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Disturbing pschoanalytic origins

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Disturbing pschoanalytic origins a Derridean reading of Freudian theory
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2000.
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 384-391).
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Printout.
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by Eric W. Anders.

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DISTURBING PSYCHOANALYTIC ORIGINS:
A DERRIDEAN READING OF FREUDIAN THEORY















By

ERIC W. ANDERS















A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2000



























Copyright 2000

by

Eric W. Anders





























To my parents in appreciation of their support:


Valerie E. Anders

and

William A. Anders













TABLE OF CONTENTS


page

1. THE (DIS)POSITION OF A PET MONSTER.......................................... 1
Double Gam es................................................ ................................. 5
Responding to Freud and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis.......................... 11
Supposing Psychoanalysis...................................... ......................... 15
Disturbing Psychoanalytic Origins .................................................. 26
Filling G aps ...................................................................................... 31
"To Post or N ot to Post?"................................................ ..................... 40

2. PROBLEMATIZING "HYSTERIA" AND THE
ORIGIN OF PSYCHOANALYSIS........................ ...................... .. 44
H istoria .................................. ...... ..... ............................ 47
Hysteria and Hysterization............................................... 57
Feminism and the Hysteric....................... ........................... ......... 62
Hom(m)osexual Pornographics and the Performing Hysteric................ 66
Psychoanalysis/Hysteria......................... 79
The Lacanian Hysteric's Essential Question of Lack ........................ 88

3. (UN)EASILY CONTAINED ELEMENTS............................ ........................ 101
Suffering Reminiscences: Reading Derrida's Reading
of the Project..... .. .... ............................................. 106
The Basics of the Project and Derrida's Reading of It.................... 108
Limiting the Effects of Memory and Chance in
Freud's Work with "Hysterics" .......................................... 116
My Reading of Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing" ....... 127
From Memory to Fantasy................................. ... 138
Disturbing Origins: The Interpretation of Dreams .................................... 143
Overdetermination and Chance.................................................. 145
The Interpretation of Dreams: Rand and Torok ............................. 156
The Interpretation of Dreams: Weber............................ ..... 162
From Primary Process to Primal Phantasies......................... 169









4. FREUD'S M ASTERPLOTTING.......................................................................... 186
The Beyonds of Freud's Case Work: From Ontogenetic to
Phylogenetic ............................ ................. ............ .......... ... 199
The Wolf Man Case History.......................................................... 205
Primal Phantasies: Freud as the Archeologist of the Mind.......... 211
Freud's Masterplot Revisited............................. ................ .......... 222
Narratology and the Wolf Man..................................................... 222
Freud's Oedipal Masterplot ............................. ................... 232
"To Speculate on 'Freud'" and Beyond ... ................................. 247
Extending Freud's Masterplot: A Reading of
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety....................... ................. 259

5. UNCANNY WOMANA: THE HOME/SECRETS OF
PSYCHOAN ALYSIS ......................................................... ............................ 288
The Lack of "The 'Uncanny'" I: Primary Femininity.............................. 299
The Lack of "The 'Uncanny'" II: Freud and Lac(k)an .............................. 313
"The 'Uncanny'" and Superstition....................................................... 318
H om e Secrets.......................................................... .......................... 332

6. WHAT REMAINS: PSYCHOANALYSES,DECONSTRUCTIONS,
AND FEMINISMS............................................................................ ............. 344
The Analysis of a Repression.......................... ............ ........... 344
Post(al)-Psychoanalysis.............................................................................. 364
Phallocentrism and Logocentrism: Relating to Feminisms...................... 370

WORKS CITED..................................................................................... 384

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ......................................................... 392













Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DISTURBING PSYCHOANALYTIC ORIGINS:
A DERRIDEAN READING OF FREUDIAN THEORY

By

Eric W. Anders

December 2000



Chair: John P. Leavey, Jr., Ph.D.
Major Department: English

This Derridean reading of Freud asks the question of how we should

read Freud with respect to sexual difference and what Derrida considers a

radicalized concept of trace, a "scene of writing" of diffirance-that is, how we

should read Freud with respect to phallogocentrism. Throughout I consider

the possible relationships among the "mainstyles" (Derrida) of various

psychoanalyses, deconstructions, and feminisms. By analyzing what is most

original for Freud-the cause of hysteria, the navel of the dream, the

perceptual identity, the primal phantasies, for example-I find that Freud

consistently seeks a single origin, a "caput Nili," on which to base a grand

narrative. At first this narrative is an etiology of hysteria, but it evolves into a

masterplot of sexual development and later into one of humanity. The

establishment of an oedipal origin and telos, and the masterplot based on

them, moves psychoanalysis toward a totalizing theory, and therefore its









openness to chance and something beyond what that theory can master is

greatly reduced.

I approach these topics in terms of a question of the ethics of

psychoanalysis. This appropriative or reductive process of Freud's

masterplotting is based on what Derrida calls "castration-truth" in his

reading of Lacan, "Lefacteur de la vgriti." In contrast to some theorists who

appeal to the radical spirit of Freudian theory as a basis for their

radicalization of psychoanalysis--specifically Barnaby B. Barratt's

Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse-I argue that Lacan's

phallogocentric "return to Freud" is actually a more faithful one since I find

both "mainstyles" of these psychoanalyses based on a logic of lack or

"castration-truth." I argue throughout that the radical spirit of Freud is at

times overemphasized or exaggerated by Derridean theorists-and even

Derrida himself, though rarely-and that the dominant specter of Freud is an

"establishment" or appropriative one, rather than one which is radical or

"other-wise." I connect this trend of Derridean thinkers claiming too much

debt to psychoanalysis to these thinkers not taking seriously Freud's

commitment to and interest in an idealized phylogenetics: "phylo-'genetics."'

Since my establishment of this establishment specter of Freud as the

"mainstyle" of Freudian theory itself risks reproducing exactly the kind of

appropriative discourse I hope to problematize, I attempt to avoid such a

reproduction by considering what remains of the radical spirit of Freudian

theory in what might be called a deconstructive "technology of iterability," a

"cyborg-analysis," or what I call "post(al)-psychoanalysis."












CHAPTER 1
THE DISPOSITIONN OF A PET MONSTER




Psychoanalysis, supposedly, is found.
When one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds itself.
When it finds, supposedly, it finds itself/is found-something. (Der87a 413)

Jacques Derrida'



It's extraordinary what happens when you get rid of the centrality of the concept of the
phallus. I mean, you get rid of the unconscious, get rid of sexuality, get rid of the
original psychoanalytic point. (Mit82 15)

Juliet Mitchell



In "Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms,

Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms," Jacques Derrida argues that those

"within the university and elsewhere who aren't completely asleep know that"

titles of academic discourses such as psychoanalysis, deconstruction, or feminism

"do not correspond to any classifiable identity, to any corpus which can be

delimited. However, for all that, this doesn't make those titles empty or

insignificant. What they name is the mainstyle of each jetty" (67).

Psychoanalysis is thus the "mainstyle" of one "theoretical jetty" in "the open and



SAlan Bass, the translator of The Post Card, writes the following note to the above: "La
psychanalyse, a supposed, se trouve. Quand on croit la trouver, c'est elle, a supposed, qui se trouve.
Quand elle trouve, i supposed, elle se trouve-quelque chose. The double meaning of reflexive verbs in
French is being played on here. Se trouver can mean both to find itself and to be found. Thus,
these are three or four statements, since the third sentence must be read in two ways. The
passage from three to four via irreducible doubleness is a constant theme in Derrida's works"
(413n2).









nonunified" field of forces that the doxa tries to stabilize and objectify in order to

fit into a neat and orderly taxonomy of discourses (65-67 passim). Here I will

attempt to establish the "mainstyle" of Freudian theory, if not of psychoanalysis

in general, with respect to my version of the "mainstyle" deconstruction. A

guiding question throughout this project is what is the relationship between

these two "mainstyle" theoretical jetties? And what is the "mainstyle" spirit of

Freudian theory of the incalculable specterss of Freud" that haunt the

"mainstyle" deconstruction and other academic discourses under consideration

here?

The "quasi-concept" (94) of "jetty," according to Derrida, "has no status"

in "theory," but is used here to refer "to the force of that movement which is not

yet subject, project, or object, not even rejection, but in which takes place any

production and any determination, which finds its possibility in the jetty" (65).

"Each theoretical jetty," Derrida continues, "enters a priori, originally, into

conflict and competition" ibidd.) with other theoretical jetties: a "convergent

competition" (72) of unstable and destabilizing pseudo-identities where "each

jetty, far from being the part included in the whole, is only a theoretical jetty

inasmuch as it claims to comprehend itself by comprehending all the others"

(65), and "each species in this table constitutes its own identity only by

incorporating other identities-by contamination, parasitism, grafts, organ

transplants, incorporation etc." (66). Derrida states that this process of

convergent competition and incorporation is based on a "principle of taxonomic

disorder" (67) and he wonders "to what kinds of monsters these combinatory

operations must give birth, considering the fact that theories incorporate

opposing theorems, which have themselves incorporated other ones" (ibid.).









According to Derrida, "Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'Here

are our monsters,' without immediately turning them into pets" (80). The

present study attempts to be, I announce here, a monstrous pet project that

combines various styles of the theoretical jetties of psychoanalysis,

deconstruction, and feminism. In English departments in North America, this

type of combinatory pet monster, known as "theory," is the norm of the "trans-,

inter-, and above all ultra-disciplinary approaches, which, up to now [1990], met

nowhere, in no department, in no area of any discipline" (82).

The present study is monstrous because its corpus tries to be of indefinite

locale with respect to traditional disciplines, to eschew traditional axiomatic

boundaries by embracing a certain litarariness found in deconstruction and some

styles of feminism; a pet because, beyond announcing itself as a monster using

predicative clauses and being required to meet the institutional standards of the

university, it also attempts to be a (transferential) testament to my position as the

proper legatee, a legitimate son, of a complex parentage that would seem quite

familiar to those doing the "theory" of English departments in North American

research universities. The parentage consists of what I will argue are generally

misunderstood elements of psychoanalysis that are too rare or too unsupported

to constitute a "mainstyle," a certain "ms. en abyme" feminism (Elam), and a

Derrida who I hope is not too simplified, especially by making him one who

would be less resistant to any such paternity or any genealogy than he actually

is. It is monstrous because this complex parentage resists being an oedipal

complex. It could also be considered a pet, however, because there are traces of

what I call, borrowing from Luce Irigaray, "hom(m)osexuality" (Iri85 98), since

the feminism here, which might be construed as occupying the position of the









theoretical mother, is significantly Derridean-but this type of critique would

require the most essentialist, phallogocentric assumptions, which are the very

assumptions I try to disrupt here. It is also monstrous because its attempt to

privilege a literariness of open-endedness and Keatsian negative capability will

endeavor to resist forming into a "corpus of philosophical-hence

phallogocentric-axioms" (Der90 84) as Derrida describes what he sees as the

"mainstyle" of feminism. It is a pet because it will also be called upon to form

just such a corpus, not just in order to be recognized by the university as a proper

dissertation, but in order to develop a somewhat cohesive, though necessarily

partial, hybrid of so-called literary, psychoanalytic, feminist, and

deconstructionist axioms of a certain ethics and undecidability that would allow

for tactical political praxis. Psychoanalysis, according to its orthodox origin

myths, was born from Freud's work with hysterics: the potentially monstrous

offspring of a diseased womb. Yet this supposed offspring, as I will argue,

would have been very much a pet if we supposed such a birth.

Freud considered psychoanalysis to be one of the "three severe blows"

received by "the universal narcissism of men ... from the researches of science"

(XVII 139). The first blow, according to Freud, was cosmological and associated

with Copernicus: the decentering of the earth in the cosmos. The second he

considered biological and associated with Darwin: the association of "man" with

the rest of the animal kingdom, and therefore the problematization of the notion

that what separated "man" out was "his" possession of a soul. The third-which

Freud associated with himself and psychoanalysis, and referred to as

"psychological in nature" and "probably the most wounding" (XVII 141)-was

the subordination of the ego to the forces of the unconscious. Contrary to this





5

positioning of psychoanalysis as such a blow, something monstrous with respect

to god-like man at the center of the cosmos, I read psychoanalysis as a powerful

mode of maintaining what Derrida calls the "system" of "phallogocentrism"

(Der87b 196): a pet as watch dog with respect to a different slant on "the

universal narcissism of men." My question throughout is how much monstrous

potential, if any, remains in this pet. The disposition of my pet monster is to be

highly skeptical of any such monstrous potential of psychoanalysis: watching out

for watch dogs.



Double Games

My positioning of the present study negotiates this phantasmatic

boundary between monsters and pets by attempting to play a double game

appropriate to the singularity of the Freudian texts I read here. In "The Double

Game: An Introduction," an essay in Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, and

Literature, Alan Bass calls the affirmation of the irreducibility of division the

"affirmation of doubleness":

I would call [the affirmation of doubleness] the essence of

psychoanalysis if I had not learned from Derrida that the concept of

essence is designed to denigrate the play of doubleness. Thus, I

will call the affirmation of doubleness the metaphor that imposes

itself upon any conception of the analytic situation, and will say

that this metaphor is no more secondary and exterior to such

concepts as transference and resistance, ego and id, than writing is

to speech. (82)









Though Bass reads the mainstyle of the psychoanalytic jetty as being akin to the

mainstyle of the jetty of deconstruction-reflecting more the way I wish I could

read psychoanalysis than how I read it here as a mode of repressing "the

affirmation of doubleness"-I want to focus here on Bass's concept of doubleness

and Derrida's concept of "disseminal alterity" (Der90 72), what I call irreducible

division. Bass's doubleness is not the doubleness of oppositional binaries, but

the doubleness of an infinity of the Other-as Emmanuel Levinas might put

it-that the doubleness of oppositional binaries dissimulate. This is the

doubleness of what Derrida calls the "disseminal alterity ... which would make

impossible pure identity" and the "convergent competition" ibidd.) of forces that

allow for the space where there is the possibility of some provisional identity

emerging. In other words, this is not the doubleness of a particular identity and

its other as two stable identities (binarisms, dualisms), and especially not the

doubleness of a One and its repressed other, but the doubleness of the possibility

of the act of establishing some unstable identity and of the "otherwise other" to

identity, the radical alterity, the space from whence this possibility emerges.2

Derrida also describes a certain doubleness of theoretical jetties, what he

calls "typical consequences-i.e., general and regular consequences" (Der90 84).

He distinguishes

on the one hand, the force of the movement which throws

something or throws itself (jette or se jette) forward and backwards

at the same time, prior to any subject, object, or project, prior to any

rejection or abjection, from, on the other hand, its institutional and


S"Act of establishment" and "otherwise other" come from Barratt's Psychoanalysis and the
Postmodern Impulse.









protective consolidation, which can be compared to the jetty, the

pier in a harbor meant to break the waves and maintain low tide for

boats at anchor or for swimmers. ibidd.)

Derrida calls the former jetty "the destabilizing jetty or even more artificially the

devastating jetty" ibidd.), which he aligns with a certain deeeR natretien that refers

neither to "specific texts nor to specific authors, and above all not to this

formation which disciplines the process and effect of deconstruction into a

theory or a critical method called deconstructionism or deconstructionisms"

(Der90 83). This deeenstruction "is neither a theory nor a philosophy. It is

neither a school nor a method. It is not even a discourse, nor an act, nor a

practice. It is what happens ..." (Der90 85). The latter jetty Derrida calls "the

stabilizing, establishing, or simply stating jetty" (Der90 84), which "proceeds with

predicative clauses, reassures with assertory statements, with assertions, with

statements such as 'this is that'" ibidd.), as when Derrida writes, "deconstruction

is neither...." That the stating or static jetty is a phallic metaphor, a piece of terra

firma jutting into, or breaking the waves of, the ocean, suggests that either getting

beyond phallocentrism is difficult even for Derrida, one of the most vigilant

theorists, or his metaphor is an example of what he sees as the phallic

establishment.

In as much as the doubleness of transference and resistance of the

psychoanalytic unconscious happens in any setting, including and especially the

analytic setting, we can say that "psychoanalysis happens," or better,

"psyeheanalysis happens." I will argue, however, that Freud-and Lacan who


3 The latter idea-that Derrida's phallic metaphor of a jetty might be a self-conscious example of
the phallic establishment-was suggested to me by John P. Leavey, Jr.









follows in his "pas-de-marche" (Derrida) footsteps-consistently reduces this

doubleness or irreducible division to "castration-truth" (Der81 441) and its

phallic One that transforms the difference of (op)positionality into identity, and

therefore the notion that "psychoanalysis happens," or that there would be a

need to put "psychoanalysis" under erasure, that it would have a "devastating"

jetty, which it would recognize as "psychoanalysis" without trying to tame it or

reappropriate it back into the terms of the "stating" jetty of "psychoanalysis," is

problematic, if not a moot point. In this respect, I argue here that

"psychoanalysis" does not simply happen. It must be established; it is

identitarian and not otherwise; it represses its own "devastating" tendencies in

order to secure its "stating" position.

The stating or "state" forms of psychoanalysis, what I call "establishment

psychoanalysis" or "psychoanalysis proper," are axiomatic, where particular and

somewhat distorted forms of the Oedipus myth occupy the position of the truth

of the unconscious, the basis for a symbolist approach to psychoanalytic

interpretation, the fundament of phylogenetic primal fantasies, the "patrix" of

the pleasure principle (which, as Derrida makes clear, Freud never goes beyond),

the "destination" of the phallic letter, and the foundation of "castration-truth."

In the (non)origin myth of establishment psychoanalysis I tell here, oedipal

psychoanalysis is a theoretical fantasy employed as a defense against the Other.

We might call it a reaction to the trauma of Freud's encounter with so-called

"hysterical" patients, his unethical "face to face" with the Other, if the categories

and concepts of hysteria and trauma were not so embedded in psychoanalysis

itself. The devastating jetty of psychoanalysis, which (under erasure) is the effect

of the deconstruction that happens with any mainstyle jetty, a "typical








consequence," has a different relationship to the stating jetty of psychoanalysis

than the devastating jetty of "deconstruction" has to its stating jetty: the latter

recognizes its devastating jetty, even actively subverts its stating jetty by working

not to repress the devastating one. I will argue here that "deconstruction," as a

mainstyle, stating jetty, points to its devastating jetty, whereas establishment

psychoanalysis, though it makes some motions toward such a recognition and

has certain elements with devastating potential as what seem to be its

foundational "discoveries," ultimately actively represses those elements,

especially with respect to its own discourse. My double game reading of

psychoanalysis is more about problematizing my own reading, my own position,

by taking seriously the irreducibility of division, than modeling my reading on

the supposed devastating aspects, or "the affirmation of doubleness" of

psychoanalysis. In other words, my reading is more deconstructive than

psychoanalytic.

In general what follows is an attempt to take seriously several texts by

Freud and several Derridean readings of Freud, especially Derrida's early essay

"Freud and the Scene of Writing" in Writing and Difference, his later "To

Speculate-on 'Freud'" in The Post Card, and Samuel Weber's The Legend of Freud.

Barnaby B. Barratt's Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse has had a

significant influence on how I approach these readings, despite the fact that his

privileging of the radical or monstrous spirit of Freud ends up a repression of the

establishment Freud. Barratt reads what are typically considered Freud's

"devastating" moments as the essence of Freudian theory, and "Oedipus" and

"fantasy" (either spelling) are not listed in the index of this book. In Legends of

Freud, Samuel Weber highlights certain "devastating" moments of Freudian









theory overlooked by Freudian scholars (except Derrida), and often by Freud

himself. Derrida and Weber are closer in their readings of Freud. Weber more

than Derrida speculates on possible points of overlap between psychoanalysis

and his deconstructive theories, but, unlike Barratt, refrains from positioning

psychoanalysis as an authority for establishing a type of postmodern theory. Of

the three, Derrida seems the most reticent to give psychoanalysis undue "credit"

for not repressing its "devastating" moments, to acknowledge more debt for

deconstruction to psychoanalysis than necessary. In "Freud and the Scene of

Writing," Derrida explains his work on psychoanalysis preceding this early essay

as

An attempt to justify a theoretical reticence to utilize Freudian

concepts, otherwise than in quotation marks: all these concepts,

without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to

the system of logocentric repression which was organized in order

to exclude or to lower (to put outside or below), the body of the

written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter

or excrement. (197)

Logocentrism, and its reduction of the Other to its terms of the Same, would be

an ethical category for Derrida. Despite his reticence, he does find potentially

"devastating" elements of Freudian theory:

Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud's text several points of

reference, and to isolate, on the threshold of a systematic

examination, those elements of psychoanalysis which can only

uneasily be contained within logocentric closure, as this closure







limits not only the history of philosophy but also the orientation of

the "human sciences," notably a certain linguistics. (198-99)

The "certain linguistics" is a reference to Saussure and Lacanian psychoanalysis,

and much of what follows touches on whether Lacan's "return" to Freud was in

fact a return and not a betrayal, as Barratt argues it was (see Bar84 and Bar93).

Beyond problematizing Barratt's "return" to a "devastating" or postmodern

Freud, I attempt to problematize Derrida's and Weber's location of only uneasily

contained elements of Freudian theory, particularly with respect to psychoanalytic

origins. What is at stake here is not only how to read Freud, but what would

constitute a good reading of him with respect to the issues forefronted in what

has been too-vaguely called the linguistic turn in the humanities. Is the Freudian

unconscious structured like a destinational language, or unstructuring like an

adestinational language? What remains of psychoanalysis after a deconstructive

reading? What debt does "deconstruction" owe to "psychoanalysis"? What, if

anything, might be considered a "Freudian breakthrough"? As Derrida suggests

in Resistances with respect to Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, what is at stake

here is not just psychoanalytic conceptions of "sense and truth" (Der98 18), but

sense and truth in general.



Responding to Freud and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis

For me, deconstructing psychoanalysis is like an imperative, but one

without foundation in some supposed moral code. Derrida argues that this

"obligation to protect the other's otherness is not merely a theoretical

imperative" (Der91 111) suggesting that this obligation is also an ethical one, and









that this ethics cannot be bound by the strictures of theory. According to

Derrida, "there is a duty in deconstruction" (Der91 108), and I understand this

duty as being related to Derrida's reading of Levinas in "Violence and

Metaphysics," and the former's notion of "the call that comes from nowhere"

(Der91 110). According to Colin Davis, the "thought of Emmanuel Levinas is

governed by one simple yet far-reaching idea: Western philosophy has

consistently practiced a suppression of the Other" (1). Levinas's ethics is

interested in protecting the Other from the violence of the Same's (or Self's)

reappropriations. In contrast to moral philosophy, which claims to be grounded

in ontological truths, Levinas's ethics attempts a certain groundlessness in this

respect. Levinas tries to argue for the priority of ethics to ontology, but his

project is complicated by the fact that the notions of grounds and priorities

belong to ontology. In his otherwise deconstructive reading of Levinas in

"Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida critiques Levinas for not recognizing the

necessity of working within the logocentrism of language and philosophy.

Levinas's project requires the playing of double games. Derrida finds Levinas's

intentions of positioning himself outside of Western ontology in conflict with the

ontological dependence of his philosophical discourse. Levinas's concern is for

developing a sense of justice and responsibility with respect to encounters with

the Other, and to do this while resisting the totalizing foundationalism of

establishing an ontological moral order. "Something of this call of the other,"

according to Derrida, "must remain nonreappropriable, nonsubjectivable, and in

a certain way nonidentifiable, a sheer supposition, so as to remain other, a

singular call to response or to responsibility" (Der91 110-111). Diane Elam's

type of feminism, as argued in Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme, is









"based" on such a "groundless" ethics. Political activity for her should grow out

of "groundless solidarity" where political actions stem from necessary ethical

judgements that "are always threatened by the displacing action of other

judgements" (115), and not from ethical judgments supposedly grounded in

ontotheological or phallogocentric truths of identity and morality.

The significance of such an ethics for psychoanalytic theory and practice is

great, especially if Freud's conception of "the unconscious" is read as a radical

alterity or an "otherwise other" to the meanings and structures of the ego or "I-

now-is," as Barratt reads it. "The unconscious" then would be akin to Levinas's

Other; the ego-what Barratt formulates as the "I-now-is" (Bar93 101)-would be

akin to Levinas's the Same, Self, or self-Same. The duty in psychoanalysis would

then be to avoid reducing the "otherwise other" to the self-Same of the ego of the

analysand or the analyst. If the duty in deconstruction is the protection of "the

other's otherness," it achieves this while still allowing for meaning, as would this

"otherwise" psychoanalysis, through the playing of a double game. Meaning or

readability require some reduction of the differance of language to the self-Same:

the stating game of a double game, where the other game is a devastating one.

Beyond there being an ethical quality of such double games, they also avoid the

pitfalls of embracing irrationalisms and the simple reversing of the Same/Other

binarism. Derrida's employment of deconstructive double games allows him to

work within logocentrism while opening up spaces to make it otherwise: he

respects the otherness of the text he is deconstructing-that is, he respects

diffrance, he responds to the singularity of the text-and is able to form a reading









of and argument about this text and its radical alterity that is potentially

meaningful.

Insofar as I have not reduced the Other of Freud's texts to more of my

Same, I have responded to the singularity of Freud's texts, and I have resisted

transforming my understanding of "deconstruction" into some "monolith" of

deconstructionismm" (Der90 88). The ethics I describe here have not only

informed my theorization of my approach, if not the approach itself, it has also

informed my understanding of what makes these texts readable. I suppose

Freud's readability with regard to his encounters with what Levinas would call

the Other. Often Freud's reappropriations of the Other in a way follow what

would otherwise be an ethical encounter with the Other. Practically invariably,

Freud either transforms these "other-wise" moments into "establishment"

theories by establishing an origin of identity prior to the "theory" or "time" of

these moments, or he represses these moments via neglect or obfuscation. Freud

even uses what seems to be something "otherwise" about a theory (for example,

the "contradictoriness" [Barratt] of the unconscious) to support his

"establishment" conclusions or closure (such as what I will call the seemingly

contradictory "trauma"-structure trope of "castration-truth"). My theory of

readability with respect to Freudian texts is in some ways a generalization of

Derrida's reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in terms of what he calls Freud's

"pas de march" (Der81 283), where the step beyond is always taken back or

transformed into a non-step. One possible difference between Derrida's "pas de

march" and my theory of readability is that I want to focus more on how Freud's

most "otherwise" concepts are sometimes more than taken back or transformed

into their absence, but are redeployed as part of the "establishment" arsenal in









the defensive war of maintaining a proper identity, institution, and legacy. I am

interested in connecting Freud's readability-the necessary stating game of any

deconstructive double-game-to a Levinasian and Derridean type of ethics.


Supposing Psychoanalysis

What is at stake when one supposes psychoanalysis? To suppose

psychoanalysis-to hypothesize that it exists as one thing, identical to itself, self-

same--would mean to disregard the divisions, conflicts, aporias, and to decide

undecidables "within" psychoanalysis. To suppose psychoanalysis as a

unifiable, delimitable theoretical identity is also to disregard the competitive,

conflictual, and differential process by which it comes into being and sustains

itself in relation to other discursive forces: to decide undecidables regarding its

relation to what is "without" psychoanalysis. Yet my questioning of the

supposition of psychoanalysis is also a questioning of the very boundaries that

would allow for a "within" and a "without," a problematization of the notion of

psychoanalysis as having secure and identifiable boundaries: an identification, a

locale, an inside and outside. Moreover, to write of psychoanalysis as coming

into being and sustaining itself, to assume that it is ever a simple presence in the

present, or a simple re-presentation, that it is simply demarcated in opposition to

other discourses, other locales, is to miss the aspect of deferral and the

relatedness and imbrication of differences in the generation of any pseudo-

identity-that is, to disregard the generative powers involved in what Jacques

Derrida calls "diffrrance." Among other things, to suppose psychoanalysis is to

mark an inside and an outside of psychoanalysis, then to make cohesive what

could only be an aporetic inside, and to make the outside separate and passive









with regard to the creation of this identity. In other words, the creation of a

binary-inside/outside-that constitutes a certain repression of undecidables, of

difffrance, is at stake in the supposition of an identity "psychoanalysis." Some

might argue that this supposition would be unpsychoanalytic, but this argument

itself requires a supposition of psychoanalysis as essentially about the

problematization of certain identities achieved via the repression of

undecidables. I suppose a psychoanalysis here, on the contrary, that is very

much about this kind of repression.

What is at stake when one does not suppose psychoanalysis? Without

such a supposition any treatment of "psychoanalysis"-whether it be a critique,

a so-called "deconstruction," or some other mode of reading-would be

impossible. The stakes would be not to question the traditional suppositions of

psychoanalysis as found truth. Some mode of questioning is required to disrupt

these types of suppositions. While critique is a single game that simply assumes

the subject position for the critic and the object position for what is being

criticized, a deconstructive reading plays a double game where the subject-object

positions of critique are problemetized as they are assumed. This

problematization of the subject-object split subverts any simple inside/outside

for both the supposed subject and the supposed object, yet even a deconstructive

reading of "psychoanalysis" would be difficult, if not impossible, without the

supposition of "psychoanalysis" as its simple, unified object. In his 1991 lecture

"'To Do Justice to Freud, The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,"

Derrida asks his audience to allow him to "provisionally assume that there is

indeed a psychoanalysis that is a single whole: as if it were not, already in Freud,

sufficiently divided to make its localization and identification more than









problematic" (Der98 76-77). As always with Derrida, that the assumption is

provisional is a crucial part of any double game. My provisional assumptions of

"Freud" and "psychoanalysis" do not ultimately assume them as single wholes: I

attempt to show here how they are irreducibly divided. But to do so, I do

provisionally assume a single or basic tactic or strategy of

"Freud"/"psychoanalysis" of securing a position of undividedness for

himself/itself. The "Freud" and "psychoanalysis" I suppose are both

"interested" in their own unity even though, in significant ways, they position

themselves as the Truth of universal "division"--or "division" as castration,

which is why the quotes are needed.

With respect to Derrida's quotation above, it must also be asked to assume

provisionally that there is indeed an author, a "Derrida," as subject that is single

and whole, separate from the assumed object: as if he were not, already with

respect to Freud and to himself, already divided to make his localization and

identification more than problematic. Also, the assumed "objects" of "Freud"

and "psychoanalysis" are not only divided but "within" the "author" in that

he/I cannot simply step outside "Freud" in order to make it his/my object.

Inasmuch as my reading becomes a critique unawares-a single game of simple

insides and outsides, simple subjects and objects, repressing the irreducibility of

division from my awareness-my reading becomes an example of what I am

trying to disrupt in "Freud": the identitarian force or "interest" I call

(op)positionality. Simply put, (op)positionality is a mode of securing a position,

and therefore a subject identity, by establishing the separate identity of the

object, and the subject's mastery of that object. To whatever degree my work

here is a reading in this mode, a critique, I am suspect of securing my "I," of









finding myself with respect to an "object" I suppose and oppose:

"Freud"/"psychoanalysis." Insofar as this mode of positioning is unavoidable,

especially in the highly formalized mode of a dissertation, the question of

awareness of "one's"-the "subject's," the "author's"--own division, and the

effect of this division on the supposed "object," becomes a crucial focal point for

differentiating types of discourses, particularly between critiques and

deconstructive readings. The provisional and the playing of double games

becomes crucial. Some might argue, as Barnaby B. Barratt suggests in

Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse, that (op)positionality and critical

modes of reading that stem from this type of identitarian logic would be

unpsychoanalytic. But this argument is itself dependent on a supposition of

psychoanalysis as essentially about revealing identities and subjects (egos) as

essentially divided. Again, this is another version of the supposition I mentioned

above, and which I want to disrupt here.

From such a (supposed) Freudian perspective this argument might hold

up for everything and everyone except Freud himself/psychoanalysis

itself-that is, Freud/psychoanalysis reveals all other identities to be divided

except for himself/itself. Herein lies a significant difference between what is

signed by Derrida and what is signed by Freud: the texts signed by Freud lack a

certain awareness of the irreducible division of the Freudian text, its signature,

and its signator, whereas the double games of so-called "deconstruction" are the

manifestation of this type of awareness. Psychoanalysis claims to be a method, a

science, based on a discovery of Truth. Derrida resists deconstruction as a

method since it is a mode of reading that treats every text singularly, according

to its own readability: a response to the text, rather than an application of some









Truth of deconstruction. We might paraphrase the pun of the title of Shoshana

Felman's book questioning applied psychoanalytic readings of literary texts,

Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise, and call this

reading mode, this responsive (non)methodology, "reading other-wise."

Following Derrida's "Lefacteur de la viriti," his reading of Jacques Lacan's

"Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,"' I argue here that Freud/psychoanalysis

attempts to establish himself/itself as that unity that stops the incessant sliding

of the "en abyme" effects of disruptions to the simple subject-object, a simple

inside/outside, caused by irreducible division. As the discoverer of the Truth of

psychoanalysis, Freud positions himself as the unified subject. He is supposedly

beyond the obvious en abyme effects of "the unconscious," his supposed

discovery, in his self analysis. Derrida asks, "how can an autobiographical

writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self-analysis, give to a worldwide

institution its birth?" (Der81 305). As the Truth discovered, psychoanalysis is

established as the unified object: a strangely material-ideal object, a stereotomy,

an "point de capiton" (Lacan). The self-sameness and immediacy of this "act of

establishment" require the repetitive repression of the differences and endless

deferrals of meaning in the creation of any signifying system: diffirance. Derrida

calls this strangely material-ideal subject-object positioning the metaphysics of

presence or logocentrism: the found "object" of psychoanalysis is part of the

"object world" and the signifying system at the same time, the centering

idea/matter, the idea that matters, or logos. This repression of diffirance is

logocentric repression. We might say that the unconscious of

Freud/psychoanalysis is this differance, kept out of awareness as part of the "act

of establishment" of an identity, an institution, a legacy-that is, if the word









"unconscious" were not so imbricated in the very identities of Freud and

psychoanalysis I wish to disrupt. My use of "unconscious" under erasure can be

read as an example of how "I" cannot be simply inside or outside

psychoanalysis.

Though "Freud" opposess himself as subject to the object of

psychoanalysis, there is also a unity of subject and object here, which sends the

phenomenology "en abyme": "When one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself,

supposedly, that finds itself" (ibid.). One doesn't just find oneself with respect to

the object, but in the object. (Op)positionality, as a mode of stabilizing the

dizzying movement of diffirance, is itself unstable: the unification of "Freud" is

"discovered" through the discovery of the Truth of the unconscious,

"psychoanalysis," which "then" "sutures" (Miller) the "Freud" who was

previously divided between his conscious and unconscious self, which "then"

allows the unified "Freud" to discover psychoanalysis unencumbered by his

own division.... This process of "positioning" beyond (op)positioning, where

the subject and object are no longer opposed in a simple phenomenology, which

moves toward a totality of the Self via Truth, an identity of subject and object, I

call, following Derrida, "self-posting," where the self sends itself a post of its

own identity. For Lacan in "The Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter," as Derrida

argues in "Lefacteur de la vtritj," posts always arrive at their destination. For

Derrida, there is always the chance that something otherwise could happen. For

Lacan, the Truth of psychoanalysis is the Truth of a destinational linguistics:

"Quand elle trouve, a supposed, elle se trouve-quelque chose." The sending envoii) of

the post, which is supposedly identical with the self-sender, in fact reveals the

presence of something totally other that causes the sending. Derrida reads Lacan









as positing the truth as "something" found, and a cause of the "eternal return"

(Nietzsche): a destinational linguistics based on a theory of the postal system

without a dead letter office. For Derrida, the "eternal return" cannot be reduced

to a thing or a transcendental structure centered on an absence or a veiled

presence (the phallus as an always already absent presence)-a negative

theology (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy) or a "Negative Concord"

(Kermode)-but is something radically other, which subverts ontology

(conceptions of thingness, centers, structures) and Lacan's synchronic

transcendent structures: a (non)origin of repetition and an adestinational postal

system. That letters are repetitively sent and may end up in the dead letter office

suggests the system is related to and part of something totally other.

Lacan stresses the detour the letter takes, the division its detour signifies.

But this detour is quite specific, and it is necessary in order to allow for the

proper return. Division is reduced to presence/absence where the absence is

always the absence of a very specific presence. Psychoanalysis 4 la Lacan and

Lacan himself are unified in the truth of the proper detour of the letter, the

proper division. Derrida calls this truth "castration-truth" (Der81 441). The

metaphysics of presence, the logocentrism of Lacanian psychoanalysis is

phallogocentrism, where the material-ideal letter is the penis-phallus. Castration

as the proper division, the proper detour of the letter, reduces the binary of

male/female to one-sex system in terms of presence/absence of the phallus:

male/not-male. The not-male secures the phallus as transcendental Truth by

reducing division to an absence, or lack. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, according

to Derrida, somethingig is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing

from it" (Der81 441). The "something" that psychoanalysis finds when it finds









itself is lack as the "central place," the familiar locale, and also the center of a

structural system, a logic of lack: what Derrida refers to as the psychoanalytic

oikos, where the Greek word suggests both home and economy. This lack

signifies the transcendence of the phallus and therefore its uncastratability.

According to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, "the ultimate effect of the Lacanian

strategy thus turns out to be a surprising but vigorous repetition of negative

theology" (Nan92 xviii).

For Derrida, division is that which disrupts the concept of truth by

disrupting the signifying system that might support such a concept.

"Dissemination" is one word Derrida uses with respect to irreducible division:

dis-semination as not allowing for a stable semantics, which is supposedly the

spawn (semen) of phallic truth. The spreading and dispersal of seeds suggested

by dissemination suggest the dispersal of meaning of diffrance, the disruption of

any economy, any logic. No "central place" of absence, no castration home, is

allowed by dissemination: "the lack does not have its place in dissemination"

(Der81 441). Following Derrida's reading of Lacan, this project contrasts a logic

of lack with a "logic" of dissemination with respect to Freud. Is Freud another

"facteur de la viritJ" of a destinational postal system? Is Freudian theory based on

"castration-truth," where "Femininity is the Truth (of) castration" (Der81 442)?

Like Lacan, who positions himself as the mystic who has mastered the

cosmology of the Real-Symbolic-Imaginary or "RSI," Freud often positions

himself as undivided, in possession of the whole story, properly analyzed.

In chapter two, "Problematizing Hysteria and the Origins of

Psychoanalysis," I explore how the theme of Freud's lack of awareness of the

irreducibility of division, and how division would apply to oneself and one's









theories, is reflected in the large role his self-analysis plays in his claims to have

access to truth and in the orthodox origin myths of psychoanalysis which he

invented and fostered. Freud, the undivided subject, the subject that "sutures"

his own division-that is, cures the "hysteria" that marks this

division--supposedly discovers Freud/psychoanalysis. He/it is found, a solid

whole, a stereotomy, a something. The something Freud initially finds are gaps

in narratives, which he fills first with phallic memories of "seduction" and then

later with fantasies of phallic wholeness when "hysteria" is replaced by

"femininity" as the privileged object and "gaps" are replaced by "castration" as

the lack that secures the oikos of Truth. Freud secures an undivided, phallic

subject position by creating an object of lack: the hysteric and her narratives full

of gaps. I will explore in chapter two whether Freud's writing on so-called

"hysteria" is an example of what Barratt calls the phenomenologyy of fucking":

"the operation of 'I' as the aggressingg or aggressed) subject of

(phallo)logocentric discourse" (Bar93 150). Foreshadowing the "castration-truth"

of psychoanalysis proper, the division of the object, the so-called hysteric, was

reduced to a specific absence, a specific gap. I argue that the phenomenology is a

sort of mixture of (op)positionality and self-posting, and is ultimately unstable

because it depends on cure: as with woman in Freud's later theory, the so-called

hysteric exists as gap to be filled and as what must disappear as cured.

One question I want to privilege in this study is whether Freudian theory

can get beyond its phallocentrism-that is, what, if anything, remains of

Freudian theory once Derrida's project is accomplished: "the Freudian concept of

trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which

still retains it" (Der78 229)? Is Freud's logocentrism the same as his









phallocentrism: phallogocentrism? Since Barratt's book lacks an entry in its

index for anything related to Oedipus-the expanded oikos of castration-

truth-and his book sets forth a general metapsychology of sorts, it seems that he

would answer yes to this query, and his theory of "genitality" reflects an attempt

at such a distancing from phallocentrism while remaining "within" his supposed

psychoanalysis. Barratt suggests that Freud's phallocentrism, the oedipal aspects

of psychoanalysis, are in fact a betrayal of what is essential about psychoanalysis.

Certainly Derrida has shown that one cannot simply step outside the

metaphysics of presence of logocentrism. In "Violence and Metaphysics,"

Derrida argues for the necessity of "lodging oneself within traditional

conceptuality in order to destroy it" (111). But is phallocentrism unavoidable?

Since the Freud I suppose here is one of "castration-truth" and the logic of

lack-arguing that Freud, like Lacan, is a "facteur de la vfritd" of a phallocentric

and destinational postal system-I conclude that little would remain of Freudian

theory to constitute a radical spirit of Freud if its oikos lost its privileged place.

Barratt's Freud represents something closer to what I wish Freud would be,

rather than how I actually read him. To "suppose" is not only to assume or to

hypothesize, but to suspect too.

The function of "castration-truth" is to theorize division in terms of what

secures identity. Phallocentrism, therefore, is the mode of logocentrism of

psychoanalysis in its Lacanian mode, as Derrida argues, and in its Freudian

mode, as I argue here. The Lacanian "phallic function," according to Bruce Fink,

author of The Lacanian Subject, "is the function that institutes lack" (103). In Lacan's

own words, the "phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark in which the role

of the logos is joined with the advent of desire" (Lac77b 287). Since Lacanian









desire is never in relation to an object but to lack, the joining point or "point de

capiton" of desire to the logos would be a "mark" of lack. The phallus is that

magical signifier/mark, the letter, that sets the Symbolic in motion but also keeps

it centered enough to write "Symbolic" with a capitol "S."

One central question for me here is how well does Lacan read Freud?

How faithful is Lacan's return to Freud? I argue that Lacan's "phallic function"

can be generalized and theorized as what I call the "actual phallic function,"

another way of naming phallogocentrism and its one-sex self-posting, what I will

later call, co-opting Irigaray's pun, "hom(m)osexuality," which Lacan attempts to

address in Encore (Lac98 84). The series of acts of self-posting constituting the

actual phallic function comprise what I call a "triple (self-)deception": the first

deception is the dissimulation of difference and chance behind the binarism of

Man/Woman dissimulatingg the Other), the second is the dissimulation of the

significance of woman's role in establishing the identity of man dissimulatingg

the other), and the third is the dissimulation of all previous dissimulations. With

the actual phallic function, as with Derrida's conception of phallogocentrism,

presence is established by reducing the Other to absence, binary difference is

effaced by erecting one term (the phallus) to identify difference, the binary is

always already a hierarchy, and these processes are naturalized via the

repression of repression and the supplementarity of what remains. I argue that

Lacan's phallogocentrism suggests a faithful return to Freud since Freud

consistently reverts to the "actual phallic function" in his theorizing. I argue in

chapter three, "(Un)Easily Contained Elements," that many of the concepts of

psychoanalysis that are traditionally read as the "otherwise" elements of

psychoanalysis-for example, overdetermination, free-association, memory, and









the primary process-either are actually more dependent or related to

"castration-truth," or are simply not as "otherwise," as previously thought.



Disturbing Psychoanalytic Origins

What does psychoanalysis risk by being logocentric? Is there any other

kind of psychoanalysis? Can there be an-other kind, a non-logocentric

psychoanalysis, an "other-wise" psychoanalysis? Can psychoanalysis afford not

to assume that it masters the truth it supposedly finds and is? Psychoanalysis as

truth must master especially itself, and then all other. Can it afford not to

assume that it has a privileged access to this truth and the totality it implies?

How can it master this truth, itself, if this truth is the division of self? As I argue

in chapter two, one way is to repress how this truth applies to itself, to repress

how the found disrupts trust in the finding and founder. Self-analysis as

repression: a (non)origin since this repression would be required to attain this

truth. Doesn't the unconscious as, not a self-absence, but a self-differance-a

deferral, dispersal, dissemination of the self-obliterate the possibility of self-

presence? Yet the self-present founder is the primary figure of the orthodox

myth: Freud's self-presence is the result of a successful self-analysis, where it

seems all of the Es (Other) was transformed into Ich (Same), his "hysteria" cured.

Through the inspiration of genius, so the myth goes, Freud is able to simply step

outside of the truth that he supposedly founded, achieve a self-presence

uncorrupted by the unconscious forces he supposedly discovers, and he is then

able to perceive this truth (himself, his unconscious, psychoanalysis) without

distortion, without transference or resistance. He is thus able to be the founding

father of psychoanalysis, a primal father as in Totem and Taboo, with his legatees









establishing institutes with reportable training analyses that supposedly assure

the reproduction of this founding perception in the form of the proper paternal

transference. I cite Derrida's question again, "how can an autobiographical

writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self-analysis, give to a worldwide

institution its birth?" (Der81 305).

Or, turning the question above around, can psychoanalysis be anything

but otherwise than logocentric since what is supposedly found disrupts the

possibility of finding? Does Freud take seriously the unconscious as what Barratt

calls an "otherwise other"? In chapter three, I argue that Freud does not sustain

the fragments of conceptualizations that might constitute theorizing the

unconscious in terms of something totally other, an "otherwise other," or Other,

but that he consistently reduces its origin ultimately to a simple presence (with

respect to a "specific" absence, a lack that has its place) that he then treats as

oikos, home and economy (the logic of lack). Yet does not the unconscious, the

traditional "object" of psychoanalysis, supposedly the site of unreason, promote

a "logic" where contradiction is tolerated? Can the unconscious be both the site

of unreason and the validating center for psychoanalysis's logocentrism, the

center of the logos, the site of the organizing principle of reason, of the finding of

the truth found? Building on the disturbances of psychoanalytic myths of origins

in chapters two and three, I attempt to show in chapter four, "Freud's

Masterplotting," that there is a progression in Freudian theory, one repressed by

the psychoanalytic orthodoxy and others, where the ego transforms from the site

of order to the site of disorder and contradiction, and its beyond-the

unconscious, and then the id-transforms from the site of disorder and

contradiction to the site of a priori order. I will show that this progression is









connected to the ascendancy of Freud's plotting of his master narratives of

human kind, and the descendancy in his interest in etiologies of neurosis and

cure.

Is a logocentric psychoanalysis contradicted if the truth that it finds/is

found is posited as the unconscious as the site of unreason? Is it contradicted if

this truth is posited as the truth of Freud's Oedipus complex? "Unreason" could

be construed, and is construed by Freud, as the absence of reason. I will argue

that Oedipus is construed as that Truth whose repression allows for reason, and

therefore Oedipus can be conceptualized as the unreason (phallic absence) that

allows for reason (transcendental phallic presence): the lack which assures the

place of the phallus, "castration-truth." In this way, Oedipus as the truth of the

unconscious secures the totality of psychoanalysis as truth that establishes reason

and therefore goes beyond reason. Freud's supposed discovery, the truth he

supposedly found, is therefore prior to reason. Because this "prior to" is also a

beyond, Lacan positions himself as within but also beyond reason or his

Symbolic. He calls himself both an hysteric and a mystic. But the "prior to" does

not really work for Lacan's structuralist psychoanalysis: his structures are

outside of time, transcendent more than synchronic. In chapter four, I will

attempt to show that the origins that Freud developed with respect to his

dominant masterplot of the war years are also more transcendent and structural

in this way, even though he uses the diachronic term "genetic" to describe them.

Freud's "before" becomes a "beyond" and then a type of "always already." I

argue that he pushes his origins beyond the ontogenetic and "into" an "always

already" he calls phylogeneticc." I will attempt to show how Freud posits the

truth he discovered as Oedipus in terms of this "always already" phylo-








"genesis," and that the "uneasily contained elements" (Derrida) of Freudian

theory were consistently employed theoretically to sustain this truth as the truth

beyond reason, the truth that supposedly secures reason and science. Like

Lacan's Symbolic, this structure becomes a totality as what is Other to it-for

Lacan the Real-is reduced to the absence of the structure. For Freud, any

potential Other, all the beyond he considers, are ultimately reduced to the

absence of the structure of his masterplot: gaps in the narrative or "trauma."

Specifically the "logic" of oedipal and logocentric Freudian theory

positions the truth Freud found as the "Urphantasien,"4 the oedipal "origin of

origins" (Bro84 276), the primal fantasies of the primal scene, castration, and

seduction, which Laplanche and Pontalis equate with the Oedipus complex: "The

universality of these [primal fantasy] structures should be related to the

universality that Freud accords to the Oedipus complex as a nuclear complex

whose structuring a priori role he often stressed" (Lap67 333na). Primal

fantasies, according to Laplanche and Pontalis, are typicalcl phantasy structures

... which psychoanalysis reveals to be responsible for the organization of

phantasy life, regardless of personal experiences of different subjects; according

to Freud, the universality of these phantasies is explained by the fact that they

constitute a phylogenetically transmitted inheritance" (Lap67 331). Freud

posited these structures at the same time that he held that the unconscious was

the site of unreason that could tolerate contradiction. One wonders how these

structures, these a priori organizing principles of the unconscious, could tolerate



4 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Ed.
and trans. J. Strachey et al. Volume XIV (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 269. Hereafter the
Standard Edition will be cited by volume using Roman numerals.









contradiction, and, as theorized, they could not. Freud argues in his 1918

addendum to the Wolf Man case that they supercede any conflict with anything

ontogenetic. Thus we have the makings of an aporia with respect to what truth

psychoanalysis finds and to what truth it is founded on: the oedipal unconscious

versus the unconscious of contradiction, that which secures the Same or reason

versus that which is radically other to reason. I will also show how Freud's

phylo"genetic" "origin of origins" conflicts with his foundation, his origin of

psychoanalytic authority: the differentiation of the normal and the neurotic, or

the answering of the question, "whence the neurosis?," via a cure and an etiology

based on that cure. Many readers of Freudian theory have repressed the

significance of phylo"genetics" for Freud, including the readers of Freud I am

concerned with here. The "mainstyle" psychoanalysis I suppose is one that takes

seriously Freud's oedipal masterplot, and this focus will differentiate me to

different degrees from these other readers of Freud who attempt to take seriously

the ethical imperative to be "otherwise."

The primal phantasies naturalize "castration-truth" as the center of its

logic, its oikos (home and economy). According to Derrida, "castration-truth" is

"the very antidote for fragmentation" since "that which is missing from its place

has in castration a fixed central place, freed from all substitution (Der87a 441).

With Lacan, Freud's primal fantasies are transformed into an inevitably

phallocentric language: the Symbolic. According to Derrida, the absence of the

penis-phallus sets in place the phallogocentric signifying chain of Lacanian

psychoanalysis, the destination at which all sliding arrives: "truth-unveiled-

woman-castration-shame" (Der87a 416) or simply "castration-truth." This

absence, he argues, is "that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring) in order to









bring the phallus, the signifier, the letter, or the fetish back into their oikos, their

familiar dwelling, their proper place" (Der87a 441).


Filling Gaps

In the spirit of intertextuality, I cite Weber citing Freud citing Heine.

Weber argues that Freud contrasts his theories with what the former calls the

"phobosophie" of the philosopher whose approach Freud compares to the making-

cohesive function of the secondary revision of dreams:

This function behaves in the manner which the poet maliciously

ascribes to philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure

with shreds and patches. As a result of its efforts, the dream loses

its appearance of absurdity and disconnectedness and

approximates to the model of an intelligible experience. (XXII 161)

The "shreds and patches" are references to two lines in Heine's "Die Heimkehr,"

which Freud cites in full at the beginning of his final "New Introductory Lecture"

in 1933: "Mit seinen Nachtmiitzen und Schlafrockfetzen / Stopft er die Liicken des

Weltenbaus." Strachey translates these lines as follows: "With his nightcaps and

the tatters of his dressing-gown he patches up the gaps in the structure of the

universe" (ibid.). Whereas our nightcaps and dressing-gowns bring us comfort

during sleep, secondary revision is that which brings us comfort after we awake,

that which transforms the "absurdity and disconnectedness" of the primary

processes as experienced in dreams into what is an "intelligible experience" for

the awake consciousness. The "primary revision" would be the dreamwork of

the dream, the condensation and displacement of the primary processes: the

dissimulatingg function" which allows the ideational material-which would









otherwise remain unconscious-to slip by the sleeping censors of consciousness.

Secondary revision is thus a re-establishment of consciousness, its corresponding

sense of self, and their censors after they have been vulnerable to the disruptive

forces of the unconscious material during sleep.

The unconscious is thus theorized here by Freud as being a locus of

disruptive forces with respect to consciousness, forces radically other to

consciousness and its systems. Freud also associates the unconscious with "the

gaps in the structure of the universe," gaps which cannot be filled despite the

systematic "pretensions" of "phobosophers" or anyone else:

The secondary revision of the product of dream-activity is an

admirable example of the nature and pretensions of a system.

There is an intellectual function in us which demands unity,

connection and intelligibility from any material, whether of

perception or thought, that comes within its grasp; and if, as a

result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true

connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false one. (XII95)

System making therefore can have a defensive quality, and, in Levinasian terms,

an unethical quality inasmuch as it attempts to move toward totality by reducing

what is totally other to the system's logic-that is, inasmuch as it denies the

necessity for partiality, provisionality, and openness as a system, and inasmuch

as it denies the irreducibility of division as a unity. Following Freud, Weber

makes the connection explicit between theory (speculations, system making) and

narcissism:

The "expectation of an intelligible whole" described by Freud, the

expectation of a coherent meaning, appears thus to denote the









reaction of an ego seeking to defend its conflict-ridden cohesion

against equally endemic centripetal tendencies. The pursuit of

meaning; the activity of construction, synthesis, unification; the

incapacity to admit anything irreducibly alien, to leave any residue

unexplained-all this indicates the struggle of the ego to establish

and to maintain an identity that is all the more precarious and

vulnerable to the extent that it depends on what it must exclude. In

short, speculative, systematic thinking draws its force from the

effort of the ego to appropriate an exteriority of which, as Freud

will later put it, it is only the "organized part." (Web82 13-14)

Thus there is something "phobosophic" and narcissistic, if not unpsychoanalytic,

about theorizing in general, if that which is opposed to the ego, that against

which it organizes itself-"the" unconscious, the id, or that which simply

happens-is posited as that which cannot be organized in terms of the ego, that

which resists theory, that which is radically other to intelligible wholes, coherent

meaning, sense, organization. "For speculation," Weber continues, "which

Freud associates with narcissism, systematization, and secondary revision,

would be a form of thought ill-suited to 'judge unconscious material' inasmuch

as it is driven precisely to deny the influence of its own unconscious" (14).

Hence Freud's criticism of Adlerian theory: "The Adlerian theory was from the

very beginning a 'system'-which psychoanalysis was careful to avoid

becoming" (XIV 50). I will argue in later chapters that the year Freud made this

statement, 1914, he was on the verge of making the move toward primal

phantasies as the basis of his masterplotting, his ultimate system based on









"castration-truth." With this system, the identity of Narcissus and Oedipus is

established.

Freud decries all system making that is different from his own, and yet,

there are moments when Freud approaches taking seriously his own criticisms of

"phobosophie." In "Resistances," Derrida discusses one of these moments in a

note Freud makes to his interpretation of the Irma dream in The Interpretation of

Dreams where "Freud confesses a feeling, a premonition (Ich ahne, he writes)" (4)

that "something exceeds [his] analysis" (5):

I had a feeling that the interpretation of this part of the dream was

not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its

concealed meaning.... There is at least one spot in every dream at

which it is unplumbable-a navel, as it were, that is its point of

contact with the unknown. (IV 111nl)

Towards the end of The Interpretation of Dreams Freud reiterates this point:

There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted

dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become

aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a

tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled and which

moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the

dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down

into the unknown. The dream-thoughts to which we are led by

interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite

endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the

intricate network of our world of thought. (V 525)









These might be the dream-thoughts that take detour and never return to some

notion of the proper destination--one might say an adestinational theory of the

unconscious. This would make the "unknown" the "unknowable." Freud

seems to be arguing that the system-making of philosophy will necessarily be

incomplete due to "the unknown" of the most entangled roots of the

unconscious, and that any attempt to create a unity, eine Weltanschauung, as

Freud says, is similar to the folly of secondary revision: a projection of the need

for unity. It would seem that we have a Freud here that demands that certain

holes or gaps remain unfilled: open spaces.

Yet, Derrida argues, "Freud seems to have no doubts that this hidden

thing has a sense," that "the secret" (4) is unknown but not unknowable, and that

the open spaces are gaps where a certain presence is missing from its place. For

Freud, if the interpreter could do the impossible and accomplish just the right

unraveling of the tangle of dream-thoughts, and follow all the myriad detours,

sense could be made of the dream:

The inaccessible secret is some sense, it is full of sense. In other

words, for the moment the secret refuses analysis, but as sense it is

analyzable; it is homogeneous to the order of the analyzable. It comes

under psychoanalytic reason. Psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic

reason. ibidd.)

We might argue that Freud becomes split regarding the sense of the navel of the

dream into two Freuds: one is the Freud of the inaccessible secret, the unknown

as exceeding the analysis, but as ultimately knowable and "homogeneous to the

order of the analyzable"; and the second is the Freud, not of the unplumbable

unknown, or not-yet-known, but of the unplumbable and therefore unknowable,









the abyssal. One Freud would be of system-making grounded in truth; the other

would recognize that all systems will fall short of a totality and have spaces open

up within due to the irreducibility of the Other to the Same. I will argue that

there is little evidence of this latter Freud, and abundant evidence of former.

Moreover, what is the not-yet-known for Freud here becomes that which

grounds all of his later theory.

Both Weber and Derrida draw attention to the maternal connections of

Freud's navel metaphor. As will be even more the case as the "castration-truth"

system of oedipal psychoanalysis develops, the center of the structure, its navel,

will be associated with an absence (the "unknown") related to woman, the

absence of woman, and the mother's absence (as in the fort/da game of Beyond the

Pleasure Principle). At one point in his treatment of this note to the Irma dream,

Weber argues that the navel of the dream would not necessarily be a site of

destabilizing mystery:

What could be more reassuring and familiar, more primordial and

powerful than this reference to the place where the body was last

joined to its maternal origins. That this place is also the site of a

trace and of a separation, but also of a knot, is a reflection that

carries little force next to the reassuring sense of continuity,

generation, and originality connoted by the figure. (76)

The question of Freud's "navel of the dream" becomes: is it a "gap" that can be

filled by discovering the correct sense that would then correspond to this

dream's truth, or an infinity of ever-returning spaces that do not allow for a

totality, a system (something that simply happens)? And what is the relationship

of these gaps/spaces to the mother, femininity, and woman?









What is at stake here seems to be the status of (psychoanalytic) knowledge

and the very nature of the unconscious: whether it has a nature and whether that

nature can be expressed in a form that might be meaningful. Discussing related

issues, Derrida states matter-of-factly in Resistance of Psychoanalysis that what is at

stake "are sense and truth" (18). In "Lefacteur de la vriti," Derrida argues that

Lacan treats the navel simply as a fillable gap. According to Lacan, whatht

Freud calls the navel-the navel of the dreams, he writes, to designate their

ultimately unknown centre ... is simply, like the same anatomical navel that

represents it, that gap of which I have already spoken" (Lac77b 23). Lacan's

interest in what Derrida calls "the gap and the carved-out localization of the

umbilical hole" (Der96 11) is a repetition of the "castration-truth" Derrida finds

to be the basis of Lacan's reading of "The Purloined Letter," and of Lacan's

"destinational" theory of language. More simply, Lacan's rendering of the navel

as a center reveals his penchant for idealist structures with centers. It is a

philosophy or "phobosophie" that "fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with

shreds and patches," but Lacan fills it with a supposedly material and, at the

same time, indivisible letter, what I call a material-ideal letter. Again the

question becomes: how well does Lacan read Freud? Or does psychoanalysis

itself, despite Freud's criticisms of philosophers, attempt to be a Weltanschauung?

Freud's transformation of open spaces into specific absences, and making

these absences the center of a grand system, begins with his treatment of

hysterics and ends with the "castration-truth" of psychoanalysis proper. In "A

Fragment of a Case of Hysteria," Freud's 1901 case commonly known as the Dora

case, Freud states clearly that "[n]o one who disdains the key will ever be able to

unlock the door" (VII 115). At this point in his theorizing, the gaps in hysterical









narratives are the locks supposedly unlocked by Freud's, and later Lacan's,

phallic keys. When Dora recounts her narrative of being assaulted by Herr K. at

fourteen, the absence of Dora's desire for Herr K.'s advances is for Freud a

telltale bit of the "unconscious disingenuousness" (17) that leaves "gaps

unfilled" (16) in the narratives of hysterics. Effecting an abreaction, according to

the Freud of the Dora case, would supposedly require a catharsis of the

repressed ideational content via its dialogical reconstruction from the

analysand's free associations and the analyst's interpretations. Freud, however,

does not report filling this supposed gap in Dora's narrative with a

reconstruction that is at all dialogical. Rather, Freud, as he often does, employs

his own associations: "I believe that during the man's passionate embrace she felt

not merely his kiss upon her lips but also the pressure of his erect member

against her body" (30). Freud's primary key to the supposed hysteria of his

female patients up to and including Dora, the absent presence of every gap, is

often an "erect member," which he uses to know his patients, to penetrate their

unconscious desires.

The hysteric with her gaps ready to be filled by the phallocentric master

narratives of Freudian theory provides the initial small-"o" other. Freud

assumes a position of the narrative totality from whence he can see gaps. Later,

this position would be one of a masterplot, a metapsychology, rather than an

etiological narrative totality. Freud's initial system is based on cure, etiological,

and provides the foundation of truth on which psychoanalysis is supposedly

based. Psychoanalysis proper would be theorized according to the terms of

universal fantasies rather than the traumatic memories from which hysterics









supposedly suffered during the "seduction"5 theory: "hysterics suffer mainly from

reminiscences" (II 7). Supposedly, Freud was right about the truth he found, but,

he would later rationalize, this truth was in the form of universal fantasies rather

than traumatic memories. Freud's movement from his system of filling gaps in

phallic narratives to the "castration-truth" of totalizing masterplots is

complicated by a question that ultimately remains unanswered by Freud after

the movement: whence the neurosis? Though Freud's theorization, treatment,

and cure of hysteria are supposedly the authoritative foundation of

psychoanalytic truth, Freud would argue in The Interpretation of Dreams that

psychoanalysis finds "no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions

between normal and neurotic life" (V 373). Freud thus clearly differentiates a

nascent psychoanalysis proper from his earlier etiology of hysteria here. The

latter posited a structural difference between hysteria, one form of neurosis, and

normalcy: the hysteric, according to the Freud of around 1895 and 1896, suffered

from the pathogenic repression of traumatic memories of incestuous violence,

whereas the normal female did not. The Freud of the Dora case, written as an

addendum to The Interpretation of Dreams, had no clear etiology: this Freud could

not answer, "whence the neurosis?," and he avoided answering the question in

this mere "fragment of an analysis."

One of the dominant themes in my study is the possibility of chance in

Freud's system making. During the "seduction" theory, the difference between



5 Freud's theory was called the "seduction" theory only later and not by Freud. It is quite a
misnomer given that the theory is really one of child molestation or rape. The idea of
"seduction," however, seems to support the contention of psychoanalysis proper that there is a
desire in the child for the parent, which seems to be a retroactive rhetorical move to make the
child rape theory more cohesive with psychoanalysis proper.









neurotic and normal development was dependent on the chance occurrence of

the rape, molestation, or "seduction." In this sense, trauma, chance, and memory

are clearly linked in the answering of the question, "whence the neurosis?"

Freud's initial truth, his supposed "discovery," is the answering of this question

as part of a more general question of cure and the nature of the unconscious.

Narratives as etiologies, chance as part of that narrative, answering the question,

and cure are all the basis of establishing this truth. In one of his last essays,

"Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Freud argues that the way

psychoanalysis has come to understand the nature of resistance means that cure

is hard to come by. But cure is supposedly how psychoanalysis came to

understand the nature of resistance. What Freud is doing in this essay written in

1938, the year before the year of his death, and forty-three years after the

publication of Studies on Hysteria, is privileging metapsychology (metanarratives)

over technique etiologiess, cure) as the central concern of his theorizing and

forgetting that all of his appeals to the authority in his metapsychology are

ultimately based on cure. I return to the theme of chance in chapter three, and

again in chapter five, where I link it to the (non)position of woman in mainstyle

psychoanalysis.



"To Post or Not to Post?"

This project attempts to show how the masterplotting of psychoanalysis

proper reduces "open spaces" to the specific absences of "castration-truth," and,

as I quote Derrida above, this psychoanalytic absence is "that which contracts

itself (stricture of the ring) in order to bring the phallus, the signifier, the letter, or

the fetish back into their oikos, their familiar dwelling, their proper place"









(Der87a 441). As I argue in chapter five, "Uncanny (Wo)Man," the double games

of deconstructive readings should be differentiated from the phallocentric fetish

and its disavowal, where doubleness is dissimulated in order to achieve the

illusion of a One, rather than the explicit acknowledgment of fragmentation-not

as castration, but as "difference as division" (Der96 33)-when a double game is

played. I read the "castration-truth," the phallogocentrism of Freudian theory, as

such a legie of disavowal: divided not by its simultaneous belief in the

presence/absence of the phallus, a fetish, but in the simultaneous belief in the

presence/absence of woman. Contrary to those psychoanalyses that reduce

woman to desire for the phallus, the question regarding "woman" of the present

study is not the truth of woman, but the way psychoanalysis posits Truth of

woman in terms of the presence/absence of woman: first the hysterical gaps in

narratives and the cured hysteric (chapter two), then (op)positionality of

Freudian sexual theories, and finally the phallic One via the actual phallic

function and "castration-truth" (chapter five). Through my reading of Freud's

essay "The 'Uncanny'" in chapter five, I attempt to bring together many of the

questions and themes of the previous chapters in relation to Freud's treatment of

his formulation of the question of woman, especially the theme of the possibility

of chance in Freud's theory, which stems from my reading of Derrida's essay,

"My Chances/Mes Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies."

I argue that Freud's strong superstitious tendencies are related to his desire to

extend his deterministic psychology into a cosmology. I connect these themes to

Freud's repression of the importance of the mother. The question for me in this

chapter is not the question of woman revisited, and especially not Freud's

question, "Was will das Weib?" The question here is of psychoanalysis: the









question of psychoanalysis and its uses of truth, determinism, castration,

woman, and hysteria as the basis of its phallogocentrism and destinational

linguistics.

Derrida argues that "deconstruction has developed itself as a

deconstruction of a system which is called phallogocentrism, which is a whole

structure, which is a system so to speak" (Der87b 196). As Derrida attempts to

"open a space within which we can make philosophy otherwise" (Der78 178), I

hope to do so here with psychoanalysis. I imagine psychoanalysis proper would

see the opened spaces for making psychoanalysis otherwise as Freud saw the

narratives of the so-called hysterics he treated: as gaps in what would be a

complete narrative, Freud's oedipal narrative of totality, his masterplot. Seen

from psychoanalysis proper, such a deconstructive reading of psychoanalysis

would appear to be an hysterical reading. For Lacan, the structure of hysteria is

centered on the question, "What is it to be a woman?" (Lac93 175). Here the

opened spaces of deconstruction would be seen as evidence of certain semantic

castration. The other neurotic structure Lacan theorizes is the obsessional

structure, and its question is Hamlet's: "to be or not to be?" (Lac93 179-180).

Since castration is equated with not being according to Lacan's "castration-

truth," we can equate the two questions: to be a woman is not to be, or as Lacan

says, "Woman doesn't ex-sist" (Lac90 38). I read Freud's texts as stuck in what

might be called an obsessional structure if I were not so interested in

problematizing such psychoanalytic categories and the structures on which they

depend. Not to be in this structure would mean not to have mastery over

woman, and woman here, according to the actual phallic function, is a way of

reducing the Other to a specific absence. In other words, psychoanalysis









obsessionally attempts to master the trauma of the Other by reducing whatever

spaces open up-"deconstruction happens"-to castration.

The question on which the structure of this project is provisionally

centered with respect to one of its double games is what remains after the

phallogocentrism, the "castration-truth," of psychoanalysis is deconstructed, and

whether these remains can or should be called "psychoanalysis," or if the

remains of this deconstruction would in some way constitute a posting of

psychoanalysis: "post-psychoanalysis." In a section of chapter six I call "Post(al)-

Psychoanalysis," I attempt to problematize such a posting, if not embrace it.

Besides the obvious drawbacks of such a trendy move, a simplistic posting, a

putting behind of psychoanalysis, of course, seems to assume that one can

simply step outside and in front of psychoanalysis: moves I try to problematize

here. As with post-Marxism, for example, this posting, if it is one, would be one

where the emphasis would remain ambiguous: is it post-psychoanalysis or post-

psychoanalysis? Adding an "al" in parentheses is intended to problematize any

reading of the title of the conclusion as such a simple posting of psychoanalysis

and to associate this problematized posting with Derrida's problematization of

postal systems.













CHAPTER 2
PROBLEMATIZING "HYSTERIA" AND THE
ORIGIN OF PSYCHOANALYSIS


In this chapter I show how Freud's system-making begins very much in

terms of gap filling, a process at least related to what I have described, following

Barratt, as the phenomenologyy of fucking." The Other to Freud's system-

making is consistently transformed from Other into other, from the unconscious

or the unknown (the open spaces, the remains of the system) into femininity,

woman, or, as I will discuss here, hysteria (gaps, specific absences). Because the

traditional myth of psychoanalytic origins is that psychoanalysis was discovered

during Freud's work with hysterics, hysteria becomes a privileged category for

any project interested in disturbing these origins and the myths based on them. I

posit here what I think has been a repressed binary, psychoanalysis/hysteria,

where, analogous to the male/female of psychoanalysis, this binary reduces the

Other to a simple other, "hysteria," in order to establish itself, "psychoanalysis,"

in a mode of self-posting "auto-bio-graphy" (Derrida). My goal in this chapter is

to deconstruct this binary and therefore problematize psychoanalysis at what the

orthodoxy considers to be its origin: its analysis and cure of hysteria. By

focusing on Freud's own "hysteria" and his impossible "self-analysis," I hope to

further problematize these myths by (dis)placing them en abyme, and, in general,

to show that Freud's own "phobosophie" is consistently mixed with misogyny.

This latter theme is treated in chapter five below.







What is hysteria? Or should I ask, what was it? In Feminism and

Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, Ellie Ragland-Sullivan's Lacanian entry for

hysteria is typical in its acceptance of certain myths of hysteria:

Psychoanalysis was born with Freud's treatment of the illness then

named "hysteria" (from the Greek hysteros 'womb'), a uterus

thought to be "wandering," a malady as old as Hippocrates and the

subject of the oldest known medical text. (163)

Ragland-Sullivan's acceptance of this so-called "illness" as one is a typical

psychoanalytic assumption, one on which the myth of the birth of

psychoanalysis depends. Moreover, she seems unquestioning that this "illness"

indeed had something to do with a reality related to actual diseased wombs. The

womb (hystera) has been consistently established as the essence of women

throughout Western history, and from this determination came the various

discourses of medicine, biology, sexuality, religion, etc., which gave birth to

many forms of sexism stemming from the notion that "anatomy is destiny."

Of course, we are investing ourselves in a "certain linguistics" when we

speak of "maladies" with ancient histories and their realities. And this

linguistics and its essentialism and reality, as I will argue, create this "illness"

and the misogyny associated with it in order to sustain itself. This linguistics

and its phallogocentrism need this "illness." Yet, even within the context of such

a linguistics, the symptomatology of what was called "hysteria" has a long,

unwieldy, and inconsistent history, though not nearly as long as presumed by

Ragland-Sullivan, nor as is usually presumed. The orthodox mythology of the

birth of psychoanalysis depends on the objective existence of hysteria as a

disease entity that psychoanalysis cures. What I argue here is that even within a









logocentric episteme, hysteria can make no claim to being a proper disease.

Freud constructs his "hysteria" and its cure to father psychoanalysis and

"Freud," and Lacan and Lacanians, such as Ragland-Sullivan, will assume its

existence within a "certain linguistics" of phallo-phono-logocentrism. I will

argue that psychoanalytic hysteria constitutes a magical detour-destination,

which allows the letter to be properly purloined so that it will always properly

arrive back at its proper destination. Psychoanalysis and "hysteria" are one:

psychoanalysis/hysteria. All detours must be construed as circles leading back

to the proper destination, and the sending of the self-post must be appropriated

as the proper detour, instead of indicating something radically other that might

account for the compulsion to repeat the sending.

In Womanizing Nietzsche, Kelly Oliver argues that "woman and the

feminine" (5) are the excluded other in the discourse of Western philosophy, but

that this excluded other is also an other within. Oliver urges philosophy to

"engage in a dialogue with the other within it, the other out of which it was

born" (4). Certainly this approach could be applied to Freudian theory and

psychoanalysis in general: hysteria was indeed repressed as a psychoanalytic

concern after the Dora case, and the cure of hysteria has been considered the

womb out of which psychoanalysis was born. Yet the way Oliver sets up her

problem reinscribes the (op)positionality of the binary philosophy/woman in

order to create a dialogue, and, as with any (op)positionality, the binary

dissimulates difference and division behind opposed identities or ideal

categories. I do not ascribe to a project where psychoanalysis would "engage in

a dialogue with the [hysterical] other within it, the other out of which it was

born" since to do so would be to risk reinscribing the binary I reveal/construct









here in order to destabilize: psychoanalysis/hysteria. My hope in this chapter is

to show how this binary acts as a mode of defense against the radical alterity

Freud encounters in this initial phase of his theorizing. I do this after showing

how the history and the histories of this supposed disease support the repression

of what is totally other via this supposition. Because of the tradition of how this

word "hysteria" was used to support a variety of patriarchies, it seems to me that

any attempt at any "reappropriation" (a making proper to a discourse interested

in subversion of the proper)-for example, hystericizing hysteria or hystericizing

psychoanalysis-even if successful, would run the risk of reproducing the

reification of "hysteria" and all of the misogynistic baggage this reification

carries with it, and it would do so without any clear gain with respect to

problematizing how "hysteria" was used to create this baggage or how

psychoanalysis/hysteria was used by Freud and his followers as the basis of an

origin myth.



Historia

Sweeping histories of this supposed disease, this supposed

singularity-such as Ilza Veith's classic, Hysteria: The History of a Disease-are

flawed in that they create what Mark Micale, author of Approaching Hysteria, calls

"a remote and venerable historical heritage" (Mic95 46) rooted in the Hippocratic

texts. In "Once upon a Text: Hysteria and Hippocrates," Helen King undercuts

traditional histories of hysteria in three crucial ways: (1) by problematizing the

similarity between popular conceptions of hysteria in its modern forms and the

hysterike pnix, or "suffocation by the womb" (Gil93 28-9), which Hippocrates

described; (2) by arguing that anything recognizable as a modern form of









hysteria was not recorded until the 16th century; and (3) by pointing out that the

diagnosis "hysteria" was not coined until 1801 (Gil93 73). According to Micale,

the common type of mythical historical heritage of a disease entity for something

"as elusive and mysterious as hysteria ... implies the universality of the disorder,

establishes the validity of the diagnostic category, and bolsters the scientific

status of psychiatric medicine itself" (Mic95 46). Even during the latter part of

the nineteenth century, which Fulgence Raymond called "la pdriode h&roique de

I'hystrie" (qtd. in Mic95 3), hysteria's symptomatology could not sustain what

most nosologists, then or now, would consider proper disease status. Jean-

Martin Charcot's conceptions of hysteria in his writings of the 1870s and 1880s

reveal a dizzying polysymptomatology despite his efforts to make the diagnosis

functional through a delimiting classification system. Basically any behavioral

abnormality in a woman was suspect of being a sign of hysteria during "la periode

hdroique de l'hystrie."

Contemporary symptomatologies for hysteria-a diagnosis unfortunately

still in use-are also extremely vague and general. The very recently outdated

Diagnostical and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition-Revised) or

DSM-III-R lists "paralysis, aphonia, seizures, coordination disturbance, akinesia,

dyskinesia, blindness, tunnel vision, anosmia, anesthesia, and paresthesia ...

[disturbances of the] autonomic and endocrine systems ... [and vomiting" (257)

as symptoms of the more specific category of "Hysterical Neurosis, Conversion

Type." The DSM-III-R also lists the dissociative type of hysterical neurosis,

hysterical personality (histrionic personality disorder), and various kinds of

hysterical psychoses. The updated and current DSM-IV does not list hysteria at

all, I hope in recognition of the nosological chaos of the history of this diagnosis









and, more importantly, the often violent misogyny of the history of "hysteria's"

theorizations and treatments. Since the term remains a common element of

psychoanalytic discourse, it seems that the psychoanalytic community is far from

acknowledging this history of misogyny and nosological chaos. To do so would

be to undercut the origin myth and therefore the very foundation of the

supposed scientific status of psychoanalysis-not to mention the complicity of

psychoanalysis in the latter part of this misogynistic history.

As with many psychoanalytic feminists who write about hysteria, many

Freudian faithful attempt to limit hysteria to symptoms of "conversion," the

somatic expression of psychical conflict, as Freud, early in his career, claimed

should be done (see 141-52 passim). Reducing the vast polysymptomatology of

hysteria to its merely broad psychosomatic component appeals to psychoanalytic

feminists because the metaphorics of the silenced women who can only express

their dis-ease within) the patriarchy through their culturally hypercathected

bodies is indeed powerful. This reduction appeals to the Freudian faithful

because the mythologies surrounding Freud's supposed cure of hysterics, and

hysteria as the womb of psychoanalysis, comprise the origin myths of

psychoanalysis (Freud cures/anchors the womb that gives birth to

psychoanalysis as anchor). Freud's own symptomatologies and theorizations

with respect to hysteria, however, were varied, inconsistent, contradictory, and

usually conflated with female homosexuality after the initial writing of the Dora

case-a far cry from the "gross, florid motor and sensory somatizations" (Mic95

4) we associate with Freud's earlier work on hysteria with Breuer. At the same

time that Freud would try to limit the symptomatology of hysteria in order to

make it manageable, he would also bring in many other symptoms from the









dizzying polysymptomatology when they would suit his particular purposes at

that time.

If hysteria could be said to have been one thing, something that might

constitute a categorization, it was simply a diagnosis, one that was historically

made by males in positions of authority-primarily nineteenth-century

physicians-about women who were somehow beyond the boundaries of what

was contemporaneously considered proper womanhood. The diagnosis of

hysteria itself may be a symptom of a patriarchal "dis-ease"-that is, the

patriarchy's dis-ease with those bodies classified as female that did not conform

to, were in excess of, its dictates of proper womanhood. Many of the feminists

who make this argument or similar ones, however, treat hysteria as if it were

something beyond a diagnosis. If they don't explicitly do this, and even if they at

times argue against such a position, their common unproblematized use of

"hysteria" suggests just such an assumption (see Showalter, Kahane, Matlock,

Smith-Rosenberg, among others). In other words, many feminist theorists often

use "hysteria" as an unproblematized denotation of an actual disease even

though these feminists suggest that the word "hysteria" itself cannot be anything

but the discursive manifestations of a variety of related patriarchal defensive

strategies, especially with its unavoidable anatomical etymology of a diseased

womb. There seems to be an understandable, if unfortunate, need to figure out

the causes of hysteria-the-disease at the same time that some feminists argue for

hysteria as a part of a reappropriative discourse of nineteenth century physicians

made insecure by the changes happening with respect to women and their roles

in society, in the family, and in their personal and sexual relations.









Histories such as Veith's-not a "hys-story" as much as a case of

"historia"-if not histories of a disease entity, may be useful as histories of what

Elaine Showalter calls "the pervasive association of women and madness" (Sch85

4), if their use of "hysteria" is retroactively problematized. For two reasons I

hesitate to say that such histories might be considered histories of female

madness. First of all, Showalter would see this as a redundancy since she argues

"madness is a female malady" (Sch85 3). Second, Derrida might argue that this

would be an "infeasible" (Der78 33) categorization for the same reasons that

Foucault's intention of writing his History of Madness from the position, as

Foucault said, "of madness itself ... before being captured by knowledge" (qtd.

in Der78 34), is for Derrida infeasible, or even "the maddest aspect of his project"

(ibid.). Any history is on the side of reason, thus making a history of madness a

reduction of the Other of "madness" to reason's more of the Same. Indeed,

madness can be read as the oppositionn that allows for reason.

What these "hys-stories" mask as aspects of this general reduction of the

Other to the Same with respect to reason/madness, are the undecidables of

certain boundaries that make up the dualisms or (op)positionalities that have

played major roles in the West's representational histories. This masking is a

process of naturalization of dualisms such as male/female and reason/madness,

a deciding of undecidables along traditional lines. A third dualism, mind/body,

is also a major player in the general representational histories of the West. On

one level, what is at stake with these hys-stories, and the many questions of

hysteria in general, is the reproduction of what Showalter calls "the fundamental

alliance between 'woman' and 'madness'" (Sch85 3) and "how women, within

our dualistic systems of language and representation, are typically situated on









the side of irrationality, silence, nature, and body, while men are situated on the

side of reason, discourse, culture, and mind" (Sch85 3-4). These dualisms have

been hierarchies in practice, and they mask the undecidables-the radical alterity

of what is Other, the instability of the same-and the futility of the various

patriarchies' attempts to reduce what is Other to its dualistic codes and

hierarchies once and for all.

Showalter's feminism itself seems to be based on the self-evidence or

naturalness of such a dualism, male/female, and therefore it risks reproducing

the phallogocentric reduction of what is Other to more of the Same-that is,

inasmuch as such an assumption necessarily leads to such a reproduction, and

inasmuch as feminism necessarily makes such an assumption. In,

"Deconstruction in America," Derrida suggests that feminisms are necessarily

phallogocentric:

So I would say that deconstruction is a deconstruction of feminism,

from the start, in so far as feminism is a form-no doubt a

necessary form at a certain moment-but a form of

phallogocentrism among many others. (Der85 30)

Psychoanalysis, of course, would also be one of these phallogocentric forms. The

appeal of psychoanalysis for some feminisms seems to be what these forms of

feminism read as its anti-essentialism, which gets away from "anatomy is

destiny." And yet, since Derrida argues both psychoanalysis and feminism are

forms of phallogocentrism, the source of this attraction may also be that they

share phallogocentric assumptions. In so far as phallogocentrism prescribes a

destiny, a destinational linguistics, ultimately "anchored" to the letter of

anatomy, the two "lures" of psychoanalysis for certain feminisms-anti-









essentialism and sharing phallogocentric assumptions-become mutually

exclusive. Without getting embroiled in the intricacies of the relationship

between deconstruction and feminism at this point, I am interested in suggesting

here that the conflicted strategies of treating hysteria as a discursive formation

and attempting to theorize the origins and essence of hysteria-that is, treating it

as a "real" illness-can be understood in relation to the certain feminisms'

conflicted relationship to phallogocentrism and the mainstyles of psychoanalysis

and deconstruction. I return to these issues in the concluding chapter.

The primary function of hysteria is to bolster and reproduce the

aforementioned hierarchical dualisms-mind over body, reason over madness,

and male over female. Even when the diagnosis of hysteria was used for men, as

in the late nineteenth century by Charcot and Freud-and though the diagnosis

was severed here from its history of connecting the pathology to a diseased

womb-the diagnosis was used figuratively to suggest that the male had

succumbed to a feminine type of madness, a "female malady." Freud returns to

this type of metaphorics-the type where Freud must cure himself of his

hysterical symptoms, his femininity-in the late essay, "Analysis Terminable and

Interminable," where he stresses the difficulty of curing his male patients of their

residual femininity (though he never theorizes this source of femininity beyond

simply stating the universality of bisexuality).

The discursive formation "hysteria," the diagnosis, was used to justify

oppressive practices in the service of the stability of various patriarchies. Prior to

the inception of "hysteria" as a diagnosis in 1801, the theories, speculations, and

"treatments" of aberrant forms of femininity were also used oppressively, often

violently. I will refer to all aberrant forms of femininity I deal with here that









various Western patriarchies felt the need to classify or diagnose to defend

against their disruptive potential, borrowing from Showalter, "the female

malady"-though I use this phrase, not as a synonym for madness in general,

but as a way of denoting the paradoxical imbrications of femininity and madness

from the perspective of a hom(m)osexual patriarchy-that is, the malady of

being female, and, furthermore, the malady of not being female enough.

Psychoanalysis continues this treatment of the themes of femininity in terms of a

malady for both men (see "Analysis Terminable and Interminable") and women

(the "peculiar" sex, penis envy), and this contradictory treatment of the feminine

malady as not being female enough (either hysteria or female homosexuality

with respect to Freud's "three lines of development"). With respect to

terminology, my hope here is to differentiate the broader term, "the female

malady," from its subset "hysteria," and therefore to historicize "hysteria" as a

diagnosis made after 1800. This allows me to maintain the broad strokes of

related histories of female oppression associated with female madness without

reifying hysteria and making the error of assuming that nineteenth-century

hysteria has a "remote and venerable historical heritage" (Mic95 46) rooted in the

Hippocratic texts. In fact, I would say that a "remote and (un)venerable

historical heritage" of the imbrication of femininity and madness would be less

vulnerable to historica" than a comparable hys-story.

The theories and treatments for the female malady were aspects of varied

though similar forms of patriarchal reappropriation, where the aberrancy of

things feminine-that is, associated with femininity yet in excess of its proper

form-is reappropriated by establishing that which is aberrant as the abject form

of the proper in a name-game of mastery that re-establishes the One and the









same in the face of the Other. As usual, the aberrancy-the transgression,

perversion-was used as limit and negative in order to establish and center the

proper, the norm, the law. In the Timaeus, Plato wrote:

the womb is an animal which longs to generate children. When it

remains barren too long after puberty, it is distressed and sorely

disturbed, and straying about in the body and cutting off the

passages of the breath, it impedes respiration and brings the

sufferer into the extremist anguish and provokes all manner of

diseases besides. (qtd. in Mic95 19)

With proper femininity in Plato's Greece, the womb is irrigated and inseminated;

the happy womb does not wander as it is anchored by the penis. A proper

sexuality, a proper relation of womb to penis, therefore, is the cure and antithesis

of the diseased womb, the symptom of aberrant femininity. The themes of

proper sexuality and the curative penis/phallus would recur throughout the

history of the female malady. For example, Rudolph Chrobak sent along the

following course of treatment with a patient he had diagnosed as hysterical and

had sent to Freud: "penis normalis dosim repetatur" (Gay 92).

Another recurring theme in histories of the female malady is violent

misogyny. Despite what seems like what should have been the sound security of

Western patriarchies throughout history due to their rootedness and

overwhelming power, violent misogyny regarding the treatment and

theorization of the female malady has been common and often virulent, which

suggests that these patriarchies were not as stable as they were powerful, and

that the threat of what is Other associated with the phantasmatic feminine was

consistently great. After St. Augustine, who attributed all illness to "a









manifestation of innate evil" (Mic95 20), the female malady became synonymous

with witchcraft and possession by the devil:

During the late medieval and Renaissance periods, the scene of

diagnosis of the hysteric [sic] shifted from the hospital to the

church and the courtroom, which now became the loci of

spectacular interrogations. Official manuals for the detection of

witches, often virulently misogynistic, supplied instructions for the

detection, torture, and at times execution of the witch/hysteric.

The number of such inquisitions remains unknown but is believed

to be high. (Mic95 20-1)

The violence of the nineteenth-century patriarchal reactions to what was named

"hysteria" is consistent with the violence of previous eras' patriarchal reactions

to the demonic female malady, such as the uncountable murders of women

deemed to be witches. Nineteenth century forms of violence were often

medicalized and sexualized in keeping with its less religious Enlightenment

ethos. The seventeenth century would see the beginning of a neurological model

used to theorize the female malady, one that would evolve until the present time.

A revival of uterine theories would occur in the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth century, hence the womb-oriented diagnosis of "hysteria" for what

were considered materialist maladies circa 1801. As examples of this

combination of medicalization and sexualization, treatments that stemmed from

a combinatory, neuro-uterine model of "hysteria" included "intrauterine

injections, the cervical and vulvar application of leeches, and clitoral

cauterizations," and recalcitrant "cases were occasionally subjected to

amputative and extirpative gynecological surgery, including bilateral









ovariotomies" (Mic95 24). Though a pioneer in getting away from physically

violent forms of treatment, Freud in 1896 volunteered one of his "hysterical"

patients, Emma Eckstein, for a procedure developed by his friend Wilhelm Fliess,

who posited that the cauterization of the turbinate bone of the nasal cavity could

supposedly cure sexually related neurotic and physiological ailments such as

hysteria. By Freud's own account, the operation had disastrous effects: the

patient nearly bled to death because of bone chips and a meter of gauze left in

her nose after the operation. As late as 1920, Freud would consider an

overidectomy as a potential therapy for one of his patient's homosexuality and

the hysteria Freud associated with it (XVIII 172). Whether neurological or

uterine/sexual, there are clear connections between "hysteria," the female

malady, aberrant forms of femininity, proper forms of femininity, feminine

sexuality, patriarchal insecurity, and the violence to which this insecurity led.



Hysteria and Hysterization

Differentiating my conception of hysteria from Foucault's "hysterization

of women's bodies" (Fou78 104)-one of his "four great strategic unities which,

beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific mechanisms of knowledge

and power centering on sex" (Fou78 103)-will help to expand my own

treatment of the questions of hysteria I have raised here. According to Joan

Matlock, author of Scenes of Seduction: Prostitution, Hysteria, and Reading Difference

in Nineteenth-Century France, hysteria "is far less the diagnostic name for a set

symptoms than a category for perceptions":

While doctors with radically different views reported similar

phenomena-paralyses, fainting, coughing fits, convulsions,









impressionability, and hypersensitivity to physical and emotional

stimulation-the range of symptoms for this disorder [sic] was so

great that some doctors refused to categorize it at all except as an

exacerbation of whatever made women different from men. (3)

Except for Matlock's unproblematized assumption that hysteria is a "disorder,"

so far so good. Matlock continues by incorporating her reading of Foucault:

What Foucault called the hysterization of women's bodies was

achieved in the nineteenth century by differentiating orderly bodies

from those perceived as disorderly. The hysteric and the prostitute

provided opposite models against which an orderly body could be

measured-the one tormented by desires welling up from the

inside, the other transformed into a holding tank for desires that

might contaminate society from the outside. (4)

What Foucault called the hysterization of those bodies called female, however,

was not achieved through any differentiation among these bodies. On the

contrary, his anti-essentialist take on hysteria and sexuality posits the

hysterization of those bodies called female as a "strategy" of "the deployment of

sexuality," and, according to Foucault, it would not have excluded any "women"

from the category of the potentially threatening to the hegemonic patriarchal

order: all "women" were deemed "thoroughly saturated with sexuality" (Fou78

104), therefore they were all disorderly, and this disorderliness was used as an

alibi for policing by being "integrated into the sphere of medical practices, by

reason of a pathology intrinsic to" sexuality (ibid.). In other words, hysterization

allowed for the policing of all women, but Foucault does not address the

differentiation between proper women and hysterics in the first volume of the









History of Sexuality. Lacan's conception of hysteria can be seen as an example of

Foucault's hysterization since Lacan's "hysteric" cannot be differentiated from

his "woman."

Besides the anti-essentialism of Foucault's take on the hysterization of

women, another strength of his formulation is the imbrication of women and

madness with respect to sexuality, which seems to have been the source of Elaine

Showalter's notion of "the female malady" in her book by that name, despite the

critique of Foucault we find there:

Although anyone who writes about the history of madness must

owe an intellectual debt to Michel Foucault, his critique of

institutional power in Madness and Civilization (1961) does not take

account of sexual difference. (6)

Foucault's notion of the hysterization of women's bodies, published seven years

before The Female Malady, does take into consideration something akin to what

Showalter calls "the pervasive cultural association of women and madness"

(4)-that is, how being designated female equals suspicion of being laden with a

malady, since the female is defined as being saturated with supposedly

pathogenic sexuality. Where Showalter truly differs from Foucault-and what

seems to be the source of her misunderstanding of Foucault's anti-

essentialism-is her acceptance of hysteria as a disease, and her other essentialist

notions concerning "the feminine":

While he exposed the repressive ideologies that lay behind the

reform of the asylum, Foucault did not explore the possibility that

the irrationality and difference the asylum silenced and confined is

also the feminine. (6)








In other words, Showalter does not acknowledge that such an essentialist

exploration in relation to an a priori feminine is contrary to the anti-essentialist

thrust of Foucaults work, and, accordingly, she does not problematize her

essentialist notion of hysteria.

Where I differ with Foucault begins with his tendency toward a

monolithic conception of power. According to Lois McNay, author of Feminism

and Foucault,

What Foucault's account of power does not explain is how, even

within the intensified process of the hysterization of female bodies,

women did not slip easily and passively into socially prescribed

feminine roles. (41)

Accordingly, Foucault's first volume of The History of Sexuality argues against the

psychoanalytic idea of repression. Repression and resistance, which Freud and

Derrida argue are two sides of the same coin, fall away when power is

monolithic: without something otherwise to the discursive constructs that make

up the ego and other institutions of power, what is there to repress or resist?

Where or how do the discursive constructs and what is otherwise to them meet

without the aporetic "logic" of what Barratt calls the "in but not of" (Bar93 133)

relation of the "otherwise other" to the "I-now-is" (Bar93 passim)? When

Foucault does posit an Other, it is either completely passive-as with the silence

of madness in Madness and Civilization--or it betrays his anti-essentialist creed, as

with the notions of "plebs," "subjugated knowledges" and "disqualified

knowledge" in his later work. Whereas all authors who write about some form

of what is totally other, or "the Other," struggle to avoid the reduction of this

"subject" to the more of the Same-as Derrida argues in his analysis of Levinas









in "Violence and Metaphysics"-Foucault is a special case since he is one theorist

who seems to understand such struggles and their significance-for example,

when he writes that madness is "the absence of the work" (qtd. in Der78 43) in

reference to Madness and Civilization. Unfortunately, he sometimes passes over

these difficulties as he posits the Other as the simple opposite of the Same

(Madness and Reason in Madness and Civilization), or ontologizes and

essentializes the Other (plebs, Madness), or makes it an a priori in the form of the

Same (disqualified and subjugated knowledges.

The passivity that characterizes some of the conceptions of a non-

reductive encounter with what is Other-for example, the silence of

Madness-accounts for neither the instability of the Same, nor the necessary

exclusion of what is Other (repression and resistance) that allows for the

establishment of the Same and its logic. In other words, Foucault does not

account for the role the Other plays in the "acts of establishment" (Bar93 12) that

constitute the Same, and how the Other is "in but not of" the Same. The

energetic of Foucault's discursive power, what he calls "biopower" in his later

theorizing, is all on the side of the Same: the power of the Same determines the

modes of the "bio," as with the hysterization of women's bodies. Foucault seems

to have been unable to conceptualize a type of power, what might be called an

otherwise energetic (that is, an otherwise energeticc" under erasure), which is

"of" the Other yet constitutive of, or "in," the Same (that is, "in but not of" the

same). According to Foucault,

Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which

power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which

knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be








given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to

grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of

bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse,

the formation of special knowledge, the strengthening of controls

and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few

major strategies of knowledge and power. (Fou78 105-6)

With this monolithic "deployment of sexuality," repression of the Other that

allows for an "act of establishment" of the Same would not be needed since it is a

totality of the Same. Derrida refers to Foucault's use of "The Decision" for

Foucault's separating of "sexuality" and the energetic of discursive power

(Der78 38). Is this evidence of a certain avoidance by Foucualt of the problem of

the relationship between language and what makes it unstable, what it represses

and resists? Derrida asks how Foucault could write about madness as an Other

within a history of reason. I would add: whence the madness with respect to

such a monolithic power of reason? Foucault gestures toward letting madness

speak for itself, which is a gesture towards writing ethically in the Levinasian

sense. Ethics, in this sense, seems to preclude "The Decision," a distinct

delimitation between the Other and the Same, which would be different than

Barratt's "in but not of" and Derrida's "dissension" where "the exterior (is) the

interior, is the fission that produces and divides it along the lines of the Hegelian

Entzweiung" (Der78 38-39).



Feminism and the Hysteric

Foucault's concept of hysterization theorizes a pathologizing of all

women's bodies, employed to justify all policing, but it does not account for the








use of the diagnosis as a means of appropriation or reappropriation of the

disorderly bodies labeled as hysterics. The difference between the normal female

body and the hysterical one, in a pseudo-Foucauldian sense, might be construed

as the difference between the always potentially disruptive body (in need of

policing) and the actually disruptive body (in need of a type of incarceration, a

diagnosis as incarceration). It would be "pseudo" because Foucault did not

theorize anything beyond the body as a discursive formation: nothing to repress,

and nothing otherwise to the power that might create a dissension within

discursvity. Furthermore, Foucault's hysterization does not account for the

difference between the normal and hysterical positions of "woman" within

patriarchies that used the diagnosis of hysteria, and it does not account for the

deployment of "hysteria" as a reappropriative measure. As with Lacan's

hysteric, Foucauldian "hysterized body" is synonymous with "female body."

Whatever created the dissension within the strictures of proper womanhood, or

within the hysterized body, would have been radically other to the identitarian

logics of these discursive formations, and therefore would have been threatening

to the stability of these logics and the powers of the patriarchies in question. To

call this source of dissension "hysteria," however, would reduce what is radically

otherwise to that logic, to make it recognizable and therefore masterable within

that logic and its possible bodily positions. "Hysteria" marks what is otherwise

to a particular phallic order, while providing one of many feminine positions

within that order, and a mode of defense against what is radically other to that

order. In all cases "hysteria" is a reappropriative tool of these orders.

The hysteric as proto-feminist would be oxymoronic if hysteria is

understood only as a patriarchal tool of appropriation, and if feminism is









understood as being about problematizing, if not disrupting or destroying,

traditional positions which would be in the service of patriarchy. Dianne

Hunter's assertion that "feminism is transformed hysteria, or more precisely, that

hysteria is feminism lacking a social network in the outer world" (Hun83 68)

would thus seem to be contrary to my position, as Hunter's position seems to

associate hysteria with what is otherwise to the patriarchy, rather than with

patriarchy's appropriation or totalization processes, its identitarian or

(op)positional logics of the Same. Some feminisms might aspire for feminism to

be the transformation of the disruption of whatever it is that creates Derrida's

"dissension," and by definition this (non)source or seuree would lack a social

network. Again, to call this disruption "hysteria" is to risk legitimizing the

patriarchal tool that associates any deviation from proper womanhood with an

essentialist notion of a diseased womb--even if "hysteria" is used in a way that

attempts to destabilize what is proper by "reappropriating" "hysteria."

Derrida might argue that both "hysteria" and feminism are both part of a

phallogocentric social network. We might ask, how much is the

phallogocentrism of "hysteria" linked to the phallogocentrism of feminism? The

larger question becomes how much is feminism invested in the "social network

of the outer world," its logic of the Same, its essentialism, and its use of

"hysteria." Limiting the scope of my inquiry, I want to focus on the problematic

relation of certain feminisms to essentialist conceptions of hysteria. These

conceptions might be seen as the lure of phallogocentrism for these feminisms.

As I stated above, Derrida reduces feminism to a phallogocentric discourse, and

feminisms' inability to give up essentialist conceptions of hysteria seem to be

evidence supporting Derrida's reduction. Yet Derrida's reduction of feminism to









phallogocentrism is just that, a reduction. It assumes that, like logocentrism,

phallocentrism is inescapable, thus all logocetrism would be phallogocentrism.

In Spurs, Derrida writes probably his most infamous lines for feminists:

And in truth, they too are men, those women feminists so derided

by Nietzsche. Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman

who aspires to be like a man. And in order to resemble the

masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays claim-just as

much claim as he-to truth, science and objectivity in all their

castrated delusions of virility. Feminism too seeks to castrate. It

wants a castrated woman. Gone the style. (Der79 62-65)

Derrida assumes that all feminists assume only two positions available to bodies:

male or female. Most feminists do just this, particularly psychoanalytic

feminists, who seem to be the most invested in this fundamental aspect of

phallogocentrism. In Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme, however, Diane

Elam writes,

If feminism is merely a form of phallogocentrism, then Derrida,

however much he gestures at historical necessity, would be

equating all of feminism with a teleological search for the essence

of woman. Thus, he would be reducing all feminisms to one and

the same feminism. Lost the style, for Derrida as well. (16-17)

Derrida also reduces all male/female binaries to its phallogocentric form:

presence/absence of the penis-phallus by assuming that all searches for truth or

logocentrism are necessarily phallogocentrism. Since Derrida wrote Spurs in

1978, many feminists have attempted to theorize bodies, genders, and sexualities

beyond the limitations of phallogocentrism and its male/female. For me the









question remains open whether logocentrism, which seems to be inescapable for

theory, is necessarily phallocentric. Logocentrism seems inescapable for any

theory of bodily or sexual positioning. But why would phallocentrism be

inescapable? What seems to be at stake here is the relationship between the

traditional binary of sexual difference, male/female, and the traditional binaries

of presence/absence. Which is primary? Is logocentrism, the metaphysics of

presence, always phallogocentrism? Can we have logocentrism without

phallocentrism? I return to this question in the concluding chapter.


Hom(m)osexual Pornographics and the Performing Hysteric

The hysteric as an individual seems to disappear, not only with Foucault's

hysterization, but also with the reduction of hysteria to a reappropriative

discursive strategy of patriarchy. The potential drawback of this disappearance

is that certain feminists portray the hysteric as a potential revolutionary figure, or

as a proto-feminist and resister to the misogynistic violence of patriarchy.

Though I argue that the feminist-hysteric is oxymoronic given the way I define

hysteria, the hysteric as an individual does not necessarily fall away: there were

individuals, mostly women, who performed a masquerade of hysteria I la the

supposedly anti-essentialist line of theory that grew out of feminist readings of

Joan Riviere's 1929 essay, "Womanliness as a Masquerade." I write

"supposedly" because this line of theory has become essentially an extension of

Lacanian theory, which, as I have argued, following Derrida, is ultimately

essentialist with its phallogocentrism. Can the performance of the so-called

"hysteric" legitimate the use of "hysteric" within an anti-essentialist argument

that attempts to problematize traditional uses of "hysteria"?









To address this question I turn to Catherine Clement's and Helene Cixous'

The Newly Born Woman. It follows from my conceptualization of "hysteria" as

being a patriarchal tool that I would feel more kinship with Clement's position

than with H61ene Cixous' in the part of their "Exchange" dealing with

conceptualizing "the hysteric" as an individual:

H: ... Dora seemed to me the one who resists the system.... And

this girl-like all hysterics, deprived of the possibility of saying

directly what she perceived ... still had the strength to make it

known. It is the nuclear example of women's power to protest. It

happened in 1899; it happens today wherever women have not

been able to speak differently from Dora, but have spoken so

effectively that it bursts the family into pieces.... The hysteric is, to

my eyes, the typical woman in all her force....

C: ... but when you say "that bursts the family into pieces," no. It

mimics, it metaphorizes destruction, but the family reconstitutes

itself around it.... The analysis I make of hysteria comes through

my reflection on the place of deviants who are not hysterics but

clowns, charlatans, crazies, all sorts of odd people. They all occupy

challenging positions foreseen by the social bodies, challenging

functions within the scope of all cultures. That doesn't change the

structures, however. On the contrary, it makes them more

comfortable.... In that position, they are part of one of the deepest

reinforcements of the superstructure, of the Symbolic. (154-55).

Clement seems to struggle in her exchange with Cixous because she accepts that

the hysteric as an individual, and hysteria as a reified disease entity, rather than









focus her attention on how the name-game of the diagnosis hysteria, the

discursive construction of hysteria, is what reinforces what she calls "the

Symbolic"-"the Symbolic" as what this name game might call itself, under the

spell of an "Imaginary" and structuralist delusion, since language cannot be

"anchored" in order to justify the capital "S." Cixous seems to privilege the

disruptive alterity of what "hysteria" tries to name and master, but then errs, like

Clement, by reifying "hysteria." This reification follows, as with Lacan, from the

assumption of a "Symbolic" and the "certain linguistics" that is connected to this

assumption.

Cixous also disregards those individuals deemed hysterics who

performed in a way that colluded with the patriarchy in question, and whose

performance was therefore antithetical to any disruptive force that might be

construed as feminist. This patriarchy-friendly version of the hysteric, who I call

the performing hysteric, seems to be the version of the hysteric Clement

privileges in her theorizations. The performing hysteric would hardly be

considered a protofeminist. With respect to Clement's position, I am hesitant to

criticize her essentialist and unproblematized use of "hysteric" since her

privileged version of the hysteric, it might be argued, exists as much as any body

who performs an identity exists. The performing hysteric would be an hysteric

whose positionality is in collaboration with the patriarchy in question, and with

its appropriative categories or roles for women. Calling this positionality an

"hysteric" does not betray some disruptive force as I have argued the figure of

the hysteric as proto-feminist potentially would do. Clement's use of the word

"hysteric" risks essentialism-and, again, this essentialism seems to be the crux

of her struggle in the exchange-but her argument is still powerful since she









relates the hysteric to those deviants who are "the deepest reinforcements of the

superstructure." The potential essentialism of her argument is undermined by

her focus on the hysteric as performing a patriarchal function, since essentialism

and performance are potentially at odds.

Showalter's description of a fifteen-year-old patient in Charcot's SalpEtri4re

named Augustine provides an almost archetypal illustration of the performing

hysteric:

Intelligent, coquettish, and eager to please, Augustine was an apt

pupil of the atelier. All of her poses suggest the exaggerated

gestures of the French classical style, or stills from silent movies.

Some photographs of Augustine with flowing locks and white

hospital gown also seem to imitate poses in nineteenth-century

paintings.... Among her gifts was her ability to time and divide

her hysterical performances into scenes, acts, tableaux, and

intermissions, to perform on cue and on schedule with the click of

the camera. (153-54)

Actually, the cameras of that time didn't click: the lenses were held open and the

subjects would have to hold their poses for fifteen seconds or so, which would

have been exceedingly demanding during what would have been the expected

stages of the hysterical attack. Showalter explains that in "Charcot's own

lifetime, one of his assistants admitted that some of the women had been coached

in order to produce attacks that would please the maftre," which confirmed

suspicions that the hysterics' performances were "the result of suggestion,

imitation, or even fraud" (150).









I would add that these performances were also the result of a strong

unconscious desire of the performing hysteric to be something, some-body

recognized by the patriarchy after "the cult of true womanhood" became in some

way untenable. That Augustine reported being raped by her mother's lover

suggests that Augustine was probably seeking a safe role she could play that

would be recognized and appreciated by the patriarchy. Her masquerade would

then be similar to the masquerade in Riviere's essay, where the woman puts on a

mask to avert the violence of the patriarchy. What was masked here, however,

was not the essentialist masculinity of Riviere's essay, and what was feared here

was not the "reprisals" of the patriarchy that discovered a female possessing this

masculinity. What was masked was a radical alterity no longer able to transform

and channel its otherwise energetic into the structures of "the cult of true

womanhood" since this cult had become too dangerous and therefore untenable.

What was feared was the abyss of not having a mode of channeling and

transforming this otherwise energetic that would have been recognizable to

others, and therefore unable to support an object relating ego. To the identitarian

ego, constantly re-establishing itself in the "face to face" with this abyss, the

radical alterity of falling into the abyss, of being "uniterable"-that is, of not

"being"-would be the ultimate horror. Therefore the pleasure of the

performing hysteric would be the eschewal of the pain of this abyss: a certain

unpleasure principle.

The structures of the hysteric might have provided Augustine a

temporary asylum, so to speak, from this horrific abyss. The maitre's pleasure

would assure her recognition as an hysteric. The female body in this scenario is

mastered by the patriarch in question and by performing for his pleasure; the









patriarch is displaying his scientific (mental) mastery by solving a riddle of

female sexuality gone awry, as Freud would do later. The hierarchies of

hysteria-mind/body, reason/madness, and male/female-are re-established

by her performance, whence the pleasure of the male, and of the performing

hysteric, who now has an identity and a body where otherwise energetic are

channeled by/into that identity. Within the Salpitriere, the male maftre displays

that mastery among a forum of voyeuristic "subjects," most of them identified as

male, and within a hom(m)osexual economy of scientific-sexual pleasures-what

Barratt would associate with the patriarchal phenomenologyy of fucking," a

violent and phallic way of knowing what is deemed feminine nature via the

penetration of feminine mysteries (Bar93 150).

I also see here a parallel between the hysteric's position among the male

physicians of the Salpetriere and the position of the female porn star with respect

to the men involved with pornography-consumers and producers. According

to Stephen Heath,

... pornography is a relation between men, nothing to do with a

relation to women except by a process of phallic conversion that

sets them as terms of male exchange. (Hea87 2)

The hysteric mastered would have been the colonized "dark continent" of

science, the discovery of the caput Nili. Though formerly a "sexual threat" to the

male's sense of mastery and the limits of the domain of that mastery, the hysteric

would be domesticated via "the phenomenology of fucking," often violently

brought back into what Derrida calls the oikos. The Salpetri&re and its performing

hysterics, who were coached to please the voyeuristic crowds, suggest a possible

parallel between the prostitute and the hysteric: both provide ever-ready









supports for a pornographic economy for the channeling of otherwise energetic

into the "patrix" of a hom(m)osexually-reproductive patriarchy.

The hom(m)osexual pornographic of hysteria was not limited to the

Salpetriere, as evidenced by Chrobak's recommendation to Freud for the patient

he sent him-"penis normalis dosim repetatur" (Gay 92)-which can be read in a

new light along the lines of the themes introduced above: the patients passed

between the physicians can be interpreted as the products of a "phallic

conversion that sets them as terms of male exchange." Carroll Smith-Rosenberg,

author of Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America, was a pioneer

of hysteria studies in that she treated the doctor-hysteric relationship as sexual.

She points out how the physician legitimized the hysteric, and how he was often

the replacement of the husband as the woman in question went from the typical

domestic relationship structures of the home to those of the doctor(s)-hysteric of

the clinic, hospital, or doctor's office (209). Though many had theorized the

hysteric's role in this relationship as sexual, Smith-Rosenberg also recognizes the

potential sexuality of the doctor's role:

In a number of cases, the physician could have played the role of

Oedipal father figure to the patient's child-woman role, and in such

instances his complicity [with the hysteric's disruption of the

family] was not only moral and intellectual but sexual as well.

These doctors had become part of a domestic triangle-a husband's

rival, the fatherly attendant of a daughter. (209)

Smith-Rosenberg is also suggestive regarding the sexuality of the supposed cure:

"Her cure demonstrated that he had mastered her will and body" (211). Smith-

Rosenberg's analysis, however, suffers from understatement. What is missing









from it is the sexuality or even the pornographic of this mastery-how the cure

was often the climax of a scientific phenomenologyy of fucking." In 1888, Freud

most likely wrote the following in a contribution to Villaret's encyclopaedia

entitled "Hysteria" (the contribution was unsigned but mentioned in Freud's

letters): "In the face of no other illness can the physician perform such miracles or

remain so impotent" (153). Switching Freud's causation where the potency

provided the miracle cure, I would argue that the cure provided the miracles of

potency.

There is one potential disruption to my perhaps too-neat demarcation

between performing hysterics and the disorderly bodies that resist the diagnosis

of hysteria, and therefore the reappropriative name-game of patriarchy: the

protean symptomatology of hysteria that would frustrate physicians. This
frustration was one source of the violence of physicians mentioned above, and

would be contrary to the physicians' pleasure, which equaled recognition. I

interpret protean symptomatology as a potential aspect of the sexualized and

unstable relationship between the performing hysteric and the physician, and as

a way of the performing hysteric to have some control over that relationship.

I see at least three possibilities for reasons why this relationship is

unstable. First, the doctor could not tolerate his own sexuality coming to

consciousness in a recognizable, non-scientific form. This might have been the

case with Brueur's treatment of Bertha Pappenheim (Anna 0.), though this can

only be speculation (see Api92 83). It certainly was the case often with Freud.

Second, in overly simplistic terms, the position of hysteric was probably

inadequate for the task of channeling what I am calling under erasure "otherwise

energetics" Third, and I believe most significantly, the physician would lose









interest in the mastered hysteric once mastered, like the Don Juan who loses

interest in a conquest after he is sexually satisfied. Protean symptomatology

would be a vehicle for allowing the physician a miracle or two, while not

allowing him to reach the final satisfaction that would threaten the performing

hysteric with his departure.

Freud's comment in an 1895 letter to Wilhelm Fliess reveals his awareness

of the sexualization of the doctor-patient relationship: 'There are two kinds of

women patients: one kind who are loyal to their doctors as to their husbands, the

other kind who change their doctors as often as their lovers" (FF 110). He would,

however, consistently deny his own investment in this sexualized structure. An

illustration of my argument with respect to the protean symptoms of a

performing hysteric and the role this type of symptomatology plays in the

sexualized doctor-patient relationship would be Freud's first extensive case

study of Fanny Moser as presented in Studies on Hysteria as the case of Emmy

von N. According to Appignanesi and Forrester, authors of Freud's Women,

Fanny Moser was the latter type of patient: changing her doctors and lovers with

regularity. Freud seemed to share this opinion of her when in 1895 he looked

back at the case that spanned about three years starting in 1889. During the case,

however, Appignanesi and Forrester show that Freud sees her as the former,

loyal kind of patient. Freud would secure his husband-like position with her by

establishing that he had what Appignanesi and Forrester call "exclusive hypnotic

rights over her" (97). Freud writes at the close of his description of the case:

... in the summer of 1893, I had a short note from [Fanny Moser]

asking my permission for her to be hypnotized by another doctor,









since she was ill again and could not come to Vienna. At first I did

not understand why my permission was necessary, till I

remembered that in 18901 had, at her own request, protected her

against being hypnotized by anyone else, so that there should be no

danger of her being distressed by coming under the control of a

doctor who was antipathetic to her, as had happened at -berg (-tal, -

wald). I accordingly renounced my exclusive prerogative in

writing. (II 85)

Appignanesi and Forrester also show that Freud is aware of "how much the

power of suggestion [in hypnosis] places him in the role of an ex-lover" (97):

It may be remarked, by the way, that, outside hypnosis and in real

life, credulity such as the subject has in relation to his hypnotist is

shown only by a child towards his beloved parents, and that an

attitude of similar subjection on the part of one person towards

another has only one parallel, though a complete one-namely in

certain love-relationships where there is extreme devotion. A

combination of exclusive attachment and credulous obedience is in

general among the characteristics of love. (VII 296)

Freud would play the authoritative master to Frau Moser's subservient slave,

who would give him exclusive reign in the netherworlds of her psychological

interior. He even isolated her from her daughters, who seemed to him to pose a

threat to the doctor-patient bond. Freud, in relation to other doctors-suitors,

jealously guards his exclusive rights to his patient and attempts to secure her

loyalty. His hypnotic mastery and competitiveness with other doctors would









combine, according to Appignanesi and Forrester, as Freud would use his power

as hypnotist to perform tricks on Frau Moser "to demonstrate the stupidity,

cruder hypnotic skills and less amicable effectiveness of the other doctors who

had tended to Fanny" (96)-at Frau Moser's expense. According to Appignanesi

and Forrester, Frau Moser cooperated with Freud with respect to attaining

exclusive rights over her and with respect to isolating her from her family, a plan

which she agreed to, according to Freud, "without raising the slightest objection"

(II 50):

Fanny's body collaborated in Freud's plan of isolating her so that

only he had influence over her, in particular by erupting in a flurry

of symptoms whenever the resident house-physician entered her

room. (Api92 94)

Freud's initial treatment met with some successes, but Frau Moser's symptoms

returned after she left his care and returned to her home in Switzerland. During

the second phase of treatment Freud had to deal with a new and initially

recalcitrant symptom: anorexia. His treatment was based on Frau Moser's

valuing their relationship more than this relatively dangerous symptom, and,

like much of this case, had little to do with Freud's future methodologies:

Freud put their future relationship on the line: he threatened to

leave if she did not accept within twenty-four hours that it was her

fear, rather than her constitution, which made it impossible for her

to eat and drink normally. Give up your symptom, or give up your

masterly doctor! (95)









When Frau Moser wanted Freud to visit her, rather than her usual visit to

Vienna, she produced another new symptom: a phobia of trains (a case of

mimicking her doctor). Frau Moser would use her polysymptomatology to keep

Freud near her in three ways: first, by intensifying her symptoms when other

doctors would attempt to treat her while she was initially isolated from her

family; second, by giving him small "miracles," enough to keep him interested

and feeling like a man; and third, by coming up with new symptoms when she

either wanted him near or wanted to renew the treatment-and even when she

wanted to check his cock-assuredness or to stage a protest. Freud would not

only deny his sexual investment in the relationship, but hers too. He saw the

source of her neurosis as abstinence even though, as Appignanesi and Forrester,

put it: "People in the neighborhood remembered her particularly for her erotic

extravagance" (98).

The eroticism, sexuality, and pornographic of "hysteria" bring together

two themes I explore throughout this chapter, and particularly in the fifth

chapter on 'The 'Uncanny"': the relationship of questions of "sexuality" to

questions of positionality, or, as is almost invariably the case with Freud,

(op)positionality. Returning to Matlock and the relation of the positions of the

hysteric and the prostitute to the position of proper womanhood, Matlock argues

that

The hysteric and the prostitute provided opposite models against

which an orderly body could be measured-the one tormented by

desires welling up from the inside, the other transformed into a

holding tank for desires that might contaminate society from the

outside. (4)









Yet neither the hysteric nor the prostitute would constitute a disorderly body in

the terms I am trying to establish here: both are integral parts of the phallocratic

deployment of power in relation to what has been deemed feminine. They

would have provided the boundaries of the "cult of true womanhood": an

(op)positionality within "womanhood." The difference between the prostitute

and the performing hysteric might be theorized as follows: the prostitute is not

associated with any Other that might threaten the stability of the same, whereas

the performing hysteric would be associated with those "bodies" resistant to any

of these established forms of womanhood. The performing hysteric, the site of

scientific "miracles" in a context of hom(m)osexual pornographic, would thus

be associated with a potentially castrating form of "sexuality" or "bodiliness,"

the site of "impotence." But both forms of womanhood are used as boundaries

of proper womanhood in terms of sexual positioning, and both forms are subject

to the violence associated with the potential disruptions of "sexuality," and

particularly of the "sexuality" of "woman." Moreover, both forms of

womanhood can be theorized as integral parts of a hom(m)osexual pornographic

economy. Hysteria and the hysteric, like Foucault's "hysterization," should be

associated with the appropriation or totalization processes fueled by the

identitarian energetic of phallocracies-what Derrida calls "the drive of the

proper," which I discuss below-rather than with the Other and its otherwise

energetic, which would be "in but not of" identitarian energetic. Unlike

Foucault's "hysterization," however, hysteria and the hysteric should be

understood with respect to processes of repression and resistance, where these

and other identities are established via repression of/resistance to that which is

otherwise.











Psychoanalysis/Hysteria

In 1977, Lacan mourned the loss of traditional hysterics: "Where have they

gone, the hysterics of the past, these marvelous women-the Anna O's, the Doras

..." (qtd. in Nas97 1). Juan-David Nasio, opening his book on Lacan and hysteria,

Hysteria: the Splendid Child of Psychoanalysis, with this quotation from Lacan

above, adds to it: "... all those women who provided the womb from which

psychoanalysis was born" (1). Is psychoanalysis the splendid child of hysteria?

Or is it a monstrous offspring of a diseased womb? Did psychoanalysis explain

and cure hysteria? Did it master hysteria? Supposedly psychoanalysis is the

child of a diseased womb that it cures through its conception and birth.

According to the orthodox origin myth, psychoanalysis itself is born through the

cure psychoanalysis provides for hysteria. But how can it be both provider of the

cure and born of the cure? Is this a form of self-posting? Freud's cure filled the

gaps he supposedly discovered in the personal narratives of the patients he

diagnosed as hysterics. At first this filler was theorized as the repressed memory

of the (father's) phallus, and then later as the repressed fantasy of possessing that

phallus: castration, penis-envy, and refusing to give up masculine sexuality.

Freud thus positions psychoanalysis and himself as the phallic father of the cure,

what restores health to the diseased womb: a "penis-child" (Freud) as

"anchoring point" (Lacan) for the wandering womb similar to the one described

by Plato in the Timaeus. Just as Freud identified with both his grandson and as

grandfather in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, psychoanalysis is both father and

child of this process: woman as hysteric disappears as "she" becomes a conduit

for this androcentric economy. With Freud's grandson, "fort" was associated









with the absent or bad mother (hysteric), and "da" was associated with the

present or good mother (cured hysteric). The origin myth of psychoanalysis can

therefore be read as a similar fort/da game where the hysteric (fort) is cured (da)

and baby and theorist (psychoanalysis and Freud) is master. Psychoanalysis

arrives at its destination-but it arrives, it returns, at the origin.

The logocentric repression of self-posting reveals the uncanny remains of

a ghostly inheritance due to the necessity of dispatching the self to the self in this

postal relay, and the necessary impropriety of this relay's proper, and its

(non)origin. These are the destabilizing, anti-identitarian (anti-self) remains of

the original repetition, essential division, and the logic of dissemination of what

Derrida calls iterability, a concept to which I will return in the concluding

chapter. This particular self-posting of the fort/da game with hysteria and the

origin myth of psychoanalysis is one of masculine positioning that both uses the

mother-woman-hysteric as simple other and denies her significance in the game

by establishing a father-son identity: an (op)positionality of mastery and

disavowal. Since self-posting "acts out" the impropriety of the proper-mise en

abyme where, according to Derrida, the "proper is not the proper, and if it

appropriates itself it is that it disappropriates itself-properly, improperly"

(Der87 357)-it is unstable and requires repetitive "acts of establishment"

(Barratt), an interminable play.

The self or identity establishing itself simultaneously (in a mode of

disavowal) against the (op)positions of "woman" in abject form (absent mother,

hysteric, fort!) and then in proper form (present mother, cured hysteric, da!) can

be seen as two of three acts in the "triple (self-)deception" of the "actual phallic

function." The "actual phallic function" is another way of theorizing Derrida's









conception of phallogocentrism and Freud's unconscious inasmuch as it is

phallogocentric: presence is established by reducing the Other to absence, binary

difference is effaced by erecting one term (the phallus) to identify difference, the

binary becomes a hierarchy, woman is abjected and disavowed, the One or

phallic presence is established and secured by transforming what is radically

other to the One into a "specific" absence, this specific absence is put at the

center of this Negative Concord (Kermode), and these processes are naturalized

via the repression of all repressions and of all that remains.

With respect to psychoanalysis proper, man/woman is in the form of

male/female sexuality and masculinity/femininity, and the magical term of

difference-into-identity is castration. Castration had not been established as the

oikos when Freud was transitioning from his more memory-based theories

focused on hysteria to his more fantasy-based psychoanalysis proper. The

trajectory of Freudian theory from this transition to his final work should be seen

as a movement away from the unstable self-posting of psychoanalysis/hysteria

to the more stable ground of "castration-truth" and its general theories of

subjectivity-masterplots of being, metapsychologies-rather than etiologies of

neurosis. One enigma of "hysteria studies" is the supposed disappearance of

hysteria during the beginning of the twentieth century. Regardless if this

disappearance should be theorized in terms of changing diagnostics and

nosology, or if it should be theorized in terms of a change in the patriarchal

orders' relations to women and madness, hysteria was no longer in the limelight

after The Interpretation of Dreams. Judging from his own writings, even Freud's

interest in the topic waned after 1897: Freud saw the Dora case more as an

extension of his "dream book" than as a proof of a new, psychoanalytic etiology









of hysteria. Freud's two psychoanalytic case studies of hysteria, Dora (1905) and

"Psychogenesis" (1920), were both fragments of case studies. Between the two

cases Freud wrote only sporadically about hysteria (see especially his works

form 1905, 1908, 1915, 1927, and 1933).

Freud's and the psychiatric community's waning interest in hysteria-that

is, the theorization and diagnosis of this supposed psychological illness-would

mean that the cure of hysteria could not provide a stable foundation for the

claims of psychoanalysis to being a revolutionary science. But this waning is not

the only reason hysteria was an unstable foundation for psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis/hysteria is also unstable because it lacks a magical term of

difference-into-identity and simply because it was based on curing the so-called

hysterics' symptoms. Much of what is groundbreaking about psychoanalysis

relates to the absence of this difference-into-identity term. During the early years

of psychoanalysis proper the primary process, the pleasure principle, and the

navel of the dream had yet to be reduced to a logic of the Same via phylogenetics

and castration. Though Freud showed leanings towards a Symbolic based on

castration during this time, he was also able to leave-he even insisted on

leaving-something fundamental as ambiguous, such as the navel of the dream.

Cure was always an unreliable proof for the efficacy of psychoanalysis

and therefore an unstable foundation. For example, the Wolf Man haunted

Freud: for all of Freud's life and well into the 1970s, the Wolf Man's symptoms

continued and at times got worse, and, for years after Freud published his case

study, the Wolf Man was easily found in Vienna: a ghostly remains during the

ascendancy of psychoanalysis to international stature. "Analysis Terminable and

Interminable," with its pessimism regarding the efficacy of the psychoanalytic








cure, can be read as Freud privileging the truth of his metapsychology over his

technique and separating this truth from cure. For Freud to make such an

argument, such a rhetorical move, Freud would have to once again flip-flop from

what I argue in chapter four is his flip-flopped position in Inhibitions, Symptoms

and Anxiety regarding the ego's relative strength in relation to the id: in "Analysis

Terminable and Interminable," cure cannot be counted on since the id is

recalcitrant, and its strength in relation to the ego is, once again, theorized as

being great.

The scientific status of psychoanalysis also depends on the efficacy of a

particular analysis: Freud's own self-analysis. Freud and psychoanalysis seem to

have a relationship to cure based on the logic of disavowal and fetishism: cure is

both crucial (origin myth) and insignificant (as argued in "Analysis Terminable

and Interminable"). Given that metaphorically cure is often theorized in terms of

filling gaps with phallocentric etiologies and/or fantasies-in terms of the

phallus both being and not being in its proper place-I see psychoanalysis as, if

not fetishistic, since the concept of fetish is phallocentric, then very much

dependent on the defense of disavowal. The phallus is not in its place (hysteria,

fort!), and yet it is (cure, da!). What is significant for us here is that, according to

psychoanalytic orthodox myth of origin, Freud cures himself of his own hysteria.

Charles Bernheimer writes in his introduction to In Dora's Case:

Freud-Hysteria-Feminism:

Freud invented psychoanalysis between 1895 and 1900 on the basis

of his clinical experience with hysterical patients, nearly all of them

women, and of the self-analysis he performed to cure his own

hysterical symptoms. Hysteria thus is implicated in psychoanalysis








in the sense that the science enfolds the disease within it and is

constituted simultaneously with this pathological interiority. Yet

psychoanalysis contests this originary implication, insisting on its

scientific authority and asserting mastery over hysteria as the

illness of the other, typically of the feminine other. (1)

Though Freud would consistently call his female patients with hysterical

symptoms "hysterics," he would not reduce himself to that category: he merely

had hysterical symptoms, but would never consider himself an hysteric. Did

Freud cure his own hysteria? What might this have been? What symptoms?

According to Derrida, Freud's self-analysis was "unterminated" (Der87 305). But

we do not need to appeal to Derrida's authority in order to problematize

Bemheimer's orthodox assumption. What might a cure or a terminated analysis

be? What would it have been in the last years of the nineteenth century, when

Freud was conducting his self-analysis? What might a self-analysis be? How

could it possibly work? Would there be transference and counter-transference?

More importantly, what might hysteria be for a male? If it does not necessarily

have to do with a diseased womb, why call it "hysteria"? Was Freud's diagnosis

of his neurosis as hysteria correct? According to which theory? Which etiology?

Given that Freud's final theory of hysteria in "Femininity" (1933) is female-

specific-the female's improper repression of her original masculinity and its

clitoridal sexuality-how might we with hindsight theorize Freud's diagnosis of

whatever symptoms there were and his supposedly cured hysteria? Does Freud

see his so-called hysteria as one of the two "themes" that "give the analyst an

unusual amount of trouble," as he writes in "Analysis Terminable and

Interminable"? He defines this theme as the male's "struggle against his passive









or feminine attitude toward another male" (XXIII 50), and again conflates, if not

hysteria, than neurosis and homosexuality. The other theme from this passage,

of course, is "envy for the penis" in the female. Given Freud's therapeutic

pessimism in this late essay and given that a self-analysis would certainly be less

reliable than a dyadic analysis, it seems that again the foundation of

psychoanalysis is unstable inasmuch as it is based on the efficacy of Freud's self-

analysis and his cure of his so-called hysteria.

A fuller version of the quotation of Derrida referred to above is worth

mentioning here: "... how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an

unterminated self-analysis, give to a worldwide institution its birth?" (ibid.).

Freud's "auto-bio-graphy" (Der87 passim) seems to be the womb of

psychoanalysis for Derrida. As with any self-posting, auto-bio-graphy is abyssal,

but the womb of psychoanalysis is "doubly so" (if infinity could be doubled)

since it is also constituted by an impossible self-analysis. Among other problems

with Bemheimer's passage above,6 he seems to beg the question he raises about

hysteria's supposed exteriority to psychoanalysis when he assumes that Freud

cured himself through self-analysis: Freud as primal father whose genius (access

to Truth) sets him beyond transference and therefore beyond the effects of his

unconscious. Freud as the discoverer of the unconscious is assumed to be the



' I wonder why Freud's work before 1895 would not be considered part of the invention of
psychoanalysis, especially when much of his work with Breuer on hysterics was done then. The
year 1900 fits popular and orthodox conceptions of the end of Freud's invention phase, but the
Oedipus and castration complex were unformulated at that time, and the Dora case (among other
cases that were even later) still shows signs of the "seduction" theory, which the orthodox like to
believe had been "abandoned" to make way for psychoanalysis proper. Thus, "psychoanalysis,"
if your definition would be centered on the relationship of repression and sexuality, was forming
before 1895 (repression, defense) and was still largely unformed until 1908 (Oedipus and
castration complex). What seems tobe at stake here is (1) the notion that psychoanalysis has an
essence, and (2) an orthodox reading of the origin of psychoanalysis centered on 1897 and
Freud's supposed abandonment of the "seduction" theory.








exception to the very basis of his supposed discovery, the supposed

breakthrough-the relative weakness of the conscious ego in relation to the

unconscious-due to the assumed power of his ego and its genius. Here

"hysteria" becomes almost synonymous with "the unconscious" and/or

"sexuality," and Freud has basically cured himself of them: Wo Es war, soil Ich

werden. The "it" is associated with the unreason of the body, as is the traditional

hysteric. Below, especially in the section on Freud's "The 'Uncanny,'" I try to

connect this "it" with the figure of woman: what must be mastered by

psychoanalysis. Indeed, with Wo Es war, Soil Ich werden we can replace the Ich/Es

binary with any of the binaries of hysteria: mind/body, reason/unreason,

sanity/madness, and, especially, male/female:

Where body was, there shall mind be.

Where unreason was, there shall reason be.

Where female was, there shall male be.

For the orthodox keepers of the flame, Freud's "cure"-"cure" being

opposed to hysteria, "cure" as "I" unencumbered by "it"-is a crucial aspect of

the traditional origin myth to protect from criticism: the objective rationality of

the founder and, therefore, the scientific status of psychoanalysis depend on the

success of Freud's self-analysis and cure of his hysterical symptoms. These

symptoms are therefore an object, an "it," within Freud's subjectivity, and his

genius, therefore, constitutes some subjectivity untainted by hysteria, which

allows for the subject-object split necessary to keep this self-analysis out of the

abyss-to allow the subject, the "I," to become transcendent. The father of

psychoanalysis, once cured-of his body, his irrationality, and, mostly, his

femininity-is therefore the pure analyst-scientist cleansed of the irrationality








associated with hysteria and able to give birth to his science. He is like the

primal horde father: a father without a father, the analyst without an analyst.

Freud positions himself as both primal father and first-generation son, a

positioning Derrida plays with in "To Speculate-on 'Freud.'" This primal

father, beyond genealogy and an unconscious, is beyond a mother or woman in

general. "Psychic health, Freud discovered," Jonathan Lear argues in Love and Its

Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis, "depends

on abandoning the fantasy that one can be one's own child. This is as true within

the realm of thought as it is within the family" (3). But it does not seem to be

true for the founder.

Freud's mastery over hysteria, his own and others, is the basis for the

separation of psychoanalysis from hysteria: psychoanalysis (the subject of reason

and truth) is anterior to, separate from, the diseased, irrational, feminine, and

unscientific object of hysteria (the object of irrationality and deception). From

this separation and dominance, this abjection, psychoanalysis secures for itself a

position as a new and privileged way of knowing and understanding within the

fold of reason, able to reach beyond reason and the mind and master madness,

the body, and the feminine. With this origin myth the dualism of

psychoanalysis/hysteria is established, and many related traditional dualisms

are maintained: hysteria the disease, hysteria as feminine, bodily madness of the

"it"; psychoanalysis the science, a curative discourse of masculine reason and the

"I." Hysteria acts as the primary other to psychoanalysis, an extension and

condensation of philosophy's other of woman, theology's other of the flesh, and

psychiatry's other of madness. Neither psychoanalysis nor hysteria comes first:

they both arrive at the same time as psychoanalysis/hysteria. Psychoanalysis









established itself as (impossible) father-child of hysteria; it constructs hysteria as

the (impossible) feminine other that is simultaneously the mastered woman-

mother-hysteric that gives birth and security, but also does not matter or even

exist: fort/da. We should read the colon of Nasio's title, Hysteria: the Splendid Child

of Psychoanalysis, as both an "and" and an "as." With respect to origins,

psychoanalysis/hysteria is undecidable.

I interpret the loss Lacan is mourning above as the loss of the splendid or

magical present-absent other against which psychoanalysis began to establish

itself, the (op)positional other it first employed to reduce the effects of an

encounter with the Other to more of the Same. In other words, hysteria as

woman-body-irrationality is what psychoanalysis must create as an absence, a

gap to be filled by its specific, phallic presence: man-mind-reason. According to

this line of argument, Bernheimer does not acknowledge that, if hysteria is

implicated in psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis would also have to be implicated

in hysteria in order for both to be "constituted simultaneously." Psychoanalysis

constitutes its own hysteria as it constitutes itself. The proper must make the

improper that is necessary to it into a circular detour that leads back to itself:

fort/da.



The Lacanian Hysteric's Essential Question of Lack

Freud supposedly cures his own hysteria, what he and Lacan might later

call his "struggle against his passive or feminine attitude toward another

male"-but the later Freud also theorizes female hysteria as not accepting a

"passive or feminine attitude toward another male," not accepting one's lack of a

penis and instead envying the possession of one. Most Lacanians read Lacan's








return to Freud as a corrective or clarification here: hysteria is connected to

bisexuality, or, as Ragland-Sullivan puts it:

Lacan translates Freud's find, the hysteric's sexual oscillation

between women and men, into the quintessential question about

gender, divided artificially by the effects of identification and

language that constitute a sense of being in the form of totalized

gender concepts of male and female [see Lac 68]. The hysteric's

gender question-"Am I a woman or a man?-links sexuality to

identity: her discourse reveals the fundamental impossibility of

reducing identity to gender in the first place. For Lacan, there is no

signifier, symbol or archetype adequate to re-present the difference

between the sexes (Lacan, 1975, p. 74 [Lac98 80]). (Wri92 163)

But there is the lack of symbol adequate to transcendentally center the structure

of language and the unconscious, which therefore makes the hysteric's question

one of the essential lack. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, according to Derrida,

somethingig is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing from it"

(Der81 441): "manque 4 sa place," which Bass translates as "lack in its place,

missing from its place" (Der87 425). "Manque a sa place" is also a homophone of

"manque a sa place": "lack has its place." Contrary to leading to any

undecidability, indeterminacy, or division between sex and identity, "lack in its

place, missing from its place" is the very foundation of "castration-truth" and a

"destinational linguistics." According to Derrida, "lack does not have its place in

dissemination" (Der87 441).









Lacan's status as theorist-whether his work is poststructuralist or

postmodern (e.g., Cop94) or the products of a potentially reactionary

ontotheologist (e.g., Nan92)-is difficult to determine. According to Derrida,

In France, the "literary criticism" marked by psychoanalysis had

not asked the question of the text.... It is entirely otherwise in the

"Seminar on The Purloined Letter." Or so it appears. Although

Lacan has never directly and systematically been interested in the

so-called "literary" text, and although the problematic of Das

Unheimliche does not intervene in his discourse to my knowledge,

the general question of the text is at work unceasingly in his

writings, where the logic of the signifier disrupts naive

semanticism. And Lacan's "style" was constructed so as to check

almost permanently any access to an isolatable content, to an

unequivocal, determinable meaning beyond writing. (Der87 420)

Yet, following Derrida's reading of Lacan that follows this quotation, I will argue

that the Lacanian text is psychoanalytic and not literary- that is, it attempts to

ground itself in its own "castration-truth." Its "logic of the signifier" is a logic of

lack: a textuality of a "certain linguistics" (Der78 199). This logic may disrupt

"naive semanticism," but it does so by securing a transcendental phallic center

where the "failure" of language secures the center: the disruption is itself

construed as that lack which has its place. The absence of this "naive

semanticism," therefore, should not be read as an example of a postmodern

celebration of the indeterminacy of meaning and the decentering of Western

discursive structures. The question for me becomes: should Lacan's style be read









as an obfuscatory defense against any kind of critical assessment? Along these

lines, Barratt argues that

assessment of any "thesis" of Lacan's ... is notoriously difficult.

For, eschewing systematization, Lacan deftly, even roguishly,

defies systematic critique. Moreover, as is well known, his style

almost wholly obliterates considerations of the content of his

thought. For Lacan, style is everything, and the content of

whatever thesis he might happen to be presenting becomes quite

unnecessarily adumbrated. (Bar84 214)

Despite all the turnabouts and twists and contradictions, the orthodox feel of

Lacanian "psychoanalysis" comes from the way it consistently conceptualizes the

relation of the "subject" (in its most servile sense) to the Other, the ultimate

totality and patrocentrism of that Other, and the immutability and

oppositionality of the possible sexual identities determined by the Other.

Moreover, a cosmology based on Oedipal destiny (Der87 495) is created when

the "letter," the "odd" material substrate of the Other and its logic of the

signifier, "always arrives at its destination" (Lac88 53), and this destination is the

reproduction of the oedipal structure of sexual positionality and the actual

phallic function. Though Lacan claims to have subverted the notion of "anatomy

is destiny," he has erected a determinism immune even to what might be called

the vicissitudes of any "biology" or adestinational postal system and created a

sexual transcendentalism where the "male" is "whole" and the "female" is "not-

whole," as determined by the phallic function.

Despite what seems to be the consistent and radical determinism of

Lacanian "psychoanalysis," Joan Copjec, in her book Read My Desire: Lacan









against the Historicists-in particularly the section, "Sex and the Euthanasia of

Reason"-writes that deconstruction could learn about undecidability from

psychoanalysis (which she erroneously assumes is simply represented by its

Lacanian form). This claim stems from her analysis of Lacan's opening to

Television that "saying it all is literally impossible: words fail" (213), and of the

relationship of this "failure" to sexual difference, and therefore to hysteria's

essential question. The rest of this opening to his mass seminar is as follows:

I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there's no

way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail.

Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the

real. (3)

It may seem that Lacan, with his conception that "words fail," has backed away

from his previous belief in how "a letter always arrives at its destination," and

therefore embraced a less deterministic theory of language, but this is not

necessarily the case. "Words fail" to speak "the whole truth," but the letter of

each word, mysteriously connected to a part of truth, seems to still be

determined to "arrive" at the proper destination. We can read "failure" here as

"lack": words must fail, properly. They must take a detour in order to return; in

order for the "Real" to be held onto, mastered.

Truth for Lacan usually refers to the truth about desire; thus when he

claims to "always speak the truth," he seems to be saying that he has left his

imaginary behind, which purifies speech of the demands of the imaginary: Lacan

called this "full speech" (Lac77a 46), which might be equated to Freud's cure. To

"always speak the truth," it seems, would be to become one with the assumption

of one's desire, but not necessarily all of one's desire, especially when "desire"









occasionally overlaps with jouissance. Yet even Lacanians understand, as Dylan

Evans argues, that "it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan

uses [truth] since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition

to a wide variety of terms" (Eva96 215-16)-and, I would add, at times in radical

contradiction to other uses. For example, Lacan also associates truth with

deception, lies, mistakes, and errors. His line could thus be read as "I am

deceiving you, therefore I am telling the truth." Moreover, truth is supposed to

refer to the truth about desire, and desire is supposedly a product of the

Symbolic, but Lacan associates it with the Real above, an order that is

supposedly a radical alterity to the Symbolic. It seems that "words fail" only

because they cannot say the whole truth about desire-jouissance, not because of

any inherent failure within words themselves, such as a necessarily arbitrary

relation between signifier and signifieds-which would only be a "failure" if

"success" meant some magical correspondence between signifier and signified.

Lacan seems to be saying that words fail to represent the whole truth, thus he

falls back into, if he ever got beyond, a correspondence theory of language,

which is antithetical to a differential or Saussurian theory of language.

Moreover, this "failure" suggests a failure of words to correspond to the specific

absence of lack: words must "fail" in order for "castration-truth" to be at the

center of the structure of language and the Lacanian unconscious.

Before I get ahead of myself, I should put Copjec's use of the quote above

into the context of her argument. Copjec argues that Lacan, in Seminar XX:

Encore,

reiterates the position of psychoanalysis with regard to sexual

difference: our sexed being, he maintains, is not a biological




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DISTURBING PSYCHOANALYTIC ORIGINS: A DERRIDEAN READING OF FREUDIAN THEORY By ERIC W. ANDERS A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHCX)L OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2000

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Copyright 2000 by Eric W Anders

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To my parents in appreciation of their support: Valerie E Anders and William A. Anders

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page 1. THE (DIS)POSITION OF A PET MONSTER ........ .. ......... ....... ... ....... ... ..... .... .... 1 Double Games.............................................................................................. 5 Responding to Freud and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis........................... 11 Supposing Psychoanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Disturbing Psychoanalytic Origins ...... ........................................... ........... 26 Filling Gaps.................................................................................................. 31 ''To Post or Not to Post?''............................................................................ 40 2. PROBLEMATIZING ''HYSTERIA'' AND THE ORIGIN" OF PSYCHOANALYSIS................................................................. 44 Historia ...................................................................................................... 47 Hysteria and Hysterization......................................................................... 57 Feminism and the Hysteric......................................................................... 62 Hom(m)osexual Pornographies and the Performing Hysteric................ 66 Psychoanalysis/Hysteria............................................................................ 79 The Lacanian Hysteric's Essential Question of Lack................................ 88 3. (UN) EASILY CONTAINED ELEMENTS.......................................................... 101 Suffering Reminiscences: Reading Derrida's Reading of the Project......................................................................................... 106 The Basics of the Project and Derrida's Reading of It .................... 108 Limiting the Effects of Memory and Chance in Freud's Work with ''Hysterics''................................................. 116 My Reading of Derrida's ''Freud and the Scene of Writing'' ....... 127 From Memory to Fantasy ................................................................ 138 Disturbing Origins: The Interpretation of Dreams ...................................... 143 Overdetermination and Chance ...................................................... 145 The Interpretation of Dreams: Rand and Torok ................................ 156 The Interpretation of Dreams: Weber ................................................. 162 From Primary Process to Primal Phantasies .................................. 169 lV

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4. FREU'D'S MASTERPL0wc .......................................................................... 186 The Beyonds of Freud's Case Work: From Ontogenetic to Phylogenetic ........................................................................................ 199 The Wolf Man Case History.......................................... ......... ......... 205 Primal Phantasies: Freud as the Archeologist of the Mind .......... 211 Freud's Masterplot Revisited ...................................................................... 222 Narratology and the Wolf Man....................................................... 222 Freud's Oedipal Masterplot . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . ... ... 232 ''To Speculate on 'Freud''' and Beyond . . .................................... 247 Extending Freud's Masterplot: A Reading of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety................................................... .... 259 5. UNCANNY (WO)MAN: THE HOME/SECRE1S OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 288 The Lack of ''The 'Uncanny''' I: Primary Femininity ................................ 299 The Lack of ''The 'Uncanny''' II: Freud and Lac(k)an ............ ................ 313 ''The 'Uncanny''' and Superstition ............................................................. 318 Home Secrets ................................................................................................ 332 6. WHAT REMA:tNS: PSYCHO ANAL YSES,DECONSTRUCTIONS, AN"D .FEMWISMS .......................................................................................... 344, The Analysis of a Repression...... ..... ............ ..... ............................... .. ......... 344 Post(al)-Psychoanalysis ............................................................................... 364 Phallocentrism and Logocentrism: Relating to Feminisms ..... .......... ...... 370 WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................ 384BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..................................... ..... ....................... ... ............... 392 V

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DISTURBING PSYCHOANALYTIC ORIGINS: A DERRIDEAN READING OF FREUDIAN THEORY By Eric W. Anders December 2000 Chair: John P Leavey, Jr., Ph.D. Major Department: English This Derridean reading of Freud asks the question of how we should read Freud with respect to sexual difference and what Derrida considers a radicalized concept of trace, a ''scene of writing'' of differance-that is, how we should read Freud with respect to phallogocentrism. Throughout I consider the possible relationships among the ''mainstyles'' (Derrida) of various psychoanalyses, deconstructions, and feminisms. By analyzing what is most original for Freud-the cause of hysteria, the navel of the dream, the perceptual identity, the primal phantasies, for example I find that Freud consistently seeks a single origin, a ''caput Nili,'' on which to base a grand narrative. At first this narrative is an etiology of hysteria, but it evolves into a masterplot of sexual development and later into one of humanity. The establishment of an oedipal origin and telos, and the masterplot based on them, moves psychoanalysis toward a totalizing theory, and therefore its Vl

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openness to chance and something beyond what that theory can master is greatly reduced. I approach these topics in terms of a question of the ethics of psychoanalysis This appropriative or reductive process of Freud's masterplotting is based on what Derrida calls ''castration-truth'' in his reading of Lacan, ''Le facteur de la verite." In contrast to some theorists who appeal to the radical spirit of Freudian theory as a basis for their radicalization of psychoanalysis-s pecifically Barnaby B. Barratt's Psychoanalysis and the Po s tmodern Impulse-I argue that Lacan's phallogocentric ''return to Freud'' is actually a more faithful one since I find both ''mainstyles'' of these psychoanalyses based on a logic of lack or ''castration-truth '' I argue throughout that the radical spirit of Freud is at I times overemphasized or exaggerated by Derridean theorists-and even Derrida himself though rar e ly-and that the dominant specter of Freud is an ''establishment'' or appropriative one ratl1er than one which is radical or ''other-wise." I connect this trend of Derridean thinkers claiming too much debt to psychoanalysis to these thinkers not taking seriously Freud's commitment to and interest in an idealized phylogenetics: ''phylo-'genetics "' Since my establishment of this establishment specter of Freud as the ''mainstyle'' of Freudian theory itself risks reproducing exactly the kind of appropriative discourse I hope to problematize, I attempt to avoid such a reproduction by considering what remains of the radical spirit of Freudian theory in what might be called a deconstructive ''technology of iterability,'' a ''cyborg-analysis,'' or what I call ''post(al)-psychoanalysis." Vll

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CHAPTERl THE (DIS)POSffiON OF A PET MONSTER Psychoanalysis, supposedly, is found. When one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds itself. When it finds, supposedly, it finds itself/is found-something. (Der87a 413) Jacques Derrida 1 It's extraordinary what happens when you get rid of the centrality of the concept of the phallus. I mean, you get rid of the unconscious, get rid of sexuality, get rid of the original psychoanalytic point. (Mit82 15) Juliet Mitchell In ''Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms," Jacques Derrida argues that those ''within the university and elsewhere who aren't completely asleep know that'' titles of academic discourses such as psy c hoanalysis, deconstruction, or feminism ''do not correspond to any classifiable identity, to any corpus which can be delimited. However, for all that, this doesn't make those titles empty or insignificant. What they name is the mainstyle of each jetty'' (67) Psychoanalysis is thus the ''mainstyle'' of one ''theoretical jetty'' in ''the open and 1 Alan Bass, the translator of The Post Card, writes the following note to the above: ''I.a psycha.nalyse ~ a supp o ser se trouve Quand on croit la trouver c' est elle, a supposer qui se trouve. Quand elle trouve, a s upposer, elle se trouve-quelque cho s e The double meaning of reflexive verbs in French is being played on here Se trou v er can mean both to find itself and to be found. Thus, these are three or four statements, since the third sentence must be read in two ways. The passage from three to four via irreducible doubleness is a constant them~ in Derrida's works '' (413n2). 1

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2 nonunified'' field of forces that the doxa tries to stabilize and objectify in order to fit into a neat and orderly taxonomy of discourses (65-67 passim). Here I will attempt to establish the ''mainstyle'' of Freudian theory, if not of psychoanalysis in general, with respect to my version of the ''mainstyle'' deconstruction. A guiding question throughout this project is what is the relationship between these two ''mainstyle'' theoretical jetties? And what is the ''mainstyle'' spirit of Freudian theory of the incalculable ''specters of Freud'' that haunt the ''mainstyle'' deconstruction and other academic discourses under consideration here? The ''quasi-concept'' (94) of ''jetty," according to Derrida, ''has no status'' in ''theory," but is used here to refer ''to the force of that movement which is not yet subject, project, or object, not even rejection, but in which takes place any production and any determination, which finds its possibility in the jetty'' (65). ''Each theoretical jetty," Derrida continues, ''enters a priori, originally, into conflict and competition'' (ibid.) with other theoretical jetties: a ''convergent competition'' (72) of unstable and destabilizing pseudo-identities where ''each jetty, far from being the part included in the whole, is only a theoretical jetty inasmuch as it claims to comprehend itself by comprehending all the others'' (65), and ''each species in this table constitutes its own identity only by incorporating other identities-by contamination, parasitism, grafts, organ transplants, incorporation etc.'' (66). Derrida states that this process of convergent competition and incorporation is based on a ''principle of taxonomic disorder'' (67) and he wonders ''to what kinds of monsters these combinatory operations must give birth, considering the fact that theories incorporate opposing theorems, which have themselves incorporated other ones'' (ibid.)

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3 According to Derrida, ''Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'Here are our monsters,' without immediately turning them into pets'' (80). The present study attempts to be, I announce here, a monstrous pet project that combines various styles of the theoretical jetties of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and feminism. In English departments in North America, this type of combinatory pet monster, known as ''theory," is the norm of the ''trans-, inter-, and above all ultra-disciplinary approaches, which, up to now [1990], met nowhere, in no department, in no area of any discipline'' (82). The present study is monstrous because its corpus tries to be of indefinite locale with respect to traditional disciplines, to eschew traditional axiomatic boundaries by embracing a certain litarariness found in deconstruction and some styles of feminism; a pet because, beyond announcing itself as a monster using predicative clauses and being required to meet the institutional standards of the university, it also attempts to be a (transferential) testament to my position as the proper legatee, a legitimate son, of a complex parentage that would seem quite familiar to those doing the ''theory'' of English departments in North American research universities. The parentage consists of what I will argue are generally misunderstood elements of psychoanalysis that are too rare or too unsupported to constitute a ''mainstyle," a certain ''ms. en abyme'' feminism (Elam), and a Derrida who I hope is not too simplified, especially by making him one who would be less resistant to any such paternity or any genealogy than he actually is. It is monstrous because this complex parentage resists being an oedipal complex. It could also be considered a pet, however, because there are traces of what I call, borrowing from Luce Irigaray, ''hom(m)osexuality'' (Iri85 98), since the feminism here, which might be construed as occupying the position of the

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4 theoretical mother, is significantly Derridean-but this type of critique would require the most essentialist, phallogocentric assumptions, which are the very assumptions I try to disrupt here. It is also monstrous because its attempt to privilege a literariness of open-endedness and Keatsian negative capability will endeavor to resist forming into a ''corpus of philosophical-hence phallogocentric:....-.axioms'' (Der90 84) as Derrida describes what he sees as the ''mainstyle'' of feminism. It is a pet because it will also be called upon to for111 just such a corpus, not just in order to be recognized by the university a s a proper dissertation, but in order to develop a somewhat cohesive, though necessarily partial, hybrid of so-called literary, psychoanalytic, feminist, and deconstructionist axioms of a certain ethics and undecidability that would allow for tactical political praxis. Psychoanalysis, according to its orthodox origin myths, was born from Freud's work with hysterics: the potentially monstrous offspring of a diseased womb. Yet this supposed offspring, as I will argue, would have been very much a pet if we supposed such a birth Freud considered psychoanalysis to be one of the ''three severe blows'' received by ''the universal narcissism of men . from the researches of science'' (XVII 139). The first blow, according to Freud, was cosmological and associated with Copernicus: the decentering of the earth in the cosmos. The second he considered biological and associated with Darwin: the association of ''man'' with the rest of the animal kingdom, and therefore the problematization of the notion that what separated ''man'' out was ''his'' possession of a soul. The thirdwhich Freud associated with himself and psychoanalysis, and referred to as ''psychological in nature'' and ''probably the most wounding'' (XVII 141)-was the subordination of the ego to the forces of the unconscious. Contrary to this

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5 positioning of psychoanalysis as such a blow, something i:nonstrous with respect to god-like man at the center of the cosmos, I read psychoanalysis as a powerful mode of maintaining what Derrida calls the ''system'' of ''phallogocentrism'' (Der87b 196): a pet as watch dog with respect to a different slant on ''the universal narcissism of men." My question throughout is how much monstrous potential, if any, remains in this pet. The disposition of my pet monster is to be highly skeptical of any such monstrous potential of psychoanalysis: watching out for watch dogs. Double Games My positioning of the present study negotiates this phantasmatic boundary between monsters and pets by attempting to play a double game appropriate to the singularity of the Freudian texts I read here. In ''The Double Game: An Introduction," an essay in Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature, Alan Bass calls the affirmation of the irreducibility of division the ''affirmation of doubleness'': I would call [the affirmation of doubleness] the essence of psychoanalysis if I had not learned from Derrida that the concept of essence is designed to denigrate the play of doubleness. Thus, I will call the affirn1ation of doubleness the metaphor that imposes itself upon any conception of the analytic situation, and will say that this metaphor is no more secondary and exterior to such concepts as transference and resistance, ego and id, than writing is to speech. (82)

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6 Though Bass reads the mainstyle of the psychoanalytic jetty as being akin to the mainstyle of the jetty of deconstruction-reflecting more the way I wish I could read psychoanalysis than how I read it here as a mode of repressing ''the affirtnation of doubleness''-! want to focus here on Bass's concept of doubleness and Derrida's concept of ''disseminal alterity'' (Der90 72), what I call irreducible division. Bass's doubleness is not the doubleness of oppositional binaries, but the doubleness of an infinity of the Other-as Emmanuel Levinas might put itthat the doubleness of oppositional binaries dissimulate. This is the doubleness of what Derrida calls the ''disseminal alterity ... which would make impossible pure identity'' and the ''convergent competition'' (ibid.) of forces that allow for the space where there is the possibility of some provisional identity emerging. In other words, this is not the doubleness of a particular identity and its other as two stable identities (binarisms, dualisms), and especially not the doubleness of a One and its repressed other, but the doubleness of the possibility of the act of establishing some unstable identity and of the ''otherwise other'' to identity, the radical alterity, the space from whence this possibility emerges. 2 Derrida also describes a certain doubleness of theoretical jetties, what he calls ''typical consequences-i e general and regular consequences'' (Der90 84). He distinguishes on the one hand, the force of the movement which throws something or throws itself (jette or se jette) forward and backwards at the same time, prior to any subject, object, or project, prior to any rejection or abjection, from, on the other hand, its institutional and 2 ''Act of establishment' and '' oth e rwise other' com e from Barratt's Psychoanaly s is and the Postmodern Impulse.

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7 protective consolidation, which can be compared to the jetty, the pier in a harbor meant to break the waves and maintain low tide for boats at anchor or for swimmers. (ibid.) Derrida calls the former jetty ''the destabilizing jetty or even more artificially the devastating jetty'' (ibid.), which he aligns with a certain deconstruction that refers neither to ''specific texts nor to specific authors, and above all not to this formation which disciplines the process and effect of deconstruction into a theory or a critical method called deconstructionism or deconstructionisms'' (Der90 83). This deconstruction ''is neither a theory nor a philosophy. It is neither a school nor a method. It is not even a discourse, nor an act, nor a practice. It is what happens ... (Der90 85). The latter jetty Derrida calls ''the stabilizing, establishing, or simply stating jetty'' (Der90 84), which ''proceeds with predicative clauses, reassures with assertory statements, with assertions, with statements such as 'this is that''' (ibid.), as when Derrida writes, ''deconstruction is neither .... '' That the stating or static jetty is a phallic metaphor, a piece of terra firma jutting into, or breaking the waves of, the ocean, suggests that either getting beyond phallocentrism is difficult even for Derrida, one of the most vigilant theorists, or his metaphor is an example of what he sees as the phallic establishment. 3 In as much as the doubleness of transference and resistance of the psychoanalytic unconscious happens in any setting, including and especially the analytic setting, we can say that ''psychoanalysis happens," or better, ''psychoanalysis happens." I will argue, however, that Freud, and Lacan who 3 The latter idea that Derrida's phallic metaphor of a jetty might be a self-conscious example of the phallic establishment was suggested to me by John P. Leavey, Jr

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follows in his ''pas-de-marche'' (Derrida) footsteps consistently reduces this doubleness or irreducible division to ''castration-truth'' (Der81 441) and its phallic One that transforms the difference of (op)positionality into identity, and therefore the notion that ''psychoanalysis happens,'' or that there would be a need to put ''psychoanalysis'' under erasure, that it would have a ''devastating'' jetty, which it would recognize as ''psychoanalysis'' without trying to tame it or reappropriate it back into the terms of the ''stating'' jetty of ''psychoanalysis," is problematic, if not a moot point. In this respect, I argue here that ''psychoanalysis'' does not simply happen. It must be established; it is identitarian and not otherwise; it represses its own ''devastating'' tendencies in order to secure its ''stating'' position 8 The stating or ''state'' forms of psychoanalysis, what I call ''establishment psychoanalysis'' or ''psychoanalysis proper," are axiomatic, where particular and somewhat distorted forms of the Oedipus myth occupy the position of the truth of the unconscious, the basis for a symbolist approach to psychoanalytic interpretation, the fundament of phylogenetic primal fantasies, the ''patrix'' of the pleasure principle (which, as Derrida makes clear, Freud never goes beyond), the ''destination'' of the phallic letter, and the foundation of ''castration-truth.'' In the (non)origin myth of establishment psychoanalysis I tell here, oedipal psychoanalysis is a theoretical fantasy employed as a defense against the Other. We might call it a reaction to the trauma of Freud's encounter with so-called ''hysterical'' patients, his unethical ''face to face'' with the Other, if the categories and concepts of hysteria and trauma were not so embedded in psychoanalysis itself. The devastating jetty of psychoanalysis, which (under erasure) is the effect of the deconstruction that happens with any mainstyle jetty, a ''typical

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9 consequence," has a different relationship to the stating jetty of psychoanalysis than the devastating jetty of ''deconstruction'' has to its stating jetty: the latter recognizes its devastating jetty, even actively subverts its stating jetty by working not to repress the devastating one. I will argue here that ''deconstruction," as a mainstyle, stating jetty, points to its devastating jetty, whereas establishment psychoanalysis, though it makes some motions toward such a recognition and has certain elements with devastating potential as what seem to be its foundational ''discoveries," ultimately actively represses those elements, especially with respect to its own discourse. My double game reading of psychoanalysis is more about problematizing my own reading, my own position, by taking seriously the irreducibility of division, than modeling my reading on the supposed devastating aspects, or ''the affirmation of doubleness'' of psychoanalysis. In other words, my reading is more deconstructive than psychoanalytic In general what follows is an attempt to take seriously several texts by Freud and several Derridean readings of Freud, especially Derrida's early essay ''Freud and the Scene of Writing'' in Writing and Difference, his later ''To Speculate on 'Freud''' in The Post Card, and Samuel Weber's The Legend of Freud. Barnaby B. Barratt' s Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse has had a significant influence on how I approach these readings, despite the fact that his privileging of the radical or monstrous spirit of Freud ends up a repression of the establishment Freud. Barratt reads what are typically considered Freud's ''devastating'' moments as the essence of Freudian theory, and ''Oedipus'' and ''fantasy'' (either spelling) are not listed in the index of this book. In Legends of Freud, Samuel Weber highlights certain ''devastating'' moments of Freudian

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10 theory overlooked by Freudian scholars (except Derrida), and often by Freud himself. Derrida and Weber are closer in their readings of Freud. Weber more than Derrida speculates on possible points of overlap between psychoanalysis and his deconstructive theories, but, unlike Barratt, refrains from positioning psychoanalysis as an authority for establishing a type of postmodern theory. Of the three, Derrida seems the most reticent to give psychoanalysis undue ''credit'' for not repressing its ''devastating'' moments, to acknowledge more debt for deconstruction to psychoanalysis than necessary. In ''Freud and the Scene of Writing,'' Derrida explains his work on psychoanalysis preceding this early essay as An attempt to justify a theoretical reticence to utilize Freudian concepts, otherwise than in quotation marks: all these concepts, without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to the system of logocentric repression which was organized in order to exclude or to lower (to put outside or below), the body of the written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or excrement. (197) Logocentrism, and its reduction of the Other to its ter1ns of the Same, would be an ethical category for Derrida Despite his reticence, he does find potentially ''devastating'' elements of Freudian theory: Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud's text several points of reference, and to isolate, on the threshold of a systematic examination, those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure, as this closure

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11 limits not only the history of philosophy but also the orientation of the ''human sciences," notably a certain linguistics. (198-99) The ''certain linguistics'' is a reference to Saussure and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and much of what follows touches on whether Lacan' s ''return'' to Freud was in fact a return and not a betrayal, as Barratt argues it was (see Bar84 and Bar93). Beyond problematizing Barratt's ''return'' to a ''devastating'' or postmodern Freud, I attempt to problematize Derrida's and Weber's location of only uneasily contained elements of Freudian theory, particularly with respect to psychoanalytic origins. What is at stake here is not only how to read Freud, but what would constitute a good reading of him with respect to the issues forefronted in what has been too-vaguely called the linguistic turn in the humanities. Is the Freudian unconscious structured like a destinational language, or unstructuring like an adestinational language? What remains of psychoanalysis after a deconstructive reading? What debt does ''deconstruction'' owe to ''psychoanalysis''? What, if anything, might be considered a ''Freudian breakthrough''? As Derrida suggests in Resistances with respect to Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, what is at stake here is not just psychoanalytic conceptions of ''sense and truth'' (Der98 18), but sense and truth in general. Responding to Freud and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis For me, deconstructing psychoanalysis is like an imperative, but one without foundation in some supposed moral code. Derrida argues that this ''obligation to protect the other's otherness is not merely a theoretical imperative'' (Der91 111) suggesting that this obligation is also an ethical one, and

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12 that this ethics cannot be bound by the strictures of theory. According to Derrida, ''there is a duty in deconstruction'' (Der91 108), and I understand this duty as being related to Derrida's reading of Levinas in ''Violence and Metaphysics," and the for111er's notion of ''the call that comes from nowhere' 1 (Der91 110). According to Colin Davis, the ''thought of Emmanuel Levinas is governed by one simple yet far-reaching idea: Western philosophy has consistently practiced a suppression of the Other'' (1). Levinas's ethics is interested in protecting the Other from the violence of the Same 1 s (or Self's) reappropriations. In contrast to moral philosophy, which claims to be grounded in ontological truths, Levinas's ethics attempts a certain groundlessness in this respect. Levinas tries to argue for the priority of ethics to ontology, but his project is complicated by the fact that the notions of grounds and priorities belong to ontology. In his otherwise deconstructive reading of Levinas in ''Violence and Metaphysics,'' Derrida critiques Levinas for not recognizing the necessity of working within the logocentrism of language and philosophy. Levinas' s project requires the playing of double games. Derrida finds Levinas' s intentions of positioning himself outside of Western ontology in conflict with the ontological dependence of his philosophical discourse. Levinas' s concern is for developing a sense of justice and responsibility with respect to encounters with the Other, and to do this while resisting the totalizing foundationalism of establishing an ontological moral order. ''Something of this call of the other,'' according to Derrida, ''must remain nonreappropriable, nonsubjectivable, and in a certain way nonidentifiable, a sheer supposition, so as to remain other, a singular call to response or to responsibility'' (Der91 110-111). Diane Elam' s type of feminism, as argued in Femini s m and D e con s truction: Ms. en Abyme, is

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13 ''based'' on such a ''groundless'' ethics. Political activity for her should grow out of ''groundless solidarity' where political actions stem from necessary ethical judgements that ''are always threatened by the displacing action of other judgements'' (115), and not from ethical judgments supposedly grounded in ontotheological or phallogocentric truths of identity and morality. The significance of such an ethics for psychoanalytic theory and practice is great, especially if Freud's conception of ''the unconscious'' is read as a radical alterity or an ''otherwise other'' to the meanings and structures of the ego or ''1now-is,'' as Barratt reads it. ''The unconscious'' then would be akin to Levinas's Other; the ego-what Barratt formulates as the ''I-now-is'' (Bar93 101)-would be akin to Levinas's the Same, Self, or self-Same. The duty in psychoanalysis would then be to avoid reducing the ''otherwise other'' to the self-Same of the ego of the analysand or the analyst If the duty in deconstruction is the protection of ''the other's otherness," it achieves this while still allowing for meaning, as would this ''otherwise'' psychoanalysis, through the playing of a double game. Meaning or readability require some reduction of the differance of language to the self-Same: the stating game of a double game, where the other game is a devastating one. Beyond there being an ethical quality of such double games, they also avoid the pitfalls of embracing irrationalisms and the simple reversing of the Same/Other binarism. Derrida's employment of deconstructive double games allows him to work within logocentrism while opening up spaces to make it otherwise: he respects the otherness of the text he is deconstructingthat is, he respects differance, he responds to the singularity of the text-and is able to form a reading

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of and argument about this text and its radical alterity that is potentially meaningful. 14 Insofar as I have not reduced the Other of Freud's texts to more of my Same, I have responded to the singularity of Freud's texts, and I have resisted transforming my understanding of ''deconstruction'' into some ''monolith'' of ''deconstructionism'' (Der90 88). The ethics I describe here have not only infor111ed my theorization of my approach, if not the approach itself, it has also infor111ed my understanding of what makes these texts readable. I suppose Freud's readability with regard to his encounters with what Levinas would call the Other. Often Freud's reappropriations of the Other in a way follow what would otherwise be an ethical encounter with the Other. Practically invariably, Freud either transforms these ''other-wise'' moments into ''establishment'' theories by establishing an origin of identity prior to the ''theory'' or ''time'' of these moments, or he represses these mom e nts via neglect or obfuscation Freud even uses what seems to be s omething ' oth e rwise '' about a theory (for example, the ''contradictoriness'' [Barratt] of the unconscious) to support his ''establishment'' conclusions or closure (such as what I will call the seemingly contradictory ''trauma'' -structure trope of ''castration-truth''). My theory of readability with respect to Freudian texts is in some ways a generalization of Derrida's reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in terms of what he calls Freud's ''pas de marche'' (Der81 283), where the step beyond is always taken back or transformed into a non-step. One possible difference between Derrida's ''pas de marche'' and my theory of readability is that I want to focus more on how Freud's most ''otherwise'' concepts are sometimes more than taken back or transformed into their absence, but are redeployed as part of the ''establishment'' arsenal in

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15 the defensive war of maintaining a proper identity, institution, and legacy. I am interested in connecting Freud's readabilitythe necessary stating game of any deconstructive double-game to a Levinasian and Derridean type of ethics. Supposing Psychoanalysis What is at stake when one supposes psychoanalysis? To suppose psychoanalysis to hypothesize that it exists as one thing, identical to itself, self same would mean to disregard the divisions, conflicts, aporias, and to decide undecidables ''within'' psychoanalysis. To suppose psychoanalysis as a unifiable, delimitable theoretical identity is also to disregard the competitive, conflictual, and differential process by which it comes into being and sustains itself in relation to other discursive forces: to decide undecidables regarding its relation to what is ''without ' psychoanalysis. Yet my questioning of the supposition of psychoanalysis is also a questioning of the very boundaries that would allow for a ''within'' and a ''without, a problematization of the notion of psychoanalysis as having secure and identifiable boundaries: an identification, a locale, an inside and outside. Moreover, to write of psychoanalysis as coming into being and sustaining itself, to assume that it is ever a simple presence in the present, or a simple re-presentation, that it is simply demarcated in opposition to other discourses, other locales, is to miss the aspect of deferral and the relatedness and imbrication of differences in the generation of any pseudo identity-that is, t-0 disregard the generative powers involved in what Jacques Derrida calls ''differance.'' Among other things, to suppose psychoanalysis is to mark an inside and an outside of psychoanalysis, then to make cohesive what could only be an aporetic inside, and to make the outside separate and passive

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16 with regard to the creation of this identity. In other words, the creation of a binary-inside/outside that constitutes a certain repression of undecidables, of differance, is at stake in the supposition of an identity ''psychoanalysis.'' Some might argue that this supposition would be unpsychoanalytic, but this argument itself requires a supposition of psychoanalysis as essentially about the problematization of certain identities achieved via the repression of undecidables. I suppose a psychoanalysis here, on the contrary, that is very much about this kind of repression What is at stake when one does not suppose psychoanalysis? Without such a supposition any treatment of ''psychoanalysis''-whether it be a critique, a so-called ''deconstruction," or some other mode of reading-would be impossible. The stakes would be not to question the traditional suppositions of psychoanalysis as found truth. Some mode of questioning is required to disrupt these types of suppositions. While critique is a single game that simply assumes the subject position for the critic and the object position for what is being criticized, a deconstructive reading plays a double game where the subject-object positions of critique are problemetized as they are assumed. This problematization of the subject-object split subverts any simple inside/ outside for both the supposed subject and the supposed object, yet even a deconstructive reading of ''psychoanalysis'' would be difficult, if not impossible, without the supposition of ''psychoanalysis'' as its simple, unified object. In his 1991 lecture '''To Do Justice to Freud,' The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,'' Derrida asks his audience to allow him to ''provisionally assume that there is indeed a psychoanalysis that is a single whole: as if it were not, already in Freud, sufficiently divided to make its localization and identification more than

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17 problematic'' (Der98 76-77). As always with Derrida, that the assumption is provisional is a crucial part of any double game. My provisional assumptions of ''Freud'' and ''psychoanalysis'' do not ultimately assume them as single wholes: I attempt to show here how they are irreducibly divided. But to do so, I do provisionally assume a single or basic tactic or strategy of ''Freud''/ ''psychoanalysis'' of securing a position of undividedness for himself/itself. The ''Freud'' and ''psychoanalysis'' I suppose are both ''interested'' in their own unity even though, in significant ways, they position themselves as the Truth of universal ''division''--or ''division'' as castration, which is why the quotes are needed. With respect to Derrida's quotation above, it must also be asked to assume provisionally that there is indeed an author, a ''Derrida," as subject that is single and whole, separate from the assumed object: as if he were not, already with respect to Freud and to himself, already divided to make his localization and identification more than problematic. Also, the assumed ''objects'' of ''Freud'' and ''psychoanalysis'' are not only divided but ''within'' the ''author'' in that he/I cannot simply step outside ''Freud'' in order to make it his/my object. Inasmuch as my reading becomes a critique unawares-a single game of simple insides and outsides, simple subjects and objects, repressing the irreducibility of division from my awareness -'my reading becomes an example of what I am trying to disrupt in ''Freud'': the iden titarian force or ''interest'' I call (op)positionality. Simply put, (op)positionality is a mode of securing a position, and therefore a subject identity, by establishing the separate identity of the object, and the subject's mastery of that object To whatever degree my work here is a reading in this mode, a critique, I am suspect of securing my ''I,'' of

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18 finding myself with respect to an ''object'' I suppose and oppose: ''Freud''/ ''psychoanalysi~." Insofar as this mode of positioning is unavoidable, especially in the highly formalized mode of a dissertation, the question of awareness of ''one's''-the ''subject's," the ''author's''-own division, and the effect of this division on the supposed ''object," becomes a crucial focal point for differentiating types of discourses, particularly between critiques and deconstructive readings. The provisional and the playing of double games becomes crucial. Some might argue, as Barnaby B. Barratt suggests in Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse, that (op)positionality and critical modes of reading that stem from this type of identitarian logic would be unpsychoanalytic. But this argument is itself dependent on a supposition of psychoanalysis as essentially about revealing identities and subjects (egos) as essentially divided. Again, this is another version of the supposition I mentioned above, and which I want to disrupt here. From such a (supposed) Freudian perspective this argument might hold up for everything and everyone except Freud himself/ psychoanalysis itself-that is, Freud/psychoanalysis reveals all other identities to be divided except for himself/ itself. Herein lies a significant difference between what is signed by Derrida and what is signed by Freud: the texts signed by Freud lack a certain awareness of the irreducible division of the Freudian text, its signature, and its sigriator, whereas the double games of so-called ''deconstruction'' are the manifestation of this type of awareness. Psychoanalysis claims to be a method, a science, based on a discovery of Truth. Derrida resists deconstruction as a method since it is a mode of reading that treats every text singularly, according to its own readability: a response to the text, rather than an application of some

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19 Truth of deconstruction. We might paraphrase the pun of the title of Shoshana Felman's book questioning applied psychoanalytic readings of literary texts, Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Qt!estion of Reading: Otherwise, and call this reading mode, this responsive (non)methodology, ''reading other-wise." Following Derrida's ''Le facteur de la verite," his reading of Jacques Lacan's ''Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,"' I argue here that Freud/psychoanalysis attempts to establish himself /itself as that unity that stops the incessant sliding of the ''en abyme'' effects of disruptions to the simple subject-object, a simple inside/outside, caused by irreducible division. As the discoverer of the Truth of psychoanalysis, Freud positions himself as the unified subject. He is supposedly beyond the obvious en abyme effects of ''the unconscious," his supposed discovery, in his self analysis. Derrida asks, ''how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self-analysis, give to a worldwide institution its birth?'' (Der81 305). As the Truth discovered, psychoanalysis is established as the unified object: a strangely material-ideal object, a stereotomy, an ''point de capiton'' (Lacan). The self-sameness and immediacy of this ''act of establishment'' require the repetitive repression of the differences and endless deferrals of meaning in the creation of any signifying system: differance. Derrida calls this strangely material-ideal subject-object positioning the metaphysics of presence or logocentrism: the found ''object'' of psychoanalysis is part of the ''object world'' and the signifying system at the saine time, the centering idea/matter, the idea that matters, or logos. This repression of differance is logocentric repression We might say that the unconscious of Freud/psychoanalysis is this differance, kept out of awareness as part of the 'act of establishment'' of an identity, an institution, a legacy-that is, if the word

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20 ''unconscious'' were not so imbricated in the very identities of Freud and psychoanalysis I wish to disrupt. My use of ''unconscious'' under erasure can be read as an example of how ''I'' cannot be simply inside or outside psychoanalysis. Though ''Freud'' (op)poses himself as subject to the object of psychoanalysis, there is also a unity of subject and object here, which sends the phenomenology ''en abyme'': 'When one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds itself'' (ibid.). One doesn't just find oneself with respect to the object, but in the object. (Op)positionality, as a mode of stabilizing the dizzying movement of differance, is itself unstable: the unification of ''Freud'' is ''discovered'' through the discovery of the Truth of the unconscious, ''psychoanalysis," which ''then'' ''sutures'' (Miller) the ''Freud'' who was previously diviqed between his conscious and unconscious self, which ''then'' allows the unified ''Freud'' to discover psychoanalysis unencumbered by his own division .... This process of ''positioning'' beyond (op)positioning, where the subject and object are no longer opposed in a simple phenomenology, which moves toward a totality of the Self via Truth, an identity of subject and object, I call, following Derrida, ''self-posting," where the self sends itself a post of its own identity. For Lacan in ''The Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,'' as Derrida argues in ''Le facteur de la verite," posts always arrive at their destination. For Derrida, there is always the chance that something otherwise could happen For Lacan, the Truth of psychoanalysis is the Truth of a destinational linguistics: ''Quand elle trouve, a supposer, elle se trouve-quelque chose." The sending (envoz) of the post, which is supposedly identical with the self-sender, in fact reveals the presence of something totally other that causes the sending. Derrida reads Lacan

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21 as positing the truth as ''something'' found, and a cause of the ''eternal return'' (Nietzsche): a destinational linguistics based on a theory of the postal system without a dead letter office. For Derrida, the ''eternal refurn'' cannot be reduced to a thing or a transcendental structure centered on an absence or a veiled presence (the phallus as an always already absent presence),-a negative theology (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy) or a ''Negative Concord'' (Kermode),-but is something radically other, which subverts ontology (conceptions of thingness, centers, struct~es) and Lacan's synchronic transcendent structures: a (non)origin of repetition and an adestinational postal system. That letters are repetitively sent and may end up in the dead letter office suggests the system is related to and part of something totally other. Lacan stresses the detour the letter takes, the division its detour signifies. But this detour is quite specific, and it is necessary in order to allow for the proper return. Division is reduced to presence/ absence where the absence is always the absence of a very specific presence. Psychoanalysis a la Lacan and Lacan himself are unified in the truth of the proper detour of the letter, the proper division. Derrida calls this truth '~castration-truth'' (Der81 441). The metaphysics of presence, the logocentrism of Lacanian psychoanalysis is phallogocentrism, where the material-ideal letter is the penis-phallus. Castration as the proper division, the proper detour of the letter, reduces the binary of male/female to one-sex system in terms of presence/ absence of the phallus: male/not-male. The not-male secures the phallus as transcendental Truth by reducing division to an absence, or lack. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, according to Derrida, ''[s]omething is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing from it'' (Der81 441). The ''something'' that psychoanalysis finds when it finds

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itself is lack as the ''central place," the familiar locale, and also the center of a structural system, a logic of lack: what Derrida refers to a~ the psychoanalytic oikos, where the Greek word suggests both home and economy. This lack signifies the transcendence of the phallus and therefore its uncastratability. According to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, ''the ultimate effect of the Lacanian strategy thus turns out to be a surprising but vigorous repetition of negative theology'' (Nan92 xviii). 22 For Derrida, division is that which disrupts the concept of truth by disrupting the signifying system that might support such a concept. ''Dissemination' is one word Derrida uses with respect to irreducible division: dis-semination as not allowing for a stable semantics, which is supposedly the spawn (semen) of phallic truth. The spreading and dispersal of seeds suggested by dissemination suggest the dispersal of meaning of differance, the disruption of any economy, any logic. No ''central place'' of absence, no castration home, is allowed by dissemination: ''the lack does not have its place in dissemination '' (Der81 441). Following Derrida's reading of Lacan, this project contrasts a logic of lack with a ''logic'' of dissemination with respect to Freud. Is Freud another ''facteur de la verite'' of a destinational postal system? Is Freudian theory based on ''castration-truth," where ''Femininity is the Truth (of) castration'' (Der81 442)? Like Lacan, who positions himself as the mystic who has mastered the cosmology of the Real-Symbolic-Imaginary or ''RSI,'' Freud often positions himself as undivided, in possession of the whole story, properly analyzed. In chapter two, ''Problematizing Hysteria and the Origins of Psychoanalysis," I explore how the theme of Freud's lack of awareness of the irreducibility of division, and how division would apply to oneself and one's

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23 theories, is reflected in the large role his self-analysis plays in his claims to have access to truth and in the orthodox origin myths of psychoanalysis which he invented and fostered. Freud, the undivided subject, the subject that ''sutures'' his own division-that is, cures the ''hysteria'' that marks this division supposedly discovers Freud/psychoanalysis. He/it is found, a solid whole, a stereotomy, a something. The something Freud initially finds are gaps in narratives, which he fills first with phallic memories of ''seduction'' and then later with fantasies of phallic wholeness when ''hysteria'' is replaced by ''femininity'' as the privileged object and ''gaps'' are replaced by ''castration'' as the lack that secures the oikos of Truth. Freud secures an undivided, phallic subject position by creating an object of lack: the hysteric and her narratives full of gaps. I will explore in chapter two whether Freud's writing on so-called ''hysteria'' is an example of what Barratt calls the ''phenomenology of fucking'': ''the operation of 'I' as the (aggressing or aggressed) subject of (phallo)logocentric discourse'' (Bar93 150). Foreshadowing the ''castration-truth'' of psychoanalysis proper, the division of the object, the so-called hysteric, was reduced to a specific absence, a specific gap. I argue that the phenomenology is a sort of mixture of (op)positionality and self-posting, and is ultimately unstable because it depends on cure: as with woman in Freud's later theory, the so-called hysteric exists as gap to be filled and as what must disappear as cured. One question I want to privilege in this study is whether Freudian theory can get beyond its phallocentrismthat is, what, if anything, remains of Freudian theory once Derrida's project is accomplished: ''the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it'' (Der78 229)? Is Freud's logocentrism the same as his

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24 phallocentrism: phallogocentrism? Since Barratt's book lacks an entry in its index for anything related to Oedipus-the expanded oikos of castration truth-and his book sets forth a general metapsychology of sorts, it seems that he would answer yes to this query, and his theory of ''genitality' reflects an attempt at such a distancing from phallocentrism while remaining ''within'' his supposed psychoanalysis. Barratt suggests that Freud's phallocentrism, the oedipal aspects of psychoanalysis, are in fact a betrayal of what is essential about psychoanalysis. Certainly Derrida has shown that one cannot simply step outside the metaphysics of presence of logocentrism. In ''Violence and Metaphysics,'' Derrida argues for the necessity of ''lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it'' (111) But is phallocentrism unavoidable? Since the Freud I suppose here is one of ''castration-truth'' and the logic of lack-arguing that Freud, like Lacan, is a ''facteur de la verite'' of a phallocentric and destinational postal system-I conclude that little would remain of Freudian theory to constitute a radical spirit of Freud if its oikos lost its privileged place. Barratt's Freud represents something closer to what I wish Freud would be, rather than how I actually read him. To ''suppose'' is not only to assume or to hypothesize, but to suspect too. The function of ''castration-truth'' is to theorize division in terms of what secures identity. Phallocentrism, therefore, ~s the mode of logocentrism of psychoanalysis in its Lacanian mode, as Derrida argues, and in its Freudian mode, as I argue here. The Lacanian ''phallic function," according to Bruce Fink, author of The l.ilcanian Subject, ''is the function that institutes lack'' (103) In Lacan's own words, the ''phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark in which the role of the logos is joined with the advent of desire'' (Lac77b 287). Since Lacanian

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25 desire is never in relation to an object but to lack, the joining point or ''point de capiton'' of desire to the logos would be a ''mark'' of lack. The phallus is that magical signifier /mark, the letter, that sets the Symbolic in motion but also keeps it centered enough to write ''Symbolic'' with a capitol ''S.'' One central question for me here is how well does Lacan read Freud? How faithful is Lacan's return to Freud? I argue that Lacan's ''phallic function'' can be generalized and theorized as what I call the ''actual phallic function,'' another way of naming phallogocentrism and its one-sex self-posting, what I will later call, co-opting Irigaray's pun, ''hom(m)osexuality," which Lacan attempts to address in Encore (Lac98 84). The series of acts of self-posting constituting the actual phallic function comprise what I call a 'triple (self-)deception'': the first deception is the dissimulation of difference and chance behind the binarism of Man/Woman (dissimulating the Other), the second is the dissimulation of the significance of woman's role in establishing the identity of man (dissimulating the other), and the third is the dissimulation of all previous dissimulations. With the actual phallic function, as with Derrida's conception of phallogocentrism, presence is established by reducing the Other to absence, binary difference is effaced by erecting one term (the phallus) to identify difference, the binary is always already a hierarchy, and these processes are naturalized via the repression of repression and the supplementarity of what remains. I argue that Lacan's phallogocentrism suggests a faithful return to Freud since Freud consistently reverts to the ''actual phallic function'' in his theorizing. I argue in chapter three, ' (Un)Easily Contained Elements," that many of the concepts of psychoanalysis that are traditionally read as the ''otherwise'' elements of psychoanalysis for example, overdetermination, free-association, memory, and

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the primary process either are actually more dependent or related to ''castration-truth," or are simply not as ''otherwise," as previously thought. Disturbing Psychoanalytic Origins What does psychoanalysis risk by being logocentric? Is there any other kind of psychoanalysis? Can there be an-other kind, a non-logocentric 26 psychoanalysis, an ''other-wise'' psychoanalysis? Can psychoanalysis afford not to assume that it masters the truth it supposedly finds and is? Psychoanalysis as truth must master especially itself, and then all other. Can it afford not to assume that it has a privileged access to this truth and the totality it implies? How can it master this truth, itself, if this truth is the division of self? As I argue in chapter two, one way is to repress how this truth applies to itself, to repress how the found disrupts trust in the finding and founder. Self-analysis as repression: a (non)origin since this repression would be required to attain this truth. Doesn't the unconscious as, not a self-absence, but a self-differance-a deferral, dispersal, dissemination of the self-obliterate the possibility of self presence? Yet the self-present founder is the primary figure of the orthodox myth: Freud's self-presence is the result of a successful self-analysis, where it seems all of the Es (Other) was transformed into Ich (Sarne), his ''hysteria'' cured. Through the inspiration of genius, so the myth goes, Freud is able to simply step outside of the truth that he supposedly founded, achieve a self-presence uncorrupted by the unconscious forces he supposedly discovers, and he is then able to perceive this truth (himself, his unconscious, psychoanalysis) without distortion, without transference or resistance. He is thus able to be the founding father of psychoanalysis, a primal father as in Totem and Taboo, with his legatees

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establishing institutes with reportable training analyses that supposedly assure the reproduction of this founding perception in the form of the proper paternal transference. I cite Derrida's question again, ''how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self-analysis, give to a worldwide institution its birth?'' (Der81 305). 27 Or, turning the question above around, can psychoanalysis be anything but otherwise than logocentric since what is supposedly found disrupts the possibility of finding? Does Freud take seriously the unconscious as what Barratt calls an ''otherwise other''? In chapter three, I argue that Freud does not sustain the fragments of conceptualizations that might constitute theorizing the unconscious in terms of something totally other, an ''otherwise other," or Other, but that he consistently reduces its origin ultimately to a simple presence (with respect to a ''specific ' absence, a lack that has its place) that he then treats as oikos, hom e and economy (the logic of lack). Yet does not the unconscious, the traditional ''object'' of psychoanalysis, supposedly the site of unreason, promote a ' logic'' where contradiction is tolerated? Can the unconscious be both the site of unreason and the validating center for psychoanalysis's logocentrism, the center of the logos, the site of the organizing principle of reason, of the finding of the truth found? Building on the disturbances of psychoanalytic myths of origins in chapters two and three, I attempt to show in chapter four, ''Freud's Masterplotting," that there is a progression in Freudian theory, one repressed by the psychoanalytic orthodoxy and others, where the ego transforms from the site of order to the site of disorder and contradiction, and its beyond-the unconscious, and then the id-tr ansfotms from the site of disorder and contradiction to the site of a priori order. I will show that this progression is

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connected to the ascendancy of Freud's plotting of his master narratives of human kind, and the descendancy in his interest in etiologies of neurosis and cure. 28 Is a logocentric psychoanalysis contradicted if the truth that it finds/is found is posited as the unconscious as the site of unreason? Is it contradicted if this truth is posited as the truth of Freud's Oedipus complex? '1.Jnreason'' could be construed, and is construed by Freud, as the absence of reason. I will argue that Oedipus is construed as that Truth whose repression allows for reason, and therefore Oedipus can be conc~ptualized as the unreason (phallic absence) that allows for reason (transcendental phallic presence): the lack which assures the place of the phallus, ''castration-truth." In this way, Oedipus as the truth of the unconscious secures the totality of psychoanalysis as truth that establishes reason and therefore goes beyond reason. Freud's supposed discovery, the truth he supposedly found, is therefore prior to reason. Because this ' prior to'' is also a beyond, Lacan positions himself as within but also beyond reason or his Symbolic. He calls himself both an hysteric and a mystic. But the 'prior to'' does not really work for Lacan's structuralist psychoanalysis: his structures are outside of time, transcendent more than synchronic In chapter four, I will attempt to show that the origins that Freud developed with respect to his dominant masterplot of the war years are also more transcendent and structural in this way, even though he uses the diachronic term ''genetic'' to describe them. Freud's ''before'' becomes a ''beyond'' and then a type of ''always already." I argue that he pushes his origins beyond the ontogenetic and ''into'' an ''always already'' he calls ''phylogenetic.'' I will attempt to show how Freud posits the truth he discovered as Oedipus in terms of this ''always already'' phylo

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29 ''genesis," and that the ''uneasily contained elements'' (Derrida) of Freudian theory were consistently employed theoretically to sustain this truth as the truth beyond reason, the truth that supposedly secures reason and science. Like Lacan's Symbolic, this structure becomes a totality as what is Other to it-for Lacan the Real-is reduced to the absence of the structure. For Freud, any potential Other, all the beyonds he considers, are ultimately reduced to the absence of the structure of his masterplot: gaps in the narrative or ''trauma.'' Specifically the ''logic'' of oedipal and logocentric Freudian theory positions the truth Freud found as the ''Urphantasien,'' 4 the oedipal ''origin of origins'' (Bro84 276), the primal fantasies of the primal scene, castration, and seduction, which Laplanche and Pontalis equate with the Oedipus complex: ''The universality of these [primal fantasy] structures should be related to the universality that Freud accords to the Oedipus complex as a nuclear complex whose structuring a priori role he often stressed'' (Lap67 333na). Primal fantasies, according to Laplanche and Pontalis, are ''[t]ypical phantasy structures ... which psychoanalysis reveals to be responsible for the organization of phantasy life, regardless of personal experiences of different subjects; according to Freud, the universality of these phantasies is explained by the fact that they constitute a phylogenetically tran smitted inheritance'' (Lap67 331) Freud posited these structures at the same time that he held that the unconscious was the site of unreason that could tolerate contradiction. One wonders how these structures, these a priori organizing principles of the unconscious, could tolerate Sigmund Freud The S tandard Editi o n of the Complete Psy c hol o gical W o rks o f Sigmund Freud Ed. and trans. J. Strachey et al Volume XIV (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 269. Hereafter the Standard Edition will be cited by volume u s ing Roman numeral s

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30 contradiction, and, as theorized, they could not. Freud argues in his 1918 addendum to the Wolf Man case that they supercede any conflict with anything ontogenetic. Thus we have the makings of an aporia with respect to what truth psychoanalysis finds and to what truth it is founded on: the oedipal unconscious versus the unconscious of contradiction, that which secures the Same or reason versus that which is radically other to reason. I will also show how Freud's phylo''genetic'' ''origin of origins'' conflicts with his foundation, his origin of psychoanalytic authority: the differentiation of the norr11al and the neurotic, or the answering of the question, ''whence the neurosis?," via a cure and an etiology based on that cure. Many readers of Freudian theory have repressed the significance of phylo''genetics'' for Freud, including the readers of Freud I am concerned with here The ''mainstyle'' psychoanalysis I suppose is one that takes seriously Freud's oedipal masterplot, and this focus will differentiate me to different degrees from these other readers of Freud who attempt to take seriously the ethical imperative to be ''otherwise." The primal phantasies naturalize ''castration-truth'' as the center of its logic, its oikos (home and economy). According to Derrida, ''castration-truth'' is ''the very antidote for fragmentation'' since ''that which is missing from its place has in castration a fixed central place, freed from all substitution (Der87a 441). With Lacan, Freud's primal fantasies are transformed into an inevitably phallocentric language: the Symbolic. According to Derrida, the absence of the penis-phallus sets in place the phallogocentric signifying chain of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the destination at which all sliding arrives: ''truth-unveiled woman-castration-shame'' (Der87a 416) or simply ''castration-truth." This absence, he argues, is ''that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring) in order to

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31 bring the phallus, the signifier, the letter, or the fetish back into their oikos, their familiar dwelling, their proper place'' (Der87a 441). Filling Gaps In the spirit of intertextuality, I cite Weber citing Freud citing Heine. Weber argues that Freud contrasts his theories with what the forn1er calls the ''phobosophie'' of the philosopher whose approach Freud compares to the making cohesive function of the secondary revision of dreams: This function behaves in the manner which the poet maliciously ascribes to philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches. As a result of its efforts, the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible experience. (XXII 161) The ''shreds and patches'' are references to two lines in Heine's ''Die Heimkehr," which Freud cites in full at the beginning of his final ''New Introductory Lecture'' in 1933: ''Mit seinen Nachtmiitzen und Schlafrockfetz e n I Stopft er die Liicken des Weltenbaus.'' Strachey translates these lines as follows: ''With his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing-gown he patches up the gaps in the structure of the universe'' (ibid.). Whereas our nightcaps and dressing-gowns bring us comfort during sleep, secondary revision is that which brings us comfort after we awake, that which transforms the ''absurdity and disconnectedness'' of the primary processes as experienced in dreams into what is an ''intelligible experience'' for the awake consciousness. The ''primary revision'' would be the dreamwork of the dream, the condensation and displacement of the primary processes: the ''dissimulating function'' which allows the ideational material-which would

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32 otherwise remain unconscious--to slip by the sleeping censors of consciousness. Secondary revision is thus a re-establishment of consciousness, its corresponding sense of self, and their censors after they have been vulnerable to the disruptive forces of the unconscious material during sleep. The unconscious is thus theorized here by Freud as being a locus of disruptive forces with respect to consciousness, forces radically other to consciousness and its systems. Freud also associates the unconscious with ''the gaps in the structure of the universe," gaps which cannot be filled despite the systematic ''pretensions'' of ''phobosophers'' or anyone else: The secondary revision of the product of dream-activity is an admirable example of the nature and pretensions of a system There is an intellectual function in us which demands unity, connection and intelligibility from any material, whether of perception or thought, that comes within its grasp; and if, as a result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false one. (XII 95) System making therefore can have a defensive quality, and, in Levinasian terms, an unethical quality inasmuch as it attempts to move toward totality by reducing what is totally other to the system's logic -that is, inasmuch as it denies the necessity for partiality, provisionality, and openness as a system, and inasmuch as it denies the irreducibility of division as a unity. Following Freud, Weber makes the connection explicit between theory (speculations, system making) and narass1sm: The ''expectation of an intelligible whole'' described by Freud, the expectation of a coherent meaning, appears thus to denote the

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33 reaction of an ego seeking to defend its conflict-ridden cohesion against equally endemic centripetal tendencies. The pursuit of meaning; the activity of construction, synthesis, unification; the incapacity to admit anything irreducibly alien, to leave any residue unexplained-all this indicates the struggle of the ego to establish and to maintain an identity that is all the more precarious and vulnerable to the extent that it depends on what it must exclude. In short, speculative, systematic thinking draws its force from the effort of the ego to appropriate an exteriority of which, as Freud will later put it, it is only the ''organized part." (Web82 13-14) Thus there is something ''phobosophic'' and narcissistic, if not unpsychoanalytic, about theorizing in general, if that which is opposed to the ego, that against which it organizes itself-''the'' unconscious, the id, or that which simply happens is posited as that which cannot be organized in terms of the ego, that which resists theory, that which is radically other to intelligible wholes, coherent meaning, sense, organization. ''For speculation," Weber continues, ''which Freud associates with narcissism, systematization, and secondary revision, would be a form of thought ill-suited to 'judge unconscious material' inasmuch as it is driven precisely to deny the influence of its own unconscious'' (14). Hence Freud's criticism of Adlerian theory: ''The Adlerian theory was from the very beginning a 'system'--which psychoanalysis was careful to avoid becoming'' (XIV 50). I will argue in later chapters that the year Freud made this statement, 1914, he was on the verge of making the move toward primal phantasies as the basis of his masterplotting, his ultimate system based on

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''castration-truth." With this system, the identity of Narcissus and Oedipus is established 34 Freud decries all system making that is different from his own, and yet, there are moments when Freud approaches taking seriously his own criticisms of ''phobosophie." In ''Resistances," Derrida discusses one of these moments in a note Freud makes to his interpretation of the Irma dream in The Interpretation of Dreams where ''Freud confesses a feeling, a premonition (!ch ahne, he writes)'' (4) that ''something exceeds [his] analysis'' (5): I had a fe~ling that the interpretation of this part of the dream was not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its concealed meaning .... There is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable-a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown. (IV 111n1) Towards the end of The Interpretation of Dreams Freud reiterates this point: There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. (V 525)

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35 These might be the dream-thoughts that take detour and never return to some notion of the proper destination-one might say an adestinational theory of the unconscious. This would make the ''unknown'' the ''unknowable.'' Freud seems to be arguing that the system-making of philosophy will necessarily be incomplete due to ''the unknown'' of the most entangled roots of the unconscious, and that any attempt to create a unity, eine Weltanschauung, as Freud says, is similar to the folly of secondary revision: a projection of the need for unity. It would seem that we have a Freud here that demands that certain holes or gaps remain unfilled: open spaces Yet, Derrida argues, ''Freud seems to have no doubts that this hidden thing has a sense," that ''the secret'' (4) is unknown but not unknowable, and that the open spaces are gaps where a certain presence is missing from its place. For Freud, if the interpreter could do the impossible and accomplish just the right unraveling of the tangle of dream-thought s, and follow all the myriad detours, sense could be made of the dream: The inaccessible secret is some sense it is full of sense. In other words, for the moment the secret refuses analysis, but as sense it is analyzable; it is homogeneous to the order of the analyzable. It comes under psychoanalytic reason. Psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic reason. (ibid.) We might argue that Freud becomes split regarding the sense of the navel of the dream into two Freuds: one is the Freud of the inaccessible secret, the unknown as exceeding the analysis, but as ultimately knowable and ''homogeneous to the order of the analyzable''; and the second is the Freud, not of the unplumbable unknown, or not-yet-known, but of the unplumbable and therefore unknowable,

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36 the abyssal. One Freud would be of system-making grounded in truth; the other would recognize that all systems will fall short of a totality and have spaces open up within due to the irreducibility of the Other to the Same. I will argue that there is little evidence of this latter Freud, and abundant evidence of for1ner. Moreover, what is the not-yet-known for Freud here becomes that which grounds all of his later theory. Both Weber and Derrida draw attention to the maternal connections of Freud's navel metaphor. As will be even more the case as the ''castration-truth'' system of oedipal psychoanalysis develops, the center of the structure, its navel, will be associated with an absence (the ''unknown'') related to woman, the absence of woman, and the mother's absence (as in the fort/da game of Beyond the Pleasure Principle). At one point in his treatment of this note to the Irina dream, Weber argues that the navel of the dream would not necessarily be a site of destabilizing mystery: What could be more reassuring and familiar, more primordial and powerful than this reference to the place where the body was last joined to its maternal origins. That this place is also the site of a trace and of a separation, but also of a knot, is a reflection that carries little force next to the reassuring sense of continuity, generation, and originality connoted by the figure. (76) The question of Freud's ''navel of the dream'' becomes: is it a ''gap'' that can be filled by discovering the correct sense that would then correspond to this dream's truth, or an infinity of ever-returning spaces that do not allow for a totality, a system (something that simply happens)? And what is the relationship of these gaps/spaces to the mother, femininity, and woman?

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37 What is at stake here seems to be the status of (psychoanalytic) knowledge and the very nature of the unconscious: whether it has a nature and whether that nature can be expressed in a form that might be meaningful. Discussing related issues, Derrida states matter-of-factly in Resistance of Psychoanalysis that what is at stake ''are sense and truth'' (18). In ''Le facteur de la verite," Derrida argues that Lacan treats the navel simply as a fillable gap. According to Lacan, ''[ w]hat Freud calls the navel-the navel of the dreams, he writes, to designate their ultimately unknown centre ... is simply, like the same anatomical navel that represents it, that gap of which I have already spoken'' (Lac77b 23). Lacan's interest in what Derrida calls ''the gap and the carved-out localization of the umbilical hole'' (Der96 11) is a repetition of the ''castration-truth'' Der1ida finds to be the basis of La can's reading of ''The Purloined Letter," and of La can's ''destinational'' theory of language. More simply, Lacan's rendering of the navel as a center reveals his penchant for idealist structures with centers. It is a philosophy or ''phobosophie'' that ''fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches," but Lacan fills it with a supposedly material and, at the same time, indivisible letter, what I call a material-ideal letter. Again the question becomes: how well does Lacan read Freud? Or does psychoanalysis itself, despite Freud's criticisms of philosophers, attempt to be a Weltanschauung? Freud's transformation of open spaces into specific absences, and making these absences the center of a grand system, begins with his treatment of hysterics and ends with the ''castration-truth'' of psychoanalysis proper. In '' A Fragment of a Case of Hysteria,'' Freud's 1901 case commonly known as the Dora case, Freud states clearly that ''[n]o one who disdains the key will ever be able to unlock the door" (VII 115). At this point in his theorizing, the gaps in hysterical

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38 narratives are the locks supposedly unlocked by Freud's, and later Lacan's, phallic keys. When Dora recounts her narrative of being assaulted by Herr K. at fourteen, the absence of Dora's desire for Herr K.' s advances is for Freud a telltale bit of the ''unconscious disingenuousness'' (17) that leaves ''gaps unfilled'' (16) in the narratives of hysterics. Effecting an abreaction, according to the Freud of the Dora case, would supposedly require a catharsis of the repressed ideational content via its dialogical reconstruction from the analysand's free associations and the analyst's interpretations. Freud, however, does not report filling this supposed gap in Dora's narrative with a reconstr~ction that is at all dialogical Rather, Freud, as he often does, employs his own associations: '1 believe that during the man's passionate embrace she felt not merely his kiss upon her lips but also the pressure of his erect member against her body ' (30) Freud's primary key to the supposed hysteria of his female patients up to and including Dora, the absent presence of every gap, is often an ''erect member," which he uses to know his patients, to penetrate their unconscious desires The hysteric with her gaps ready to be filled by the phallocentric master narratives of Freudian theory provides the initial small-''o'' other. Freud assumes a position of the narrative totality from whence he can see gaps. Later, this position would be one of a masterplot, a metapsychology, rather than an etiological narrative totality. Freud's initial system is based on cure, etiological, and provides the foundation of truth on which psychoanalysis is supposedly based. Psychoanalysis proper would be theorized according to the terms of universal fantasies rather than the traumatic memories from which hysterics

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39 supposedly suffered during the ''seduction'' 5 theory: ''hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences'' (II 7). Supposedly, Freud was right about the truth he found, but, he would later rationalize, this truth was in the form of universal fantasies rather than traumatic memories. Freud's movement from his system of filling gaps in phallic narratives to the ''castration-truth'' of totalizing masterplots is complicated by a question that ultimately remains unan swered by Freud after the movement: whence the neurosis? Though Freud's theorization, treatment, and cure of hysteria are supposedly the authoritative foundation of psychoanalytic truth, Freud would argue in The Interpretation of Dreams that psychoanalysis finds ''no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life'' (V 373). Freud thus clearly differentiates a nascent psychoanalysis proper from his earlier etiology of hysteria here. The latter posited a structural difference between hysteria, one form of neurosis, and normalcy: the hysteric, according to the Freud of around 1895 and 1896, suffered from the pathogenic repression of traumatic memories of incestuous violence, whereas the normal female did not. The Freud of the Dora case, written as an ~ddendum to The Interpretation of Dreams, had no clear etiology: this Freud could not answer, ''whence the neurosis?," and he avoided answering the question in this mere ''fragment of an analysis." One of the dominant themes in my study is the possibility of chance in Freud's system making. During the ''seduction'' theory, the difference between 5 Freud's theory was called the ''seduction" theory only later and not by Freud. It is quite a misnomer given that the theory is really one of child molestation or rape. The idea of ''seduction,'' however, seems to support the contention of psychoanalysis proper that there is a desire in the child for the parent, which seems to be a retroactive rhetorical move to make the child rape theory more cohesive with psychoanalysis proper.

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40 neurotic and normal development was dependent on the chance occurrence of the rape, molestation, or ''seduction.'' In this sense, trauma, chance, and memory are clearly linked in the answering of the question, ''whence the neurosis?'' Freud's initial truth, his supposed ''discovery," is the answering of this question as part of a more general question of cure and the nature of the unconscious. Narratives as etiologies, chance as part of that narrative, answering the question, and cure are all the basis of establishing this truth. In one of his last essays, '' Analysis Terxninable and Interminable," Freud argues that the way psychoanalysis has come to understand the nature of resistance means that cure is hard to come by. But cure is supposedly how psychoanalysis came to understand the nature of resistance. What Freud is doing in this essay written in 1938, the year before the year of his death, and forty-three years after the publication of Studies on Hysteria, is privileging metapsychology (metanarratives) over technique (etiologies, cure) as the central concern of his theorizing and forgetting that all of his appeals to the authority in his metapsychology are ultimately based on cure. I return to the theme of chance in chapter three, and again in chapter five, where I li~k it to the (non)position of woman in mainstyle psychoanalysis ''To Post or Not to Post?'' This project attempts to show how the masterplotting of psychoanalysis proper reduces ''open spaces'' to the specific absences of ''castration-truth," and, as I quote Derrida above, this psychoanalytic absence is ''that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring) in order to bring the phallus, the signifier, the letter, or the fetish back into their oikos, their familiar dwelling, their proper place''

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41 (Der87a 441). As I argue in chapter five, ''Uncanny (Wo)Man,'' the double games of deconstructive readings should be differentiated from the phallocentric fetish and its disavowal, where doubleness is dissimulated in order to achieve the illusion of a One, rather than the explicit acknowledgment of fragmentation-not as castration, but as ''differenc;e as division'' (Der96 33) when a double game is played. I read the ''castration-truth,'' the phallogocentrism of Freudian theory, as such a logie of disavowal: divided not by its simultaneous belief in the presence/ absence of the phallus, a fetish, but in the simultaneous belief in the presence/absence of woman. Contrary to those psychoanalyses that reduce woman to desire for the phallus, the question regarding ''woman'' of the present study is not the truth of woman, but the way psychoanalysis posits Truth of woman in terms of the presence/ absence of woman: first the hysterical gaps in narratives and the cured hysteric (chapter two), then (op)positionality of Freudian sexual theories, and finally the phallic One via the actual phallic function and ''castration-truth'' (chapt e r five). Through my reading of Freud's essay ''The 'Uncanny''' in chapter five, I attempt to bring together many of the questions and themes of the previous chapters in relation to Freud's treatment of his formulation of the question of woman, especially the theme of the possibility of chance in Freud's theory, which stems from my reading of Derrida's essay, ''My Chances/Mes Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies." I argue that Freud s strong superstitious tendencies are related to his desire to extend his deterministic psychology into a cosmology I connect these themes to Freud's repression of the importance of the mother. The question for me in this chapter is not the question of woman revisited, and especially not Freud's question, ''Was will das Weib?'' The question here is of psychoanalysis: the

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question of psychoanalysis and its uses of truth, determinism, castration, woman, and hysteria as the basis of its phallogocentrism and destinational linguistics. 42 Derrida argues that ''deconstruction has developed itself as a deconstruction of~ system which is called phallogocentrism, which is a whole structure, which is a system so to speak'' (Der87b 196). As Derrida attempts to ''open a space within which we can make philosophy otherwise'' (Der78 178), I hope to do so here with psychoanalysis. I imagine psychoanalysis proper would see the opened spaces for making p~ychoanalysis otherwise as Freud saw the narratives of the so-called hysterics he treated: as gaps in what would be a complete narrative, Freud's oedipal narrative of totality, his masterplot. Seen from psychoanalysis proper, such a deconstructive reading of psychoanalysis would appear to be an hysterical reading. For Lacan, the structure of hysteria is centered on the question, ''What is it to be a woman?'' (Lac93175). Here the opened spaces of deconstruction would be seen as evidence of certain semantic castration. The other neurotic structure Lacan theorizes is the obsessional structure, and its question is Hamlet's: ''to be or not to be?'' (Lac93179-180). Since castration is equated with not being according to Lacan's ''castration truth," we can equate the two questions: to be a woman is not to be, or as Lacan says, ''Woman doesn't ex-sist'' (Lac90 38). I read Freud's texts as stuck in what might be called an obsessional structure if I were not so interested in problematizing such psychoanalytic categories and the structures on which they depend. Not to be in this structure would mean not to have mastery over woman, and woman here, according to the actual phallic function, is a way of reducing the Other to a specific absence. In other words, psychoanalysis

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43 obsessionally attempts to master the trauma of the Other by reducing whatever spaces open up-''deconstruction happens''-to castration. The question on which the structure of this project is provisionally centered with respect to one of its double games is what remains after the phallogocentrism, the ''castration-truth," of psychoanalysis is deconstructed, and whether these remains can or should be called ''psychoanalysis," or if the remains of this deconstruction would in some way constitute a posting of psychoanalysis: ''post-psychoanalysis." In a section of chapter six I call ''Post(al) Psychoanalysis," I attempt to problematize such a posting, if not embrace it. Besides the obvious drawbacks of such a trendy move, a simplistic posting, a putting behind of psychoanalysis, of course, seems to assume that one can simply step outside and in front of psychoanalysis: moves I try to problematize here. As with post-Marxism, for example, this posting, if it is one, would be one where the emphasis would remain ambiguous: is it post-psychoanalysis or post psychoanalysis? Adding an ''al'' in parentheses is intended to problematize any reading of the title of the conclusion as such a simple posting of psychoanalysis and to associate this problematized posting with Derrida's problematization of postal systems.

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CHAPTER2 PROBLEMATIZING ''HYSTERIA'' AND THE ORIGIN OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In this chapter I show how Freud's system-making begins very much in terms of gap filling, a process at least related to what I have described, following Barratt, as the ''phenomenology of fucking." The Other to Freud's system making is consistently transformed from Other into other, from the unconscious or the unknown (the open spaces, the remains of the system) into femininity woman, or, as I will discuss here, hysteria (gaps, specific absences) Because the traditional myth of psychoanalytic origins is that psychoanalysis was discovered during Freud's work with hysterics, hysteria becomes a privileged category for any project interested in disturbing these origins and the myths based on them. I posit here what I think has been a repres s ed binary, psychoanalysis/hysteria where, analogous to the male/female of psychoanalysis, this binary reduces the Other to a simple other, ''hysteria," in order to establish itself, ''psychoanalysis,'' in a mode of self-posting ''auto-bio-graphy'' (Derrida). My goal in this chapter is to deconstruct this binary and therefore problematize psychoanalysis at what the orthodoxy considers to be its origin: its analysis and cure of hysteria. By focusing on Freud's own ''hysteria'' and his impossible ''self-analysis," I hope to further problematize these myths by (dis)placing them en abyme, and, in general, to show that Freud's own ''phobosophie'' is consistently mixed with misogyny This latter them e is treated in chapter five below 44

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What is hysteria? Or should I ask, what was it? In Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, Ellie Ragland-Sullivan's Lacanian entry for hysteria is typical in its acceptance of certain myths of hysteria: 45 Psychoanalysis was born with Freud's treatment of the illness then named ''hysteria'' (from the Greek hysteros 'womb'), a uterus thought to be ''wandering," a malady as old as Hippocrates and the subject of the oldest known medical text. (163) Ragland-Sullivan's acceptance of this so-called ''illness'' as one is a typical psychoanalytic assumption, one on which the myth of the birth of psychoanalysis depends. Moreover, she seems unquestioning that this ''illness'' indeed had something to do with a reality related to actual diseased wombs The womb (hystera) has been consistently established as the essence of women throughout Western history, and from this determination came the various discourses of medicine, biology, sexuality, religion, etc., which gave birth to many forms of sexism stemming from the notion that ''anatomy is destiny Of course, we are investing ourselves in a ''certain linguistics'' when we speak of ''maladies'' with ancient histories and their realities. And this linguistics and its essentialism and reality, as I will argue, create this ''illness'' and the misogyny associated with it in order to sustain itself. This linguistics and its phallogocentrism need this ''illness." Yet, even within the context of such a linguistics, the symptomatology of what was called ''hysteria'' has a long, unwieldy, and inconsistent history, though not nearly as long as presumed by Ragland-Sullivan, nor as is usually presumed. The orthodox mythology of the birth of psychoanalysis depends on the objective existence of hysteria as a disease entity that psychoanalysis cures What I argue here is that even within a

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46 logocentric episteme, hysteria can make no claim to being a proper disease. Freud constructs his ''hysteria'' and its cure to father psychoanalysis and ''Freud," and Lacan and Lacanians, such as Ragland-Sullivan, will assume its existence within a ''certain linguistics'' of phallo-phono-logocentrism. I will argue that psychoanalytic hysteria constitutes a magical detour destination, which allows the letter to be properly purloined so that it will always properly arrive back at its proper destination. Psychoanalysis and ''hysteria'' are one: psychoanalysis/hysteria. All detours must be construed as circles leading back to the proper destination, and the sending of the self-post must be appropriated as the proper detour, instead of indicating something radically other that might account for the compulsion to repeat the sending. In Womanizing Nietzsche, Kelly Oliver argues that ''woman and the feminine'' (5) are the excluded other in the discourse of Western philosophy, but that this excluded other is also an other within Oliver urges philosophy to ''engage in a dialogue with the other within it, the oth e r out of which it was born'' (4). Certainly this approach could be applied to Freudian theory and psychoanalysis in general: hysteria was indeed repressed as a psychoanalytic concern after the Dora case, and the cure of hysteria has been considered the womb out of which psychoanalysis was born Yet the way Oliver sets up her problem reinscribes the (op)positionality of the binary philosophy /woman in order to create a dialogue, and, as with any (op)positionality, the binary dissimulates difference and division behind opposed identities or ideal categories. I do not ascribe to a project where psychoanalysis would ''engage in a dialogue with the [hysterical] other within it, the other out of which it was born'' since to do so would be to risk reinscribing the binary I reveal/ construct

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47 here in order to destabilize: psychoanalysis/hysteria. My hope in this chapter is to show how this binary acts as a mode of defense against the radical alterity Freud encounters in this initial phase of his theorizing. I do this after showing how the history and the histories of this supposed disease support the repression of what is totally other via this supposition. Because of the tradition of how this word ''hysteria'' was used to support a variety of patriarchies, it seems to me that any attempt at any ''reappropriation'' (a making proper to a discourse interested in subversion of the proper)-for example, hystericizing hysteria or hysterjcizing psychoanalysis even if successful, would run the risk of reproducing the reification of ''hysteria'' and all of the misogynistic baggage this reification carries with it, and it would do so without any clear gain with respect to problematizing how ''hysteria'' was used to create this baggage or how psychoanalysis/hysteria was used by Freud and his followers as the basis of an origin myth. Historia Sweeping histories of this supposed disease, this supposed singularity such as Ilza Veith's classic, Hysteria: The History of a Disease-are flawed in that they create what Mark Micale, author of Approaching Hysteria, calls ''a remote and venerable historical heritage'' (Mic95 46) rooted in the Hippocratic texts. In ''Once upon a Text: Hysteria and Hippocrates," Helen King undercuts traditional histories of hysteria in three crucial ways: (1) by problematizing the similarity between popular conceptions of hysteria in its modern for1ns and the hysterike pnix, or ''suffocation by the womb'' (Gil93 28-9), which Hippocrates described; (2) by arguing that anything recognizable as a modern forn1 of

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48 hysteria was not recorded until the 16th century; and (3) by pointing out that the diagnosis ''hysteria'' was not coined until 1801 (Gil93 73). According to Micale, the common type of mythical historical heritage of a disease entity for something ''as elusive and mysterious as hysteria ... implies the universality of the disorder, establishes the validity of the diagnostic category, and bolsters the scientific status of psychiatric medicine itself' (Mic95 46). Even during the latter part of the nineteenth century, which Fulgence Raymond called ''la periode heroique de l'hysterie'' (qtd. in Mic95 3), hysteria's symptomatology could not sustain what most nosologists, then or now, would consider proper disease status. Jean Martin Charcot's conceptions of hysteria in his writings of the 1870s and 1880s reveal a dizzying polysymptoma to logy despite his efforts to make the diagnosis functional through a delimiting classification system. Basically any behavioral abnormality in a woman was suspect of being a sign of hysteria during ''la periode heroique de l hysterie '' Contemporary symptomatologies for hysteria-a diagnosis unfortunately still in use are also extremely vague and general. The very recently outdated Diagnostical and Statistical Manual of Mental Disord~s (Third Edition Revised) or DSM-ill-R lists ''paralysis, aphonia, seizures, coordination disturbance, akinesia, dyskinesia, blindness, tunnel vision, anosmia, anesthesia, and paresthesia ... [disturbances of the] autonomic and endocrine systems ... [and v]omiting'' (257) as symptoms of the more specific category of ''Hysterical Neurosis, Conversion Type." The DSM-III-R also lists the dissociative type of hysterical neurosis, hysterical personality (histrionic personality disorder), and various kinds of hysterical psychoses The updated and current DSM-IV does not list hysteria at all, I hope in recognition of the nosological chaos of the history of this diagnosis

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49 and, more importantly, the often violent misogyny of the history of ''hysteria's'' theorizations and treatments. Since the term remains a common element of psychoanalytic discourse, it seems that the psychoanalytic community is far from acknowledging this history of misogyny and nosological chaos. To do so would be to undercut the origin myth and therefore the very foundation of the supposed scientific status of psychoanalysis not to mention the complicity of psychoanalysis in the latter part of this misogynistic history. As with many psychoanalytic feminists who write about hysteria, many Freudian faithful attempt to limit hysteria to symptoms of ''conversion," the somatic expression of psychical conflict, as Freud, early in his career, claimed should be done (see I 41-52 passim). Reducing the vast polysymptomatology of hysteria to its merely broad psychosomatic component appeals to psychoanalytic feminists because the metaphorics of the silenced women who can only express their dis-ease with(in) the patriarchy through their culturally hypercathected bodies is indeed powerful. This reduction appeals to the Freudian faithful because the mythologies surrounding Freud's supposed cure of hysterics, and hysteria as the womb of psychoanalysis, comprise the origin myths of psychoanalysis (Freud cures/ anchors the womb that gives birth to psychoanalysis as anchor). Freud's own symptomatologies and theorizations with respect to hysteria, however, were varied, inconsistent, contradictory, and usually conflated with female homosexuality after the initial writing of the Dora case a far cry from the ''gross, florid motor and sensory somatizations'' (Mic95 4) we associate with Freud's earlier work on hysteria with Breuer. At the same time that Freud would try to limit the symptomatology of hysteria in order to make it manageable, he would also bring in many other symptoms from the

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so dizzying polysymptomatology when they would suit his particular purposes at that time. If hysteria could be said to have been one thing, something that might constitute a categorization, it was simply a diagnosis, one that was historically made by males in positions of authority-primarily nineteenth-century physicians about women who were somehow beyond the boundaries of what was contemporaneously considered proper womanhood. The diagnosis of hysteria itself may be a symptom of a patriarchal ''dis-ease''-that is, the patriarchy's dis-ease with those bodies classified as female that did not confortn to, were in excess of, its dictates of prop e r womanhood Many of the feminists who make this argument or similar ones, however, treat hysteria as if it were something beyond a diagnosis If they don't explicitly do this, and even if they at times argue against such a position, their common unproblematized use of ''hysteria'' suggests just such an assumption (see Showalter, Kahane, Matlock, Smith-Rosenberg, among others). In other words, many feminist theorists often use ''hysteria'' as an unproblematized denotation of an actual disease even though these feminists suggest that the word ''hysteria'' itself cannot be anything but the discursive manifestations of a variety of related patr iarchal defensive strategies, especially with its unavoidable anatomical etymology of a diseased womb. There seems to be an understandable, if unfortunate, need to figure out the causes of hysteria-the-disease at the same time that some feminists argue for hysteria as a part of a reappropriative discourse of nineteenth century physicians made insecure by the changes happening with respect to women and their roles in society, in the family, and in their personal and sexual relations.

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51 Histories such as Veith's-not a ''hys-story'' as much as a case of ''historia''-if not histories of a disease entity, may be useful as histories of what Elaine Showalter calls ''the pervasive association of women and madness'' (Sch85 4), if their use of ''hysteria'' is retroactively problematized. For two reasons I hesitate to say that such histories might be considered histories of female madness. First of all, Showalter would see this as a redundancy since she argues ''madness is a female malady'' (Sch85 3). Second, Derrida might argue that this would be an ''infeasible'' (Der78 33) categorization for the same reasons that Foucault's intention of writing his History of Madness from the position, as Foucault said, ''of madness itself ... before being captured by knowledge'' (qtd. in Der78 34), is for Derrida infeasible, or even ''the maddest aspect of his project'' (ibid.). Any history is on the side of reason, thus making a history of madness a reduction of the Other of ''madness'' to reason's more of the Same Indeed, madness can be read as the (op)position that allows for reason. What these ' hys-stories ' mask as aspects of this general reduction of the Other to the Same with respect to reason/madness, are the undecidables of certain boundaries that make up the dualisms or (op)positionalities that have played major roles in the West's representational histories. This masking is a process of naturalization of dualisms such as male/ female and reason/ madness, a deciding of u~decidables along traditional lines. A third dualism, mind/body, is also a major player in the general representational histories of the West. On one level, what is at stake with these hys-stories, and the many questions of hysteria in general, is the reproduction of what Showalter calls ''the fundamental alliance between 'woman' and 'madness''' (Sch85 3) and ''how women, within our dualistic systems of language and representation, are typically situated on

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52 the side of irrationality, silence, nature, and body, while men are situated on the side of reason, discourse, culture, and mind'' (Sch85 3-4). These dualisms have been hierarchies in practice, and they mask the undecidables-the radical alterity of what is Other, the instability of the same and the futility of the various patriarchies' attempts to reduce what is Other to its dualistic codes and hierarchies once and for all . Showalter's feminism itself seems to be based on the self-evidence or naturalness of such a dualism, male/female, and therefore it risks reproducing the phallogocentric reduction of what is Other to more of the Samethat is, inasmuch as such an assumption necessarily leads to such a reproduction, and inasmuch as feminism necessarily makes such an assumption. In, ''Deconstruction in America," Derrida suggests that feminisms are necessarily phallogocentric: So I would say that deconstruction is a deconstruction of feminism, from the start, in so far as feminism is a form-no doubt a necessary form at a certain moment-but a form of phallogocentrism among many others. (Der85 30) Psychoanalysis, of course, would also be one of these phallogocentric forms The appeal of psychoanalysis for some feminisms seems to be what these forms of feminism read as its anti-essentialism, which gets away from ''anatomy is destiny." And yet, since Derrida argues both psychoanalysis and feminism are forms of phallogocentrism, the source of this attraction may also be that they share phallogocentric assumptions. In so far as phallogocentrism prescribes a destiny, a destinational linguistics, ultimately ''anchored'' to the letter of anatomy, the two ''lures'' of psychoanalysis for certain feminisms-.anti

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53 essentialism and sharing phallogocentric assumptions -become mutually exclusive. Without getting embroiled in the intricacies of the relationship between deconstruction and feminism at this point, I am interested in suggesting here that the conflicted strategies of treating hysteria as a discursive formation and attempting to theorize the origins and essence of hysteria-that is, treating it as a ''real'' illness can be understood in relation to the certain feminisms' conflicted relationship to phallogocentrism and the mainstyles of psychoanalysis and deconstruction. I return to these issues in the concluding chapter. The primary function of hysteria is to bolster and reproduce the aforementioned hierarchical dualisms-mind over body, reason over madness, and male over female. Even when the diagnosis of hysteria was used for men, as in the late nineteenth century by Charcot and Freud-and though the diagnosis was severed here from its history of connecting the pathology to a diseased womb-the diagnosis was used figuratively to suggest that the male had succumbed to a feminine type of madness, a ''female malady." Freud returns to this type of metaphorics -the type where Freud must cure himself of his hysterical symptoms, his femininity-in the late essay, ''Analysis Terminable and Interminable," where he stresses the difficulty of curing his male patients of their residual femininity (though he never theorizes this source of femininity beyond simply stating the universality of bisexuality) The discursive formation ''hysteria," the diagnosis, was used to justify oppressive practices in the service of the stability of various patriarchies. Prior to the inception of ''hysteria'' as a diagnosis in 1801, the theories, speculations, and ''treatments'' of aberrant forms of femininity were also used oppressively, often violently. I will refer to all aberrant for1ns of femininity I deal with here that

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54 various Western patriarchies felt the need to classify or diagnose to defend against their disruptive potential, borrowing from Showalter, ''the female malady''-though I use this phrase, not as a synonym for madness in general, but as a way of denoting the paradoxical imbrications of femininity and madness from the perspective of a hom(m)osexual patriarchy-that is, the malady of being female, and, further1nore, the malady of not being female enough. Psychoanalysis continues this treatment of the themes of femininity in terms of a malady for both men (see '' Analysis Terminable and Interminable'') and women (the ''peculiar'' sex, penis envy), and this contradictory treatment of the feminine malady as not being female enough (either hysteria or female homosexuality with respect to Freud's ''three lines of development''). With respect to terminology, my hope here is to differentiate the broader ter111, ''the female malady," from its subset ''hysteria," and therefore to historicize ''hysteria'' as a diagnosis made after 1800. This allows me to maintain the broad strokes of related histories of female oppression associated with female madness without reifying hysteria and making the error of assuming that nineteenth-century hysteria has a ''remote and venerable historical heritage'' (Mic95 46) rooted in the Hippocratic texts. In fact, I would say that a ''remote and (un)venerable historical heritage'' of the imbrication of femininity and madness would be less vulnerable to ''historia'' than a comparable hys-story . The theories and treatments for the female malady were aspects of varied though similar for111s of patriarchal reappropriation, where the aberrancy of things feminine that is, associated with femininity yet in excess of its proper form-is reappropriated by establishing that which is aberrant as the abject form of the proper in a name-game of mastery that re-establishes the One and the

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55 same in the face of the Other. As usual, the aberrancy-the transgression, perversion-was used as limit and negative in order to establish and center the proper, the norm, the law. In the Timaeus, Plato wrote: the womb is an animal which longs to generate children. When it remains barren too long after puberty, it is distressed and sorely disturbed, and straying about in the body and cutting off the passages of the breath, it impedes respiration and brings the sufferer into the extremist anguish and provokes all manner of diseases besides. (qtd. in Mic95 19) With proper femininity in Plato's Greece, the womb is irrigated and inseminated; the happy womb does not wander as it is anchored by the penis. A proper sexuality, a proper relation of womb to penis, therefore, is the cure and antithesis of the diseased womb, the symptom of aberrant femininity. The themes of proper sexuality and the curative penis/phallus would recur throughout the history of the female malady. For example, Rudolph Chrobak sent along the following course of treatment with a patient he had diagnosed as hysterical and had sent to Freud: ''penis normalis dosim repetatur '' (Gay 92). Another recurring theme in histories of the female malady is violent misogyny. Despite what seems like what should have been the sound security of Western patriarchies throughout history due to their rootedness and overwhelming power, violent misogyny regarding the treatment and theorization of the female malady has been common and often virulent, which suggests that these patriarchies were not as stable as they were powerful, and that the threat of what is Other associated with the phantasmatic feminine was consistently great. After St. Augustine, who attributed all illness to ''a

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56 manifestation of innate evil'' (Mic95 20), the female malady became synonymous with witchcraft and possession by the devil: During the late medieval and Renaissance periods, the scene of diagnosis of the hysteric [sic] shifted from the hospital to the church and the courtroom, which now became the loci of spectacular interrogations. Official manuals for the detection of witches, often virulently misogynistic, supplied instructions for the detection, torture, and at times execution of the witch/hysteric. The number of such inquisitions remains unknown but is believed to be high. (Mic95 20-1) The violence of the nineteenth-century patriarchal reactions to what was named ''hysteria'' is consistent with the violence of previous eras' patriarchal reactions to the demonic female malady, such as the uncountable murders of women deemed to be witches. Nineteenth century forms of violence were often medicalized and sexualized in keeping with its less religious Enlightenment ethos The seventeenth century would see the beginning of a neurological model used to theorize the female malady, one that would evolve until the present time. A revival of uterine theories would occur in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, hence the womb-oriented diagnosis of ''hysteria'' for what were considered materialist maladies circa 1801. As examples of this combination of medicalization and sexualization, treatments that stemmed from a combinatory, neuro-uterine model of ''hysteria'' included ''intrauterine injections, the cervical and vulvar application of leeches, and clitoral cauterizations," and recalcitrant ''cases were occasionally subjected to amputative and extirpative gynecological surgery, including bilateral

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57 ovariotomies'' (Mic.'95 24). Though a pioneer in getting away from physically violent forms of treatment, Freud in 1896 volunteered one of his ''hysterical'' patients, Emma Eckstein, for a procedure developed by his friend Wilhelm Fliess, who posited that the cauterization of the turbinate bone of the nasal cavity could supposedly cure sexually related neurotic and physiological ailments such as hysteria. By Freud's own account, the operation had disastrous effects: the patient nearly bled to death because of bone chips and a meter of gauze left in her nose after the operation. As late as 1920, Freud would consider an overidectomy as a potential therapy for one of his patient's homosexuality and the hysteria Freud associated with it (XVIII 172) Whether neurological or uterine/sexual, there are clear connections between ''hysteria,'' the female malady, aberrant forms of femininity, proper forms of femininity, feminine sexuality, patriarchal insecurity, and the violence to which this insecurity led. Hysteria and Hysterization Differentiating my conception of hysteria from Foucault's ''hysterization of women's bodies'' (Fou78 104)-one of his ''four great strategic unities which, beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex'' (Fou78103)-will help to expand my own treatment of the questions of hysteria I have raised here. According to Joan Matlock, author of Scenes of Seduction: Prostitution, Hysteria, and Reading Difference in Nineteenth-Century France, hysteria ''is far less the diagnostic name for a set symptoms than a category for perceptions'': While doctors with radically different views reported similar phenomena-paralyses, fainting, coughing fits, convulsions,

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58 impressionability, and hypersensitivity to physical and emotional stimulation-the range of symptoms for this disorder [sic] was so great that some doctors refused to categorize it at all except as an exacerbation of whatever made women different from men. (3) Except for Matlock's unproblematized assumption that hysteria is a ''disorder,'' so far so good. Matlock continues by incorporating her reading of Foucault: Wh~t Foucault called the hysterization of women's bodies was achieved in the nineteenth century by differentiating orderly bodies from those perceived as disorderly. The hysteric and the prostitute provided opposite models against which an orderly body could be measuredthe one tormented by desires welling up from the inside, the other transformed into a holding tank for desires that might contaminate society from the outside. (4) What Foucault called the hysterization of those bodies called female, however, was not achieved through any differentiation among these bodies. On the contrary, his anti-essentialist take on hysteria and sexuality posits the hysterization of those bodies called female as a ''strategy'' of ''the deployment of sexuality,'' and, according to Foucault, it would not have excluded any ''women'' from the category of the potentially threatening to the hegemonic patriarchal order: all ''women'' were deemed ''thoroughly saturated with sexuality'' (Fou78 104), therefore they were all disorderly, and this disorderliness was used as an alibi for policing by being ''integrated into the sphere of medical practices, by reason of a pathology intrinsic to'' sexuality (ibid.). In other words, hysterization allowed for the policing of all women, but Foucault does not address the differentiation between proper women and hysterics in the first volume of the

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59 History of Sexuality. Lacan' s conception of hysteria can be seen as an example of Foucault's hysterization since Lacan's ''hysteric'' cannot be differentiated from his ''woman." Besides the anti-essentialism of Foucault's take on the hysterization of women, another strength of his formulation is the imbrication of women and madness with respect to sexuality, which seems to have been the source of Elaine Showalter' s notion of ''the female malady'' in her book by that name, despite the critique of Foucault we find there: Although anyone who writes about the history of madness must owe an intellectual debt to Michel Foucault, his critique of institutional power in Madness and Civilization (1961) does not take account of sexual difference. (6) Foucault's notion of the hysterization of women's bodies, published seven years before The Female Malady, does take into consideration something akin to what Showalter calls ''the pervasive cultural association of women and madness'' (4)-that is, how being designated female equals suspicion of being laden with a malady, since the female is defined as being saturated with supposedly pathogenic sexuality. Where Showalter truly differs from Foucault-.and what seems to be the source of her misunderstanding of Foucault's anti essentialism-is her acceptance of hysteria as a disease, and her other essentialist notions concerning ''the feminine'': While he exposed the repressive ideologies that lay behind the refor1n of the asylum, Foucault did not explore the possibility that the irrationality and difference the asylum silenced and confined is also the feminine. (6)

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In other words, Showalter does not acknowledge that such an essentialist exploration in relation to an a priori feminine is contrary to the anti-essentialist thrust of Foucault's work, and, accordingly, she does not problematize her essentialist notion of hysteria. 60 Where I differ with Foucault begins with his tendency toward a monolithic conception of power. According to Lois McNay, author of Feminism and Foucault, What Foucault's account of power does not explain is how, even within the intensified process of the hysterization of female bodies, women did not slip easily and passively into socially prescribed feminine roles. (41) Accordingly, Foucault's first volume of The Hi s tory of Sexuality argues against the psychoanalytic idea of repression. Repression and resistance, which Freud and Derrida argue are two sides of the same coin, fall away when power is monolithic: without something otherwise to the discursive constructs that make up the ego and other institutions of power, what is there to repress or resist? Where or how do the discursive constructs and what is otherwise to them meet without the aporetic ''logic' of what Barratt calls the ''in but not of'' (Bar93 133) relation of the ''otherwise other'' to the ''I-now-is'' (Bar93 passim)? When Foucault does posit an Other, it is either completely passive as with the silence of madness in Madness and Civilization-or it betrays his anti-essentialist creed, as with the notions of ''plebs," ''s ubjugated knowledges," and ''disqualified knowledges'' in his later work. Whereas all authors who write about some form of what is totally other, or ''the Other," struggle to avoid the reduction of this ''subject'' to the more of the Same as Derrida argues in his analysis of Levinas

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61 in ''Violence and Metaphysics''-Foucault is a special case since he is one theorist who seems to understand such struggles and their significance for example, when he writes that madness is ''the absence of the work'' (qtd. in Der78 43) in reference to Madness and Civilization. Unfortunately, he sometimes passes over these difficulties as he posits the Other as the simple opposite of the Same (Madness and Reason in Madness and Civilization), or ontologizes and essentializes the Other (plebs, Madness), or makes it an a priori in the form of the Same (disqualified and subjugated knowledges). The passivity that characterizes some of the conceptions of a non reductive encounter with what is Otherfor example, the silence of Madness-accounts for neither the instability of the Same, nor the necessary exclusion of what is Other (repression and resistance) that allows for the establishment of the Same and its logic. In other words, Foucault does not account for the role the Other plays in the ''acts of establishment'' (Bar93 12) that constitute the Same, and how the Other is ''in but not of'' the Sarne. The energetics of Foucault's discursive power, what he calls ''biopower'' in his later theorizing, is all on the side of the Same: the power of the Same determines the modes of the ''bio," as with the hysterization of women's bodies. Foucault seems to have been unable to conceptualize a type of power, what might be called an otherwise energetics (that is, an otherwise ''energetics'' under erasure), which is ''of'' the Other yet constitutive of, or ''in," the Same (that is, ''in but not of' the same). According to Fouca ul t, Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be

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62 given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power. (Fou78 105-6) With this monolithic ''deployment of sexuality," repression of the Other that allows for an ''act of establishment'' of the Same would not be needed since it is a totality of the Same Derrida refers to Foucault's use of ''The Decision'' for Foucault's separating of ''sexuality'' and the energetics of discursive power (Der78 38). Is this evidence of a certain avoidance by Foucualt of the problem of the relationship between language and what makes it unstable, what it represses and resists? Derrida asks how Foucault could write about madness as an Other within a history of reason I would add: whence the madness with respect to such a monolithic power of reason? Foucault gestures toward letting madness speak for itself, which is a gesture towards writing ethically in the Levinasian sense. Ethics, in this sense, seems to preclude ''The Decision," a distinct delimitation between the Other and the Same, which would be different than Barratt's ''in but not of'' and Derrida's ''dissension'' where ''the exterior (is) the interior, is the fission that produces and divides it along the lines of the Hegelian Entzweiung'' (Der78 38-39). Feminism an~ the Hysteric Foucault's concept of hysterization theorizes a pathologizing of all women's bodies, employed to justify all policing, but it does not account for the

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63 use of the diagnosis as a means of appropriation or reappropriation of the disorderly bodies labeled as hysterics. The difference between the normal female body and the hysterical one, in a pseudo-Foucauldian sense, might be construed as the difference between the always potentially disruptive body (in need of policing) and the actually disruptive body (in need of a type of incarceration, a diagnosis as incarceration). It would be ''pseudo'' because Foucault did not theorize anything beyond the body as a discursive for1nation: nothing to repress, and nothing otherwise to the power that might create a dissension within discursvity. Furthermore, Foucault's hysterization does not account for the difference between the normal and hysterical positions of ''woman'' within patriarchies that used the diagnosis of hysteria, and it does not account for the deployment of ''hysteria'' as a reappropriative measure. As with Lacan's hysteric, Foucauldian ''hysterized body'' is synonymous with ''female body." Whatever created the di ssension within the strictures of proper womanhood, or within the hysterized body, would have been radically other to the identitarian logics of these discursive for1nations, and therefore would have been threatening to the stability of these logics and the powers of the patriarchies in question. To call this source of dissension !'hysteria," however, would reduce what is radically otherwise to that logic, to make it recognizable and therefore masterable within that logic and its possible bodily positions. ''Hysteria'' marks what is otherwise to a particular phallic order, while providing one of many feminine positions within that order, and a mode of defense against what is radically other to that order. In all cases ''hysteria'' is a reappropriative tool of these orders. The hysteric as proto-feminist "Yould be oxymoronic if hysteria is understood only as a patriarchal tool of appropriation, and if feminism is

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64 understood as being about problematizing, if not disrupting or destroying, traditional positions which would be in the service of patriarchy. Dianne Hunter's assertion that ''feminism is transformed hysteria, or more precisely, that hysteria is feminism lacking a social network in the outer world'' (Hun83 68) would thus seem to be contrary to my position, as Hunter's position seems to associate hysteria with what is otherwise to the patriarchy, rather than with patriarchy's appropriation or totalization processes, its identitarian or (op)positional logics of the Same. Some feminisms might aspire for feminism to be the transformation of the disruption of whatever it is that creates Derrida's ''dissension," and by definition this (non)source or source would lack a social network. Again, to call this disruption ''hysteria'' is to risk legitimizing the patriarchal tool that associates any deviation from proper womanhood with an essentialist notion of a diseased womb even if ''hysteria'' is used in a way that attempts to destabilize what is proper by ''reappropriating'' "hysteria.'' Derrida might argue that both ''hysteria'' and feminism are both part of a phallogocentric social network We might ask, how much is the phallogocentrism of ''hysteria'' linked to the phallogocentrism of feminism? The larger question becomes how much is feminism invested in the ''social network of the outer world,'' its logic of the Same, its essentialism, and its use of ''hysteria." Limiting the scope of my inquiry, I want to focus on the problematic relation of certain feminisms to essentialist conceptions of hysteria. These conceptions might be seen as the lure of phallogocentrism for these feminisms . As I stated above, Derrida reduces feminism to a phallogocentric discourse, and feminisms' inability to give up essentialist conceptions of hysteria seem to be evidence supporting Derrida's reduction. Yet Derrida's reduction of feminism to

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phallogocentrism is just that, a reduction. It assumes that, like logocentrism, phallocentrism is inescapable, thus all logocetrism would be phallogocentrism. In Spurs, Derrida writes probably his most infamous lines for feminists: 65 And in truth, they too are men, those women feminists so derided by Nietzsche. Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man. And in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays claim-just as much claim as he-to truth, science and objectivity in all their castrated delusions of virility. Feminism too seeks to castrate. It wants a castrated woman. Gone the style. (Der79 62-65) Derrida assumes that all feminists assume only two positions available to bodies: male or female. Most feminists do just this, particularly psychoanalytic feminists, who seem to be the most invested in this fundamental aspect of phallogocentrism. In Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme, however, Diane Elam writes, If feminism is merely a form of phallogocentrism, then Derrida, however much he gestures at historical necessity, would be equating all of feminism with a teleological search for the essence of woman. Thus, he would be reducing all feminisms to one and the same feminism. Lost the style, for Derrida as well. (16-17) Derrida also reduces all male/ female binaries to its phallogocentric form: presence/ absence of the penis-phallus by assuming that all searches for truth or logocentrism are necessarily phallogocentrism. Since Derrida wrote Spurs in 1978, many feminists have attempted to theorize bodies, genders, and sexualities beyond the limitations of phallogocentrism and its male/female. For me the

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66 question remains open whether logocentrism, which seems to be inescapable for theory, is necessarily phallocentric. Logocentrism seems inescapable for any theory of bodily or sexual positioning. But why would phallocentrism be inescapable? What seems to be at stake here is the relationship between the traditional binary of sexual difference, male/female, and the traditional binaries of presence/absence. Which is primary? Is logocentrism, the metaphysics of presence, always phallogocentrism? Can we have logocentrism without phallocentrism? I return to this question in the concluding chapter. Hom(m)osexual Pornographies and the Perfortning Hysteric The hysteric as an individual seems to disappear, not only with Foucault's hysterization, but also with the reduction of hysteria to a reappropriative discursive strategy of patriarchy. The potential drawback of this disappearance is that certain feminists portray the hysteric as a potential revolutionary figure, or as a proto-feminist and resister to the misogynistic violence of patriarchy. Though I argue that the feminist-hysteric is oxymoronic given the way I define hysteria, the hysteric as an individual does not necessarily fall away: there were individuals, mostly women, who performed a masquerade of hysteria a la the supposedly anti-essentialist line of theory that grew out of feminist readings of Joan Riviere's 1929 essay, ''Womanliness as a Masquerade." I write ''supposedly'' because this line of theory has become essentially an extension of Lacanian theory, which, as I have argued, following Derrida, is ultimately essentialist with its phallogocentrism. Can the performance of the so-called ''hysteric'' legitimate the use of ''hysteric'' within an anti-essentialist argument that attempts to problematize traditional uses of ''hysteria''?

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67 To address this question I turn to Catherine Clement's and Helene Cixous' The Newly Born Woman. It follows from my conceptualization of ''hysteria'' as being a patriarchal tool that I would feel more kinship with Clement's position than with Helene Cixous' in the part of their ''Exchange'' dealing with conceptualizing ''the hysteric'' as an individual: H: ... Dora seemed to me the one who resists the system .... And this girl-like all hysterics, deprived of the possibility of saying directly what she perceived ... still had the strength to make it known It is the nuclear example of women's power to protest. It happened in 1899; it happens today wherever women have not been able to speak differently from Dora, but have spoken so effectively that it bursts the family into pieces .... The hysteric is, to my eyes, the typical woman in all her force .... C: .. but when you say ''that bursts the family into pieces," no. It mimics, it metaphorizes destruction, but the family reconstitutes itself around it .... The analysis I make of hysteria comes through my reflection on the place of deviants who are not hysterics but clowns, charla tans, crazies, all sorts of odd people. They all occupy challenging positions foreseen by the social bodies, challenging functions within the scope of all cultures. That doesn't change the structures, however. On the contrary, it makes them more comfortable .. In that position, they are part of one of the deepest reinforcements of the superstructure, of the Symbolic. (154-55). Clement seems to struggle in her exchange with Cixous because she accepts that the hysteric as an individual and hysteria as a reified disease entity, rather than

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68 focus her attention on how the name-game of the diagnosis hysteria, the discursive construction of hysteria, is what reinforces what she calls ''the Symbolic''-''the Symbolic'' as what this name game might call itself, under the spell of an ''Imaginary'' and structuralist delusion, since language cannot be ''anchored'' in order to justify the capital ''S." Cixous seems to privilege the disruptive alterity of what ''hysteria'' tries to name and master, but then errs, like Clement, by reifying ''hysteria." This reification follows, as with Lacan, from the assumption of a ''Symbolic'' and the ''certain linguistics'' that is connected to this assumption. Cixous also disregards those individuals deemed hysterics who perfom1ed in a way that colluded with the patriarchy in question, and whose perforn1ance was therefore antithetical to any disruptive force that might be construed as feminist This patriarchy-friendly version of the hysteric, who I call the perfortning hysteric, seems to be the version of the hysteric Clement privileges in her theorizations. The performing hysteric would hardly be considered a protofeminist. With respect to Cl e ment's position, I am hesitant to criticize her essentialist and unproblematized use of ''hysteric'' since her privileged version of the hysteric, it might be argued, exists as much as any body who performs an identity exists. The performing hysteric would be an hysteric whose positionality is in collaboration with the patriarchy in question, and with its appropriative categories or roles for women. Calling this positionality an ''hysteric'' does not betray some disruptive force as I have argued the figure of the hysteric as proto-feminist potentially would do. Clement's use of the word ''hysteric'' risks essentialism. and, again, this essentialism seems to be the crux of her struggle in the exchange but her argument is still powerful since she

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69 relates the hysteric to those deviants who are ''the deepest reinforcements of the superstructure.'' The potential essentialism of her argument is undermined by her focus on the hysteric as performing a patriarchal function, since essentialism and performance are potentially at odds. Showalter's description of a fifteen-year-old patient in Charcot's Salpetriere named Augustine provides an almost archetypal illustration of the performing hysteric: Intelligent, coquettish, and eager to please, Augustine was an apt pupil of the atelier. All of her poses suggest the exaggerated gestures of the French classical style, or stills from silent movies. Some photographs of Augustine with flowing locks and white hospital gown also seem to imitate poses in nineteenth-century paintings.... Among her gifts was her ability to time and divide her hysterical performances into scenes, acts, tableaux, and intermissions, to perform on cue and on sch edule with the click of the camera (153-54) Actually, the cameras of that time didn't click: the lenses were held open and the subjects would have to hold their poses for fifteen seconds or so, which would have been exceedingly demanding during what would have been the expected stages of the hysterical attack. Showalter explains that in ''Charcot's own lifetime, one of his assistants admitted that some of the women had been coached in order to produce attacks that would please the maftre," which confirmed suspicions that the hysterics' performances were ''the result of suggestion, imitation, or even fraud'' (150).

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70 I would add that these performances were also the result of a strong unconscious desire of the performing hysteric to be something, some-body recognized by the patriarchy after ''the cult of true womanhood'' became in some way untenable. That Augustine reported being raped by her mother's lover suggests that Augustine was probably seeking a safe role she could play that would be recognized and appreciated by the patriarchy. Her masquerade would then be similar to the masquerade in Riviere's essay, where the woman puts on a mask to avert the violence of the patriarchy. What was masked here, however, was not the essentialist masculinity of Riviere's essay, and what was feared here was not the ''reprisals'' of the patriarchy that discovered a female possessing this masculinity. What was masked was a radical alterity no longer able to transform and channel its otherwise energetics into the structures of ''the cult of true womanhood'' since this cult had become too dangerous and therefore untenable. What was feared was the abyss of not having a mode of channeling and transforming this otherwise energetics that would have been recognizable to others, and therefore unable to support an object relating ego. To the identitarian ego, constantly re-establishing itself in the ''face to face'' with this abyss, the radical alterity of falling into the abyss, of being ''uniterable''-that is, of not ''being''-would be the ultimate horror. Therefore the pleasure of the perfor1ning hysteric would be the eschewal of the pain of this abyss: a certain unpleasure principle. The structures of the hysteric might have provided Augustine a temporary asylum, so to speak, from this horrific abyss. The maftre' s pleasure would assure her recognition as an hysteric. The female body in this scenario is mastered by the patriarch in question and by performing for his pleasure; the

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71 patriarch is displaying his scientific (mental) mastery by solving a riddle of female sexuality gone awry, as Freud would do later. The hierarchies of hysteria-mind/body, reason/madness, and male/female are re-established by her perf~rmance, whence the pleasure of the male, and of the perfor1ning hysteric, who now has an identity and a body where otherwise energetics are channeled by /into that identity. Within the Salpetriere, the male maftre displays that mastery among a forum of voyeuristic ''subjects,'' most of them identified as male, and within a hom(m)osexual economy of scientific-sexual pleasures-what Barratt would associate with the patriarchal ''phenomenology of fucking," a violent and phallic way of knowing what is deemed feminine nature via the penetration of feminine mysteries (Bar93 150). I also see here a parallel between the hysteric's position among the male physicians of the Salpetriere and the position of the female porn star with respect to the men involved with pomography-iconsumers and producers. According to Stephen Heath, ... pornography is a relation between men, nothing to do with a relation to women except by a process of phallic conversion that sets them as terms of male exchange. (Hea87 2) The hysteric mastered would have been the colonized ''dark continent'' of science, the discovery of the caput Nili. Though formerly a ''sexual threat'' to the male's sense of mastery an d the limits of the domain of that mastery, the hysteric would be domesticated via ''the phenomenology of fucking," often violently brought back into what Derrida calls the oikos. The Salpetriere and its performing hysterics, who were coached to please the voyeuristic crowds, suggest a possible parallel between the prostitute and the hysteric: both provide ever-ready

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72 supports for a pornographic economy for the channeling of otherwise energetics into the ''patrix'' of a hom(m)osexually-reproductive patriarchy. The hom(m)osexual pornographies of hysteria was not limited to the Salpetriere, as evidenced by Chrobak' s recorrunendation to Freud for the patient he sent him-''penis normalis dosim repetatur'' (Gay 92)--which can be read in a new light along the lines of the themes introduced above: the patients passed between the physicians can be interpreted as the products of a ''phallic conversion that sets them as ter1ns of male exchange." Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, author of Disorderly Conduct: Vi s ions of Gender in Victorian America, was a pioneer of hysteria studies in that she treated the doctor-hysteric relationship as sexual. She points out how the physician legitimized the hysteric, and how he was often the replacement of the husband as the woman in question went from the typical domestic relationship structures of the home to those of the doctor(s)-hysteric of the clinic, hospital, or doctor's office (209) Though many had theorized the hysteric's role in this relationship as sexual Smith-Rosenberg also recognizes the potential sexuality of the doctor's role: In a number of cases, the physician could have played the role of Oedipal father figure to the patient's child-woman role, and in such instances his complicity [with the hysteric's disruption of the family] was not only moral and intellectual but sexual as well. These doctors had become part of a domestic triangle a husband's rival, the fatherly attendant of a daughter. (209) Smith-Rosenberg is also suggestive regarding the sexuality of the supposed cure: ''Her cure demonstrated that he had mastered her will and body'' (211). Smith Rosenberg's analysis, however, suffers from understatement. What is missing

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73 from it is the sexuality or even the pornographies of this mastery-how the cure was often the climax of a scientific ''phenomenology of fucking.'' In 1888, Freud most likely wrote the following in a contribution to Villaret' s encyclopaedia entitled ''Hysteria'' (the contribution was unsigned but mentioned in Freud's letters): '1n the face of no other illness can the physician perform such miracles or remain so impotent'' (I 53). Switching Freud's causation w~ere the potency provided the miracle cure, I would argue that the cure provided the miracles of potency. There is one potential disruption to my perhaps too-neat demarcation between performing hysterics and the disorderly bodies that resist the diagnosis of hysteria, and therefore the reappropriative name-game of patriarchy: the protean symptomatology of hysteria that would frustrate physicians. This frustration was one source of the violence of physicians mentioned above, and would be contrary to the physicians' pleasure, which equaled recognition. I interpret protean symptomatology as a potential aspect of the sexualized and unstable relationship between the performing hysteric and the physician, and as a way of the perforr11ing hysteric to have some control over that relationship. I see at least three possibilities for reasons why this relationship is unstable. First, the doctor could not tolerate his own sexuality corning to consciousness in a recognizable, non-scientific form. This might have been the case with Brueur's treatment of Bertha Pappenheim (Anna 0.), though this can only be speculation (see Api92 83). It certainly was the case often with Freud. Second, in overly simplistic terms, the position of hysteric was probably inadequate for the task of channeling what I am calling under erasure ''otherwise energetics.'' Third, and I believe most significantly, the physician would lose

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interest in the mastered hysteric once mastered, like the Don Juan who loses interest in a conquest after he is sexually satisfied. Protean symptomatology would be a vehicle for allowing the physician a miracle or two, while not allowing him to reach the final satisfaction that would threaten the performing hysteric with his departure. 74 Freud's comment in an 1895 letter to Wilhelm Fliess reveals his awareness of the sexualization of the doctor-patient relationship: ''There are two kinds of women patients: one kind who are loyal to their doctors as to their husbands, the other kind who change their doctors as often as their lovers'' (FF 110). He would, however, consistently deny his own investment in this sexualized structure. An illustration of my argument with respect to the protean symptoms of a perfor1ning hysteric and the role this type of symptomatology plays in the sexualized doctor-patient relationship would be Freud's first extensive case study of Fanny Moser as presented in Studies on Hysteria as the case of Emmy von N. According to Appignanesi and Forrester, authors of Freud's Women, Fanny Moser was the latter type of patient: changing her doctors and lovers with regularity. Freud seemed to sh are this opinion of her when in 1895 he looked back at the case that spanned about three years starting in 1889. During the case, however, Appignanesi and Forrester show that Freud sees her as the former, loyal kind of patient. Freud would secure his husband-like position with her by establishing that he had what Appignanesi and Forrester call ''exclusive hypnotic rights over her'' (97). Freud writes at the close of his description of the case: ... in the summer of 1893, I had a short note from [Fanny Moser] asking my permission for her to be hypnotized by another doctor,

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75 since she was ill again and could not come to Vienna. At first I did not understand why my permission was necessary, till I remembered that in 1890 I had, at her own request, protected her against being hypnotized by anyone else, so that there should be no danger of her being distressed by coming under the control of a doctor who was antipathetic to her, as had happened at -berg (-tal, wald). I accordingly renounced my exclusive prerogative in writing. (II 85) Appignanesi and Forrester also show that Freud is aware of ''how much the power of suggestion [in hypnosis] places him in the role of an ex-lover'' (97): It may be remarked, by the way, that, outside hypnosis and in real life, credulity such as the subject has in relation to his hypnotist is shown only by a child towards his beloved parents, and that an attitude of similar subjection on the part of one person towards another has only one parallel, though a complete one namely in certain love-relationships where there is extreme devotion. A combination of exclusive attachment and credulous obedience is in general among the characteristics of love. (VII 296) Freud would play the authoritative master to Frau Moser's subservient slave, who would give him exclusive reign in the netherworlds of her psychological interior. ~e even isolated her from her daughters, who seemed to him to pose a threat to the doctor-patient bond. Freud, in relation to other doctors-suitors, jealously guards his exclusive rights to his patient and attempts to secure her loyalty. His hypnotic mastery and competitiveness with other doctors would

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76 combine, according to Appignanesi and Forrester, as Freud would use his power as hypnotist to perfor1n tricks on Frau Moser ''to demonstrate the stupidity, cruder hypnotic skills and less amicable effectiveness of the other doctors who had tended to Fanny'' (96)-at Frau Moser's expense. According to Appignanesi and Forrester, Frau Moser cooperated with Freud with respect to attaining exclusive rights over her and with respect to isolating her from her family, a plan which she agreed to, according to Freud, ''without raising the slightest objection'' (Il 50): Fanny's body collaborated in F:reud's plan of isolating her so that only he had influence over her, in particular by erupting in a flurry of symptoms whenever the resident house-physician entered her room. (Api92 94) Freud's initial treatment met with some successes, but Frau Moser's symptoms returned after she left his care and returned to her home in Switzerland. During the second phase of treatment Freud had to deal with a new and initially recalcitrant symptom: anorexia. His treatment was based on Frau Moser's valuing their relationship more than this relatively dangerous symptom, and, like much of this case, had little to do with Freud's future methodologies: Freud put their future relationship on the line: he threatened to leave if she did not accept within twenty-four hours that it was her fear, rather than her constitution, which made it impossible for her to eat and drink normally. Give up your symptom, or give up your masterly doctor! (95)

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77 When Frau Moser wanted Freud to visit her, rather than her usual visit to Vienna, she produced another new symptom: a phobia of trains (a case of mimicking her doctor). Frau Moser would use her polysymptornatology to keep Freud near her in three ways: first, by intensifying her symptoms when other doctors would attempt to treat her while she was initially isolated from her family; second, by giving him small ''miracles," enough to keep him interested and feeling like a man; and third, by corning up with new symptoms when she either wanted him near or wanted to renew the treatment-and even when she wanted to check his cock-assuredness or to st age a protest. Freud would not only deny his sexual investment in the relationship, but hers too. He saw the source of her neurosis as abstinence even though, as Appignanesi and Forrester, put it: ''People in the neighborhood remember e d her particularly for her erotic extravagan~e'' (98). The eroticism, sexuality, and pornographies of ''hysteria'' bring together two themes I explore throughout this chapter and particularly in the fifth chapter on ''The 'Uncanny''': th e r e lation s hip of questions of ''sexuality'' to questions of positionality, or, as is almost invariably the case with Freud, (op)positionality. Returning to Matlock and the relation of the positions of the hysteric and the prostitute to the position of proper womanhood, Matlock argues that The hysteric and the prostitute provided opposite models against which an orderiy body could be measured-the one tormented by desires welling up from the inside, the other transfor1ned into a holding tank for desires that might contaminate society from the outside. ( 4)

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78 Yet neither the hysteric nor the prostitute would constitute a disorderly body in the terms I am trying to establish here: both are integral parts of the phallocratic deployment of power in relation to what has been deemed feminine. They would have provided the boundaries of the ''cult of true womanhood'': an (op)positionality within ''womanhood." The difference between the prostitute and the performing hysteric might be theorized as follows: the prostitute is not associated with any Other that might threaten the stability of the same, whereas the performing hysteric would be associated with those ''bodies'' resistant to any of these established forms of womanhood. The performing hysteric, the site of scientific ''miracles'' in a context of hom(m)osexual pornographies, would thus be associated with a potentially castrating form of ''sexuality'' or ''bodiliness," the site of ''impotence." But both forms of womanhood are used as boundaries of proper womanhood in terms of sexual positioning, and both forms are subject to the violence associated with the potential disruptions of ''sexuality," and particularly of the ''sexuality'' of ''woman." Mor~over, both forms of womanhood can be theorized as integral parts of a hom(m)osexual pornographic economy. Hysteria and the hysteric, like Foucault's ''hysterization," should be associated with the appropriation or totalization processes fueled by the identitarian energetics of phallocracies -what Derrida calls ''the drive of the proper," which I discuss below-rather than with the Other and its otherwise energetics, which would be ''in but not of'' identitarian energetics. Unlike Foucault's ''hysterization,'' however, hysteria and the hysteric should be understood with respect to processes of repression and resistance, where these and other identities are established via repression of/resistance to that which is otherwise.

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79 Psychoanalysis/Hysteria In 1977, Lacan mourned the loss of traditional hysterics: 'Where have they gone, the hysterics of the past, these marvelous women-the Anna O's, the Doras ... (qtd. in Nas971). Juan-David Nasio, opening his book on Lacan and hysteria, Hysteria: the Splendid Child of Psychoanalysis, with this quotation from Lacan above, adds to it: '' ... all those women who provided the womb from which psychoanalysis was born'' (1). Is psychoanalysis the splendid child of hysteria? Or is it a monstrous offspring of a diseased womb? Did psychoanalysis explain and cure hysteria? Did it master hysteria? Supposedly psychoanalysis is the child of a diseased womb that it cures through its conception and birth. According to the orthodox origin myth, psychoanalysis itself is born through the cure psychoanalysis provides for hysteria. But how can it be both provider of the cure and born of the cure? Is this a form of self-posting? Freud's cure filled the gaps he supposedly discovered in the personal narratives of the patients he diagnosed as hysterics. At first this filler was theorized as the repressed memory of the (father's) phallus, and then later as the repressed fantasy of possessing that phallus: castration, penis-envy, and refusing to give up masculine sexuality. Freud thus positions psychoanalysis and himself as the phallic father of the cure, what restores health to the diseased womb: a ''penis-child'' (Freud) as ''anchoring point'' (Lacan) for the wandering womb similar to the one described by Plato in the Timaeus. Just as Freud identified with both his grandson and as grandfather in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, psychoanalysis is both father and child of this process: woman as hysteric disappears as ''she'' becomes a conduit for this androcentric economy. With Freud's grandson, ''fort'' was associated

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80 with the absent or bad mother (hysteric), and 'da'' was associated with the present or good mother (cured hysteric). The origin myth of psychoanalysis can therefore be read as a similar fort/da game where the hysteric (fort) is cured (da) and baby and theorist (psychoanalysis and Freud) is master. Psychoanalysis arrives at its destination-but it arrives, it returns, at the origin. The logocentric repression of self-posting reveals the uncanny remains of a ghostly inheritance due to the necessity of dispatching the self to the self in this postal relay, and the necessary impropriety of this relay's proper, and its (non)origin. These are the destabilizing, anti-identitarian (anti-self) remains of the original repetition, essential division, and the logic of dissemination of what Derrida calls iterability, a concept to which I will return in the concluding chapter. This particular self-po s ting of the fort / da game with hysteria and the origin myth of psychoanalysis is one of masculine positioning that both uses the mother-woman-hysteric as simple other and denies her significance in the game by establishing a father-son identity: an (op)positionality of mastery and disavowal. Since self-posting ''acts out'' the impropriety of the proper-mise en abyme where, according to Derrida, the ''proper is not the proper, and if it appropriates itself it is that it disappropriates itself-properly, improperly'' (Der87 357) it is unstable and requires repetitive ''acts of establishment'' (Barratt), an inter1ninable play. The self or identity establishing itself simultaneously (in a mode of disavowal) against the (op)positions of ''woman'' in abject form (absent mother, hysteric, fort!) and then in proper for1n (present mother, cured hysteric, da!) can be seen as two of three acts in the ''triple (self-)deception'' of the ''actual phallic function.' The ''actual phallic function'' is another way of theorizing Derrida's

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81 conception of phallogocentrism and Freud's unconscious inasmuch as it is phallogocentric: presence is established by reducing the Other to absence, binary difference is effaced by erecting one term (the phallus) to identify difference, the binary becomes a hierarchy, woman is abjected and disavowed, the One or phallic presence is established and secured by transforming what is radically other to the One into a ''specific'' absence, this specific absence is put at the center of this Negative Concord (Kermode), and these processes are naturalized via the repression of all repressions and of all that remains. With respect to psychoanalysi s proper, man/woman is in the for111 of male/female sexuality and masculinity/ femininity, and the magical terr11 of difference-into-identity is castration. Castration had not been established as the oikos when Freud was transitioning from his more memory-based theories focused on hyst e ria to his ~ore fantasy-based psychoanalysis proper. The trajectory of Freudian theory from this transition to his final work should be seen as a movement away from the un s table self-posting of psychoanalysis/hysteria to the more stable ground of '' c astration-truth ' and its general theories of subjectivity-masterplots of being metapsychologies.-rather than etiologies of neurosis. One enigma of ''hyst e ria studies'' is the supposed disappearance of hysteria during the beginning of the twentieth century. Regardless if this disappearance should be theorized in terms of changing diagnostics and nosology, or if it should be theorized in terms of a change in the patriarchal orders' relations to women and madness, hysteria was no longer in the limelight after The Interpr e tation of Dream s. Judging from his own writings, even Freud's interest in the topic waned after 1897: Fr e ud saw the Dora case more as an extension of his ''dream book ' than as a proof of a new, psychoanalytic etiology

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82 of hysteria. Freud's two psychoanalytic case studies of hysteria, Dora (1905) and ''Psychogenesis'' (1920), were both fragments of case studies. Between the two cases Freud wrote only sporadically about hysteria (see especially his works form 1905, 1908, 1915, 1927, and 1933). Freud's and the psychiatric community's waning interest in hysteria -that is, the theorization and diagnosis of this supposed psychological illness would mean that the cure of hysteria could not provide a stable foundation for the claims of psychoanalysis to being a revolutionary science. But this waning is not the only reason hysteria was an unstable foundation for psychoanalysis Psychoanalysis/hysteria is also unstable because it lacks a magical term of difference-into-identity and simply because it was based on curing the so-called hysterics' symptoms. Much of what is groundbreaking about psychoanalysis relates to the absence of this diff e rence-into-identity term. During the early years of psychoanalysis proper the primary process, the pleasure principle, and the navel of the dream had yet to be reduced to a logic of the Sarne via phylogenetics and castration Though Freud showed leanings towards a Symbolic based on castration during this time, he was also able to leave he even insisted on leaving-something fundamental as ambiguous, such as the navel of the dream. Cure was always an unreliable proof for the efficacy of psychoanalysis and therefore an unstable foundation. For example, the Wolf Man haunted Freud: for all of Freud's life and well into the 1970s, the Wolf Man's symptoms continued and at times got worse, arid, for years after Freud published his case study, the Wolf Man was easily found in Vienna: a ghostly remains during the ascendancy of psychoanalysis to international stature. ''Analysis Ter1ninable and Interminable," with its pessimism regarding the efficacy of the psychoanalytic

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83 cure, can be read as Freud privileging the truth of his metapsychology over his technique and separating this tru~h from cure. For Freud to make such an argument, such a rhetorical move, Freud would have to once again flip-flop from what I argue in chapter four is his flip-flopped position in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety regarding the ego's relative strength in relation to the id: in ''Analysis Ter111inable and Interminable," cure cannot be counted on since the id is recalcitrant, and its strength in relation to the ego is, once again, theorized as being great. The scientific status of psychoanalysis also depends on the efficacy of a particular analysis: Freud's own self-analysis. Freud and psychoanalysis seem to have a relationship to cure based on the logic of disavowal and fetishism: cure is both crucial (origin myth) and insignificant (as argued in '' Analysis Terminable and Interminable'') Given that metaphorically cure is often theorized in terms of filling gaps with phallocentric etiologies and/ or fantasies in terms of the phallus both being and not being in its proper place I see psychoanalysis as, if not fetishistic, since the concept of fetish is phallocentric, then very much dependent on the defense of disavowal The phallus is not in its place (hysteria, fort!), and yet it is (cure, da!). What is significant for us here is that, according to psychoanalytic orthodox myth of origin, Freud cures himself of his own hysteria. Charles Bernheimer writes in his introduction to In Dora's Case: Freud-Hysteria Feminism: Fred invented psychoanalysis between 1895 and 1900 on the basis of his clinical experience with hysterical patients, nearly all of them women, and of the self-analysis he performed to cure his own hysterical symptoms. Hysteria thus is implicated in psychoanalysis

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84 in the sense that the science enfolds the disease within it and is constituted simultaneously with this pathological interiority. Yet psychoanalysis contests this originary implication, insisting on its scientific authority and asserting mastery over hysteria as the illness of the other, typically of the feminine other. (1) Though Freud would consistently call his fe male patients with hysterical symptoms ''hysterics,'' he would not reduce himself to that category: he merely had hysterical symptoms, but would never consider himself an hysteric. Did Freud cure his own hysteria? What might this have been? What symptoms? According to Derrida, Freud's self-analysis was ''unterminated'' (Der87 305). But we do not need to appeal to Derrida's authority in order to problematize Bernheimer's orthodox assumption. What might a cure or a terminated analysis be? What would it have been in the last years of the nineteenth century, when Freud was conducting his self-analysis? What might a self-analysis be? How could it possibly work? Would there be transference and counter-transference? More importantly, what might hysteria be for a male? If it does not necessarily have to do with a diseased womb, why call it ''hysteria''? Was Freud's diagnosis of his neurosis as hysteria correct? According to which theory? Which etiology? Given that Freud's final theory of hysteria in ''Femininity'' (1933) is female specific,_the female's improper repression of her original masculinity and its clitoridal sexu ality-how might we with hindsight theorize Freud's diagnosis of whatever symptoms there were and his supposedly cured hysteria? Does Freud see his so-called hysteria as one of the two ''themes'' that ''give the analyst an unusual amount of trouble," as he writes in ''Analysis Ter1ninable and Interminable''? He defines this theme as the male's ''struggle against his passive

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85 or feminine attitude toward another male'' (XXIII 50), and again conflates, if not hysteria, than neurosis and homosexuality. The other theme from this passage, of course, is ''envy for the penis'' in the female. Given Freud's therapeutic pessimism in this late essay and given that a self-analysis would certainly be less reliable than a dyadic analysis, it seems that again the foundation of psychoanalysis is unstable inasmuch as it is based on the efficacy of Freud's self analysis and his cure of his so-called hysteria. A fuller version of the quotation of Derrida referred to above is worth mentioning here:'' ... how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an unter1ninated self-analysis, give to~ worldwide institution its birth?'' (ibid.). Freud's ''auto-bio-graphy'' (Der87 passim) seems to be the womb of psychoanalysis for Derrida. As with any self-posting, auto-bio-graphy is abyssal, but the womb of psychoanalysis is ''doubly so'' (if infinity could be doubled) since it is also constituted by an impossible self-analysis Among other problems with Bemheimer's passage above, 6 he seems to beg the question he raises about hysteria's supposed exteriority to psychoanalysis when he assumes that Freud cured himself through self-analysis: Freud as primal father whose genius (access to Truth) sets him beyond transferenc~ and therefore beyond the effects of his unconscious. Freud as the discoverer of the unconscious is assumed to be the 6 I wonder why Freud's work before 1895 would not be considered part of the invention of psychoanalysis, especially when much of his work with Breuer on hysterics was done then. The year 1900 fits popular and orthodox conceptions of the end of Freud's invention phase, but the Oedipus and castration complex were unformulated at that time, and the Dora case (among other cases that were even later) still shows signs of the ''seduction" theory, which the orthodox like to believe had been ''abandoned" to make way for psychoanalysis proper. Thus, ''psychoanalysis,'' if your definition would be centered on the relationship of repression and sexuality, was forming before 1895 (repression, defense) and was still largely unformed until 1908 (Oedipus and castration complex) What seems to be at stake here is (1) the notion that psychoanalysis has an essence, and (2) an orthodox reading of the origin of psychoanalysis centered on 1897 and Freud's supposed abandonment of the '' s educti o n" theory

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86 exception to the very basis of his supposed discovery, the supposed breakthrough-the relative weakness of the conscious ego in relation to the unconscious-due to the assumed power of his ego and its genius. Here ''hysteria'' becomes almost synonymous with ''the unconscious'' and/or ''sexuality," and Freud has basically cured himself of them: Wo Es war, soil Ich werden. The ''it'' is associated with the unreason of the body, as is the traditional hysteric. Below, especially in the section on Freud's ''The 'Uncanny,"' I try to connect this ''it'' with the figure of woman: what must be mastered by psychoanalysis. Indeed, with W o Es war Soll Ich werden we can replace the !ch/Es binary with any of the binaries of hysteria: mind/body, reason/unreason, sanity /madness, and, especially, male/female: Where body was, th e re shall mind be. Where unreason was, there shall reason be Where female was, there shall male be For the orthodox keepers of the flame Freud's '' cure''' cure'' being opposed to hysteria, ''cure'' as '' I ' unencumbered by ''it''-is a crucial aspect of the traditional origin myth to prot e ct from criticism: the objective rationality of the founder and, therefore, the scientific status of psychoanalysis depend on the success of Freud's self-analysis and cure of his hysterical symptoms. These symptoms are therefore an object, an ''it," within Freud's subjectivity, and his genius, therefore, constitutes some subjectivity untainted by hysteria, which allows for the subject-object split necessary to keep this self-analysis out of the abyss-to allow the subject, the '1," to become transcendent. The father of psychoanalysis, once cured-of his body, his irrationality, and, mostly, his femininity-is therefore the pure analyst-scientist cleansed of the irrationality

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87 associated with hysteria and able to give birth to his science. He is like the primal horde father: a father without a father, the analyst without an analyst. Freud positions himself as both primal father and first-generation son, a positioning Derrida plays with in ''To Speculate on 'Freud."' This primal father, beyond genealogy and an unconscious, is beyond a mother or woman in general. ''Psychic health, Freud discovered," Jonathan Lear argues in Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis, ''depends on abandoning the fantasy that one can be one's own child. This is as true within the realm of thought as it is within the family'' (3). But it does not seem to be true for the founder. Freud's mastery over hysteria, his own and others, is the basis for the separation of psychoanalysis from hyste~ia: psychoanalysis (the subject of reason and truth) is anterior to, separate from, the diseased, irrational, feminine, and unscientific object of hysteria (the object of irrationality and deception) From this separation and dominance, this abjection psychoanalysis secures for itself a position as a n e w and privileged way of knowing and understanding within the fold of reason, able to reach beyond reason and the mind and master madness, the body, and the feminine. With this origin myth the dualism of psychoanalysis/hysteria is established, and many related traditional dualisms are maintained: hysteria the disease, hysteria as feminine, bodily madness of the ''it''; psychoanalysis the science, a curative discourse of masculine reason and the ''I.'' Hysteria acts as the primary other to psychoanalysis, an extension and condensation of philosophy's other of woman, theology's other of the flesh, and psychiatry's other of madness. Neither psychoanalysis nor hysteria comes first: they both arrive at the same time as psychoanalysis/hysteria . Psychoanalysis

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88 established itself as (impossible) father-child of hysteria; it constructs hysteria as the (impossible) feminine other that is simultaneously the mastered woman mother-hysteric that gives birth and security, but also does not matter or even exist: fort/da. We should read the colon of Nasio's title, Hysteria: the Splendid Child of Psychoanalysis, as both an ''and'' and an ''as." With respect to origins, psychoanalysis/hysteria is undecidable. I interpret the loss Lacan is mourning above as the loss of the splendid or magical present-absent other against which psychoanalysis began to establish itself, the (op)positional other it first employed to reduce the effects of an encounter with the Other to more of the Sarne. In other words, hysteria as woman-body-irrationality is what psychoanalysis must create as an absence, a gap to be filled by its specific, phallic presence: man-mind-reason. According to this line of argument, Bemheimer does not acknowledge that, if hysteria is implicated in psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis would also have to be implicated in hysteria in order for both to be ''constituted simultaneously." Psychoanalysis constitutes its own hysteria as it constitutes itself. The proper must make the improper that is necessary to it into a circular detour that leads back to itself: fort/da. The Lacanian Hysteric's Essential Question of Lack Freud supposedly cures his own hysteria, what he and Lacan might later call his ''struggle against his passive or feminine attitude toward another male''-but the later Freud also theorizes female hysteria as not accepting a ''passive or feminine attitude toward another male," not accepting one's lack of a penis and instead envying the possession of one. Most Lacanians read Lacan's

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return to Freud as a corrective or clarification here: hysteria is connected to bisexuality, or, as Ragland-Sullivan puts it: Lacan translates Freud's find, the hysteric's sexual oscillation between women and men, into the quintessential question about gender, divided artificially by the e ffects of identification and language that constitute a sense of being in the fo1 of totalized gender concepts of male and female [see Lac 68]. The hysteric's gender question-''Am I a woman or a man?-links sexuality to identity: her discourse reveals the fundamental impossibility of 89 reducing identity to gender in the first place For Lacan, there is no signifier, symbol or archetype adequate to re-present the difference between the sexes (Lacan, 1975, p. 74 [Lac98 80]) (Wri92 163) But there is the lack of symbol adequate to transcendentally center the structure of language and the unconscious, which therefore makes the hysteric's question one of the essential lack. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, according to Derrida, ''[s]omething is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing from it'' (Der81 441): ''manque a sa place," which Bass translates as ''lack in its place, missing from its place'' (Der87 425). ''Manque a sa place'' is also a homophone of ''manque a sa place'': ''lack has its place ." Contrary to leading to any undecidability, indeterminacy, or division between sex and identity, ''lack in its place, missing from its place'' is the very foundation of ''castration-truth'' and a ''destinational linguistics." According to Derrida, ''lack does not have its place in dissemination'' (Der87 441).

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90 Lacan's status as theorist -whether his work is poststructuralist or postmodern (e.g Cop94) or the products of a potentially reactionary ontotheologist (e.g., Nan92)-js difficult to deter1nine. According to Derrida, In France, the ''literary criticism'' marked by psychoanalysis had not asked the question of the text .... It is entirely otherwise in the ''Seminar on The Purloined Letter.'' Or so it appears. Although Lacan has never directly and systematically been interested in the so-called ''literary'' text, and although the problematic of Das Unheimliche does not intervene in his discourse to my knowledge, the general question of the text is at work unceasingly in his writings where the logic of the signifier disrupts naive semanticism. And Lacan's ''style'' was constructed so as to check almost permanently any access to an isolatable content, to an un e quivocal, determinable m ean ing beyond writing. (Der87 420) Yet, following Derrida's reading of Lacan th a t follows this quotation, I will argue that the Lacanian text is psychoanalytic and not literarythat is, it attempts to ground itself in its own ''castration-truth." Its ''logic of the signifier'' is a logic of lack: a textuality of a ''certain linguistics'' (Der78199). This logic may disrupt ''naive semanticism," but it does so by securing a transcendental phallic center where the ''failure'' of language secures the center: the disruption is itself construed as that lack which has its place The absence of this ''naive semanticism," therefore, should not be read as an example of a postmodern celebration of the indeter1ninacy of meaning and the decentering of Western discursive structures. The question for me becomes: should La can's style be read

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as an obfuscatory defense against any kind of critical assessment? Along these lines, Barratt argues that assessm~nt of any ''thesis'' of Lacan's ... is notoriously difficult. For, eschewing systematization, Lacan deftly, even roguishly, defies systematic critique. Moreover, as is well known, his style almost wholly obliterates considerations of the content of his thought. For Lacan, style is everything, and the content of whatever thesis he might happen to be presenting becomes quite unnecessarily adumbrated. (Bar84 214) 91 Despite all the turnabouts and twists and contradictions, the orthodox feel of Lacanian ''psychoanalysis'' comes from the way it consistently conceptualizes the relation of the ''subject'' (in its most servile sense) to the Other, the ultimate totality and patrocentrism of that Other, and the immutability and oppositionality of the possible sexual identities determined by the Other. Moreover, a cosmology based on Oedipal destiny (Der87 495) is created when the ''letter," the ''odd'' material substrate of the Other and its logic of the signifier, ''always arrives at its destination'' (Lac88 53), and this destination is the reproduction of the oedipal structure of sexual positionality and the actual phallic function. Though Lacan claims to have subverted the notion of ''anatomy is destiny," he has erected a deter1ninism immune even to what might be called the vicissitudes of any ''biology'' or adestinational postal system and created a sexual transcendentalism where the ''male'' is ''whole'' and the ''female'' is ''notwhole," as determined by the phallic function. Despite what seems to be the consistent and radical determinism of Lacanian ''psychoanalysis," Joan Copjec, in her book Read My Desire: l.Jlcan

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against the Historicists-in particularly the section, ''Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason''-writes that deconstruction could learn about undecidability from psychoanalysis (which she erroneously assumes is simply represented by its Lacanian form). This claim stems from her analysis of Lacan's opening to Television that ''saying it all is literally impossible: words fail'' (213), and of the relationship of this ''failure'' to sexual difference, and therefore to hysteria's essential question. The rest of this opening to his mass seminar is as follows: 92 I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there's no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real. (3) It may seem that Lacan, with his conception that ''words fail," has backed away from his previous belief in how ''a letter always arrives at its destination," and therefore embraced a less deterministic theory of language, but this is not necessarily the case. ''Words fail'' to speak ''the whole truth," but the letter of each word, mysteriously connected to a part of truth, seems to still be determined to ''arrive'' at the proper destination. We can read ''failure'' here as ''lack'': words must fail, properly. They must take a detour in order to return; in order for the ''Real'' to be held onto, mastered. Truth for Lacan usually refers to the truth about desire; thus when he claims to ''always speak the truth," he seems to be saying that he has left his imaginary behind, which purifies speech of the demands of the imaginary: Lacan called this ''full speech'' (Lac77a 46), which might be equated to Freud's cure. To ''always speak the truth," it seems, would be to become one with the assumption of one's desire, but not necessarily all of one's desire, especially when ''desire''

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93 occasionally overlaps with jouissance. Yet even Lacanians understand, as Dylan Evans argues, that ''it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses [truth] since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terms'' (Eva96 215-16)-and, I would add, at times in radical contradiction to other uses. For example, Lacan also associates truth with deception, lies, mistakes, and errors. His line could thus be read as ''I am deceiving you, therefore I am telling the truth.'' Moreover, truth is supposed to refer to the truth about desire, and desire is supposedly a product of the Symbolic, but Lacan associates it with the Real above, an order that is supposedly a radical alterity to the Symbolic. It seems that ''words fail'' only because they cannot say the whole truth about desire-joui ss ance, not because of any inherent failure within words them selves, such as a necessarily arbitrary relation between signifier and signifieds.-which would only be a ''failure'' if ''success'' meant some magical correspondence between signifier and signified. La can seems to be saying that words fail to represent the whole truth, thus he falls back into, if he ever got beyond, a correspondence theory of language, which is antithetical to a differential or Saussurian theory of language. Moreover, this ''failure'' suggests a failure of words to correspond to the specific absence of lack: words must ''fail'' in order for ''castration -truth'' to be at the center of the structure of language and the Lacanian unconscious Before I get ahead of myself, I should put Copjec's use of the quote above into the context of her argument Copjec argues that Lacan, in Seminar XX: Encore, reiterates the position of psychoanalysis with regard to sexual difference: our sexed being, he maintains, is not a biological

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94 phenomenon, it does not pass through the body, but ''results from the logical demands of speech'' [Lac98 15]. These logical demands lead us to an encounter with a fundamental bedrock or impasse when we inevitably stumble on the fact that ''saying it all is literally impossible: words fail." Moreover, we are now in a position to add, they fail in two different ways, or, as Lacan puts it in Encore, ''There are two ways for the affair, the sexual relation, to misfire .... There is the male way ... [and] the female way." (213) Beyond the unfounded assumption of the identity of words failing and the sexual relationship misfiring, Copjec's citation of the latter quote by Lacan is disingenuous. Bruce Fink's translation of the extended selection of Encore Copjec quotes reads as follows: The universe you might realize it by now, all the same, given the way in which I have accentuated the use of certain words, the ''whole'' and the ''not-whole," and their differential application to the two sexes-the universe is the place where, due to the fact of speaking, everything succ~eds (de dire tout reussit) Am I going to do a little William James here? Succeeds in what? I can tell you the answer, now that I have, I hope, finally managed to bring you to this point: succeeds in making the sexual relationship fail (faire rater) in the male manner. Normally I would expect to hear some snickering now-alas, I don't hear an y. Snickering would mean ''So, you've admitted it, there are two ways to make the sexual relationship fail." That is how the music of the epithalamion is modulated. The

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epithalamion, the duet (duo)-one must distinguish the two of them-the alternation, the love letter, they're not the sexual relationship. They revolve around the fact that there's no such thing as a sexual relationship. 95 There is thus the male way of revolving around it, and then the other one, that I will not designate otherwise because it's what I'm in the process of elaborating this year-how that is elaborated in the female way It is elaborated on the basis of the not-whole. But as, up until now, the not-whole has not been amply explored, it's obviously giving me a hard time. (Lac98 53) Contrary to Copjec' s misquote La can never argues here that words or the sexual relationship fail in the female way. He only argues that there is another way besides the ''male way'' of revolving around the fact that there's no such thing as a sexual relationship, whatever this might mean. Moreover, his statement ''there are two ways to make the sexual relation s hip fail'' seems to be what he imagines his detractors ignorantly accusing him off admitting. Copjec's quotation is thus misleading in two ways: 1) she quotes ''there are two ways to make the sexual relationship fail'' as if it were directly and unambiguously argued by Lacan, and 2) she equates the ''male manner whicD is highly ambiguous with respect to whether it modifies the univ e rse s success or the sexual relation's failure, with ''the male way of revolving around'' the ''fact that there is no such thing as a sexual relationship," and opposes it to ''the female way'' of ''elaborating'' what Lacan ''will not designate otherwi s e'' to the ''the male way of revolving around'' the ''fact that there is no such thing as a sexual relationship '' Thus in Copjec's quotation of Lacan there is a conflation of various actions and the potentially

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96 very different objects of these various actions: a way of elaborating, a way of revolving, and a manner of failing-succeeding. Even if we granted Copjec the equation of the failure of the sexual relationship and the failure of words, and that Lacan argued that they could fail in a ''female way," it would be hard to imagine these ''failings'' that fall into two a priori categories as ''undecidability'-but Copjec doesn't stop there. Following Lacan's '' A Love Letter'' in Encore, she defines these two categories or positions as follows: [On the males side:] There is at least one x that is not submitted to the phallic function Allx's are (every xis) submitted to the phallic function [On the female side:] There is not one x that is not submitted to the phallic function Not all (not every) xis submitted to the phallic function (214) Copjec justifies ''Lacan's abandonment of some of the terms, and even some of the premises, of classical logic'' because of the ubiquity of the phallic function. Yet isn't this in some ways intended as proof of the phallic function? Why this ubiquity would justify such abandonment, furthermore, is unclear. Perhaps similar to the phallus, which is the magical signifier that determines its signified-and, in the process, all other signs -the phallic fun~ion' s magic allows for Lacan's tables to pass as logic. Further1nore, in a rather obtuse Kantian argument for how this a priori compartmentalization of sexual positions

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97 constitutes undecidability, Copjec contradicts Lacan's (and her) notion that 'Woman doesn't exist'' (Television 38) and argues ''a judgement of her existence is impossible'' (226) She also contradicts the idea that the category of woman is determined by the phallic function (castration) and, following Lacan, reduces ''woman'' to the ''not-all'' equation ''because she lacks a limit, by which [Lacan] means she is not susceptible to the threat of castration; the 'no' embodied by this threat does not function for her'' (226)-which is ultimately a repetition of the traditional notion of the underdeveloped super-ego of women, the result of the actual phallic function and their marginalization with respect to the phallic Other. Copjec concludes her discussion of the left side of the table as follows: For it is precisely because she [it?] is totally, that is, limitlessly inscribed within the symbolic that she is in ?ome sense wholly outside it, which is to say the question of her existence is absolutely undecidable within it ... We are thus led to the conclusion that the woman is a product of a ''s ymbolic without an Other." For this newly conceived entity, Lacan in his last writings, coined the ter1n lalangue Woman is the product of lalangue. (227) This seems to me to be a rationalization of the presence:.absence of woman required by ''castration-truth'': totally inscribed, and yet ''not-whole." If woman is the product of an-Other symbolic the supposedly undecidable of her existence with respect to the symbolic of the Other seems to have been decided, this time in harmony with Lacan's position that ''Woman doesn't exist." Lacan concludes here a totality of ''castration-truth," a transcendental structure centered on a specific absence. One wonders what happened to the idea that ''there is no Other to the Other'' (Television 40). Moreover, a 'symbolic without an Other'' (how

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98 could this be?!) sounds a lot like castration as God, negative theology (Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe). Any ''failure'' that reinforces the negation of woman and re-establishes man's privileged relation to the Other would be a success in terms of reinforcing and re-establishing what is obviously a version of the actual phallic function. And any ''failure'' of words or ''the'' sexual relationship-as if there were only one, a heterosexist assumption-that maintains two transcendental categories does not embrace undecidability. The so-called failing of language in Lacan always seems to end up reestablishing the oppositionality of the possible sexual identities, a type of ''complementarity'' that Rose argues is the foundation of the ''ultimate fantasy'': ''It is when the categories 'male' and 'female' are seen to represent an absolute and comple:111entary division that they fall prey to a mystification in which the difficulty of sexuality instantly disappears?'' (Mit83 33)-and the ''difficulty'' of language when it is the basis of an oedipal destiny and the letter's inevitable return reestablishes this ''proper." That these categories are each populated by two contradictory ''arguments'' is more a product of Lacan's need for ''odd'' conceptualizations to sustain whatever might be considered his theoretical system than the basis for some kind of undecidability. I will argue later that these ''odd'' conceptualizations, Lacan's material-ideal letter /phallus/penis, are the proper legatees of what I call Freud's ''trauma'' -structure trope of castration, his difference-into-identity trope. Another example of one of Lacan' s ''odd'' conceptualization would be the ''at least one x'' of the right side that designates the mythical primal father. Isn't this supposed to be a materialist theory? Also, no explanation is given for why there

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would not be symmetry between the use of verbs in the second ''argument'' of each side. Why isn't it '' All x is'' or 'Not all x' s are''? Early in her essay, Copjec argues: So you see, there's no use trying to teach psychoanalysis about undecidability, about the way sexual signifiers refuse to sort themselves out into two separate classes. It's no use preaching deconstruction to psychoanalysis because it already knows all about it. (Cop94 216) 99 In Lacanian ''psychoanalysis," any signifier, not just ''sexual'' ones-whatever these might be in a system where signifiers are not attached a priori to signifieds-are submitted to a linguistic version of the phallic function. This is the ''odd'' function where the ' parl e tr e' s'' alienation is conceived of in terms of castration, and, at the same time, castration provides the emptied space the S1 of Lacan's Urverdrtingun g for the S2 of the phallus, which anchors what would otherwise be the sliding of signifiers to the signifieds in accordance with the proper, the proper destination where the letter always arrives at what Derrida calls the oikos, Das heimlich, the familiar and the familial-which, of course, is Oedipus, the Law-of-the-Father, that which determines the economy of the phallic Other. What remains consistent through the equivocations, obfuscations, and ''odd'' concepts of Lacanian ''psychoanalysis''-w hich can be confused as ''undecidability''-is the repetition of the a~al phallic function: repressed, mostly hidden from direct assessment, but constantly returning and hardly an undecidable. Just as there s e ems to be only successful language in Lacan's universe, success being determined by the reproduction of oedipal sexual

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100 identities, a ''specific'' failure, any failing of ''the'' sexual relationship in Lacanian theory has less to do with some mythical obstructions of a Third, the Other, and more to do with Lacan's drive to maintain the ''singuliere'' hom(m)osexual basis of his theory, his logic of the same, where one side of his oppositionality falls out after it serves its purpose of acting as oppositional other. Any oppositionality would be devoid of sexuality if this sexuality is conceived of as an otherwise other to the binarisms of identitarian logic (see Bar93). Lacan and Lacanians often conflate sexuality and oedipal sexual identities, just as they do language with a rigid and stiltified Other of the Law-of-the-Father. Lacan's hysteric, therefore, is not the figure of sexual indeter1ninacy, the so-called ''Real,'' or undecidability, but the foundation, the ''anchoring point'' of a ''specific'' failure, a ''specific'' absence, whose loss would be mourned. Lacan' s hysteric is like Freud's, but more in the terms of the so-called ''linguistic tum'' of mid-century structuralism Lacan mourned lack not having its place, the lack of lack, when he mourned the loss of the traditional hysteric. Psychoanalysis/hysteria

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CHAPTER3 (UN)EASIL Y CONTAINED ELEMENTS Freud reveals his fascination with words with two meanings where one is the opposite of the other in his 1910 essay, 'The Antithet i cal Meaning of Primal Words." In this vein, Derrida reads the word ''analysis'' in Resistances of Psychoanalysis as both ''philolytic'' and unity-seeking along the lines of ''the archeological or anagogical motif of return to the ancient as archi-originary'' (27). Derrida might as well be describing the philolytic when he describes the double bind as ''a transcendental sickness of the analytic'' (qtd in How99 121). We can read Derrida's ambiguous quote as suggesting that that which aspires for the tranrcendent and unitary is also in a way a sickness of the philolytic analytic in that it represses its difference. If we read ''the analytic'' above in terms of analysis as a return to archi-origins, the philolytic aspect of the double bind might be considered the ''sickness'' of the transcendental, that which would not allow for a stable health of unitary totality. One of the major goals of this project is to show how Freudian theory is most clearly divided-.jcontradictory, aporetic, ''sick''-when it goes furthest toward establishing such a unity, totality, and transcendence. Though ''the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy'' (Der78 196), psychoanalysis and decon struction are both a part of this ''analytic'' (these parts, of course, having no discemable boundaries, as I argue in chapter one). Derrida calls deconstruction a ''hyperanalytisme'' (qtd. in 101

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102 How99121), which suggests that psychoanalysis would be simply an ''analytisme," the differentiation being determined by, as Christina Howells implies, the ''radically differing degrees of consciousness'' of psychoanalysis and deconstruction ''of the effects of this entrapment'' of being ''caught in the aporias and double binds of their own projects'' (How99 121). Whereas Freud speculates on precursors of the double bind, ultimately playing a game of fort/da with whatever is beyond his various systems-whatever philolytic aspects of his work threatens the stability of his archi-origin analysis-Derrida attempts to call attention to the doubleness of his own work, and the work to which he is responding, without reducing the other work, the other text, to his own terms, to more of the Same. The double bind being explored here is more a product of Freud's ultimately divided attempts to establish an archi-origin of truth found: psychoanalysis as Truth, and as the basis of a transcendent legacy. Despite what Derrida recognizes as the marginal status in psychoanalysis of any Freud of the trace and differance, Derrida often interprets the Freud of the Project in ''Freud and the Scene of Writing' (' Scene'') as amenable to deconstruction: ''It is with a graphematics still to come, rather than with a linguistics dominated by an ancient phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself as destined to collaborate'' (220). As Derrida makes clear in his later essays, destiny and the type of graphematics Derrida is known to promote cannot peacefully coexist: they are mutually exclusive because a Derridean graphematics embraces chance and is therefore adestinational. His formulation here of how psychoanalysis sees itself would suggest a certain paradoxical self perception with regard to chance a graphematic destiny-or simply a lack of awareness on the part of Freud regarding this mutual exclusivity, or division's

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103 inevitability or irreducibility. In his later essay on Lacan, ''Le facteur de la verite," Derrida seems at times critical of Lacan for betraying those graphematic aspects of Freudian theory that Derrida values most, those aspects that seem to suggest a kind of chance-embracing psychoanalysis which that make destiny an identitarian fantasy. With regard to destiny, Derrida shows that Lacan would also ''betray'' Crebillon and Poe when he misquotes Dupin's quotation of Crebillon in the substitute letter: ... Un dessein si funeste, S'il n' est digne d' A tree est digne de Thyeste. (Lac88 31) Lacan twice substitutes destin for dessein (''destiny'' for ''design''). As early as ''Scene'' Derrida would argue that whatever ''the historical originality'' of ''the Freudian breakthrough'' might be, ''this originality is not due to its peaceful coexistence or theoretical complicity with [a certain] linguistics, at least in its congenital phonologism'' (199). Derrida, later calling this linguistics ''destinational," would argue that the Lacanian letter supposedly always arrives at its destin(y)ation. Derrida is indirectly referring to Plato and Lacan when he writes ''congenital phonologism." He is also attempting to establish an epistemological connection that stems from Plato to a Freud of metaphysics and ''hypomnemic writing'' (227) to Lacan and the ''ancient phonologism'' of his destinational linguistics of ''castration-truth." Derrida is therefore suggesting that Lacan' s phonologism (and Freud's too) would be a sort of betrayal or repression of those ''otherwise'' aspects of Freudian theory that Derrida relates to the ''Freudian breakthrough'' and its ''graphematics still to come'' that are supposedly ''proper'' to it. Later in this essay on the Project, Derrida again refers to a Freud akin to deconstruction when he warns that

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104 the metaphorical concept of translation (iibersetzung) or transcription (Umschrift) is dangerous, not because it refers to writing, but because it presupposes a text which would be already there, immobile: the serene presence of a statue, of a written stone or archive whose signified content might be harmlessly transported into the milieu of a different language, that of the preconscious or the conscious. It is thus not enough to speak of writing in order to be faithful to Freud, for it is then that we may betray him more than ever. (210-11) The Freud Derrida wants to avoid betraying here is not the descendent of Plato. If not simply a unitary and deconstructive Freud-the ''may'' leaves room for other possible Freuds with whom this would not be a betrayal, and avoids any paradoxical pairing of ''unitary'' and '' deconstructive''-this is a Freud where immobile texts, origins, and translation are betrayals. But what happened to the ''without-exception'' Freud of metaphysics of presence and hypomnemic writing? The Freud of phonologism and logocentrism? Derrida seems to want to salvage an otherwise and graphematic Freud, a ''breakthrough'' Freud akin to Derrida's own breakthroughs-and he does this even though he begins the essay by arguing that ''Freudian concepts . without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics'' (Der78 197) In two of the quotations above Derrida seems lured by a paradoxical ''otherwise essence'' of psychoanalysis that would somehow determine a proper legatee, a destiny-though in the ''graphematics'' quotation he indicates that the destiny is what psychoanalysis sees for itself and not necessarily what Derrida sees. Because Derrida is trying in this essay to locate a ''Freudian breakthrough''

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105 that would account for the paradigm shift away from Platonism and a crude Cartesianism for which Freud is generally credited and to which Derrida seems to feel indebted-and to put this breakthrough in the language of the then nascent deconstruction-the metaphysical Freud, the Freud that tried hard to deny the radical nature of his insights, ends up being marginalized in ''Scene'' despite Derrida's ''without-exception'' opening to the essay. In the next two chapters I attempt to problematize whatever ''Freudian breakthrough'' there might be that would account for any debt Derrida has to Freud by extending Derrida's ''without-exception'' reading of Freud. I hope to problematize as ''easily contained'' or even tools of ''logocentric closure'' those concepts that might be typically considered by Derridean readers of Freud to be the ''uneasily contained elements'' (see Der78 198) of Freudian theory with regard to logocentric closure: memory and the scene of writing of the Project (Derrida), overdeter1nination (Smith and Kerrigan), the navel of the dream (Weber), the primary process (Derrida and Weber), repression (Weber and Barratt), anxiety (Weber), and the id. In the next chapter, ''Freud's Masterplotting," I attempt to show how Freud's psychic determinism is extended toward a cosmology as chance is negated within the ever-expanding domain of Freud's castration masterplot. When read with regard to this masterplot, I hope to show that Freud's concepts of the primary process, repression, anxiety, and the id are all transfor1ned into, if not simply easily containable elements of Freudian theory within logocentric closure, then elements that are integral parts of this totalizing masterplot. In this chapter, I attempt to problematize or disturb the (non)origins of the psychical apparatus as Derrida reads them in Freud's Project. In this chapter I look at Derrida's essay on the Project and a variety of

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106 readings of The Interpretation of Dreams in order to problematize the ''uneasy'' or ''otherwise'' status of such concepts as overdetermination, the navel of the dream, memory, and the primary process, which will set up my next chapter on Freud's theoretical movement toward a totalizing theory. Suffering Reminiscences: Reading Derrida's Reading of the Project According to Derrida, ''the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it (particularly in the concepts of consciousness, the unconscious, perception, memory, reality, and several others)'' (229). I would add fantasy, time, certain forms of repression, and Nachtrtiglichkeit to this list, but I will deal with these themes later Here I want to focus on Derrida's reading in ''Scene'' of Freud's conceptualization of memory in the Project, which may be a surprising inclusion to Derrida's parenthetical list given how he has argued how Freud radicalized memory there in terms of the trace, the ''scene of writing'' of mobile texts. In line with what I will argue is Freud's progression toward a more establishment theory as his theorizing progressed in time, the critical aspect of Derrida's deconstruction of the Freudian concept of trace focuses on Freud's treatment of memory in ''A Note on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad''' (XIX 227-234), where Freud attempts to deal with the conundrum of how the mnemic trace can be written and yet the memory apparatus remains open to new traces, without ''the receptive capacity of the writing-surface'' (227) being exhausted. The top sheet of the pad, if lifted after it is marked, allows for new marks while the wax underneath retains a trace of the old ones.-tha t is, as long as the top sheet is separated from the wax by the intervention of a helping hand. Derrida criticizes

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107 Freud for throwing out the writing machine because, like all machines, it is dead. It can't run by itself: it needs a hand to lift the top sheet. Derrida argues that by throwing out the machine, the metaphor as supplement, Freud preserves the Platonic idealism of the soul that runs by itself, that requires no supplement to make it whole (no writing or language), and that is based on the binary of life/ death (life/machine, whole/not-whole). Here the writing machine, and by extension writing in general, is thrown out as a supplement to pure self-presence in the process Derrida describes as logocentric repression: ''to exclude or lower (to put outside or below), the body of the written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or excrement'' (Der78 197). If there is a Freudian breakthrough associated with memory or the mnemic trace, Derrida argues that it would be found in the Project and its ''scene of writing." Supposedly this is where the evidence of a paradoxical destiny of a ''graphematics still to come'' is located. I argue that this ''scene of writing'' also shows evidence of a more straightforward destinational de s tiny, which makes the Freudian trace in general in need of radicalization In fa c t I will argue that it is from the Freudian concept of trace that whatever is radicalized needs to be ''extracted'' (Der78 229) What I will argue is the ''origin of origins'' (Bro84 276) of Freud's phylo-''genetic'' masterplot is a mnemic trace, though a paradoxically idealized one and, not surprisingly, in a vein similar to Lacan' s material-ideal phallus. It is clear that Derrida associates his conception of the Freudian breakthrough with Freud's focus on mnernic systems and writing in the Project. The ''metapsychological fable'' of psychoanalytic theory that followed, Derrida writes, ''marks perhaps only a minimal advance beyond the neurological tales of the Project'' (228),-and we can assume that for the Derrida of ''Scene'' this

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108 advance would have been one toward a ''graphematics still to come." What was to come after the Project was not as much a minimal advance toward such a graphematics, but more a retreat from it. The Project itself is imbued with the forerunners of this ''metapsychological fable." I hope to show that, even in the Project, and despite the power of Derrida's reading from the margin, the Freud of the Project had more in common with the Freud that followed than not. In other words, I will try to show that there is much in the Project that begins the advance toward the ''metapsychological fable'' and away from the supposed ''graphematics still to come." Having said this, the Project remains, as Derrida argues, one of Freud's more otherwise moments, one of the more ''uneasy'' elements of his theorizing, and this may account for why it was only published posthumously. The fantasy of the ''metapsychological fable,'' the fantasy of phantasy, provides a protection against the disruptions, the trauma, of positing an archi-writing at the non-origin. Like Freud's early take on the hysteric, Freud ''suffered mainly from reminiscences'' (II 7). The Other is reduced to the Same via Freud's related conceptions of hysteria and trace, linking the feminine and memory in Freud's mainstyle establishment discourse. The Basics of the Project and Derrida's Reading of It Derrida's reading of the Project in ''Scene'' initially establishes that Freud, in his own words, intended to ''furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science'' by representing ''psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles'' (I 295). Continuing in this materialist and mechanistic mode, the Project is founded on Freud's ''principle of inertia," the basic principle that ''neurons tend to divest themselves of Q'' (296), which Freud

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109 defines simply as the quantitative difference between activity and rest. This principle of inertia, what Freud calls the ''primary function'' (297), is complicated by the fact that the neuronal system itself has a source of Q, ''endogenous stimuli'' (297) which Freud calls Qr\. 7 Another complicating factor, according to Freud, is that the complexity of the human organism and the exigencies of life require that this Qr\ be kept at a level sufficient to stimulate the appropriate movement toward fulfilling the ''major needs: hunger, respiration, sexuality'' (297) and to guard against unwanted increase in Q. This is the ''secondary function'' of the neuronal system of the psyche: keeping the level of Qr\ at the lowest level possible while making sure there is enough of it to energize the fulfillment of the major needs. This secon dary function will evolve into the psychoanalytic concept of the ''principle of constancy." Moreover, what will later become the pleasure principle, the reality principle, and libido, are all foreshadowed here by the Project's Qr\ in relation to the secondary function. What Freud would later call the ''Nirvana principle'' in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, following the suggestion of English psychoanalyst Barbara Low, is prefigured by the primary function of the principle of inertia (Lap67 272). With the principle of inertia, the Nirvana principle, and Freud's Todestriebe, there is a common movement toward a zero state. The Project also tries to establish memory, according to Derrida, as ''not a psychical property among others [but] the very essence of the psyche'' (201). Memory in the Project is a factor of the differences between the Bahnung or ''breaches'' of the ''impermeable'' neurons, or 'V neurons. External Q is 7 Freud is not consistent with his differentiation between Q and Qn as external and internal quantity respectively.

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110 transmitted to the 'V system along the system of permeable neurons. This dual system of neurons allows Freud to at least address, if not solve, what he sees as a conundrum of neurons: how ''neurons are permanently different after an excitation from what they were before, while nevertheless it cannot be disputed that, in general, fresh excitations meet with the same conditions of reception as did the earlier ones'' (299). This is a version of the conundrum Freud returns to in 1924 with ''A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad''': the <1> neurons would be analogous to the pad's topsheet, and the 'V neurons would be analogous to the wax. According to Freud, the 'V neurons are ''the vehicles of memory and so probably of psychical processes in general'' (I 300). The 'I' system offers resistance to the Q that passes through the system, which remains unchanged in that system. The resistance of the 'I' neurons, their impermeability, is what allows for the alteration of that system. Though the 'I' neurons are not as much impermeable as they are permeable with resistance, Freud conceptualizes them as the termination location of Q. The alterations of 'I' neurons are a factor of the differences between the Q in question and the resistance of the 'I' neuron in question, which makes memory (and therefore the psyche in general) a factor of the difference between Qs. Freud calls this difference ''Bahnung," which is translated as ''facilitation'' by Strachey8, ''frayage'' by Derrida, and ''breach'' by Alan Bass, the translator of ''Scene." Bass argues that, with respect to the many difficulties of translating ''Bahnung," ''it is crucial to maintain the sense of the force that breaks open a 8 Strachey: ''The word 'facilitation' a rendering of the G e rman 'Bahnung' seems to have been introduced by Sherringtion a few years after the Project was written. The German word, however, was already in use" (SE I : 300n4) .

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111 pathway, and the space opened by this force'' (Der78 329n2). Bass's translation, however, seems to interpret Bahnung in ter1ns of a singular force opening a pathway and space in a neuron What I believe is also crucial to the concept of Bahnung is the meeting of two types of forces, one of external Q and the other of the internal Q11 that provides the resistance to the external Q. According to the Project, ''memory is represented by the differences in the facilitations between the 'I' neurons'' (300). Memory is a complex of differences: the differences in the breaches between 'I' neurons, and the differences between Q and Q1i within the 'V neurons. Breaching, according to Derrida, is the ''tracing of a trail ... [ w ]hich presupposes a certain violence and resistance to effraction'' (200), and is better suited to being read as a ''metaphorical model and not ... a neurological description'' (ibid.). it must be stipulated that there is no pure breaching without difference. Trace as memory is not a pure breaching that might be reappropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the ungraspable and invisible difference between breaches. We thus already know that psychic life is neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of force but the difference within the exertion of forces As Nietzsche had already said. (ibid.) Derrida's ''trace as memory'' above seems to beg the question a bit: what seems to be at issue in ''Scene'' is whether Freudian memory as conceptualized in the Project has any relation to a Derridean trace. Moreover, Freud might have conceptualized the ''difference between breaches'' as predetermined, a possibility I will suggest here, rather than as ''ungraspable." Freud's breakthrough for

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112 Derrida it seems was the recognition of difference as the (non)essential aspect of the operation of the machine of the psyche, or establishing the psyche as a ''scene of writing'' where ''writing'' is understood to be one of differance and not of the translation of an immobile text. Difference is a non-essential aspect of this machine because such a machine would have no essence, center, or origin given the effect this type of differential ''system' has on structures, origins, and whatever essentialism they foster. The (non)essence of this machine is better served by Derrida's notion of differance since it alludes to an element of displaced temp orality. The word ''differance'' alludes to both difference and deferral, and the temporality of this type of system would be one where deferral was always already a part of it, from the non-origin. Difference and deferral are inseparable here, and, along these lines, Derrida writes that the ''irreducibility of the 'effect of deferral' such, no doubt, is Freud's discovery' (203) He writes this after giving the reader the impression that Freud's breakthrough was establishing the psyche as a differential mnemic system. Derrida sees d e ferral as an integral element of any differential system. Referring to the differences of breaches and resistances to those breaches, Derrida states that, according to the Project, all ''these differences in the production of the trace may be reinterpreted as moments of deferring'' (202). Freud's breakthrough, according to Derrida, is one of recognizing the importance of difference/ deferral for the ''scene of writing'' of the psyche. Derrida makes the claim about Freud and the irreducibility of the effect of deferral after noting the concepts of Nachtriiglichkeit and Verspiitung (delay), concepts which, according to Derrida, ''govern the whole of Freud's thought and determine all his other concepts'' (ibid.) I will show in the next chapter that

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113 Freud does not use the concepts of Nachtrtiglichkeit and delay only in the vein of the irreducibility of the effect of deferral, but also, and more often, to protect a transcendental and originary presence, an essence. Nachtriiglichkeit is also dear to the Freud of the hypomnemic or immobile text, as we will see with the discussion of phylo-''genetics'' below. As Derrida argues, however, Freud is also consistently concerned with, and conflicted about, ''the effort of life to protect itself by deferring a dangerous cathexis, that is, by constituting a reserve (Vorrat)'' (202), and Derrida supports this claim by connecting the theme of deferral to ''the detour (Aufschub, lit. delay) which institutes the relation of pleasure to reality'' and the ''death at the origin of .life which can defend itself against death only through an economy of death, through deferment, repetition, reserve'' (ibid ), as in Beyond the Pl e asure Principle. For Derrida, there is no doubt that ''life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance (deferral)'' (203). Here we have a foreshadowing of chapter four as the themes of life-death are connected with diff erance and memory as a product of the difference between the differences between forces-and of def err al The dual impossibilities of (non)originary repetition and differance as the (non)essence of the ''system'' are the dual impossibilities of the ''scene of writing,'' and are connected here by Freud to equally aporetic concepts of life and death, and which should be associat e d with Derrida's ''life death," the title of his seminar preceding ''To Speculate-on 'Freud.''' Since these impossibilities are what make possible ''life''-the phantasm of life by itself-together they might be called ''(im)possibility." Derrida connects life to (non)originary repetition when he argues that life ''is already threatened by the origin of the memory which constitutes it, and by the breaching which it resists, the effraction

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which it can contain only by repeating it'' (Der78 202). But ''the very idea of a first time becomes enigmatic'' because the first time is a repetition. The alogic 114 here ''begins'' with the atemporality of a ''system'' of differance that precludes any beginning of a simple presence, any a priori text, here ''impressions'' or an engram: For repetition does not happen to an initial impression; its possibility is already there, in the resistance offered the first time by the psychical neurons. Resistance itself is possible only if the opposition of forces lasts and is repeated at the beginning. (ibid.) For Derrida, these are ''the enigmas of the 'first time' and of originary repetition''. and I would add differance-as presented by Freud in the Project in terms of memory and the psyche: memory as trace. For both Derrida and Freud, the ''scene of writing'' is attributed to the primary function of the psyche, and, for Derrida, Freud ''excludes any possible derivation'' of this function. According to Derrida, memory is posited by Freud in the Project as the essence of the psyche and its primary function, and this primary function serves as a protection device that deals with dangerous cathexes with the tools of ''repetition, trace, differance (deferral)'' (203). What is being protected? Life. But, Derrida warns, it is not ''life present at first which would then come to protect 1 postpone, or reserve itself in differance'' (ibid.). Enter the second (im)possibility and its connection to life: because differance ''constitutes the essence of life'' (ibid.), but ''differance is not an essence, as it is not anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/ existence, substance or subject'' (ibid.). The (necessary) combination of these (necessary) (im)possibilities and their relation to the psyche in the Project, Derrida suggests, is the harbinger of the

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115 ''graphematics still to come,'' the horizon Freud supposedly sets his sights on in the Project. Out of this combination, and its relation to the psyche, comes what I think is the crux of Derrida's essay for us here: Freud's take on memory in the project establishes it as a process and product of diff&ance or archi-writing, and this process is basic to how life ''must be thought as trace before Being may be determined as presence'' (ibid.). The memory Derrida finds in the Project, therefore, becomes highly disruptive to any theories of the psyche's mechanisms being based on some immobile a priori text, ontology, or metaphysics of presence. Derrida and Freud meet here with a memory psychology based on the dual (im)possibilities of the ''scene of writing.'' Freud's breakthrough, which Derrida suggests above is a repetition of Nietzsche's breakthrough, is a breaking away from the history of logocentric repression in the service of the self-present subject through the establishment of the unconscious as a non-original ''scene of writing," a play of diff&ance. The (im)possibility of the 'V system as a harbinger of the self-alienated subject of psychoanalysis would constitute a break from Platonic metaphysics of pre se nce based on phonologism and self-presence. The 'V system is here a precursor of ''t he'' Freudian unconscious, if this unconscious is understood as one of the ''scene of writing," and writing is understood as (non)essentially of diff&ance and very mobile texts. The very mobile text of memory established in the Project, however, is complicated when memory as a factor of the and 'V systems is integrated into the rest of the psychic machine Freud attempts to construct there. The 'V system as a precursor of the various Freudian unconsciouses, and the large role played by Qri in this system. as well as its relationship to what Freud names the ego in

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116 the Project-will foreshadow the significance of instinct, drives, and fantasy in Freud's subsequent theories. The 'V system, I will argue, is as much, if not more, a fantasy system than a mnemic system when it is put into relation with regulatory processes of the whole machine (pleasure-unpleasure, ego) Furthern1ore, the fantasy aspect of this system is the precursor of the very immobile texts of what Freud would later call ''primal phantasies,'' which ultimately imply a scene of writing of translation, a scene radically different to the one described above. Before I substantiate these claims, I would like to return to Freud's theory of hysteria and its relationship to memory to show how Freud consistently moves away from the contingencies and chance of memory toward something more reducible, more congenial to totalizing theory and immobile texts. Limiting the Effects of Memory and Chance in Freud's Work with ''Hysterics'' It is ironic that, at the same time Freud made his breakthrough by radicalizing memory in the Project, he was also radically narrowing the type of memory involved in his etiologies of hysteria. The Project was written during 1895 when Freud was steeped in his attempt to find a ''caput Nili," the origin and etiology of hysteria. ''Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences'' (TI 7) is Breuer's and Freud's closing line of the first part of the ''Preliminary Communication'' in Studies on Hysteria, written just before the Project. Though they agreed on the central role of memory in the creation of hysteria and its symptoms, Breuer and Freud disagreed on whether these memories were necessarily sexual. For the Freud of the Project, the original event was necessarily of a sexual nature, even if it was not experienced as such by the child who was still considered by this

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117 Freud to be pre-sexual. The power of sex, according to Freud, fueled the pathogenic repression of hysterical symptoms. I try to show in this project overall how, throughout his theorizing, Freud's tendency is to move away from his ''otherwise'' positions toward more ''establishment'' ones when he includes sex and sexuality in his theorizing. Given the potentially very ''otherwise'' position Freud takes on memory in the Project, it is important to see how he moves away from this position as sexuality is introduced through the theory of the etiology of hysteria he presents in the ''Psychopathology'' section of the Project, and in similar works of 1895 and 1896. The original cause of hysteria, the event, according to the Project and the later ''Aetiology of Hysteria," always occurred during early childhood. In the Project, and later in ''Draft K: The Neuroses of Defence'' (sent to Fliess on January 1, 1896), Freud would allude to a complex connection between the memory of the original event of early childhood and the pathogenic trauma that leads to hysteria with the concept of Nachtrtiglichkeit. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, Freud '' never offered a definition [of Nachtri,iglichkeit] ... [although] it was indisputably looked upon by Freud as part of his conceptual equipment'' (Lap67111). Actually, Freud never off~red a psychoanalyti~ definition of Nachtriiglichkeit, though he used it in his psychoanalytic cases. The Nachtriiglichkeit of the ''seduction'' theory was well-defined, and dependent on his conception of childhood as a period of life prior to sexuality. With Nachtriiglichkeit the path from the hysterical symptom back to its origin was not a simple one that leads directly through a psychical engram to the traumatic event that it represents. Nacl1trtiglichkeit problematizes any simple or linear form of psychical determinism whe_re the past simply affects the present. The deferral of

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118 Nachtriiglichkeit would posit that the original event and the memory of it formed by the young child were not pathogenic in themselves. The sexuality of the event would not have a meaningful context for the young child since he or she was pre-sexual. The sexuality of puberty would create the context which would then transform this memory into a trauma once it was activated or energized associatively by a second event ~ur~ng puberty. This trauma would be kept from consciousness (repressed) creating a gap in the narrative that the hysteric told Freud. Thus the origin of hysteria, according to the Freud of the ''seduction'' theory, was a sexual event that occurred during early childhood or infancy but was not experienced as sexual since the child would not be a sexual being according to this theory. Thus so-called hysterics, according to this ''seduction'' theory, don't only suffer from reminiscences of sexual events during childhood; they also suffer from the sexualization during puberty, the association of pubertal experience with their memory of the earlier sexual event, a delayed process of traumatization, and the after-effects of repression. The Freud of the ''seduction'' theory was different from the Freud that worked with Breuer on Studies, though the time difference between these stages was only a matter of a few ye~rs. During the ''seduction'' theory stage his etiology had become much more structured and specific, and it had been limited to the realm of sexual development. Freud's theories of hysteria prior to the Project were often a jumble of vague propositions and concepts, sometimes even contradictory ones. In the cases Freud presents in Studies, each one has a different approach, and, in several cases, it is far from clear what constitutes the therapy, and if the therapy given is at all effective. More specifically, it is unclear in many of the cases what Freud uncovers in terms of pathogenic reminiscences.

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119 With the case of Cacilie M., Freud wrote that by ''hypnotic influence'' he was able to make it ''possible for her to lead a tolerable existence'' and he ''was always able to take her out of the misery of her condition'' (Api92 89). However, Freud admits, ''she always relapsed again after a short time'' (ibid.). The case of Emmy von N. saw Freud using more traditional methods than the cathartic method developed by Breuer and himself: massage and hydrotherapy. Moreover, the patient suffered from memories of family deaths and loved ones being committed to insane asylums, and none of these potentially traumatic memories seem to have been particularly sexual, repressed, or infantile. The case of Katharina in Studies was a harbinger of his later theory of seduction, though the sexual trauma, the ''seduction," occurs in adolescence rather than in childhood. Of course, Freud would certainly have argued later that Katharina's adolescent trauma was a repetition of an infantile one. Again, the method used here is quite different than the cathartic method common to Studies and his later work using the ''seduction'' theory. What Freud calls Katharina's ''period of working-out, of 'incubation''' (131) of the pathogenic memory can be interpreted as a gern1 of the seduction theory's Nachtriiglichkeit. In the final case of Studies, the case of Lucy R., Freud does not uncover a pathogenic repressed memory but a pathogenic repressed fantasy: Lucy, a nanny, fantasizes that her recently widowed employer would take her as his wife and she would become the mother of the children under her care. This case is thus a harbinger of psychoanalysis in that it is focused less on memory and more on a fantasy conducive to an oedipal reading. I have mentioned the cases of Studies to suggest certain progression and inconsistencies in Freud's theorizing during these years when he wrote mostly about his treatment of patients diagnosed as hysterical. His later theory of the

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120 etiology of hysteria would in at least one way invalidate his argument as presented in every one of the cases of Studies. More importantly for our purposes, the cases of Studies and his later theories show a progression towards circumscribing the potentially pathogenic memories, the displacement of trauma away from the origin of hysteria (from event-trauma to meaning-trauma), and movement toward fantasy. All three of these progressions potentially delimit the influence of chance on the etiology of hysteria. By demanding that pathogenic memories were necessarily of a sexual nature, Freud was going against much of the theorizing that preceded him and that linked trauma and hysteria, including much of Charcot' s work, and even much of his own prior work, most notably his work on male hysteria, which he attributed to a shock such as a train wreck. Violence causing trauma in the same moment or immediately afterwards (event-trauma) was rarely a part of Freud's theorizing. This type of trauma would later cause Freud to reevaluate psychoanalysis in 1920 after encountering the effects of the violence of war on veterans: what was called shell-shock. Though Freud's insistence on the deferred trauma in the realm of meaning is an important aspect of both the ''seduction'' theory and of psychoanalysis, there is also a disavowal of the > importance of non-sexual events that cause trauma because the ''content'' of this type of trauma can 1;>e radically other to the realm of meaning: it is full of chance. There are a similarity and a connection between Freud's stereotomy of psychic determinism and the realm of meaning. Thus there is more than a hint of Freud attempting to reduce the effects of what he would later think of as the chance of the external world on his etiology's development by introducing deferral and sexuality . In other words, the violence and chance of what Freud constructs as

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121 the external world-he often refers to simple ''reality'' in contradiction with his theories of perception and memory in the Project and in psychoanalysis proper-and the disruption they can cause to ordered life are radically delimited by both the ''seduction'' theory and psychoanalysis. Freud's theory of ''seduction'' had many forms, but its final public and ''formal version'' (Bla92 173n) was presented by Freud in ''The Aetiology of Hysteria," a lecture given to the Viennese Verein far Psychiatrie und Neurologie on April 21, 1896. In this lecture, Freud never used the term ''seduction theory'' for the theory he described; and, as Jeffrey Moussaief Masson explains, given the violence Freud depicts there, the name was an odd choice made by Freud's followers: Freud uses many words to describe these ''infantile sexual scenes'' [in this lecture]: Vergewaltigung (rape), Missbrauch (abuse), Verfahrung (seduction), Angriff (attack), Attentent (the French term, meaning an assault), Aggression (aggression), and Traumen (traumas). All of these words explicitly state something about violence being directed against the child expressed in the sexuality of the adult, with the exception of the word ''seduction," which was an unfortunate choice, since it implies some form of participation by the child. (Mas84 3-4) 9 9 One difference between seduction and sexual abuse has to do with the element of complicity that the former has and the latter lacks. Seduction involves persuasion-persuasion to do what one at least partially wants to do. What Freud describes as the ''infantile sexual scenes" of the "seduction" theory seem to lack this element, which thus makes ''the child rape theory'' a more appropriate name. On the other hand, "seduction" seems appropriate to an understanding of these scenes in a psychoanalytic context where one presupposes the existence of infantile sexuality-thus making psychoanalytic narratives of such sexual abuse narratives of "seduction'' (cf. Forrester, 82-89). My choice to consistently, and perhaps irritatingly, put quotes around ''seduction" is an attempt not to fall into the traditional orthodox habit of assuming that what

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122 Freud's theory that child rape was the origin of hysteria received renewed interest in the U.S. starting in 1984 with the publication of a book by Masson, a staunch advocate for the ''recovered memory'' movement: The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory. Proponents of ''recovered memory'' argue that there has been extremely wide-spread sexual abuse in the U.S. and that the memories of these supposedly real scenes of abuse are being repressed by many of the victims, and consciously and unconsciously disavowed by therapists of all ilks. Masson argues that Freud's supposed abandonment of the child rape theory was a similar ''assault on truth." This argument assumes that Freud had indeed helped his patients recover a true memory of an event of child rape. Freud's eventual disbelief in the child rape theory would seem to stem from his later disbelief that the narratives he constructed with his patients corresponded to an event in their lives. Beginning in 1905, Freud would argue that these narratives were actually his patients' fantasies, and even their ''falsifications'' (VII 274). In The As s ault on Truth, Masson cites Freud's 1925 autobiography: '' ... I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only fantasies which my patients had made up. [ s ic]'' (11). Here I shall switch the focus from Freud to Masson. The period at the end of Masson's quotation is either disingenuous or a bit of careless scholarship. The actual quotation should contain an ellipsis at both ends: was being described by the "seduction'' theory had anything to do with seduction. The orthodox view is that Freud as he later claimed supposedly mistook the ''hysterics'' oedipal fantasies (the desire to be seduced by the father) for memories of ' seduction." Calling the ''child rape theory'' the "seduction theory" in retrospect assumes the truth of psychoanalytic assumptions regarding oedipal sexual development, one of the primary assumptions I want to problematize here.

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123 When, however, I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only fantasies which my patients had made up or which I myself had perhaps forced on them, I was for some time completely at a loss. (XX34) I suspect that Masson' s erroneous period is not a minor mistake of scholarship since Masson has had a lot invested in the absence of suggestion in Freud's practice during the 1890s. If Freud had ''forced'' the narratives of ''seduction'' on his patients, then there would have been no truth to assault. In a way, Masson attempts to sanctify the Freud of the child rape theory and villainize the later Freud, by arguing that Freud assaulted the truth to gain acceptance from the leaders of the Verein fiir Psychiatrie und Neurologie. Though I agree that Freud was motivated by his desire for this acceptance when he turned away from repressed memories and trauma toward repressed phantasies as the caput Nili-and, I would add, that this acceptance would probably outweigh any hesitancy toward shocking the fin-de-siecle public with the concept of infantile sexuality-I disagree with Masson' s ungrounded claim that Freud had had access to truth with the child rape theory, 10 and would point to Masson's own arguments on Freud's powerful tendency to find what he wanted despite what the evidence showed or what his patients said. As Masson repeatedly shows in his book, there were many reasons Fliess would write to Freud in 1901 that ''the reader of thoughts merely reads his own thoughts into other people'' (Mas85 1 Childhood sexual abuse is still a huge problem, but to address this problem we do not have to blind ourselves to what is at times the obvious suggestion occurring in ''recovery'' therapies that construct ''repressed memories" of sexual abuse.

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124 447). Freud was driven to find a very specific origin of hysterical symptoms in order to make a scientific discovery that would bring him respect. This origin would have to be specific yet at the same time have a very general applicability-as would be the case as Freud saw it with the Oedipus complex of psychoanalysis proper (never mind it could not be applied to females without assuming that little girls were really ''little men'' (XXIII 118; see chapter five below). In order to support this drive, Freud would not directly deal with potential traumas that didn't fit his scheme because they were not sexual, or because they were simply reported to him, which meant they hadn't been repressed and weren't in need of Freud's (re)construction. In other words, Freud was driven to construct the etiological narrative he needed, which would hardly constitute a ''truth'' that might be suppressed or ''assaulted." For example, in his letter to Fliess of April 28, 1897, Freud writes about a female patient who remembers being ''seduced ' by her father, no (re)construction by Freud needed: And it then turned out that her supposedly otherwise noble and respectable father regularly took her to bed when she was from eight to twelve years old and misused her without penetrating ( 'made her wet,' nocturnal visits)." (Mas85 238) Freud told this patient ''that similar and worse things must have happened in her earlier childhood'' because, if they did not, then there would have been no repression and therefore no pa tho gen. The etiological origin of Freud's ''formal version'' of the ''seduction'' theory is made more specific via several means: by ruling out the trauma of violence in the moment, by making it age specific (prepubertal, but usually three or four years), and by making it sexual. By making the origin more specific,

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125 Freud would then have a unique discovery that would differentiate his work on hysteria from that of others, such as Charcot. Memory and trauma were non specific and more appropriate to models of chance and dispersal that spread out like a root system of a tree as one digs deeper. Freud would use archeological metaphors when he thought of his work in terms of digging, and he imagined himself more in terms of finding the single artifact that would fill all the gaps in a certain history: a singular caput Nili : During the evolution of Freud's work with so-called hysterics in the 1890s, he seems to be searching for ways to limit the ''otherwise'' effects of memory and trauma. And indeed, after the formal version of the ''seduction'' theory, Freud would make his etiological origin even more specific. Freud called his very specific theory of 189'?, his belief that the rape of the child was always done by the father, his ''paternal etiology'' (Mas85 237). Freud would use the case reported above in the letter of April 28, 1897, as evidence for his confidence in the paternal etiology, even though the ''scene of seduction'' didn't require (re)construction (the supposed earlier events however, would). In their essay, ''Freud on His Own Mistake(s): The Role of Seduction in the Etiology of Neurosis," Rachel B. Blass and Bennett Simon write that Freud ''never publicly presented'' the ''paternal etiology," and that they find it strange that, despite this fact, ''it is this formulation of the seduction theory that is most directly addressed in Freud's later, public comments on early psychoanalytic theory'' (167). I do not find this strange at all given that Freud at that later point was trying to establish the untenability of the ''seduction'' theory at the same time that he wanted to establish the ubiquity of the patrocentric Oedipus complex. These patients, the psychoanalytic Freud argued, all had fanta s ies of being ''seduced'' by their j

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126 fathers. All hysterics being seduced by their fathers would be less believable as memory than as phantasy, and the supposed universality of the Oedipus complex would then match up with the supposed universality of the ''paternal etiology'' of hysteria-though this very universality, as I address in later chapters, raises the question of whence the neurosis. The mistake made by the ''seduction'' theory Freud, according to the psychoanalytic Freud, was to attribute his (re)constructions to memory rather than fantasy. By referring to the ''seduction'' theory in terms of the ''paternal etiology," however, Freud could argue that the (re)constructions of the ''paternal etiology'' were in man y ways correct. Therefore he would not be vulnerable to suspicions of suggestion with respect to the (re)constructions that were the very foundations of both theories. These examples of Freud narrowing memory and then abandoning the (re)construction as memory are crucial examples of Freud moving away from the chance of memory and the external world toward what I will argue is the determinism of fantasy and what the psychoanalytic Freud calls ''psychical reality." When Freud began using the cathartic method with so-called hysterical patients, there were a variety of ''reminiscences'' from which they suffered, the age at which they suffered them was unspecific, violence was often posited as the cause of the trauma, the trauma was not deferred, and, if there had been violence, the actant could have been anyone or any thing. As with Lacan, who called his psychoanalytic school ''the Freudian cause''-''cause'' being in the singular--Freud would not be satisfied theoretically with overdetermination, if this word is defined as multiple causes, and especially if the definition allows for chance. Freud's mastery of hysteria had to include a mastery of the causes,

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127 which would then lead to a mastery of its cure. Memory and trauma do not easily allow for such mastery, mastery of a single narrative, a singular cause and predictable evolution along the line of a known etiology. Indeed the establishment Freud would attempt to secure such mastery by first making the pathogenic memory very specific, and then by repressing throughout the psychoanalytic years what had been that aspect of the psychological system based on memory and the ''scene of writing'' in the Project. The psychoanalytic Freud represses the importance of memory, and with regard to this repression we could say that psychoanalysis itself suffers from reminiscences, especially if reminiscences or memory are thought of in terms of something akin to the Derridean trace. Memory, trauma, and chance pose a threat to Freud's stereotomy of the realm of meaning-the inside, the psyche-and therefore would pose a threat to his ability to be the master. And, ironically, it may be Freud's own theory of memory, as Derrida reads it, that best defines that threat-or, at least, it would be difficult to define this threat without some debt to Freud. My Reading of Derrida's ''Freud and the Scene of Writing'' The Derrida of ''Scene'' seems to want to put aside those aspects of the Project he recognizes to be antithetical to the Freud of ''the scene of writing'' where writing is the type of differance and not one of translation and immobile texts. According to Derrida, we recall, Freud tells us that we are wrong ''to speak of translation or transcription in describing the transition of unconscious thoughts through the preconscious toward consciousness'' (Der78 211). But the Freud of the Project does not ne~essarily say this: there are aspects of the Project

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that allow for just such a description. In The Legend of Freud, Samuel Weber makes it clear that the Freud at the time of the Project and the Freud of the topographical model-that is, the Freud of 1890s and 1915 respectively-both argue for translation as a way of ''describing the transition of unconscious thoughts through the preconscious toward consciousness'' (44). In one of his 128 earliest descriptions of repression Freud described it as ''the interdiction of translation'' (qt. in Weber 44) And in 1915, the heyday of the topographical model and one of the most active times in terms of Freud's theorizing of what Derrida refers to as the ''metapsychological fable," Freud wrote: ''We can now also formulate precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected representation in the transfer e nce neurosis: the translation into words capable of remaining attached to the object'' (qt. in Weber 45). Weber makes it dear that repression as translation is mutually exclusive with respect to Freud's previous theorizations of the primary processes (I return to this in the next chapter). Derrida predicts this objection to his argument: It will be said: and y e t Fr e ud translates all the time .. . And, in fact, Freud never stopp e d proposing codes, rules of great generality. And the substitution of signifiers seems to be the essential activity of psychoanalytic interpretation (Der78 210) But Derrida quickly responds: ' Certainly, Freud nevertheless stipulates an essential limitation on this activity'' (ibid.). I argue that Freud was more apt to put a limitation on those ''activities''-such as memory, trauma, archi-writing, and differance, that threatened his desire to theorize the psyche in terms of translations of an immobile text. For example, Freud never published the Project, and, according to Derrida, Freud ultimately returns the ''Note upon the 'Mystic

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129 Writing-Pad,"' the direct descendent of the Project, to a ''Cartesian space and mechanics'' where ''like Plato, [he] thus continues to oppose hypomnemic writing and writing en tei psychei, itself woven of traces, empirical memories of a present truth outside of time'' (Der78 227). Derrida himself makes clear how after the Project the writing and machinery (Freud refers to the mnemic system of the Project as a machine) he theorized there are reappropriated into a system of writing where interpretation is based on translation of a castration-based hypomnemic text (Der78 229). Despite this, Derrida seems to avoid the evidence of this reappropriation in the Project itself Early in ''Scene," Derrida seems to recognize that the ''scene of writing'' of Freud's Project may be more of the immobile kind when he writes about resistance in terms of a ''first time'': Resistance itself is possible only if the opposition of forces lasts and is repeated at the beginning. It is the very idea of a first time which becomes enigmatic What we are advancing here does not seem to contradict what Freud will say further on: ''Facilitation is probably the result of the single (einmaliger) passage of a large quantity.'' Even assuming that his affim1ation does not lead us little by little to the problem of phylogenesis and of hereditary breaches, we may still maintain that in the first time of the contact between two forces, repetition has begun. (202). Actually, it is only ''assuming that his affirmation does not lead us little by little to the problem of phylogenesis and of hereditary breaches'' may such a ''scene of writing'' of the mobile kind be maintained. Freud's affir111ation and conceptualization of resistance in the Project, as Derrida seems to recognize, might indeed lead us ''little by little to the problem of phylogenesis and of

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130 hereditary breaches," yet Derrida does not entertain that the repetition of the first time might be explained as an ont(?genetic first time and a phylogenetic repetition. The ''idea of a first time'' becomes less enigmatic if the difference between the two forces is in some way determined. One of the two forces in question here, Qn, Freud saw as the product of instinct, which constitutes an original text (see 297nl, 317, 321n2). What I will argue is that breaches, as Freud theorized them here, are a product of a determined Qn of the ''first time,'' and of a highly circumscribed and also predetermined external Q, both of which combine to constitute the original text of the psyche. Similar to the analogous roles played by memory and fantasy after the Project, the role played by chance with respect to the external Q is diminished (as it is with memory), and the role played by the original Qn is emphasized (as it is with fantasy). If this is so, then the ''scene of writing'' of the Project would be one where translation would indeed apply. Derrida also cites Freud's notion that ''facilitations serve the primary functio~'' (I 303). Derrida reads this in support of his main argument: the deferral of writing protects life, and breaches are a part of that writing system. But Freud seems to contradict himself here in this quote. Breaches are made up of the contact of two forces: external Q and internal Qr\. The primary function of maintaining the lowest level of Q within the system is certainly not served by the introduction of Q, so Freud must be referring here to the resistance provided within each breach of Qn. Freud's statement suggests that he believed there was little threat posed by external Q to the primary function, as if for every Q that would enter the$ system there would be a matching Qn stored away in the

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131 corresponding neuron-and there would be an a priori corresponding neuron. Somehow breaches seemed to be predetern1ined so that they do not threaten the primary function. The only way this could be true would be for the Q11 of the ''first time~' to determine all subsequent breaches. Before we get ahead of ourselves here, let us return to the Project. The 4>-'V system explained above is not the complete system of the Project. In order to explain repression, or 'inhibition,'' Freud would introduce a third group of neurons, ro, which he would associate with perception and consciousness. These neurons, according to Freud, do not deal in quantities, Qs, but in qualities Despite this pure difference between the 'V and ro systems, the two systems, Freud argued, were directly connected: '' . ro and 'V would, as it were, represent intercommunicating vessels In this man!ler the quantitative processes in 'I' too would reach consciousness, once more as qualities'' (I 312). Wanting to maintain the system of the Project as a system of writing and differences between forces (quantities), Derrida does not see Freud's introduction of quality in this neuronal group as dealing in pure presence beyond writing due to Freud's introduction of the notion of periodicity. My focus here, however, is not quality and its reduction to periodicity, but the role the ro group of neurons play in ''serving the primary function ''4>-'V-ro'' (312) was the complete ''apparatus," and when the primary function was served it would be sensed in the ro system as pleasure. When it was disturbed, unpleasure or pain would be registered there. Pleasure and unpleasure in the ro system would correspond to a leveling and increase of Qin the 'V system, respectively. Though consistently defined in terms of quantity, pleasure is supposedly lived in terms of quality

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132 The ego as described in the Project is supposedly strictly a functionary of the 'V system and the principle of inertia. In other words, it is solely concerned with pleasure and unpleasure. For his section on the ''Introduction of the 'Ego,"' Freud writes: with the hypotheses of ''wishful attraction'' and the inclination to repression we have already touched on a s tate of 'V which has not yet been discussed. For these two processes indicate that an organization has been formed in 'V whose presence interferes with p~ssages [of quantity] which on the first occasion occurred in a particular way [i.e., accompanied by satisfaction or pain]. This organization is called the ''ego." (323, my italics) Freud imagines the ego as ''a network of cathected neurons well facilitated in relation to one another'' (323). Freud explains repression as a ''side-cathexis'' where an external Q's established path to neuron bis diverted to neuron a, where the meeting of Q and b would have caused an increase in Q (pain), and a meeting of Q and a causes no increase in Q The ''ego's attention'' allows for the routing of such Q to the neuron most desirable in terms of serving the primary function. Freud struggled with how ''attention'' would not constitute a separate observing ego, and with its origin: I find it hard to give a mechanical (automatic) explanation of its origin. For that reason I believe that it is biologically determined-that is, that it has been left over in the course of psychical evolution because any other behaviour by 'V has been excluded owing to the generation of pleasure. The outcome of

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133 psychical attention is the cathexis of the same neurones which are bearers of the perceptual cathexis. This state has a prototype in the experience of satisfaction. (360-61) We will see that the original ''experience of satisfaction'' plays a large role in this project, and in the Freudian masterplot as I interpret it. As Derrida later argues with reference to Freud's 1924 essay on the Mystic Pad, Freud would again run into the problem of bringing together the ''automatic'' and the ''mechanical.'' With the Mystic Pad, he would throw out the ~echanical metaphor as supplement (death) in order to preserve the supposedly automatic wholeness of the psyche (life). In the quotation above, we find signs of Freud's nascent association of evolution, instincts, and the linking of a certain ''idea'' and a certain perception at the origin. It should be noted here that neurones here are not treated as part of a differential ''scene of writing'' but carriers of a priori ''identities." Here Freud's quantitative machine turns into a vitalism of quality: no longer a factor of the difference between Q and Qrl, but a factor of the difference between perception and ''the wishful idea'': Tension due to craving prevails in the ego, as a consequence of which the idea of the loved object (the wishful idea) is cathected. Biological experience has taught that this idea should not be so strongly cathected that it might be confused with a perception, and that discharge must be postponed till the indication of quality appear from the idea as a proof that the idea is now real, a perceptual cathexis. If a perception arrives which is identical with the idea or similar to it, it finds its neurones precathected by the wish-that is, either all of them already cathected or a part of

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134 them-so far, in fact, as the agreement goes. The difference between the idea and the approaching perception then gives occasion for the process of thought, which reaches its end when the superfluous [i.e., unwanted] perceptual cathexes have been conveyed, along some pathway that has been found, into ideational cathexes. With this, identity is attained. (361) As with the ''Mystic Pad," Freud throws out the machine and its materialism for an idealism of a priori or immobile texts. Here we see the seeds being sown for primal phantasies and a scene of writing of immobile texts that originates phylo ''genetically'' with ''biological experience'' and ontogenetically with a ''perceptual identity'' linked to the primary ''love object'' and instincts ''left over'' from ''psychical evolution.'' It should be noted that this vitalism and idealism are connected to Freud's introduction of the ego and its relation to pleasure and unpleasure. Attention plays a role in satisfaction by privileging those objects that correspond with a mnemic image that brought satisfaction, or the release of Qti, on ''the first occasion." Attention thus consists in establishing the psychical state of expectation.... Attention is biologically justified; it is only a question of guiding the ego as to which expectant cathexis it is to establish and this purpose is served by the indications of quality. (361) The ffi neurons ''furnish the indication [of quality]: the indication of reality'' (325):

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135 In the case of every external perception a qualitative excitation occurs in ro, which in the first instance, however, has no significance for 't' It must be added that the ro excitation leads to ro discharge, and information of this, as of every discharge, reaches V Th~ information of the discharge from ro is thus the indication of quality or of reality for VI. (325) Freud writes of the discharge of the ro neurons as ''signals," which foreshadows his later theory of anxiety in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, which I discuss in chapter four. The notion of ''indications of reality'' presages Freud's never resolved dilemma with the notion of ''reality-testing'': how does the psychical apparatus test reality without involving thew system? This seemingly magical testing of reality has the effect of reducing the effects of chance of the external world, as anxiety does in Freud's later work What is important for our purposes here is to recognize that Freud's apparatus has changed from ''-v-ro'' (314) to <1> (J)-'tf (325, Letter 39), and that the external Q's potential for effecting thew system has been greatly limited by the transpositioning of the ro system between the <1> and v systems: ro acts as a buffer of external Q and its chance. This transposition corresponds to Freud's ''introduction of the ego.'' The total system, even factoring in quality and the transposition of ro between q, and 'V, can still be thought of as one of writing. The question, however, must be asked again: what type of writing? Freud's pseudo-materialist system of the latter half of the Project (after the ''introduction of the ego'') moves away from external Q having any unadulterated effect on 'V, in a similar fashion to how his etiology of hysteria would move away from any random memory.

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136 The q> system is the first gatekeeper of the general apparatus, as it only allows a certain level of Q into the apparatus: not too high, not too low. More importantly for our purposes here, external Q becomes in a way a product of the 'If system and its Qrl via the pleasure system of the ro system or ego and its gatekeeping ''attention." In other words, the ro system is also the gatekeeper function, as it works with the 'I' system to attract and repel according to whatever serves the primary function. ''Facilitations serve the primary function'' only after the external Q has been filtered and sorted, first by the q> system and then by the 'Jf system-informed ro system: external Q is made to match the QTl established from the ''first occasion'' and according to the biologically inherited instincts that constitute Qrl. This system is no longer simply a mnemic system: it is a system that shapes perception and experience according to the dictates of the 'V system's ''first occasion'' and predetermined instincts. According to Derrida: Writing supplem e nts perception before perception even appears to itself [is conscious of it s elf]. 'Memory' or writing is the opening of that process of appearance itself. The 'perceived' may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it. (224) But is this past one of a non-origin, or of an origin, ''first occasion," and instinct? Is the writing one of translation or differance? The original resistance of QT\ in the 'V neurons constitutes much of the ''first occasion'' in the Project if it has a hand in shaping the ro system and therefore determining what the q> system allows into the apparatus. The deferral of writing would therefore be the deferral of translation, the translation of external Q-through the processes of the ego, the ro system's indications of quality, and the q> system's filtering-in accordance with

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137 QT\ as established by the ''first occasion'' and its corresponding instincts. As Derrida shows of the Freud of the ''Mystic Pad," the Freud of the Project may start out with a materialist apparatus, but he throws it out for a vitalist and idealist one when he tries to take the ''automatic'' into consideration. Freud preserves the life/ death distinction here by preserving this form Platonic '1ife'' by itself. If the original resistance could determine the destiny of this vital apparatus, then Freud's ''scene of writing'' of the Project can be understood as one of translation as well as one of differance. Derrida argues that even assuming that Freud here intends to speak only the language of full and present quantity ... we find that the concept of breaching shows itself intolerant of this intention. An equality of resistance to breaching, or an equivalence of the breaching forces, would eliminate any preference in the choice of itinerary. Memory would be paralyzed. It is the difference between breaches which is the true origin of memory, and thus of the psyche. (201) In other words, Freud's notion of breaching, and the scene of archi-writing that it necessitates, goes against any intention he might have to ''speak only the language of full and present quantity'' or of memory as a product of translation. Yet instinct and ''first occasions'' are part of this language and certainly are part of the language of the Project -and this language does indeed conflict with the writing of breaches and its (im)possibilities of (non)essence of differance and non original origin. To conclude that the ''seen~ of writing'' described by the Project is one best suited to translation ignores Derrida's point that the differance of breaches is unavoidable Moreover, breaches cannot be reduced resistance: QT\ is

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138 only one of the two forces that constitute a Bahnung. But Derrida does not acknowledge Freud's introduction of ''biologically determined'' origins with his attempt to account for the reality testing of the ego. Moreover, he does not consider the effects on the writing apparatus of the introduction and transpositioning of the ro system beyond questions of periodicity. If the 'I' system in some way determines the external Q allowed into the system, the two forces of the breach would both be factors, at least to some extent, of the 'I' system, making their difference a factor of that system too. Because breaches are not simply reducible to the original resistance and the 'V system, one cannot come to a conclusion as to which form of writing is described or privileged in the Project, though Freud's discussion of a priori ''ideas'' suggests that privilege should not be given to a Derridean ''scene of writing." There is a tension in the Project between the Freud of the written trace and differance, and the Freud of hypomnemic writing and immobile texts. The transition that followed the Project from memory-based to fantasy-based theories would reflect this tension. As Freudian theory becomes more fantasy-based, it als<;> becomes more intolerant of any influence chance may have on the psychical ''apparatus," and, therefore, more one of translation and immobile texts From Memory to Fantasy The mnemic and the desire that stems from instinct combine to make what Freud calls the wish, and wishes combine in narrative form to make fantasies. According to Derrida, the Project is interested in establishing memory as ''not a psychical property among others [but] the very essence of the psyche'' (201).

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139 Given that the ''mnemic'' and ''perceptual'' are intrinsic parts of fantasy, and the centrality of the role played by instinct in all of Freud's systems, the 'I' system could be considered more of a fantasy system than a memory system, combining the forces of external Q and instinctual Qn in the breaches that make up the scene of writing of the psyche. The 'I' system of the Project can be read as a harbinger of Freud's transition away from memory-based theories such as the seduction theory, and memory-based methods such as the cathartic method, to fantasy-based theories such as the varieties of oedipal psychoanalysis. We also see the conflation of memory and wishes (fantasy) in Freud's discussion of ''ideas'' and ''wishes'' in the latter part of the Project As with his later primal phantasies, the origin of Freud's apparatus will conflate what is mnemic and what is derived from instincts. Since Freud argues that instincts are the source of fantasy and the product of a species memory of sorts, these two categories can never simply be separated With primal phantasies, as with the origin of the psychical apparatus of the Proj ec t, Freud will rely on a certain mixture of idealism and materialism when it comes time to account for an origin. Regardless, there is never memory as an engram, uninfluenced by fantasy; and there is never a fantasy that is not made up of both memory and desire, fantasy's brick and mortar. Neither exists without the other. This muddling of these categories, I will argue, is both a strength and weakness of psychoanalysis. In the Project, Freud wrote that a ''psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an explanation of memory'' (299), but he would wait until 1925 and his ''Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad''' to return to memory in any systematic way. According to Freud's own criteria here, psychoanalysis

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140 actually would be in danger of not deserving consideration, especially since, as Derrida points out, Freud abandons the Mystic Pad as a writing metaphor for memory. In 1899, a couple years after he began thinking of infantile sexuality, but years before he would systematically incorporate it into his theorizing, Freud wrote his essay, ''Screen Memories," which describes a psychical construction that appears as an unusually clear memory of an apparently insignificant event, and whose analysis leads to both childhood experiences and unconscious fantasies. ''Like the symptom," Laplanche and Pontalis explain, ''the screen memory is a formation produced by a compromise between repressed elements and defense'' (Lap67 411). In ''Screen Memories," Freud recounts a dialogue with a patient, who many suspect is Freud himself. The patient recounts his ''memory,'' and Freud interprets it as a combination of two fantasies: 'It seems then that I amalgamated the two sets of phantasies .... Yes. You projected the two phantasies on to one another and made a childhood memory of them .... I can assure you that people often construct such things unconsciously-.almost like works of fiction. 'But if that is so, there was no childhood memory, but only a phantasy put back into childhood .... There is in general no guarantee of the data produced by our memory. But I am ready to agree with you that the scene is genuine. If so, you selected it from innumerable others of a similar or another kind because, on account of its content (which in itself

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141 was indifferent) it was well adapted to represent two phantasies, which were important enough to you. (315) Freud ends the essay by doubting ''whether we have any memories at all from our childhood'' and by concluding that ''memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess'': Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were arous~d. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were for1ned at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves (322) I want to stress that I think this part of Freud's early theorizing is important: memory should never be thought of as completely separate from fantasy. Yet this is a far cry from an etiology of hysteria based on the veracity of childhood memories that ''emerge'' during puberty as the result of Nachtriiglichkeit. And it is an even farther cry from th~ phylo-''genetic'' ''memories'' that, despite the ontological situation, override all other memories. This quotation, like the moments in the Project where memory is a product of a differential relation of forces, is a moment of early Freudian theory that lends itself to a ''scene of writing'' of differance. One of the strengths of t~e ''Screen Memories'' essay is its recognition of the effects of fantasy on what are experienced as memories. 11 But Freud takes this to an extreme so that his endogenous and idealist ''phantasies'' 11 This might constitute a possible Freudian truth Masson and other supporters of the 'Tecovered memory' movement should try not to "assault."

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and wishes become the over-riding determinant, the iiberdeterminierung, that cancels out all the chance of ''external reality." 142 What is important here for my purposes is that ''Screen Memories'' is an excellent example of Freud's transition away from the memory-based ''seduction'' theory to a theory based on phan tasmatic constructions. In this case, I would say it is an admirable one away from the traditional conception of memory as engram-though it may be toward a traditional conception of memory as ideal or ''unerasable'' (Der78 230) trace. But this transition toward an unerasable trace would require Freud's working out of his masterplot according to his Oedipal theories of sexual difference. The memory-fantasy constructions of ''Screen Memories'' Freud would later associate with infantile sexuality, but his transition from the pre-sexual child of the ''seduction'' theory and Nachtrf,iglichkeit to the infantile sexuality of oedipal psychoanalysis was not complete at this time, as evidenced by Freud's discussion of the ''pre-sexual period'' (VII 31) of childhood in the Dora case, which was written immediately after ''Screen Memories." Regardless, Freud here has moved away from hysterics ''suffering mainly from reminiscences'' and toward a fantasy-based psychology that does not explain memory as much as eclipse it by fantasy-or rather, memory as some type of representation of an experience is no longer a factor during childhood, that time of life Freud consistently points to as the most determinate. As Freudian theory progressed in time, memory as some ''scene of writing'' of differance, an example of a radical concept of trace, became even more buried by Freud's logocentrism. In fact, what Freud calls ''screen memories'' are more ''screen fantasies'' that defend against the effects of the chance Freud

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143 associates with ''events'' or ''reality," and Derrida associates with differance and the erasable trace. Disturbing Origins: The Interpretation of Dreams In the previous section I have tried to show that in the Project Freud did not unproblematically get away from reestablishing a metaphysics of presence and a simple origin of an immobile text, even while simultaneously creating the possibility for, as Derrida makes clear, a very mobile textu~lity within the mnemic apparatus he describes, the simple -'V system, by theorizing it as a potential ''scene of writing'' of differance. This potential is lessened, if not negated, by Freud's subsequent theorizing in the Project, primarily the introduction of thew neurons and the biologically determined origin of ''wishful ideas." This same tension would be played out in psychoanalysis proper, though, as with the Project, whatever possibility arises for a non-origin of mobile textuality is either marginalized or negated. What follows is my attempt to trace this tension in Freud's descriptions of the unconscious, dreams, dream interpretation, the ''navel'' of the dream, and the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams. In the next chapter, I trace this tension in his positing of primal phantasies in the case of the Wolf Man. To do this I first look at the Freudian concepts of ''overdetermination'' and ''overinterpretation'' to show that it is not, as some Derrideans claim, necessarily synonymous with chance. I then look at the initial arguments made by Maria Torok and Nicholas Rand in Questions for Freud: the Secret History of Psychoanalysis. In contrast to the two oppositional binaries they use free association versus symbolism as the basis of

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144 a methodology, and what they misname, as Freud does, ''reality'' versus fantasy as the basis of an etiology-I will try to show how their initial arguments are at the same time problematized and better served by focusing on the (non)binarism of the mobility or immobility of (non)origins. I will show that, even more so than in the Project, Freud counteracts whatever ''otherwise'' breakthroughs he makes in The Interpretation of Dreams by turning (troping) toward a psychoanalysis of an immobile text and translation. In this chapter and the next, this tracing (of the repression of the erasable trace) spans from the paradigm shift in Freud's thinking that followed his cessation of work on the Project to the Wolf Man, which Strachey called ''the most important of Freud's case histories'' (XVII 3). What we find is a theory of repression, for example, that transforms from one that suggests a very mobile textuality at an indeterminable origin-s uggested by the paradox at the base of Freud's theory of the primary processes and the undecidability of the dream ''navel," both as described in The Interpretation of Dreams-to one that posits an original and very immobile text of ''phylogenetic heritage'' (XVIT 97) in the Wolf Man. As Samuel Weber makes clear in The Legend of Freud, Freud's theory of repression in 1916 radically problematizes his theory of the primary processes of 1899,, and translation becomes that which explains repression and the preferred mode of interpretation in the form of a symbolism. I conclude by expanding on a theme I touched on above: Freud's turning toward an immobile text also includes an expansion of his stereotomy as the fantasy of castration. What Freud initially calls an ''infantile theory of sexuality'' becomes a supposedly true part of ''reality''-that is, a Truth that transcends and therefore subverts the binarism of inside/ outside. As the external world of chance becomes more deter1nined by

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145 the internal world of destiny with respect to Freud's inside/outside (determinism/chance), chance is wiped out and Freud becomes master of a stereotomy turned cosmology. Freud's phantasmal world of the ''inside'' eclipses ''reality'' and those aspects of the psyche that are commonly thought to originate there, on the ''outside'': trauma and memory. In other words, whereas the Freud of The Interpretation of Dreams made space for something otherwise and > indeterminate, the Freud of the Wolf Man subverts the binarism of inside/ outside in order to establish, if not a phantasmatic totality, a stereotomy of determinism that would greatly decrease the effects of chance on the object of his theory. Lacan would do something similar with his reading of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams which grounds La can's adestinational theory of language in a theory of the unconscious ''structured like a language," as both Weber and Derrida argue. In chapter five, I will argue that the lure of extending or projecting psychical determinism into 'external reality'' is evidenced by the lure superstition held out for Freud, and that, insofar as Freud theorizes this extension or projection, this theorization constitutes a reactionary subversion of the inside/ outside dichotomy. Overdetermination and Chance If ''there is never anything but overdeter1nination'' [Der81 346], and if, as Freud wrote ... ''we are all too ready to forget that in fact everything to do with our life is chance ... chance which nevertheless has a share in the law and necessity of nature, and which merely lacks any connection with our wishes and illusions''

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146 [XI 137], overdetermination and chance are always co-implicated. Here is the place where Freud and Derrida meet. (Srni84 viii-xi) Which Freud might this be? Is Freudian theory consistent with the quotations from Freud above? This passage is part of an odd introduction to Derrida's essay, ''My Chances/Mes Chances," since Smith and Kerrigan's Freud is a Freud that embraces chance, and Derrida mostly focuses on a Freud of strict psychic determinism: the one of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life who proclaims that ''[n]othing in the mind is arbitrary or undetermined'' (VI 242). In fact, Derrida writes about at least two Freuds: one Freud allows for the co implication of chance and determinism, whereas the other bars any such co implication within the psychic realm. However, the dominant Freud of Derrida's essay-indeed, the dominant Freud in general-is the Freud that wants ''to efface the appearance of chance'' (17). Smith and Kerrigan seem to want to recognize only a supposed otherwise Freud, as if psychoanalysis had always been otherwise, had always been ''taking chances'' like deconstruction. The marginalized, repressed, or avoided fragments of the otherwise Freud, however, must be understood in relation to the establishment Freud, as I hope to do here According to Derrida, these differing collections of ''elements'' of Freudian theo ry-those that are more or less easily contained by logocentric repression-are a factor of a certain demarcation made by Freud himself: We also know that in other passages, in other problematic contexts, Freud carefully avoids ontologizing or substantializing the limit between outside and inside, between the biophysical and the psychic. But in the Psychopathology and elsewhere he requires this

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147 limit not only to protect this fragile, enigmatic, threatened defensive state that one calls ''normality'' but also to circumscribe a solid context (once again stereotomy), the unity of a field of coherent and determinist interpretation, that which we so calmly call psychoanalysis itself. (Smi84 25) This Freudian stereotomy ontologizes a limit between outside and inside where the properties are different in terms of their relationship to chance In Psychopathology, Freud writes that he ''believe[s] in external (real) chance, it is true, but not in internal (psychical) accidental events'' (VI 257). When Freud writes, ''we are all too ready to forget that in fact everything to do with our life is chance'' in his study of da Vinci (XI), he is referring only to this ''external (real) chance." Psychical events, according to Freud, are never accidental, but follow ''the law and necessity of nature'' (XI 137). Unlike the chance-filled outside, there is no chance on the inside. Psychical det e rminism might seem to conflict with two basic psychoanalytic tenants: overdetermination and overinterpretation. Overdetermination is first u sed when Freud is grappling with theories of hysteria and the significance of psychical ca uses versus organic determinants. Eventually Freud uses ''overdeter1nined'' interchangeably with ''unconscious'' since any manifest formation, such as a symptom, would be said to have always had latent determinants, if not manifest ones too In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis use the following for their primary definition of ''Over-Determination, Multiple Determination'':

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The fact that formations of the unconscious (symptoms, dreams, etc.) can be attributed to a plurality of determining factors. This can be understood in two different ways: 148 a. The formation in question is the result of several causes, since one alone is not sufficient to account for it. b. The formation is related to a multiplicity of unconscious elements which may be organized in different meaningful sequenc~s, each having its own specific coherence at a particular level of interpretation. This second reading is the most generally accepted one. (292) Are these the only ways to understand overdetermination? What is the difference between a and b? If the ''determining factors'' of definition a are ''causes," what would be the ''determining factors'' of definition b? The ''elements''? Both the ''causes'' of a and the ''elements'' of b are multiple, but these ''elements'' are meaningless without the organization of the ''sequences." These ''sequences'' are also multiple in that they are arranged hierarchically in terms of ''level of interpretation.'' The multiple levels allow for multiple interpretations, even interpretations that conflict: ove~interpretation. With this compounding multiplicity, it is hard to imagine that Freud insists on psychical determinism. Contrary to Smith and Kerrigan's assertion that ''overdetermination and chance are always co-implicated,'' there is a profound difference between Freud's multiplicity and overdetermination and whatever related Derridean concepts there might be (the nonconcept of ''differance," Derrida argues, has little to do with indeterminacy or polysemy). Quite clearly, Smith and Kerrigan's claim regarding the co-implication of

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149 overdetermination and chance is contradicted by Freud's insistence on both overdetermination and determinism being characteristics of the psyche. Derrida's system of language embraces chance, whereas Freud's psychical system ''effaces'' it, as Derrida argues Freud's overinterpretation, however, would seem to work against any determinate logic, and it suggests that the ''unconscious elements'' involved might be undecidables like Derrida's pharmakon. Overinterpretation would also create space for opposing interpretations, never allowing for a final interpretation: undecidability. Psychical determinism and overinterpretation would seem to be incompatible: if conflicting interpretations are equally valid, then the meaning of any one element would necessarily be the product of chance. Comp~tibility between psychical determinism and overinterpretation, however, could be achieved if each level of interpretation corresponded to some level of the psyche In fact, each Freudian level of psychical meaning has a specific logic appropriate to it. Furthermore, the hierarchical (archeological) metaphor suggests a vertical relationship of interpretation to truth, as Laplanche and Pontalis argue: over-interpretation is related to meaning, and becomes synonymous with 'deeper' interpretation. And it is true that interpretation is brought to bear at various levels, ranging from the level where it merely brings out or clarifies the subject's behaviour and statements [the manifest level], to the level where it comes to grips with unconscious phantasy. (294) The ''unconscious formation'' thus has a meaning with multiple sources, fanning out like a tree's root system-but then this system begins to converge at some

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150 point, and, as it goes deeper, it becomes like a mirror image of the root system across a horizontal line, converging until it reaches one point at the deepest level, what Freud would later call ''the bedrock." Laplanche and Pontalis translate ''iiber'' as ''deeper'' here. Paradoxically, it seems that, for Freud, the deeper one goes, the higher the truth-which makes the translation of ''Uber-'' of ''Uberdeterminierung'' as ''multiple'' problematic, and the more common translation of ''above'' or ''higher than'' more fitting. In Resistances of Psychoanalysis, Derrida notes that Freud, in The Interpretation of Dreams, points out that most dreams, although not all, do not require over interpretation or over-analysis (Uber-deutung) and that all dreams do not lend thems e lves to an anagogic interpretation (anagogische Deutung), that is, to an interpretation that, like analysis, goes back (ana) to the highest most originary, the most archaic, or the most profound. (Der98 12) In fact, ''multiple'' or ''many'' is not a definition of ''uber-'' given in Langenscheidt's Ne-w College German Dictionary. The establishment Freud's fixation on singular sources as the truth of the unconscious puts the emphasis on ''Determinierung '' rather than ''iiber-," as the Freud of psychic determinism would have it. Moreover, psychical determinism in ter1ns of this truth would seem to cancel out the validity of multiple interpretations if they were conflicting. If each interpretation, however, is appropriate to a specific level, and, if these levels have conflicting logics, then there is a possibility for overinterpretation and psychical determinism to be co-implicated. The question becomes: does the deepest level, the bedrock, have a conflicting logic for Freud? Does it tolerate conflict or

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151 multiplicity? Is it essentially defined by, as Barratt argues, ''contradictoriness'' (Bar93 35). There is often a curious focus on condensation-though rarely any mention of displacement, if any-when the topic of overdetermination and overinterpretation comes up in psychoanalytic circles, especially in relation to the primary processes. While a single unconscious for1nation may refer back to myriad ''prior'' unconscious formations, there is still a sense that these references could maintain a certain core signification-that is, within a singular complex of formations (e.g. Oedipus), or with respect to a certain overriding truth (e.g., ''castration-truth''). Defining overd e termination and overinterpretation in terms of condensation, therefore, does not nece s sarily preclude defining the ''iiber'' of both as ''deeper With displacement, however, the signifier can only be arbitrary. In other words, condensation works vertically, whereas displacement works horizontally The verticality of condensation does not necessarily conflict with a combination of overdetermination and psychic determinism, whereas the horizontality of displacement ne cess arily does conflict with such a combination: displacement or dissemination nece ss arily introduces chance. The mostly vertical metaphor of roots I used before is inadequate to take displacement into account. The primary vertical metaphor used by Freud, the navel, does not allow for either condensation or displacement in any direct way. Condensation demands a vertical metaphor that narrows as it comes up from the deep, whereas the navel does the opposite. In the following passage, Freud mixes three metaphors-the navel, mushrooms, and one more like my root metaphor:

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152 There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork is particularly close [to what?] that the dream-wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium. (V 525) Though the metaphors of networks, branches, meshwork, and mushroom roots all suggest an interpretation of the ''iib e r'' of iiberdeterminierung and iiberdeutung as certainly multiple and potentially deeper here (''branch out in every direction''), Freud consistently refers to the source of dream thoughts as coming from below. As the archeologist digs deeper, Freud's search is often in terms of a singular source or reservoir from whence the dream thought originated, as with Freud's ca put Nili metaphor. R~gardless, this passage does leave us with the question of the source(s) of dream thoughts as singular versus multiple and the relation of the determination of the psychic system to either the singular or multiple source(s). Another problem or question that stems from the above quotation concerns how interpretations supposedly never have any definite endings: is there an ultimate source in Freud's determinism, or does the

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multiplicity tum into an infinity. Certainly Freud's many conclusive interpretations in his case studies and elsewhere treat the source of the dream material under consideration as having an ending discovered by Freud . The mushroom of Freud's quotation above seems to line up with the 153 manifest dream-thought, while the dream-wish is a product of a deeper meshwork. The navel, however, seems to suggest a deeper level than even the meshwork, or the branches/roots (the network of bra11ches seems to be analogous to the meshwork of roots, both leading to the ''world of [dream]thoughts''). This level of ''the unknown'' is underneath other levels, but seems to determine (psychic determinism) the different meanings (overinterpretation) of the various parts of the meshwork and the mushrooms that grow out of it -that is, it seems to determine both wishes and thoughts. Whether we have a multiple determination Freud, and one who allows for chance or not, seems to be more dependent on the relationship of this deepest level to the other levels, than the multiplicity within the level of the network/meshwork. A related question would be whether ''the unknown," what Derrida calls the ''inaccessible secret,'' is ultimately knowable, whether it is ''full of sense'' (Der98 4). How one answers this question will deter1nine whether ''psychoanalytic reason'' constitutes a ''hermeneutic reason'' (ibid.)-that is, whether ''the unknown'' constitutes a truth that psychoanalysis reveals by going deeper with its interpretations. We are left with the question of whether Freud saw the navel as leading to a secret, to secrets, or to something totally otherwise, and, if sense is found there, whether this secret or these secrets are inaccessible because of their multitude and endlessness, or because of some other cause related to the nature of this secr~t. For now, suffice it to way, if the relationship

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154 of this deepest level, this ''bedrock," is 1ike every other use Freud makes of archeological metaphors, then this truth (or these truths) would also be the very foundation of psychic determinism, what Lacan calls ''the Freudian cause'' -definite and singular. I argue here that Freud consistently moves more toward a deterrninist foundational truth as his theorizing progresses with time. Contrary to the Freud of Smith and Kerrigan' s introduction, a Freud of chance whom they ally with Derrida, the dominant Freud in Derrida's essay, and in psychoanalysis in general, is a superstitious (or even paranoid) Freud-that is, a Freud who does not believe in chance and who sees sense everywhere he looks: [Freud] only distinguishes himself from the superstitious person at the moment of concluding at the instant of judgment and not at all during the unfolding of interpretation .... He will only go as far as admitting that the only thing he has in common with the superstitious man is the tendency, the ''compulsion'' (Zwang) to interpret: ''not to let chance count as chance but to interpret it." The hermeneutic compulsion-that is what superstition and ''normal'' psychoanalysis have in common. Freud says it explicitly. He does not believe in chance any more than the superstitious do. What this means is that they both believe in chance if to believe in chance means that one believes that all chance means something and therefore that there is no chance. Thus we have the identity of non-chance and chance. (Der84 22) Paranoia could also be considered a form of a ''hermeneutic compulsion .,, Derrida's '''normal' psychoanalysis'' is similar to my establishment Freud, and

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Derrida's reminder that Freud ''says it explicitly," that he does not believe in psychical chance, suggests that the ''inaccessible secret'' constitutes a truth of sense at ''the bedrock '' for Freud. 155 I have attempted here to problematize Freud's use of the term ''overdetermined," which is commonly read as multiple determination and associated with chance. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, ''the essential precondition of over-interpretation is to be found in over-determination,'' which would thus suggest that overdetermination would include chance,, since multiple interpretations require a certain undecidability of signifiers. But Freud consistently effaces chance in the p sych ical realm with his strict division of inside (determinism) and outside (chance), and his circumscription of a singular cause and origin. Freud's idee fixe with regard to seeing the psyche archeologically permits a possible way of theori zi ng overinterpretation that does not allow for chance that is, translating Freud's ''iiber'' in these cases as deeper. The different levels of Freud 's metaphor point to a sing le source at the deepest level, thus we end up with the identity of multiple and si ngular determinations in ''nor1nal'' psychoanalysis. Under th e entry for ''hermeneutics'' in The Columbia Dictionary of Literary and Cultural Criticism, at the ''heart of all hermeneutic enterprises is the presupposition that a text, whether legal religious, historical, or literary, contains a determinate meaning, whose r ecove ry, whether possible or not, is the goal of interpretation'' (133). Freud's ''hermeneutic compulsion'' thus does the double job of effacing chance while presupposing a deter111inate meaning and determining a first cause at the deepest level, this ''bedrock."

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156 The Interpretation of Dreams: Rand and Torok The orthodox narrative of the history of psychoanalysis and Freud's theorizing place a radical schism between the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams. Though The Interpretation of Dreams is different in that it deals with the theme of infantile sexuality, it also sets up a metapsychology that has many resemblances to the Project's apparatus. Because infantile sexuality requires fantasies to be privileged over memories, the metapsychology of The Interpretation of Dreams would be about a machine of the psyche which would be primarily of fantasy, in contrast to the supposedly mnemic one of the Project. I . will return to the themes of fantasy and memory below, but here I want to focus on what seems similar between the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams:-indeed, what suggests that there was a great deal of continuity across the supposed schism. As I read the Project above, I read The Interpretation of Dreams as having a strong version of the tension between an ethos of mobile versus immobile texts at the origin. Because The Interpretation of Dreams describes self-present qualities independent of the differences between forces, as with the ro system or ego in the Project, it does not necessarily qualify as a candidate for Derrida's preferred ''scene of writing." Though a differance-type ''scene of writing'' is missing from The Interpretation of Dreams there are aspects of its metapsychology that create space for such a machine: uneasy elements with respect to logocentric repression. The first part of Rand and Torok's Questions for Freud: The Secret History of Psychoanalysis, ''Fundamental Contradictions in Freudian Thought," is divided into two chapters. In the first chapter, ''Dream Interpretation: Free Association and Universal Symbolism," Rand and Torok try to illustrate what they believe is

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157 an aporia within The Interpretation of Dreams by giving evidence of Freud stressing two ''orientations'' of dream interpretation, free association and symbolism, which they argue are fundamentally ''incompatible," constituted by ''contrary principles'' (22), and ''mutually exclusive'' according to what they see as ''the necessary logical conclusion'' (23). They conclude that Freud's approach to dream interpretation is conflicted and The Interpretation of Dreams is an ''ambivalent book'' (22). I agree that The Interpretation of Dreams is an ambivalent book, but not because of Freud's inability to decide on a privileged method of interpretation between two supposedly mutually exclusive methods. Indeed, I do not see these two supposed methods as necessarily conflictual, and the context that allows for them not to conflict was a privileged one of Freud's thought: the context of the immobile text at the origin. Laplanche and Pontalis define free association as follows: ''Method according to which voice must be given to all thoughts without exception which enter the mind [of the analysand]'' (Lap67 169). Free association is not so much a mode of interpretation as a methodological tenet to be followed by the analysand to assist the analyst's interpretation. Freud's use of 'free'' here does not mean that he sees these associations as being outside of any deter1ninative order. How could they be when he sees the psychical order as a deterministic one? ''Free'' here means that the association is allowed to be, at least somewhat, outside the order by which conscious selection works. It is, however, very much an effect of what the censors of that order might have missed (have not distorted). Ideally the analysand's associations would be more free of the distortions of consciousness so that the relationship can be revealed between his or her supposedly unique order of consciousness (which is connected to the chance of

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158 ''external reality'') and what Freud saw as the more universal and very deterministic order of the unconscious (not connected to chance at all for Freud). In other words, Freud believed that it was via free association that the analyst could discover the relationship between the analysand's conscious and unconscious orders by getting past the distortions and censorship of consciousness and its secondary elaboration of the unconscious material. Symbolism is pretty straightforward: there is a transcendental, one-to-one relation between signifier and signified. For Freud, symbolism was ''a kind of cryptography in which each sign can be translated into another sign having a known meaning, in accordance with a fixed key'' (V 97-8). With symbolism, translation would then be the methodology, and an original text would be required, albeit a latent one Again, Freud also believed in the transcendence of this key: ''There is in the first place, the universality of symbolism in language ... Moreover, symbolism disregards differences of language; investigation would probably show that it is ubiquitous-the same for all peoples'' (XXIlI 98-9). What Freud describes here is a Symbolic with a capital ''S," as Lacan would write it later Lacan would base his psychoanalytic Weltanschauung on a symbolism of his ''castration-truth," phallocentric Symbolic If we combine Freud's belief in an unconscious order and free association as a means of getting past the idiosyncratic relationship of the analysand to that order, then we can see how symbolism could be used with the free associations of the analysand in order to discover that analysand's idiosyncratic relationship to the supposedly universal order of the unconscious:-its original immobile text. The ambivalence of The Interpretation of Dreams, in fact, has to do with the nature of this unconscious order and whether it is an order, as he posited repeatedly, or something else

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159 altogether, for which his theories here sometimes left room. In relation to what Freud usually posited as the oedipal transcendental order of the unconscious, free association and symbolism d9 not necessarily constitute ambivalence in The Interpretation of Dreams or anywhere else. Where Rand and Torok's argument is most convincing is with respect to Freud's conception of the dreamer's role in interpretation, though this point too stems from a misunderstanding of free association as mutually exclusive from symbolism. They quote passages from The Interpretation of Dreams that seem diametrically opposed with respect to the dreamer's role, such as this one from a footnote: The technique [of dream interpretation] which I describe in these pages that follow differs in one essential respect from the ancient method [of dream interpretation using symbolism]: it imposes the task of interpretation upon the dreamer himself. (V 97n) What Freud claims here is inconsistent with both the method Freud describes and the way Freud interprets dreams throughout his writings: the analyst, of course, plays a very significant role in any Freudian model and mode of interpretation. A dream book would decode the signifiers, but the interpretation would still be up to the analyst. Regardless, Freud directly contradicts the footnote passage above: For when, with experience, we have collected enough of these constant renderings, the time comes when we realize that we should in fact have been able to deal with these portions of dream interpretation from our own knowledge, and that they could really be understood without the dreamer's associations (XVI 150)

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160 And a little further on: ''Symbols allow us in certain circumstances to interpret a dream without questioning the dreamer, who indeed would in any case have nothing to tell us about the symbol'' (XVI 151). Rand and Torok's argument makes the same (false) assumption Freud makes in the footnote passage above: that this so-called ''free association method'' creates a situation in which the dreamer is more involved with the interpretation than with symbolism where the dreamer is supposedly not involved. Again, free-association is one mode of providing signifiers. A symbolist approach is one way of combining a signified to a signifier to create a sign that would then be a part of an interpretation, a complex of signs supposedly connected according to some logical or narrative structure. Rand and Torok seem to confuse free-association with a mode of interpretation and seem to assume that it would be one more ''free'' of universalist methods and more individualistic. The last assumption Freud makes above symbolism does not require the dreamer's input-is simply wrong: even with symbolism the dreamer must at least provide the signifiers to be referenced with the dream book, either by some mode of ''free'' association or some mode more conscious or more determined by the patient's typical way of relating to his or her unconscious. We could even say that the transcendental order determined by a dream book is not necessarily as specific as Freud's transcendental order, and the interpretation process with the dream book does not necessarily lead to a single source, a singular caput Nili. For example, the dreamer could come up with three signifiers, which would make for three signs when put through the dreambook processor Even assuming there is a one-to-one relationship between signifiers and signified in dream books, which is not usually the case, these three signs

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161 could still be put together in myriad ways. Ironically, the footnote passage above suggests that the free associations of the dreamer necessarily leads the dreamer to an interpretation that seems unavoidable, as if there were a transcendental logical or narrative structure for the signs to be stuck into. With regard to the tension between transcendental structures of meaning and more individualistic ones that Rand and Torok mistakenly associate with free association, Rand and Torok present the ambivalence of The Interpretation of Dreams as follows: ''Here are two simultaneous and incompatible Freudian positions: dream interpretation requires the dreamer's participation; the interpretation of dreams has no need for the dreamer's contribution'' (15). They are interested in preserving ''each person's distinctive signification'' and see Freud's use of symbolism as a threat to this interest. What they fail to see is that Freud's conception of free association does not necessarily give the task of interpretation to the dreamer It does not necessarily give the dreamer a larger role in the interpretation process either. And neither does it necessarily respect any individuality of the dreamer, as Freud's usually reductive interpretations illustrate. If the analyst is committed to a specific ''key,'' as Freud always was,-though the key would change according to the point being made and to where he was in his theorizing-the analysand's free associations can be interpr e ted according to that key regardless of how contrary or different it may seem Rand and Torok ask the following questions: Is Freud attempting to reveal by dream analysis the dreamer's inalienable and personal psychic patrimony, or to recover a historical, cultural, and linguistic heritage that is allegedly known

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162 and commonly used by all? Is it possible to maintain that personal meanings coincide with universal ones? (22) To the first question I answer that he is doing both simultaneously, with an emphasis on the ''patrimony'' that Rand and Torok unfortunately seem to support. To the second question I would answer that this is what the establishment Freud is all about-again, with Oedipus as the primary example of how Freud believed fervently that the truth of the personal was universal. The dreamer may have an idiosyncratic relation to the unconscious order, but the truth of this order was universal. The truth of dreams, however, was not located at the destination-origin of the ''royal road," as Freud (at times) and Lacan would argue; the truth of dreams, Freud would argue at other times, was the road itself. Discovering this road, Freud argued and attempted to demonstrate, could be done via the free association of the dreamer, via the symbolism of a dream book, or via both-but both methods require the dreamer to provide the signifiers to be translated, and both require the analyst to consolidate these translations into a meaningful interpretation. Free association can be just as much a part of a method of translation as the use of a dream book. The key here is that they both can be used in relation to an immobile text. The Interpretation of Dreams: Weber In a footnote added to The Interpretation of Dreams in 1914, Freud makes it clear that he thinks that the essence of dreams should be looked for in the dream work, the resistance of the dreamer, and not in the latent dream-thoughts (V 579n1). At this time in his work (1914), Freud was not as interested in discovering the destination-origin of the ''royal road'' in the form of dream

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163 thoughts and dream-wishes because, as I will argue below, he felt he had already discovered the components of what was primal in the unconscious. Focusing on the dream-work suggested that what is important is the individual's personal relation to the truth of the dream-thoughts. Because this truth included the themes of incest and infantile sexuality, themes Freud considered to be transcendentally noxious to any conscious order that might be produced within a civilization, the dream-work would then constitute the analysand's unique way of not presenting, ''de-presenting'' ''Ent-stellung'' (Web82), a dream-wish based on that truth, or Truth. At the time The Interpretation of Dr eams was written, however, Freud was more ambivalent with respect to the nature of the unconscious, to the extent that he was even ambivalent about whether its bedrock constituted an order or not, though he leaned toward the side of order. Freud's ambivalence with respect to this issue constitutes what I consider to be the actual ambivalence of The Interpretation of Dreams. The Freud of The Interpretation of Dreams certainly felt he had access to many universal aspects of desire, Oedipus being for the most part introduced there but he also made speculations that subverted anyone having such access. In order to highlight those aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams that suggest something otherwise than having such access that is, to suggest that Freud had not decided on what was primal regarding the unconscious, and whether this issue was decidable-I turn away from Rand and Torok' s chapter in Questions to a chapter in Weber's The Legend of Freud called ''The Meaning of the Thallus," where we find his reading of The Interpretation of Dreams. Weber begins:

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164 Every science is informed by a notion of meaning, which serves to legitimize the knowledge it seeks to produce .... Freudian psychoanalysis was bent upon demonstrating both the ubiquity of ''meaning'' in the realm of mental activity and the peculiar interpretive techniques required to get at such meaning. (65) In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud would at rare times disrupt his own goal of establishing the ubiquity of meaning, the order of the unconscious. What is at stake in Weber's reading of The Interpretation of Dreams is Freud's position with respect to the ubiquity of meaning and, therefore, the possibility and certainty of interpretation-or, as Derrida writes, whether psychoanalytic reason constitutes hermeneutic reason. Weber 's argument, like Derrida's in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, centers on the short passage I quoted above, and which Weber believes is possibly the ''most celebrated passage'' in The Interpretation of Dreams. I quote it again here, but this time translated by Weber: Even in the best interpreted dreams, there is often a place [eine Stelle] that must be left in the dark, because in the process of interpreting one notices a tangle of dream-thoughts arising [anhebt] which resists unraveling but has also made no further contributions [keine weiteren Beitrage] to the dream-content. This, then, is the navel of the dream, the place where it straddles the unknown [dem Unerkannten aufsitzt] The dream-thoughts, to which interpretation leads one, are necessarily interminable [ohne Anschluss] and branch out on all sides into the netlike entanglement [in die netzartige Verstrickung] of our world of thought Out of one of the denser

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places in this meshwork, the dream-wish rises [erhebt sich] like a mushroom out of its mycelium (Weber, 75). 165 Weber argues that this passage is not simply Freud ''perched on the threshold of metapsychology, on the border that ostensibly divides the transparent realm of dream-interpretation from the obscurities of speculation .. only to discover, or describe, a shadowy place in the midst of the light'' (ibid.). There is also the self assured Freud who knows what this absence is about, where it is located, ''because of its obscurity'': ''It is as if its shadowy contours are all the more readily identifiable, localizable, by virtue of the clarity against which they are silhouetted ' (76). In The Po s t Card, Derrida shows Lacan making the same move with his letter and conception of truth, the ab s ence of castration locating the letter's destination within its silhouette: Lacan leads us b a ck to the truth, to a truth which itself cannot be lost. He brings back the letter, shows that the letter brings itself back toward its proper pla c e via a proper itinerary, and, as he overtly notes, it is this d e stination that interests him, destiny as destination .... Once more a hole will be stopped: and to do so one does not have to fill it, but only to see and to delimit its contour. (436) Lacan's destinational linguistics maps out Freud's ''royal road'' as a ''circular path'' with a destination-origin and a version of a Nietzschean eternal return. Freud's navel is also a knot that constitutes a trace, an absence as mark, signifying the mother's absence. Whence Freud's security as he gazes into the ''navel of the dream''; he sees a navel, the abs e nce of the mother, castration (the absence of the mother), and not an abyss Weber argues,

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166 What could be more reassuring and familiar, more primordial and powerful than this reference to the place where the body was last joined to its maternal origins. That this place is also the site of a trace and of a separation, but also a knot, is a reflection that carries little force next to the reassuring sense of continuity, generation, and originality conn oted by the figure. (Web82 76) And what could be more reassuring than if this navel represented the destination-origin of a circular path? Lacan even goes beyond Freud by assuming the centrality of the navel and therefore the structure of the unconscious, since every center has a structure. Weber suggests another connection between Freud and Lacan when he focuses on Freud's confidence that, despite the supposed obscurity of the navel, the dream-thoughts have, according to Freud, ''made no further contributions to the dream content." Weber wonders how Freud could know this given that the navel represents the unknown. How could there be c e rtainty that the navel represents some kind of end point? Both Freud and Lacan seem to know the pathway and destination in question, even though the Thing (das Ding) itself eludes interpretation-or because the Thing eludes interpretation. As Derrida shows with his reading of Lacan, centering the navel is not so much the unknowable being seen as the unknown, as it is transforming the unknowable into a specific absence of the presence that centers knowledge, of reducing the Other to more of the phallic Same: the primary trope of psychoanalysis All that is Other is transfor1ned into the ''absence of the mother'' at the center, a specific absence where she (her desire for the phallus, her lack) figures its transcendental presence. ''Castration-truth'' is the magical trope that secures logocentrism at the same time that it secures the

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167 One of hom(m)osexuality. Phallocentrism, via ''castration-truth,'' becomes a dominant mode of logocentrism. Are there other modes? Other magical, material-ideal tropes that can perform the same tricks? Is ''castration-truth'' the actual ''Freudian breakthrough''? I will return to this more general question in the concluding chapter. As will be the case throughout my project, the more specific question for me here becomes: should we read Freud as Derrida has read Lacan, in terms of ''castration-truth''? Contrary to Lacan's reading of the ''navel of the dream'' passage a reading Weber calls La can's ' Baedeker'' (79),-Freud' s passage above, according to Weber, r e sists such simple 'mappings'' (ibid.), and even resists the confid e nce and su gge st e d decidability Freud asserts within the same passage. ''If Freud's description of this nav e l differs from Lacan's," according to Weber, ''it is precisely because it brings into movement just what Lacan seeks to arrest: the very notion and place of a center'' (80) Weber's evidence for this claim first focuses on Freud's phra s e ''dem Un e rkannt e n aufsitzt," which Strachey translates as ''straddl e s the unknown." Zooming in on ''aufsitzt'' or ''straddles," Weber refers to the O.E.D. and its many definitions that suggest the action of spreading and moving apart and al s o notes a synonym from botany, divaricate: ''To stretch or spread apart; to branch off or diverge'' (qt. in Weber 80). The ''navel of the dream'' is read through ''dem Unerkannt e n auf s itzt'' by Weber as ''an untenable alternative'' which Freud ''straddles'' (81): what I call, following Derrida, undecidability. The reference to botany leads Weber to focus on the last line of the passage ''Out of one of the denser places in this meshwork, the dream-wish rises [erhebt sich] like a mushroom out of its mycelium''-and his next piece of evidence that Freud-unlike Lacan and his ''castration-truth''

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168 Baedeker of the Symbolic-is interested in the dream as dis-location, ''ent-stellt'' (81). Referring again to the 0.E.D., Weber finds the following for ''mycelium'': ''Mycelium. (f. Gr. mykes mushroom, after epithelium) Bot. The vegetative part of the thallus of fungi, consisting of white filamentous tubes (hyphae); the spawn of mushrooms'' (qtd. in Weber, 81). And for ''thallus'': ''(Gr. thallos, green shoot, f. thallein to bloom) Bot. A vegetable structure without vascular tissue, in which there is no differentiation into stem and leaves, and from which true roots are absent'' (ibid.). Weber contrasts Freud's undecidable metaphor of the thallus with Lacan's phallocentric reading of the navel's absence: If the dream-wish erects itself, phallic-like, out of the mycelium, the latter serves to remind us of what the Lacanian reading would like to forget: that the dream-navel cannot be reduced to a question of the phallus, of the beance, split or absent center of a subject, for one simple reason: the thallus (81) Weber sees Freud's thallus metaphor as constituted of negations and therefore analogous to ''that form of language that the unconscious employs to render itself accessible to consciousness while avoiding repression'' (82). Weber shows that Freud's metaphor subverts Freud's own confidence regarding the ubiquity of meaning and Freud's own knowledge of what lies beyond the horizon of interpretation. Interpretation's straddling of the dream-navel, and the thallus (non-roots) at the root or origin of the dream (the dream-wish), both suggest the undecidability of an unknowable rather than an unknown. This movement and undecidability, for Weber, suggest the unknowable, a differance and not a specific absence of meaning: a non-original mobile textuality rather than an original immobile text. Though I find Weber's reading to be powerful and convincing,

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169 ''straddle'' (aufsitzen) also connotes a mode of controlling, as when one straddles a horse in order to ride it; and a thallus, though not a proper root, could be said to be a pseudo-root for those things that grow in very dark places It is still cylindrical and tubular, and can be read as a metaphor of the origin-a phallic From Primary Process to Primal Phantasies In this section I want to connect my readings of two of Weber's arguments in The Legend of Freud to show how Freud gets further away from whatever ''otherwise'' aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams there might be with the ''establishment'' aspects of his work around the time of the Wolf Man case, specifically his metapsychological essays of 1915. My reading uses and attempts to problematize the point Weber makes that Freud's conception of repression as ''the interdiction of translation'' (qtd. in Weber 44) in 1915 contradicts Freud's conception of the primary process as a mobile textuality in The Interpretation of Dreams. I hope to show how Freud's conception of the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams is actually more ambivalent than Weber might argue with respect to any non-original mobility of textuality. In Freud's work of 1915, he seems unambivalently committed to an immobile text of primal phantasies (Urphantasien) and thing-presentations (Sachvorstellung), but this reading of Freud at this point in his work, which is suggested by Weber, is not as contrary to his metapsychological speculations of The Interpretation of Dreams as Weber argues. Despite my problematization of Weber's argument, there is a definite progression in Freud's work from ambiguity with respect to an original immobile text in The Interpretation of Dr e ams to his more unambiguous position of

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170 1915. To follow this progression-the progression of the repression of the erasable trace I will first summarize Freud's conception of the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams while showing the paradox at the core of this conception a la Weber, but with an important variation. I will then refer to Weber's insight regarding Freud's unacknowledged overthrow of his theory of repression as expressed in his metapsychological essays of 1915. Freud's ''progression'' is the repression of the ''otherwise'' irruptions to his search for a totalizing narrative grounded in a simple caput Nili: the repression of the (mnemic) trace, chance, the ''scene of writing'' that is not one of translation. This ''progression'' should be understood as a retreat away from the supposed ''graphematics still to come," and a repression of what Derrida considered the ''Freudian breakthrough'' in the Project. Weber's interpretation of Freud's passage above ''the dream-wish rises [erhebt sich] like a mushroom out of its mycelium''-points us to what Weber argues is the (non)root of the mycelium's thallus, the (non)origin of the dream. As with his work on hysteria, Freud is often found working back toward a source or origin. Rather than the origin of hysteria, the caput Nili here is the dream-wish, or even the ''unknown'' of the dream-navel that is before, beneath, or behind the dream-wish. Freud's approach to dream interpretation at times is interested in revealing the roots of the dream-wish, the simple origin, an original identity. Rarely does he leave these roots as non-roots, leaving them mysterious, and focus his attention on how the dream-wish works its way into consciousness in order to (re)construct the dreamer's unique relationship to these universal (non)roots, which, as I noted above, is his stated purpose of dream interpretation. At other times, his interpretive goal is like that of the archeologist searching for

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171 the oldest artifact: the origin as the artifact that will give him the key to unlock the particular mystery on which he is focused at that time. And at still other times, and as Freud described in The Interpretation of Dreams (IV 277; V 610), he assumes he knows what lies within, behind, under, before, or beyond the navel of the dream, and reduces the dream-work to the translation or encryption of the latent content into its manifest form, as I will show in his interpretation of the Wolf Man's wolf dream. What is at stake here seems to be the status of (psychoanalytic) knowledge and the very nature of the unconscious: whether it has a nature and whether that nature can be expressed in a form that might be meaningful. Discussing related issues, Derrida states matter-of-factly in Resistance of Psychoanalysis, that what is at stake ''are sense and truth'' (18). More specifically the issues here revolve around the question of whether there is an original identity, an immobile text, at the origin-indeed, whether there is an origin, and, according to Derrida, the ''intelligibility'' (18) of that origin. This intelligibility has to do with whether there is a mobile text po s ited at the non-origin (making the beyond of the dream-wish ultimately unknowable) or whether there is an immobile text at the origin (making this beyond simply an unknown). Freud generalizes the significance of his dream theory throughout his psychoanalytic writings, with the assumption being that what he is describing, as in the Project, is a general machin e of the psyche, though this more quality oriented (psychological) machine of The Interpretation of Dreams relies on a simple assumption of qualities, whereas the quantity-oriented machine at least attempted not to assume quality (tried to be a scientific psychology). The general operation of the Dreams-machine, as with the machine of the Project, is theorized

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172 as being divided between two processes (often referred to as ''functions'' in the Project): the primary and secondary processes. These processes explain the relationship between quality and quantity in these dualistic machines. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, the primary process is associated with system Ucs. while the secondary one is associated with the system Pcs.-Cs. in terms of the topographical model. The economic definitions of the processes are as follows: ... in the case of the primary process, psychical energy flows freely, passing unhindered, by means of the mechanisms of condensation and displacement, from one idea to another and tending to completely recathect the ideas attached to those satisfying experiences which are at the root of unconscious wishes (primitive hallucination); in the case of the secondary process, the energy is bound at first and then it flows in a controlled manner: ideas are cathected in a more stable fashion while satisfaction is postponed, so allowing for mental experiments which test out the various possible paths leading to satisfaction. (339) I will argue here that, with the secondary process, quantity or energy is not bound at first: this process is initially the unbinding of the ''perceptual identity'' (or ''primitive hallucination'' above) of the primary process, what Freud called ''in~ibition.'' As Weber points out, for the Freud of 1915, the hypercathexis of some object in the secondary process, the binding of some quality and quantity, is always the anticathexis of the perceptual identity of the primary process: a translation. Yet, I will argue, even in the earlier definition of the primary process, there is never simply freely floating psychical energy, and the secondary

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process is always also defined in terms of unbinding as well as binding. Eventually I hope to show that Freud's supposedly mobile cathexes actually constitute an original identity, a proper oik o s (home, economy) of original satisfaction, and that this castration-based oikos is a harbinger of Freud's ''castration-truth'' masterplotting, and Lacan's destinational linguistics, his paradoxically sliding signifiers that are also anchored. Freud contrasted the ''idea'' with affect and thus formed yet another 173 dualism of the Dreams-machine, the other important one being the pleasure and reality principles which correspond respectively to the primary and secondary processes. Lacan compares the Freudian ''idea'' (V orstellung) to the signifier, but this seems to be exactly what is at issue In other words, is the Vorstellung a quality dependent on or attached to a specific and original quantity (part of a Symbolic), or simply an arbitrary quality-that is, a signifier which is part of yet to-be-determined system of signification. Laplanche and Pontalis' definition above assumes both: on the one hand, ''psychical energy flows freely ... from one idea to another''; on the other, the ''primitive hallucination," what Freud calls the ''perceptual identity'' (Wahrnehmun gs id e ntiti : it) and psychical energy, tend to recathect ''the ideas attached to those satisfying experiences which are at the root of unconscious wishes." How can there be an identity between a quality and quantity when there is the free flow of quantity between whatever qualities? In other words, if the primary process is d e fined as mobile quantity, how can a quantity be ''attached'' to a specific quality? How can there be both this mobility ~nd the tendency to ''recathect'' the primary hallucination-as if the cathexis of this idea could ever be broken within the ''memory'' of such a system of the original identity? How can there be mobility or freedom and an original identity

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174 (''perceptual identity'') that determines the system? Also, what would satisfaction be prior to the primary process that is, prior to the pleasure principle it sets up? Weber's contrast of Freud's 1915 assumption of an original identity for his contemporaneous theory of repression with Freud's conception of the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams seems to decide an undecidable: Weber privileges the mobility aspect of the primary process over its identity aspect, as do Laplanche and Pontalis. The translation-repression of 1915 does not necessarily conflict with Freud's definition of the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams, especially if the primary process is understood as being a process that is not free in terms of its ''memory'' of the original identity. Furthermore, Laplanche and Pontalis' definition also suggests that the quality associated with the quantity of ''those unconscious wishes'' is not arbitrary (my italics), that there is some necessity, some proper original satisfaction and wish-the typical example being an image of the mother's breast attached to the experience of satisfying hunger (though this satisfaction must be sexualized for Freud, as we shall see). Similar to Weber's position that there is a ''secondary-process'' aspect of the primary process, the binding of the ''perceptual identity'' (as if secondary process were synonymous with binding), I find an unbinding aspect of the secondary process that seems to suggest the mobility Freud and others associate with the primary process. The goal of the primary process, as with the ''primary function'' of the Project, is to get as quickly as possible to a state of zero tension. The preferred strategy of the primary process is via the primary hallucination which allows for the calling up of the mnemic image attached to the original experience of satisfaction, the ''primary hallucination." Freud associated this

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175 process with the pleasure principle. The secondary process, in the interest of the organism's survival and the ''exigencies of life,'' defers this binding of quantity and quality, and creates a mobility of quantity-the reality principle and its inhibition and deferral. If the secondary process cannot allow for the rebinding of the perceptual identity in order for its quantity to be attached to a more reality-appropriate quality (what Freud called ''thought identity'' or ''Denkidentittit''), the secondary process must then keep the investment of quantity mobile The mobility of cathexes, therefore, would also be a product of the secondary process. The mobility of the dream is dream-work or distortion (Entstellt), whereas the mobility of the primary-secondary progression is one of deferral and appropriation to reality. Therefore, the analogy between the mobility of dreams and the mobility of the primary-secondary progression, it seems, would be problematic, unless distortion and appropriation could be the same in some way. Ironically, Freud's definition of the mobility of the primary-secondary progression is exactly the same as the definition of dream-work: comprised mostly of condensation and displacement. The dream-wish is the input to the dream process, and the manifest content is the ego syntonic output. Could the perceptual identity be seen as the input to the primary-secondary progression, and the thought identity be seen as the Pcs.-syntonic variation of the perceptual identity that both allows for dealing with the ''exigencies of life'' and the discharge of at least part of the original quantity, just as the manifest content is an ego-syn tonic compromise form of the dream-wish? Regarding Freud's 1915 theories of primal repression and primal phantasies, this equation of distortion and appropriation can be made, as I hope to make clear below. The question

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176 becomes whether the identities in question, as inputs or outputs to the various systems in question, can be said to be arbitrary, whether chance is a part of the origins and mobility of these systems and processes. One thing can be said simply regarding the arbitrariness of the primary process: if the inhibition of the primary process by the secondary process is necessary to the secondary process, the perceptual identity would necessarily be an identity inappropriate to reality. With the primary-secondary progression, we have two identities: perceptual and thought. The former is proper with respect to the pleasure principle, while the latter is prop~r with respect to the reality principle. That the former is necessarily improper with respect to the latter suggests that the perceptual identity is not arbitrary. If it were arbitrary, there would be some chance of it ending up proper to reality, making inhibition unnecessary. The paradoxes and problems of Freud's definition of the primary and secondary processes in The Interpretation of Dreams leave me with many questions. Did Freud conceive of the quality of the perceptual identity as being arbitrary? Did he conceive of the mobility of the primary process, which must succeed the establishment of the perceptual identity, as also preceding it? In other words, did he posit an original identity between the original satisfaction and the quality associated with it? How could there be an identity between them? Did Freud conceive of this ''identity'' as some proper, original correspondence between quantity and quality? Where does the distortion occur in the primary-secondary progression? Is it part of the primary or secondary process, or both? And why? Is it necessary? Why would the original experience of satisfaction and the quality associated with it necessarily be Pcs.-Cs. dystonic?

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177 In other words, why would the pleasure principle necessarily be different than the reality principle? Why is inhibition (repression) required when we seem to be dealing with a progression between one identity and another? Why is there necessarily a split subject with such a progression? Weber points out that the primary question of ''Freud's differentiation of the psychic apparatus into primary and secondary processes'' is ''how is libidinal energy bound. to representations?'' Weber connects this question of binding to the concept of inhibition. Freud at times used the term ''inhibition'' in the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams as synonymous with ''repression'' during his discussion of the primary and secondary processes. Yet ''inhibition'' was not only used, as Weber suggests, to ward off the binding of the perceptual identity in order to allow for the binding of the thought identity of the secondary process, which leads to Weber's association of inhibition with the stabilization of cathexes. Inhibition should not be seen as ''necessary for the stability of cathexes'' (Web82 38) since Freud also uses it-as in the case of warding off ''hostile mnemic images'' (I 324)-as an explanation of how the psyche destabilizes cathexes in orde r to avoid unpleasure. Weber's argument is that what is primary ''is the notion of inhibition as the necessary condition of cathexis," and that this sets up the primary process as a ''theoretical fiction'' since the notion of primacy of inhibition is paradoxical: an origin of inhibition always requires something before the origin to inhibit. Weber concludes that Freud's definition of the primary process is therefore an undecidable in terms of an origin and essence: This ''primacy'' of inhibition is even more the inhibition of the Primary. As such, however, it marks much more than a mere

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178 paradox in Freud's thinking. Rather, it indicates the necessity of a shift in conceptualization, from the terms that designate selfidentical objects, to those that signal irreducible conflict. (39) Weber's argument, though complicated by a questionable equation of inhibition and cathexis stabilization 1 -would Freud argue that inhibition is original? still points to a valuable reading of Freud's primary process. Freud's aporetic and ambiguous definition of the primary process in The Interpretation of Dreams both opens spaces for ''otherwise'' readings and sets up the potential to establish an immobile text at the origin. Weber's reading of this definition privileges the mobility of cathexis rather than original ''self-identical objects'' in the for1n of perceptual identities. He reads Freud on the margins 1 -The Legend of Freud-but this reading is incomplete with respect to a central term, ''inhibition," which is not just about stabilization of cathexes, and is not original for Freud who posits the ''original experience of satisfaction'' or perceptual identity as original. If not a clear ''shift in conceptualization, from terms that designate self-identical objects, to those that signal irreducible conflict," Weber's insight is important in that it opens up the possibility that Freud was struggling between these two ''positions''-between original immobile texts and the irreducibility of mobile textuality, the latter being more a non-position. I would argue that this struggle, if there was one, had more to do with Freud's paradoxical definition of the primary process in terms of both a mobility of cathexes and a perceptual identity at the origin, the ending, and throughout the primary process in the for1n of a ''memory'' of that process. This suppo s ed struggle seems to be, in general terms, about Freud's desire to theorize the system Ucs. as both a site of irreducible movement and tolerant of contradiction (the navel of the dream as the

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179 unknowable) and the site of a truth, or Truth, he has found (the navel of the dream as the unknown secret) ''Castration-truth'' creates a pseudo-combination of these two ''positions'' by transforming the ''unknowable'' of the former into a ''specific'' absence: it is a pseudo-combination because the transformation radically changes the former non-positionality into a simple oppositionality. ''Castration-truth'' tran sforms what is potentially radically other into a totality of ( op )posi tionali ty. In the next section of The Legend of Freud, ''Repression," Weber introduces another crucial argument with regard to the struggle regarding the ''essence'' of the primary process (whether it has an essence) and shows how Freud tries to resolve it in 1915 by committing to the side of original immobility. Weber argues that Freud's earlier genetic explanations of repression and the psyche in The Interpretation of Dreams get trapped by circularity in definitions of a process that assumes an impossible origin that both sets up the process and also contains it: '' ... to explain repression, Freud posits ( se tzt) an origin in which it [repression] has already taken place: the constitution of a store of memories, excluded from consciousness 'from the very first' ' (Web82 42). I argue (mostly in the next chapter) that Freud's solution to this supposed circularity is to posit a phylo ''genetic'' ''before'' for an ontogenetic origin. This ''solution," however, has wide-ranging and unacknowledged, if not disavowed, consequences for Freud's Dream-machine As both Derrida (Der78 226) and Weber (Web82 43ff .) make clear, Freud's 1915 attempt to get beyond this circularity by positing an original repression in terms of a certain ''fixation'' rather than a process of repression cancels out the possibility of defining the primary process strictly in terms of mobile cathexes, a possibility to which both Derrida and Weber seemed attracted

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180 to the point of both not taking into consideration the importance of phylogenesis for Freud and the relationship of phylogenesis to Freud's understanding of the primary process Freud writes in his 1915 essay, ''Repression'': We have reason therefore to assume a primal repression [Urverdrtingung], an initial phase of repression which consists in denying [versagt] mental representations [Vorstellungs-Repriisentanz] access to consciousness. This is accompanied by a fixation; from this moment on, the representation concerned remains unchanged together with the drive that is attached to it. (XIV 148; qt. in Web82 43; trans Weber) The ''solution'' of primal repression answers the question of ''Freud's differentiation of the psychic apparatus into primary and secondary processes''-''how is libidinal energy bound to representations?''-with an a priori ''fixation' or binding of quantity and quality This supposed ''solution ' cancels out the possibility of any und e cidability with regard to mobile and immobile texts, origins and non-origins. Though Freud never explicitly theorized the connection between these two ''primal'' conceptions, lost is any conception of the perceptual identity as arbitrary with the notion of primal phantasies that logically accompanies primal repression Furthermore, the source of the quality of the ''fixation'' no longer includes any input from the ontogenetic world and therefore cancels out the chance Freud associates with the external world of ontogenetics (I return to this issue in the next chapter). Both mobility and chance would be further excluded from the theory of repression posited in Freud's other major metapsychological essay of 1915, ''The Unconscious Weber argues that Freud in 1915 has returned to a theory of

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181 repression that preceded his speculations on the primary process in the Project: what he called in a letter to Fliess ''the interdiction of translation." It may be the case that Freud never fully left this theory of repression and that Weber sees this as a return because of his privileging of the mobile-cathexes definition of the primary process to the point of excluding Freud's consistent focus on the original identity of the primary process, even in The Interpretation of Dreams. In ''The Unconscious," Freud's conception of repression resolves some of the struggles of a primary process that is simultaneously mobile and fixed, but it does so by creating other problems: It strikes us all at once that now we know what the difference is between a conscious and unconscious representation .... The conscious representation comprises the thing-presentation [Sachvorstellung] plus the corresponding word-presentation [plus der zugehorigen Wortvorstellung], the unconscious one consists in the thing-presentation alone .... The system Ucs. contains the thing cathexes of the objects, the first and authentic object-cathexis; the system Pcs originates in a hypercathexis of this thing-presentation through its being linked [durch die Verkniipfung] with the word representations that correspond to it [mit den ihr entsprechenden Wortvorstellungen iiberbesetzt wird]. It is such hypercathexes [iiberbesetzungen], we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychic organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which dominates the Pcs. We can now also formulate precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected representation in the transference neurosis:

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the translation into words capable of remaining attached to the object [die iibersetzung in Worte, welche mit dem Objekt verkniipft bleiben sollen]. The non-verbalized representation, or the non cathected act, then remains repressed in the Ucs. (XIV 201-2; qtd. and translated by Weber 45). 182 The quantity of the original cathexes of the primary process cannot be mobile, and the quality cannot be arbitrary or ontogenetically mnemic: as Weber argues, the language of the ''authentic'' cathexes of ''objects'' is contrary to one of mobile cathexes of representations. The language of objective authenticity wipes out the possibility that the ''perceptual identity'' could have been arbitrary, even though this arbitrariness had also been, paradoxically, part of Freud's original definition. This passage also disregards the fact that Freud never theorized perception independent of the pleasure principle: he writes of simple ''objects." Thing presentations (Sachvorstellung), the new original identity of Freud's dualistic progression of 1915, seem to be predetermined cathexes as established in primal repression, therefore not requiring perception for the acquisition of the quality aspect of the original cathexes. A phylo-''genetic'' ''perception''/ ''memory'' would fit as a replacement to ''objects'' above that is, if the pleasure principle could be thoug~t of in terms of this phylo-''genetics," as I will argue it must be. Freud's 1915 resolution of the struggle between immobile origins and the mobility of non-origins is simply to repress any possibility of the latter. This resolution wipes out whatever possibility for original mobility or chance there might have been and any potentially otherwise space due to paradox and struggle. The translation of the 1915 progression from thingto word presentation (Wortvorstellung) is ?ome kind of encryption or distortion

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183 (Entstellung) similar to dream-work, but the theme of authenticity is common to both Vorstellungen, which is certainly foreign to any reading of The Interpretation of Dreams in terms of the arbitrariness of dream-wishes or any potential mobility associated with dream-work (distortion) Freud's language of authenticity is especially odd given that Freud associates it with both the system Ucs. and the system Pcs. Cs: as Laplanche and Pontalis argue, ''the distinction between [thing and word-presentations] has an essential topographical importance to Freud'' (448). In other words, with the topography of thingand word-presentations, combined with a metapsychology grounded in primary repression, there seems to be little room for any radical splitting of the subject and arbitrariness of cathexes, and no room for ''primary'' mobility or chance. Though perceptual and thought identities-and the corresponding primary and secondary processes--are all referred to in construction of the 1915 psychic machine, the mechanics of this machine cancel out the possibility of essential (non-essentialist) elements of the prior definitions of th es e identities and processes. Of course, translation requires a certain mobility of cathexis, which would correspond to a ''certain linguistics'' of a proper detour. These earlier definitions, as I have argued above, were problematic and even paradoxical. Though lacking a clear ''scene of writing'' of mobile texts--perhaps even more immobile than the ''scene'' of the Project-these definitional problems and paradoxes potentially allowed space for the play of something ''otherwise." When phylogenetics is taken seriously, the metapsychology of 1915 avoids becoming irreducibly conflicted and paradoxical due to its dependence on these previous ''elements." The result is that, with respect to the psychic machine of 1915, there seems to be little opening of any playful space due to the pervasive identitarian logic and the

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language of authenticity that is common to both sides of the division of this meta psychology. 184 As I will further support in the next chapter, the Freudian truth and sense of 1915, in the realms of Sachvorstellung and Wortvorstellung, seem to be predetermined in a Freudian Platonism-one that hearkens back to the '1>iologically determined'' ''wishful ideas'' and ''identities'' introduced into the Project to account for the origins of the mechanism, and these origins relations to ''external reality'' and its chance (see I 360-61). The unknown of the dream, the source of the dream-wish, seems, if not already known, certainly knowable. In Resistances of Psychoanalysis, Derrida argues that this was true in The Interpretation of Dreams, contrary to Weber's reading of the ''navel of the dream'' that focuses on the undecidability of straddling and the non-roots of the thallus. For Derrida, the ''navel of the dream'' had a sense for Freud; it was an unknown, and not an unknowable: The inaccessible secret is some sense, it is full of sense. In other words, for the mom e nt the secret refuses analysis, but as sense it is analyzable; it is homogeneous to the order of the analyzable. it comes under psychoanalytic reason. Psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic reason. (4) In fact, in 1915, even the unknown becomes the known for Freud. The difference between 1915 and the last years of the nineteenth century, when Freud wrote The Interpretation of Dreams, is that the Freud of 1915 had decided on a phylo ''genetic'' origin of origins, the beginning and end of Freudian masterplot. Oedipus, according to this Freud, determined how the ''the navel of the dream'' would be known Free association might determine the analysand's particular

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185 relationship to that 1:1nknown, leaving some room for (ontogenetic) chance. The ''free'' associations of the analysand were used by Freud, however, in a symbolist mode to arrive at this now known sense: the signifier always had a proper signified, as in any Symbolic. As I will argue in the next section, the Platonism of 1915 psychoanalysis approaches a traditional idealism: the truth and sense of the essence-origin of the unconscious subvert the inside-outside dichotomy and extend the determinism Freud associates with the inside (''psychic reality'') to the outside (''reality''). What is nearly an idealistic monism, however, is divided between two logics or ''propers," where the relationship between them is a certain determined mobility of encryption, a translation, where distortion (Entstellung) and appropriation become identical, and incorporate both displacement and condensation. As I show, this is not a subject divided between two realms of radical alterity, but a subject of two potentially amiable identitarian logics and truths. More importantly, Freud's masterplotting will continue his delimitation of the effects of chance on his psychic apparatus as all that is other to this system is reduced to the ''specific'' absence that constitutes this system's center: castration.

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CHAPTER4 FREUD'S MASTERPLO'l*l'ING It is commonplace to note that Sjgmund Freud 'discovered' another reality. This reality is the reality of the psychic life. The meaning of its unconscious underpinnings surfaces in the other world of dreams and in the slips of the tongue that indicate a beyond to the day-to-day life given to us by conventions of our form of life. Certainly Freud always returns us to the problematic of Jenseits, the other side, the beyond of the unconscious, which leaves its traces and marks on so-called 'real objects,' but which can never be simplistically identified with them. An obvious example of this mistake is the conflation of the penis and the phallus. Another is the identification of the unconscious fantasy object, the Phallic Mother, with actual mothers. Indeed, the ferocity of the debates between different schools of psychoanalysis can, at least in part, be attributed to the idea that unless one remains 'true' to the unconscious as the beyond to 'reality,' there is no psychoanalysis at all, only the crude fix-it therapy that invests in the 'world' of purportedly real familial objects as if these objects should serve as the basis for analysis Simply put, psychoanalysis begins with the differentiation of unconscious from conscious objects. Drucilla Cornell The introductory paragraph of ''Rethinking the Beyond of the Real'' Contrary to Cornell's opening assumption of her essay on Lacan, this chapter argues that Freud himself does not remain ''true ' to the unconscious or anything else as a beyond to that over which he has mastery. Freud calls the ''reality'' he invents (not discovers) ''psychic reality'' rather than ''psychic life." This ''reality'' and its determinism, what I am referring to as ''stereotomy," following Derrida, becomes the reality that matters, to use Judith Butler s pun.-though this stereotomy, like Lacan's phallus, is oddly material-ideal ''Reality,'' what Freud called ''external reality," was actually never considered the home or oikos from which to speculate on a beyond; on the contrary, ''reality'' 186

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187 is an aspect of the traditional psychoanalytic beyond, or one of the beyonds, of consciousness or the ego (these two not being synonymous and their differences significant). ''External reality,'' according to Freud, is full of chance, which thus makes the type of mastery Freud is interested in achieving impossible with this type of reality, and therefore it is rarely his ''object." I hope to show that the determinism of Freud's ''psychic reality," extending as it does beyond the bounds of ontogeny into phylogeny, also extends beyond the bounds of some constructed ''inside'' and eclipses the chance of the corresponding ''outside'' by reducing ''external reality'' to the organizing principles of psychic reality. Thus Freud essentially moves toward creating a totality of psychic reality, which is therefore much more than just ''another reality." Though many contemporary theorists praise Freud for subverting the inside-outside dichotomy, they should recognize that the most forceful and repeated way he does this is by totalizing his stereotomy of oedipal detern1inism. This is the Freud to whom Lacan returns, to whom Lacan is faithful with his subversion of the inside-outside dichotomy via his phallogo-phonocentric theory of language and the unconscious. With what I call ''establishment'' psychoanalysis, the traditional beyonds of psychoanalysis--the unconscious, reality, the death drive, and repetition,-all end up slaves to the mastery of what Derrida refers to as the ''PP'' (Der87a), a combination of the pleasure principle and Freud the grandfather (pepe') of the psychoanalytic legacy-indeed, they become even more slave-like than Derrida argues. The question remains-suggesting what is at stake with psychoanalysis and its beyonds whether an ''otherwise'' psychoanalysis can be ''found'' within psychoanalysis yet beyond the ''establishment''? Who or what finds it? To whom or what is the finder indebted?

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188 Cornell's essay, despite what I believe is some confusion at the start, ends up insightfully showing how ''Lacan fails to adequately address the alterity of the real'' by ultimately rooting ''the real in the meaning of the symbolic'' (142). In this respect, my argument here is similar to Cornell's, but with respect to Freud rather than to Lacan. Cornell decides that psychoanalysis is essentially about a ]enseits of a Derridean type of ''radical alterity'' (141),-a psychoanalysis that respects the otherness of the Other -when, as this project hopes to show, psychoanalysis s e ems to be quite undecidable with respect to its ''otherwise ness," and, if were to favor any one decision, it would be quite the contrary to Cornell's. Cornell therefore reads Lacan' s return to Freud as fundamentally a betrayal of Freud, whereas I read his return as being true (no quotes) to the dominant Freud Unlike Cornell, I don't put quotes around ''truth'' because being faithful to Freud, keeping fidelity, is all about truth and a ''certain linguistics ' of truth and ontology. The move of authorizing one's Derridean project by claiming allegiance to the true psychoanalysis is particularly evident in Barratt's work s P s ychic R e ality and P s ychoanalytic Knowing and Psychoanalysis and the Postmod e rn Impulse For Barratt, psychoanalysis is fundamentally ''eine psychologie der Verdrtingung' (Bar84 65), and the repression here is essentially one that splits the subject, creating what he calls in the latter book, ''contradictoriness'' (Bar93 38) Though I wish Freudian theory had unambivalently embraced something akin to Barratt's ''contradictoriness," it seems, among other problems of such a reading of Freud and such an appeal for legitimacy (the proper legatee, the rightful heir), that a decision has been made about what I consider to be the undecidable of Freudian repression: with Barratt we are not talking about the repre ss ion of 1915 where one (original) identity is

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189 not allowed translation into another identity, but a repression that constitutes a division of radical alterity-that is, something closer to the rather vague theory of repression of Freud's early psychoanalytic work, or a theory of repression that might come out of a patchwork of Freudian theories, or aspects of them. As I argue below, Barratt's conception of Freudian repression is a repetition of Derrida's privileging of an otherwise repression in his reading of Freudian theory, a type of repression that has little to do with an ''interdiction of translation." In fact, Barratt's debt is more to Derrida than to Freud. It is a possible case of deconstruction finding itself when psychoanalysis is found, but one that doesn't problematize the finding/found/finder according to ''itself'' or the finding, etc., en abyme. Barratt seems to find a paradoxical deconstructive truth when he finds psychoanalysis. As Cornell argues, Lacan represses the otherwise Freud, but he does so, contrary to Cornell's argument, by continuing the trend in Freudian theory to reappropriate those Freudian elements that can only be uneasily contained by logocentric repression to ''the Freudian cause'' and the determinism of a Symbolic. What Cornell calls the ''crude fix-it'' therapies of many contemporary schools of psychoanalysis with names that unreflectively use terms like ''self," ''subjectivity," and ''ego," reveal an allegiance with the teleology, essentialism, ego-centrism, and drive toward totality of what I will argue is the ''mainstyle'' of Freudian theory during and after the war years. In other words, it is difficult for these concepts of ''self," ''subjectivity," ''ego'' to escape their roots of simple self reflection, simple identity, completeness, cohesion, and agency. Though Lacan subverts traditional notions of self, subject, and ego by making the linguistic tum in a structuralist mode, Lacan' s structuralist psychoanalysis based on a logic of

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190 lack, centered as it is on its specific absence of ''castration-truth," represses whatever ''uneasily contained elements'' of Freudian theory there might have been-those elements that might have lent themselves to a ''logic'' of dissemination-making Lacan's return to the ''mainstyle'' Freud a faithful one. Like Cornell and Barratt, Lacan essentializes Freud according to one pole of the mobile-immobile axis of (non)origins I have constructed here, though his reduction is the opposite of the others. Weber and Derrida seem to possess a similar position with respect to this axis, though they both seem to give more weight to the establishment aspects of Freudian theory than does either Barratt or Cornell. Both Weber and Derrida recognize the dominance of the establishment Freud, but read aspects of his theory as at least suggesting what Derrida calls a ''scene of writing'' of differance I argue below that, for both, their readings of Freud seem to be largely influenced by their unambiguous readings of what I find to be a more ambiguous, if not paradoxical, fundamental concept of Freudian theory: the primary process. As I argued with Weber before, Derrida at times decides the undecidable essence of Freud's take on the primary process as being one of mobile cathexes rather than original identity (''perceptual identity'' and ''original experience of satisfaction''). Thus Weber and Derrida, I argue, seem to give Freud too much ''credit'' for being ''otherwise." My position, which is ironic given my Derridean critique of Lacan that follows, is closer to what I read as Lacan's position (albeit an unwitting one) with respect to this axis: I read Freud as being more true to an ontotheological discourse of truth, an oedipal totality, than the Freuds I read in the readings of Weber and Derrida-that is, Freud is for the most part true to a truth to which Lacan faithfully returns

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191 I have tried to show in previous chapters that the establishment Freud has been evident even in Freud's most ''otherwise'' moments -that is, moments that do posit a division of radical alterity, and don't posit an Other that is merely other, merely a variation of more of the Sarne. What makes Freud so difficult is that there are also ''otherwise'' aspects to his most ''establishment'' works. Cornell writes that ''psychoanalysis begins with the differentiation of unconscious from conscious objects'' and qualifies this claim with ''simply put.'' He may have moments at the beginning of his theorizing, but, as I try to show here and in previous chapters, even those moments are ''disrupted'' with consoling cohesion of system and origins of identity. Freud wrestles with many differentiations, and at times the unconscious does seem quite ''oth~rwise'' from consciousness, especially with respect to its timelessness, its overdetermination, its supposed a-logic that allows for contradictions to exist side by side, and its mobile cathexes. When discussing the ''navel of the dream'' there are, as Weber makes clear, hints that Freud might see the mycelium of the mushroom as something, not just unknown, but unknowable: potentially beyond theory and even Freud's speculations. As with the unconscious he describes, however, his theorizing contains contradictions side by side, and these ''otherwise'' tendencies are made at best undecidable as they are linked to the universal Oedipus complex Freud posits as his caput Nili, which is ultimately his origin of the psyche and a rather detailed description of the roots of the mushrooms and the stuff of his myceliurn. Timelessness accornodates a phylo-''genetic'' pre-origin, overdetermination is better translated as deeper determination or higher determination, and the ''contradictoriness'' accornodates a center of absence, where what is Other is reduced to a simple other and (op)positionality, and what

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192 I later call the ''trauma'' -castration trope. What might have been the unknowable is later what is merely uncomfortably known by civilized individuals and therefore hidden from themselves: Freudian theory potentially spans from a radical division between potentially radical alterities, to a minor split between incompatible identities. The split subject of the later Freud is more the latter: not radically split. With Freud's Oedipus, psychoanalysis becomes more the master of the beyond than that ''science'' that extols and wam s about the po~ers and mysteries of the beyond Indeed, it becomes a mode of fix-it therapy where cure is brought about via the revelation of the predetermined truth of the unconscious: ''Wo Es war, so/I Ich werden." There is nothing radically different about the id in this ''establishment'' system, and cure is merely a process of colonization of the id by the ego. In Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926), Freud even seems to change his mind about what is for many his Copernican breakthrough regarding the relative power of the id and that of the ego: W e are very apt to think of the ego as powerless against the id; but wh e n it is opposed to an instinctual process in the id it has only to give a 'signal of unpleasure' in order to attain its object with the aid of that almost omnipotent institution, the pleasure principle. (XX 92) Here the pleasure principle seems to be in league with the ego, rather than its adversary, which suggests that, for the older Freud, the mobile cathexes we might associate with the pleasure principle and the id are no longer privileged over the original perceptual identity when confronted with the undecidable of the primary processes In other words, and as I show below, the theories of the

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193 Freud of the mid-twenties justify the name ''ego psychology," which was chosen by his American legatees to represent their form of psychoanalysis. The ''otherwise'' moments of Freud's theory, seemingly more concentrated and left more open in his early works such as the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams, do not, indeed cannot, constitute some semblance of a ''mainstyle'' of psychoanalysis without betraying much of this older Freud's, the psychoanalytic Freud's work. Despite Freud's railings against philosophers and their systems, their cosmologies, what Freud refers to as a Weltanschauung, the ''establishment'' Freud constructs quite a Weltanschauung, which essentially negates these previous otherwise moments -though Freud doesn't acknowledge this, whence the complexity of reading him, especially his later works: he rarely, if ever, simply abandons a theory. There seems to even be a progression of his work-or regression away from the limit that constitutes a beyond, or a retreat away from some supposed ''graphematics still to come''-toward the securing of this Weltanschauung against any disruptions, especially the ''internal'' disruptions of previous moments, earlier ''uneasy elements'': like an ego attempting to bind unbound and disruptive quantity. Any reading of Freud's works becomes complicated by the asystematicity with which Freud makes his progression towards this system-often using asystem~ticity to obfuscate what are ''clearly'' disruptions to his progression, to rationalize the effects of the irreducibility of division for any totalizing ''act of establishment." Derrida's otherwise legendary respect of context fails him at moments in ''To Speculate on 'Freud''' when he doesn't take into consideration the aspects of this progression that occurred between the Project and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Derrida's two focal texts of Freudian theory besides The Interpretation of Dreams. For example, and as I will

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194 argue below, Derrida privileges a type of repression more in harmony with the The Interpretation of Dreams over the more contemporaneous, and radically different translation repression of 1915 in his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which I believe in some way accounts for his ''finding'' Freud to be more ''otherwise'' than I ''find'' him. The Jenseit of Freud's early theorizing is called the unconscious, and the topographic model lends itself to a single line of demarcation. The question, ''beyond to what?," becomes more complex with the introduction of the economic model, especially since the two models do not lend themselves to any simple superimposition: for example, the system Pcs.-Cs. is certainly wholly part of the ego, but the ego is largely unconscious In The Ego and the Id, Freud argues for three beyonds of the ego: external reality, the superego, and the id (XIX 57). In Beyond the Pl e a s ure Principle, the pleasure principle is the focus, even though it is usually associated by Freud and his followers with what was originally considered the J e n se it: the unconscious and the id In other words, what was considered the e s sential principle of the unconscious, the pleasure principle, and therefore of the beyond of consciousness, was now that which required another beyond, another dividing line. In this sense, the pleasure principle seems to be a stable and known thing to Freud, which suggests that the beyond would be something not known: again, we return to the question of the nature of something beyond being unknown versus unknowable, and, as Derrida argues, whether psychoanalytic reason is hermeneutic reason. As I touch on above, Freud complicates matters more when the pleasure principle is associated with, put in the service of, the ego via its signal of unpleasure Here the confusion of what constitutes a beyond, what is the

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195 relationship of this beyond to the ego (indications of reality) and to the id, and what is dominant with respect to the ego and the id (the ro and the 'I' system), are all revisited. What follows does not try to decide where to place the proper lines of demarcation with respect to either the topographic or economic models, or with respect to an oikos and a beyond, or whether the ego or the id is the dominant ''agency." Instead I intend to show, following Derrida, how the establishment Freud does not ''always [return] us to the problematic of Jenseits, the other side," but rather works toward creating a totality based on original identities of a priori bound quantity and quality, the original cathexes that constitute not only an invariable ontogenetic origin, but a phylogenetic truth and teleology. Proper placement of a horizon or boundary is not an issue without a beyond. In ''Speculate," Derrida shows that Freud never commits to (posits, positions) a beyond of the pleasure principle, and that the compulsion to repeat and the unbinding Freud associates with the death drive certainly candidates for a beyond, and possible evidence of something ''totally other," as Derrida makes clear-are mastered through Freud's own fort/da of Beyond the Pleasure Principle: hypothesized as a beyond (fort!) only to be taken back and incorporated into his PP totality (da!). Even trauma in the form of some kind of violence coming from the ''outside," what might have been the chance of ''external reality'' flooding and overwhelming the deterministic stereotomy of this psychic reality, is posited as a returning and reduced to castration, the centering absence that structures his stereotomy of psychic reality, and the origin and end of his masterplot. All possible beyonds, all chance, all evidence of something totally other that might prevent the mastery of the PP, are mastered and incorporated by the PP.

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196 Cornell-like Barratt, Weber, myself, among others represented here reads psychoanalysis in a mode influenced by Derrida and deconstruction. Like Barratt, Smith, and Kerrigan, Cornell supposes a psychoanalysis that is fundamentally akin to deconstruction, one that calls upon its legatees to be ''true'' to the beyond of the unconscious. This is how she finds psychoanalysis, and, in the interest of a ghostly inheritance, I repeat Derrida: Psychoanalysis, supposedly, is found. When one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds itself. When it finds, supposedly, it finds itself /is found-something. (413) Here we ''find'' the dissimulated mi s e en abyme, and dissimulation of the dissimulation (Weber), of the self-addressed and self-posted post card, the ''post'' as the repetitive ''act of establishment'' (Barratt) of any identitarian institution. If psychoanalysis finds itself when it is found, it must be a transcendental truth that is found and informs the finding. Thus it would seem that one can only be true (again, no quotes) to psychoanalysis by reducing the beyond (what is to be found) to more of the same (what informs the finding), as Lacan does. Ultimately what is at stake here is not only the ''truth'' of psychoanalysis-is it a discourse of truth? a totality? a teleology? the mapping of destiny? an ontotheology?-but also truth itself, as Derrida suggests in Resistances of Psychoanalysis. An extension of this issue of psychoanalytic truth is whether one can be ''true'' (quotes required) to psychoanalysis by being ''true'' to a beyond of radical alterity (what Cornell criticizes Lacan for not doing)? Is there a psychoanalysis of the beyond, an otherwise psychoanalysis, eine andere

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197 Psychoanalyse, to which I can/ should be ''true'' in a mode that pays respects to, for example, Levinas and Derrida? Is there a way to speculate on such a psychoanalysis without risking a play at (self)mastery, fort/da: to speculate, on '' Anders''? To find myself in eine andere Psychoanalyse? To find myself by playing ''fort!'' with Freud? By posting psychoanalysis? Can there be a psychoanalysis, a partial, non-totalitarian psychoanalysis, that informs the finding but does not predetermine what is found? That respects the otherness of the other? And, if not, does an adestinational ''posting'' of psychoanalysis help? And what are the problems with such a posting? Such epochal thinking that supposes psychoanalysis and denies any ghostly inheritances? Wouldn't a post(al)-psychoanalysis be oxymoronic, if not a form of Haraway's ''ironic allies''? Can one avoid fort/da games and discourses (an oikos and oikonomia) of truth and mastery as one establishes one('s relationship to a certain family, genealogy, and legacy of discourses) via writing? Derrida seems at times ambiguous on the issue of whether there is something like an ''otherwise'' psychoanalysis to be ''found'' in Freudian theory, and unambiguous at other times The opening of ''Freud and the Scene of Writing," I repeat, is suggestive with respect to the complexity of his position on this issue. He explains his work on psychoanalysis preceding ''Scene'' as, An attempt to justify a theoretical reticence to utilize Freudian concepts, otherwise than in quotation marks: all these concepts, without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to the system of logocentric repression which was organized in order to exclude or to lower (to put outside or below), the body of the

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198 written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or excrement. (197) Despite this reticence, he does find more hopeful moments of Freudian theory with respect to his complex ethos: Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud's text several points of reference, and to isolate, on the threshold of a systematic examination, those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure, as this closure limits not only the history of philosophy but also the orientation of the ''human sciences," notably a certain linguistics. (198-99) Supposedly, some of the concepts that belong to ''the system of logocentric repression'' of the written trace overlap or harbor ''elements'' which ''can only uneasily be contained'' within the closure of that system. These elements, however, could not constitute a system, an a-systematic system, or a ''mainstyle'' to which one should remain ''true'' (quotations pointing to the abyssal effects of such an a-system on truth), and neither could they constitute a ''Freud," as with my ''otherwise Freud." The question of the ''otherwise-ness'' of psychoanalysis concerns the ''historical originality'' of the Freudian breakthrough-indeed, whether there is a breakthrough: ''If the Freudian breakthrough has an historical originality, this originality is not due to its peaceful coexistence or theoretical complicity with this linguistics, at least in its congenital phonologism'' (ibid.). For Derrida, it seems clear, whatever breakthrough there might be would be something that disrupted notions of truth and the types of discourses on which these notions rely, rather than a discovery of some truth that would legitimate a ''certain'' legacy (Lacan) or one that is not so certain (Barratt et al.). For Lacan

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199 and his phonologistic linguistics, a discourse of truth, a ''negative theology'' (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy) of ''castration-truth'' (Derrida), the Freudian breakthrough was Freud's discovery of the unconscious and its relationship to lack, a discovery which seemed to lack only Lacan's systematic misreading of Saussure's linguistics. Here castration becomes the primary mode of logocentric repression, where the metaphysics of presence/ absence is the basis of a hom(m)osexual cosmology. For Barratt, Cornell, and others, being ''true'' (quotations necessary) to Freud is being ''true'' to a beyond that complicates truth and its discourses. Despite being in debt to these thinkers (and, yes, maybe because of it), I see this legacy and its claim to legitimacy as a contradictory position with respect to discourses of truth, and the product of deciding undecidables of Freudian theory, if not of a misreading of Freud that stems from privileging ''uneasy elements'' of his theory that were negated by subsequent aspects of his theory that were more than mere elements. In sum, much is at stake, and the stakes are interdependent: logocentricism, phallocentrism, a Jenseit, language, partiality versus totality, truth, (non)origins, essentialism, determinism, chance, their relationship to Freudian discourse, how to read Freud, and whether the Freudian scene of writing is one of translation or differance, immobile or mobile texts, lack or dissemination The Beyonds of Freud's Case Work: From Ontogenetic to Phylogenetic There are profound connections between the various beyonds of Freudian theories, and their related and various (non)origins. These connections are also related to the connections Freud makes between sexuality and (dis)order. In

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200 1896, at the height of the ''seduction'' theory, the origin of hysteria was a sexual trauma experienced during childhood and then activated during puberty through the deferral Freud called Nachtrtiglichkeit. The beyond here was the repressed memory of the childhood sexual trauma and the conflict it created for the patient in developing into a mature, sexual adult-all of this being a part of the patient's unconscious. The source of the trauma, the caput Nili, was a violence originating in the external world, and, as I've argued before, the chance of ''external reality'' was limited by Freud when he argued that this trauma was very specific: sexual abuse by an adult, and later by only the father. Freud's source was a very specific, well-defined disruption to normal development; in a sense, it was a specific re-ordering of a known order by something also known, rather than any uncertain or messy disruption from without or within (as Freud would later theorize trauma) With this early model, there was a qualitative difference between those categorized as normal and those categorized as neurotic: the neurotics had been traumatized in this specific way. The gaps in the narratives these so-called hysterics would tell Freud were, according to Freud at that time, the product of the repression of the memories of this specific violence. The beyonds of external reality, sexuality, and the unconscious are circumscribed via Freud's strict delimitation of the reminiscences from which the hysteric suffered, and of the unconscious and sexuality that were shaped by these reminiscences. On September 1, 1897, Freud wrote to Fliess, '1 no longer believe in my neurotica'' (Mas85 264). And on the following October 15, he would write, '1 have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early

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201 childhood ... (Mas85 272). The psychoanalytic orthodoxy has consistently read these epistolary passages as a simple confirmation of Freud's abandonment of the ''seduction'' theory and the beginning of psychoanalysis proper, or oedipal psychoanalysis. In ''The Concept of Psychical Reality and Its Traps,'' Rand and Torok make it abundantly clear that the transition from a memory-based theory to a fantasy-based one is not so simple, and they argue that Freud was ''permanently of two minds'' regarding the question of whether there was actual ''seduction or fantasy' (26) at the origin of the etiology of hysteria or any other neurosis. Though I agree with Rand and Torok that the typical orthodox interpretation of these passages is simplistic and revisionist, the problems with Rand and Torok's argument are many. These problems, however, help me to illustrate how Freud developed an even more totalizing narrative of the neuroses and of the psyche, during the time of what Rand and Torok call ''the magisterial consolidation of psychoanalytic theory'' around the time of World War I. Though Rand and Torok realize that Freudian theory subverts the treatment of fantasy as simply of internal origin and memory as simply of external origin, they treat these two categories as such, at times reducing them to ''false'' and ''true," respectively (24n). It is to Freud's credit that he at times complicated and intertwined the two in the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams, among other places, though he too would also often reduce fantasy to ''falsehood'' and memory to an unmediated imprint of the subject's experience of objective reality or ''truth." Despite these common and confusing lapses, there was for Freud, when pressed, no ontogenetic memory unmarked by fantasy, and no fantasy that was not in some way the product of some kind of memory (ontogenetic or phylogenetic).

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202 Rand and Torok interrogate Freud's position on their question: ''Is what patients say about their childhood experiences true or false?'' Regardless of being stuck in what might be considered a rather unpsychoanalytic terminology, they prudently poin t out the importance of this question by pointing out how damaging it could be to a survivor of the Shoah for an analyst to treat his or her memories as if they were fantasies. They might also have pointed out how damaging it can be to treat fantasies as memories, though this danger is rarely discussed in certain revisionist psychoanalytic circles due to the necessary reappraisal of the extremes of the psychoanalytic orthodoxy with respect to imposing or enforcing oedipal fantasies as truth and therefore as therapeutic After documenting Freud's equivocation and sometimes bizarre twists of rhetoric between 1897 and 1924, Rand and Torok conclude that ''[b]ecause Freud could neither reject nor accept the reality of infantile traumatic sexual events, he emphasized in 1916 the value of a hybrid concept, psychical reality, in which truth and falsehood coincided' (37) Rand and Torok's argument breaks down when they fail to see that Freud's conception of truth is not always or fundamentally the same as theirs,-that is, truth for Freud is not the faithful representation of objective reality as Rand and Torok seem to assume it is. Moreover, they incorrectly conclude that ''psychical reality is for Freud the falsification of objective or material reality'' (38). This latter statement is complicated by the fact that ''psychical reality'' includes both the unconscious and conscious, and truth, reality, (alsehood, etc., will be different with respect to both, though not always necessarily. In other words, and as Lacan emphasizes, psychic reality can be a lie and true at the same time.

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203 Rand and Torok's argument, however, is particularly off with respect to truth, which they treat simplistically and as if it could ever be extra-tropological. Psychic truth for Freud is less the correct representation of reality, one type of correspondence theory, as it is the correct representation of the beyond of the unconscious-another beyond, and another type of correspondence theory. The truth of psychic reality, not external reality, is what is privileged by Freud. It is consistently the object of his studies. Lacan is helpful here as he treats deception and lies as evidence of the truth (Lac77b 139-140). The Freudian and Lacanian truth is supposedly unbearable, traumatic even, and this is why it is repressed by consciousness. It is not that trauma is a ''face to face'' with something totally other, but an encounter with a truth of some sense: the supposedly castrating truth of castration. Rand and Torok wonder ''what provoked Freud's choice of the term reality (even if psychical) to designate what, in the same lecture, he keeps calling invented stories, fictions, falsehood, and falsified memories'' (38). For Freud, the reality and truth of psychic reality is more ''real'' than material reality, and yet Freud falls into the same problematic equation of truth and reality as he tries to present his theories as scientific, not being able to come to terms with the consequences of his ''otherwise'' moments on truth and science. He avoids problematizing his own position with respect to this ''truth," and asking questions regarding what is at stake when the object is the split subject and with the mise en abyme of any analytic or theoretical endeavor given this split. In other words, psychic truth-reality is more true for Freud than material truth-reality (whatever this might be): It remains a fact that the patient has created these phantasies for himself, and this fact is of scarcely less importance for his neurosis

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204 than if he had really experienced what the phantasies contain. The phantasies possess psychical as contrasted with material reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in the world of the neuroses it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind. (XVI 368) Freud's unilateral focus on psychic reality, and his negation of the importance of ''external reality'' suggests that he would extend this ethos beyond the world of the neurosis to the world in general. Besides not fully appreciating or acknowledging the potential mise en abyme quality of his endeavor-as Derrida asks, ''how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an unterminated self analysis, give to a worldwide institution its birth?'' (Der87a 305)-Freud makes the mistake here of assuming a ''material reality'' that would not also include a psychic reality, or psychic processing. In other words, Freud assumes an imprint-type memory contradicting his previous work on memory. What is significant here, however, is that ''reality'' can and should be read as ''truth'' and should be associated with the psychical world. This reading helps us understand the earlier chapter in Lecture XXIII, where Freud writes, ''we should equate phantasy and reality and not bother to begin with whether the childhood experiences under examination are the one or the other'' (XVI 368). For Freud, fantasies represent the truth of sexuality in the context of psychic reality. This seems to be an answer of ''both'' to Rand and Torok' s question-''ls what patients say about their childhood experiences true or false?''-though understandably they would find this answer unsatisfying. And neither should this answer satisfy us. But the problem seems to me to be less the answer, more the question, and what would constitute satisfaction. Rand and Torok, like Freud, trip over the terms of their question. Another way

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205 of addressing what is at stake with Freud's concept of psychic reality is to approach it with respect to how this concept relates to the changing horizons of what ''lies'' beyond this type of reality, especially with respect to the issue of chance. I read Freud's statement from Lecture XXIII above as saying that psychic reality and fantasy represent a truth that overrides anything that might happen in ''material reality'' or ''external reality'-that is, anything that might include chance, according to Freud's inside (detreminism)/outside (chance) binary. If for Freud the only ''beyond'' of psychic reality is external !eality, this would mean that psychic reality would in effect be a deterministic totality since external reality doesn't ''really'' ''matter." The other beyonds of this reality might be what lies beyond the navel of the dream, the death instinct, and/ or repetition, and what follows attempts to show how Freud especially the Freud of the Wolf Man case, the Introductory Lectures, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety-attempts to tie all of these ''beyonds'' together and define them in terms of the truth of psychic reality. This reading of the war-years and later Freud focuses on his attempt to create a system, a totality that connects origins and teleologies, in the form of a narrative, what Peter Brooks calls ''Freud's Masterplot'' in his essay by that name. The Wolf Man Case History The bulk of From the History of an Infan tile Neurosis, otherwise known as the Wolf Man case history, was written in the autumn of 1914 soon after Freud had ended the analysand's initial treatment which had lasted for four years. Freud would also add two important passages in 1918 before its publication. The case seems to be Freud's response to the defections of Adler and Jung, who were

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206 critical of Freud for his single-mindedness regarding the importance of infantile sexuality. In the ''Editor's Note," Strachey writes that the Wolf Man case history ''is the most elaborate and no doubt the most important of all Freud's case histories'' (XVII 3). Strachey probably felt this way because Freud seemed to intend the case to work as a means of unification for the young psychoanalytic community, but also as a means of delimiting what counted as psychoanalysis and what did not: those theories or theorists that denied the centrality of infantile sexuality as defined by Freud in this case were out of bounds. In a similar vein, Nicholas Rand writes in his introduction to Abraham and Torok's The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonomy that the Wolf Man case was written as ''Freud's test case for the establishment of psychoanalysis as a transmissible school of thought'' (Iii). The centerpiece of this centering case history is the analysand's dream at age four of wolves in a tree, and not surprisingly Freud interprets this dream as evidence of infantile sexuality playing a crucial role in the Wolf Man's neurosis. Freud initially interpreted this dream as evidence that the analysand had been a witness to his parents having sex ''a tergo'' at the age of one and a half, what Freud called a ''primal scene." For Freud, the dream was a reproduction of this primal scene in a different and pathological context, a product of Nachtrtiglichkeit (though it is unclear what this child-as-pre-sexual concept might be in this context). Freud's request in a 1912 letter to the ''Open Forum'' of the psychoanalytic community that his colleagues ''collect and analyze carefully any of their patients' dreams whose interpretation justifies the conclusion that the dreamers had been witnesses of sexual intercourse in their early years'' (XVII 4) further suggests that Freud was trying to establish that the witnessing of this

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207 event, the ''primal scene," was some ingredient of a new take on the origin of his psychoanalytic etiology of neurosis: a new caput Nili that included sexuality, infancy, and some sense of a trauma. The pathology, however, the disruption to normal development, was not some supposed trauma of witnessing the scene. Freud initially argues that the trauma, what created the deferred pathological context of the dream, was an experience and memory of ''seduction'' by the analysand's older sister, as with the ''seduction'' theory. Later, in the 1918 addendum, he argues that this primal scene, this fantasy /memory, was universal, part of normal development. Freud initially wants to establish the ''primal scene'' as the origin of the neurosis, but then, as I argue below, he later tries so hard to secure its ''reality'' that he ends up universalizing it as a phylo ''genetic'' part of the truth of the unconscious, which means it can no longer serve as an origin of a neurosis if neurosis is a detour from normal sexual development-and which means we are left asking, whence the neurosis? Which is another way of asking, whence the chance that differentiates the normal and the neurotic? Which opens up myriad other fundamental questions since the truth of psychoanalysis, what is found, is supposedly found via its ability to cure neurosis. Freud interpreted the Wolf Man's lasting ''sense of reality'' left by the dream as more evidence that there had in fact been such an event for the dreamer to witness: [This lasting sense of reality] assures us that some part of the latent material of the dream is claiming in the dreamer's memory to possess the quality of reality, that is, that the dream relates to an

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occurrence that really took place and was not merely imagined. (XVII 33) 208 At this point in the case Strachey refers the reader to the section ''Representation by Symbols," in chapter six, ''The Dream Work,'' of The Interpretation of Dreams, where Freud makes a similar argument in which a sense of reality was a symbol of the material existing in memory and that the event with which it is associated actually took place (V 372)-one of many examples of how The Interpretation of Dreams is at least partially committed to a symbolic approach to interpretation, therefore to a ''scene of writing' of translation. Though this symbol would of course in some way be acquired, I will note in passing that, in the same passage of The Interpretation of Dreams where he establishes the symbolism of the sense of reality, Freud states unequivocally that ''dreamers have symbolism at their disposal from the very first'' (V 373), which suggests that this symbolism must precede the individual. Though the Freud of 1912-14 seems unambiguously intent on establishing that the event of copulation between the parents actually occurred and that the infant child witnessed it, what we find with the Freud of 1918 is potentially a form of the kettle logic Freud so humorously interprets in his Jokes and the Unconscious of 1905: A. borrowed a copper kettle from B. and after he had returned it was sued by B because the kettle now had a big hole in it which made it unusable. His defense was: ''First, I never borrowed a kettle from B. at all; secondly, the kettle had a hole in it already when I got it from him; and thirdly, I gave him back the kettle undamaged." (VIII 62)

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209 Freud argued that the primal scene was ''indispensable to a comprehensive solution of all the conundrums that are set us by the symptoms of the infantile disorder, that all the consequences radiate out from it, just as all the threads of the analysis have led up to it'' (XVII 55). In the interest of buttressing infantile sexuality as the foundation of psychoanalytic theory and practice, Freud was positing here a new caput Nili of neurosis. But what constitutes this primal scene? Is it made up of memories somehow separated from fantasies? Is it a trauma? How would it then be related to the other centerpiece of psychoanalytic thought at the time, the Oedipus complex? Freud's first answer, which in some ways reads like a defense to Jung and Adler's criticisms, is that ''it is impossible that [the primal scene] can be anything else than the reproduction of a reality experienced in childhood'' (XVII 55), and in ''the present case the content of the primal scene is a picture of sexual intercourse between the boy's parents in a posture especially favourable for certain observations'' (ibid.). Freud argued so vehemently for the ''reality'' of this scene, for this scene as event, that he could ''see no other possibility'' and claimed that ''either the analysis based on the neurosis in his childhood is all a piece of nonsense from start to finish, or everything took place just as I have described it above'' (XVII 56) .... I never borrowed a kettle. In his 1918 addition to the case, Freud writes that ''we cannot dispense with the assumption that the child observed a copulation, the sight of which gave him a conviction that castration might be more than an empty threat'' (XVII 57), but that perhaps ''what the child observed was not copulation between his parents but copulation between animals, which he then displaced on to his parents, as though he had inferred that his parents did things in the same way'' (ibid.). The kettle already had a hole in it.

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210 Obviously Freud did not believe that his analysis of the Wolf Man should now be considered ''a piece of nonsense from start to finish'' because he had changed his mind about the necessity of the child witnessing his parents, though we might wonder why he did not revise his initial version of the case study before he published it. A clue to why he did not revise is given at the end of the added passage when he asks of potential critics if he seems ''unwilling to admit'' (XVII 60) that he had altered his position. Part of his answer to this potential criticism-''I intend on this occasion to close the discussion of the reality of the primal scene with a non liquet-'' (ibid.)-suggests that he does feel he or psychoanalysis is on trial, something like a law suit regarding a kettle. This ''it is not clear," with a ''yet'' subsequently attached to it in another part of his answer, points to a later development in the case, to the third defense, and suggests that this third somehow integrates the case as a whole. I believe that Freud did not revise the earlier version because he did not see the two lines of argument presented above as necessarily contradictory, and especially not as candidates for kettle logic. To support this claim I propose that the third (kettle logic requires at least threes, whereas contradictions require only twos) suggests a way of reading all three as coherent: These scenes of observing parental intercourse, of being seduced in childhood, and of being threatened with castration are unquestionably an inherited endowment, a phylogenetic heritage, but they may just as easily be acquired by personal experience. (XVII 97) Yet, on the surface, it would seem that we can ''dispense with the assumption that the child observed a copulation'': I gave him back the kettle undamaged.

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211 Primal Phantasies: Freud as the Archeologist of the Mind This third, what Freud called primal phantasies, c~mplicates such categories as memory, fantasy, observation, reality, among others, by introducing a Lamarckian phylogenetic foundation to psychic reality. H we read Freud's first answer to the conundrum of the status of the Wolf Man's primal scene ''it is impossible that [the primal scene] can be anything else than the reproduction of a reality experienced in childhood''-with respect to the phylogenetic third answer, ''reality'' can be read as a phylogenetic reality, though the experience of it in childhood would itself be a reproduction. In the second answer-''we cannot dispense with the assumption that the child observed a copulation''-''observation'' could be construed as a part of the recalling of a phylogenetic ' m e mory," an internal ob s ervation of sorts. If we assume the centrality of the third, Freud's logic no longer appears to be necessarily of the kettle sort With the centrality of this third we have another dimension to our an swer of ''both ' to Rand and Torok's question, ''Is what patients say about their childhood experiences true or fal s e?'' Material might be true or false ontogenetically and be the opposite phylogenetically Perhaps we should read the phylogenetic/ ontogenetic split as what constitutes the split of the Freudian ''subject'' after the Wolf Man ca s e. Despite Freud's persistent and intense rhetoric regarding the objective and external reality of the event observed by the Wolf Man at age one and a half, we can now understand why he might consider this issue unimportant in 1918: I should myself b e glad to know whether the primal scene in my present patient's case was a phantasy or a real experience; but,

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taking other similar cases into account, I must admit that the answer to this question is not in fact a matter of very great importance. (XVII 97) 212 Of course, it is important if we are trying to establish an etiology, an origin of neurosis: again, as a fantasy the primal scene could hardly constitute a pathogen since it would be universal. It seems, however, that Freud-despite the fact that he is writing a case study-is at this point moving away from grounding his theories on etiologies of neurosis and toward a more grand masterplotting. Freud's reliance on this third--one that can be made to seem that it ties it all together and thus allows Freud to avoid the criticism of kettle logic-and his confusing undifferentiated use of ''reality," ''truth,'' and ''experience'' with respect to ontogeny and/ or phylogeny help us to understand Freud's non abandonment of ''seduction'' as an element to his etiology of neurosis in the Wolf Man case, which is another issue for Rand and Torok. Freud needs a pathogen specific to the case. In ''The Aetiology of Hysteria," after trying to allay his audience's doubts about the reality of the sexual scenes of ''seduction'' Freud supposedly reconstructed with his so-called hysterical patients, he added the following footnote in 1924: ''All this is true; but it must be remembered that at the time I wrote it I had not yet freed myself from my overvaluation of reality and my low valuation of phantasy'' (III 204). To ''The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense'' he added a similar footnote in 1924: This section [on the ''specific aetiology of hysteria''] is dominated by an error which I have since repeatedly acknowledged and corrected. At the time I was not yet able to distinguish between my patients' phantasies about their childhood years and their real

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213 recollections. As a result, I attributed to the aetiological factor of seduction a significance and universality which it does not possess. When this error had been overcome, it became possible to obtain an insight into the spontaneous manifestations of the sexuality of children which I described in my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). Nevertheless, we need not reject everything written in the text above. Seduction retains a certain aetiological importance, and even to-day I think some of these psychological comments are to the point. (III 168) '' All this'' about the ''seduction'' theory is ''true'' except, according to Freud, the misappropriation of the scenes to the category of ontogenetic memory. But how can ''all this be true'' if ''seduction'' goes from being what disrupts normal development to a universal fantasy? In other words, how can ''seduction'' as a fantasy be the etiology of a neurosis if it is a universal fantasy? According to Freud's ''logic," ''seduction'' ''retains a certain aetiological importance'' with respect to phylogenetic phantasy-memory. And we find that ''seduction'' is one of the three primal phantasies, the others being the primal scene and castration. But how can the primal phantasies constitute the origin of an etiology of neurosis if they are at the center of normal development, if they are universal? What we find, despite Freud's twisted ''logic'' employed in an attempt to create continuity between the ''seduction'' theory and oedipal psychoanalysis, is that a radical reevaluation of everything claimed within these ''seduction''-theory essays is needed. No specific origin, and therefore no specific etiology, can be gained from them since everything that is attributed to ontogenetic reality, experience, or truth after 1918 should be reconceptualized in phylogenetic terms.

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214 Freud's rhetoric in his notes to the ''seduction'' theory essays is similar to that of his Wolf Man case, where he is so insistent on the ontogenetic reality of the ''reconstructed'' events that it seems that, if he is not convincing, the example and the theory won't hold itself together-and then, in a blase manner, he argues that it is not important that the event occurred after all. What is consistently important for Freud up to this point is the origin of his etiology, which, during the war, he had decided were the primal phantasies. This origin, however, combines (conflates) material and psychic reality,norinal and neurotic, and grounds p s ychic reality and Freud's privileged for111 of truth in phylogeny. All that we find in the prehistory of neuroses is that a child catches hold of this phylogenetic experience where his own experience fails him He fills in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth; he replaces occurrences in his own life by occurrences in the life of his ancestors (XVII 98, my italics) Gaps in individual 'truth'' would only be created when individual experience strays from phylogenetic experience-truth-reality. We find evidence in the passage above that Freud does not wish to distinguish between reality, truth, and even experience Furthermore, the agency given to the subject here ''He fills in ... and ''he replaces ... "-is misleading since ''prehistoric truth'' would always already be there, always already constitute the narrative structure and meaning, and the individual would certainly be passive with respect to this narrative and the symbolism determined by its transcendental meaning. Certainly this subversion of the ontogenetic subject to a phylogenetic ''subject'' or ''other'' would constitute ''the Freudian breakthrough'' for some

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215 When discussing in 1938 the importance of the mother as the first object of the child, Freud would argue: In all this the phylogenetic foundation has so much the upper hand over personal accidental experience that it makes no difference whether a child has really sucked at the breast or has been brought up on the bottle and never enjoyed the tenderness of a mother's care. In both cases the child's development takes the same path .... (XXIIT 188-89, my italics) This passage has special significance with respect to four issues, only two of which concern us at present. The first of the two that will concern us only later is the issue of what constitutes t~e ''original experience of satisfaction'' that establishes the ontogenetic primary process and the corresponding pleasure principle, and whether chance could ever play a role in this ontogenetic moment of origin. The second of these two is the significance of ontogenetic experience and chance in general: ''personal accidental experience." The first issue I want to address presently concerns the importance of the ontogenetic reality and the chance events that were a part of the Wolf Man's specific primal scene for the coherence of this case history. We are reminded that the Wolf Man's primal scene included coitus a tergo in order for him to develop his various fantasies of his parents' and sexuality's relationship to castration, and the intricacies of his (and Freud's) scatological fantasies, which were supposedly confirmed by the Wolf Man's ''transitory symptoms'' of farting during session (XVIT 80). The infant Wolf Man, Freud concludes, defecated while he watched his parents' coitous a tergo, which gave him an excuse to scream and interrupt what he saw. When Freud protects himself from criticism by adding, ''It would

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216 make no difference to the story as a whole if this demonstration had not occurred, or if it had been taken from a later period and inserted into the course of the scene'' (XVII 80-1), I wonder if the Wolf Man might have taken a shit while watching the dogs, or how such an insertion would work. I also wonder how Freud might account for his scatological associations phylogenetically, which, of course, he could do since ''Man's'' primaeval experience amply provides such material. But this accounting could never square with his appeals to the ontogenetic experiences o f the Wolf Man, the requirement of any case study to establish an etiology that accounts for the specifics of that case; and that accounts for what is pathogenic. Regardless, many of the intricacies of Freud's interpretation are left ambiguous with respect to their phylogenetic or ontogenetic status, which, it seems, is what Freud wants -that is, it is an important aspect of his rhetorical strategy. What remains clear is that Freud's interpretative leaping room is greatly increased by the shell games he plays with the categories of ontogenetic, phylogenetic, phylo-''genetic," and the associated categories of truth, reality, and experience. The second issue of interest here concerns the date of the quotation above: 1938. I refer to this date in order to dispute the common claims of the psychoanalytic orthodoxy who would like to believe that Freud's phylogenetic theorizing, what Peter Gay calls Freud's ''Lamarckian fantasy'' (Gay88 368), was short lived, primarily a product of the war years, and ultimately not important to psychoanalysis and its legacy (its transmissibility as a school of thought, as Rand would say). Despite the centrality of phylogeny in psychoanalytic theory after 1913, the psychoanalytic ortho~oxy has consistently marginalized phyolegeny. Its centrality is evidenced by the necessity of such theories for Freud's theories

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217 and claims to achieve some semblance of coherence (which certainly helps with transmissibility), and the importance of these types of theories in such major works by Freud such as Totem and Taboo (1912-13), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the E g o (1921), The Future of an Illusion (1927), and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). The position that it was just a passing fancy of Freud during the war years is supported by occasional claims of Freud himself discounting the importance of phylogeny, which suggest that he was ambivalent at times with respect to his dependence on such theories. For example, Freud writes in the Wolf Man case, I am aware that e x pression has been given in many quarters to thoughts like the s e, which emphasize the hereditary, phylogenetically acquired factor in mental life. In fact, I am of opinion that people have been far too ready to find room for them and ascribe importance to them in psycho-analysis. (XVII 121) We find here, if not another candidate for kettle logic, a clear example of Freudian legerd e main Freud see ms to be referring to Jung here, and in an exasperating and bizarre ca s e of active forgetting, seems to repress the fact that the coherence of this very case relies on what Freud posited as an ''unquestionable'' ''inherited endowment, a phylogenetic heritage'' (XVIl 97), an endowment of memory-fantasy that supposedly made it immaterial whether the Wolf Man witnessed the primal scene at age one and a half or not. More poignantly, Freud was forgetting the importance he attributed to Totem and Taboo as a grounding of the universality of the Oedipus complex in the primal horde's relation to practices of exogamy and to the killing of the primal father. A year or so after writing the passage above from the Wolf Man case, Freud wrote the

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following passage in his Introductory Lectures, which seem to express his conviction, or at least the part of him that was convinced, that the ''phylogenetically acquired factor in mental life'' was actually of crucial importance: 218 The only impre$sion we gain is that these events of childhood are somehow demanded as a necessity, that they are among the essential elements of a neurosis. If they have occurred in reality, so much to the good; but if they have been withheld by reality, they are put together from hints and supplemented by phantasy. The outcome is the same, and up to the present we have not succeeded in pointing to any difference in the consequences, whether phantasy or reality has had the greater share in these events of childhood.... I believe these primal phantasies, which I should like to call them, and doubt a few others as well, are a phylogenetic endowment. In them the individual reaches beyond his own experience into primaeval experience at points where his own experience has been too rudimentary. It seems to me quite possible that all the things that are told to us to-day in analysis as phantasy-the seduction of children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental intercourse, the threat of castration (or rather castration itself)-were once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family, and that children in their phantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth. (XVI 370-71)

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219 It seems that Freud was the only one allowed to appeal to phylogeny. And, again, among numerous other repeated themes, we see here the conflation of ontological and phylogenetic experience, reality, and truth. We also find here how Freud makes these phantasies the origin of neurosis and then contradicts the possibility that they could ever differentiate the normal and the neurotic by making them universal endowments. Despite the importance Freud gives the primal phantasies and phylogeny from 1913 to the end of his life in 1939, these concepts and themes are hardly discussed by either Ernest Jones or Peter Gay, two of Freud's most read biographers. Gay alludes to Freud's attempt to ''plot the succession of neuroses onto a corresponding historical-or rather, prehistorical--sequence'' (Gay88 368), an allusion to Freud's 1915 letter to Sandor Ferenczi, but Gay's treatment suggests that it is a passing fancy of merely peripheral significance. Gay makes the mistake of lumping all of Freud's Lamarckian and phylo-''genetic'' theories into one group and then di s mi ss ing th e m as insignificant, and concludes that ''while it lasted, Freud's phylogenetic fantasy at once elated and disturbed him'' (ibid.). In a footnote, Gay writes: During the war, as he told Abraham, he toyed with the possibility of enlisting Lamarck in the psychoanalytic cause by demonstrating Lamarck's idea of ''need'' to be nothing other than the ''power of unconscious ideas over one s own body, of which we see remnants in hysteria, in short, 'the omnipotence of thought''' (Freud to Abraham, November 11, 1917). (Gay88 368) What Gay misses is that Freud did not have to make an announcement of enlisting Lamarck because he had already done so, as evidenced by Totem and

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220 Taboo, among the other central works mentioned above. Gay blinds himself to the crucial importance of this recurring theme of phylogeny in Freud's work between 1913 and 1939. This blindness also seems to be endemic to the psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Freud's legacy In Freud: Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend, Frank Sulloway provides a corrective to the blindness of the orthpdoxy. He argues that Freud's Larnarckian foundational theories were a crucial aspect of his thought since the mid-1890s (364-65), and to his general and published theories after Totem and Taboo. In Sulloway's chapter, ''Evolutionary Biology Resolves Freud's Three Problems," he argues this by showing how Freud, through his unique take on phylogeny, was able to r eso lve what Sulloway believes were the three problems which had proved so recalcitrant in the mid-1890s: ''the nature of pathological repres sio n, Why sex?, and the choice of neurosis'' (367). Sulloway argues that between 1895 and 1905, the year of the Three Essays, Freud makes a ''shift from pro x imate-causal theory to ultimat e -causal theory'' (365), the former's concern being ontogenetic and specific, the latter's phylogenetic and universal Etiology-based theory would be proximate-causal, whereas metapsychologies and masterplots would be ultimate-causal. Sulloway sees the Project as Freud's abortive attempt to provide a proximate-causal explanation of brain functioning and suggests that it was because of its proximate-causal limitations, and not its attempt to ground his theori es biologically, that Freud gave it up. I would argue that the Project represents Freud's first attempt at an ultimate-causal theory, a psuedo-biological metapsychology. Freud's theories of hysteria, including those found in the Project, would be more representative of his proximate-causal work. In general, Freud was always more drawn to ultimate-causal theory: even his

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case work was used to ground his ultimate-causal theory, sometimes at the expense of his own proximate-causal claims, as with the Wolf Man. Sulloway sees Freud as a ''biologist of the mind'' and finds his evolutionary and ultimate-causal theories as an attempt to provide a much needed ''universal theory of human behavior'' (367). Of course, I find such totalizing attempts of grand theorizing to be anathema to my attempt at achieving a Levinasian ethic of not reducing the Other to more of the Same. Furthermore, ''Lamarckian fantasies'' should not be associated with ''evolt1tionary biology'' as Sulloway argues, but with mythopoetic and social 221 psychological history-archeology: I put ''genetic'' in quotes because his primal phantasies are outside of any time, idealistic. I will try to show below that Freud was more the mythopoetic ''archeologist of the mind'' or the oddly Lamarckian ''Platonist of the mind." With respect to the question of the role phylogeny played in Freud's theorizing, I am in partial agreement with Sulloway, who argues that, In short, phylogeny was Freud's final answer to many of the difficulties that threatened to undermine his most basic psychoanalytic claims. From the problem of attributing neurosis to phantasies instead of to real events, to the issue of just how universal were the psychosexual stages and neurotic complexes that Freud espoused, phylogenetic suppositions played a paramount role in legitimating his science of the mind. (388) Of course, ''attrib~ting neurosis to phantasies'' ~ay have helped Freud avoid the problems of chance, the criticism that suggestion had played a role in his analyses, but it also creates another problem: whence the neurosis? Freud's

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222 ultimate-causal solution does not work for significant proximate-causal problems such as ''the nature of pathological repression, Why sex?, and the choice of neurosis'' (Sul92 367). That Freud believed his ''phylogenetic suppositions played a paramount role in ligitimating his [supposed] science of the mind'' should be obvious by the importance he gave the books he wrote on the subject, from Totem and Taboo to Civilization and Its Discontents. Sulloway recounts how Freud tellingly responded to Fritz Wittels' critical biography of Freud of 1924, where Wittels argues that Freud's various caputa Nili-seduction, threats of castration, the witnessing of primal scenes,-are in reality far too infrequent to support Freud's claims of their universality: ''Duly inscribed by Freud in the margin of his personal copy of this book is his confident handwritten retort 'und die Phylogenese?' ('and what of phylogeny?')'' (Sul92 386). Freud's Masterplot Revisited Narratology and the Wolf Man Referring to Freud's presentation in Beyond the Pleasure Principle of the fort/da game played by his grandson, Derrida argues in ''To Speculate on 'Freud''' that It is neither a narrative, nor a story, nor a myth, nor a fiction. Nor is it the system of a theoretical demonstration. It is fragmentary, without conclusion, selective in that it gives something to be read, more an argument in the sense of a schema made of dotted lines, with ellipses everywhere ~ (Der87a 298) It seems that the same could be said about Freud's case histories, especially the Wolf Man case, which is very much part of an extended argument, seemingly

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223 directed at Jung primarily, concerning the importance of infantile sexuality. In ''Fictions of the Wolf Man: Freud and Narrative Understanding," Peter Brooks argues that though a case history is a ''nonfictional genre concerning a real person, the case history of the Wolf Man is radically allied to the fictional," and he gives the following as reasons: ... its causes and connections depend on probabilistic constructions rather than authoritative facts, and on imaginary scenarios of lack and desire, and since the very language that it must work with, as both object and medium of its explanations, takes its form from histories of desire consubstantial with what cannot be. (Bro84 284) As I have gone to some lengths to show that Freud was only satisfied with facts discovered in a context of determinism (no probabilities, no chance), and that the case histories he created he saw as histories of truth (consubstantial with what is),-Freud went to great lengths to distance his work from the fictional, and himself from the creative writer. That Freud went to such lengths, however, would suggest that Brooks is indeed on to something. Moreover, that Freud intended to produce the nonfictional is hardly a conclusive argument regarding what he actually produced. But his intentions are significant with respect to the arguments of the Wolf Man case history, and whether it should be read as an argument. Is the Wolf Man case history an argument, a history, a narrative, or all three? How should we read it? Logos for Aristotle was an argument, an imitation of the real, and provided the basis for mythos or plot. The category myth is useful to include in our discussion when considering Brooks's notion of

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224 fiction. Frank Kermode's differentiation of myth and fiction creates yet another level of complexity to our already overly complex categories: We have to distinguish between myths and fictions. Fictions can degenerate into myths whenever they are not consciously held to be fictive .... Myth operates within the diagrams of ritual, which presupposes total and adequate explanations of things as they are and were; it is a sequence of radically unchangeable gestures. Fictions are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change. Myths call for absolute, fictions for conditional assent. Myth makes sense in terms of a lost order of time, illud tempus as Eliade calls it; fictions, if successful, make sense of the here and now. (Ker66 39) Certainly the Wolf Man case history, with its source in the ritual of analysis and its appeals to a primaeval time, which creates a stable and absolute context of significance, should be associated with Kern1ode's category of myth. Yet, in his reading of the Wolf Man case, Brooks associates Freud and his Wolf Man case with modern novelists: In his narratives-as in all his writings-Freud shares with such other modernists as Conrad or Joyce or Proust a basic pessimism about life stories and their putative plots. His vision of man insists on the limits to man's self-knowledge and mastery of his own biography. (Bro84 284) Freud was pessimistic about the life stories others told themselves, but it is clear from one consistent aspect of Freud's rhetoric that his pessimism regarding self

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225 knowledge obviously did not extend to his own mastery of his or others' life stories: and that aspect is his confidence in the curative power of his analyses (though this confidence, especially with respect to the Wolf Man, was misplaced), including his self-analysis. I would group Freud with those modernists whom Kermode would ''without difficulty convict ... of dangerous lapses into mythical thinking," those modernists who ''venerated tradition and had programmes which were at once modern and anti-schismatic'' (Ker66 104). In contrast to these mythopoeic modernists-Pound, Wyndham Lewis, Yeats, and Eliot-Kermode applauds Joyce for writing fiction: ... Ulysses alone of these great works studies and develops the tension between paradigm and reality, asserts the resistance of fact to fiction, human freedom and unpredictability to plot. Joyce chooses a Day; it is a crisis ironically. The day is full of randomness. There are coincidences, meetings that have point, and coincidences which do not. We might ask whether one of the merits of the book is not its lack of mythologizing; compare Joyce on coincidence with the Jungians and thei~ solemn concord-myth, the Principle of Synchronicity. From Joyce you cannot even extract a myth of Negative Concord; he shows us fiction fitting where it touches. (Ker66 113) This passage touches on s~veral issues. What is the tension between paradigm and reality? Can fiction containing a plot ever avoid being mythical? How d~es chance factor into this tension? What is the relation of chance to mythologizing? to reality? Does what I will argue is Freud's Negative Concord show us

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something ''fitting where it touches''? Does Freud's Wolf Man case history? Again, how should we read it? In ''Freud's Masterplot: A Model for Narrative," Brooks turns to Freud and his Beyond the Pleasure Principle 226 ... not in the attempt to psychoanalyze authors or readers or characters in narrative, but rather to suggest that by attempting to superimpose psychic functioning on textual functioning, we may discover something about how textual dynamics work and something about their psychic equivalences. (Bro84 90) Though Brooks's essay is a complex reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle that foreshadows Derrida's ''Speculate'' in significant ways, it is severely limited by his definition of ''textual'' as ''narrative'' that ''rejects the merely contingent'' and moves ''toward totalization," and ''plot'' that structures ''action in closed and legible wholes '' (Bro84 91). In his analysis of Sartre's La Nausee, Kermode finds ''a kind of crisis in the relation between fiction and reality, the tension or dissonance between paradigmatic form and contingent reality'' (Ker66 133). For Kermode, the contingency of life is not representable in narrative or plotted time. The time of narratives is always kairos, ''the season, a point in time filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end,'' whereas the time of life or reality is chronos, '''passing time' or 'waiting time'that which, according to Revelation, 'shall be no more''' (Ker66 47). Though narratives and life share in that the end may be imminent, in life the end of death does not create kairos because of the uncertainty and contingency that surround death, its timing, and its beyond. Events in the context of chronos are

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227 like the letter that may not arrive at its destination, and, indeed, Brooks's ''textuality'' is similar to Lacan's language: it always arrives at its destination . The rejection of ''mere contingency'' leads to the world of plots being of kairos and destiny (destinational). Freud's myth of Negative Concord fits ''where it touches'' only if ''psychic reality'' is one of determinism, if there is some kind of ''omnipotence of thought," and within a metaphysical context of logocentrism, where thought (argument) imitates reality (logocentrism). Whether the Wolf Man's primal scene was a representation of an ontogenetic and external reality becomes immaterial, as Freud claimed, if the ontogenetic truth of the individual is preprogrammed phylogenetically, and if truth is primarily concerned with psychical reality, and if psychic reality constitutes a context of deterxninism. Yet, if it does not matter whether the primal scene was an ontogenetically produced memory that in some way corresponds to an ontogenetically experienced and external reality, or a phylogenetic fantasy-memory, then whence the pathology? Using a well-worn trope, one that is disavowed by the psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Freud attempts to save the argument of/in his case history from the abyssal question that follows his grounding all of his claims on the foundation of a phylogenetic origin-why would the Wolf Man suffer from pathology given the determinism of psychic reality and phylogenetic origins?-by contradicting the determinist logic of the totality that results from his ''it doesn't matter'': the chance ''seduction'' by his sister supposedly disrupted the healthy ontogenetic realization of the normal disharmony (the proper disharmony of the Negative Concord) between the Wolf Man's consciousness, primal phantasies (unconscious), and the external world Several (abyssal) problems stem from this answer with respect to the totality of the ''it does not matter'' logic. First, why

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228 such a seduction would be pathological when seduction is also one of the primal phantasies remains unexplained. In other words, it is the contingent nature of this event that seems to be what separates the Wolf Man from a normal development, and contingency is negated by the ''it does not matter'' and the fact that the contingent event is also a primal phantasy (if dogs can count as a primal scene, then a sister can count as a seduction). Moreover, much of Freud's rhetoric leads the reader to equate the primal scene, if not to the original trauma, then to the origin of the deferred process of trauma, the origin of the etiology of neurosis, that ''memory'' which is deferred to the time of the dream. The reality of the external and ontogenetic event of the primal scene seems to be important for Freud initially because he is trying to establish what in the Wolf Man's unconscious is pathogenic, what makes his wolf dream so unsettling. Another seemingly contingent or arbitrary element of the Wolf Man's development also seems to be at the core of his pathology according to Freud-his identification with his mother-but the source of this identification is left unclear. Regardless of the source of his identification with his mother, the ''it does not matter'' of 1918, regarding the nature of the primal scene, creates a logic that conflicts with the logic of the initial writing of the Wolf Man case history in 1914, where it did matter, where the contingent event, that which is supposedly unique to the Wolf Man, that which will explain his unique psychology, ~as the memory of an event and the basis of an etiological narrative. At the core of this conflict is the relationship to contingency of Freud's arguments and the masterplots for which he argues. If we are all endowed with a determinist phylo-''genetic'' preprogramming, what separates the neurotic from the normal would depend on ontogenetic, ''exogenic'' contingency, though it is difficult to see how this

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229 contingency could have an impact on psychic reality within Freud's ''it does not matter'' logic. I read Freud's Wolf Man case as an ultimately internally conflicted argument: first for the importance of infantile sexuality directed at Jung and Adler; and then, second, for the importance of primal phantasies for determining this reality when he realized that ''reconstructions'' of events at age one and a half cannot escape sounding like the analyst's constructions. Given the significance of infantile sexuality and phylogeny for Freud during the war years, and how both of these issues were associated with Jung and the emotional break up between them, these factors-their interrelatedness and how they manifest in the Wolf Man case in a way that makes the text conflict with itself should not be marginalized in any reading of this case history. Whereas infantile sexuality and the conflict with Jung are often kept front and center in readings of the Wolf Man case, I have not discovered a reading unfettered by marginalization and neglect of phylogeny's role in creating the conflict of logics between the initial writing in 1914 and the addition of 1918. In ''Fictions of the Wolf Man," Brooks writes about the Wolf Man case: ... in the place of a primal scene we would have a primal phantasy, operating as event by deferred action. And Freud refers us at this point to his discussion of the problem in the Introductory Lectures, where he considers that such primal phantasies may be a phylogenetic inheritance through which the individual reaches back to the history of mankind, to a racial ''masterplot." (Bro84 276, my italics)

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230 How could a primal phantasy not be a phylogenetic inheritance? I read Brooks ''may' as suggesting his own desire that these theories of Freud's had indeed been merely peripheral. More to the point, Brooks does not consider the sea change of context and logic the switch to phylogeny as the true ''origin of origins'' (ibid.) certainly introduces, nor does he consider the significance of the differences between what Freud wrote in 1914 and what he wrote in 1918. Though Brooks (strangely) deems Freud's turn toward phylogenetics and his ''does not matter'' twist of rhetoric in 1918 as ''one of the most daring moments of Freud's thought, and one of his most heroic gestures as a writer'' (Bro84 277), Brooks does not read Freud as being committed to the certainty of such phantasies in the Wolf Man case, despite the case's dependence on this ''third'' to pull it together, and, moreover, despite what Freud wrote in the Introductory Lectures and the obvious fact that Freud wrote several volumes to which he gave central importance to phylogenetics Brooks' essay, ''Freud's Ma s terplot," reserves the idea of ''masterplot'' for ontogenetic plots, which suggests that Brooks doesn't consider Freud's phylogenetic plotting as integral to his ontogenetic plotting. He differentiates phylogenetics by calling it a ''racial masterplot'' (Bro84 276). Though a phylo ''genetic'' plot that determines ontogenetic plots would seem, in one respect, to qualify it for the qualifier of ''master," Brooks's idea that the plotting of Beyond the Pleasure Principle is more general is based on the idea that, for Freud, the plotting of the life and death drives is applicable to all life. Yet the only grand or master plotting Freud commits to-any beyond on which we might base a rnasterplot-is one that is limited to the human race (the beyonds of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Derrida argues, are left as hypotheses). Moreover, it seems that

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any Freudian masterplot would be centered on the Oedipus complex, and Oedipus is hardly mentioned i~ Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 231 Freud's ''racial masterplot,'' like his case histories, however, does not provide what Brooks considers to be essential to plotting: Kermode's idea of the ''sense of an ending." Brooks privileges the plotting of Beyond the Pleasure Principle due to the prominence of death in its plotting, and as an ending, which is in harmony with Brooks's Lacanian-destinational conclusions about ''how textual dynamics work and something about their psychic equivalences." What Brooks calls a ''racial masterplot'' suffers from being more like a history, or case history, in that the present is the end of the fabula, and the sj11zet is a simple cause and effect working backward in time to the end at the origin. But Freud's sense of oedipal destiny-Freud consistantly associates destiny and fate with the oedipal inheritance of every individual, the super-ego-is the product of a ''sense of beginning." The ending is immanent in the origin, the history-ontogenetic (case history) or phylogenetic-is one of determinism and destiny, and the time is kairos. Given how Freud explicitly argues that phylogeny determines the foundation of human ontogenic psychology, how could any Freudian masterplot be limited to ontogeny? In other words.-and what seems rather obvious in retrospect -any Freudian masterplot for humankind would have to have the type of oedipal essence that the phylo-''genetic'' primal phantasies of primal scene, seduction, and castration constitute: the origin, teleology, and destiny of the Freudian oedipal ''racial masterplot." With respect to the Wolf Man case and the war years, the ending of Freud's plotting is not yet death but cure: it relies, as almost all of his theorizing beyond Beyond the Pleasure Principle does, more on the

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232 sense of a beginning rather than ''the sense of an ending." Of course, the sense he posits blurs the boundary between neurotic and nor111al, between etiology and metapsychology, and therefore blurs his plotting. The coherence of the Wolf Man case as an etiology, as a case history of an analysis, suffers from being on the cusp of this significant and overlooked transition in Freud's thought: the transition from ontogenetic narrative origins to phylogenetic ones. This transition follows from Freud's transition from a memory-based theory to a fantasy-based one and therefore can be seen as an extension of Freud's supposed abandonment of the ''seduction'' theory, which I have argued was more a transition from the chance of memory (a scene of writing potentially of mobile texts) to the deter111inism of a pr ep rogrammed, fantasy-based psychic apparatus (a scene of writing of immobile te xts, translation). Freud's Oedipal Masterplot I believe a brief summary of my version of Freud's masterplot at this point will be helpful-that is, one that includes both phylo-''genetics'' and ontogenetics. The ''origin of origin'' for the post-war Freud is his primaeval ''man," and the androcentrism here is int~nded. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle it will be the simplest form of life, a plotting that attempts to go beyond human kind, beyond a ''racial masterplot .'' Freud is more an ''archeologist of the mind'' during the war years, whereas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle he is more a ''philosopher of life," despite his railings against philosophers and his disavowal of their influence on his writing (see Derrida's ''Speculate'' and below). The essential primaeval man, like the infant and the primary process, knows no deferral, no difference between thought and action He acts on his desires

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233 without hesitation. He is imbued with sexuality and knows no limits as to whom he can pursue as a sexual partner. Once he is a part of the primal horde, however, the primal father has blocked his access to potential sexual objects. Freud's primal man is essentially a primal son, an Oedipus. The primal father is totemic. The subject mother /sister /wife/ daughter is largely absent: she is reduced to an object of exchange. Parricide leads to access to all the potential sexual objects, including and especially the primal mother. Cannibalizing the primal father is not just vengeance, but a process of incorporation, something more profound than identification, and related to the process of mourning. The guilt the primal son feels follows this incorporation and is transformed into totemic law (eating of the totem), especially in the form of structures of exogamy and the punishment of castration for transgression of these structures of Law. Castration is the punishment for going outside these boundaries, but it can also describe the state of those that do transgress--not the effects of punishment necessarily, but the effects of simply transgressing the structures of the law. This is the state of being the sons experienced, the trauma, after they transgressed the original law of the father. Th~ law erected by the sons is not arbitrary, but repeats the effects of their original deed: it tries to fix it, work through their trauma, totemically, symbolically. As a threat of punishment for transgression, castration is associated with both that which structures and the trauma of going beyond those structures. As a totemic symbol, we might call castration a trauma structure trope. Not only do we have the Oedipus complex encoded here in Freud's cave man theories, but we also have its resolution in the Symbolic of the Law of the Father (Lacan): the polymorphous perversity of the infant-man-son

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234 (trauma castration) is transformed into civilized man of the totemic father-law (structure castration). What is crucial to understand about the phylo-''genetic'' inheritance is that it contains symbols of both trauma something akin to the sliding signifiers of La can's Symbolic -and the center of the inherited structures of drives and fantasies something akin to what Lacan calls the ''point de capiton'' of the Symbolic. If trauma is defined as a puncturing, that which disrupts a certain order by breaking its boundaries and creating chaos in its structures, a symbol of trauma would seem paradoxical: how could there be a universal symbol of disorder? Freud makes this symbol castration, the absence of the penis-phallus, an opposition of a specific absence to a specific presence. The unconscious, according to Freud, is indifferent to contradiction. Referring to Lacan, Derrida calls the logic of castration, ''le manque a sa place," or the ''lack in its place/the lack has its place'' (Der87a 425n10). Castration as trauma suggests there is only one order to disrupt, a phallocentric one, and one type of chaos, the specific absence of this order. Wh e r e as for Freud it sugg es ts that there is only one possible order, for Lacan it is much more than merely suggested. Given that Freud's phylo ''genetic'' conception of order in Totem and Taboo is the law of the totemic or symbolic father a law forbidding parricide and the strict rules of exogamy, it should not be a surprise that castration would then be a symbol for that order: the opposite (the absence of the penis-phallus) of what centers the structure of that order (the presence of the penis-phallus). This sets up order and its other as an oppositionality, a binary, and difines chaos as the absence of this order rather as something radically different. What is crucial here is the difference between the absence of a specific order, and an understanding that might position the

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235 traumatic other, not as an ''opposition'' that negatively secures a certain position, but as potentially something radically or totally other. This something totally other might be a beyond, but for Freud and Lacan there is only ever lack and oppositions, which is my general thesis here. This is what I believe Derrida is alluding to when in ''Speculate'' he states the issue under consideration as ''the question of position (Setzung), the question of positionality in general, of positional (oppositional or juxtapositional) logic'' (Der87a 259). With respect to Lacan, this (op)positional lack is what Derrida calls ''castration-truth," and it is the basis of Lacan's destinational linguistics, which in turn is the basis for his ''return to Freud." For Derrida, '1ack does not have its place in dissemination'' (Der87a 441), and ''dissemination'' can be understood as an aspect of his adestinational take on language and writing. For Lacan, the Symbolic is both that which structures, its center, and that which is Other: the law of the father, that which structures the unconscious, and where signifiers somehow are always sliding despite being ''anchored'' by the transcendental signifier of the phallus. Lacan's Real is the absence of the ''Symbolic'' with a capitol ''S," and should be associated with its phallic center in the form of ''das Ding." Lacan's transcendental Oedipal structure is more linguistic, whereas Freud's is more anthropological or mytho-idealistic. Whereas Lacan locates this oppositional, contradictory logic in language, which the unconscious is supposedly structured like, Freud locates it in the phylo-''genetic'' primal phantasies. For both, however, it is ''castration-truth," and both would argue that the unconscious does not mind such contradictions (''contradiction'' is reduced to this specific presence/ absence). The issue I want to draw attention to here, however, is that the trope of castration as lack and an opposition between

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236 order and the absence of order (not necessarily disorder) is common to what grounds both Freudian theory after Totem and Taboo and Lacanian theory in general. There is no place for something totally other than the place established by lack, something beyond this place or its (op)positionality. No place for chance; no chance of something otherwise than this place and non-place. With his conception of the Symbolic, Lacan faithfully returns to Freud's ''trauma'' structure trope of castration he posits with his phylogenesis. The quotes of '''trauma' -structure'' denote an (op)positional logic rather than one of radical alterity. Some will object to my conflation of the penis and phallus, but I am following Freud, and Lacan, the latter of whom writes of the ''real phallus'' and ''symbolic penis'' (qtd. in Evans 141). Freud consistently conflates the two, as he does what is psychically real (because it is inherited phylogenetically) and what is ''externally'' and ontogenetically ''real." Freud writes about trauma and its relationship to castration in his 1926 work Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. In this work we find Freud treating what he had earlier presented as a childhood sexual fantasy, that females have been castrated, as something quite ''real'': Furthermore, is it absolutely certain that fear of castration is the only motive force of repression (of defense)? If we think of neurosis in women we are bound to doubt it. For though we can with certainty establish in them the presence of a castration complex, we can hardly speak with propriety of castration anxiety where castration has already taken place. (XX 123, Freud's emphases) Le manque a sa place. It is especially with respect to castration that the term ''real'' is used carelessly by Freud, as he refers to it as a ''real anxiety'' (XX 162) (where

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237 the danger is known and real), ''real danger'' (XX 126), and repeatedly as a fear (where the danger is known and real). Despite the confusing and illogical overlapping of categories, Freud makes little distinction between phalluses and penises. Indeed, foreshadowing my treatment of anxiety below, Freud makes little distinction between exogenic and endogenic dangers: 'We should not be threatened with castration if we did not entertain certain feelings and intentions within us. Thus, such drive-impulses are determinants of external dangers and so become dangerous in themselves'' (qtd. in Weber 56). And then,'' ... the external (real) danger must also have managed to become internalized if it is to be significant for the ego. It must have been recognized as related to some situation of helplessness that has been experienced'' (qtd. in Weber 57). Castration assumes the position of, not a danger, but as danger itself, due to both its endogenic and exogenic ''reality," that which connects the phylogenetic and ontogenetic. The phallic order, the oedipal organization and organizing of the primal phantasies, would also seem to constitute the essence and the ''point de capiton'' of both sides of the various splits and the various pairs of primaries and secondaries in Freud's theories. The phallic order, therefore, would be the origin of those ontogenetic orders of primary repression and would deterrnine the ontogenetic ''original experience of satisfaction," which would in turn determine the ''perceptual identities'' of both the primary process and the pleasure principle (I emphasize ''both'' here because the ''perceptual identity'' is the origin of both processes, according to Freud). Freud wrote to Jones on August 1, 1912: ''Every internal barrier of repression is the historical result of an external obstruction. Thus: the opposition is incorporated within; the l1istory of mankind is deposited

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238 in the present-day inborn tendencies to repression'' (Sul92 370). The ''external obstructions'' of the primaeval horde can be linked to the primally repressed, which, Freud argued, like a magnet, pulls from the unconscious, and pulls on like material that reaches consciousness. Repression requires both a pull and a push, he argued. Besides being another indication of his commitment to thinking of repression as the interdiction of translating one identity into another, one position into another (op)position, this push-pull concept of primal and secondary repression suggests a necessary identity between endogenic reconstructions of phylo-''genetic'' memory-phantasy and exogenic reconstructions of ontogenic memory-phantasy. The identity would be as necessary as repression and meaning. Two of the primal phantasies-the primal scene and seduction-constitute a matrix of positive drives and aims. The primal scene positions the parents as sexual objects, imagoes of sexuality and sexual difference. Seduction denotes the aim of having sex with the sexual object. Seduction and primal scene seem to constitute what Freud called the ''sexual instincts." Castration negatively denotes the basis for all of what Freud calls the ''ego instincts'': the whole (masculine) body being the basis of ''the bodily ego'' and the ''ego ideal." The primal phantasies combine the dualism of sexual instincts/ ego instincts (self-preservative instincts), which was Freud's dualist position on the instincts prior to Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Obviously the primal phanfasies are primal. Being phylo-''genetic'' they would constitute a transcendental (always already) ''origin'' prior to any ontogenetic origin, including the ''original experience of satisfaction," which inaugurates the primal process and the pleasure principle through its binding of

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239 the perceptual identity. Again, this perceptual identity constitutes a tendency or aim of whatever mobility follows its establishment as the basis of the primary process and pleasure principle; thus this mobility is not free. The original experience of satisfaction is often assumed to be the feeling of satisfaction at the breast. With phylogeny included in the process, a satisfaction that precedes the establishment of the pleasure principle becomes less enigmatic, at least superficially. Regarding the satisfaction of being fed, the primal phantasy of a sexual connection to the mother can serve as the basis for an ''original experience of satisfaction'' of the real thing. In other words, regardless of who or what feeds the baby, the satisfaction of being fed could be ''experienced'' and ''remembered'' as satisfying a desire to be sexually connected to the mother. The perceptual identity would, therefore, be determined to be bne of sexual connection to the mother regardless of ''mere contingency." Of course, this logic suggests that the reality principle could indeed be, according to Freud's logic here, a ''psychical reality'' principle, since all of the obstacles to immediate repetition of the ''original experience of satisfaction'' would be encoded in the obstacles to such satisfaction inaugurated by the primal sons after the primordial crime. In other words, the ''no'' of the father during the oedipal years would also be independent of ''mere contingency," and therefore the reality principle would be significantly, if not totally, determined by phylogeny. These phylo-''genetically'' encoded obstacles of reality would act like the required preestablished Q11 in the Project, which foresees the quantity required to meet the ''exigencies of life,'' and thus establishes the ego: a similar logic to the push-pull logic of primal repression, where what comes from the ''outside'' is matched by what waits for it on the inside (predetermined, foreseeing). As I will argue later in terms of

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240 anxiety, Freud, with his phylo-''genetics'' especially with respect to the positive aspects of the primal phantasy of the threat of castration, the predete1mined ''no'' of the father, and the whole-body ego-ideal-is guilty of the same hypostasizing of the ego of which he ac cuses Rank in his criticisms of The Trauma of Birth (see XX 150 ff.). These phylo-''genetic'' encodings, according to the logic of the Wolf Man case history, among other writings by Freud, would have precedence over the contingencies of life, such as being bottle fed, not witnessing your parents having sex, or not being afraid or anxious about castration. This line of argument returns us to the questions of Freudian th eory and the beyonds of ''external reality'' and the depths of the unconscious. Freud's phylo-''genetic'' masterplot reduces these beyonds to its own logic : it moves toward totality. The only context for significance within this masterplot would be in terms of its origins and the phantasmatic structures of that origin. Thus the only events that matter are those that can be redu ced to the code of this ma s terplot Since psychic reality is privileged by Freud-it is the only r ea lity that matters-all ''events'' are reduced to its code, even traumati c ones. With both ''external reality'' and the unconscious reduced to the codes of phylogeny, there is not much left to constitute a ]en seit, contrary to Cornell's claim that it is certain that ''Freud always returns us to the problematic of ] enseits, the other side, the beyond of the unconscious'' (Cor98 139). Freud's etiological narratives.-with the ending of his analysand's supposed cure, cure being the sign of Freud's mastery-transform from proximate-causal, causation limit ed to the individual, to masterplots, ultimate causal narrative sr or ''racial masterplots," which include the whole species (see

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241 Sul92 365). This transformation can be seen in the difference between the two parts of the Wolf Man case: the part written in 1914, the original and major part, being more the former, and the later supplement showing signs of a ''racial masterplot." This dramatic change might account for why there are no major case histories written by Freud after 1918, the 1920 case of the homosexual woman being, like the Dora case, fragmentary: after 1918 Freud seems more interested in ultimate-causal masterplots than etiologies, and case histories require etiological structuring. Regardless of this drama tic change, Freud's etiologies from 1896 up to 1918 have remarkable similarities in structure. Those who focus on the differences between the two ''mainstyle'' plots of 1896 and 1918 generally fail to incorporate phylogeny into their conceptions of the later masterplotting and to define adequately notions such as memory, fantasy, trauma, the primary process, and the pleasure principle, among others, in terms of Freud's phylogeny. For both ''mainstyle'' plots, trauma exists either at the origin or at least in relation to it through deferred action or Nachtrfiglichkeit Though Sulloway misreads Freud's phylogeny as ''biogenetic''-it is neither biological nor genetic-he is a rare exception with respect to giving the primal phantasies their due with respect to trauma: Also from the vantage point of his biogenetic-Lamarckian presuppositions, Freud was able to attribute to ''pure phan~asy'' a degree of traumatic force that was otherwise missing from his general [psychoanalytic] etiological framework. Writing in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud later insisted that the potentially pathological overreactions of children to their oedipal

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242 situation were hardly surprising when properly understood as a brief repetition of the more severe experiences with the terrible father of phylogeny [XXI 131]. Similarly, he rationalized the traumatic nature of castration threats by appealing to ''a phylogenetic memory-trace'' of the actual deed, which long ago was performed by the jealous father of the primal horde whenever his sons became overly troublesome as sexual rivals [XXIII 190n., 200, 207]. (Sul92 387) With the ''seduction'' etiology a sexual ''scene'' of violence occurs but is not registered by the infant as traumatic because the scene lacks a certain context for meaning for the suppo s edly pre-sexual child. With primal phantasies, the case is more complicat e d. The traumas of the sexual ''scenes'' of primal phantasies-primarily castration, but also the primal scene and seduction-would unfold during the first five or so years of life in an ontogenetic version of the tri a l s of the prim a eval son, which ends in either the resolution or non-re s olution of the Oedipus compl ex In both cases, there is a memory of trauma that is d e ferred until a later context In the latter case, Nachtriiglichkeit, as a crucial compon e nt of Freud's plot of original presence and destiny, is radically other to the deferral of differance. Though the introduction of phylogeny and ultimate-causal narratives solve some of Freud's problems especially with respect to the repetition he posits at his origins, and the contingency of ''external reality'' not necessarily providing the scenes proper to his masterplot-they are also fraught with problems. For example, what might cause the non-resolution of the Oedipus > complex is uncl e ar given Freud's privileging of the ''psychic reality'' of these

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243 primal fantasies-memories over the ''reality'' of the individual child's unique experiences. More to the point here, the ''traumas'' of the primal phantasies are supposedly necessary for the normalcy of the sexual development of the child, whereas in the ''seduction'' etiology they were the source of pathology, that which disrupted the proper development. For example, the ''no'' of the symbolic father, an aspect of the primal phantasy of castration, would recall both the castration of the primal sons prior to their parricide that is, the fantasy-memory of the primal trauma-and the flip side of this trauma, the totemic law. Whence the neurosis if the trauma associated with what disrupts proper development is also the foundation of the structure of that development? If a priori trauma and structure are combined, so are pathogen and normalcy. In the ''seduction'' etiology, the ''scene'' represents a violence from ''external reality," and the psychic conflict arises with a psychic change: the pre-sexual child becomes sexual in puberty, and so gives the memory of ''seduction'' a new context and therefore a new and unacceptable meaning R e pres s ion and neurosis ensues. The neurotic in this case is thus differentiat e d from the norm by the violent event of early childhood-that is, the chance violence that was forced onto the child and diverted from its normal developmental path. In the psychoanalytic etiology, the ''scene'' is ultimately psychic. What could possibly cause deviation in such a hermetic system? ''Castration-truth'' reduces the potential trauma of the Other by treating that Other as the center of the Same-''trauma'' -structure-and as a specific absence of the supposedly transcendental presence of the phallus: phallogocentrism. My goal here is to show how Derrida's reading of Lacan in these terms in '~La facteur de la verite'' also applies to the oedipal Freud and his

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244 masterplot when his reliance and belief in his phylogenetics is taken seriously. In the rest of this chapter, I will argue that Freud's notion of castration becomes very broad in later works, especially Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, and that he reduces any possible ontogenetic event -all of ''external reality'' and its contingency, anything that might constitute a force for deviance from the prescribed path, anything resembling trauma-to castration. With this reduction, a reduction at the core of the introduction of phylogeny as the true ''origin of origins," I am left with four ''ifs'' that take us in the direction of recognizing Freud's phylo-''genetic'' masterplot as something totalitarian: 1 If primal phantasies contain both trauma and the structure of the drives ... 2. If primal phantasies constitute both the origin and essence of ontogenetic psychic reality ... 3. If there is no chance in psychic reality, and ... 4. If the playing out of these phylogenetically determined scenes is more significant than the ''mere contingency'' of ontogenetic experience ... . then whence neurosis? Moreover, whence the split subject? What happens to psychoanalysis and the ''Freudian breakthrough''? What would constitute a Jenseit? My incomplete answer to this series of questions is that Freud's etiologies change into masterplots with the introduction of his phylo-''genetic'' masterplot, and one result of this paradigm shift from proximate-causal narratives to an ultimate-causal one is that the ending of the narratives, that which gives the narratives a sense, is no longer cure. Freud's caput Nili of his masterplot is no

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245 longer the source of pathogenesis, but of a more fundamental and ultimate genesis. What is lost in the 1918 ''logic'' of the Wolf Man case history, the very logic that helps it avoid being an example of what Freud calls ''kettle logic,'' is the sense of a pathogenic beginning. Trauma and the source of pathogen are like the repressed for Freud: they continue to return. It will even do so as Freud moves away from etiologies and becomes further committed to his phylogeny based masterplot. Freud defines trauma as the piercing of structure, what he refers to as the ''vesicle'' (see Der87a 347), a structured energetics of the ''inside of the inside." According to Freud, there are two possible sources of energy or Q, both outside the hermetic system of the vesicle: the outside of the outside (the ''exogenic'' source or ''external reality''), or the outside of the inside (an ''endogenic'' source that was, during the war years, the unconscious). Since Freud has such a specific conception or positioning of the ordering of the inside of the inside, the hermetic system, both of the outsides are treated as oppositions to that ordering. Ultimately, Freud equates these two ''outsides," positioning both of their orders as orders, as positional, in terms of the negative of the order of the vesicle. In other words, both of the beyonds of the vesicle order are defined and reduced to the order of the vesicle, to the absence of its order. And ultimately, I will argue, neither beyond is ultimately considered as potentially different. This positioning of the outsides as positions, as orders or the absence of this specific order of the vesicle, is achieved by Freud via his ''trauma'' -structure trope of castration, which (op)poses what is otherwise as presence/ absence and accounts for both. Freud, eventually reducing all disruptions to the order of the vesicle to castration, makes this order a phallocentric one.

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246 Whatever contingency there may be in ''external reality," it is reduced to the negative position of this order, its (op)position. The chance that either or both outside orders might be different than the negative of the inside order, might not be castration to its penis-phallus, is not seriously considered, just as the chance that the inside order might be anything but phallocentric is not serious! y considered. Difference and chance are not seriously considered: therefore, something beyond these (op)positionalities is not seriously considered. Serious consideration would require something more than an occasional or oblique reference to some potentially ''otherwise'' concept-such as Bahnung, free association, overdetermination, the mobile cathexes of the primary process, the difficulty in taming sexuality, the supposed disorder of the unconscious, the thallus, and the navel of the dream, among others-which would later be buried by those aspects of Freud's oedipal totality. It would require some systematic, logical, and fuller accounting of something beyond Freud's phallic (op)positionality not that his phallic order is really all that systematic, as I have also tried to show. Would such a systematic account of a beyond to Freud's phallic order necessarily reduce that beyond to another phallic order? Is systematicity necessarily phallic? Only if difference is necessarily repressed by (op)positionality with systematicity, and if difference is reduced to sexual difference, and this is defined in terms of the phallus, as with Freud's castration truth. As Derrida argues, this repression and reduction of difference are not necessary. What is at stake for me here is whether this (op)positionality is something necessary to Freudian theorywhether anything would remain if it was taken away, left behind, ''posted." With his phylo-''genetic'' ''origin of

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247 origins," Freud has reduced the ''outside of the inside," the unconscious, to such an absence of the phallic order. What remains is the ''outside of the outside,'' ''external reality," the only source of contingency left to this metapsychology, and always a thorn in Freud's side: the potential trauma of trauma. Freud's masterplot, like a traditional novel, cannot help but repress contingency. ''To Speculate on 'Freud''' and Beyottd ... The remainder of contingency, something quite other to Freud's determinist totality, that which haunts any totality, can be thought of as a trauma from which the oedipal totality of Freud's ''racial masterplot'' suffers, that which the totality tries to reappropriate by reducing to castration: not something radically other, but the specific absence of the specific order: a mode of binding an otherwise energetics. Concurrent with the development of this masterplot was the first world war, which produced many sufferers from what inescapably seems to be the effects of exogenic and contingent violence on the vesicle. For Freud, the natural opening of the vesicle, the inside of the inside, was always thought of as directed toward the outside of the inside,-that is, the opening of the vase-like metaphor was thought of as turned inward. Freud assumed that the ''stimulus barrier'' between the vesicle and the outside of the outside was greater than the one between !he vesicle and the outside of the inside: the vesicle was open and vulnerable to unconscious drives, more vulnerable than it was to external Q. With what Freud called the ''war neuroses'' or ''traumatic neuroses'' (consistently differentiated from ''transference neuroses'') the contingency of ''external reality'' would seem to have been more than ''mere contingency."

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248 When perhaps millions of war veterans returned from the horrors of war, they presented symptoms, such as repeated ''traumatic dreams,'' which threatened at least one of the basic ideas of Freudian theory: the wish-fulfillment of dreams, which for Freud was practical! y synonymous with the pleasure principle. These repeated dreams suggested that not every dream works as Freud had theorized in The Interpretation of Dreams, where, like the perceptual identity of the primary > process, the wish-fulfillment of the dream would constitute the immediate binding of a wish usually associated by Freud with the memory traces of early satisfactions. According to Freud, the dream takes advantage of the sleeping sensors of the ego to enjoy such ''primaeval'' pleasures and processes without the hindrance of the secondary process and it s def err al of satisfaction. The incessant repetition of ''traumatic dreams'' of so many veterans disrupted Freud's plotting, > creating spaces-not gaps, since gaps follow the logic of lack-of something quite different from the simple absence of the phallic order of Freud's masterplot. Following Derrida, I read Beyond the Pleasure Principle as a reaction to this trauma, this trauma to Freud's ma s terplot-order of trauma, even a symptom of this trauma's effects. Beyond .. is ultimat e ly a mode of binding what is otherwise in order to maintain a spec ific order. What we find in Beyond ... is something similar to the symptoms of the shell-shocked veterans: repetition of what would seem to be something unpleasurable to the order in question, an ego, ego-ideal, or masterplot. Freud always associated psychic health with the individual's ability to construct a coherent self-narrative. With his so-called ''hysterical'' patients, he would, attempting to fill the gaps he ''found'' in their narratives with his caput-Nili plotting, consistently assume he was in possession of the knowledge of the whole narrative. What seems to be at stake is Freud's

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249 mastery, his ability to masterplot the wholeness of his phallic masterplot, and ''Freud,'' as an id e ntity and the basis of an in sti tutional legacy. ''Freud'' and the masterplot here are the same. Freud's r e lationship to cure had been one of mastery through c ure, and, paradoxically cure through mastery. With Beyond ... Freud seems more interested in re-establishing his own story, his ultimate causal masterplot, and not with cure and proximate-causal etiologies at all. All of the se themes are at least touched on in Derrida's ''To Speculate on 'Freud,"' a reading of Freud's Beyond th e Pleasure Principle as an example of what Freud describes ther~ 'Specu late'' is a m e ticulous and extended reading of Beyond .. and Derrida plays with Freud's id e ntification of himself with his pleasure-principl ebased th eo ry'' Freud'' and the legacy he hopes it will afford him due to its ''transmissibility'' (Rand)-via Derrida's use of the acronym ''PP," which, in French, i s a homophone for ''pepe," or grandfather. Derrida associates Freud as grandfather with both the s tory of Freud's grandson's game, fort/da, and with Freud's concern with his/psycho a nalysis's lega cy What Freud tells of his grandson, Heinz, playing with a spoo l, is repeated by Freud with the game he plays with the PP in Beyond .... Throughout ''Spec ulate,'' Derrida wonders about the ''mise en abyme'' effects of the rel a ting being an exa mple of what is being related: The sto ry that is related ... seems to put into ''abyme'' the writing of the relation (let us say the history, Historie, of the relation, and even the history, Geschichte, of the relater relating it). Therefore the relat e d is related to the relating (304) Derrida differentiates ''fort/da'' (with a slash), where there is equivalence between the two sides of the binarism, from ''fort:da'' (with a colon), where there is ''an

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250 overlap without equivalence," suggesting that the da of fort:da is always implied by the fort (hence the colon), more a narrative than a binarism. According to Derrida, Freud plays fort:da, rather than fort/da, with the PP in Beyond ... (321). Freud dispatches the PP, envoi, only to have it come back to its proper destination: ''Freud." The return is immanent in the dispatch: fort:da. Derrida sees in the self-posting, the establishing of the proper, indications of something totally other (why the need to post?), and he calls this the logic of the postal relay. It is in this postal relay of the self-posting that Derrida reads Freud showing us the beyond, not by what he writes, but by what he does. Derrida seems to be arguing that there is something basic about this self-posting with regard to any identity's relation to what is totally other to identitarian logic. Barratt calls something like self-posting ''the act of establishment." Like the unheimlich aspect of ''heimlichkeit," there is always a demonic aspect to the double, the double created via the distancing of oneself when one self-posts as one must: the distancing of the dispatch, the necessity of expropriating to reappropriate. The combination of the abyssal effects of Freud's ''related'' in Beyond ... would then be ''related to the relating," and the impropriety of the proper created by the nece ssa ry dispatching of self-posting constitutes a significant example of a beyond Derrida ''finds'' in Beyond .... Less abstractly, Derrida argues that Freud's fort:da with the PP is played when his ''positions'' on the Jenseit end up either negated or being left in the for1n of a hypothesis, making Beyond ... an athetic text. At moments in ''Speculate,'' I am left wondering if Derrida admires Freud for not ''taking a position'' on the beyond, as if Beyond ... were some text akin to his own or to Levinas' s speculations on speculating on the Other. The a thesis of Freud's Beyond ..

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251 however, is more a product of his game of fort:da than any precursor to Levinasian ethics. Derrida makes clear that even Freud's hypotheses that seem like they would be a threat to the mastery or totality of the PP end up in some way being in the service of the PP-if not completely a slave to the master, then partially a slave (repetition) or very much of the same logic (the Todestrieb). Freud's inability to position a beyond to the PP is a product of his desire to treat the PP as a totality: the self-born master who must secure his legacy. The logic of the PP is ultimately totalitarian. ''Speculation'' is how Freud obliquely refers to philosophy, and Freud argues strongly that somehow his ''abandonment'' to speculation in Beyond ... is somehow necessary, yet it manages to completely avoid ''any contact with philosophy proper'' (XVIII 59). Derrida connects speculation to debt, specifically to Freud's blatantly disavowed debt to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. With regard to genealogy, Derrida suggests, ''Freud'' is not just about contJ:olling the descendancy, but also the ascendancy: always the legator, never the legatee, an Oedipus with no Laius. Derrida is critical of Freud when Derrida points out that Freud puts the expression ''perpetual recurrence of the same thing'' (Der87a 269) between quotation marks, but does not cite the stoics or Nietzsche, whose concept of ''eternal return'' would seem to share a great deal with Freud's repetition compulsion, if this repetition were indeed something of or from the beyond. It is as if Freud were never a son, his own father, and grandfather-a PP-and as if he had no debt, no inheritance with which he speculates. Freud's positioning of the pleasure principle in opposition to a beyond suggests that the PP is that which (he who) constitutes the realm of mastery, that which (he who) establishes the boundaries of what is known and certain. Given

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252 that the pleasure principle is the primary principle of the unconscious, the principle almost indi s tinguishable from the primary process, we find that the unconscious, at least to some degree, no longer constitutes the beyond for the Freud of Beyond.... In fact, the system Ucs. has become that which is known, that which would supposedly itself have a horizon and a beyond: it is indeed a system, it is one of sense, and, therefore, it is not based on a process of mobile cathexes. When Freud asks, what is the beyond of the pleasure principle, he is asking what goes beyond his understanding of the psychic systems, including the system Ucs. Freud's ''racial'' masterplot is analogous to the PP here: it is what is known and certain, it spans all that is known, it is what will insure the proper legacy, and it is what will, surviving this trauma of (war) trauma intact, admit no threatening beyond of radical alterity, just a beyond that reestablishes its position and necessity. The PP must be considered phylo-''genetically'': it spans both phylogeny and ontogeny. The phylo-''genetic'' aspects of the masterplot might be considered the beyond of the pleasure principle because it is that which established the PP Unlike Derrida, however, I consider Freud's origins as a part of what they inaugurate since they are in some odd way ideal, or outside of time, yet material and ''genetic." The beyond Freud seems to be wrestling with in Beyorzd ... has more to do with a masterplot of life in general, the greater context of his masterplot of human life. We could read the title as ''beyond the oedipal masterplot." The beyond of the general masterplot would be in harn1ony with the life/ death of this ''racial'' i:nasterplot since the life/ death of the oedipal masterplot is still about a proper detour, but in the terms of castration

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253 The orthodox reading of Beyond ... positions the Todestrieb and the repetition compulsion as two possible beyonds of the pleasure principle. When Freud theorizes trauma, however, repetition serves the PP and the ego by being the process of reconstituting structure: repetition allows for the binding of the unbound energy that had disrupted the structures. In this case repetition would not necessarily be a beyond, but part of the Bemiichtigungstrieb, or drive/instinct to master. Freud, however, does not embrace this possible beyond of Bemfichtigung st rieb by making it a thesis or a position. Derrida points out that this same possibility of Bemfichtigung strieb can be logically deduced from Freud's vague po~itioning regarding the Tod es tri e b. Derrida begins ''Speculate'' by pointing out that ''Speculate'' is an extraction from a seminar entitled, ''la vie la mort," or life death (259). Derrida sees life and death as inseparable in the logic of Freud's Beyond ... and as another disavowed debt of Freud's to Nietzsche, who, according to Derrida, ''said that life is a very rare species of death'' (355). The (eternal) return to the deathly state of inactivity, the destination of all detours-prefigured in the Project as the principle of inertia and later as the Nirvana principle establishes death, the zero state, as primary, and life as an extension or detour of it. Derrida argues that, for Freud, the path this detour takes, however, is far from arbitrary or contingent: The component drives are destined to insure that the organism dies of its own death, that it follows its own, proper path toward death. That it arrives by its own step at death ( eige nen Todesweg). That are kept far from it (weg! we might say, fernzuhalten he says) all the possibilities of a return to the inorganic which would not be ''immanent'' to it. The step must occur within it, from it to it,

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between it and itself. Therefore one must send away the non proper, reappropriate oneself, make oneself come back [revenir] 254 (da !) until death. Send oneself [s' envoy er] the message of one's own death. (ibid.) Here we see a repetition of the self-post, the postal relay. When one sends ''oneself the message of one's own death," one is sending oneself the ''sense of an ending'' (Ker1node) of the narrative that gives one's life a context for meaning. Derrida calls this drive to die one's own death, that which deter1nines the proper life and makes it a proper aspect of death, ''the drive of the proper'': The drive of the proper would be stronger than life and than death .... neither living nor dead, its force does not qualify it otherwise than by its own, proper drivenness, and this drivenness would be the strange relation to oneself that is called the relation to the proper: the most driven drive is the drive of the proper, in other words the one that tends to reappropriate itself .... Life death are no longer opposed in it. (356-57) Behind the instability of Freuq's life/ death opposition is Freud's reliance on a drive of the proper, a form of self-posting that can only mean the impropriety of the proper, and a beyond of this drive of something radically other. Derrida shows that hidden behind what Freud does (his fort:da of the PP, his self-posting) and what he writes (the (op)positionality of life/ death, and the drive of the proper assumed with the drive toward a proper death) is the irreducible division of any totalizing move, self-post, or drive of the proper. We could even simply say ''drive'' if drive is understood a la Derrida's passage above: the drivenness of any drive implies an Other

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255 Such an Other is not a dualism of Same/ Other: an Other cannot be accounted for, it is beyond calculability. Any (op)positionality is essentially a monism: for example, castration-truth establishes the transcendental phallus, and castration is its absence. Freud's life/ death is also a form of a monism of the proper, of ''castration-truth'' and Oedipus. Freu~ would criticize Jung for his monism and the mysticism of what became the collective unconscious and the Principle of Synchronicity. But Freud's monism was also a mysticism of a Negative Concord, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argued about Lacan in The Title of the L etter: '' the ultimate effect of Lacanian strategy thus turns out to be a surprising but vigorous rep etit ion of negative theology'' (Nan92 xxvii). This monism is what sets up the destinational postal relay of a totality sending itself to itself, and, as Derrida argues, any such self-posting, any such attempt at totality, only becomes more indicative of something totally other. But this is not acknowledged by Freud; in fact, the po ssibi lity of something radically other to the masterplot is dissimulated in myriad ways, as is any debt he has to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer with resp ect to eternal return, mastery, or power. As Derrida points out, Freud's monism can also be described as a Hegelian Aufhebung, where the opposition is preserved in an ideal whole: life-death. Hegel's speculations regarding the Aufhebung would therefore constitute another unacknowl e dged debt for Freud with re spec t to philosophy. Derrida shows how through the mastery of binding, the Bemiichtigung, Freud's ''fort:da of Nietzsche'' is played out with both hypothetical beyonds of the pleasure principle: the compulsion to repeat and the drive of the proper. According to D e rrida's reading of Beyond ... ''[b]eyond the pleasure principle-pow e r '' (405). But Derrida puts power-mastery beyond the pleasure

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principle because he puts binding before the PP: quoting Freud, ''binding (Bindung) is a prepatory act which introduces and assures (einleitet und sichert) the dominance of the pleasure principle'' (XVITI 62). For Derrida, binding as a ''prepatory act (vorbereitender Akt)'' means that, as such, ''it is not yet the PP'' 256 (Der87a 395). We should read Freud's ''introduce'' as making this binding a part of the pleasure principle, and given the significance of phylogeny in Freud's work at this time, the identity established with this ''prepatory act'' would have been determined, prepared for, prior to the origin of the ontogenetic pleasure principle: the ''original experience of satisfaction." So instead of ''beyond the pleasure principle-power," I would argue that Freud's text never avows anything beyond the mastery of the PP-that power, mastery, binding, the proper and its drive, life-death and repetition all serve the PP, and that the PP is better understood as the Negative Concord and ''castration-truth'' of the phylo ''genetically'' based masterplot. ''Freud,'' and the masterplot that ''introduces and assures'' this identity, the PP, his/ its non-ascendancy and its descendancy, his/its speculation without inheritance, without debt, have all recovered from the trauma of the war, the trauma of trauma, through the repetitive pas de marche, his trauma symptom, his fort:da of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Phylo-''genetics'' would constitute a (phylo-''genetically'') bound ''before'' to (ontogenetic) binding: the transcendental PP. Derrida's Freud in ''Speculate'' is not as totalitarian as my Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. His Freud potentially avows a beyond of the PP in the form of a before of binding. As the basic difference between my reading of Freud and Derrida's, I see Derrida's positioning of binding before the PP as an extension of his reading of Freud's primary process that privileges mobile ca th exes or

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' 257 ''rebelliousness'' over identity, and of his neglect of Freud's phylogenesis and the effect it has on the concept of the primary process. Derrida, like the other readers of psychoanalysis here, allows for the possibility that the pleasure principle (''PP'') is something different from the primary process (''pp''), its opposite rather than identical to it: the PP as something identitarian to the pp's something otherwise. Looking at Freudian theory as whole, the primary process could be read as an undecidable between perceptual identities and mobile cathexes, whether it is ''essentially rebellious'' (Der87a 344) or essentially essentialist. Evidence of Derrida's (non)decisions can be ''found'' in his oxyrnoronic description here, and in his other description of the primary process as ''paradoxically disbanded'' (ibid.). Derrida's (non)decision becomes a simple decision with respect to his reading of the pleasure principle as the PP, as essentially an identity, and his (op)postioning of the primary process with respect to this identity: The speculative hypothesis of the repetition compulsion and the death drive do e s not work without unleashing, without the very principle of that which unbinds from all contracture: in this context it is named free, unleashed, unbound, paradoxically disbanded energy, the pp, or the primary process. Binding always will occur in the service of the PP whose mastery, thus, will tend to make an essentially rebellious pp submit to itself. (Der87a 343-44) I agree that these hypotheses do not work without this ''unleashing," but Freud's unleashing, as I have argued, is always reduced to the absence of the structure and, at the same time, the absence that centers the structure or, as with how I have described the primary process, it has a 'memory'' or tendency to return to

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258 the original position of full presence. For Freud, ''unleashing'' is never free, chaotic, contingent, or something truly ''otherwise." As in Lacanian psychoanalysis, the detour circles around ''das Ding'' and properly returns. Derrida's decision about the PP as an identity, and then his (op)positioning of the primary process with respect to the PP, belies that they are both pp's: they both have an identical origin of identity, and both have the ''paradoxical disbanding'' which I describe above as the absence of full presence, and as never one of contingency or differance. Despite Derrida's oxymoronic description of the primary process as ''essentially rebellious," ''Speculate'' can be read as deciding the PP as identity and the pp as rebellious, and opposing them rather than identifying them-as Freud often does (Freud would never have admitted that the PP is simply an identity). The result of Derrida's decision is a Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle that potentially avows, if not posits, a beyond of the PP. I would add that if the primary process of the Project and The Interpretation of Dreams were undecidable, this indeterminacy could be attributed solely to the fact that a simple ontogenetic origin had not been established, could not have been established without Oedipus firmly in his place, which would leave the early Freud with the potential of a (non)origin of repetition. With phylogeny, Oedipus is secured, lack has its place, and an ''origin of origin'' of identity was established: an ident,ity of ''trauma'' -structure and (op)positionality, which would allow the ontogenetic origin to be a repetition of the phylo-''genetic'' (ideal) origin. I have tried to extend Derrida's argument that Freud never posits such a beyond by arguing that Freud moves away from any such avowal in the form of a ''before'' by taking seriously Freud's phylo-''genetics'' as a transcendental Before, an ''always already." Again, the ''genetics'' of

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''phylogenetics'' here should be in quotes because there is no temporal progression or evolution with this idealist process: it is a tran scendental structure, a Symbolic. 259 What is at stake here is to what degree do we read Freud as a totalizing theorist. Derrida is right to criticize Freud for his active forgetting with respect to his debt to certain philosophers, to their ''speculations," and to deconstruct Beyond the Pleasure Principle by showing how Freud's attempt at a totality via the avoidance of a beyond to the PP, Nietzschean or otherwise, is always already divided. I will extend this argument in the next chapter by showing how Freud's masterplotting is ultimately divided with regard to the question of woman. Extending Freud's Masterplot: A Reading of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety Beyond the Pleasure Principle is often treated as a major turning point in the development of Freudian theory With re spec t to Freud's ''metapsychological writings," according to Strachey's introduction, ''Beyond th e Pleasure Principle may be regarded as introducing the final phase of his views'' (XVIII 5) Given the reestabli s hment of the ma ste ry of the PP with Beyond .. and of the oedipal and phylogenetic masterplot I would de-emphasize this claim: the paradigm essentially remains the same. The new instinctual dualism of life/ death, Strachey' s main evidence of a paradigm shift, does not affect Freud's theorizing in any major way, as evidenced by the small role this dualism plays in his subsequent writings, even The Ego and th e Id-perhaps even smaller than the role played by explicit appeals to phylogeny (the implicit appeals being ubiquitous). Life/ death is yet another version of the ''trauma'' -structure trope found in

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260 myriad forms throughout Freud's theory since the Project, especially with respect to origins or structural centers. The question becomes with every form whether and how the trauma-structure trope becomes a ''trauma'' -structure trope of opposi tionali ty In this section I will explore yet another version of this trope in the form of anxiety, along with what could be read, but never has been read, as the paradigm shift of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Freud's masterplot, however, survives this shift. In fact, the shift was immanent in the masterplot since its inception. One significant change r ep r ese nted by Beyond the Pl e asure Principle-but not necessarily a paradigm shift -is Freud's introduction of the economic or structural model As with almost every introduction of new concepts in Freudian theory, Freud would supplement the old versions of his theory more than revise them, even if the new theories would conflict with the old. This particular supplementati?n would create an even more confusing and sometimes conflicted array of categories with vague boundaries, while also creating potentially powerful new ways of conceptualizing the ''objects'' of study. In significant ways, the economic model potentially conflicts with the masterplot and the mastery of the PP, espec ially if we accept Freud's definition of the id as ''chaos' (XXII 73). This conceptualization of the id is almost automatic for most theorists, as is the similar, if not identical, conceptualization of the primary process as rebellious. Yet this conceptualization of the id conflicts and negates a slew of other Freudian conceptualizations So much of how we read Freud depends on sorting through such conflicts. Is it possible to accept the definition of the id as ''c haotic ," without negating much of Freud's work prior to Beyond ... ? The economic model is ba sed on a divi sio n between ''agencies'' that in turn is

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261 based on the ordering of the binding/unbinding of energy (investments). According to the Freud of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, ''the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially differentiated part of it'' (XX 97). But he also claims that in repression ''the decisive fact is that the ego is an organization and the id is not. The ego is, indeed, the organized portion of the id'' (ibid.). The ego is both identical to the id and, at the same time, radically different in terms of organization. According to Freud the id is ''chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations'' (XX 73), and simultaneously the locus of the instincts, which, according to his own, much fought for definitions, are rather organized. In The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Laplanche and Pontalis ask, ''Does the id have a mode of organization-a specific internal structure?'' (198). At first they answer with a quotation from Freud in the New Introductory Lectures: ''it has no organization, no collective will'' (XX 73). They continue: The fact is, however-and it should be emphasised-that Freud transfers to the id most of the properties which in the first topography had defined the system Ucs., and which constitute a positive and unique form of organization: operation according to the primary process, structure based on complexes, genetic layering of instincts, etc. Similarly, the freshly introduced dualism of life and death instincts implies that these properties are organized into a dialectical opp~sition. Thus the id's lack of organization is only relative, implying merely the absence of the type of relations that characterise the ego's organization. This absence is epitomised by the fact that ''contrary [instinctual] impulses exist side by side,

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262 without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other'' [22: 73-74] (198-99). What is at times defined by Freud as being radically otherwise to the ego, the id can only be ''the absence of the type of relations that characterise the ego's organization'' if the predominance of Freudian theory before and after is not to be negated. The id goes from being radically other to a specific absence of a specific presence, an (op)positionality. What I question here is if even this differentiation between the id and ego can be maintained with respect to some of Freud's speculations in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, and whether the typical or traditional differentiations are not either negated or completely turned around. The first question I ask: can the id be differentiated from the ego due to the ego's intolerance of something like tl1e contradiction of instinctual impulses? We might even ask if the ego is not also a ''cauldron full of seething excitations'' for self-preservation? My answer is that Freud's conception of the id, like that of the ego, is an (op)positionally structured organization of identities. As for the id being the ''negative'' of the ego, I will argue to the contrary that, for the Freud of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, the ego is also based on a castration trope, a ''trauma''-structure trope of (op)positionality, making any differentiation between the two problematic, and therefore subverting any supposed ''Freudian breakthrough'' associated with something like the divided subject. Freud's totality problematizes the odd ''differentiation'' he describes in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: ''the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially differentiated part of it'' (XX 97). In other words, because the totality of the Freudian masterplot defines both the id and the ego, the two are difficult to

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differentiate for the same reasons it is difficult to differentiate between the normal and neurotic: there is no room for chance, and the ''trauma'' -structure trope of castration is treated as a transcendental truth. 263 Whereas the id's castration is phylo-''genetic'' only-the inheritance of man's primaeval split between individual desires and group needs-the ego's castration is both phylogenetic and ontogenetic, which would account for its ''special differentiation." If ''external reality'' can be reduced to the absence of phallic order, as in the phylogenetic tropology-that is, if the ego's difference as determined by its relation to ''external reality'' (and, therefore, to chance) is insignificant-then it seems there would be no difference between the organizations of the id and ego with respect to the castration trope. In other words, if the ego's relation to ''external'' objects especially to the parents, if all objects are ultimately only ' internal'' objects -is reduced by Freud to a for1n of castration, then whence differentiation between the ego and id based on a difference in the relation to castration? If the privation demanded by the father's ''no," le ''non ' du pere (Lacan), the echo of the totemic law of the primaeval sons, le nom du pere (Lacan), that forces the child to give up ''his'' wish for a sexual connection (mastery) of the mother, does not require a ''real'' father, and is not subject to any chance concerning ''real'' objects-that is, if the symbolic father is destined to signify the le ''non'' du pere then the ''no'' and the name of the totemic father would be the center of both the structures of the id and ego. There must be something potentially different about the world of ''real," ''external," or ontogenetic objects and the castration that sterns from a relation with them, and the world of phylogenetically determined objects and its castration, for there to be some difference between the castration-centered structures of the id and the

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264 ego. Moreover, the difference of ''reality'-its chance, its differance-must in some way survive whatever phylo-''genetic'' memory-phantasy there might be. Freud might rebut here that the castration complex requires repression by the ego, which makes the ego intolerant of the contradiction of the ''trauma'' structure of castration, and therefore differentiates the ego from the id in terms of their relation to castration. But the ''trauma'' of castration, le ''non'' du pere, must in significant ways be a positive presence in the ego, and not something that never gets translated into the terrns of the ego and therefore never enters into its organization. Moreover, and more simply, castration would not have to be conscious to be the center of the structure of the ego. The ego is both conscious and unconscious, a fact which by itself suggests that the ego is quite tolerant of contradictory positions. Also, Freud says the unconscious is tolerant of contradiction: the ego is partly unconscious. Regardless, the question remains: does the le ''non ' du pere coming from reality-which Freud argues is the ''push'' part of the repression; the ''pull'' part being the castration of primary repression-1contain a trauma-structure of sorts? For Freud, tolerance of contradiction-which is actually just the (op)positionality of castration-quickly transforms into ''chaos," as Laplanche and Pontalis' passage above suggests. For ''psychic reality' to reduce mere contingency to castration, the id must be the source of ''trauma," just as it must be the source of castration structure The id as source of this ''trauma'' was foreshadowed, as I argued before, by the Qr1 that would have foreseen all possible Q allowed into the system. If the split of the ego between its conscious and unconscious systems does not provide the contradiction or opposition Freud equates with ''chaos,'' and neither does the ego's castration-structured center,

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265 perhaps the ego's exclusive contact with the contingency of ''external reality'' might constitute a tolerance of ''chaos'' at least on par with the id's. In other words, the ego has a potential relation to contingency, whereas the id, as I argue, is actually a determinist system when we factor Freud's emphasis on phylogeny and his privileging of psychic reality over whatever might involve the system Pct.-Cs. The question becomes if the ego's relation to contingency should be considered potentially traumatic, full of chance, or castration ''trauma'' foreseen by the id: a reality deternlined by psychic reality. Ironically, in a discussion of das Unheimlich, Freud writes that, .. the infantile element in [the uncanny effect attaching to magical practices], which also dominates the minds of neurotics, is the over accentuation of psychical reality in comparison with material reality-a feature closely allied to the belief in the omnipotence of thought. (XVII 244) Just as Freud's initial take on castration as childhood sexual fantasy about females becomes a reality for him, the ''belief in the omnipotence of thought'' also becomes a central aspect of his theory, and psychic reality becomes simply reality, truth. The ego, as Freud writes about it in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, can be read as more chaotic, more ''otherwise," than the id since it can be read as centered on anxiety, a potentially ''paradoxically disbanded'' trauma-structure trope, one that might be read as not (op)positional. Whereas the a priori castration ''trauma'' of the id takes us back to the original Qn in the 'V system of the Project, the chaos of the ego takes us back to its system, and the concept of

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266 anxiety takes us back to that study's concept of ''attention'' and its difficulties with w neurons and ''indications of reality." Regarding the chaos of unbound energy of the system Pct.-Cs., it was only the Project's neurons of perception that were unmarked, provided no resistance to Q and remained that way in order to be open to all Q within certain intensity parameters. Freud's 1925 concept of anxiety harkens back to his 1895 concept of ''attention," so crucial for Freud's apparatus of the Project as it somewhat magically guarded against potentially unpleasurable Q, like an ego within the ego of the apparatus. How these external Q could avoid being posited as possessing some a priori cathexes for which the apparatus was prepared was at issue for Freud in the Project, and this issue returns in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. I argued before that Freud would transpose the c.o of the -w-w apparatus to the middle position, q>-(1)-'V, in order to attempt an accounting for the way this apparatus deals with the contingency of the ''external world," the contingency of the Project being in the form of memory, perception, and experience. To distinguish the quality of ''experience'' from that of a ''memory''-and this ''memory'' being in the for111 of a hallucination, suggesting that this ''memory'' is a super-charged ''memory phantasy," such as the perceptual identity of the primary process and pleasure principle-thew neurons of the ego would serve as a catalyst for inhibition, another theme from the Project elaborated on in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Attention and inhibition become hallmarks of the ego in the Project, written at a time when Freud still considered anxiety a product of excess libido percolating up from the system Ucs. For Freud, the raison d'etre of reality testing is the differentiation of hallucinatjon from perceptions of ''external reality''; reality

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267 testing guards against the solipsistic threat posed by the pleasure principle (XXIII 162; Lap67 383). Freud's privileging of ''psychic reality'' starting in the Wolf Man case will further problematize a Freudian concept which had only ever been riddled with problems: reality testing. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety returns to some of the difficulties encountered in the Project, especially ''reality testing'' and how its conceptualization influences the conceptualization of the relation of the ego to the organism's system of energetics, to ''memory'' (memory-phantasy), and, in general, to the organism's relation to chance. I argue here that, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Freud repeats his ''fort!'' of the contingency of ''external reality'' in the Project via his conceptualization of anxiety, and, in doing so, must subvert the traditional definitions of the ego and the id with respect to issues such as ''chaos," tolerance of contradiction, and even which is more powerful. Ultimately, if the ego is the chaotic one, then the economic model may not only conflict with the topographical model, but it may ultimately turn it on its head. This would indeed be the case if trauma, the contingency of ''external reality'' par excellence, were not reduced to castration, and anxiety were not transformed by Freud from a trauma-structure trope into a ''trauma'' -structure trope of (op)positionality, the presence and absence of a specific structure. I will show that the trauma on which the definition of anxiety is based is treated by Freud as the absence of phallic order or presence-castration equates such presence and order-and his concept of anxiety becomes a ''trauma'' -structure trope of oppositionality if trauma is reduced to castration. If this is so, the economic model, and the phylogeny-based masterplot which precedes it; would constitute a paradigm shift in that the subject of the Freudian masterplot is not

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268 necessarily split since there is no clear differentiation between ego and id, which would be the expected outcome of a paradigm attempting to establish itself as a totality, a monism One might conclude that Freud's difficulties with the concept of ''reality testing''-that is, his problem accounting for contingency in his etiologies and masterplots.-are connected to his desire to maintain the supremacy of the psyche's structured energetics over the ego and the ego's supposed connection to the contingency of the ''external'' world. Some might object to my hypothesis of an undifferentiated ego and id by arguing that the id, as the source of this energetics-Freud's ultimately vitalist concept of ''libido," which he presents as materialist (see Hol89)-is differentiated from the ego: the ego as epiphenomena!, a subset or aspect of the id: part of it, but different from it Freud was as contradictory with regard to the id being the sole source of libido as he was regarding the relationship of anxiety to birth-and th ese contradictory aspects of this text by Freud, despite being intimately related for him, also help us to understand the context of his treatment of anxiety in Inhibition s, Symptoms and Anxiety. Strachey' s '' Appendix B: The Great Reservoir of the Libido'' is an unu s ual case of Freud's English translator's attempts to smooth over contradictions in The Ego and the Id beyond the usual means of translation or footnotes. Regarding the ego as a source of libido, Strachey straightforwardly points out that Freud writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: ''Psycho-Analysis .. came to the conclusion that the ego is the true and original reservoir of libido, and that it is only from that reservoir that libido is extended on to objects'' (XVIII 51). Freud 's view here seems to be a product of his embracing of the idea of primary narcissism in his 1914 essay, ''On Narcissism'' (XIV). We might compare these positions of Freud's,-his primary

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269 narcissism and libido reservoir of the ego,-to Derrida's drive of the proper: all drives, the very drivenness of drives, being a drive for the proper. Libido would be the energetics of all drives, and the ego would be the ''agency'' of the proper, of appropriation. We can read Freud's confusion regarding the source of libido with respect to the undecidability of what is Other to the drive of the proper, the (non)origin of repetition of this drive. I will return to this idea in chapter six. In The Ego and the Id, however, Freud contradicts the quotation above: ''Now that we have distinguished between the ego and the id, we must recognize the id as the great reservoir of libido ... (XIX 30n1). According to Strachey, the latter passage appears to be ''a drastic correction'' (XIX 64) to the former, but this appearance, Strachey continues, is dependent on narrow thinking that treats the ambiguous reservoir metaphor solely in terms of a ''source'' (XIX 65), as in caput Nili, rather than in terms of something more like a ''storage tank'' (ibid.). For Strachey, the corrective is not drastic because Freud had never really gotten away from the id or unconscious as the source of libido. His explanation does not explain how the ego as the ''true and original reservoir'' might be considered a storage tank for the ''great reservoir'' of the id. Strachey might argue that the ego is the source of object cathexes, and the id is the source of subject or ego cathexes. But would the ''objects'' of primary phantasies be included in the ego's cathexes? Moreover, isn't the ego an object, according to Freud in ''On Narcissism''? Categorical confusion is unavoidable. For example, is the ego the source of object cathexes when the ego is the object? Given that the ego is the only source of object cathexes, wouldn't the id need to be an ego of sorts in order for it to

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270 cathect the ego as an object? Primary narcissism seems to hypostasize an ego, an id-ego. 12 What is at stake here is whether the id is primary, and whether it is something ''otherwise''-that is, whether Freud runs into the problem of subverting his breakthrough of privileging the power of the unconscious over that of consciousness, and whether the unconscious is some timeless, a-logical realm potentially radically other to the reason and temporality of consciousness. The way I have structured the issue here is complicated by the ego being both conscious and unconscious. But the id, or the ''it," is solely unconscious for Freud, and it seems like it would be the material source of the physicalist sounding libido, including the ego instincts, such as the instinct for self preservation. What is also at stake is whether Freud ends up positing an ego at the very origin, a hypostasized ego, even a phylogenetic Ego even though he criticized Adler and Rank along the same lines (Web82 52). If the primaeval drives of the primaeval sons for immediate gratification, not knowing death or deferral, constitutes the inherited model of the id, wouldn't their totemic law constitute the model for the ego? The law of the Father and the ego ideal or iiber-lch? These stakes, combined with the stakes of whether the ego can be differentiated from the id with regard to libido, and whether ''external reality'' and its contingency play a role in this differentiation-that is, whether the 12 I return to Freud's confusion regarding the source of libido in the final chapter. For now I will say that the contradictions of positions may not be simply his usual rhetorical legerdemain, but a struggle with what I might call the (non)origin of energetics of an ''otherwise other'' that Barratt argues is "in but not of" his version of the ego: the '1-now-is." The question becomes: what is the relation of the "otherwise other'' to the "drive of the proper'' (Derrida) which it is ''in but not of''? I address this question in the final chapter when I differ from Barratt with respect to his conception of "desire."

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271 psychoanalytic postal relay could ever be theorized as adestinational with respect to Freud's later theory, all combine to threaten what is usually the most fundamental aspect of most claims to a Freudian breakthrough, and perhaps even a good deal of the authority of psychoanalysis in general. I will argue that Freud's conception of anxiety as being both primary and situated in the ego combine to hypostasize the ego, and this hypostasization suggests that the ego is determined by the ''trauma'' -structure of the primal phantasies, which, in turn, constitute scenes that are privileged over ''external reality's'' scenes. Moreover, I see these theoretical troubles of Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety as a repetition of Freud's paradigm-busting transposition of thew neurons in the Project, and in general related to how Freud could not account for ''reality testing'' and contingency. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety was, to a significant degree, a response to Otto Rank's The Trauma of Birth, where Rank argues that all anxiety attacks are a mode of abreacting the effects of the trauma of birth. Freud first claims it was originally his own idea (see Web82 52) and assumes the anxiety of birth as a basic principle: ''The first experience of anxiety which an individual goes through (in the case of human beings, at all events) is birth ... (XX 130). According to this Freud, repression is not first or primary, anxiety is: ''It was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety'' (XX 108-9). This is another case of Freud making a radical change in his theory without working out how the resultant and new paradigm conflicts with the old, attempting to maintain the old within the new even though they are contradictory. Contrary to his earlier beliefs that anxiety was the product of excessive libido, Freud now argued that anxiety ''never arises from repressed

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272 libido'' (XX 109). Freud argued that ''the ego is the actual seat of anxiety'' and that we must ''give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy of the repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety'' (XX 93). Quite simply, with the anxiety-before-repression theory we immediately run into the problem of how the ego, which is needed for anxiety, came to be prior to repression, especially since Freud has consistently defined the ego as t;he product of the repression of the sexual drives and their representatives. This theory cannot account for the origin of the ego; it requires the ego's hypostasization. If anxiety is experienced at birth, as Freud argues, and anxiety ''is an affective state and as such can, of course, only be felt by the ego'' (XX 140), then there must be an ego at birth: a hypostasized ego. Freud criticizes Rank for assuming a hypostasized ego at birth: In the act of birth there is a real danger to life. We know what this means objectively; but in a psychological sense it says nothing to us. The danger of birth has as yet no psychical content. We cannot possibly suppose that the foetus has any sort of knowledge that there is a possibility of its life being destroyed. It can only be aware of some vast disturbance in the economy of its narcissistic libido .... It is easy to say that the baby will repeat its affect of anxiety in every situatio n which recalls the event of birth. The important thing to know is what recalls the event and what it is that is recalled .... [Rank] assumes that the infant has received certain sensory impressions, in particular of a visual kind, at the time of birth, the renewal of which can recall to its memory the trauma of birth and thus evoke a reaction of anxiety. This assumption is quite

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273 unfounded and extremely improbable. It is not credible that a child should retain any but tactile and general sensations relating to the process of birth. (XX 135) It seems that only Freud is allowed to hypostasize the ego. We also find in this passage that Freud's ego, castration-based as it is, is also an oculocentric one: it is required to see the lack of the penis in the mother. Vision is required for an awareness of castration; Oedipus blinds himself. Freud seems to be accusing Rank of theorizing an ego at birth that could be aware of castration. Freud's hypostasized ego, it seems, only needs to see ''psychical reality'' because his hypostasized ego is a castration-based one: why else would it sense anxiety? Perhaps Freud imagined that his hypstasized ego ''saw'' phylo-''genetic'' castration. Earlier, with a twisted rhetoric, Freud associates his relationship of the mother, birth, and castration with his critique of Rank's hypostasization of the ego: The first experience of anxiety which an individual goes through (in the case of human beings, at all events) is birth, and, objectively speaking, birth is a separation from the mother. It could be compared to a castration of the mother (by equating the child with a penis). Now it would be very satisfactory if anxiety, as a symbol of a separation, were to be repeated on every subsequent occasion on which separation took place. But unfortunately we are prevented from making use of this correlation by the fact that birth is not experienced subjectively as a separation from the mother,

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274 since the foetus, being a completely narcissistic creature, is totally unaware of her existence as an object. (XX 130) If you are wondering if Freud is concerned with the anxiety of the mother or the child at birth, and which anxiety is to be associated with castration, it is both. He later writes that the anxiety of the child, who longs for the lost object, appears as a reaction to the felt loss of the object; and we are at once reminded of the fact that castration anxiety, too, is a fear of being separated from a highly valued object, and that the earliest anxiety of all-the 'primal anxiety' of birth-is brought about on the occasion of a separation from the mother. (XX 137) Freud's next move equates loss of the loved object (not the ''penis-child'' but the ''penis-mother'') to the absence of satisfaction and a subsequent ''growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless'' (ibid.). The primary danger is consistently reduced to this kind of buildup ''without its being possible for them to be mastered psychically or discharged'' (ibid ) and equated with the danger situation experienced at birth. Though Freud discusses birth and the tension build up as a real danger, he puts ''danger'' in quotes in the next sentence. Freud has just described birth exactly as he describes trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This feeling of tension becomes an ''affective symbol'' (XX 94), or what Freud calls a ''signal," of possible danger: ''It is unnecessary to suppose that the child carries anything more with it from the time of its birth than this way of indicating the presence of danger'' (ibid.). So the birth trauma is repeated in every experience of anxiety that succeeds it, even if it is not abreacted as Rank argued. It seems the reason Freud was so anxious about Rank's thesis was that it threatened Freud by being too close to his own reconceptualizations of the early

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275 1920s. By focusing on how Freud's theory of anxiety requires a hypostasized ego, however, we should not lose track of how it is also, and relatedly, a logical extension of his masterplotting and its movement toward being a totality. According to the Freud of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, anxiety is the signal of the possible onset of a ''danger-situation,'' or ''situation of helplessness'' in the face of growing internal tension. But how would a signifier be attached to a signified in such a context? How would such a signal or symbol be created out of an experience of the ego being overwhelmed? Does the particular dissolution of the primary narcissism create a particular affect which is transfor111ed into a particular signifier then to be associated with the whatever traumatic experience? The problems here are many For example, any experience of ''external reality'' would require an ego in a state of not being overwhelmed. Also, the ''transformation'' of the affect into a signal that combines both signifier (affective experience) and signified (affective experience in terms of ''experience'') would require some stable signifying chain, some context which would allow for significance, the s ign always being a product of difference. The experience of being overwhelmed by tension would supposedly subvert such a context. How is the ''anchoring point'' of the signal established within a context of unmastered and overwhelming internal tensions? This reminds me of the question of the relationship of the ''perceptual identities'' to the ''mobile cathexes'' of the primary process, but now we are concerned with the economic model's ego rather than with the topographical model's system Ucs. Freud calls the signal an ''affective symbol ." For Freud, the affect of being overwhelmed by internal tension would always be the same, therefore Freud reduces the experience of trauma to this affective state: a symbol, not a signifier; a signified as symbol The

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quality of the symbol, however, would not be a product of an ''indication of reality'' or reality testing; it would not be exogenic. It would be a product of psychic reality: endogenic. 276 Weber's treatment of these issues in The Legend of Freud considers the relationship of anxiety to the primary process. Weber first makes it clear that, for Freud, trauma cannot designate any particular, determinate objective reality, for what it entails is precisely the inability of the psyche or more specifically the ego,-to determine, its inability to bind or to cathect an excess of energy that therefore tends to overwhelm it (53) After Weber insightfully reads Freud as assuming that ''the trauma constitutes the point of departure for the development of anxiety," he quotes Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxi ety: ''what is decisive is the first displacement of the anxiety reaction from its origin in the situation of helplessness to an expectation of that situation-that is, to the dangers ituation'' (ibid.). Weber notes, as Freud does, that this first displacement ''marks the emergence of a subject-object relationship'' (Web82 53; XX 138). One might question whether anxiety could ever account for an objective world for two reasons. First, because the trauma ''object'' is indeterminable by the ego, and, second, the ''affective symbol'' would not be specific to the object, but only a general reaction to the situation of helplessness. Weber then refers to Freud's earlier essay ''Negation," where Freud argues that the object is never discovered but always rediscovered (XIV 237), but Weber does not consider how, with respect to anxiety, Freud might account for what seems to be an infinite regress of discovery. Weber shows us that a trauma cannot simply be ''discovered'' or ''experienced'' for two reasons:

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277 first, it must be rediscovered or re-experienced, and, again, this must happen despite the fact that trauma subverts the ego's ability to discover or experience. How does Weber account for the infinite regress and impossibility of object relations in terms of anxiety? He doesn't: he leaves Freud's take on anxiety as enigmatic and sees it as potentially an aspect of Freud's recognition of the irreducibly conflictual nature of the psychoanalytic project. About Rank's work in general, Freud wrote: ''Rank's theory completely ignores constitutional factors as well as phylogenetic ones'' (XX 151). Weber's take on anxiety so far ignores how Freud might have ''solved'' what even Freud considered to be the enigma of anxiety: a phylogenetic solution where the trauma ''objects'' are predetermined and not in need of ''determination'' with respect to the ontogenetic ego. The primal ''experience'' of castration as ''trauma'' -structure could provide some sort of solution. The ''affective symbol," the signal, would be associated with castration and a phylo-''genetic'' ego. All trauma, as it is r ed uced to the dissolution of the psychic order, and the affective experience of such dissolution, would then be reducible to castration as the universal symbol of such dissolution. Accordingly, the phylogenetic ''experience'' or ''discovery'' of the (loss of the) object (the whole bodily ego as loved object) could preclude an infinite regression of repetition: the ontogenetic ''first time'' would be a phylo''ge netic'' repetition Furthermore, with Freud's ideal phylogeny, the cohesion of the ontogenetic ego would not be required to establish the signal, especially if its primal phantasies were ordered in such a way as to provide the ultimate context of meaning. Like Rank, and almost every other reader of Freud, Weber ignores phylogeny. This is also evident in his

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decision with respect to the primary process. Discussing the importance of perception, particularly vision, for the ego, Weber argues, 278 ... the ego develops its organization through the formation or cathexis of perceptual objects. These are precisely not the ''perceptual identities'' of the primary process, which, as we have argued, are not identities at all but rather constantly shifting alterations. (Web82 55) Due to my factoring in of Freud's phylogeny, my decision regarding the primary process is the opposite: the ''constantly shifting alterations'' only shift after a phylo-''genetically'' determined identity has been established ontogenetically, and they shift with respect to the memory of that identity, a memory which establishes the tendency of shifting, the absence of presence being at the center of the structured shifting, as with Lacanian desire and ''the Freudian cause'' of das Ding. This tend e ncy will be in a significant way a factor of the difference between the primary and secondary process, and therefore a factor of the difference between the ego and the id. Moreover, the primary process as Freud describes it, as well as the pleasure principle, does not work, does not make sense, without the original experience of satisfaction constituting the mnemic trace Freud calls the perceptual identity-that is, without an original identity that is indeed an identity. With regard to anxiety, Weber argues that the ''rediscovery'' required to establish the ''first displacement'' first requires the ''inhibition or deflection of the unpleasure principle that dominates the primary process, which otherwise would tend to produce ever-changing cathexes as an effort to reduce tension'' (Web82 53). The primary process does not produce ever-changing cathexes; the

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279 inhibition of the secondary process does. Moreover, the reduction of tension is never a product of ever-changing cathexes and is always the product of ''rediscovering'' or rebinding cathexes that brought ''satisfaction'' before. The primary process attempts to ''rediscover'' the ''original experience of satisfaction'' in order to reduce tension, and it does this regardless of ''external reality." Again, the only way this process can make sense is if the ever-changing cathexes are considered the prod~ct of the secondary process's inhibition of the primary process's goal to rebind the original identity. Weber concludes his line of argument as follows: Thus, what Freud calls the 'first displacement' is, strictly considered, not first at all but rather the displacement of the displacements of the primary process, which in turn have culminated in the 'situation of helplessness Through a process of rep e tition, then, the psyche displaces the displacement of 'helplessness' and thus alters the incessant alteration implied by the primary proce ss It does so by the production of what Freud calls a signal (Web82 53) Weber associates the primary process, as Freud does at times, with the chaos caused by trauma I would associate the identity of the primary process with the identity of anxiety, the signal The supposed chaos of the primary process, like the supposed chaos of the id, cannot be factored into Freud's more dominant theorizations of the organizations of the id, the primary process, and of anxiety (and even trauma) As with the supposedly chaotic id, Freud treats the ''trauma'' of the ''trauma''s tructure (op)positionality of castration as chaos. It would be a mistake to read Freud's claims to ''chaos'' with the id, the primary process, and

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280 anxiety as anything but (op)positionality. As with Derrida, it seems that Weber's decision to treat the primary process as ''essentially rebellious'' leads to a reading of ''trauma'' -structure trope as a trauma ''structure," or in terms of differance, rather than in terms of (op)positionality. The ''first displacement of the anxiety reaction'' can be considered the reduction of what is other to the phallic order to castration via the reduction of the experience of trauma to one affect (castration anxiety), the signal to one ''affective symbol," and therefore the object world to a binary of phallus/ castration, or phallic presence/ absence: possible difference is reduced to identity, or, as Levinas might put it, the Other to more of the Same. Without any altering of alteration-indeed without any alterity at all-the signal of castration is established: it is always already established as the center of psychic reality and its destinational postal relay. As Weber points out, castration narratives conserve ''the belief in the ubiquity of the phallus'' through their ability to ''repeat difference as identity'' (Web82 56). The ''trauma'' -structure trope of castration, the fundamental trope of Freudian theory, reduces what is totally other to identity via the reduction of ''chaos'' to a phallic presence/ absence (op)positionality: Derrida's ''castration truth." That the beyond of the unconscious is reduced in this way is not surprising if we assume, as Freud does, that there is no contingency in psychic reality. The organization of the id, an organization not disrupted by chance, is for Freud a phylogenetic inheritance. With respect to the beyond of ''external reality," however, its reduction of its disturbances or disruptions to the opposite, loss, or absence of a phallic order (the logic of lack) suggests that its contingency can be reduced to the terms of the psychic order-which means there is ultimately no contingency.

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281 Because Weber, like Rank, does not factor in phylogeny, anxiety remains enigmatic. For Weber, if ''the ego is ... the 'seat' of anxiety, then anxiety is equally the site of the ego'' (Web82 57). The signal is the center of what Weber argues is a crucial concept for Freud, the '' Auseinandersetzung'': The ''infantile sexual theories'' are thus stories the child tells itself to confront the ''narcissistic'' shock as which Freud always characterizes ''castration." The story allows for the Vorurteil [prejudice] that is absolutely constitutive for narcissism, and hence also for the development of the ego: the conviction that the child inhabits a world of ''sameness," in which difference and alterity can be regarded merely as privative, negative fon11s of an original and pervasive identity: as a Mangel or loss of what once was. But this original identity, which the castration-story seeks to confirm, dialectically as it were, is increasingly subjected to the difference it seeks to deny The term that Freud uses to designate this process of subjection, which is also the process by which the subject is constituted, is: Au s einandersetzung. (Web82 24) Weber then quotes Freud: '' ... and now the child is faced with the task of dealing [sich auseinandersetzen] with the relation of castration to himself' (ibid.). Since Weber reads Freud's signal as part of what he reads as the enigma of anxiety, he will not read Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety as Freud's own Auseinandersetzung of psychoanalysis in the face of the ''difference and alterity'' of what might be experienced as trauma. Yet the conceptions of trauma and anxiety are reduced to the ''privation'' of castration-truth and (op)positionality. For Weber, anxiety cannot be grasped ''in the dyadic, dichotomized space and time that anxiety itself

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282 engenders and disrupts at once'' (Web82 58). Anxiety engenders dichotomized space and time by being the signal and the center of Auseinandersetzung. For Weber, anxiety disrupts this space and time because it is a product of the contingency and irreducibility of ''external reality'' or ''real danger," and with respect to his reading of the primary process. Weber's conception of anxiety, therefore, is based on what Freud calls the ''capital X," or as Weber describes, quoting Freud, ''the unknown variable that 'we are obliged to carry over into every new formula''' (Web82 59): Thi s ''X'' marks the spot to which psychoanalytic thinking is constrained, often against its will, to return, a spot that is impossible to occupy (besetzen) because it is impossible to locate. Any attempt to identify it, situate it, name it-for instance, as ''trauma''-must be regarded as the signal of a danger that can be apprehended, but never recognized as such. The ''capital X'' of Freud's metapsychology can therefore be designated as the signal of psychoanalytic thinking. (Web82 59) For Weber, ''anxiety ha s no proper place'' (Web82 58). Contrary to Weber, I read anxiety as establishing the proper place of the phallus negatively via its dichotomization of space and time, what I call (op)positionality. Therefore it is not surprising that Weber would associate the signal of his take on anxiety with the ''capital X'' of indeterminacy. Weber's conclusion is that the Auseinandersetzung of psychoanalysis, ba se d as it on the signal of the ''capital X," is conflictual, undecidable, indeterminable. Due to the enigma of anxiety and the ''capital X'' we are left with only ''the ineluctable imposition of the dynamic, conflictual factor as that which characterizes the psychoanalytic conception of the

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283 psychic'' (Web82 59). Weber ''finds'' in his (non)center of the psychoanalytic Auseinandersetzung the very (non)center he brought as an assumption of what is the essence of psychoanalysis, as evidenced by his reading of the primary process. Psychoanalysis has supposedly found itself (Der87a 413). Or has Weber found himself? Is this a self-posting via a reading of psychoanalysis? Freud's Auseinandersetzung is about achieving identity by denying difference, as Weber describes the process: identity ... appears increasingly to be the effect of a process of reduplication or of reciprocal separation (aus-ein-ander). Such a pro~ess seems to necessitate a form of articulation that is inevitably narrative: the 'story' that 'begins' with the primal scene, and which continues in the denials of difference that constitute 'castration,' culminates in the Auseinandersetzung with the relation of castration to the developing subject. (Web82 24) But, for Freud, this process is not ''the ambivalent, conflictual effect of an interminable struggle to alter alterity," since alterity is never part of the process as he conceptualizes it. I read castration as this signal, the center of the Auseinandersetzung of psychoanalysis. With the topic of anxiety we are led once again into the mise en abyme of when ''the related is related to the relating," and of the self-posting of an identity in the face of something totally other-a self posting which tries to exclude the totally other, but ends up ''revealing'' it the only way it can be: as something totally other in the spaces caused by a disruption of an identitarian discourse or ''subject." The conflictual dynamism Weber speaks of is lost in psychoanalysis as the ego becomes indistinguishable from the id, both being the products of an

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284 Auseinandersetzung centered on castration. The ''trauma'' -structure trope of castration is consistently the fundamental trope of Freudian theory, reducing what is totally other to (op)positionality (identity, lack). A Negative Concord. Whatever potential beyonds there might be are reduced to the mastery of the PP when phylogeny's relation to the primary process is taken seriously and not overlooked, as is the case with so many readings that, seemingly in order to make him more amenable to contemporary theory, either decide some of the undecidables of Freud, read him out of context, or privilege his potentially ''otherwise'' ideas even though they have been made inoperable by a deluge of subsequent ''establishment'' ideas. The stakes are high, as Derrida makes clear with respect to the navel of the dream. What I am arguing here calls for a reconsideration of the ''Freudian breakthrough." There is also the potential for a radical re-evaluation of the authority of psychoanalysis, given the aporetic aspects this reading ''finds," such as the privileging of the ego in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: In this light, I mention what I find to be a bizarre passage by Freud, even if it does fit my argument: At this point it is relevant to ask how I can reconcile this acknowledgment of the might of the ego with the description of its position which I gave in The Ego and the Id. In that book I drew a picture of its dependent relationship to the id and to the super-ego and revealed how powerless and apprehensive it was in regard to both and with what an effort it maintained its show of superiority over them. This view has been widely echoed in psycho-analytic literature. Many writers have laid much stress on the weakness of the ego in relation to the id and of our rational elements in the face

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285 of the daemonic forces within us; and they display a strong tendency to make what I have said into a comer-stone of a psycho analytic Weltanschauung. Yet surely the psycho-analyst, with his knowledge of the way in which repression works, should, of all people, be restrained from adopting such an extreme and one-sided view .... I must confess that I am not partial to the fabrication of Weltanschauungen. Such activities may be left to philosophers, who avowedly find it impossible to make their journey through life without a Baedeker. (XX 95-96) Freud's early ''cornerstone of psychoanalysis," repression, assumed the power of the id over the ego. With ''interdiction of translation," the ego became relatively stronger, and with Freud's positioning of anxiety as primary with respect to repression, the ego became even stronger. In ''Analysis Terminable and Interminable,'' Freud returns to his earlier position and stresses the power of the id, and even questions the potential efficacy of psychoanalytic technique, a position which I will treat more fully in the next chapter. I have argued here that Freud's Baedeker is his phylogeny-based masterplot. It botl1 describes and acts out an Auseinandersetzung centered on the signal of castration. It reappropriates what is potentially Other by making it the absence at the center of a Negative Concord. The danger situations of/for Freudian theory have changed over time. It is to the first danger situation to which Freud applied a potential trauma-structure Auseinandersetzung that I tum in chapter two: what Freud called ''hysteria." The supposed gaps in the hysterics were both the effects of trauma, and absent center of Freud's etiological structure, his speculations In chapter five, I trace his psychoanalytic

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286 Auseinandersetzung with respect to his conceptualizations of sexual difference in order to show how it is with respect to this theme we most clearly find the monistic self-posting, the irreducible division of such attempts at totality, and, therefore, the evidence of something radically other. Sexual difference seems to act as the most threatening of differences, which may account for why his Auseinandersetzung is always in terms of castration, or that which establishes sexual difference (as an identity) for Freud. What we will (re)construct is yet another form of the master narrative of Freud's Baedeker, and Freud-despite his railings against speculation and philosophy, and his disavowal of the debt he owes to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer (see Der87a 266)-philosophizing like a pre-Socratic philosopher on the nature of activity and passivity, another dualism. The question will be: is this duali s m ''beyond'' (or before) his usual ''trauma'' structure trope? Is it reduced to what I have posited as the fundamental trope of psychoanalysis? What we will ''find," again, i s a fort:da of Nietzsche in terms of the will to power and the que s tion of Woman, and this time ''power'' is the masculine form of activity. Toward s the end of this evolution, late in Freud's theorizing, the caput Nili, or ''bedrock," not surprisingly, will be conceptualized as ''the repudiation of femininity'' (XXIII 250). And, once again, the caput Nili begins to look more like a ''trauma'' -structure trope as femininity is defined as the opposite to a self-same, self-posted, phallic order. Freud's ''will to power'' is sexed, sexing: mastery of Woman and femininity. Woman constitutes the only remaining ''beyond'' that I ha ye not argued is usurped by the totality of the Freudian masterplot. Not surprisingly, given that this totality is one of ''castration-truth ," I venture to do so ... Only one question follows me: is this my

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287 way of ''finding'' myself? Ausein-anders-etzung? ~ But, ''I think," what else could it be?

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CHAPTERS UNCANNY (WO)MAN: THE HOME/SECRETS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud argues that psychoanalysis finds ''no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life'' (V 373). The hysteric, according to the Freud of around 1895 and 1896, suffered from the pathogenic repression of traumatic memories of incestuous violence. Freud would later argue that he mistook these memories and their traumas for what were actually the child's oedipal fantasies. Since he argued that these fantasies are aspects of the universal Oedipus complex, they could no longer be the source of any structural differentiation between ''normal and neurotic life''-hence my previous question asked with respect to the Wolf Man case: whence the neurosis? I argued before that the orthodox view of the supposed schism between the ''seduction'' theory and psychoanalysis proper-Freud's supposed abandonment of the -''seduction'' theory -is often over emphasized because, as Rand and Torok argue, Freud never is able to turn completely toward fantasy as the basis of his theory, and, as we see in the Wolf Man case and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the significance of the contingency of ''external reality'' haunts Freud's movement toward a totalizing theory based on the determinism of his psychical reality. I quote the passage from The Interpretation of Dreams above to note that this movement had begun for his theorizing as early as the late 1890s Given that there had been a structural 288

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289 difference between his earlier, ''seduction'' etiology of hysteria and normality, his position in The Interpretation of Dreams does represent a movement toward a paradigm shift, a movement toward a theory which attempts to reduce, if not negate, the effects of chance. Though Freud's etiologies of the neuroses of his male patients, such as the Wolf Man, were muddled by his generalization of ''seduction'' fantasies and the ''reality'' of primal scenes, he would theorize a very distinct and female-specific etiology for hysteria about thirty years after he all but dropped his inquiry into the source of hysteria in 1897. Predictably this later etiology grew out of his increasing emphasis on the importance and centrality of the castration complex. Besides contradicting his earlier, Charcotian position on the reality of male hysteria, this female-specific etiology would also draw a clear line of division between the sexes with respect to bisexuality and the Oedipus complex. The Freudian female of the Freud of the late twenties and the thirties is more clearly bisexual than the Freudian male, and, unlike the male whose developmental telos is to transcend the Oedipus complex, the Freudian female's telos is to become embedded in it Freud's final etiology of hysteria can be found in his essays ''Female Sexuality'' (1931) and ''Femininity'' (1933), and is one of three possible ''lines of development'' (XXI 229) open to females: The first [the hysteric's line] leads to a general revulsion from sexuality. The little girl, frightened by the comparison with boys, grows dissatisfied with her clitoris, and gives up her phallic activity and with it her sexuality in general as well as a good part of her masculinity in other fields. (ibid.)

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290 The hysteric would like to give up sexuality in general by repressing what Freud theorizes is her primary masculinity, the latter of which he clearly equates with sexuality, and also with a highly abstract, pre-Socratic conception of activity. The hysteric represses her primary masculinity too much, whereas the other two lines of development-of homosexuality and ''normal'' femininity-would repress it too little or just enough respectively. Freud unambiguously posits masculinity as primary, both in terms of sexuality and activity, and therefore in terms of his conception of ''subjectivity," and even of Life in the most abstract. His position-which would suggest that females are more bisexual since male bisexuality seems to have no origin-is based on his theory that females start out as males: ''We are now obliged to recognize that the little girl is a little man'' (XXII 118). Freud argues that the girl's pre-oedipal phase is spent as a little man who takes her mother as ''her'' primary sexual object, just as the boy does. Strangely, however, the girl identifies with her mother, while the boy somehow identifies with his father, which contradicts Freud's own conception in The Ego and the Id that, at ''the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other'' (XIX 29). The source of the male's original identification with the father is simply assumed, leaving little room for Freud's common claim for the universality of bisexuality. Other evidence of Freud's theorizing sexuality proper as masculine can be found in ''Female Sexuality'' where, after positing the two phases of the female's sexual life-the initial masculine, active phase Freud associates with what he conceptualizes as a phallic clitoris, and the latter feminine, passive phase Freud associates with his conception of the vagina as the passive receptor of the

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291 penis Freud writes that we ''do not, of course, know the biological basis of these peculiarities in women'' (XXI 228). How could what Freud has just described as the nature of female sexuality be a peculiarity unless male sexuality, with its single sex organ and its one masculine sexuality, is considered primordial? The traditional conception of the ''enigma'' of female sexuality is based on the assumption that male sexuality is a known norm of sexuality. Yet Freud's closing words on the ''dark continent'' (XX 212) of female sexuality and the question ''Was will das Weib?'' (JonSS 2:421) have the uncanny effect of bringing up disturbing questions regarding his theory of male sexuality-that is, of psychoanalysis in general, insofar as it is a form of hom(m)osexual theory. Male sexuality is assumed as the norm, but it becomes the enigma itself as Freud theorizes female sexuality late in his career, and seemingly once and for all. For example, why does the Oedipus complex seem to be the beginning of male development, whereas it is the end of female development? In other words, what would be the pre-oedipal phase in boys? Why would the boy be bisexual if he begins and ends as a male? Why would the boy not initially identify with his mother? How important is identification? Is it as important as object choice? Wouldn't a change of identification be as significant as the girl's supposed change of object? If not, what would be the source of neurosis and homosexuality for boys? In other words, why is there not an equivalent, clearly mapped-out three paths -normality, neurosis, homosexuality-for male sexuality in Freudian theory? Through my reading of Freud's essay ''The 'Uncanny,"' I attempt to address these questions, not as much by delving into the fragments of Freudian theory that might be made to cohere in order to provide some answers, but by

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292 showing how these questions mark a much more general attribute of psychoanalysis: its primary defense against what is totally other via the reduction of that other to the binary of male/ female and the (op)positionality of ''castration-truth." Psychoanalysis can be read as a positioning with respect to the Other, a positioning sustained by the Other's reduction to a simple other of (op)position, and this simple other at times figuring as woman, femininity, or hysteric, while at other times as ''the unconscious," the id, or ''external reality." The figure of woman becomes the missive of the hom(m)osexual self-posting of psychoanalysis: the other that must be reduced to the One and what reveals the divisions of the One. More specifically, I try to show in my reading of ''The 'Uncanny''' how the undecidability of ' the'' unconscious is related to chance and the significance of the mother. I argue here that the home (Heim) of psychoanalysis is established through the repression of a variety of secrets (Geheimnises) related to what is actually the undecidability hidden behind Freud's rigid male/female (op)position and his ''castration-truth." These secrets are not like Freud's unknown of the navel of the dream, full of sen se, but the secret of something otherwise to sense, a hidden unknowable, the partiality of the discourse that represses the secrets. Moreover, these secrets are also the division within the supposed totality. Finally I try to show how psychoanalysis employs many of the major defenses it describes in its relation to the Other, and to the Other in its simple-other guises as hysteric, femininity, female, woman, or mother. I attempt to group all of these defensive strategies togetl1er under what I have called ''the actual phallic function." My general goal is to show how Freud's generalization into universal fantasies of memories that were pathogenic and (despite his efforts

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293 to make these memories all the sam e) full of chance is related to the ''bedrock'' (XXIII 252) of his phallic Weltanschauung, where anatomy is certainly destiny, despite his feints to the contrary. In other words, I want to link Freud's logic of lack and his destinational theory with his theories of sexual ''difference'' in order to show how psychoanalysis functions defensively in its ''face to face'' with actual difference, or differance and chance-how sexual difference in the (op)positional form male/female provides the basis of his reduction of difference to more of the same via a destinational linguistics based on ''castration-truth.'' In ''The 'Uncanny,"' I read Freud as being in a Levinasian ''face to face'' (Lev69 79) with the beyond of ''t h e'' unconscious in a different mode than in Beyond the Plea sure Principle. Whereas Beyond ... dealt with trauma and the contingency and violence of ''external reality," this text deals with what would seem to be the contingency or conflict of ''psychic reality'': the beyond of the outside of the in s ide. In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud was clear where he stood on the que st ion of psychic det e r1nini s m and the nature of the simple in s ide in general: ''nothing in the mind is arbitrary or undeter1nined'' (242). What I see as being at stake in '' The 'Uncanny''' is whether Freud reduces what he called ''the uncon sc ious'' to more of the same via the psychoanalytic trope of (op)positionality, castration-therefore securing the position of his ''I.'' A simpler way to put it-in line with how I read Derrida's essay ''My Chances/ M es Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies''-might be to say that what is at stake is whether there is any space (or time) for chance and difference in Freud's conception of the psyche. ''The'' unconscious that is tolerant of contradiction seems to be for Freud intolerant of th e chance that the letter might not arrive at its destination. ''Freud''

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294 depends upon all possible ''beyonds'' to the PP-these potential radical alterities.-being reduced to what is known, predictable, and calculable, in order to secure his totality-based position and his transmissibility-dependent legacy. With the Wolf Man case and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, we see Freud extending his determinism-seeking logic from ''psychical reality'' to ''external reality'' by a reduction of the latter to the ''trauma''-structure of the former and therefore attempting to extend his determinism of the inside to the outside in order to achieve a totality of calculable terrain. I conclude that Freud s ultimate system, and the positioning of totality it attempts to secure, requires a split along the lines of the existence of woman and therefore along the lines of the (male, phallic) self as being One. The positioning of psychoanalysis is much like the positioning of man I derive from Freudian theory: a split ego that must at the same time believe in woman's absence and presence, the product of a fort/da game (with a slash, where there is equivalence, repetition, and interminability). We might call this a fetishist's position of disavowal if not for the fact that Freud's conception of the fetishist is centered on the presence/ absence of the maternal phallus, and not the presence/ absence of woman: the concept of the (male) fetishist is part of ''the actual phallic function'' in that it displaces the role of woman with the identity-difference term of castration. What I am arguing here is that this disavowal is first of all the dissimulation of the Other behind man/woman, and then of the simple, or small ''o'' other behind the One of man via the magical identity-difference term of castration. What the concept of the fetish hides behind its phallocentrism, its ''castration-truth," is difference. Here I attempt to map out the (op)positioning of Freudian theory with respect to the dissimulation of difference via the

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295 (op)positioning sexual ''difference'' as man/woman, Masculinity /Femininity, or Male/Female. I argue that this dualistic sexual ''difference'' is part of the ''actual phallic function''-that is, part of that which hides difference behind the ''difference'' of (op)positional and ideal binaries. I attempt to relate here themes of chance (the possibility of difference) with themes of sexual ''difference'' in Freudian theory. In ''The 'Uncanny,"' this relationship can be found with respect to the themes of superstition and the mother-infant monad/ dyad. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, besides being one of the primary texts where Freud makes his position on psychic detern1inism clear, is also the text where Freud treats superstition as a projection of repressed or unconscious wishes into ''external reality." Given this position, one might assume that Freud is simply a committed materialist waging war on such beliefs. Yet Freud is radically split on issues such as the relationship of psychoanalysis to what he considered to be two primary sub-categories of superstition: occultism and telepathy. Whereas he rarely if ever took a definitive stance on the various beliefs he classified as occultism, Freud's belief in telepathy was clearly stated later in his career (see Gay88 443-45). I read ''The 'Uncanny''' as evidence of Freud's profound conflict regarding his superstitious beliefs, the lure these beliefs held out for him, and his desire to be a paragon of the materialist scientist-this despite his understanding of these two belief systems as mutually-exclusive. I attribute this conflict, this splitting of Freud, to his desire to master ''external reality'' as a determinism, as he believed he had done with psychical reality. I show how Freud associated superstition with ''animistic beliefs," and therefore with the primitive of man and ontogenetic infancy when the relationship to the mother is dominant. Superstition thus is

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296 one theme that illustrates the splitting of the ''castration-truth'' positioning of the One in terms of the significance of the mother, or in terms of her presence/ absence. Castration, like animistic beliefs, is first theorized by Freud as a childhood sexual theory, a childhood belief-but it later becomes for Freud a grand truth. Freud seems quite tempted to have animistic beliefs follow the same pa th from an aspect of inf an tile or childish psychology to a grand truth. A determinism of ''external reality'' might be called Fate or Destiny, and, for the materialist scientist Freud, such superstitious beliefs assume a God-like or demonic Other who has framed the determinism as such. The determinism of these beliefs held out the lure of Freud's mastery over ''external reality," though the God-like Other they assumed conflicted with his identity as a materialist scientist. What is primitive, irrational, uneducated, and childlike Freud often associates with femininity, in contrast to what he associates with masculinity: what is civilized, rational, enlightened, and adult. What I will show as Freud's severe ambivalence with respect to ''animistic beliefs'' might be understood in terms of two mutually exclusive methods of achieving a certain mastery over ''external reality," chance, difference, and the figure of the mother or woman, which all should be associated with each other in this context: (1) by assuming the (phallic) position of materialist scientist and reducing the chance and difference of ''external reality'' to the absence of this position, that is, to lack or castration; and (2) by accepting the beliefs of occultism, superstitions, and possibly religions as partially true, or true if reformulated in a way more amenable to Freud's psychoanalytic logic of determinism as applied to ''psychic reality." Freud is split by maintaining both methods, both positions,

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297 simultaneously, which I argue is similar to what Freud describes as disavowal, where two mutually exclusive positions are held together: the fetishist boy ''has retained that belief [in castration], but he has also given it up'' (XXI 154). I argue below that ''The 'Uncanny''' is a position(ing) paper of ''Freud's," much as Beyond ... is one, where the positioning becomes abyssal because ''the related is related to the relating," and where the self-posting suggests something totally other beyond what the text admits: something that might be called das Unheimlich if Freud's essay didn't reduce this category to a logic of lack. I show that Freud's positioning in ''The 'Uncanny''' is primarily one made against difference and chance, which are first figured as the (op)positional other, the other against which the self-same is defined, the figure of woman, who is then (dis)figured as non-existent or absence in terms of castration: it is a positioning that employs the aforementioned triple (self-)deception of the actual phallic function. Since the other of the positioning of ''The 'Uncanny''' remains repressed, the text becomes, again, an example of self-posting, an attempt at establishment of the One via the One. This essay, which was written shortly before Beyond . is, like Beyond ... a text where its self-posting ends up revealing an insecure positioning, and in this case with respect to chance, difference, and woman. The feeling that this positional insecurity would produce could be called ''uncanny,'' though it might also simply be called anxiety. The difference between the two here is that the uncanny marks the feeling of the return of something repressed, something that had once been familiar. Yet, since Freud reduces all anxiety to castration anxiety, anxiety would also be the return of something familiar. What differentiates the uncanny from anxiety is one question to keep in mind here. Another would be whether Freud's conception of

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298 the feeling of the uncanny would be specific to the (op)positionings determined by ''castration-truth." Would it be, like fetishism, male-specific since females in this context are already castrated? 13 ''The 'Uncanny''' is another example of a self-posting text of logocentric repression that reveals the uncanny remains of a ghostly inheritance due to the necessity of dispatching the self to the self in this postal relay and the necessary impropriety of this relay's proper. These are the remains of the original repetition, the essential division, and the logic of dissemination of what Derrida calls iterability. This self-posting is based on a ''castration-truth," castration as identity-difference, a material-ideal phallus/letter that always arrives at its destination. I argue here that the feeling of the uncanny, as Freud theorizes it, cannot be differentiated from Freud's later, castration-based theory of anxiety, and is male-specific like Freud's theory of fetishism. In addition, I attempt to reveal how this self-posting of the ''actual phallic function'' goes beyond (op)positionality to a position where the self must be split -an impropriety of the proper a la Derrida, a ''splitting of the ego'' a la Freud-in order to simultaneously ''believe'' in the presence and absence of woman: not the presence or absence of woman's phallus, the fetishist's position, but the presence and absence of woman, the psychoanalytic position. Psychoanalysis theorizes the fetishist position in order to center the phallus in defense against the opposition of woman, but ultimately against what is totally other that this opposition represses. This present/ absent woman, and the totally other her 13 Feminists have criticized Freud's notion of fetishism for being male-specific, and have attempted to theorize a female fetishism (see Apt91), which seems misguided to me since this concept attempts to secure phallocentrism.

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299 presence/ absence hides, is the secret and the home, the familiar that returns with what we might call an uncanny feeling, if Freud had not theorized das Unheimlich in terms of what reduces the total! y other to more of the phallic same via castration. Heidegger writes the following in Being and Time: ''Not-being-at-home [Ex-propriation] mu s t be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon'' (Hei96 177). This primordialness of ''Not-being-at home," the familiarity of the impropriety of the proper, could be said to be the secret of Freudian theory, hidden by the (op)positionality of ''castration-truth'' and the (non)origin before the origin of phylo-''genetics," and requiring this disavowal logic with respect to woman. Therefore this psychoanalytic secret (Geheimnis) would constitute the psychoanalytic home (Heim), which is another way of theorizing that these psychoanalytic concepts ''belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to the system of logocentric repression'' (Der78 197), where this logocentric r e pr ess ion is carried out via a ''castration-truth'' and its destinational linguistics: phallogocentrism. The Lack of ''The 'Uncanny''' I: Primary Femininity ''The 'Uncanny''' is another candidate for an athetic text, just as Beyond ... is, according to Derrida. Freud 's hypotheses in ''The 'Uncanny''' are fragmentary, and his explication of them incomplete. Freud asks more questions here than he answers, and many of the enigmas he introduces remain as such at the end: they are left to haunt the text. For example, the uncanny is an affect for Freud,-Freud ''feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics'' (XVII 219)-and he initially associates this affect with fear. Later, however, he will wonder if there is also something about it that is at the same time pleasurable. In

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300 his discussion of Olympia in E.T. A. Hoffman's ''The Sand-Man," and of automatons in general, he notes that a ''living doll'' (XVII 233), while often associated with the uncanny, would also suggest the realization of a basic desire of children to have their dolls come alive. Freud could simply be refuting here the typical reading of Olympia as the primary uncanny aspect of Hoffman's tale in order to make space for his own reading focusing on the eyes and castration. Freud's later discussion of what is required for any literary author's ''success'' at evoking the feeling of the uncanny, however, suggests that he conceives of this feeling as being analogous to the feeling of pleasure a tragic play might provide its audience. Regardless, Freud acknowledges a ''contradiction'' between the association of the uncanny with unpleasure and pleasure at the same time (ibid.). This possible mixture of pleasure and unpleasure suggests the uncanny at least paradoxically combines opposites with regard t.o pleasure and defies any simple definition in terms of the pleasure principle, if not pointing towards something beyond it. Yet, paradox s eems to be right at home with the uncanny. That the meaning of ''das Heimlich'' contains both the sense of what is familiar and unfamiliar makes the English translation of its opposite, ''the uncanny," lose the sense of uncertainty and undecidability of the German word. Freud's 1910 essay ''The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words'' reveals his fascination with words with two antithetical meanings, ana his association of these words with the primitive, which for Freud always points to early infancy, the inner layers of the unconscious, and the pre-history of human kind at the same time. Freud associates such a conflicted unity with the system Ucs., which remains a unity even when it ''holds'' contradictory ideas simultaneously. Such a ''holding''

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301 splits the ego, but not the unconscious. Freud sees these words as being common in the primitive form of Egyptian, yet not in modern languages. The system Ucs. is more archaic for Freud, whereas the ego would be associated with what is more contemporary, such as civilization. Linguistically and psychologically, Freud might have seen ''Unheimlichkeit'' as something remaining in the present from the past, a ghostly inheritance. I would argue that Freud's fascination with these words is in a significant way related to the recurring trauma-structure tropes of psychoanalysis, his fascination with the primitive, and his consistent connection of these metaphors with the primitive and all it entails for him, especially the ontological primitive of the mother-infant monad/ dyad. For Freud in general, ''the uncanny proceeds from something familiar which has been repressed'' (XVIl 247), but he also relies heavily on Schelling's related definition: '''Unheimlich' is the name for everything that ought to have remained ... secret and hidden but has come to light'' (qtd. in XVII 224). Freud's definition relies on both the root meanings of heim as home (familiar) and secret (private). So the uncanny for Freud, at least as his essay sets out, seems to be a feeling associated with something that was once familiar, that something having since been repressed or made secret from oneself, and then the return of that something. Not only does Freud not fully explicate any of his examples of what evokes uncanny feelings according to this definition, he will also contradict this definition with other definitions. The closest he comes to explicating one of his examples fully-fully meaning accounting for issues of familiarity, repression, and return-occurs when he describes the feeling of ''neurotic men'' who ''declare they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs'':

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302 This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a joking saying that 'Love is home-sickness'; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: ''this place is familiar to me, I've been here before'', we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body. In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, familiar; the prefix ''un'' is tl1e token of repression. (XVII 245) Why would this heim be a secret or repressed? Why just neurotic men if it is everyone's former home? What about healthy men? Or women in general? Obviously, Freud is alluding to castration as the source of the uncanny here, as he does repeatedly throughout the essay (e.g., XVII 227,231, 232n1, 233,235, 243, 244,248, 248-49, 252, 252n1). But why does he keep it vague? Is it a secret for him in some way? We might read Freud's vagueness regarding the Unheimlichkeit of castration as a manifestation of the threat it represents of bringing woman to the fore, and, therefore, of revealing the secret of the repression of her significance. Just before his explication of the uncanny with respect to viewing female genitalia above, Freud gives what he claims to be a thorough list of examples of what constitutes the uncanny: We have now only a few remarks to add-for animism, magic and sorcery, the omnipotence of thoughts, man's attitude to death, involuntary repetition and the castration complex comprise

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practically all the factors which tum something frightening into something uncanny. (XVII 243) 303 Towards the end of the essay Freud divides the uncanny into two categories: those having to do with ''infantile complexes'' and those having to do with ''animistic beliefs." Freud argues that the uncanny feeling associated with infantile complexes concerns the repression of ''a particular ideational content'' (XVII 249) and its return, whereas the uncanny feeling associated with animistic beliefs concerns the truth or reality of such beliefs: superstitions, the occult, magic, the omnipotence of thought, telepathy, etc. Freud argues that animistic beliefs are not repressed but ''surmounted," therefore we are left with a choice: either one of the primary categories of the uncanny does not fit the general definition provided above, or the ''secret and hidden'' of Schelling's definition should be understood not simply in terms of repression. Though something simply surmounted would not necessarily be secret in terms of repression (secret from oneself), and therefore its return would not necessarily be disturbing, Freud's concluding definition takes into account the difference between repression and surmounting, which he recognizes would extend ''the term 'repression' beyond its legitimate meaning'' (ibid.): Our conclusion could then be stated thus: an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed. (ibid.)

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304 We might ask why Freud feels it is necessary to differentiate between repression and surmounting with respect to animistic beliefs, especially when it comes to his self-positioning and his own beliefs? I return to this question below. Freud refers to both sources of the uncanny as the primitive, archaic, primal, and primeval-and to ''the distinction between the two'' categories of uncanny as both ''theoretically very important'' and yet ''hazy'' (ibid.). Freud argues,''[ w]hen we consider that primitive beliefs are most intimately connected with infantile complexes, and are, in fact, based on them, we shall not be greatly astonished to find that the di s tinction is a hazy one'' (ibid.). How might superstition be based on the castration or Oedipus complexes? Magical thinking? The omnipotence of thought? Any answer to these questions must come to terms with how much Freud conflates the two infancies of ''man'' and ''Man." My gen e ral thesis here is that Freud's thesis, his positioning in terms of his formulation of the uncanny, cannot be understood, does not make sense, unless it is und erstoo d in terms of, not just the archetypal scenes of both infancies, but with resp ec t to both plays in their entirety, and to how these plays relate to each other. For Freud, they are remarkably similar since the scenes of the ontogenetic play of infancy is a repetition of the phylogenetic one. Therefore, I argue here that Freud does not simply reduce das Unheimlich to castration and (op)positionality-though many of his examples are simply reducible in this way-but that he does so with reference to what might be called his primal play, which is made up of specific primal scenes and primal phantasies. Moreover, I see this primal play as the manifestation of the ''actual phallic function'' and the ''three (self-) deceptions'' of what I am arguing is the ''mainstyle'' of Freudian theory.

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305 If we compare the plays of primitive ''Man'' and ''man'' as treated by Freud, a possible differentiation would be the role of woman in each: in the former ''she'' is largely absent except as an exchange commodity, whereas in the latter ''her'' role as mother seems central. This main role in the ontogenetic play, however, is ultimately effaced in the proper resolution of the Oedipus complex: as in the phylogenetic play, she becomes a place holder for the phallus. In both plays the protagonists are sons (or a son) and a father, and the mother and females are not players as much as commodities of exchange and conduits of desire for the phallus: the girl is even ''a little man." On one level, the importance of woman in these plays even as conduit, place holder, and commodity-seems to be the secret of the phallocentric home of psychoanalysis: the familiar that has been repres sed and yet keeps returning. On another level, the figuring of woman hides the secret of difference (diff e rance) beyond binaries, which I would argue constitutes the primal repressed of psychoanalysis, as with any phallogocentric discour se. The former level attempts to achieve hom(m)osexuality, a phallic One (phallocentrism), while the latter attempts to dissimulate the Other behind the binary of man/woman (dualisms as an aspect of logocentrism). The staging and casting of the phylogenetic play, which is ultimately privileged by Freud, can be read as a denial of the importance of woman, specifically of the mother. The ''origin of origins'' is constructed with the primal father and his sons already in place at the beginning of the play; the women are not as much mothers as wives and daughters. The players are outside of time: phylo-''genetics." It may be useful to turn to Lacan's treatment of these two plays in his return to Freud since Lacan' s reading of Freud, as an example of such a reading

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306 according to a strict logic of lack, assumes the effacement of woman's role in terms of presence: ''woman doesn't ex-sist'' (Lac90 38). ''Her'' absence, as we might suspect, is ultimately God for Lacan (see Lac98, chapter VI). For Lacan the two plays are One, and the One is the Symbolic c;>f ''le 'non' du pere'' I ''le nom du pere." In Lacan's Kojevian reading of Freudian desire, desire is essentially about recognition: ''Man's desire is desire of the Other's desire'' (Lac77b 235; see Bor92). Via Kojeve's reading of Hegel, Lacan's mother is reduced to her lack and subsequent desire for the phallus. Woman is simultaneously other and absent in Lacanian psychoanalysis, and as other she is reduced to the absence-presence of the phallus: woman as phallus is the commodity of exchange between father and son; woman as lack is the conduit of phallic desire. Her mutually exclusive dual roles require a logic of disavowal. This phallic economy, one in which difference is reduced to identity and position is thus secured, is the Freudian heim to which Lacan returns Derrida points out the common Greek root of ''home'' and ''economy," oikos and oikonomia (Der97 359): home and economy based on the repression and disavowal (a secret). With the primitive of ''Man'' one can assume, as Freud does, a mythical patriarchal society where females are insignificant outside their role in the commodity exchange. With the primitive of ''man''-that is, with ontogenetic infancy-it is harder to efface the significance of the role of the mother, but both Freud and Lacan manage to a large extent to do just this. One way of conceptualizing the secret Freud seems to be hiding in 'The 'Uncanny''' is what he would later call in his essay ''Analysis Terminable and Interrninable'' the ''bedrock'' of psychoanalysis: ''the repudiation of femininity'' (XXIII 252). In ''The 'Uncanny,"' Freud repudiates the importance of femininity. The secret is

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307 the importance of femininity, and the home is its repudiation. Given that this so called bedrock of psychoanalysis had formerly been conceptualized as repression-Freud wrote in 1914 that the ''theory of repression is the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests'' (XIV 16)-it is not hard to imagine that, for Freud, these two themes of femininity and repression are intimately related, though never fully spelled out. For primeval ''man," exogamy becomes the result of the taboo of incest, and the privation of the mother (secret, private, Geheimnis) and the threat of the son's castration (trauma, Unheimlichkeit) become two sides of the same coin (''trauma'' -structure) in the law of the totemic or Symbolic father. The desire for the mother-that is, for her desire-becomes a secret that is repressed, as is the father's threat of castration. Resolution of the race's Oedipus complex translates into the establishment of the transcendental law of the symbolic father, or ''civilization." Yet this is not the whole story. The differentiation between the two plays becomes clear when we consider that, in the ontogenetic play, identity, positioning, or subjectification is part of the process, whereas phylogenesis privileges the race or group above the individual. In Freud's phylo-''genetic'' play, the establishment of the law, the relationship of individual to the group, is more the issue: the identity of the group. The Freudian ontogenetic split of Freud's later work should be conceived as one between selfish or individualist instincts and the requirements of the group or law (see Civilization and Its Discontents). This split, however, would be preprogrammed in the ''trauma'' structure of the primal phantasies the individual inherits (instincts of law? drive of proper?). Regardless, the plays differ when it comes to the mother's central role in the establishment of the primary institution in question: the mother

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308 would seem to play a leading role in the ontogenetic play where there seems to be a conflation of desire for the mother and identification with the mother--0r, as cited before, Freud's conception in The Ego and the Id that, at ''the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other'' (XIX 29, my emphasis). And this may point us toward another way of conceptualizing the secret which Freud keeps repressed in ''The 'Uncanny."' This conflation of ''desire for'' and ''identification with'' is an especially pertinent theme for 1919 and the war years when Freud was struggling with a concept that ultimately could threaten the primacy of the uncon scious: primary narcissism. In the abyme of the mother infant ''dyad," a two which is one, ''love of the mother'' and ''love of self'' would be supposedly indistinguishable. When we consider how separation from the mother is theorized by Freud as a form of castration in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, we can now begin to piece together the connections between the mother, positioning-identity, and castration. If the loss of the loved object conflates the mother and the penis, and the primary love object may be a conflation of the ego (primary narcissism) and the mother, then a loss of identity or sense of place or position or self, would also be a form of castration for Freud, and would associate castration with death. Within the phallic economy, it is important that the mother's role not be too significant or else it might eclipse the (male) infant's identity /position/ existence. Again the mother is merely a conduit for a phallic economy. Regardless of her significance being displaced by castration (of not being as castration), what is important here is the connection of identity, castration, death, and the mother's effacement/role. With respect to these themes, the male infant's identity would be analogous to the positioning of

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309 ''Freud'' and psychoanalysis: castration as both an ''infantile sexual theory' and the truth that is found. ''The 'Uncanny'' is a position(ing) paper which, at the same time, attempts to establish phallocentrism and base itself on phallocentrism: self posting. The secret of ''The 'Uncanny,"' behind which lies the secret of non binary difference and chance, is the importance of the mother's role to establishing identity, the importance of the primary identification with the mother for any individual, and the intensity of this bedrock of identity. 14 It is as if, with psychoanalysis, Freud is acting out the male infant's anxiety with respect to the secret of the power and significance of the mother and his primary identification with her, the latter being theoretically repressed with the assumption of ''primary masculinity." We might call the secret ''primary femininity,'' where the little boy and the little girl start out as ''little women'' with respect to identification-that is, according to the explicit logic of The Ego and Id. Of course, there would ae a ''more primordial'' (Heidegger) Otherness behind this ''primary femininity' as primary small ''o'' other. This femininity, . however, would be primary for any such identitarian ego within such a system, a system that would establish an origin, where there was a feminine mother and the mother was the first object of identification and desire. In this vein-one which suffers from being essentialist with respect to the male/female and father /mother binaries-primary femininity in terms of identification could have been coupled with primary masculinity in terms of object-cathexes, which would 14 I am referring here to the mother's role within Freud's own theories of development, and not to some natural or reified mother. Moreover, assuming the mother to be female naturalizes the male/female binary I am trying to problematize, and especially trying to avoid reproducing.

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310 make the primary state of being a bisexual one, and therefore give masculinity a source for bisexuality (again, it lacks such a source with Freud's primary masculinity). In The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud's Writings, Sarah Kofman writes, [Freud's] affirmation of bisexuality thus amounts to affirming the original predominance of masculinity (in both sexes); what becomes enigma tic, then-and this is the riddle of femininity-is the development into womanhood of a little girl who has first been a little boy. (111-12) Freud's ''affirmation'' of ''primary masculinity'' (the predominance of masculinity) is a negation of his earlier numerous affirmations of bisexuality. What becomes enigmatic if we accept both the predominance of masculinity and bisexuality is, first, how these conflicting conceptions can both be primary, and, second, how male sexuality could ever be bisexual: the bisexuality of femininity could be, and is, explained with respect to this logic. Male sexuality becomes the riddle of primary-masculinity psychoanalysis. The ''development into womanhood of a little girl who has first been a little boy'' is not enigmatic here. Both Freudian ''affirmations'' or assumptions-of bisexuality and primary masculinity-work for females, but not for males. Freud's unexplained assumption that the boy's primary identification is to his father-an aspect of his primary masculinity-can also be found in The Ego and the Id (XIX 31; see also XIII 115 ff, 259; XVIII 105 ff), directly contradicting his other position in The Ego and the Id quoted above conflating early object cathexes and identification. The little girl as solely a ''little man'' and the boy's identification with the father appear magically despite Freud's general assumption of bisexuality and his

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311 concept of object and identity being initially conflated. Freud's assumptions allow for femininity to be theorized in Freudian terms and with respect to bisexuality, neurosis, homosexuality, and nor1nality, but not masculinity. Bisexuality is required for Freud's theoretical mastery of woman, but he never systematically applies it to man. Primary masculinity is at once assumed as a known and stable thing, while also making masculinity in general into an enigma. Freud's later theorization of female sexuality makes male sexuality the enigma; and this theorization requires the ideal of masculinity as an unquestionable ideal category and origin of full presence and identity. Moreover, Freud's assumption of a primary ''masculinity' would not be limited to human subjects. It would also include the nature of libido and the most abstract of philosophical categories: activity. Freud's extension of his primary masculinity assumption beyond human subjects and into Nature makes inescapable, contrary to Kofman's claims, Freud's multiple appeals to ideal categories of masculinity and femininity. Primary femininity-as we might extrapolate it from Freud's position in The Ego and the Id where object-cathexes and identification are the same with respect to the supposed f~male mother of early infancy-would solve many of the enigmas of his conception of male sexuality, which I find his work on female sexuality complicates and uncovers. A concept of primary femininity would account for Freud's position in ''Analysis Terminable and Interminable'' that the male's ''passive or feminine attjtude to another male'' (XXIII 250), like penis envy for the female, is one of the ''themes'' that ''give the analyst an unusual amount of trouble'' (ibid.). Without such a concept, whence this attitude of the typical male analysand? It would be an especially inexplicable attitude given the

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312 awesome fear associated with the castration complex. Primary femininity in this respect could also constitute one aspect of a primary bisexuality. It would also account for a pr e-oe dipal phase for the boy: one whose negative Oedipus complex would be based on identification, unlike the girl's, whose pre-oedipal phase is theorized as a negative Oedipus complex based on object-choice. From this primary femininity, Freud might have also developed an analogous three lines of masculine development: a normal one with the proper repression of primary femininity, a neurotic one with too much repression, and a homosexual one with not enough. It should be understood that I am not arguing for primary femininity as a gap-filling measure for Freudian theory; I am not advocating for the acceptance of primary femininity in terms of identification To do so would be to accept the very ideal categories I am trying to deconstruct. I am trying to draw attention to a lacuna in Freud's theorization in order to put into relief what I feel are primary secrets of p syc h oa nalysis, secrets that establisl1 its home: the significance of the mother, male id e ntification with the mother, the obvious necessity of male bisexuality if bi sex uality is theorized as primary and universal, and the absence of an equivalent three-path theorization of masculinity in Freud's later work. My goal has been to suggest a connection between these secrets and the logic of lack of psychoanalysis, its ''castration-truth," its ''actual phallic function''-that is, its mode of reducing the Other to more of the Same. Freud's theorization of the development of female sexuality destabilizes the basis of psychoanalysis itself: his theorization of the development of male sexuality in terms of the Oedipus and castration complexes. We might see the three path theory as a move to theorize woman once and for all, a mastery of the other. But this move

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destabilizes the basis of the original position, and this destabilization goes unacknowledged. The Lack of ''The 'Uncanny''' II: Freud and Lac(k)an 313 Part of the very early relation to the mother is a ''pleasure'' or affective intensity that would go beyond the pleasure principle. Lacan would call this intense affective intensity ''jouissance.'' He would call ''jouissance'' any such intensity beyond pain or pleasure, anything beyond the ''(un)pleasure'' principle and contrary to the edict of the ego's principle of constancy to feel as little pain and pleasure as possible. Lacan associates the jouissance of this supposed early dyadic oneness with das Ding and objet a, the hub and cause of desire respectively. Lacan argues that to go ''beyond the pleasure principle'' in order to experience jouissance would b~ closer to the experience of pain, since one's desire can only circle around das Ding: to actually achieve it would mean one would no longer be one, separated from the mother: one would no longer exist, as with ''woman''; one would not be supported by the ''bedrock'' of ''the repudiation of femininity." Much as with Freud, the secret behind Lacan's abstractions here is the significance of the mother's role in phallic identity-positioning. The paradoxical pleasure-unpleasure of Freud's uncanny, which is weighted toward horror and the fear of extreme unpleasure, could be read as being related to Lacan's conception of jouissance, and therefore with the objet a, das Ding, and the intensity of the mother-infant oneness. If the uncanny is the return of this primitive time of ''identification'' with the mother--the quotes are intended to note that identification requires a simple subject-object split--then many of Freud's examples of the uncanny begin to take on new significance in relation to

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314 the mother: telepathy, magical thinking, the omnipotence of thoughts, primitive beliefs, ''phantasies of intra-uterine experiences,'' the fulfillment of every wish, the effacement of reality and the imaginary (the oneness being imaginary), and even reminders of death. The pleasure-unpleasure for all of them could all be associated with the jouissance of this oneness, its intensity that goes beyond the pleasure principle and the oneness of this ''dyad." When we consider the process of subjectification in the mirror stage of Lacanian psychoanalysis with respect to the importance of this earlier ''identification," Freud's examples of the uncanny as related to doubling, automatons, ghosts, mutilated bodies (fragmentation versus wholeness), positioning, the effacement of reality and the imaginary (the ego ideal of the whole body being an effacement of the infant's actual experience of the body), and ''secret injurious powers'' (the mirror stage, according to Lacan, gives rise to aggression towards the image), among others, also take on a new significance. Inasmuch as the nascent ego can experience this process of individuation, it would be terrifying and painful at the same time it might also be pleasurable: the ontogenetic origin. Whatever terror and pain there might be, from whatever ''memory'' migh t exist from a ''before'' of the origin of the individuated ego, would be caused by having the jouissance of oneness with the mother taken away-which Lacan, faithfully following Freud, reduces to castration. But Lacan also associates this original oneness with castration. The pleasure of individuation, according to Lacan, would be caused by leaving behind what Lacan refers to as a state of fragmentation and utter dependence, and which he associates with castration: fragmented body ego Individuation here would be a making-whole of the (always male) bodily ego. Once again denying the

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315 importance of the mother and privileging the pleasure of phallic individuation, Lacan privileges the pleasure here and calls this moment when the infant is able to recognize itself as a subject and the mother as an object a ''jubilant'' moment (Lac77a 2)-that is, when the (always male) infant recognizes the image as ''himself," when ''he'' identifies with it, with its phallic completeness, he feels joy. What happens to the castration of the infant being separated from the mother of which Freud so often writes? Lacan argues that this identification, this moment of self-positioning, leads to a sense of mastery, including self-mastery, and eventually mastery over the mother, a prefiguring of her repudiation in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. This could be read as the origin of the phallic pleasure principle and its self-posting of letters that always arrive at their destination. Paradoxically, this origin would be one of castration, as Freud formulates it: separation from the mother as castration. It seems both sides of the individuation process are castration: ''trauma'' structure. Lacan's notion of the ''jubilant'' moment represses the nece ssa ry ambivalence of this origin, and privileges phallic individuation. The early id e ntification of the '' infant'' (subjectivity being especially problematic at a pre-individuation point) would be with an ego ideal, a prefiguring of the super ego, which, according to what I would call a secret logic of Freudian theory, would be a bodily Gestalt ultimately grounded in the mother-infant oneness. Given that the nascent identification of the mirror stage is based on the repudiation of the mother-infant oneness, the phallic Gestalt of the Oedipus complex would to a large degree depend on keeping this original Gestalt and its intensities secret. The mother-infant Gestalt would be based on a repudiation of difference and chance, which Lacan calls fragmentation and

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316 ultimately reduces to castration. The oedipal Gestalt would also be based on the repudiation of the (identification with the) mother as a female, and therefore the absence to the presence of this phallic Gestalt, the other against which the One is established. The transition of the mother from the blissful mother of oneness to the imaginary-symbolic-lacking mother that incites aggression (she threatens castration) is figured from an oedipal position as the transition from the phallic mother (the repressed basis of the oedipal Gestalt identity) to the castrated (castrating) mother: thus the subject of the Symbolic is born of the Law of the Father. This figuration of the mother reduces ''her'' to the central absence of phallic economy or heim. Every definition and every example Freud gives of the uncanny is in harrnony with a definition of the uncanny according to this economy and their phallic figurations of the mother as secret (phallic mother) and opposite (abject castrated-castrating mother). The mother and the Other are simultaneously reduced to more of the phallic Sarne via Freud's treatment of the uncanny in these terms. Again, one secret of ''The 'Uncanny,"' and of psychoanalysis in general, is the great importance of what Freud referred to as ''Minoan-Mycean'' (XXI 226) layer of the bedrock of infancy; and this ''bedrock'' of the mother-infant monad/ dyad, hidden behind the oedipal construction of the phallic mother (which must be repudiated in order for phallic individuation to occur), itself hides something totally other behind it: the mise en abyme of something like jouissance, of ''experience'' prior to an ego, prior to any kind of individuation, any kind of subject-object experience. The ''archeologist of the mind'' tended to see the deepest layers in terms of his androcentric and patriarchal themes of Totem and Taboo, and not in terms of an all-powerful figure

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317 of the mother, and especially not an all-powerful ''(dis)figure(ing)'' of differance. Lacanian psychoanalysis is very much the legitimate legatee of ''The 'Uncanny''' with respect to three profound and related themes: the effacement of the importance of woman, the reduction of (sexual) difference to identity via castration (really the same as the first theme), and the reduction of literature to psychoanalytic truth. For example, with respect to all of these themes, ''The 'Uncanny''' prefigures Lacan's ''Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter."' Derrida shows that Lacan reduces Poe's text to his destinational linguistics where the proper destination of the phallic and mysteriously material-ideal letter is with the Queen (woman as phallus), her secret (the loss of her penis-phallus-letter; her wandering desire or womb) is kept, and her position in relation to the king maintained (proper arrival). It is interesting to note that the secret of the letter is ''hidden'' in a most heimlich place: in the Minister's home, and Dupin immediately looks to the loins of the woman-shaped mantle. The hiding place is so heimlich it becomes unheimlich; it also recalls female genitals, and the letter a phallic lost object The letter's eventual arrival sets everything right, and, according to Lacan, it must happen this way: it is destiny, the nature of language. Lack has its proper place. Literature-which is traditionally figured as the female other to phallic psychoanalysis, science, and philosophy-is reduced to ''castration-truth'' by both Lacan and Freud. Psychoanalysis, philosophy, and science attempt to erect a firm position, whereas with literature and its numerous vehicles for effecting ''uncanny'' displacements, one never knows where one stands. As Lacan effaces the narration of Poe's tale, and treats Dupin as the (Lacanian) analyst, Freud reduces the function of the author to that of the analyst in ''The 'Uncanny."' Like

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318 a proper analyst, the ''success'' of Freud's literary author depends on divining methods of getting beyond tl1e resistances of the reader-analysand in order to produce a catharsis of the repressed in the form of an uncanny feeling (XVII 250). Freud even uses the term ''recalcitrance'' with respect to the literary reader at this point in ''The 'Uncanny,"' much as he had in his description of a patient in the dream of Irma's injection in The Interpretation of Dreams. That which displaces (literature) is reduced to the terms of what seeks a fixed place (Freud's science or ''analysis''). ''The 'Uncanny''' and Superstition Early in ''The 'Uncanny,"' Freud praises Jentsch, a predecessor on the subject of das U11heimlich, for laying ''stress on the obstacle [to writing about the uncanny] presented by the fact that people vary so very greatly in their sensitivity to this quality of feeling'' (XVII 220). Then Freud makes the following statement and disingenuously frames it as a confession: The writer of the present contribution, indeed, must himself plead guilty to a special obtuseness in the matter, where extreme delicacy of perception would be more in place. It is long since he has experienced or heard of anything which has given him an uncanny impression, and he must start by translating himself into that state of feeling, by awakening in himself the possibility of experiencing it (ibid.) I find it intriguing that Freud would argue that he could actively make himself open to feeling the uncanny More evidence of his sense of mastery over this feeling-to which by definition one would be passive-lies in his later claim that

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319 the type of uncanny feeling associated with animistic beliefs does not concern repression-a process to which one is passive but a process of ''surmounting,'' where one would be a more active participant. Freud puts himself in the category of someone who has gotten beyond sensitivity to this feeling because he has actively rid himself of those remnants, the ghostly remains, of animistic beliefs that cause the uncanny: ''anyone who has completely and finally rid himself of animistic beliefs will be insensible to this type of the uncanny'' (XVII 248). Perhaps Freud felt he had also ''surmounted'' the other type of the uncanny, which involves infantile complexes, by way of his self analysis, where Freud, via a certain activity, is able to subvert his own theory of one's passive relation to the unconscious. Of course, Freud's own works, and those of his biographers, are filled with clues that, far from being insensitive to this type of feeling, Freud was acutely sensitive to them, and to the conflicts such beliefs would cause for the leader of a movement that is trying to establish itself as a science and that often must do so by fending off accusations that psychoanalysis is akin to, if not an example of, occultism. According to Jones, Freud's ''wish to believe [in occultism] fought hard with the warning to disbelieve'' (Gay88 444). Jones writes the following in his most orthodox biography of Freud: The extent to which a given superstitious belief is accepted by the mind is usually one of degree, and it is often very hard to ascertain to what extent the person ''really'' gives credence to it. It is a common experience to get the reply when someone is questioned on the point: ''No, I don't really believe it, but all the same it is very odd Acceptance and rejection are both operative .... Freud was

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320 no exception in this respect, and he would himself have not found it easy at times to say whether he accepted a given belief of this order or not. (3: 379) This simultaneous 11 acceptance and rejection'' would be a forn1 of Freudian disavowal and a similar alogic as in Freud's conception of the fetish. Given the definitive statements he makes, such as the one above about his insensitivity to uncanny feelings, it seems that Freud actually found it quite easy to disavow his superstitious beliefs, even though he would argue at other times they were either partially true (aspects of occultism) or wholly true (telepathy). At times he would even vehemently attack superstitions, occultism, and religion as if they were the enemy in a war. According to Peter Gay, Freud's ''view of religion as the enemy was wholly shared by the first generation of psychoanalysts'' (Gay88 533n), and this view was extended to superstitions and occultism. Those beliefs of Freud's that other psychoanalysts would classify as superstitious in other people, as Freud would also do in his more secular materialist moments, might be compared with his Lamarckian mytllology of phylo1 'genetics'': both were somewhat suppressed by Freud and the psychoanalytic orthodoxy, and both have a similar relation to science and to the issue of deter1ninacy versus contingency-that is, both superstition and Freud's phylo-''genetics'' are ultimately deter1ninistic beliefs. An example of Freud's superstitious beliefs is given in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, where Freud finds a hidden meaning regarding the number 2,467, which he had written to Fliess regarding his guess at how many mistakes The Interpretation of Dreams contained. After relating the number to the retirement of a general he knew, and then the manipulation of the number of

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321 years he had until his own retirement, subtracting, then dividing ... he came up with the number sixty seven, and interpreted this as a wish to have just a few more years of life that is, not to die at age sixty two, the age his father had died, and the age he was sure he would die Seven or so years after writing this passage in Psychopathology, Freud would begin writing ''The 'Uncanny."' He would write over a period from when he was about fifty eight to sixty three, including this passage: If we take another class of things, it is easy to see that there, too, it is only this factor of involuntary repetition which surrounds what would otherwise be innocent enough with an uncanny atmosphere, and forces upon us the idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should have spoken only of ''chance." For instance, we naturally attach no importance to the event when we hand in an overcoat and get a cloakroom ticket with the number, let us say, 62; or when we find that our cabin on a ship bears that number. But the impression is altered if two such events, each in itself indifferent, happen close together-if we come across the number 62 several times in a single day, if we begin to notice that everything which has a number, addresses, hotel rooms, compartments in railway trains-invariably has the same one, or at all events one which contains the same figures We do feel this to be uncanny And unless a man is utterly hardened and proof against the lure of superstition, he will be tempted to ascribe a secret meaning to this obstinate recurrence of a number; he will

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322 take it, perhaps, as an indication of the span of life allotted to him. (XVII 237-8) Did Freud see himself as such a hardened man, with ''a special obtuseness in the matter''? Or did he see himself as a less special man, one who would be tempted to ''ascribe a secret meaning''? The ''lure of superstition'' is not to have to speak of ''chance." Freud's quotes around ''chance'' suggest a certain disdain for what would be this more common sense conclusion. Freud suggests that what is difficult is not the hardening of oneself, but the acceptance of a certain fate and the ''involuntary repetition'' it enforces--that is, ultimately giving up a certain bad faith of having choice and of there being chance. Fate's lure for Freud is its determinism For Freud, the evidence of the 2,467 example is, not necessarily the truth of Fate and related superstitious beliefs, but the proof that there is no chance in psychic reality, and that there is nothing beyond his theory of wish-fulfillment: nothing beyond the PP and its/his mastery. But Freud's point with the number sixty in ''The 'Uncanny''' goes beyond psychic determinism. Freud wrote this essay right after the Wolf Man case where he struggled so with the contingencies of ''external reality," and the problems these contingencies created for the development of his masterplot. This is not an example of unconscious fantasy filtering out other numbers (anticathexis of sorts) and investing in the one number (hypercathexis), which would be a typical psychoanalytic interpretation, if not simply a Freudian one. For the number to indicate a destined ''span of life allotted to him," of course, there would have to be Fate: a cosmological determinism. The imbrication of themes we find above themes of a general determinism, a powerful Other that constitutes one's fate, one's passivity to this

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Other, chance, one's connection to a parent (in this case, the father), and death-are repeated in Freud's later essay, ''Femininity," with respect to the child's relation to the mother. Freud writes, after discussing one of the child's early reproaches of the mother, ''that it never gets over the pain of losing its mother's breast'' (XXII 122). 15 He then claims a universality of the fantasy of being poisoned by the mother: 323 The fear of being poisoned is also probably connected with the withdrawal of the breast. Poison is nourishment that makes one ill. Perhaps children trace back their early illnesses too to this frustration. A fair amount of intellectual education is a prerequisite for believing in chance; primitive people and uneducated ones, and no doubt children as well, are able to assign a ground for everything that happens. Perhaps originally it was a reason on animistic lines. Even to-day in some strata of our population no one can die without having been killed by someone else-preferably by the doctor. And the regular reaction of a neurotic to the death of someone closely connected with him is to put the blame on himself for having caused the death. (ibid.) First of all, Freud would often claim the truth of what he had formerly posited as a children's theory, as he did with castration. Freud associates truth with what is archaic and primitive. Another example would be the childhood belief in ''the 15 Freud is discussing the little girl here, but will later argue that this applies to the little boy too He is trying to theorize what motivates the girl to reject her mother as love object, while the boy keeps her as such. Therefore, any experiences common to both boy and girl, such as the one above, would not explain this cause. Ultimately Freud will theorize the cause as the girl's castration complex.

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324 omnipotence of thought'' and Freud's belief in telepathy (see Freud's essay, ''Psychoanalysis and Telepathy' (XVIII)). What I want to draw attention to here, however, is the imbrication for Freud of animistic beliefs and the mother, and of science and the father: Freud's gendering of belief systems. As Freud argues, believing in Fate, in a Destiny where there is no chance, would be a primitive belief of ''Man/man." Science, on the other hand, teaches chance; it is a mature belief system one hopefully grows into. As one must do with one's connection to the mother, one must ''surmount'' animistic beliefs. Soon after the passage above, Freud argues that the ''wish to get the longed-for penis'' may be sublimated by a woman in the form of a capacity ''to carry on an intellectual profession'' (XXII 125) Clearly the sciences and intellectualism, and therefore a belief in chance, are associated for Freud with masculinity and by extension with the father, whereas an animistic and primitive belief in determinism is associated with the primitive or archaic connection with the mother and by extension with femininity. Like Derrida's reading of Plato's undecidable use of ''pharmakon'' as poison/cure, determinism is the poison/nourishment of the mother's milk-though we might wonder why Freud strangely claims that all poison is nourishment. The poison of determinism for Freud is the separation it causes from the position of masculine science; the nourishment is the potential sense of mastery it provides. Here, from a phallocentric perspective, the figures of both parents are simultaneously ''phallic'' and castrating. As Plato wrote about the dangers of writing-needing writing itself, and its metaphors, to further his phonocentric and logocentric beliefs.-Freud at times disparages the determinism of superstition as he works hard to create a masterplot of totalizing cause and

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325 effect. Freud's repeated return to the themes of the occult and telepathy can be read as Freud trying to have the ''nourishment'' of both animistic beliefs (determinism) and the ''nourishment'' of science (the legitimate, masculine authority), the nourishment of both the mother and the father, without the poison of either: femininity /primitiveness and chance, respectively Freud would associate death with both poisons He was like a man with two gods: one maternal and one paternal But both are viewed from a phallocentric position, and in fact the phallic mother might be a compromise figuration of such a conflicted belief The connections between the uncanny, superstition, chance, difference, and the figure of woman are revealed in Freud's treatment of disavowal as a simultaneous belief-disbeli e f, as the primary defense mechanism of the fetishist against ''external reality ." Freud's relationship to superstition and the uncanny can be seen as an example of the ''Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence'' (XXIII), according to his 1938 essay title, and concerns the disavowal of perception. Th e phallic archetype of ''pe rception '' h e re is the perception of the ''reality'' of woman's castration. A secret of Freud's 1938 essay is that splitting is the defense of (op)positionality in th e ''face to face'' with an Other that is irreducible to a One via twos, threes, absences, presences, theses, antitheses, or the kind of Aufhebung Hegel defined as preserving both the thesis and antithesis, rather than negating either or both. This is the type of Aufhebung the fetishist tries to realize: a preservation of both the phallic mother and the mother of castration (castrated and therefore potentially castrating). The fetishist cannot decide between giving up the jouissance the oedipally individuated subject might associate with the former (being One with Fate or God) or the possibility of the

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326 position of scientific master the latter holds out as lure through the reduction of woman to castration-truth where lack has its place (the hom(m)osexual One). We might say that there are three demons under the employ of psychoanalysis: ''external reality," ontogeny, and woman. With the deter1ninism of Fate associated with the phallic mother, the chance of ''external reality'' cannot disrupt the movement toward the totality of the masterplot. The phallic mother, however, is a mother, and therefore does not allow for a simply masculine position of power. With a masterplot based on primal narratives free of all powerful mother figures, it can position a masculine One. But this masterplot lacks the cosmological determinism of an ''external reality'' where ontogeny is determined by Fate: it contains the chance of what is figured from a phallocentric perspective as paternal science. Freudian psychoanalysis attempts to reduce what is totally other and full of contingency to (op)positionality and determinism via the trope of castration. Behind the ''three demons'' mentioned above is the Other, even though these three demons to the One are also employed as dissimulators: they all are the products of idealist binaries. Chance is rarely if ever used by Freud, and yet it haunts psychoanalysis. Ironically, Freud's work is full of the very animistic beliefs he claims to have surmounted: for example, the omnipotence of thought (privileging of psychical reality, the truth of telepathy) and what he calls the displacement of the symbol for the thing itself. The latter is especially evident in Freud's treatment of castration as a reality. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, the splitting of the ego of disavowal concerns ''the primary defense consisting of a radical repudiation and the notion that such a mechanism bears specifically upon the reality of castration'' (Lap67119).

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327 This last point is without doubt the one which gives us the best key to the Freudian idea of disavowal, but it also brings us to reopen and extend the questions which that idea raises. If the disavowal of castration is the prototype-and perhaps even the origin-of the other kinds of disavowal of reality [such as superstition], we are forced to ask what Freud understands by the ''reality'' of castration or by the perception of this reality. If it is the woman's ''lack of penis'' that is disavowed, then it becomes difficult to talk in terms of perception of reality, for an absence is not perceived as such, and it only becomes real in so far as it is related to a conceivable presence. If, on the other hand, it is castration itself which is repudiated, then the object of disavowal would not be a perception-castration never being perceived as such-but rather a theory designed to account for the facts-a ''sexual theory of children'' .... These considerations clear the way for the following question: does not disavowal-whose consequences in reality are so obvious,-bear upon a factor which founds human reality rather than upon a hypothetical ''fact of perception''? (See also ''Foreclosure''.) (Lap67120) Or we might ask: what is Freud disavowing when he refuses to see the non reality of castration? For Lacan, psychosis is the product of foreclosure: a radical repudiation of the truth of castration and the reality it founds. Laplanche and Pontalis begin to ask the questions that subvert this castration truth, but seem incapable of seeing the idea that ''woman is castrated'' as a projection of the ''hom(m)osexuality' of psychoanalysis, and itself a disavowal of difference

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328 beyond (op)positionality. Castration is the disavowal of sexual difference, and here I mean sexual difference beyond the traditional binary of male/female In other words, this binary of ''sexual difference'' is itself a disavowal of difference, a reduction of something totally other to an idealized binary. Freud's reduction of what is totally other to man/woman is then followed by a reduction of woman to castration, so we are left with two (op)positions (having/not having) of One sex: hom(m)osexuality. 16 Lacan's introduction of foreclosure and his definition of the Real in terms of woman and God in Encore belies the rigidness of the ''castration-truth'' of his psychoanalysis: in many ways, he takes this logic of lack to its end Lacan's psychotic lacks the ''anchoring point'' that stops the supposed sliding of signifiers in the Symbolic, but then reduces this sliding and its ''chaos'' to a specific absence '' related to a conceivable presence'': ''trauma''-structure. Lacan's position, however, is clearly one of disavowal trying to maintain an Aufhebung that preserves mutually exclusive opposites since the Symbolic is both fixed as the law of the father and in motion as the maternal other Freud's position is also consistently one of disavowal with respect to sexual difference, superstition, and contingency-and by extension, the uncanny. His disavowal, and the subsequent splitting of the PP, concerns his own position in relation to these themes. Castration logic is necessarily doubly split with relation to woman: ''she'' is both present (as (op)positional other) and absent (with respect to the 16 My critique of the ''hom(m)osexuality' of psychoanalysis is in no way intended to be a criticism of what is commonly termed "male homosexuality," a te1111 which relies on, in addition to male/female, a simplistic binary of homo -/ hetero-, another reduction of something totally other to an idealistic binary. "Hom(m)osexuality" is the term I use for the reduction of what is totally other first to a binary, then to a phallic s ingularity

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One of hom(m)osexuality). She is 'Woman'' (Encore), but this should be read differently than Derrida's use of erasure, where the ter1n has a use within logocentrism and under erasure. Derrida's erasure attempts to acknowledge differance and the necessity of ''logo-phonocentrism'': 329 Logo-phonocentrism is not a philosophical or historical error which the history of philosophy, of the West, that is, of the world, would have rushed into pathologically, but is rather a necessary, and necessarily finite, movement and structure: the history of the possibility of symbolism in general (before the distinction between man and animal, and even before the distinction between the living and the nonliving); the history of differance, history as differance which finds in philosophy as episteme, in the European form of the metaphysical or onto-theological project, the privileged manifestation, with worldwide dominance, of dissimulation, of general censorship of the text in general. (Der78 197) 17 The line throt1gh the Lacanian ''Woman," on the contrary, is part of this dissimulation and censorship of the text and its differance. What I am trying to argue here is that this line, as with Derrida's erasure, requires a double reading, but the difference is that the double and aporetic reading of Derrida's erasure is between the (op)positionalities of binaries and differance, rather than between the presence and absence of one pole of the assumed-natural binary: they are at different levels of the triple (self-)deception, and radically different with respect 17 ''Phallogocentrism is neither an accident nor a speculative error that can be imputed to any given theoretician. It is an old and enormous root that must also be accounted for'' (Der87 4802n60).

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330 to awareness of the irreducibility of division and its applicability to their own project. In other words, Derrida's erasures are intended to be done without dissimulation, or with as little as possible, whereas Lacan's 'Woman'' requires a logic of disavowal with respect to the division of the Lacanian project. Derrida's erasures denote a double game, whereas Lacan's erasure of ''Woman'' is the primary trope employed to establish a single game of ''castration-truth''-and this supposedly singular game is actually divided, as any totalitarian game would be due to the irreducibility of division. The ''Woman'' must be a ''hysteric'' in Lacanian psychoanalysis: she must be divided with respect to existence. The phallic mother is the fetishist's compromise figure, the perverse ego ideal. From an oedipal position, however, this figure is psychotic: it threatens the patrocentrism of oedipal positionality based on the male/female binary and is therefore still associated with castration with respect to the oedipal One this binary serves,-that is, even though the phallic mother is intended to nullify the very issue of castration. The phallic mother short-circuits the actual phallic function by mixing the two poles of the binary, which constitutes ''her'' for1n of castration for the oedipal One. Though it attempts to deal with castration, the ''problem'' of the One, the phallic mother subverts the very binary foundation that castration ''solves'' by providing an identity-difference tertn. The fetishist's ''solution'' subverts the ''solution'' of the oedipal One by subverting the binary of male/female, which thus makes the fetishist seem psychotic to the oedipal subject. The difference between the oedipal One and the fetishist is that the former relies on the logic of lack and the actual phallic function to achieve his position (or her (non)position), whereas the fetishist relies on a logic of

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331 disavowal with respect to castration. The oedipal One and the actual phallic function, however, also rely on a logic of disavowal, but with respect to the presence and absence of woman, rather than the presence or absence of the maternal phallus Despite these differences, both positions suffer from a splitting of the ego since both rely on a logic of disavowal: ''solutions.'' Whereas the phallic mother is a non-solution because it disrupts ''castration-truth," the ''hysteric'' and 'Woman'' are two similar, if not the same, ''solutions'' of ''castration-truth'' and the disavowal of the irreducibility of division. When Lacan mourns the loss of traditional hysterics, he is mourning the version of this ''solution'' that exists. The phallic mother is a psychotic and destabilizing figure within an oedipal patriarchy, and ther efo re cannot be the ideal of Freud's masterplot The lure of this figure, however, is the lure of an even more totalizing masterplot than that which can be had within the oedipal ''solution." Freud associates this ''solution'' with science and its acceptance of chance, and this chance provides the limit of what the masterplot can mast e r, the limit of the PP: chance as what is beyond the PP. The animistic beliefs of superstition, associated with the primitive of Man/man, and therefore with the motl1er, and the Gestalt of the mother-infant monad/ dya~, combine with the phallocentrism of Freud's oedipal patriarchy to make the phallic mother a figure combining phallic totality and maternal totality. Freud's fantasy of combining occultism and psychoanalysis can be construed as a fantasy of absolute mastery with no loss: like a fetishist's fantasy of total determinism, with no loss, but one that is ultimately split along the dividing line of a disavowal. Another way of conceptualizing this dividing line is with respect to the subject-object split required in the logic of phallic

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332 mastery, and the mise en abyme of what appears as a fusion with the mother from an oedipal position-accepting the truth of ''animistic beliefs'' as regressing back into fusion with the mother. Jouissance would be both the pleasure of the ''oceanic feeling'' of such a ''(dis)solution'' and the terror of falling into the void. From a phallic position, such a fall would be a castration, a death. Home Secrets I read ''The 'Uncanny''' as study of the roots of the word ''heim," or the treatment of the relationship of the home (oikos, proper, position, identity) to the secret (repressed). The secret is the repressed version of the home, or what is repressed in order to achieve the home. The home is repressed secrets: first a logocentric repression of diff era nce that allows for the establishment of an idealistic binary of male/ female, then the repression of the difference of the oppositional term ''woman," via the identity-difference or ''trauma" structure ter1n, castration. This home is ultimately split due to the conflict between these two repressions : one requires woman's presence, the other requires her absence. In ''The 'Uncanny,"' Freud supposedly reveals the secret of castration, but this supposed secret, as the home, the oikonomia, of psychoanalysis and its logic of lack, is based on the secrets, the dissi1nulations of the actual phallic function . We find here the ''interiority'' to psychoanalysis of ''hysteria,'' the divided woman, woman as a ''division'' that secures phallic Oneness: psychoanalysis/hysteria. The ''hysteric," after her figuration wanes, is replaced by 'Woman ." As I argued in chapter two, psychoanalysis supposedly begins with its mastery of hysteria, but it constructs hysteria in order to provide a specific absence,-specific ''gaps'' in the masterplot-for it to fill Thus what is

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original, psychoanalysis or hysteria, is undecidable: psychoanalysis/hysteria again. To sustain the orthodox origin myth, one must disregard the dizzying polysymptomatology of ''hysteria," its inability to sustain a proper disease 333 status; disregard Freud's diagnosis of his own hysteria, or what would have been the interiority of hysteria; disregard the impossibility of a self-analysis, and the psychoanalytic breakthrough that gives greater power to the system Ucs. than to the system Cs. ''Hysteria'' was Freud's specimen neurosis: it was, to a large extent, synonymous with ''neurosis." The cure of hysteria, supposedly, is the birth of psychoanalysis and its authority regarding the unconscious in general. It was supposedly the discovery of the truth of the unconscious as Oedipus. Neurosis was a ''female malady'' (Showalter), a repression of (masculine) sexuality as a reaction to not accepting ''castration-truth." With hysteria and this birth of psychoanalysis, woman is linked to the unconscious. Freud would later say that the ''bedrock'' of psychoanalysis is ''the repudiation of femininity''-and in his later theory of hysteria, posited around the same time he made the above claim, what made the female ill with hysteria was her repudiation of femininity. Here femininity is synonymous with ''castration-truth'': the hysteric can't accept her (non)position as castrated. Freud would also argue late in his career that th~ problem for women was invariably penis envy, a difficulty repudiating what he theorized as their primary masculinity: never giving up the desire to be masculine as the repudiation of femininity. For men, on the other hand, the problem he argues is invariably their ''struggle against his passive or feminine attitude to another male'' (XXIII 250). Whereas the female neurotic suffers from repudiating her femininity, the male neurotic suffers from not doing it enough. The male, it seems, though Freud

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334 never theorizes it in any systematic way, suffers from his bisexuality. Would this be his primary femininity he must repudiate? That which he must repudiate to avoid ... what? The homosexual side of his bisexuality (always divided into two: male/female)? Is homosexuality a problem? If so, is it the only problem of male sexual development for Freud? What about neurosis? How is neurosis related to homosexuality and the repudiation of femininity? If libido is male, and both the boy and the girl start out as ''little men," what would be the femininity or passivity the male would have to repudiate? As I have argued above, despite Freud's theory of the conflation of object-cathexes and identification in infancy, the boy somehow identifies with the father. So whence the femininity the boy and man must repudiate, and which fonns the bedrock of psychoanalysis? Freud never elaborates beyond the claim that bisexuality is fundamental: he never theorizes the feminine aspect of being male. Indeed, he contradicts his claim to the universality of bisexuality with his adamant and arbitrary theory of what I call primary masculinity. lf bisexuality is a crucial aspect to any sexuality, it seems that, with respect to Freudian theory, male sexuality is more the enigma for psychoanalysis. The answers to these questions are not as much absent or missing as they are impossible, if ''possibility'' means maintaining the disavowal of the importance of the woman (and therefore femininity) as one pole of the fundamental binary of man/woman, especially with respect to the mother in the primitive of ontogeny where object cathexis and identification are the same. The bedrock of psychoanalysis itself is ''the repudiation of femininity'' insofar as this repudiation is analogous to the disavowal of woman required by the actual phallic function and its phallic position of the One: the pure presence that is

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335 necessarily split, necessarily impure. Behind/within this secret that constitutes the home or the One of psychoanalysis and its split hom(m)osexual positioning, lies another, more basic secret, behind the idealist categories of man/ woman. Something totally other is dissimulated by this binary. Behind/within the psychoanalytic sexual ''difference'' of man/woman is the radical difference of an adestinational postal relay: the differance of the trace. Questioning the foundation of psychoanalysis as a cure of neurosis and a theory of the unconscious-the discovery of how repression works with respect to this supposed cure quickly becomes a questioning of psychoanalytic theories ~f sexual difference, and of the role of chance in the etiologies of neurosis and therefore in the unconscious. With Freud's early memory-based etiologies of hysteria, some room had to be made for chance. Despite Freud's efforts to narrow ''seduction'' to a scene that only concerned the patient's father, the chance of this ''seduction'' still differentiated the normal from the neurotic I have attempted to problematize the orthodox myth of Freud's switch from memory-based theories to fantasy-based theories above. If there was a switch at this time, it was one made from an etiology of the traumatic and chance imposition of sexuality on an asexual child to a metapsychology of what constituted normal sexual development: the infant was no longer raped or molested, it was a sexual being with fantasies of seduction. The chance was no longer in terms of a trauma etiology; it would become, after Dora, the chance of a deviation from normal sexuality: too much masturbation, ''seduction'' by a nurse or sister, inability to give up primary masculinity, etc. Freud's etiologies after the ''seduction'' theory are never so definitive, and what exactly is pathogenic is usually left untheorized, thus psychoanalytic claims to authority or to truth

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336 based on cure, including or especially those regarding sexual development, are highly dubious. Freud's later theory of hysteria is in harmony with his notion from The Interpretation of Dreams that psychoanalysis finds ''no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life'' (V 373): the hysteric represses her primary masculinity too much. Freud is less concerned at this point with the cause, with finding his caput Nili. His primary goal seems to have been to establish a stable position of masculinity via his theory. The metapsychological theory of sexual development, Freud's phylo-''genetic'' masterplot of the PP, achieved this better than any etiology of hysteria ever did. Yet when he attempts to define woman and femininity according to this masterplot--when he tries to appropriate the other and the Other--he ends up destabilizing the very basis of his theory: the oedipal masterplot of masculine sexual development. Disavowing this instability, Freud's woman is still reduced to functionaries according to his ''three lines of development'' and within a phallic economy centered on ''castration-truth." This economy (oikonomia) provides the home (oikos, Heim) for the phallic One. The stability of the oikos is achieved through a stable and complete definition (reduction of) woman, and the repression (secret, Heim) of the instability this definition causes (the repression of male bisexuality). In ''Analysis Terminable and Inter111inable," Freud would switch the dominance between the ego and the id back to the id, after switching his original stance in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. When Freud argues in this essay that the way psychoanalysis has come to understand the nature of resistance means that cure is hard to come by, he is privileging psychoanalysis as a

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337 metapsychology over psychoanalysis as a technique. Given that this technique is what originally grounded the metapsychology, we are left wondering what is it that grounds the psychoanalytic metapsychology that theorizes interminable analyses. Whence the authority? What in turn grounds Freud's theories of sexual difference? With respect to females, analyses are interminable because, Freud argues, females cannot give up their penis envy. But how did Freud arrive at the ''truth'' of penis-envy but via cure? The foundation of psychoanalysis is not so much Freud theorizing and curing neurosis, but attempting to master sexual difference by theorizing normal sexual development: not curing hysteria as much as defining hysteria in terms of nor1nal female development. In this vein, I have tried to show how the trajectory of psychoanalysis was fundamentally directed toward securing a position, via metapsychology and masterplots, of a masculine One with respect to the unconscious, woman, chance, and difference. Without cure as the basis, Freud's theories would be mere speculations. Freud's movement away from etiologies and cures toward metapsychologies of sexual difference is continued by Lacan, who would de differentiate normality and neurosis by doing away with the category of normal, and essentially collapsing it into the category of neurotic. For Lacan, neurosis is a clinical structure not differentiated from nor1nality, but from psychosis and perversion, perversion being the other possible structures of subjectivity. Neurosis ''is a question being poses for the subject'' (Lac93 168) Lacan divides the neurotic structure into two forms, and each for1n is centered on its own question. The question (asked) of the obsessional neurotic is Hamlet's basic existential question, ''to be or not to be?'' -or, ''am I dead or alive?'' and ''why do

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I exist?'' (Lac93 179-80). The question (asked) of the hysteric concerns the subject's sexual position: ''Am I a man or a woman?'' or ''what is a woman?'' 338 (Lac93, 170-75). With respect to this last form of the hysteric's question, Dylan Evans argues that Lacan ''reaffirms the ancient view that there is an intimate connection between hysteria and femininity'' (Eva96 78-79). I would first argue that the Lacanian hysteric is the Lacanian woman, since neurosis and normality are the same: two forms of the Lacanian ''solution'' of ''castration-truth," where the irreducibility of division is transformed into the center of identity (though this ''solution'' itself is divided, hence the quotation marks). ''Femininity'' for Lacan is reduced to lack, and specifically a lack of being-''woman doesn't ex. sist'' (Lac90 38),-and therefore the hysteric's question and the obsessional's question are the same question, since being for La can is a question of one's position within the Symbolic-i.e., one's sexual identity. Having a position, being, would then be obsessional and masculine. To ask ''am I a man or a woman?'' would therefore be the same as asking ''to be or not to be?'' To be is to be a man, and to be obsessional. This would be the onto-theological positioning of the hom(m)osexual One: vigilant about the Other/ other potentially within (bisexuality) and against which it had to define itself in its (<.,p)positional stage, and whose non-existence must be assured to maintain its fantasy of Oneness. Yet, since the two questions are the same question, and therefore the same ''solution," the One is also divided, which would also explain its vigilance, its obsession, with maintaining not only the repression of ''woman'' and her division, but the repression of all repression. The difference between the questions, the sexual difference, would be from whence the questions are asked. According to Ellie Ragland-Sullivan,

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339 Lacan placed knowledge of the something else on the side of woman or the feminine: the hysteric's solution goes against the normative one of believing in cultural stereotypes, adapting to the Symbolic pere-version, aiming, rather, at the Real father of the jouissance of the impossible. In its very impossibility, her quest reveals a lack in desire, a flaw in culture, and in knowledge. Not surprisingly, she has a certain subversive attitude towards norms. Lacan hypothesized that the hysteric's particular dignity comes from her ability to elevate a suffering life to a worth y position, despite the fact that her body is constantly invaded by anxiety and affect that others more successfully repress. In a more general sense, Lacan saw the hysteric as embodying the quintessence of the human subject because she speaks, as agent, from the lack and gaps in knowledge, language and being. In her ''being'' she reveals the incapacity of any human subject to satisfy the ideals of Symbolic identification. (Wri92 164) Lacan would therefore continue the traditional imbrication of femininity and madness by associating femininity with the Real and masculinity with the Symbolic. The quotes around ''being'' above exemplify the hysteric's impossible question. She cannot ask ''what is not being?'' without the ''is'' and ''not being'' creating an aporia. How can the hysteric speak with agency from the gaps? Doesn't agency require existence? Doesn't speech? The hysteric, according to Lacan, asks her question from the Real, but this Real is what sustains the Symbolic and its norms: the Real as the (op)position of the Symbolic (and the Symbolic as inseparable from the Imaginary as in ''symbolic identification'' (see

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340 Web92)), and the Real as the absent center of the Symbolic, ''das Ding," which desire circles. Ragland-Sullivan reads Lacan's hysteric as if she represented some radical positioning from beyond. This hysteric, however, cannot be subversive. She is the (op)position, the specific absence, the center, that allows for the unquestioned presence of man: the taming of the Other as other. The hysteric here is the figure of woman that ''ex-sists''-and she magically exists, but does not exist, in a manner akin to the magically material-ideal phallus: The phallus, thanks to castration, always remains in its place, in the transcendental topology of whicl} we were speaking above. In castration, the phallus is indivisible, and therefore indestructible, like the letter which takes its place. And this is why the motivated, never demonstrated presupposition of the materiality of the letter as indivisibility is indispensable for this restricted economy, this circulation of the proper (Der87 441) The reduction of woman to castration, to its magical presence/ absence is also indispensable. Lacan's hysteric is woman in his structural economy that collapses the categories of the neurotic and the normal into one. Tl1e dignity Lacan gives to the hysteric is the dignity usually afforded to woman for providing this specific absence to presence, where lack (the Real) has its place (opposed to the Symbolic). Lacan's identification of Socrates, Hegel, and himself as hysterics is less an identification of hysteria with these thinkers who went beyond common knowledge than a manifestation of Lacan's relationship of disavowal with respect to woman: Lacan, with his usual immodesty, associates himself with those whom he sees as having possessed some Knowledge that might be

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341 associated with the phallic mother, if woman were not constantly a threat. ''Castration-truth'' provides a transcendental place for the specific lack, but the threat always remains, as does the instability due to the logic of disavowal required to sustain the One. The hysteric must exist (Lacan's mourning) and yet ''be'' woman who cannot exist All this must ''be'' in order to achieve the ideal ''hom(m)osexuality'' of Being. Man exists (alone) in Lacan's phallogocentrism, and Lacan presents himself as an example of His ability to transcend the limitations of normal knowledge, beyond the obsessional position, to possess the God-like knowledge of both Self and Other, both sides of the split in the RSI: he supposes himself to be a mystic, a subject of knowledge (''sujet suppose savoir''). Lacan's association of himself and his three great men with the god-like position of the man-hyst e ric, what he calls ''the mystic' (Lac98 76), and the hysteric's quintessential lack can be seen as a disavowal of the hysteric as woman: the man hysteric is akin to the phallic mother, his-her absolute knowledge the product of a totality unbounded Lacanian psychoanalysis is Lacan's superstition: a destinational linguistics. With re s pect to one level of the actual phallic function-the level that hides the small ' o'' other behind the One of hom(m)osexuality-what remains is the existence and femininity of the hysteric and woman. With respect to a ''more primordial'' level, the level of das Unheimlich, the 'not-bei.ng-at-home," what remains, as usual, is the trace of logocentric repression: the diff e rance of a split One, the impropriety of the proper in a self-post. Lacan's neurotic structures are thus ideal categories of sexual difference in ontological terms La can extends a trend in Freud's theorizing that conflates neurosis and normality, and associates ideal categories of masculine and

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342 feminine with diagnostic categories, among many other types of categories. In this sense psychoanalysis resembles the ego of the obsessional male. Like the obsessional male, psychoanalysis can be read as a defensive discourse attempting to maintain the masculine position of existence against the threats of feminine uncertainty and undecidability. Laplanche and Pontalis describe obsessional neurosis as follows: the psychical conflict is expressed through symptoms which are described as compulsive-obsessive ideas, compulsions towards undesirable acts, struggles against these thoughts and tendencies, exorcistic rituals, etc.-and through a mode of thinking which is characterized in particular by rumination, doubt and scruples, and which leads to inhibitions of thought and action .... displacement of af feet on to ideas removed to a varying degree from the original conflict; isolation; undoing what has been done ... ambivalence . (Lap67 281) Freud's attempts to theorize ''the uncon sc ious'' might be read as a compulsive undesirable act for the obsessional interested in certainty and mastery. Analysis itself might be considered an exorcistic ritual: for men, exorcising the feminine or passive trends, enhancing the repudiation of femininity, whereas for women exorcising resista1:1ce to assuming the feminine position, to not being. With regard to positioning, the Lacanian obsessional-hysterical question itself is one that dissimulates, represses something beyond La can's RSI based on a logic of lack: the obsessional-hysterical question, the ontological question, is in the service of a totality of positioning, and a representative of castration-truth. Lacan positions himself as master of this totality. Without the Lacanian hysteric,

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343 without woman as magical presence/ absence (division as identity), without the magical material-ideal phallus of Lacanian ''castration-truth," this totality cannot be maintained. The magic is required to disavow the impropriety that these concepts and categories bring with them, to dissimulate the dissimulation of the irreducibility of division, to transform the otherwise spaces into ''gaps'' and ''lack." Just as ''lack does not have its place in dissemination'' (Der87 441), there is no space for dissemination or differance within a logic of lack

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C ~6 WHAT REMAINS: PSYCHOANALYSES, DECONSTRUCTIONS, AND FEMINISMS The Analysis of a Repression In ''Freud and the Scene of Writing,'' Derrida argues that ''[d]espite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy'' (196). He then refers to these appearances in terms of ''the analysis of a historical repression and suppression of writing since Pia to'' (ibid.), which suggests that the common ground between the methodology of psychoanalysis and the methodology of deconstruction would be an analysis of a repression. Derrida's problematization of ''analysis'' in Resistances of Psychoanalysis twenty years later reveals two contradictory motifs of ''analysis," one of which can be linked to the ''deconstruction'' or ''dismantling'' of ''logocentric repression'' in ''Freud and the Scene of Writing'': The concurrence of these two motifs figures in the figure from the Greek language, namely, analuein. There is, on the one hand, what could be called the arch e ologi c al or anagogical motif, which is marked in the movement of ana (recurrent return toward the principal, the most originary, the simplest, the elementary, or the detail that cannot be broken down); and, on the other hand, a motif that could be nicknamed lytic lytological, or philolytic, marked in the lysis (breaking down, untying, unknotting, deliverance, solution, 344

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345 dissolution or absolution, and by the same token, final completion). Thus the archeological motif of analysis is doubled by an eschatological movement, as if analysis were the bearer of extreme death and the last word, just as the archeological motif, in view of the originary, is turned toward birth. (19-20) The ''analysis'' of the ''mainstyle'' Freudian psychoanalysis would be archeological, and the ''analysis'' of deconstruction would not be simply the death-oriented, eschatological ''analysis," but a double game where it is both life and death-oriented: ''life death'' (Der87a 259). In other words, a deconstruction of the logocentric repression of philosophy and psychoanalysis could not be a described as a simple methodology. It would be a double game which would seek out ''the most originary'' of the logocentric discourse, the archeological game, while disturbing that origin by playing the other, philolytic game-and playing this game with the discourse under consideration as well as with its own discourse. With respect to the discourse under consideration here, my project has attempted to locate the various origins of psychoanalysis--memory, trauma, narrative gaps, perceptual identities, original experiences of satisfaction, the navel of the dream, the dream wish, primary process, pleasure principle, primal repression, primal phantasies, and anxiety, among others--in order to then disturb those origins philolytically. Besides the double and paradoxical ways of reading ''analysis," the myriad ways of reading ''analysis of a repression'' are further complicated by the multiple Derridean and psychoanalytic definitions of ''repression." In ''Scene," Derrida cites Freud when he writes,

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346 Repression, not forgetting; repression, not exclusion. Repression, as Freud says, neither repels, nor flees, nor excludes an exterior force; it contains an interior representation, laying out within itself a space of r epression. Here, [with the deconstruction of logocentrism,] that which represents a force in the form of the writing interior to speech and essential to it has been contained outside speech. (196-97) Despite certain similarities, the form of repression Derrida refers to here would not simply be the ''interdiction of translation'' form of Freudian repression from 1915, which Freud describes as ''fending off instinctual impulses'' via the non translation of ''thing-presentations'' into ''word-presentations." First of all, it is questionable whether the ''thing-presentation'' represents a re-presentation since the ''castration-truth'' of primal phantasies are both Lamarckian (a theory of evolution, acquired traits over time) and transcendental (outside of time, ideal, mythical). If we accept that thing-presentation would be a manifestation of the primal repression, and therefore of ''castration-truth," then the transcendental quality of thing-presentations would therefore constitute a presentation: a simple presence as the basis of a metaphysics of presence. Even without phylo ''genetics'' playing a role, Freud's separation of thing-presentation from the mnemic image (see XIV 201) and treatment of it solely in ter111s of cathexis, suggest that this ''presentation'' has little to do with what Freud might have considered in the Project as some exogenic Q or a quality of the ro system. Moreover, this thing-presentation by definition would never be interior to what keeps it contained as exterior: it would never be translated. As Weber has shown, the 1915 translation repression negates the mobile cathexis of the primary

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347 process and is based on the notion of the authenticity of the ''presentation.," both of which would be anathema to the ''historical dismantling'' (Der78 197) Derrida hopes to further with ''Scene.'' Though Derrida attempts to distance the ''analysis of a repression'' of his project in ''Scene'' from that of psychoanalysis when he writes that ''the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy.,'' his appeal to Freud's authority on repression seems to establish a questionable kinship between decon~truction and psychoanalysis with respect to repression. The form of repression Derrida represents here, however, seems more Derridean than Freudian, mostly because Freud is more often less specific regarding repression, especially in his early theorizations of it, usually theorizing it in ter1ns of repelling and excluding a force exterior to consciousness, and at times simply equating it with defense, or the unconscious in the broadest terms. Despite this early appeal by Derrida to what is presented as a specific and agreed upon form of Freudian repression, a ''mainstyle'' repression, Derrida later recognizes,-specifically in Resistance of Psychoanalysis-that psychoanalysis lacks a ''unified concept of resistance'' that might unify the tradition of psychoanalysis. Lacking such a concept of resistance would mean that psychoanalysis would lack a unified concept of repression too, since Freud consistently theorizes them as interdependent. In Resistances of Psychoanalysis, Derrida's treatment of the various forms of resistance Freud posits in The Ego and the Id, specifically the final id resistance, contradicts his earlier delimitation of repression to ''that which represents a force ... [and is] interior ... [and] has been contained outside'':

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348 As for the resistance that comes from the id, it calls for the analytic work that Freud names Durcharbeitung. (Perlaboration is the standard French translation: the English ''working through'' would be clearer, more analytic, more ''French.") In the course of this laborious traversal, the subject sometimes becomes entrenched in resistance. Repression still persists, it insists, it resists even when the resistance of the ego has already been lifted. At that moment, one sees that the intellectual, theoretical, philosophical, ideal, or ideational acceptance of the analytic interpretation does not suffice to lift repression, which is, according to Freud, the ultimate source of resistance. What remains still to be conquered is the repetition compulsion .... (22) Derrida is referring here to Freud's position in '' Analysis Terminable and Interminable'' where the id once again is the most powerful agency (and we are left wondering on what psychoanalytic truth is based since cure seems so elusive to this Freud of 1938). Regardl ess, this resistance of the id seems to suggest something beyond ''that which represents a force ... [and is] interior ... [and] has been contained outside." Resistance for Derrida and Freud is the flip side of repression-''[r]epression still persi sts, it insists, it resists''-and this resistance/repression seems before/beyond representation. It does not seem to be about containing an interior representation as exterior; what seems to be contained is something like a force itself. The question becomes, is this force the insistence of the primal order? Or is this force a ''force," a radical alterity to be considered as that which ''causes'' the drivenness of the drive of the proper (also a re s istance), where ''cause'' is in

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quotes because this ''beyond'' of the proper would also be beyond the origins and temporality created through the process of repression (see Bar93 123-33)? With the repetition compulsion does Freud suggest a theory of repression-a concept of trace, or a hypothesis of trace. as radical as Derrida's theory of 349 repression of ''Scene''? With repetition compulsion is the Freudian concept of trace radicalized? Referring to ''Speculate'' and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Derrida explains in Resistances of Psychoanalysis that ''there is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the more decisive and difficult stakes between, let's say, 'psychoanalysis' and 'deconstruction' should have taken a relatively organized form around the question of the repetition compulsion'' (32). The categories and dualisms seem to dizzyingly pile up here: repetition, resistance, repression, id/ ego, the drive of the proper/ the 'force,'' thing-presentations/word presentations, interior/ exterior, force/representation, etc. The difficulties seem to grow when resistance is equated with repression and the compulsion to repeat is associated with the id (does the id repress itself?). Moreover, these difficulties might account for why Freud ''stepped back'' from the hypothesis of the repetition compulsion as that which is beyond the pleasure principle in Beyond the Pleasure Principle-why he enacted a fort/da game, a pas de marche. I believe it would be helpful at this point to sort out some idea of the differences between the ''mainstyle'' repressions of psychoanalysis and deconstruction, though such sorting out could risk occluding some of Freud's most '' otherwise'' moments. I have argued that ''mainstyle'' psychoanalysis posits phylo-''genetics'' as its transcendental origin of origins Supposedly, ''repression'' here would be divided between primal and secondary repression: phylogenetic (structural,

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350 transcendental, yet somehow Lamarckian) and ontological (structural yet somehow temporal) repression respectively The ideal memories-phantasies of phylo-'' genetics'' constitute Freudian primal repression. Yet, any form of secondary repression, including the ''interdiction of translation," would be significantly problematized by the fact that this complex of memories/phantasies, otherwise known as the Oedipus complex, would predetermine both or all sides of the repression process: it would be that which constituted the id and the source of what I have argued is originally a hypostasized ego. It would also determine the oedipal ego, whether conscious or unconscious. According to the ''mainstyle'' or oedipal Freud, the phylo'' genetic'' Oedipus complex would determine the ''interdiction of translation''-that is, determine repr ess ion and therefore the ego-since the phylo-'' genetic'' oedipal script of development would override any ontological accident of development. The split of the ''rnainstyle'' Freudian subject would be between the oedipal ego of civiliza~ion and the oedipal id of phylo-' 'ge netics," which would contain the ''chaos'' of the polymorphous perversity of the primeval sons, the ''trauma'' of patricide and self-punishment, and the castration-centered structure of the law of the father that would transform that punishment into a legacy and destiny in the forrn of the super-ego. My ''rnainstyle'' Freud resembles Lacan's ''return to Freud'' in that both posit a transcendental structure that makes it difficult to account for secondary repression for what might be known as the individual person Barratt sees this problem in terms of the differences between French and North American versions of ''psychoanalysis," the quot es indicating his position that these

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351 traditions betray the essential Freud's ''postmodern impulse'' with their respective ''returns'': ''North American'' and ''French'' versions of ''psychoanalysis'' distinguish between so -c alled primary and secondary repression, with ''North American'' egologic~l versions often having difficulty in accounting for primary repression, and the ''French'' structuralist versions often having difficulty in accounting for secondary repression. (163) In this sense, my ''mainstyle'' Freud is more French and structuralist; and with respect to ''castration-truth," I would even say Lacanian, though the structuralism of my ''mainstyle'' Freud is based on a paradoxically Lamarckian and Platonic mythology rather than Lacan's Platonic and pseudo-Saussurian linguistics. The structuralist Freud has difficulty accounting for what Freud himself called ''secondary repression''-that is, he had trouble accounting for ontogeny, for chance, and for the question, ''whence the neurosis?'' What Barratt has in common with the egological ''North American'' ''psychoanalysis'' of which he is so critical, is that they both disregard the importance of phylo ,, genetics'' for Freud, the importance of this Platonic structuralism and the Freudian unerasable trace. ''Mainstyle'' psychoanalytic repression does not posit the id as a beyond or something totally other, but as pure presence, an ''unerasable trace'' (Der78 230), a hidden sense. Discussing Freud's footnote on the ''navel of the dream," Derrida argues that ''Freud seems to have no doubt that this hidden thing has a sense'' (Der96 4):

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352 The inaccessible secret is some sense, it is full of sense. In other words, for the moment the secret reuses analysis, but as sense it is analyzable; it is homogeneous to the order of the analyzable. It comes under psychoanalytic reason. Psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic reason. (ibid.) '' Analysis'' of primal/ secondary repression would therefore be archeological or anagogic and resist the philolytic (''lytophobic''?). Since Freud supposed he knew ''the inaccessible secret'' to be Oedipus and its ''castration-truth," psychoanalytic treatment would then be a process of working through the individual's supposedly idiomatic resistances to this Truth. One's compulsion to repeat would, in these terms, be both symptomatic and associated with the insistence of the ideal memories-phantasies being played out as primal ''scenes,'' and therefore the repetition compulsion could be associated with both the resistances of the ego and the id. The other of the ego here, the ''the inaccessible'' secret, is supposedly traumatic, transcendental, original, and full of sense. As is always the case, the type of analysis would follow from the type of repression assumed. And the type of repression assumed would depend on whether the other is assumed to be ''an inaccessible secret'' full of sense, or an Other, something totally other to sense and truth: '' At stake, then, are sense and truth'' (Der96 18). Towards the close of ''Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida compares Freud to Plato with respect to writing and finds him at times ''extremely Platonic," especially when Freud discards the Mystic Pad and thus differentiates the writing of the soul from writing machines: ''Only the writing of the soul, said the Phaedrus, only psychical trace is able to reproduce and to represent itself

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353 spontaneously'' (227). The soul here is associated with life without death. Derrida adds that two of Freud's examples of ''[i]n what pathbreaking [Bahnung] consists'' seem to reaffirm phallogocentrism. From Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety: As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a piece of white paper, assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as walking becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual act. (XX 90) In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud writes, ''[i]t is highly probable that all complicated machinery and apparatuses occurring in dreams stand for the genitals (and as a rule male ones), in describing which dream-symbolism is as indefatigable as the joke-work (Witsarbeit)'' (V 356). Derrida cites this last passage in reference to Freud's use of a machine as a metaphor of the psyche. Derrida sees Freud discarding the Mystic Pad because it is an inadequate representation of ''the psychical apparatus'' (Der78 227), supposedly because the psyche cannot be a machine since the psyche is life without death; the soul or psyche runs by itself and m~chines, which are dead, do not run by themselves (for Freud, the Mystic Pad requires two hands at least to begin to resemble the mnemic system of the soul): ... what was to run by itself was the psyche and not its imitation or mechanical representation. For the latter does not live. Representation is death. Which may be immediately transformed into the following proposition: death is (only) representation. But it

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354 is bound to life and to the living present which it repeats originally. A pure representation, a machine, never runs by itself. (ibid.) The machine is dead, as is any language separated from self-presence: re presen(ce)-tation, writing. It is not just that the Mystic Pad is a writing machine: writing itself is a machine. Derrida is critical of Freud here for not entertaining more the commonality between psyche and writing machines, for not deconstructing his rigid life/ death (op)position based on his Platonic conception of the soul as the source of self-presence (castration-truth), as something beyond a machine since it supposedly runs by itself: All that Freud had thought about the unity of life and death, however, should have led him to ask other questions here And to ask them explicitly Freud does not explicitly examine the status of the ''materialized'' supplement which is necessary to the alleged spontaneity of m e mory, even if that spontaneity were differentiated in it s elf, thwart e d by a censorship or repression which, moreover, could not act on a perfectly spontaneous memory. Far from the machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to the psychical apparatus, its existence and its necessity bear witness to the finitude of the mnemic spontaneity which is thus supplemented The machine-and, consequently, representation-is death and finitude within the psyche (Der78 227-28) The psyche requires a d eadly supplement: it does not run by itself, it is not life without death, it is mortal Derrida calls one question Freud did not ask ''the question of technology'' and considers it a crucial question for problematizing

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355 the rigid (op)positioning of life and death, ''between present and representation, and between two apparatuses'' (Der78 228): the psychical apparatus and the writing machine. When Freud's discourse ''opens itself to the theme of writing'' and to the ''unity of life and death," and therefore to the ''question of technology," Derrida argues that Freud shows signs of opening up something otherwise to Platonism: ''a beyond and a beneath of the closure we might term 'Platonic''' (ibid.). In other words, Freud is ''extremely Platonic'' when he avoids ''the question of technology," when he discards the Mystic Pad in order to return to the soul of ''Cartesian space and mechanics," but he entertains a beyond to this mechanics, space,. a~d Platonic closure when he entertains the ''resemblance'' of the two apparatuses, which Derrida calls ''the Freudian breakthrough'' (ibid.). The difference between the supplementary memory machine Freud discards and the ''Cartesian mechanics and space'' of the psyche to which Freud returns-the return is enacted by the discarding-has to do with the type of wax the machines use, the interiority of the wax with respect to the machine, and the erasibility of the traces marked in that wax. The ''natural wax'' (Der78 227) of the Cartesian machine is posited, Derrida argues, as an ''exteriority of the memory aid'' (ibid.), and the archi-traces of this wax are unerasable. The resemblance Derrida wants to stress is the interiority of all waxes, the interiority of representation, writing, death, finitude, and chance to the two machines that which allows the machine to work, if not by itself: writing as supplementarity as life death. When Freud discards the Mystic Pad, he represses ''that which represents a force in the fortn of the writing interior to speech and [that which is] essential to it [and which] has been contained outside speech'': phonologocentric repression.

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356 For Freud, the archi-trace is one of ''castration-truth'': a specific absence that keeps the place of a pure presence, an indelible absence, an unerasable trace. The uneras~ble trace for Freud is analogous to Lacan' s indivisible, material-ideal phallus. Thus, as I have argued throughout, Derrida's critique of Lacanian discourse as one of phallogocentric repression based on ''castration-truth'' also applies to Freudian discourse. My assumption of a ''mainstyle'' Freud even resembles Derrida's assumption of a ''mainstyle'' La can in ''La facteur de la verite." Castration is the unerasable trace of the transcendental phallus for both discourses. Derrida concludes ''Scene'' by stressing the ''archi-trace as erasure'': erasure of the present and thus of the subject, of that which is proper to the subject and of his proper name. The concept of a (conscious or unconscious) subject necessarily refers to the concept of substance and thus of presence-out of which it is born .... Thus, the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it (particularly in the concepts of consciousness, the unconscious, perception, memory, reality, and several others) (229) I would include phylo-''genetics," sexual ''difference," castration, primary process, pleasure principle, primal repressed, anxiety, and repression, among still several others, to the list of those Freudian concepts that need to be radicalized in ter1ns of the erasable trace, or the trace as erasure. Such a radicalization of the trace-going from the unerasable trace of Platonism to the erasable trace of deconstruction-would radicalize ''analysis of a repression'' with respect to both ''analysis'' and ''repression."

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357 In the paragraphs that follow the quotation above, Derrida makes more explicit that there is a connection between Freud's unerasable trace and his division of repression into primal (phylo-''genetic'') and secondary (ontogenetic) repression. Derrida makes this connection after differentiating the erasable and unerasable trace q11d associating the former with this division of repression and the latter with the synthesis. It is worth quoting both paragraphs in full: The trace is the erasure of selfhood, of one's own presence, and is constituted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance. An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full presence, an immobile and un co rruptible substance, a son of God, a sign of parousia and not a seed, that is, a mortal germ. This erasure is death itself, and it is within its horizon that we must conceive not only the ''present," but also what Freud doubtless believed to be the indelibility of certain traces in the unconscious, where ''nothing ends, nothing happens, nothing is forgotten." This erasure of the trace is not only an accident that can occur here or there, nor is it even the necessary structure of a determined censorship threatening a given presence; it is the very structure which makes possible, as the movement of temporalization and pure auto-affection, something that can be called repression in general; the original synthesis of original repression and secondary repression, repression ''itself." (230) The synthesis occurs because the radicalization of the Freudian concept of the trace would not allow or require an origin, a primal repression. Primal

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358 repression marks pure and original self-absence-the absence being one of lack, always already implying a specific presence whereas secondary repression would mark the proper detour of the missive of the self-post. Though Freud often talks about primal repression in ter1ns of a first time, this ideal origin would not be a first time but an always already outside of time, yet participating in it as well: a ''lost order of time, illud tempus as Eliade calls it'' (Ker66 39); a mythical aevum of primordial sons and fathers rather than angels, what Kem1ode calls ''the time-order of novels'' (see Ker66 71-72). As I argued before, the self post would not be required if the original self-presence was pure, simple, and a totality-that is, the self-post is evidence of the (non)presence of something radically other that requires the self-posting. Lacan would reduce this radical alterity to lack, to the specific absence of ''castration-truth," and therefore the detour would be proper to the letter that always arrives (no arriving without the detour). Like the letter that does not arrive at its destination, or the orphaned signifier of iterability, the accident of erasure ''makes possible'' the structure of temporalization and auto-affection (self-posts), where the ''disappearance of disappearance'' (akin to what I have called the third self-deception of the triple self-deception of the actual phallic function) creates the appearance of the self. . Derrida would see these as examples of a ''logic'' that ''comes to deprive of meaning the very thing to which it gives meaning'' (Der96 23), the original example of the essay ''Resistances'' being the repetition compulsion and its ''resistance to analysis'' ''that figures both the most resistant resistance, resistance par excellence, hyperbolic resistance, and the one that disorganizes the very principle, the constitutive idea of psychoanalysis as analysis of resistance'' (22).

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359 ''Desire," as theorized by Barratt in Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse, has a great deal in common with Derrida's erasable trace, except for Barratt's treatment of it as something ''like an unavoidable plenitude'' (163), since the erasable trace subverts any simple presence/ absence: Desire is thus like an unavoidable plenitude that foils every positionality and oppositionality by which consciousness is structured. It is incontourable .. .. It galvanizes yet usurps. All we can ''know'' about desire is that it ''appears'' as the disruption, the incogitancy, and the ''disconsistency'' of knowing. (ibid.) If we were the Freud of the ''seduction'' theory and were analyzing the desire of a so-called ''hysteric," this ''disconsistency'' or these disruptions of knowing might appear as gaps in an established or establishment narrative, rather than as spaces suggesting an ''otherwise other." According to Barratt, ''desire usurps the very representationality that it galvanizes .... reflection can never grasp itself despite the appearance of so doing, because it is always infused with the radical foreignness of its desire'' (164). Barratt's line of argument here concludes with how desire is ''in but no t of'' the product of ''the appearance of so doing," the product of what Derrida calls above ''the disappearance of its disappearance''-the self, the ego, or what Barratt calls the ''I-now-is." For Barratt, the ''contradictoriness'' of desire ''is within the eventuation of > representationality'' (the ''is'' of representation's ontology), ''yet without the temporality of re-presentation'' (the ''now'' of representational time). Unlike Derrida's ''erasable trace," which plays with presence and absence since the trace itself is undecidable in terms of presence and absence, and erasibility negates any possibility of simple presence Barratt's ''desire''

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360 suffers from seeming too simply present, too much of a force (no quotes), being too like a ''plenitude," to play the deathly role of supplement and/ or writing machine, or to play both life and death. Moreover, Barratt's association of ''desire'' with his ''otherwise other'' does not seem to take into account any differentiation between what I have called ''force'' (quotes intjicating something quite otherwise, better even to have it under erasure) and what Derrida calls ''the drive of the proper." It seems that a term like ''desire'' would be better associated with what is ''in and of'' the ''I-now-is'' rather than what is ''in but not of'' it which would be analogous to Lacan's desire of demand and the Imaginary-Symbolic (see Web92), rather than associating ''desire'' with something akin to the Real (that is, if Lacan's discourse were not radically different than Barratt's) In other words, ''desire'' should be thought of in tertns of Derrida's ''drive of the proper," where this drivennes$ would be the strange relation to oneself that is called the relation to the proper: the most driven drive is the drive of the proper, in other words the one that tends to reappropriate itself. The movement of reappropriation is the most driven drive. (Der87a 356) ''Desire'' and ''drivenness'' should be associated with what Barratt calls the repetitive ''acts of establishment'' of the ''I-now-is'' rather than with the ''otherwise other.'' The ''drive of the proper'' is the answer to Derrida's question with which he begins Resistances: ''Must one resist?'' His answer, of course, is an extension of his ''absurd hypothesis'' or ''sole thesi s of 'Deconstruction''' of posing divisibility: in order to stay one, one must resist divisibility, must make the disappearance of

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361 oneness disappear. This line of argument reminds me of the aforementioned line by Heidegger in Being and Time: ''Not-being-at-home [Ex-propriation] must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon'' (Hei98 177). More prim ordial than what? Can something be somewhat primordial? Perhaps it is helpful to think of Derrida's drive of the proper as ''somewhat primordial." It creates the time, the ''now," of the proper in order to posit a beginning, but there is ''something'' beyond or ''before'' this time that is otherwise to temporality and ontology. This ''something'' under erasure allows for ontology, temporality, representation, identity, logic, home, and economy, while it subverts it: das Unheimlich, the Not-being-at-home and the Being-at home at the s~me time, a ''logic'' that ''comes to deprive of meaning the very thing to which it gives meaning'' (Der96 23), like the erasable trace, and a radicalized version of the compulsion to repeat. This radicalized version of the compulsion to repeat, a version that takes seriously the question of technology, the (non)unity of life and death, is Derrida's (non)concept of iterability. With the (non)concept of iterability, Derrida associates repetition with alterity: Such iterability-(iter, again, probably comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties repetition to alterity) structures the mark of writing itself, no matter what particular type of writing is involved ... A writing that is not structurally readable iterable beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing. (Der88 7)

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362 For Derrida, iterability, essential drift [derive] bearing on writing as an iterative structure, cut off from all absolute responsibility, from consciousness as the ultimate authority, orphaned and separated at birth from the assistance of its father, is precisely what Plato condemns in the Phaedrus. (Der88 8). Though Freud would usually subvert the ultimate authority of consciousness, he would do so, as I have argued, in order to secure the centered position of the father. Freud's Platonism is not straightforward: he reduces the ''cut off'' from the father to castration, thus he reduces the e ssential drift to a specific absence of a specific presence, which transforms a logic of dissemination (dis-semination) to a logic of lack For Derrida, any unity must resist, because any unity of the signifying form only constitutes itself by virtue of its iterability, by the po ss ibility of its being repeated in the absence not only of its ''referent," which is self-evident, but in the absence of a determinate signified or of the intention of actual signification, as well as of all intention of present communication This structural possibility [e~sential chance] of being weaned from the referent or from the signified (h e nce from communication and from its context) seems to me to make every mark, including those which are oral, a grapheme in general; which is to say, as we have seen, the nonpresent remainder [restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative ''production'' or origin And I shall even extend this law to all ''experience'' in general if it is conceded that there is

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no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks. (Der88 10) 363 Most significantly, Derrida directs our attention to the experience of consciousness or self-presence: the self-post is a form of writing and therefore subject to the essential drift of iterability. Iterability could be thought of as the basis of a psychology, if ''psyche'' were not traditionally associated with the self starting, self-present soul. A ''technology," then, where the psyche is understood as supplemented by a writing machine, as requiring a supplement to get started: the supplement creates the origin, possibility of the whole. With a technology of iterability, according to Derrida, ''the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance [I enonciation]'' (Der88 18). Intention would be basic to self-presence, consciousness, the subject, and Derrida allows that the ''essential absence of intending the actuality of an utterance '' can be considered a ''structural unconscious'' (ibid .). Thus, with ''mainstyle'' psychoanalysis and deconstruction, we have two radically different forms of ''analysis and repression," where the type of analysis assumes a corresponding type of repression ''Mainstyle'' Freudian archeological or anagogic analysis seeks to uncover '' the principal, the most originary, the simplest, the elementary, or the detail that cannot be broken down'' (Der96 19): the unerasable trace, ''a full presence, an immobile and uncorruptible substance, a son of God, a sign of p~rousia'' (Der 78 230). Derridean philolytic analysis seeks to disturb the logocentric repression of such discourses based on such analyses of such repressions: to disturb the origins, and the logics and mythologies based on those origins This is why deconstruction is not a

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364 psychoanalysis of philosophy, and why this paper is not a psychoanalysis of Freudian theory, but a deconstruction of it. Derrida's ''analysis of a repression'' is a deconstruction of logocentric repression, whereas both Freud's archeological analysis and phylo-''genetic'' repression are forrns of logocentric repression in need of deconstructing. Derrida's ''analysis of a repression'' can be thought of as, if not a ''psychology," a technology of iterability-.a ''techno-analysis," or, better yet, paraphrasing Donna Haraway, a ''cyborg-analysis'' (see Har91)-where the unity of life death leads to ''difference as divisibility'' (Der96 33), where the supplement precedes the whole, where the psyche resembles the writing machine, where the repetition of desire or the ''drive of the proper'' is primordial, but not as primordial as the alterity of what causes the drive or desire to establish the one that must resist via repetition/repression: das Unheimliche or the ''otherwise other'' that is ''in but not of'' the one of the ''I-now-is." These erasures and quotation marks require the double games of philolytic analysis, as does any concept of repression that would include the analyst. Post(al)-Psychoanalysis What remains of psychoanalysis after ''the Freudian concept of trace'' is ''radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it'' (Der78 229)? Given my reading of the ''mainstyle'' Freud, my attempt to problematize the supposed unease of certain Freudian c oncepts within logocentric closure, to disturb these supposed! y disturbing origins, it would seem that I might argue that little remains of psychoanalysis proper or ''mainstyle'' Freudian theory after this process of radicalization and extraction. What could possibly remain of a Platonic discourse of ''castration-truth'' after

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365 such a process? This process might be considered a posting of psychoanalysis, and the product of such a process might be called ''post-psychoanalysis.'' With any such posting the question becomes whether that which is being posted is being rejected outright, or whether it is in some significant way being retained yet altered, as with the definition of ''post-Marxism'' in The Routledge Critical Dictionary of Postmodern Thought: The term ''post-Marxist'' can be applied in two specific ways: to those who have rejected Marxist beliefs, and to those that have attempted to open up Marxism to more recent theoretical developments such as poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism and the various new social movements (such as the Greens) that have risen to prominence in the latter decades of the 20th century. In the terminology of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, arguably the leading theorists of post-Marxism, this would equate to being either POST-Marxist of post-MARXIST. (338). If I were to post psychoanalysis, it would be a post-PSYCHOANALYSIS rather than a POST-psychoanalysis: it would not assume that psychoanalysis could, let alone should, simply be rejected or left behind. Any POSTing of psychoanalysis would have to assume that the process of POSTing could somehow simply step outside of psychoanalysis, that psychoanalysis was somehow not interior to the process, interior to the POSTing and that which POSTs-s omehow not part of the ''convergent competition'' (Der90 72) and general theoretical contamination that makes up the field of jetties, of the ''sta tes of 'theory,"' and that does not allow for distinct boundaries to be drawn between jetties. Moreover, what Derrida says about the relationship between what he sees as the ''rnainstyles'' of

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Marxism and deconstruction might also apply to psychoanalysis and deconstruction: 366 Deconstruction has never had any sense or interest, in my view at least, except as a radicalization, which is to say also in the tradition of a certain Marxism, in a certain spirit of Marxism. There has been, then, this attempted radicalization of Marxism called deconstruction .... If this attempt has been prudent and sparing but rarely negative in the strategy of its references to Marx, it is because the Marxist ontology, the appellation of Marx, the legitimation by way of Marx had been in a way too solidly taken over [arraisonnees]. They appeared to be welded to an orthodoxy .... But a radicalization is always indebted to the very thing it radicalizes. (Der94 92) Just as ''this attempted radicalization of Marxism'' is called ''deconstruction'' by Derrida, his ''attempted radicalization'' of Freudian theory, of the Freudian concept of trace, might also simply be called ''deconstruction." If to radicalize the Freudian concept of trace is simply to adopt a Derridean concept of trace, and if Derrida's process of extraction leaves behind only Freudian concepts that are ''without exception'' (Der78 197) part of the history of metaphysics of presence, then would not this process of radicalization and extraction simply be a posting < of psychoanalysis? What debt would a radical ''technology of iterability'' or a ''cyborg-analysis' ~ have to Freud? to ''mainstyle'' or oedipal psychoanalysis? What debt is incurred to Freudian theory by its being that which is radicalized? Is the Freudian concept of trace radicalized or merely replaced by the Derridean concept of trace? Wouldn't there have to be some relationship beyond that

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which radicalizes and that which is radicalized in order for their to be a debt? There would have to be, if not a common spirit, than a commonality of spirit. 367 In its attempt to radicalize psychoanalysis, Derrida's strategy of references to Freud have not been as ''prudent and sparing'' as they were to Marx. He does not hesitate to note his ''theoretical reticence to utilize Freudian concepts, otherwise than in quotation marks'' since they, ''without exception, belong to the history of metaphysics'' (Der78197). Yet there are also moments when Derrida seems too ready to be indebted to Freud. In ''Scene," Derrida's reading of Freud's Project does not question the origin of Qti and the effect of this origin on the supposed ''scene of writing." He also does not question the origin of quantity in the ffi system of Freud's apparatus. In ''Speculate," he treats the ''pp'' or primary process as something other to the PP or pleasure principle, and as ''essentially rebellious'' (Der87 344), rather than as in many ways identical to the PP and as the product of an original identity: what Freud calls the perceptual identity. Derrida does not take seriously what was for Freud the origin of origins: what I have called his oedipal phylo-''genetics.'' In this sense Derrida represses a certain spirit of Freud that is anathema to the spirit of deconstruction. And this repression calls for further analysis and working through-which I have tried to do here. Yet there are also those times when Derrida does see psychoanalysis as the perfect ''object'' of analysis, loving and missing Lacan in some respects similarly to the way Lacan loved and missed hysterics (see ''For the Love of Lacan," Der96 39-69). Despite the greater debt Derrida seems to feel to Freud in comparison to the one he feels to Lacan, he seems to have been more ready than

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368 he was with Lacanian psychoanalysis (and Marxism) to put Freudian theory in the position of that which must be radicalized: that which must be analyzed with respect to a repression, and that whose resistances must be worked through. The reasons he resists putting Marxism in this position seem quite different from the reasons he resists putting Lacanian psychoanalysis there. It is almost out of respect for the radicalism he finds in Marxism, as much as his desire to avoid its orthodoxy, that Derrida resists what Michael Sprinker calls ''the long-awaited direct encounter between Derrida and Marxism'' (Spr99 1). With Lacan it is for Derrida more a matter of ''love''-which both Freud and Lacan stressed is always ambivalent--and ''Le facteur de la verite'' at times reads more as a critique of Lacanian ''castration-truth'' than a deconstruction. Since I argue my ''mainstyle'' Freudian theory is also a ''castration-truth'' discourse, it is more difficult for me to find the commonality of spirit, of a radical or ''otherwise'' spirit, between psychoanalysis and deconstruction beyond the ''analysis of a repression," which I have attempted to show as potentially both radical and conservative. Certainly, any technology of iterability that claimed to simply post psychoanalysis would be haunted by specters of Freud. The ''certain spirit'' of Freudian theory, the spirit of t!le radical Freud, would be what I have called the ''otherwise'' Freud. And certainly this spirit haunts my reading of ''mainstyle'' Freudian theory. I would associate this radical specter of Freud with those moments when he asks questions, forms hypotheses, in a non-reductive ''face to face'' (Levinas) with the Other. Freud's ''analysis of repression'' (without the indefinite article) would be a significant aspect of this radical specter. It is when Freud answers the questions of this analysis with an ''analysis of a repression,"

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369 with a division of repression into primal and secondary-where the former is the immobile text of phylo-''genetics'' and ''castration-truth'' and the latter is an ''interdiction of translation''-that he represses his radical spirit. I hope my reading of ''mainstyle'' psychoanalysis will be read as a de-repression or ''de. sedimentation'' (Derrida)-a process of disturbing the origins of psychoanalysis, disturbing the sediments of this specific repression-where the importance of phylogeny and translation to Freud are taken seriously, rather than a repression itself of Freud's radical spirit. Yet too often the establishment spirit of ''mainstyle'' Freudian theory is repressed (anticathected) when the radical spirit is brought to the fore (hypercathected), as in Barratt's Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse. In order to avoid the criticism of reducing Freudian theory to an establishment or conservative spirit, and in recognition of the interiority of Freudian theory to my own ''analysis of a repression," and the radical ''Legend of Freud," the radical spirit of his theory Freud himself would often marginalize, I will problematize any simple posting of psychoanalysis for my Derridean ''technology of iterability'' or ''cyborg-analysis'' by adding an ''al'' in parentheses to ''post'': post(al)-psychoanalysis. I am interested in naming the theoretical discourse I will use as both a theoretician and a clinician doing what is presently called simply ''psychoanalysis." The problem with ''tecl1nology of iterability'' or simply ''deconstruction'' is that these names of jetties, of ''mainstyles," would not make any debt to psychoanalysis conspicuous and would seem, therefore, to be repressive to some extent themselves. ''Postmodern Psychoanalysis'' would make the debt too high, and would not take serious! y the conflict between most definitions of postmodemism and the ''extremely Platonic'' aspects of Freudian

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370 ''castration-truth.'' Post(al)-psychoanalysis would suggest a simple posting of psychoana~ysis, but it would also privilege a reading as post PSYCHOANALYSIS rather than as POST-psychoanalysis since the adjective of ''post al'' suggests a retaining of psychoanalysis. Though ''postal'' is undecidable itself, since we don't know which type of postal relay is being referred to here, putting it into the terms of postal relays itself suggests a Derridean bent. The adjective, therefore, suggests a posf-PSYCHOANAL YSIS, but a psychoanalysis as it might be radicalized via a deconstructive reading. Phallocentrism and Logocentrism: Relating to Feminisms ''Cyborg-analysis'' suggests some debt to ''analysis," and it leaves out the psyche (soul) of ''psyche." Though it doesn't associate the technology in question with Derrida, it does with a theorist I see as one of his ''ironic allies'' (Har91 157), Donna Haraway. Haraway and Derrida could be seen as ''ironic allies'' in the sense that their theories both embrace the doubleness, undecidability, division, chance, surprise, and literariness of irony: allies with respect to irony But Haraway also uses the concept of ''ironic allies'' to promote what would be the seemingly paradoxical solidarity between identity politics, such as feminisms, and what she would probably consider to be the ''acid tools'' of ''mainstyle'' deconstruction: It is important to note that the effort to construct revolutionary standpoints, epistemologies as achievements of people committed to changing the world, has been a part of the process of showing the limits of identification The acid tools of postmodernist theory

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371 and the constructive tools of ontological discourse about revolutionary subjects might be seen as ironic allies in dissolving Western selves in the interests of survival. (Har91 157) Many feminisms, as examples of such ''revolutionary standpoints," have the contradictory goals of ''showing the limits of identification'' and maintaining themselves as an ''ontological discourse about revolutionary subjects," or as politics of feminine identities, selves. The relationships of feminisms to the ''mainstyles'' of deconstruction and psychoanalysis should be seen as invariably ironic, if these two ''mainstyles'' are seen as committed to the subversion of identitarian logics of ontology (deconstruction) and firmly embedded in an androcentric one (psychoanalysis). I have argued for this reading of ''mainstyle'' Freudian theory as androcentric, but this would be somewhat of an oversimplification of ''mainstyle'' deconstruction since it generally promotes the irony of playing double games. Inasmuch as a feminism is embedded in identitarian logics, however, any relationship to ''mainstyle'' deconstruction would have to be ironic given that it is always plays at least one game of disturbing such embeddedness. One question of feminisms' relati onships to these ''mainstyles'' becomes: can all identitarian logics be described as phallocentric? Are there non phallocentric forms of logocentrism? What are they? Is logocentrism always phallogocentrism? A related way of phrasing this question is whether sexual difference should be situated as the ''absolute ethical difference'' or whether it should be ''accorded an ontological privilege," as Elam describes other feminists as doing (Ela94 118). I have argued throughout that sexual difference as male/female cannot be ethical in a Levinasian sense since it is one of the primary

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372 modes of reducing the Other to more of the Same by creating (op)positionalities of ideal binaries: the ''first'' level of the actual phallic function. The question of ontological privileging, however, has not been addressed and is very much related to, if not the same as, its corollary: whether logocentrism is always phallogocentrism Allow me to take a few steps back at this point and return to Kermode' s distinction between myths and fictions: Fictions are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change. Myths call for absolute fictions for conditional assent. Myths make sense in terms of a lost order of time, illud tempus as Eliade calls it; fictions, if successful, make sense of the here and now, hoc t e mpu s. (Ker66 39) Another useful distinction Kermode makes in The Sen s e of an Ending is between old and new modernism: . two phases of modernism, our own [of 1966] and that of fifty or so years ago. This is of course, a crude distinction. What I here, for convenience, call traditionalist modernism has its roots in the period of the Great War, but its flowering came later than that of anti-traditionalist modernism, which was planted by Apollinaire and reaped by Dada. This anti-traditionalist modernism is the parent of our own schismatic modernism; but at both periods the two varieties here co-existed. Having said this, I shall speak freely of the traditionalist modernism as the older. (Ker66 103-104)

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373 Ker1node associates Pound, Yeats, Eliot, and even Joyce with this older phase, and claims that ''we can without difficulty convict most of these authors of dangerous lapses into mythical thinking .... All, in different ways, venerated tradition and had programmes which were at once modem and anti-schismatic'' (Ker66104). I would add Freud to this list of literary myth-makers: his own traditionalist modernism also has its roots in the period of the Great War, and its flowering also came later. Joyce will be Kermode's exception to the other modernists because Ulysses alone of these great works [of the older modernists] studies and develops the tension between paradigm and reality, asserts the resistance of fact to fiction, human freedom and unpredictability against plot .... Th e re are coincidences, meetings that have point, and coincidences which do not. We might ask whether one of the merits of the book is not its lack of mythologizing; compare Joyce on coincidence with the Jungians and their sole mn concord-myth, the Principle of Synchronicity. From Joyce you cannot even extract a myth of Negative Concord; he shows us fiction fitting where it touches. (Ker66 113) In crude terms, we might consider modernism in both forms as reactions against the failings of the Positive Concords of the Judeo-Christian tradition of ''the West." Freudian theory is modernist in that it rejects the Positive Concord, but what might have first appeared as a potentially schismatic fiction evolved into a myth of Negative Concord, as Kermode suggests was the case with the works of many modernist writers. The magical trope of Freudian theory-the one that transforms the apparent schism of the Freudian unconscious or ''scene of

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374 writing'' into the basis of a Negative Concord-is, of course, castration. Castration transforms difference into identity. The concept of ''difference'' here should be generalized to incl ud~ chance and the differance of Derrida's adestinational linguistics. Freudian theory, therefore, is a particularly powerful old-modernist fiction-as-myth, a Negative Concord of ''castration-truth'' veiled in the schismatic language of materialism and modernism. What Foucault describes as the ''hysterization'' of early mode!l'ism-that is, the modernism of and before the old modernists, modernism in its broadest sense could then be seen as analogous to Freud's Negative Concord of ''castration-truth'' in terms of their functions: both were discursive modes that dealt with a certain insecurity regarding sexuality and sexual difference by securing the place of woman. Foucauldian hysterization put woman in her place by pathologizing her as sexual, thus rationalizing the medical-psychiatric policing of women. Freud's treatment of ''hysteria'' was much in the same vein, and his ''castration-truth'' of oedipal psychoanalysis would share in hysterization's pathologization of woman (her ''peculiar sexuality''; for Lacan, the symptom of man) and, therefore, in the general policing of woman that this kind of misogyny promotes. The waning of ''hysteria'' after the turn of the century to some extent might be attributed to a shift between the types of paradigms needed to ~eep woman in her place: the early modernist Foucauldian hysterization replaced by the late (''old'') modernists myths of Negative Concord. As the structures of patriarchal Positive Concords crumbled, the insecurity of place, particularly of sexual place, came to the fore. Freudian theory, in the guise of a schismatic theory, would appeal to those impatient with and cynical towards the authority of Positive Concords, while also appealing to

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375 their love of patriarchal traditionalism ~nd insecurity regarding sexual place or identity. ''Castration-truth'' presents itself as schismatic, but ''le manque a sa place'' (Der87 a 425). Many feminists seem to be attracted to psychoanalysis because they see it as ''fiction fitting where it touches," and where it touches, according to them, would be something like the workings of patriarchal power and its sexism. The confusions here seem to be between whether ''castration-truth'' is indeed a truth, and whether psychoanalysis itself is an example of ''castration-truth'' being used as a mode of reducing the Other to more of the Same. Furthering the confusion is the debt of the latter point to psychoanalysis: the interiority of psychoanalysis to the criticism or deconstruction of it as ''castration-truth." Since castration truth seems to be a dominant ontological mode of reducing the Other to the Same, it is easy to see how it could be mistaken for truth, the only game in town, or the privileged form of ontological difference. The question becomes: does psychoanalysis reveal this truth or is it an example of such a reduction? Or is it to some degree both? At least partially, we might attribute this confusion to the singular effectiveness of castration as a modernist trope of difference-into-identity. What trope performs this necessary reduction of logocentrism as well? Even if we don't cling to logocentrism and its subject as a truth, a myth-as many feminists do in order to maintain their ''revolutionary standpoints'' with ''the constructive tools of ontological discourse'' they see as necessary-and we accept logocentrism as a necessary fiction, does this fiction have to be in the form of ''castration-truth''? If there are only fictions, does this primary fiction become a truth of sorts? Does the necessary fiction of logocentrism have to be

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376 phallogocentrism? Is there another trope as successful as ''castration'' for creating a myth of Negative Concord through the reduction of the Other to presence/ absence? Doesn't phallogocentrism still perforrr1 this reduction if it is seen as the only fiction available, the only game in town, the only way to get it ''wrong''? This seems to be the confusion of Lacanian feminists such as Copjec, as I argued in chapter two: they mistake their sexual ''difference'' as a specific ''failure'' of ''the sexual relationship," but, beyond simply failing to see that Lacan's linguistics is a mythology based on ''castration-truth'' and the sexual ''difference'' determined by it, they seem blind to how Lacan has established this fiction as the lie that speaks the truth, and how this truth is phallocentric. Is difference best or most fundamentally represented by male/female? Is not this (op)positionality always a mode of dissimulating difference as differance, as I have argued? Is this (op)positionality not always a mode of reducing the Other to more of the Same? And therefore a mode of denying difference? Also, is male/ female always the primary (op)positionality of this reduction? Should this ''difference'' be privileged over others? Over other binaries? Is it the origin of the ''drive of the proper''? Is this ''difference'' of male/female primordial? That which establishes the home and economy? A Heideggerian ''Being-at home'' that is primordial, if not as primordial as ''Not-being-at-home''? Is ''castration'' always the primary trope of such ''difference'' and reduction? Does castration-truth fiction indeed correspond to the most primary aspect of the ''drive of the proper''? Would not life/ death or presence/ abs~nce be contenders for this position as privileged ontological difference? One answer to many of these questions might be: only if phallogocentrism is the only game played, and only if ''one must resist'' by playing only this one

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377 game. For many feminists, psychoanalysis explains the way patriarchy works. But how does language work? Is it de s tinational? What about chance? Can any such masterplotting, or any plotting in general, really constitute a fiction that ''fits where it touches'' without negating chance, as Kermode argues with respect to Joyce? Isn't this idea of correspondence itself logocentric? Is the unconscious structured like a destinational language, or is it (un)structuring like language and differance? Can patriarchy ''work'' the way Freud and Lacan theorized if the unconscious does not work the way they theorized? If language does not work the way Lacan th eo rized? No, but these psychoanalyses themselves work the way patriarchy works if ''patriarchy'' h e re is understood as a reduction of the Other to more of the phalli~ Same, and this process of reduction is understood as phallogocentrism As I have tried to show here, there is more to learn by what they do than what they say. But, as I argued above, the analysis of what they do owes some debt to what they say, which accounts for much of the confusion I am trying to address here. Perhaps, if the modernist sensibility must have a schismatic-appearing, fiction-appearing myth of Negative Concord, then ''castration-truth'' fictions will appeal to such sensibilities as the only fictions In Lacan's Negative Concord, there are only fictions, yet there is also alienation. This fiction of alienation is the specific lack of what is transcendentally authe~tic: there is only one, very specific fiction for Lacan, one lie that tells the truth. ''Fiction'' works as a category for Lacan because there is a truth about which lies can be told. Copjec, a Lacanian feminist, writes the following under the assumption that psychoanalysis ''says'' the truth about language, rather than performs a ''castration -truth '' reduction of the differance of language to more of the phailic same:

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378 So you see, there's no use trying to teach psychoanalysis about undecidability, about the way sexual signifiers refuse to sort themselves out into two separate classes. Bisexuality was long a psychoanalytical concept before it was a deconstructionist one. (Cop94 216) Bisexuality is not a ''deconstructionist'' concept. Her misunderstanding of ''mainstyle'' deconstruction reaches even new heights as she continues: But the difference betw ee n deconstruction and psychoanalysis is that the latter does n o t confuse the fact of bi se xuality that is the fact that male and female signifiers cannot be distingui s hed absolutely-with a denial of sexual difference. Deconstruction falls into this confusion only by disregarding the difference between the ways in which this failure takes place Regarding failure as uniform, deconstruction ends up collapsing sexual difference into a sexual indistinctness. This is in addition to the fact that, on this point at least, deconstruction appears to be duped by the pretension of language to speak of being, since it equates a confusion of sexual signifiers with a confusion of sex itself. (ibid.) The confusions this passage ''falls into'' are too many to address all of them here. Yet what might these a priori ''sexual signifiers'' be except for transcendental signifiers of man and woman? The sexual ''difference'' that ''deconstruction'' denies, and the very distinct way ''this failure takes place," would be man/woman and castration respectively. We might simply say that, unlike Copjec, '' deconstruction'' does not know in advance how any failure will take place It only knows that the failure can take place in a way Copjec does not

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379 know, has not predicted with her destinational linguistics. Copjec's foreknowledge can only mean we are dealing with a destinational linguistics, which would certainly cancel out the undecidability Lacanian psychoanalysis certainly needs to learn from ''mainstyle'' deconstruction. In other words, this deconstruction knows that the signifiers of sexual ''difference'' and ''sex'' cannot be predeter1nined, are not transcendental, and do not constitute the structure of any certain ''failure''-a very specific ''failure'' that functions as the proper detour, which allows for the successful return, a destiny. Undecidability and dissemination cannot be reduced to a preprogrammed failure, or lack of success. Any ''failure'' that reinforces the ''place'' of lack would be a success in terms of reinforcing and re-establishing what is obviously a version of the actual phallic function and ''castration-truth." And any ''failure'' of words or ''the'' sexual relationship-as if there were only one-that maintains two (op)positional transcendental categories does not embrace undecidability. The so-called failing of language in Lacan always seems to end up reestablishing the type of ''complementarity'' that Jacqueline Rose, a Lacanian, argues is the foundation of the ''ultimate fantasy'': ''It is when the categories 'male' and 'female' are seen to represent an absolute and complementary division that they fall prey to a mystification in which the difficulty of sexuality instantly disappears?'' (Mit82 33)-and the ''difficulty'' of language when it is the basis of an oedipal destiny and the letter's inevitable return reestablishes this proper. Copjec mistakes Lacanian psychoanalysis as a theory of undecidability and (sexual) difference, rather than as a sexist determinism that negates chance and difference, a phallocentric ontotheology, and the performance of a powerful mode of phallogocentrism in need of deconstruction.

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380 The question still remains, however: among logocentric games, is ''castration-truth'' the only game to play? Another way of putting this might be: is all subjectivity castration-based? An answer of ''yes'' would fit with Haraway's notion of ''survival'' requiring the ''dissolving of Western selves'' (Har91 157). It would also fit with Derrida's Nietzschean take on feminism in Spurs: And in truth, they too are men, those women feminists so derided by Nietzsche. Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man And in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays claim-just as much claim as he,-to truth, science and objectivity in all their castrated delusions of virility. Feminism too seeks to castrate. It wants a castrated woman. Gone the style. (Der79 62-65) 18 Inasmuch as f~minisms play only one game, and that game is the game of constructing ''revolutionary standpoints, epistemologies as achievements of people committed to changing the world'' based on ''ontological discourse about revolutionary subjects," and inasmuch as single games of ontological subjectivity are phallogocentric, then ''[g]one the style'' for those feminisms. Again, Elam criticizes Derrida as follows: If feminism is merely a form of phallogocentrism, then Derrida, however much he gestures at historical necessity, would be equating all of feminism with a teleological search for the essence 18 Is he miming Nietzsche here? Or is this his own voice?

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381 of woman. Thus, he would be reducing all feminisms to one and the same feminism. Lost the style, f9r Derrida as well. (Ela94 16-17) It is questionable, however, if any feminists had accepted the ''acid tools'' of the second game, this ''ironic ally'' in 1978 the year his book on Nietzsche was published. Inasmuch as all logocentrism of that time was ''castration-truth'' based, and inasmuch as feminisms were only playing the aforementioned singular games, then Derrida's Nietzschean criticism of feminism would be justified. What seems most questionable to me is the first assumption: that all logocentrism of that time was ''castration-truth'' based-that phallocentrism is the only form of logocentrism, and castration its primary trope. This is seemingly an assumption shared by both Derrida and many feminisms. A guiding question throughout this project has been what is the relationship between the two ''mainstyle'' theoretical jetties of psychoanalysis and deconstruction Because phallogocentrism is figured here as ''mainstyle'' deconstruction's primary ''object'' of analysis, and ''mainstyle'' psychoanalysis is argued as being eve n more phallogocentric than Derrida has argued, the relationship is on e of radically different ''analyses of repressions." What about the relation of these two ''mainstyles'' to feminisms? On the one hand, since Freudian theory cannot be simply reduced to phallogocentrisrn (specters of a more radical Freud would haunt any such reduction), Haraway's ''ironic allies'' would seem to best describe the relationship of those feminisms interested in producing ''revolutionary standpoints'' while reproducing as little of the sexism which seems so difficult to escape while using psychoanalytic ''tools of ontological discourse'' (Har91 157) On the other hand, to read psychoanalysis in either its Freudian modes or its Lacanian modes as in any significant way ''acid

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382 tools of postmodernist theory'' would be to mistake the radical specters of Freud and Lacan for the ''mainstyles'' of their theoretical jetties. The lure of these psychoanalyses for feminisms may be that their ''bedrock'' is one of sexual ''difference." But this ''difference'' is ''castration-truth," and the ''bedrock'' is consistently ''the repudiation of femininity'' (XXIII 250): castration-truth is ''sexual difference-into-identity," a negation of difference, a (the?) primary mode of reducing the Other to more of the Same. Should the ontological difference of male/female be privileged? I will close by deferring to Diane Elam's closing statement in Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme on the relationship of deconstruction and feminism: It is significant to note here that my argument for ethics in the name of deconstruction and feminism does not situate sexual difference as the absolute ethical difference .... Either, as for Irigaray and Spivak, sexual difference is accorded an ontological privilege (ethics is solely a question of intimacy), or critics spend their time trying to calculate the exact ratio of importance to be accorded to sexual as against ethnic, class, or other differences In the latter case, it is easy to see that what is at stake is an attempt to put an end to the ethical pull of the problem of difference and to turn it into a purely epistemological question, a matter of calculation. I would argue that sexual difference is neither primordial nor calculable (in the manner of the utilitarian philosophers). By contras t, I would underline that feminism needs to remain open to the fact that sexual difference is one difference

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. among many--not the only or always the most important difference, not the absolute mark of otherness. (Ela94 118) ''Castration truth'' would therefore be one '' difference-into-identity'' trope 383 among many, one mode of logocentrism. But what might these other tropes be? Which of them can appear schizmatic? Yet to claim that castration is not one ''difference-into-identity'' trope among many, to claim that castration is indeed the primary trope of ontological difference, would be to subordinate other modes of ontological difference to sexual difference. It would also court the potentially dangerous idea that it is the only game in town, the only way to ''fail'' with language. In har1nony with Elam's promotion of a relationship of ''groundless solidarity'' between ''feminist and deconstructive politics'' (Ela94 120), any relation of these politics and theoretical jetties to psychoanalysis in general, and Freudian theory in particular, should be wary of what I have tried to show as Freud's insistence on grounding his theory in the ''bedrock'' of ''the repudiation of femininity'' (XXIII 250) where f e mininity is a stand-in for difference and chance

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Eric Anders received his Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Air Force Academy in 1987, and his Master of Liberal Arts in English and American Literature and Language from Harvard University in 1994 He is currently a research psychoanalytic candidate at the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles, and practices psychoanalysis in Pasadena, California. 392

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. John Leavey, r., Chair Professor of English I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. \._, t---~~ .. ~... Barnaby B. Barratt Professor of Family Medicine, Psychiatry, and Behavioral N eurosciences Wayne State University I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree O}--t:tc';~ of Phil so hy l tJ~ Robert A. Hatch Associate Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Phillip Wegner Assistant Professor of English This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of English in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December 2000 Dean, Graduate School

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