The U.S. Eighth Air Force and its British World War II hosts

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Title:
The U.S. Eighth Air Force and its British World War II hosts a history of international public relations
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viii, 299 leaves : ; 29 cm.
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Crooks, Kerry Anderson, 1955-
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Mass Communication thesis, Ph. D   ( lcsh )
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Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1999.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 283-297).
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kerry Anderson Crooks.
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Printout.
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Vita.

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THE U.S. EIGHTH AIR FORCE AND ITS BRITISH WORLD WAR II
HOSTS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS











By

KERRY ANDERSON CROOKS













A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1999













ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


It is with the deepest sense of gratitude that I thank

those who have assisted me in reaching this point in the

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of

Philosophy. First, I am totally indebted to Dr. Robert

Kendall of the University of Florida for bringing me to

this fine university. My wife, Viviene, and I will always

cherish both his professional and personal efforts on our

behalf.

When I first arrived at the University of Florida, the

mentoring of Dr. Bernell Tripp helped me to develop the

historian skills necessary to meet the challenges of a

rigorous academic experience. Dr. Tripp kept me on course

during the research and writing of this dissertation, and

it is she with whom I can explain the joy I have in

engaging in the historical research others would find

tedious. Dr. Gail Baker's assistance has been invaluable

and Dr. Jack Detweiler provided me the opportunity to

engage in the PRSA Body of Knowledge project, which gave me

the insight of numerous public relations professionals. I

would be remiss if I didn't thank Dr. Winnie Cooke and Mr.

Tim Aydt for providing me financial assistance through the










opportunity to tutor students. The appreciation of my

entire family goes to Dr. Frank Courts for his sage advice

and his caring nature. Very heartfelt thanks go to Laura

Hunt, Jody Hedge and Andrea Snyder for their help.

Rarely does a graduate assistant acknowledge his

students, but mine were exceptional, particularly Sheri

Treadwell, Danny Wuerffel, Jen Steiner, Cori Weisner, Kim

Mariani, Emily Hess, Michelle Stevens, and Thad Bullard -

and so many more.

Through it all, Dr. Marilyn Roberts had the faith in

me to chair this committee and encouraged me onward. She

knows how I feel.

I would like to acknowledge some people to helped in

my research, particularly Colonel Alexander DiSanto, USAF,

retired, who started me down this path, and Major Joseph

Del'Marmol, Jr., USAF, retired, who provided me invaluable

insight and encouragement. Chaplain J. Wuerffel, USAF,

provided me insight and direction regarding the role of

military chaplains, as did the Veterans Hospital,

Gainesville, Florida professionals on stress-related

psychological phenomena. The research staff at the Mighty

Eighth Air Force Heritage Museum in Savannah, Georgia, the

Imperial War Museums in London and Duxford, and the Public

Records Office at Kew, England were particularly helpful.










Thanks, also, to Bridget McCall, Dave and Alison

Wilkinson, May and Ronnie Black, Roger Freeman, and

everyone else in Scotland and England who helped me along

the way.

Most of all, my thanks go to my family, particularly

to my wife, Viviene, and my daughters, Kate and Victoria.

Each of my brothers provided invaluable support towards the

completion of this dissertation in one way or another. A

special thanks to my brother, Lieutenant Colonel Kelley

Crooks, USAF, who took time out from his Air War College

studies to dig into the U.S. Air Force archives at Maxwell

Air Force Base, Alabama to find those rare source materials

I needed.

And, of course, my deepest appreciation goes to my

father, Colonel Kenneth E. Crooks, USAF, retired, and my

mother, Kathleen Crooks, who encouraged me to come to

Florida and who did those things great and small that

ensured this day.

As I write on this Veterans' Day 1999, this

dissertation is dedicated to those who have served this

country, particularly to my fellow crew members who flew

out on RC-135S Cobra Ball II 61-2664 to Shemya Air Base,

Alaska on March 15, 1981 and never returned. We who

continue on will never forget you.













TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................... ii

ABSTRACT ............................................ vii

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION .............................. ............ 1

Purpose of this study ..................... 8
Significance of this study ................ 15
Notes ....... ................ ............ 18

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ........ ................ 22

General military histories ............... 24
Military History of World War II .......... 27
Aviation History of World War II .......... 31
Social/Local Histories of World War II.... 38
Public Relations Histories of World War II 42
Notes ............ ... ..................... 44

3. METHODOLOGY ....................................... 44

Implications ................... ......... 51
A Note on Style and Terms .................. 52
Notes .......... ................ ............ 55

4. BACKGROUND ....... ................ .. ......... 56

History of U.S./U.K. relations ............ 56
U.S./U.K. During the War ............... 60
U.S./U.K. Civilian Leadership ............. 83
U.S. Military relations .................. 93
U.S. Air Chiefs: PR at the Top ........... 100
British Air War Experience ............... 117
U.S. Strategic Warfare Problems .......... 122
Notes ............ .... ................... 114

5. BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PR EFFORT ................ 138

Evaluating U.S./U.K. Relations ........... 144
Notes ....................... ............ 156










6. ANATOMY OF U.S./U.K. RELATIONS ................. 159

Initial U.S.A.A.F. Beddown ............... 159
U.S./U.K. troops comparison .............. 162
U.S.A.A.F. and British Army relations ... 165
The Pay Issue .......................... ..... 166
G.I. and Civilian Relations ............. 150
The Nature of the American Flyer ......... 180
Psychological Issues ....... ............... 188
Notes ....................... ............ 197

7. U.S. MORALE PROGRAMS .......................... 204

U.S. Public Information Officers ......... 204
U.S. programs promoting U.S/U.K. relations 215
The American Red Cross ................... 218
Chaplains: PR and the Pulpit ............. 222
The Role of Radio ........................ 231
Wartime Pictures and Propaganda .......... 241
Notes ..................... ........ ....... 245

8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................ 253

APPENDICES .......... ............................ 268

A. MILITARY RANK ABBREVIATIONS ..................... 268

B. BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND U.S. PERSONNEL .......... 269

C. LIST OF TERMS AND NON-RANK ABBREVIATIONS ...... 232

D. AGENDA FOR MOI MEETING ON U.S. TROOPS IN U.K.. 270

E. MINUTES OF BOLERO COMMITTEE ................... 275

F. BOLERO COMBINED COMMITTEE ..................... 276

G. RATES OF PAY ........... ....................... 277

H. INTERVIEW: COLONEL DISANTO ................... 279

REFERENCES ......... ................. ............ 283

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............. .............. 298















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE U.S. EIGHTH AIR FORCE AND ITS BRITISH WORLD WAR II
HOSTS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

By

Kerry Anderson Crooks

December 1999


Chair: Marilyn R. Roberts
Major Department: Mass Communications


During the titanic struggle that was World War II,

thousands of young men and women came from the United

States to Great Britain to form what was to be a mighty air

armada. This aerial fleet, the U.S. Eighth Air Force, was

obligated by the nature of their mission, the availability

of airfields and the design strengths and limitations of

their aircraft to support and fly missions against Nazi

Germany from the fields of England. As the Eighth Air Force

was the most potent striking force potentially available to

the United States in the early days of the U.S. involvement

in the war, there was a strong commitment to supplying

personnel and material to this organization in the shortest

time possible. This meant that thousands of Americans,










from every part of the United States, were transported

into the midst of a well-populated foreign country from

which to conduct their war. What the U.S. and British

authorities attempted to provide as a means of preserving

domestic tranquility for the British residents and morale

support for the personnel of the Eighth Air Force while

also seeking to build positive public relations between the

two groups is the focus of this study.

This paper proposes to discuss the issues relating

to the reasons for bringing U.S. airmen and support

personnel to Britain, the potential and real problems

created by such a deployment, the programs both British and

American authorities employed to enhance cross-cultural

relations and U.S. air forces personnel morale, and the

obstacles these programs faced.

The scope of the total public relations efforts was

significant in its size, the political level of attention

and the effect on Anglo-American relations during the war.

In the end, however, it appears that the efforts of highly

organized British government programs probably had less

consequence than existing cultural dynamics and the simple

decency inherent in the peoples of the two lands.


viii















CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the large Nissen hut used for briefing, now
deserted and covered with dust, he saw
foregathering a ghostly company of 250 pilots,
navigators, bombardiers and gunners encumbered
with bulky clothes, life vests and oxygen masks,
straining to hear the words of a ghostly
Intelligence officer as he indicated a target on
the map.
-Beirne Lay, Jr., and Sy Bartlett, 12 O'Clock
High!, 10.



Arriving in teeming, dank troop ships, Second

Lieutenant Joseph J. Del'Marmol, Jr., and Corporal Aida

Friedland disembarked onto the soil of a 1940s Britain

well into its fifth year of total war. Lieutenant

Del'Marmol would join the veteran 381st Bomb Group as a

B-17G Flying Fortress bombardier and survive thirty-five

missions over hostile European skies.' Corporal Friedland

would be assigned as a public relations liaison at the

Eighth Air Force Headquarters at High Wycombe. As a

public relations specialist, Corporal Friedland would be

responsible for performing the duties typical of the image

of public relations personnel of that period -- media

liaison. She would later work with Holocaust survivors in

Germany, teaching them enough English to emigrate to

America.2











Lieutenant Del'Marmol and Corporal Friedland's

experiences, as thrilling or as fascinating as they were,

could not be considered extraordinary in a time of

remarkable events. Indeed, they were but two of the more

than 350,000 American men and women assigned to one of

history's unique organizations, the Eighth Air Force of

the United States Army Air Forces.3

The Eighth Air Force was an amalgamation of bombing

and fighter planes with the assigned duty of destroying

German industry and morale. For the bombing crews, their

life was a surreal and severe contrast of activities. For

these aviators, the average work day was an early

breakfast and morning briefing, a five-hour flight

penetrating deadly fighter plane and anti-aircraft

artillery (flak) opposition to reach a point in the sky to

rain destruction on an unseen enemy below, and back

through the gauntlet to arrive at their peaceful base in

time for dinner.4

The activities of the aviators separated them from

those with whom they shared base facilities and nights out

on the town. The casualty rates for U.S. bomber crews

exceeded that of any American force of arms during the

war. Statistically, if a crewmember arrived in Britain to

fly Fortresses or B-24 Liberators when the Eighth was

first deployed to England in 1942, the odds were against











him surviving until his 25th mission, the official

rotation point.5

Eighth Air Force bases were odd oases of Americans,

mostly men, whose transient status was certain, but the

length of time of that visit depended on an individual's

job -- and luck. The U.S.A.A.F. ground support personnel

endured days that were long, fatiguing, but generally

safe. On the other hand, aircrews knew their lives were

hanging in a grim balance -- often here at breakfast, dead

by dinner. Some dealt with this reality better than did

their comrades. The seemingly arbitrary nature of death

was a horror to some, a savior to others.6 Because of its

effect on the communicator/receiver, this shadow of death

is a very real variable in any communication equation.

The bottom rungs of Maslow's hierarchy of needs model are

hardly the realm of proactive relationships.7 The sheer

horror experienced by aircrews was terribly unique due to

the rapid in-and-out-of-danger cycle. Even so,

relationships between aviators and the local population

existed -- and in some cases existed quite well.8

Some, such as historian Roger Freeman, have called

this episode of 1940s-Americans-on-British-soil a

"friendly invasion," but, in reality, it was more similar

to a Gastarbeiter (guest worker) situation. The guest

workers were expected to do their job, behave well, and











when their peculiar work was done, go home. The members

of the Eighth Air Force were neither invited on tourist

visas, nor were they diplomats on missions of state. They

were, according to Eighth Air Force Major General Ira

Eaker, in England to do a job.9

In the cities, towns, and villages of East Anglia, in

whose nearby grain fields the scores of Eighth Air Force

bases were constructed, the population also was a

statistical oddity. The effects of a protracted war had

dramatically altered the demographics of British

communities. With the British men of military service age

gone off to war, the population consisted mostly of

children, the elderly, and women.10

While relations between base personnel and locals was

structured by the necessity of base security and the self-

contained nature of U.S. military bases, there were few

restrictions on what base ground personnel did during

their time off. This offered opportunities for these

personnel to interact with the local English population

and, at times, with the British people residing or working

in those popular destinations of Americans on three-day

passes or leave. For aviators, the case was slightly

different, as restrictions to base often occurred due to

the capricious nature of English takeoff/landing

conditions and Continental enroute weather. As a result,











Bomber Command was reluctant to release crews and miss

the possibility of good bombing weather.11

The social dynamics between the Americans and their

British "cousins" were significant.12 The U.S. Army Air

Forces was an officer-heavy organization. This was due to

Air Forces requirements that pilots, navigators, and

bombardiers be officers -- roughly 40-50 percent of a

bomber crew and nearly 100 percent of fighter pilots.

American service personnel, particularly American aviators

earning additional flight pay, were generally better paid

than were British soldiers.13 This meant free-spending,

middle-class young American men appeared in working-class

English communities that were enduring strict rationing.

To some in the British community, American servicemen

were "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here."1" Both U.S.

and British authorities realized that problems would

emerge due to unbalanced social conditions created by

exotic foreigners with more pocket money. Those problems

did occur. Yet popular American mythology of that period

leads us to believe no problems existed at all. Motion

pictures regarding the Eighth Air Force, including such

movies as "The War Lover" and "The Memphis Belle," portray

U.S. and British relations as being extremely cordial and,

in some cases, very romantic. To some degree, the facts

support the over-generalized myth. Thousands of British











women became "G.I. brides," which suggests that some

British families were, at the very least, grudgingly

accepting of American sons-in-law. While the years apart

make for great differences in circumstances, the relative

congeniality of the British population stood in stark

contrast to Colonial New England some 170 years earlier.

British soldiers then stationed in Massachusetts became

unbearable so much so that prohibition against quartering

of troops in civilian homes became protected by the Third

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. As a

result of their intolerance of British occupation and

other issues, the "embattled farmers" of Lexington,

Concord, Bedford and Lincoln fired their hunting pieces at

British soldiers executing their duties.15

When the aircrews and ground support personnel of the

Eighth Air Force finally left Great Britain after the

European War had ended, they left a legacy that bespeaks a

favorable relationship between members of the Eighth and

their British hosts. The monuments placed by the people

of the home country were memorials to their guest workers,

the airmen of the Eighth Air Force.16

The Eighth Air Force was sent to do a job. The

limitations of their equipment meant the job required them

to be in England; England was the only safe land mass from

which the Eighth could launch their bombing missions. The











British wanted the job done as well. The basic

motivation was there to create a favorable environment in

which the Eighth Air Force could better perform its

mission. Part of that environment would be favorable

relations between the Eighth Air Force personnel and their

British hosts. But motivation is not execution.

Prior to the 20th century, the Americans and the

British rarely enjoyed cordial relationships.17 Beginning

with the American revolutionary War, there were sporadic

conflicts with the British throughout American history.

The War of 1812 and the intense negotiations between the

United States and Britain over the U.S./Canadian border

are only two, though prime, examples of strained

U.S./British relations. The favorable relationship that

developed between the U.S. and Britain during World War I

almost completely eroded when the British lagged in

repaying American war loans. Exacerbating American

mistrust of Britain was the American perception that the

British maneuvered them into a European war where U.S.

interests were minimal.18

There was little history to indicate the Eighth's

deployment would be taken well by the local British

population, let alone become a smooth integration into the

British social fabric.19 That relatively harmonious,

though not perfect, relations existed throughout the











entire 1942-1945 period may have been the result of two

peoples just getting along naturally, or it may have been

the result of a well-planned public relations campaign to

ensure harmonious relations were created.

This research is designed to investigate

institutionalized public relations programs designed to

enhance Eighth Air Force and British relations. This

research is based on the following questions:

What was the nature of any public relations campaign,

whether American or British, that was designed to promote

positive relations between Eighth Air Force personnel and

the British residents of the cities, towns, and villages

surrounding the American bomber bases? And what, if

anything, is the legacy of that campaign?


Purpose of this study

In the last years of the 20th century, the Department

of Defense employed thousands of public relations

professionals to perform a wide variety of activities,

including public information, recruiting, press relations,

and internal communications. 20 With this level of

commitment, the military's emphasis on the need for

effective public relations cannot be doubted. The U.S.

military system of this period cannot afford for it to be

otherwise. The entire structure depends on the











understanding of its mission by the people of the United

States and their elected representative. This

understanding cannot endure continuous conflicts created

by improper communication. When the role of the military

comes into disfavor or citizens are apathetic about it,

funding dries up and military effectiveness suffers. This

cycling of funding has been a long tradition in the United

States, and some argue that it reached the bottom of the

cycle as recently as the latter years of the 1990s.21

In the creation of the Eighth Air Force, a number of

factors became congruent. The factors included war, the

advent and development of airpower, and the allied

relationship of the United States and Great Britain for

the purpose of defeating Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

All three factors were essential. The Eighth Air Force

was created as a result of America's entry in the war. It

did not exist until after that event.22 Without the rapid

development of powered, heavier-than-air craft, plus

airpower doctrine and the sophisticated organizational

structure possible by 1942, the whole concept of airpower

would have been different and the Eighth Air Force would

not have been a conception, much less a reality. Unless

Great Britain had successfully resisted Nazi Germany

during the latter's attempt to effect air superiority over

Britain, if not an invasion, then the United States could











not have operated out of Great Britain against Nazi

Germany. Indeed, there may not have been an American war

against Nazi Germany at that time. Those strategists who

envisioned the defeat of Great Britain and saw the U.S.

waging war against Nazi Germany foresaw the need for

intercontinental bombers.23 This was the strategic reason

behind building the massive B-36, later to become the

backbone of the post-war U.S. Strategic Air Command. In

any case, these bombers would have operated out of the

United States or other sites in the western Atlantic.

Thus, they would have been the air arm of the Continental

Air Forces, and not a newly created Eighth Air Force.24

Perhaps it is also well to mention the publicly

expressed reason for the creation of the B-17, later to

become the main striking machine of the Eighth Air Force.

When the B-17 was first proposed, it was to be as a

"fortress" against an invasion fleet heading for the

United States. Therefore, publicly at least, the B-17 was

a defensive weapon, not the offensive weapon as used by

the Eighth Air Force.25

When Britain stood its ground, and air, against the

Germans in 1940, the island of Great Britain became a

secure "aircraft carrier" from which to strike Germany

using the bombers available at the time. Since it was in

Britain's interest to end the war against Nazi Germany as











quickly as possible, there became a natural alliance in

purpose between the U.S. and the U.K. Part of that

alliance was to support the efforts of each other in their

military efforts.26

One of the stated strategies of the United States was

to wage bombing missions against industrial targets in

Nazi Germany. This fit British overall planning, and

since Britain was a nearly ideal place from which to wage

that air campaign, the agreement between the British and

Americans assured the development and deployment of the

newly formed Eighth Air Force to Great Britain.27

Within these major factors, there existed some very

significant issues that required resolution to ensure the

creation, effective deployment, and successful use of the

Eighth Air Force as the weapon it was envisioned. One of

the essential requirements, as stated by American

commanders for successful operations against Nazi Germany,

was successful Anglo-American relations. The British were

equally as keen to ensure the two nations cooperated as

best as they could.28 Whether these relations could have

run smoothly, or even if they were necessary, could be

debated. It is enough, for the purposes of this study, to

take the American commanders at their word. Once "good

Anglo-American relations" as a goal became policy, that

policy affected operations. In some ways, those











operations were adjusted to meet the perceived

requirements of good Anglo-American relations. In some

other occasions, this policy dictated new operations.

That is, the need for good Anglo-American relations caused

the creation or enhancement of activities that, as

planned, directly resulted in improved U.S./U.K.

relations.29

In the period leading up to World War II, the

fledgling air arm of the U.S. military understood the

requirement of public support for its mission. Those who

were to lead the U.S. air effort in Europe were old hands

in understanding the requirements for proactive public

relations to advance the cause of aviation as an effective

weapon of war.30 Their pre-war public relations campaign to

promote the new air arm was waged on all fronts and

prepared them for the public relations efforts needed

during World War II. During the war, these commanders were

as aggressive in achieving support -- both in the United

States and in Great Britain -- for their aims as they were

in the period leading up to the war and even more

successful in results. In the end, Nazi Germany was

defeated and an independent United States Air Force was

created.

Set in the period of 1942 to 1945, this study will

examine evidence from various sources to detect and











categorize programs designed to build rapport between

U.S. airmen and members of the British population. The

scope of this investigation will center upon those efforts

made by U.S. and British authorities to establish and

maintain successful relations between those involved in

Eighth Air Force operations and the general English

population who would potentially have contact with

personnel of the Eighth Air Force. Such efforts will

include American command policies, British political

decrees and directives, local American air base programs

and British activities designed to build better relations

between the Americans on the air bases and their British

hosts, or even those British activities that, through

their execution, built such rapport. This study will also

identify various organizations that were designated to

support U.S./U.K. relations and how their activities fit

within the overall public relations effort. Further, the

efforts of those not normally associated with public

relations activities, such as military chaplains, will be

reviewed.

The purpose for such an investigation is this: to

place within the body of knowledge of the field of public

relations a history of a period of time when international

relations came down to a very personal level on a very

massive scale. During the period covering 1942-1945,











planned public relations programs and impromptu public

relations activities combined to build localized American

and British relations to help ensure the successful

execution of the strategic bombing campaign of the U.S.

Eighth Air Force. The human dynamics of hundreds of

thousands of Americans involved with the largest air

armada in history relating with the peoples of a nation,

which hosted them for a three-year period, makes for a

compelling chapter of public relations history. It is not

the purpose of this study, however, to gauge the

effectiveness of such a program on the mission of the

Eighth Air Force. The variables affecting the mission

effectiveness of such a vast military undertaking are far

too many to even attempt such an effort, particularly from

the vantage of nearly fifty-five years from the end of the

war.

Unable to prove causality, this dissertation has as a

purpose the goal of pinpointing contributing factors to

the building of cordial relations between members of the

Eighth Air Force and their British hosts. Many of the

tools of modern public relations were in their infancy

during this time, and no particular effort seems to have

been made to make any contemporary measurements of

U.S.A.A.F. attitudes toward British subjects with whom

they came in contact. Also, while measurements were made











of general British and American attitudes toward each

other, and some of these measurements are presented within

this study, such measurements serve only as cultural

backdrop to the relations between the personnel of the

Eighth Air Force and the British.



Significance of this study

There are several arguments for establishing the

significance of any study dealing with this subject. One

argument can easily be supported. The history of the

period of World War II has been covered extensively, but

generally through military histories, biographical works,

and more recently, social studies. Communication studies

of the period have centered on issues of propaganda

effectiveness or the role of mass media, while scarcely

touching military-civilian relations at basic military

unit levels. While this is understandable when

considering the numerous units of the U.S. military, it is

a bit puzzling when the size and scope of the Eighth Air

Force is considered. When hundreds of thousands of

Americans, many of whom had never before met a foreigner,

suddenly came in contact with a people who, in many cases,

had never met an American and may have formed their

opinions of that nationality from motion pictures, there

were bound to be some problems.31











There can be no assumption that any two people will

coexist merrily, much less masses of peoples from two

sides of the Atlantic. While culture is one consideration

when analyzing relations between two different peoples,

the relationship between the American personnel of the

Eighth Air Force and their British hosts was more

complicated, and in some ways simpler, than can be

explained by culture studies. There were numerous factors

influencing those relations. Some of these influences may

have been strong enough to affect missions, and even more

probably, post-war relations between the two countries.

In any event, the result of those relations was the

creation of a generally favorable impression between the

two peoples of that time and that has created a legacy

between the two countries.

However, other factors add to the potential

importance of this study. Public relations historian

Scott Cutlip admitted that military PR practitioners

formed much of the backbone of the post-war practice.32

Thus, public relations activities practiced by military

public information staff members during World War II

becomes a probable link in the chain of the development of

the field -- certainly of military public relations. The

insight into cross-cultural relations, albeit in rare

enough circumstances, also is worth any research effort.











In addition, post-war U.S. Air Force leaders were

Eighth Air Force veterans and were strongly influenced by

the developments of wartime public relations.33 Indeed,

until the era of Kennedy/McNamara, the U.S. Air Force's

desires and defense mantras became one with national

defense policies and budget priorities. Evidence of

rather wily PR efforts of U.S. Air Force line officers

appears to be a cornerstone of the development of U.S.

airpower since the days of Kittyhawk, with particular

acceleration in the war and post-war period.

Understanding and appreciating the public relations

efforts made during World War II aids in understanding the

nature of our defense decisions and some conventional

wisdom that came after hostilities ended in 1945.

Finally, the timing of this research is at an

important point when research sources shift from a mixture

of oral histories and archival evidence to purely

archival. Those who remember the period of study as

participants are rapidly dwindling in population. While

this particular research effort is based mainly on

archival information, the recollections and directions of

World War II veterans have aided the process quite

considerably.

Between 1942 and 1945, people were engaged in

international relations on a massive scale, and those











relations were, perhaps, affected deliberately by

systematic programs. This study is based upon the

assumption that any public relations endeavor of this

scope is worth examination as an integral part of the

heritage of the field of public relations.


Notes

1 Joseph Del'Marmol, "Sovereigns of the Conquered Sky,"
unpublished typewritten book manuscript, 18. Provided to
author by Joseph Del'Marmol. According to Del'Marmol, he
traveled across on the U.S.S. Edmund B. Alexander, which
he described as "tightly crammed, jam packed full of young
American soldiers." Interestingly enough, his ship had a
"miniature gambling casino" to include roulette equipment.
19.

2 Aida Friedland Kaye, Miami, Florida, phone conversation
with author. May 1, 1998. The conversation was not set up
as an interview, but as a fact-finding discussion. Ex-
Corporal Friedland Kaye's role in World War II was
verified by historian Roger Freeman during a phone
conversation with Freeman in London, England, on May 23,
1998.

3 Gerald Astor, The Mighty Eighth (New York: Fine, 1997),
420.

4 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation
of Britain 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995), 296-
297, and Philip Kaplan and Rex Alan Smith, One Last Look
(New York: Artabras, 1983), 63-72. However, lead crews
had slightly longer days (due to more mission planning),
but received better breakfasts. See Alexander DiSanto,
Appendix H.

5 See Jeffrey Ethell, Air Command: Fighters and Bombers of
World War II (Ann Arbor, MI: Lowe and B. Hould, 1997), 7.
"... Of all the combat jobs in the American services during
World War II, from infantryman to submariner, no job was











more dangerous, statistically, than that of a man in a
bomber over Germany." Specific statistics are given in
Martin W. Bowman, U.S.A.A.F. Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud,
U.K.: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1997), 226-239. In one
postwar study, out of 1,000 aviators starting out at
"Mission One" only 358 would answer the roll call after
Mission 25. Bowman, 232.

6 George Henderson, Human Relations: From Theory to
Practice (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974),
236-238. Individuals handle the potential of death in
different ways. Some can deny death will happen to them,
while others may be obsessed by the thought of an early
demise. Historian John Keegan has described the ability of
most warriors to "compartmentalize" their minds in normal
circumstances. Interestingly, Keegan asserts that the
soldier who faces death with stoicism and kills without
remorse is rare, and they are even rarer in American and
German armies than those of the British and French. John
Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Barnes & Nobel,
1976), 25-27.

7 Henderson, Human Relations, 237-238.

8 See Reynolds, Rich Relations, 301; and Steve Snelling,
Over Here: The Americans in Norfolk during World War II
(Derby, U.K.: Breedon Books, 1996), 8.

9 Astor, The Mighty Eighth, 435. In an effective public
relations speech of few words, Eaker stated early in his
tenure to his British hosts: "We won't do much talking
until we've done more fighting. After we've gone, we hope
you'll be glad we came." And Walter Boyne, Clash of
Wings: World War II In The Air (New York: Touchstone,
1994), 304.

10 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 404-406.

11 Freeman, Roger, The Friendly Invasion (Suffolk, England:
Lavenham Press, 1992), 24.


12 Ibid., 4-6, 23-27.











13 Norman Longmate, The G.I.'s: Americans in Britain 1942-
1945 (London: Penguin, 1985), see Appendix G.

14 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 61. According to
Freeman, this quip, based on the World War I song "Over
There," was "the cruelest, yet most enduring comment on
the (Americans)."

15 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 412-428; Richard Wheeler, ed.,
Voices of 1776: The Story of the American Revolution in
the Words of Those Who Were There (New York: Penguin
Books, 1991), quoted from DeBerniere, Ensign (British
Army) personal diary, page 13.

16 Kaplan and Smith, One Last Look, 206-207.

17 Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (New York: Random
House, 1998), 130-154.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 154-157.

20 See Fraser Seitel, The Practice of Public Relations 6th
Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 377.
Seitel gives a figure of "more than one thousand."
However, as early military units often assigned additional
duties, public relations type responsibilities are carried
out throughout the military down to squadron levels or
their equivalent.

21 Tom Clancy and General Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger
(New York: Putnam, 1999), x-xi, 124. Paul Jackson,
"Raptor Spreads Its Wings" United States Air Force
Yearbook 1999 (R.A.F. Benevolent Fund, 1999), 6-9. See
also Appendix F of "The Economic and Budget Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2000-2009" published by the Congressional
Budget Office (January 29, 1999). The Congressional Budget
Office figures on defense spending which shows a marked
decrease in actual spending and spending as a percentage
of GDP since 1989. In 1989, discretionary outlays for
defense were $304.0 billion, while in 1998, the figure
dropped to $269.6 billion. As a percentage of GDP,
discretionary spending on the military dropped from 9.3 in











1962 to 6.2 in 1985, further dropped to 5.7 in 1989, and
fell to 3.2 in 1998.(Tables 10 and 11) Congressional
Budget Office, www.cbo.gov

22 Astor, The Mighty Eighth, 1-2.

23 Thomas M. Coffey, Hap: The Story of the U.S. Air Force
and the Man Who Built It General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
(New York: Viking Press, 1982), 218-219.

24 Robert F. Futrell, "Air Power in World War II" chapter
in The United States Air Force by Monro MacCloskey (New
York: Praeger, Inc., 1967), 45.

25 Paul Perkins, The Lady: Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress
(Surrey, U.K.: Ian Allen Publishing, 1993), 1-2.

26 Walter J. Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air
(New York: Touchstone, 1994), 282-320.

27 Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in
World War II (New York: Random House, 1993), 46-47.

28 Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 150-154.

29 Ibid., 150-174.

30 Coffey, Hap, 101-107, 119, 146, 160, 167. David Mets,
Master of Air Power: General Carl A. Spaatz (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1988), 41, 46-47, 55 57-58, 60-63.

31 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 1.

32 Scott Cutlip, The Unseen Power: Public Relations A
History (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1994), 528.

33 Mets, Master of Air Power, 307-332. Thomas Coffey, Iron
Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New
York: Crown Publishing, 1986), 277.















CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW



The volumes written about World War II are far too

numerous to mention. From such works such as Samuel Eliot

Morrison's classic on the role of the U.S. Navy1 to the

autobiographies such as Winston Churchill's massive Second

World War series,2 this titanic six-year struggle was

followed by an equally massive collection of books about

the war years.

There is no body of literature that deals

specifically with the public relations between the members

of the Eighth Air Force and their British World War II

hosts. There are, however, histories that cover various

aspects of the factors relating to Eighth Air Force

operations and personnel and British society during the

period. For the convenience of this study, the literature

will be categorized into general histories of the war,

which may include larger histories in which World War II

merits considerable discussion; histories on aviation and

its development; social histories of the war to include

histories of local regions; and, finally, histories which

give an accounting of the public relations efforts during

World War II.











General histories of the war offer the overall

context of the war period. Aviation histories generally

cover the development of aerodynamics and aerial warfare

doctrine. Doctrine drives aerodynamic development and

vice versa. Without the development of each to the state

in which they existed in 1942, the Eighth Air Force would

not have existed and, if it did, its methods would have

been different with results that may have prevented or

altered any deployment to Britain. Aviation histories,

therefore, describe the various paths leading the

personnel and material of the Eighth Air Force to Britain

in 1942.

Social histories of the war offer insights to the

construction of the social fabric which tied the various

people together even under stress. They also reveal the

tears in that fabric and suggest the causes of those

problems. The social histories reviewed include various

levels of discussion of the interaction between the U.S.

and British people during the war, with some works giving

the dynamics of this relationship more attention than

others. Typically, social histories describe the

phenomena relating to U.S. and British interactions

without much attention paid to the systematic

communications process abetting such relations. Yet,

without noting the interactions, discussion of the public











relations programs becomes an exercise in theoretical

supposition.

Histories of public relations during World War II are

virtually non-existent, with those few who have commented

on the subject ignoring the Eighth Air force operations

entirely. What is said in these histories is notable for

an emphasis on the war itself producing numerous public

relations professionals for the post war expansion of the

PR field.



General Military Histories

Few histories of World War II can be credible without

mentioning John Keegan, A.J.P. Taylor or Stephen Ambrose.

Each is often cited by other military historians and,

particularly in the case of Keegan and Ambrose, are

prolific authors. Further, no collection of books on

warfare can be complete without the addition of Lynn

Montross' 1,063-page work, War Through the Ages, nor can

any tales of the experiences of the Eighth Air Force in

Europe be told without referring to the research of

Britain's Roger Freeman. All are quoted herein, as well

as the biographers of the architects of American airpower,

the strategists of pre-war strategic bombing, and the

social historians who have reflected on the British-

American relations during the war.











To select a comprehensive history of warfare, there

are few works as thoroughly and logically developed as War

Through the Ages by Lynn Montross.3 This large, single

volume was clearly written with descriptive phrasing

through the more than 1,000 pages of text. The reader is

provided a well-developed, logical progression of the art

of war. Montross both recounted the theories of Sun-Tzu,

Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet and applied them to the

military activities of their time and their influence on

later generations of politicians and warriors. As

diplomacy and war are but two tools of the state to

achieve similar aims, Montross outlined diplomatic

initiatives as they affected the balance of power and

encouraged or relieved international strife.

Montross, who wrote from the close vantage point of

the early post-World War II period, could write about that

struggle only from what materials were then available to

lay historians. He gave solid coverage of the pre-war

writings of Giulio Douhet on strategic bombing and its

potential effect on civilian morale, as well as providing

an assertion that Douhet's strategies influenced many

aviation enthusiasts. The application of Douhet's

theories found little validation in the results of the

actual fighting of the war, but they influenced how the

war was fought. Without the influence of the pre-war











aviation theorists, the Eighth Air Force would not have

been created. Also, the R.A.F. would have been structured

differently. An emphasis on defensive rather than

offensive strategies would not have put the Eighth Air

Force in Britain and would not have created the U.S./U.K.

cohesion in the concept of strategic bombing, which helped

to cement their relationship. Even though he was writing

shortly after the war, Montross was able to read the famed

Strategic Bombing Survey, which was being compiled even as

the final raids on Germany were being conducted. Although

critics of the U.S./U.K. strategic bombing campaigns over

Europe seized upon the fact that German war production

actually increased during the latter years of the war,

just when American and British bombing was at its height,

Montross was quick to point out that this is merely a

statistical phenomenon. What the bombing did, Montross

claimed, was create specific shortfalls that seriously

crimped Germany's strategic capabilities.4

This ambiguity served to muddle the understanding of

the role of airpower, leaving the discussion unresolved as

recently as the Kosovo air campaign of 1999.5

However, as poetic or insightful as Montross was in

writing War Through the Ages, he failed, as he had to

fail, to bring much of a social balance to his writings,

particularly his section on World War II. To cover the











social side of the war would have required Montross to

deviate from the science and art of warfare theme of his

work. Thus, Montross only could provide a single

dimension of the war.



Military History of World War II

John Keegan, renowned British historian, wrote The

Battle for History: Re-fighting World War II,6 in which he

provided his recommendations for histories of World War

II. While he recommended the previously mentioned

Morrison series, and a host of other volumes on the Second

World War, his stated belief regarding the dubious value

of the Allies' strategic bombing effort corresponded with

his failure to list even one book dedicated to the

personalities, events, tactics and hardware regarding that

mission. Further, Keegan, though given to psychological

and even moral assessments of the war, failed to make

direct mention of any work dedicated to the social

persuasive or mass media efforts in Britain or the U.S.,

even though a full chapter was given to books about

resistance movements in occupied countries. In his own

World War II history, The Second World War,7 Keegan does

provide operational analyses of the strategic bombing

program, granting that the Eighth Air Force was able to

create strategic shortages in fuel and transportation











stock. He was less charitable to his own country's

efforts, quoting Lord Salisbury who lambasted British area

bombing missions, "that of course the Germans began it,

but we do not take the devil as our example." While

American bombing crews and their leaders earned favor

through various public relations efforts, Air Chief

Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris was the only major British

military leader not granted a peerage and his bomber

command troops the only service not granted a campaign

medal of their own. To the British, Keegan claimed, area

bombing was "certainly not fair play."8 U.S. bombing guru,

General Curtis E. LeMay's condemnation came much later and

for totally different reasons.9

Keegan dismissed the famous historian A.J.P. Taylor's

Origins of the Second World War0l as "notorious." Calling

Taylor a pyrotechniciann" and "gadfly," Keegan was even

caustic enough to write that Taylor's "verdict on the

Second World War may be judged his greatest perversity.""

Certainly, Taylor's book is controversial. Taylor

insisted that Hitler never considered Japanese aid against

Russia12 -- an assertion that flies in the face of counter-

claims by other historians and even common sense.

Taylor's claim that Roosevelt had meant it when he said in

the autumn of 1940 "Your boys are not going to be sent

into any foreign wars"13 was not even believed by his











barely more isolationist opponent, Wendell Wilkie, who

knew a hypocritical statement when he heard one. Further,

Taylor made a rather inflammatory assertion that the

Soviet Union's "title to the Baltic states and eastern

Poland was a good deal better than that of the United

States to New Mexico." While such a Soviet claim may not

have been much less than that of the Americans, to state

beyond that is to conveniently forget a thousand years of

eastern European history.

It should not come as a surprise, then, that Taylor

felt Germany's invasion of Russia was the most significant

act of the war -- neglecting such events as Germany's

invasion of Poland, the Battle of Britain, the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the

dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. The curious

"alliance" behavior between the Axis powers is as much a

significant series of activities as anything else in the

war. This review of Taylor, as wide-ranging and as far

afield from the topic of this paper as it is, is done so

with the full intent to explain what would otherwise seem

to be Taylor's inexplicable lack of discussion of

U.S./U.K. relations and any efforts made to enhance them.

How a nation perceives its political functions in

operation (and war is political) is critical to

understanding that nation and, to some extent through the











contrast, one's own. For a rather different perspective

on World War II, The Russian Version of the Second World

War,14 edited by Graham Lyons and translated by Marjorie

Vanston, provided an intriguing view inside the Soviet

system as the work seeks to explain the events of World

War II to its young scholars. Perhaps it is not

surprising to note that the publishers of the book

included A.J.P. Taylor's assertion that "the Soviet

version is nearer the truth than most versions current in

the West," which was printed on the back cover. This

book, however, acknowledged the weakness of the Soviets'

moral positions regarding their 1939 war with Finland and

the Soviet-Polish relations throughout World War II.

To explain the Soviet perspectives of these

controversial events, "summarized Western positions" were

given, then countered by Soviet accounts of these

episodes. The war with Finland, for example, was excused

as buttressing the Soviet western borders to protect

Leningrad. While no doubt the Soviets were concerned with

their own national security, the morality of their

decisions remain very questionable. On the other hand,

the account explaining the failure of the Soviets to aid

the Polish uprising in Warsaw toward the end of the war

can be taken as more reasonable. Then again, the cynics

may be right, but we will, in all probably, never know.











This perspective to the war serves as a valuable

counterweight to typical western histories, but like them,

concentrated on policies, strategies, and weaponry,

largely ignoring sociological phenomena. Thus, the Soviet

author spent zero ink on discussing close cooperation

efforts between U.S./U.K. relations -- at any level.



Aviation History of World War II

There are several histories pertaining to the

development of U.S. military aviation. Some are used by

the United States Air Force as part of its professional

officer development programs, while others are written by

and for aviation enthusiasts. The former concentrate on

the development of doctrine, while the latter emphasize an

anecdotal style. Curiously, there were several histories

written by British historians on the American air forces,

and much of the more recent histories on U.S. war aviation

were, in fact, written and published by the British for

the British. Such histories are valuable as they provide

the reasons for the deployment of the Eighth Air Force to

Britain and describe the conditions facing these

personnel.

The U.S.A.A.F. Handbook: 1939-194515 by Martin W.

Bowman is one of several U.S. aviation histories written

by an Englishman. Bowman is among the most prolific,











having written some 20 or more U.S.A.A.F. histories.

This particular book was selected for inclusion in this

review due to its comprehensive nature, which included the

U.S.A.A.F.'s wartime organizational structure. To put it

in Bowman's words, the work was designed to "fill in some

of the gaps."16 However, for the purposes of this study,

Bowman added precious little mention of any systematic

program for building underlining public relations support

for strategic bombing missions in Britain. Further,

Bowman's account contrasted with other sources on a couple

of minor facts that have achieved some degree of lore.

While one of General Mitchell's biographers described

Mitchell's award of a special medal,17 Bowman stated that

Mitchell earned the Medal of Honor.18 Further, Bowman

contended that the B-17 Flying Fortress was so named due

to its role as an aerial fortress against invading ships.19

There does not seem to be any evidence to support this

contention, while other publications refer to the

aircraft's defensive armament, though fairly modest in the

beginning, as the cause for the nickname.20

Bowman did draw some illuminating comparisons useful

for understanding strategic issues. For instance, in June

1939, while Hitler was carving up Czechoslovakia, the Army

Air Corps possessed only 13 B-17s (its main heavy bomber)











and just over 22,000 personnel, only twice the number of

its cavalry troopers.21

Heavily a "dates, designs and doctrine" history,

Bowman remarked on U.S./U.K. relations as they affect

aircraft/technology designs or development of doctrine and

tactics. For instance, the U.S. sent operational aircraft

such as the B-17, A-20, and other aircraft to Britain,

while the U.K. reciprocated by forwarding technological

advances in radar and jet engines, as well as operational

reports needed to assess current battlefield operations.

The American generals responsible for building up an

operational air force were not pleased with handing over

to the British the creme of the aviation production lines

in the years between 1939 and the end of 1941. Bowman,

although an Englishman, gave strong sympathy to the

American air commanders, but in all probability, the

British put the American material to more effective, more

direct use than mere training.22 Further, as any veteran

of U.S. Air Force Squadron Officer School wargaming knows,

in a technological war, having later model weapons at a

crucial point can make all the difference. Some of the

material the Americans sold to the British in 1940 proved

woefully inadequate for 1942 warfare.23 The British, in

other words, kept the aviation production lines open, used

the material to great effect, and forced the Yanks to re-











tool with more modern aircraft when the U.S. finally

entered the war. At the time, the Americans did not seem

to appreciate the contributions of the British to this

aspect of the development of U.S. airpower. The fact is,

aerial warfare is military Darwinism. Only the most

modern and fittest survive. The Stukas and P-40s that

were hot birds in 1939 were clay pigeons by 1942. With

British assistance the Americans adjusted; the Luftwaffe

did not. The Germans, who were beginning to introduce

jet/rocket technology in late 1944, found the cold truth

regarding technology timing when their Me-262 jets were

taking off from runways far too deep within Germany to

stop the swarms of American machines raining death from

30,000 feet above.24 British and American cooperation on

aircraft and technology development ensured Allied

success. Cooperation at this level was indicative of the

overall Anglo-American effort.

However, other than the strategic discussions and

exchange of airframes outlined above, Bowman completely

neglected the human relations aspects of the air war,

leaving such discussions to others.

Geoffrey Perret, a dual U.S./U.K. citizen, devoted 468

pages of well-researched efforts to Winged Victory: The

Army Air Forces in World War II.25 Perret did lend some










discussion to U.S./U.K. relations at the higher level,

relating the angst senior American airmen felt about

selling American aviation assets to the British prior to

America's entry into the war and the "close but tense"

relations during that entire period. Once into an active

alliance after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the

relations strengthened.

Perret added that some senior U.S. air officials were

masters of public relations, particularly General Hap

Arnold. Further, Perret included an entire chapter on

U.S. aviation morale, but he made no mention of British

efforts to build relations other than the willingness of

British women to date American aviators. This "hands

across the sea" effort, however, was recounted behind such

morale boosters as good bombing results, commanding

officers who flew combat missions, beer, mail, Bob Hope,

mission limits, food, poker games, and the Glenn Miller

Band.26

The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine27 by Lieutenant

Colonel Barry Watts is another example of a doctrine-

drives-development book. Colonel Watts intended to

demonstrate how current Air Force doctrine became such.

In World War II, the pre-war assumptions of the










superiority of self-protected manned bombers in bringing

the war to the enemy was handed a rude welcome to reality.

In turn, the Germans, the British, and then the Americans

found strategic bombing to be a difficult campaign at

best. No nation was able to execute strategic bombing

without fearsome losses to their own bomber fleet. The

strategic phenomenon labeled as "friction of war" is the

degree of variation of actual events from anticipated

activities. According to Watts, friction was in effect

when the Germans, acting somewhat more varied than

statistical models, created mission success problems for

U.S. bombers. The answer to German defenses were resolved

only by the serendipitous joining of British Rolls-Royce

Merlin engines to American P-51s, thus allowing U.S.

strategic bombers to criss-cross the skies of Europe in a

much safer fashion.28

Unfortunately, Watts seemed to make a point, then

wander off in an altogether new direction. Where Watts

made a valiant effort was not in his historical methods,

but his conclusion. According to Watts, instead of war

being a science, as attempted by McNamara in Vietnam, or

even an art form, as proposed by Sun Tzu, it is little

more than semi-organized chaos. The side that builds more










flexibility into its structure and in its mindset has a

greater chance of success. This is critically important

to the success of the frontline troops. To go into battle

as "masters of chaos" is infinitely superior than

wondering why nothing ever seems to go as planned.

Seeming to be in control of the uncontrollable is

psychologically superior to uncertainty. To quote from

the novel, 12 O'Clock High,29 "'Consider yourself already

dead,' the general said." For the men of the Eighth Air

Force, survivability and sanity both rested upon being

masters of chaos. It was counter-intuitive, but,

according to Watts, critical.

Gerald Astor's The Mighty Eighth30 is dedicated to

weaving oral interviews into a history, using archival

information as documentation. Of wild tales of the wild-

blue yonder, Astor's book fills the bill. However, it is

woefully short on forwarding knowledge on the building of

relations between U.S./U.K. populations at the local

level. Some information, particularly recounted on pages

233-237, provided some anecdotal insight on localized

relations to include "boy-meets-girl routines" and

"liberty runs." Astor did not dwell on this subject and

did not try to cubbyhole relationships into some










convenient stereotype. He left the little information

provided to be of the anecdotal sort a "flyer about

town" story rarely supporting more than the fact that

each American seemed to have his own routine. Astor's

work is no more, nor any less, than what it purports to be

- an oral history.



Social and Local Histories of World War II

There are several books that localize World War II.

In this genre, authors describe the activities of the war

as they affect a particular region. Two books typical of

this kind are Philip Ziegler's acclaimed London at War:

1939-194531 and the Norwich-published East Anglia at War:

1939-194532 by Derek E. Johnson.

Ziegler's work owes much of its primary source

materials to the U.K. Public Records Office at Kew,

outside of London, as well as the British Imperial War

Museum. Therefore, due to the excellent archival

resources of those two establishments, there is a natural

inclination to infer the utility of this work. The

problem, though, for the purposes of understanding the

American presence in Britain, was the rather extreme

method of introducing his chapter on the Americans by










giving it the chapter title: "The girls here walk out

with niggers!"33 The chapter made a point about

demonstrating the differences between Americans and the

natives, even recounting a Mass Observation poll that

while Londoners favored the Dutch by 73 percent, the

Czechs by 64 percent and the Free French by 52 percent,

the Americans were liked by only 33 percent. Of course,

Ziegler did not mention a possible sympathy factor as only

the Americans, in that grouping, were from a country

unconquered by the Nazis.

Yet, Ziegler did seem to give the "American problem"

an even hand, blaming members of all corners for

exacerbating what unpleasantness that did exist. Ziegler

admitted that even given the standards of the day, any

American-caused crime wave was more of a "ripple."

Another, more modest example of localized history of

the war is Johnson's work on the effects of the war on

East Anglia. Since that region was the site of the

greatest concentration of air fields, the flying aspect of

the war received considerable mention. Johnson mentioned

the American involvement with the region's infrastructure

to some limited degree, but gave far more attention to

rather lurid speculations about the death of Lieutenant










Joseph Kennedy, Jr. regarding Lt. Kennedy piloting what

was, in effect, a flying bomb.

Many histories of World War II developed from a

military history perspective, while some as previously

mentioned, tied the events of the war to a specific

region. Another form of relating the past is through

social histories. In the case of World War II, social

histories have dealt with the social interactions of

people tied together by the overarching socially

environmental condition that was the war.

Perhaps the best book on U.S./U.K. relations in World

War II is David Reynolds' Rich Relations: The American

Occupation of Britain, 1942-45.34 Reynolds took advantage

of recently unclassified materials, as well as the

personal interviews that the 50th anniversary period (1989-

1995) made easier.

Unfortunately, neither Reynolds' title, "Rich

Relations," nor subtitle, "The American Occupation of

Britain," accurately described the phenomena of U.S./U.K.

relations in 1942-45. In seeming contradiction to his own

title, Reynolds pointed out that America had just emerged

from a severe depression that hit the country far harder

than was the case in Britain. Further, while U.S. pay was










superior to most British servicemen of the same rank,

this neither meant that Americans were in any sense

"rich," nor were they "occupiers" any more than were those

of the British commonwealth or exiled warriors of

conquered countries. The disservice his title provided to

the illumination of the subject cannot be ignored.

Further, while he did add much to the body of knowledge on

U.S./U.K. relations, he failed to fully understand the

total dynamics of U.S.A.A.F. relations with their local

populations.

Britisher Roger Freeman's The Friendly Invasion35 was

written to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the

beginning of U.S.A.A.F. operations out of England. As

such, it was not designed to be a critical piece on the

American and English relations, although Freeman did not

pull any punches regarding the worst transgressions of

either side. He did gloss over the problems of American

racial issues, particularly U.S. white and black relations

in Britain. According to Freeman, these relations were

far better than has been the common perception.

Considering that there were no black aviators and few

black on-site ground support personnel in the Eighth Air

Force, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of white/black










relations during the war as a whole. The famed Tuskegee

Airmen, for example, flew with the 15th Air Force from the

Mediterranean theater of operations.

Freeman is a master of the anecdotal tale, but he

provided some statistical analysis to back up his

assertions that, by and large, the Yanks and Brits got

along. Freeman's folly, which may be intentional, was not

investigating, or at least reporting the reasons for a

lack of airman enthusiasm for British home visits. This

seeming aloofness by the Americans received no analysis.

Freeman also spent little time on the planned public

relations aspects of the relationships.



Public Relations Histories of World War II

Those who enjoy taking photographs are often the very

people left out of most of the pictures in the album. The

same phenomenon may be suggested for those whose job was

to publicize others during World War II.

Individuals who have made the history of the practice

of public relations their area of expertise have failed to

include the relations of the Eighth Air Force with their

British hosts. In his rather extensive book on the

history of public relations, The Unseen Power,36










communications historian Scott Cutlip virtually ignored

the role of public relations not directly involved with

domestic consumption. Almost no research indicated a

determination of common practices within the field during

this time, except that which was done by practitioners

employed by the president or by major corporations at

senior advisory levels. Cutlip's version of the history

of public relations remains the primer in the field. His

version is used by the Public Relations Society of America

and the Universal Accreditation Board for their Accredited

in Public Relations examinations.37 Further, Cutlip's

version of the history of public relations has been widely

quoted by others, to include Fraser Seitel in his college

textbook, The Practice of Public Relations.38


Vanessa Murphree in William Sloan's Perspectives on

Mass Communication History39 provided scant comment on

public relations histories and historians save those

involved with "great men" studies such as Cutlip, or those

concentrating on public relations' role in the economy or

operating from an economic perspective.

This dissertation has the goal of expanding the

accounting of the history of public relations to include a

significant period of international public relations.

This period was from 1942 through 1945, and the people











involved were hundreds of thousands of Americans and the

population of Britain. While this dissertation includes

information on military development and doctrine necessary

to provide context to the public relations activities, it

is not a military history. Instead, this is a

communications history, more specifically a history of the

field of public relations.




Notes

Samuel Eliot Morison, The History of the U.S. Navy During
World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947).

2 Winston Churchill, World War Two (Boston, MA: Bantam
1962).

3 Lynn Montross, War Through The Ages 3rd Edition (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960), 1-1063.

4 Ibid., 919-923.

5 Mark Demnis, Stryker McGuire, and Juliette Terzieff,
"Mission Uncertain," Newsweek April 5, 1999, 29-34.

6 John Keegan, The Battle for History: Refighting World War
II (London: Pimlico, 1997), 128.

7 John Keegan, The Second World War (London: Penguin,
1990), 608.

8 Ibid., 433.

9 Coffey, Iron Eagle, 3.

10 A. J. P. Taylor, The Second World War (New York: Putnam,
1975), 240.











11 Keegan, The Battle For History, 9-29.

12 Taylor, The Second World War, 81.

13 Ibid., 82.

14 Graham Lyons, ed., The Russian Version of the Second
World War trans. Marjorie Vanston. (New York: Facts on
File Publications, 1976), 142.

15 Bowman, U.S.A.A.F. Handbook.

16 Ibid., iv.

17 Major Alfred Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air
Power (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1964, 1992), 140.

s1 Bowman, U.S.A.A.F. Handbook, 4.

19 Ibid., 9.

20 Roger Freeman and David Anderton, B-17 Fortress, B-29
Superfortress At War (London, England: Promotional Reprint
Co. Ltd., 1996), 8. Freeman claimed the defensive armament
inspired the nickname.

21 Bowman, U.S.A.A.F. Handbook, 10.

22 Ibid., 12-25.

23 Ibid., 121.

24 Ibid., 16, 27, 54.

25 Perret, Winged Victory.

26 Ibid., 408-414.

27 Lieutenant Colonel Barry Watts, The Foundations of U.S.
Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB,
AL: Air University Press, 1984), 166.

28 Perret, Winged Victory, 375.











29 Beirne Lay Jr. and Sy Bartlett, 12 O'Clock High! (New
York: Ballentine Books, 1948), 81.

30 Astor, The Mighty Eighth.

31 Philip Ziegler, London At War 1939-1945 (London,
England: Arrow, 1998), 372.

32 Derek Johnson, East Anglia At War 1939-1945 (Norwich,
U.K.: Parke Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1992), 176.

33 Ziegler, London At War 1939-1945, 205.

34 Reynolds, Rich Relations.

35 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion.

36 Cutlip, The Unseen Power.

37 When the Public Relations Society of America "APR"
accreditation program was merged with those of other
public relations associations, such as the Florida Public
Relations Association's "APRP" accreditation program, the
Cutlip, Center and Broom textbook, Effective Public
Relations, was adopted as the basis for the accreditation
examination. See the "Study Guide for the Accreditation in
Public Relations (APR) Examination." Public Relations
Society of America, 1999.

38 Fraser Seitel, The Practice of Public Relations 6th
Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).

39 Vanessa Murphree, "Public Relations, 1900-1950" in
William David Sloan, Perspectives on Mass Communication
History (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1991), 230-241.















CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY



This study intends to discover and categorize public

relations activities as they related to and affected the

personnel of the Eighth Air Force in their relations with

the British population serving as their hosts during the

period of 1942-1945. This study used information from

both archival and personal interview sources to determine

the existence and scope of public relations activities

during this period. As an objective of the research,

information sought included any U.S. governmental and

military programs established for the express purpose of

building positive relations between U.S.A.A.F. personnel

and their British hosts. Other information was sought on

British government or military public relations programs

to aid in U.S./U.K. relations, programs established

outside of U.S. or British government or military

headquarters that were designed to promote U.S./U.K.

relations, and any program that, by its nature, would have

the effect of improving U.S./U.K. relations.

Like many historical studies, this dissertation

relies, primarily, on written sources. Primary sources

include diaries, military manuals, military orders and










similar documents, public relations brochures and

booklets, unit histories, newspapers, abstracts of police

records, oral statements, and, perhaps most important, the

original national government documents. These sources

provide background information, suggest different avenues

for research, and offer the facts from which to form

conclusions.

Diaries provide the thoughts of an individual at the

time of an event, rather than recollections challenged by

time. Military manuals and other military documents show

the level of training and the military thought and

constraints of the period. The published and printed

public relations brochures and booklets provide insight to

the state of the art in 1940s public relations. Unit

histories contribute a worm's eye view of the effects of

programs on a particular group of individuals. Police

records can reveal the extremes of activities of local

groups. Oral statements serve to fill gaps in records and

give a sense of the time and how and why events of that

time affected individuals.

The British government and American military files

are particularly important as these are the two official

entities charged with establishing structured public

relations programs to aid relations between U.S. military

personnel and the British citizenry.










As the primary sources were obtained from official

British or American government agencies, their validity is

as assured as such documents can be. The files of the

British Foreign Office are of particular value as it was

this agency that initiated many of the formal U.S./U.K.

programs. The British Ministry of Information and U.S.

Air Force records are critical as well. However, due to

the need by intelligence agencies to determine public and

military morale, some rather extraordinary primary

documentation of personal sentiments is available --

intercepted/censored mail. As all mail was intercepted, a

fairly substantial body of data was developed.

While the facts of particular public relations

programs are provided by primary sources, secondary

sources, particularly military histories, are invaluable

as assets from which to forward a synthesis upon various

events. Military historians also may note, for example,

that the BOLERO committee, which was conceived to aid the

American forces buildup in Britain, made a strenuous

effort to build adequate housing for American servicemen.

The energy of the BOLERO committee was not duplicated by

earlier efforts on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of

Canadian troops who arrived in Britain two years earlier.

As a consequence, many Canadians lived with their British

hosts. How did this affect U.S./U.K. and U.K./Canadian

relations?










For the Americans, they lived in small oases of

Yankee communities nestled in the British countryside --

more isolated from the neighboring English. This style of

U.S. troop deployments for war has continued from World

War II through the 1991 Desert Storm operation in the

Persian Gulf. However, after World War II, U.S. families

permanently assigned to overseas locations generally lived

amongst their hosts. According to Dimbleby and Reynolds,1

in post-war Great Britain, the East Anglia communities and

the U.S. Air Force personnel have enjoyed very harmonious

relations -- in sharp contrast to the early post-war

experience of the U.S. Navy at Holy Loch in Scotland.

What did the Air Force learn that the Navy did not?

When considering the various facets of U.S. Army Air

Forces relations with the British during World War II, it

can easily be argued that there are public relations

lessons to be learned for modern military operations.

Examination of data will pay particular attention to the

formation of British public relations activities,

particularly how the British organized their official

public relations programs. Also, attention will be paid

to the obstructions to these programs and to providing

evidence that suggests the overall success of these

programs. The American military effort to provide public

relations training to their own personnel will be

examined, particularly by accounting the various methods










of conducting such training. Further, there will be an

examination of American efforts to provide their troops

the services to support morale similar to British

programs.



Implications

In seeking information to discover and categorize

public relations activities as they affected U.S. Eighth

Air Force personnel and their relations with their British

hosts, a variety of sources were used. Sources were

selected to reveal the extent of the British government's

role in setting up public relations programs on a broad

scale to enhance U.S./U.K. relations. Other sources were

sought to show the extent the American military leadership

fomented good U.S./U.K. relations. Also, sources were

sought that could suggest the many effective public

relations programs conducted by those not normally

associated with public relations activities.

The potential implications of the research are

several. If Anglo-American public relations programs were

planned by the British government, and if several

organizations and individuals to promote and enhance good

relations between Eighth Air Force personnel and their

British hosts were formed, how were these organizations

formed and organized? The answer to that question

advances our understanding of the British government's










role and commitment to building effective public relations

between their people and their American guests. Further,

were the leaders of the Eighth Air Force adept at

practicing effective public relations and did they

practice this craft during the war? If the leadership

understood the role of public relations, this may explain

any evidence of positive relations between their personnel

and the British, particularly if they actively put their

knowledge into policy. Did public relations programs that

were created vary in size and organization? If so, this

speaks to the sophistication of the overall effort, but

may also suggest uncoordinated activities.

In total, the investigation and accounting of the

public relations activities of this period will fill gaps

in the body of knowledge of public relations history.




A Note on Style and Terms

Since there are, essentially, some very distinct

cross-culture and sub-cultural differences in usage of the

English language between the various sources used for this

study, some decisions on style had to be accomplished.

The document itself is written in what is commonly called

American Standard English.2 However, so as not to taint

original meanings of various phrases, British English, to









include British-style spelling, is often used in direct

quotes. Where it seems Britons are being quoted with

Americanized spellings, it is probably due to the source

from where the quote was derived. Dates are given in the

standard American civilian month-day-year format unless

presented as part of a document. Generally speaking, the

British and the American military both use the day-month-

year format.

U.S. Air Force terms are used for Air Force phrases

and areas of protocol. This includes issues of

abbreviations for rank and capitalization of various

military operations. Because it is the custom to refer to

or abbreviate the United States Air Force as U.S.A.F. or

USAF, both are used herein as appropriate. In other

matters of usage, the United States is abbreviated as

"U.S." and the United Kingdom is abbreviated as "U.K." A

list of U.S. Air Force rank abbreviations is attached as

an appendix. When conflicts occur between American and

British military terminology, the American format will be

favored unless specifically noted.

Contemporary terms that enhance the understanding of

the period will be used, but explained in endnotes to

avoid confusion. The terms for World War II troops









included G.I. (Government Issue) for U.S. soldiers and

airmen and "Tommies" for British ground forces only. Both

GI and G.I. are used interchangeably due to quotes and

book titles, although the G.I. abbreviation is favored in

the narrative. The term "troops" is used for both air and

ground personnel. Where air force personnel need to be

distinguished from ground forces, they will be more

clearly delineated with terms such as aircrew, Eighth Air

Forces personnel and the like. Because it is common usage

in the United States Air Force for "aircrew" to be a

combined word, it is done here as well.

Since the American Red Cross is a distinctive

organization from its British counterpart, it will always

be identified as the American Red Cross or ARC. A list of

British organizations and their abbreviations also is

provided as an appendix. Since Britain was a more

centrally governed entity than is the United States,

"government" as a noun or adjective will refer to the

central government headed by the Prime Minister, unless

otherwise noted.

A number of pieces of correspondence are cited.

Since the British during this period showed a remarkable

degree of informality, probably due to the crush of the









responsibilities of that time, a piece of correspondence

was often typed, with personal handwritten notes attached,

and internal memos were often handwritten with initials,

rather than signatures, serving to identify the writer.

Therefore, some degree of standardization is attempted

herein to identify types and origins of correspondence.

Letters are identified as such if they are signed and go

from one office or ministry to another. Memoranda are

labeled as such if that piece of correspondence is

initialed rather than signed, or is intra-office, or is

actually called a "memorandum," even though intended for

external use.


For the sake of convenience, the British honors

abbreviated and attached after names in correspondence are

deleted herein. However, the honors "Rt. Hon." and "Sir,"

plus military ranks, etc. are rendered as these help to

identify the roles of these persons.


Notes

Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 294.

2 See Michael Gregory and Susanne Carroll, Language and
Situation (London, England: Routledge and Keegan Paul,
1978), 10, Tables 1 and 2.















CHAPTER 4
BACKGROUND



History of U.S./U.K. Relations

For those Americans born after the beginning of World

War II, Anglo-American relations have generally been

regarded as close and compatriotic. Even post-war

falling-outs such as the Suez crisis and the Vietnam War

have been supplanted in the public's eye by more recent

demonstrations of U.S./U.K. geopolitical cooperation to

include the raid on Libya in the early 1980s, the 1991

Gulf War, and 1990s U.S./U.K. joint missions over Iraq and

the Balkans.' Until World War II, mutual suspicion was

about as good as relations got.2 There are differences

between Americans and the British that transcend the

common language. These differences have been created by

different histories, different challenges, and even a

different military tradition.

The early explorers, trappers, pilgrims, and planters

who left Britain to stake a claim in the New World, were,

on occasion, the shining sons of the rising empire.










However, the vast majority of those splashing ashore at

Plymouth Bay or tidewater Virginia were the lower-ordered

sons of nobility, marginalized merchants, Highlanders

fleeing the "Clearances," or the religiously outcast.3 In

short, they had more of a stake in where they were going

than where they had been. They were the new Americans.

New World energy built the mighty cities, its waterways,

and its transcontinental railroads. Americans were even

the first to conquer the air. Sheer power and aggressive

"can do" attitude overwhelmed the Rockies, the Alaskan

cold, and Death Valley.4

The patriots in 1776 did not outfox the British

terribly often. Instead, they blundered at battle more

often than they were able to stage brilliant set-piece

victories.5 Up to World War II, Americans had been

relatively successful in their wars, if not always in

their battles. Perhaps this had to do with the non-

professional nature of its military. Perhaps, as a

democracy, America just took too long to get ready for

war.6 But it can be argued that the democracy builds

better "teamwork" than dictatorships. To Americans, it is

not as important to outsmart your opponent as it is to

demonstrate a stronger will.7










The War of 1812, waged between the new American

nation and the British Empire, holds four images for

posterity. The first is the mythical durability of the

oak hull of the U.S.S. Constitution (Old Ironsides). The

second is the resilience and stubbornness of Oliver Hazard

Perry at the Battle of Lake Erie who, even though losing

his flagship, held out long enough to send the oddly

eloquent message: "We have met the enemy and they are

ours...." Third, it was watching the dandies get chased by

the British out of Washington long enough to have them

torch the president's house -- and then have Fort McHenry

withstand "the bombs bursting in air" to thwart the

further advance of the British. Finally, as the crowning

glory, a handful of good old boys and bayou pirates

sending the flower of Wellington's troops packing with

unseemly alacrity from New Orleans.8

That the British army generally performed better than

the American was not of particular concern to the young

country as it did not alter its military structures

appreciably until World War II.9

Historically, when the Americans met the British,

whether during their revolutionary struggle, the

exercising of the prerogatives of a new republic,









establishing western boundaries or proclaiming hemispheric

hegemony, the U.S. could rightly feel they had taken the

weight of British power and found the British failed to

exert the moral fiber to finish the game.10

Other Anglo-American issues were of more concern.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 had the potential to

bring the U.S. and Britain into conflict if the Japanese

were to aggressively pursue their own Pacific interests.

The militant nature of the Japanese in the first 20 years

of the 20th century worried the Americans.

Indeed, when World War I began, Americans were fairly

ambivalent about their own loyalties unless they had an

ethnic stake in the struggle. Certainly, the rather

politically strong enclaves of German- and Irish-Americans

were strongly anti-British." Only the government and big

business ties to Great Britain tilted the balance toward

American intervention on the side of the allies. Even

then, the rallying cry was "Lafayette, we have returned."12

Americans were not interested in preserving the British

Empire and considered British sacrifices in the early days

of the war as upper-class callousness toward their own men

not a sacrifice made to make the world safe for

democracy. That was the role of the Americans. And when










they were done, they bade good bye and good riddance to

the horrors and decaying embers that remained of the moral

fire of the Old World.13 Americans turned their back on

Europe and from World War I to World War II dealt with

their own concerns.14

From the time of the American Revolution, the British

left the temperate middle of North America to the ex-

colonists. The British then cast their eyes to other

sectors of the world. By the time of World War I, Britain

controlled the vast majority of world trade, and her

subjects were beneficiaries of the toil of colonial labor.

So while British citizens abhorred American Jim Crow, many

Americans felt the British Empire was an immoral

structure, constructed and maintained by the backs of

colonists.15 Of course the average Brit was not a colonial

master any more than every American was a flaming racist.



U.S./U.K. During the War

To meet their obligations within the December 23,

1941 Arcadia accords, the U.S. agreed to send G.I.s to the

British Isles. Considering that the U.S. Army envisioned

a five-million men (and women) force for Europe, this was

going to be quite a deployment.16









The U.S. Army realized that morale may be a problem

with this amount of ground troops and airmen deployed far

from home. The U.S. Army pushed for the authorization of

overseas service ribbons, a source of amusement to British

soldiers who felt that the Yanks getting a medal for

merely arriving at the plot of soil the British called

"home" was a bit ridiculous.17

The British, from their experience of hosting other

nationalities, were aware of the difficulties of foreign

troops quartered on British soil. The Americans, on the

other hand, were not terribly experienced with this sort

of phenomena, having sent troops overseas only reluctantly

in the 150-year history of the country. This is not to

say the Americans did not anticipate problems. They did -

and they were quick to learn and adapt. There were

several factors that influenced the U.S./British relations

in World War II, some reaching other theaters of operation

outside of Western Europe. However, both sides were keen

to minimize problems of relationships at whatever level

such relationships emerged.18

At the top, the Americans and the British enjoyed

cordial relations, but were wary of political intrigue and

submerged agenda. While it may be assumed easily enough








that U.S. leaders were unwilling to support British

efforts to maintain British imperial hegemony in various

parts of the world, this does not appear to be a national

goal. Although the preservation of the British Empire

took a distant back seat to other political and military

missions, there is little to suggest that the top U.S.

planners were very interested in upsetting whatever

balance may still exist after the war.19

Therefore, U.S./U.K. relations were not much affected

by vague anti-colonial philosophies at the top of the

Roosevelt government. One can, perhaps easily enough,

argue that it was in the U.S. interest to see a known and

reliable ally help maintain post-war stability that would

be along the line of the known pre-war structure.

Naturally, this was not a strongly articulated goal by any

member of government bowing to businessmen and populists.

British hegemony meant a British control of certain

markets and a loss of freedom for free international

trade. Although trade was in the national interest, other

issues around the world were not. To Americans of the late

1930s and early 1940s, the "white man's burden" was heavy

enough at home.20 So, all in all, the Washington power

structure had no real plans to aid the dismantling of









British power. That the British lost their empire after

the war and Americans rushed in to fill much of the void

was more a factor of British decisions, British domestic

pressures, colonial unrest and natural international

market tendencies. Aside from some issues of trade, there

were no political or economic reasons in 1941 to keep the

British at arm's length.21

Though some senior American officers seemed unaware

of the fact, in strategic aims of military operations, the

cards of both the Americans and the British were laying

pretty much face up. While the British emphasis on the

Mediterranean theater of operations was held with some

suspicion by American planners, the British had other than

the preservation of a post-war empire in their thoughts.

Both sides realized numerous factors weighed heavily on

British military decisions throughout the war, and these

factors were often at odds with the aims and strategies of

the Americans. But while some strain between the allies

was caused by adverse opinions regarding the aims,

strategies and conduct of the war, post-war aims were

roughly in congruence, that is, the maintenance of peace

and a minimum of international disturbance to trade.22










Therefore, the overall differences were minor enough.

The social, political, strategic, and psychological forces

that cause political leaders to gravitate to each other

were certainly in effect with the top U.S./U.K.

leadership. There were cases where U.S./U.K. factions

were split along other lines rather than national, with

the joint position of the leaders of the U.S. and U.K.

strategic bomber forces adverse to ground command

priorities prior to D-Day being an excellent example.23

There were far more reasons for the two nations to

cooperate than otherwise. The primary reason was the

sheer military necessity. On her own, Britain did not

have the resources to dislodge Hitler from Europe. Even

the current Russian successes were uncertain to be

permanent or decisive, if the U.S. decided to contain its

fight to the Pacific.24

Prior to 1942, Britain had little to show for its

military efforts other than to resist being overwhelmed.25

It could not launch offensive actions directly at the

Germans with the exception of aerial assault. British

efforts at the periphery of German military power were not

terribly encouraging. While Britain executed an

astounding retreat/evacuation at Dunkirk and a superbly







65

executed defense over her own skies, other operations seem

to meet with success against those enemy forces that were

not German.26

Britain did succeed brilliantly in sinking both

French and Italian navies, which, ironically, proved to

the Japanese such tactics were possible.27 Although the

British, heretofore, had proved it could defeat Italian

armies, they lost battle after battle to German troops

whenever ground was contested. Defeats in Norway, France,

Greece, Crete, and North Africa were striking examples.

The British Tommy knew his German counterpart and felt the

frustration of meeting a foe superior in both tactics and

training.28 While the pendulum did eventually swing the

other way, it was not until the power of the Soviet Union

and the United States were brought to bear. To the

British, it would have been wonderful to have handled the

task themselves, but since they could not, they clearly

had to make the best of the situation.29

The operation for the U.S. to ship, and the British

to accept, American troops and airmen for the purposes of

the invasion of Europe and its supporting activities was

titled "BOLERO." The Maurice Ravel piece was selected due










to its steady amplification or crescendo -- implying an

ever-increasing supply of American troops and supplies.30

However, despite the Army's visions, Churchill and

Roosevelt, while establishing the framework for an

expanding deployment, personally decided on little more

than the U.S. buildup of its bomber fleet and American

troops assuming the defense of Northern Ireland, thus

releasing British "Tommies" for deployment elsewhere.

Thus, BOLERO began with an uncertain rhythm.31

Churchill set policy; his field marshals carried them

out. Churchill was not blind to the manpower equation of

Allied versus Axis strength once America was in the war.

Save some massive strategic blunder, U.S. and U.S.S.R.

economic power would overwhelm the Axis military at some

future point in time. Churchill understood that

eventuality on the day Japanese bombs rained down on Oahu.

The question wasn't whether the Allies would win. It was

a question of the final effect of that inevitable victory.

To a patriot and politician with Churchill's vision, where

Britain stood after the war's dust cleared was critically

important.32 Britain could not afford the massive losses

of lives of more populous nations. It could not afford a

loss of perceived power and still hope to retain its










overseas possessions. And, for Churchill and his

political party to have any standing after the war,

success must be as painless as possible.33

There was, therefore, nothing in all that to

recommend a cross-channel invasion of France in 1942 or

even 1943.34 The nightmare of the ignominious retreat of

the British Expeditionary Force from France in 1940 was

enough of a reminder that any duplication of failure would

be a catastrophe of national and timeless proportions.

Victories build morale. Churchill appreciated that fact

of warfare and saw opportunities for victory in North

Africa, where extended supply lines for the Germans made

them vulnerable. The British strength was in its navy.

It could control the sea-lanes and supply its forces -- so

long as those forces were small facing similar numbers.

Churchill, again, understood such grand strategy and made

his thoughts clear to his marshals. The Americans, on the

other hand, knew that British foreign interests lay, in

part, in the Arab world and were, thus, a bit leery of

supporting British operations in that region.35

The Americans faced an extended war on two fronts,

with one adversary already demonstrating an ability to

strike effectively at U.S. possessions.36 U.S. forces were










committed from Iceland to Alaska, and from Northern

Ireland to Australia. Scurrying around the Mediterranean

after pockets of German and Italian troops seemed to

Americans to be a further dissipation of troops, going

against a premier doctrine of war: generals win when their

troops are massed at the point of attack.37 The Americans

felt a dissipation rather than a massing. The U.S.

generals deciding U.S. military and therefore geo-

political issues had deep-felt fundamental problems with

any leakage in troop concentration against the German

center.38

The British, though, were possessed by their demons

of military failures. They had a palatable fear of the

real possibility of the entire war being a Pyrric victory

with Britain collapsing on the field of conquest.39

Therefore, the British were as a Greek phalanx against

American opposition to a North African campaign in lieu of

a cross-channel invasion.40

Due to the inability of American generals to present

a coherent position in the face of British insistence on

North African diversion as the first step to Berlin, the

"TORCH" invasion of North Africa was agreed upon. The

British acquiesced to the overall command of General










Dwight Eisenhower for the North Africa campaign, but his

whole layer of deputies were British. The Americans were

to have, initially, a rough time in North Africa, but

eventually proved to be competent enough to help drive the

Germans out. The British, far more veteran at this point,

forgot their own long road to military competency and much

talk was made by the British soldier commented on the lack

of American ability. British feeling of martial

superiority was to be a recurring theme in many quarters

as the war progressed.41

On 20 February 1942, General Ira C. Eaker and six

officers arrived in Britain to begin the arduous task of

creating what was to become the "Mighty" Eighth Air

Force.42 Eaker arranged with his British counterparts to

assume the occupation of eight airfields, upon which the

British had begun construction.43

However, the Battle for Midway in the Pacific did

much to waylay the combat crews, with the first not

arriving until May 11. At that point, the British were

providing the chief supply and construction support, but

that would change.44 The British favored this gradual

approach, confident at this point for her own safety, and

reluctant to commit ground troops to an early cross-










channel invasion. Rather, the British pushed for, and

were eventually successful in opening U.S./British joint

operations against the European Axis powers in North

Africa, then in Italy.45

The U.S.-favored operation, titled "ROUNDUP," was a

1943 cross-channel concentrated invasion of France, rather

than parceling out American troops around the world. An

emergency plan, "SLEDGEHAMMER," was even drawn up to

deploy invasion troops as early as the autumn of 1942 in

the event the Eastern Front struggles between Germany and

Russia provided either an extraordinary opportunity or a

threat of a complete Russian disaster. Both evaporated in

favor of TORCH. So, in the end, the British prevailed, and

it was not until June 1944 that U.S./U.K./Canadian troops

finally crossed the English Channel as an invasion force.

That operation became known well to history as "OVERLORD."

By that time, much water traveled under the Anglo-American

bridge of relations.46

As soon as the initial American deployment began in

1942, two special BOLERO committees were formed to sort

out the various problems and issues inevitable with cross-

cultural logistics of any size. The requirements of the

various invasion plans meant BOLERO was a tricky affair.










Eventually, the quickly deployed combat troops were

followed up by the support functions, but SLEDGEHAMMER

meant the cutting edge had to be in place quickly. Since

air power was a critical aspect of SLEDGEHAMMER, U.S.

aircrews were a top priority, and to maintain active

aviation functions, maintenance assets and other support

services were required. Unfortunately, the conflicting

requirements resulted in patchy, confused logistics,

making life fairly miserable for Americans existing in

hastily constructed facilities.47

Further complicating matters was the rivalry between

General James E. Chaney, the man-in-place for the American

contingent, and the U.S.A.A.F. senior aviators headed by

Generals Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker. Chaney assumed the

U.S. Air Forces would operate under British "directions"

without its own headquarters function. To subordinate the

U.S. Air Forces to the British was an anathema to Arnold,

who resolved to tear the air arm away from the U.S. Army

once conditions favored such a move. A separate acting

U.S. air operation in Europe was central to that vision,

and Arnold would have nothing to do with British control

of U.S. air assets.48










Chaney lost this battle, and for him, the war was

over. He was relieved in mid-June 1942 and replaced by

General Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower's marching orders

were not to allow U.S. forces to be employed piecemeal

into allied armies. This General Pershing non-integration

doctrine of 1917 was to be carried through in 1942.

Eisenhower was a fortuitous choice for U.S./U.K.

relations. He was seen as "less nationalistic than ...

Eaker and Spaatz."49 Eisenhower established his policy

early. Eisenhower told his staff: "Gentlemen, we have

one chance and only one of winning this war and it is in

complete and unqualified partnership with the British...."50

While the U.S.A.A.F. commanders were very conscious

of needing British support and did well during the war in

obtaining it, the airmen stated their positions in stark

terms. Their agenda was clear: there could be no

appearance of subordinating U.S. Air Forces missions and

assets into any other organization or program if the air

arm was to make a post war case for independence from the

U.S. Army. In keeping with this aim, Ira Eaker allegedly

told an Army staff member, "I'll never take an order from

a Britisher," while Spaatz insisted that U.S. airmen "must









not be permitted to lose their identity through

integration into the British command system."51

Meanwhile, the British kept their own counsel

regarding the SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP schemes so long as

the Yanks did not do anything rash and kept the supplies

coming. Eventually, the gig was up and the British owned

up to the fact they were not keen in having a go at a

cross-channel invasion that would be ill-supported by the

Americans.52 Considering the BOLERO logistics, the British

had a point. The Americans attempted to bluff or

otherwise persuade the British that if no cross-channel

invasion were in the works, then the U.S. would pack up

its troops and deploy them in the Pacific. The British

were unimpressed by the ploy. The Americans gave in and

supported British plans for Mediterranean operations until

such time as a proper buildup of American forces meant a

more-impressive U.S./U.K. cross-channel showing.53

American polls showed a relative lack of support for

U.S. operations against Germany, as compared to what there

was against the Japanese.54 Even so, the U.S. leadership

had committed to a "Europe first" policy, and the British

intended to hold them to it -- so long as that policy

followed British guidelines.55










In terms of prestige and military leverage with its

ally, the TORCH invasion was a British high water mark.

The turnabout from earlier North African defeats provided

British planners the shot in the national psyche for which

they had hoped. A succession of British defeats in North

Africa and the Pacific did not leave them eager for a

debacle on the scale of the retreat at Dunkirk. British

morale called for British victories and North Africa was

a good place to start.56

When the U.S./U.K. invasion of Northwest Africa,

Operation TORCH, began in late 1942, even the Eighth Air

Force, along with its commander, Tooey Spaatz, fell victim

to losing resources to North Africa. The Eighth lost

25,000 men, 75 percent of its supplies, and some 1,000

aircraft to TORCH by June 1943. Also leaving was Brit-

friendly Eisenhower, who was described as possessing a

"talent for public relations and (a) passion about Anglo-

American harmony."57 Left behind was General Russell P.

"Scrappy" Hartle, a less-dynamic character who, it

appears, was given the caretaker position instead of a

battlefield command due to previous "mediocre

performance. "58









The TORCH operations and its effects deeply touched

Eighth Air Force operations. Of considerable importance

was the drainage of men, weapons, and supplies to support

the TORCH invasion. Ira Eaker, seeing his aviators and

assets heading south, complained: "It is a heart-breaking

business to see our bomber force going downhill instead of

uphill."59 What massing of bombers that may have occurred

without TORCH was soon a forgotten dream. The Eighth Air

Force, therefore, started slowly. Without a massed aerial

armada, results were difficult to judge. Any deficiencies

in operations could be attributed to a lack of proper mass

and the flexibility massive support provides. What also

may have occurred, though one can only speculate, is that

TORCH prevented a greater slaughter of Eighth Air Force

aviators as the P-51 and advances in B-17 armament were

still a year and a half way. Whether one can win an

argument that TORCH was worth the effort, Eighth Air Force

assets sent to TORCH, one can counter argue, may have been

better used there than ineffective thrusts against the

European Continent in 1942.60

Another byproduct of the TORCH diversions was a

slowing of the buildup of the human tsunami that was to

become Eighth Air Force personnel in East Anglia.61 While









the waves of Americans still overwhelmed Britain, TORCH

operations and the subsequent Sicily/Italy campaigns

relieved a bit of the pressure. One can only imagine the

effect of these troops spending two years in training for

D-Day on British soil.62

When senior U.S. officials and their British

counterparts convened in Casablanca in January 1943,

Churchill pushed for an invasion of Sicily, leading to an

Italian campaign. The Americans, once again, were not

pleased to see forces suctioned away from the cross-

channel invasion. However, American internal squabbling

left them presenting a less-than-united front to the calm,

pre-sorted British. "One might say we came, we listened

and we were conquered," lamented General Albert

Wedemeyer.63

Adding to the weakened American position was the

simple math of numbers of available forces. It would take

until D-Day 1944 before there were more American divisions

in place against the European Axis than that of the

British Empire. Odd as it may seem, there were more U.S.

Army troops in action, at the end of 1942, against the

Japanese than actively facing German and Italian troops.

That equation did not change until May 1943.64









Only at the Teheran Conference, after TORCH was

secured, with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin siding with the

American position, was Churchill brought to bay regarding

the setting of an invasion of France. The period set was

May 1944. Various logistical hang-ups would eventually

move that date to June 6 -- a day when weather tides and

the lunar cycle were ideal, at least enough.65

While ground actions impacted air operations

directly, they also affected all aspects of air force

activities. The ground operations dragged air assets for

an African excursion and then, prior to the Normandy

invasion in 1944, joined in swamping England with sheer

numbers of ground troops that led to direct competition

for supplies and other benefits. For a short period after

the end of TORCH and with the Army ground troops crawling

up the hard backbone of Italy supported by a separate air

force entity, the 15th Air Force, U.K.-based American

airmen saw their own numbers begin to increase. In the

period between May to December 1943, "the number of

operational heavy bomber groups...jumped from 16 to nearly

38."66 Included in the buildup were an additional 3,000

aircraft, operating out of 66 airbases by the end of 1943.

Adding to the congestion were 75,000 support personnel










sent over on "casual status," that is, as individuals

rather than in units. Plugged in wherever needed, these

soldiers-without-portfolio were ill-trained, ill-

disciplined, and a problem for American authorities.67

By the time of the D-Day invasion in mid-1944, U.S.

airmen saw their population percentage, vis a vis the

entire American contingent, decrease until only 28 percent

were U.S.A.A.F. personnel. Ground troops awaiting D-Day

constituted 40 percent, while support personnel rounded

out most of the remainder.68

When General Hartle outlived his usefulness he was

replaced by U.S.A.A.F.'s General Frank Andrews. A solid

leader with a sensitivity for Anglo-American relations,

Andrews spent much of his time assisting in the buildup of

the Eighth Air Force, during this time being the only "big

show" in Britain. However, in May 1943, Andrews may have

demonstrated the old adage about there never being "old,

bold pilots" when it appears he disregarded warnings about

poor weather in Iceland and flew into a mountain --

killing himself and his entire on-board staff.69

When Andrews was replaced by General Jacob Devers,

new programs between U.S. and U.K. troops were created.

However, Devers was not going to be the Supreme Commander









of the D-Day invasion, and, therefore, his power and

prestige were limited.70

The ebb and flow of ground troops meant the steady

population in Britain remained the support personnel,

usually a section of the Army prone to morale problems,

and the personnel of the U.S.A.A.F., with its ground

echelons living a totally benign existence compared to the

surreal war facing the aircrews with their lifestyle of

breakfast, war, and dinner.71

The bulk of Eighth Air Force units and its hundreds

of thousands of airmen were located in Norfolk and

Suffolk. "It was as if 130 airbases had been dropped down

in the state of Vermont," stated Reynolds.72 Indeed, in

Suffolk there was one G.I. for every six civilians. In

Wiltshire, located in Southwestern England, the ratio

began approaching one American to two Brits, reaching near

parity just before D-Day.73 Aside from the social strain

caused by the saturation of English soil by foreign

troops, there were logistic problems as well. Traffic

accidents probably were inevitable. When young men behind

the steering wheels of big trucks began to motor along on

narrow English lanes, driving on the left side of the road

rather than on the right as in North America, accidents










occurred, with 372 fatalities between June 1942 to March

1944.74

Accommodations for Eighth Air Force began with their

headquarters. To ease communications between the

airfields, the British air forces and the center of power

that was London, the Daws Hill Lodge near the R.A.F.

headquarters at High Wycombe, northwest of London, was

selected. The needs of the U.S.A.A.F. outweighed the

current occupiers of the lodge -- the Wycombe Abbey girls'

school. The school protested, but the British Defense

Regulations of the period permitted the government to

clear out the girls.75 The officers took over the offices;

the enlisted bunked in the student dormitories. It is a

common enough story that the young enlisted men began to

rouse the officers with a cacophony of message bells.

Puzzled, the officers tracked down the ringing. What they

discovered quickly became another in the lore of the U.S.

Air Force. In the dorms, above the push buttons for

message bells were the signs: "If Mistress is desired,

Ring Bell. ,"76

The concern of Britons for the welfare of their

American cousins was, perhaps, best exemplified by "a

flood" of offers for the Yanks to occupy their homes for










hospital beds. As it turned out, there was a need for

beds, but otherwise nothing the British infrastructure was

unable to handle.77

What was desperately needed to build up the Eighth

were airfields plenty of runways and support facilities.

Existing airfields were given over by the British, or the

Americans took over during British construction, or the

Yanks built the remainder themselves. Some 500 airfields

in total were built in Britain during World War II, using

enough concrete, one historian claimed, to build a three-

lane highway 4,000 miles long. At the height of the

construction flurry, in 1942, "a new airfield was being

started, on average, every three days."78

Not all Anglo-American relations regarding real

estate assets were congenial. Negotiations for a transit

hospital, where critically wounded would receive treatment

that could not wait for a regular hospital, came to an

impasse. The Americans had very specific requirements,

due to the nature of the hospital. Since it was a transit

hospital, it needed to be near a railhead and good roads

close to an English port, where casualties would be

expected to flow on D-Day. The British offered up

swampland and the like. The Americans, quite naturally,










were not keen to locate where transportation would bog

down. One suitable meadow meeting all the U.S.

requirements hit a snag when the farmer enlisted the help

of the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer worried that

the hospital would destroy the grazing ground for his 80

head of cattle. The British War Office offered up some

more swampland until the American colonel in charge of

negotiations made the point that he could not understand

the British preference for the fourscore of cows over

thousands of wounded Americans. Some weak reassurances of

an eventual agreement did not suit the indignant colonel,

who followed up with a warning that either the issue got

solved within 24 hours or U.S. authorities above his pay

grade would take the matter up with senior British

authorities. While the British took 23 of the 24 hours to

sort out the issue, the colonel got his pasture.79

Other American construction needs were given, to

British eyes, reasonable effort, but U.S. officials were

often enough put off by civilian contract work.80 Labor

shortages and poor workmanship added to the problems, as

did differing electrical currents and other variations

between U.S. and U.K. supplies and equipment. To the

Americans, the British just were not "can do" enough,










while the Americans, to the British eye, held to

excessively high standards. Add weather, plus mud, and

the accommodation situation became a real headache.81

In spite of labor and other construction woes, the

Americans and British coordination and cooperation at the

highest levels were forged by TORCH and would strengthen

as the war progressed. Deviations from that degree of

cooperation were more caused by individuals than by

disagreements over grand strategy.82



U.S./U.K. Civilian Leadership

While there are several biographies, and even Winston

Churchill's massive autobiography, worth accessing to

describe the civilian leadership of the war years, a

contemporary, popular mass media portrayal was provided by

Time magazine's "Man of the Year" feature. The Time

pieces are useful partly as a standardized comparison and

partly as commonly read portrayals. What they potentially

reveal is both the journalistic standard of the day and

the U.S. journalistic perception of the two leaders, at

least for the editors of one highly popular news weekly.

From 1940 through 1942, Time featured the three leaders of

the major allied powers as their "Man of the Year."









Churchill was featured in 1940, Franklin Roosevelt in

1941, and Joseph Stalin in 1942.83

Time's annual selection is generally based on the

individual who had the greatest impact on world events.

Thus, those whose impact was blatantly anti-social, such

as the 1938 selection of Adolph Hitler, still merited

consideration in 1940. Americans received Time's 1940

essay and tribute to Winston Churchill in language clearly

unabashed. Churchill, according to Time, was the right

man, at the right time leading a righteous cause.84

Churchill was a vital link between peacetime, and fretful

America and embattled Britain. According to Churchill

himself in a later comment, he was an ardent suitor of

America as if she were a reluctant, but very eligible

debutante.85 Born of an American mother and the heir of

one of Britain's leading families, Churchill was the ideal

image for Americans, and he rarely failed to enhance that

image through brilliant oratory and dramatic gestures.

Churchill, according to the article, was backed by a

nation of "small men." These men were simple, rough

around the edges, but resilient.86 To pick an American

equivalent to Time's characterization of the average

Briton, it would be the common Pittsburgh steelworker -









not the typical American image of Hollywood actor or

Western cowboy. And that was, perhaps, the strength of

the article. It downplayed the glamorous R.A.F. rake or

the haughty arrogance of the Regular Army brigadier. Time

reinforced an uncommon stereotype, the equanimus Britisher

whose resiliency was to be both admired and counted upon.

And if you were a steelworker from Clairton or Bethlehem,

or a miner from New Castle, Pennsylvania or the iron

shield of Minnesota, or even a Maine fisherman, you knew

this "typical" Englishman. You saw him every day in the

shaving mirror. Your kids called him "Dad." Thus, while

Churchill was larger than life, the people he governed

were like many Depression-era Americans. It was the right

imagery at the right time.8

Contrasting the Time 1940 article to 1941's reveals

some common points for comparison.88 In 1940, Churchill is

portrayed as multi-dimensional with a personal history,

a stacked-deck of talents and a leader representing people

of lesser abilities, but of plain and resolute character.

FDR, on the other hand, is only a sketch, noted more for

his pivotal role as the U.S. president than any personal

quality. Most of the article argued why others were

unworthy of the honor of Time's "Man of the Year" honor.









Only three paragraphs of the more than 25 paragraphs were

dedicated to Roosevelt and his contributions. Time's

selection was based, as it states rather bluntly in its

closing statement, on the opinion that "he was the man of

1941 because the country he leads stands for the hopes of

the world. "89

FDR's fellow countrymen were not mentioned as a

striking, stereotypical whole as was the case with Britons

in the 1940 article. While some Americans were portrayed

as blind to the signals of the onrushing tide of war, the

Chinese and Russian people were long-suffering, but

resolute in the face of evil enemies.90

One point is important to make here, though. The

following year, Time failed to renew the credentials of

Winston Churchill as "Man of the Year" largely, it said,

because "after more than two years of war under his

leadership, Britain was still losing campaigns." In

essence, Churchill the politician was a bit betrayed by

Churchill the defense minister.91

Because Winston Churchill served as both head of

government and as the defense minister for the United

Kingdom, he held a prominent role in U.S. military

relations with the British. Winston Churchill is,










perhaps, more an image of World War II than any other

person save, perhaps, Adolph Hitler. Roosevelt was

already in his third term by the time America entered the

war. Churchill's ascent to power was a result of the war,

and he fell from power just as the war waned.92

For the British, the tone and tempo, as well as the

direction, of the war came from its Prime Minister,

Winston Churchill. The British parliamentary system

allows for a far stronger and singular governmental

structure than is the case in America. Given certain

demographics, the party in power can remain in power for

quite a considerable length of time. The Prime Minister

also enjoys a number of luxuries the American president

does not have. First, the division of power that

Americans take for granted does not exist in Britain.

There is no separation between the legislative and

executive branches of national government. The judiciary

does not possess the judicial review powers of its

American counterpart, and the strongly divided roles

included in the federalism system of the U.S. is not

experienced in Great Britain.93 It is an oddity that the

American state of Florida enjoyed a far more independent

structure than the Kingdom of Scotland -- and even more so







88

than Wales. It has only been in the last year of the 20th

century that Scotland wrestled some semblance of

independence with the limited-powers parliament of its

own.

The Prime Minister did not even have to deal with the

time-consuming panoply of chief of state the U.S.

president faces. That ceremonial role is reserved for the

King or Queen.95 Thus, the Prime Minister was able to

operate in almost perfect autonomy under the cover of the

Royal Family.96

Other leaders, such as Neville Chamberlain, did not

possess the internal vision and energy to transform

political opportunity to political power the way Churchill

managed to do.97 For the purposes of this study,

Churchill's administration, spanning from 1940-1945, is

the only one considered. By the time he was unseated by

Atlee, Churchill's power had waxed, waned, and left an

indelible mark on the course of the war. His is the force

that guided his nation's military and civil fortunes as

probably no Western leader since Napoleon. Indeed, Stalin

chided Churchill that the British leader was, in fact, a

dictator.98









Churchill was the son of a British blueblood with a

glorious lineage that stretched back to the legendary John

Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, victor at the battle of

Blenheim against the forces of Louis XIV." Churchill's

mother was an American heiress who brought more charm than

money to the marriage. However, prior to a late '20s

visit to the States, Churchill had an animosity toward the

United States. But traveling the vast country and being

treated like royalty -- including making a killing in the

U.S. stock exchange -- changed his mind.100

Churchill spent quite a bit of energy in the years

leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor trying

to woo the U.S. into the fray. From the fall of France

until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in mid-1941,

Britain stood as the only major power actively opposed to

Nazi Germany. To the British, and their leader, the math

was chilling. Their small island nation had its resources

spread out throughout its colonial empire. Japanese saber

rattling and German submarine and surface raiders

threatened to cut Britain off from all potential help.

Sitting idle was the U.S. Navy, one of the world's largest

and most professional naval forces, as well as the world's

largest industrial base in America.101










Churchill traveled across the Atlantic to personally

meet with Roosevelt in the sheltered waters off the

Canadian coast.102 The British came with hat in hand and

left with no engagement commitment, but the United States

had begun a series of escalated moves to aid the British.

There were the famous destroyers for navy bases trade and

then the quasi-legal lend-lease scheme.103 In light of the

isolationist movement in the U.S., Roosevelt could not

overstep his authority to bring the U.S. into the war, so

he gave all support short of the war, even stationing U.S.

troops in Iceland and placing U.S. destroyers in harm's

way. Some of the destroyers fell afoul of German U-boats,

including the U.S.S. Reuben James.104

Despite the best efforts of Churchill, the Americans

would not bite. It would take the Japanese to push the

United States into the war. Once the Americans entered

the fray, the British attitude shifted. No longer

courting the Americans, Churchill now felt that the Yanks

were to be partners -- with the British leading the

dance. 105

Early U.S./British meetings found the Americans in

organizational disarray, with the British better prepared

to negotiate grand strategy.106 Churchill's relationship







91

with the Americans is worth a closer examination as it set

the tone for the entire U.K./U.S. relationship.

Churchill was a prodigious consumer of alcohol, and

Americans responsible for official publications and

documents, according to historian David Irving, were kind

enough to have purged any reference of this vice from

their pages. However, private observers were not so

circumspect in their own papers.107 Irving stated that

Churchill seemed indifferent to the effects of his actions

on the enemy and barely more sensitive to his own

people. Churchill displayed stereoscopic pictures of the

British firebombing of Dresden, which Irving

melodramatically compared to Hitler pinning "up color

photographs of Auschwitz or Buchenwald for visiting

celebrities."108 He was a famous orator, brightening drab

parliamentary debate and when sober, an exceptional,

inspiring speaker.109

Between the wars, Churchill's personal and political

fortunes ebbed and flowed, and when it was at its lowest,

friend Brendan Bracken landed him a 7,800-pound salary

job. Churchill would return Bracken the favor by making

him his Minister of Information, an appointment that would










have a huge impact on U.S./U.K. national and local

relations.110

Making a few more pounds, he wrote reviews for the

tabloid News of the World. He also earned a few dollars

from selling articles to an American publisher.111

As a 1930s outsider, Churchill took on the

government's lack of attention to air defense. His dire

predictions of national disaster due to German air forces

were grossly premature and may have helped to create an

atmosphere of undue fear of German prowess. This

exaggerated perception came to roost at Munich in 1939.112

After continuous miscues by Chamberlain, including the

Munich crisis, Churchill was selected to succeed him just

in time to watch France fall to the German onslaught.

Churchill would remain the Prime Minister for the next

five years, successfully integrating the Americans into

the British scheme for winning the war, but losing his

influence over events as the years wore on. But, in 1942,

when the Americans began to arrive in Britain in numbers,

Churchill's shadow loomed large over the entire Anglo-

American relationship.




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