regard as further evidence of the good relations now prevailing
lIet wten ouir coutlt ries.
YIgos lavia's l'adlers siowe(l a keenn awareness of the international
i.ssI.S a1nd a depth in knowle(lge about such complicated questions as





21

the Middle East dispute and Cyprus peace efforts. We are grateful
for their willingness to share their views candidly with us and their
desire for peaceful solutions.
Particularly in this Bicentennial year, we appreciate and support
Yugoslavia's determination to maintain her independence.
In our economic relationships with Yugoslavia, we share in the
desire to increase trade and business activities.










A CONCLUDING OBSERVATION


In addition to the specific findings and recommendations expressed
in the country-by-country sections of this report, members of the mis-
sion were impressed throughout the visit by the widespread, frequently
expressed interest in a continuation of America's active role in inter-
national affairs. We sensed a latent fear at various stops that the
United States, for a variety of reasons, might be tempted to "turn
isolationist" and abandon its international commitments. We would
point out that the very existence of this fear, even if it is unjustified,
could have a significant, impact, on our alliances and other relationships
and on our ability to influence events in the area.
Each country we visited, regardless of its current state of bilateral
relations with Washinrton, attaches great important ce to U.S.
policy on such area is.-ies as the Middle East, Cyprus. NATO, and tlh
Indian Ocean. as well as to American policy globally. We returned
with a heightened awareness that what the United States does-or does
not do-on such issues will continue to have major effect in shaping
their future coursp and that because we are a major power, we cannot
escape this leadership responsibility.
As Members of Congress with particular responsibilities in the. field
of international relations, we also received many questions about the
evolving role of Congress in the shaping of our foreign policy. The
concerns expressed to us served as a reminder that what we do on
Capitol Hill, as well as what emanates from the Whiite House and the
State Department. can often be of far-reaching significance to our
friends abroad.
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